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## Our Views On The News—

# Need Facts, Not Soft Soap

Last week a top adviser to President Kennedy, in an off-the-record meeting with newspapermen, engaged in a remarkably far-fetched rationalization of the U. S.-supported invasion debacle in Cuba. One might have gotten the impression, in hearing him explain blandly that the action had "crystallized" Latin-American sentiment behind the U. S., that we had been involved in a great victory instead of a humiliating defeat.

A few days after this meeting Adolph Berle, special consultant to the Secretary of State and head of the special Kennedy task force on Latin America, took the same tack in a talk to the Woman's National Democratic Club. Mr. Berle compared the Cuban action by the Kennedy administration to President Truman's intervention against communism in Greece and Turkey in 1947.

One might expect a leading official of an administration concerned with the problems facing President Kennedy and the nation today to be somewhat more attentive to the truths of history. President Truman made his decision to send American aid to the legally constituted governments of Greece and Turkey when it became clear that they were the targets of a Soviet-backed insurrection. In Cuba the roles were reversed. The Communists were supporting a legal government — no matter how repugnant that government might be to the United States — which faced an external threat.

The results of the invasion demonstrated clearly that the Castro government in Cuba enjoys a substantial measure of popular support. At least in the face of repressive measures the majority was passive. It failed to rise to the counterrebellion's standards, despite a belief — attributed to the Central Intelligence Agency — that the Cuban people were ready to flock to the aid of a deliverer.

The Communists of course do not scruple at such methods. What

has evoked such profound shock—among American allies as well as neutrals, as evidenced by the British commentary in today's Roundtable column — is that the United States, with its professed belief in the processes of world law, hemispheric cooperation and the United Nations charter, would become involved in such an action. Even if the U. S.-supported "invasion" had succeeded this kind of reaction would have been inevitable.

But far from "crystallizing" Latin-American opinion in favor of the United States, the Cuban invasion folly appears to have added new incentive to "Yankee imperialism" charges in South American and Caribbean countries. A few governments openly have endorsed the U. S. action. The majority, attuned to the voices of peasant workers who identify themselves with the currents of social revolution, have remained noncommittally politic in their expressions. Despite Mr. Berle's Alice-in-Wonderland evaluation of the invasion's results it is obvious that under any circumstance they belong on the debit side of the U. S. leadership prestige ledger.

Furthermore, although manfully accepting the full responsibility himself for this costly failure, the President, in later attempting to thrust a share of the blame upon the press, did not inspire new confidence in his shaken administration. He contributed to the aura of confusion and insecurity, giving rise to fear that rash new action would be undertaken as a means of redressing U. S. losses.

Fortunately our policymakers now seem to have regained some degree of equilibrium. Recognition appears to be increasing that Cuba, as Laos, is a subsidiary aspect to the cold war struggle, and should be treated as such. Emotional judgments cannot be permitted to compel us into errors in circumstances which are not crucial to the total free world security; into wasting our resources where they cannot be telling over the long haul.