

January 14, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

209

trends, as well as to search scientifically for the causes of productivity growth.

We need better estimates of the Nation's wealth. If we are to aim economic policy so that demand grows in line with potential supply, we need better estimates of the growth of that supply. And we will need to know how much capital is needed to augment capacity in different lines. The Joint Economic Committee, which has done so much to promote better statistics for this country through its Subcommittee on Economic Statistics, published an important report last year on this problem. We need to improve our price information. The United States has much the most comprehensive set of price measures of any country in the world. But our measures are not sufficiently sensitive, probably overstate price increases by inadequate allowance for quality improvement, and do not adequately reflect actual transaction prices or other aspects of total cost such as the period of delivery, freight absorption, etc. The report of the Stigler committee provides some important insights and suggestions.

We must continue to strengthen our unemployment statistics, and supplement them with figures on job vacancies. We need better information on compensation per man-hour. With fringe benefits becoming an ever-larger share of total worker compensation, we should have regular, periodic information on fringes along with straight wages. Further, a larger part of the labor force consists of nonproduction workers, and is engaged in the tertiary industries. We need more thorough coverage for these types of workers and these sectors.

Finally, our statistical efforts must more fully serve this country's increased concern with its balance of payments.

We need to do a lot more work on indexes of export prices, both for ourselves and for our major competitors.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The Federal Statistics Users' Conference has been a source of great strength to the Federal statistical program. I have outlined to you tonight some of the changing needs for our information base for continued prosperity. We shall look to you in the future as we have in the past for advice and guidance and for support in keeping our programs up to the needs of the times. We are blessed that the challenges before us are the challenges of prosperity and not of depression. Speaking for those of us in the Government, let me express our gratitude for the support you have given us in the past and for the continued support I know you will give us in the future.

Thank you.

WISCONSIN'S DICK CUDAHY SHOWS HOW INITIATIVE STILL PAYS OFF

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I think we all would agree that loyalty, hard work, and initiative should be recognized. That is what I want to do today in a brief comment on a young man who restored to fiscal soundness an old and famous family firm.

The man is Richard D. Cudahy, a grandson of the founder of Patrick Cudahy, Inc., of Milwaukee.

Richard Cudahy chose a career outside the family business after World War II when he entered Yale University Law School, graduated, and began the practice of law in Chicago.

But by 1961, his grandfather was deceased and his father, Michael Cudahy, was ill.

Without hesitation, Richard Cudahy picked up the reins of leadership. With

the cooperation of the United Packing-house Workers, he initiated modern, efficient, and productive meatpacking practices. The success of his policies became evident by the next year.

His continued success is truly a tribute to those virtues of enterprise, imagination, and thrift which we hear too little of today.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article of this high example from Meat Processing magazine.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RICHARD D. CUDAHY, YOUTHFUL LEADER OF PATRICK CUDAHY, INC. SWITCHES PROFESSIONS TO GUIDE 77-YEAR-OLD WISCONSIN PACKING FIRM

Five years ago Patrick Cudahy, Inc. was faced with a situation that has confronted many packers at one time or another. Rising labor costs, outdated production methods, and unprofitable operations posed serious financial problems for the Wisconsin firm. Since Patrick Cudahy founded the firm in the Milwaukee suburb that bears his name, things had never been quite so desperate.

Today, however, the 77-year-old firm is experiencing a relative prosperity that is surprising the industry.

Much of the credit for this turnabout can be traced to a new management team headed by the company's president, Richard D. Cudahy.

WEST POINT GRAD

Although a grandson of the founder, Richard Cudahy had severed direct relations with company operations early in life to pursue other career interests. In 1944 Cudahy joined the U.S. Army Air Force but shortly thereafter received an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy. After graduation from West Point, he served 4 years with the Air Force. Upon leaving the service in 1952, he attended the Yale University Law School where he received his LL. B. degree in 1955.

With this background, Cudahy spent several years in Government legal posts but in 1957 the Midwest beckoned and Cudahy joined a prominent Chicago law firm.

In 1961, Patrick Cudahy's plight came to a head. Michael Cudahy, president of the firm since the death of his father, was ill and unable to maintain effective company leadership. He summoned his son to take the helm—and that Richard Cudahy did.

UNION HARMONY

Cudahy explains that he rejoined the firm partly to carry on the family tradition as well as for the opportunity the new post presented. "Meat packing is a fascinating business," he says. "Certain managerial policies were not working out in the late fifties, but I felt that a new approach could help resolve the problems." Cudahy thus had the chance to exercise his own ideas in regard to labor relations, personnel, and marketing. "This approach," says Cudahy, "is by no means original—but our plans call for continued development and emphasis of our more distinctive and distinguishable products as opposed to our commodity products."

Cudahy became president in January of 1961. Through his efforts and with the cooperation of Local 40 of the United Packing-house Workers, wage scales were realigned and a long-range modernization of production practices was initiated. The first beneficial effects of these policies were evident by the end of 1962—and from then on the benefits have been snowballing.

Cudahy retains an active interest in the legal aspects of business. Associates reveal that when legal problems arise, it is altogether too easy to take them to Cudahy for solution—and if an answer is not readily

apparent, he will research the problem until one can be found. In fact, Cudahy spends some of his leisure time as a lecturer in law at Marquette University Law School.

ACTIVE DEMOCRAT

In line with this legal background, he has been admitted to practice in three States and the District of Columbia and is a member of the American, Wisconsin, Chicago, and Milwaukee Bar Associations.

Cudahy is also on the Milwaukee Board of Harbor Commissioners and active in affairs of the Cudahy Marine Bank, the Wisconsin Regional Export Expansion Council, and a State subcommittee on education. He is president of the Milwaukee Urban League and has been active in Democratic political circles including membership in the Wisconsin delegation to the last Democratic National Convention.

Still a young man at 39, Cudahy's prospects for the future are bright. Meanwhile, he is gaining valuable experience guiding Patrick Cudahy, Inc., on a new course.

HARVARD VERSUS OXFORD DEBATE ON VIETNAM

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, one of the finest examples in recent years of debate in a free society took place less than a month ago. It was, in fact, an international debate between a trio at Harvard University and their opposite numbers in London. It was televised by CBS via satellite.

Laurence Tribe, one of the Harvard students, states the U.S. goal most eloquently when he said:

The United States has no ambitions in South Vietnam. We have no interest in creating an outpost of American democracy there. Our purpose is not to impose a particular government on South Vietnam. Our purpose is only to give them a chance to choose.

The distinguished professor, Henry Kissinger, also contributed an eloquent summation when he said:

I would like to emphasize that our goal is and should be freedom for the people of all of Vietnam to determine the future of their country. As Americans, we would far prefer to engage in tasks of construction. We would far prefer to do what President Kennedy said in his inaugural address, that to those people in the huts and villages of half the globe, we pledge our best efforts to help themselves. But we do not have the choice between defense and construction. Unless we can do both, we will not be able to do either.

I would like to emphasize that our continued efforts should be devoted to the goals so well stated by these two articulate and outstanding Americans.

Because television debates, despite their immense immediate impact, are perishable, I ask unanimous consent to have the text of that debate printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the text was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From "CBS Reports," as broadcast over the CBS television network, Dec. 21, 1965]

TOWN MEETING OF THE WORLD

(With CBS News Correspondent Charles Collingwood, Executive producer, Don Hewitt)

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Good evening. As part of our continuing special coverage of the war in Vietnam, this CBS News broadcast, "Town Meeting of the World," has arranged a transatlantic debate on the subject: "Re-

solved that the United States should carry out its commitment in Vietnam." The two debating teams, one in England and the other in the United States, are linked together via Early Bird satellite. They see each other. On this side of the Atlantic, two Harvard students and a distinguished Harvard professor; on the other side, two Oxford students and a famous Oxford graduate. At this time, I think I ought to introduce them to each other. First, on the subject, the debating side taking the affirmative side of this resolution, the team arguing that the United States should carry out its commitment, this is Robert Shrum, a student at Harvard Law School. Mr. Shrum was picked this year as the top debater at the National Intercollegiate Debate Tournament.

Next, Prof. Henry A. Kissinger, of Harvard. Professor Kissinger is a leading scholar and theoretician on defense and foreign policy in the nuclear age. He's been an adviser to the U.S. Government under four Presidents and has recently returned from Vietnam.

Mr. Laurence Tribe is, like Mr. Shrum, at Harvard Law School. He's also a notable college debater, his team having won the national championship in 1961.

Now, Messrs. Shrum, Kissinger, and Tribe, I'd like you to meet your opponents in England. Mr. Tariq Ali, of Lahore, Pakistan. A former president of the Union at Oxford, he's been quoted as predicting that he'll be president of Pakistan in 10 years. In the meantime, he's standing as candidate for Parliament in the radical alliance interest against British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart. Mr. Michael Foot, who is presently a Member of Parliament and is generally regarded as the ablest and most articulate spokesman for the Labor Party's left. Mr. Foot has also had a brilliant career outside of Parliament as an author and journalist. Mr. Stephen Marks, a former chairman of the Oxford Labor Club, has been called the most formidable debater at Oxford.

Now, gentlemen, let me give you the ground rules of this debate of ours. We're going to start with 1½-minute arguments from the students on each team. You may find that a little constricting, but there'll be time later. They'll be followed by 2½ minutes by senior members, Professor Kissinger and Mr. Foot; and when your time is up, I'll ring a bell, like that, carried across the Atlantic via Early Bird. Now, after the opening statements, we'll open things up for a give-and-take discussion among the two teams and later we'll invite the audiences in London and New York to give questions to you, and incidentally, I think I'd better introduce the audiences. In London, students from Oxford, members of the Oxford Union. We're making no pretense, of course, that everyone at Oxford agrees with the view taken by the Oxford debaters; nor for that matter, that the American college students from the various schools in the New York area here all agree with the views taken by the Harvard debaters.

Now, after all that ado, but with no further, let's begin with the first American spokesman for the affirmative, Mr. Larry Tribe. One and a half minutes, Mr. Tribe.

Mr. Tribe. Ladies and gentlemen, Asians and Americans are dying tonight in order to preserve a world in which each nation can shape its own future. Peace was preserved in Cuba and Berlin because no one doubted that we would carry out our pledge not to back down. We have made that pledge in Vietnam. Nowhere have we said more clearly, "We will stand." If we abandon that commitment, imagine a future confrontation and ask yourself, who would believe us then?

Vietnam was one country before it was divided; so was Korea, so was Germany. The issues are the same in Vietnam. There can be no peace when international lines of

demarkation are challenged by military force, when the pen that draws those lines is challenged by the sword. Nor can there be peace so long as unrest and social revolution remains the prey of hostile powers, the focal point of global confrontation. We seek no military victory in Vietnam. We will withdraw when North Vietnam ceases its support and guidance of the South, ceases its support of the war. That will come about when Hanoi is convinced of our resolve. To retreat before she is convinced would tempt aggressors everywhere.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Tribe. Now, for the negative. Mr. Tariq Ali, of Oxford.

Mr. Ali. I would like to pick up where Mr. Tribe left off on the subject of negotiations. The Hanoi regime, before the United States started bombing North Vietnam and increasing its buildup of troops, told the Secretary General of the United Nations that it was prepared to negotiate. This offer was not made clear to the American people, with the results that we have the situation—we have the situation as it is today. And this is basically the point, that you can't expect people to negotiate when you are bombing their cities, when you are destroying their villages. I think it is unfortunate, and I hope members—I hope members across the Atlantic forgive this callous remark that the United States and member citizens of the United States don't really know what bombing is. If they did, no decent U.S. citizen could support it. An American pilot told (a reporter) of the New York Times, "I don't like to hit a village. You know you're hitting women and children too, but you've got to decide that your cause is noble and that the work has to be done." This situation, as this statement, saddens me, as it should sadden every human being, as it should sadden Professor Kissinger, who just returned from South Vietnam and said that he was very worried that the South Vietnamese Government did not enjoy the support of the people; and that is why you cannot equate Germany and South Korea with Vietnam, because the majority of the people in South Vietnam supports the Vietcong.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Ali. And now, on the affirmative side of the argument, another student at Harvard, Mr. Robert Shrum.

Mr. SHRUM. Perhaps no nation in the history of warfare has ever known the horrors of bombing better than the United Kingdom, and yet the United Kingdom knew that in World War II, bombing was necessary to meet the Nazi threat, and if bombing is necessary in Vietnam to meet the Communist threat, then unpleasant as that course may be, it is the only real one that the United States can pursue. Why are we pursuing that course? Not because we seek a military victory, not because we seek an economic advantage, but because we seek to see to it that the people of South Vietnam are not forced to choose their way of life at the point of a gun. Rather we seek for them a free election under international auspices in which they can decide under what form of government they want to live. The form of negotiations proposed last year by Hanoi excluded the South Vietnamese Government. It's totally antithetical to the American commitment in Vietnam for we aren't fighting for ourselves. We're fighting for the principle that people shall not have to submit their wills to aggression. We're there, fighting for the South Vietnamese. We surely could not abandon them at a time when negotiations came about. Our principal purpose in South Vietnam is to repel aggression. When aggression is repelled, when the North Vietnamese cease their aggression against South Vietnam, then the bombing will no longer be necessary; then negotiations can take place, then the people of South Vietnam can decide their own future.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Thank you. And now, on the other side of the issue, once again from Oxford, Mr. Marks.

Mr. MARKS. Ladies and gentlemen, I'm very frightened by those last two speeches, very frightened indeed, and I'd like to try, in the short time I've got, to deal with some of the frightening misconceptions that lie behind them. First of all, Mr. Shrum's statements—no, I'll start first with Mr. Tribe. He talked about America's pledge. Who was that pledge made to? The pledge the United States is defending in Vietnam was made to a government the United States deliberately installed there in the first place with the intention of frustrating free elections as provided for in the Geneva agreement. That's how their government got there. It represents no one except American dollars. That is all that government is there for, and the commitment to that sort of government isn't worth the paper it's written on.

What other points did he make? Korea and Germany. Neither Korea nor Germany have specified for them in international treaties that they have to be reunited within a specified time under free elections. America agreed to that pledge in 1954 in Geneva. She's broken her word. That's why the comparison with Korea and Germany doesn't apply.

What other points were made? Support and guidance from the North. We're told when that stops, America has no quarrel with the South Vietnamese. Then why was America intervening, giving military help in contravention of the Geneva agreement to South Vietnam before they started getting help from the North. From—sorry—from the day the Geneva agreements were signed, America was helping the South Vietnamese Government and there's no reason to think they will stop because if they did stop that Government would fall. That's just the beginning.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Marks. We'll hear from you later, but now we're going to hear from the two senior members of each team beginning with Prof. Henry Kissinger from Harvard. Two and a half minutes, Mr. Kissinger.

Mr. KISSINGER. Ladies and gentlemen, the subject we are discussing this evening is whether the United States should honor its commitment to Vietnam. Let me first answer the point about to whom this commitment was made. I take it that the commitment is made to the people of South Vietnam to give them an opportunity to choose their own future, free of outside interference. We have an obligation as well to the peoples of other new nations that the dislocations that are inseparable from the process of their development not be used by more powerful or better organized neighbors. We have a responsibility toward our friends all over the world that they can rely on our pledges. And finally we have an obligation to the peoples of the world to be in the pursuit of these obligations—will explore every avenue toward peace. If we withdraw from our commitment in Vietnam today, we will leave countless thousands to a brutal fate. We will strengthen all those in the Communist world who argue that war is a means for settling disputes. In the pursuit of our responsibilities, we have, of course, always to be careful that our measures reflect a political and moral purpose and not simply the momentum of past decisions. We are—we have a responsibility to see to it that political and military means reflect the proper priorities. Of course, the war in Vietnam is a grim and desperate struggle, but those who defend the principle of peaceful change will always be challenged in difficult situations. Of course, everyone watching the sacrifice and the suffering must suffer great anguish, most of all Americans whose sons are running—are risking their lives daily. But we

January 14, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

211

are not in Vietnam because we want to stay. We are in Vietnam because we want to withdraw, and we will do so as soon as free choice is guaranteed to the people of South Vietnam.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Kissinger. And now, from England, Mr. Michael Foot.

Mr. Foot. Ladies and gentlemen, I'm still not clear, despite the statements made by the three movers of this motion, exactly what is the commitment which the United States claims to be defending in Vietnam. We are told by Professor Kissinger that the commitment is made to the Government of South Vietnam, and, of course, it is true that the only possible excuse for the Americans having 170,000 troops or 180,000 troops on the other side of the world from the United States itself is that they should be there on the invitation of a foreign government. Now, of course, there will be many arguments, no doubt, in this debate as to who installed the government in South Vietnam and whether, in fact, the United States did not help to install the Government that has issued the invitation. There would be arguments about that. There may be arguments, also, as to whether in fact they are repelling aggression; but even if Americans sent troops—think they have the right to send troops to South Vietnam in response to an invitation from the South Vietnam Government, and even if we were to concede that, and even if we were to concede that the South had suffered aggression from the North—I concede none of these things; but even if we were to accept all those parts of the arguments put forward by those who sponsor this motion, it still remains the fact that the United States of America would not have the slightest right whatsoever, under the charter of the United Nations, in order to repel alleged aggression, to bomb indiscriminately a neighboring country; and if South Vietnam were subject to aggression, why did not the United States of America take this issue to the Security Council of the United Nations? Why did they not attempt to secure—why did they not attempt to secure the backing of other countries there? Why did they not go and put their case? Why did they not go and present their evidence to the other nations, or does the United States of America think that it has the right to decide these things for themselves on the other side of the world? Well, we contest that right. We contest that right partly because we don't think the American claims conform with the facts, but also because we do not believe that any single nation has the right to decide how it is going to respond to aggression, particularly when they're doing it on the other side of the planet.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Foot. Now we have the outlines of the arguments between the two teams on each side of the Atlantic. Let's carry on from there. Who on the American side wishes to answer Mr. Foot and the British side? Mr. Shrum.

Mr. SHRUM. Mr. Tribe.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Sorry, Mr. Tribe.

Mr. TRIBE. Mr. Foot asks why did the United States not take the issue to the United Nations? In August of 1964, it was the United States that invited Hanoi to take part in Security Council discussions on the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Hanoi refused. It was in September of this year that the Government of North Vietnam said bluntly any United Nations resolutions in this area would be null and void. Under those circumstances, what sense would it make to go to the Security Council and simply make the motion of having been there? Secretary Goldberg—Ambassador Goldberg, in September of this year, pointed out the majority of the members of the Security Council are agreed that while the United Nations can be used in a

conciliatory capacity in this area and that America has done on a number of occasions, it cannot effectively be used for anything other than quiet diplomacy.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. How about that, Oxford? Who wants to reply to that?

Mr. FOOT. Well, I don't know what right Mr. Goldberg has got to decide which matters should go to the United Nations. This is the charter that we all signed, that the U.S. Government signed as well. Their obligation under that charter is that if they think they or their allies are subject to aggression, we should take this matter to the United Nations to be judged. My answer to the reason why the United States didn't take this major matter to be decided at the United Nations is because they had no clear case. They had no clear case that in fact the cause of the war in Vietnam was an aggression by the North against the South. I haven't any doubt that the North has given assistance to the South during the course of the war, but that's not the origin of the war. If you're going to go to the origin of the war, you have to go back at least to 1954, when an agreement was signed as to how a settlement should be made in Vietnam, an agreement which, among other things, specified that there should be elections in the whole of Vietnam within a period of 2 years; and the U.S. forces in Vietnam and the U.S. policy in Vietnam has upset the demand and insistence of the Geneva Conference that there should be general elections in the whole of Vietnam, so I would like to ask the question: Do the sponsors of this motion, does the Government of the United States now accept the terms of the Geneva settlement of 1954?

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Mr. Kissinger.

Mr. KISSINGER. With respect to the United Nations Charter, article 51 specifically provides for the right of individual and collective self-defense.

Secondly, the view that Mr. Foot has just expressed does not seem to be shared by the Government of North Vietnam, which on September 23, 1965, stated as follows: "The U.S. authorities are feverishly trying by every means to secure a United Nations intervention in Vietnam. They have, quote, 'requested help from the United Nations membership at large in getting peace talks started.' This is a maneuver to use the United Nations to impose on the Vietnamese people negotiations under U.S. terms." There have been at least five other instances this year in which the North Vietnamese Government has asserted that the United Nations is not competent to enter the Vietnamese dispute. This is the primary reason why the United Nations has not been apprised of this problem.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Mr. Marks, you said at the end of your speech that that was "only the beginning." Do you have something that you'd like to address to the proposers of the resolution?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, there are a number of points I'd like to add. I'm glad to get off the United Nations. The North Vietnamese don't think that it has much to offer and quite frankly, I agree with them.

I'd like to take up this point which I think Mr.—where are we?—I think Mr. Shrum made. He said—and the others. He said that America was in favor of the people of South Vietnam choosing their own government. Now, I remember reading a newspaper report on this. I'm afraid I don't have the detailed reference here, but I hope you'll take my word for it—of an interview recently with Vice President HUMPHREY, who said that the United States would not permit the Vietcong to take part in free elections in Vietnam. Now, I'd like to know if Mr. Shrum means the same thing by free elections as President HUMPHREY, or whether he means the same thing as most Democrats

mean by free elections. I'd also like to ask, since our own Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, who's usually an authoritative spokesman for the Washington line, tells us that there can be no free elections in Vietnam until there's been a period of classification—of pacification. I would like to know whether this pacification is a polite word for killing all the Communists, because I have a rather great suspicion that it is.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Mr. Shrum.

Mr. SHRUM. Well, I—before answering this question about elections, I do want to say that the United Nations is available. It could be very fruitfully used in this problem. I think that if North Vietnam were only willing to accept the good offices of people like Secretary General U Thant, then much of the Vietnamese difficulties could be cleared up.

If Vice President HUMPHREY said that the United States should not allow the National Liberation Front of Vietcong to participate in elections, then I disagree with him. I very much doubt that he said it. I think that the U.S. aim in South Vietnam is to give these people any kind of government that they want as long as they freely choose that government in a ballot box rather than at the point of a gun.

By pacification, I would suggest Mr. Stewart probably means that the country must no longer be seething with violence and terrorism, because in that kind of atmosphere, free elections can never take place.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Now, let's have a question from the American side to the Oxford side. Mr. Tribe.

Mr. TRIBE. It strikes us that the idea that the Americans should not carry out their commitment in Vietnam may differ greatly from the reality that the gentlemen from Oxford want to impose. We want to know whether they are advocating unilateral and immediate withdrawal. If not, are they simply advocating that we seek a negotiated end? If that's their point, I would like to remind them that the position of the U.S. Government has been and remains that we want peace in Vietnam, simply peace that will guarantee the right of self-determination to that warring country.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Mr. Ali?

Mr. ALI. Yes, I will reply to that, if I may. We have tried to point out, and not only us here in Britain this evening, but the North Vietnamese have been trying to point out that before the bombing of North Vietnam started, there were peace feelers from Hanoi via U Thant which said that Ho Chi Minh was prepared to go to Burma and discuss a negotiated peace with an American spokesman, but unfortunately, President Johnson was busy taking on Barry Goldwater and the elections, and Dean Rusk's sensitive mind thought that these offers were not sincere and, therefore, they were rejected.

As to the second part of your question—do I think that the United States should get out of Vietnam now, my answer is yes—without any qualifications, that the only way—it's made out very often that this is a very complicated issue. Perhaps I'm a bit naive, but to me it seems very simple. The United States is there, thousands of miles away from Washington. Surely you can't claim that this is self-defense and that the only way in which they can earn the respect of the world—better later than never—is by leaving Vietnam now, and this I think is the only alternative left to President Johnson. If De Gaulle can do it vis-a-vis Algeria, why not Johnson vis-a-vis Vietnam?

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Professor Kissinger?

Mr. KISSINGER. I would like to make a slight factual correction about the overture of U Thant. I'm not here to defend every action of the American Government and I have often been critical of it in other fields,

but the facts of the situation seem to me to be as follows: There was a feeler through U Thant, which was very ambiguous and which required us to negotiate without the government to which we were committed in Saigon. We attempted to determine through other sources just exactly what Hanoi had in mind and received very inconclusive and rather negative answers and on the basis of this information, the Government decided that it would be better not to pursue this overture. But it is not correct to say that a clear offer to negotiate was rejected, and whatever one's judgment about that overture, there have been more than 15 American proposals since then which surely could have provided an opening for another conversation.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Mr. Shrum, you were bouncing around there in your chair. Do you want to reply to Mr. Ali?

Mr. SHRUM. Mr. Ali said that he is in favor of complete withdrawal. Now, I think that he should probably discuss the implications of this, especially in light of the fact that people like Lin Piao, who is Chinese Defense Minister, have delivered statements—the one I'm specifically citing was on September 2, 1965—saying that the war in Vietnam is a test case and that if the Communists can win there, they can then begin and start wars of national liberation all over the world. Of course, wars of national liberation is a euphemism for Communist takeover in these underdeveloped countries. I want to know whether he wants to substitute a new form of colonialism and a more iron tyranny for the one these countries have just gotten rid of.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Mr. Ali, you'd better answer that.

Mr. ALI. Yes, I will answer both Professor Kissinger and Mr. Shrum—sorry, Mr. Shrum. Professor Kissinger, first. I would like to make this point again, Professor Kissinger, with due respect to you and public opinion in the United States, that really, when you are bombing a nation, you can't expect that nation to negotiate with you. If the Japs had asked you to negotiate immediately after they started bombing Pearl Harbor, what would your answer have been?

As far as Comrade Shrum's point is concerned—I don't accept that wars of national liberation all over the world result in Communist domination. The Sino-Soviet split has shown that communism too has its own nationalisms. And I would like to ask Mr. Shrum, that—does he really believe that 12 Communists in Santo Domingo constituted a national liberation movement and were sufficient reason for the United States to intervene in Santo Domingo? And another point I would like Mr. Shrum to answer, that what he quotes Marshal Lin Piao as saying, when responsible American generals like Curtis LeMay say that the only way we can win this war is to bomb North Vietnam back into the stone age, when other responsible American commentators say that this is America's test case, when they are treating Vietnam as a war laboratory with which to test new weapons, which could be used in the future in Latin America.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Well, we're getting a little far afield in Santo Domingo, but I think Mr. Shrum ought to have a chance to answer that.

Mr. SHRUM. I don't think 12—I don't think 12 Communists in Santo Domingo necessarily constitute a Communist national liberation front. I don't want to really talk about Santo Domingo, but I think that thousands of Communists in Vietnam do constitute a national liberation front, and a real threat to the peace and security of the United States and of southeast Asia. Yes, this is a test case for the United States of America, and it's a test case because the United States has to prove to aggression that it cannot succeed and that communism cannot expand all

over the world, simply through wars of national liberation. Because someone like Gen. Curtis LeMay sometimes might make an irresponsible statement does not discount Lin Piao's statement when he said that wars of national liberation could begin all over the world, taking their inspiration from the war in Vietnam. I'm not here to defend Curtis LeMay; I'm here to defend American policy in Vietnam, because I think it's right.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Now from England—Michael Foot, we haven't heard from you for a while.

Mr. FOOT. We are told that the aim of the United States in Vietnam is to prove that aggression doesn't pay. First of all, as I have said, they haven't yet proved that it's aggression. They haven't attempted to prove that it's aggression before any independent tribunal. One of the reasons why they have not done so, is because they wish to draw a veil over what really happened, and what are the real origins of the war in Vietnam. This maybe is the reason why we have had no answer in this debate and no clear answer from the U.S. Government in all the negotiations over—and all the discussions over these years as to whether they accept in full the Geneva settlement of 1954. At the time, most of the other countries concerned accepted that agreement, with its commitment to free elections in the whole of Vietnam, which we were told by the spokesman here is what the United States is fighting for in Vietnam. But, we've never had from the statement from the American Government that they accepted in full the Geneva settlement of 1954. If they would say that, there would be some advance, but of course, if they accepted that, one of the difficulties is that it would destroy a large part of the American argument. Because the Geneva settlement also laid down that Vietnam is not two countries, there is one country, and therefore, what has been happening throughout these years in Vietnam is not a war of aggression, but a civil war, and what the United States is doing is to intervene in a civil war, intervene in a manner which they've certainly got no international claim under any international law to do. They intervene in a manner which they have not been prepared to put before any international tribunal. Now, this is a very serious matter indeed, and you cannot say that they are doing it in order to uphold international law when they are not prepared to apply international law to their own actions and moreover, it's no good to say that they are repelling aggression. That's what the people in North Vietnam think they are doing.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Mr. Tribe?

Mr. FOOT. The people in North Vietnam say they want the right to shape their own right and to shape their own destinies. So they're fighting and will continue to fight very hard for those same things. Somehow we have to overcome that barrier and if we're going to do that, the American Government, the most powerful government in the world, will have to retreat from its present position, and be prepared to make proposals for a settlement very much in advance of anything they've yet suggested.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. We'll give the American debating team an opportunity to answer the points made by Mr. Foot when we return with "Town Meeting of the World" after this message.

[Announcement]

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. In this transatlantic debate between students of Oxford and students at Harvard and Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Foot on both sides of the Atlantic via Early Bird, we've just heard a challenging statement on American policy, its defects, according to him, by Mr. Foot. Who on the American side would like to reply to that? Professor Kissinger?

Mr. KISSINGER. I would like to make—to reply both to Mr. Ali and to Mr. Foot, briefly. Mr. Ali presented the beginning of American bombing as if it were a decision that President Johnson took because he felt angry one Sunday morning and decided to proceed. I think the facts of the situation are that North Vietnamese—North Vietnam—had been encouraging, supporting and supplying an uprising in South Vietnam for 5 years; and it is not obvious to me what the moral distinction is between explosives carried on the back of foot soldiers and explosives carried by airplanes. Every argument that was made against negotiation on the part of Hanoi would apply equally well to negotiations on the part of Saigon, which has also been subject to attack. And I would say that the only way to escape this logjam, is to stop talking about the past and to try to see whether one can find comparable restraints on both sides to stop the shooting and to begin the negotiations.

Secondly, to Mr. Foot: It is not correct, I believe, to say that there were no international commitments in the case of other countries. At least in the case of Germany with which I am familiar, there was a commitment at the Summit Meeting of 1955, to settle—to achieve German unification on the basis of free elections, and no one would argue that the fact that no free elections have been held in East Germany, and that the government demonstrably does not enjoy the support of its population, that this entitles the West German Government to start a guerrilla movement in Eastern Germany.

Thirdly, it is the Geneva settlement. It is my belief that the United States should accept the Geneva settlement as a basis for the settlement of the present war in Vietnam, and it is my impression that the American Government has indicated its readiness to do so. The issue in South Vietnam with respect to pacification is not to kill every Communist. The issue is to induce the Communists in South Vietnam to accept the principle of free choice, and as soon as this is accepted, they should as individuals be permitted to participate in the political process.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. The audiences on both sides of the Atlantic have been following with great interest. Let's bring them into this discussion now. You may ask questions of either side or individuals on either side, no matter which side of the Atlantic you happen to be on. Let's begin though with the American audience. Dave Dugan, do you have someone who wants to ask a question?

Mr. DUGAN. Charles, we have lots of people who want to ask questions. It's a matter of getting as many in as we can. I think in section D, in the front row, there's a gentleman, third from the aisle, who has a question if we could get a microphone to him.

Question. Yes, I'd like to direct this question to Mr. Foot. Does he believe that the way to achieve peace is to allow the spread of international communism to go unchallenged, much as Prime Minister Chamberlain did in World War II, when he gave Adolf Hitler Czechoslovakia in return for peace in our time?

Mr. FOOT. The prewar situation was that governments in Britain and America were appeasing fascism, and I think it was a very dangerous policy to follow. But I don't believe there's any comparison between what is happening in Vietnam and what happened in Czechoslovakia before the war. You see, I think what the United States is doing in Vietnam, so far from resisting the spread of communism, is increasing the likelihood of the spread of communism. I think that the more the United States continues to bomb North Vietnam, the more they will rally support behind the Government of North Vietnam, the more they will drive the rest of Asia into the hands of China. If that's what

January 14, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

213

they want, if the U.S. policy was designed for spreading communism, then I think it's carrying it out extremely efficiently.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Now—now let's have a question from the audience in London. Bob Trout, do you recognize someone?

Mr. TROUT. Yes, Charles. After listening so far in comparative silence, I'm sure that our 50-odd Oxford students are eager to join the fray. Who does have the first question? In the first row on the right side?

Question. Professor Kissinger, I find American intervention in Vietnam as immoral as Nazi and Italian intervention in Spain before the last war. Why don't you?

Mr. KISSINGER. I don't find the intervention in Vietnam immoral because our purpose is to give the people of South Vietnam a free choice. The Nazi intervention was to deprive the people of a free choice, and I would have thought that people in Britain should know the difference between American and Fascist motivations.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Another question now from the New York audience.

Mr. DUGAN. Yes, Charles, in section C there is a gentleman in the third row on the aisle—if we could get a microphone to him.

Question. This question is directed to Mr. Foot. If you so ably agree with Mr. Chamberlain, how else do you think communism would be able to be stopped throughout Asia if not by domination by the United States?

Mr. Foot. I think it is a great folly and indeed one of the—I think it is a great folly and indeed one of the great mistakes made by the Government of the United States, and one that we could all suffer for, to equate international communism or communism with prewar nazism. They're two very different institutions indeed; and indeed, international communism has not shown anything like the aggressive tendencies which were shown by fascism before the war. Indeed, the meaning of fascism was that it was aggressive in that sense. I don't think necessarily that the international communism is aggressive in that sense, although it sometimes is aggressive. But you know, the United States is sometimes aggressive, and you see the actions of the United States in Vietnam are not merely actions taken in response to aggression. We've been trying to get to the bottom of this matter, right since this dispute began—this argument began. We asked Mr. Kissinger whether the U.S. Government accepted the Geneva settlement. If they accepted it, the war might never have started.

There would be no necessity to resist international communism in Vietnam; and incidentally, what right has the United States to say that we're going to pick on Vietnam for carrying out your crusade against international communism. What right have you got to pick on Vietnam, only if you can claim that there was an aggression that you had every right to resist, but you've never been prepared to take this before any international tribunal whatsoever for them to judge. Moreover, Professor Kissinger would not tell us whether the U.S. Government, his own government, accepted the Geneva settlement or not. He said they should accept it. Well, I agree, they should. Why don't they? He said it was his impression that the U.S. Government does accept it. I think for an expert of Professor Kissinger's eminence to say that it's his impression that they accept it—why does not the United States say quite clearly they will accept the whole of the Geneva settlement. If they did that, then I think we would make progress toward real negotiations and an escape from the present confrontation, which certainly will spread international communism much more likely than it will kill it.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Now, I don't want to turn this into just a debate between Michael Foot and Henry Kissinger. I'd like to get some of the students in, but I think I really

must let Professor Kissinger have a chance to answer that.

Mr. KISSINGER. I used the words, "It is my impression" in deference to the debating skill of my British friends. I have every reason to believe that the American Government accepts the Geneva settlement, whatever may have happened in the past. I simply do not have the document in front of me in case I am challenged to produce the exact words.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Now let's have a question from the London studio, but let's address this one to one of the students and not to Professor Kissinger.

Mr. TROUT. In the front right section, you have a question?

Question. I don't mind which of the American students answers this question. The government which invited the American troops into Vietnam in the first place was not a democratically elected government. The government which is now supported by the American troops in Vietnam is possibly even less democratic, since it was installed by a military coup d'etat. I should like to know the legalistic basis on which the American Government claims to be justified in sending troops to South Vietnam.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. They're both law students, but let's have Mr. Tribe answer that.

Mr. TRIBE. I think it's important to remember with regard to the particular governments in South Vietnam that our commitment is broader than a commitment to any one of them; but with regard to either the government of Diem or the government of Marshal Ky, Bernard Fall, recognized as an objective, impartial authority on this question, points out that at least 9 out of 10 of the member states of the United Nations have no greater a claim to legitimacy.

It is not our contention, and it is not the position of the United States, that any particular government of South Vietnam is the preordained and necessarily legitimate representative of the people. That is the contention of the North when it insists that no settlement can be reached which does not accept the Vietcong and the National Liberation Front as prima facie the representative of the people. What we want is to ask the people that question, and you cannot ask them that when the Vietcong are conducting terrorist raids within Vietnam. The only reason America is in Vietnam is to create a condition in which the people themselves can constitute a truly representative government.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Now, we have time for a very quick question from the American audience, and a very quick answer. Question from the New York audience, quickly.

Mr. DUGAN. Yes, Charles, in section A, in the second row, can we get a microphone down to the second gentleman from the aisle, please.

Question. A question directed to the American team. They have said that it is our purpose to give a free choice to the Vietnamese people. Let us attempt to expose this hypocrisy. As long as there is a chance, which is now good, that we will lose those elections, we will not permit them.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Quick answer, Mr. Shrum.

Mr. SHRUM. We're committed to democracy, and as long as we're committed to self-determination in Vietnam, all the North Vietnamese have to do is agree to free internationally supervised elections, and we will hold them.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Thank you very much. We'll be back with more of this transatlantic debate on "Town Meeting of the World" after this message.

[Announcement]

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Let's have some more questions now from the audiences both in London and New York, addressed to the

debaters on this "Town Meeting of the World." I think it's the London audience's turn. A questioner from London.

Mr. TROUT. The gentleman in the—

Question. Would a member of the U.S. team like to state quite clearly whether or not the United States would accept a democratically elected Communist government in South Vietnam?

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Mr. Tribe.

Mr. TRIBE. The answer is yes. The United States has no ambitions in South Vietnam. We have no interest in creating an outpost of American democracy there. However, we think it is extremely unlikely that South Vietnam would be the first nation in the history of the world to accept in free elections a Communist government—unlikely not only because of the 1 million people who fled the Communist government from the north, but unlikely as well because of the fact that the basic traditions in Vietnam, the traditions of land ownership, of family and of religious belief, are inconsistent with the fundamental tenets of communism. Even if it were true that Ho Chi Minh had some popularity, it is certainly not demonstrable that the people of South Vietnam would, in any free election, elect a Communist regime. But I emphasize, our purpose is not to impose a particular government on South Vietnam. Our purpose is only to give them a chance to choose.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. And now a question from the New York audience.

Mr. DUGAN. Yes, Charles, in section A in the front row, we have a gentleman right by the aisle, if we can get a microphone to him.

Question. I address my question to Mr. Foot, who says the United States picks on Vietnam, and to Mr. All, who says the majority of the people in South Vietnam support the Vietcong. If this is true, how do you explain the half million South Vietnamese soldiers who have been fighting and dying, and often dying valiantly, for their country; and how do you explain the fact that there are 1 million North Vietnamese who have fled their country and are now living as refugees in Saigon?

Mr. ALL. Yes, I'll answer to all three of your points. Point No. 1, how do I say that the Vietcong is supported by the majority of the people in Vietnam? I say this because it has been admitted by every—almost every—newspaper correspondent in Saigon and, indeed, even admitted by Mr. Kissinger. When he returned from a visit from South Vietnam he said he was distressed to find that the gulf between the Government and the people was very large. There's more evidence for this: the whole attempt to herd people into concentration camps or strategic hamlets, as you euphemistically call them, was an attempt to separate people from the Vietcong, an attempt which did not succeed. And also, the North Vietnamese, according to every American reporter and the State Department—

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. At this moment, Mr. All, I must interrupt you because our time is running out and I want to ask the senior members of both teams for a brief summation of the debate so far. And let's begin with Mr. Foot.

Mr. Foot. Of course, all of us must be passionately concerned to see the end of this appalling war and I am glad that Professor Kissinger has said that the U.S. Government now accepts the Geneva settlement of 1954. I didn't ask him that as a kind of trick question. I wanted genuinely to know, and I think it is correct that they have said sometimes that they do accept the Geneva settlement. Unfortunately, they may have accepted it in the letter, but never in the spirit. This very weekend we have Mr. Rusk in Paris saying United States still wants peace talks on Vietnam, but only if South Vietnam's independence and territorial integrity are guaranteed. In other words, they are still saying two Vietnams. That is con-

trary to the Geneva settlement. The Americans refused free elections. That is contrary to the Geneva settlement. The Americans are obviously refusing to neutralize the area. That is contrary to the Geneva settlement. If the United States would come forward with proposals for genuinely seeking a settlement on the basis of the 1954 agreements, then we could begin to end this appalling horror which, if it continues, could drag not merely the United States but the whole world into nuclear catastrophe.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Sorry, Mr. Foot. And now, a last word, 1-minute summation from Professor Kissinger.

Mr. KISSINGER. The war in Vietnam is a tragic and desperate effort. I'm distressed that so many of the questions seemed to challenge not the judgment but the motivation of American policy. I would like to emphasize that our goal is and should be freedom for the people of South Vietnam to chart their own future, and freedom for the people of all of Vietnam to determine the future of their country. As Americans, we would far prefer to engage in tasks of construction. We would far prefer to do what President Kennedy said in his inaugural address, that to those people in the huts and villages of half the globe, we pledge our best efforts to help themselves. But we do not have the choice between defense and construction. Unless we can do both, we will not be able to do either.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Thank you very much. Thank you, gentlemen of Oxford and gentlemen from Harvard, for an hour's interesting and provocative debate. This is Charles Collingwood. Good night.

ANNOUNCER. This "Town Meeting of the World" was produced in cooperation with the British Broadcasting Corporation, using the facilities of the Early Bird communications satellite. The Oxford students and Mr. Foot were seen from a BBC studio in London. The two Harvard students and Professor Kissinger were seen from a CBS studio in New York. We wish to thank the Oxford Union and universities in the New York area for their cooperation in helping us to select the student audiences on both sides of the Atlantic.

RESERVATION OF CERTAIN PUBLIC LANDS FOR A NATIONAL WILD RIVERS SYSTEM

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate the pending business, which is S. 1446.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 1446), to reserve public lands for a National Wild Rivers System, to provide a procedure for adding additional public lands and other lands to the system, and for other purposes.

THE VIETNAM CONFLICT

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, the most pressing problem facing our Nation and the world today is the war in Vietnam. I hope our President will continue to strike out boldly for a peaceful settlement of this bitter conflict. Bonafide peace negotiations mean concessions by us, concessions by the Vietcong and a cease fire with no one an abject loser and no one an arrogant winner. Unless there is a negotiated settlement, American GIs are likely to be fighting and dying in Vietnam until 1980.

President Johnson is to be commended for directing a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam. But standing alone, this is not enough.

In his outstanding state of the Union message, the President set forth our goals in Vietnam when he said:

We seek neither territory nor bases, economic domination or military alliance in Vietnam. We fight for the principle of self-determination that the people of South Vietnam should be able to choose their own course, choose it in free elections without violence, without terror, and without fear. The people of all Vietnam should make a free decision on the great question of reunification.

We have also made it clear from Hanoi to New York that there are no arbitrary limits to our search for peace. We stand by the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962. We will meet at any conference table. We will discuss any proposals—4 points or 14 or 40—and we will consider the views of any group. We will work for a ceasefire now, or once discussions have begun.

I wholeheartedly agree with the goals set by our President. However, because in the past there have been conflicting statements by our officials on our support for the Geneva accords, on negotiations with the Vietcong, and on free elections, we must further clarify our war aims and negotiating position.

We should clearly announce our willingness to seek a settlement based on the 1954 Geneva accords providing neutrality, self-determination, and free elections for Vietnam. The Geneva accords which we agreed to but did not sign state that "the military demarcation line at the 17th parallel is provisional and should not in any way be considered as constituting a political or territorial boundary." Historically, there is no North and South Vietnam.

We should indicate explicitly our readiness to participate in negotiations with all parties involved—I mean with delegates of the Vietcong, or National Liberation Front, so-called. We should agree to abide by the results of a peaceful, free election by the people of Vietnam of their own Government, their own leaders, and their own destiny. I know our CIA officials in Vietnam and Prime Minister Ky, of the Saigon government oppose an armistice at this time. Our President should overrule their views along with those of the Curtis LeMays.

If our President moves decisively for such peace our people will support him. If instead, he approves steadily expanding military involvement, he will please our militarists, and warhawks in Congress. Then in the 1966 congressional elections and in 1968, as casualty lists mount, some Republican politicians, now urging acceleration of the war by bombing Hanoi and Haiphong and even Red China, will be the first to denounce this as "Lyndon's war."

Were we to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong, thousands of Vietnamese civilians including women and children would be killed and wounded. If we failed to destroy all the war planes of North Vietnam some might bomb Saigon, and elements of the North Vietnamese army, numbering some 400,000, would cross the demilitarized zone and invade South Vietnam.

Pentagon gossip reports plans to bomb Haiphong and Hanoi followed by an amphibious landing at Haiphong and then "bombing Red China back into the stone

age." That, to quote Gen. Curtis LeMay. Let us hope President Johnson rejects these proposals. Bombing Hanoi would be compared with the Nazi bombing of Guernica in the Spanish Civil War. Furthermore, no one can accurately forecast just how damaging the reaction would be. It would certainly at least outweigh any possible military gain.

From September 28 to last October 20 I was in southeast Asia most of the time. I went, looked, and listened. Very soon I learned we are involved in a civil war over there. In South Vietnam I was at every airbase except one—traveling through the entire area by helicopter, airplane, and jeep. It is my considered judgment that South Vietnam is of no strategic importance whatever to the defense of the United States. Furthermore, the fact is that the conflict raging in Vietnam is a civil war. General Westmoreland stated to me that the bulk of the Vietcong fighting in South Vietnam were born and reared in South Vietnam. General Stilwell, in Thailand, went further. He stated that 80 percent of the Vietcong fighting in the Mekong Delta area south of Saigon, were born and reared in that area. They were not infiltrators or Communists from the North.

No matter how often we profess our intention to defend freedom in Vietnam, the increasing escalation of the war is raising grave doubts throughout Asia and elsewhere in the world as to the wisdom of our policy. Attacks with sophisticated weapons on unsophisticated and illiterate Asians are building a vast reservoir of anti-Americanism and misunderstanding of our country among the masses of the people in Asia.

A military surrender to the United States will never produce acceptance of American presence in Asia by most Asians. It would be a legacy of ill will which we should not leave to future generations of Americans. Until Asiatics show more interest in defending themselves, then unilateral American involvement in Asia is doomed to failure. The ugly reality is that for the most part it is American GIs who are fighting and dying in Vietnam for the alleged defense of freedom in Asia. Do we Americans have a mandate from Almighty God to police the entire world?

President John F. Kennedy said on September 3, 1963, shortly before his assassination:

I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it—the people of Vietnam—against the Communists. We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don't think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort, and, in my opinion, in the last 2 months the Government has gotten out of touch with the people.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. I am glad to yield to the distinguished Senator from Alaska.

January 14, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

215

Mr. GRUENING. Is it not a fact that when President Kennedy made that statement in September of 1963, we had been in Vietnam for practically a decade?

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. The Senator is correct.

Mr. GRUENING. Yet, at the end of 10 years of assistance of all kinds, including vast sums of money, we had a situation that was deteriorating; and it was clear then, was it not, that the government of South Vietnam, either the puppet government that we had installed there, or its successors after various coups were out of touch with the needs of the people, were uninterested in those needs, and were doing little or nothing to bring about the reforms which President Eisenhower had made conditional upon our giving them aid for 10 years previously? Is that not a fact?

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. That is true, of course.

Mr. GRUENING. Is that not a demonstration of the folly of our policies there?

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. I agree with the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. GRUENING. I thank the Senator.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, on our initial commitment to South Vietnam made by President Eisenhower in 1954 in a letter to the President of South Vietnam stated:

I am instructing the American Ambassador to examine with you how an intelligent program of American aid can serve to assist Vietnam in its present hour of trial.

He added:

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The U.S. Government hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Vietnam endowed with a strong government.

That was a very "iffy" commitment made by President Eisenhower.

Can anyone claim that Prime Minister Ky, of South Vietnam, who himself was born and reared in Hanoi, heads a strong, viable state? He could not remain in power 1 week except for the operations of our Central Intelligence Agency and the support of our Armed Forces.

To justify sending a military advisory group to Vietnam and increasing its size from 327 in 1953 to 685 in 1961, President Eisenhower on April 7, 1954, said:

The loss of Indochina will cause the fall of southeast Asia like a set of dominoes.

That was in the Stalin era. Today, there is no bitter cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States as when Stalin was dictator. The Soviet Union is no longer a "have not" nation. It is veering toward capitalism. Its leaders and the Russian people seek coexistence instead of coannihilation. Moscow and Peiping are now in bitter conflict. This domino theory has been completely discredited.

Red China is a paper dragon. It is overrated as a great power. It has crude nuclear capability, that is true. However, it will take at least 5 or 10 years

before it will have the know-how to deliver any nuclear warheads on targets. Its air force is inferior. It has no surface navy except a few torpedo boats and gunboats—no modern transports—nothing except thousands of junks. It is an agrarian nation, with 85-percent of its population engaged in agriculture. On the Pacific, under the Pacific, and in the air, we have a more powerful Navy, submarine fleet, and Air Force than all the nations of the world combined.

Red China does have a huge land army. The elephant can fight neither the eagle nor the whale. As General MacArthur in his "Reminiscences" stated:

Anyone in favor of sending American ground troops to fight on Chinese soil should have his head examined.

Can anyone claim that we would lose face and that our prestige in Asia would be damaged were we to withdraw from this conflict? France was bled white during the 8-year struggle to save her vast colonial empire in Indo-China. France became a greater and more powerful nation following her withdrawal from what is now North and South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Furthermore, did De Gaulle lose face or prestige when he surrendered Algeria, that vast domain larger than France? A great nation like ours does not lose face by withdrawing from a miserable war. We have lost face by messing around with it in the first place.

The winds of freedom are blowing across the China Sea and elsewhere throughout the world in a manner and to an extent almost beyond belief. Surely we should not respond with our Armed Forces whenever the winds of change strike a country in southeast Asia or in Africa or elsewhere outside our hemisphere and sphere of influence. In Vietnam the security of the United States is not the issue. Saigon is not and never will be an outpost defending Seattle. Vietnam very definitely is of no strategic importance to the defense of the United States.

We should have long since learned that the outcome of a guerrilla war in the swamps, jungles, and highlands of southeast Asia does not threaten the security of the United States. We should, if we wish, give money, food, or guns, giving this aid from afar. We should withdraw from implicating ourselves so deeply into this conflict converting it into an American war.

This steaming jungle where thousands of American GI's have already been afflicted with malaria and other jungle diseases is the worst place in the world for us to wage a ground war.

Americans should not blindly accept the propaganda coming from Washington. If mistakes are compounded on mistakes, then the conflict will be expanded and escalated.

In my judgment, our national interest requires a redirection of our policy in Asia. We should not be the sole defenders of freedom as we define freedom in Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and our CIA should take a back seat when it comes to formulating foreign policy. I hope that President Johnson will reassert

that civilian authority must remain supreme over military authority. The men who wrote the Constitution of the United States provided that civilian authority in this Nation must always be supreme over the military. We should adhere to that.

Any forces we have in Vietnam should be only part of the forces of many nations under the United Nations and for peacekeeping and not warmaking purposes.

Vietnam is a land of breathtaking sea-coasts, green jungles, fertile rice paddies, picturesque mountains—a lovely Garden of Eden converted into a hell on earth by man's inhumanity to man.

I have just quoted the distinguished senior Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER] who revisited the scene of his youth in the early part of World War II when he served as a marine in Vietnam.

Let it not be written by future historians that American boys died needlessly in far distant jungles because of weakness of diplomats and indifference of politicians. I wish I had as much confidence in the skill and intelligence of our diplomats in trying to settle this war as I do in the bravery and high competence of our soldiers fighting the war.

The primary reason for our being in Vietnam today is our stubborn refusal to admit a mistake in our attempt to make Vietnam a pro-American and an anti-Chinese state. More than anything else, we are fighting to avoid admitting failure. As Walter Lippmann bluntly put it, "We are fighting to save face."

The late President John F. Kennedy said, "Transforming Vietnam into a Western redoubt is ridiculous."

Sallust, the Roman historian, about 40 years before the birth of Our Savior wrote:

It is always easy to begin a war, but very difficult to stop one, since its beginning and end are not under the control of the same man.

That is true now as it was then. President Johnson deserves praise for ordering a holiday in bombing North Vietnam while his executive department officials are seeking to secure an armistice and cease-fire at the conference table with representatives of the Vietcong or National Liberation Front, so-called, and Hanoi.

We Americans should not be so much interested in saving face as in saving lives.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I congratulate the Senator from Ohio on his forthright, penetrating speech. I think it is one of the most important statements that have been made in Congress on the war in Vietnam. It deserves the widest attention. I am happy to welcome the Senator from Ohio to the ranks of those of us who feel and for nearly 2 years have stated that our military involvement there is folly and represents a tragic mistake, perhaps the most tragic ever made by this country. As pointed out in the report of our distinguished majority leader, an expert on southeast Asia, and our colleagues who went to South Vietnam and other parts of the world, that unless we can bring the war

to an end at the conference table there appears no prospect except more and more destruction and killing. I think we should get out in the best way possible and admit that we made a mistake. Individuals who do this are honored. Great nations find it harder to do.

I applaud President Johnson for the efforts he is making for peace, but I feel he is handicapped by some needlessly unqualified verbal commitments he has made.

Three Presidents did not, as President Johnson has indicated—I think he is mistaken in this—promise military aid and establish thereby a national pledge. President Eisenhower offered only economic aid, provided certain reforms were made. As the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Young] pointed out, it was a very "iffy" offer, and was contingent upon improvement and reforms in the then Diem government—reforms which never took place.

During the 6 years of President Eisenhower in the White House, there was no military involvement, that is, no Americans were sent into combat, only a military mission with an advisory role. Under President Kennedy, we sent military advisers, and President Kennedy continued to maintain that it was South Vietnam's war—and that they had to win it. It has been only in the past year that we have become involved with our troops in combat—a tragic mistake.

I hope the speech that the Senator from Ohio has delivered will have wide circulation.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President I thank the distinguished junior Senator from Alaska. Contrary to what we sometimes read in the press, the Vietnam issue was debated in the Senate during the past year; and as we settle down to the final session of the 89th Congress the debate is renewed. There is a great difference of opinion among Senators.

It is going to be a good thing that all Senators debate this pressing problem, the greatest problem before the country at this time, and express their views.

Mr. President, supplementary to what I have said, I have a letter from a constituent of mine, Thomas A. Gianfagna, of 841 Alhambra Road, Cleveland, a valiant young constituent of mine. I do not know him personally, but he wrote me as follows:

DEAR SENATOR YOUNG: I have followed with great interest your views on the situation in Vietnam. As an ex-GI just recently granted the blessing of rebirth into civilian life and as a veteran of 2 months service in the central highlands of Vietnam with the 1st Cavalry Division, I want you to know that I agree with you 99 percent.

As you say, we are not the policeman of the world. As you say, the situation in Vietnam is more a civil war than a war of aggression or subversion. Thank you for saying it so loudly.

Thank you again.

Yours truly,

THOMAS A. GIANFAGNA.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. I believe I heard the distinguished Senator from Ohio state that the senior Senator from Mary-

land had visited Vietnam during World War II.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. I did so—inadvertently. I meant Okinawa.

Mr. BREWSTER. I thank the Senator, because I was in Vietnam only with the Senator from Ohio and the Senator from Nevada [Mr. Cannon], where the three of us spent some time. My world war service took me to Espiritu Santos, Guadalcanal, Ulithi, Eniwetok, Guam, and Okinawa, but not until recently was I in Vietnam.

My own observations are somewhat different from those of the Senator from Ohio, but I appreciate the deep sincerity with which the Senator from Ohio has expressed his point of view.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. I greatly respect the Senator from Maryland who is a great Senator. He is one of the heroes of World War II, and he has a fine record in the Senate. It was a slip of the tongue when I used the word "Vietnam" for "Okinawa," because I knew he was with the Marines who conquered Okinawa in World War II.

I had two sons, both of whom served in the Pacific, and I know something about the hardships of those fine young men who, some 22 and 23 years ago, fought for their country in the Pacific.

Whenever I see a marine like DAN BREWSTER, of Maryland, who fought there, I feel like taking off my hat to him. Of course, I readily accept the fact that both he and Senator Cannon have views and conclusions somewhat different from mine. I know both of them and many other Senators will express those views later this year.

It was not a correct statement for anyone to assert that the Vietnam situation and the conflict there had not been debated in the last Congress; and it is fair to assume that it will be fully debated in the final session of this Congress. It deserves to receive more attention and no doubt will receive more attention, than any other issue.

I yield the floor.

BILLBOARDS

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, last year Congress enacted the so-called billboard bill, or highway beautification bill, which many of us criticized vigorously and tried to correct in many different ways in order to make it a workable law.

I do not believe the purpose of anyone in this area is too different. My own record in that regard, when this first matter came up, with the Senator from Oregon, Richard Neuberger, is very clear. The two of us supported the measure on the floor at that time.

However, as everyone knows, the bill was hastily rewritten over the weekend and did not reflect the bill which the committee had reported, nor did it reflect, in my opinion, the will of the majority of the Senate, although the majority of the Senate voted for it.

A tremendous amount of pressure was brought on the Senate from down the street, and it was changed when it was taken up. As a consequence, as I have pointed out many times since, it is filled with faults. It is filled with errors, and

it will have to be rewritten completely someday.

I ask unanimous consent to insert in the Record at this point an article written by William Logan and appearing in the Rocky Mountain News of December 10, 1965, which points out a few of the problems that are beginning to rise in our own State, although it refers to other States in this, as a result of the hasty and ill-considered action that was taken on that bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Proxmire in the chair). Without objection, the article will be printed in the Record.

The article is as follows:

COLORADO BILLBOARD CONTROLS EXAMINED BY FEDERAL COURTS

(By William Logan, Rocky Mountain News writer)

The courts are going to have to decide whether Colorado and 21 other States that have championed highway billboard controls now face a prospect of being penalized in Federal funds for their efforts, State highway department officials believe.

Colorado was among States that agreed under the original 1958 Federal law to use its police powers to control signboards under Federal standards. Last spring's legislature enacted a law to control billboards that became effective July 1.

The new highway beauty bill of the Johnson administration, enacted after the Colorado law became effective, requires "just compensation" be paid to billboard owners when signs are removed.

The Federal Government will pay 75 percent of the cost of removing signs and States must pay 25 percent, under the Federal law.

CAN BE PENALIZED

Any State that refuses to pay—or that refuses to control billboards—can be penalized up to 10 percent of its Federal road funds, under the new U.S. law.

Many of the States that earlier enacted antibillboard legislation have listed the signs as public nuisances and have laws that prohibit payments to owners for removal of nuisances.

Colorado, in a series of notices just going into the mails to owners of signs found in violation by the highway department, is directing the owners to remove them.

The State isn't planning to pay costs for removal, but isn't terming them nuisances either. The notices merely state the signs are in violation of the new State law and ask their removal.

MOST NOTICES

Darrell Vail, highway department maintenance engineer, said most of the notices mailed thus far concern signboards erected since the law took effect "and are clearly in violation."

Notices will be mailed shortly to owners of signs put up earlier, ordering their removal, he said. Each highway department maintenance district is charged with enforcing the law in its territory.

Vail believes the fact Colorado is just beginning to enforce its law probably will mean the State can receive 75 percent of sign removal costs from the Federal Government.

But it's up to the courts to decide the whole course of the antibillboard legislation, he said.

A test case is pending in Denver District Court involving a sign on Interstate Highway 80S, about 5 miles northeast of Brush, a section of Interstate highway that opened this fall along new right of way.

UNREASONABLE?

Fred Efken, motel operator and plaintiff, represented by Denver Lawyer C. Hamilton

from the human suffering and degradation that is involved pose a serious threat to peace. And second, to create a tribunal of opinion in which solutions can be organized. Much has been done. There are national freedom-from-hunger committees in so many countries. Much has been done by individual countries, none more than by the United States.

I don't know if you know of your Public Law 480, but millions of hungry people do. If I may give you just one example, the food provided under that law at this moment is feeding one-fifth of the total population of Bechuanaland, where they have had no rain for 3 years. Some of us are worried that the Public Law expires next year. Worried because far too many of you don't know it. And we hope and pray and believe that the U.S. people and Government will continue to look at world hunger compassionately and creatively. What was planned as a 5-year campaign has become a permanent campaign. It's a long-term job, but it is a long-term job charged with urgency. The gap between the hungry and the overfed has widened in those 5 years, not narrowed. It's urgent because the hungry can't afford to wait. And it is urgent because the world can't afford to wait.

Lord Boyd-Orr once said "hunger is the worst politician." And how right he is. If I wanted to preach communism it wouldn't be to you, it would be to the hungry. You can't digest Karl Marx on a full stomach. If I wanted to cause trouble in the world it would not be to you I would turn, but to the hungry. Hunger is the worst politician. There are two other things that most disturb me as a Christian. The one is that the mass of the hungry are, by and large, the so-called colored people. And the mass of the well-fed are, by and large, the white. And race relations, God knows, are bad enough without their being exacerbated by hunger. What's even more disturbing is that, by and large, the well-fed call themselves Christians. And, by and large, the hungry don't. And I find nothing in Holy Writ that links obesity with sanctity.

It has been said that every war is either a crime or a crusade. I'm talking to you about a crusade. The war on want. It is a world problem. It is a governmental and intergovernmental problem. We can't do it by private societies, collecting subscriptions. The effort of every one of the rich nations must be harnessed if we are to achieve victory. Only governments can do that and only they in concert. Aren't you relieved to hear that? So what? I'm not a government. But this, I say, neither precludes nor excuses the churches. God's purpose as revealed in Jesus Christ is to redeem the whole of human life. And if the church is to carry conviction that His Gospel is the only Gospel it must do so by showing that redemption is for the whole of human life and is offered by One who came not only that man might have life but have it more abundantly. And I am proud that there is so great a Christian response to this tragic need. In Germany, in Austria, in Switzerland, there are bread for my brother campaigns. Here in America, Church World Service and National Catholic Relief have been sending millions of tons of food to the hungry. And with your continuing compassionate help could send more. Again I say, it's clear that only massive international action can begin to solve the problem. But this depends for success on public understanding, public compassion, and public support. And if we can get understanding in the churches and in the Y's, we'll get compassion. I know it. And where there is compassion there will be a wave of public support for the most liberal kind of governmental and intergovernmental action. If this campaign has a philosophy it might be the old Chinese proverb "If you give a man a

fish you feed him for a day, but if you teach him how to fish you feed him for a lifetime." And the main theme of this campaign is to teach the hungry how to fish if you like, how to plow deeper furrows, plant better seed and grow better harvests. It's education. But I need not remind you that while you are being educated your parents have to feed you. And every kind of emergency aid, the work of UNICEF, the work of the church agencies, the work of anybody who sends food to the hungry, helps to feed them while they're learning how to fish. And I am glad that not only member churches of the World Council of Churches, but the great Roman Catholic Church also, are committed to this campaign. Pope John the XXIII said of it, rightly and holily, "Beloved children, must we repeat and exalt the principle of human solidarity and remember and preach loudly the duty of those communities and individuals who live in plenty to reach out to those who live in want." I treasure all those phrases, but one I love most of all was when he says, "Preach loudly." I remember when I was an undergraduate I used to buy the gramophone records of some music-hall type who called himself Jack Smith, the Whispering Baritone. I have an uneasy feeling that our pulpits are filled with the Reverend John Smith, the whispering preacher. Preach and preach loudly so that we may be heard outside. Now one of the great privileges I have had in America is meeting many of my brother clergy who tell me that the pace of life in your country is so fast that apparently you all have tranquilizers for breakfast, and that their ministry consists almost entirely of comforting the disturbed. And I thank God it isn't mine. If I were to define my ministry just now, it's disturbing the comfortable, and nobody looks more comfortable than you do. Nicolas Berdalyev once said that "bread for oneself is a material preoccupation; that bread for others is a spiritual preoccupation." Give us this day our daily bread, not every other day as happens in some countries. And so I remind you again of our Lord's command. You give them something to eat. You remember the disciples replied, "We only have five loaves and two small fishes." You aren't give that answer. It wouldn't be true. But you do have an answer. It's the theme of your week. You give them something to eat. Yes, Lord.

SENATOR HARRIS HONORED

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, I call the attention of the Senate to a signal honor which has been awarded to one of our colleagues, Senator FRED R. HARRIS, the junior Senator from my home State of Oklahoma. He has been named by the U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce as one of the Nation's 10 outstanding young men in 1965, and has gone to St. Paul, Minn., for an awards congress scheduled Friday and Saturday.

I believe my colleagues on both sides of the aisle join me in congratulating the honored Senator from Oklahoma. Despite his youth—he is 35—he has made an excellent record since he won election in 1964 to serve out the last 2 years of the late Senator Robert S. Kerr's term. He not only has been a faithful Member, with an excellent attendance record, he has presided hour after hour with the patience we ask of new Members. He also has made an extensive study of Senate rules and procedure in carrying out what could have been a routine chore.

Those of you who have served on the Public Works or Government Operations Committees with him have learned what

a hard and effective worker he is. The senior Senator from Arkansas, chairman of the latter group, has appointed him to the chairmanship of a new Special Subcommittee on Government Research. Under his vigorous leadership, I am sure we are going to learn a great deal about our national research effort with answers to such questions as where it is done, by whom, whether or not there is duplication, and whether or not its results are readily available.

FRED HARRIS's excellent first year record in the Senate undoubtedly had to do with his selection by the Jaycees. They probably also considered important the fact that a man, barely old enough to serve and making his first statewide race, won a runoff primary as well as a general election against impressive contenders.

Elevation to high office at a minimum age has happened before to the junior Senator from Oklahoma. He was elected to the State senate at the age of 25, a year and a half after his graduation from the University of Oklahoma Law School. He also has practiced law in Lawton, Okla., not far from his hometown of Walters, Okla.

I congratulate both Senator HARRIS and the U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce for a wise selection.

U.S. POLICY AND ACTIONS IN VIETNAM

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, there are very few Members of Congress who have as clear an understanding of the history and the conflicting forces involved in the Vietnam war as has our colleague the distinguished junior Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING]. I am glad to say "junior." It happens that, according to the calendar, he is one of the older Senators, but in accord with his activity and with his thinking, he is one of the youngest and most vigorous.

He was one of the very first of our statesmen to speak out repeatedly in opposition to the policy being pursued in Vietnam by the United States. Whether or not citizens agreed with his point of view, he has demonstrated outstanding leadership in helping to initiate a public debate on Vietnam, and our present policies in southeast Asia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to continue for 1 additional minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, on December 9, 1965, Senator GRUENING in a speech entitled "U.S. Policy and Actions in Vietnam," delivered at Harvard and Boston Universities, made a masterful and scholarly argument opposing our Nation's present policy in Vietnam. I commend this to my colleagues and ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Beyond that there should be a great increase in the planned movement of individuals between the Federal Government and the other worlds that make up American life—the world of business, the military, the universities, the labor unions, agriculture, State and local government. I have moved in several of these worlds, and I am continually shocked at their mutual ignorance of one another. That ignorance breeds both complacency and paranoia. Each of these worlds imagines that it is uniquely close to the moral center of American life, and believes that the other worlds aren't really quite to be trusted with the American future.

Of all these worlds, the Government service has the least excuse for being provincial. It should have the capacity to understand all of the other segments of society. Without that understanding it will not be able to serve them effectively.

I would also favor an oversea assignment early in the career of those young Government people who seek to rise to the top. We have gotten past the day when only those individuals who have an explicit international interest should think of going overseas. The work of Government at home and abroad needs the breadth of perspective acquired by experience overseas. Such experience is valuable any time during one's career, but the earlier it comes the better.

All the processes of refreshment I've mentioned are particularly needed in the case of professional, scientific, technical, and scholarly people. Government needs such people more and more. But it will neither get them nor keep them if it doesn't provide the opportunities for further growth that they value so highly.

There is no excuse for Government to lose out in the competition for talent. It has a built-in advantage over every other employer. The cynics would deny this but the truth is that talented people are attracted to Government because it gives them an opportunity to render service to the entire Nation. They come with the highest motives. They leave when their purpose is thwarted or when they begin to feel trapped. Government cannot afford to be inhospitable to these people.

The administration of the affairs of this Nation is complex and dynamic. They are going to become increasingly so. The Congress has just enacted a staggering amount of legislation which must now be translated into action. It would be hard to overstate either the magnitude of the tasks ahead or their importance to the Nation.

President Johnson made this abundantly clear in his state of the Union message on Wednesday.

Now, let me ask these questions:

Is the Federal service capable of meeting this challenge? Of course, but to do so it must take some significant steps to renew its spirit and its people.

Is renewal compatible with the Federal merit system? It most certainly is. The merit system, now in its 83d year, represents a great advance in the personnel practices of government. We are not about to return to a spoils system.

But tenure was not designed to trap people, to make them inert. It was designed to free them from the capriciousness of politics. They need both the protection of a career system and opportunities for growth.

We can preserve all the great traditions of the system and still maintain the vitality that is so essential in this rapidly changing and infinitely challenging moment of history.

Recognizing that the very size and nature of the system make it particularly susceptible to stagnation, we can make special efforts to build in arrangements for renewal. Through some of the devices I have mentioned we can turn the concept of tenure into a positive asset rather than a deterrent to the full use of our talent.

The momentum generated by the President and the flood of legislation enacted by the Congress have given us unparalleled opportunities to create new patterns of work and to bring new strength and vitality to the career service.

I am optimistic that we will do so, and that optimism is based in no small measure on the fact that one of the boldest innovators in government today, John Macy, is also Chairman of this Commission.

John Macy introduced this session with some kind remarks about me and I want to end it with a tribute to him. I think he is a superb example of the best that the Federal service can produce, and I am proud to have shared this platform with him.

THE WAR ON WANT

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, while Congress was out of session, an outstanding sermon was preached at the YWCA service in Washington Cathedral by the Reverend Dr. Elfan Rees, who is secretary of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, for the World Council of Churches, Geneva, Switzerland.

In discussing "The War on Want," a world problem, on November 14, Dr. Rees urged public understanding, public compassion and public support for the most liberal kind of governmental and inter-governmental action to prevent widening of the gap between the hungry and the overfed in the world.

He recalled the Chinese proverb:

If you give a man a fish, you feed him for a day, but if you teach him how to fish, you feed him for a lifetime.

While we are teaching the hungry to fish, "how to plow deeper furrows, plant better seed and grow better harvests," he added, there is need to feed the hungry, just as parents feed their children while they are being educated.

I ask unanimous consent that this very pertinent sermon be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the sermon was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

You know my text very well. It is the sentence from the Lord's Prayer: "Give us this day our daily bread." I know you all say the Lord's Prayer, but I don't suppose any one of you here has ever thought of saying it in the first person singular. My Father which art in Heaven, as though you were the only child of God. Forgive me my trespasses as though you couldn't care less about the sins of mankind. Lead me not into temptation, as though the pitfalls of life to other people were immaterial. Now, this is not a bright idea of mine. As long ago as 1400 the great Moravian reformer, Jan Huss, preached a sermon in which he accused his congregation of doing exactly that. And I was so fascinated by the idea, as one is by a snake, I tried it myself just for the hell of it. And it sounded like a prayer out of hell. And the more I said it the more I began to feel that I was separating myself from my family, from my community, and from mankind. And the words that stuck most in my gullet was when I said "give me this day my daily bread," as though it was immaterial what was on the table for my family—as though it mattered not that my neighbor next door was short of food—as though it mattered not that millions unknown to me were half starved. And then I remembered that one of the temptations of our Lord was that He should turn stones into bread. And

He refused it because at that time it was only His personal hunger that mattered. But when later in His ministry He was told that thousands were hungry, you remember what He told His disciples? "Don't send them away. You give them something to eat." You know, as one who is too old and of the wrong sex to belong to the YW, one of the things that I'm sorry about your generation is that you have forgotten one of the great things of my generation. The four freedoms that were enunciated by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. Do you even remember them? Freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from fear, and freedom from want. Even in those dark days of 1940 the specter of hunger was stalking the world. Today it is a much more material thing than a specter. The facts of life that happen around us today is that two-thirds of the world go to bed hungry every night. The privileged one-third, those of us who live in North America and Western Europe and Australia, we have 17 percent more food than we need. And the rest of the world has 24 percent less than is required to keep it reasonably healthy. Let me put this in a more vulgar fraction. In the United States of America in a day the average person eats 4½ pounds of food and very often looks like it. In Asia they eat 1½ pounds of food a day, and 85 percent of that is rice. And in the big cities of India at this moment the rice ration has been cut by 50 percent. One-third of the world has to diet, two-thirds starve.

And the grim factor in this situation is that the hungry are multiplying the population far faster than the wise are increasing food production. During the course of this service the population of the world will increase by 5,000. By this time tomorrow it will have increased by 120,000. We anticipate 48 million more births than deaths in the next 12 months. You know, even in North America you have a sort of population explosion. Your population has increased 30 percent in the last 20 years. But during the same time your food production has increased by 50 percent. Why should you worry? You can use that unpleasant English phrase, "I'm alright, Jack." In Asia the population increase is also 30 percent, but the food production has increased only by 25 percent. Twenty years of technology, of technical assistance, of charity, of science, and the food consumption of the hungry is down by 8 percent. You would think, wouldn't you, that this staggering problem of population explosion and the lag in food production would be one and indivisible. But that is not so in fact. While scientists and the United Nations are bending their energies to increase food production, far too many obstacles are being placed in the way of internationally planned family control. Let's be frank; too many of those obstacles are placed there by the Christian church or parts of it. And not until we who call ourselves Christians have greater unanimity and greater wisdom on this problem can we play our proper role in this tragic situation. Meanwhile, we can turn ourselves to what we can do for the hungry with what we have.

Five years ago the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations started a freedom-from-hunger campaign. Like anything else in the United Nations it had to begin with a resolution. Sometimes that's where things end as well. And I want to read you the preamble of this resolution. "Considering," it says, "that a large part of the world's population still doesn't have enough to eat and an even larger part doesn't get the right kind of food * * *." Now this isn't a resolution by a church synod; this is a resolution adopted by hard-bitten diplomats and specialists. The campaign has two aims. First, to create a worldwide awareness of hunger and malnutrition which apart

January 14, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

203

U.S. POLICY AND ACTIONS IN VIETNAM

(Remarks of Senator ERNEST GRUENING delivered at Harvard and Boston Universities December 9, 1965)

I have been asked to address you on the subject of the U.S. policies and actions in Vietnam. As you know, for reasons which I will discuss in detail, I am not in agreement with those policies and actions.

Recently those who have publicly criticized those policies have come under increasing attack. This is a surprising development. I would assume that in this land of freedom, the right to speak out openly on behalf of peace would be taken for granted. I would consider it not only a right but a duty—an imperative duty.

As the St. Louis Post Dispatch—one of the Nation's finest newspapers—stated editorially on December 2:

"One of the striking things about the criticism of Vietnam policy is its persistent refusal to be silenced. We hope that continues to be the case. Every citizen shares the moral responsibility for his country's conduct. If he believes his country's conduct to be wrong, but fails to speak out, he is betraying his own obligations as a citizen. Just as public criticism of a no-negotiation policy brought about a policy of pro-negotiation, so criticism of mistaken objectives in Asia can bring about adoption of the right objectives. It is vital that discussion of the Nation's Asian objectives be free and vigorous."

Since the Bill of Rights, the first of the 10 amendments to the Constitution, prohibits the Congress, and by implication all other legislative and executive authorities in the Nation and State, from abridging freedom of speech, the burden of proof should rest heavily on any who would deny or seek to impair such freedom. I know of no right more precious or more inherent in our Nation's philosophy and its often reiterated professions.

But our Nation is now at war—an undeclared war, to be sure—and many of our fellow citizens hold the view that it is our duty as patriotic Americans to support the administration, which has assumed the responsibility for our course of action in southeast Asia, and is conducting the war. When our men are dying in combat deep passions are naturally aroused, the martial spirit becomes rampant, and dissent and protest become increasingly perilous.

Yet it is just at such a time that speaking out is more than ever essential.

Earlier this week I received a letter from a professor in a large western State university, asking me to come there and address the student body and faculty on Vietnam and related matters. I quote from his letter:

"We have had a small protest demonstration * * * and this has produced a most violent reaction which has assumed chilling proportions, creating a climate extremely unfavorable to rational discussion of these problems."

There in a brief sentence you have what is going on all over the country, and it emphasizes the need for presentation on both sides of the case for and against the U.S. policies in southeast Asia, and our armed intervention there.

So, whatever the consequences, I agree with the Post-Dispatch editorial that he who dissents from his country's policy but fails to speak out, is indeed betraying his obligations as a citizen.

Clearly it is not easy to oppose the publicly expressed and reiterated declaration of policy and related action by the President of the United States, policies largely supported by the press—with some honorable and courageous exceptions—and in behalf of which the powerful machinery of Government is militantly mobilized.

Yet those who disagree with our national policy in this area can support President Johnson's statement in his April 27 news conference, which is pertinent to recall.

Asked: "Mr. President, do you think any of the participants in the national discussion on Vietnam could appropriately be likened to the appeasers of 25 or 30 years ago?"

He replied: "I don't believe in characterizing people with labels. I think you do a great disservice when you engage in name calling. We want honest, forthright discussion in this country, and that will be discussion with differences of views, and we welcome what our friends have to say, whether they agree with us or not. I would not want to label people who agree with me or disagree with me."

It is not a secret that I have been one of those who have disagreed. I began voicing my disagreement in a full-length speech on the floor of the Senate on March 10, 1964, just 21 months ago. It was entitled: "The United States Should Get Out of Vietnam." That was before our country had committed a single soldier to combat, or dropped a bomb. It would have been far easier to negotiate an honorable settlement at that time and to obviate much of the slaughter and all else that has happened since and the grim prospect that now lies before us.

Among the imperative reasons for full public discussion and disclosure is because, in my view, the justification for the course which has now so deeply and tragically involved our country in Vietnam and in southeast Asia, with apparently only a prospect for further and deeper involvement, is that the basis—the alleged basis—as I have studied it differs very materially from the actual historic record. And it is not possible realistically to appraise what should have been our course of action and what it should be now and in the future without a presentation of that other side of how we got into this mess.

During World War II the French colony of Indochina was overrun by the Japanese. Fighting to liberate this area were Vietnamese and the Allied Forces at war with Japan. The native aspirations—part of the worldwide revolt against foreign domination, against colonialism—were for independence. But the French wanted to regain their colonial possessions. Because of the fear that Communist China would take over this area, the Eisenhower administration was urged to assist the French in reconquering their former colony. Certain voices in the United States urged all-out military assistance. Others advised against it. President Eisenhower declined to send our troops into combat to aid the French although we did give the French substantial financial assistance and some cooperation in military training through a military mission established in Saigon. But lacking this all-out support, the French were defeated by the local forces, the Vietminh, suffering staggering losses and surrender at Dienbienphu.

In consequence, there was a meeting at Geneva of representatives of 14 nations, where accords were drawn up which provided that 3 new nations should be born out of the former French colony—namely Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The accords provided that Vietnam was to be temporarily—but only temporarily—divided into North and South Vietnam for reasons of demobilization, but that within 2 years an election would be held to choose the officials who would govern the reunited Vietnamese.

The United States was in South Vietnam with its military mission at Saigon, and with the political demise of the French, was in charge. It was the United States that brought Ngo Dien Diem back from monastic life in the United States, was installed by us

as President of the Cabinet and in a subsequent plebiscite backed him against the playboy Emperor Bao Dai.

Now we come to what I consider the pertinent part of the history of U.S. involvement.

The United States did not sign the Geneva Accords but it expressed support of them in a unilateral statement.

This statement by Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, dated July 21, 1954, was declared by him to be a unilateral declaration of U.S. position in these matters, and it stated:

"The Government of the United States being resolved to devote its efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations takes note of the agreements concluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954."

The statement declared its support of paragraphs 1-12 inclusive of the Geneva agreements and that "it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them in accordance with article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force," and second it "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."

"In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning free elections in Vietnam my Government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954, as follows: 'In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly.'

"With respect to the statement made by the representative of the State of Vietnam, the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing in its declaration just made is intended to or does indicate any departure from this traditional position."

"We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples of that area to determine their own future."

You will note that in this declaration by the United States, we speak only of Vietnam, not of South Vietnam or North Vietnam, but Vietnam, and we reiterate our traditional position that its people are entitled to determine their own future.

On the same day, July 21, 1954, President Eisenhower issued a statement confirming Under Secretary Bedell Smith's declarations.

Now the official justification for our subsequent and present military involvement there and our steadily increasing involvement in South Vietnam was stated as follows:

In the state of the Union message in January 1965, President Johnson said: "We are there, first, because a friendly nation has asked us for help against Communist aggression. Ten years ago we pledged our help. Three Presidents have supported that pledge. We will not break it."

He elaborated on this statement in his Johns Hopkins speech on April 7, 1965, saying:

"Why are we in South Vietnam? "We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Vietnam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Vietnam defend its independence."

"I intend to keep that promise. To dishonor that pledge * * * would be an unforgivable wrong."

Now let us go back and see what that first pledge was—the pledge by the first of the three Presidents President Johnson refers to, namely President Eisenhower.

It was contained in a letter to President Diem as President of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam on October 23, 1954. I will read it.

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Vietnam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. The implications of the agreement concerning Vietnam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within.

"Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formidable project of the movement of several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens away from areas which are passing under a de facto rule and political ideology which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort."

You will note that what I shall read now, which follows those first two paragraphs of President Eisenhower's letter to Diem, says nothing about a further request by President Diem for assistance. The only request of record was limited to assistance in moving several hundred thousand Vietnamese from the north to the south. There is nothing to indicate that Diem was asking and that President Eisenhower was responding to a request "for help against Communist aggression."

I now resume the quoting of Eisenhower's letter:

"We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Vietnam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Vietnam. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Vietnam to examine with you, in your capacity as Chief of Government, how an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Vietnam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied."

Consider now this language. "We", namely, the Government of the United States, "have been exploring ways and means" of aiding Vietnam. But that aid is to be given only "provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied."

Now to continue President Eisenhower's letter:

"The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Vietnam in undertaking needed reforms."

I continue to quote from President Eisenhower's letter:

"It (namely the Government of the United States) hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Vietnam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who

might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people."

So here we have a third precondition for U.S. aid. The Viet Government was to be a government respected both at home and abroad. We know how responsive it was to the aspirations of its people, how enlightened its purpose, how much respected at home—since a civil war broke out against it. And it was not respected abroad, as evidenced by the fact that Ambassador Lodge supported the removal of Diem and the Nhu's. Of course, those conditions prescribed by President Eisenhower were not fulfilled by the Diem regime. But in any event nothing was said about sending in our troops. There was no promise or pledge of military aid.

This is further confirmed by a White House statement of November 3, 1954, which states that President Eisenhower had instructed Gen. J. Lawton Collins as his special representative "to explore" with President Diem and his government how "to help them with their critical problems and to supplement measures adopted by the Vietnamese themselves." Again, no mention of any request by Diem for that aid. Had there been, it is hardly likely that such a request would not have been mentioned. That is why I believe that we asked ourselves in. The most that was implied was economic aid which was given, and President Eisenhower himself declared a few months ago that he had only offered economic aid. During the remaining 6 years of the Eisenhower administration, we had a military mission which did not exceed some 600 officers and men; not one of these were engaging in combat, no American lives were risked or lost during that period. So much for the first of the three Presidents.

Now we come to the second President, John F. Kennedy, who was persuaded by his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, to escalate our commitment to the extent of sending military advisers whose number rose before the end of his Presidency to some 15,000. But as late as September 2, 1963, less than 3 months before his death, in an interview with CBS newscaster, Walter Cronkite, President Kennedy said: "I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win popular support that the war can be won out there."

So, President Kennedy had reached the conclusion that Diem had not fulfilled Eisenhower's conditions although he had had 9 years to do so from 1954 to 1963. And then President Kennedy goes on to say: "In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it—the people of Vietnam—against the Communists. We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don't think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort, and, in my opinion, in the last 2 months the Government has gotten out of touch with the people."

I believe this record shows that we did not make a solemn pledge to support that Government. And in any event that Government ceased to exist after its failure was manifest. One of the reasons why civil war broke out against Diem in addition to his own oppressive tactics of jailing hundreds of people without trial, some of them being tortured in prison, was the repudiation of the provision to hold general elections in July 1956. This was the most basic item in the Geneva Accord and you will recall our unilateral commitment to it by Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State, when he stated:

"In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections."

Yet, the United States, which dominated the situation of South Vietnam, approved and ratified that Government's refusal to

hold the elections. We and they refused to hold them for the reason, frankly stated, that it was felt that Ho Chi Minh would be elected President. But what principles are we espousing when we agree to go to an election and then call it off because we feel we are going to lose it? That is the unquestionable record on this issue. How do we square that with our national conscience and a tradition that would be inviolate under our standards?

Now, some deny that this is a civil war and one of the partial myths on which we base our actions is that the whole trouble stems from aggression from Hanoi. Well, no one could have been better informed on this issue than John F. Kennedy who was in the Senate since 1953 and who, in his news conference of July 18, 1963, referred to "the civil war which has gone on for 10 years."

Chapter 3, article 16, of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities provides: "With effect from the date of entry into force of the present agreement, the introduction into Vietnam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited."

And further: "With effect from the date of entry into force of the present agreement, the introduction into Vietnam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions and other war materiel, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons and armoured vehicles, is prohibited."

The Geneva agreement provided for an International Commission to supervise the carrying out of the Geneva Accord and to see that its provisions were carried out in Vietnam. The Commission consisted of three representatives, one from Canada, one from India, and one from Poland. They made various reports which indicated increasing violations of the agreements by both parties. When one reads them objectively one gains the impression that the violations by the South Vietnamese under U.S. tutelage were far more serious and far more extensive. A special report by the Commission in paragraph 12 states:

"Since December 1961 the Commission's teams in South Vietnam have been persistently denied the right to control and inspect, which are part of their mandatory tasks. Thus, these teams, though they were able to observe the steady and continuous arrival of war materiel, including aircraft carriers with helicopters onboard, were unable, in view of the denial of controls, to determine precisely the quantum and nature of war materiel unloaded and introduced into South Vietnam."

And it continues in paragraph 17: "As the Commission has been denied mandatory controls, as pointed out earlier in paragraph 12 above, it has not been able to make a precise assessment of the number of military personnel and the quantum of war materiel brought in. However, from December 3, 1961, up to May 5, 1962, the Commission's teams have controlled the entry of 72 military personnel, and observed but not controlled 173 military personnel, 62 helicopters, 6 reconnaissance aircraft, 5 jet aircraft, 57 fighters/fighter bombers, 25 transport aircraft, 26 unspecified types of aircraft, 102 jeeps, 8 tractors, 3 105-mm. howitzers, 3 armoured carriers (tracked), 29 armoured fighting vehicle tractors, 404 other trailers, and radar equipment and crates; 5 warships, 9 LST's (including 4 visiting LST's), 3 LCT's, 5 visiting aircraft carriers and spares of various kinds."

In the case of North Vietnam, the Commission (the Polish delegate dissenting, which is not surprising since he represented a country behind the Iron Curtain) concluded that "in specific instances there was evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms and other supplies had been sent from the North to the South with the

January 14, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

205

purpose of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities including armed attacks, directed against the armed forces and administration of the zone in the south. These activities are in violation of articles 10, 19, 24, and 27 of the agreement of cessation of hostilities in Vietnam."

Obviously, both sides, North and South, were violating the Geneva agreement. It would appear that those of the South were far larger and they had the support and approval of the United States. The violations on both sides were charged by the Canadian and Indian representatives who may well be credited with impartiality. The Polish delegate, whose report may not be accepted as unbiased, refused to join in the indictment of the charges against North Vietnam but joined with his colleagues against those of the South.

We now come to further U.S. violations. The United States is a signatory to the United Nations Charter. In fact, the United States was largely instrumental in creating the United Nations.

Article 2, of chapter 1, paragraph 4, provides:

"1. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

Article 33 of chapter 6, provides:

"1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."

Now you notice that this article does not say that they may do this but that they shall do it, and lists eight alternative methods which should be used "first of all." Now we may well ask, did we, the United States, when there were violations of the Geneva agreements, seek a solution by negotiations? We did not. Did we seek a solution by inquiry? We did not. Did we seek a solution by mediation? We did not. Did we seek a solution by conciliation? We did not. Did we seek a solution by arbitration? We did not. Did we seek a solution by judicial settlement? We did not. Did we seek a solution by resorting to regional agencies or arrangements? We did not. Or did we seek a solution by "other peaceful means of our (their) own choice?" We did not.

One of the "regional agencies or arrangements" whose aid we might have invoked for a peaceful solution was the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization which was created at the instance and by the leadership of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and whose signatories were the United States, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, The Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom. It reaffirms in article I the agreement to settle international disputes by peaceful means and, to quote it exactly:

"The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

Thus having used force the United States was also violating the SEATO treaty. I have spoken of the violation of article 2, paragraph 4, chapter 1 (which was specifically mentioned by Under Secretary Walter Bedell Smith's declaration of U.S. policy which we would adhere to), and the violation of article 33, chapter 6, of the United Nations Charter that provides for the settle-

ment of disputes by peaceful means. Another violation was that of article 37 which provides that if parties to a dispute of the matter referred to in article 33, fail to settle it by the means indicated in that article they shall refer it to the Security Council. Again not "may" but "shall." The United States has not done that.

So when those in authority in Washington speak of "a national pledge" as a justification for our course of action in Vietnam, I find it difficult not to contrast that dubious conditional, qualified, tentative offer of help to a vanished South Vietnamese Chief of State—who did not fulfill the conditions—with our violation of the unqualified treaty commitments, of which there could be no more solemn category—the United Nations Charter, the Southeast Asia Treaty, and the violations of the unilateral statement by Under Secretary Walter Bedell Smith, reiterated on the same day by President Eisenhower, that we would support Vietnam supervised elections in 1956.

To review briefly what has happened in the Congress: In August of 1964 it was reported that two, or possibly three, PT boats had attacked our 7th Fleet in the Tonkin Gulf. But if, as reported (although it is questionable whether the full facts have been revealed to the American people), this was an act of aggression—although perhaps as unimportant as an attack by a 14-year-old boy with a bean shooter against Cassius Clay—the President was wholly within his rights to order a retaliatory attack by airplanes from the fleet on the base from which these PT boats emerged. However, the next day a resolution drafted in the White House was submitted to the Congress not merely approving everything that had been done before in southeast Asia, but giving the President unlimited power in his own discretion to use the Armed Forces of the United States anywhere in southeast Asia. It passed the House unanimously and in the Senate there were two opposing votes—those of Senator WAYNE MORSE and mine. I could not justify giving the President this unlimited, unrestricted power out of which our steadily escalating military commitment stems. For one thing the Constitution of the United States is specific that only Congress can declare war. We are now at war, and in my judgment, and that of WAYNE MORSE, who is a constitutional lawyer, we are thereby in violation of the Constitution.

In February last we started bombing North Vietnam. The justification for this drastic change of policy was that there had been an attack on one of our outposts at Pleiku. Pleiku is about 200 miles south of the 17th parallel, the boundary between North and South Vietnam. At night a group of Vietcong passed through the lines of the South Vietnamese troops who were either too inert or uninterested to alert our men in the barracks. The Vietcong opened fire with a mortar of American make, which they had apparently secured from the South Vietnamese forces, and killed 8 American soldiers. There was no direct relation between this incident and North Vietnamese infiltration, but it was made the justification for the bombing which has now continued for 10 months with no appreciable result. It appears rather to have hardened the determination of the North Vietnamese to continue what they have been doing and rather to increase their aid to the South Vietnamese National Army of Liberation.

Last May the President sent to the Congress an appropriation request of \$700 million to conduct this undeclared war in Vietnam. President Johnson frankly stated that this request was being made not because moneys were needed to supply our Armed Forces in Vietnam, for he could transfer money needed from other sources, but rather as a vehicle to secure additional congressional approval of his carrying on the undeclared war in

Vietnam and anywhere else in southeast Asia that he saw fit. This the President made clear at the outset of his message, when he stated: "This is not a routine appropriation. For each Member of Congress who supports this request is also voting to persist in our effort to halt Communist aggression in South Vietnam. Each is saying that the Congress and the President stand united before the world in joint determination that the independence of South Vietnam shall be preserved and Communist attack will not succeed."

Since this money was not needed and was to be used merely as a symbol of support for our policy, I found myself unable to vote for it, as likewise did WAYNE MORSE, and we were joined by another Senator, GAYLORD NELSON, of Wisconsin. In the House, seven Members voted against it.

Going from these factual presentations to the realm of personal opinion, it is my deep-seated belief that we made a very serious mistake in getting involved militarily because first, in my view, nothing that happens in South Vietnam jeopardizes the security of the United States. And even if it did so there is a question of whether that would justify our invading Vietnam and bombing it any more than we can justify the seizure by Stalin of the formerly independent countries surrounding Russia—Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary—on the grounds that their control was essential to the security of Soviet Russia. Nor do I subscribe to the domino theory which is that had we not gone in, these nations of southeast Asia would have fallen into the hands of the Communist Chinese. And then we are told in sequent flights of fancy that after southeast Asia the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand would fall and we would have to be fighting the Communists on the beaches of California. That to me is arrant nonsense. Certainly our control of the Pacific by sea and air renders that absurd. Moreover I am not a pacifist and I do not like and am utterly opposed to the advance of totalitarianism anywhere. If a situation should arise whereby a free government such as that of Australia or New Zealand were threatened by attack and invasion by the forces of imperial communism and there was a request from those governments for our aid, I would be for giving that aid without stint or limit. The situation in South Vietnam is quite different. I am confident, and this is further in the realm of opinion, that had we stayed out entirely we would have three independent countries formed out of French Indochina, that they would have installed their own social and political ideology, which they would have had every right to do, and that a united Vietnam would have adopted communism as its social and economic system. But it would have been a Communist regime independent of Peiping and there is evidence that many non-Communists are enlisted in the civil war against the South Vietnamese Government. The history of Vietnam shows conclusively their people's dislike and fear of the Chinese, and their war is largely motivated by a desire to get rid of all foreign rule. They want independence, and that should be a cause that ought to appeal to Americans. They did not want the French in. They did not want the Chinese, and I doubt whether a majority want us in. In Europe, to achieve a corresponding situation, namely in Yugoslavia, a Communist state independent of Moscow, the United States invested \$2 billion in aid for Tito, and our policy makers considered that, and now consider it, a sound and profitable investment.

I need not detain you longer to point out what has happened and what is happening. I consider our bombing of North Vietnam totally without justification morally, legally, or otherwise. It is the sort of thing we condemned scathingly when done by totalitarian powers in past years; and as we have

seen now after 10 months of such bombing. It has merely stiffened the resistance of those whom we are fighting. We are getting in deeper and deeper; not only are our casualty lists growing, but the toll of not merely those fighting but of civilian non-combatants mounts daily. It is my reasoned view that in our effort to stop the advance of imperialist communism, we are actually aiding it. So far, at least, the situation must be to the liking of the Communist rulers of China, for to date they have not committed a single soldier to this war. And yet there we are—a great Western Power, the greatest in the world—engaging in a desperate, bitter, and horrible struggle on the continent of Asia with a small Asiatic nation, sacrificing the lives of our youth and spending billions of dollars.

The situation is different even from that of Korea. First, there was overt aggression from the North there. Second, we were there under a United Nations mandate. Third, the South Koreans wanted to fight. These factors are not present, at least not in the same degree, in Vietnam. There was no overt initial aggression from the North at the start. There has been infiltration, subsequent infiltration, but paralleling the U.S. support of South Vietnam, and at least not appreciably until our and Diem's refusal to hold elections. The United States went in unilaterally and until very recently, and only in response to great pressure from us, we had little support from our SEATO allies—none from Pakistan, none (to speak of) from Britain, none from France, and when administration spokesmen cite the total number of nations that are allegedly with us—in a kind of numbers game—we find that they have come in late and largely with only token assistance. In the November 29 issue of Newsweek there was a little item in its Periscope column entitled "Spain Lends a Hand" which reads: "Spain is the latest country to lend a hand in Vietnam. After much prodding from L.B.J., the Franco government hopes to ship in four ambulances with medical crews. Actually the ambulances will have little significance (the helicopters do their work now) but the medics are wanted and the Spanish contingent will be welcomed as evidence of support for the United States and Saigon."

When I was in South America last January I found that every American Ambassador had received orders to go to the President of the country to which he was accredited to request support for our efforts in Vietnam. Many of them were reluctant to do this and in many cases their pleas were unheeded, while in others there was the same kind of token compliance which we now see we have coming from Spain. These countries are all recipients of lavish American aid and the United States is, in effect, paying for these tokens and is in a position to apply pressure.

I could only wish there could be a ready and quick answer to and a way out of the tragic dilemma that the President, his advisers, and the people of the United States find themselves in. We are now so deeply committed that a way out is extremely difficult to find. There have been numerous suggestions made and we should explore them all actively. Our so-called unconditional discussions are not unconditional as long as we do not firmly pledge willingness to negotiate also with the people who are doing the fighting, the National Liberation Front, or Vietcong; guarantee the carrying out of the general agreements to which we once pledged support, namely supervised elections in all Vietnam, but whose violation we approved, and make every effort for a cease fire and simultaneous phasing out of the combatants of both sides. Unless we make such modifications in our attempts at negotiation and stop the bombing of North Vietnam—because no people will yield under those cir-

cumstances—this senseless war will go on and get steadily more disastrous.

What the United States should do—in sum—is to return to the rule of law. We should have invoked the United Nations at the very beginning when we felt that treaty commitments were violated and we have not used the United Nations as we should have.

In this connection, the disclosures by Adlai Stevenson to Eric Sevareid, which appeared in the November 30 issue of Look magazine, that both McNamara and Rusk turned a deaf ear to the efforts of U Thant to secure negotiations which were then possible, are very disturbing.

Because I strongly value adherence to law, I cannot approve the action of a few of our draftees in burning up their draft cards. They are in violation of the law and must take the consequences, however one may sympathize with their feelings that we should never have been in Vietnam and that what we are doing there is morally wrong and self-defeating. But peaceful protests and freedom of speech should remain inviolate and we should continue to urge almost any sensible solution that would put an end to the killing. It would be much better than the dark prospect of more and more slaughter which lies ahead and which ultimately, in my judgment, will result in a solution which could have been achieved bloodlessly a few years ago. The sad fact is that we cannot win this war. When I say "win" I do not necessarily mean that in a strict military sense. If we continue to pour troops into southeast Asia, blast its villages from the air with bombs and napalm, kill more tens of thousands, we may in time impose a military domination, although even that is by no means certain. But even if we did, what then? Sooner or later the problems of Asia will be settled by Asians, as they should be. We should have learned that the white man cannot settle them for the Asians. We will be told that there are some Asians fighting on our side, as in the case of the Koreans, but they are beholden to us, and in general, it appears to me that we have very little spontaneous enthusiastic support from almost any source.

I cannot conceive that it is desirable or wise for us to throw our young men into every cockpit in the world where Communist totalitarianism rears its ugly head. And why should we assume the role of self-appointed "citizen fixit," of world policemen, all over the globe? If the cause is sufficiently good and urgent, an approach should always be made under the United Nations on a basis of international legality and with the support, from the very beginning, of others who believe that freedom is truly at stake and that those for whom we fight also know and value freedom and are prepared to do their share. This is far from the reality in Vietnam.

There are still other impending grave casualties of our military plunge into the quagmire of southeast Asia. To date over 1,500 fine young Americans have been killed in action. Several hundred more have died in noncombat fatalities. Ten thousand have been wounded, many crippled for life, and that ghastly toll is just beginning. Meanwhile, the great achievements on the domestic front of President Johnson and the 89th Congress in its 1st session—and they were great—will be largely nullified. They will be nullified just as their implementation was to begin. The inspiring vision of the "Great Society" will be blurred if not blacked out. There will not be the means both for the construction of that society at home and the destruction of war abroad. Most tragic of all, apart from the human sacrifices and the blighting of countless homes, is the fading of the national image of our beloved country, of which, despite some of its failings, we have had every right to be proud, to cherish, and to wish to maintain.

I can only express the fervent hope that we can, somehow, soon, call a halt before that image and that vision of this great land become a memory. Let us all do our utmost to bring that about.

PROXMIRE POSTMASTER BILL SUPPORTED BY ARTHUR D. LITTLE, EFFICIENCY EXPERT

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, last year I introduced legislation which would place postmasters' appointments under the civil service system. At that time I pointed out that the present system of political patronage injured post office employee morale. Postal employees are forbidden by Federal law to participate in the very political activities that are essential under the patronage system if they are to get a postmastership. I also indicated that patronage matters of this kind tie up valuable staff personnel. They create dissension in State and local parties. For every party worker who is a successful postmaster appointee, there are 5 or 10 who are disappointed and resentful.

The distinguished management consultant firm of Arthur D. Little has recently cited the present postmaster appointment system as an example of time wasted "on nonpolicy business by Congress that could be saved without significant political cost or effect." This conclusion was included within a management study of the Congress commissioned by NBC News in connection with its special report "Congress Needs Help."

The specific language of the Arthur D. Little report states:

The time spent on postmaster and service academy appointments serves little useful purpose. Some 21,000 postmaster appointments and all appointments to the military academies clear through congressional offices. These appointments * * * are an avoidable distraction. In the judgment of many Congressmen, the political values of this time-honored custom are not commensurate with the amount of time it takes.

I agree with the report's comments. I hope that the Post Office and Civil Service Committee will schedule early hearings on my proposal, S. 252, in the coming year.

CHURCH CONCERN FOR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, on November 12, 1965, the board of directors of the Council of Churches of Greater Washington passed two resolutions which I deeply hope the Senate heeds in carrying out its duties and responsibilities to the citizens of the District of Columbia and the Nation at large during the 2d session of the 89th Congress.

The first resolution expresses the council's support for appropriations to implement the rent supplement program authorized by Congress last year as part of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965. As a member of the Housing Subcommittee of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, I am particularly aware of the long hours spent in committee and in conference on this legislation. All of my colleagues in the Senate remember the thorough floor

same spirit that so many Alaskans showed in rebuilding after the Good Friday earthquake of 1964.

Rather, my purpose is to call national attention to the loss of a building on which it is impossible to place a value—St. Michael's Cathedral.

Estimates have been made on the cost of reconstructing St. Michael's, but I know of no way to put a price on the historical value of the church. The cathedral is believed to be the oldest church in Alaska and was one of the few buildings remaining from the days of Russian rule.

The cathedral, called by the National Survey of Historical Sites and Buildings the finest example of Russian architecture in the United States, was dedicated in 1848. Construction began 4 years earlier.

From 1848 until 1862 and from 1905 until the present it was the cathedral for the Russian Orthodox Church in Alaska.

Some of the ornaments inside the cathedral date from an earlier church at Sitka. The icon of the Archangel St. Michael, patron saint of Sitka, was brought to the colony in 1816 by Father Alexis Sokoloff, the first priest assigned to the town founded 17 years earlier.

Father Ivan Veniaminov, the great Russian missionary, came to Sitka, capital of Russian-America, in 1834. He returned to Russia 4 years later to appeal for an expansion of church activities in Alaska.

Father Veniaminov came back as Bishop Innocent of Alaska and launched a program which included schools and theological seminaries. It was under his leadership that the cathedral was built. Sitka became the home of the bishop.

For a time after the Alaska purchase the church continued to receive support from Russia, but since 1918 local congregations have been the sole support of orthodox clergy and churches in this country. In 1933 the ruling bishop of the Russian Orthodox Church of North America declared the church on this continent to be temporarily autonomous from the Communist-controlled organization in the Soviet Union.

As cathedrals go, St. Michael's was not imposing in size. Built in the shape of a cross, the church was 97 feet long and 66 feet wide. Despite its modest dimensions, the building had a graceful grandeur and beauty seen against its backdrop of beautiful mountains.

A four-story bell tower, constructed of massive, hand-cut logs, supported an octagonal belfry which held eight bells ranging in weight from 75 to 1,500 pounds. A carrot-shaped steeple topped by a gilt cross rose above the belfry.

A dome, like the steeple, showing the influence of oriental architecture, covered the center of the church.

The interior of the cathedral was as ornate as the wood exterior was plain. Walls were covered with painted cloth, but of most interest were the many sacred objects, paintings, and icons on display.

I won't attempt to note all that the church contained. A brief description of the iconostas, the partition in an Eastern Orthodox Church which separates the main part of the church from the sanctuary, will suffice to give an idea of the richness of the church's interior. The partition was adorned with 12 icons, splendid examples of repoussé art. In this art form, figures are painted on canvas. Then a craftsman, working with a thin sheet of silver, beats out the form of clothing worn by the figure, reproducing folds and ornaments in the original painting. The 12 icons on the St. Michael's iconostas required 50 pounds of silver.

Perhaps the cathedral's most famous icon is the Sitka Madonna, known throughout the world. The painter of the icon was Vladimir Lukich Borovikovskiy, a great portrait painter who died in 1826. Employees of the Russian-

American company gave the icon to the church.

Fortunately, through the efforts of firemen, priests, and residents, all of the precious items of the cathedral, with the exception of a single painting, were saved. Unfortunately, the church books, dating back to the early 1800's, were destroyed.

There are many reasons why St. Michael's should be rebuilt, but the most compelling reason is to give these beautiful ornaments, sacred objects, paintings and icons saved from the flames a proper setting. While a reconstructed church will not be of equal historical importance as the original, it seems only right that the ornaments be displayed in a church which recreates as closely as possible their original setting.

It will be possible to rebuild a replica of St. Michael's because detailed plans of the cathedral are on file in the Library of Congress.

The plans are on file because of a project of the National Park Service known as Mission '66. In 1956, Congress approved appropriations so that the Park Service could embark on a 10-year program to upgrade national parks which had been neglected during and immediately following World War II. Part of that effort was directed toward resuming the Historic American Building Survey, which had been suspended during World War II.

The six measured drawings of the cathedral were done as part of the survey. I think the tragedy at Sitka demonstrates the value of that survey. Because of that survey, it will be possible to reconstruct the cathedral.

I am happy to report that a drive to raise funds for construction of a replica already has been started by interested Alaskans. Contributions are being sent to the St. Michael's Cathedral Fund established by the Sitka Historical Sites Restoration Committee, a nonprofit, tax-exempt organization under the chairmanship of James T. Thomason.

The drive has attracted statewide support. For example, a formal campaign has been launched in Anchorage. The committee is headed by Merrill Mael, and includes among others Mayor Elmer Rasmuson, William Hopkins, an aid of the Governor, and Robert D. Arnold, my special assistant in Alaska.

It was reported that the Alaska State Chamber of Commerce has pledged \$10,000 to the fund.

A radio station in Cleveland, acting on its own, reportedly made an appeal for funds.

A nationwide effort is being planned, and I am pleased to serve as the honorary chairman of this portion of the drive.

Estimates on reconstructing the church range from \$500,000 to \$800,000. I hope that money will be raised and that Sitka will once again be the site of historic St. Michael's Cathedral.

In closing I would like to quote from a study made for the National Park Service. Better than I could, the quotation sums the historical importance of the cathedral:

"In our opinion, St. Michael's Cathedral is of sufficient national historical and cultural significance to qualify as a national historic site.

"First, as the cathedral and spiritual center for the Russian Orthodox Church in Alaska for many years, both during the Russian and American periods of Alaskan history, it is the structure best suited to commemorate the influence of the Eastern Orthodox Church in the development of Alaska.

"Second, as the oldest known surviving religious structure in Alaska and as a splendid any typical example of Orthodox church architecture in Alaska, it is eminently qualified to illustrate for future generations one of the cultures which has contributed to the formation of our American civilization and our national scene.

"Third, as one of the very few structures of any type still remaining from the period

of Russian occupation, it symbolizes and commemorates the meeting of Eastern and Western cultures on the western edge of America.

"Fourth, because of its association with Father Veniaminov it commemorates one of the great, though little known, men of the American missionary frontier.

"This site is a natural point at which to present these broad aspects of American history. No other national historic site commemorates these particular phases of our country's history. Nearby Sitka National Monument presents another, though related, phase of Alaska's story—the culture of the natives and their resistance to white settlement."

THE MANSFIELD REPORT ON VIETNAM

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, our distinguished majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, of Montana, and his colleagues, Senators AIKEN, MUSKIE, INOUE, and BOGGS, deserve the highest commendation for their forthright report on the grim realities of the situation confronting us in Vietnam.

If there is to be a meaningful debate in Congress on the war in southeast Asia, it must be based upon a realistic assessment of where we are, whence we came, and where we are headed. Too much mischief has already been done by the instant victory advocates who keep assuring us that the Vietcong will collapse, if we will just push the war up still another notch.

The sobering effect which the Mansfield report should inspire cannot help but add new momentum to the quest for a rational settlement of the war in Vietnam.

Mr. R. H. Shackford, staff writer for the Scripps-Howard newspapers, has given a fine appraisal of the Mansfield report in an article published in the January 10 edition of the Washington Daily News. I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

VIETNAM DEBATE WARMS UP—THE MANSFIELD REPORT HAS STIRRED HAWKS AND DOVES

(By R. H. Shackford)

Senate Democratic Leader MIKE MANSFIELD's grim but extraordinarily candid report about the mess in Vietnam has set the hawks and the doves at it again.

It has created the background for a debate, already under way, that is certain to grow in intensity as Congress reconvenes and President Johnson faces new decisions.

The hawks in private denounce Senator MANSFIELD for his candor, claiming that his report aids and abets the enemy and will mislead Hanoi about U.S. intentions.

The doves praise the report, especially for its candor. They argue that it is about time some one courageously painted the real, pessimistic picture as a contrast to the ones created daily by U.S. military and diplomatic spokesmen.

The hawks, who include those who for years have argued that just a little more pressure will bring the other side to its knees, claim the situation is more hopeful than Senator MANSFIELD sees it—provided a little more escalation is ordered.

The doves suggest that the outlook in Vietnam is even bleaker than Senator MANSFIELD's public report and that the Senator's

January 14, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

197

fire protection, and sanitation. The initiative for creation usually came from the citizens of the community. The legislature granted broad powers and duties to the governing boards of these municipalities, including complete power to determine their organizational structure. This made it far simpler to centralize the administration of cities and towns.

MORE SERVICES

Faced later with demands by the people for services, the legislature granted power to counties to decide whether other activities should be carried on, and if carried on, the extent to which performed. Thus the legislature has authorized counties to establish public health programs, to establish and maintain hospitals and, more recently, to provide mental health services, libraries, agricultural extension programs, trade and vocational courses, industrial education centers, and community colleges. The legislature has authorized counties to protect property through firefighting programs, building codes, and zoning, and to build and operate airports, to establish, recreation programs, to maintain civil defense programs, and to conduct other activities.

Thus counties today serve a twofold purpose. They are subdivisions of the State and they are units of local self-government.

Because of the county's role as a subdivision of the State the direction of county government is a matter of State policy. It is true that county officials often have their own suggestions with respect to activities they administer, but because of the State-county partnership they share the initiative with others.

External influences, which grow out of the traditional role of the county as a subdivision of the State, thus have a substantial bearing on the direction of county government.

URBAN COUNTY PROBLEMS

The large urban counties have a growing mobile population and an expanding urban area. These combine to create problems.

First of all, the urban counties are faced with the problem of taking over and providing on a countywide basis some of the services traditionally performed by cities. For a number of years there has been a movement toward countywide operation of library service, for example. Since World War II, county activity in hospital construction and maintenance has far outdistanced municipal interest. An interest in airports has recently become evident, and if county experience in North Carolina follows county experience elsewhere, there will soon be an increased interest in parks and recreation. None of these activities is a respecter of municipal boundaries, and counties will become more and more involved in all of them.

A second problem lies in the demands of people in unincorporated areas for services traditionally provided by cities. Many counties have recently received demands for water and sewer service in unincorporated areas, and some have come from areas into which the nearby city cannot justify expanding its service. The near future may bring demands on counties for pure water on a wholesale basis for both unincorporated areas and smaller municipalities, and the same may be true of demands for the disposal of sewage. There are already the faint stirrings of interest in housing and renewal to clear up slums in unincorporated areas.

A third problem is developing as communities spill across county lines and make regional cooperation imperative. This is making itself apparent in the physical planning area. The organization of the Piedmont Crescent 2,000 Commission recognizes the fact that land development is no respecter of county lines. Regional cooperation in hospital planning has already developed in several areas and will develop in others. We may see in the future a recognition that

decentralization of industry has advantages in the overall development of an area, whereas at present each county desires maximum industrialization for itself.

A fourth problem of the large urban county lies in the necessity for developing rural-urban cooperation and communication. Urban growth patterns affect rural areas quite dramatically, not only through the effects of changing land uses on property values, but also through tax increases on rural as well as urban property to meet the cost of growth.

Finally, there is the problem of reorganization. Most large counties have already reorganized internally to meet the challenges ahead. They have county managers and county planning departments to provide centralized administration and long-range planning. Will there be a need for external reorganization, like city-county consolidation or "metro" government? In North Carolina, we do not have the overlapping and duplication of activities that have led to this kind of development elsewhere, and we may achieve the major advantages of consolidation merely through cooperation in planning between counties and municipalities.

RURAL COUNTY PROBLEMS

The small rural county has a different set of problems. More often than not, there is a decline in population, through small increases in town population will often partly offset the declining population of the rural areas. But size, more than population loss, presents the problem of providing adequate services with too few people to serve and too few taxpayers.

The schools may have too few students for a full curriculum geared to the needs and abilities of the students. The welfare department may have too few cases to justify the intensive services that some people require; child welfare service is a typical example. Many departments have too little work to justify the salaries demanded by highly trained people. And finally there is the limited tax base that must finance these services.

Some of these difficulties are being offset by multicounty operations, particularly in the health and library areas. Joint operations in other areas may follow. But the regional arrangement is easier in some cases than others, and problems arise where mountains or water add transportation difficulties. The problem of sufficient population must be solved, or the people in these smaller counties will suffer. Merger of counties is no answer, for merger itself can do little to overcome the problems presented by a scattered population.

A second problem faced by the small rural county is the need for industry and job opportunities. The competition, however, is terrific. There are some 14,000 communities in the United States engaged in the hunt for new industry, and industry continues to be attracted to the more populous areas where other business is succeeding.

A third problem may lie in reapportionment. Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions announcing the "one man, one vote" rule, unless changed by constitutional amendment, will mean loss of representation to many of the smaller counties. Legislative representation, certainly, has been one of the biggest single factors militating against merger of counties, and loss of representation could change the picture. Whether reapportionment itself will affect the direction of county government cannot be foretold.

One important problem that faces all counties is the necessity for obtaining and retaining sufficient competent personnel. In small counties, the salary problem is coupled with the necessity for finding people who want to live in smaller communities.

An additional problem lies in money. For

all counties will be faced with increased demands for services, and these demands will mean higher taxes. The one thing worse than higher taxes is the consequences of failure to meet the demands. If they are not met, people will turn to the State capitol and Washington for help. History tells us that there the call will be answered. Generally speaking, it has proved true that the demands for services are stronger than the demands for economy in government, and the greatest threat that faces county government in the years ahead is failing to provide what the people want and demand.

SIGNIFICANCE

If the problems are met, this itself will give a changing direction to county government. If the problems are not met, we can expect to see increased State and Federal activity, and this, too, will affect county government's direction.

One difficulty is that large counties are faced with different challenges from those of small counties. Large counties will need help from small counties in solving their problems, at least where legislation is needed. And small counties will need help from the large counties in financing expanding services to serve people who live in the rural areas and small towns.

As we look at the direction of county government, we can count ourselves fortunate that we do not face the problems of those States where one metropolitan area is dominant. Our more even spread of population in North Carolina is advantageous in that problems are more widely shared and understood.

But with the differences we do have, small counties and large counties can develop together. Working together, we can continue to build, and the direction of county government, like the direction of State and municipal government, will be in the tradition of good government.

A NEW CATHEDRAL FOR SITKA

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on behalf of the distinguished senior Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT], I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD a statement prepared by him concerning a new cathedral for Sitka.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR BARTLETT

On January 2, fire, spread by 15-mile-an-hour winds, swept a section of the city of Sitka in southeast Alaska. Before the fierce flames were extinguished, 2 churches and 11 buildings housing 21 businesses and 8 apartments were razed.

According to figures I have received, the loss in real and personal property was close to \$2 million. Perhaps a more important figure is the estimate of \$3.5 million put on rebuilding the burned-out section of Sitka. Insurance will cover only \$835,000 of the loss.

For Sitka, a small city, the loss is extensive. However, I am happy to report that residents led by Maj. John W. O'Connell, launched plans to rebuild their city almost immediately after the flames were put out. They will have the aid of the Small Business Administration, which already has declared the city eligible for disaster loans.

Robert E. Butler, SBA Alaska Director, and two aids, inspected the site of the fire the day after the tragedy. I know I speak for the people of Sitka when I say the speed with which the SBA investigated and acted was greatly appreciated.

But my principal purpose in speaking today is not to pay tribute to the courageous people of Sitka who are demonstrating the

January 14, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

199

private report to President Johnson was much more ominous about the future.

NOT THAT SIMPLE

The hawk-dove formula is a gross oversimplification of official Washington. And there are no known official doves who would cut and run.

But the hawk-dove formula today does describe roughly the views of those who, given today's facts, would proceed quite differently—those who would go all out for a military solution and those who would hold only what we have and play for time.

Within the next few days and weeks, after the President's state of the Union message and the end of the jet-borne diplomatic mission (both American and Soviet), the battle lines for the debate will be much clearer.

Response to the Mansfield report, however, already has shown the broad outlines.

GOP UNITY

Republican leaders, including Senator EVERETT DIRKSEN, Republican, of Illinois, whom the President has done so much to flatter and woo, have put their prestige behind the hawks who want total military victory before negotiations.

Democratic leaders are divided. Some of the conservative congressional committee chairmen, such as House Armed Services Chairman MENDEL RIVERS, Democrat, of South Carolina, would light the fuse, even if it leads to Peiping, if Hanoi does not back down immediately.

But other influential Democrats oppose further escalation and would, in fact, seek ways to deescalate, even unilaterally.

The value of the Mansfield report is that it states without flinching several facts that Johnson administration officials have conceded privately for some weeks but have been unwilling to spell out for the public.

These include:

The vast U.S. escalation of the war in Vietnam has failed to produce the original objectives—to reduce Communist military activity and to bring Hanoi to the conference table for a negotiated compromise settlement. Senator MANSFIELD says the Communists have matched the increased U.S. commitment.

Senator MANSFIELD estimates that the acceleration of Vietcong efforts is so great that it is doubtful the Saigon government can even hold what it has, let alone extend it, without a further augmentation of American forces on the ground.

The situation is already perilously close to where it will no longer be possible to retain the myth that it is a Vietnamese war. The mere weight of American involvement makes it an American war. Weekend reports from Saigon confirm this trend—the huge U.S. troop operation against the Vietcong's "iron triangle" was undertaken without even telling the South Vietnamese high military command anything about it.

After nearly a year of high-intensity bombing, both in the north and south, and bloody ground-fighting, the control of the country—measured by both terrain and population—is no better than it was early in 1965 when, Senator MANSFIELD discloses, the Saigon regime was about to collapse and sent an SOS to the United States for American ground troops.

Vietcong recruiting in the south continues to be successful. And the North Vietnamese—undeterred by our bombings—have doubled their infiltration rate and are expected to triple it to 4,500 per month soon. A high desertion rate in the South Vietnamese army continues and, Senator MANSFIELD warns, there is no chance of the South Vietnamese substantially increasing their regular forces much above the current 300,000 figure.

All the American military talk about the pro and con effects of the monsoon on the

military operations of both sides was a miscalculation and poor judgment. Senator MANSFIELD said the consequences of the monsoon were minor, if there were any at all.

Weekend news stories from Saigon quoting Air Force pilots achieving "excellent results" from large raids on the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos will be taken with a grain of salt by readers of Senator MANSFIELD's report. He says the trail is "not easily susceptible to aerial interdiction" because most of it is protected "by double canopies of jungle foliage."

Senator MANSFIELD's basic conclusion is the center of the debate—that there is "only a very slim prospect of a just settlement by negotiations" with the "alternative prospect of a continuance of the conflict in the direction of a general war on the Asian mainland," meaning war with Communist China.

Privately, many administration officials have agreed with that appraisal, if our military policy continues unchanged. In fact, some thing it is inevitable in the long run, and a few would argue the sooner the better.

Senator MANSFIELD warns that Asians, frequently portrayed by administration officials as wholeheartedly behind us, are most fearful of a United States-Chinese war, but recognize their "relative powerlessness" to influence the big events.

THE SIGN AT TASHKENT

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, Mr. Walter Lippmann, ever the journalist of substance and insight, has given us another profound statement on the meaning of the recent events at Tashkent. I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Lippmann's column, which was published in the Washington Post of January 13, 1966, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the column was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE SIGN AT TASHKENT

(By Walter Lippmann)

Death came to Shastri at a high moment in his life, and the grief which is worldwide is therefore lighted with the poetic grandeur of the circumstances. He did his best day's work and died in the evening when he had completed it. The world is the better for what was done in Tashkent. For mankind has needed badly to be shown that it is still possible to get on top of the intractable violence of human affairs.

None will suppose that peace has now been established. No doubt the way ahead will be full of trouble. Nevertheless, we have seen at Tashkent at least a part of the pattern of what might be the shape of things to come. The conflict between Pakistan and India could become a catastrophe for hundreds of millions of people. What we have been shown in Mr. Kosygin's mediation has been that the primary responsibility for making peace lies with those who are most directly concerned. The powers most directly concerned are those who are nearest to the conflict—Pakistan, India and the Soviet Union.

Mr. Kosygin was able to do what neither Mr. Wilson nor Mr. Johnson could have done. That is not because he is cleverer than they, but, in the last analysis, because he is nearer. Great Britain, in spite of the ties of the Commonwealth, has been helpless; the United States, in spite of its wealth and power, has been ineffective. The critical advantage of the Soviet Union has not been due to race, color, or culture, but to geography. The Soviet Union can talk with authority about peace in Asia because it is a power with an Asian frontier of thousands of miles.

I have come increasingly to think that the

cardinal defect of our own foreign policy in this century of the wars and disappointments and frustrations has been the pursuit of idealism separated from the geography of the world. The American globalist school of thought has dominated American strategic and diplomatic policy since 1917.

In that time we have fought and won two have always been too high minded to make peace after either of them. The globalists have always been too high-minded to make the compromises and concessions which are the essential ingredients of any peace settlement. Now we are engaged in a war which has no visible limits, and the reason given to us by our globalist leaders comes down to saying that we have appointed ourselves the guardians of the peace of the world.

Before the globalist illusion came upon us, we thought it was our business to define our vital interests and defend them. As against the gross self-delusion of globalism, there is the traditional realism which holds that a sound foreign policy is based on a careful and constant study of the geography of the world. This leads to the realization that American power cannot be equally effective all over the globe. A full understanding of this simple, self-evident, profound truth is the beginning of wisdom in foreign affairs.

Globalism is the thinking of those who have not learned the facts of life. They include the zealots of the world revolution who expect all mankind to imitate and follow them. They include also the idealists who have overreacted from their old isolationism and expect to enforce everywhere their own views of the moral law.

They cannot do that, and when they try to do it, the reality of things asserts itself and the reckoning cannot be long postponed.

POLITICAL LUXURIES

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD an editorial entitled "Political Luxuries," published in the Wall Street Journal of today, January 14, 1966.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

POLITICAL LUXURIES

"I have not come here tonight to ask for pleasant luxuries or for idle pleasures"—Lyndon B. Johnson in the state of the Union message.

In the sense that, but for Vietnam, the administration presumably would be asking for much more domestic spending, the President's claim of modest budgeting is correct. All the same, the programs he has sketched seem amply supplied with luxuries and pleasures for a time of grievous war.

Mr. Johnson argues that his civilian recommendations represent a sort of minimum that must be done for schoolchildren, the sick, and the poor. Any sacrifices required by war, he insists, must not come from cutting back on aid to those most in need.

It follows, then, that anyone who questions this huge spending on the homefront is a monster of hardheartedness. The unfortunate fact nonetheless is that the projects the Government has embarked on and now wants to expand are not necessarily in the interests of those they are supposed to help. In some cases, like the notorious business of urban renewal dispossessing the poor, they are injurious.

Consider the so-called war on poverty, which the President asks Congress not only to continue but to speed up. At present it is a costly and wasteful chaos which benefits politicians but scarcely the poor. Instead of a speedup it needs a pause for an examination of its faults and to see why it is being run so badly.

For another example of good governmental management, look at Mr. Johnson's remarkable plea for a new Department of Transportation—because, as he puts it, the existing structure of no less than 35 agencies, spending \$5 billion a year, is practically incapable of serving the Nation's needs. No institution except Government could get away with failure on that grand scale.

What would benefit the people, including the poor (and the poor taxpayer) is Federal austerity to reduce the danger of a serious inflationary outbreak. Here, too, in implying that the forthcoming budget will be noninflationary, the Government appears on weak ground; the President himself suggests so when he warns we must all increase our vigilance against inflation.

The budget forecast is for fiscal 1967 spending of nearly \$113 billion, a staggering drain on the economy. But with the hope that revenues will reach \$111 billion the anticipated deficit is "only" \$1.8 billion as compared with much higher earlier estimates.

The revenue expectation may well be unduly optimistic and will prove wildly optimistic if the economy should slow down just a bit or fail to expand between now and the end of the period 18 months hence. Accept the revenue figure at face value and it still depends on rescinding the excise tax cuts put in effect only at the beginning of this year and on various gimmicks such as accelerating corporate tax payments.

Even if they were not excessively expensive and inflationary, the administration's plans rest on an intellectual confusion that Federal outlays are good for your soul as well as your body.

"A great nation is one which breeds a great people," says Mr. Johnson. "A great people flower not from wealth and power but from a society which spurs them to the fullness of their genius * * *. This year we must continue to improve the quality of American life."

In practice, though, that noble dream turns out to have very little to do with quality; it is, and in the nature of government must be, almost wholly quantitative and materialistic. Doling out dollars does not automatically make education better, and certainly it does not spur people to the fullness of their genius. The hand of Government pressing down everywhere is more likely to demean the quality of life, including the precious quality of individual liberty.

We agree with the President that this Nation is strong enough to fight in Vietnam and do what is necessary at home. It is difficult to agree that all the proposed domestic spending is necessary, wise or effective. And there can be no guarantee of continued strength if the Government persists in indulging in the political pleasures of handouts and the exorbitant luxury of inflation.

RENEWAL OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, today marking the 83 years since the establishment of the Civil Service Commission, the Honorable John W. Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, delivered an address on "The Renewal of the Government Service."

This excellent address commemorated the 83 years of the merit system service in the U.S. Government. It preceded the awards for distinguished service of Civil Service Commission employees.

Secretary Gardner emphasized that the duty of the career service was not only to search out the gifted young people of our schools and colleges for recruitment into Government service, but

to continue their growth and education and qualifications after formal education ceases.

All organizations of our society today are competing desperately to get their share of the flow of talent—

Secretary Gardner said—

but few are developing that talent properly after they get it.

I commend this excellent speech to the attention of the Congress, and ask unanimous consent to have it printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RENEWAL OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE
(By John W. Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare)

We are here to commemorate an important beginning and to honor a fine tradition. The civil service is one of our noblest social institutions and I am proud to have a part in this tribute to it.

But I have learned from long experience that it is not really necessary to congratulate institutions. They have built-in mechanisms for self-congratulation that are marvelously effective. Having participated intimately in the life of Government agencies, the military services, business firms, and universities, I feel that I can make that generalization on the basis of fairly comprehensive experience.

So I am going to honor the civil service by talking about the goals ahead rather than the laurels already won.

First, let me clear away some general questions. Is the Federal Government bureaucratic? It is indeed. But so are business firms, colleges and universities, the military services, State and local governments, and philanthropic organizations.

Is the Federal Government in danger of going to seed? It is in the gravest danger. But so are all other organizations large and small.

I think most of you know my views on the decay and renewal of organizations.

Briefly, I believe that most human organizations that fail in their missions or fall short of their goals do so not because of stupidity, not because of faulty doctrines, but because of the internal decay and rigidification to which they are all subject. They get stiff in the joints. They get in a rut. They go to seed.

I know that many of you are familiar with my diagnosis of what brings that condition about. So I am going to limit myself today to a few brief comments on what I regard as the most important single line of therapy for moribund organizations.

Organizations go to seed when the people in them go to seed. And they awaken when the people awaken. The renewal of organizations and societies starts with people. And since the first and last business of the civil service is people, this seems an appropriate occasion to examine the problem.

Specifically, I want to talk about what the Federal Government does to develop talent—after recruitment. Recruitment itself is worthy of discussion, and there is a vastly better job to be done on that front, but that is not the problem that interests me at the moment.

As a society, we are pursuing energetically, almost feverishly, the identification and nurture of gifted young people in our schools and colleges. In contrast, we are quite haphazard about the provisions for their continuing growth after formal education ceases. Almost all organizations in our society today are competing desperately to get their share of the flow of talent. But few are developing that talent properly after they get it.

The still untapped source of human vitality, the real unmined reservoir of talent is in those people already recruited and thereafter neglected.

The quickest and most effective road to renewal of the Federal service is the mining of that untapped resource. It is not only a means of tapping unused talent and opening up new stores of vitality, it is a solution to the old, old problem of developing a government service that is responsive—responsibly responsive—to changing top leadership. Vital people, using their gifts to the full, are naturally responsive. People who have stopped growing, defeated people, people who no longer have confidence in the use of their own powers, build bastions of procedure between themselves and any vital leadership.

Now, how does one go about renewing the people in the Government service—or anywhere else for that matter? There are many sources of renewal, of course. One is the uninvited crisis. Wars and depressions bring a certain amount of renewal, though the price is far higher than sensible people are willing to pay.

Another source is challenge and competition, and in this respect our Constitution has built-in provisions for the renewal of elected officials. But appointive officials, not facing the challenge of an election, are denied that stimulus.

Another source of renewal is rapid growth. Very rapid expansion of an agency is apt to have a highly stimulating effect upon the people within it.

Still another source of renewal is the sheer vitality of top leadership. I think, for example, that President Johnson has been as vigorous, if not cyclonic, a force for renewal as we have seen in this Government.

But what about the more mundane things that good government administrators can do to renew their organizations? What about the good personnel practices and procedures that will insure renewal? I'm going to give you an oversimplified answer, but an oversimplification based on having observed the personnel field with a professional eye for 30 years.

I am going to assert that the best means of inducing growth, developing talent, and insuring continued vitality in the individual is change. The change may take many forms—a change of troubles, a change of assignment, promotion, living in different parts of the country, moving in and out of Government, sampling the different worlds that make up this society, serving abroad, serving in an organization that is itself rapidly changing.

It follows, I believe, that the single condition that would contribute most to greater vitality in the Government service today is flexibility of reassignment. In his state of the Union message, President Johnson pledged bold leadership to bring this about.

The size of the Federal Establishment and the diversity of activities it encompasses offer unexampled opportunities for imaginative reassignment. With such an array of possibilities it is unforgivable that any reasonably competent Government servant should suffer in a job that does not suit his talents.

It is unforgivable that any Government servant should lack the stimulus to personal growth that comes with change. The individual should be allowed to move and the agency should be allowed to move him without damage to his status or his feelings.

Free, frequent, and fluid movement among all the agencies of Government should be the accepted rule. The ambitious or merely restless young person who wants to sample several different lines of work should not be punished or penalized. Restlessness and vitality go together. And especially promising young people should be systematically reassigned through several agencies to insure their growth.