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## A Summary of Criticism

The confused story of the Cuban fiasco continues to unfold.

The American government, faced with a whole cluster of hair trigger choices, managed to get on the wrong side of most of them.

There may be value in summarizing major criticisms. It is said:

1. We miscalculated the possible

weight of Fidel Castro's armor and the prospect of a popular Cuban uprising against him.

2. A strong and perhaps controlling voice in the choice of landing spots and distribution of rebel forces was exercised by state department officials backed up by President Kennedy's White House foreign policy advisers.

To an outsider, this sounds like contending that men who might never have seen a Cuban beach were telling military and intelligence officers where to land, and with what.

3. Cuban forces trained only for guerrilla warfare and intending to practice it in this instance were sent ashore in a coordinated army assault-type landing without the air and naval cover such an attack demands, onto beaches unsuited for any fighting at all.

Military critics say guerrillas should hit the beach in darkness and vanish into ground cover within 15 minutes. These rebels wallowed in swampland six to eight hours, under Castro's murderous fire, trying unsuccessfully to secure their hold.

4. They got their guerrilla training not from the army, but from the Central Intelligence Agency, which never before had been charged with such an assignment, having focussed on "small jobs with small groups" bent on sabotage, infiltration, more modest guerrilla effort.

5. The Cuban underground was never informed (evidently because mistrusted by CIA), nor were all the key rebels, nor was much of the populace whose rising was necessary to final success. And top revolutionaries were held incommunicado while U. S. officials issued statements in their name.

6. No serious consideration was given as to how to meet the consequences of failure.

Obviously the Kennedy administration sought to have its cake and eat it, too. It wanted to assist the assault, but manage it in a manner to play down its intervention.

Now it, and all of us as well, ought to know better.