

Mr. ASHLEY. Yes. There may be more than that, as a matter of fact. In the testimony received by the committee it was indicated that there might be as many as between 350 and 500 Americans who would be either unwilling or unable to fly to Puerto Rico. A good many people who are anxious to attend this convention or convocation feel strongly about flying.

Mr. GROSS. What are the designated points of departure from this country?

Mr. ASHLEY. I am pleased the gentleman asked that. The bill has been amended to limit the use of the vessel or vessels making this trip, if the legislation passes, to a direct voyage from the United States to Puerto Rico and then back to the United States.

Mr. GROSS. From designated points to and from; is that correct?

Mr. ASHLEY. Yes.

Mr. GROSS. I am a little surprised that there are no charter vessels of the United States which can be used.

Mr. ASHLEY. This came as a surprise to the members of the committee, also, I might say to my friend from Iowa. The record shows very clearly that the group in question made every effort to find available passage and was unable to do so.

Mr. GROSS. Have there been any other organizations granted this type of exception, to the knowledge of the gentleman?

Mr. ASHLEY. No.

On the previous point, I might say that the commercial shipping interests as well as maritime labor attended the hearings and participated in them. They also were most interested in the question of whether there actually were available American vessels for this purpose. They agreed, under questioning, that such was not the case.

Mr. GROSS. This does in fact set a precedent, then?

Mr. ASHLEY. Yes. The circumstances are quite unusual in that respect.

Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Speaker, I must confess that I view this bill with some misgivings. I suppose that no matter how many times we might say this is not intended to create a precedent, the fact that we pass the measure will create a precedent whether we like it or not.

The bill as originally introduced both by the gentlewoman from Oregon [Mrs. GREEN] and the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. BOLLING] I would have felt bound to oppose vigorously. However, with the new text which we wrote in committee, the restrictions are quite severe. We guarantee that any ship which is put into this domestic trade for this particular voyage will comply with basic safety requirements and that the passengers will be bona fide members of this group and their families, and this will not be opened up to commercial groups of passengers, so I am not constrained to object.

I do hope that we are not going to be put in the position of having other worthy groups come along with a similar proposal where some of their members either do not like to fly or their health

will not permit them to so they should have sea transportation. I, for one, would hate to decide an assembly of the World Convention of Churches of Christ had some special right that some other equally worthy group might not enjoy. Yet it is going to be a very embarrassing position for the committee to be in if we are required to deal with this type of legislation on any frequent basis. It may be that out of this could come some good. They have pointed up the fact that we have no service available and in what ought to be, I should think, a very fine domestic trade that might support U.S. passenger vessels designed for this purpose. Perhaps if other groups are interested in it, it might stimulate the investment of American capital in providing such a service to the profit of everyone.

I hope that that might be the case, although the facts presented to the committee do not give me too much basis for being optimistic in that regard.

Mr. ASHLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAILLIARD. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. ASHLEY. I think the gentleman from California has very thoughtfully pointed up the fact that the committee considered this legislation very definitely and specifically as an exception and really a one-time exception. It is only because of the peculiarities of the circumstances that it has acted as it has. By no stretch of the imagination should this legislation be interpreted or construed as an invitation or an encouragement to other groups to seek the same remedy.

Mr. MAILLIARD. I am happy to have the gentleman make that statement, because I have some misgivings that it might be otherwise construed.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Ohio that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill H.R. 6164 with an amendment.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended, and the bill was passed.

The title was amended so as to read: "A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to permit vessels other than vessels of the United States entitled to engage in the coastwise trade to transport passengers between the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to attend the Seventh Assembly of the World Convention of Churches of Christ."

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

NORWEGIAN CONSTITUTION DAY

(Mr. ROONEY of New York asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. ROONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, today marks the 151st anniversary of the signature of the Norwegian Constitution at Eidsvoll, near Oslo. Although the Constitution has since been amended and some of its articles substantially altered, the basic principles of the Constitution of 1814 remain the

fundamental law of the land, thus placing the Norwegian Constitution among the oldest in the world.

The Norwegian Constitution of 1814 drew heavily both on Norwegian legal traditions and on the 18th century liberalism which produced the American Declaration of Independence and Constitution, the French Revolution, and the expansion of democracy in Britain. Much of the language of the Constitution followed that of the old Norwegian laws. Thus, Parliament, for example, was named the Storting after a quasi-democratic body which in the 9th and 10th centuries had been an important instrument of royal power.

The structure of the government provided for in the 1814 Constitution, on the other hand, found its pattern in 18th century European liberalism, in the theory of the separation of powers developed by Montesquieu in France and also adopted as the basis of our own American system of government. The Constitution provided that power would be divided among the executive—the King in council—the legislative—Parliament—and the courts. In addition to this separation of powers, other basic principles of the Constitution were national independence, popular sovereignty, and the inviolable rights of the individual versus the state.

These basic principles have now been Norway's fundamental law of the land for more than 150 years. The fact that Norway's democratic institutions have continued to develop and the role of the people in government has continued to expand attest to the flexibility of the document and to the foresight of its framers. Without any change in the Constitution, parliamentarianism was introduced in Norway in 1884 when the King agreed to appoint a council which had the confidence of the Storting. Among the most important amendments to the Constitution has been the extension of universal suffrage, first to men in 1898 and then to women in 1913.

Mr. Speaker, Norwegians are justifiably proud of the democratic system of government they have built on the Constitution of 1814. Today Norway is one of the most prosperous countries of the world, a stable and thriving democracy offering equal opportunity to all its citizens. On this important anniversary we in the U.S. Congress join with all Norwegians and Norwegian-Americans in celebrating the important step taken by Norway on May 17, 1814.

DYNAMIC NEW AFRICAN PROGRAM

(Mr. O'HARA of Illinois asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. O'HARA of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I was pleased to read in the Washington Post of May 14, 1965, a dispatch by Roscoe Drummond from Nairobi, Kenya, stating that the African image of Uncle Sam has greatly improved. This statement by such an experienced observer and conscientious reporter as Mr. Drummond

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verifies the reports that have been reaching me as chairman of the African Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

For some months following the November election there was speculation that the administration of the Honorable Mennen Williams as Assistant Secretary of State for Africa was near a close. I never took the slightest stock in the many rumors and loud whisperings that were circulated. The fact was that Mennen Williams had done a terrific job in Africa and was immensely popular with Africans of all ranks and all stations.

When the President asked Secretary Williams to remain on, thus ending a long period of groundless rumors, the favorable reaction in Africa was unmistakable. This was greatly heightened by the news that President Johnson, clearly showing a deep personal interest in Africa and concern for the future welfare of the African countries, instructed Secretary Williams to head a high-level task force, exploring the possibilities of and planning the foundations of a dynamic new African program.

I can only say, Mr. Speaker, that the members of the African subcommittee were thrilled by Secretary Williams' sketching of the undertaking of this task force and the possibilities promised by it of a new era of brilliant African development and, of deepened African-American partnership in friendship and in joint ventures.

The article in the Washington Post by Mr. Drummond follows:

UNITED STATES AND AFRICA—OUR IMAGE IMPROVES

(By Roscoe Drummond)

NAIROBI, KENYA.—At three critical points the image of the United States in much of Africa is greatly improved over what it was a few months ago.

Because political equality for the American Negro is moving visibly forward.

Because of President Johnson's offer of "unconditional discussions" to bring the war in Vietnam to the peace table.

Because United States and Belgian forces did not remain in the Congo after the rescue of the rebel-held white hostages and because Premier Moise Tshombe is gaining prestige among his neighboring political leaders.

This does not mean that the newly independent African governments are going to align themselves with the United States. It does not mean that African leaders like the dispatch of American Marines to the Dominican Republic. They don't. It does mean that U.S. actions are beginning to make more sense to more Africans and that there will be less temptation to be drawn into the Communist camp, either Chinese or Soviet.

Here is the trend of African opinion on these matters as I have found it:

On the American Negro's struggle for freedom—the many years of painful discrimination which the American Negro has suffered have long sullied the U.S. image in Africa. While Americans have seen the slow but now accelerated progress toward racial justice, Africans have been more aware of the struggle than of the progress. When Alabama or Mississippi denies Negroes the right to vote, to Africans this means the American Government is using its power against Negroes. Most Africans were dismayed and frightened by Senator Goldwater. Last fall Malcolm X toured Africa predicting a Goldwater victory.

Three events have helped to repair these views:

The massive majority by which President Johnson won.

Mr. Johnson's incandescent speech before Congress introducing the new Federal voting rights bill.

The speed with which the voting rights bill is going forward in Congress.

U.S. Ambassador William Attwood sent, with a personal note, a text of the Johnson voting rights speech to every member of the Kenya cabinet. I am sure other U.S. Ambassadors acted similarly. It made a tremendous impact here. It cleared away much of the misamic feeling toward what was happening in the United States on racial discrimination. President Jomo Kenyatta wrote President Johnson a personal letter of appreciation.

On the war in Vietnam—until President Johnson's offer to negotiate a peaceful settlement on the war in Vietnam "with any government, anywhere, any time," most African leaders felt it was the United States that preferred fighting to talking. But the refusal of the Communists to respond and their flat rejection of any peace talks changed feeling in Africa a great deal.

Now Peking has changed it more by branding the appeal of the nonaligned nations for a Vietnam peace conference as making them "tools of the imperialists." The Kenya foreign office, for example, described this article in the Peking People's Daily as "an incredibly vicious attack on Kenya and the other nonaligned nations." The hope was expressed that "such groundless insults, which are completely inadmissible, would not be repeated."

On the Congo—Premier Tshombe is winning wider respect among his African colleagues. He has impressed them with his ability and force as they have become personally acquainted with him. If Tshombe can free himself from the onus of using white mercenaries, he will enhance his standing and be enabled to become a source of strength to the cause of African unity. And U.S. support of Tshombe will no longer be an embarrassment to Washington.

For all of these reasons, the United States is winning somewhat more understanding in nonaligned Africa. We are not asking for nonaligned support.

FOREIGN AID HONORS OUR COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM

(Mr. MATSUNAGA asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, whether we like it or not, we have a commitment in Vietnam.

It is a commitment first made by President Eisenhower, and reaffirmed by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

It is a commitment to help the millions of people in this embattled land to resist military aggression from the north.

But more than that, it is a commitment to the free world—a promise that we will do all we can to preserve the freedom of choice for all of southeast Asia. For—let us make no mistake about it—if South Vietnam falls, the great arc of free world defense between Korea and Pakistan will be in grave danger.

In reaffirming our intention to continue to honor our commitment in Vietnam, President Johnson recently put it this way:

The real goal of all of us in southeast Asia must be the peaceful progress of the people of that area. They have the right to live side by side in peace and independence. And if this little country does not have that

right then the question is what will happen to the other 100 little countries who want to preserve that right.

The outcome in Vietnam is still uncertain. But our foreign aid program in South Vietnam is still keeping the embers of hope alive. It is still making sheer survival possible.

Our foreign aid program in Vietnam is providing the advisers and the hardware needed in the continuing struggle against the Vietcong.

Our economic assistance program in Vietnam has two broad objectives:

First, To strike at the root causes of insurgency; and second, to help keep Vietnam's economy afloat and avoid disastrous inflation.

The first objective, the attack on the root causes of insurgency, involves the heaviest concentration of AID-financed contract and direct-hire American technicians in any country today: more than 800 advisers and helpers—doctors, health workers, educators, administrators, engineers, agriculturists, police experts, and the like, working side by side with the Vietnamese in every one of the country's 45 Provinces.

General economic support accounts for about two-thirds of the estimated \$210 million in AID funds budgeted for Vietnam during the current fiscal year. Economic support includes the financing of such essential imports as oil, steel, medicine, and machinery, and managing the flow of U.S. surplus farm products that make up for Vietnam's shortage of certain foods and fibers.

Because the immediate issue in Vietnam is survival, AID technical and capital assistance concentrates on activities with an immediate impact on a lot of people. But a portion of current assistance will have long-term results. In broader support of the counterinsurgency program, AID-supplied materials have been used to repair 594 highway bridges sabotaged between December 1961 and December 1964; another 44 reinforced concrete bridges and culverts have been completed on major routes. With AID assistance, more than 700 medium and small factories have been established in Vietnam for the manufacture of cement, pharmaceuticals, rubber, jute, ceramics, paint, paper, and plastics. Negotiations are now underway to bring in an oil refinery financed by private capital under an AID investment guarantee. AID-financed teams from Michigan State University helped to develop one of the key institutions in Vietnam today, the National Institute of Administration in Saigon. It has become Vietnam's major source of professionally trained Government officials for both the central and the provincial governments.

These are just some of the things we have been doing to honor our commitment in Vietnam.

The AID program in Vietnam in fiscal year 1966 will continue to place great emphasis on relief and development in the rural areas where the brunt of the war is borne. It will also give increased attention to improving the numbers, training and effectiveness of the national police, to the needs of Vietnam's urban population, to the encouragement of domestic private industry, to assisting

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in the training of more crucially needed government officials, to financing commercial imports essential to sustain the economy, and to providing technical advisers and training to help the local government further develop its self-reliance and ability to govern effectively.

Mr. Speaker, I urge full support of the President's foreign aid program so that we can continue to honor our commitment for freedom and progress in Vietnam.

PRESS BECOMES AWARE OF CRIME SITUATION IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

(Mr. McMILLAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. McMILLAN. Mr. Speaker, I am sure that Members of the House have noticed that all of the newspapers in Washington have suddenly seen fit to run a series of articles or special reports on the crime situation in the city of Washington. These press stories have restated many of the facts which have long been known to Members of the House but which are seemingly for the first time being given acknowledgment by the press.

The House District Committee held hearings for approximately 2 years in an effort to find out why crime continued to increase in the Nation's Capital. We did this without the support of the press or news media in the Nation's Capital and were successful in having the Members of the House of Representatives support the omnibus crime bill on 2 occasions during the past 2 years by a vote of approximately 250 for to 130 against. These bills have been pending before the other body; however, after hearing crime experts from all over the Nation, chiefs of police from all of the larger cities, as well as our own Chief of police, and also the senior Federal judge in Washington and the present and past District Attorneys, we feel that if the proposed legislation were enacted into law, it would not be necessary to employ additional policemen. I personally can see no reason to add to the present police force, as long as the police are handcuffed and cannot question a criminal or arrest a suspect without being insulted.

I was delighted to read in the Washington Star on Sunday, May 16, where Senator ROBERT BYRD had spoken out on this subject. I am certain Senator BYRD is well aware of the conditions existing in the District of Columbia, and I hope everyone will take time to read his remarks, as I am having them inserted in the RECORD at this point:

BYRD CHARGES "SOFT" RULINGS Aid CRIMINALS

(By Sam Eastman)

A series of "soft hearted" court rulings have given the lawbreaker a powerful weapon in the crime war, Senator ROBERT C. BYRD, Democrat, of West Virginia, charged yesterday.

BYRD, chairman of a Senate Appropriations subcommittee, said at a hearing on crime-fighting proposals for Washington:

"The courts have absolutely handcuffed the Police Department—there's just too much of this."

The major proposal before BYRD's subcommittee is to beef up protection in crime-ridden neighborhoods by allowing policemen to work extra days.

"Such moves," BYRD said, "are counterbalanced by court decisions that favor the criminal."

"It seems to me that the real culprit * * * is going unnoticed," the Senator said.

After commenting that nothing ever seems to be done about the vicious crimes committed in the Capital, BYRD asked Police Chief John B. Layton:

"When was the last execution?"

"Not for a number of years," Layton replied.

(The last electrocution in the District took place in April 1957, when a man died for the slaying of a Washington policeman.)

The District Commissioners are asking Congress for nearly \$1.9 million for the emergency crime-fighting measures.

Under the key proposal, policemen would volunteer to work extra days for straight-time pay. The move would, in effect, add 235 men to street patrol duty.

The volunteers would work in five areas plagued with high crime rates. Layton said this saturation technique would be tried for a 9-month period, beginning July 1.

If the trial worked well, he said the city would ask Congress for funds for more policemen to continue this attack.

Layton noted in his testimony that the Department's authorized strength now is 3,000, and that the House-passed appropriations bill for the District includes money to add 100 men. The Department, however, actually has 2,878 men at last count—122 below the authorized level.

BYRD said he was concerned over the added strain and danger involved in the 6-day workweek proposal.

The real answer, he said, is for the city to solve its recruitment problems.

The Police Chief said that the recruitment procedures had been streamlined a few months ago. The changes, he said, have produced good results so far.

"Not good enough," the Senator commented.

BYRD's position that the Department should make every effort to fill the jobs already approved by Congress is in line with that taken by Representative WILLIAM NATCHER, Democrat, of Kentucky, chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee for the District.

Last March, NATCHER and BYRD approved a Police Department request to allow volunteers to work a sixth day, but only until the end of June.

This has produced the equivalent of 113 additional policemen, and the Department hopes to raise this figure to 313 next month.

The extra police strength then would drop to the 235 figure for the 9-month experimental period.

Layton assured BYRD that the Department expects to reach the authorized 3,000-man level by July 1. The money requested for the additional 100 policemen covers only the last half of the fiscal year. This would give the Department 6 months to recruit the 100 men, Layton explained.

Layton reported that he will ask the Commissioners to lift the maximum age for police recruits from 29 to 30.

In his comments, Layton noted that the city's police requests were "encouraged" by President Johnson. BYRD said he is "happy" that the city and the President finally have become aroused over the problem. The city's crime rate, the Senator pointed out, has risen for 35 straight months over the monthly figures the year before.

Mr. Speaker, one significant omission in these press reports is any reference to the fact that the House of Representatives during the past three Congresses

has devoted continuing study to the crime problem and in each of the last three Congresses has approved by heavy majorities anticrime legislation designed to deal with the crime problem.

The failure of the press to make full and objective reports becomes obvious when people in the District of Columbia, aroused by such articles as "Crisis in Crime" call members of the House Committee on the District of Columbia or the committee wanting to know what the House of Representatives is doing about crime in Washington. The failure to report in such press stories the facts regarding the efforts of the House Committee on the District of Columbia and the House of Representatives leaves the impression in the mind of the public that the House of Representatives has been derelict in its obligations to the people of Washington and to the people of the States who visit the Nation's Capital. At the very least, the local press might have advised the public that the House of Representatives has been reasonably diligent in meeting its obligations in this respect.

Whether the local press feels that the House of Representatives is entitled to any credit for its efforts, the press might at least state in its crime reporting that the House of Representatives has acknowledged the serious crime problem and has taken action toward dealing with it.

A TRIBUTE TO THE STARS OF THE ENTERTAINMENT WORLD

(Mr. ANNUNZIO asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, for the past 5 years it has been my good fortune and privilege to act in the role of general chairman for the Villa Scalabrini Development Fund—Italian Old Peoples Home. The chief purpose of my committee has been to raise the necessary funds in order to expand the present home which houses 100 "golden agers." The Villa Scalabrini Italian Old Peoples Home is located in the beautiful town of North Lake, Ill., adjacent to Chicago.

Just last December ground was broken for phase two of the home which will include a much needed infirmary and will increase the capacity of the villa to accommodate 200 "golden" agers. Our committee raised \$1 million for this worthwhile project and we borrowed another \$1 million from the Chicago archdiocese. The interest alone on the money is close to \$50,000 a year.

In order for our committee to pay out this loan and the interest, we prevailed upon our dear friend, the beloved Jimmy Durante, who has appeared on two previous occasions at fund-raising dinners in behalf of the villa, to help us obtain the services of other top stars in the entertainment world. With the aid of Jimmy Durante, as honorary chairman, and Enzo Stuarti, as honorary cochairman, we have organized a very ambitious program for Saturday, June 5, in Chicago's 5,000-seat Arie Crown Theater at McCormick Place.

I should like to pay tribute to the outstanding personalities of the entertainment world who will appear on this night and who are paying their own expenses, paying for their own transportation, their room and board, and are contributing their talents in order for our home to net from the show on this night over \$200,000 which will be used to pay out the principal and the interest on the loan. These great entertainers, in the best of American traditions, are helping to create a private home for the aged solely by their own efforts and without depending on public funds. They are to be hailed and congratulated, not only by all the Members of Congress, but by the people of America, for their generosity and public-spirited interest in helping to build an institution that will eventually have over 350 golden agers spending the last days of their lives in the tranquility of this house of God.

Thank you, Jimmy Durante, Enzo Stuarti, Dean Martin, Connie Francis, Louis Prima with Sam Butera and The Witnesses, Vic Damone, Rocky Marcino, Ford and Mercer, Anna Marie, Jimmy Roma, The Salvinos, Jimmy Faro, and Lou Breese. My heart is full of joy—full of profound gratitude—to each and every one of these performers for their gracious contribution to Villa Scalabrini.

Too often we have heard that movie stars and entertainers show no interest in their communities and in the affairs of those less fortunate. Yet, this is a concrete example of the generous contributions that these great stars of radio, television, and the movies are making, day in and day out, to the American way of life. Throughout America, stars of all races, colors and creeds are contributing daily of their time and talents to benefit institutions which are trying to raise private funds to alleviate the suffering and the miseries of the poor. They are doing a tremendous job in helping to raise funds to combat juvenile delinquency, to aid the mentally retarded, to aid in the fight against cancer, to aid in the fight against heart disease, and countless other worthwhile causes.

How can we ever forget the contributions they made during World War I and World War II and the Korean war? How can we forget the programs they provided for our soldiers and the job they are still doing today entertaining our soldiers both at home and abroad?

We in America can be proud of the patriotism and the good will that these stars are showing toward their fellow man and their fellow Americans.

A REFERENDUM IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

(Mr. FRASER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, the United States is keeping marines in the Dominican Republic for the announced purpose of maintaining law and order while a political settlement is worked out through the Organization of American States.

Our deeds, however, do not fully correspond with this policy. From daily press reports it appears that U.S. military forces have been working with the military junta. Whether or not this one-sided cooperation is inadvertent or even inevitable under the circumstances, our impartiality and good faith are brought into question. This apparent lack of impartiality is given further credence by some of our actions in the U.N., the OAS, and in the character of negotiations with the rebel group. Moreover, the mere passage of time tends to shift the relative balance of power between the two sides. This inevitably intensifies the anti-American feeling which is developing rapidly on that island.

Of the utmost importance, therefore, is the posture of the United States in reaching a political settlement. When the United States intervened, two forces were struggling for control of the Dominican Republic. Lives were being lost. Intervention could be justified on the grounds that the citizens of that nation should not be forced to accept a government which could muster the greater military power rather than the allegiance of the larger number of citizens.

We have sought a political settlement through the formation of a coalition government. Whether or not a coalition is being blocked by extremists on either side is uncertain, but delay in finding other political solutions will lead to further aggravation of this conflict. Moreover, even if a coalition government were formed, that such an uneasy coalition could successfully sponsor fair elections in the near future is open to serious question.

Therefore, it seems to me, Mr. Speaker, that the United States should announce its support of a plan to permit the people of the Dominican Republic to choose one of the contending factions to serve as an interim government until regular elections can be held later. This referendum should be conducted—not just supervised—by the OAS or the U.N. The mode of carrying out such a referendum should be determined by the OAS or the U.N. in consultation with all sides, but should be carried out whether or not agreement is obtained from all sides. If necessary, mass media facilities should be imported and operated under international control to assure equal access by all sides. The United States should announce its support in advance for the victor at such a referendum.

We need to recognize that such a referendum might bring to power persons with whom we are in disagreement. It may bring to power persons who fail to recognize the antidemocratic character of the Communist movement or who choose to temporize with that movement. It may also bring to power persons who have shown little devotion to democratic procedures. It may be appropriate for the OAS or the U.N. to require that any faction represented on the referendum ballot make a commitment to sponsor free elections within a stated time.

Mr. Speaker, the course I recommend carries risks, but the risks are less than those we incur with other courses of action.

We have a bearcat by the tail. The OAS nations appear reluctant to come to our aid in solving the problems of the Dominican Republic. If we could announce our intentions now—and make them explicit—OAS nations should not hesitate to intervene more actively in support of these goals, but when our intentions are obscured as they largely are when we seek to manipulate the junta government to make it more attractive, lack of enthusiasm on the part of many OAS members is understandable.

Mr. Speaker, the U.S. national interest will become increasingly jeopardized as we are drawn more deeply into the internal dispute in the Dominican Republic. We urgently need to proclaim now that our intervention continues for but one purpose: to give effect to the principle of national self-determination. Action needs to follow this proclamation. With this action we would stand proudly before the world community of nations as the defender of the right of people everywhere to choose their own government.

HON. BASIL L. WHITENER, DOCTOR OF LAWS

(Mr. KORNEGAY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KORNEGAY. Mr. Speaker, our distinguished colleague, the gentleman from North Carolina, Hon. BASIL L. WHITENER, is at Pfeiffer College, Misenheimer, N.C., today taking part in the commencement exercises of that outstanding institution. I am happy to say that the trustees of Pfeiffer College, recognizing the great contributions that our colleague has made to his State and Nation, are conferring upon him the degree of honorary doctor of laws.

I know of no one who more richly deserves to be honored today at Pfeiffer College than BASIL WHITENER. I am pleased that the college has recognized his outstanding record of public service and is conferring upon him the degree of honorary doctor of laws.

Mr. Speaker, Pfeiffer College is a splendid senior institution of higher learning located in the south central Piedmont section of North Carolina. Under the dynamic leadership of Dr. Lemuel Stokes the college has witnessed rapid growth in recent years. Pfeiffer College has an outstanding faculty, and the school is fulfilling a vital role in the field of higher education in North Carolina.

Our distinguished colleague who is being honored today at Pfeiffer College has always been interested in education. At an early date he developed an appreciation of the role that higher education has in the life of our Nation. BASIL WHITENER has always supported public and private efforts in behalf of education.

He was educated in the public schools of Gaston County, N.C.; Rutherford College; the University of South Carolina; and Duke University. BASIL has a sister who is a schoolteacher, and he, himself, was an instructor in commercial law in Belmont Abbey College, Belmont, N.C., in 1939, 1940, and 1941.

Belmont Abbey College is a fine Benedictine senior college, and BASIL WHITENER has always been interested in the welfare of the school. In 1960 Belmont Abbey College bestowed the degree of honorary doctor of laws on BASIL WHITENER in recognition of the work he had done in promoting the expansion of the college and for his continued interest in the welfare of its students.

Mr. Speaker, I have known BASIL WHITENER for many years, and I have worked with him in junior chamber of commerce activities, Young Democratic Club programs, and as a fellow prosecuting attorney in North Carolina. I have observed his devotion to duty, great concern for others, and profound interest in education.

BASIL WHITENER was an outstanding prosecuting attorney in North Carolina, and he was instrumental in improving the administration of justice in our State. He was a member of the Commission To Study the Improvement of the Administration of Justice in North Carolina from 1947 to 1949.

BASIL has also had a fine record of service to his country as a member of its Armed Forces. In 1941 he was a member of the General Assembly of North Carolina and was renominated in 1942. He resigned, however, to enter the U.S. Navy and to serve with distinction until November 1945.

All of us have had occasion to observe BASIL's outstanding record of service in the Congress. He has represented the people of North Carolina with a high sense of devotion to duty. He is an outstanding Member of this House.

Whenever one of our colleagues is honored for civic achievement it reflects great credit upon the House of Representatives and the State which our colleague represents. It has always been gratifying to me to observe one of our colleagues being honored by an institution of higher learning. I feel that this is the highest and most distinguished type of recognition that one can receive.

Mr. Speaker, in receiving an honorary doctor of laws degree today from Pfeiffer College, BASIL WHITENER is bringing honor and distinction to the people he represents and to this great House. We are indeed pleased, therefore, to join with his constituents in extending our best wishes to him on the outstanding recognition he is receiving today.

AIR FORCE ACADEMY HONOR VIOLATION

(Mr. HEBERT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Speaker, I wish to supplement my remarks of February 1 on the Air Force Academy honor violation as a result of the report to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force by the Special Advisory Committee on the U.S. Air Force Academy Academy.

If we are to assume that Secretary Zuckert's public statement, stating "we owe a debt of gratitude to the committee," is in effect an endorsement of the

report, then now is the proper time for me to reorient my thinking about the service academies. Perhaps, I, too, owe a debt of gratitude to this committee, but for a far different reason.

It is not my purpose to challenge in detail the conclusions drawn by the committee other than to state that I am astounded at the lack of emphasis given to major contributing conditions which are greatly in need of overhaul at the Air Academy.

It disturbs me as a friend of the academies when I recall that during the past 15 years there has been three major cheating scandals involving hundreds of cadets and the most we get out of this report is a reaffirmation that all is well with the system.

Why, I wonder, did West Point go from the years 1900 to 1950, a half century, with no cheating problems and then in the fifties have a deplorable breakdown of the system? Certainly it had bigtime football as far back as the twenties.

Why, for example, should the Air Force Academy's honor system patterned precisely after that of West Point turn up such a sorry scandal in a little more than 10 years of existence?

When are we to expect another breakdown of a system which has cracked so badly in the last 15 years?

While good families suffer the consequences and fine young Americans run afoul of the system the report barely challenges the causes. But it did as usual get out the old perennial culprit football and from press accounts we are led to believe that bigtime football ambitions and recruiting debauched the wing.

The report states:

It is distressing to note that football players were a prominent group in the honor incident * * * that pressures for a nationally powerful team must be resisted * * * football at the Academy must be brought into line with its fundamental goals as an educational and military institution * * * that pressures, if acceded to, may well affect adversely the environment and distort the true mission of the Academy * * * the present football schedule and programs are not entirely consistent with the purpose of the Academy.

For 25 years, ever since coming to Congress, I have been a staunch friend and advocate of the service academies. This has included guiding needed legislation, serving on Boards of Visitors and being ever watchful and sympathetic to their athletic programs. From time to time I have been assured that their extensive recruiting efforts both in and out of Congress had the blessing of Academy authority, their respective Chief of Staff and Secretary.

Now I am disturbed over the section of this report on football. There is no evidence to support that any one or more football players were directly responsible for the breakdown in the honor system. By inference, however, the football player is indicted and the impression given to the American public is that "bigtime" football plagues the Air Academy.

At one moment the report states it would be grotesque to assume that football players, as such, are less moral than members of any other group, but it

opened the section on the specific role of football by stating:

It is distressing to note that football players were a prominent group in the honor incident.

It further found as a cadet no significant relationship to exist either in favor of the football player or against him, but later states the officer effectiveness reports of football players are slightly higher than those of the nonfootball player classmates. So the football player is a bland cadet, but upon graduation is more effective than the nonplayer. Since the press failed to comprehend anything favorable to the football player, the question is asked what is the mission of the Air Academy—to make supercadets or good officers?

The matter of special privileges given to the football player is confusingly suggested. It appears as a major problem, but the report indicates that football players eating together is the only special privilege accorded the squad. Certainly such a trite privilege, if it were indefensible, could have been rectified by the several generals in command.

For many years it has been my sincere belief, perhaps erroneous, if we accept the conclusions of the report, that strong football teams have been good for the service academies. Further, that any statement of a tendency to go "bigtime" at these institutions in the light of their rigid admission and academic requirements fails to understand the high standard which all cadets, including football players, live by.

I have also observed that the pressure to win comes far more from high command than it does from within the Academies. For example, why did West Point authority abrogate a written contract with one football coach and at the same time seek a replacement whom they knew was required to break his contract with a university? It was pressure—pressure for a Navy victory that forced such questionable ethical action—action hardly consonant with the spirit of the cadet honor code.

Perhaps it is well then that the academies downgrade football to the playing of schools, as the report ambiguously states, "having athletic standards that are roughly equivalent to those of the Academy."

Obviously the solution to this problem is quite simple. If the report becomes the official bible of the Air Academy, then as a Member of Congress I shall no longer be a party to any recruiting effort which might distort the true mission of the Academy.

Nor will I, for one, encourage any hypocritical approach that would endorse the report and at the same time open a rear door for the recruited athlete.

The Air Academy as well as all service academies should forthrightly accept the recruitment of athletes as proper and desirable. There is nothing wrong with this practice. It is both honorable and proper and I do not apologize for my support of such activities.

A cause which they are not willing openly to support does not have my endorsement. I am not so naive as to

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believe that a restricted recruiting program would be followed. Further, I am not about to turn over the selection of my candidates to the academics who may have the misguided belief that they can select better than Congressmen.

Therefore, until the superintendents make defensible their policy on varsity football, I want no part of any athletic program which purportedly distorts in any way the mission of any service academy.

I am tired of the football program and the qualified athlete being made the "whipping boy" on every occasion. An individual should be allowed to use muscle and brawn as a means of educating himself and serving his country as an individual with excess brains and long hair.

I want the well-rounded typical American boy to become our military leader of tomorrow and I do not want any special consideration or privileges given to any one group of qualified candidates.

I do not deprecate brains and genius. We need every talent we can get and utilize in this space age of sophisticated weapons. We need equally as much the extraordinary physical reflexes and leadership quality which results from contact and competitive sports.

I belong to that school which has subscribed to the Duke of Wellington's observation that the Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton and Gen. Douglas MacArthur's endorsement with the opinion that World War II was won on the plains of West Point.

There is a place in the sun for boys of all types, ability, and inclination in the defense of our country, and to tear one group down at the expense of the other is a disservice to our country.

I will have no part of it.

THE NATIONAL TEACH-IN

(Mr. RYAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, on Saturday, the Nation witnessed a great exercise in democracy. The National Teach-In in which faculty members and students participated was stimulating, instructive, and in the highest tradition of free inquiry. For the benefit of those who did not have the opportunity to participate or observe the teach-in, I ask unanimous consent to insert at this point in the Record the New York Times summary of the proceedings which was published today, May 17.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

EXCERPTS FROM NATIONAL TEACH-IN ON VIETNAM POLICY AND TEXT OF BUNDY STATEMENT

Moderator ERNEST NAGLE, professor of philosophy at Columbia University. Ladies and gentlemen, I have a very important announcement to read. I've been requested to read to you a text of a statement by Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to President Johnson:

"I greatly regret that it is impossible for me to take part in the discussion this afternoon of our policy in Vietnam.

"I have looked forward to this meeting and I hate to miss it. When I accepted your invitation, I did so with a warning that I might be unable to attend because of other duties. It gives me no pleasure that this warning has come true.

"I regret my absence the more because I wholly disagree with those who have argued that it is inappropriate for a Government official to take part in a discussion of this kind.

"It may be true, although I have no firsthand knowledge, that some of your meetings on Vietnam have failed to meet the standards appropriate to university and college discussions. It may also be true, and I have thought so once or twice myself, that a few of those who feel strongly about the situation in Vietnam have been more interested in pressure upon the administration than in fair discussion with its representatives.

"But the preliminary arrangements for this particular meeting, so far as I have knowledge of them, have been fair to a fault. I'm confident the discussion this afternoon will be a model of its kind.

"SHARE DEEP INTEREST

"Members of the academic community and members of the administration share a deep interest in the encouragement of such fair and open discussion. It has been argued that debate of this kind should be avoided because it can give encouragement to the adversaries of our country. There is some ground for this argument, since it is true that Communists have little understanding of the meaning of debate in a free society. The Chinese will continue to pretend, and perhaps in part to believe, that American policy is weaker because 700 faculty members have made a protest against our policy in Vietnam.

"The American people, whatever their opinions, know better. They know that those who are protesting are only a minority, indeed a small minority, of American teachers and students. They know also that even within that minority the great majority accept and respect the rights and duty of the American administration to meet its constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of our foreign affairs.

"The American people know that the real day of danger will come when we are afraid of any unpopular minority or unwilling to reply to its voices. They understand what Communists cannot understand at all: That open discussion between our citizens and their Government is the central nervous system of our free society. We cannot let the propaganda of totalitarians divert us from our necessary arguments with one another, any more than we should let them be misled by such debates if we can help it.

"I will not take your time in this brief message for a rehearsal of the policy of this administration on Vietnam. Let me take only a word to speak of our purpose here—our purpose there. That purpose is peace for the people of Vietnam, the people of southeast Asia and the people of the United States.

"We evidently differ on the choice of ways and means to peace, in what we all must recognize to be a complex, ugly and demanding situation. Those differences may go deep to the nature of the politics of Asia, to the legitimacy of the force in the face of armed attack and to the true prospects and purposes of the people of Vietnam themselves.

"NO EASY GOALS

"But my own assessment is that what divides us is less than what unites us. None of us wants the war to be enlarged. All of us want a decent settlement. None of us wants other men to be forced under a totalitarian political authority. All of us seek a solution in which American troops can be honorably withdrawn. None of us, I hope, believes that these are easy goals. All of us, I trust, are

prepared to be steadfast in the pursuit of our purposes.

"I recognize the entire sincerity of the great majority of those who now disagree with our policy in Vietnam. I think many of these critics have been wrong in earlier moments of stress and danger and I think many of them misunderstand the hard realities of this dangerous world. But their good faith and good intent are not in question, and on other issues at other times their efforts have been of great service to the country.

"Having said this much, perhaps I can ask you in return that these critics should recognize that the administration, which now bears responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs, does not admire force for its own sake, or brinkmanship of any sort. The purpose of its foreign policy in Vietnam as elsewhere is that diplomacy and power and progress and hope shall be held together in the service of the freedom of us all.

"So I trust that the discussion this afternoon will not turn upon charge and countercharge against the motives of those with whom we disagree.

"Let it turn, instead, upon analysis of the situation as it is, and of choices for the future which can serve the purposes we share.

"I repeat my apologies for my forced absence; and I take comfort in the thought that I shall miss the meeting more than you will miss me."

RULES TO GOVERN PROCEEDINGS

NAGLE. In view of this statement from Mr. Bundy some changes will have to be made in the program for this afternoon and I will mention that presently.

My role as moderator imposes upon me the obligation to say only what is essential and to say it briefly. I will therefore limit the introductory remarks to stating what I believe to be the objective of this meeting and to mentioning the simple rules that will govern these proceedings.

This meeting has come into being because of widespread doubt in many academic communities as well as elsewhere concerning the wisdom of current U.S. policy in Vietnam. It needs to be emphasized, however, that the meeting has been sponsored by university teachers throughout the country and organized by the interuniversity committee for a public hearing on Vietnam on the basis of two assumptions:

The first is that whether or not those doubts are well-founded, there has been insufficient responsible debate in public of the great issues raised by our actions in southeast Asia.

The second assumption is that since a thorough airing of these issues by competent students is a condition for an enlightened public opinion on them, in a liberal democracy such as ours in which governmental policies require the assent of its citizens, students who possess knowledge pertinent to those issues have a special duty to discuss them openly and critically.

Aim is stated

In short, the primary aim of this meeting—an aim that surely merits the strong endorsement of all who are committed to the ideals of liberal democracy—is to contribute to the public enlightenment through responsible discussion of a serious problem confronting all of us.

It is possible that a precedent is being set for the development in the academic community of a generally recognized but vigorous and informed opposition to those entrusted with political power, in the best sense of opposition in the great traditions of political democracy.

Let me explain the format of the discussion this afternoon. There are two principal speakers: Dr. George M. Kahin, professor of political science, Cornell University, and Dr.

Robert Scalapino, professor of political science, University of California at Berkeley.

Dr. Scalapino has graciously agreed at the last meeting to replace the speech that Mr. Bundy had promised to give.

Associated with each of the principal speakers, there's a supporting panel. Because of the lateness of the word received from the White House about the unavailability of Mr. Bundy, Mr. Kahin's supporting panel consists of four members; while Mr. Scalapino's only three, since he was originally one of that group.

Dr. Kahin is associated with Hans J. Morgenthau, professor of political science and modern history at the University of Chicago; Dr. Mary Wright, professor of history, Yale University; Dr. Stanley Millet, professor of history and political science in Briarcliffe College; Dr. William A. Williams, professor of history, University of Wisconsin.

With Dr. Scalapino is associated a group consisting of Dr. Zbyslaw Brzezinski, professor of government, Columbia University; Dr. Wesley Fishel, professor of political science, Michigan State University, and Dr. Michael Lindsay, professor of government, American University.

The principal speakers will have a half-hour each to present their views; and then share an additional 5 to 10 minutes to discuss what has been said by them. This exchange will be followed by comments or questions from the panelists, each with 6 minutes at his or her disposal, and beginning with Dr. Morgenthau in an order alternating between the supporting groups.

Three minutes will be available to the principal speakers to respond to questions put to them by panelists; or if the speaker prefers to delegate the response, to some member of his supporting panel.

The final portion of these proceedings, which we hope will begin not later than 4:30, because of commitments to various broadcasting systems, will be a general discussion of issues in which principal speakers and panelists will participate.

The meeting will conclude with summations by Drs. Kahin and Scalapino.

The first principal speaker this afternoon is Dr. Kahin.

GRAVE ERRORS IN POLICY FOUND

MR. KAHIN. Mr. Nagel, ladies and gentlemen, I am indeed very sorry to learn that Mr. Bundy finds it impossible to be with us this afternoon. I see no reason, therefore, for altering in any significant way the remarks I'd planned to make. I will perhaps have a few additional things to say in closing concerning his absence.

Since the end of the last war, American officials have made such grave errors in policy toward southeast Asia that we have every right to be skeptical about their ability to respond intelligently to the present situation in Vietnam. Their most consistent failure has been an inability both to appreciate the importance of Asian nationalism and to work with rather than against this powerful force. This is a major reason why Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia have become so distrustful of the United States, and why they have either broken or come close to breaking their relations with us.

Moreover the obsession of American policymakers with what they still see as monolithic communism has blinded them to the fact that communism in Asia has adapted itself to nationalism. And they have confused the broad but nationally differentiated force and potential of communism with the threat of specifically Chinese power.

Despite the immense information-gathering facilities of the Government, serious policy mistakes have been made because decisions have been taken on the basis of inappropriate criteria, wrong analyses, and a disregard for the relevant facts. At the

same time essential information has been withheld from the American public and crucial policy decisions concerning southeast Asia have been made before the public has even been aware that a problem exists. And once taken, these decisions have set in motion events which severely circumscribed any moderating influence which an informed public opinion might bring to bear.

Moreover, in recent months the tendency has increased to dismiss even thoughtful criticism of Government policy as irresponsible meddling.

Illusory hope seen

In Vietnam, American policy has been wrong from the outset. In the decade following World War II, because of our illusory hope that we could induce France to become the keystone in an American-designed European military organization, we temporized with our commitment to national self-determination and backed France in her efforts to reestablish control over Vietnam.

By supporting her attempt to establish a Vietnamese regime which lacked nationalist support, we helped insure that Vietnamese patriots would have no real alternative but to rally to the banner of Ho Chi Minh. France's humiliating defeat at Dienbienphu in 1954 was a military defeat but it was made inevitable by the political failure that preceded it.

Then came the Geneva agreements clearly specifying that Vietnam was one country. They stipulated that the 17th parallel was a temporary demarcation line, not in any way to be interpreted—and here I'm using the text of the agreement—not in any way to be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary.

The United States in its own unilateral declaration at Geneva spoke only of one Vietnam, not of a South, and not of a North, and with respect to the conference's provision for national elections, the United States also stated—again in its own unilateral declaration—that it would continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations.

Nevertheless the United States soon thereafter set out to build up a separate state in the south. And again we made the mistake of thinking we could establish a viable government on an inadequate nationalist base. The United States supported Ngo Dinh Diem giving him, as you know, massive amounts of—economic initially and later—military assistance.

But American aid was no substitute for nationalist support, something Diem's regime never really acquired, despite what our officials told Congress and the American people.

Diem himself had said in 1953—repeatedly, I might add—that Ho Chi Minh—and I'm quoting him—"gained in popularity as a leader of the resistance, not as a Communist," and that the vast majority of his followers were nationalists and in no way pro-Communist.

What the United States failed to recognize was that in these conditions Ho Chi Minh, who for at least 9 years had been the acknowledged head of the Vietnamese nationalist movement, could not be replaced as the leader of the Vietnamese people by a man supported from the outside, a man little known and who had spent the critical years—nearly all of them—of the independence struggle abroad.

America's failure, of course, to build up an effective government under Diem is now well known, but this was not immediately apparent, for after Geneva his regime enjoyed several years of grace during which Ho Chi Minh's followers left it pretty much alone.

Essentially this was due to the fact that the Geneva agreements had promised na-

tionwide elections for 1956 and it was primarily because of this provision and because the agreements also stipulated that France would be responsible for carrying out the accords—carrying out the accords south of the 17th parallel—and that France would remain there until the elections were held—primarily because of those reasons that the Vietminh withdrew its armies from the south and for a considerable period suspended revolutionary activity there.

But with American encouragement Diem refused to permit the elections in 1956 and France washed her hands of the responsibilities which she had assumed at Geneva.

Reneging is charged

Regardless of what sophistry has been employed to demonstrate otherwise, by encouraging Diem to defy this central provision of the Geneva agreements, the United States reneged on the position it had taken there in its own unilateral declaration.

Civil war in Vietnam became inevitable, for when a military struggle for power ends on the agreed condition that the competition will be transferred to the political level, can the side which violates the agreed conditions legitimately expect that the military struggle will not be resumed?

Despite the initial period of insulation from Vietminh militancy and despite unstinted American economic and political backing, Diem failed to develop a real base of popular support. Programs urged by the United States for social and economic reform, and for winning the allegiance of the non-Vietnamese hill-dwelling people, were never effectively carried out.

The Saigon regime remained all too isolated from the Vietnamese peasantry. As a result, it was unable to compete with the Vietcong guerrillas when, from 1958 on, these guerrillas adopted increasingly militant policies.

And in the 19 months since the assassination of Diem, the situation has continued to deteriorate and the shifting combinations of army officers and bureaucrats controlling the Government have remained just as isolated from the villagers of Vietnam.

Faced with this decline in political cohesion, and the evident inability of the South Vietnamese military to stave off the Vietcong, the present administration has enlarged the war in Vietnam by bombing the North and increasing American military activity in the South.

Power called the reply

It has endeavored to compensate for the continuing erosion of Saigon's political and military base by introducing more American troops, more American airpower.

It has justified this in terms of our pledge to support Vietnam, a commitment which, as you know, the administration regards as a test case.

And here I think it might be appropriate to recall the caveat of Secretary Acheson in 1950 when he stated that America could not by itself create politically stable states in Asia.

KENNEDY REMARK OF 1963 QUOTED

President Kennedy also recognized these limitations when, in September of 1963, he said of the South Vietnamese, "In the final analysis it's their war—the're the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, give them equipment. We can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it."

In the context of these cautions, does an unconditional American military pledge to a weak and factious regime which lacks popular backing—does that make commonsense? Is our pledge of support completely unqualified? Does it not demand a minimum degree of performance and cooperation from Saigon—political as well as military? Is our pledge automatically to any military or civil-

ian group which happens to control Saigon? What happens if our current policy of brinkmanship induces Hanoi to send its 300,000-man army into South Vietnam?

Because this it may very well do if the damage inflicted by the United States becomes so great that the north has little to lose by undertaking a retaliatory attack and little to save through compromise and negotiation.

The well-known military analyst, Hanson Baldwin, has estimated that to cope effectively with such a force the United States might have to use as many as a million men.

The United States, of course, does not have these forces immediately available and even to send in a small proportion would use up our entire strategic reserve.

This same trend toward a rapprochement with Russia started by President Eisenhower, continued by President Kennedy, that trend has already been seriously affected by our policy in Vietnam and it will be further undermined if we continue on our present course.

Among Communist parties throughout Asia as well as among the nonaligned states generally, China's scornful derision of Russia's policy of peaceful coexistence has been gaining ever wider approval.

The possibility of cooperation between the United States and Russia to contain China's power—China's power and influence in southeast Asia—is becoming ever more remote. Our major aim in Asia is to contain China and thus to provide the opportunity for the states of south and southeast Asia to develop free from Peiping's dominating influence.

And it is this consideration which should govern American policy toward Vietnam. No matter how much military power we pour into Vietnam, the present American policy of trying to sustain a separate state in the south may very well fail because the local political factors necessary to insure success are simply not there.

If we are going to salvage anything in Vietnam, we will achieve more through a ceasefire and a negotiated political settlement than through the futile infusion of more and more American military power.

The United States must recognize that the historic Vietnam fear of—fear of and antagonism toward—China continues—continues despite the common adherence to Communism ideology. And inasmuch as the character of Vietnamese communism is inseparable from Vietnamese nationalism, Vietnamese power, will not necessarily be exerted in concert with Chinese power.

Defining interest

This is likely to depend upon whether such actions conform with Vietnamese national interest as the Vietnamese people define that interest.

Those who still are impressed by the simplistic domino theory must realize that non-Communist governments of southeast Asia will not automatically collapse if the Communists should come to control all of Vietnam. So long as southeast Asian governments are in harmony with their nation's nationalism, so long as they are wise enough to meet the most pressing economic and social demands of their people, they are not likely to succumb to communism.

Nationalism and the demand for social and economic progress are the dominant forces in southeast Asia today. If we can work with these forces, if we can work with them we will make a major contribution to maintaining the territorial integrity of the states of southeast Asia and provide them with a better opportunity to develop along non-Communist lines.

The first step in that direction must be to negotiate a settlement in Vietnam.

What has our position been thus far? I think you know it well. The administration tells us that it is prepared to negotiate unconditionally but in effect on condition that

the Vietcong cease all operations immediately and on condition that the state of South Vietnam—and this is the most important condition, I would say—on condition that the state of South Vietnam continue its separate existence in permanent violation of the Geneva Agreements.

Furthermore, we have made clear that the Vietcong and its political arm, the National Liberation Front, cannot be party to such negotiations. Not only is that one more condition, but it flies squarely in the face of reality—political reality.

It is, I think, widely acknowledged that at least half of the south is today under the control of the Vietcong. Is it not utopian to assume that Hanoi is in a position to insist upon the Vietcong's yielding up the position it has won there?

In 1954, the Vietminh could induce its numerous supporters in the south to accept Vietnam's partition and to abandon their gains south of the 17th parallel, because partition was regarded as a temporary measure to last only until elections.

But we cannot assume that once again the insurgents in the south will give up what they have won through long and difficult campaigns.

Over the last 5 years, the doctrine of uncompromising struggle and a real expectation of victory have been assiduously nurtured among the Vietcong. While there is undoubtedly a considerable congruence of interest between Hanoi and the Vietcong, under these circumstances we cannot assume that Hanoi can abruptly call off the southerners' resistance.

And whatever influence Hanoi can exert over the Vietcong, we cannot expect it to exert this so long as we continue bombing the North.

The morale of the North Vietnamese is, of course, no more likely to be broken by bombs than was that of the British or the Russians in the last war. Indeed their will is likely to be stiffened. President Johnson said after our Embassy in Saigon had been bombed that outrages like this will only reinforce the determination of the American people and Government. What is true for Americans is true for the Vietnamese.

Halting our bombardment of the North would be our first genuine indications of an interest in negotiations. Our quite cavalier dismissal of the United Nations Secretary General's efforts hardly constituted a serious American interest in negotiations. I submit that we should give him an unequivocal mandate to pursue negotiations and that we should make clear that we want not just discussions but serious negotiations.

Support of others urged

And I would suggest that concurrently we should give much more encouragement than we have to those nonaligned Asian and African States which wish to help promote a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

And finally, for those many Americans who still regard full public discussion of vitally important national issues as essential to our brand of democracy, there is a particularly disquieting domestic aspect of this situation:

Realizing as they do that an informed public discussion requires access to the relevant facts, these Americans can only be deeply disturbed when a spokesman for the newspaper editors of this country feels compelled to state as he did last month that the American press in Vietnam faces stronger restrictions than it ever has in wartime and that we are getting contradictions, double-talk and half-truths from the Government concerning the situation in Vietnam.

And surely Americans have grounds for concern when the New York Times can editorialize, as it did shortly after this, less than 3 weeks ago, that high-ranking representatives of Government in Washington and in Saigon have so obscured, confused, or dis-

torted news from Vietnam or have made such fatuously erroneous evaluations about the course of the war that the credibility of the U.S. Government has been sacrificed.

When the American public faces the prospect of war it has the right to full and honest answers.

I had indeed hoped that Mr. Bundy's appearance would be an indication of a change in the administration's attitude as to the value of informed public discussion. I can only hope that his indispensability in meeting some major crisis of policymaking is really of greater importance than the contribution he might have made this afternoon toward our better understanding of the administration's aims and to that kind of enlightened public discussion which is so essential to the wisest conduct of foreign policy.

IS VIETCONG AN INDIGENOUS FORCE?

Mr. NAGEL. The second principal speaker is Professor Scalapino.

Professor SCALAPINO. Mr. Moderator, ladies and gentlemen of the panel, ladies and gentlemen of the audience, both here and unseen:

First, it should be perfectly clear that I am not here as a spokesman for the Government. I did not know—I do not know—what Mr. Bundy would have said. As the moderator has made clear, we knew about this on both sides of this panel only about 12:30 and consequently my remarks will be strictly those of myself as prepared rather hastily after that time.

Now it seems to me that in beginning I would not start my remarks with a historical background as did Professor Kahin. I would rather prefer to work those into some of the critical questions to which I would like to address myself.

The first of these questions, which is, I think, critical, is as follows:

Is the Vietcong a truly indigenous force in South Vietnam and has it achieved its strength for its support such as it is through promoting socioeconomic reform?

To me, the answer to this question, while complicated, is, on balance, "No."

Let me cite, to begin, an editorial from the Peiping Daily Worker of April 15 of this year and reproduced in the Peiping Review on April 23. Said Peiping: The Vietnamese people's anti-U.S. struggle for national salvation is a just, revolutionary struggle against aggression. It is certain to win, because there is the wise leadership of the Marxist-Leninist Worker Party of Vietnam, because there is the unity of the 30 million Vietnamese people, and because there is sympathy and support from people the world over.

I call to your attention the first phrase in that statement: Because there is the wise leadership of the Marxist-Leninist Workers Party of Vietnam. I think that there is little question that the Vietcong is a carbon copy of the Vietminh which preceded it. This is certainly not to say that it does not have indigenous support and leadership in nominal terms at least. Clearly most of the leaders of the National Liberation Front originated from the south as the front is now structured. And whatever the bewildering differences in figures, I am prepared to say that a significant segment of the National Liberation Front is still southern in origin.

Critical factors

But what are the truly critical factors? These factors, it seems to me, are as follows:

First, who does know the leadership of the National Liberation Front? Individuals like Nguyen Wue Ngo. How many either in or out of Vietnam really subscribe to their leadership? The real leaders of the Vietcong are, and have always been, those in small hard-core elements that are also members of the Communist Party—and that party has Hanoi as its headquarters now as in the past.

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The South Vietnamese Revolutionary Party numbers no more than 500 or so. It could not possibly be expected to dominate the 500,000-man party of the north. Not only is the leadership of this movement shadowy indeed, but take a look at its basic principles. I urge you to read them carefully, because I suggest that though there may have been differences in tactics between the South National Liberation Front and the North Workers Party, or Laodong group, there have been no differences up to date on the question of basic policies or of fundamental programs.

This is not an unusual movement. The Vietminh also had innumerable non-Communist elements. The Vietminh also until it came to power claimed to be a multiclass, multifront organization dedicated to national liberation of Vietnam. But it ended up as you well know under the domination of the Communist Party and opponents were either liquidated, silenced, or reformed.

Thus it seems to me what is critical here is that we do indeed face a complicated situation in which borrowing heavily from Chinese revolutionary tactics of the past a five-stage development toward revolution is involved.

The first stage is always to build a tightly disciplined, carefully controlled Communist Party that is not susceptible to penetration from the outside.

The second stage is to develop a united front movement, and in this stage of course one solicits the support if one can obtain it of the peasantry, of the intelligentsia, of the petit bourgeois, using such socioeconomic issues and nationalist issues as can be used.

The third stage is that when the united front is built one moves into guerrilla warfare.

The fourth stage that if guerrilla warfare is basically successful and the cities can be surrounded one moves into positional warfare.

And thence to victory, and the establishment of a people's democracy in which the real opponents of the regime are at that point out.

For I know of no significant opposition in North Vietnam today that survived this five-stage development and could remain in true opposition to the leaders of the Laodong Party.

I think it is important to understand this development, because it is neither unique to Vietnam, nor for that matter of fact, to China, whence it came earlier; nor, in certain respects, to North Korea.

It is a phenomenon that involves a combination of civil war and international aid and assistance. And unless both ingredients are given their approximate weight and role. I think one misunderstands the complexity of the problem, and the difficulty of the solution.

Let me raise another question: Does the Vietcong really command the support and allegiance of the people of South Vietnam?

Answer must be "no"

I think again, though the answer is complicated, the answer on balance must be no.

What is a true phenomenon is that though the Diem Government made many mistakes, and I am not here in any sense to defend it, although the Diem Government made many mistakes, one of the interesting things is that very few, if any, significant anti-Diem leaders in the South joined the Vietcong. One of the significant things is that today still, the great popular elements of South Vietnam are not a part of the Vietcong, nor have they ever been.

I refer to the Buddhists. And the Buddhist solution for this problem, neutralist as it is, does not involve the movement of the Vietcong into power. The latest Buddhist proposal that I've seen urges that all Vietcong elements go; North Americans go

out, and some kind of international force come in.

Now, secondly: What about the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao.

There are groups that command in some degree the allegiance of millions of Vietnamese. The Cao Dai alone has some two million in its reported membership. Have these leaders joined the Vietcong? Have they supported this so-called national liberation movement?

There have been some exceptions. One is always able to pick up in united-front activities five Catholics, three Hao Hoa, 10 Buddhists. But en masse, the leadership that represents the central strength of the really important functional elements of South Vietnam are not, and have never been, a part of this Communist-dominated National Liberation Front.

It is not to say that they support the present Government necessarily.

But what I think is more important is to say that through the stresses, the travails, the uncertainties of months and years of civil war, they did not join the Communist movement.

And I think it is also significant, quite frankly, to point out that the successes of the Vietcong are neither attributable alone to the appeals which they have been able to make on social, economic or nationalist grounds.

I would not deprecate those appeals, or their success in some quarters. But what I would emphasize and re-emphasize is the fact that Communist strength in South Vietnam, as in many other areas, is also heavily attributable to organizational skill.

A powerful weapon

If one takes hold of a movement politically and can organize it, mobilize it, and utilize all of the organizational technique, then one has, indeed, a powerful weapon—particularly when one works in a truly diverse, heterogeneous, nonorganized society.

THREE BROAD ALTERNATIVES SEEN

It does not necessarily mean, however, that because one has organizational control, one has public support. I think anyone familiar with American big city politics must know that.

The fact is that organization is critical to Communist success in Asia, and elsewhere, and very frequently coercion as much as persuasion is involved. How many village officials, good, bad and indifferent, have been killed by the Vietcong in recent years?

Some estimates are 6,000. I have no doubt that some of them were bad, many of them indifferent, some of them good, but the only question that was really asked was, "Do they support the Government or don't they?"

And if they do, then they're finished. For to root out the willful bases of power that critical in the development of a moment like this, and it has little to do quite frankly with the appeal of issues, socioeconomic, or others.

Now I make these points because I think that if the true allegiance of the people of South Vietnam could really be tested, it is very doubtful that they would vote for the Vietcong. And this question of elections, in Geneva, or after the Geneva agreements or elsewhere, troubles me greatly.

For I do not know, frankly, of any state that has been controlled by the Communists which could afford to allow free elections. And, quite frankly, in recent announcements coming out of Hanoi, I have seen nothing to indicate that Hanoi is interested in elections in the north.

Mass media system

I have seen nothing to indicate that they would really relinquish the mass media communications system for purposes of a true dialog, that they would allow the establishment of class-enemy parties.

I have seen nothing to indicate that the formula of free elections which is meaningful in the democratic context can be meaningful in a Communist context. And if that is true, then was the Geneva agreement always a fraudulent one? Then, was it clearly fraudulent from the beginning to assume that you could have free elections in a society dominated by men who regard class enemies as susceptible to control through whatever means possible?

Now, I think that when it comes to the basic issues that confront us today, they were outlined in broad terms very well this morning by Professor Schlesinger. We are confronted, at least theoretically, with three broad alternatives: Withdrawal, negotiation, or escalation.

It seems to me clear that the arguments against withdrawal are so powerful and so strong that at least as yet they have not been answered.

It is not merely that withdrawal would reduce American credibility with her allies and neutrals around the world, but it is also that it would be a green light to the new national liberation movements which are even now getting underway. I do not need to remind you that Peiping has broadcast repeatedly its intent to support the Thai national liberation movement and has already launched the first propaganda with this matter in hand.

If socioeconomic interests are the critical question, we would have some curious new kinds of analyses to make. We cannot ignore the ingredient of power. And central to this, it seem to me, is the fact that for more than 5 years, Peiping and Moscow have been arguing vigorously about the way in which to handle American imperialism. That argument, which has gone down to this present month, is roughly speaking as follows, and I think you know it well:

American imperialism, argues Peiping, is a paper tiger. Push and attack—it will retreat. It is not to be taken as a nuclear blackmail threat. The problem with the Russians, argues Peiping, is that they have been too sensitive to American power, too willing to compromise, too unwilling to push the revolutionary movement forward.

It seems to me that, above all, withdrawal—withdrawal would prove that Peiping was right and make it virtually impossible for moderation to prevail inside the world Communist movement. For if the strategy of pushing American power and forcing it into a unilateral retreat works—if it works in Vietnam, it will work elsewhere and be tried everywhere.

Domingo view altered

I do not subscribe to the domino theory precisely. I think it should be more applicable to checkers theory. For, Peiping will jump over—not only states which she can neutralize, but perhaps even continents. She will jump to those areas where she can build the ingredients for this kind of formula. And, indeed, as long as she has the combination of privileged sanctuaries within her own territory and that of her allies; as long as she had the ingredients, her mobilizing manpower and equipment for their support and training; as long as she had these ingredients, then, I think, she had a strategy that was well-nigh foolproof.

Let me then move to this question of negotiation: I suspect the overwhelming majority of people in this room, and listening to us, favor negotiation. And I suspect that the critical issues, therefore, to come is: who is willing to negotiate and on what terms.

Up to date, and we can certainly hope that this will change, the Chinese have indicated very little willingness to negotiate. They have refused U Thant's proposed visit to Peiping, a visit which, incidentally, had our support. They have also declined to accept the overtures of the English and the

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French, either privately or publicly, to move toward any kind of negotiation.

Their comments upon the recent proposal of the Indians can be summed up in one word: "ridiculous," they said concerning an Afro-Asian international force.

Their sabotage, or attempted sabotage, of the Cambodian conference is well known to everyone. In short, it seems to me that on the record whatever they have been, the qualms of the United States toward coming to the conference table, we have explored and we have allowed our allies to explore every combination of public and private opportunity that seemed promising.

And we are still hoping that at least Hanoi will come forward and break its tie, now more than 2 years old, with Peiping and move into a new orbit of independence.

The whole history of Vietnam indicates that while there has always been a stout resistance to China on the one hand there has always been a strong element willing to cooperate and collaborate with China on the other. And this brings to me—I think—the focus, of this problem; namely, the question of the containment of China.

May I say that I agree very much with Professor Kahin when he talks about the importance of aligning ourselves openly with Asian nationalists. I think this is critical.

May I suggest also that I think that there may be some slight discrepancy in his thesis that on the one hand the nationalist movement and the Communist movement are antithetical, which I think he suggested at one point, and on the other that they can be united.

In my opinion both are possible. They can be united sometimes, for purposes that are perhaps limited in time and space, but they can also be antithetical.

But what I would urge you to look at here is to see how clearly was communism in Asia truly the product of nationalism and the nationalist capture.

In part it was, but only in part. North Korean communism was implanted as a result of Soviet power. And I suggest that the pressures which Communist China is putting upon the small neutralist countries today—unless they are counteracted by some balance of power in this region—will be anti-nationalist and increasingly satellite in character.

These are small states, the survival of which depends upon some balance of power—a balance of power, I say, that must be a combination of both Western and Asian power, that must represent a fusion, for today it is critical that we come into line with such major societies in Asia as Japan and India, and I would hope some day, Indonesia. For these are societies with whom we can work in forwarding the social, economic, and nationalist revolutions that the last 2 or 3 years are indications that Communist power unchecked will ultimately impose its own version of socioeconomic revolution and will ultimately impose its own sense of national interest.

I say that this policy, in conclusion, can run along these lines:

First, our broad objective should be a neutral, nonaligned Asia that is truly neutral and nonaligned, not the Communist version of the Vietcong.

Secondly, we should, of course, negotiate. But we should make it clear that we are not negotiating just with labels, that we are negotiating with men representing forces. We should negotiate with the Communists in South Vietnam as Communists, and we should negotiate with the other elements in terms of whatever representation they truly represent. It must be remembered that the Buddhists are the largest functional group in South Vietnam and they certainly dwarf the Vietcong in numbers and supporters.

And lastly, I would say this, that I think that as long as we maintain two open channels not only for the neutrals but for the Communists, one in which we urge social, economic, cultural exchange, one in which we urge peaceful coexistence, one in which we desire the exchange of scholars, journalists and economic development—yes, with China, as with others. And the other channel in which we say we will not surrender unconditionally, we will not be driven out by a philosophy that regards compromise as evil as long as it takes that stand, as long as we keep these channels open and operative in an imaginative sense, I do not see how we can fail in the long run to reach a solution to our problems.

STUDY OF HANOI ELECTION RECORD

Professor KAHIN. With regard to the attitude of Hanoi Government to elections, if you—I'm sure you have studied the election records there—but for years after Geneva that Government did remind the South of its desire for elections, it did remind the co-chairman of the Geneva conference for several years repeatedly thereafter even after the date of in 1966 had gone by that it still wanted the elections, and if Hanoi says today it wants to go back to the Geneva agreements in their entirety, I submit that it wants to go back to elections conducted under international auspices as well.

I've been looking at the record, as I suppose you have, of Hanoi broadcasts during the last month and I haven't seen any indication to suggest that it does not want elections. I would ask Professor Scalapino why it is, because I think that this is germane, that the United States continues to press for elections uniting Germany and Korea that has in no case I know of in recent years indicated any willingness to do so in Vietnam and where it did before attach conditions.

I hope you won't mind my saying, Bob, but your analysis of the internal political balance in Hanoi was given with more self assurance than I've ever heard anyone give before, and I think that insofar that one can scrutinize this, he is impressed with consistent zigzags and zags of policy as between Russia and Communist China.

Statement at seminar

With regard to the matter of nationalism, may I go back to 1963 when I quoted Diem before he was at a seminar we had at Cornell and he made these same statements afterward. His most poignant concern at that time was that the vast majority of real nationalists as he put it had either made their political usefulness much the less by having been attentive—in other words opportunistic politically as he saw it during the previous years—or had in fact already gone over to the Vietminh. A major proportion of them, as he said at that time, had gone over to the Vietminh and he added the words the most courageous of them.

I'd also suggest that when a nationalist movement is frustrated in its efforts to win independence that it can very easily spill over into Communist-controlled channels, particularly in a country like Vietnam, where there was a very particular history.

The French were very hard on Nationalists and well before the war the Vietnamese Communist party had gone underground and had developed a capacity to operate effectively underground that no other nationalist party had.

And during the Japanese occupation, as you recall, there was an arrangement between the Japanese and the Vichy French—the Vichy French worked with the Japanese—and both of them made it very difficult for the Communists to operate anywhere except underground and this was true for nationalists in general.

Nationalists elsewhere in southeast Asia

were often given some opportunity to organize and develop by the Japanese occupation authorities. Not so in Indochina. They had to work. Non-Communist nationalists had to work underground and in working underground they naturally gravitated toward the only well-organized underground that was in existence.

Professor SCALAPINO. First, let me talk to the question of Hanoi's allegiances. I want to admit that this is a very complicated matter and one still, I think, in very great dispute within the Laodong Party of North Vietnam. However, having followed rather closely both Haktob and Nandan for the last 3 years in translation, I have come to the conclusion, and I think most other scholars on North Vietnam have come to the conclusion, that there is a very obvious, and decided, and total swing in that period.

Now it may, as I say, be swinging back, because I think that our bombing in the North had a political impact upon that party, and a very decisive one. But let me quote you, just so that I won't be saying something that you have to take on my faith, let me quote you two items, the first one from September 25, 1963, "Peace or Violence," the name of the article, September 1963, Haktob, which talks about the modern revisionists and rightists; "Opportunists are doing their utmost to peddle pacifism and misrepresent the Marxist-Leninist theory on the role of violence in history."

Let me quote you an article from one of the leading North Vietnamese generals, Pham No Mal, which appeared in the March 11 People's Army newspaper in Hanoi of this year: "All over the world the struggle movement for peace, independence, democracy and socialism is developing and is winning real victories. The flag of Marxism-Leninism is being waved more and more in all the five continents. Modern revisionism is being defeated, but it has not yet been completely eliminated, and the struggle between the two paths is continuing."

Question of nationalism

Now with respect to this question of nationalism, let me reiterate, and this is all I can do, George, one of the points that I tried to make in my unprepared remarks; namely, that it seems to me that the issue of how communism treats nationalism both in ideological terms and in policy terms is entirely derivative from certain other considerations, that is, I have the strongest feeling that most of the leaders of the Vietcong in the south are—owe their primary allegiance to Hanoi and its policy formation, and that how the Hanoi party goes will determine the future of the South and that, in turn, the general situation in Asia will determine whether Asian nationalism for small states is viable. But it seems to me we have seen increasingly that unless we can establish some balance of power in Asia, nationalism is going to go under in societies like Cambodia, it's going to go under in societies like Burma.

Th inextorable pressure of the big states that are just emerging now, of which China is one but not the only one, is going to submerge indigenous Asian nationalism in its own concept of its own ideological interest and its own self-interest from a national standpoint. And I think the evidence is already piling up on this score. If a Prince Sihanouk has to call off the Cambodian Conference, if the Burmese have to worry about whether the Communists are going to come into their Government or not because of pressures, if on all sides one has to ask, What does Peiping think and say? then it seems to me nationalism is under assault.

And it is up to us, and I think we are the largest power in the world that truly does not have serious economic and political interests that lie in this form of neocolonialism in Asia. I think we are the power that

can align ourselves with the true nationalist movements of this area and, I repeat, that it seems to me that the evidence thus far shows that most of the true South Vietnamese anti-Communist or non-Communist leaders do not regard the Vietcong as a nationalist movement.

The main—the key Buddhists have not joined it; the key Catholics have not joined it; the key Hoa Hoa and Cao Dai groups have not joined it. There are some exceptions. But by and large, that's a shadowy movement without the kind of leadership that really speaks to the issue of nationalism.

And in closing, I would like to have Professor Kahin speak to really two themes. I would like to have him discuss whether or not he believes that the Vietcong is similar or identical to the Cietminh and that, in all probability, it is or is not Communist controlled—what its other components.

I would like to have him pursue this, then, by suggesting what he thinks would happen if we withdrew from South Vietnam unilaterally.

Second, I would like to ask him what he proposes to do if the Chinese and through them, other elements of the Communist movement, continue to remain adamant on the question of negotiations—something that we hope, very much, will not happen.

But suppose they continue to denounce the 17 nonaligned nation approach, the Indian approach, all other approaches to negotiations as ridiculous, a plot to show China up. Then what is our next move?

SOME OBSERVATIONS AND QUESTIONS

Mr. NAGEL. I regret I cannot give Mr. Kahin the opportunity to reply at this point. But there will be, hopefully, the chance to do so in the final part of the proceedings.

We now come to observations and questions by the various commentators. I would like to remind both them and you that each will have not more than 6 minutes, to be followed by any response that the principal speaker may wish to make.

I will—because of the distribution of mikes, I think it'll be best if each of the commentators remains and talks into the mike in front of him. And since not everybody is visible from every fixed point, I think, perhaps, the best way of telling you when your time is nearly up if I rise 1 minute before and so indicate.

The first commentator is Prof. Hans Morgenthau.

Professor MORGENTHAU. Let me suppose that Professor Scalapino's analysis of the facts in southeast Asia is correct in every particular—a mere hypothetical assumption on my part.

What would the consequences for American policy be?

Professor Scalapino speaks very softly about the establishment of a balance of power. I speak very crudely about war against China.

For I see here one of the basic inner contradictions of our official policy which makes, as speakers have reminded us this morning and this afternoon, those problems so terribly complicated.

It is because we set ourselves goals in Asia and we have done so, I should say in parting, for half a century, which cannot be achieved with the means we are willing to employ.

And as it is in philosophy and in pure logic, if you pose a wrong question you find it extremely complex to give a simple and correct answer.

Something basically wrong

And the uneasiness in the country of which this assembly is an impressive manifestation, I think stems from this instinctive recognition that there's something basically wrong in the modes of thought and action of our Government, that there is an essential contradiction or a number of contradictions between what we profess to want and the

policies we want to employ and the risks which we want to take.

And I submit again, as I have done this morning, and have done before in lectures many times, that if you really want to achieve in Asia what the spokesmen for our Government say they want to achieve, you must be ready to go to war with China, with all that that implies.

I would also say a word—I'm getting nervous—about negotiations. Much has been made of our willingness to negotiate. There is, of course, no doubt, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy didn't need to emphasize it, that our Government wants a peaceful solution. No decent government which isn't out of its mind would want anything else.

But this is not the point. The point is not what you intend, but the point is what you do regardless of your intentions. The history of the world is full of instances where well-meaning, high-principled people have brought unspeakable misery upon their own nation in spite of their good intentions, because it used the wrong policies.

Let me turn to the problem of negotiations. Of course we want a negotiated settlement, and I'm sure there are people in our Government who pray for a negotiated settlement, if only the other side would make a move.

But those people cannot see that the implicit conditions which we have made—the unspoken conditions—make a negotiated settlement at the moment impossible.

For, first of all, we refuse to negotiate with the Vietcong.

Second, we make it an implicit condition that we remain—at least for the time being—in South Vietnam—that is to say, as long as no stable government is established there, while will take a very long time.

Now the other side is fully aware of the blind alley in which we find ourselves in South Vietnam. We don't have the courage to retreat and we don't dare to advance too far.

And so obviously from the point of view of Peiping, which hasn't lost a single man in that conflict and has only lost, as far as we can tell, one gun, which Mr. McNamara showed the other day in a press conference.

Of course from the point of view of Peiping, nothing better could happen than the United States waging a war in Vietnam which it is not able to win and which it cannot afford to lose.

Why should Peiping under such circumstances recommend negotiations?

Negotiations are possible only under the conditions such as when one recognizes the inevitable facts of life in Asia which, as I have said before, can only be changed by war.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. It seems to me that the basic issue that we are facing here today involves the fact that we're living in an age of very rapid change with many countries and several continents undergoing many revolutions rolled into one. Out of that condition arises two basic questions: What will be the nature of the change which these societies are going to experience and are experiencing, and what role can the United States play in these changes?

It seems to me that in Asia we have demonstrated not perfection but a positive commitment to social change—in Japan, where we have helped the reconstruction of a country ravaged by war and social reform. We are doing the same in India, in Pakistan, in Thailand, in Taiwan. We have maintained our economic presence and assistance because we have been able to maintain our political presence.

And our political presence will be denied if the United States and those associated with it permit themselves to be expelled militarily. And yet that in many respects

is the issue today in southeast Asia: The nature of change, of social reform, whether it will be by evolution or by more rapid, coercive, indeed violent means, and whether the United States will be associated with it.

International politics

There are those who argue the revolution in South Vietnam is purely indigenous and nationalist. Now I'm not an expert on southeast Asia. I'm interested in international politics. I can only judge on the basis of what I read. And I'd like to read to you two passages written by men who are not known as apologists for the administration and both associated with a newspaper which has been highly critical of the administration, particularly editorially.

The first comment is by Robert Kleiman in the New York Times, an editorial writer. He states that after years—5 years—the so-called war of national liberation in South Vietnam still retains its original characteristics as an armed conspiracy. The Vietcong has scored military successes and entrenched itself politically in many rural areas. But there has never been any sign of a mass uprising. And then he goes on to discuss the relative absence of popular support for the Vietcong.

Peter Grose, writing in the Times magazine, states clearly and explicitly that the South Vietnamese Vietcong operation is controlled from the North, directed from the North, supported from the North and, indeed, even cites North Vietnamese admission to that effect.

HOPE FOR EVOLUTION TO EFFECT CHANGE

Now I cite that because the basic issue here seems to me to lie in the fact that we are not trying to overthrow the North Vietnamese Government. We are not trying to change an existing political situation. And, as in Europe, we hope to rely on the passage of time and evolution to effect change, a condition which I hasten to add the Soviet leadership accepted after Cuba when it desisted from the use of force to change the situation in Europe and itself is banking on evolutionary change, on the peaceful transition to socialism to attain its objectives. Now that condition is yet to be attained in Asia.

There are those who say that it can never be, for China is the predominant power in the region. Let us assume for a second that it is. So was Japan in 1940. Does that mean we should not have taken the course we did? So was Germany in Europe in 1940. So was the Soviet Union in Europe in 1945-46. Yet this did not justify the conclusions that one should therefore disengage and in a self-fulfilling prophecy make right the assertion—make right the assertion that China is the predominant power and prove it by disengaging.

We may or may not have been remiss in the past, but the fact is that in a number of societies we have shown that we can relate ourselves positively to their development. And today we are trying to negotiate over the issue of Vietnam.

We have made a number of proposals. These proposals have been accompanied by proposals from the 17 nations, from India, from U Thant, and the United Nations, and none of these proposals have been accepted because at the present time the other side makes a demand which involves a qualitative change in the political status quo. That demand, it seems to me, is ahistorical and dangerous in the nuclear age.

It is imperative that both sides, both sides, all major powers, learn that in the nuclear age the existing political status quo cannot be changed by force. And I repeat—it is not us who are trying to overthrow the North Vietnamese Government. It is the South Vietnamese Government which is being tested from the North.

Professor SCALAPINO. If I may risk a simplification of Professor Morgenthau's thesis: It seems to me that he is coming pretty close to saying that either war or withdrawal from Asia is inevitable for the United States—that we must either get out or we must go to war with China.

I may be misinterpreting him, but that's the way I read his remarks and he'll have a chance to rebut this if I'm wrong.

Now, I would just like to reiterate what's been said by other people here. I don't believe in historical inevitability. But if I did, I would put this in precisely the opposite framework. I would say that withdrawal at this point will mean war. Because I think it will inevitably settle, at least for the time being, the issue of how to meet American imperialism, as the Communists put it.

I think it will inevitably cause the launching not of a thousand ships, but a thousand revolts not just in Asia, but wherever this movement can get underway. And I think that that means war. Under what conditions, I cannot predict, nor can you.

The critical issue

Now it seems to me that that's the critical issue.

We are engaged—we are engaged in the hard, difficult, complex task of trying again to build a containment policy, if you will, but one that is more broadly gaged than the past. And I would simply end my answer to Mr. Morgenthau's comment by suggesting that if you take the last 10 years, I think that the United States itself a late-developing society in terms of world leadership, has learned a great deal; has moved a great distance.

Ten years ago we were still saying—some of us, not I, but some—that neutralism was immoral. Today, we are prepared—and I think this is true of both of our major parties—to work with and underwrite when we can, neutral and nonaligned states.

We have people—and this point ought to be underlined and reemphasized—who are not reactionary; who are not committed to the past, and who have found that between us and the Communists they'd rather take their chances on socioeconomic reform and development with us.

And I maintain that in some of the areas where the American commitment has been heaviest in Asia, the standard of living is going up most rapidly.

This is important, not because I want to whitewash American policy, I think we've made many mistakes in the past, we're still making some—I've been a frequent critic of American policy myself—but I think the time has come, both to face up to alternatives and at the same time to point out again and again that, if we can't do something to preserve a certain openness in these societies, then, it seems to me, the balance of power will be abruptly changed and global war will shortly ensue.

UNITED STATES SAID TO CREATE SITUATION

Professor KAHN. Well, there are just two points that I'd like to make. One, I was pleased at his reliance upon the New York Times. I would hope that his reading is a little wider and that he reads some of the other views in the Times. One healthy thing about the Times is, it seems to me, the variety of viewpoints—and there are others expressed.

The other point that he made that I would like to take issue with is this: that in Vietnam we are not trying to change an existing situation. And I say this is true in a basic sense. And the reason is because the situation that exists is one which we created, beginning in 1956, and which we are simply trying to maintain. No, we're not trying to change it basically. The trouble is it's an artificial situation and it's one that can't be shored up militarily. It lacks basic political ingredients.

MARY WRIGHT. My differences with Professor Scalapino and his analysis of the situation are very deep and very profound and we are talking about a very serious matter here. It's a good deal more serious than I expected it to be when we came onto this platform today.

I agree with him, with his very curious and earnest statement, that I, too, will fight for American soil. But when he makes that plea for Asia—we will not be moved out of Asia. We will not give up unilaterally. I am absolutely dumfounded, because he links it to a policy of getting into alignment with nations like India and Japan.

He surely is as well aware as I am and all of you are of what our policy and the kind of policy he poses, the kind of tensions that this has placed on our sound relation with Japan and India.

We are risking our relations with Japan and India.

It's a very serious thing.

I am in favor of attempting to provide multiple outlets for nationalism for the new nations, but only when we are wanted.

Professor Scalapino would like Asia a certain way. I agree with Professor Morgenthau that to have the Asia that he has outlined is not only impossible within the means which we are willing to use, it is impossible within the means at our command.

Because we sit here with an Asia projected of how we would want it. We are trying to disavow the Communist revolution in China. We pretend it doesn't exist there. We talk against the advice of our best friends of Europe, against our best allies as far as Asia goes. We upset the nonaligned countries. We bring in far more military aid than the opposition is bringing in as far as that goes.

We've got some lessons of history here to learn and Mr. Brzezinski's parallels are those very dangerous intellectual exercises—faulty parallels—to the position of Hitler's Germany or Imperial Japan. Because this is not the first time that a great power has gone to war to try to save—use military force to try to save Asia from communism.

I find myself in very profound opposition to my friends and colleagues on the panel and on the other side.

It appears to me that the Communist revolution has been won in China; as Mr. Brzezinski says, a great deal has happened in the last 20 years. The one place it's not happened is in Chinese-American relations.

We've either got to accept the fact of the existence of Communist China and agree—and if you ask some Japanese and Indians, who, of course, will tell you at once that Communist China is the preponderant power in Asia—and try to come to deal with it as best we can, extricate ourselves where we are clearly not wanted militarily with what dignity we can muster, not because it's easy for a great power to retreat, but because it's almost the last moment to retreat in Vietnam and salvage something.

Professor SCALAPINO. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to respond to that now.

I think it's better for me to respond now than after another speaker. Though I certainly respect the judgment of the Chair on these matters:

Firstly, we do indeed differ, Professor Wright and I, both in interpretation and in fact. Because I regard about 60 percent of what she said as nonfact and it would take me a long time to go over this.

Sometimes, nonfact comes in nonspoken statements, incidentally. For example, the question of our relations with Japan and India and the other non-Communist countries. I do not want for a moment to obscure the fact that there is opposition to our policy in Asia, as there is opposition to our policy here in the United States.

But I want to ask this question: Does the Government of India, does the Government of Japan, do most of the non-Communist

governments of Asia really want us out of Asia as she suggests? They do not. They do not.

Professor WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to suggest that our difficulty arises not so much from a particular complexity but from a general misconception. I would like to say in addition in the context of the news of the last few days and Mr. Bundy's absence that given enough attention to their critics and enough rational collaboration from their opponents, our leaders may end the Vietnam war short of disaster.

But sophisticated salvage operations are not enough. Our rivals being human beings may some day become irrational under such stress. And our own imagination is being contained and stunted within the limits of the past.

Our difficulty, it seems to me, is more subtle and more pervasive than even the resort to complexity we all acknowledge. We have not recognized and adapted to the triumph of an outlook and a policy formulated 70 years ago. The success of that policy as has been pointed out changed the reality upon which it was based. The success of that policy having changed the reality needs to be reconsidered, and I suggest that we need a new outlook and a new policy appropriate to the changed conditions, instead of struggles to operate successfully within the old framework.

"OPENNESS TO" PROBLEMS FAVORED

Professor SCALAPINO. It's question of how you integrate a meaningful social, economic, political, and military program from the standpoint of maximizing the fundamental interests which you and the non-Communist world hold in common. I don't think it's an either-or basis.

I think that the Communists themselves have shown us that it isn't, because their approach is not an either-or basis, and never has been. And this is the kind of problem—how do you develop the socioeconomic, political military integration that provides a base for political support, for economic development, and for some openness?

And I maintain that that's the most critical problem that we face, because it seems to me that we've done it successfully in some areas. Japan is a marvelous example of where the application of American and Japanese aid interrelated was successful.

There are areas where political stability has interacted with socioeconomic gains. And I think that these areas must be preserved and expanded in company with our allies and our potential allies.

When the President of India, for example, says that an Afro-Asian force might make some sense in the area of Vietnam and we say we're interested, and Peiping says it's ridiculous, it seems to me this is a kind of openness with which we should approach more and more of our problems.

I favor bringing the Asian and the African states into discussion of how peace can be developed and maintained and economic and social growth developed.

But I don't think ours is an adamant position. I don't think we've ever said or thought you could rely upon force alone. I don't think that that's the position that any thinking American today, however he may differ on the question of precisely of what we should do in Vietnam now.

Professor LINDSAY. I think this is a very valuable kind of meeting, and I think that a great many of the failures in both British and American policy have come from the Government failing to realize that a democratic country can only pursue an effective policy on the basis of an informed public opinion. And I think a great many mistakes have arisen from failure to produce one.

Then I think on that what it does seem to me that a lot of this trouble has come from

failure to discuss the issues involved very much sooner. That if I look, I think, at most of the remarks of the speakers on the other side, it seems to me they all depend on a complete refusal to face what is a basically fairly new problem—how does one deal with the Leninist technique of spreading totalitarian control? I mean you had it in some extent actually with German infiltration in the Balkans in the 1930's.

But I think you do have to say what you do with the problem when you have a small determined minority who are perfectly prepared to use force and terrorism to get themselves in power. And it does seem to me that the American political scientists have far too much thought in terms of the kind of society in which things work through elections where it's one man, one vote, and haven't nearly enough thought about the problem of how you deal with a kind of society where your great majority are comparatively uninterested in politics and where a determination, where a small determined and forceful minority has a power completely out of proportion to their numbers.

Now the other point I think they've refused to face. This actually was put by one of the Austrian Social Democrats a long time ago when he said "if you're playing chess all right you keep to the rules as long as your opponent does, but if you know perfectly well that once your opponent starts to lose he will just knock over the table, then you have to think out new rules."

So it does seem to me that you have to begin by thinking of how do you deal with this kind of problem, and I might just cite, I think, a very clear case is the case of Malaya. Here again you had a determined minority and I think if you go back and look at the papers as of about 1950 you will find people saying very much the same as this is right just now, now here is a popular movement which it is wrong to oppose. But I think it was perfectly clear after the event this power depended on terrorism. Once you had the organization which broke that terrorism, Malaya has become in fact one of the more successful Asian countries with a government which does in fact have a fair amount of support.

And so I feel perhaps the basic failure in American policy has been failure to develop the ideas of the Declaration of Independence, of governments owing their just powers to the consent of the governed. And to go on to say that a government which relies to maintain its power on terrorism, on keeping—on prevention of discussion, on keeping its people from any access to information, thereby proves that it does not represent the people.

TRUTH FOR VIETNAMESE PEOPLE

Professor MILLET. This a serious moment. And we're here in search of truth. And much has been said about many truths—one has been left out of account. I should like to say a little about that.

Behind all these high issues of international politics and hegemony of great States and international balance of power, there lies the Vietnamese truth. The truth for Vietnam; which for the Vietnamese people is a very bitter truth indeed.

Scalapino has said Communists do not ask for elections. Let us not forget it was the Vietminh who expected elections in 1956. And I wish merely to read from the program of the National Liberation Front of 1960, second article:

"Abolish the present Constitution set up by the servile dictatorial Vietminh administration, carry out universal suffrage to elect a new national assembly." That was the NLF position in 1960. It has not changed.

Professor SCALAPINO. I'm surprised that someone would say here that terror on our side accounts for all that happens in Vietnam.

And beyond that—on that particular point—I cannot comment more, except to say that as I tried to make clear at the outset, I think this is an enormously complicated problem. There has been terrorism on both sides. There have been many injustices, many killings on both sides.

To try to establish where the balance of terror lies, would, I think, be exceedingly difficult, but it seems to me clear that every observer of the Vietcong region has referred to a variety of techniques that range from persuasion to coercion. He has referred to the taking of young men for military service with or without their leave, and the government has done the same thing.

This is not a situation in which you can demark the good guys from the bad guys in these absolutist terms. And I think it's fairly clear that when I talked about Vietnam elections what the question I really raised was this: How can you have meaningful free elections unless opponents have full access to mass media or at least sufficient access to get their position expressed?

Professor FISHEL. Mr. Chairman, colleagues, Professor Kahin and Professor Scalapino began this discussion on a high and responsible level with able and solidly grounded analyses. I see my role as a panelist as the only member of this panel who has lived and worked extensively in Vietnam, to try to set forth a few facts with respect to the country whose continuing agony is our reason for assembling here today.

I think we should keep in mind that there are very few blacks or whites in the Vietnamese situation. There are many shades of gray. We, as scholars, should strive for accuracy and wherever it is possible, for precision. I don't think we should succumb to the very natural inclination to over-simplify and thereby reduce to the absurd what is a very difficult and complex problem area.

REPEAL OF 14(b) OF TAFT-HARTLEY ACT

(Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, the issue involved in the passage of H.R. 77 is simple. The repeal of provision 14(b) of the Taft Hartley Act will restore the right to vote to workers throughout the country. They will regain the freedom to determine whether or not their interests would best be served by a union security clause in their contract. At present their right to vote on this issue is restricted by the so-called right-to-work laws in 19 States.

There has been an extended test of this provision of the Taft-Hartley Act in the years since its original passage. There is no evidence of harm to the public interest in those States which do not infringe the rights of the employees to negotiate for a union shop. Why should we continue to restrict employees freedom in 19 States?

Despite the simplicity of the issue there are a number of deceptive arguments on behalf of 14(b) and the right-to-work laws which have accumulated in the last 18 years. Because they are overlapping it would be difficult to deal with all the variations in one brief speech. Since they will be exhumed in the current debate over H.R. 77 I will mention some of the more common ones and their more obvious flaws.

First is the claim that the existence

of 14(b) permits States to enact right-to-work laws. These laws, which actually restrict the employees' right to vote to negotiate for a union shop are improperly named. They restrict rather than enlarge the employee's rights, and do not guarantee any right to work. The name is deceptive and misleading. It has been held illegal in at least one State—*Idaho State Federation of Labor, in Re (Robert E. Smylie)*, 26 LC Par 68, 541, 75 Ida. 367, 272 P. 2d 707.

The proponents of the so-called right-to-work laws use the time worn technique of using two definitions—one for attack and one for defense. In ads and pamphlets they attempt to define the right to work as a fundamental right equal to the freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and other basic civil rights. They paint in somber hues the dire consequences of limiting this fundamental American right to earn a livelihood.

When it is pointed out that right-to-work laws do not create any right to work, or even guarantee a chance to work, they recoil in horror that anyone would suspect them of advocating such alien ideas. This kind of right to work, they say, is found only in socialist countries. The only right they want to protect is, "the right of an individual to work at his job without being compelled to belong or not to belong to a labor union." It is interesting to substitute this definition in some of the more flamboyant propaganda sent out by right-to-work groups and the mass mail which comes into our offices.

It is obvious that in States which do not prohibit union security contracts that the right to work without joining a union exists. The overwhelming majority of nonagricultural employees are not union members. In the most strongly unionized State, Illinois, almost two-thirds of the employees do not belong to a union. Their "right to work" without joining a union exists without restricting the right to vote of those who do want a union shop. The following table shows the percentage of union members in each State. Notice the number who have the right to work without joining a union:

AFL-CIO membership as percentage of non-agricultural employment, by States, 1962

	Employees in non-agricultural establishments	AFL-CIO membership	AFL-CIO members as percent of employment
	Thousands	Thousands	Percent
Alabama.....	791.8	185	23.4
Alaska.....	53.9	20	34.0
Arizona.....	364.8	76	20.8
Arkansas.....	306.8	72	18.1
California.....	5,218.4	1,400	26.8
Colorado.....	550.8	108	19.6
Connecticut.....	949.8	185	19.5
Delaware.....	155.4	16	10.3
Florida.....	1,387.8	150	10.5
Georgia.....	1,101.1	120.0	10.9
Hawaii.....	195.2	(1)	(1)
Idaho.....	164.6	14.0	.5
Illinois.....	3,551.8	1,250.0	35.2
Indiana.....	1,461.3	350.0	24.0
Iowa.....	686.4	100.0	14.6
Kansas.....	572.1	85.0	14.9
Kentucky.....	674.4	135.0	20.0
Louisiana.....	794.9	130.0	16.4
Maine.....	279.0	88	20.8
Maryland-District of Columbia.....	1,516.0	275	18.1

Footnotes at end of table.

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AFL-CIO membership as percentage of non-agricultural employment, by States, 1962—Continued

	Employees in non- agricultural establish- ments	AFL-CIO member- ship	AFL-CIO members as percent of employ- ment
	Thousands	Thousands	Percent
Massachusetts.....	1,958.0	525	26.8
Michigan.....	2,335.5	750	32.1
Minnesota.....	984.2	300	30.5
Mississippi.....	425.7	45	10.6
Missouri.....	1,357.5	400	29.5
Montana.....	171.7	30	17.5
Nebraska.....	393.4	50	12.7
Nevada.....	126.6	18	14.2
New Hampshire.....	204.6	50.0	24.4
New Jersey.....	2,086.3	600.0	28.8
New Mexico.....	242.6	31.0	12.8
New York.....	6,266.2	2,000.0	31.9
North Carolina.....	1,258.5	80.0	6.4
North Dakota.....	129.5	15.0	11.6
Ohio.....	3,099.2	1,000.0	32.2
Oklahoma.....	601.6	65.0	10.8
Oregon.....	528.0	140.0	26.5
Pennsylvania.....	3,698.7	1,250.0	33.8
Rhode Island.....	298.3	60.0	20.1
South Carolina.....	609.3	40.0	6.6
South Dakota.....	151.8	17.0	11.2
Tennessee.....	965.4	150.0	15.5
Texas.....	2,624.8	350.0	13.3
Utah.....	287.3	45.0	15.7
Vermont.....	109.3	9.5	8.7
Virginia.....	1,081.8	100.0	9.2
Washington.....	856.6	250.0	29.2
West Virginia.....	447.5	95.0	21.2
Wisconsin.....	1,207.9	264.0	+21.9
Wyoming.....	95.5	17.0	17.8

1 Not available.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor (Manpower, report of the President, March 1965 and Directory of National and International Labor Unions in the United States, 1963).

The deception in the use of the term "right to work" has been pointed out by many eminent Americans. Here are only a few statements:

Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt: "I am opposed to this legislation because it does not guarantee the right to work, but gives the employer the right to exploit labor. While it is true that a great deal of labor is not unionized, much of it benefits from unionized labor's gains. If the 'right to work laws' were passed, unionized labor would be so weakened that it could make no gains for any of its members or for those who are not members."

The Methodist Church Board of Social and Economic Relations: "Such laws are mis-called 'right to work laws' since they do not oblige anyone to give any individual a job. Their real menace lies, however, in denying by law the possibility of increasing the quality of individual freedom."

Rabbinical Council of America: "Recognizes the right to work legislation as a misnomer and beholds such legislation as a camouflage and a gimmick to weaken and undermine responsible, democratic unionism."

Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam (late president, Council of Bishops of Methodist Church): "Americans believe in the right to work. They resent the parasite, and such worthy terms as 'peace,' 'democracy,' and 'justice,' so too, clever crafty, and highly-paid public relations experts have designed these efforts to weaken labor as 'right to work' laws."

"Actually, a sanctimonious subterfuge is being foisted upon the public. The most significant progress has been made in industrial relations where the workers belong to the union and the union, through its representatives, meets the management, through its representatives, and together they think out the problems that should not be fought out." (Address to Baltimore Conference of the Methodist Church, June 1958.)

Former Secretary of Labor James Mitchell: "They call these right-to-work laws, but that is not what they really are. In the first place, they do not create any jobs at all. In the

second place, they result in undesirable and unnecessary limitations upon the freedom of working men and women and their employers to bargain collectively and agree upon conditions of work. I oppose such laws categorically."

Rev. William J. Kelley O.M.I., L.L.D.: "The right to work bills don't guarantee the individual any right at all. They provide him with an opportunity to work alone, to work at less than union wages."

Mr. Speaker, a related argument by those who support right-to-work laws is that they are necessary to protect fundamental individual freedoms. It is strange that the proponents of 14b wish to protect the employee from himself by restricting his freedom—his right to vote to determine whether or not he wishes to make a union security agreement a goal of collective bargaining. This is paradoxical. In those States which do not have a right-to-work law an employee may work in a union shop, either as a member or as an employee who tenders dues and fees for services rendered but is not an active member. He may also work in an open shop, or he may work where there is no union. In a right-to-work State an employee, even if he wants to, cannot have the protection of a union shop. Which one has the greater freedom of choice?

The repeal of 14b does not create a compulsory union shop. It merely puts the power of decision where it should be, with the employee. Remember that in every State a minority of employees are union members. Why should the right to vote on this issue be denied to this minority? To hold that restoring the right to vote to the minority endangers the right to work of the majority is obviously false. The repeal of 14b only restores to this minority the freedom of choice which has been denied to them in 19 States. This restoration of freedom of contract is desirable.

A third common argument is that the union shop is unnecessary. This has two parts. First, it is held that the union will survive if its services are of value for members will retain their membership and new employees will be glad to join. This overlooks the fact that both can get something for nothing by staying out of the union; namely, the benefits that the members win for them. Unfortunately there are still corporations whose management is antilabor, and which engage in union busting activities. In these the employees need the protection of a union shop. Also, in many cases the union shop works to the benefit of both labor and management by increasing the effectiveness of the work force, and by stimulating harmony and understanding in labor-management relations.

Second, it is argued that right-to-work laws have not stopped the growth of voluntary unionism. Those in favor of retention of 14b normally use a base period which has a small number of union members. Thus even a small numerical increase appears as a large percentage increase. This way they can talk about the rapid percentage growth of unions in right-to-work States. The

preceding table presents a more accurate picture of the strength of unionism in right-to-work States.

Even this acknowledgement of union growth must be considered as grudging tribute to the value of the union movement if unionism can advance under the most adverse circumstances. In many cases the benefits accounting for the growth of unions in States which restrict union security agreements could be achieved more effectively within such contracts. Who is in better position to determine the need for such a contract than the employees? If they feel that a union security contract would be beneficial let them have the right to vote to decide. Let us end the deceptive protection which limits their right to choose.

A fifth argument is that compulsory membership clause is a perversion of democracy which infringes on minority rights. First, is the term compulsory membership accurate? No, it is not. The worker is free to work elsewhere. Remember, in the 31 States which allow a union shop the great majority of employees are not union members. The individual is obviously not compelled to join a union. Second, the rights of the minority in a democratic system are retained and are guaranteed by law. The government of the union is conducted by democratic means and the minority retains the right to protest and to vote against the leadership. There have been violations of democratic procedure within some unions, but these are not due to the union shop. The existence of these violations of democratic procedure is no reason to argue against the democratic process.

Related to this is the thesis that right to work laws protect the public from the abuses of unions which have grown too powerful. This overlooks the many other legal protections in the Taft-Hartley and other labor acts. In those instances in which abuses occur they are caused by human nature, not the union shop. It is possible to point to similar abuses in other sections of the economy. Price fixing in certain major industries is an illustration. I would not recommend abolishing the corporation to cure these. Decapitation is not the proper remedy for a headache.

A sixth major argument is that the union member in a union shop is a captive rider. This is an attempt to refute the fact that in an open shop the non-union member is a free rider who does not pay for the services rendered by the union. It is a strange thing to hear so many who fear the effects of "something for nothing" in government arguing the merits of something for nothing in labor management relations. In a shop which has a union a nonunion worker is employed, by law, on precisely the same terms as is the union member. His refusal to join a union does not prevent him from getting all the union benefits gained by collective bargaining and arbitration. He takes these benefits without paying for them.

The unions properly feel that the worker should pay for the services rendered by the union in collective bargain-