

ern European exports have doubled and our exports to Japan have tripled. Our European markets have made possible a favorable balance of trade of over \$3 billion. U.S. wheat and milk donated to Japan in earlier years has contributed to making Japan today the single largest consumer of American agricultural products today.

U.S. aid is so familiarizing the world with American products and techniques that it is creating a market which is potentially four times that of the Marshall plan countries. As these countries achieve economic growth and stability so will demand and purchasing power for buying U.S. goods.

The President has stated that the role and responsibilities of the U.S. private sector in the aid program is growing. More opportunities will result from the enactment of the President's request to expand the existing investment guarantee programs and the enactment of the investment tax credit program. At the same time, the foreign assistance program affords many chances for advancement for the private sector in the developing countries. The program loans to small business and development and agricultural credit banks as well as technical assistance will encourage private enterprise and provide a favorable climate for investors from abroad.

These aspects—the expansion of U.S. exports, earnings from U.S. foreign investments and acquainting nations with U.S. goods and services—mean that the foreign assistance program, contrary to some popular beliefs, actually contributes to the long-range improvements in our balance of payments.

Aside from the benefits to U.S. business and export, American products have added new dimensions to the living standards of developing countries. U.S. wheat and milk which went to Japan during assistance days created a market for additional quantities of milk, wheat, and corn products now important nutritional ingredients to the Japanese diet. U.S. technology and business enterprise have appealed to the inventiveness of the developing countries and by their example have importantly contributed to better living standards, future industrialization, with accompanying job opportunities.

The foreign aid record is particularly encouraging in light of these facts. It certifies the prudence of our loan record and responsibility with which recipient countries have carried out their agreements. It proves itself a sound investment for the U.S. business community. It represents an investment which will increase U.S. exports and further reduce the U.S. balance-of-payment deficit. Most important, it is a sound investment in creating a world of modern and secure nations.

Lest We Fail To Remember

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. BURT L. TALCOTT

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 14, 1965

Mr. TALCOTT. Mr. Speaker, probably too many American citizens and leaders fail to remember daily that we are at war—a dirty, dying, deteriorating war—in Vietnam.

Some of America's best manhood is dying each day in Vietnam. We need to remember. They need to know why.

More than 18 graduates of the Defense Language Institute, Monterey branch, have been killed in Vietnam. This is an enormous number.

I recently read the following requiem from the U.S. Air Force Academy student magazine, the Talon, of December 1964.

The first Academy cadet to take the oath of allegiance was killed in Vietnam. We should remember this outstanding young man.

On Saturday, October 24, 1964, the U.S. Air Force Academy lost its first graduate in combat. Not only was he the first Academy graduate to be killed under enemy fire, but he was also the first cadet to take the oath of allegiance in the first entering class.

Lt. Valmore Bourque took the oath with the class of 1959, but he graduated with the class of 1960. His mission while in Vietnam was combat support in C-123's. His specific mission on the 24th of October was a resupply drop of high explosive and ammunition to Special Forces. He was flying lead in a flight of three C-123's when his ship was hit by ground fire. Although the other two planes were hit, they managed to limp home. Lieutenant Bourque was posthumously promoted to captain and awarded the two highest Vietnamese Air Force citations. The Academy can look with pride on Captain Bourque's record as an officer. He was an aircraft commander and was recently made a mission commander, a great distinction for so junior an officer.

Captain Bourque's death marked the first Academy graduate to die in combat. He is not the first graduate to die, nor will he be the last to do so under enemy fire. But his sacrifice epitomizes the sacrifice each and every cadet voluntarily swears to make upon entrance into the Academy. Moreover, the death of Captain Bourque illustrates more vividly the true mission of the Academy. This does not include excellence in academics, physical education, or military training alone, but rather in a willingness and responsiveness to give up whatever is necessary, including the life itself, for one's country.

While at the Academy we are still a long step from participation in the mission of the Air Force. In effect we are training ourselves—mentally through academics, physically through athletic programs, and professionally through military training. However, often our vision as to where we are going, or why, is clouded by problems of immediate concern with regard to academics, physical education, or military training. To us, Cap-

tain Bourque is not only a symbol of why we exist, but he represents these characteristics each one of us should try to emulate. He realized his responsibility; he undertook the mission in full realization that he might not return, and he prepared for the untimely conclusion. In preparation for this assignment to Vietnam, he requested that should he not return, he would like to be buried in the Academy cemetery. Our vantage point of Captain Bourque and what he contributed to our further development can best be summarized by the somewhat unrenowned philosopher John Berrill:

"I am like a man journeying through a forest, aware of occasional glints of light overhead, with recollections of the long trail I have already traveled, and conscious of wider spaces ahead. I want to see more clearly where I have been and where I am going, and above all, I want to know why I am where I am and why I am traveling at all."

Can anyone in a position of leadership or authority tell the family of Captain Bourque "why he was there" or what the sacrifice of his young life contributed to the betterment of society. These valiant young men may be willing to die for their country, but should they not have a purpose?

Long Campaign Breeds Venom

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JAMES J. DELANEY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 14, 1965

Mr. DELANEY. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call to the attention of the Members the enclosed article which appeared in the San Francisco Examiner, November 6, 1964, on the subject of long campaigns. This presents the views of two outstanding leaders in the Democratic and Republican Parties—James A. Farley, a former Democratic national chairman, now chairman of the board of the Coca-Cola Export Corp., and Leonard Hall, a former Republican national chairman—who agree that the length of a campaign should be given serious consideration.

The article follows:

LONG CAMPAIGN BREEDS VENOM

Two of the Nation's most respected politicians, James A. Farley and Leonard Hall, were as far apart as the poles in their election positions. Farley is a former Democratic Party national chairman, Hall a former Republican chairman.

But they stood together in advocating shorter election campaigns. Farley contends that a majority of the people had made final decisions in the first few days—or weeks at most—after the national conventions. Hall attributed the campaign excesses of bad temper and bad taste to prolongation of the effort to influence the voters.

Long election campaigns stem from the days of slow communications and travel.

Those days are long gone. Now communications are virtually instantaneous. Physically, San Francisco is less than 5 hours from New York.

Most of the venom, hate and calumny of the 1964 campaign built up through the unnecessary weeks and months of the contest. Politicians and candidates said all that needed saying and then kept on saying it over and over again, with embellishments. The more a story is told the farther it gets from the truth. The inventions, contrivings, exaggerations and misrepresentations of a political campaign amount to wearing and wearying boredom for voters. They change few voters, if any.

The British concentrate their major election campaigns into a little more than 2 weeks. These are tense weeks, with controversy, personalities and vilification to spare. But candidates and voters alike get in and out of a campaign fast without injury to the democratic process, without risk of an uninformed electorate and without any damper on free expression.

We do not propose a 2-week national election campaign in the United States. We do propose as do Messrs. Farley and Hall, that shorter campaigns would take much of the bad temper and bad taste and much of the cost in wasted time and money out of our elections.

The Dedication of the John F. Kennedy Elementary

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. JAMES A. BURKE

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 14, 1965

Mr. BURKE. Mr. Speaker, it was my pleasure to be the principle speaker on Sunday, November 22, 1964, at the dedication ceremonies of the John F. Kennedy Elementary in Holbrook, Mass. I presented a flag which had been flown over the Capitol as well as Senate Document No. 59, Memorial Addresses in the Congress of the United States.

Following are my remarks:

Mr. Chairman, on Friday, November 22, 1963, the assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy brought shock and grief to both great and humble people throughout the world. The inspiration of President Kennedy's courageous, stirring leadership will live through the years to strengthen and sustain our great Nation and time will enrich the greatness of this outstanding American, who shall always be remembered for his courage and his dedication to freedom, peace, and the cause of humanity.

How impressive was his magnetic personality, how appealing his alert mind. How appreciated the lightning of his ready wit. How admired his lofty ideals, his intrepid courage, his concern for those unable to speak for themselves, his inspired battle for social justice, for equality of right and opportunity for the cause of the oppressed. His determined struggle for peace and order and a world organized on the rule of law, his firm resolve to preserve the integrity and security of our Nation and the free world, to uphold the basic moral and ethical principles of the American way of life.

The name of John Fitzgerald Kennedy will go down the long unbroken annals of history like a great gleaming beacon light casting its warming glow of toleration and justice over the Nation and the world and showing us,

and generations to come, the way to prosperity and peace.

My friends, rarely in the history of America has one man blazed his path of glory across the horizons of this Nation in so short a time and with such momentous impact as did John Fitzgerald Kennedy. He was fashioned of the heroic stuff of which great Americans are made. Yet we who knew him best can testify before all the world that here was a man of gracious charm, broad intellect, and rare wisdom, a man with all the courage, faith, and compassion which real manhood forever requires.

And as if aware of the tragic limitations which destiny was to impose upon him, he swept with power and purpose out of the mists of relative political obscurity to burst upon the consciousness of the American people as few men before him have ever done, symbolizing in his vigor, his leadership, and his vision a new generation of Americans. In all of his formative years, it is difficult to find a time when John Kennedy was not testing himself, when he was not sharpening and perfecting his moral and intellectual capacities for that fateful moment when he would keep his long appointed rendezvous with destiny as President of the United States. His entire life became a hymn of preparation for the brief but critical months of service he would undergo as leader of the country he loved so dearly and for which he finally gave every last ounce of devotion that there was in him to give.

Though he wrote three books, he considered himself no author. Though he was a decorated war hero, he was no militarist. Though he served with honor as a distinguished political figure, he was no politician. But, first and foremost, he was a great patriot. Above personal ambition, above party affiliation, above petty conceits, John F. Kennedy will forever be a challenge and an inspiration to all those patriots, present and future, who would take their place among History's honor roll of the brave and the good. Though many men are called to serve their God and their country, a very few men in any generation are chosen to walk the solitary path to glory which he walked. His entire life was a noble overture to his sudden and tragic death.

No man so captured the imagination of his age as did John F. Kennedy. No man so mirrored the ideals and aspirations of the American people as did he. When John Kennedy died, people the world over felt hope within them die. When John Kennedy was struck down, men everywhere saw reason and sanity and understanding being struck down with the same brutal senselessness and violence.

But the ideals which were so much the immortal part of John F. Kennedy shall endure beyond the grave. The assassin's gun and the assassin's bullet has not been made which can destroy freedom's dream—a dream that is indelibly impressed upon the minds and hearts of men. The dream of freedom shall endure so long as man himself endures. On January 20, 1961—nearly 4 years ago—John F. Kennedy said:

"Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans. * * * Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival of liberty."

John Fitzgerald Kennedy has borne his burden. Now let us take up ours. With God as our shield, with freedom as our cause, let us labor to create a new and even greater America so that historians, in the years to come, will not find us unworthy of the sacrifice made by one of the noblest men of this or any other age.

A list of the members and programs is as follows:

BUILDING COMMITTEE

Thomas F. Hoell, chairman; Henry L. Dye, secretary; Thomas Ahern, Andrew H. Card,¹ Stanley R. Christianson,¹ secretary; Walter W. Donovan,¹ Peter George, Francis Hoban, Edward Huntington, George T. Jameson, Jr., Gerard Lane, Frances MacWilliams, James F. Magrath, Donald J. Martin,¹ chairman; Miss Grace G. McCarthy,¹ Irene A. Moran, Roger F. Poole, Ralph A. Samuels, John C. Sarhans.

Superintendent of schools, I. D. Reade; assistant superintendent of schools, John E. Zolno; principal, Irving Waitz; architect, Korslund, LeNormand & Quann, Inc.; contractor, Marshall Contractors, Inc.; clerk of the works, Irving Winslow.

Hosts: Holbrook Parent-Teacher Association.

DEDICATION PROGRAM

Presentation of the flag, main entrance: John J. Kelly.

Invocation: Rev. Charles B. Murphy, pastor, St. Joseph Church.

Welcome: Thomas F. Hoell, chairman, school building committee.

Introduction of platform guests

Music: Kennedy School Glee Club, director, Marcia Galway.

Presentation of keys

Contractor to architect.

Architect to building committee.

Building committee to school committee.

School committee to superintendent of schools.

Music: Kennedy School Glee Club, director, Marcia Galway.

Presentation of John F. Kennedy portrait Council No. 5046 Knights of Columbus, William Godfrey.

"God Bless America": Audience.

Benediction: Rev. Roy Bruce, pastor, Brookville Baptist Church.

Open house: 3 to 5 p.m.

¹ School committee.

Who Says What?

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. ANCHER NELSEN

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 14, 1965

Mr. NELSEN. Mr. Speaker, the editor of the Mankato, Minn., Free Press raises an interesting question about who should make agricultural policy. I would like the editorial, by Franklin Rogers, included in today's CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

L.B.J.'s REMARKS

Comments on President Johnson's state of the Union message included one from the Department of Agriculture that he did not say what that Department had told him to say about the farm problem. The President informed the Nation that he had instructed Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman "to lead a major effort to find new approaches to reduce the heavy cost of our farm programs and to direct more of our effort to the small farmer who needs help most." This apparently surprised the Secretary and his advisers.

A legitimate question arises here, however. It revolves around who is the boss, as far as the executive department is concerned. Is it the President? Or some of his underlings?

Effective tax rates under H.R. 8363

[Married couple with 2 dependents, with typical dividends, capital gains, and other income,¹ and typical itemized deductions.]

Adjusted gross income ¹	Realized income ²	Tax under H.R. 8363	Tax as percentage of realized income
\$3,000	\$3,131	0	0
\$4,000	4,130	\$103	2.5
\$5,000	5,126	219	4.3
\$6,000	6,126	339	5.5
\$7,500	7,638	569	7.4
\$10,000	10,189	972	9.5
\$12,500	12,736	1,373	10.8
\$15,000	15,385	1,830	11.9
\$17,500	18,033	2,296	12.7
\$20,000	20,713	2,820	13.6
\$25,000	26,026	3,663	15.3
\$30,000	31,461	4,507	16.8
\$40,000	42,331	6,394	19.8
\$50,000	53,291	8,334	23.0
\$75,000	81,220	20,672	25.5
\$100,000	113,212	29,670	26.2
\$200,000	247,580	56,675	22.9
\$500,000	721,365	138,216	19.2
\$1,000,000	1,501,588	238,037	15.9

¹ Includes such income as wages and salaries, interest, rents, business and partnership income, royalties, and typical dividends and capital gains. Estimates of typical dividends and realized capital gains and itemized deductions are based on 1960 tax return data.

² Realized income exceeds adjusted gross income largely because adjusted gross income includes only 40 percent of capital gains under H.R. 8363 (50 percent under existing law).

NOTE.—Several items, such as tax-exempt interest, 1/2 of long-term capital gains, including so-called statutory gains which often have no logical relationship to capital transactions, depletion, and intangible drilling costs, are omitted from adjusted gross income and from realized income.

Source of basic data: Office of the Secretary of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis. See table on p. 709 of Finance Committee hearings.

Mr. GORE. Senators will find that the highest percentage tax payment shown on the table is reached at an adjusted gross income of \$100,000 and a realized income of \$113,212. This high point of tax rate for "typical" taxpayers in the various income groups is not the confiscatory rate of taxation about which we hear and read so much, but a payment which represent 26.2 percent of realized income. From there on, in the table, Senators will see that as income goes up, the effective rate goes down.

While I call the Senate's attention to this point, I wish also to invite the attention of Senators to the fact that a father with a child to clothe, feed, and educate would be allowed an exemption for himself and each dependent of only \$600 a year. That represent a wartime levy. In 1940 a man and his wife had an exemption of \$2,000. That amount was reduced during World War II in order to raise revenue for the war and to dampen consumer demand. Do we now need to dampen the consumer demand of low-income people in the hills of Kentucky?

We do not need now to suppress demand. Our economy needs stimulation of the consumer sector.

President Johnson has declared unrelenting war against poverty. I applaud him for it. He identified the place where we should start. He called attention to the fact that one-fifth of our people live in or near poverty. One-fifth of our people live either in abject poverty or on the very verge of it. This is where we need to start the war on poverty. Do not forget that the tax bill is supposed to be an important part of the war on poverty.

Will the passage of a bill under which the "typical" taxpayer with a realized income of more than \$1.5 million a year pays less than 16 percent represent an attack, a battle, in the war on poverty? Such a bill would be a battle lost in the war on poverty. We must start not by giving the greatest benefits to those who need them least, but by giving tax relief to those who need it most—the parents with the largest number of children to educate.

Madam President, the Senate Finance Committee is proceeding with orderly consideration of amendments to the bill. In due course it will be reported to the Senate. I shall offer amendments in the interest of equity and fairness; but I shall not wait to alert the Senate to the unfairness and inequity of this bill. Daily I shall speak briefly in the Senate on this point.

Mr. MORSE. Madam President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GORE. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. The Senator from Tennessee will recall that in 1958 I joined in offering a proposal for a \$1,000 exemption, and was willing to compromise at \$800. We lost the proposal for the \$800 exemption on a voice vote. We were not even able to obtain a ye-and-nay vote.

I want the Senator to know that when his amendment, calling for a \$1,000 exemption, reaches the floor of Senate, I shall support it. My mind is open about other proposals made by the Senator from Tennessee.

Also, I shall support some reduction in the corporate tax from 52 percent. Two years ago I said on the floor of the Senate that I would go as low as 46 percent, but I would be glad to compromise at 48 percent. With respect to many American businesses, a corporate tax of 52 percent operates as a restriction of production, rather than an expansion of production. It is leading to restriction, which is costing jobs. We need to expand the economy, not restrict it. The tax structure is one way of dealing with that problem.

As the Senator knows, there are certain tax deductions which are loopholes, and I shall help the Senator try to plug them.

Mr. GORE. I thank the Senator from Oregon. His comments are encouraging. Perhaps many other Senators will join in the battle on poverty when the Senate considers the tax bill.

SMOKING AND HEALTH—REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL

Mr. COOPER. Madam President, the report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, entitled "Smoking and Health," is being studied and considered seriously throughout the country. I intend later this week to discuss it more fully and, I hope, constructively. Today I want to bring to the attention of the Senate, and to the news media, a point about which I believe there has been widespread misunderstanding.

I think it very important that those who are interested in this subject—who speak, comment, and write on the subject—be very sure of their facts and read carefully the report. For our people, with their deep interest in it from the standpoint of health and its important economic interest to thousands of farmers and others, require that this subject be treated factually.

My purpose in speaking briefly today—and I expect to comment later in more detail—is to emphasize the need for care by calling attention to one specific point which has been commented upon very widely. In news reports, and in several editorials, it has been generally stated that there is no evidence that filters used in cigarettes have any value. Some statements have gone further. They have indicated that the report of the Advisory Committee stated that filters have no value. I think, in part, this impression or misconception followed the press conference Saturday by Dr. Luther Terry, the Surgeon General, Dr. James Hundley, Assistant Surgeon General, and members of the Advisory Committee. I noted in the New York Times of Sunday, January 12, 1964, a report of their responses to questions from the press.

The inference is drawn from the statements in these articles that filters in cigarettes were found by the Advisory Committee to have no helpful effect. I read the report and I could find no conclusion or finding in it to substantiate such an inference. In fact, I found, from my reading of the report, scarcely any mention of filters. The Committee evidently made no comprehensive study of filters, pointing out they had been in use only about 10 years.

At pages 60 and 61 of the report the Committee uses language which suggests that further study may show that filters are or would be helpful. I quote from page 60:

The fact that side-stream smoke—

By which is meant smoke along the side of a cigarette when it is not being smoked, as distinguished from smoke inhaled from the cigarette—

contains three times more benzo(a)pyrene than mainstream smoke has been cited as evidence that more efficient oxidation could conceivably lower the content of carcinogenic hydrocarbons.

On page 61 I find this statement:

Activated carbons differ markedly in their adsorption characteristics. Carbon filters previously employed in cigarettes do not have the specific power to scrub the gas phase. It has been reported that a filter containing special carbon granules removes gaseous constituents which depress ciliary activity.

I do not want to go into details, for I am not a scientist or a doctor. But these statements do suggest the effective value of filters.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. COOPER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have additional time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

January 14

Mr. COOPER. I want to make the point that the Committee did not make any findings upon the effectiveness of filters.

To make certain that I was correct, I wrote a letter yesterday to Dr. Luther Terry, the Surgeon General. I asked if he would respond as quickly as possible. I received a letter from him today which verifies what I have said. I will read the letter. Then I shall ask that my letter and his reply be placed in the body of the RECORD.

The letter is dated January 14, 1963:

DEAR SENATOR COOPER: This is in response to your letter of January 13 which poses certain questions as to the Advisory Committee's views on cigarette filters. Certainly, it is erroneous to conclude that cigarette filters have no effect. As noted in the Committee's report, filters in common use do remove a variable portion of the tars and nicotine. Your specific questions and our replies will follow:

1. Is it not correct that the Advisory Committee made no judgment as to the effect of adding filters to cigarettes?

Answer. Yes.

2. Do I understand correctly that the Committee made no finding on filters because it believed it had insufficient evidence from animal experiments, clinical studies, or population studies—the three kinds of evidence it considered—on which to base any findings as to the effect of the various types of filters?

Answer. Yes.

3. To the extent that a filter removes tar, nicotine, and the gaseous elements of cigarette smoke, is it not reasonable to assume that the effects of the filter will be similar to the effects reported by the Committee of smoking fewer cigarettes?

Answer. A categorical answer to this question is difficult. The best I could do would be to answer "Yes—perhaps," or "Yes—probably." A part of the problem here is whether the filter in addition to removing tar, nicotine or other elements of cigarette smoke might also lead to different levels of cigarette consumption and different amounts of inhalation, etc. Another difficulty is that we do not know all of the substances which different filters do or do not remove. Since we do not yet know all of the substances in tobacco smoke which have adverse health effects, a given filter might permit the selective passage of hazard substances, as well as selectively removing others.

4. Does not the limited discussion of a new-type filter, on page 61 of the report, suggest that the Advisory Committee believes that the development of selective filters may have significance in terms of reducing the hazards to health the Committee believes it has found?

Answer. Yes; the Committee felt that the development of better filters or more selective filters is a promising avenue for further development.

5. Would not standardized research on the effectiveness and selectivity of filters, as well as additional research on the components of smoke, be desirable?

Answer. Yes, unquestionably.

I hope these responses will be of assistance.

Sincerely yours,

LUTHER L. TERRY,
Surgeon General.

My comment on this is that those who study this report must be careful not to extend the conclusions of the Committee.

No findings were made with respect to filters. It is important that further study and research be conducted on the question of filters. Dr. Terry has stated that the Committee felt that the devel-

opment of better or more selective filters is a promising avenue. I urge that research in this area be expanded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the two letters will be printed in the RECORD at this point.

The letters ordered to be printed in the RECORD are as follows:

U.S. SENATE,
January 13, 1964.

DR. LUTHER L. TERRY,
Surgeon General, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Washington, D.C.

DEAR DR. TERRY: The report on smoking and health, and the press conference Saturday, January 11, by the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General, appear to be widely interpreted as having included a finding that cigarette filters have no effect. On the contrary:

1. Is it not correct that the Advisory Committee made no judgment as to the effect of adding filters to cigarettes?

2. Do I understand correctly that the Committee made no finding on filters because it believed it had insufficient evidence from animal experiments, clinical studies, or population studies—the three kinds of evidence it considered—on which to base any finding as to the effect of the various types of filters?

3. To the extent that a filter removes tar, nicotine, and the gaseous elements of cigarette smoke, is it not reasonable to assume that the effects of the filter will be similar to the effects reported by the Committee of smoking fewer cigarettes?

4. Does not the limited discussion of a new-type filter, on page 61 of the report, suggest that the Advisory Committee believes that the development of selective filters may have significance in terms of reducing the hazards to health the Committee believes it has found?

5. Would not standardized research on the effectiveness and selectivity of filters, as well as additional research on the components of smoke, be desirable?

Because the report of your Advisory Committee is the subject of wide and general interest, it will be helpful to have your answers, at least to the first question, as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,

JOHN SHERMAN COOPER.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE,

Washington, D.C.

HON. JOHN SHERMAN COOPER,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR COOPER: This is in response to your letter of January 13 which poses certain questions as to the Advisory Committee's views on cigarette filters. Certainly, it is erroneous to conclude that cigarette filters have no effect. As noted in the Committee's report, filters in common use do remove a variable portion of the tars and nicotine. Your specific questions and our replies will follow:

1. Is it not correct that the Advisory Committee made no judgment as to the effect of adding filters to cigarettes?

Answer. Yes.

2. Do I understand correctly that the Committee made no finding on filters because it believed it had insufficient evidence from animal experiments, clinical studies, or population studies—the three kinds of evidence it considered—on which to base any finding as to the effect of the various types of filters?

Answer. Yes.

3. To the extent that a filter removes tar, nicotine, and the gaseous elements of cigarette smoke, is it not reasonable to assume that the effects of the filter will be similar

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Answer. A categorical answer to this question is difficult. The best I could do would be to answer yes—perhaps, or yes—probably. A part of the problem here is whether the filter in addition to removing tar, nicotine or other elements of cigarette smoke might also lead to different levels of cigarette consumption and different amounts of inhalation, etc. Another difficulty is that we do not know all of the substances which different filters do or do not remove. Since we do not yet know all of the substances in tobacco smoke which have adverse health effects, a given filter might permit the selective passage of hazard substances, as well as selectively removing others.

4. Does not the limited discussion of a new type filter, on page 61 of the report, suggest that the Advisory Committee believes that the development of selective filters may have significance in terms of reducing the hazards to health the Committee believes it has found?

Answer. Yes. The Committee felt that the development of better filters or more selective filters is a promising avenue for further development.

5. Would not standardized research on the effectiveness and selectivity of filters, as well as additional research on the components of smoke, be desirable?

Answer. Yes, unquestionably.

I hope these responses will be of assistance.

Sincerely yours,

LUTHER L. TERRY,
Surgeon General.

SAIGON SUMMARY

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I invite the attention of my colleagues to an article entitled "Saigon Summary" by Miss Marguerite Higgins, which appears in last week's issue of America magazine.

This is a shocking article; indeed, it would be almost incredible if it did not come from a correspondent of such exceptional stature. Although I am in no position to vouch for the accuracy of Miss Higgins' statements on every point, her article raises such serious questions about the conduct of American foreign policy that it cannot be dismissed or ignored. On the contrary, I believe that the Foreign Relations Committee should look into the charges and allocations made by Miss Higgins, and that Miss Higgins should be called before it as the first witness to report in more detail on her personal knowledge of the developments in Vietnam.

"Saigon Summary" is the story of the final days of the Diem regime, or, in Miss Higgins' words:

Of the inglorious role played by the Department of State by encouraging, for the first time in our history, the overthrow in time of war of a duly elected government fighting loyally against the common Communist enemy.

In her article, Miss Higgins makes the statement that the agitation about Buddhist persecution was a complete fraud and she charges, further, that the State Department knew that it was a fraud. She quotes Roger Hillsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, as telling her:

After the closing of the pagodas on August 21, the facts became irrelevant.

Miss Higgins, whose personal contacts are second to none in the Washington

press corps, states that Secretary of Defense McNamara and Central Intelligence Director John McCone opposed a coup d'etat because they feared its consequences but—

They were overruled by the pro-coup d'etat faction led by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman, and Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hillsman.

The point was made by every commentator at the time that, through its August 25 broadcast, the Voice of America virtually called on the Vietnamese military to overthrow Diem. Miss Higgins offers the additional information that:

At the same time, Ambassador Lodge asked the CIA to poll the Vietnamese generals and see when and if they were ready to translate revolt talk into action.

Miss Higgins also points out that Thich Tri Quang, the No. 1 Buddhist leader who took refuge in the American Embassy, was, according to his own admission, a one-time member of the Vietnam Communist liberation front; that he had twice been arrested by the French for dealings with Ho Chi Minh; that his brother is currently working for the Ministry of the Interior in Communist Vietnam; and that Thich Tri Quang is an outspoken neutralist. She quoted Thich Tri Quang as telling her:

We cannot get an arrangement with the north until we get rid of Diem and Nhu.

As I have said, the article would be all but incredible if it did not come from a correspondent of Miss Higgins' stature.

Miss Higgins, despite her relative youth, was generally credited with being one of the ablest of the corps of American correspondents covering World War II. She covered the Korean war with equal distinction. She has reported on the major political events of our time in the course of travels that have taken her repeatedly through many countries. She has served as chief of the New York Herald Tribune Bureau both in Berlin and in Tokyo. She has won the Pulitzer Prize and numerous other journalistic honors. But above all, I believe that Miss Higgins' article deserves special attention because of the enviable reputation which she enjoys both for thoroughness and for integrity.

Of this I can speak from personal experience because I came to know Miss Higgins well when she was covering the Nuremberg trials and I was serving as executive trial counsel under Justice Jackson. In all of my long experience I have never met a more honest or more conscientious correspondent than Marguerite Higgins. And I believe this opinion of her is shared by everyone who knows her.

Unlike some of the journalists who covered the Vietnamese crisis for the American press, Miss Higgins was no newcomer to Vietnam. Indeed, she has been in that country at virtually every critical period since Dienbienphu. She saw Vietnam during the period of crisis that followed the French pullout and the partition of the country, when virtually all of the State Department pundits despaired of creating a viable govern-

ment in the south. She was a witness to the almost miraculous consolidation and progress that took place under President Diem. And she was in Vietnam again both before the recent coup and after the coup.

Unlike some of the other American correspondents in Vietnam, Miss Higgins did not confine herself to Saigon. She traveled extensively in the Vietnamese countryside. She interviewed Government officials and leaders of the Buddhist opposition, Vietnamese villagers and Vietcong deserters, American officers and rank and file members of the American forces in Vietnam.

In a remarkable series of articles which she wrote for the New York Herald Tribune during the last week of August of last year, Miss Higgins did not absolve the Diem government for its handling of the so-called Buddhist crisis. But she sought to look at the picture of Vietnam whole, examining its strong points as well as its weaknesses. Her articles devoted much attention to the situation in the rural countryside, where as she pointed out, the overwhelming majority of South Vietnam's 14 million people live, and where the war will be either won or lost.

I have hesitated to say anything critical of our Vietnamese policy because I believe that in a situation such as exists in Vietnam, we must accept the regime in power, seek to help it overcome its shortcomings by persuasion, and cooperate with it loyally.

While I deplore the assassination of Diem and Nhu, and while I gravely fear that their overthrow may produce a worse situation rather than a better situation, I have not wished to say anything that could be construed as undercutting the military junta now in power in Vietnam.

It is my hope, indeed, that we will support the junta somewhat more loyally than we supported the government of President Diem; that we will not demand of it the democratic perfection that we demanded of Diem; that we will not subject its shortcomings to propaganda bombardments that can only play into the hands of the Communists; and that we will not again stoop to engaging in intrigues against an allied anti-Communist government.

I hope that, by our actions, we will give the lie to the Peiping broadcasts which have been warning the new rulers of Vietnam that American imperialism, when it suits its whims, will betray them as mercilessly as it betrayed Ngo Dinh Diem.

It is for this purpose that I speak today, and, it is for this purpose that I ask unanimous consent that the article by Miss Marguerite Higgins entitled "Saigon Summary" be inserted into the Record at the conclusion of my remarks. By way of historical background, I also ask consent to insert into the Record the text of the series of six articles on Vietnam which Miss Higgins wrote for the New York Herald Tribune during the last week of August 1963.

I urge my colleagues to give Miss Higgins' article the careful study which it merits. I hope, too, that the Foreign Relations Committee will be convened at

an early date to hear Miss Higgins because I am certain she possesses more information of a confidential nature that she has not yet published.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From America, Jan. 4, 1964]

SAIGON SUMMARY: OUR COUNTRY PLAYED AN INGLORIOUS ROLE IN THE FINAL DAYS OF THE DIEM REGIME

(By Marguerite Higgins)

(Miss Higgins, Pulitzer Prize winner, former New York Herald Tribune bureau chief in Berlin and Tokyo, has just returned from Saigon. She now reports for Newsday, Garden City, N.Y.)

What is the meaning of the five tragic self-immolations that took place in Vietnam in the 6 weeks following the November coup d'etat against Diem? How did it come to pass that under the military junta, which seized power in the name of an end to "persecution," there have been more suicides by fire over a short period than had ever been the case under President Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu? Even though virtually ignored by the Western press, will this latest spate of suicides by fire—without clearly stated reason—destroy at last the false notion that the repeated acts of self-immolation in Vietnam were indisputable proof of massive persecution of the Buddhist religion by President Diem, a Roman Catholic?

Will historians be more equitable with President Diem than his contemporaries were?

On two trips in Vietnam in 1963, one before and one after the coup d'etat, this writer was never able to find an instance of repression on religious grounds. Under Diem, there was repression on religious grounds. Under Diem, there was repression of Buddhists, Catholics, Confucianists, etc., when—in defiance of clearly stated laws—they took to the streets to demonstrate against the Government. But Diem's repression was not directed against a religion. It was aimed at overt political opposition. There were deplorable police excesses in Vietnam, but there is no sign that they were desired or condoned by Diem any more than police excesses in Alabama are condoned or desired by Washington.

There was, for a long time, a clear double standard in Vietnam, in which accusations against Diem gained, in most cases, giant headlines, but attempted refutations received only perfunctory notice. For instance, last summer Thich Duc Nghiep, the Xa Loi pagoda spokesman, told reporters dramatically that 365 persons in a Saigon suburb had been arrested "because they were Buddhists." That figure was headlined throughout the world. But when I went to the suburb in question, I found that a routine check was being made of a neighborhood through which the Vietcong often infiltrated. I stayed for 2 hours to talk with those rounded up as they emerged from the police compound after questioning. I talked to 20 persons—ancestor worshippers, Catholics, Confucianists, Taoists, Caoists, etc.—before I finally found a genuine Buddhist among those picked up. So the charge of "365 persons arrested because of being Buddhists" was invention.

There is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the American press corps in Saigon thought—out of the most idealistic and patriotic motives—that they were serving a good cause in arousing world opinion against Diem. Whether his strengths and faults were greater or less than those of his junta successors remains to be seen.

It is certain that under the military junta, Vietnamese have been jailed for far less than was necessary to send a person to prison

under Diem. Said a European observer: "Under Diem, a Vietnamese had to do something specific against the regime to get into trouble. Under the military junta, a Vietnamese can be jailed without charge, simply under the suspicion that he was loyal to the Diem regime when it was the legally constituted authority."

Sanche de Gramont, of the New York Herald Tribune, has estimated the number of arbitrary arrests right after the coup as around 500. So far, Mr. de Gramont and this reporter are the only ones who have written with any detail about the junta's reversion to some of the police-state tactics the Saigon press corps so bitterly criticized in Diem.

Nowadays, some of the most ardent anti-Diem writers, such as David Halberstam, Saigon correspondent of the New York Times, acknowledge that the Buddhist agitation of last summer and fall was politically motivated. In an admiring magazine article written by his close friend, George J. W. Goodman, Mr. Halberstam is quoted as saying: "I always said it. The Buddhist campaign was political. * * * I thought I always emphasized that this was a political dispute under a religious banner—the only place an opposition had found to gather in an authoritarian regime."

Whatever Mr. Halberstam's intentions, his and other press dispatches last summer and fall did create the impression in the outside world that some kind of religious crisis was going on inside Vietnam. And it was the image of religious persecution—false as it was—that paved the way for Diem's downfall. Without the embarrassment of being the patron of a country suspected of battling Buddhists, it is doubtful that the United States would ever have reached the decision to try to get rid of Diem. The authorities in Washington knew, of course, that the conflict in Vietnam was political, not religious. But they were reluctant to speak out lest, in the process, they attract to Washington some of the onus being poured—with hardly any contradiction—on Diem.

By staying silent, Washington acted as if it thought Diem guilty. And this helped to complete the vicious circle.

Or as Roger Hillsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, put it: "After the closing of the pagodas on August 21, the facts became irrelevant." So, evidently, did a sense of perspective. What, for example, about the fact that President Diem was far more lenient to his political opposition than President Sukarno of Indonesia or Premier Sarit Thanarat of Thailand, both recipients of American aid? Whereas some 300 political prisoners, at most, were found in Diem's jails, the prisons of Thailand, Indonesia, and Burma were filled—and are still filled—with tens of thousands of political victims.

"But," explained a pro-coup State Department officer, "the world spotlight is not on those countries, and it is on Vietnam."

At the State Department, there have been some attempts to rationalize the coup d'état by describing it as necessary to save the Vietnamese war effort from going to pieces. One difficulty with this argument is that it makes liars out of Secretary of Defense McNamara, Chief of Staff Maxwell D. Taylor, and Gen. Paul Harkins, who testified under oath to Congress in October that the war was making reasonable progress. If the State Department ever took seriously the argument that the disturbances in the cities would affect morale in the countryside, it betrays a regrettable lack of understanding of the structure of Vietnam and of the gap between the countryside, where the war will be won or lost, and the cities, where less than 10 percent of the Vietnamese live.

For the Buddhists, intellectuals and students who marched the streets in anti-Diem demonstrations could not have cared less

about the war—before the coup, or after the coup. Vietnamese students in particular tell you quite frankly that one reason they prize admission to a university is that it enables them to avoid the draft. Vietnam's intellectuals have narrow horizons, are excessively inward-turning, and make constant and factional criticism their specialty. Except for a handful of terribly militant leaders, the Buddhist monks are rather passive. If the success or failure of the war were to depend on these groups, Vietnam would have been lost from the start. As to the effects in the countryside of the critical clamoring by Vietnam's spoiled young intellectuals in the cities, it was virtually nil. The American attitude seemed to be that if a Vietnamese student demonstrates, virtue is on his side and the government is wrong. But in the countryside there were many peasants and plain soldiers who disapproved of the defiance of the regime—in those rare places where anyone knew anything whatsoever of what went on beyond the next village.

If there was any slowdown in the war in September and October of 1963, it was because the Vietnamese generals—under American prodding—were concentrating on thoughts of a coup d'état, while Diem and Nhu, out of fear of America, were concentrating on how to prevent a coup.

It was not until after the coup d'état that the Vietnamese war took a decidedly downward turn. The military junta with its uncertain leadership, after purges of key (and scarce) officials, finally plunged much of the countryside into the confusion from which it purportedly was trying to save Vietnam.

No wonder the Vietcong took advantage of the situation to seize the military initiative for the first time in many months. No wonder that, in the 2 months after the coup d'état, the military junta lost more real estate, lives and weapons to the Vietcong than at any previous time in the war.

It was precisely out of fear of such predictable consequences of trying to change regimes in midwar that Secretary of Defense McNamara and Central Intelligence Director John McCone opposed a coup d'état. But they were overruled by the pro-coup d'état faction led by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman, and Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hillsman.

The Diem-must-go decision came shortly after the temporary closing of about a dozen (out of 4,000) pagodas on August 21, which outraged Washington. Diem said that his only aim was to get the Buddhist leaders out of politics and back to religion. The Vietnamese leader insisted that unless he shut down the propaganda machinery of the pagodas and put a halt to the glorification of suicide by burning, public disorder in the cities would mount and world misunderstanding would deepen. Washington disagreed. Further, it felt that Diem had not only humiliated it and flouted its advice, but had broken a promise to be conciliatory. Washington's anger was heightened by horrendous stories of alleged killings and brutalities during the pagoda raids. (There were no such killings, as the monks themselves later said.)

In any case, on August 24, the State Department sent out word—without the knowledge of Secretary McNamara or of CIA Director John McCone—instructing Ambassador Lodge to "unleash" the Vietnamese generals with a view to toppling the Diem government if they could. Plotting among educated Vietnamese, including the generals, is a kind of national pastime, as chess is to the Russians. Until lately it had been a pretty harmless pastime, because everybody knew that real action was dependent on an American green light—and until August such a green light had been withheld.

But on Sunday, August 25, Washington publicly gave the generals a green light in

a Voice of America broadcast that virtually called on the Vietnamese military to take over. At the same time, Ambassador Lodge asked the CIA to poll the Vietnamese generals and see when and if they were ready to translate revolt talk into action.

Diem's shock at the Voice of America broadcast and the CIA poll of the Vietnamese generals can only be imagined by turning the tables around. Suppose the United States were engaged in a war against the Communists in which we depended almost totally on aid from Vietnam; suppose, in the middle of that war, Vietnam issued a broadcast calling for the American Joint Chiefs of Staff to overthrow the American Government?

The miracle is that the Diem regime survived as long as it did the virtual declaration of political war served on it that August by Washington.

What, after many months of hesitation, finally decided the general (in mid-October) to stage the coup? In separate interviews with this correspondent, members of the military junta spoke of these factors:

1. The late President Kennedy called, at a press conference, for "changes of policy and maybe personnel" in Vietnam.

2. Washington announced the withdrawal of 1,000 American soldiers by the end of 1963, and possible total withdrawal by 1965. (Said one general: "That convinced us that unless we got rid of Diem, you would abandon us.")

3. The economic aid was cut. Many generals agreed that this cut was psychologically the most decisive goad to a coup d'état. "It convinced us," a key plotter explained, "that the United States was serious this time about getting rid of Diem. In any case, this was a war we wanted to win. The United States furnished us with the jeeps, the bullets, the very guns that made the war possible. In cutting economic aid, the United States was forcing us to choose between your country's help in the war and Diem. So we chose the United States."

Ironically, President Diem did make some important concessions to the United States in September and October. For example, in mid-September President Diem agreed to every point put forward by the United States in a program to reform and consolidate the strategic hamlet program in the Mekong Delta. Many Americans had long felt that this program had been overextended. At last President Diem agreed with the diagnosis and decided to do something about it. Why was this move toward the American position never publicized? One Western diplomat put it this way: "Ambassador Lodge and his deputy, William Truehart, were so determined to get rid of Diem that they were opposed to putting him in a conciliatory light. They were afraid this would strengthen the hands of those in Washington against a coup d'état."

Even at the 11th hour, Ambassador Lodge could, of course, have turned off the revolt if he had chosen to give the slightest sign that the new frontier and President Diem were even beginning to move to heal their rent. As one member of the military junta put it: "We would never have dared to act if we had not been sure that the United States was giving us its moral support."

In the last hours before his death, President Diem was stripped of any doubt whatsoever of Washington's hostility. Telephoning the American Embassy from the Palace at 4:30 p.m. on November 1, after the bombardment had started, President Diem asked Ambassador Lodge: "What is Washington's attitude toward this?" Lodge replied: "I don't know Washington's attitude. After all, it is 4:30 in the morning there."

"But you must have some idea," Diem said.

Whereupon Lodge turned the conversation to the matter of Diem's safety, offering him

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an airplane to take him out of the country. Could anything have indicated more clearly that in American eyes the success of the coup d'etat was a fait accompli?

The only certain thing about the murder of President Diem and Counselor Nhu is that they were shot in the back (Diem in the neck, Nhu in the right side) with their hands tied behind them. Nhu also had a dagger or bayonet wound in the chest, which was apparently indecisive.

These facts were established beyond all doubt by this reporter through photographs and through talks with military eyewitnesses, attendants at St. Paul's Hospital (where the bodies were first taken) and from information given by two relatives, a niece and nephew who handled the preparations for the burial.

In the light of the way Diem and Nhu died, there is a strong possibility that the shootings were ordered by some or all members of the military junta. Would a junior officer take such a responsibility on himself?

Now for the Buddhist leaders who started it all: have they got what they wanted? I use the word "leaders" advisedly, for of the Buddhists in Vietnam, who form about 30 percent of the population of 14 million people, the overwhelming majority are largely nonpolitical. Buddhist monks tend to be somewhat passive. They would never have dreamed of resorting to violent demonstrations had they not been subjected to the skillful and inflammatory propaganda that poured from the humming mimeograph machines of the Xa Loi pagoda. By the end of last summer, the original grievances of the Buddhist leaders in Hue—matters of property rights, flag flying, etc.—had largely been met by the Diem regime.

In the midst of the anti-Diem ferment I wrote an article asking: "What do the Buddhists want? They want Diem's head—not on a silver platter, but wrapped in an American flag."

You have to hand it to the Buddhist leaders that they got what they wanted. But will this satisfy the more militant Buddhist leaders? It is heady stuff, even for Buddhists, to have the attention of the entire world focused on you, and to exercise the kind of political power that can topple governments. Will, for instance, the venerable Thich Tri Quang, the mastermind of the Buddhist campaign and by far the most intelligent and militant of all, be satisfied to take a political back seat?

Thich Tri Quang is a Buddhist leader from Hue who was granted asylum at the American Embassy even though his past is in some controversy. According to records of the French Colonial Office, he had twice been arrested during the postwar French occupation of Indochina for dealings with Ho Chi Minh. By his own admission, he was a member of the Vietnam Communist liberation front. He claims to have fallen out with the Communists later. Again according to the French, who still have representatives at Hanoi, Thich Tri Quang's brother is currently working for Ho Chi Minh in the Communist Vietnam's Ministry of the Interior. The duties of Thich Tri Quang's brother are the direction of subversion in South Vietnam.

None of this, of course, proves anything about Thich Tri Quang's current attitude toward the Communist Vietcong. What does seem clear is that he learned a lot from the Communists about organization and propaganda. He ran his emergency headquarters at the Xa Loi pagoda like a company command post. Orders were barked out, directing a demonstration here, a protest meeting there. Messengers scurried in and out, carrying banners with their newly painted slogans. Respectful monks brought in the latest anti-Diem propaganda blast

for Thich Tri Quang to review word by word.

In my discussion with Thich Tri Quang, I was somewhat taken aback at his indifference about the war against the Communists. When I asked whether the occasional outburst of turmoil might not offer the Vietcong the opportunity to infiltrate among the demonstrators, Thich Tri Quang shrugged his shoulders and said: "It is possible that the current disorders could lead to Communist gains. But if this happens it will be Diem's fault, not ours."

In the same interview in the Xa Loi pagoda, Thich Tri Quang told me that his preferred solution for Vietnam was "neutrality," adding: "We cannot get an arrangement with the North until we get rid of Diem and Nhu."

The Vietcong are suspected of having led several of the attacks against property on November 1, the day of the coup d'etat. For instance, a small but violent gang of young people attacked and demolished the newly opened headquarters in Saigon of the Asian Anti-Communist League. This league had no connection, financial or otherwise, with Diem. Yet the coup day rioters systematically removed its anti-Communist literature onto the streets, burned it, then wrecked the headquarters.

Whether the new military junta's government by committee can do any better than Diem and Nhu remains in doubt. The junta is ripe for further coups and counter-coups. In any case, it was not because he enjoyed being condemned by world public opinion that President Diem engaged in repressive measures (mild as they were by Asian standards). The new Government will be faced by similar problems, because the fundamental situation has not changed. For example, the change of Government has not altered the tendency of Vietnam's citified intellectuals to take to the streets.

Within 2 weeks after the coup d'etat, 10,000 students at Hue demonstrated noisily against the military junta because it had not dismissed several professors who had been loyal to Diem. This is but one example of pressure by mob. Can the military junta long tolerate decisions enforced by street mobs, or justice by demand of the newly freed and utterly irresponsible Vietnamese press? Three Saigon newspapers have closed—and rightly—already. The smut and sheer mendacity of the postcoup free press of Vietnam is one of the blackest marks of recent months in the annals of Vietnam's so-called intellectuals. In view of the indiscipline, factionalism, and irresponsibility of citified Vietnamese, can the military junta long escape resorting to the same tight rein held by President Diem?

The only sure thing in Vietnam today is that the United States has set an extremely controversial precedent by encouraging, for the first time in our history, the overthrow in time of war of a duly elected government fighting loyally against the common Communist enemy.

[From the New York Herald-Tribune, Aug. 26, 1963]

VIETNAM—FACT AND FICTION: FIRST OF A SERIES ON THE ASIAN TROUBLE SPOT BY MARGUERITE HIGGINS

(Today's events in South Vietnam are confused, uncertain and contradictory. Pulitzer Prize-winning Herald Tribune correspondent Marguerite Higgins, in 4 hectic weeks in the Vietnamese countryside, has spoken to the rulers and the peasants, to the government and its foes, studying the background to the present crisis. This morning, she discusses the general outline of the situation in the country today. In five subsequent articles, Miss Higgins will present the facts and an interpretation of the Government-Buddhist dispute; the United States-backed war against the Communist Vietcong; the "new

breed" American adviser; the Vietcong defectors; and the over-all opposition to the Diem regime.)

(By Marguerite Higgins)

SAIGON.—The Montagnards, their spears at their sides, stood at rigid attention in the brand new village whose bamboo fence cut into the vast sweep of jade-green plateaus that stretches like a Shangri-la between the shelter of northwest South Vietnam's soaring 7,000-foot mountain peaks.

How do the Montagnards (non-Buddhist mountain people) feel about the Communist Vietcong guerrillas?

Their chieftain stepped forward mutely to show a badly butchered hand and arm. It was the cruelty of the Vietcong, he said, that was bringing his people (nearly three quarters of a million strong) away from their beloved mountains and nomadic ways to the villages in the lush, emerald plateaus.

South of Saigon, far back from the mountain peaks and deep in the dull, flat muddy delta, a wizened Buddhist monk, considered a saint by the local villagers, shook his head disapprovingly at the news from the capital.

"I would not kill a fly myself," he said, "I do not believe in the taking of life in any form—even by suicide. * * * All this talk of discrimination has nothing to do with reality as we know it here in our village. Our village chief (a Buddhist) gives out pigs, fertilizer and rice seed without asking anybody his religion. The Catholics don't get more than we do, and we don't get more than the Catholics."

Up north in the arid coastal plains of Phan Rang Province, a Moslem leader of Vietnam's Cham tribesmen (of Indonesian origin) stood outside the mosque with its blue mosaic dome and shook his head in puzzlement at the stranger's question, as did the villagers who crowded around.

"We know nothing about any religious persecution," said the Moslem. "President Ngo Dinh Diem was province chief here (beginning in 1923). He helped our people build mosques, and now he sends us rice, seed and water. So we are grateful to President Diem."

This is a fragmentary picture of the seldom told other side of the story: The attitudes in the deep rural countryside where the overwhelming majority of South Vietnam's 14 million people live. This story contrasts violently with the tragic headlines and anti-Diem ferment in the big cities of Saigon and Hue, which have a combined population of slightly more than a million, but which have captured the bulk of the world's attention.

And it is in the countryside—not the cities—that the war will be won or lost.

Despite the strident antigovernment campaign spread to provincial towns from humming mimeograph machines at the Xa Loi pagoda in Saigon in the months before the government's crackdown last week; despite the tragic suicides by fire; despite the loss of most citified intellectuals including university students, President Diem's Vietnamese armies continued this summer to gain in those areas of the countryside where the war is fought the hardest.

Paradoxically, the blacker Vietnam's image grew in the outside world, where President Diem was widely assumed to be totally at fault in the Buddhist affair, the greater grew the momentum of the Vietnamese Army's assaults on the Communist Vietcong.

Contrary to recent published reports that the situation in the rich Mekong River delta area has deteriorated, Gen. Paul Harkins, chief of the American military mission here, insists that the opposite is true. In a curious coincidence, the week that saw the greatest number of suicides by fire also brought the greatest decrease ever in Vietcong-initiated action in the delta. The American military, with few exceptions, are convinced

that after 18 months of buildup, setbacks and false starts, the war in Vietnam is beginning to be won.

SAVAGERY

That is why the Buddhist affair and the savagery of the political repression are doubly tragic. They rivet world attention on the dark and dismal side of a picture that is by no means all black.

Why did the Diem Government institute its crackdown on the Buddhists last week and declare martial law?

Not, certainly, for religious reasons. Rather because Mr. Diem was bitterly convinced that the leaders of the General Buddhist Association were going for his political jugular and that the conciliatory policies advocated by the United States were only making them more thirsty for his political blood.

President Diem stated this conviction in the strongest terms during an interview even though at the time he was still trying to please the Americans by going along, albeit reluctantly, with the policy of conciliation. This policy only allowed the Buddhists to stage otherwise illegal antigovernment demonstrations and to disseminate antigovernment propaganda. It was a privilege not extended to any other political or religious organizations by Mr. Diem's authorization regime, which always has pulled in the reins harshly when it felt politically threatened.

U.S. officials in Saigon and in Washington agreed with Mr. Diem's assessment of the Buddhist leaders' ambitions. But they disagreed angrily and bitterly with the brutal tactics with which he silenced his political opposition.

PRODS

Right up to the moment of the imposition of martial law, Americans had pleaded with Mr. Diem to put some sense of personal conviction and dynamism into the policy of conciliation. They argued that in this way the Buddhists would be deprived of an issue and would in due time be pacified by the real concessions which the Americans gradually and painfully had extracted from President Diem.

But Mr. Diem, prodded by his more militant brother, Counselor Ngo Ninh Nhu, and his brother's wife, Mrs. Nhu, could only see that each concession brought new Buddhist predictions of demonstrations and suicides to come.

Or as a Buddhist spokesman told this correspondent several weeks ago "when Lodge gets here there will really be some excitement."

Now that martial law has been imposed, it seems impossible, in this reporter's judgment, that President Diem, irrespective of American pressure, would again permit the Buddhists—or any other group—to set up mimeograph machines and start back up the road of anti-Government action.

In an authoritarian state, where there is no outlet for political steam, anything can happen.

No one is more aware of this than Mr. Diem and his family, especially Counselor Nhu who is the President's closest political adviser.

COUP

At an interview that took place prior to martial law, Mr. Nhu said: "I do not think that a coup d'etat could be successful without American support. And I certainly do not suspect the Americans of plotting to overthrow us, especially at a point when the war is beginning to go better. Still people are not always rational. And so somebody might be crazy enough to attempt a coup d'etat, especially in the present atmosphere."

Counselor Nhu observed that he had called army generals to a meeting to discuss the Buddhist affair.

"The army does not like to have this matter dragged out," Mr. Nhu said. "They see

that the Government is successfully defied by the Buddhists, and this is a dangerous precedent. It could give ideas to others. So the army is angry with us for letting the Buddhists continue these demonstrations and disorders.

STOP

"The Americans want us to sit by quietly and let a handful of Buddhist leaders tell lies about us to the world and foment disorders. We offer the Buddhists everything—international investigation of every so-called grievance; but the Buddhist leaders refuse because it is their policy to rouse opinion against us in hopes of overthrowing this Government. * * * There is a point where this must stop."

It is of note that Counselor Nhu, after imposition of the martial law, gave army impatience with the Buddhist situation as a main reason for the regime's action against the pagodas.

After martial law was imposed, the Vietnamese Army made haste to assure the Americans that the war against the Vietcong would be prosecuted as vigorously as ever. The American military mission has confirmed that the tempo has not been slowed and that there has been no substantial diversion of frontline troops.

Is there a contradiction between the steady American optimism about the war against the Vietcong and the ferment caused in the cities by the Buddhist affair and the indignation of many Vietnamese over the Government's brutal methods?

The impact of the Buddhist affair in the rural countryside (the villages and hamlets rather than the provincial towns) is far less than Americans imagine for these reasons:

It is demonstrably incorrect to give the impression that the General Buddhist Association represents 80 percent, or even 70 percent, of Vietnam's population of 14 million people.

RACE

In the first place the association, whose member pagodas are largely in the coastal towns, is but one of the many rival Buddhist sects in Vietnam. In a 1962 pamphlet, the association claimed 1 million members plus 3,000 monks and 300 nuns. One million members is less than 10 percent of the population.

And even though reliable figures are hard to come by, it is clear that any percentage must not overlook the many different races as well as religions of Vietnam.

The Defense Department in its "Pocket Guide to Vietnam" and the American Embassy in Saigon gives the following as the best estimate of the breakdown between the various groups, although noting that in Vietnam it is considered quite acceptable to have more than one religion.

For instance, a special dispensation was given several years ago to permit Vietnamese Roman Catholics to engage in ancestor worship. And President Diem, in his home at Hue, has a shrine there to his ancestors.

Out of 14 million people in South Vietnam there are:

One million five hundred thousand Catholics.

Five hundred thousand other Christians, including Baptists, Mennonites, Seventh Day Adventists, and converts of the Christian and missionary alliance.

One million five hundred thousand Cao Dai (believers in a mixture of Eastern and Western religions and worshipping as saints diverse figures such as Joan of Arc and Sun Yat Sen).

POINT

Five hundred thousand Hoa Hao (a new religion founded in 1939 containing elements of Buddhism and magic. Its founder, Huynh Phu So, was famous as a teacher and miracle healer and preached that temples, rituals and priests were not necessary to the worship of God.

Seven hundred and fifty thousand Animists (these are mainly the Montagnards, who worship gods of the soil and river, and so forth.)

Three million Confucianists and ancestor worshippers (these include the nearly million Chinese left over from the 900 long years in which Peking, the larger dragon, ruled Viet Nam, the smaller dragon.

Five hundred thousand Hindus and Moslems (these include the Cham tribesmen who are non-Mongol, and the many Pakistanis in Vietnam.

Five hundred thousand Taoists (again a heritage from the many years of Chinese rule).

Add up all these figures and the result is that 8.75 million people are not Buddhists. This leaves 5.25 million Buddhists at most, eliminating those who have no beliefs at all beyonds vague superstitions. So 35 percent would be indicated as a more realistic—though still generous—estimate of the percentage of Buddhists in South Vietnam.

Rufus Phillips, head of the U.S. operations mission that is helping create the strategic hamlet system in the Vietnamese countryside, gives his own well educated guess that 30 to 40 percent of Vietnam is Buddhist in conviction, with perhaps 15 percent pagoda-going Buddhists. Mr. Phillips has been in Southeast Asia since 1954 and has visited literally thousands of Vietnamese villages.

PICTURE

Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, states that the number of Buddhists in Vietnam "has been exaggerated" and says that the whole picture is much misunderstood.

Additionally, events in Saigon don't seem as compelling in the countryside as in Washington because there are thousands of hamlets that are so cut off from anything except their district headquarters that they literally may hear nothing about suicides and demonstrations for years, if then.

Of the more than three dozen hamlets visited by this correspondent, there were only two in which anybody could be found who had even heard about the self-immolation of Thich Quang Duc, the first dramatic suicide.

The steady loyalty of the Vietnamese Army—so far at any rate—is in some part related to the large number of officers drawn from the 2 million refugees who came south from North Vietnam. These soldiers have known Communist rule first hand and are likely to look on President Diem's rule differently than those who have never had this experience.

PRIDE

But a soldier's morale and a soldier's pride have far more to do with success or failure against the immediate enemy than with a dispute that most of them sense has more to do with political opposition to Mr. Diem than with religion. And in talking with many officers and men in three different corps-areas, this reporter felt their excitement at "seeing the light at the end of the tunnel!"—as one colonel put it.

Finally, former Ambassador Frederick G. Nolting, Jr. was quite clear in saying recently that there is no religious "persecution" in Vietnam. There has been repression of Buddhist leaders—not because of their religion but because they conducted anti-Government agitation. Many Vietnamese oppose the repression, but they understand it to be political, not religious.

There probably has been favoritism in the bureaucracy, especially in towns like Hue where the Catholic Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc is one of President Diem's brothers. Currying favor is a full time occupation among some Vietnamese, and there are no doubt Catholics who sought to use acquaintance with powerful members of the Diem family to advance themselves. The Catholics are far better educated than the Buddhists.

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For one thing a Catholic has to have at least a high school education to be qualified to train for the priesthood in a seminary.

MONK

Under the Mahayana (greater vehicle) Buddhism of the association, anyone can go into a pagoda and become a monk for however long he pleases. No educational credentials are needed. And Buddhists tend to be more passive than the Catholics, who have been intensely engaged in building hospitals, leprosariums and schools.

In the view of American officials on the scene, President Diem himself is not guilty of a policy of religious discrimination. But in addition to permitting police brutality, he is most certainly guilty of political and psychological ineptitude which are grave faults in a man trying to run a country by personal, unquestioned dictate.

Said a high official in Saigon: "If Diem had gone instantly to the microphone after the May 8 incident (in which eight bystanders to the Buddhist demonstration were killed) had deplored the tragedy and pledged the Government's best effort to see that such events did not happen again—irrespective of where the guilt lay—it would have been impossible for anyone to pin an anti-Buddhist image on him.

"Instead he is so preoccupied with saving face that he resists admitting anything done by his appointees could be wrong. At first he stayed silent, then he gave way to each Buddhist demand in such a grudging way that it had little effect."

The dispute between the General Buddhist Association and the Government started out as limited psychological warfare over limited and justified objectives involving mainly protocol and property. The Buddhist demands later vastly amplified, were at first primarily that the Government permit Buddhist flags to be flown at pagodas and during religious processions on special holy days. They also asked that certain laws be amended to permit the Buddhists to have greater opportunity to buy property.

MISTAKE

According to Counselor Nhu, "the first mistake the Government made in this Buddhist affairs was to make a fuss about flags. Let them fly any flags they want. If my advice had been asked, I would never have permitted the local authorities to have enforced ordinances against flag flying."

President Diem has in fact yielded to all but one of the Buddhist demands (that he publicly accept guilt for the May 8 incident) but not until police ineptness and sheer brutality set in train events which neither the Buddhists nor the Government foresaw.

Violence first erupted in the university coastal town of Hue where on May 8 two exploding grenades killed eight people, including three children and one Catholic. The May 8 victims were watching a Buddhist protest march to the radio station where the monks wanted to put on a broadcast condemning the Government for attempting to prohibit flying the Buddhist flag even though the Catholics in a procession only 10 days before had flown their religious emblems.

The Buddhists blamed the Vietnamese Army for the killings, while the Diem regime said it was the Vietcong who threw plastic grenades into the watching crowds insisting that the autopsy showed the fragments did not come from Government-type weapons.

The late Thich Quang Duc considered the Government police to be guilty and through his tragic suicide by burning in Saigon's principal intersection imprinted the Buddhist side of the story on the mind of the world.

DEFIANCE

It was then for the first time that the Buddhists began courting arrest deliberately by staging demonstrations in defiance of city ordinances that prohibit them (to all religions) without prior permission.

The police reacted in several instances with rambunctious brutality, beating seated monks and nuns slyly as they carted them off to concentration areas outside the city. The government claims that those arrested were subsequently all released.

But in the meantime a tidal wave of world attention focused on the Buddhists of Vietnam who were soon making use of their unexpected ability to manipulate international attention as a weapon against the government.

In the pagodas, the monks, exhilarated by playbacks of U.S. press stories which were somehow copied from the U.S. Embassy file, began talking of continuing their campaign until Mr. Diem was overthrown. More and more in the weeks prior to martial law, the monks seemed to convince themselves that the new Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, would be Washington's agent in overthrowing the Diem regime.

Mimeograph machines, loudspeakers, and English-speaking press spokesmen were brought to the pagodas to disseminate to the foreign press charges and demands that became tougher and tougher.

OFFER

For instance, the Buddhist Association at first clamored for an investigation of the Hue killings under credible conditions. But when Mr. Diem finally offered them an internationally observed joint investigation of this and every other alleged grievance, the Buddhists refused.

As a price for joining the investigation they demanded that Mr. Diem first admit guilt for the Hue killings.

In other words, the Buddhists demanded that the regime admit—prior to investigation—that it was wrong. The admission of guilt was part of the five Buddhist demands issued in May. But it was not made a precondition of an internationally observed investigation until midsummer.

In American eyes, the desperate need remains to establish the facts as to Buddhist charges of persecution for religious reasons, which is quite a different matter than police repression for political reasons, although the two are often confused. And the only way world opinion can be satisfied is for the investigation to be carried out in a manner that will make the results credible.

After martial law, this reporter queried President Diem on this point with this question: "You recently told me in answer to a question that a policy of conciliation was irreversible. Have you now reversed that policy? Or will you hold open the offer of an internationally observed investigation of Buddhist complaints?"

ANSWER

The President replied that the offer was still open, saying in his written answer: "My government has never had a policy of religious discrimination so why should we refuse the help of impartial and sincere observers to make clear to the world our good faith?"

And an internationally observed investigation to establish and rectify any Buddhist grievance seems the best way in American eyes to bring some understanding and order out of a confused and tragic situation.

The tragedy of the events set in motion by the Hue killings is heightened by the fact that never before last May 8 had there been mention of a "religious issue" in Vietnam.

Most Vietnamese do not know the religions of their friends and coworkers and do not presume to ask it.

This reporter has heard a Buddhist bureaucrat say that a Catholic got the promotion instead of himself because President Diem is a Catholic. It happens that a Catholic will say that the Buddhist got promoted instead of himself because Mr. Diem is bending over backwards to please the Buddhists. No one has accused Vietnam of suffering from a shortage of human nature.

But from a social point of view of clubs or residential areas or education, no Vietnamese has been socially handicapped by his religion as still happens today in America to some members of the Jewish faith and as used to happen to Irish Catholics in those days when the Kennedy clan was in Boston.

BIAS

Never in history has a Vietnamese paper carried an ad: "No Buddhist need apply." But as President Kennedy's father and mother well remember, advertisements saying "No Irish need apply" were a fact of life not so very long ago.

More than half of the 40 province chiefs in Vietnam are Buddhists, ancestor worshippers, Confucianists, Cao Dai, etc.—that is, non-Catholic. Only 6 of President Diem's cabinet of 17 are Catholics. The task of negotiating a truce with the Buddhists had been assigned to Vietnam's Vice President, also a Buddhist.

The American mission here has had more than its share of troubles resulting from Mr. Diem's lack of political dynamism. No New Frontiersman he. The shock at police brutality has been profound. But this is not the first nation whose police have gotten out of hand. And these days it is a bit delicate for an American to lecture because it is not impossible for a Vietnamese simply to reply: "Remember Alabama."

CHARGE

But prior to martial law there had been a certain disenchantment among Americans at persistent Buddhist dissemination of unproved charges. At one point, for instance, the Buddhists said flatly that the police had arrested 365 Buddhists in a suburb on the outskirts of Saigon in a night raid.

On checking the Americans found that hardly any of those arrested were Buddhists, that the raid was a routine one to check the identity cards of families in a district through which Vietcong frequently infiltrate into Saigon, and finally that all except those without identity cards and criminal records were released. The Buddhists were accurate on one point. The raid was at night.

There is not the slightest tendency among the Americans to gloss over the situation here. The Diem regime is authoritarian, admits it and justifies this on grounds of being engaged in a fight for its life.

ACTION

Because his regime is authoritarian, President Diem cracks down on any opposition that resorts to direct action. If Montagnards or Cao Dais were to break the law and stage anti-government street demonstrations such as those engineered by the Buddhists, they would be in trouble. Catholics are certainly not immune. A highly critical Catholic editor in a provincial town had his newspaper shut down not too long ago and was sentenced to 18 months in jail.

Americans—especially in the field—do feel frustrated that their efforts seem to be tarnished in the eyes of their countrymen just at a time when the day-to-day cooperation between Vietnamese and Americans has reached an all-time smoothness. This reporter has not seen and seriously doubts any anti-American feeling of any scope in Vietnam.

In the vast countryside, the peasant in the myriad tiny hamlets lives far too elemental a life to care about what is going on in Saigon, even if he happened to be a Buddhist. Tending ricefields all day and defending hamlets by night does not leave much time for thoughts about Buddhist banners and Buddhist property rights, which in any case are not matters that touch his life.

TOLL

The same is true of the foot soldier who has no time for such abstractions because he is deeply engaged in a war that is being fought increasingly hard—so hard that the Vietnamese dead and injured are running

at 14,000 a year. Up in the coastal province of Quang Nai, which only last year was Communist controlled, this reporter asked a Vietcong defector, a warrant officer of 9 years service in Hanoi and elsewhere, who was going to win the war.

The ex-Communist fighter seemed surprised at the question. "Your side," he said, "because we are hungry and tired. When my battalion (the 80th Vietcong Battalion) came down from Hanoi in February 1962 we could get food and recruits from the villages. Now the villages are fortified and it is risky to go in. Life is very hard for us, but the Nationalists (Diem party) get supplies from the Americans. So that is why I think that they are going to win. Don't you?"

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Aug. 27, 1963]

VIETNAM—FACT AND FICTION: WHY THE BUDDHIST FURY

(A monk in flames started it. A bizarre sacrifice in Saigon's main intersection, and the world was shocked and stirred. Since then the high stakes crisis in South Vietnam has grown more intense, and at the same time more emotional, more complex more confusing. But Buddhist discontent remains the one constant factor in the swift march of events. Pulitzer Prize-winning Herald Tribune Correspondent Marguerite Higgins, in the Vietnamese countryside, cut through rumor and contradiction in a search for the facts of the Buddhist-Government dispute. Today, in the second of a six-part series, she presents her surprising findings.)

(By Marguerite Higgins)

SAIGON.—The saffron-robed monk came down the steep steps of the Xa Loi pagoda looking much younger than his 24 years. Infinitely poised, he greeted the waiting journalists, each one by name.

From inside the ornate exotic pagoda, whose peaks thrust three stories high, drifted the mixed aroma of burning joss sticks and jasmine. Ceremonial services were being held for the late Thich Quang Duc, who set the tragic precedent of suicide by fire.

Outside the iron-grilled gates, another monk harangued several thousand of the faithful. He was standing, loudspeaker in hand, on the roof of the pagoda souvenir shop. It was doing a brisk business in post-cards depicting photographs of the venerable Quang Duc's self-immolation at a Saigon intersection.

DRAFT

The older members of the crowd stood impassively, but the youngsters seemed to be visibly enjoying the excitement. They roared back enthusiastically when the monk, in modified cheerleader fashion, gave the signal to shout "Buddhism Forever" and "Down With Madame Nhu."

Back at the inner steps of the pagoda, the young monk—Thich Duc Nghiep, the assistant secretary of the General Buddhist Association and spokesman for the pagoda—expertly fielded in stilted but clear English, the questions of the journalists.

Then, as was routine, Thich Duc Nghiep handed out mimeographed sheets of new allegations about Government repressions against Buddhists. Almost as an afterthought, the monk remarked that it would "be very interesting" for the journalist to go to Hue 4 hours flying time from Saigon) "right away."

"Is it another barbecue?" blurted out a photographer with typical irreverence.

"Ahhh (drawing the word way out) I cannot say," responded Thich Duc Nghiep. "But I recommend going to Hue and it would be a good idea to take your cameras."

As he turned to go, the monk tossed back over his shoulder the admonition "You ought to try and be in Hue by 8 o'clock in the morning."

As is happened, although a number of reporters and photographers got to Hue the next morning, there were no self-immolations (the word suicide is taboo among the Buddhists) until a week later.

But the scene at the pagoda was typical of the expertise in Buddhist press handling that was a thorn in the side of the Government.

This correspondent who had never before passed much time in pagodas, was astonished to be greeted on the first day at Ya Loi with a query by Thich Duc Nghiep: "Ah, you are from New York * * * what kind of a play are we getting?"

Not expecting the question, I asked, "Do you mean is the Buddhist story still getting headlines?"

"Yes, yes," he nodded impatiently.

THE PAGODA PUBLICISTS

"It certainly is," I said. "That's why I'm here."

And when Thich Duc Nghiep learned that my stay in Vietnam would be limited to about 3½ weeks, he declared, "You are making a great mistake, Miss Higgins. When new U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge arrives, there will be many demonstrations that will make what went before look like nothing. And there will be many more self-immolations * * * 10, 15, maybe even 50."

Exactly what was the discrimination that was causing all this tragedy, I asked young Thich Duc Nghiep.

"What we want," said the monk, "is for the Government to fulfill the five Buddhist demands in a just spirit."

(The five demands involve flying Buddhist flags on certain ceremonial occasions, improved chances to purchase property, freedom to propagate the Buddhist faith, punishment of those guilty of throwing grenades into a crowd of demonstrators May 8 in Hue, and an end to arrests and persecution of Buddhists.)

But what, I inquired, about the Government's claim that it had met virtually all these demands in an agreement signed June 16?

A SUMMONS

"That is just on paper," said Nghiep.

"Is it absolutely too late for the Government to find agreement with the Buddhists?"

Nghiep: "We do not go in for political questions. But it does seem too late to reform."

Buddhist intentions became clearer to me in one of the few amusing incidents of a sad period.

I was leaving the Hotel Caravelle an hour before store closing time to pick up some slacks for a dawn departure for the combat zones the next morning. Excitedly, the hotel telephone operator intercepted me to say that "the very highest monk" at the Xa Loi pagoda had summoned me to an audience, that I was to report instantly to the pagoda, and that I was not to bring my interpreter as this was to be "top secret."

At the pagoda I passed rows of politely bowing monks in saffron robes and was ushered into the innermost inner sanctum—a small cosily furnished room in the residential wing of the Xa Loi.

There sat Thich Duc Nghiep and an older, alert-looking monk. This one was in grayish blue robes. He was lavishly introduced by the young pagoda spokesman as "one of our most important leaders and one who ordinarily never sees correspondents but since you represent the White House."

The light dawned.

THE MESSAGE TO KENNEDY

I dug into my purse, got out the White House press card which I had used earlier that day at the pagoda as identification, and said to the monks, "You don't understand. I am a reporter. I am only accredited to the White House."

"Precisely," answered Thich Duc Nghiep, triumphantly taking the White House card and showing it proudly to Thich Tri Quang, one of the leaders from Hue. "You are accredited to the White House, and we have a message for President Kennedy."

Argument got me nowhere. Two and a half hours later, after the stores were closed and the slacks irretrievable, I emerged with the message to President Kennedy which boiled down to this:

"We the Buddhists have good information that President Kennedy sympathizes with our anti-Diem efforts and he no doubt had to maintain a certain public posture. But his last press conference was much too favorable to Diem. The time is coming when President Kennedy will have to be more outspoken because it would be hard to get rid of Diem without explicit American support."

In response to my rather astonished questions (I had only been there 2 days) Thich Tri Quang indicated that the Buddhists felt Mr. Diem would be inhibited by American pressure from cracking down on them. So they thought they had a good chance of continuing their agitation to the point where the Americans would be embarrassed into withdrawing their support of Mr. Diem or getting rid of him. And the Buddhists had no apparent doubt that "getting rid of Mr. Diem" would be Washington's choice.

A GOAL

What did the Buddhists want? Diem's head—and not on a silver platter but enveloped in an American flag.

It was Buddhist strategy, as a number of their leaders openly told me, to keep agitation—and publicity about it—at a high level until Washington finally ordered new Ambassador Lodge somehow to remove the Diem family from power. A number of the now jailed Buddhist leaders, in fact, asked me point blank: "How much will it take to force the United States to act against Mr. Diem?"

Although they insisted that they had no special candidate for the Presidency, the Buddhists clearly expected that the power and influence of their leaders would be enhanced under any successor to Mr. Diem.

The political nature of the Buddhist aims was evident to Westerners in Saigon despite the worldwide acceptance of Buddhist claims of religious persecution. The Buddhist leaders are being persecuted all right—but for daring to challenge Mr. Diem, not for their religion.

Former Ambassador Frederick Nolting, Jr., is one among many diplomats who believe that the Buddhist leaders deliberately expanded some perfectly legitimate local grievances about flying flags and property rights into a misleading picture of religious strife for political ends.

Father Patrick O'Connor—an Irishman, not an American—wrote from the scene an article that appeared August 9 in the Catholic Standard, stating:

"The Buddhists in South Vietnam have been selling the American public a bill of goods. They sold it first to some of the foreign correspondents in Saigon. * * * The militant intersect committee for the defense of Buddhism has listed five demands. For these five demands, the Buddhist association is prepared to throw the country into disorder and defy the government in the middle of its life and death struggle with communism."

THE POLITICAL ENDS

"For these it is prepared to let bonzes (monks) burn to death—if the foreign press can be present. * * * As one bonze has admitted to a correspondent, the five demands no longer represent their aim.

"No matter what the Government may do, the leaders will find a new matter for complaint. Only the fall of the Government will satisfy them."

Although Pope Paul VI has personally interceded with an appeal for tolerance in South Vietnam, the Vatican has also taken a position that the conflict is not a religious dispute, but a political one. The Vatican newspaper *L'Osservatore Romano*, in a front-page article last week, said that the cause of the crisis was "the political judgment of the Government—whether justified or not—as to the ability of the Buddhist community to resist and defend against communism."

How do the political aims of the Buddhist leaders in Saigon square with five tragic suicides by fire of monks and nuns? In every case the suicides left notes indicating that their act was done in the belief that Buddhism was being persecuted as a religion—a religion that in some interpretations approves self-sacrifice.

It is a fact that monks in pagodas and some Buddhist laymen would tend to accept as correct the claims of persecution put out by Buddhist leaders in Saigon whether they themselves or any one around them had ever experienced religious persecution.

A MOTIVE

And outside Vietnam, the American public—which has a hard time avoiding the temptation of applying Western logic to oriental situations—tends almost automatically to assume that the tragic suicides are proof in themselves of religious persecution. Why would anyone, the Westerner reasons, choose such a horrible death unless he or she had irrefutable proof that the Diem government was doing terrible things to Buddhists.

The unnecessary savagery of the Vietnamese Army in smashing the pagodas cannot help but deeply tarnish Mr. Diem's regime. But police brutality, which had also occurred before the imposition of martial law, was not the cause of the tragic spate of suicides.

For example: At Phan Thiet, the coastal town where a 20-year-old Buddhist monk burnt himself at high noon alone in the memorial park, the Buddhists were unable to give this reporter any specific example of their grievances except that they had been compelled on Buddha's birthday to fly the Vietnamese national flag alongside the Buddhist flag.

This reporter remarked that this hardly seemed a grievance warranting suicide. Agreeing, the Buddhist spokesman finally said: "But whatever is the case here, we know there is persecution because our leaders in Saigon have told us so."

In talking to monks in the smaller towns, I found them kindly, credulous, and disconnected from reality. Most had not had more than a grammar school education. The effort of sorting out the facts in the maze of charges and denials between the Buddhist Association and the Government was beyond any desire of theirs. If the venerable elder monks in Saigon's pagodas said Buddhism was being persecuted—then it must be so.

No one will ever know, of course, just how much the suicides were influenced by the emotional, powerfully written tracts sent out from Xa Loi. Among the slogans lettered on huge banners draped over the pagoda's outer wall were these: "We are ready to sacrifice ourselves for Vietnamese youth." * * * "Resolutely in the footsteps of Quang Duc" (the first suicide).

In the stormy seas of charge and counter-charge, there are only a few steadfast islands of incontrovertible truth.

The Diem government has had a history of religious tolerance.

For many years President Diem's two closest advisers were members of the Jewish faith: Wolf Ladejinsky, land reform expert, and Dr. Wesley Fishel, head of the Michigan State University advisory group to Vietnam.

THE ISLANDS OF TRUTH

There is no record of the phrase "religious issue" ever being used in South Vietnam until after the May 8 incident.

Catholics, Confucianists, and others have joined the protest against the government and in fact have faced punishment as the result of their stand; among them, the Catholic rector of Hue University, who was dismissed for his backing of demonstrations.

A U.S. military mission fact sheet prepared in November 1962 had this to say:

"The religious atmosphere of Vietnam is characterized by tolerance and acceptance of various religious beliefs. Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Christianity are prevailing religions. To the Vietnamese there is nothing wrong with holding several religious beliefs at once."

It is also true that the Buddhists in the weeks before the imposition of martial law had become increasingly militant in their anti-Diem propaganda. They were clearly courting arrests by staging demonstrations of larger and larger proportions even though these are illegal under local ordinances which apply equally to Catholics, students, or any organized group.

President Diem, in a statement to this reporter, insisted that the recent action against the Buddhists was not because of their religion, but because they turned their pagodas into "hives of antigovernment political activity."

AN ANGER

"Why do the American correspondents insist on calling my government 'Diem's Catholic regime'?" President Diem once flung out angrily. "I notice they never say 'Kennedy's Catholic regime.'"

When this reporter interviewed Mr. Diem, the President was clearly torn by his desire to please the Americans and his inner conviction that the Buddhists were determined to keep things stirred up and topple him.

And even to please the Americans, Mr. Diem was not about to take steps he felt might weaken his personal power and so begin the liquidation of his regime.

In this reporter's judgment, the Buddhists overplayed their hand in thinking that the Americans could indefinitely stay Mr. Diem from reacting in the face of the rising tide of demonstrations, suicides, and Thich Duc Nghiep's open predictions of "much more excitement when Lodge gets here."

And the Buddhist capacity to keep things stirred up stemmed directly from their public relations skill. But while this skill skyrocketed the Buddhist cause to world attention, it was also part of the reason for their current plight, including arrests during the brutal police raid on the Xa Loi and other pagodas. In equal measure to Mr. Diem's fury at the Buddhist political agitation was his fury at the world's attention it received.

For instance, a couple of Mondays ago at 10 p.m. on a rainy night in Saigon, an 18-year-old girl was found on the steps of the Xa Loi pagoda, her right arm bleeding profusely from her unsuccessful attempt to chop it off at the wrist. (In some Buddhist circles, detachment of limbs is an acceptable religious gesture.)

THE DIEM DICHOTOMY

Within 10 to 20 minutes of the discovery, American photographers and reporters were at the macabre scene. They had been summoned there by spokesman Thich Duc Nghiep, who rushed to pagoda phones that kept in close touch with the American and other foreign correspondents. The Xa Loi monks made the blood-drenched girl available for at least 40 minutes to photographers and the press, for whom she tape recorded a statement. Only then was she finally taken to the hospital.

And that is how the United States learned of the incident within hours even though, ironically, the villages of Vietnam would probably not hear of it for months, and in some cases years.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Aug. 28, 1963]

FACT AND FICTION—No. 3—VIETNAM BATTLE IN THE FIELD AND THE GOVERNMENT

(American Death No. 106 in South Vietnam came Monday—an Army reconnaissance pilot, his plane shot down by Communist fire. It was another tragedy of the lonely war in which the United States has staked the lives of 14,000 soldiers and more than \$1 billion in aid, with the goal of defeating the Communist Vietcong guerrillas. President Kennedy has pledged the United States will stay in South Vietnam "until we win." The Herald Tribune's Pulitzer Prize-winning correspondent, Marguerite Higgins, touring the Vietnamese countryside, reports today on how close the West is to success in this crucial cold war battleground.)

(By Marguerite Higgins)

SAIGON.—"The Vietcong are losing because we are steadily decreasing their areas of maneuver and the terrain over which they can move at will."

This judgment was rendered by U.S. four-star Gen. Paul D. Harkins shortly before President Ngo Dinh Diem instituted martial law through South Vietnam. A tall blunt soldier, General Harkins has been in charge here since U.S. military advisory units began to swing into action against the Communist Vietcong guerrillas. Big-scale American efforts got underway in February 1962.

General Harkins continued: "The fortified villages are cutting the Vietcong lifeline to the little people whom they used to tax to get their plasters and their rice. It is harder for them to get into the fortified areas to kidnap youngsters and turn them into recruits. Slowly, I grant you, but surely, the Vietcong will find that there is no place to hide."

The general's words reflected the somewhat favorable turn the war had taken—despite the Buddhist dispute with the Government—during the spring and summer.

How will the imposition of martial law affect all this? It simply too early to tell. The Diem regime has declared that there will be no substantial diversion of troops from the war zone. Whether this promise can be kept obviously depends on the state of law and order.

But as of this moment, General Harkins and his staff flatly contradict published reports that South Vietnam's U.S.-backed fight against the Communists—particularly in the rice-rich delta—is "deteriorating" and that a Vietcong buildup is taking place to the point where the Communists will be able to conduct mobile warfare with battalions as well equipped as the Government's.

"What is mobility?" interjected one of the general's corps advisers. "Mobility means vehicles and aircraft. You have seen the way our Vietnamese units are armed—50 radios, 30 or 40 vehicles, rockets, mortars, and airplanes. The Vietcong have no vehicles and no airplanes. How can they be mobile?"

"Further," the American officer continued "there has been no evidence of any increase in the number of Vietcong units in the delta even though we expected there would be because our strategy is to sweep them steadily southward and finally corner them. As to weapons loss, a year ago our side was losing 20 percent of its weapons. Now the average for our side is 5 percent. Further, the delta area under our control is increasing, not spectacularly, but steadily."

General Harkins frequently has been taken to task by the resident American press corps for overoptimism, but such criticism has left him unmoved.

BREAKTHROUGH

The general and the key members of his staff commanding 14,000 Americans, are convinced that a military breakthrough has begun this summer. At last they can see their laborious preparations paying off as the Vietnamese emerge in imposing numbers from the training camps and the intelligence and communications systems start functioning as they should. Most gratifying of all, the peasants have abandoned their historic and fear-enforced neutrality and have increasingly come to the Vietnamese and Americans to tip them off on Vietcong whereabouts.

But it is when talk turns to the fortified villages (the strategic hamlet program) that the glint of anticipated victory—not this year but not too many years away—really comes to the eyes not only of General Harkins but of most of the American and other diplomatic missions here.

Unless something goes wrong unexpectedly, it is in the strategic hamlets that the American taxpayer will get his \$1-million-a-day worth.

There is no question but that this program—although it has a long way to go—already has changed for the better the security and—even more important—the psychology of huge areas of South Vietnam.

The strategic hamlet plan was developed by United States and Vietnamese leaders as a bold, revolutionary method to halt Vietcong control of the countryside.

Under the plan, peasants—who make up 85 percent of Vietnam's 14 million people—were grouped in rebuilt, fortified communities.

Previously, Vietcong harassment had resulted in whole villages paying tribute to the Communists to avoid extinction. But in a strategic hamlet, the peasant is backed up by a village militia and, if necessary, by the regular army or militia from other villages, which maintain close communication.

Since February 5, 1962, 8,500 hamlets have been established, in which 8 million Vietnamese live. This means that more than half of the nation has a measure of security from Vietcong pressure that has never before been available.

The most convincing report of the success of the strategic hamlet program comes from those who should know best—the Communists themselves.

In the amnesty camp near Quang Nai in the northern coastal regions, a 28-year-old master sergeant who defected told his story.

"I gave up because I was hungry and I heard about the government's amnesty program. It used to be easy to go into the villages and obtain a bottleful of rice a day from the people. Some were willing to give it. Others we had to force. But after the villagers were given guns and barricades it became risky to try to go in even at night. So life in the mountains became very hard."

SECURITY

Maj. John Kelly, the U.S. sector adviser at Quang Nai said the reasons advanced by the Communist sergeant were similar to those given by nearly all of the 800 Vietcong defectors who had come through the camp since the amnesty program was launched in the spring of 1963.

The strategic hamlets look like the stockades the American pioneers built to defend themselves against the Indians, except that the Vietnamese use bamboo instead of logs. Most peasants have not been physically moved from their old homes. Rather, defense works—bamboo and barbed wire fences and sometimes moats—are erected around a group of closely situated villages.

Under President Diem's concept that democracy can best be learned at the rice paddy roots, hamlets are not declared a part of the national network—which would qualify them for a number of special health and educational benefits—until after elections have been held for the hamlet chief.

The hamlet program has gotten off the ground despite an unfortunate psychological start. The Vietnamese Army announced the opening of the program in such a way that it sounded as if hundreds of thousands of families were going to be moved into the fortified villages whether they liked it or not. In actuality only those who volunteered were moved.

The strategic hamlets are not completely immune from attack. In American judgment, the Diem regime has moved too quickly in some areas in setting up strategic hamlets and arming the village militia before the surrounding area is sufficiently cleared of Vietcong.

This reported visited in July the village of Van Vien, which had been held for 30 hours by the Vietcong. Although the village had called for help when attacked, the regular military forces normally stationed at the province capital of nearby My Tho had been diverted at the time to a major military operation in another province.

In August, the Vietcong attacked and burned a strategic hamlet only 20 miles from Saigon. But occasional attacks on a few strategic hamlets do not materially change the picture of increased security for those in the 8,500 hamlets already established. The majority of these, of course, are not successfully overrun.

Deep in the Mekong delta, a few miles from Ap Bac, where bloody battles have been fought with the Vietcong, this reporter talked with villagers whose huts had literally been put aboard army trucks and transported to a new strategic hamlet. The land around the house seemed strangely bare because the rice had been planted late. And the villagers were not without their complaints.

One of the elders—greatly respected because he could read and write and had a slight command of French—talked frankly as we sat on his tiny front porch. Underfoot were muddy and naked children. Curious neighbors hurried over to stare at the strangers. And a stone's throw away, a water buffalo lumbered by guided by a tiny boy astride its broad back.

"This village," said the elderly Vietnamese, "is 5 kilometers (about 3 miles) from my rice paddies. So I must bicycle and walk many miles every day. The Government gave us a thousand piastres with which to rebuild this house. But it really is not good enough to make the chicken roosts and pig stys and things for the animals as good as they were in Ap Bac.

"When I go back to my old rice paddies, I pass the Vietcong every morning, and they are very polite to me and I am polite to them. They do not bother old men. But before, when my hut was at Ap Bac, the Vietcong taxed me 200 piastres (about two and a half dollars) and one bag of rice a year. Now that we are in the strategic hamlet, the Vietcong no longer collect taxes, and that is good. But it is hard for an old man to travel so far each day."

The old Vietnamese was asked whether, if he had it to do over again, he would have stayed in his old village at Ap Bac.

"No," he replied, "from the point of view of security it is better here. Security is especially important for the younger men. The Vietcong do not dare to come this far to kidnap them. The young people are very frightened * * * for they know that the Vietcong will cut their throats if they not do what they say. In Ap Bac we all had to believe in the Vietcong because they were the strongest. Here we have a choice."

It was only in the fall of 1962 that the Vietnamese Army, its buildup completed, was ready to seize the initiative. During the preceding 9 months, the American advisory staff of 700 had been expanded to 12,000, the strategic hamlets had been launched, 375 civil guard companies totaling 100,000 men had been formed and armed, and a village self-defense corps numbering 60,000 had been created.

Additionally, General Harkins likes to cite these changes since the summer of 1962. A year ago, the Vietnamese Air Force was flying about 100 sorties a month and is now flying about 1,000 monthly. The Vietnamese Navy, which plays an important role patrolling the delta, was virtually nonexistent a year ago. Now it has a junk fleet, a river force and patrol ships at sea.

Although the exact figure is classified, the prevailing estimate of Vietnamese Army strength is about 230,000 men.

But most significant of all in the American view are the figures concerning Vietcong attacks. In the summer of 1962, these Communist-initiated actions (including ambushes, kidnappings, terrorism, and propaganda) totaled from 500 to 600 a week. They now are down to somewhere between 200 and 250 a week.

CASUALTIES

Vietnamese Army losses in dead and injured have been running at the rate of 14,000 a year, which, as a top American officer observed, "is testimony to the fact that this Army is not holding back but fighting very hard indeed." The Vietcong losses in dead and wounded are estimated at about 30,000 a year. And in the week since martial law, the losses on both sides were running close to the weekly average.

More than 100 U.S. officers and men have lost their lives, about half of these in combat, the others in accidents of various sorts.

One of the most stunning—and frankly somewhat unexpected successes—was the clearance of most of the Quong Nai area in the northern part of the country. This area had always been revolutionary in spirit and until recently rather pro-Communist. The progress in the highlands near Pleicu, where the Montagnards prevail, has also come quicker than any one had dared hope.

It is in the Mekong Delta that both the war and the strategic hamlet programs are meeting the most difficulty. The reason for this, paradoxically, is that the delta is the richest area. Because of the delta, and despite all the war and turbulence, Vietnam, a deficit rice area in 1962, will export 300,000 tons this year. In the northern areas it is possible to cut off the Vietcong from food supplies from the peasants in the strategic foraging the delta, even if he can't always get rice, a guerrilla can pick coconuts or pineapple off the trees.

Still, as one officer put it, "the important thing is that village after village is being taken from the Vietcong and they are neither able to take them back nor take any geography from our side. Roads are unsafe but not as unsafe as last year."

This fact was confirmed by this reporter, who drove 100 miles through the delta on roads that last year were considered impassable because of Vietcong terrorists.

LODGE SEES DIEM AND NHU

The Diem government tightened authoritarian rule in troubled South Vietnam yesterday, postponing indefinitely the National Assembly election scheduled for Saturday.

The action came as new U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge continued conferences with top Government leaders. Mr. Lodge, who met twice with President Ngo Dinh Diem Monday, conferred at length with the President's brother and chief adviser, Ngo Dinh Nhu, yesterday, in what was described by diplomatic sources as a "very frank" session.

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Mr. Nhu, who requested the meeting, is believed to have directed the savage crackdown on Buddhists, which brought mass arrests and martial law throughout the nation last week. Some sources assert that the President's brother—who controls the police and several other paramilitary organizations—has taken over action command of the Government. Mr. Nhu denies this, but his meeting with Mr. Lodge hardly lacks in significance.

Mr. Lodge's task is crucial because of the high American stake (14,000 men, \$1 million a day) in South Vietnam's war against the Communist Vietcong guerrillas. This war was brought home grimly again yesterday with a report of the death of a U.S. Army pilot, the 106th American to die in Vietnam.

U.S. policymakers are faced with the problem of how to justify continued American presence here in the face of the Government's repressive tactics.

On Monday, the State Department indicated that it absolved the Vietnamese military of instigating the Buddhist raids, with the apparent implication that if the military ousted those responsible Mr. Nhu and/or Mr. Diem—the United States would not be unhappy.

Yesterday the U.S. foreign aid chief, David Bell, in a Washington interview, said the United States desires to continue aiding "the free people of Vietnam" against the Communists, but added:

"We don't support repression in any country."

There is the further crucial problem of how the martial law will affect the Vietcong fight, although the Diem government has contended that the war effort remains unflagged, and in fact announced that 49 Vietcong have been killed in the past week.

Nonetheless, there were unconfirmed reports that Vietnamese Ranger units in three towns were fighting among themselves over the recent actions.

President Diem called off the legislative election yesterday in an official decree issued through the Government-controlled Vietnam Press Agency. The statement gave no details on the reason for the postponement or when the vote would be rescheduled. The one-house 123-member National Assembly is nominally the legislative branch of the Republic but has little authority. The present assembly was elected in August 1959.

Despite certain outward signs of a relaxation of tension yesterday (easing of Saigon's curfew, removal of some barbed wire barricades, shifting of censorship from military to civilian authority), events made clear that the Government would brook no opposition.

Among the developments:

Brig. Gen. Ton That Dinh, Saigon's military governor, ordered security forces to shoot into "any group of troublemakers who violate the state of martial law." He also banned any labor strikes.

Vu Van Mau, Vietnam's longtime Foreign Minister until he resigned last week in protest against the Buddhist crackdown, apparently was under arrest. Mr. Diem had asked Mr. Mau to take a vacation instead of quitting, but the Foreign Minister vanished shortly before he was supposed to take a plane to India over the weekend.

More than 10,000 Government troops remained in Saigon alone. All school, pagodas, movie houses, and parks were closed. More than 2,000 students were arrested Sunday, and their whereabouts remained uncertain. There were some reports the students were being drafted into the army. Thousands of others have been detained by police.

It was reported that Mr. Lodge has unconditionally rejected a demand that the United States turn over two Buddhist monks who took refuge in the American aid mission

next to the Xa Loi pagoda when it was raided last Wednesday.

The Ambassador discussed the turn of events with Mr. Diem in their second meeting Monday, after a brief ceremonial session earlier in the day. The State Department in Washington said the two men, in a 2-hour meeting, "reviewed in some detail the situation currently prevailing in South Vietnam," but declined to spell out details of the conversation.

There was no indication of what was said between Mr. Lodge and Mr. Nhu yesterday.

Meanwhile, the Saigon government received a not-unexpected blow from its neighbor, Cambodia, which cut off diplomatic relations. There has been longstanding border friction between the two nations, and in addition, largely Buddhist Cambodia condemned the Diem crackdown.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Aug. 29, 1963]

VIETNAM: THE WAR ON POVERTY

(War in South Vietnam brings quickly to mind the torturous campaigns against the elusive Vietcong Communist guerrillas. But the war being fought there also is against an older enemy: Poverty and the ignorance that nourishes it. A new breed of Americans is helping the Vietnamese peasant to fight both battles, which go hand-in-hand. Marguerite Higgins, Pulitzer Prize winner, takes a long look at how the wars are going in this 4th article in her series.)

(By Marguerite Higgins)

QUANG NGAI, VIETNAM.—Here in the palm-dotted northern coastal plains you can tell where Americans are welcome—and the Viet Cong are absent—by the sight of the children who rush to the side of the road and shout over and over, "Hello! OK!" after the passing jeep. Wide smiles and Life Savers have been the GI's passport to popularity.

And so far in this northern province, only once did the Life Saver gambit boomerang. This was when a local farmer took the translation of the trade name on the wrapper literally. So one day he stormed up to a group of American advisers, dangled a badly broken arm before their horrified eyes, and denounced the "American magic" as phony because he had swallowed a Life Saver and it had obviously not healed his wounds.

REWARDING

To Maj. Robert J. Kelly, 39, of Allegan, Mich., a veteran of 20 years in the U.S. Army, the job of adviser to the province chief of Quang Ngai is "the most rewarding, exciting and eye-opening experience that I have ever had."

Major Kelly is one of the thousands of a brandnew breed of military that is getting on-the-job training in a new kind of struggle. In this war, winning the minds, hearts and trust of little people has equal priority with winning military battles.

In addition to such orthodox matters as flanking maneuvers, firepower and keeping your carbine clean, the new breed must think about pigsties, rat eradication and psychological warfare.

"The reason this job gets a hold on you" said Major Kelly, "is that you can see things getting better before your very eyes. You can feel the Vietnamese trusting you more each day. And you know you are really doing all right when the start begging you to extend. (The ordinary tour is 1 year.)"

"When I first came here 8 months ago, the rice was yellow and sickly," he said. "There was only one crop a year. The rats were so fierce that they ate up 80 percent of the rice before it could be harvested. The people here were scared and desperate and

half-starving. We had to import rice from the delta."

But then the U.S. group went to work. "We started a rat-eradication program and a fertilizer program. The U.S. operational mission came in and showed them how to use the fertilizer," Major Kelly said.

FERTILIZER

"We built pigsties and brought in pigs and lent them out for breeding. We showed them how to make compost out of pig manure so they could make their own fertilizer. Pretty soon they will be close to self-sufficient in fertilizer and will be exporting pigs. And just take a look at those beautiful green, thick, high stalks of rice."

The major's arm pointed toward the jade green fields where fragile Vietnamese girls in their straw bonnets were carrying buckets of precious water from the canal to the crops.

And looking at those shimmering green fields that were indeed beautiful, it was impossible not to share Major Kelly's sense of pride and accomplishment.

Major Kelly, a holder of combat ribbons for Korea and the New Guinea and Luzon campaigns of World War II, was not alone. There are more than 100 other advisers attached to this 25th Vietnamese Division area. In addition, American agricultural experts are doing a herculean job of helping to build the strategic hamlets that are increasingly giving the peasants protection from Vietcong harassment.

The lowest ranking advisers here are captains who are at the battalion level. All these soldiers, including Major Kelly, go out on combat operations and are authorized to shoot if necessary to prevent their own death or capture.

They do not feel that they are exactly fighting a war, since they have no right of direct command over the Vietnamese troops. But these Americans are often in combat because they accompany their opposite numbers in the Vietnamese divisions into action so that their advice will be available.

Down in the delta, where the war is slower and more difficult, this reporter found Americans who were highly impatient with the infrequency with which their advice was asked. There were complaints that the Vietnamese regimental and division commanders had to refer too often to higher headquarters—complaints that have threaded through the early phases of the war for Vietnam.

But even in the delta, an American colonel remarked: "Part of the problem is that it simply takes time to establish a rapport between the Vietnamese and Americans. Judgments are proved or disproved in the test of operational decisions. Things used to be a bit sticky. But now, when we really get into a fight, I am not at all surprised to have the Vietnamese commander turn to me and ask: 'OK, what do we do now?'"

CIVIC ACTION

In this connection, this reporter was mildly surprised to hear quite a few officers remark that 1 year's tour of duty was not really enough, because "it is time to go home just when things are getting organized."

Throughout South Vietnam, Americans of the new breed are taught to think in terms of "civic action"—a dry-sounding term which, however, means warm, human, easily understood acts of helpfulness by the soldiers to show the people that they are their friends and protectors.

In this spirit, several small groups of Sea-Bees and Army engineers are traveling from village to village, and on a tiny budget of \$20,000 are performing what the Vietnamese regard as small miracles.

There is a small village north of My Tho in the delta, that will forever remember the Americans for building a wooden bridge over the canal that, so long as anyone could re-

member, had separated half the inhabitants from the others.

It all began when the Americans asked the hamlet chief to list three priority needs of the village and then take a vote to see which one the majority wanted to have done. After the bridge was voted, three American engineers appeared, hired local labor to do the work (at 40 piastres or about 65 cents a day—high for the area) under their direction.

MONEY

This brought in extra money to the community and lots of extra excitement. Under the adoring eyes of hundreds of Life Saver-bloated ragamuffins, the engineers showed the Vietnamese how to pour concrete pilings and other such mysteries of bridge building. The whole project probably cost only a few hundred dollars, but it will surely be a high point in the history of that village.

The Americans are seeking by example and prodding to encourage the Vietnamese Army to join the civic action movement. The idea has now progressed to the point where every Vietnamese division "adopts" a strategic hamlet and devotes some labor and materials to completing its defenses.

Quang Ngai had the highest morale of any area I visited, and with good reason: the American advisers, the brand new Vietnamese 25th Division (commanded by a Buddhist) and the peasants defending the hamlets had shared a rousing and genuine victory over the Vietcong.

It happened on April 15 of this year, when an entire Vietcong battalion attacked 12 strategic hamlets. When the 4-day battle was over, the Vietcong had left 226 dead in the rice fields. The 2-weeks-old 25th Division had few casualties.

"It was after that victory," recalled Major Kelly, "that everybody's self-confidence seemed to return. The villagers, instead of being neutral, started coming to us with information about the Communists. People started flooding back into the province capital and, before you knew it, we were in the middle of a building boom.

The Buddhist crisis in the cities seemed from Quang Ngai, with its sanity and sense of purpose, to be a terrible nightmare. Perhaps the Government crackdown can affect the morale of future Americans coming to Vietnam if they believe that they are making a sacrifice for a tarnished and worthless cause.

But you couldn't tell Major Kelly that the people who had fought so bravely on April 15 and who had made the rice so tall and green were part of a cause not worth fighting for. He would fight you first.

In point of fact, at the time of my visit, there had never been any trouble in Quang Ngai between Buddhists and the Government.

How did the Americans in the field react to the preoccupation at home with the Buddhists? There is a natural preference of American soldiers to have hometown attention focus on the accomplishments of which they are so proud rather than on an issue that is not yet real to them.

As Major Kelly said, "When you can see and feel every day how much has been done to make life better and the rice greener, it is a pretty good feeling in itself. But do you suppose anybody at home ever hears about this sort of thing?"

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Aug. 30, 1963]

A VIETCONG DESERTER SPEAKS

(South Vietnam is a testing ground. The fate of southeast Asia is at stake, and that's why the United States is there in force. But in the Vietnamese countryside, great cold war issues come down to a bloody fight. Part of that fight is to win over the enemy. In this fifth article, Pulitzer Prize-winner Marguerite Higgins interviews a Vietcong

guerrilla who tells her why he rejected the Communists.)

(By Marguerite Higgins)

QUANG NGAI, VIETNAM.—"There they are—real, genuine bonafide, 18-carat Communist Vietcong."

The U.S. Army captain waved his hand in the direction of a schoolhouse where 60 deserters from Vietcong were sitting in prim rows, singing a patriotic Vietnamese song that required rhythmic clapping. They looked amazingly young, fresh faced—and bored.

These Vietcong were among 800 who had passed through this amnesty camp since April 1963 when President Ngo Dinh Diem proclaimed a policy of forgiveness and rehabilitation for those Communists who gave themselves up. Throughout the country, the Chu Hoi (amnesty program) has brought in more than 10,000 Vietcong, far exceeding expectations.

MESSAGE

Here in Quang Ngai, the Vietnamese and American psychological warfare officers have worked out an ingenious program to take the amnesty message to the many Vietcong battalions known to be hiding both in the nearby foothills and in the forested highlands of Vietnam's northwest frontier.

Each morning light planes equipped with loudspeakers fly low to broadcast the Government's invitation. The broadcasts are in Vietnamese and in the different dialects of the Montagnards (mountain people of non-Vietnamese origin). Each day thousands and thousands of pamphlets are dropped into the foothills and mountains. These amount to safe-conduct passes for any Vietcong who retrieves one.

In the Quang Ngai area, where food is hard to come by, nearly every Vietcong has given hunger as a main cause for desertion. The Communists blame their troubles on the fortified village program, which has made it harder and harder to get into populated areas and extort rice from the peasant.

"Which one do you want to speak with first?" asked the Vietnamese camp director as 60 pairs of eyes looked up expectantly, their owners clearly desiring to be liberated from the usual routines and indoctrination of the amnesty camp.

A Vietcong master sergeant who was one of the most recent defectors was asked to join this reporter and her interpreter, an American who speaks Vietnamese, in a far corner of the school's grounds where we could talk without interruption.

The master sergeant, Vu Duy Liem, 28, was clad in the cotton pajamas that many Vietnamese traditionally wear as outer garments. They find it amusing to think that Americans use them to sleep in. The master sergeant was slim, wiry, with a mind razor-sharp.

BIOGRAPHY

His home was a village in the Quang Ngai area, which has had a history of being very revolutionary. His family were peasants and ancestor worshipers, as were most of the people in the village. He joined the Communist Viet Minh armies in 1953 to fight the French. In 1954 the master sergeant was regrouped to Hanoi in North Vietnam under the terms of the Geneva agreement.

In July 1962 Sergeant Liem was among 450 men of the 80th Vietminh Battalion who completed an arduous journey south to the mountains near Pleiku with the assignment to join with other regular Viet Minh units that were infiltrating at the time in peak numbers to "liberate South Vietnam."

"We came through Laos over a mountain pass that was so steep that one misstep would cause you to tumble to death in the chasm below," said Sergeant Liem. "Fortunately, we had excellent guides. For the Communists, as you well know, prepare everything thoroughly in advance. We car-

ried with us Chinese and Czech weapons that are modified in North Vietnamese factories so that they can fire ammunition manufactured in Hanoi."

Why did Sergeant Liem desert?

"I learned very gradually that the Hanoi government was one that denied freedom," said the sergeant, "but in any case, I had been unsure of my loyalty to the Communists for some time before I came South. In the North they told us that the Communist system would bring a better life to the people. They told us that the Russians and the Chinese were coming to our country to help raise the standard of living. But everybody could see with their own eyes that in the North that standard of living is going down and the people are suffering."

RUSSIANS

The sergeant was asked whether the people of North Vietnam preferred to get their "assistance" from the Russians or the Chinese.

"As a rule the Vietnamese don't like foreigners of any kind," said Sergeant Liem. "But if they have to have them, they prefer the Russians because they are more skillful and prosperous than the Chinese. Everybody knows that the Russians have succeeded and the Chinese have failed. Everybody in Hanoi follows very closely the situation in China and knows all about the terrible suffering of the Chinese peasants."

The sergeant was asked to describe the life and activities of his battalion in the mountains.

"The first few months were spent," he said, "in getting organized in the matter of food and water and establishing liaison with the other battalions. At first the Montagnards gave us a bottleful of rice a day willingly. Later we had to force them. We planted some crops of our own (corn). In the fall we had our first success. We attacked a Vietnamese Army convoy near Khontum, and we captured three cannons and lots of other ammunition. But we had difficulty fulfilling our assignment to capture and indoctrinate young men from the villages to fill our ranks and fight on our side. By winter the village defenses had been built up so that it was risky to go into them even at night to get food."

The sergeant continued: "Life in the mountains became very hard. Through attrition and battle losses my battalion lost 100 men in 1 year. We did not have enough to eat. There was no medicine. I had been thinking for some time of trying to get away, though I could not speak of it, for the Vietcong would have killed me. Still I was afraid of how the Government would treat me. Then I heard the broadcast from the plane about the amnesty camps. And I decided I would run away the first chance I got."

The peak infiltration of regular Vietcong units such as Sergeant Liem's battalion occurred, according to American sources, during the summer and fall of 1961 and continued heavily through the spring and summer of 1962.

PRESIDENT

As the U.S. military fact sheet on Vietnam puts it: "By 1960 the Communists realized that they had lost any chance to take over South Vietnam by political and propaganda means alone." According to the fact sheet the reason the Communists knew there was no chance for political victory was that President Diem, who in 1954 had been given survival chances of 6 months, had defied the skeptics and in addition to establishing order out of chaos had achieved major social, economic and, above all, agricultural gains.

"The economic progress made by the Republic of Vietnam," the fact sheet adds, "was seriously embarrassing to the North. Accordingly * * * the Communists launched what they surely hoped would be an all-out

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drive to overturn the Diem government by armed force * * *

The Vietcong organization in South Vietnam is on three levels. The political machinery consists of regional, provincial, and district committees that parallel the Government's own administrative units. These committees operate secretly in areas controlled by the Government and openly in those villages and districts still held by the Vietcong, the majority of which are in the Delta.

The duties of the Communist political warriors are to disseminate Red propaganda, spread false rumors about the Government, act as intelligence agents and informers for the regular military units, earmark government administrators for assassination and exploit trouble.

The regular military Vietcong units comprise 22,000 to 25,000 men at present. This figure would have risen far higher during the 1961-62 peak period of infiltration had it not been for Communist losses last year. These amounted to an estimated 30,000 last year in dead and wounded.

The Communist military units have concentrated in the past on squad and company-size attacks, although battalion and regimental-size actions (combining two battalions that ordinarily operate independently) are undertaken when the target seems lucrative enough. Thus Sergeant Liem's battalion joined with the Vietcong 60th Battalion to attack a South Vietnamese convoy in Khontum Pass.

In addition to the regular military there are estimated to be more than 60,000 guerrillas, who are farmers by day and soldiers by night. They engage in terroristic actions such as throwing grenades blindly into a division command post or a hospital or a movie theater, to confuse and frighten the population. They also stage ambushes, mine roads and the like.

According to Sergeant Liem, "Quite a few more of my battalion will try and come to the amnesty camp—if they hear the broadcasts and if the Vietcong don't catch them trying to escape."

What kind of life did the sergeant want after leaving the camp, which he will be allowed to do after a few months of observation and indoctrination?

"I would like to work for the Vietnamese Government and do something to get even with the Vietcong for fooling me," said Liem.

Then he added proudly: "I have already gone on two missions with the 25th Division. I led them to our old outpost and we captured three weapons, four Vietcong soldiers and 2½ pounds of documents, and we destroyed two supply dumps. And next week I will lead them to the cornfields and we will destroy them, and that will make the Vietcong even hungrier."

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 2, 1963]

VIETNAM: FACT AND FICTION—AMERICAN POLICY DEBATE—THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, PRO AND CON

(South Vietnam's present crisis has renewed cries for ouster of the ruling Diem family. But if President Ngo Dinh Diem, and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were to go, who would take over? The Herald Tribune's Pulitzer Prize-winning Marguerite Higgins, who has just returned from Saigon, reports on the strength—and weaknesses—of the opposition to Mr. Diem in the final article of her six-part series. She also discusses the current policy battle—in Washington and Saigon—over what to do next.)

(By Marguerite Higgins)

WASHINGTON.—A successful coup d'etat against Diem would probably set the war back 12 months.

The speaker was a top American diplomat on the scene in Saigon. His estimate was

echoed by the British advisory mission and by most experienced foreign observers with whom this reporter spoke not only in Saigon, but also at military headquarters in the field.

And fears of a setback in the war, which after many painful false starts is finally going better, explains why the United States has so long endured President Ngo Dinh Diem, for all his authoritarian ways, his stubbornness, and his failure to make his position clear to the world.

U.S. policy has now wavered to the point where the Government this week decided to issue what amounted to an open invitation to the Vietnamese military to take over the government in Saigon—if they could.

The change of policy has stirred an internal row in the U.S. Government, and the outcome is in doubt.

The proponents of getting rid of Diem argue that his political repression has reached the point where the United States must disassociate itself from the image he has created.

The opposite view is that the Vietnamese army has quite enough on its hands fighting the Communist Viet Cong guerrillas, that one war at a time is enough. Finally, this group argues that the greatest threat to the soldier's morale is not Diem's authoritarian approach but the confusion and dismay created by Washington's unsubtle attempts to pit the army against his regime and the hints that U.S. aid may be curtailed.

In light of this clash of views inside the Kennedy administration on what to do next, anything can happen. Only two things are clear:

1. The State Department's apparent attempt to set the Vietnamese army at the throat of the Diem regime in the middle of a war will be the subject of bitter controversy both inside this Government and around the world for an unpredictable period of time.

2. New U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge has been put in a terribly difficult diplomatic position.

And Mr. Lodge, it can be stated on good authority, has protested at least some of the State Department's publicity tactics in the sharpest terms.

The most controversial train of events began last Sunday—before Mr. Lodge had even had a chance to present his credentials to Diem. (He did so at 11:30 a.m. Saigon time, Monday.)

Sunday night, the Voice of America broadcast a news roundup which among other things said that the United States might make sharp cuts in its aid program to South Vietnam unless Diem punished the special Vietnamese troops allegedly responsible for attacks on the pagodas and arrest of the Buddhists. The Voice broadcast also for the first time stated the American Government's view that the army was innocent of responsibility for the pagoda raids.

The Voice based its broadcast on a news agency story from Washington. Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, told a Voice employee that the story was good guidance and that the Voice could go ahead with the information.

And as Hilsman and the Department anticipated, the part of the Voice broadcast referring to the U.S. abolition of the Vietnamese military was instantly interpreted in Saigon as a sign that Washington was encouraging the military—with its cleaned-up image—to take charge.

As to aid, it is certain, as the State Department says, that no decision on future cuts has been taken. It is equally certain that Diem has been warned that such cuts are likely if he is not responsive to American wishes.

The Vietnamese military are in an agonizing dilemma. As a European diplomat in Saigon put it in a message to this correspondent: "The morale of the army at the fight-

ing level has been astonishingly immune to outside pressure up to and through the imposition of martial law. But now the high officers are bewildered. You Americans have lectured them ad infinitum about civilian rule. Americans have lectured them ad infinitum about getting on with the war. And they want to get on with the war. These Vietnamese officers are truly dedicated.

"But now the U.S. Government comes out with what amounts to a suggestion that the Vietnamese military try and take charge of the country as well as the war. The military know that the jeeps they ride in, the planes they fly, the very bullets in their guns come from the United States. What are they to do? Forget about civilian rule, and go the way of the Korean juntas? Are they to risk chaos by trying to throw out Diem by force? So long as this uncertainty about American policy exists, Washington will be responsible for sowing more and more disunity and doubt in a country that desperately needs unity and resolve."

HE'LL FIGHT BACK

So far the Vietnamese army has on the surface rallied to Diem to the extent of accepting full responsibility for martial law and events in the pagodas. It is possible that the Vietnamese generals were forced by the Diem family to accept this public responsibility. But one thing is certain. President Diem and his family are not about to go quietly. Diem's head is not for the taking. He is bound to fight back.

Washington's current reappraisal of policies toward South Vietnam are in part motivated by the anxiety to avoid the danger that Diem's anti-Buddhist image might rub off on America and endanger relations with Buddhist nations. The irony here is that Washington is perfectly well aware that Diem himself is not guilty of persecution of any religion, but rather pulled in the reins harshly on the leaders of the Buddhist Association because they were waging an increasingly loud and effective political campaign against his regime.

Opposition to the Diem regime includes the outs who want in, the citified intellectuals in the bureaucracy, the universities, the military, and—equally important—Confucianists, Capitalists, Taoists, ancestor worshippers, Hoa Hao, and Catholics as well as Buddhists.

President Diem does not tolerate real political opposition in the sense of forces that stand a chance of ushering his family-dominated regime out of power. South Vietnam has the trappings of a democracy, an elected national assembly, a presidential race. The elections are to some degree fair. But the catch is that hardly anybody is ruled eligible for election unless he is acceptable to President Diem and family. Diem is, by Western standards, a dictator who holds the reins loosely when things are going well and can tighten them up cruelly when he feels threatened.

Today's secret political opposition to the Diems still appears splintered. It has no known national following.

Still the rumors this summer of possible coup d'etats have been more persistent than Saigon mosquitoes. There is not one of the 20 generals in South Vietnam's army who has not been reported to be a potential strongman about to oust President Diem and his family.

Why are so many Vietnamese intellectuals disenchanting? One reason is that President Diem, although himself an intellectual, has nonetheless displayed an attitude of disinterest toward the literati, an attitude that has given them a sense of being left out.

The only real common denominator between the splinter opposition groups is a steady soaring hatred for the fiery Mme. Ngo Dinh Nhu, the President's sister-in-law, whose talk of "barbecued monks" revolted the world. In a personal interview, the beau-

tiful Madame Nhu struck this reporter as a woman of bad judgment in the sense of insensitivity to the rest of the world, and enormous courage. And this quality of courage just makes matters worse so far as Madame Nhu's impact is concerned. If she had a bit less courage, she might speak her mind less openly, and less insistently.

A close second in unpopularity is her husband, Ngo Dinh Nhu, who is feared because of the power he wields as close adviser to the President. Counselor Nhu is also disliked in large part because it is widely assumed that Madame Nhu is merely stating what her husband really thinks.

There have been some suggestions in American circles that relations with South Vietnam would improve posthaste if Diem would only fire Nhu and silence Madame Nhu. In this reporter's judgment, it is unrealistic to seek to split off Counselor Nhu from the President. President Diem gave this reporter the impression of trusting and needing his brother, indeed of being extremely proud of him for the strategic hamlet program in which Counselor Nhu has been a driving force.

Opponents of Diem usually claim that his war and national reconstruction efforts would be carried on under any successor, but more democratically. In intellectual circles, there is the conviction that more civil liberties would and could be offered if Diem were toppled.

THE IRONY

The tragic irony of South Vietnam today is that its worldwide image is being tarnished at a period when the war is going better than ever. Its little people are more secure from Vietcong attack and better fed than at any time since the Communists unleashed their cruel military assault in 1961.

Is the United States going to jeopardize these real accomplishments in exchange for a coup d'etat and military dictatorship that may or may not supply the image that Washington desires? Is it already perhaps too late to put a halt to a train of unpredictable and chaotic events? These are the issues that are being battled out behind the scenes in Washington and Saigon as our top policy leaders try to decide where we go from here in Vietnam.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 82) to amend the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, in order to provide for the reimbursement of certain vessel construction expenses; asked a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. BONNER, Mr. ASHLEY, Mr. DOWNING, Mr. TOLLESON, and Mr. VAN PELT were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

INCREASED PARTICIPATION BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the order of December 16, 1963, the Chair lays before the Senate H.R. 7406, a bill

to provide for increased participation by the United States in the Inter-American Development Bank, and for other purposes, upon which there is a limitation of debate and a control of time.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 7406) to provide for increased participation by the United States in the Inter-American Development Bank, and for other purposes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT obtained the floor.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Madam President, will the Senator yield, without his losing his right to the floor?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. How is the time to be charged?

Mr. MANSFIELD. The time is to be charged on the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Madam President, at this time I wish to make a second introductory statement in support of H.R. 7406, a bill to provide for increased participation by the United States in the Inter-American Development Bank. While the proposed legislation was discussed in this Chamber in mid-December, I am sure my colleagues will appreciate having a brief summary of the issues at stake in the bill.

The Inter-American Bank, established toward the end of 1959, has been conducting its lending operations for a period of 3 years. These activities for the most part have been patterned after those of the highly successful World Bank. There has been wide agreement on the vital need for such operations—especially in connection with the Alliance for Progress—and little or no criticism of the manner in which they have been conducted. Because the Latin American countries together contribute over 50 percent of the resources available to the Bank, they have an equal interest with us in efficient management which carries out the developmental purposes set forth in the Bank's charter.

Now even a brief description of the Bank's activities to date first calls for differentiating between two distinct types of operations. The ordinary operations, virtually identical with those of the World Bank, are based upon roughly 85 percent of the Inter-American Bank's resources; these are so-called "hard loans" administered on customary banking terms. Only about 15 percent of the Bank's resources are devoted to the separate Fund for Special Operations, which was established to provide loans on more flexible terms for projects with less immediate economic returns than those financed with ordinary capital. In fact, however, these special fund loans have only partially taken the form of what we are accustomed to consider as "soft loans": the interest rate

has not gone below 4 percent, the term of repayment has averaged around 20 years, and a number of the loans are repayable in hard currency. It should be noted, in addition, that the Bank in another separate account has administered the social progress trust fund resources on behalf of the United States; these are not involved at all in H.R. 7406.

I think we need not belabor the obvious point that the Bank is a central factor in the provision of loans and guidance for desperately needed economic and social development in Latin America. Nor do we have to argue that such activities are the hemisphere's best defense against the dangerous tendencies summed up in the word "Castroism." There are, on the other hand, two aspects of the Bank's operations which may not have received adequate notice; namely, the Bank's role as a catalyst in mobilizing other financial resources, and its vital educational functions.

On the first count, it should be noted that the Bank, through August of 1963, had used its own resources—including the social progress trust fund—for only about 40 percent of the total cost of over \$1.9 billion for the projects in which it participated. Bank loans amounted to roughly \$775 million, while more than \$1.1 billion was mobilized from other sources—primarily domestic resources in Latin America. The record has been especially good with respect to the Bank's ordinary operations: about \$300 million of Bank funds have been accompanied by almost \$540 million of outside financing. In this connection, the Bank has been making special efforts to obtain greater participation of European capital in Latin America. It has been forming cooperative arrangements with the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD and with the agencies of the European Economic Community; in the private sector, an Atlantic Community Development Group for Latin America was established last April to form a multinational private corporation to engage in operations of venture capital investment in companies undertaking important activities in Latin America.

On the second count, the Bank has made available from its own resources close to \$16 million in technical assistance in less than a 3-year period, with the major aim of expanding the capacity of member countries to absorb foreign capital and to use investment funds more efficiently. Feasibility studies and projects in the field of general planning have accounted for the major portion of the funds made available. But the value of Bank training programs cannot be measured in terms of money. The same is true of Bank assistance in establishing local development institutions through which to channel resources to meet the needs of small private-enterprise concerns. The Bank has also played a very significant role in cooperation with the activities of United Nations and OAS agencies, designed to help the Latin American countries with their economic and social planning. Finally, it should be pointed out that the Bank has financed its grant technical assistance from its own net earnings.

Slandering Congress Is Slandering Our System of Government

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. OLIN E. TEAGUE

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, December 24, 1963

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, perhaps the most widely played indoor game in the United States is that of slandering the Congress. It is not a new game. It has been played with great fervor and spirit ever since we became a nation.

Usually, but not always, the tide of slander arises because Congress has refused to act as a rubberstamp for a popular President.

The torrent of abuse that is being poured out against the Congress today is not unprecedented, but it is serious and it is growing in its intensity. Newspaper cartoonists delight in picturing Members of the legislative branch either as egocentric clowns or as mindless sluggards. National columnists, ridicule the Congress unmercifully because we do not throw our doubts and our convictions out the window and vote instantly for measures of which the columnists personally approve. Since most newspapermen are somewhat more liberal in their politics than the average American, their scorn usually falls heaviest on legislators whom they consider to be conservative.

There is a dangerous tendency to judge a Congress merely by the amount of legislation it passes. Too many commentators are interested in quantity, not quality. If a Congress refuses to pass a flock of laws, regardless of their merit, it is inevitably tagged with the "do nothing" label, and the inference is that its leaders are weaklings and its Members timewasters.

Such people confuse progress with mere motion. When a man spins around in a revolving door, Mr. Speaker, he is not making progress. Neither is he making progress when he falls down a flight of stairs.

Because we have moved with deliberation in areas of enormous importance to the Nation and to the free world we have been accused of weakness. Our procedures have been a sign, not of weakness, but of strength. The Congress is a continuing body with roots sunk deep in every corner of the land. The Members of Congress collectively know far better than anyone else what the people of the country think and what they want and what they are saying. It is my considered opinion that the average American citizen is less liberal in his thinking than most of the columnists and commentators would like him to be. And I am absolutely certain that the average American citizen does not want his Congress to plunge the Nation swiftly into vast and continuing programs as a result of hysterical snap decisions made at the behest of the executive branch.

As we all know, our Government was founded on a system of checks and balances. The executive branch sometimes acts as a check on the impulsiveness of the legislative branch, and vice versa. During the past 2 years the 88th Congress has been a wholesome and restraining influence upon Executive exuberance.

By acting with thoughtful deliberation we are making certain that human rights are being preserved; that property is being properly protected, and that individual liberty is not being imperiled by expediency.

Over the centuries, Congress has built a structure of laws upon a foundation of precedence. Because we have built this structure with thoughtful deliberation, it is the soundest legislative structure in the world today.

Our critics, Mr. Speaker, make the claim that our refusal to act impulsively is proof that our legislative processes are not efficient. Although I deny the allegation, I also maintain that bloodless efficiency is not the sole aim, or even the principal aim, of Government. A representative democracy, such as ours, is not nearly as efficient according to your definition of efficient, as a Fascist or a Communist despotism, where the merest whims of the dictator have the iron effect of law. But who would exchange the comparatively inefficient freedom of this land of ours for the prisonlike efficiency of the slave state?

I repeat, Mr. Speaker, that the value of a Congress should not be measured merely by the number of bills it passes. In many cases, as we all know, it takes harder work and a great deal more courage to resist legislation than it does to ride complacently with the tide. It also takes courage to insist upon the thoughtful shaping and refinement of legislation so that it will achieve the maximum good for the maximum number of people, when the strident voices of the propagandists are demanding that we pass it instantly, without debate or deliberation. It takes courage, in short, "to keep one's head when all about are losing theirs, and blaming it on you."

This is not the spectacular brand of courage, but it is something immensely valuable to the Nation. It is the brand of courage that the 88th Congress has exhibited in abundance.

The fact that we have been able to do so, Mr. Speaker, is a tribute to your own firm and understanding leadership.

I am proud of being a Member of the 88th Congress and I deeply resent the libels and slanders that the irresponsible propagandists for instant legislation have been throwing at us.

And, Mr. Speaker, it is heartening to know that there is a growing segment of the Nation's press that is beginning to appreciate the value of the 88th Congress. Under unanimous consent, I insert in the RECORD two recent examples of such constructive thinking:

[From the Dallas (Tex.) Morning News, Jan. 3, 1964]

IN DEFENSE OF CONGRESS

Barely 30 hours before the end of the old year, Congress adjourned—if that's what you can call it. It might be more correct to say

that Congress has recessed, since the 1st session of the 88th Congress set a peacetime longevity record and allowed only 8 days of vacation for the legislators before the 2d session is called to order January 7.

There has been a tremendous amount of criticism leveled against Congress lately for being slow and failing to enact legislation. Most of this criticism is unfair.

Americans for Democratic Action refers to Congress as the "iceberg on Capitol Hill," charging that it is run by a "reactionary-conservative" coalition. Roy Wilkins of the NAACP says Negroes are "disenchanted" with the whole legislative process.

Walter Lippmann, in a recent column, goes so far as to charge that the "88th Congress has been paralyzed by * * * a conspiracy to suspend representative government." He adds, referring to efforts by Congress to prohibit credit guarantees for sale of wheat to Red nations, that the legislative branch has been attempting to usurp the President's constitutional power to conduct our foreign relations."

Such charges are not altogether valid. With respect to the wheat deal, as one of our readers pointed out in a letter on this page Wednesday, article I, section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations." How can Congress be engaged in "a conspiracy to suspend representative government" when it is essentially the most representative branch of government?

Congress is closer to the people than the President or the Court can ever be.

The fact that Congress has refused to grant certain Presidential requests or failed to act on others does not mean that we have a "do-nothing" Congress, as frequently charged. It might, and often does, mean that Congress thinks some of these requests are not in the best interest of the Nation. Or it might mean simply there have been too many requests.

Every year the President asks more of Congress, and in the last session the administration kept coming back with the same requests for second and third tries after initial attempts to win congressional approval failed.

Most of the people who attack the congressional seniority system, the power of committees and the rules of Congress have been extremely hypocritical.

When seniority, committee power, and the rules are used to promote liberal legislation, the liberal critics are not loud with their complaints. They make noise usually when these factors work against legislation they would like to have passed.

One thing is sure: The next session will be shorter. Though the number of requests in the President's program may be greater than ever before—with a civil rights bill and tax cut proposals left over, plus a revival of medicare and other issues to come up—Congressmen from both parties, both liberals and conservatives, will be anxious to adjourn early to go home for the primaries, the conventions and the politicking for next November.

CONGRESS AND THE AID PROGRAM—PASSMAN'S BATTLES BELIEVED REFLECTIONS OF PUBLIC REACTION TO WASTE SPENDING

(By Richard Wilson)

OTTO ERNEST PASSMAN, 63, is a Congressman from Louisiana. Annually, Mr. PASSMAN gets into a fight with the White House over spending for foreign aid. He is chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee which handles this troublesome item.

It is usually said that Mr. PASSMAN is trying to superimpose his judgment on that of four Presidents of the United States and any number of other outstanding personalities. This devastating remark is supposed to crush Mr. PASSMAN and hold him up to public

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scorn as the wrecker of the foreign aid program.

The truth seems to be, however, that Mr. PASSMAN knows more about the foreign aid program than any President has had an opportunity to know for the simple reason that he has studied it longer and in more detail.

He has handled the foreign aid appropriation for 9 consecutive years. Mr. PASSMAN is not a liberal; he is a conventional Louisianian, but with a flair for rather rakish attire and an endless patience in coping with one of the really big practical problems of modern government.

It is only a slight exaggeration to say that officials of the foreign aid program would much prefer it if neither Congress nor the public knew much about its activities, except the puff stories on its great achievements which are not inconsiderable.

The official attitude about foreign aid is that it is an instrument of foreign policy used by the President under his constitutional authority to direct this policy. What flows from that conception is that Congress should not, indeed cannot under the Constitution, interfere.

This is an impractical concept, which Mr. PASSMAN annually demonstrates to be faulty. However, much of what is done under the foreign aid program is hidden from the public. There was a time when it was a secret how the money was divided up between various countries. Even now the secrecy label is so widely used that "it looks like a ticker tape parade when you see us lifting secret and classified stuff in the hearings."

Every now and then a little something leaks out, like Lebanese bulls with nine stalls apiece or extra wives for Kenyan Government officials, or air-conditioned Cadillacs for Middle Eastern potentates. A suffering public has become more or less conditioned to this kind of thing and would not abandon foreign aid for this alone. Nor is it likely that the public as a whole would end all foreign aid, however much annoyed it may become over waste and incomprehensible spending abroad when there is so much that needs improvement in this country.

But it is clear that a majority in Congress believes that the country wants to go slower on foreign aid, be more selective, be more certain that definite policy aims are being pursued toward a useful conclusion.

Every year for 9 years the clamor has come from the White House and the Department of State that any cutback will wreck our foreign policy. And any time there is a cut our foreign policy never seems to be demonstrably better or worse off.

A few facts are useful in this connection. In the last 8 years Congress has reduced the White House budget requests by more than \$6.5 billion. Yet every year more money was appropriated than foreign aid officials could use. The so-called pipeline funds from past years which are committed to continuing projects now amount to more than \$7 billion. Foreign aid could go on for several years without another penny of appropriation.

It is not uncommon for officials to make huge allocations of their funds in the last 2 or 3 days of a fiscal year so that they won't have any uncommitted money left, and can claim they are emptyhanded in meeting the world's challenges.

Last year the White House, the State Department, and the Defense Department all said our foreign policy was being wrecked by a billion-dollar cut. Yet these agencies finished the fiscal year with a total of \$744 million of unobligated funds on their hands.

Basically, the facts do not support any contention that Congress has either wrecked the foreign aid program or really harmed it. Nor does the contention hold water any longer that the Russians are rushing in where we pull out. The Russians have had their own serious problems with foreign aid.

This appears to be one case where instinctive public reactions are right; that we have been spending too much on foreign aid and not getting enough out of it.

The CIA is too much a law unto itself. For its own good, and the country's, it should be curbed and put under constant check.

CIA Needs Watchdog Committee

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, January 14, 1964

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, day by day the evidence mounts that a congressional watchdog committee on the Central Intelligence Agency is needed; and day by day public support grows for the creation of such a committee.

Created as a central agency to gather and analyze intelligence information, the CIA has, all too often, been guilty of formulating foreign policy.

Recently, former President Truman, under whom the CIA was first organized, expressed his belief that the CIA had strayed off course and should be made to adhere to the original purpose for which it was created.

I could not agree more. For the reasons set forth by President Truman and other constructive critics of the CIA, I have introduced legislation into every Congress since 1953 calling for the creation of a Joint Congressional Committee on the CIA.

My bill, House Concurrent Resolution 2, currently is pending before the House Rules Committee. I urge my colleagues on that committee to consider this resolution and companion bills as soon as possible.

Further, under permission granted, I include an editorial from the January 4 issue of the Milwaukee Journal calling on Congress to approve a committee such as that proposed in House Concurrent Resolution 2.

TRUMAN: CIA OFF TRACK

Former President Truman has added his doubts to many others about the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. And he speaks with authority, for the CIA was organized during his presidency to serve the needs of his office.

As organized, Truman says, the CIA was to bring together intelligence information available to all branches of Government, value and interpret it for the President. It was never meant, Truman says, to "be injected into peacetime cloak and dagger operations." It was never meant to make policy.

CIA activities have frequently been embarrassing to this country in the last decade. In numerous instances the Agency actually has worked counter to our foreign policy. Certainly we need no agency to work to subvert foreign governments—yet the record indicates that the CIA has done that very thing.

Truman is quick to acknowledge the patriotism and the dedication of CIA officials. He just thinks they have been off the track. The Agency, he says, should return to its basic job of gathering and assessing intelligence for the use of the policymakers.

In connection with this, the proposal that the CIA be audited by a special committee of Congress, just as the Atomic Energy Commission is, deserves congressional approval.

No Compromise on Canal

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. DONALD RUMSFELD

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, January 14, 1964

Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Speaker, I wish to insert in the Record the following Chicago Daily News editorial of January 13, which briefly but concisely analyzes the background of the Panama crisis and recommends a firm stand by the United States:

NO COMPROMISE ON CANAL

Facing the first international crisis of his administration, President Johnson was understandably eager to fill the role of peacemaker in Panama. We have some qualms, however, that his eagerness led him to concessions he may regret.

It was essential to seek an end to violence and bloodshed. It was also essential to deal with the political overtones that quickly came to the fore. But neither howling mobs nor demagogic politicians are likely to be deterred by weakness, and in Panama the United States has exhibited more weakness than strength.

Why should we adopt an almost apologetic attitude either in the United Nations or in the Organization of American States for trying to protect Americans from Panamanian attack? Nothing more than self-defense was involved, and the loss of American lives and the extensive destruction of U.S. property are ample evidence that we were more timid in exercising that right than the circumstances justified.

The mobs that stormed the U.S.-controlled Canal Zone were organized too well and too quickly to qualify as an accident. The Government of Panama has aroused the people against Americans in the Canal Zone year after year, for its own political benefit, and this is its harvest. There is good reason to believe that Castro-Communists joined the attacks, if they did not help instigate them in the first place.

Panama's quick break in diplomatic relations, and the immediate demand for control of the canal, seemed well rehearsed. And, as might have been predicted, the Soviet bloc plus the anti-American clique in the Latin republics joined in the howls against American "imperialism."

It is clearly true that the history of the Panama Canal is somewhat checkered, and that conditions have changed since the United States engineered both the canal and the creation of the Republic of Panama. But it is also true that in recent years the United States has made many concessions to appease the Panamanians.

If there are other negotiable grievances, they can be settled around the conference table when things quiet down again. But nothing should be conceded in an atmosphere of bloodshed and blackmail, for to do so is to invite more of the same not only in Panama but elsewhere.

In particular, U.S. ownership and control of the Panama Canal must not be regarded as negotiable. If it takes a show of strength to shut off the threats to the canal, let strength be shown. That, at least, is something everybody understands—and it is more likely to win respect than a willingness to be everybody's doormat.