

SECRET







IAC MEETING ON QUESTION OF STAFF COORDINATION

Minutes of Meeting
Held in Room 2519 "M" Building
On 5 October 1949, at 1000

Mr. Theodore Babbitt, Presiding

* * *

PRESENT

- Mr. Allan Evans.....Department of State
- Mr. W. E. Dunn.....Department of State
- Dr. Samuel McKee.....Department of the Army
- Col. R. E. Hommel, USMC.....Department of the Navy
- Mr.....Healy.....Department of the Navy
- Col. John Lovell.....Department of the Air Force
- Mr. Donald Benjamin.....Department of the Air Force
- Mr. .....Central Intelligence Agency
- Mr. .....Central Intelligence Agency
- Mr. .....Central Intelligence Agency
- Mr. .....Central Intelligence Agency
- Mr. .....Central Intelligence Agency
- Mr. .....Central Intelligence Agency

25X1A

SECRET

SECRET

IAC MEETING ON QUESTION OF STAFF COORDINATION

BABBITT: Gentlemen, this conference was called primarily to look into the procedures which now control the coordination process, to take a look at the machinery which has been going without any major, overall change for nearly a year and a half now in its present form, and which although functioning, produces bumps and squeaks of proportions that seem unnecessary, and we wanted to look into the matter and see if the procedures needed amending, and if so, along what lines.

As I said, it is primarily a question of the machinery, because it was thought that at this level (which is definitely, as far as coordination goes, the working level), matters of policy, such as those which are now before the Standing Committee of the IAC should not properly be brought up or discussed here, because this meeting would have no official standing in that regard.

The Department of State sent in a letter in August suggesting expanding Agenda Item Number 1, by subdividing it into two parts, as follows:

- "(a) The relaying to IAC Departments of requests within their assigned fields of substantive responsibility;
- (b) The arranging for departmental contributions to appropriate national intelligence papers."

It seemed to me that those suggested items were rather an expansion of Agenda Item 1., which is entitled:

- "1. Exchange of information on initiation of projects."

It gets into matters which are now, as a matter of fact, in one form or another, pending before the IAC Standing Committee, and I wonder if we could not stick to the original agenda rather than get into those matters which, it seems to me, are more IAC and CIA policy than matters of coordination mechanism, so to speak, under which we are now working.

EVANS: It is true, of course, that things are being taken up in a general way. I think they are pretty essential elements. There are other approaches which it might be more profitable to take up here, rather than something entirely new. I don't know whether there are any other members of the committee who are concerned on these matters or not.

BABBITT: It seemed to me that that was probably outside the competence of this conference, and it was certainly on a level which was not contemplated in the wording of the original agenda which was sent around. As I say, this was conceived of originally as a meeting to discuss machinery. I would prefer to

SECRET

SECRET

keep it at that level, if you have no violent objection.

EVANS: I think the other matters will be discussed in time.

BABBITT: Then if there is no objection, I should like to get into the agenda and discuss the first question: "1. The Exchange of information on initiation of projects." The procedures for the coordination process are set out in DCI/1 and DCI/2. In the past we have tried various forms for the exchange of information on the initiation of projects, (That is CIA projects, of course.) and there is no question about it, the situation remains, from our point of view, entirely unsatisfactory.

In the first place, let me say that we have never been successful in getting the information on projects in hand, or contemplated, from all of the agencies, such as is contained in our own Monthly Status Report. The exception is OIR. We have received their Status Reports, their reports of projects in hand; but we have never been successful in getting similar documents from any of the Military Agencies. I don't know why. No active efforts have been made in the last six months or so, so far as I am aware, but I should like to explore that question a bit. It is obvious that a true coordination of intelligence production is impossible unless there is a full and free interchange of information on projects in hand, or contemplated. I see no way of preventing a considerable measure of duplication if everybody is working in the dark. Duplication in the finished projects can probably be headed off, but at that there is implied a waste of time and effort.

Is there any reason why we can not exchange information on this basis? And mind you, I don't consider that the present exchange of the Monthly Status Report is fully satisfactory. Obviously you set out, either quarterly or monthly, your pious hopes for the production of the following period, and as we all know only too well, such programs are subject to interruptions by higher authority at every point, so that they are not the complete answer, of course. The exchange of those programs is not the complete answer to the question. At the same time, it would be of great assistance to us to know what line of work was contemplated in the various departmental Intelligence organizations.

For instance, is there anything published in A-2, Colonel Lovell?

LOVELL: A project system of the advance work we are going to do next month?

BABBITT: Yes.

LOVELL: Not as such. As we operate over there, a request for work comes in and it is passed to the proper section for action, and it is more or less on

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

a day to day basis. Some projects, of course, are long range in nature, and others are twenty-four hour jobs.

BABBITT: We all have that.

LOVELL: I don't believe we have the actual work program for the next month.

BABBITT: Is there one in ONI?

HOBMEL: Not to my knowledge.

BABBITT: In Army?

McKee: We have no list.

LOVELL: May I make a suggestion? It seems to me that the DCI could call for such a report, and that might result in it actually being required to plan such a program, and that would offer an opportunity then for some coordination.

McKee: Such a request was made some time back, and I am rather surprised to hear that the Army has not been sending you the list, because we agreed to do so. That is something I will look into.

25X1A

BABBITT: Yes, the request was made some time ago. [REDACTED] do you recall the approximate date of that? I am not sure how formal it was. Certainly we requested it from ORE.

25X1A

[REDACTED] I don't recall the date. It was approximately fifteen months ago.

CHILDS: The only one I saw was two years ago. It started before I got here.

BABBITT: I don't think it was ever followed up formally and officially.

25X1A

CHILDS: That was to find out what they were doing at the time.

[REDACTED] We did get some sort of a summary report from Air for a period of time. That stopped about six months ago, I believe.

25X1A

[REDACTED] It was something like six months ago.

[REDACTED] About six months ago the Air reports stopped coming to us.

BABBITT: Possibly we could revive the issue by asking the Director to make another request on the agencies. It is just that sort of thing for which I am exploring around. That is, whether these things exist and we are not getting them, or whether you don't have them, and whether you would find difficulties in producing them.

LOVELL: We would have difficulty in doing it, all right. If you can tell me what we have to do for the next 30 days, I would be most grateful, because then we could do some planning.

BABBITT: Obviously you can not fill up your schedule tight on any plan, because we all have to leave a good deal of leeway for the day to day spot requests.

LOVELL: Even an agency like JIG, which is a pretty cut and dried proposition,

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

which should know, comes through with these things which very often happen on a couple of days notice.

BABBITT: Yes, they are particularly at the mercy of the planners over there, who land on them with no warning at all, as I know, and then they pass it on, and we all suddenly get a three week's project to turn out in forty-eight hours. That, obviously, can not be cured by anything which this conference can do, although the situation certainly has been called to the attention of the planners before now, but without any particularly noticeable results.

LOVELL: As another approach to the problem, instead of getting a project production system -- how about getting a report on what has been done for the last 30 days and analyzing that report inter-agency wise to see what can be done to save labor in that fashion?

BABBITT: That at least would be a help. But the main point is to try to get some planning into the future, so that each of us will know what the others are doing, and if a request does come in for project 'A', we will know before we start anybody in on it if Air or Army or Navy or State has already got a project something like that, or on the general subject on the board, and a conference can be called to see just how far it goes. We can see if, by any chance, the project will fill our own requirement, or to what extent it will.

EVANS: The OIR report, which does not deserve to stand alone, I must confess is woefully incomplete. It shows the past month's work and a promise of what we think we are going to do. In other words, what we have under way on the first of the month. The fact that it may be interrupted half an hour later is understood. But it is at least a lick and a promise toward the future, and it is indispensable for planning. It is an indispensable item. I think even the summary of what has gone by would be important.

On the two parts to the thoughts you put out: One is the desirability of lists, and our confidence in the use of lists is shown by the fact that we have one. On the other hand, I think the thought you had that no list will do the job completely is fully fifty percent the problem, and it seems to me that this issue that is raised in point 1. possibly relates to point 2. where we get to the "working-level" coordination with analysts. But I don't think that the full and efficient exchange of information could ever occur on the basis of paper work. I don't think it can; I don't think it should; I don't think it will. And I feel very strongly that we should possibly spend a few minutes on the question of how, on the initiation of the projects, especially in the CIA which has the coordinating

SECRET

SECRET

responsibility, a process of permanent exchange of information can be developed -- the most rapid possible permanent exchange of information on proposed programs.

I think there is a certain vagueness of wording in our SOP, but the intent, it seems to me, is quite plain when you look at point b. under Number 3, (DCI 3/1), and that is that there will be consultation with the departments in the course of initiating a report -- not when the thing is initiated and under way and is a fixed and firm thing, but at the beginning: Why is it under way? What is it intended for? And that is the kind of information on which we can work to cooperate with the CIA, which is our aspect of the coordination. And I don't think that until we get more running about of people -- as somebody coming to me some day and saying, 'We are thinking of doing this. What have you got? What are you doing? What can be contributed to this thing?' Before we decide the thing can be done we ought to know what is being done, and we won't get it out of lists. There is no conceivable system, except the teletype, for instant transmitting around, and we don't have that. But I don't think even that would be satisfactory, but I think there has to be a great deal of running around. Coordination is one word. Coordination is running around. I don't know any other meaning to it. And it seems to me that that element in the thing, at the moment, is the one that so far as our experience goes is lacking.

BABBITT: That is it exactly. The question is divided into two things. What I meant by the inadequacies of our present means -- as you know, we tried various systems for spreading the word, so to speak, when we get a request. There is one factor which has always bothered us, and that is the factor of time. Unquestionably, running around is the way to do it. That takes two things: people and time. And some times we don't have either, and sometimes we have one, and sometimes we have the other.

LOVELL: That would be our principal objection. We don't have the people. We are turning out Staff Intelligence with just a little handful of people, and to try to run around and coordinate, and get improvement in our work, is literally impossible because of the pressure of production that is on us to satisfy our departmental requirements.

EVANS: I would answer that by saying that we have a great pressure of time and people, but we would not dream of doing a doing project which involves a minor element of coordination, without asking you for advice, without coming to you. We do that with Sam (McKee) Sam does that with us. With the well known straightened T/O's, nevertheless we do that kind of coordination. It occurs to me that coordination being the function of CIA, we must start with the format, (we have great

SECRET

SECRET

respect for the resources of CIA) and time is the inescapable factor. The use of the personnel that we send at the end, who take the time and get into their cars and go somewhere, and discuss the paper, and then they find they have to go and see the people involved anyway. I think that conversations at the beginning of a project would go far towards solving a great many of the problems that arise at the early stages. That is my firm conviction. It is lack of agreement on the basic principles on which the project is going to rest that causes a great deal of the trouble in the text later.

LOVELL: Has CIA ever considered the possibility of utilizing the project system of teams? That is a system developed by the Army during the war as a means of avoiding departmentalization, which is what we are talking about now -- putting people on project teams to answer specific problems. It was an Intelligence task force. People were called together to solve the problem, and the allocation of work was made by the chairman, and you got the men and the facilities of the participating branches into the thing right away. A person from the branch brought all of the material with him and participated to the point where you wrote draft paragraphs. If that could be done on an interdepartmental basis, and if CIA could get a couple of conferences over in the Pentagon, where most of us are located, we could participate directly in the projects with CIA.

BABBITT: That is a very good theory. Again, the question of time comes up. Here I would like to refer to some of the gentlemen who actually hold these conferences. It is extraordinarily difficult to set up a full interdepartmental conference at short notice, on any subject, at any level. And when we get these requests, we don't always have the time. In fact, we very frequently do not have the time to do that. That is why, in most cases, we have adopted the procedure of sending out the paper, as usually we get the requirement or the request and there is not a great deal of leeway in the terms of reference (that is not always the case, but usually it is). So that we have adopted the procedure of getting out a draft paper first, and calling the conference thereafter, so that there is something concrete on the table when the conference meets. It is largely a question of time, and of difficulty in assembling people at any one place.

EVANS: I think we will go astray if we get the concept of assembling people too much in our minds. I think the heart of the whole difficulty is the draft. I think we have touched a point which is very important in my mind. We seldom undertake a request for another agency without going to them. The terms of reference are set by the other agency, and the other agency is not always aware of what they are not expert in. We are expert in the subject and we can tell them

SECRET

SECRET

better than they know, what it is they want. I think the thought that we must take the terms of reference when they come to us is a most dangerous thought. I think that is one of the things that we find difficult. Here are the terms of reference, and the draft is made up, and you can not then get back to the root of the matter. I think that it is absolutely vital that we get back to the root, which is the requestor, and persuade him of the things he really is going to need when the job is through. We have had more and more success on that, and it is an indispensable principle.

That goes back to the time which is spent at the end, instead of the work being done before the first draft. I think the work should be done in the beginning; doing it later does not save you time. It is a dangerous procedure. Here is the kind of thing we keep running up against: Our boys are meeting at 11 o'clock this morning on a very rush thing. Time is of the essence. It is an illustration in this way -- you people are working away on a draft, and not until very late did we discover the exact nature of this thing. And we had a draft, and we had already been working on this problem. Now there will be two drafts. Why? Because there was not a proper handling of the thing at a very early stage.

My picture of it would be -- if somebody would come over to us: 'This is our problem. This is the ^{way} we are going at it. What can you contribute? Here is a draft, and use it if you can.' That, it seems to me in this instance would have saved a tremendous amount of time. That is going to happen not infrequently, because the lists are never going to be able to tell exactly. Today is the 5th of October, and we began that on the 1st, I think, and our list was published on the 30th of September, and this one that I speak of would not be in it. And yet there it is -- a perfectly good paper.

That is a perfect illustration, it seems to me, of the absolute necessity for the analysts of ORE to come to talk to us about the things we are going to undertake. In the Far Eastern area they do do that. In the other areas they don't do that.

DUNN: I might say that there is a good deal of friction as to who will see who.

EVANS: There are areas in ORE where there are analysts who will not get away from their desks and come to see us. They tell us so.

BABBITT: There are two sides to it. We have a different story in ORE, and I don't know who is right. The unquestioned fact is that there is friction. It is spotty.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

EVANS: The originator, or the coordinating people -- I would be inclined to recommend that the onus of the coordinating and the dashing about is on them. I think that would be a good principle. When we are the originator, we undertake the responsibility. If somebody else is the originator, then it is up to them to dash around the landscape and find out what the resources are.

BABBITT: I don't want to have it understood by anybody that we are claiming to be entirely without blame or fault, or anything else, in this business. I quite realize that there are definite shortcomings in the matter. I think most of these difficulties do come down to personalities, because you cited the Far East.

EVANS: Near East is the next best. Far East is perfect. They are ready for the papers when they come. In Latin America, I don't know what they know. In Western Europe, they know little. Far East is the perfect proof of the way it ought to work.

BABBITT: Eastern Europe has the 'Politburo', which results in at least a partial knowledge of what the others are doing. I am still not absolutely convinced, Allan, that the calling of a conference, or even the running around would solve the problem, because what we are up against is not just a question of going to OIR. In most cases we have got to consult the Pentagon people too. That takes time.

EVANS: Do the same people do both?

BABBITT: As a rule. It may or may not be the same ones.

LOVELL: We have more interviews with CIA than with any other agency.

McKEE: This kind of spontaneous coordination at the working level that you are talking about is essential, and in the long run it saves a great deal of time, and of course we just do it as a standing procedure with everybody, time permitting, of course, that when we are thinking about a project we start running around and talking to people at the working level, and we have no difficulty with that at all. It seems to me that that is the practice in most of the other agencies, except that occasionally -- I might say frequently, you have a CIA paper which would come over as a draft and there has been no previous intimation whatever that the paper is coming, or what will be the character of it. You were speaking before of how well it worked with the Far East. There was a paper which came over not so long ago on the Far East, which came over as a finished draft. There was no previous notice, and it took weeks before everybody was satisfied with the paper. It was pointed out at that time, that if there had been a meeting of the minds before the writing of the draft had begun, a great many of these difficulties would have been

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

avoided. Because if you are going to end up with certain conclusions, you point the paper all through toward those conclusions; and if somebody violently objects to some of the conclusions, the only thing you can do is just start again with a new paper, or come up with a compromise which really satisfies no one.

LOVELL: I would like to commend the way that some one in CIA came over informally with a draft, and talked to Army and Navy and Air, while the paper was in the draft stage, absolutely informally. And our analyst went over and called in an Air order of battle man, and they made the corrections in the draft stage, while it was still in the formulating process, with the result that when the paper came over to us for conference it was pretty clean from our standpoint. The result was that when the paper finally went through, it went through with a minimum of sharp-shooting.

BABBITT: There is no question about the desirability of the coordination 25X1A starting at the very earliest time. Our difficulties are in achieving that, and that is precisely the kind of thing I wanted to bring out at this meeting. [REDACTED] have you anything to contribute? After all, you are the people who run the mechanism here.

25X1A [REDACTED] On the subject of the desirability of the coordination?

BABBITT: The desirability and the practicability.

25X1A [REDACTED] The desirability has certainly been settled. I don't know about the practicability exactly, as a matter of really comparing papers and getting them in. The case that Col. Lovell spoke of seemed to work out very well, but in that case apparently your man had the time right then to look at the paper and to discuss the points. But there are also the times when the paper has to be left there for a couple of weeks in an other agency while it is being discussed. 25X1A

LOVELL: A draft was sent over, and I think it was [REDACTED] who came over a day or so later, and they got together, and in the meantime Weems* had had a chance to consult our other people, and we got a chance to suggest some constructive changes in it, so that when the first draft came out it already had our views in it, and our facts.

BABBITT: To go back to your point of running around, Allan. Our people have done that, and do do that in many cases. They go over and see the other person, who is up to his neck in something else, and who can not be expected to drop all of the rest of his work for what may be an hour, or an hour and a half with a CIA analyst, so we leave the paper over there for him to work on when he has a chance, and very often that chance just does not come for a long time.

* Phonetic

SECRET

SECRET

EVANS: There again you already have a paper in existence. My analysts are delighted to talk over the prospects of a paper that is of any importance at all. And I am perfectly certain that they will. If not, then I will issue instructions that they do so -- that they discuss with CIA analysts the prospects of a paper. You have again introduced the draft.

BABBITT: I have, because it simply has not worked out that way. We have not felt that we could go over and talk to your analysts about a project, or anything else. It just does not work that way. You can not expect them to drop everything.

EVANS: I expect them to.

BABBITT: They don't.

EVANS: World economic projects hit us from time to time, which have obviously taken months to do, which we have never heard of before. It seems to me that anybody who was complaining would come to me, as a general overall world initiator, and nobody has ever come to talk to me, except a certain few, on the initiation of any large overall subject. That is my own personal experience in the case. It is not done. I pointed that very sharply, as that seems to me to be a lack that we should experiment with, and have not. Of course there are short ones, but it is these great big things, especially in the Economic area -- very large economic reports which come and hit us out of the blue, with a short deadline. They are thick, and have no footnotes. But the basic thing is that we have not known about it from the beginning.

BABBITT: We have tried time and time again to do it, and I am quite frank -- I don't know the details of why we have been unable to get anywhere. And all I can say is that we will try again.

EVANS: I suggest, as a specific recommendation of action, that we get whoever it is -- the coordinating expert, or the planning expert -- I don't care what kind of an expert he is -- to work with the DRF and your people in the Far East and find out why it works there, and why the others do not. Let's have a study of the operation that goes on -- how a project that is initiated in the Far East works so well, and does not in the others.

BABBITT: That is a good concrete recommendation. We will follow that through certainly. Has anybody any comments on that -- why it works, and so on?

MCKEE: I would say it is largely a spirit of cooperation and willingness to talk over the problem with the other people. And also, willingness to take the time out, before plunging into the work itself. It is difficult to contact

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

the other agencies, one after the other, but if there is thought of a particular project, to hold preliminary meetings for the persons who are going to draft it, to get some idea of what the others are thinking about it, so he can take their thoughts into consideration, it would save a great deal of disagreement when the draft of the paper is ready.

BABBITT: It would, obviously.

McKEE: That should not take more than an hour. If, for instance, you ask the agency to have some qualified person at this meeting to discuss this subject for an hour, I think most of them would provide such a person for you, because they all recognize that it is better to do it that way, than to take literally days in wrangling over a final draft of it.

LOVELL: It is time that is obviously not lost. If we could establish a national intelligence project, I think it would cure all of these evils.

BABBITT: It would not cure all of them! But it comes back to the business of.....* We are working on that, by the way, Jack. Where is that intelligence project by the Far East? Again the Far East! What stage is it in?

25X1A

██████████ It is at the stage where a memo for the Director is in preparation. This is the first time it will be presented to him, with recommendations for action and sending around to the agencies for their interdepartmental coordination.

BABBITT: It is an Intelligence Production Plan. We are running a trial run on the Far East, but are in the course of working in other areas. On that line, Jack (Lovell), to try to get a general overall government intelligence production plan, a truly coordinated production plan.

LOVELL: You are right that when you get a representative of the originator of the project that lots of the fellows don't know what they want. They throw it up against the wall and hope you will answer something, but they don't know what they want. The next thing that happens is that they come back and want something along another line, and your work is duplicated, if not quadruplicated.

25X1A

██████████ I think it might be brought out that there have been instances of starting projects from nothing with a committee, particularly an ad hoc committee, that have not always produced very startlingly good results. They still took up a great deal of time, and didn't bring up a very clearly agreed upon paper.

BABBITT: None of these methods and means are going to be one hundred percent perfect. There is no question about that.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EVANS: I think there is a time for committees, and a time for other approaches by other ways. If we can recognize the principle here, that is all we can do at this point -- recognize the principle that information on the initiation of projects means information on a project, that a project will be initiated, and then leave it up to our junior persons to find the ways and means of implementing the principle. We can not go farther than the principle here.

BABBITT: That will be initiated. I think we have practically covered Number 2. on the agenda.

EVANS: I might introduce for the record that our Biographical Information people have a special feeling that they are relegated to the other end of the paper pipeline, when they would very much welcome much closer discussion of the biographical reports that they require. They had a very special feeling that we receive a lot of written requests, and they share my skepticism on written requests.

BABBITT: There is one point which I noted before. I would like to make the point again that our main difficulty in the matter of getting together at an early stage -- or perhaps what I am thinking of is after the production of the draft -- but certainly there we have run into this question of priorities, which incidentally underlies most of our coordination troubles when you really analyze it. Your people are working for your chiefs -- for the Intelligence chiefs of the department, naturally. They are busy. You have not got enough people. They are going to keep on working for them; it is their primary job. And when we come in with a CIA project, it is very difficult, and quite understandably (this is not a complaint but a statement of fact), to get the ear of the analyst at the time when you must get it, provided you have a deadline. There is no priority to CIA productions within the departments, short of the final, formal coordination meeting. And if a kind word for the CIA analysts could be spoken to your people early in the game, it would help our people to get into the habit of going over and trying to get it.

CHILDS: You can do that in your shop? (Remark made to Mr. Evans.)

EVANS: Yes, our people would love to get in on the early stages.

CHILDS: Would the rest of you do that too? Pass the word that if they want to take something over, to try and hold up for half an hour and talk with them.

BABBITT: When we have the final coordination, all right, we expect the people over, but by that time things have jelled to a very considerable degree.

EVANS: If they have agreed to the importance of the project, and cooperated in it from the very beginning, then they are under a moral obligation to continue. The difficulty comes when we are hit by these terrific great drafts. One report

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

that I have, the people spent 48 hours going over it -- a block of 48 hours on a draft -- because they had never seen it. It is not the information that underlies it -- and that is something we are going to meet resistance on. I will try to overcome the resistance. Certainly, all of our people are instructed to give you a high priority. It can not always be the first priority -- but a very high priority.

DUNN: That situation would not arise if there was coordination before the draft was started. The analysts would not have a leg to stand on. But they say, 'I never heard of this before, and here this thing is thrown at me in this finished form.' That is the trouble we find. It is pretty hard for us to do much on the paper if we don't like it from the factual or the deductive standpoint after it has all been jelled.

BABBITT: I see what you mean.

LOVELL: If we get in on the formulative stage and make suggestions as to what material should be included from which to make our deductions, I think we would be a hell of a lot happier. Lots of times these things are not obvious on the face of them, in the paper, and of course we don't always have the basis to determine, particularly on the political and economic lines.

EVANS: I think my contribution to this discussion, for you Ted (Babbitt), is that the complaints our analysts make are: 'I never saw this before. This is a big thing. It has come at me unexpected. How can I program for it?' That is the basis, that I regard as somewhat understandable, of our resistance. Of course we find some cantankerous people who we try to deal with on a personal basis.

BABBITT: We will certainly see if we can get a study of the Far East situation. If there is no further discussion, the next item is the matter of deadlines.

(3. Deadlines for comment and concurrence. Problems of IAC agencies in meeting deadlines.)

In most cases we can fix deadlines after consultation with the agencies. In some cases we can not. When we get a deadline given to us, that is that. We simply have to work back from that -- when we have to have the draft, and so forth. That is quite understandable. It is also understandable, in those cases, that the agencies may have difficulty in meeting the deadline. But the difficulty which I think we should be able to iron out more is that of a deadline fixed in consultation with the agencies on something that is not an urgent formal production, giving a matter of a month or two months for the production -- and then having that deadline not

SECRET

met. Is there any way, or anything we can do to avoid that? Obviously, your chiefs are not particularly concerned with deadlines set by CIA, or anybody else outside the agency, but it happens so often that I am wondering whether there is not some different procedure which we can adopt in the setting of deadlines to make them a little more realistic, so that we can count on them.

LOVELL: It seems to me, in our outfit, we are faced with a mass of deadlines. They are all the same. We get the hell skinned out of us if we miss any of them. On examination, some of them are important, and some of them are not. Some of them we could give a week on without hurting anybody. And in fact, in some cases, another agency gets an extension of say a week, and nobody else is informed, and everybody fusses on one thing to get it in on the deadline, when the other week could have been given. I think every effort should be made to give the working level all of the time possible. And again I point out that some deadlines are more important than others. For example, the one this morning is an important deadline that has to be met. If some indication of the importance of the deadline could be given, then we would know whether we have to work nights or not, because that is the problem.

RABBITT: What I am referring to is not the case where the deadline is the overriding factor, but at times it will come where the deadline is the controlling factor, and you work up to it and get in what you have been able to do.

LOVELL: There is no differentiation between that deadline and a planning deadline when it hits our place.

RABBITT: Take this big paper we are doing for the Army, an ID request -- Communist Tactics. We got that last spring, and the deadline was set originally for some time in August. That was postponed until 1 September, and then 15 September, and then 1 October, and I understand that it is now 15 October. However, there is no particular rush about that paper, as far as I know, although at some point the Army is going to say, 'Listen, we are expecting to have this to use. How about it?' And we have got to get it out some time. But, now those deadlines, I think, were fixed after consultation, and yet they didn't stick. What is the answer?

DUNN: I think much of the deadline trouble goes back to the coordination concept of the paper.

RABBITT: This was, most thoroughly. It is white as the driven snow!

DUNN: Most of the trouble is that the analyst has an alibi because he has not known about it in the beginning. He says, 'I have to take my time on this' -- particularly on the SR's.

SECRET

BABBITT: The SR's are a problem in themselves. I am hoping that they won't last much longer, as such. On this particular paper, that was a definite, fully coordinated at its inception -- allocation of work was made with the full knowledge and consent of all -- and still we don't get the paper.

EVANS: The trouble is that it was not made with the knowledge and consent of Joe Stalin! Some of the people, as have yours, have been on things relating to more important things. The priority problem is with us all, internally, externally. My boss is most urgent that we meet their deadlines, but then there is always a loophole -- providing you do something else. That is inevitable. Just as you have to do too. You have to postpone your papers sometimes too.

McKEE: On the deadline for a paper that takes a long time to do, you reconsider the priority as time goes on.

BABBITT: I take it that there is not much we can do about the deadline problem. I did want to bring it up to see if we have been overlooking something, or whether you were possibly able to improve that situation. It is certainly not one of our major problems, although it is one that is a source of constant sniffling, with the irritations that go with them.

McKEE: As Lovell cited, it would be very much appreciated if the people on the working level ^{could} spend as much time as possible. Occasionally a project comes over, and what they grumble at is the very short deadline of a few days, and then you find later that that project is still kicking around weeks later. And they feel, 'If that time could have been taken on it, why could not we have been given a little more time?'

BABBITT: Yes, that, I think would bring us very nicely into the next two points, because we have found in our shop that the actual production of a draft is really the quickest part of the whole problem, and thereafter, just on the mechanical end of it, you have the problem of reproduction. It may be stuck in our printing place for far longer than it has taken the analysts to work out a draft. That is one problem.

Another thing is the question of concurrences -- formal and otherwise. After conferences a draft is produced, and agreement is reached at the working level. The amended draft is then circulated for formal concurrences, or dissent, or comment, and that is when we begin to bump into difficulties. Obviously, the ideal solution would be to have all of the Intelligence chiefs sitting around at the coordination conference, and have them all initial the paper, but of course, unfortunately, they don't feel they have the time to spare for that sort of thing.

SECRET

SECRET

They have other things to do, after all. But, the authority of the person who attends the conference to speak for his department -- and I don't mean finally -- to initial the concurrence and to be acquainted with the general thinking, at least, of the Intelligence chief who is going to sign the concurrence or dissent, is a factor which causes infinite difficulties and delays. Is there anything that could be done to increase the authority of the representatives so that they are representative of something other than themselves and their own personal opinion as to the validity or lack of validity of the paper? In other words, a coordination conference between people who do not speak for their departments or agencies is a complete waste of time. Is there any way in which CIA can get around the table with the people who are going to tell the general or the admiral, 'This is valid in our opinion. We recommend concurrence, or we recommend dissent.' So that the time of that final conference or series of conferences -- which very often happens -- is not a complete waste of time.

DUNN: I think that goes back to the question of deadlines also, because there is a temptation to send some substitute to a meeting, because the person who really knows is working on something else. There is always that temptation to send someone to pinch-hit -- someone who does not really know the problem. That happens at times.

BABBITT: Is there any way to get around that? That is a waste of time.

DUNN: It is a question of deadlines -- saying, 'This gets first priority when it comes up.'

BABBITT: That is a fact we have got to face. We have had a lot of trouble recently. It seems to be increasing. We have had numerous examples recently of getting complete agreement on a final draft at the working level, of all hands saying, 'This is fine.' There is one case I am thinking of -- that China paper. We got two dissents thereafter -- one from the Air Force, and one from the Navy -- which struck us as a complete surprise.

HAMMEL: That was 72?

BABBITT: That was another one. That had been going for a year. But we got two dissents out of it, and obviously there is something wrong with the machinery if that can occur. The people who come from the agencies, particularly from the military, are not authorized to speak finally for the Intelligence chief. But is it too much to ask that they inform themselves, in some way or other, about the general thinking of their chief on this matter before they come?

McKEE: I can only speak for the Army, but in most instances the persons who

SECRET¹⁶ -

who attend the conference are the ones whose opinions could carry practically the final weight on that paper.

BABBITT: That is what we have hoped for.

MOORE: Once or twice they have contended that in the final revision of the draft -- they will have a conference, and everybody will agree as to what the changes will be, and then when the final copy comes over for concurrence or dissent, something new is in it, and they say it has been changed in such a way that it gives the subject a new slant, and that that is the basis for their dissent. I can not give you a specific instance of that, but I have heard them say that that is occasionally the case. And then a howl goes up that Army has agreed to this paper in its final draft and then dissents on the final paper. But they say that something has crept into the final paper which was not previously considered.

EVANS: I agree with him on that. We have the same comment from our people. One is the relationship of the final paper to what has been agreed -- and editing and re-writing is a difficult thing, and everybody can understand that that will happen. There are two aspects. On the other hand, we have this problem, which probably relates to the problem in the Services, that most times we coordinate our thinking within the department with other authorities outside the Intelligence area, because we sometimes consult with people in seeing whether this touches on their interests, and so on. We try to do anything of that kind, to get any opinions and suggestions, ahead of time. But there will be times occasionally when one can control ones own points but in dealing with some other elements of the Department we don't have quite the same freedom. That is one reason. If you have more than one element of a Department involved, more than one element of your organization, then you have a cause of possible subsequent disagreement. We may be told something by somebody outside that we were not aware of before, which will somewhat modify the opinion. That, I think, are the two aspects of this problem, and it involves being more careful within your own department before you come to the meeting. And it involves great care in re-drafting after the meeting.

DUNN: There is also one little angle that our analysts complain about -- there are not many cases, but I can cite one that I know -- where the changes have been agreed upon, and then when the final draft comes over that change has not been made, and that causes a lot of trouble. It may be an honest misunderstanding of what was agreed upon, and no minutes of the meeting being kept, and it is a question of a difference of opinion. That happened in the SR for Portugal.

25X1A

██████████ You will remember that it was seven weeks after the meeting that that was made. We are going to try to record that. There was certainly no intention

SECRET

of changing anything. We go out of our way to let everybody know what we do.

BABBITT: That is the exception. It is obvious that if the paper which comes around after the meeting does not represent accurately what was agreed upon, that the fault is right here in ORE.

DUNN: That complaint has been made a number of times.

BABBITT: Beyond that is the fact that in your case the Geographic desks get a crack at it later, and in the case of the Service Agencies the chief is the man who injects the policy, if any, into it. And what I am trying to explore is the possibility of a more intimate knowledge on the part of the agency representatives, of the thinking of the people who will eventually pass on this, because otherwise, what good is all of this time spent in conferences? It does not reach the level at which the decision is going to be made. Is there any way in which we could cut down the distance between the coordinating representative and the final authority?

HOMMEL: That might vary within each organization. In ONI we have the so-called staff, of which I am a member, and we get all of the ORE's and SR's in our office and we sent them to the various geographic desks. That is where the coordination begins -- right in our staff. I know that the Far East Section has close coordination with our Far East Section, but I have never seen anyone from the Far East Section from CIA in our staff office. There have been other members of CIA come over on various larger projects.

BABBITT: Is that our fault?

HOMMEL: No.

BABBITT: Are we applying to the wrong office originally?

HOMMEL: It might be better if you applied to our office, I think. We pass on the recommendation that goes to the Admiral. He may not take it, of course.

BABBITT: You are the people we want to get at. It is your opinion that we want around the table at the final draft conferences --- whose office is that?

HOMMEL: Captain Frost's office.

BABBITT: Don't we normally go through his office?

25X1A [REDACTED] If Colonel Hommel is talking about pre-coordination, I don't think that has ever been thought of. They go to the people on the area desks. If that should be changed --

HOMMEL: I don't think we could be the coordinators for the desks, because the desk is the one who has the information, but we are on the higher echelon

SECRET

SECRET

and would like to know what is going on, and would like to know about the fact that you are at the desks on some project, and perhaps whether we think the Admiral's thinking could be injected in it, immediately. It might do away with your coordination meeting -- it might.

BABBITT: I think that would have to be continued anyway. It seems to me that this would indicate that a series of individual conferences with the agencies might be set up to see in what way we can improve this process. Do you think that would be a good idea?

MCKEE: I think that would be an excellent idea.

BABBITT: In the past we have run into some problems in ID. I remember one famous paper on Greece that got completely reversed, much to the astonishment even of your analysts.

MCKEE: You do run into personnel situations which are difficult to handle in any organization, but normally, as I said before, we try to have the person who represents ID be the one who attends -- that is the one who usually shapes ID's opinions on such matters.

BABBITT: That is what we are after. What about the Air Force setup on that?

BENJAMIN: We have taken this business of concurrences and dissents pretty much to heart, and we are trying to work out something now, within our own organization. I believe that your suggestion of somebody over here contacting our agency would help immensely on that.

25X1A BABBITT: Good. Will you set that up [REDACTED] We will find out about that. Certainly I think it looks as though individual conferences would be much more productive than the general discussion here. But it is a problem which we have got to lick some way, because a coordination meeting where nobody represents anything or anybody is no coordination meeting at all. Probably a very pleasant and instructive session, but it is not getting us any further in the coordination of the paper. As I said, the ideal would be to have the Admiral here, and the two Generals, and the Director of CIA, but --

EVANS: On that, I think some times there is a little lapse in the actual writing of a dissent, with unfortunate results, because they are, of course, very closely drawn.

BABBITT: If we get it in time. The whole question of policy control of Intelligence is one which again I don't think it is proper for this conference to take up, but which is bothering us. On the evaluation of coordination

SECRET

SECRET

meetings (No. 5 on Agenda), by which I mean the final conferences, the result of which will be the draft which is sent around for formal concurrence or dissent -- what is the opinion of the gentlemen present about the value of those conferences? Could they be eliminated? Could the draft be circulated for return with written comments, or is there a definite value in the conferences? We are inclined to think that there is, and that they should be retained, not as optional but as a required part of the coordination process.

EVANS: You are talking about the final conference.
written

BABBITT: Yes. If comments are sent in, they may, or may not, be incorporated in the text. Suppose they are. That would require a revision of the text, and a re-circulation, with the consequent delays. Whereas around the conference table, if the Air Force has a suggestion and a paragraph is modified in the presence of the other agencies, then the result is agreed on, or not, as the case may be, or at least it is known to all of the others, and it seems a much better way of handling the thing. But I would like your opinions on that.

MCKEE: The value varies. Some of them are considered very profitable. Some of them -- putting it bluntly -- are considered a waste of time. Frequently there are ones where there is very little difference of opinion. They get together, time is consumed, and afterwards there is a feeling of nothing having been accomplished, largely because nothing had to be accomplished.

BABBITT: Is there any way of being sure that that would be the case before the conference would be called? In other words, would you be willing to let us be the judge of the necessity of calling the final conference?

EVANS: Before the final text comes out for concurrence? You would be willing to do that? I think it would be entirely on your head, but I think it is a judgment you could make.

BABBITT: If you put it in such an ominous way, I think we would call a conference every time!

EVANS: I think you could judge out some of the papers, and decide, 'We will send the final draft out to the individual agencies.'

BABBITT: As the directive now stands, we are required to call a conference.

25X1A

██████████ If there is a difference of opinion.

EVANS: Change it to 'a substantive difference of opinion.'

25X1A

██████████ The trouble is that we might try to make a judgment as to what will happen -- for instance, my office was informed a while ago that there was positively no comment on a certain thing, that everything was in substantial consort,

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

and we sent it out, and all of the comments came back, and we had to have a meeting anyway.

BABBITT: That happens if we judge wrong.

25X1A

[REDACTED] It is very hard to guess right.

EVANS: I, for one, am willing to leave that.

BENJAMIN: We find the conferences very valuable. As Dr. McKee says, a few are a waste of time. But even in the few that we feel are a waste of time, there is often some difference of opinion settled right there. I think a good example is the SR - 20, on Germany — a good example of where a conference possible would help out, rather than sending it out in sections and doing comments on each section, possible a conference on the whole thing could be held.

25X1A

[REDACTED] We plan to have one.

DUNN: That is a case where the appendices came first.

BABBITT: The consensus of opinion seems to be that the conference has sufficient value to be retained, except in exceptional cases. And it would not be taken amiss, if in certain cases we sent the paper around without calling the conference. But that as a general thing the conference should be retained. I am inclined to agree with that. How would you feel if we left in the requirement for a conference, but did not expect the attendance of any agency which was satisfied with the paper substantially as sent around? If we did that, we would have to add the corollary, I think, that no subsequent comment could be sent in unless major changes were made — substantial changes, or something like that. Would any of you be willing to accept that, with the understanding that if you don't show up at the conference you would neither concur nor dissent, but simply have no comment?

MCKEE: There is a risk there.

BABBITT: I am trying to get this in for papers which really do not concern one or the other agency.

MCKEE: There is a risk. You might be willing to accept the paper in its present form, but if you stay away from the conference the paper might be changed, so that then when it comes in its final form it is not the one you are willing to accept; whereas, if you think you have agreement all around, and that there is very little change that anybody is going to object to in its final form, then you don't have the risk of the change being made at the conference not attended by someone. It seems to me much better, if you think you have general agreement, to take a chance on the conference, with the understanding that we are committed to make

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

comments at all.

BABBITT: This was brought up, Allan, by the fact that your people rather objected to some conferences on some papers recently.

DUNN: It varies, very often.

BABBITT: I think we told them that we would have the conference, but 'we are not going to send the sheriff over to get you'. But, they came.

EVANS: I think they should.

DUNN: You will find many of these difficulties disappearing if you change the procedure from the start.

EVANS: The conference is not much good if it does not have the power to change the paper, and if the paper is going to be changed everybody had ought to be there.

BABBITT: On the agenda, Number 5. (b) and (c).

(5. Evaluation of coordination meetings.

(a) Should they be optional?

(b) Why is there still extensive editing in spite of previous coordination?

(c) Why is there sometimes dissent in final concurrence although basic differences appear to be reconciled at the meeting?)

'Extensive editing' does not refer to our shop, but to the comments.

EVANS: There is a point that has been raised at a recent conference, (which comes under the heading of (b)), which I thought we might air briefly, and that is the fact that people who come to the conferences from the department, who have different ideas, should bring those ideas in formulated form, in writing, that can be stuffed into the paper. This, presumably, is the working level -- the rewrite conference rather than the final concurrence conference. But our idea is that whoever it is that is actually doing the drafting takes the ideas and continues to do the drafting. If that principle is to be changed, I think we might have a moments talk on that subject. This was stated as a very definite principle of a very recent conference. It happened to be a girl who came, and she was told 'you are supposed to bring this all in writing -- drafted as a contribution to the draft'. We are glad to make contributions under some circumstances, but I think that is not the right one. The conference is held to bring people's ideas together, and the draft is changed, presumably, by the drafter.

BABBITT: Was that something particular?

EVANS: It was on France.

25X1A [REDACTED] I think the general idea was that the comments as made seemed so vague that they would be hard to incorporate in the text. That was my understanding

SECRET

SECRET

of it. The thought probably was that if her ideas had been written out, perhaps they would have been more specific and easier to handle.

EVANS: There is no such general principle then?

BABBITT: No.

DUNN: The analyst understood that that material should be rewritten so it would be in final form. She got that idea.

██████████ I think she misunderstood.

BABBITT: Nobody has suggested that principle, to my knowledge.

EVANS: That clears that up. It is useful to mention these things to solve the difficulties we do face from time to time.

BABBITT: Now, item 6 on the agenda.

"6. Considerations of the function of coordination.

(a) Distinction between corrections due to differences in style or personal taste and those due to differences on substantial matters.

(b) Definition of "substantial dissent."

This is one on which we feel rather deeply at times -- the distinction between corrections due to differences in style or personal taste, and those due to differences on substantial matters. And the definition of "substantial dissent".

Now one might take a minute to detail something which I do not think will come as anything very new to any of you, but I would like to repeat it. That is, that when we in ORE make up a draft, and it is submitted for conference, and modified, and the final draft is sent out, it is after all, submitted to you as a CIA paper. It has been done in CIA by CIA analysts. And what they want to know is whether or not you find anything in that paper so alien to the thoughts of your chiefs that you can not concur in the conclusions. That is not limited to the conclusions, but in that paper as written. That is really what we mean by "substantial dissent". It is very easy for the other analyst to look at the paper and read it over, and to say to himself, either consciously or unconsciously, 'I could have done a much better paper'. Or, 'This is not the paper we would have put out. Therefore we will tell them how it should have been done.' That is not much of an exaggeration. We get a great many comments which can be boiled down to saying, 'We would have done this paper differently if we had been doing it in our shop.' That may be true, that you could have done it better. That is still not the question at issue, though. Is it so far off that you can not say that you concur in it? That is the idea. Not this -- Would you have preferred to have the order shifted, or the emphasis a little different, or to bring in this matter, or to omit certain matters. It is a CIA paper. It is not an agency paper.

SECRET

If that could be kept in mind more, I think a great deal of time, and certainly friction, could be avoided. We send these thing out, finally, for one of three things: concurrence, concurrence with comment, or dissent. At that point we are not asking for a criticism of the paper other than in those fundamental ways.

And we get an amazing number of so-called dissents, in the first place, which are not really "substantial dissents". They are expressions of thoughts on how the paper might have been written otherwise. To say nothing of the still all too common submission of concurrences 'subject to the following comments.' The conditional concurrence, which is no good, because look at what we would have to do -- if we accepted your comments, and they were incorporated into the paper, we would then have a different paper which again would have to be circulated, and somebody else concurring in the first paper might not like the additions.

EVANS: You get such a comment at the final stage?

BABBITT: At the final stage.

DUNN: That is never sent over as far as we are concerned, in an official way -- sent over informally?

BABBITT: I beg your pardon -- with the signatures of Major Generals and Rear Admirals -- exactly in that way. 'Concur subject to the following.'

MCKEE: The Army does that?

BABBITT: I don't think the Army. I was thinking of General Cabell, and McDonald before him.

MCKEE: A dissent has to run a really severe gauntlet. A concurrence can slip out much more easily, and so can comments. There is a feeling that a dissent should only be based upon disagreement on some major matter of fact or opinion which seems to be contrary to the interest of the Army. In other words, it is possible for us to concur in a paper and at the same time think it is a perfectly terrible paper.

BABBITT: That is right. It should be.

EVANS: I pass over the interesting question of: Why, if the paper could be written better in another agency that it is not. That is for higher authorities to discuss. But we too sympathize very deeply with the CIA situation, and we too, as in the Army, check our dissents very carefully. You may not always think so, but we do. Let me put the other side -- again not as a criticism, but to present the facts of the matter. The analysts are constantly coming to me and saying, 'What does a concurrence mean? It means that we become partly responsible for

SECRET

SECRET

this paper.'

BABBITT: No!

EVANS: No? You can not escape that.

BABBITT: I deny that.

DUNN: The policy people in State thing so.

BABBITT: It is CIA's paper. You are not responsible for it. If you concur, you see in it nothing which contravenes the conclusions which you might have given.

EVANS: We concur in something, which is read by our policy people in the State Department, and they say, "You agree with that statement!"

BABBITT: Your policy officers?

EVANS: Yes, that is where the paper goes. Out comes a CIA paper that does not agree, and they say, 'Look, you come and say this, and now comes a CIA paper'* (Panamanian paper)

BABBITT: I would think that calls for a dissent.

MCKEE: If it seems to be something of major importance. If it is just a trivial, you probably would not dissent on it, and of course you have to decide whether it is a trivial or a matter of importance. Of course the Patagonian desk might think it is a matter of importance.

BABBITT: That is all right; then that is a dissent.

DUNN: Concurrence is not defined. If you had a statement on concurrence -- very few readers know what it means. They read a lot more into it.

BABBITT: Let's take a shot at getting an agreed definition of concurrence.

DUNN: A specialist in a certain thing might say the paper is very amateurish and should not have been put out at all, and yet they feel they have to concur on it. Another analyst might have a more sympathetic view.

BABBITT: I don't think that is grounds for dissent.

DUNN: That is what you are up against.

BABBITT: I think it perfectly possible for you all to concur in a CIA paper which you regard as lousy, but which does not contravene any conclusions or opinions.

DUNN: I believe if you will put a definition of 'concurrence' in the paper you will get around that.

EVANS: Maybe we should concur only in the conclusions of these papers.

DUNN: Nobody knows what it means; everybody reads something different into it.

* Could not understand speaker - 25 -

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

MCKEE: I think what you concur in are the facts of the opinions in the paper. If you don't, then you have grounds for substantial dissent. If you think the facts, or the reasoning is wrong, you have reason for dissent.

25X1A [REDACTED] There is a definition in DCI/2.

DUNN: But not in each paper.

EVANS: It is known only to us, and not to the readers.

25X1A BABBITT: I don't think this is a good one. (One in DCI)

[REDACTED] It is the official one.

BABBITT: "When there is no disagreement with the paper, and no comments felt to be of sufficient importance for formal submission, a simple concurrence should be returned. Such a statement may be limited to the aspects of the paper pertinent to the special interests of the Intelligence organizations concerned".

That is the definition. I think there is a great deal of logic to the idea that the Navy should dissent on naval matters rather than on political or economic, and so on; and that State should not dissent on purely military matters on which the military agencies are in concurrence.

EVANS: Have we had trouble on that?

BABBITT: On one.

EVANS: That has been a minor cause for trouble?

BABBITT: Yes, but it is there. As a matter of fact, Navy, that is, Admiral Inglis is very apt to dissent on political matters.

HOMMEL: We feel that we have an interest in the whole paper.

BABBITT: That is a point of view we don't share. It seems to me there is a certain amount of logic in restricting the departmental comments to the interests of the department.

MCKEE: It is awfully hard to separate political affairs. As you know, we have a form in which we say that we are commenting only on the subjects of interest to the Army, and therefore we usually shy away from the political and economic matters. But once in a while we may spot something which may seem to us to affect the Army and we will discuss it.

BABBITT: Certainly. Nobody could say that the political matters and the economic matters do not affect the Army or the Navy or the Air Force. They most certainly do.

BANJAMIN: If we can not resolve this definition of concurrence here, when your representative comes around to the different agencies, particularly to ours, that subject could be discussed along with the subject of the representatives who come over here. I think that would be of value to us also.

SECRET - 26 -

SECRET

BABBITT: Certainly -- an agreed definition. I don't think we need to call an ad hoc committee for the purpose ^{of} defining 'concurrence'.

EVANS: I hope not!

BABBITT: But we will see what we can get in the way of a new definition.

MACKEE: Do you think, also, that that there should be no resentment by CIA whatsoever, if there is a dissent? Some of the analysts have gotten the opinion that CIA objects strenuously to a dissent.

BABBITT: We do not,

MACKEE: We feel that it is something like a minority opinion on a discussion. It is just that the reader can take the dissent into consideration.

BABBITT: We do all we can to avoid dissents in the coordination process. We try to iron out the difficulties and the differences of opinion, but most certainly we are not going to succeed in every case. We have your opinion and you have yours, and when those clash, most certainly there should be a published statement of dissent. Where the irritation comes in ORE is in these cases where agreement has been achieved around the table, and then a week or so later comes an official dissent. That most certainly annoys us, because we have done all that we can to iron it out, but we have not gotten to the people who are making the final recommendation to the chief.

DUNN: How does it happen that in the case of the SR on Portugal, at the final meeting certain changes were agreed upon, according to our analyst, and when the final draft came over those changes had not been made? While they agreed at the meeting, still they could not concur in the final draft, and they had considerable trouble in getting those changes made. It took two or three days, on certain very, very vital questions. Changes had been made two or three places, and in the Summary, where it was most important, the changes had not been made.

BABBITT: That would sound very much like a pure slip.

DUNN: That does not happen often.

25X1A. [REDACTED] It was the matter of seven weeks, and one person's word against another's. A paper was agreed to; that much was there. Now your analyst said that something was agreed to that had not been done. Possibly she was right, but it is possible that she misunderstood. She might have understood that a change was going to be made that nobody else did.

BABBITT: It sounds like a misunderstanding, but it is certainly something that should not have happened.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

25X1A

██████████ I think the Portugal case should be put down as a very exceptional one. I happened to be chairman, and not all of the changes were made verbatim. There had been a previous conference with your member, and I think there must have been some misunderstanding on some items that apparently had been agreed upon and were not put in the paper. But it certainly is not a typical case. Ordinarily at these meetings we make verbatim changes and record them, and we are sure that everybody is in agreement, and after that we make no changes unless we communicate them to the agencies. The difficulty with the SR's is that they are so voluminous that ordinarily we have not had meetings. In fact, the meeting on Portugal was in itself an exceptional procedure.

EVANS: I am quite sure that such cases are more emphasized in their repercussions than is justified by the number of occasions. It does not happen very often.

I think the concurrence thing is very, very difficult. Because of the phrasing, it is difficult to make a decision for a dissent on let's say a paper that comes up sometimes, one of your economic papers, in which a statement is made of the economic prospects and it is based on immediate circumstances. There are some reasons for thinking that any estimate of economic prospects are good for about a month and are not much good after that. That is one theory on which some people operate, that any estimate of the petroleum situation is good for now, but not for long. Now, that is not made clear in the paper. Do we dissent on that? If used outside of a certain context, a series of little things in which we had agreed, we might dissent, but if we say we don't agree with some of the facts, the first thing we get back is 'what do you mean by this? What are the facts?' But, do we want to dissent on the basis of a series of small things? If there is a great issue of peace or war, you can write a wonderful dissent, or you had ought to be able to concur. I don't agree that dissent should be taken light-heartedly.

But, frankly, in the Intelligence network as a whole, I don't like the idea of dissents. I think we should be able to agree in the maximum number of times. We don't have a final court of appeal which says that this is the way the agency will speak, and so we are going to have to dissent. I feel that the less dissents the better, which is the reason we take great care in them. There are many, many shades of things that arise in the kinds of papers produced which make the dissenting process a very difficult one.

BABBITT: It is a difficult one.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

EVANS: Under it lies an emotional aspect, I think, as much as anything -- the issue of what responsibility is involved in the concurrence. Obviously some is involved, or else we would not do the darn thing. And then there is the question of how much responsibility. That is the rock on which the whole thing keeps crashing in my office. Over and over again, 'what does "substantial dissent" mean?' And they say, 'We are responsible for this thing'. And I say, 'Only within certain limits.' Then, 'What is the limit? It does not say so in the paper.'

MCKEE: Would it be possible to work out a form which would take care of many of these borderline cases? It is true that you have an idea which you feel should accompany the paper, but is not covered, and then calls for a dissent, and would it be possible, for instance, to request that an agencies particular comments, not all of the comments, but some, accompany the paper so it would not be considered a dissent? That would not be comments on trivia -- use of words, or organization of material -- but simply observations which the agency thinks are highly pertinent and that the reader of the paper should take into consideration. There is something very sweeping about a dissent, which you hesitate to make simply because paragraph 7 is a little bit off the beam and that you would like to point out certain things about it.

BABBITT: We have done that in formal footnotes.

MCKEE: You have?

BABBITT: But there are reproduction difficulties in that. There again, the time element comes up. I think we have done it only twice.

25X1A [REDACTED] I think it was twice. One was early in the game, where a long dissent was published as a comment. Maybe twice since then.

BABBITT: I seem to remember some footnotes, but I don't remember the paper.

25X1A

[REDACTED] It has been quite rare.

HOMMEL: Often in printing a dissent you put it on the last page. Why could not the comments that Dr. McKee suggested be handled in the same fashion. Would that put too much of a load on the printer?

BABBITT: If we published all of the comments, we might get ourselves in for a good bit there.

MCKEE: Oh yes, you would have to publish the comments very sparingly. But there are occasions where the agencies have ideas they would like to communicate to the reader of the paper without dissenting. As, 'Here is a thought on the subject which is important, and we would like to have it go along with the paper.'

SECRET

SECRET

RABBITT: What we have tried to do with the comments was to incorporate as much as we thought we could into the text. But I think we certainly could not undertake to publish all the comments. There may be a middle ground.

MACKEE: You might find at your coordination conference that one agency contemplates a dissent because there are differences which can not be reconciled, but the agency would be perfectly happy simply to have his idea put into the comments without a dissent. It is that sort of thing which I have in mind instead of trying to reach a compromise, which frequently is undesirable. Simply leave the paper untouched, and put the ^{major} opinion in as a comment. I was not suggesting that the comments be published in their entirety.

EVANS: The kind of thing I was referring to, where for our purposes we would like to make clear our understanding of the usefulness of the paper. We feel we would like to put in something that from our point of view we feel there is a certain length of time that this would be true.

RABBITT: I don't know how often any of the individual types of cases would come up.

EVANS: If the paper tells the whole story in your opinion, this is a hard one to handle. For instance, you can not say, 'This paper is thin.' You might feel the same way about ours. But we feel that we bear some brunt of the paper when we participate.

RABBITT: Some, yes, but the question is where to draw the line.

I think this has been an extremely valuable, though by no means definitive conference. Thank you very much for coming over. To summarize a bit:

On points 1, and 2 to a certain extent, we will look into the detailed mechanism and working methods of our respective Far East divisions, and see if something can come up all around. We will come over and confer with each of you three (the services) gentlemen or whoever you designate, on the question of who we should contact on the entire coordination procedure. And we will try to work up a new and acceptable definition of 'concurrence'.

CHILDS: That will have to go through the Standing Committee if you are going to change DCI/3 - 1, 2, and 3.

EVANS: We can talk about it before it gets there.

RABBITT: I hope so!

The meeting adjourned at 1205.

SECRET