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COMMENTS ON CIA "COORDINATION" PROCESSES WITH IAC AGENCIES

1. Present NSC directives require that CIA Reports and Estimates shall "be officially concurred in by the Intelligence Agencies or shall carry an agreed statement of substantial dissent."

2. Worked out in practical detail, this directive entails:

- a. Considerable paper work for all departments concerned;
- b. Extensive work over and above their normal duties on the part of IAC personnel; some extra work on the part of CIA personnel;
- c. A delay in the dissemination of CIA publications.

3. It is believed that the chief reasons advanced to justify inter-departmental coordination are:

- a. Coordinated reports are derived from all intelligence facilities in the Government; not merely those of CIA;
- b. Readers will have greater confidence in a report to which all Agencies have agreed;
- c. Agencies have an opportunity to enter a dissenting opinion on reports they believe might mislead the authorities to whom they are immediately responsible.

4. Reasons which might be offered in opposition to the coordination process as it has so far been worked out are:

- a. It is an unjustifiable waste of time for those affected by it;
- b. It often results in publication of reports after their time of greatest effectiveness;
- c. The appearance of dissenting opinions on intelligence estimates is more likely to confuse than to aid the person who is called on to make use of the estimates. (See appended discussion of this subject.)

5. From a broader point of view, the following objections might be raised:

- a. A CIA report does, in fact, make use of all the intelligence facilities of the Government in that every source of intelligence open to any US agency is open concurrently to CIA as well as the best intelligence personnel who are either in CIA or available through liaison with other agencies. (If the above points are not actually true at the present time, US intelligence is facing a most serious danger in the very withholding of information which played such a part in the Pearl Harbor disaster. If better personnel are in the Agencies and are needed in CIA, they should be transferred to it.)

~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

- 2 -

b. The very assumption that concurring opinions from the IAC Agencies lend weight to CIA reports denies the whole principle of a Central Intelligence Agency. The assumption presupposes that the IAC agencies and CIA are all equally autonomous. If this be actually the case, the way is open for interdepartmental jealousies, political maneuvering, and even, as indicated above, such serious infractions as withholding of information or falsifying intelligence to suit departmental interests. In short, if CIA is presumed to be actually the central intelligence agency of the US government, any estimates it publishes should be assumed, ipse facto, to be reliable and to be correct insofar as US intelligence can be correct; if not, the US is, as in 1941, without a central Agency for intelligence.

g. The coordination system tends to divide responsibility: CIA, theoretically at least, does not have to stand solely responsible for an estimate in which four other agencies have concurred. It would hardly seem wise from any point of view to allow the agency charged with the duty of furnishing national intelligence to evade responsibility for any national intelligence furnished. On the other hand, an IAC agency should not be called up to bear part of the responsibility for any faulty intelligence report published by CIA. As a corollary, it should be noted that CIA will probably develop the stature and maturity it should certainly have until or unless it is allowed to or forced to stand on its own feet.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

- 3 -

COMMENT ON DEPARTMENTAL DISSENTS WITH SELECTIONS FROM DISSENTING OPINIONS

A quick check indicates that the IAG Agencies have found it necessary to enter contrary opinions on about one fourth of 46 published ORE estimates. With two exceptions in each of which two agencies dissented, only one Agency has dissented on any single paper. The Department of State has been the most frequent dissenter.

The ten dissents referred to below are representative. It would be hard to show that any of them represents a direct and unavoidable disagreement with a major conclusion. One fails to see how any of the dissents could be helpful to a person using the studies for official purposes. Any of them might lead to confusion on his part.

The abstracts below are not, of course, conclusive but are intended to give at least the main tenor of the average dissent:

- a. ORE 10-48. "Consequences of Certain Courses of Action with Respect to Greece?" ARMY. "...does not agree with the general tone of extreme pessimism..."
- b. ORE 9-48. "Cuban Political Trends" STATE. "...the somewhat alarming tone of the summary is not justified."
- c. ORE 8-48. "Peron and the Argentine Congressional Elections" State. The paper leaves out an analysis of the Peronista party which is "central to such a study." (Whatever this ORE leaves out, its conclusion was that Peron would continue to cooperate with the US after the elections. This conclusion is not denied in the dissent.)
- d. ORE 6-48. "Consequences of Communist Accession to Power in Italy by Legal Means." NAVY. "...is not prepared to underwrite the detailed speculative predictions derived from the assumption...The situation presented by such an assumption...cannot be clearly charted." (The assumption was required of CIA by the NSC. Navy's position is that since no one can be sure what events will occur in the future, an intelligence estimate should not attempt to predict the probable consequences of a possible future event.)
- e. ORE 69. "Possible Consequences of Communist Control of Greece in the Absence of US Counteraction." STATE. Objects to the assumption that the US would take no counteraction and therefore finds it necessary to "disassociate itself from the paper." NAVY. "...does not consider it feasible to compound the lack of realism of the assumption...with a detailed forecast of events." (It is clearly pointed out in the paper that the assumption of no US counteraction was necessary because CIA "cannot prejudge the US reaction" to such an event as Communist control of Greece.)

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SECRET

f. ORE 65. "The Venezuelan Elections of 14 December 1947." ARMY. Believes Accion Democratica is not a non-Communist party as maintained by CIA, and that present Accion Democratica cooperation with the US represents "expediency." (The first part is a direct disagreement; the second points out what is almost always true of the actions of any political party.)

g. ORE 64. "The Current Situation in France." STATE. Believes the CIA view is "unbalanced", chiefly because the strategic importance of France is viewed from a military angle, ignoring such matters as France's cultural leadership. It then offers objections to miscellaneous details and calls the CIA view of the consequences of Communist domination of France "overly pessimistic."

h. ORE 9. "The Succession of Power in the USSR." STATE. Says that a group of men, rather than Molotov as suggested by CIA, will control the USSR after the death or disability of Stalin. Adds that if Stalin continues in office for some time, the balance of power in Soviet leadership may change, so that "any present prediction will require considerable future modification."

i. ORE 63. "The Current Situation in French North Africa." STATE. Dis-sents because it believes that the "cumulative effect" of the paper is to overemphasize Communist strength.

j. ORE 22-48. "Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action During 1948". AIR FORCE. ~~XX~~ "There is no reliable intelligence currently available to indicate that a Soviet-initiated war is likely within the forthcoming sixty days. ...an extension of this estimate to the end of 1948 is largely dependent upon the application of logic to the basic intelligence previously considered. The weakness in this process is that our Occidental approach to logic might well be diametrically opposed to that of the Oriental Russian mind."

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