that his gross rate shall not be less by more than $2,200 than the highest gross rate paid to any other employee of the Committee: and (3) with the prior consent of the heads of the departments or agencies concerned, and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to utilize the reimbursable services, information, facilities, and personnel of any of the departments or agencies of the Government.

SEC. 3. Expenses of the special subcommittee under this resolution, which shall not exceed $100,000, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the special subcommittee.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. BYRD of Virginia:

Editorial entitled "Airport Congestion," printed in the Loudoun Times-Mirror, of Leesburg, Va., on September 15, 1966.

Article entitled "The Effects of Planned, Mass Disobedience of Our Laws," written by Hon. Charles E. Whittaker, former Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and published in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin of September 1966.

By Mr. THURMOND:

Editorial entitled "Damaged Document," written by Editor W. D. Workman, Jr., published in the State newspaper, in Columbia, S.C., September 17, 1966.

LIMITATION ON STATEMENTS DURING TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that statements in connection with routine morning business be limited to 3 minutes, but that an exception be made in the case of the distinguished Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON].

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PRAYER IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, our schools here in America, as well as their counterparts in Europe, had their origin as offsprings of the church. The first schools in America were the fruits of the Protestant revolt in Europe.

Many Europeans, unable to realize their ideals of life and worship in their homelands, came to America, where they settled and began life anew. Many religious congregations, most of them embracing some form of Protestantism, left Europe and came as groups to America. Naturally, they brought with them their European ideas about religion and the education of their children. These ideas were to give a European background to the beginnings of American education.

Education was given serious attention by these early religious groups. Their chief aim was to train their young for righteous living, as they interpreted it, and to perpetuate an educated ministry for their congregations.

The early schools in America were clearly the instruments of religion. The story of how our schools have been gradually changed to instruments of the State is a long one indeed. The early religious leaders in America felt a moral obligation to educate their children. They apparently felt that there was no harm in appealing to the State, which was then their servant, to assist in compelling parents to observe their obligations.

There are those who assume that old relationships must be terminated simply because new trends and changes usher in new relationships and designate new points of emphasis. This is fallacious reasoning.

Granted our modern schools train the child physically, emotionally, and socially, as well as intellectually. But this does not preclude the preservation of positive moral and religious training which at one time characterized all education in this country.

In the early American schools, religion was not merely a part of the curriculum. Religion was the curriculum. Such an emphasis, to the neglect of everything else, would be absurd in our modern public schools. But is it not equally as absurd to completely eliminate religion from the curriculum?

Some spokesmen today seem to be endeavoring to convince us that freedom of religion means freedom from religion. Some would have use believe that separation of church and state means the abolition of all religion from civic undertakings.

Separation of church and state does not preclude religion, because no state can truly prosper unless its officials are motivated by religious ideals and purposes.

Civil government is the logical outgrowth of religion, and the religion of a nation determines the character of its government. Our civil liberties can be secured only by holding fast to the basic tenets of God's word.

We can realize our national ambitions and goals for our schools, our homes, our churches, and for ourselves as individuals only in loyalty and dedication to the religiously oriented ideals upon which our Nation was founded.

For our country was truly founded on belief in God as the giver of man's unalienable rights. It grew to greatness upon that foundation. "In God we trust" is a part of our country's past and should be a part of its future. With such a religious heritage and history, today's Americans surely must recognize the justification of expressions of faith in God in our many institutions.

VIETNAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, this afternoon the United Nations embarks on the 21st meeting of its General Assembly. There are just under 100 matters on the agenda, but one matter which is not listed is Vietnam—a subject in the minds of all the delegates to the United Nations, a subject in the minds of all Americans, including the President of the United States, and a subject very much, in my opinion, in the minds of the peoples of the world.

Of late, there have been a number of appeals for renewed effort to end the Vietnamese conflict via the path of negotiations. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. U Thant, for example, has been eloquent in his call for a new perspective. Indeed, the struggle in Vietnam ought to be seen in terms of the enormous and bloody human pain which is being inflicted on combatants and noncombatants in that country, rather than in the painless and sanitized detachment of a football field on which two ideologies clash. For similar reasons, Pope Paul VI has urged a redoubling of efforts to achieve a settlement by negotiations, and he has coupled an expression of human compassion with a warning to call a halt to the rising tide of conflict before it is too late to turn back, not only for Vietnam but also for all of Asia and the entire world.

Other informed persons have added their voices to the deepening concern over the trends of the war. Prominent among those is Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., a former special assistant to the late President Kennedy and to President Johnson. Mr. Schlesinger, writing in the New York Times magazine of September 18, addresses himself to the Vietnam dilemma in an article entitled "The Middle Way Out in Vietnam." Mr. Schlesinger looks back over the years of the Vietnamese involvement, not in a search for scapegoats, but rather with the eyes of the historian and in an honest and frank search for a new approach. He is persuaded that it is not in the interest of any nation and, perhaps, least of all, in the interest of the United States to extend the war deeper into Asia. But he is also convinced that it is not possible for the United States to walk off abruptly and forget the whole business. He urges, therefore, a new approach which will correspond to these dual national realities. In a sentence he calls for a new strategy of deescalation of military activity, coupled with political initiatives in South Vietnam which are aimed at conciliation of the people of that region with a government in Saigon rather than the domination of the Saigon government over the people of the region.

It is an essential of this approach, indeed, of any reasonable approach that there be a renewed effort to initiate negotiations with whomever may be necessary to bring the actual fighting to a halt. In the latter connection, it would be well to recall the three points which U Thant has stated are essential for the creation of "conditions conducive to the holding of a conference and conducive to the creating of conditions for a peaceful settlement of the problem in Vietnam."

First. An end to the bombing of North Vietnam;

Second. Reduction of all military activities in South Vietnam leading to a cease-fire on all sides;

Third. Willingness on all sides to enter into discussions with all who are actually engaged in the fighting.

There is, in my judgment, nothing in those points which is inconsistent with what the President of the United States has indicated he is prepared to do in the search for a just peace through negotia-

tions. It would be my hope that U Thant, now that he has agreed to remain as Secretary General of the United Nations for this session, will go beyond the simple articulation of these three points and into specific recommendations to the parties concerned. In short, Mr. President, I would urge the Secretary General to set forth a timetable and a step-by-step procedure for the initiation of negotiations and request this Nation and all others involved in Vietnam to follow it.

COMMITTEE MEETING DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare be permitted to meet during the session of the Senate today.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, objection has been lodged with the minority leader. I object.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Objection is heard.

On request of Mr. KUCHEL, and by unanimous consent, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs was authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

AMENDMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, RELATING TO DEDUCTION OF CERTAIN EXPENSES BY TEACHERS

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I am introducing, for appropriate reference, a bill to correct inequities in rulings by the Internal Revenue Service regarding tax deductions of teachers for educational expenses.

The mail I am receiving, Mr. President, indicates that these rulings have worked a hardship on many teachers in Nebraska at a time when this Nation and its Government profess to be placing new emphasis on educational quality.

Teacher training and preparation are fundamental requirements of improved education, far more important than the bricks and mortar which provide the place for teaching. This has been true through the years and it is still true today.

The Nation is experiencing a critical teacher shortage this fall from coast to coast. I have read articles citing statistics placing much of the blame for this on the Federal Government. We must take steps to encourage qualified teachers to improve their skills and remain in the profession. We must encourage them to work to improve their station in life and thereby the quality of the education provided for our children.

Under the Internal Revenue Service regulations, money spent for education is deductible on individual income tax returns if the expenditure is made to maintain or improve skills required in the taxpayer's job, trade or business or if it is required by the employer as a condition of retaining the taxpayer's job, salary, or status.

This has been interpreted by the IRS to mean that teachers are not entitled to the deductions if they return to college voluntarily, without being forced or required to do so. The deductions are not allowed teachers who go back to school merely to become better teachers or to improve their station in life or increase their salaries.

I believe, Mr. President, that our Government should encourage teachers to act on their own initiative, in the American free-enterprise way, to improve their status.

The bill I am introducing will allow teachers to deduct as business expenses educational expenses connected in any way with their work.

One group particularly hard hit by the IRS rulings, Mr. President, are persons preparing themselves for college teaching. The national effort to improve higher education needs all the encouragement it can get, and this bill would help on an individual basis.

The bill would eliminate the doubt and confusion that now exists by writing into the Internal Revenue Code certain provisions now left entirely to administrative regulations. No longer would teachers have to live under the threat that there might be a technical slip-up in reporting their income and deductions for tax purposes, causing them to run afoul of the Internal Revenue Service. No longer would they have to be threatened with the loss of their job before they could deduct the expenses of furthering their education in order to improve the education available to the children they teach.

This bill is offered in the sincere interest of improving education and clarifying tax deduction policies for teachers, Mr. President, and it should have broad support.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 3840) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow teachers to deduct from gross income the expenses incurred in pursuing courses for academic credit and degrees at institutions of higher education and including certain travel, introduced by Mr. CURTIS, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Finance.

AMENDMENT OF FIRE AND CASUALTY ACT AND THE MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, 3 weeks ago, just prior to the Labor Day recess, the Senate debated H.R. 9918, a bill to protect the residents of the District of Columbia from insolvent uninsured motorists. The Senate was unable to complete action on the bill at that time, because we lacked a quorum to do so. However, I am hopeful that now the Senate will be able to complete its action on H.R. 9918.

This is purely a local District of Columbia bill, but one which it is our duty to pass as the legislature for the District of Columbia and one which is essential, of Congress is going to fulfill its legislative duty to the District of Columbia to protect its residents' safety and welfare.

As I explained in the debate on the bill prior to the Labor Day recess, the parliamentary situation we face in considering this legislation is a rather unique one. H.R. 9918 was passed in the House over the objections of the leadership of the House District Committee. It is a much better bill than that committee reported. It is the only adequate bill considered by either House in this session of Congress to protect the victims of insolvent uninsured motorists.

Because the bill was passed over the objections of the leadership of the House committee, the word is out that if the Senate amends the bill by so much as changing a comma, and the bill must go back to the House, it will die there. It will die there not just for this session, but for the indefinite future because the leadership of the House District Committee is adamantly opposed to this legislation.

So in the debate prior to the Labor Day recess, I asked Senators who had amendments to this legislation to withhold them until we got the bill on the books. For to amend this legislation is not to improve it. It is to kill it.

For that reason, in the pre-Labor Day recess debate, I volunteered that immediately upon reconvening next January, I would, as chairman of the District of Columbia Subcommittee on Business and Commerce, hold prompt hearings and executive consideration of these amendments and report them to the Senate for action.

When this guarantee proved insufficient to the sponsors of the various amendments to this bill, I volunteered to hold hearings and executive sessions on the amendments during the pendency of the civil rights debate in order to report them during this session.

This guarantee also fell short of what was desired by the proponents of the amendments.

Now if I understand the proponents of the amendments accurately, they seek essentially four amendments to this bill.

First, they wish to have the uninsured motorist clause, required by H.R. 9918 to be inserted in every policy of automobile liability insurance issued in the District of Columbia, carry with it the right of rejection on the part of the policyholder.

Second, they wish to have residents of the District of Columbia whose cars, under District of Columbia law, are legitimately registered and licensed elsewhere brought under the protection of the bill.

Third, they also seek an amendment to include under the protection of the act out-of-State pedestrians who are injured in the District by insolvent uninsured motorists who have cars registered in the District of Columbia.

Fourth, they wish the bill to specifically spell out that any State with a similar fund which provides reciprocity for District of Columbia residents injured in that State will be entitled to similiar protection for its citizens when they are in the District of Columbia.

I have no basic objecion to these amendments. I think none of them are likely to jeopardize the solvency of the uninsured motorist fund created by this bill. However, as I have so frequently

some said, a sleepy town. Today it is a bustling city with the fastest growth record of any city in the Nation, and it is the center of America's rocket and space effort. The Huntsville area, with the space center and Redstone Arsenal, is a section which no visitor to Alabama ought to miss.

Good highways traverse this entire area. It is a pleasure to drive in Alabama. In many sections along the river the traveler can see the lakes without leaving the highway, but I suggest a stop for a more leisurely view of this Tennessee Valley country.

So this is another part of a great State. I invite you to see it, and to see all of Alabama. I promise you that you will enjoy a visit to this State in the heart of the Deep South.

THE VISTA VOLUNTEERS OF HAWAII

Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, the State of Hawaii has an unusually large number of VISTA volunteers working in various communities throughout the United States.

One of these VISTA volunteers is a former resident of Kauai, Hawaii, who is now serving in Fairbanks, Alaska. The Honolulu Star-Bulletin recently described her activities in this community which is so far from her former home.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, July 7, 1966]

EX-KAUAIAN VISTA WORKER IN FAIRBANKS—GETTING USED TO COLD

The sole V.I.S.T.A. worker in Fairbanks, Alaska, is a former islander—Mrs. Billie Smith.

Mrs. Smith, a widow, used to live on Kauai.

Since her two sons are in college, she decided to "do something." The "something" she decided on was joining V.I.S.T.A. (Volunteers in Service to America).

In Fairbanks, Mrs. Smith has a multi-pronged job of being adviser-big sister-teacher-pal to young village girls who come to the city for schooling or to take jobs.

Headquartered at Hospitality House, a home away from home for these girls, she helps them to adapt to city living.

VISITS JAILS

In addition, she works with young girls who began as bar girls, eventually got into difficulty and landed in jail.

She visits the girls in their cells, brings them books and helps them to find jobs once they're released.

Mrs. Smith has been teaching them to sew and instructing them in nutrition and homemaking skills.

She pointed out that alcoholism, delinquency and unwed motherhood are grave problems in Fairbanks, as they are elsewhere.

BUSY AS BEAVER

She admitted missing the warm beaches and lush gardens of Kauai, but noted she's getting used to Alaska's sub-zero weather and learning to like moose meat, caribou steak and "squaw candy" (dried smoked salmon).

Asked whether she gets lonely there, she replied: "Lonely? I've been so busy I haven't a chance to think about it."

She hopes to open a dressmaking shop to provide jobs for some of the girls.

After her year with V.I.S.T.A., she said, "my sons and I have talked about starting a home for boys. Sort of a Boys' Town idea. If we do, my year with V.I.S.T.A. will be invaluable."

A MIDDLE WAY OUT OF VIETNAM

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I had scarcely finished reading Richard Goodwin's call for a united citizens front against a wider war in Vietnam when I came across a most important article authorized by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in last Sunday's New York Times magazine, September 18, 1966.

Mr. Schlesinger, like Goodwin, a former White House assistant to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, is one of the Nation's ablest historians. His article presents a most carefully reasoned case against the administration's continuous enlargement of the Vietnam war—followed by an appeal for a new effort to negotiate an end to the fighting.

Writes Mr. Schlesinger:

Are the only alternatives widening the war or disorderly and humilitiating withdrawal? Surely, our statesmanship is not yet this bankrupt. I think a middle course is still possible if there were the will to pursue it. And this course must begin with a decision to stop widening and Americanizing the war.

I believe it is a matter of national concern when two top-level former White House advisers with the recognized ability of Richard Goodwin and Arthur Schlesinger appeal on successive days for a halt in the growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam. These are tough minded, realistic thinkers who have seen administration policy being shaped from the inside but who have had the opportunity in recent months for thoughtful reflection free from official pressures. I believe their sobering words of this past weekend deserve the most careful consideration.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Schlesinger's superb article be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was order to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times Magazine, Sept. 18, 1966]

SCHLESINGER SUGGESTS THAT WE RECOVER OUR COOL AND FOLLOW A MIDDLE WAY OUT OF VIETNAM

(By Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.)

Why we are in Vietnam is today a question of only historical interest. We are there, for better or for worse, and we must deal with the situation that exists. Our national security may not have compelled us to draw a line across Southeast Asia where we did, but, having drawn it, we cannot lightly abandon it. Our stake in South Vietnam may have been self-created, but it has nonetheless become real. Our precipitate withdrawal now would have ominous reverberations throughout Asia. Our commitment of over 300,000 American troops, young men of exceptional skill and gallantry engaged in cruel and difficult warfare, measures the magnitude of our national concern.

We have achieved this entanglement, not after due and deliberate consideration, but through a series of small decisions. It is not only idle but unfair to seek out guilty men. President Eisenhower, after rejecting American military intervention in 1954, set in motion the policy of support for Saigon which resulted, two Presidents later, in American military intervention in 1965. Each step in the deepening of the American commitment was reasonably regarded at the time as the last that would be necessary; yet, in retrospect, each step led only to the next, until we find ourselves entrapped today in that nightmare of American strategists, a land war in Asia—a war which no President, including President Johnson, desired or intended. The Vietnam story is a tragedy without villains. No thoughtful American can withhold sympathy as President Johnson ponders the gloomy choices which lie ahead.

Yet each President, as he makes his choices, must expect to be accountable for them. Everything in recent weeks—the actions of the Administration, the intimations of actions to come, even a certain harshness in the Presidential rhetoric—suggests that President Johnson has made his choice, and that his choice is the careful enlargement of the war. New experiments in escalation are first denied, then disowned, then discounted and finally undertaken. As past medicine fails, all we can apparently think to do is to increase the dose. In May the Secretary of the Air Force explained why we were not going to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong; at the end of June we began the strikes against the oil depots. The demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam has been used by North Vietnam units for years, but suddenly we have begun to bomb it.

When such steps work no miracles—and it is safe to predict that escalation will be no more decisive in the future than it has been in the past—the demand will arise for "just one more step." Plenty of room remains for widening the war: the harbors of North Vietnam, the irrigation dikes, the steel plants, the factories, the power grid, the crops, the civilian population, the Chinese border. The fact that we excluded such steps yesterday is, alas, no guarantee that we will not pursue them tomorrow. And if bombing will not bring Ho Chi Minh to his knees or stop his support of the Vietcong in South Vietnam, there is always the last resort of invasion. General Ky has already told us that we must invade North Vietnam to win the war. In his recent press conference, the Secretary of State twice declined to rule out this possibility.

The theory, of course, is that widening the war will shorten it. This theory appears to be based on three convictions: first, that the war will be decided in North Vietnam; second, that the risk of Chinese or Soviet entry is negligible, and third, that military "victory" in some sense is possible. Perhaps these premises are correct, and in another year or two we may all be saluting the wisdom and statesmanship of the American Government. In so inscrutable a situation, no one can be confident about his doubt and disagreement. Nonetheless, to many Americans these propositions constitute a terribly shaky basis for action which has already carried the United States into a ground war in Asia and which may well carry the world to the brink of the third world war.

The illusion that the war in South Vietnam can be decided in North Vietnam is evidently a result of listening too long to our own propaganda. Our Government has insisted so often that the war in Vietnam is a clear-cut case of aggression across frontiers that it has come to believe itself that the war was started in Hanoi and can be stopped there. "The war," the Secretary of State has solemnly assured us, "is clearly an 'armed attack,' cynically and systematically mounted by the Hanoi regime against the people of South Vietnam."

Yet the best evidence is that the war began as an insurrection within South Vietnam which, as it has gathered momentum, has attracted increasing support and direction

States it lacked the stabilizing force of tradition, probably because it was largely the product of an academic gold rush. As the university in the last decade burgeoned in size, with new departments, new centers, and new institutes, there came forward a whole new academic generation, shaped in the post-World War II period, with values which reflected that age of mobility and achievable wealth. The new university was virtually ahistorical, with few roots in the past; in the social sciences especially there was no sense of a continuity with the work of predecessors. Departments were riven by severe conflicts of generations, of personalities and politics—certainly nothing new in academic life. But perhaps only on a campus which had lost sight of scholarly dignity, honor, and courtesy could these episodes of ugly competitiveness and naked hostility have resounded so shockingly.

Berkeley, indeed, is the first "political university" in the United States. This is a development of the highest significance. For the first time the intellectual class of the United States is undertaking to enter politics directly, and to offer to the electorate, through the agency of faculty-student activists, something akin to an Intellectuals' Party. During the spring of 1966 in Berkeley, almost all faculty-student activism converged around the candidacy in the Democratic congressional primary of Robert Scheer, who, running on a platform of militant opposition to the Vietnam war, nearly defeated the liberal incumbent; he carried Berkeley by 14,625 votes to 12,165, but lost in the district as a whole, receiving 28,751 votes against the victor's 35,270. Robert Scheer is a typical product of the Berkeley student movement. In 1961, while a graduate student in economics, he was an editor and founder of a magazine of the New Left, Root and Branch.

"The college left," he wrote at that time in a vocabulary which had ugly connotations, "consists of a few thousand cultural freaks. Its membership is weighted heavily to New York Jews, children of older generation radicals, and Bohemians. For reasons of culture, personality, or choice, they are generally impervious to the normal rewards and concerns of American society." Because the intellectuals were alienated from society, he wrote, they clung to the university—"the University is 'home'; this is the world we understand, and the other one frightens the hell out of us."

Scheer was pro-Castro, anti-John Kennedy, and mildly pornopolitical. His studies came to grief. He grew a shaggy, Castro-like beard, and went to work as a salesman for the famed literary center, City Lights Bookshop, in San Francisco. Subsequently, the System, through the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, published a paper by him on Vietnam. He spoke at teach-ins, and according to V.D.C. spokesmen, during the mass demonstration in the Berkeley streets on the night of October 15 supported the breaching of the Oakland police formation. He had been using for some time the rhetoric of a seizure of power by the Oakland poor. Then he became a candidate for Congress. He trimmed his beard so that he looked like a New England whaling captain, and began to wear a bourgeois jacket, as befitted a well-groomed congressional candidate. Student and faculty activists gave time and money to the Scheer campaign. They availed themselves of all techniques, from exhaustive precinct work to demagogy and sexagogy. One day they brought a leading San Francisco go-go dancer to the Lower Plaza to lure the students into politics. She danced for the multitude, but embarrassed her sponsors by telling a reporter that she didn't know who Robert Scheer was.

The New Intellectual class in Berkeley is feeling its way toward a technique for exerting political power through a variety of devices—stopping troop trains, massive demonstrations open-ended toward illegality, and the more staid political primaries. And, of course, the university is in the strange position of being the "staging area" for all these actions. Two demonstrations, of October 15 and November 20, though in large part composed of non-students, assembled and marched from the university grounds. Public criticism indeed moved the chancellor to an agreement with the Berkeley authorities that he would henceforth deny the university grounds to illegal parades. This constituted a welcome departure from the unrestricted Faculty Resolution of December 8. The faculty counterposed no objection. The administration, however, never undertook a straightforward discussion with the students of the inadequacies of December 8. Rather, it rendered a continuing obeisance to the resolution, thereby always providing a basis for students' charges of "bad faith."

A great institution like Berkeley has, however, tremendous resources for recovery of integrity. It is likely that the moderate studentry will eventually assert itself and terminate the hegemony of the non-students on Sproul Plaza. The non-students themselves are an unpredictable segment; Berkeley might cease to be the fashion, and the guerrilla warriors would go elsewhere. Yet meanwhile the possibility remains of troubled days. The virus of violence is strong in Berkeley; in the spring the headquarters of the V.D.C. near the university was bombed and shattered beyond repair. To be sure, the V.D.C. itself included many who advocated or justified the rise of terrorism. But it was remarkable how little concern was shown by the Berkeley community.

In the last reckoning the problem of Berkeley is the problem of the American intellectual class itself, its sudden power, affluence, influence, and immaturity. Here was the largest aggregation of intellectual force in the United States, yet its dealings with basic political issues were often deflected by a congeries of slogans, fantasies, rancors. A whole group of vaguely conformist leftists were now enjoying a vicarious ideological fling in the form of the New Student Left. A cult of youth swept over faculty activists; somehow youth's idealism over faculty activists; somehow youth's idealism must have history on its side, even if it went wrong in particular instances. One could not help remembering that German professors in the nineteen thirties had apologized for their Nazi students in precisely this way, with precisely this faith in the redeeming sincerity of youth. One also remembered the American fellow-traveling professors of the thirties who had underwritten the idealistic Communist commitment of their students; the Berkeley Faculty Activists were their living replicas, using the same words, expressions, and arguments. Many professors were particularly affected by accusations of hypocritical inactivism, especially when such charges came from their students. The intellectual is as susceptible to fashions as any other part of the community, and intellectual fashions are insidious in a way others are not. To fall behind the vanguard is a kind of spiritual death for the intellectual. Thus the old men and the middle-aged men in Berkeley were curiously adrift, and failed to supply that balancing principle, that measure of experience, which was the duty of their years.

In this sense, the problem of Berkeley is the problem of the American intellectual class. As it grows in power and numbers, wooed alike by the government, foundations, the publishing world, industry, and the universities, it demands for itself the privileges and prerogatives of a third chamber of government. It demands that governmental officials be especially accountable to it as the guardians of intellect and knowledge. Yet it has scarcely shown itself to possess the character which its pretensions would require.

The twentieth century has shown how the intellectual class can become a primary force for an assault on democratic institutions, and we may yet witness this phenomenon in America disguised under such slogans as "participatory democracy." Bernard Shaw remarks that the most tragic thing in the world is a man of genius who is not also a man of character. This in a sense has been the collective tragedy of Berkeley.

INVITATION TO VISIT THE QUAD CITIES AREA OF ALABAMA AND THE TENNESSEE VALLEY

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, some weeks ago I mentioned the Helen Keller home at Tuscumbia, Ala., as one of the attractions which tourists ought to see in a tour of the Deep South country. I repeat the invitation to see Ivy Green, where Helen Keller began the training which overcame handicaps and set an example for people everywhere, but I would like to enlarge the invitation to include the whole Quad City area on both sides of the Tennessee River at Muscle Shoals.

I was reminded of this a few days ago when I crossed and recrossed the bridge between Florence and Sheffield and looked at the palisades along the Tennessee, a magnificent sheer cliff rising hundreds of feet above the waters of the river. This is beautiful country, but it is more than that.

This is the place which inspired TVA, a model of regional resource development for the entire world. This is the place at which the dangerous and treacherous Muscle Shoals in former days stopped steamboat traffic on the Tennessee River. It is the site of Wilson Dam, initial dam in the TVA complex of dams and powerhouses. This dam now has one of the highest single-lift locks in the world. Wilson Dam is a great tourist attraction.

This is the place from which Henry Ford envisioned a 75-mile-long industrial city, a vision which has come to pass in the Huntsville-Decatur-Quad Cities complex of great industrial plants—chemicals, shipbuilding, synthetic fibers, milling textiles, aluminum, and the new electronic space industries. Between the industries the wide Tennessee River lakes behind the dams offer wildlife refuge areas, boat-launching ramps, State parks, good motels, and many recreational opportunities. I recommend this entire area of the State.

At Decatur, the Ford idea has been realized for a dozen or more miles along the river, with handsome industrial buildings rising along the banks of the Tennessee River. An interesting landmark here is the old State bank, built almost a century and a half ago, a simple but handsome Greek building. A short distance from Decatur, on the north side of the river, is Mooresville, one of Alabama's oldest towns. It is famous for its fine ante bellum homes.

On up the river there are the great lakes extending past Guntersville and Scottsboro to the Tennesse line, but before one gets to this water playground area, there is Huntsville—my hometown—which I remember as a small and,

from the north. Even today the North Vietnamese regulars in South Vietnam amount to only a fraction of the total enemy force (and to an even smaller fraction of the American army in South Vietnam). We could follow the genial prescription of General LeMay and bomb North Vietnam back to the Stone Age—and the war would still go on in South Vietnam. To reduce this war to the simplification of a wicked regime molesting its neighbors, and to suppose that it can be ended by punishing the wicked regime, is surely to misconceive not only the political but even the military character of the problem.

As for the assurances that China will not enter, these will be less than totally satisfying to those whose memory stretches back to the Korean War. General MacArthur, another one of those military experts on Oriental psychology, when asked by President Truman on Wake Island in October 1950, what the chances were of Chinese intervention, replied, "Very little. . . .Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter." Such reasoning lay behind the decision (the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs at that time is Secretary of State today) to send American troops across the 38th Parallel despite warnings from Peking that this would provoke a Chinese response. In a few weeks, China was actively in the war, and, while there was the greatest slaughter, it was not notably of the Chinese.

There seems little question that the Chinese have no great passion to enter the war in Vietnam. They do not want to put their nuclear plants in hazard; and, in any case, their foreign policy has typically been a compound of polemical ferocity and practical prudence. But the leaders in Peking are no doubt just as devoted students of Munich as the American Secretary of State. They are sure that we are out to bury them; they believe that appeasement invites further aggression; and, however deep their reluctance, at some point concern for national survival will make them fight.

When will that point be reached? Probably when they are confronted by a direct threat to their frontier, either through bombing or through an American decision to cross the 17th Parallel and invade North Vietnam. If a Communist regime barely established in Peking could take a decision to intervene against the only atomic power in the world in 1950, why does anyone suppose that a much stronger regime should flinch from that decision in 1966? Indeed, given the present discord in Peking, war may seem the best way to renew revolutionary discipline, stop the brawling and unite the nation.

It is true that the Chinese entry into the Korean War had at least the passive support of the Soviet Union; but it would be risky today to rely on the Sino-Soviet split to save us from everything, including Soviet aid to China in case of war with the United States or even direct Soviet entry into the war in Vietnam. For the Soviet Union is already extensively involved in Vietnam—more so in a sense than the Chinese—and it would be foolish to suppose that, given Moscow's competition with Peking for the leadership of the Communist world, Russia could afford to stand by and allow Communist North Vietnam or Communist China to be destroyed by the American imperialists.

As for the third premise (that military "victory" is in some sense possible): The Joint Chiefs of Staff, of course, by definition argue for military solutions. They are the most fervent apostles of "one more step." That is their business, and no one should be surprised that generals behave like generals. The fault lies not with those who give this advice but those who take it. Once, early in the Kennedy Administration, the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs outlined the processes of escalation in Southeast Asia before the National Security Council, concluding, "If we are given the right to use nuclear weapons, we can guarantee victory." President Kennedy sat glumly rubbing an upper molar. After a moment someone said, "Mr. President, perhaps you would have the general explain to us what he means by victory." Kennedy grunted and dismissed the meeting. Later he said, "Since he couldn't think of any further escalation, he would have to promise us victory."

What is the purpose of bombing the north? It is hard to find out. According to Gen. Maxwell Taylor, "The objective of our air campaign is to change the will of the enemy leadership." Secretary McNamara, on the other hand, has said, "We never believed that bombing would destroy North Vietnam's will." Whatever the theory, the results would appear to support Secretary McNamara. The northern strategy, instead of driving Hanoi to the conference table, seems to have hardened the will of the regime, convinced it that its life is at stake, brought it closer to China and solidified the people of North Vietnam in its support.

"There is no indication," General Westmoreland said the other day, "that the resolve of the leadership in Hanoi has been reduced." In other words, bombing has had precisely the effect that the analyses of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey after the Second World War would have forecast. Under Secretary of State George Ball was a director of that survey; this may well be why he has been reported so unenthusiastic about the air assault on the North.

And, far from stopping infiltration across the 17th Parallel, bombing, if our own statistics are to be believed, has stimulated it. "It is perfectly clear," Secretary McNamara has said, "that the North Vietnamese have continued to increase their support of the Vietcong despite the increase in our effort. . . . What has happened is that the North Vietnamese have continually increased the amount of resources, men and material that they have been willing to devote to their objective."

Nor can we easily match this infiltration by enlarigng our own forces—from 300,000, for example, to 500,000 or 750,000. The ratio of superiority preferred by the Pentagon in guerrilla war is 10 to 1, which means that every time we send in 100,000 more men the enemy has only to send in 10,000 or so, and we are all even again. Reinforcement has not created a margin of American superiority; all it has done is to lift the stalemate to a higher and more explosive level. Indeed, there is reason to suppose that, in its own manner, the enemy can match our every step of escalation up to the point of nuclear war.

U.S. News & World Report says in its issue of Aug. 22: "It's clear now to military men: bombing will not win in Vietnam." This is a dispiriting item. Why had our military leaders not long ago freed themselves from the illusion of the omnipotence of air power, so cherished by civilians who think wars can be won on the cheap? The Korean war, as Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway has said, "taught that it is impossible to interdict the supply route of an Asian army by airpower alone. We had complete air mastery over North Korea, and we clobbered Chinese supply columns unmercifully. . . . But we did not halt their offensive nor materially diminish its strength." If air power was not decisive in Korea, where the warfare was conventional and the terrain relatively open and compact, how could anyone suppose that it would be decisive against guerrillas threading their way through the hills and jungles of Vietnam?

The bombing illusion applies, of course, to South as well as to North Vietnam. Tactical bombing—bombing in direct support of ground operations—has its place; but the notion that strategic bombing can stop guerrillas runs contrary to experience. And we had it last winter, on the authority of the Secretary of State, that despite the entry of North Vietnamese regulars the war in South Vietnam "continues to be basically a guerrilla operation."

Sir Robert Thompson, who planned the successful British effort against the Malayan guerrillas and later served as head of the British advisory mission in Saigon, has emphasized that the defending force must operate "in the same element" as their adversaries." Counterinsurgency, he writes, "is like trying to deal with a tomcat in an alley. It is no good inserting a large, fierce dog. The dog may not find the tomcat; if he does, the tomcat will escape up a tree; and the dog will then chase the female cats. The answer is to put in a fiercer tomcat."

Alas, we have no fiercer tomcat. The counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam has languished, while our bombers roam over that hapless country, dumping more tonnage of explosives each month than we were dropping per month on all Europe and Africa during the Second World War. Just the other day our bombs killed or injured more than 100 civilians in a hamlet in the Mekong Delta—all on the suspicion that two Vietcong platoons numbering perhaps 60 men, were there. Even if the Vietcong had still been around, which they weren't, would the military gain have outweighed the human and political loss? Charles Mohr writes in The Times: "Almost every provincial hospital in Vietnam is crowded with civilian victims of the war. Some American doctors and other officials in the field say the majority are the victims of American air power and South Vietnamese artillery."

The trouble is that we are fighting one war, with our B–52's and our naval guns and our napalm, and the Vietcong are fighting another, with their machine guns and ambushes and forays in the dark. "If we can get the Vietcong to stand up and fight, we will blast him," General Westmoreland has plaintively said; and when they occasionally rise to the surface and try to fight our kind of war, we do blast them. But the fact that they then slide back into the shadows does not mean that we are on the verge of some final military triumph. It means simply that we are driving them underground—where they renew themselves and where our large, fierce dog cannot follow.

Saigon officials have been reporting that Vietcong morale is declining as long as I can remember; these reports need not be taken seriously now. I know of no convincing evidence that the Vietcong lack the political and emotional commitment to keep fighting underground for another 20 years.

Our strategy in Vietnam is rather like trying to weed a garden with a bulldozer. We occasionally dig up some weeds, but we dig up most of the turf, too. The effect of our policy is to pulverize the political and institutional fabric which alone can give a South Vietnamese state that hope of independent survival which is our presumed war aim. Our method, in other words, defeats our goal. Indeed, the most likely beneficiary of the smashed social structure of South Vietnam will be Communism. "My feeling," Gen. Wallace Greene, commandant of the Marine Corps, has wisely said, "is that you could kill every Vietcong and North Vietnamese in South Vietnam and still lose the war. Unless we can make a success of the civic-action program, we are not going to obtain the objectives we have set."

Much devotion and intelligence are at present going into the programs of reconstruction, but prospects are precarious so long as the enemy can slice through so much of South Vietnam with such apparent immunity; and so long as genuine programs of social reform threaten the vested interests of the Saigon Government and of large land-

holders. In any case, as claimants on our resources, these programs of pacification are hopelessly outclassed by the programs of destruction. Surely, the United States with all its ingenuity, could have figured out a better way to combat guerrilla warfare than the physical obliteration of the nation in which it is taking place. If this is our best idea of "protecting" a country against "wars of national liberation," what other country, seeing the devastation we have wrought in Vietnam, will wish American protection?

At the same time, our concentration on Vietnam is exacting a frightful cost in other areas of national concern. In domestic policy, with Vietnam gulping down a billion and a half dollars a month, everything is grinding to a stop. Lyndon Johnson was on his way to a place in history as a great President for his vision of a Great Society; but the Great Society is now, except for token gestures, dead. The fight for equal opportunity for the Negro, the war against poverty, the struggle to save the cities, the improvement of our schools—all must be starved for the sake of Vietnam. And war brings ugly side-effects: inflation; frustration; angry protest: attack on dissenters on the ground that they cheer the enemy (an attack often mounted by men who led the dissent during the Korean war); premonitions of McCarthyism.

We also pay a cost abroad. Our allies naturally draw away as they see us heading down the road toward war with China. When we began to bomb the oil depots, James Reston wrote: "There is now not a single major nation in the world that supports Mr. Johnson's latest adventure in Hanoi and Haiphong." As nations seek to disengage themselves from the impending conflict, the quasi-neutralism of leaders like de Gaulle gains new plausibility.

On any realistic assessment, Western Europe and Latin America are far more significant to American security than South Asia; yet the Vietnam obsession has stultified our policy and weakened our position in both these vital areas. The war has clouded the hope, once mildly promising, of progress toward a *détente* with the Soviet Union. It has helped block agreements to end underground nuclear testing and to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. It has precipitated the decision of U Thant to resign as Secretary General of the United Nations and condemns the U.N. itself to a time of declining influence.

Our rejection of the views of our friends and allies—our conviction, as Paul H. Smith has put it, "that we alone are qualified to be judge, jury and executioner"—ignores Madison's solemn warning in the 63rd Federalist: "An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons: the one is that independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy; the second is that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations; and how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbaised part of mankind."

The Administration has called the critics of its Vietnam policy "neo-isolationists." But surely the real neo-isolationists are those who have isolated the United States from its allies and raised the tattered standard, last flourished 15 years ago by Douglas MacArthur, of "going it alone."

How have we managed to imprison ourselves in this series of dilemmas? One reason surely is that we have somehow lost our understanding of the uses of power. Understanding of power implies above all precision in its application. We have moved away from the subtle strategy of "flexible response" under which the level of American force was graduated to meet the level of enemy threat. The triumph of this discriminate employment of power was, of course, the Cuban missile crisis (where the Joint Chiefs, as usual, urged an air assault on the missile bases). But President Johnson, for all his formidable abilities, has shown no knack for discrimination in his use of power. His technique is to try and overwhelm his adversary—as in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam—by piling on all forms of power without regard to the nature of the threat.

Given this weakness for the indiscriminate use of power, it is easy to see why the application of force in Vietnam has been surrendered to the workings of what an acute observer of the Johnson foreign policy, Philip Geyelin, calls "the escalation machine." This machine is, in effect, the momentum in the decision-making system which keeps enlarging the war "for reasons only marginally related to military need."

The very size and weight of the American military presence generate unceasing pressures to satisfy military demands. These may be demands to try out new weapons; the London Sunday Telegraph recently ran an informative article comparing the Vietnam war to the Spanish Civil War as a military testing ground and laboratory. Or they may be cries for "one more step," springing in part from suppressed rage over the fact that, with military power sufficient to blow up the world, we still cannot compel guerrilla bands in black pajamas to submit to our will. Whatever the reason, Sir Robert Thompson has noted of the American theory of the war: "There was a constant tendency in Vietnam to mount large-scale operations, which had little purpose or prospect of success, merely to indicate that something aggressive was being done."

The Administration has freely admitted that such operations, like the bombing of the North, are designed in part to prop up the morale of the Saigon Government. And the impression is growing now that they are also in part undertaken in order to smother doubts about the war in the United States and to reverse anti-Administration tendencies in the polls. Americans have become curiously insensitive to the use of military operations for domestic political purposes. A quarter-century ago President Roosevelt postponed the North African invasion so that it would not take place before the midterm elections of 1942; but today observers in Washington, without evidence of shock, predict a new venture in escalation before the midterm elections of 1966.

The triumph of the escalation machine has been assisted by the faultiness of the information on which our decisions are based. Nothing is phonier than the spurious exactitude of our statistics about the Vietnam war. No doubt a computerized military establishment demands numbers; but the "body count" of dead Vietcong, for example, includes heaven knows how many innocent bystanders and could hardly be more unreliable. The figures on enemy strength are totally baffling, at least to the ordinary citizen relying on the daily newspaper. The Times on Aug. 10 described "the latest intelligence reports" in Saigon as saying that the number of enemy troops in South Vietnam had increased 52,000 since Jan. 1 to a total of 282,000. Yet, "according to official figures," the enemy had suffered 31,571 killed in action in this period, and the infiltration estimate ranged from 35,000 as "definite" to 54,000 as "possible."

The only way to reconcile these figures is to conclude that the Vietcong have picked up from 30,000 to 50,000 local recruits in this period. Since this seems unlikely—especially in view of our confidence in the decline of Vietcong morale—a safer guess is to question the wonderful precision of the statistics. Even the rather vital problem of how many North Vietnamese troops are in South Vietnam is swathed in mystery. The Times reported on Aug. 7: "About 40,000 North Vietnamese troops are believed by allied intelligence to be in the South." According to an Associated Press dispatch from Saigon printed in The Christian Science Monitor of Aug. 15: "The South Vietnamese Government says 102,500 North Vietnamese combat troops and support battalions have infiltrated into South Vietnam.

"These figures are far in excess of United States intelligence estimates, which put the maximum number of North Vietnamese in the South at about 54,000."

But General Westmoreland told his Texas press conference on Aug. 14 that the enemy force included "about 110,000 main-force North Vietnamese regular army troops." Perhaps these statements are all reconcilable, but an apparent discrepancy of this magnitude on a question of such importance raises a twinge of doubt.

Nor is our ignorance confined to battle-order statistics. We have always lacked genuine knowledge of and insight into the political and cultural problems of Vietnam, and the more we press all problems into a military framework the worse off we are. The Administration in Washington was systematically misinformed by senior American officials in Saigon in 1962–63 regarding the progress of the war, the popularity of Diem, the effectiveness of the "strategic hamlet" program and other vital matters. It was not that these officials were deliberately deceiving their President; it was that they had deceived themselves first. Ordinary citizens restricted to reading the American press were better informed in 1963 than officials who took top-secret cables seriously.

The fact is that our Government just doesn't know a lot of things it pretends to know. It is not discreditable that it should not know them, for the facts are elusive and the judgments incredibly difficult. But it is surely inexcusable that it should pretend to know things it does not—and that it should pass its own ignorance on to the American people as certitude. And it is even less excusable that it should commit the nation to a policy involving the greatest dangers on a foundation so vague and precarious.

So now we are set on the course of widening the war—even at the cost of multiplying American casualties in Vietnam and deepening American troubles at home and abroad; even at the risk of miring our nation in a hopeless and endless conflict on the mainland of Asia beyond the effective employment of our national power and beyond the range of our primary interests; even at the risk of nuclear war.

Why does the Administration feel that these costs must be paid and these risks run? Hovering behind our policy is a larger idea—the idea that the war in Vietnam is not just a local conflict between Vietnamese but a fateful test of wills between China and the United States.

Our political and rhetorical escalation of the war has been almost as perilous as our military escalation. President Kennedy's effort was to pull Laos out of the context of great-power conflict and reduce the Laotian civil war to rational proportions. As he told Khrushchev at Vienna in 1961, Laos was just not important enough to entangle two great nations. President Johnson, on the other hand, has systematically inflated the significance of the war in Vietnam. "We have tried to make it clear over and over again," as the Secretary of State has put it, "that although

Hanoi is the prime actor in this situation, that it is the policy of Peking that has greatly stimulated Hanoi. . . . It is Ho Chi Minh's war. Maybe it is Mao Tse-tung's war."

"In the forties and fifties," President Johnson has said, "we took our stand in Europe to protect the freedom of those threatened by aggression. Now the center of attention has shifted to another part of the world where aggression is on the march. Our stand must be as firm as ever." Given this view, it is presumably necessary to pay the greatest costs and run the greatest risks—or else invite the greatest defeat.

Given this view, too, there is no reason not to Americanize the war. President Kennedy did not believe that the war in Vietnam could succeeed as a war of white men against Asians. It could not be won, he said a few weeks before his death, "unless the people [of South Vietnam] support the effort. . . . We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam." We have now junked this doctrine. Instead, we have enlarged our military presence until it is the only thing that matters in South Vietnam, and we plan now to make it still larger; we have summoned the Saigon leaders, like tribal chieftains on a retainer, to a conference in an American state; we crowd the streets of Saigon with American generals (58 at last count) and visiting stateside dignitaries. In short, we have seized every opportunity to make clear to the world that this is an *American* war—and, in doing this, we have surely gone far to make the war unwinnable.

The proposition that our real enemy in Vietnam is China is basic to the policy of widening the war. It is the vital element in the Administration case. Yet the proof our leaders have adduced for this proposition has been exceedingly sketchy and almost perfunctory. It has been proof by ideology and proof by analogy. It has not been proof by reasoned argument or by concrete illustration.

The proof by ideology has relied on the syllogism that the Vietcong, North Vietnam and China are all Communist states and therefore must be part of the same conspiracy, and that, since the Vietcong are the weakest of the three, they must therefore be the spearhead of a coordinated Chinese plan of expansion. The Department of State, in spite of what has struck most people as a rather evident fragmentation of the Communist world, has hated to abandon the cozy old clichés about a centralized Communist conspiracy aimed at monolithic world revolution.

As late as May 9, 1965, after half a dozen years of public Russo-Chinese quarreling, Thomas C. Mann, then No. 3 man in the department, could talk about "instruments of Sino-Soviet power" and "orders from the Sino-Soviet military bloc." As late as Jan. 28, 1966, the Secretary of State could still run on about "their world revolution," and again, on Feb. 18, about "the Communists" and their "larger design." While the department may have accepted the reality of the Russo-Chinese schism by September, 1966, the predominant tone is still to regard Asian Communism as a homogenous system of aggression. The premise of our policy has been that the Vietcong equal Hanoi and Hanoi equals Peking.

Obviously, the Vietcong, Hanoi and Peking have interests in common and strong ideological affinities. Obviously, Peking would rejoice in a Hanoi-Vietcong victory. But they also have divergent interests and purposes—and the divergencies may prove in the end to be stronger than the affinities. Recent developments in North Korea are instructive. If any country was bound to Peking by ties of gratitude, it was North Korea, which was preserved as an independent state by Chinese intervention 15 years ago. If any country today is at the mercy of Peking, it is again North Korea. When North Korea now declares in vigorous language its independence of China, does anyone suppose that North Vietnam, imbued with historic mistrust of China and led by that veteran Russian agent Ho Chi Minh, would have been more slavish in its attitude toward Peking?

The other part of the Administration case has been proof by analogy, especially the good old Munich analogy. "I'm not the village idiot," the Secretary of State recently confided to Stewart Alsop. "I know Hitler was an Austrian and Mao is a Chinese. . . . But what is common between the two situations is the phenomenon of aggression." The Vietnam war, President Johnson recently told the American Legion, "is meant to be the opening salvo in a series of bombardments or, as they are called in Peking, 'wars of liberation.'" If this technique works this week in Vietnam, the Administration suggests, it will be tried next week in Uganda and Peru. But, if it is defeated in Vietnam, the Chinese will know that we will not let it succeed elsewhere.

"What happens in South Vietnam," the President cried at Omaha, "will determine—yes, it will determine—whether ambitious and aggressive nations can use guerrilla warfare to conquer their weaker neighbors." The Secretary of State even described an exhortation made last year by the Chinese Defense Minister, Marshal Lin Piao, as a blueprint for world conquest comparable to Hitler's "Mein Kampf."

One thing is sure about the Vietnam riddle: it will not be solved by bad historical analogies. It seems a trifle forced, for example, to equate a civil war in what was for hundreds of years the entity of Vietnam (Marshal Ky, after all, is a North Vietnamese himself) with Hitler's invasion of Austria and Czechoslovakia across old and well-established lines of national division; even the village idiot might grasp that difference.

When President Eisenhower invoked the Munich analogy in 1954 in an effort to involve the British in Indochina, Prime Minister Churchill, a pretty close student of Munich in his day, was unmoved. The Chinese have neither the overwhelmingly military power nor the timetable of aggression nor, apparently, the pent-up mania for instant expansion which would justify the Hitler parallel. As for the Lin Piao document, the Rand Corporation, which evidently read it with more care than the State Department bothered to do, concluded that, far from being Mao's "Mein Kampf," it was a message to the Vietcong that they could win "only if they rely primarily on their own resources and their own revolutionary spirit," and that it revealed "the lack, rather than the extent, of Peking's past and present control over Hanoi's actions."

In any case, guerrilla warfare is not a tactic to be mechanically applied by central headquarters to faraway countries. More than any other form of warfare, it is dependent on conditions and opportunities within the countries themselves. Whether there are wars of national liberation in Uganda and Peru will depend, not on what happens in Vietnam, but on what happens in Uganda and Peru.

One can agree that the containment of China will be a major problem for the next generation. But this does not mean that we must re-enact in Asia in the sixties the exact drama of Europe in the forties and fifties. The record thus far suggests that the force most likely to contain Chinese expansionism in Asia (and Africa, too) will be not Western intervention but local nationalism. Sometimes local nationalism may call on Western support—but not always. Countries like Burma and Cambodia preserve their autonomy without American assistance. The Africans have dealt with the Chinese on their own. The two heaviest blows recently suffered by Peking—the destruction of the Communist party in Indonesia and the declaration of independence by North Korea—took place without benefit of American patronage or rhetoric.

In an unpredictable decades ahead, the most effective bulwark against "international" Communism in some circumstances may well be national Communism. A rational policy of containing China could have recognized that a Communist Vietnam under Ho might be a better instrument of containment than a shaky Saigon regime led by right-wing mandarins or air force generals. Had Ho taken over all Vietnam in 1954, he might today be enlisting Soviet support to strengthen his resistance to Chinese pressure—and this situation, however appalling for the people of South Vietnam, would obviously be better for the United States than the one in which we are floundering today. And now, alas, it may be almost too late: the whole thrust of United States policy since 1954, and more than ever since the bombing of the North began, has been not to pry Peking and Hanoi apart but to drive them together.

Is there no way out? Are the only alternatives widening the war or disorderly and humiliating withdrawal? Surely, our statesmanship is not yet this bankrupt. I think a middle course is still possible if there were the will to pursue it. And this course must begin with a decision to stop widening and Americanizing the war—to limit our forces, actions, goals and rhetoric. Instead of bombing more places, sending in more troops, proclaiming ever more ardently that the fate of civilization will be settled in Vietnam, let us recover our cool and try to see the situation as it is: a horrid civil war in which Communist guerrillas, enthusiastically aided and now substantially directed from Hanoi, are trying to establish a Communist despotism in South Vietnam, not for the Chinese but for themselves. Let us understand that the ultimate problem here is not military but political. Let us adapt the means we employ to the end we seek.

Obviously, military action plays an indispensable role in the search for a political solution. Hanoi and the Vietcong will not negotiate so long as they think they can win. Since stalemate is a self-evident precondition to negotiation, we must have enough American armed force in South Vietnam to leave no doubt in the minds of our adversaries that they cannot hope for victory. They must also have no illusion about the prospect of an American withdrawal. The object of the serious opposition to the Johnson policy is to bring about not an American defeat but a negotiated settlement.

Therefore, holding the line in South Vietnam is essential. Surely, we already have enough American troops, firepower and installations in South Vietnam to make it clear that we cannot be beaten unless we choose to scuttle and run, which will not happen. The opponents of this strategy talk as if a holding action would put our forces under siege and relinquish all initiative to the enemy. This need not, of course, be so. It is possible to slow down a war without standing still; and, if our present generals can't figure out how to do this, then let us get generals who can. Generals Ridgway and Gavin could doubtless suggest some names. Moreover, there is a South Vietnamese army of some 600,000 men which can take all the initiative it wants. And if we are told that the South Vietnamese are unwilling or unable to fight the Vietcong, then we must wonder all the more about the political side of the war.

The object of our military policy, as observers like Henry Kissinger and James MacGregor Burns have proposed, should be the creation and stabilization of secure areas

where the South Vietnamese might themselves undertake social and institutional development. Our resources should go, in the Vietnam jargon, more to clear-and-hold than to search-and-destroy (especially when search-and-destroy more often means search-and-drive-underground). We should get rid of those "one-star generals who," in the words of Sir Robert Thompson, "regard their tour in Vietnam as an opportunity to indulge in a year's big-game shooting from their helicopter howdahs at Government expense."

At the same time we should induce the Saigon Government to institute generous amnesty provisions of the kind which worked so well in the Philippines. And we should further increase the incentive to come over by persuading the South Vietnamese to abandon the torture of prisoners—a practice not only horrible in itself but superbly calculated to make the enemy fight to the bitter end. In the meantime we must end our own shameful collaboration with this barbarism and stop turning Vietcong prisoners over to the South Vietnamese when we know that torture is probable.

As for bombing the North, let us taper this off as prudently as we can. Bombing is not likely to deter Hanoi any more in the future than it has in the past; and, given its limited military effect, the Administration's desire to gratify the Saigon Government and the American voter is surely not important enough to justify the risks of indefinite escalation. Moreover, so long as the bombing continues there is no chance of serious negotiation. Nor does the failure of the 37-day pause of last winter to produce a settlement refute this. Thirty-seven days were hardly enough to persuade our allies that we honestly wanted negotiation; so brief an interlude left no time for them to move on to the tricky job of persuading Hanoi. For Hanoi has substantial reasons for mistrusting negotiation—quite apart from Chinese pressure or its own hopes of victory. Ho has entered into negotiation with the West twice in the past—in 1946–47 and again in 1954—and each time, in his view, he lost at the conference table things he thought he had won on the battlefield.

For all our official talk about our readiness to go anywhere, talk to anyone, etc., it cannot be said that the Administration has pursued negotiation with a fraction of the zeal, imagination and perseverance with which it has pursued war. Indeed, some American scholars who have studied the matter believe that on a number of occasions when pressure for negotiation was mounting we have, for whatever reason, stepped up the war.*

Nor can it be said that the Administration has laid fairly before the American people the occasional signals, however faint, which have come from Hanoi—as in the early winter of 1965, when U Thant's mediation reached the point of selecting the hotel in Rangoon where talks might take place, until we killed the idea by beginning the bombing of the North. Nor, for all our declarations about "unconditional" negotiations, have we refrained from setting conditions—such as, for example, that we won't talk to the Vietcong unless they come to the conference table disguised as North Vietnamese. Though the Vietcong constitute the great bulk of the enemy force, they have been given little reason to think we will negotiate about anything except their unconditional surrender.

It is hard to see why we should not follow the precedent of Laos, when we admitted the Pathet Lao to the peace talks, and offer the Vietcong the prospect of a say in the future political life of South Vietnam—conditioned on their laying down their arms, opening up their territories and abiding by the ground rules of free elections. Nor is there reason to see why we have been so reluctant again to follow the Laos model and declare neutralization, under international guarantee, our long-run objective for Vietnam. An imaginative diplomacy would long since have discussed the ways and means of such neutralization with Russia, France, Britain and other interested countries. Unsatisfactory as the situation in Laos may be today, it is still incomparably better than the situation in South Vietnam.

On the other hand, negotiation is not an exclusive, or even primary, American responsibility. Along with a military stalemate, the other precondition of a diplomatc settlement is surely a civilian government in Saigon. Marshal Ky is one of those Frankenstein's monsters we delight in creating in our "client" countries, very much like the egregious General Phoumi Nosavan, who single-handedly blocked a settlement in Laos for two years. Like Phoumi, Ky evidently feels that Washington has committed itself irrevocably to him—and why should he not after the laying on of hands at Honolulu?—and that, whatever he does, we cannot afford to abandon him.

Robert Shaplen, in the August 20 issue of The New Yorker, reported from Saigon that the atmosphere there "is being compared to the miasma that surrounded Diem and his tyrannical brother Ngo Dinh Nhu" and that "many Vietnamese believe that the Americans, having embraced Ky so wholeheartedly and supported him so long, are just as responsible as his Government for the recent repressive acts."

I am sure that President Johnson did not intend to turn over American policy and honor in Vietnam to Marshal Ky's gimcrack, bullyboy, get-rich-quick regime. The time is bound to come when Ky must learn the facts of life, as General Phoumi eventually and painfully learned them.

But why wait? In our whole time in Vietnam, there has never been a Government in Saigon which had the active loyalty of the countryside. It might be an agreeable experiment to encourage one to come into existence. Instead of identifying American interests with Ky and rebuffing the broader political impulses in South Vietnam, we should long since have welcomed a movement toward a civilian regime representing the significant political forces of the country and capable both of rallying the army and carrying forward programs of social reform. We should give such a Government all possible assistance in rebuilding and modernizing the political and institutional structures of South Vietnam. And if it should favor the neutralization of its country, if it should seek negotiation with the Vietcong, even if it should release us from our commitment to stay in Vietnam, we should not think that the world is coming to an end.

It is not too late to begin the deescalation of the war; nor would the reduction of our military effort damage our international influence. "There is more respect to be won in the opinion of this world," George Kennan has written, "by a resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound positions than by the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or unpromising objectives." France was stronger than ever after de Gualle left Algeria, the Soviet Union suffered no lasting damage from pulling its nuclear missiles out of Cuba. And the policy of de-escalation recommended here is, of course, something a good deal less than withdrawal.

De-escalation could work *if* there were the will to pursue it . . . This is the hard question. The Administration, disposed to the indiscriminate use of power, enmeshed in the grinding cogs of the escalation machine, committed to the thesis that China is the enemy in Vietnam, obviously could not turn to de-escalation without considerable inner upheaval. The issue in the United States in the months to come will be whether President Johnson's leadership is sufficiently resilient and forbearing to permit a change in the direction of policy and arrest what is coming increasingly to seem an accelerating drift toward a great and unnecessary catastrophe.

*See "The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam," by Franz Schurmann, Peter Dale Scott and Reginald Zelnik of the University of California; to be published in October by Fawcett Books (paperback) and Beacon Press (hardcover).

TRAFFIC IN FIREARMS

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, for 6 years, now, I have been investigating the very serious traffic in firearms sold through the interstate mails and delivered to juveniles, criminals, addicts, and others.

I have had proposed legislation pending before Congress for more than 3 years. Each attempt to pass a stronger gun-control law has been stymied by gun lobbyists, misled sportsmen, and spokesmen representing that portion of the gun industry which wants no further legislation whatsoever.

Although representing only a minority, these opponents have repeatedly demonstrated their effectiveness. No new gun law has been passed, and the present bill, S. 1592, which I introduced as a part of the President's crime bill package, has been stalled for weeks in the Committee on the Judiciary.

During these same years, a number of public opinion polls have been conducted by professional, respected opinion takers on the question of stronger and more effective gun laws.

I have yet to see one of these polls register less than 70 percent of the public in favor of new laws to reduce effectively the flow of deadly weapons into the hands of potential troublemakers. I might add that in each of these polls the questions were based on proposals going far beyond any legislation under serious consideration, such as the registration of all guns and the fingerprinting of gun owners. Even so, 70 percent or more favored more effective controls.

A poll published in the Washington Post of September 14, 1966, finally drops below this 70-percent mark.

In this Gallup poll, based on a question which suggests that the legislation now before the Senate would require a record to be made of the gun and the name of the purchaser, only 68 percent of the nongun owning public favored stronger controls.

However, that same poll shows that 56 percent of the gun owners themselves favor such a strong law and would vote for its enactment.

I wonder what effect this revelation will have on the small army of self-styled spokesmen for the 20 million American hunters and gun owners who say they want no gun law at all.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Gallup poll be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 14, 1966]

THE GALLUP POLL: GUN OWNERS THEMSELVES FAVOR CURBS

PRINCETON, N.J., September 13.—Few issues spark such heated reactions as gun controls, and few issues are so widely misunderstood.

plish purposes contrary to the intent of Congress inevitably created a great political storm. The President and the Secretary finally got the message and last month they started doing some fast backpedaling. The USDA launched a massive public relations effort to win back the support of the farmer. but as one farm expert has noted, "the Administration really is in a corner. It keeps telling the farmer that it is his friend. But the farmer is still skeptical."

The reaction of farmers and ranchers is clear.

What was the reaction in Congress?

I can assure you that it was vigorous and intense. Except possibly for Vietnam and inflation, I don't think any other single issue has been subjected to as much debate as this one. Both Democrats and Republicans have taken part, and the debate has been almost entirely highly critical of the Administration's actions.

Let me cite a couple examples. The Congressional reaction to the cattlehide export embargo was so intense that the Commerce Department ultimately has to retreat, acknowledge that it had been wrong, and restore a portion of the cutback. In regard to this particular episode, I remember the day that Bill House dropped by my office after he had attended the hide hearings held by the House agricultural committee. Bill told me that the Secretary of Commerce John Connor got such a dressing down by the committee that he almost felt sorry for him. Now Bill was exaggerating, of course, because I am sure he could not really feel very sorry for Mr. Connor. However, the treatment that Connor and other Administration officials received is indicative of the Congressional reaction to the export embargo. I played a part.

Another example of Congressional attitude toward the Administration's efforts to roll back farm prices is the resolution recently passed in the Senate, which I and 42 other Senators had sponsored, declaring the intent of Congress that the Administration should be prohibited from further arbitrary actions to hold down farm prices which, as you know, are still considerably below parity.

Now an equally important question is what has been the reaction of the general public.

Specifically, has all the Administration talk about food prices and inflation aroused significant anti-farm sentiment among the consumers?

There is no doubt that it has caused a certain amount of damage. However, as far as I can tell from sampling city newspapers and from conversations with my Senate colleagues from urbanized states, it is my impression that while the Administration's actions certainly created opposition among farmers and ranchers, their actions won few friends among urban voters and opinion leaders.

One of the reasons for this is that responsible newspaper editors and urban political leaders know that farm prices have not been a significant cause of the current inflation. But there is another reason why the Administration's actions elicited little support from the urban areas. This is simply that a great number of people were appalled at the way the Administration has carried out these actions. For example, the cattlehide incident was spotted by fair observers as an irresponsible and heavy-handed affair.

By in large then, I would say that from agriculture's point of view the general reaction to the actions by the Administration in the past few months has been rather encouraging. However, the fact that the Administration made the decision to take these actions has potentially dangerous implications for the future of agriculture. There is no question that these actions were taken because the Administration made the judgment that they would gain more political votes than they lost. The fact that it apparently has not turned out this way is due to a certain extent to the manner in which these actions were taken.

But regardless of how they were handled, the fact remains that they were taken. In trying to explain why these decisions were made, I have heard a lot of people say that they are due to the fact that the Administration is against the farmer. Now this is a simple and easy answer, but I believe that it is a dangerously naive one. I shall defend the Administraton against the charge that it is deliberately anti-farmer for the simple reason that both the President and the Secretary are experienced enough in politics to know that you don't make political hay by being anti-anybody except for extremist groups of both the right and the left.

Thus, the question is not whether the Administration is *against* the farmer but whether he really is *for* him. When the political chips are down is this Administration really prepared to stand up and do right by agriculture?

In this lies the most crucial question mark about agriculture's future. It is too early to answer with certainty. However, one thing is absolutely clear; the national political climate is changing dramatically and at a faster pace than many of us realize. The United States is a nation increasingly dominated economically, socially, and politically by a few giant cities such as New York, Detroit, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Thirty-five percent of the entire population lives in the 25 metropolises with populations of at least one million.

The danger presented is that in the making of national policies, the needs and problems of agriculture, and non-metropolitan areas as well, will be ignored. In some instances this might be unintentional and simply the result of unfamiliarity and lack of concern. In other cases it might be the result of deliberate political calculation. In either case the end result for agriculture could only be negative.

Thus, in assessing agriculture's long range future, I would first emphasize that farmers and ranchers have simply got to face the fact that they are becoming an extremely small minority. Now if a minority this small is to have any significant political influence, the members must be politically informed and active and above all they must be united in their common purpose.

One of the reasons why organized labor in this country has been politically successful is that when the union spokesmen come to Washington, they are pretty well agreed in what they are going to ask Congress to enact or oppose. But, unfortunately, when agriculture comes to Washington, it too often speaks with many different and often sharply conflicting voices. Given the extent of disunity among agriculture organizations, it is a wonder that agriculture is as well off today as it is. Complete unity is neither possible nor desirable, but the tensions and conflicts among agricultural organizations and spokesmen is a luxury that cannot be afforded in the future. Farmers and ranchers and their organizations and leaders must take heed of the changing national political climate and make a greater effort to find common ground and coordinated action.

In addition to the need for greater unity, I would also suggest that farmers and ranchers and all the individuals and groups whose own economic welfare is so closely tied to agriculture should make a much greater effort to work together than has been the case in the past. I am thinking particularly of the businessmen and workers in the thousands of towns and cities across the country whose welfare and interests are so closely tied to agriculture. I think there is great potential here for strengthening rural America's political power. There have been too few efforts in this direction in the past, there must be many more in the future.

WHO ARE THE REAL ISOLATIONISTS?

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in an excellent article in the New York Times Magazine for September 18, 1966, Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., famed historian and former adviser to President Kennedy and President Johnson, had this to say about the label "neoisolationists" which some seek to append to those who would speak out against the United States further enmeshing itself in a senseless, undeclared and costly war in Vietnam:

> The Administration has called the critics of its Vietnam policy "noeisolationists." But surely the real neoisolationists are those who have isolated the United States from its allies and raised the tattered standard, last flourished 15 years ago by Douglas MacArthur, on going it alone.

A similar theme is developed in the leading editorial in The Nation for September 12, 1966, under the title "Who Are the Isolationists"? in which it is stated:

> In essential respects it is the Johnson Administration that is isolationist. Its opponents would favor a constructive foreign policy. Their opposition is to a policy of aggression that has alienated allies and hardened the resolution of opponents—policy that, in the view of such an experienced observer as U Thant, carries within the fulminate of a third World War.

The point made by many of us who have for over 2½ years have advocated a changed position for the United States with respect to Vietnam is the direct antithesis of isolation. When the United States "goes it alone" it is isolating itself from the other nations in the world.

When the United States says to the community of nations: we will escalate, and escalate and further escalate our military actions in Vietnam—take it or leave it—it is not acting in concert with other nations but rather is isolating itself from all other nations.

The so-called nonisolationist says: form alliances and act together with your allies. In Vietnam we are in violation of our pledges to other nations under the Charter of the United Nations, under the Geneva accords, and under the SEATO Treaty. It is hard to contend that the administration—rather than its critics—is not assuming an isolationist posture before the entire world.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial entitled "Who Are the Isolationists"? in the September 12, 1966, issue of The Nation be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WHO ARE THE ISOLATIONISTS?

Santayana's oft-quoted saying that those who do not remember the past are doomed to repeat it needs a corollary: those who misread the past are even more inexorably doomed to reiterate ancient errors. The Johnson Administration's favorite stereotype—the identification of the advocates of de-escalation in Vietnam with the appeasers at Munich in 1938—is an example of how history can be distorted by politicians whose only use for the past is to justify their misdeeds in the present. A related inversion of the truth is lumping current critics of American foreign policy (Senator FULBRIGHT, for instance) with the pre-World War II isolationists, some of whom were pro-German, some pro-Fascist or both.

Some of the opposition to the registration of guns comes from those who think that this would mean banning all guns. Actually, the law proposed would not prohibit a person from owning a gun—either for sport or protection—but would require that a record be made of the name of the gun purchaser. The purpose of such a law would be to keep guns out of the hands of persons with a criminal record, the mentally disturbed and others unqualified to handle weapons.

The mood of the public for nearly three decades has been to impose controls on the sale and possession of weapons.

The survey questions and findings:

"Would you favor or oppose a law which would require a person to obtain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun?"

[In percent]

	All persons	*Gun owners*
Yes	68	56
No	29	41
No opinion	3	3

Those who favor such a law:

1. Too many people get guns who are irresponsible, mentally ill, retarded, trigger happy, criminals.
2. It would save lives.
3. It's too easy to get guns.
4. It would be a help to the police.
5. It would keep guns out of the hands of teenagers.

Reasons of those who oppose such a law:

1. Such a law would take away the individual's rights.
2. Such a law wouldn't work—people would still get guns if they wanted to.
3. People need guns for protection.

"Which of those three plans would you prefer for the use of guns by persons under the age of 18—forbid their use completely, put restrictions on their use, or continue as at present with few regulations?"

[In percent]

	All persons	*Gun owners*
Forbid use	27	17
Restrictions on use	55	59
Continue as at present	15	22
No opinion	3	2

CURRENT AGRICULTURAL POLICY—SPEECH DELIVERED BY SENATOR PEARSON

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, a speech delivered by the distinguished junior Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] to the national brand convention on July 16, 1966, at Dodge City, Kans., describes the actions of the administration which have generated the current agricultural political discontent.

The speech explores why the administration took these actions, what the political consequences may be, and finally attempts to evaluate not only where we are, but also where we are going in American agriculture.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this speech be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SPEECH DELIVERED BY SENATOR JAMES B. PEARSON TO THE NATIONAL BRAND CONVENTION, JULY 16, 1966

These comments are going to be critical of the Administration, of the agricultural policy of President Johnson and Secretary Freeman. Yet this is not to say that this shall be a partisan political speech. I emphasize that the growing volume of criticism of recent Administration actions has come from both parties.

The truth of the matter is that just as we need a non-political foreign policy we also need agricultural bi-partisanship.

The other day a rural North Dakota newspaper editor expressed this idea. He noted that there were a lot of strong Democrats and Republicans in his area and that they take their politics seriously. But the editor stated, "When a neighbor is in trouble partisanship ends and we all pitch in. When one of us is attacked all of us are attacked . . . be the attackers—elements, beast, man or government." And so after reviewing some of the highlights of the Administration's "war on farm prices" the editor closed by saying "We've been attacked, partisanship thus has ended, we've closed ranks and are fighting back."

Let me digress for one further word of explanation or definition. Should I hereafter use the word politics or political, once again I do not do so in a partisan sense. But a political attitude is an expression of democracy, is a manifestation of the attitude and the will of the people and it is in that meaning that the word is used.

Thus, let me make note that during the past two months there has been considerable talk in the press about political unrest among farmers and ranchers. It is this rural unrest to which I now direct my attention. Yet I shall not describe the adverse economic effects of recent administration actions or why such government action has been unjustified. Your knowledge concerning your own interest is greater than mine and it is not necessary for me to go over the arguments you have formed for yourselves or heard from others.

I want to approach the events of the past few months from a somewhat different perspective. I want to briefly describe the actions which generated the current agricultural political discontent. I should like to explore with you why the Administration took these actions; what the political consequences may be and finally to attempt to evaluate not only where we are but where we are going in American agriculture.

First, I think some historic background is necessary in order to keep matters in proper order.

Certainly the present Secretary of Agriculture is no stranger to controversy. In fact, if we look back over the past several decades one gets the impression that this is an inevitable occupational hazard of being the Secretary of Agriculture. As one astute political observer once stated: "Among the many mysteries which surround the government of the United States there is none more baffling than why anyone should want to be Secretary of Agriculture." Indeed, the very mention of the name of Charles Brannon, Truman's Secretary of Agriculture still generates heated debate in many circles.

The trials and tribulations of Ezra Taft Benson were endless and harrowing. But I suppose that if Benson proved nothing else he, at least, demonstrated an enormous capacity for sticking it out under intense political pressures.

Orville Freeman entered the office under a cloud of doubt due to the fact that he was almost totally lacking in agricultural experience. However, it is to Mr. Freeman's credit that during his first year in office he helped to improve the image of agriculture which had become somewhat tarnished in the minds of the urban public and particularly the big city press. Freeman launched a successful public relations effort which stressed the great successes and achievements of agriculture rather than its failures and problems.

He first began to get in real political hot water with his proposals for stringent and mandatory controls which he indicated he would, like to ultimately see extended throughout agriculture. At about this time the increase in beef imports and his unconvincing efforts to explain them brought the cattlemen down on his neck.

Because of growing pressure from farmers and ranchers and with Congress in firm opposition, Mr. Freeman was forced to abandon many of his policies and proposals, several of which I believe were not only ill-conceived but—to a degree—dangerous.

After these rebuffs, the Administration in cooperation with Congress and the majority of the farm organizations put together a program in 1965 which no one found entirely satisfactory but which the majority, I believe, thought to be a reasonably satisfactory temporary compromise. Because of this and because there were signs of slight improvement in the agricultural economic picture the relations between the Administration and the country's agricultural interests had improved considerably by the fall of 1965.

However, between January and June of this year this situation was completely reversed.

The first signs of trouble appeared when the Administration, in announcing its proposed budget, recommended that major cuts should be made in federal funds to agriculture research and extension programs and to the school milk and lunch programs.

During this same time, the Department of Agriculture began to quietly dump millions of bushels of government-owned corn and wheat stocks on the open market. An action, by the way, which Secretary Freeman only two months earlier had stated would not be taken. As a result of these two developments, discontent and resentment were beginning to develop. And this criticism was brought to a high point in early May when the Department of Commerce announced that it was imposing stringent restrictions on the export of cattlehides. The uproar over this incident was loud—but I will refer to this mater later on.

It was also during March, April and May that the Secretary and other top Administration officials were talking a great deal about food prices and inflation. Gardner Ackley, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, revealed that the massive dumping of corn was intended to encourage pork production which would in turn bring down pork prices. The Defense Department announced that it was cutting back on its purchases of pork and leather and was substituting margarine for butter. Also it became known during this period that the Administration was increasing the import quotas on such products as sugar and cheese.

Now the clear implication that emerged from all the public and off-the-record statements by officials was that the Administration was trying to blame the inflation on farm prices. And the picture that emerged from the various actions—such as the cattlehide embargo, the dumping of corn and so forth was that the Administration was actively pushing a policy of attempting to freeze or roll back farm prices.

The Administration got so carried away with this whole food-price inflation program that President Johnson claimed that he had instructed Mrs. Johnson to purchase cheaper cuts of beef and expressed the hope that housewives across the country would do the same.

All this was finally capped off when Secretary Freeman was reported as having expressed pleasure over the recent downturn in farm prices and as having predicted with considerable satisfaction that future decreases would be forthcoming.

Well, I don't have to tell you that farm prices have not been a significant factor in the current inflation. The error of the Administration's policy on the inflation's cause plus the fact that it was exercising price control without legal authority—and—was in fact manipulating existing laws to accom-

In essential respects it is the Johnson Administration that is isolationist. Its opponents would favor a constructive foreign policy. Their opposition is to a policy of aggression that has alienated allies and hardened the resolution of opponents—policy that, in the view of such an experienced observer as U Thant, carries within it the fulminate of a third World War.

Mr. Johnson and his aides give lip service to the United Nations while undercutting it at every turn. This is *de facto* isolationism—the sacrifice of international order to domestic political advantage. The reason U Thant is reluctant to accept another term as Secretary-General is the ambivalence which President Johnson, Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg have exhibited time and again in their relations with him. Why should he remain in an office in which he is powerless to restrain the continuing American probing of supposed Soviet and Chinese impotence to give significant aid to North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front? If it should turn out to be based on a miscalculation, this experimentation threatens to bring on a disastrous showdown—disastrous because the circumstances will permit neither a compromise between the belligerents nor retreat of either from hardened positions.

The headlines show the accelerating progress toward this kind of confrontation, as in "Strategists See Need in Vietnam for 600,000 GIs" (*The New York Times*, August 29), and in the same issue "Moscow Training Fliers for Hanoi." The correspondent reports on articles in three leading Soviet newspapers, stating that at least one detachment of Vietnamese pilots have completed a combat flying course under the direction of "Soviet battle veterans" and have returned to North Vietnam, while another group is under instruction. Inexperienced Vietnamese pilots in MIG–17s are not much of a menace to American fliers, but now there are suggestions that the Soviet Union may supply MIG–21s or the "all-weather" MIG–23s.

Should the Vietnamese prove unequal to the difficulties of their mission, rather than allow a sister Communist state to be destroyed the Russians may send their own pilots into combat. According to Donald Grant, the staff correspondent of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* at the UN, U Thant was told in Moscow recently that Russian pilots would be sent to fly MIG–21s in Vietnam, and Russian crews would man the Russian-built surface-to-air missile sites which, by whomever manned heretofore, have made a dismal showing against U.S. aircraft. Thant is said to have repeated this to Under Secretary of State George Ball and Sen. ROBERT F. KENNEDY, and presumably Secretary Rusk has been informed. But, Grant writes, UN diplomats "see no signs that Thant's view will have any real impact on U.S. policy." A familiar story.

Suppose, however, that the worst does not come to the worst, and a lethal confrontation between the two great powers is providentially avoided. This would not invalidate the predictions of a war lasting a decade or longer which have been coming from both sides. Ten years? One can hardly conceive of Johnson's predatory brand of internationalism surviving for even half that period. Either it will win a speedy victory—a happy ending which few competent observers expect—or he may have difficulty convincing a majority of the voters in 1968, a fact of which Mr. Johnson is keenly aware.

Alastair Buchan's comments on the Johnson gamble in the London *Observer* are worth noting in this connection. Precisely because our commitments are so far-flung (and, to date, so unsuccessful) while domestic difficulties continue to mount, Buchan sees a coming reversion to those interational obligations that the United States could discharge effectively, such as deterrence of nuclear war and economic assistance to countries politically and industrially qualified. That kind of internationalism the critics of the Administration could and would support. It is Johnson's ventures abroad in search of monsters to destroy that the critics condemn and that Johnson himself, were he to reflect, could see leading only to disaster.

SARATOGA PERFORMING ARTS CENTER IN NEW YORK STATE—A SUMMER CULTURAL ATTRACTION

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. President, I would like to call attention to the conclusion of a successful first season of the Saratoga Performing Arts Center.

During this season more than 85,000 people visited Saratoga Springs to attend 21 performances of the New York City Ballet. An additional 83,000 visitors attended the 14 concerts of the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra. These attendance figures reflect the enthusiastic public response to the programs offered by the Center.

In commenting on the quality of the programs at the Center, Mr. Paul Hume remarked in the Washington Post of July 31:

> The happy fact is that a superlative combination of excellences has come together at Saratoga . . . one of the world's greatest ballet companies and one of the world's finest symphony orchestras . . . At a single stroke the Saratoga Performing Arts Center has placed Saratoga in the very top circle of summer music centers.

The Saratoga Performing Arts Center provides a unique setting for the performance of these programs. The amphitheater at the center was designed and engineered with imagination and competence by Architect John MacFayden and acoustical consultant Paul Veneklasen. It seats 5,100 and is placed in a graceful natural locale which permits the seating of almost 2,000 more on the surrounding lawn.

Hotel, dining, and other refreshment facilities are within walking distance, at the nearby Gideon Putnam State Reservation.

The arts center adds a new dimension to the many attractions of Saratoga Springs, the renowned racetrack, the National Racing Museum, the spas, the Yaddo Gardens, swimming pools, and a series of golf courses for every player. The center's performances make a visit to Saratoga that much more enjoyable.

The Saratoga area is also interesting from a historical standpoint. Nearly is the Saratoga battlefield and museum where the tide of the Revolutionary War was turned by the defeat of Gen. John Burgoyne, who was attempting to capture the capital at Albany and cut the colonies in two. Saratoga lay along the "road to empire"—the Hudson River—Champlain waterway. Along this route the French, British, Indians and Colonists warred for nearly 100 years to settle the destiny of the continent, and their fortresses and battlegrounds may still be seen today.

I join my fellow citizens of New York in saluting the Saratoga Performing Arts Center. It reflects the vigor and vitality of this historic area. I look forward to its growth as a national summer cultural center. I call the center to the attention of my colleagues as one of the new attractions that makes upstate New York an outstanding place to visit and enjoy.

THE DICKEY-LINCOLN SCHOOL POWER PROJECT

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, because of the very considerable opposition in the House of Representatives to the Dickey-Lincoln School Power Project—because the House Appropriations Committee has cut the President's proposed budget on the item by one-third from the requested $1,200,000 for fiscal year 1968—because the House Appropriations Committee placed a delaying restriction even on these reduced funds by imposing the restriction and condition of another study on this project—and because the House will vote on this project tomorrow, I deem it appropriate and urgent to place before the Congress the high points of the testimony given today by the Army Engineers before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Public Works this morning.

These very pertinent points were made in the statement of General Leber and in answer to questions asked by myself and the chairman of the subcommittee, the senior Senator from Louisiana. Army Engineers witnesses testified that:

First. There was no need for further study and investigation of the project for it had been studied several times, citing studies in 1953, 1956, 1959, 1963, and 1965;

Second. That these studies had clearly established that the project met all three tests of comparability, financial feasibility, and favorable benefit-cost ratio;

Third. That the benefit-cost ratio was a very favorable 1.9-to-1 ratio—in other words, annually the benefits will be twice as great as the cost of the project;

Fourth. That the Army Engineers had a capability of $2 million of work on the project in fiscal 1967 even though the President had asked for only $1,200,000 and the House Appropriations Committee had cut the amount down to only $800,000;

Fifth. That the action of the House Appropriations Committee would delay the action program on the project on the project by at least 1 year; and

Sixth. That the status of the treaty negotiations was that while all the details had been worked out, the treaty had not yet been ratified because of change in personnel handling the treaty, but was about to be ratified.

PROTESTANT CLERGYMEN OPPOSE ADMISSION OF RED CHINA TO U.N.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, an advertisement appeared in yesterday's New York Times and Washington Post carrying the results of a nationwide poll of Protestant ministers concerning the question of admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

This poll and the story behind it is of significant interest, and I wish to briefly

discuss the reason for this poll, and the nature of its conclusions.

On February 22, 1966, the General Board of the National Council of Churches adopted a resolution calling for the admission of Communist China to the United Nations and granting of U.S. diplomatic recognition to the Chinese Communist regime. These resolutions were adopted by a nearly unanimous vote.

As a result of these resolutions and other statements by individual churchmen, the impression has been created that the majority of American clergymen support both Communist China's admission to the United Nations and its recognition by the United States. Denominations belonging to the National Council of Churches have a total of more than 40 million members. Despite any disclaimers, the political impact of such resolutions is to encourage the impression that these sentiments are held by the great majority of Protestant church members and clergymen.

As the advertisement in yesterday's New York Times points out, the 30,000 replies to a nationwide poll of Protestant clergymen demonstrates that—contrary to the impression conveyed by the National Council of Churches resolution—the overwhelming majority of Protestant ministers oppose the admission of Red China to the U.N.

The poll was conducted by the Reverend Daniel A. Poling, chaplain of the Interfaith Memorial Chapel of the Four Chaplains in Philadelphia, and chairman of the board of Christian Herald magazine. The results indicated that 71.4 percent of American Protestant clergymen polled were opposed to the admission of Communist China to the United Nations or American recognition of that government. The same poll showed that 93.7 percent of American Protestant clergymen were opposed to the "expulsion of the Republic of China from the United Nations in order to satisfy Communist Chinese conditions for joining."

Commenting on what these results mean, Dr. Poling stated:

This great reaffirmation of support of present United States policy toward Communist China was made in spite of the tremendous and continuing campaigns advocating appeasement of Red China which have been leveled at American clergymen. The results of this poll should set the record straight. Those church bodies or officials who may take a different point of view have every right to do so. However, it is now clear that they speak only for themselves and not for the Protestant community.

Following the poll, a clergymen's Emergency Committee on China was formed. The committee is backed by Reverend Poling, Dr. Walter Judd, and a number of other religious leaders, and it will combat the ideas concerning China which has been adopted by the National Council of Churches.

I wish to share with my colleagues the results of this poll, together with the text of an advertisement which is planned for use in a number of major newspapers.

I request unanimous consent for the insertion of this material at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[Press release from the Clergymen's Emergency Committee on China, Rev. Daniel A. Poling, chairman; Rev. David C. Head, executive secretary]

NATIONWIDE POLL OF PROTESTANT CLERGYMEN INDICATES 71.4% OPPOSED TO U.N. ADMISSION OF RED CHINA OR U.S. RECOGNITION OF PEIPING—NATIONAL PROTESTANT CLERGYMEN'S COMMITTEE ON CHINA ORGANIZED

NEW YORK, N.Y., August 31, 1966.—Reverend Daniel A. Poling, Chaplain of the interfaith memorial Chapel of the Four Chaplains and Chairman of the Board of Christian Herald magazine, today announced the results of a nationwide poll which indicated that 71.4% of American Protestant clergymen polled were opposed to the admission of Red China to the U.N. or American diplomatic recognition of Peiping. The same poll showed that 93.7% of American Protestant clergymen were opposed to the ". . . expulsion of the Republic of China from the U.N. in order to satisfy Communist Chinese conditions for joining."

Dr. Poling also announced the formation of the Clergymen's Emergency Committee on China to ". . . provide factual information and material on Red China to American clergymen and, whenever necessary, to articulate the sentiments of the majority on the question of concern."

In his statement announcing the results of the poll, Dr. Poling said: "On February 22, 1966, the General Board of the National Council of Churches, meeting in St. Louis, adopted a resolution calling for the admission of Communist China to the United Nations and the granting of United States diplomatic recognition of the Peiping regime.

"This widely-publicized resolution—and similar statements from some other church bodies—has caused dismay in nations throughout the world who stand in firm opposition against Communist aggression and enslavement and who look to the United States as the leader in this crucial world struggle. Particularly tragic is the effect on the morale of young Americans battling Communism in Vietnam. If their own churches and church leaders favor accommodation with totalitarian, atheistic and predatory Communism, should they give their lives in resisting it?

"In the belief that these resolutions and statements do not represent the American Protestant community—and that the great majority of Protestant clergymen are one with their fellow Americans in opposing any steps which would help strengthen Communist China—I undertook to poll individual American Protestant clergymen on this historic question.

"A master list of Protestant clergymen from every state of the Union was obtained through the Dunhill International List Co. of New York City, and 65% of these were selected at random and mailed a form containing three questions: are you in favor of the admission of Communist China to the United Nations at this time?; are you in favor of the expulsion of the Republic of China from the United Nations in order to satisfy Communist Chinese conditions for joining?; are you in favor of the United States granting diplomatic recognition to Communist China at this time? Nearly 30,000 clergymen mailed their completed forms back to Philadelphia. The services of John Felix Associates in New York were employed to make an independent tabulation of the results.

"The 'No's' were overwhelming. Of those responding: 72.9% were opposed to the admission of Communist China to the United Nations; 25.6% were in favor, the balance did not reply; 93.7% were opposed to meeting the basic Red Chinese condition for joining the United Nations; 2.9% were in favor, the balance did not reply; 71.4% were opposed to diplomatic recognition of the Peiping regime; 25.8% were in favor, the balance did not reply. This great reaffirmation of support of present United States policy toward Communist China was made in spite of the tremendous and continuing campaigns advocating appeasement of Red China which have been leveled at American clergymen.

"The results of this poll should set the record straight. Those church bodies or officials who make take a differing point of view have every right to do so. However, it is now clear that they speak only for themselves and not for the Protestant community."

Dr. Poling went on to announce the organization of the Clergymen's Emergency Committee on China by saying: "Well-financed and well-publicized pressures for appeasement of Red China still continue. It is therefore vital that clergymen be kept informed of the true facts—without illusion or wishful thinking—so that the will of the majority will not be overcome by a small minority through default. For this reason, the ad hoc Clergymen's Emergency Committee on China has been formed—to provide factual information and material on Red China to American clergymen and, whenever necessary, to articulate the sentiments of the majority on the questions of concern.

"We call on clergymen of all faiths to join with us in this emergency movement. We call on the American people of all faiths to support this movement. We have a transcendent moral and spiritual responsibility: to the young Americans who are daily giving their lives in Vietnam in the struggle for freedom against a ruthless Communist enemy; to the enslaved Chinese people who have no place to look for hope but to us; to the hundreds of millions more who live in Communist darkness throughout the world; and to the basic security and safety of our beloved country."

The Reverend David C. Head has been appointed Executive Secretary of the new Committee which will have its national headquarters at 342 Madison Avenue in New York City. Rev. Head served with the American Baptist Convention and was former pastor of the Grace Baptist Church in Brooklyn, New York. He was Vice President, Public Relations & Development of The King's College, Briarcliff Manor, New York and served as the Director of their National Freedom Education Center.

For further information contact: Rev. David C. Head, Telephone: 661-3375.

Because The New York Times gave a lead story position and almost a whole page to "198 academic experts on China," including a high school teacher, and an assistant professor of library science, but gave only six inches to the following poll of 30,000 clergymen, we are paying for this space to bring the story to the American public.

71.4% of American Protestant Clergymen polled vote "No" to the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, to United States diplomatic recognition of Peiping.

93.7% of American Protestant Clergymen polled vote "No" to satisfying Red China's primary condition for joining the United Nations; the expulsion of the Republic of China.

On February 22, 1966, the General Board of the National Council of Churches, meeting in St. Louis, adopted a resolution calling for the admission of Communist China to the United Nations and the granting of United States diplomatic recognition to the Peiping regime.

This widely-publicized resolution—and similar statements from other church bodies—has caused dismay in nations throughout the world who stand in firm opposition against Communist aggression and

Our boys in Vietnam need boots, shoes, and footwear of all sorts. I hope that we will not have to go scurrying around the world to buy this footwear from Japan, Italy, and other nations. We ought to insure that this footwear will continue to be manufactured right here in the United States of America.

I hope that we do not begin to bargain away, as I said before, the birthright of the American worker so that he will wake up and find that there is no job for him in our factories manufacturing peacetime goods rather than bullets and atomic bombs.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

NO WIDER WAR

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, for many months some of us in the Senate have expressed concern over the deepening involvement of American forces in the Vietnam war. The expression of that concern has veen varied, unorganized, and sporadic. At times it has been timid and faltering. But it has for the most part represented the thoughtful questions and doubts of Americans deeply troubled by our Vietnam policy.

I believe that history will vindicate those who have warned against the course our Government is following in southeast Asia—especially since early 1965. Even in a great democracy such as ours, however, dissent is difficult and sometimes ineffective in competing with the din of battle and the avalanche of official pronouncements.

In 1964 the American people overwhelmingly endorsed the position of President Johnson who said: "We seek no wider war." Those who called for the bombing of North Vietnam, aerial interdiction of the jungle trails, defoliation, and a sharp U.S. troop buildup were rejected as irresponsible and trigger happy.

But for the past 2 years, we have been widening the war in virtually every conceivable manner. Our bombing planes are now hitting daily in both North and South Vietnam with a force equal to our World War II bombardment of Germany and Japan. We have 400,000 men in southeast Asia and that number is growing.

Where are we heading in Vietnam? Has the bombing worked? Are we moving toward an endless war in Asia involving eventually the Chinese and the Russians? Have we been given all the facts about the nature of our commitment and the alleged efforts to reach a settlement with the other side? What is the significance of reports this weekend that American forces are now engaged in a combat role in Thailand? Does this mean we are setting the stage for another Vietnam-type war? Was there an election mandate in 1964 against a wider war? If so, what are we to say of our fast spreading involvement since 1964?

There are questions that have been brilliantly considered by Mr. Richard Goodwin, former White House assistant to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson in a historic speech given at Washington's Statler Hotel, September 17. Mr. Goodwin, now associated with Wesleyan University, and the author of a highly discussed book on Vietnam, "Triumph or Tragedy," is one of the Nation's most brilliant young men.

His words are well worth considering. He has now called on Americans of every persuasion to unite on the proposition we accepted 2 years ago: "We seek no wider war." He advocates a national committee of citizens opposed to any further escalation of the war. In describing the purposes of such a committee, he said:

> It will not be aimed at withdrawal or even a lessening of the war in the South; although individuals who oppose escalation may also hold those views. Thus it will be open to all groups who oppose escalation in the North regardless of their position on other issues, and will be open to the millions of Americans who belong to no group but who share this basic belief and apprehension. Such a committee can provide a constant flow of objective information about Vietnam. It can keep vigil over official statements and ask the hard questions which might help separate wishful thinking from facts. It will neither be against the Administration nor for it, neither with any political party or opposed to it, neither liberal nor conservative. Its sole aim will be to mobilize and inform the American people in order to increase the invisible weight of what I believe to be the American majority in the deliberations and inner councils of government. Its purpose is to help the President and others in government by providing a counter pressure against those who urge a more militant course; a pressure for which those in government should be grateful since it will help them pursue the course of wise restraint.

Mr. Goodwin's proposal for the formation of a national committee opposed to any further widening of American military operations against North Vietnam would seem to make sense. I hope such a committee will be established. Those of us who question the wisdom of the war in the South have all the more reason to oppose its escalation in the North.

These are some of the observations advanced by Mr. Goodwin:

First. He believes that the Vietnamese war is "the most dangerous conflict since the end of World War II."

Second. He believes that our fast-spreading commitment in Vietnam "has reduced discussions about domestic America to academic discourse," and "has swallowed up the New Frontier and the Great Society" while "eroding our position throughout the world."

Third. He believes that "there has never been such intense and widespread deception and confusion as that which surrounds this war."

> The continual downpour of contradiction, misstatements, and kaleidoscopically shifting attitudes has been so torrential that it has almost numbed the capacity to separate truth from conjecture or falsehood. At one time we are told that there is no military solution, and then that victory can be ours. There are months when we talk about negotiations and months when we forget them. There are times when dissenters give aid and comfort to the enemy and times when they are acting in the greatest of our traditions. We have been reassured about efforts to reach a peaceful settlement when there is no plan or program for settlement in existence. We are given endless statistics with a numerical precision which only masks the fact that they are based on inadequate information, or guesses, or even wishful thinking. For example, if we take the numbers of enemy we are supposed to be killing, add to that the defectors, along with a number of wounded much less than our own ratio of wounded to killed, we find we are wiping out virtually the entire North Vietnamese force every year. This truly makes their continued resistance one of the marvels of the world. Unless the figures are wrong, which of course they are. We are told the bombing is terribly costly to North Vietnam. Yet the increase in Soviet and Chinese aid, since the bombing, is far greater, in economic terms, than the loss through bombing. Except in human life, the North Vietnamese are showing a profit * * *.
>
> As predicted by almost every disengaged expert, from General Ridgway to George Kennan; and as taught by the whole history of aerial warfare, that bombing has neither brought the enemy to his knees or to the council table. It has not destroyed his capacity to make war, or seriously slowed down either infiltration or the flow of supplies. At each step it was claimed the bombing would make a decisive difference. Yet it has made hardly any difference at all. In fact, the tempo of conflict has increased.
>
> The official statements justifying the Hanoi-Haiphong raids bore partial witness to the futility of bombing. We were told the raids were necessary because infiltration had increased enormously; an official admission of the failute of one of the most intensive bombing campaigns in world history. Despite thousands upon thousands of raid more men and supplies are flowing South and the routes of infiltration have been widened and improved. Despite the bombing, or perhaps because of it, all signs indicate the North Vietnamese will to fight has stiffened and the possibilities of negotiation have dimmed. Despite the bombing, or because of it, North Vietnam has become increasingly dependent upon Russia and China. Despite the bombing, or because of it there has been a vastly increased supply of aid to North Vietnam by Russia and China and a deepening world communist commitment to this war.
>
> In short the bombing has been a failure, and may turn out to be a disaster.

Fourth. To those who are afraid of honest dissent and courageous criticism in time of war lest it give encouragement to the enemy, Mr. Goodwin answers:

> Of course the enemy is glad to see our divisions. But our concern is with America not Hanoi. Our concern is with those millions of our own people, and with future generations, who will themselves be glad to see that there were men who struggled to prevent needless devastation and thus added to the strength and the glory of the United States.

It is in that American tradition that Mr. Goodwin speaks as have earlier wartime dissenters including Abraham Lincoln who could not remain silent when his conscience told him that the campaign against Mexico was wrong.

I hope that every Member of Congress, every Government official and many American citizens will read Mr. Goodwin's thoughtful analysis of where we are heading in the Vietnam war.

I ask unanimous consent that his address be printed at this point:

circumstances this is not the time to consider such a drastic change in the method of assessing duty on rubber footwear.

Now the Commission is considering also whether or not rubber footwear should be included in the Geneva tariff negotiations. I do not believe that the industry is in a position where it can withstand any further reduction in duties on competitive imports.

Foreign manufacturers have already captured a disproporiate share of the domestic market. Our American industry has long lost its export market. We can no longer compete abroad—not because of any lack of enterprise on the part of American manufacturers but simply because of American labor's high standard of living.

The basis of this high standard of living, of course, is our high wage level. Rubber footwear requires a greater ratio of labor in production than most industries. Wages represent between 45 and 50 percent of the cost of production of rubber footwear in the United States. It is true that a high ratio of labor is needed overseas to produce rubber footwear but the big difference is in the way we pay labor in this country.

I believe that it is essential that we preserve our high standard of living. We must protect the jobs of our American workers. Under the present import duties on rubber footwear the impact of imports has been immense.

We have already lost one manufacturer in Rhode Island—the Goodyear Footwear Corp.—and there have been losses of jobs in other companies. The details have been provided to the Tariff Commission by spokesmen for the labor unions.

We have only to scan the witness list at the Tariff Commission hearings to understand the problem. Representatives of the American footwear industry and American labor testified as did representatives of their foreign competition.

Let us this once resolve the question in favor of the American worker.

I hope that the Tariff Commission and Governor Herter, and all those responsible for making the decision, will consider very long and very deeply the interests of our American workers. There is no man, in my opinion, who should understand this problem better than Governor Herter, who used to be the Governor of the State of Massachusetts. I would hope that in our desire and our intent to obtain an agreement with GATT, we do not bargain away the birthright of the American worker.

I urge the Tariff Commission and Governor Herter to retain the American selling price method of valuation and to remove rubber footwear from any consideration for further tariff reductions.

Mr. President, I submitted a statement to the Tariff Commission, and I ask unanimous consent that that statement be printed in the RECORD at this point, as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN O. PASTORE, DEMOCRAT, OF RHODE ISLAND, BEFORE THE U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION, SEPTEMBER 19, 1966

Mr. Chairman, your Commission has under consideration today a matter which is of serious concern to me and to the State of Rhode Island. The purpose of this hearing is to determine the probable effects of a proposed change in the method of assessing import duty on rubber footwear, and of a further reduction in the rate of duty on such footwear. The first part of your inquiry involves the elimination of the American Selling Price method of assessing duty on imported rubber-soled fabric footwear and the substitution of a straight 58 percent ad valorem rate. The second phase is directed to a determination of whether or not this type of footwear should be put on the GATT bargaining table where it would be subject to a duty cut of up to 50 percent, pursuant to the provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.

I appreciate this opportunity to submit to you my views on these points, and to explain my deep interest in your investigation. We have in my State two of the major manufacturers of rubber footwear, Bristol Manufacturing, of Bristol, and the United States Rubber Company. The latter has plants in both Providence and Woonsocket. Its rubber footwear producing facilities are located in Woonsocket.

These companies are vital to the Rhode Island economy. In both Bristol and Woonsocket, they are the largest employers and the largest taxpayers. It seems to me that it is important to keep in mind during your deliberations whether or not the rubber footwear industry and the general economy would be adversely affected by either of the two proposed changes in tariff treatment on imported rubber footwear.

Through a provision of the Tariff Act of 1930, the American Selling Price method of assessing duty was applied to imported rubber footwear in 1933. This action followed an investigation by your Commission into the costs of production in this industry as well as in the exporting countries. It was this Commission's recommendation at that time that the differentials in costs of production, chiefly labor costs, were so wide that a duty increase to the fullest extent then permitted under the law, 50 per cent, would not be adequate to allow the American manufacturers to compete on a fair basis in their home market with products from abroad.

Those costs of production and wage differentials between the American manufacturers and the producers in the leading exporting countries are as great today—possibly greater—than they were at the time of this Commission's investigation. Under these conditions, there appears to be no justification for revoking the policy you recommended more than 30 years ago.

I am greatly concerned that in the proposed conversion from American Selling Price to an ad valorem of 58 per cent, the domestic manufacturers may lose some of the protection Congress meant for them to have. The manufacturers feel they will. They are not satisfied that in its study of this matter the Commission took the proper base, or a broad enough base, in averaging the applicable duties.

Further, the proposed rate was based on new procedures of the Treasury Department, which, by the Department's admission, have resulted in a reduction of 35 per cent in the effective duties collected. Congress has before it now several identical bills seeking to reverse the Treasury action. With the atmosphere so beclouded, it hardly is the time to consider such a drastic change in the method of assessing duty on rubber footwear.

There is more clarity on the second question—whether rubber footwear could be negotiated for tariff cuts in Geneva.

This industry is in no position to withstand a further reduction in duties on competitive imports.

Importers already have taken over a disproportionate share of the domestic market. The American industry has long lost its export market and can no longer compete abroad. This is in no sense due to lack of enterprise or intelligence on the part of the American manufacturers. It is simply because of the high standard of living we have acquired in this country. The basis of that high standard is our high wage level. Rubber footwear requires a greater ratio of labor in production than most industries. Wages represent between 45 and 50 per cent of mill door costs in the United States. A high ratio of labor is needed also to make competitive rubber footwear abroad. But the big difference is in what we pay labor in this country and what they pay in foreign countries.

It is essential that we preserve our high standard of living. It is essential that we protect the jobs of American workers. Under the present import duties on rubber footwear, the impact of imports has been severe. One manufacturer of rubber footwear in my State has closed its doors—the Goodyear Footwear Corporation. There have been losses of jobs in other companies. Details on this were given to your Commission by spokesmen for the labor unions of several rubber footwear manufacturers at the hearings you held June 8 on your proposed conversion from the American Selling Price.

With the difficulties the American rubber footwear industry has been having with expanding imports for the past decade, it hardly seems necessary to comment on a proposal to subject the industry to further reductions in its tariff protection.

But for the record, let me say that this industry needs more—not less—tariff protection. I urge you to recommend that rubber footwear *not* be considered for any further tariff reductions at the GATT conferences.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PASTORE. I yield.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I congratulate and commend my senior colleague on his leadership—just as he has already displayed it with respect to the question of textile imports—in seeking to stem the flood of foreign footwear, which can, unless braked, wash out two of the most important companies in our State of Rhode Island.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I wish to say we are developing a certain rationale in this country that some of our American industry is dispensable. And some of our foreign friends ought to know better, but that is the argument that they make. We have to understand that, bit by bit, they are chewing away at our American economy.

It is true that we are the most affluent society in the world. It is true that we probably have the largest gross national product of any country in the world. But the fact still remains that we have our share of poverty. We have our share of unemployment, although we have the largest employment rate today in the history of the country.

But we must take into account that we are fighting a war in Vietnam, and many of our workers are manufacturing the implements of war while some of our friends all over the world are manufacturing refrigerators, televisions, and radios—peacetime commodities.

The time will come, and I hope that the time will come soon, when we have peace in the world. At that time, our workers will have to be engaged in the manufacture of peacetime commodities. We might wake up to find that some of our domestic manufacturers have disappeared.

That has happened to the textile industry. It is now happening to the footwear industry.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SPEECH BY RICHARD N. GOODWIN AT THE NATIONAL BOARD MEETING OF AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION, STATLER-HILTON HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C., SEPTEMBER 17, 1966

This is a time when labels are unfashionable. Men hesitate to call themselves liberals or conservatives or radicals, fearing the complexity of their views will be swallowed up in some formal catechism of belief. Yet groups like this one are drawn together by a shared body of beliefs and values, and by common reactions to the sins and shortcomings of their society. They differ on many particular issues; but they do agree on the wisdom of a general direction and the urgency of certain purposes. In this sense, even in non-ideological America, there are radicals and rightists, liberals and conservatives. In this sense the Americans for Democratic Action is the spearhead of American liberalism.

It can look back on a record of achievement unmatched in American political organization. It has elected dozens of members to high office, many of its early programs are now law, and its once theoretical notions are the daily staple of bureaucracy.

It is easy to blunt, answer, and even ignore the criticism of liberalism which is largely a reflex action from past battles. The ease of such refutation, however, should not be permitted to obscure real defects. If there is reason for doubt it is not that today's liberals are too progressive, but that they are often not progressive enough: not that they are radical but that they are sometimes mired in outworn outlooks and programs; not that they are impractical but they have occasionally let practical necessities override faithfulness to ideals and values. We have discovered the perverse principle that defeat can breed strength while victory often erodes will and creates intoxication with success. Success is the disease of American society, a disease which strikes impartially at businessmen, politicians, movie stars and intellectuals alike.

It is especially virulent when it attacks the politically concerned and passionate, making them more anxious to enact bad programs than fight for a good one, elect a mediocrity than lose with distinction, support a sympathetic office holder even when he is wrong, simply because he is sympathetic. We do not advocate a policy of defeatism or even political suicide. We are politicians and the object of politics is the acquisition and use of power. Pragmatism, the code word of today's liberalism, is a useful tool to carry you forward, remove obstacles, and solve problems. But it does not tell you where to go. Beliefs tell you. Values tell you. Common goals tell you. Once that distinction is obscured it is easy to forget where you are going and even who you are.

Let me give a few tentative thoughts about today's redefinition of liberal goals before proceeding to the principal obstacle to all those goals: the war in Vietnam.

Liberal thought in America has always been a confederation of diverse beliefs. But there have been certain, discernible, central strands in the fabric of the past thirty years. One is the once revolutionary idea that the national government has a direct responsibility for the welfare of the people: For their well-being as individuals—older citizens, poor or Negro—and for the general health of the economy. Another is the belief that private power must be compelled to act in the public interest, that through regulation America must be made safe for capitalism.

Those were the subject of wonderful, passionate engagements, but they are largely won. They have become the truisms of American political life, although there are many important skirmishes to be fought and the specter of Hooverism occasionally looms over the horizon only to be brushed casually away by a slightly surprised electorate.

It is this victory of important principle, and the changes it has helped bring the nation, which makes it necessary to rethink most of the old political beliefs and slogans as this organization, and others, have been doing.

At one time to be a liberal meant to be for federal action against states' rights. Particularly in civil rights this is still a vital question. Yet our major effort now is to find new ways to help states and local government assume responsibilities and burdens; and it was a Democratic liberal, not a Republican conservative, who proposed to turn over federal revenue to state government.

At one time to be a liberal meant to automatically favor the cause of labor over business. Yet the Chamber of Commerce is more willing to trade with China than the AFL–CIO; unions are often more concerned with protecting the established order than businessmen; and it was the liberals who helped pass laws against racketeering in labor. Even the most ardent liberal will prefer the activities of Tom Watson of IBM to those of Jimmy Hoffa.

At one time to be a liberal was to oppose big business. Yet it was the Administration of John Kennedy, not Eisenhower, that proposed and passed measures for business expansion to the benefit of all of us.

At one time to be a liberal was to fight for the principle that collective action did not diminish individual freedom. While we still go through the motions, the battle is over, for freedom has been enlarged as collective action widened. Rather we are now increasingly concerned about coercion from the center.

These old battle cries are largely a victim of success and of profound changes in American society. They were built on the assumption that rising wealth fairly shared was the key to the American dream. Of course, that dream has not yet come true for the chronically poor or the Negro. Still, in terms of the old values, most Americans have achieved greatly. They are well-fed, live in decent houses, own television sets, drive 90 million automobiles, and debate not whether but where to take a vacation. Yet even at the moment of victory for so many we know that shared prosperity is not enough. Modern man, with all his wealth and comfort, is oppressed by forces which menace and confine the quality of his life.

Increasingly American thinkers are discovering, describing, and attacking these forces. It is the responsibility of politics to translate this emerging awareness into political action.

The ancient desire to stretch one's talents to the limit of ability and desire now enters a world whose instruments grow in complexity, where understanding is more difficult as the possibilities of all encompassing knowledge disappear, and where leisure threatens many with boredom and futility. It is not enough to train people, we must do so through an educational system of a quality and daring of innovation past all our old objectives.

Even with knowledge and understanding at his command, however, man alone is not man fulfilled. He must be sustained and strengthened by the world around him, and by those with whom he lives and works.

He will not find that strength in cities scarred by slums, encircled by suburbs which sprawl recklessly across the countryside; where movement is difficult, beauty rare, life itself more impersonal and security imperiled by the lawless.

And even beyond education and the deterioration of our environment modern America assaults the deepest values of our civilization, those worlds within a world where each man can find meaning and dignity and warmth: family and neighborhood, community and the dignity of work.

Family ties grow weaker as the gap between the generations widens. The community disappears as the streets of our cities rush in upon each other. Work, once the principal support of self-respect, becomes more and more mechanical, each man a replaceable componency in an abstract task. Ahead lies the most terrible danger of all: a nation of strangers; each separate from his fellows, remote from his labors, detached from participation in the great enterprise of American life.

Underneath there is a single, overwhelming cause for the discontent which runs like a dark thread through the silver fabric of American life. It is cause and consequence of all the rest. It is the fear of the individual human being that he has become meaningless in the great human enterprise. Decisions of peace and war, life and death, are made by a handful of men beyond his reach. Cities and factories grow and spread seemingly powered by a force beyond the control of man.

Science describes our world, and life itself, in terms far beyond the reach of ordinary understanding. Computers and marvelous machines seem to make man unnecessary in the oldest stronghold of all, his work.

This is the motive power, the fueling force, behind the new right and the new left. They want to matter. And so do we all.

To glimpse the shortcomings of American life, to feel the weight of dark and obscure forces, even to illuminate with investigation and thought the wrongs of American life, it is not enough for any group dedicated to political action. That requires we translate passion, engagement, and a sense of injustice into concrete action; as individual groups, and through political institutions. Many of the proposals which fill liberal journals and meeting chambers are little more than logical extensions of old ideas and processes. The guaranteed annual wage, the organization of farm workers, national health insurance, and many other ideas, can stand on their own merits but they hardly represent a radical departure from our past. Most of the causes which engage us deeply—from civil rights to the war against poverty—flow from the historic drive to open the blessings of society to all people.

I do not pretend to have the answers or a dramatic new approach but it seems to me that certain guidelines are emerging which may help show the way.

First, is to devote more of our resources to common needs; from schools and playgrounds to blighted cities and poisoned air. History has proved that rising national wealth does not resolve social problems. Present experience proves that the old method of handing out federal grants will not rebuild a city or clean up pollution. The problems of the city, for example, are not simply problems of welfare or income. They demand technical skill, a network of subsidies and regulation, planning and engineering. More and more we will have to turn problems over to technicians, equip them with authority, and provide the funds to do the job. People are far more concerned with progress, with getting the job done, than they are with the ideology of change. The technician-politician—the man who regardless of party can resolve complex problems—is the man of the future.

Secondly, we will have to reshape the historic relationships of our federal structure so not to be completely dependent on Washington for comfort, help and skill. The problems are far too huge and varied to be solved from the top. Moreover, to attempt it is to strip people in communities and

states of the chance to share in the solution of the great problems of society. It is essential to our spiritual health to develop structures which give people a chance to share in the American enterprise. It is essential to our national progress that we tap the enormous resources of mind and energy which lie unused, ignored and unwanted throughout America.

This means decentralization of government action; a decentralization which will take many forms and whose evolution is a challenge to our genius for political creation. Variety will be the hallmark of such a system, but I believe the basic pattern will be federal funds and guidelines with responsibility for action left to the community. For example, perhaps the best approach to the problem of our cities can be drawn from the theoretical patterns of foreign aid. The federal government would require the city to develop a master plan of development embracing basic services, housing and all the components of community life; providing federal funds on a large scale to carry the plan forward. As another example I have proposed turning a large part of the foreign aid program over to the states, involving communities and citizens directly in our relationship with the underdeveloped continents.

Even then individuals will have to fight City Hall; but it is far easier than fighting the White House.

We are worlds away from the old debate about federal power and big government. For underneath the rhetoric that was a debate whether we should tackle social and economic problems at all; or whether we should leave them to the impersonal workings of an unregulated society. Today decentralization assumes that many problems will yield to directed human intelligence; the question is how best to enlist the energies of Americans in that task. I have no doubt that citizen participation is the future direction of liberalism. It will permit us to do a better job with our society. It will allow our people to share the life of the nation; to contribute, to work, to be needed and to be heard. It is a key to salvation from the separation and human frustration which are a poisoning and unnecessary by-product of our civilization.

Thirdly, we who have often looked to Washington for protection of human rights must increase our guard against the coercive society. It is the nature of power to resent opposition to its exercise. That resentment is multiplied as power grows. When those who have such power are also convinced of the wisdom and beneficence of their views that freedom is in danger. The worst threat to liberty comes not from those who simply seek their own aggrandisement, but from those who seek the good of others, identifying opposition to their desires with harm to the nation. Already wiretapping, bugging, and manifold invasions of privacy are growing, I believe, far beyond the present knowledge of any of us. There are laws in Congress to give the Secretary of State arbitrary power to limit the travel of Americans. It has even been proposed that we draft all Americans—not simply to meet an immediate threat to our securiey—but as a matter of course. All of these have in common the frightening belief that individual action and freedom should be limited for the good of the state,, according to some officeholders' view of what that good requires. That is the cause to enlist our energies, to bring us shouting into the streets against any who claim the right to tell us where to go, or listen to our private conversations, or prescribe how we must serve our society. The coercive society is no less obnoxious when coercion is masked in benevolence.

These are tentative steps toward redefinitions of difficult and shifting goals; but they are charged with a traditional faith in the capacity to reshape our society more to the needs of man.

There is, however, another issue which has reduced discussions about domestic America to academic discourse, which has swallowed up the New Frontier and Great Society, and which is eroding our position throughout the world. That issue is, of course, the war in Vietnam.

The Vietnamese war is, I believe, the most dangerous conflict since the end of World War II: more dangerous than Berlin or even Korea. In those confrontations the danger was clear and sensibly appraised. The stakes were fairly obvious to both sides. Objectives were carefully limited; and power ultimately became the handmaiden of reason and final accommodation. In Vietnam, on the other hand, the dangers are confused and unclear. Objectives are expressed in vague generalities which open to endless vistas. Moreover, from other cold war confrontations there evolved a set of tacit understandings designed to limit conflict even while it was being waged. That, for example, is the real meaning of the no-sanctuary policy carefully observed, we should remember, by both sides. Today those understandings are in grave danger of being swept away, and with them our most important protections against enlarging conflict.

The air is charged with rhetoric. We are buried in statements and speeches about negotiation and peace, the defense of freedom and the dangers of communism, the desire to protect the helpless and compassion for the dying. Much of it is important and sincere and well-meaning. Some is intended to deceive. Some is deliberate lie and distortion. But the important thing is not what we are saying, but what we are doing; not what is being discussed, but what is happening.

And what is happening is not confusing or unclear or contradictory at all. It is not masked in obscurity or buried in secret archives. It stands in clear, vivid and towering relief against the landscape of conflict. The war is getting larger. Every month there are more men in combat, more bombs falling, greater expenditures, deeper commitments. It is the steady inexorable course of this conflict since its beginning. We have gone to the United Nations' and the war has grown larger. We have offered funds for development and talked of social reform; and the war has grown larger. We have predicted victory and called for compromise; and the war has grown larger.

There is therefore, little escape from the conclusion that it will grow larger still.

Nor is this steady pattern the consequence of inexorable historical forces. It flows from the decisions of particular men in particular places –in Washington and Hanoi, in Saigon and in the jungle headquarters of the Vietcong. It is in part a product of communist hope and drive for victory; but it is partly our decision too. And we must suppose those same decisions will continue to be made.

Nor is this, as we are sometimes told, because there is no alternative. There are dozens of alternatives. There are enclave programs, and programs to hold the centers of population. There are suggestions that we rely on pacification of the countryside rather than the destruction of the Vietcong. There are proposals to limit the bombing or to end it. There are proposals for negotiations, complete with all the specifics of possible agreement. The fact is the air is full of alternatives. They have simply been rejected in favor of another course; the present course. And we must also suppose they will continue to be rejected.

All prophecy is an exercise in probability. With that caution let us try to strip the argument of its necessary passion and discuss the probabilities which are compelled by the awesome logic of the course of events in Vietnam. Passion is important; it lies at the root of war and of hatred of war. Nor do I lack personal feeling; for only the strongest of feelings could impel me to discuss a subject with which I was so recently connected in so intimate a way. Yet we can perhaps now meet more productively on the common ground of reason. Rarely has there been greater need for such unity among men of good will.

In other places I have set forth my personal views on the conduct of the war in South Vietnam: The belief that we have an important stake in Southeast Asia, and that we must continue the battle in the South—although differently than we are now doing—until a political settlement is reached. And I have, like many others, discussed alternative routes to these objectives. Today, however, I would like to talk about the lengthening shadow of the war in the North; for in that war are the swiftly germinating seeds of the most grave danger.

In this, as in so many aspects of the war, much of the information which feeds judgment is deeply obscured. Of course, in times of armed conflict facts are often elusive and much information, of necessity, cannot be revealed. By its nature war is hostile to truth. Yet with full allowance for necessary uncertainties I believe there has never been such intense and widespread deception and confusion as that which surrounds this war. The continual downpour of contradiction, misstatements, and kaleidoscopically shifting attitudes has been so torrential that it has almost numbed the capacity to separate truth from conjecture or falsehood.

At one time we are told there is no military solution, and then that victory can be ours.

There are months when we talk about negotiations and months when we forget them.

There are times when dissenters give aid and comfort to the enemy and times when they are acting in the greatest of our traditions.

We have been reassured about efforts to reach a peaceful settlement when there is no plan or program for settlement in existence.

We are given endless statistics with a numerical precision which only masks the fact they are based on inadequate information, or guesses, or even wishful thinking. For example, if we take the numbers of enemy we are supposed to be killing, add to that the defectors, along with a number of wounded much less than our own ratio of wounded to killed, we find we are wiping out virtually the entire North Vietnamese force every year. This truly makes their continued resistance one of the marvels of the world. Unless the figures are wrong, which of course they are.

We are told the bombing is terribly costly to North Vietnam. Yet the increase in Soviet and Chinese aid, since the bombing, is far greater, in economic terms, than the loss through bombing. Except in human life, the North Vietnamese are showing a profit.

At the time of the Hanoi-Haiphong bombings last June we were told that in the first six months of 1966 enemy truck movement had doubled, the infiltration of supplies was up 150%, and infiltrated personnel increased 120%. However, the fact is we do not know, except in the most vague and general way, how much supplies are being brought in or how many men. They move at night, sometimes on trails we have not yet discovered, and the best intelligence gives only the most vague picture. We could not only be wrong, but enormously wrong. The swiftness with which we change our estimates helps show that seeming exactness conceals large uncertainties.

The statements which followed the Hanoi-Haiphong bombings are an illuminating example of this process in action.

It was said the raids would destroy a large proportion of North Vietnam's fuel capacity and this would help paralyze—or at least

slow down—the process of infiltration. Yet these raids had been anticipated, alternative techniques of providing fuel had been developed, and the raids were destined to have little if any effect on the North Vietnamese capacity to make war. And this was clear at the time we bombed.

We were told, in an inside story in the New York Times, that the bombings would prove to Hanoi it could not count on its allies. The fact is that aid was stepped up as we anticipated it would be.

Within a few days a high official said fresh intelligence showed that Hanoi was now plunged in gloom, weary of war, and suffused with a sense of hopelessness, presumably at least in part as a result of the raids. Yet, there was no substantial intelligence of this kind. We have heard little about it since. And recent information indicates that the opposite was the case—the enemy's will was strengthened.

The truth is that this major and spectacular escalation in the war had had little measurable effect on the enemy's capacity or morale, and most of those who looked at the matter seriously in advance of the bombing knew it would probably be ineffective.

Yet despite confusion and misstatement, despite the enormous difficulty of grasping the realities on which policy must be based, I believe we can know that further escalation of the war in the North will only bring us farther from settlement and closer to serious danger of a huge and devastating conflict.

We began the campaign of bombing in the North as a result of the enormous and unresolved difficulties of winning the real war, the war in the South.

As predicted by almost every disengaged expert, from General Ridgway to George Kennan; and as taught by the whole history of aerial warfare, that bombing has neither brought the enemy to his knees or to the council table. It has not destroyed his capacity to make war, or seriously slowed down either infiltration or the flow of supplies. At each step it was claimed the bombing would make a decisive difference. Yet it has made hardly any difference at all. In fact, the tempo of conflict has increased.

The official statements justifying the Hanoi-Haiphong raids bore partial witness to the futility of bombing. We were told the raids were necessary because infiltration had increased enormously; an official admission of the failure of one of the most intensive bombing campaigns in world history. Despite thousands upon thousands of raids more men and supplies are flowing South and the routes of infiltration have been widened and improved. Despite the bombing, or perhaps because of it, all signs indicate the North Vietnamese will to fight has stiffened and the possibilities of negotiation have dimmed. Despite the bombing, or because of it, North Vietnam has become increasingly dependent upon Russia and China. Despite the bombing, or because of it there has been a vastly increased supply of aid to North Vietnam by Russia and China and a deepening world communist commitment to this war.

In short the bombing has been a failure, and may turn out to be a disaster.

Yet we once again hear voices calling for further escalation; just as each previous time that the bombing has failed we have been told that more bombing is necessary and new goals are articulated. First it was said we wanted to stop infiltration. Next, we would persuade the North Vietnamese to come to the Council table. Then we would punish them and force them to surrender. Now men are talking of the need to destroy their capacity to make war. And so we move inexorably up the ladder of failure toward widening devastation. And the latest goal, the destruction of enemy capacity, if ever adopted, will be the most vaguely ambitious of all. For such capacity rests on the entire society; and that whole society; factories, dams, power plants, cities themselves must be brought tumbling down.

All of this is possible despite the fact that each future escalation will probably have the effect of previous escalations. It will increase the dangers of wider war, lessen the chances of a negotiated settlement, drain away effort which should be concentrated in the South, further alienate our allies, and have little damaging effect on the enemy's ability or will to fight.

We are sometimes asked what else we can do. I believe there are other things to do. The war can be fought more effectively in the South. The search for a settlement can be given greater direction and brilliance. We can prepare ourselves, if necessary, to accept a long ground war of attrition leading ultimately to a political settlement. But that is not the question. If the bombing cannot win the war, if it does not work; and above all if it carries tremendous political and military risks, then it should not be increased, either out of frustration with the war or with the polls.

For the greatest danger of this course—the course of escalation—is not only in the extent of devastation and death, or the damage it does to the hope of peaceful solution, but the fact that each step of the way increases in vast proportion the danger of a huge and bloody conflict. If North Vietnam is devastated then all reason for restraint or compromise is gone. The fight is no longer a war for the South but a struggle for survival calling their still largely uncommitted armies and people into battle. Nor can China stand by and see its ally destroyed. I do not believe China wants to fight the United States, at least not yet; but it cannot stand by while we destroy North Vietnam. To do so would forfeit all its claim to moral and political leadership of militant communism. They would then be truly a paper dragon, stoking the fires of revolution only when Chinese blood and land was not at stake.

Nor is China's entrance likely to be signalled by a huge and dramatic sweep of armies across the frontier. It is far more likely that increasing destruction in the North will stimulate or compel the Chinese to accelerate the nature and kind of their assistance. Perhaps Chinese pilots will begin to fly air defense over Hanoi. The number of Chinese troops in North Vietnam may be greatly increased. Chinese anti-aircraft crews may be placed throughout the country. Thus, step by step, China acting in response to seeming necessities, may become involved in a war it did not fully contemplate, much as we have. And there are many signs that this process has already begun. This is the most likely and grave route to enlarging conflict. And if China does enter we must bomb them, for certainly we will not permit them sanctuaries or, if it comes to that, engage their armies solely in the jungles of Southeast Asia. And lastly is the Soviet Union, forced to choose between China and America.

None of this is certain. An entirely different course is possible. Yet the danger of such a chain of events grows by immeasurable strides each time we enlarge the war in the North: and if past is prologue we will continue that enlargement. Yet the fantastic fact, the truth that challenges belief, is that this is being done although virtually no one remains besides some of the engaged military and a few men in the State Department—virtually no one in the Administration or out—who believes that increased bombing will have a decisive effect on the war in South Vietnam. We are taking likely and mounting risks in pursuit of an elusive, obscure, marginal, and chimerical hope; a course which defies reason and experience alike.

Yet I believe this is the way we are going: that only beneficent and uncertain fortune can bar the way. This is not a belief born of personal fear. After all, we, or most of us, will continue to work and prosper, hold meetings and make speeches, unless all of our civilization is swallowed up. Even then enough will survive for the race to evolve and perhaps create something finer. It is rather a belief born of a fallible reason and analysis, always better able to describe our situation that guide our action, which seeks in the acts of our past and the attitudes of our present a guide for our future.

I do not wish however, to come with a counsel of despair. The surest guarantee of misfortune is resignation. Therefore, we must all make what effort we can. There are enormous differences among the critics of the war. There are those who believe we have no interest in Vietnam or even in all of Asia. There are those who wish us to withdraw. There are fierce debates over the history of the war, the nature of its participants, the goals of our enemies. There are those, like myself, who believe we should carry on the war in the South while intensifying, modifying and sharpening the search for peaceful compromise tied to some measures of de-escalation in the North. Yet our danger is so grave that those who fear the future even more than they distrust the past—a group which encompasses, I believe, the majority of the American people—must seek some common ground rather than dissipating energies in exploring the varieties of dissent. Without sacrificing individual views we must also shape a unified stand, a focal point of belief and action which can unite all who apprehend coming dangers. Only in this way can we create a voice strong enough to be heard across the country, bringing together men of diverse beliefs, adding strength to the views of those in government who share this apprehension. It must also be a clear and direct stand; one that fires response in those millions of our fellow citizens who glimpse through complexity, discord and obscurity the vision of something dark and dangerous.

I believe there is such a position. It is simply the victorious slogan of the Democratic Party in 1964. It is: No wider war. It is to oppose any expansion of the bombing. It is to speak and work against all who would enlarge the war in the North.

Such a stand will not end the war in South Vietnam. It may even prolong it. It will not fully answer the deep objections, feelings and fears of many in this room or across the country. But it can crystallize the inarticulate objections of many. It may well increase the weight and impact of the forces of restraint. Most importantly it strikes at the most ominous menace to the lives of millions and the peace of the world. Such a rallying cry requires compromise, the willingness to seek less than is desired; but that is the basic necessity of those who seek not self indulgence but to shape the course of this nation.

To be most effective this position will require more than speeches and resolutions. It will need structure and purpose. I suggest this organization work with other groups and individuals to form a national committee against widening of the war. It will not be aimed at withdrawal or even a lessening of the war in the South; although individuals who oppose escalation may also hold those views. Thus it will be open to all groups who oppose escalation in the North regardless of their position on other issues, and will be open to the millions of Americans who belong to no group but who share this basic belief and apprehension. Such a committee can provide a constant flow of objective information about Vietnam. It can keep vigil over official statements and ask the hard questions which might help separate wishful thinking from facts. It will neither be against the Administration nor for it,

neither with any political party or opposed to it, neither liberal nor conservative. Its sole aim will be to mobilize and inform the American people in order to increase the invisible weight of what I believe to be the American majority in the deliberations and inner councils of government. Its purpose is to help the President and others in government by providing a counter pressure against those who urge a more militant course; a pressure for which those in government should be grateful since it will help them pursue the course of wise restraint.

Although I believe deeply in this proposal I do not wish to give the argument a certainty I do not have. The most important fact of all, the unkown which transcends all debate, are the thoughts and intentions of our adversaries and their allies. Yet skepticism born of imperfect knowledge cannot be permitted to dull the passion with which we pursue convictions or the fervor of our dissent. For we must fight against fulfillment of Yeats' prophecy which foresaw destruction if the time should come when "the best lack all conviction, and the worst are full of passionate intensity."

Some have called upon us to mute or stifle dissent in the name of patriotism and the national interest. It is an argument which monstrously misconceives the nature and process and the greatest strength of American democracy. It denies the germinal assumption of our freedom: that each individual not only can but must judge the wisdom of his leaders. (How marvelously that principle has strengthened this country—never more dramatically than in the postwar period when others have buried contending views under the ordained wisdom of the state, thus allowing received error to breed weakness and even defeat. The examples are legion. The virgin lands settlement and the Great Leap Forward failed because experiment was made into unchallengeable law; while we began to catch up in space, modernized and increased our defenses, and started the Alliance for Progress because what began as dissent became national purpose). Of course the enemy is glad to see our divisions. But our concern is with America not Hanoi. Our concern is with those millions of our own people, and with future generations, who will themselves be glad to see that there were men who struggled to prevent needless devastation and thus added to the strength and the glory of the United States.

Among the greatest names in our history were men who did not hesitate to assault the acts and policies of government when they felt the good of the nation was at stake: Jefferson at a time when the integrity of the new nation was still in doubt, Lincoln during the Mexican war, Roosevelt in the midst of national depression, John F. Kennedy among cold war defeats and danger.

Only a dozen years ago, in 1954, another American leader assaulted our policy in Vietnam, saying "The United States is in clear danger of being left naked and alone in a hostile world . . . It is apparent only that American foreign policy has never in all its history suffered such a stunning reversal. What is American policy in Indochina? All of us have listened to the dismal themes of reversal and confusions and alarms and excursions which have emerged from Washington . . . We have been caught bluffing by our enemies. Our friends and allies are frightened and wondering, as we do, where we are headed . . . The picture of our country needlessly weakened in the world today is so painful that we should turn our eyes from abroad and look homeward."

It is in this same spirit of concern for our country that we should conduct our dissent as, on that day, did Lyndon B. Johnson then leader of the minority party.

It is not our privilege, but our duty as patriots, to write, to speak, to organize, to oppose any President and any party and any policy at any time which we believe threatens the grandeur of this nation and the well-being of its people. This is such a time. And in so doing we will fulfill the most solemn duty of free men in a free country: to fight to the limit of legal sanction and the most spacious possibilities of our constitutional freedoms for the safety and greatness of their country as they believe it to be.

The arguments of this speech have been practical ones founded, to the limits of my capacity and knowledge, upon the concrete and specific realities and dangers of our present situation. But there is more than that in the liberal faith. American liberalism has many faces. It pursues divergent paths to varied and sometimes conflicting goals. It cannot be captured in an epigram or summarized in a simple statement of belief. Part of it, however, is simply and naively a belief in belief. It is the idealistic, visionary and impractical faith that action and policy and politics must rest on the ancient and rooted values of the American people. It still believes that for a nation to be great, to serve its own people and to command the respect and trust of others, it must not only do something but stand for something. It must represent in speech and act the ideals of its society and civilization.

Some part of the conflict in Vietnam may have been unavoidable, some is the result of well-intentioned error, but some must surely flow from the fact we have bent belief to the demands of those who call themselves realists or tough minded.

It is not realistic or hard-headed to solve problems and invest money and use power unguided by ultimate aims and values. It is thoughtless folly. For it ignores the realities of human faith and passion and desire; forces ultimately more powerful than all the calculations of economists and generals. Our strength is in our spirit and our faith. If we neglect this we may empty our treasuries, assemble our armies and pour forth the wonders of our science, but we will act in vain and we will build for others.

It is easy to be tough when toughness means coercing the weak or rewarding the strong; and when men of power and influence stand ready to applaud. It is far harder to hold to principle, speaking, if necessary, alone against the multitude, allowing others to make their own mistakes, enduring the frustration of long and inconclusive struggles, and standing firm for ideals even when they bring danger. But it is the true path of courage. It is the only path of wisdom. And it is the sure path of effective service to the United States of America.

TAX TREATMENT OF TREBLE DAMAGE PAYMENTS

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, if a person violates our antitrust laws, he may have to pay treble damages in private lawsuits under section 4 of the Clayton Act to the persons wronged by such violation. A certain amount of concern has been generated lately over the deductibility of these treble damage payments for Federal income tax purposes. The purpose of my remarks today is to place the tax status of these payments in proper perspective.

About 2 years ago, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that amounts paid as treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses. The position adopted by the Internal Revenue Service in that ruling was the result of an intensive task-force study of the applicable law, including all of the Supreme Court decisions on the subject. Recently, the procedures followed, and the multitude of factors considered by the Service in arriving at its conclusion, has been fully and ably explained before the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee by Mr. Mortimer M. Caplin, who was Commissioner of Internal Revenue when the Service was considering this problem.

Mr. Caplin, who is now engaged in the private practice of law here in Washington, testified before the Antitrust Subcommittee on July 29, 1966, in connection with the subcommittee's consideration of a bill which its proponents say would restrict the deductibility of treble damage payments (S. 2479). In my opinion, Mr. Caplin's testimony demonstrates the soundness of the present Service position, which allows a tax deduction for treble damage payments, and I ask unanimous consent, that his testimony be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, in regard to this subject, I would like to make two points. The first is that, in my opinion the Service position is a correct interpretation of present law. Because the ruling does reflect present law, we should recognize that any legislation which would prohibit the deductibility of treble damage payments would constitute a change of present law; it cannot be passed off as a clarification of original congressional intent made necessary by an erroneous administrative interpretation. I think we should proceed slowly before we change present law.

My second point is that, in addition to changing present law, legislation to disallow a deduction would have a harsh effect. It would result in the violator paying six times his after-tax gain, which is the same as the wronged party's after-tax injury. Thus, if the violator is taxed on his gain but disallowed a deduction for the damage payments, he will end up paying six times the out-of-pocket damages incurred by the wronged party.

The reason for this is explained by Mr. Caplin in a colloquy which followed his formal statement and can be demonstrated by a simple example.

Before giving that example, Mr. President, I observe that the treble damage statute was passed at a time when income tax was not a factor. Certainly it was not a factor such as that which we have now, inasmuch as the bracket for corporate profit is in the neighborhood of approximately 50 percent for corporations.

Assume that a corporate seller receives an extra $100 because of a price-fixing conspiracy. Its gain, and the other party's damage, after taxes is $50. If the seller has to pay $300 in treble damages, that is, three times the overcharge, without being able to take a deduction, it will

of scientific sophistication. Dr. Schubert said that all concerned with the program at American University were in complete agreement that George Eliopoulos should have this award because he made a distinct contribution in a very important area of radiation research.

Mr. Speaker, Springfield Technical High School has produced many outstanding students. George Eliopoulos is a splendid example of the brilliant students at Springfield's Technical High School. He is a straight A student and is particularly strong in the fields of mathematics and science, which he intends to pursue as his career. Speaking on behalf of the people of the Second Congressional District of Massachusetts, I wish to commend George Eliopoulos and Springfield Technical High School for achieving this high honor and distinction.

THE HONORABLE SAM GIBBONS

(Mr. OLSON of Minnesota asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. OLSON of Minnesota. Mr. Speaker, recently one of our distinguished colleagues was verbally accosted by another Member and referred to as a "jerk."

SAM GIBBONS' record speaks for itself and does not need my defense. His record of devotion to duty and responsibility, as a Members of this body, adequately reflect SAM GIBBONS' character.

Most people in public life are familiar with the tactic of vilification and abuse and surely Members of this House can recognize these tactics for what they are.

I rise because, as I feel a responsibility to uphold the integrity of my Government and my office back home, I am even more aware of this responsibility here in this House.

I do not believe any Member of Congress with a record like that of SAM GIBBONS should be attacked without our rising to his defense. I have taken part in the defense of other Members of this body when they were irresponsibly attacked.

An attempt to make civil rights a question as far as SAM GIBBONS' record is concerned is irresponsible. During the debate in July of 1966 on the Civil Rights Act of 1966, the RECORD will show that SAM GIBBONS was voting and present for the entire debate on that Civil Rights Act which lasted for over 2 weeks.

Congress is largely responsible for policing the activities of its own Members. This can only be achieved if we resolve our differences without demeaning the character of this body or its individual Members.

THE POWER OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR

(Mr. ASHBROOK asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, I for one will vote to strip ADAM CLAYTON POWELL, chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor, of the powers that he has exercised so arbitrarily in the past. I shall do this not because of any particular affinity for those who are belatedly coming to the forefront and belatedly getting disturbed about the apparent excesses of our chairman. I will not do this because of any personal opinions Chairman POWELL might properly have about black power or racial concepts which affect education and labor.

I will certainly not do this because he is a Negro. I for one will vote to strip him of all powers as the chairman, or for any partial limitations on his power, because on the merits I believe they have been exercised in such a manner as to bring discredit to the entire House of Representatives.

Later today I will again address the House and place in the RECORD many of the reasons I have for taking this action. For now, I merely want to announce that, as one Member, I will vote to take Mr. POWELL's committee chairman's power away.

FOREIGN AID PROGRAM

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I certainly commend the Members of the House Appropriations Committee for its action in reducing the administration's foreign aid request by almost $300 million. A review of the committee's report nevertheless convinced me that this Bill still contains a lot of fat which ought to be trimmed, considering the present state of our economy.

In view of inflationary pressures affecting our own economy and the present availability of over $16 billion in unexpended foreign aid funds, the Congress might well consider making no new foreign aid appropriations this year. Obviously funds for Vietnam for military and economical assistance should be excluded from any further cut for the situation there is entirely different and the urgency is obvious.

The committee report shows that foreign aid would suffer very little even if no new funds were approved this year. A further reduction would be the most effective step we could take to reduce the gold outflow and imbalance of payments.

The AID program since 1945 has cost American taxpayers over $100 billion. While effectively managed foreign assistance can, and has played a decisive role in maintaining free world strength, it has grown like "Topsy," to the point where 95 countries and 5 territories will receive some form of U.S. assistance. Surely the strain on our economy at the present time justifies a more prudent look at the foreign aid program.

Many public works projects in our own country are subject to closer scrutiny and supervision, then similar projects in the foreign aid program.

A total of 61 AID projects costing over $63 million were initiated this year without prior justification by the Congress. We don't allow that kind of leeway for similar projects at home, whether it be for highways or reservoirs.

Approximately 43 percent of the total number of projects initiated in the Africa region alone, were started without prior justification to Congress.

I questioned the propriety of furnishing budget support for some of the less developed countries at the same time that our own Federal budget is being financed on a deficit basis. The fact is, that we are borrowing money at some of the highest interest rates in history in order to give it away or loan it at much lower rates.

NO WIDER WAR

(Mr. RYAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, yesterday I pointed out that there have been a number of provocative recent pronouncements on Vietnam. Unhappily, they have emanated not from the administration, but from the university community, where many former members of the administration reside.

One of the most sensible recent commentaries on the war is the speech which Richard N. Goodwin, former assistant to President Kennedy and President Johnson, made to the national board of the Americans for Democratic Action on Saturday, September 17.

Perhaps the most noteworthy of Goodwin's comments—which ranged from domestic to foreign affairs—was his suggestion that concerned citizens form a committee to oppose further escalation of the war. He points out that the slogan of such a group could be the slogan of the Democratic Party in the 1964 campaign: "No wider war."

I hope that Goodwin's remarks will be read by as wide an audience as they deserve. His speech follows:

SPEECH BY RICHARD N. GOODWIN AT THE NATIONAL BOARD MEETING OF AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION, STATLER-HILTON HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C., SEPTEMBER 17, 1966

This is a time when labels are unfashionable. Men hesitate to call themselves liberals or conservatives or radicals, fearing the complexity of their views will be swallowed up in some formal catechism of belief. Yet groups like this one are drawn together by a shared body of beliefs and values, and by common reactions to the sins and shortcomings of their society. They differ on many particular issues; but they do agree on the wisdom of a general direction and the urgency of certain purposes. In this sense, even in non-ideological America, there are radicals and rightists, liberals and conservatives. In this sense the Americans for Democratic Action is the spearhead of American liberalism.

It can look back on a record of achievement unmatched in American political organization. It has elected dozens of members to high office, many of its early programs are now law, and its once theoretical notions are the daily staple of bureaucracy.

It is easy to blunt, answer, and even ignore the criticism of liberalism which is largely a reflex action from past battles. The ease of such refutation, however, should not be permitted to obscure real defects. If there is reason for doubt it is not that today's liberals are too progressive, but that they are often not progressive enough: not that they are radical but that they are sometimes mired in outworn outlooks and programs; not that

House of Representatives

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1966

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Edward G. Latch, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Great is our Lord and of great power: His understanding is infinite.—Psalm 147: 5.

O God, our Father, who dost reveal Thyself in numberless ways, deepen within us this day the sense of Thy presence as we wait upon Thee in prayer. Strengthen us by Thy spirit that no danger may overwhelm us, no difficulty may overcome us, no distress may overburden us, and no discouragement may cause us to turn aside from walking with Thee. May Thy grace sustain us in our labor, Thy hand uphold us when we fall, Thy joy make our hearts glad, and Thy presence give us courage to face the experiences of this hour unashamed and unafraid. Help us to grow in strength, in understanding, in never-ending good will; and may we ever commit our lives to goals great enough for freemen. In the Master's name we pray. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

SUNDRY MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Sundry messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the House by Mr. Geisler, one of his secretaries, who also informed the House that on the following dates the President approved and signed bills of the House of the following titles:

On September 12, 1966:

H.R. 2270. An act for the relief of the Moapa Valley Water Co., of Logandale, Nev.;

H.R. 3999. An act to provide the same life tenure and retirement rights for judges hereafter appointed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico as the judges of all other U.S. district courts now have;

H.R. 4665. An act relating to the income tax treatment of exploration expenditures in the case of mining; and

H.R. 15858. An act to amend section 6 of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, to authorize early land acquisition for the purpose of acquiring a site for a replacement of Shaw Junior High School.

On September 13, 1966:

H.R. 12328. An act to extend for 3 years the period during which certain extracts suitable for tanning may be imported free of duty; and

H.R. 12461. An act to continue for a temporary period the existing suspension of duty on certain istle.

On September 14, 1966:

H.R. 3671. An act for the relief of Josephine Ann Bellizia;

H.R. 10656. An act for the relief of Kimberly Ann Yang;

H.R. 11347. An act for the relief of Maria Anna Piotrowski, formerly Czeslawa Marek; and

H.R. 13284. An act to redefine eligibility for membership in AMVETS (American Veterans of World War II).

On September 16, 1966:

H.R. 399. An act to provide adjustments in order to make uniform the estate acquired for the Vega Dam and Reservoir, Collbran project, Colorado, by authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to reconvey mineral interests in certain lands;

H.R. 790. An act to rename a lock of the Cross-Florida Barge Canal the "R. N. Bert Dosh Lock";

H.R. 2349. An act for the relief of Robert Dean Ward;

H.R. 3078. An act for the relief of Lourdes S. (Delotavo) Matzke and Yusef Ali Chouman;

H.R. 4861. An act to direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey certain lands in Boulder County, Colo., to W. F. Stover;

H.R. 6305. An act for the relief of lessees of a certain tract of land in Logtown, Miss.;

H.R. 7141. An act for the relief of Ronald Whelan;

H.R. 7446. An act for the relief of certain civilian employees and former civilian employees of the Department of the Navy at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Va.;

H.R. 7671. An act for the relief of Sophia Soliwoda;

H.R. 8000. An act to amend the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920, relating to fees for certification of certain documents, and for other purposes;

H.R. 8989. An act to promote health and safety in metal and nonmetallic mineral industries, and for other purposes;

H.R. 10990. An act for the relief of Maj. Alan DeYoung, U.S. Army;

H.R. 11038. An act for the relief of Mrs. Edna S. Bettendorf;

H.R. 12950. An act for the relief of Kazimierz (Casimer) Krzykowski; and

H.R. 13558. An act to provide for regulation of the professional practice of certified public accountants in the District of Columbia, including the examination, licensure, registration of certified public accountants, and for other purposes.

On September 17, 1966:

H.R. 4075. An act for the relief of John F. Reagan, Jr.;

H.R. 6606. An act for the relief of Li Tsu (Nako) Chen;

H.R. 11271. An act for the relief of certain individuals employed by the Department of Defense at the Granite City Defense Depot, Granite City, Ill.;

H.R. 11844. An act for the relief of Maria Giuseppina Innalfo Feole; and

H.R. 14514. An act for the relief of Vernon M. Nichols.

On September 19, 1966:

H.R. 8058. An act to amend section 4 of the District of Columbia Income and Franchise Tax Act of 1947;

H.R. 1066. An act to amend section 11-1701 of the District of Columbia Code to increase the retirement salaries of certain retired judges;

H.R. 11087. An act to amend the District of Columbia Income and Franchise Tax Act of 1947, as amended, and the District of Columbia Business Corporation Act, as amended, with respect to certain foreign corporations; and

H.R. 15750. An act to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes.

GEORGE M. ELIOPOULOS, SPRINGFIELD TECHNICAL HIGH SCHOOL SENIOR, RECEIVES NATIONAL SPACE CLUB AWARD

(Mr. BOLAND asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, I just came from the National Press Club where I had the honor and pleasure of meeting and being with a constituent of mine, George M. Eliopoulos, of 17 Beaumont Terrace, Springfield, Mass., a senior at Springfield Technical High School, who was honored by the National Space Club and received the Chemistry Award.

The National Space Club, formerly the National Rocket Club, honored six high school students who participated in the seventh summer research program from June 20 through August 11. The American University and the Joint Board of Science Education are the sponsors. The program is conducted by American University and is funded by the National Science Foundation, the National Space Club, the Goddard Space Flight Center, the Washington Academy of Sciences, and the Washington Junior Academy of Science.

Mr. Speaker, over 115 high school students participated. Students worked in research laboratories and participated in actual research projects under the direction of scientists at various laboratories such as the Goddard Space Flight Center, National Institutes of Health, Naval Medical Research Institute, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, National Bureau of Standards, Melpar, Inc., Georgetown University, College of Observatory, and others.

Students experiences this past summer revealed a sense of job responsibility for the first time with working scientists and an insight into career opportunities. Many high school students learned to operate a variety of complex instruments that the student seldom sees in high school or college laboratories, thus affording an opportunity to work with unique research projects at an early age.

Mr. Speaker, George Eliopoulos did his research work at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, and his subject was "Anoxia as a Factor in the Toxicity of Certain Radiation Protecting Drugs." Dr. Leo Schubert, chairman of the Chemistry Department at American University, who was the summer program director, said that George Eliopoulos' research preceptor wrote up a most glowing comment on the level of the Springfield Technical High School senior's level

they are impractical but they have occasionally let practical necessities override faithfulness to ideals and values. We have discovered the perverse principle that defeat can breed strength while victory often erodes will and creates intoxication with success. Success is the disease of American society, a disease which strikes impartially at businessmen, politicians, movie stars and intellectuals alike. It is especially virulent when it attacks the politically concerned and passionate, making them more anxious to enact bad programs than fight for a good one, elect a mediocrity than lose with distinction, support a sympathetic office holder even when he is wrong, simply because he is sympathetic. We do not advocate a policy of defeatism or even political suicide. We are politicians and the object of politics is the acquisition and use of power. Pragmatism, the code word of today's liberalism, is a useful tool to carry you forward, remove obstacles, and solve problems. But it does not tell you where to go. Beliefs tell you. Values tell you. Common goals tell you. Once that distinction is obscured it is easy to forget where you are going and even who you are.

Let me give a few tentative thoughts about today's redefinition of liberal goals before proceeding to the principal obstacle to all those goals: the war in Vietnam.

Liberal thought in America has always been a confederation of diverse beliefs. But there have been certain, discernible, central strands in the fabric of the past thirty years. One is the once revolutionary idea that the national government has a direct responsibility for the welfare of the people: For their well-being as individuals—older citizens, poor or Negro—and for the general health of the economy. Another is the belief that private power must be compelled to act in the public interest, that through regulation America must be made safe for capitalism.

Those were the subject of wonderful, passionate engagements, but they are largely won. They have become the truisms of American political life, although there are many important skirmishes to be fought and the specter of Hooverism occasionally looms over the horizon only to be brushed casually away by a slightly surprised electorate.

It is this victory of important principle, and the changes it has helped bring the nation, which makes it necessary to rethink most of the old political beliefs and slogans as this organization, and others, have been doing.

At one time to be a liberal meant to be for federal action against states' rights. Particularly in civil rights this is still a vital question. Yet our major effort now is to find new ways to help states and local government assume responsibilities and burdens; and it was a Democratic liberal, not a Republican conservative, who proposed to turn over federal revenue to state government.

At one time to be a liberal meant to automatically favor the cause of labor over business. Yet the Chamber of Commerce is more willing to trade with China than the AFL–CIO; unions are often more concerned with protecting the established order than businessmen; and it was the liberals who helped pass laws against racketeering in labor. Even the most ardent liberal will prefer the activities of Tom Watson of IBM to those of Jimmy Hoffa.

At one time to be a liberal was to oppose big business. Yet it was the Administration of John Kennedy, not Eisenhower, that proposed and passed measures for business expanion to the benefit of all of us.

At one time to be a liberal was to fight for the principle that collective action did not diminish individual freedom. While we still go through the motions, that battle is over, for freedom has been enlarged as collective action widened. Rather we are now increasingly concerned about coercion from the center.

These old battle cries are largely a victim of success and of profound changes in American society. They were built on the assumption that rising wealth fairly shared was the key to the American dream. Of course, that dream has not yet come true for the chronically poor or the Negro. Still, in terms of the old values, most Americans have achieved greatly. They are well-fed, live in decent houses, own television sets, drive 90 million automobiles, and debate not whether but where to take a vacation. Yet even at the moment of victory for so many we know that shared prosperity is not enough. Modern man, with all his wealth and comfort, is oppressed by forces which menace and confine the quality of his life.

Increasingly American thinkers are discovering, describing, and attacking these forces. It is the responsibility of politics to translate this emerging awareness into political action.

The ancient desire to stretch one's talents to the limit of ability and desire now enters a world whose instruments grow in complexity, where understanding is more difficult as the possibilities of all encompassing knowledge disappear, and where leisure threatens many with boredom and futility. It is not enough to train people, we must do so through an educational system of a quality and daring of innovation past all our old objectives.

Even with knowledge and understanding at his command, however, man alone is not man fulfilled. He must be sustained and strengthened by the world around him, and by those with whom he lives and works.

He will not find that strength in cities scarred by slums, encircled by suburbs which sprawl recklessly across the countryside; where movement is difficult, beauty rare, life itself more impersonal and security imperilled by the lawless.

And even beyond education and the deterioration of our environment modern America assaults the deepest values of our civilization, those worlds within a world where each can find meaning and dignity and warmth: family and neighborhood, community and the dignity of work.

Family ties grow weaker as the gap between the generations widens. The community disappears as the streets of our cities rush in upon each other. Work, once the principal support of self-respect, becomes more and more mechanical, each man a replaceable componency in an abstract task. Ahead lies the most terrible danger of all: a nation of strangers; each separate from his fellows, remote from his labors, detached from participation in the great enterprise of American life.

Underneath there is a single, overwhelming cause for the discontent which runs like a dark thread through the silver fabric of American life. It is cause and consequence of all the rest. It is the fear of the individual human being that he has become meaningless in the great human enterprise. Decisions of peace and war, life and death, are made by a handful of men beyond his reach. Cities and factories grow and spread seemingly powered by a force beyond the control of man. Science describes our world, and life itself, in terms far beyond the reach of ordinary understanding. Computers and marvelous machines seem to make man unnecessary in the oldest stronghold of all, his work.

This is the motive power, the fueling force, behind the new right and the new left. They want to matter. And so do we all.

To glimpse the shortcomings of American life, to feel the weight of dark and obscure forces, even to illuminate with investigation and thought the wrongs of American life, is not enough for any group dedicated to political action. That requires we translate passion, engagement, and a sense of injustice into concrete action; as individual groups, and through political institutions. Many of the proposals which fill liberal journals and meeting chambers are little more than logical extensions of old ideas and processes. The guaranteed annual wage, the organization of farm workers, national health insurance, and many other ideas, can stand on their own merits but they hardly represent a radical departure from our past. Most of the causes which engage us deeply—from civil rights to the war against poverty—flow from the historic drive to open the blessings of society to all people.

I do not pretend to have the answers or a dramatic new approach but it seems to me that certain guidelines are emerging which may help show the way.

First, is to devote more of our resources to common needs; from schools and playgrounds to blighted cities and poisoned air. History has proved that rising national wealth does not resolve social problems. Present experience proves that the old method of handing our federal grants will not rebuild a city or clean up pollution. The problems of the city, for example, are not simply problems of welfare or income. They demand technical skill, a network of subsidies and regulation, planning and engineering. More and more we will have to turn problems over to technicians, eqiup them with authority, and provide the funds to do the job. People are far more concerned with progress, with getting the job done, than they are with the ideology of change. The technician-politician—the man who regardless of party can resolve complex problems—is the man of the future.

Secondly, we will have to reshape the historic relationships of our federal structure so not to be completely dependent on Washington for comfort, help and skill. The problems are far too huge and varied to be solved from the top. Moreover, to attempt it is to strip people in communities and states of the chance to share in the solution of the great problems of society. It is essential to our spiritual health to develop structures which give people a chance to share in the American enterprise. It is essential to our national progress that we tap the enormous resources of mind and energy which lie unused, ignored and unwanted throughout America.

This means decentralization of government action; a decentralization which will take many forms and whose evolution is a challenge to our genius for political creation. Variety will be the hallmark of such a system, but I believe the basic pattern will be federal funds and guidelines with responsibility for action left to the community. For example, perhaps the best approach to the problem of our cities can be drawn from the theoretical patterns of foreign aid. The federal government would require the city to develop a master plan of development embracing basic services, housing and all the components of community life; providing federal funds on a large scale to carry the plan forward. As another example I have proposed turning a large part of the foreign aid program over to the states, involving communities and citizens directly in our relationship with the underdeveloped continents.

Even then individuals will have to fight City Hall; but it is far easier than fighting the White House.

We are worlds away from the old debate about federal power and big government. For underneath the rhetoric that was a debate whether we should tackle social and economic problems at all; or whether we should leave them to the impersonal working of an unregulated society. Today, decentralization assumes that many problems will yield to directed human intelligence; the question is how best to enlist the energies of Americans in that task. I have no doubt that citizen participation is the future direction of liberalism. It will permit us to do a better job with our society. It will allow

our people to share the life of the nation; to contribute, to work, to be needed and to be heard. It is a key to salvation from the separation and human frustration which are a poisoning and unnecessary by-product of our civilization.

Thirdly, we who have often looked to Washington for protection of human rights must increase our guard against the coercive society. It is the nature of power to resent opposition to its exercise. That resentment is multiplied as power grows. When those who have such power are also convinced of the wisdom and beneficence of their views then freedom is in danger. The worst threat to liberty comes not from those who simply seek their own aggrandizement, but from those who seek the good of others, identifying opposition to their desires with harm to the nation. Already wiretapping, bugging, and manifold invasions of privacy are growing, I believe, far beyond the present knowledge of any of us. There are laws in Congress to give the Secretary of State arbitrary power to limit the travel of Americans. It has even been proposed that we draft all Americans—not simply to meet an immediate threat to our security—but as a matter of course. All of these have in common the frightening belief that individual action and freedom should be limited for the good of the state, according to some officeholder's view of what that good requires. That is the cause to enlist our energies, to bring us shouting into the streets against any who claim the right to tell us where to go, or listen to our private conversations, or prescribe how we must serve our society. The coercive society is no less obnoxius when coercion is masked in benevolence.

These are tentative steps toward redefinitions of difficult and shifting goals; but they are charged with a traditional faith in the capacity to reshape our society more to the needs of man.

There is, however, another issue which has reduced discussions about domestic America to academic discourse, which has swallowed up the New Frontier and Great Society, and which is eroding our position throughout the world. That issue is, of course, the war in Vietnam.

The Vietnamese war is, I believe, the most dangerous conflict since the end of World War II: more dangerous than Berlin or even Korea. In those confrontations the danger was clear and sensibly appraised. The stakes were fairly obvious to both sides. Objectives were carefully limited; and power ultimately became the handmaiden of reason and final accommodation. In Vietnam, on the other hand, the dangers are confused and unclear. Objectives are expressed in vague generalities which open to endless vistas. Moreover, from other cold war confrontations there evolved a set of tacit understandings designed to limit conflict even while it was being waged. That, for example, is the real meaning of the no-sanctuary policy carefully observed, we should remember, by both sides. Today those understandings are in grave danger of being swept away, and with them our most important protections against enlarging conflict.

The air is charged with rhetoric. We are buried in statements and speeches about negotiation and peace, the defense of freedom and the dangers of communism, the desire to protect the helpless and compassion for the dying. Much of it is important and sincere and well-meaning. Some is intended to deceive. Some is deliberate lie and distortion. But the important thing is not what we are saying, but what we are doing; not what is being discussed, but what is happening.

And what is happening is not confusing or unclear or contradictory at all. It is not masked in obscurity or buried in secret archives. It stands in clear, vivid and towering relief against the landscape of conflict. The war is getting larger. Every month there are more men in combat, more bombs falling, greater expenditures, deeper commitments. It is the steady inexorable course of this conflict since its beginning. We have gone to the United Nations and the war has grown larger. We have offered funds for development and talked of social reforms; and the war has grown larger. We have predicted victory and called for compromise; and the war has grown larger.

There is therefore, little escape from the conclusion that it will grow larger still.

Nor is this steady pattern the consequence of inexorable historical forces. It flows from the decisions of particular men in particular places—in Washington and Hanoi, in Saigon and in the jungle headquarters of the Vietcong. It is in part a product of communist hope and drive for victory; but it is partly our decision too. And we must suppose those same decisions will continue to be made.

Nor is this, as we are sometimes told, because there is no alternative. There are dozens of alternatives. There are enclave programs, and programs to hold the centers of population. There are suggestions that we rely on pacification of the countryside rather than the destruction of the Vietcong. There are proposals to limit the bombing or to end it. There are proposals for negotiations, complete with all the specifics of possible agreement. The fact is the air is full of alternatives. They have simply been rejected in favor of another course; the present course. And we must also suppose they will continue to be rejected.

All prophecy is an exercise in probability. With that caution let us try to strip the argument of its necessary passion and discuss the probabilities which are compelled by the awesome logic of the course of events in Vietnam. Passion is important; it lies at the root of war and of hatred of war. Nor do I lack personal feeling; for only the strongest of feelings could impel me to discuss a subject with which I was so recently connected in so intimate a way. Yet we can perhaps now meet more productively on the common ground of reason. Rarely has there been greater need for such unity among men of good will.

In other places I have set forth my personal views on the conduct of the war in South Vietnam: The belief that we have an important stake in Southeast Asia, and that we must continue the battle in the South—although differently than we are now doing—until a political settlement is reached. And I have, like many others, discussed alternative routes to these objectives. Today, however, I would like to talk about the lengthening shadow of the war in the North; for in that war are the swiftly germinating seeds of the most grave danger.

In this, as in so many aspects of the war, much of the information which feeds judgment is deeply obscured. Of course, in times of armed conflict facts are often elusive and much information, of necessity, cannot be revealed. By its nature war is hostile to truth. Yet with full allowance for necessary uncertainties I believe there has never been such intense and widespread deception and confusion as that which surrounds this war. The continual downpour of contradiction, misstatements, and kaleidoscopically shifting attitudes has been so torrential that it has almost numbed the capacity to separate truth from conjecture or falsehood.

At one time we are told there is no military solution, and then that victory can be ours.

There are months when we talk about negotiations and months when we forget them.

There are times when dissenters give aid and comfort to the enemy and times when they are acting in the greatest of our traditions.

We have been reassured about efforts to reach a peaceful settlement when there is no plan or program for settlement in existence.

We are given endless statistics with a numerical precision which only masks the fact they are based on inadequate information, or guesses, or even wishful thinking. For example, if we take the numbers of enemy we are supposed to be killing, add to that the defectors, along with a number of wounded much less than our own ratio of wounded to killed, we find we are wiping out virtually the entire North Vietnamese force every year. This truly makes their continued resistance one of the marvels of the world. Unless the figures are wrong, which of course they are.

We are told the bombing is terribly costly to North Vietnam. Yet the increase in Soviet and Chinese aid, since the bombing, is far greater, in economic terms, than the loss through bombing. Except in human life, the North Vietnamese are showing a profit.

At the time of the Hanoi-Haiphong bombings last June we were told that in the first six months of 1966 enemy truck movement had doubled the infiltration of supplies was up 150%, and infiltrated personnel increased 120%. However, the fact is we do not know, except in the most vague and general way, how much supplies are being brought in or how many men. They move at night, sometimes on trails we have not yet discovered, and the best intelligence gives only the most vague picture. We could not only be wrong, but enormously wrong. The swiftness with which we change our estimates helps show that seeming exactness conceals large uncertainties.

The statements which followed the Hanoi-Haiphong bombings are an illuminating example of this process in action.

It was said the raids would destroy a large proportion of North Vietnam's fuel capacity and this would help paralyze—or at least slow down—the process of infiltration. Yet these raids had been anticipated, alternative techniques of providing fuel had been developed, and the raids were destined to have little if any effect on the North Vietnamese capacity to make war. And this was clear at the time we bombed.

We were told, in an inside story in the New York Times, that the bombings would prove to Hanoi it could not count on its allies. The fact is that aid was stepped up as we anticipated it would be.

Within a few days a high official said fresh intelligence showed that Hanoi was now plunged in gloom, weary of war, and suffused with a sense of hopelessness, presumably at least in part as a result of the raids. Yet, there was no substantial intelligence of this kind. We have heard little about it since. And recent information indicates that the opposite was the case—the enemy's will was strengthened.

The truth is that this major and spectacular escalation in the war had had little measurable effect on the enemy's capacity or morale, and most of those who looked at the matter seriously in advance of the bombing knew it would probably be ineffective.

Yet despite confusion and misstatement, despite the enormous difficulty of grasping the realities on which policy must be based, I believe we can know that further escalation of the war in the North will only bring us farther from settlement and closer to serious danger of a huge and devastating conflict.

We began the campaign of bombing in the North as a result of the enormous and unresolved difficulties of winning the real war, the war in the South.

As predicted by almost every disengaged expert, from General Ridgway to George Kennan; and as taught by the whole history of aerial warfare, that bombing has neither brought the enemy to his knees or to the council table. It has not destroyed his capacity to make war, or seriously slowed down either infiltration or the flow of supplies. At

each step it was claimed the bombing would make a decisive difference. Yet it has made hardly any difference at all. In fact, the tempo of conflict has increased.

The official statements justifying the Hanoi-Haiphong raids bore partial witness to the futility of bombing. We were told the raids were necessary because infiltration had increased enormously; an official admission of the failure of one of the most intensive bombing campaigns in world history. Despite thousands upon thousands of raids more men and supplies are flowing South and the routes of infiltration have been widened and improved. Despite the bombing, or perhaps because of it, all signs indicate the North Vietnamese will to fight has stiffened and the possibilities of negotiation have dimmed. Despite the bombing, or because of it, North Vietnam has become increasingly dependent upon Russia and China. Despite the bombing, or because of it there has been a vastly increased supply of aid to North Vietnam by Russia and China and a deepening world communist commitment to this war.

In short the bombing has been a failure, and may turn out to be a disaster.

Yet we once again hear voices calling for further escalation; just as each previous time that the bombing has failed we have been told that more bombing is necessary and new goals are articulated. First it was said we wanted to stop infiltration. Next, we would persuade the North Vietnamese to come to the Council table. Then we would punish them and force them to surrender. Now men are talking of the need to destroy their capacity to make war. And so we move inexorably up the ladder of failure toward widening devastation. And the latest goal, the destruction of enemy capacity, if ever adopted, will be the most vaguely ambitious of all. For such capacity rests on the entire society; and that whole society; factories, dams, power plants, cities themselves must be brought tumbling down.

All of this is possible despite the fact that each future escalation will probably have the effect of previous escalations. It will increase the dangers of wider war, lessen the chances of a negotiated settlement, drain away effort which should be concentrated in the South, further alienate our allies, and have little damaging effect on the enemy's ability or will to fight.

We are sometimes asked what else we can do. I believe there are other things to do. The war can be fought more effectively in the South. The search for a settlement can be given greater direction and brilliance. We can prepare ourselves, if necessary, to accept a long ground war of attrition leading ultimately to a political settlement. But that is not the question. If the bombing cannot win the war, if it does not work; and above all if it carries tremendous political and military risks, then it should not be increased, either out of frustration with the war or with the polls.

For the greatest danger of this course—the course of escalation—is not only in the extent of devastation and death, or the damage it does to the hope of peaceful solution, but the fact that each step of the way increases in vast proportion the danger of a huge and bloody conflict. If North Vietnam is devastated then all reason for restraint or compromise is gone. The fight is no longer a war for the South but a struggle for survival calling their still largely uncommitted armies and people into battle. Nor can China stand by and see its ally destroyed. I do not believe China wants to fight the United States, at least not yet; but it cannot stand by while we destroy North Vietnam. To do so would forfeit all its claim to moral and political leadership of militant communism. They would then be truly a paper dragon, stoking the fires of revolution only when Chinese blood and land was not at stake.

Nor is China's entrance likely to be signalled by a huge and dramatic sweep of armies across the frontier. It is far more likely that increasing destruction in the North will stimulate or compel the Chinese to accelerate the nature and kind of their assistance. Perhaps Chinese pilots will begin to fly air defenses over Hanoi. The number of Chinese troops in North Vietnam may be greatly increased. Chinese anti-aircraft crews may be placed throughout the country. Thus, step by step, China acting in response to seeming necessities, may become involved in a war it did not full contemplate, much we have. And there are many signs that this process has already begun. This is the most likely and grave route to enlarging conflict. And if China does enter we must bomb them, for certainly we will not permit them sanctuaries or, if it comes to that, engage their armies solely in the jungles of Southeast Asia. And lastly is the Soviet Union, forced to choose between China and America.

None of this is certain. An entirely different course is possible. Yet the danger of such a chain of events grows by immeasurable strides each time we enlarge the war in the North: and if past is prologue we will continue that enlargement. Yet the fantastic fact, the truth that challenges belief, is that this is being done although virtually no one remains beside some of the engaged military and a few men in the State Department—virtually no one in the Administration or out—who believes that increased bombing will have a decisive effect on the war in South Vietnam. We are taking likely and mounting risks in pursuit of an elusive, obscure, marginal, and chimerical hope; a course which defies reason and experience alike.

Yet I believe this is the way we are going; that only beneficent and uncertain fortune can bar the way. This is not a belief born of personal fear. After all, we, or most of us, will continue to work and prosper, hold meetings and make speeches, unless all of our civilization is swallowed up. Even then enough will survive for the race to evolve and perhaps create something finer. It is rather a belief born of a fallible reason and analysis, always better able to describe our situation than guide our action, which seeks in the acts of our past and the attitudes of our present a guide for our future.

I do not wish however, to come with a counsel of despair. The surest guarantee of misfortune is resignation. Therefore, we must all make what effort we can. There are enormous differences among the critics of the war. There are those who believe we have no interest in Vietnam or even in all of Asia. There are those who wish us to withdraw. There are fierce debates over the history of the war, the nature of its participants, the goals of our enemies. There are those, like myself, who believe we should carry on the war in the South while intensifying, modifying and sharpening the search for peaceful compromise tied to some measures of de-escalation in the North. Yet our danger is so grave that those who fear the future even more than they distrust the past—a group which encompasses, I believe, the majority of the American people—must seek some common ground rather than dissipating energies in exploring the varieties of dissent. Without sacrificing individual views we must also shape a unified stand, a focal point of belief and action which can unite all who apprehend coming dangers. Only in this way can we create a voice strong enough to be heard across the country, bringing together men of diverse beliefs, adding strength to the views of those in government who share this apprehension. It must also be a clear and direct stand; one that fires response in those millions of our fellow citizens who glimpse through complexity, discord and obscurity the vision of something dark and dangerous.

I believe there is such a position. It is simply the victorious slogan of the Democratic Party in 1964. It is: No wider war. It is to oppose any expansion of the bombing. It is to speak and work against all who would enlarge the war in the North.

Such a stand will not end the war in South Vietnam. It may even prolong it. It will not fully answer the deep objections, feelings and fears of many in this room or across the country. But it can crystallize the inarticulate objections of many. It may well increase the weight and impact of the forces of restraint. Most importantly it strikes at the most ominous menace to the lives of millions and the peace of the world. Such a rallying cry requires compromise, the willingness to seek less than is desired; but that is the basic necessity of those who seek not self indulgence but to shape the course of this nation.

To be most effective this position will require more than speeches and resolutions. It will need structure and purpose. I suggest this organization work with other groups and individuals to form a national committee against widening of the war. It will not be aimed at withdrawal or even a lessening of the war in the South; although individuals who oppose escalation may also hold those views. Thus it will be open to all groups who oppose escalation in the North regardless of their position on other issues, and will be open to the millions of Americans who belong to no group but who share this basic belief and apprehension. Such a committee can provide a constant flow of objective information about Vietnam. It can keep vigil over official statements and ask the hard questions which might help separate wishful thinking from facts. It will neither be against the Administration nor for it, neither with any political party or opposed to it, neither liberal nor conservative. Its sole aim will be to mobilize and inform the American people in order to increase the invisible weight of what I believe to be the American majority in the deilberations and inner councils of government. Its purpose is to help the President and others in government by providing a counter pressure against those who urge a more militant course; a pressure for which those in government should be grateful since it will help them pursue the course of wise restraint.

Although I believe deeply in this proposal I do not wish to give th argument a certainty I do not have. The most important fact of all, the unknown which transcends all debate, are the thoughts and intentions of our adversaries and their allies. Yet skepticism born of imperfect knowledge cannot be permitted to dull the passion with which we pursue convictions or the fervor of our dissent. For we must fight against fulfillment of Yeats' prophecy which foresaw destruction if the time should come when "the best lack all conviction, and the worst are full of passionate intensity."

Some have called upon us to mute or stifle dissent in the name of patriotism and the national interest. It is an argument which monstrously misconceives the nature and process and the greatest strength of American democracy. It denies the germinal assumption of our freedom: that each individual not only can but must judge the wisdom of his leaders. (How marvelously that principle has strengthened this country—never more dramatically than in the postwar period when others have buried contending views under the ordained wisdom of the state, thus allowing received error to bread weakness and even defeat. The examples are legion. The virgin lands settlement and the Great Leap Forward failed because experiment was made into unchallengeable law; while we began to catch up in space, modernized and increased our de-

fenses, and started the Alliance for Progress because what began as dissent became national purpose.) Of course the enemy is glad to see our divisions. But our concern is with America not Hanoi. Our concern is with those millions of our own people, and with future generations, who will themselves be glad to see that there were men who struggled to prevent needless devastation and thus added to the strength and the glory of the United States.

Among the greatest names in our history were men who did not hesitate to assault the acts and policies of government when they felt the good of the nation was at stake: Jefferson at a time when the integrity of the new nation was still in doubt, Lincoln during the Mexican war, Roosevelt in the midst of national depression, John F. Kennedy among cold war defeats and danger.

Only a dozen years ago, in 1954, another American leader assaulted our policy in Vietnam, saying "The United States is in clear danger of being left naked and alone in a hostile world . . . It is apparent only that American foreign policy has never in all its history suffered such a stunning reversal. What is American policy in Indochina? All of us have listened to the dismal themes of reversal and confusions and alarms and excursions which have emerged from Washington . . . We have been caught bluffing by our enemies. Our friends and allies are frightened and wondering, as we do, where we are headed . . . The picture of our country needlessly weakened in the world today is so painful that we should turn our eyes from abroad and look homewards."

It is in this same spirit of concern for our country that we should conduct our dissent as, on that day, did Lyndon B. Johnson then leader of the minority party.

It is not our privilege, but our duty as patriots, to write, to speak, to organize, to oppose any President and any party and any policy at any time which we believe threatens the grandeur of this nation and the well-being of its people. This is such a time. And in so doing we will fulfill the most solemn duty of free men in a free country: to fight to the limit of legal sanction and the most spacious possibilities of our constitutional freedoms for the safety and greatness of their country as they believe it to be.

The arguments of this speech have been practical ones founded, to the limits of my capacity and knowledge, upon the concrete and specific realities and dangers of our present situation. But there is more than that in the liberal faith. American liberalism has many faces. It pursues divergent paths to varied and sometimes conflicting goals. It cannot be captured in an epigram or summarized in a simple statement of belief. Part of it, however, is simply and naively a belief in belief. It is the idealistic, visionary and impractical faith that action and policy and politics must rest on the ancient and rooted values of the American people. It still believes that for a nation to be great, to serve its own people and to command the respect and trust of others, it must not only do something but stand for something. It must represent in speech and act the ideals of its society and civilization.

Some part of the conflict in Vietnam may have been unavoidable, some is the result of well-intentioned error, but some must surely flow from the fact we have bent belief to the demands of those who call themselves realists or tough minded.

It is not realistic or hard-headed to solve problems and invest money and use power unguided by ultimate aims and values. It is thoughtless folly. For it ignores the realities of human faith and passion and desire; forces ultimately more powerful than all the calculations of economists and generals. Our strength is in our spirit and our faith. If we neglect this we may empty our treasuries, assemble our armies and pour forth the wonders of our science, but we will act in vain and we will build for others.

It is easy to be tough when toughness means coercing the weak or rewarding the strong; and when men of power and influence stand ready to applaud. It is far harder to hold to principle, speaking, if necessary, alone against the multitude, allowing others to make their own mistakes, enduring the frustration of long and inconclusive struggles, and standing firm for ideals even when they bring danger. But it is the true path of courage. It is the only path of wisdom. And it is the sure path of effective service to the United States of America.

CORRECTION OF THE RECORD

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the permanent bound CONGRESSIONAL RECORD be corrected as follows: Page 21988 of the RECORD for September 19, 1966, 4th paragraph, the figure 70,000 should be changed to read "approximately 30,000." Also, on page 21988, 7th paragraph of the 3d column, delete the words "must return to their native country" and add: "must go to another country" in order to gain permanent residence.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

CORRECTION OF RECORD

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the permanent bound CONGRESSIONAL RECORD be corrected as follows: Page 20849 of the RECORD for September 6, 3d paragraph of my remarks, last word of paragraph should read "bay" instead of "basin."

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

TENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 499)

The SPEAKER. The Chair lays before the House the following message from the President of the United States.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present. I believe the Members should hear the President's message.

The SPEAKER. Will the gentleman from Missouri withhold his request for a minute?

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw the request.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States, which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Ways and Means and ordered to be printed with illustrations:

To the Congress of the United States:

This is the 10th annual report on the trade agreements program, as required by section 402(a) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. It covers calendar year 1965.

World trade in 1965 surpassed all previous levels, enriching the lives of peoples around the globe. Record levels of U.S. foreign trade contributed greatly to this advance, and the American people shared fully in its benefits.

However, the successes of 1965 also served to dramatize the vast unrealized potential of the world market and the importance of moving forward with the Kennedy round of tariff negotiations, the great multilateral endeavor to generate more rapid growth in trade. Recently, the pace of these talks has intensified. The major participants have shown renewed determination to conclude an agreement. The United States will continue to exert every effort to assure that these negotiations yield extensive reductions in restraints on trade in all classes of goods, including agricultural products.

The steady growth and freer flow of world trade are essential to full prosperity at home, economic growth and stability in the industrialized countries, and progress in the developing world. We shall do everything in our power to build in future years on the substantial progress in these directions achieved in 1965.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 20, 1966.*

THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CORREGIDOR-BATAAN MEMORIAL COMMISSION—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 498)

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 193, 83d Congress, as amended, I hereby transmit for the information of the Congress of the United States the 13th Annual Report of the Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1966.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 20, 1966.*

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. YATES. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

A call of the House was ordered.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

mined by the Secretary of the Interior. Such payment shall be considered as full satisfaction of all claims of the United States against C. A. Lundy for any acts by or on behalf of C. A. Lundy upon such land.

"SEC. 2. In the event C. A. Lundy does not elect to apply for and obtain conveyance of the land as provided in section 1, all claims of the United States against C. A. Lundy for any acts by or on behalf of C. A. Lundy upon such land shall be deemed to be waived upon the relinquishment by C. A. Lundy of all claims to such land."

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed.

The title was amended so as to read: "A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to convey certain lands in Plumas County, California, to C. A. Lundy, and for other purposes."

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

The SPEAKER. That concludes the call of the Private Calendar.

VIETNAM AND ALL ASIA

(Mr. BOGGS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker, on yesterday the columnist, Richard Wilson, published an article in the Evening Star in which he recounted the plus factors in the war in Vietnam. Mr. Wilson is not particularly sympathetic with this administration, but his column points out developments all over the world, and he makes the point that had we not taken the stand that we have taken in Vietnam, the whole area might now be under Communist control.

He points out developments in Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, and all that area involving many hundreds of millions of people who seek freedom.

This morning in the Washington Post there was published another article, this time talking about a so-called white paper issued by some organ of the Republican Party, I presume to serve as a piece of Republican campaign strategy in the upcoming election. This pamphlet offers no solutions. In reading it all I could find is that it attacks the President of the United States for carrying out his responsibilities as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces.

It makes no mention of the fact that Members of the opposition party voted in this body, if I remember correctly, unanimously for the resolution on the Gulf of Tonkin just a year or so ago. The resolution was clear and unmistakeable, but there is no mention of that.

I believe, Mr. Speaker, it behooves all of us to defend and help thousands of Americans who are fighting for this country in Vietnam, fighting for the freedom of free men everywhere in the world. I do not believe what is happening in Vietnam should be the subject of partisan political attacks, particularly by those who offer no solution nor give alternatives.

The walls of this Chamber normally echo with debate. That is what this Chamber is for. That is what democracy is for. That is what the political liberty of free men is for.

But in time of war, it is the perennial policy of this Nation to stand behind the fighting men of this Nation. That policy has now been breached by the appearance of an openly partisan attack on this Nation's longstanding commitment to assist in the defense of free choice in Vietnam.

This document presents itself as a chronicle of recent history.

But it is a curious chronicle indeed.

It is carefully selective.

It is not history as history happened. It is history as history is edited, and manipulated—and even omitted—in order to serve Republican campaign strategy.

This pamphlet attacks—and it attacks vigorously. But it does not attack the enemies of the United States.

It attacks the President of the United States for carrying out his responsibilities as Commander in Chief.

What is even more disappointing, it attacks the President of the United States for carrying out the very resolution that these same men voted for in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964.

By the terms of that resolution, these same men charged the President to take whatever actions he deemed necessary to protect American interests in southeast Asia.

That resolution was clear and unmistakable.

It was discussed; it was debated; and it was overwhelmingly passed.

The men who now affix their names to this so-called white paper voted for that resolution.

But where in this white paper in that fact mentioned?

Where is there any discussion of that resolution whatsoever?

This pamphlet pretends to be history. But why is this particular bit of history omitted?

It is the most crucial item of the recent history of this conflict in Asia; for it is the very mandate that the Congress of the United States gave to the Commander in Chief to do whatever was necessary to protect our national interest in that beleaguered part of the world.

The men who drafted this pamphlet ask many questions. But they give us no answers.

They raise many objections. But they give us no solutions.

They make many attacks. But they offer us no alternatives.

Indeed, perhaps the authors of this pamphlet are to be congratulated on a magnificent piece of campaign strategy. For what they seem to be saying is this: here are the problems of the war—now go out on the stump and recount these problems—and give any answer that you think your particular constituency may want to hear.

The Wilson article follows:

[From the Evening Star, Sept. 19, 1966]

THE WAR AND THE PLUS FACTORS IN SOUTH ASIA

(By Richard Wilson)

BANGKOK.—Optimism is cheap here, and thus to be regarded with some suspicion.

It is hard to go along with the experienced and philosophical diplomat who says that we are on the verge of an enormous victory in South Asia, but these factors are at least well worth examining:

Japan is returning to South Asia as the beneficent provider of capital and know-how, and not as the would-be conquerer that she was during her drive to the south 20 years ago.

Australia has begun to consider herself a part of Asia and thus a participant in its general development.

Indonesia has turned away from Chinese Communist influence.

While the war in Viet Nam is yet far from won, the shape of a new independent order there at some date not in the distant future can be visualized.

Thailand has, with U.S. help, created a western flank against the expansion of Chinese Communism.

Burma's attitude under Ne Win has faced toward the West after a decade of isolation.

The Philippines, Korea and Taiwan, with Japan, are cooperating in development plans and ideas yet to be translated into action but highly promising.

Unlike NATO, the SEATO organization is expanding its activities in cooperative health, educational, and cultural work, as well as in military cooperation. An imposing new SEATO headquarters is going up here. There are even projects going forward on the Mekong River for its ultimate development as an Asian TVA.

These favorable factors do exist and they are probably attributable mostly to a single factor—the massive and growing American intervention in South Viet Nam. The most important factor in this intervention aside from the exercise of power itself is that it is generally understood to be for the purpose of creating stability, and when that stability is created the Americans will go home. "We know that you are not here forever," says a prominent Thai official.

Behind us, when we can go home, we will leave immense shipping, transportation, and military facilities costing many billions, as we left behind us many billions in Europe for the successful creation of stability there.

What is not commonly realized is that a year ago we faced possible collapse in South Viet Nam and if that had happened we could have bid goodby to any vestige of influence in Asia. Today the military situation has vastly improved, although there is hard fighting ahead, and the whole political climate of Asia has improved with it.

The proposal for an Asian conference to devise a settlement for the problem in Viet Nam is important. While it is true that such a conference could bring to bear no more than moral weight, it would serve to illustrate that the nations of South Asia could agree on a settlement Peking would probably not accept. Thus the disparity of interest witth the Peking government would be dramatized further.

It would be a wise man who, after a brief observation in South Asia, could weigh the validity of all the foregoing factors, but one conclusion comes out strong and clear: The stand we are making in Viet Nam has changed the whole outlook in this part of the world. It is not the wrong war in the wrong place, but it is a war at a time and place which can have a decisive effect on the future of 200 million people and our relation to them.

HOUSE GOP PAMPHLET HITS L.B.J.'S VIET POLICY

(Mr. MAHON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I was disturbed and disappointed when I read in this morning's paper a front-page story entitled, "House GOP Pamphlet Hits L.B.J.'s Viet Policy." I shall insert the news story in the RECORD. I had thought that the war was nonpartisan and that this had been more or less established by our vote on the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964 and confirmed by votes on defense bills and in various statements and positions since.

If it be true, as the story says—and I have not had an opportunity to peruse the report in full and complete detail—that the only positive suggestion made is that we have a blue ribbon committee appointed to study the situation and tell us what to do, this is most unfortunate because it could only be interpreted as a vote of "no confidence" in our elected officials in the legislative and executive branches who are supposed to speak for the American people. We cannot abdicate our responsibility.

In other words, few, if any, constructive suggestions are offered. The so-called white paper was issued, I note, by a "committee on planning and research." I must say that the paper appears to give evidence of research. It is fairly liberally footnoted. But a plan "to end this war more speedily and at smaller cost" or any other planning is not so evident—indeed, it is made most notable by its absence.

So this white paper seems most unfortunate. Coming at this time, it can only be interpreted as an effort to throw this war into partisan politics.

Last year, the Republican white paper on Vietnam—by the same committee that issued today's report—stated:

> The nation, by the President's admission, is now engaged in a war. All Americans must support whatever action is needed to put a stop to Communist aggression and to make safe the freedom and independence of South Vietnam.

Now, the new Republican white paper says:

> The urgent immediate question facing the nation is how to end this war more speedily and at smaller cost while safeguarding the independence and freedom of South Vietnam.

It would appear that emphasis is now placed on ending the war "more speedily and at smaller cost" rather than on support of "whatever action is needed to put a stop to Communist aggression." It would be most unfortunate indeed if the apparent shift should lead our opponents in the war to believe that one of the two major political parties of the United States no longer supports "whatever action is needed to stop Communist aggression." I am sure that this was not intended, but I am concerned about what our opponents might conclude.

I believe that any partisanship in the war will be resented in Vietnam by the men who slosh through the rice paddies and fight and hazard their lives for their country. I want to bespeak the support of the President's policy in Vietnam on both sides of the aisle by Democrats and Republicans alike.

The news story follows:

HOUSE GOP PAMPHLET HITS LBJ'S VIET POLICY

(By Richard L. Lyons)

House Republicans issued a 36-page campaign document on Vietnam yesterday, pinning full responsibility on President Johnson for the big American troop involvement there.

An updating of a 1965 White Paper issued by the House Republican Conference's Committee on Planning and Research, the pamphlet charges the Administration with deceiving the American people on the facts of Vietnam and with pursuing zigzag policies which hold no promise for a satisfactory end to the conflict.

"The urgent immediate question," said the GOP document, "is how to end this war more speedily and at smaller cost while safeguarding the independence and freedom of South Vietnam."

Other than proposing creation of a blue ribbon committee to consider basic policies, the statement made no suggestions on what to do—thus leaving members free to go either way depending upon the climate of their districts. Purpose of the document, said GOP leaders, was to recite history, in hopes that a "clear perspective of the past helps toward making right decisions in the future."

The report contains charts showing that American casualties have climbed from zero to over 20,000 under Democrats, and that American troops in Vietnam have increased from 16,000 to 300,000 under President Johnson, while the Vietcong strength has increased by a similar amount.

Republicans said the Johnson administration's policy in Vietnam has been "uncertain and subject to abrupt change," its objectives "clouded" and its minimum peace terms "obscure."

It quoted the President and other top officials as saying or suggesting at various times that the American objective in Vietnam was victory, stalemate, independence for South Vietnam and a coalition government.

It quoted Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's optimistic statements from 1961 to 1963 saying military operations were going well and his 1965 statement that "we have stopped losing."

It criticized President Johnson's "campaign oratory" of 1964 when he opposed carrying the war north and said "we are not about to send American boys 9,000 or 10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves."

Now, 2 years later, said the Republicans, there are as many American troops in Vietnam as ever were in Korea.

Republicans accused the Administration of "studied deception" in failing to tell the American people "the truth about the military situation in Vietnam, about the mission of American troops, about casualties, about peace feelers."

Their only good word for President Johnson was that his policies have prevented a Communist takeover of South Vietnam.

But they completely disassociated the GOP from the step-by-step escalation that has put 300,000 American troops there.

The commitment of American troops, said the Republicans, was the decision of President Johnson. It was not forced upon him by the SEATO treaty or by any obligation entered upon by an earlier administration."

No mention was made of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution of 1964 by which Congress with no Republican defections backed the President in whatever actions he deemed necessary to protect American interests in Southeast Asia. In the context of that moment, this meant helping defend South Vietnam from a Communist takeover.

REPUBLICAN WHITE PAPER HITS L.B.J.'S VIETNAM POLICY

(Mr. EDMONDSON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, like my colleagues who preceded me, it was my thought, when an overwhelming majority on both sides of the aisle passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964, that our policy in South Vietnam had passed out of the realm of partisan politics.

Now we have, in the resolution which has just been referred to, a piece of very obvious campaign political propaganda, which contributes practically nothing of a constructive nature to the situation that confronts us in Vietnam.

The authors of the pamphlet that has been issued say that they want a shorter war. Is there anybody in this Hall today who does not want a shorter war? Is there any American who does not want a shorter war today? They say they want fewer casualties. Is there anybody in this Hall who does not want fewer casualties in South Vietnam?

They say they want peace. Is there any American who does not want peace today?

I say to you, Mr. Speaker, what we need is not a restatement of these commonly held goals. What we need are practical alternatives to the narrow choices which now confront us in Vietnam. If the leadership of the opposition can give us such alternatives the whole Nation will be in their debt, but if they can do nothing more than carp at our Commander in Chief and our Secretary of Defense without offering any constructive ideas or alternatives, then the Republic is not well served—nor is the cause of freedom in Asia.

PAMPHLET PUT OUT BY REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE ON PLANNING AND RESEARCH

(Mr. HOLIFIELD asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I, too, read the article in the Washington Post, and I have had occasion to look at the pamphlet put out by the Republican committee on planning and research.

I know we will all note the charts in the back pages. The first one, of course, refers to U.S. combat casualties in Vietnam, showing casualties since 1961 of more than 20,000 people—some 3,218 deaths and 19,976 wounded.

Then this chart shows the growth of military personnel in Vietnam, showing it has gone up to around 300,000.

I have been on this floor a number of times when I have heard members of the minority party say that we should have a stronger effort in Vietnam. We are making a stronger effort. Of course, to make a stronger effort we must have more men involved. And if we are going to match the sternth of the opposition we are going to have more casualties.

I believe this so-called white paper is a very cheap political effort to bring a matter which is of great concern to all

the people of the United States—the casualties which have occurred in all of our districts, including my own—into the arena of partisan politics. I say that this type of attack upon the policy of the United States is a pretty weak attack. It offers no alternative except a blue ribbon committee.

We had about 75 or 80 blue ribbon committees during the regime of President Eisenhower, and they studied every subject to death.

The war over there is not going to be fought by a blue ribbon committee. It is going to be fought by men, by American soldiers and allied soldiers who are willing to go in and fight and to lose their lives, if necessary, to stop the onrushing tide of communism and to protect freedom and liberty in the world. There is no place for a blue ribbon committee in Vietnam.

HISTORICAL RECORD OF POSITION IN VIETNAM

(Mr. GOODELL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOODELL. Mr. Speaker, I am surprised and I must say amazed by the comments of my colleagues with reference to this paper. All I can say is that at least one of the gentlemen who preceded me admitted he had not read the paper yet. I would say the comments indicate that none of these Members have read this paper. I believe they should read it.

We issued a scholarly white paper in August of 1965, which detailed step by step the progression of involvement in southeast Asia. This is an updating of that paper.

If the gentlemen have facts to disagree with, with reference to the historical record that is recited in this paper, name them and come forward, but do not come up and accuse us of making a partisan document, when we have presented a scholarly paper that recites the commitments which have been made, the deteriorating situation that has existed, and the failure to give the American people the full story as to our commitments.

This is the purpose of the paper—to give a perspective to the American people and the Congress of the United States as to where we stand today, so that we can make realistic decisions as to what the alternatives are for the future. This white paper does not make partisan recommendations or oversimplify serious issues. That is exactly why we make no specific recommendations for the future. We present it as a scholarly document showing the perspective of our position in Vietnam today.

THE WAR IN VIETNAM

(Mr. PEPPER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, we are all Americans and however we may differ about the best way to serve our country, all of us are conscientious in the discharge of our patriotic duty as we see it. However, today it would seem to me that the critical nature of the crisis which we face makes it necessary that all of us not only consider the sincerity of our utterances but how they may be interpreted by those who are the enemies of our country and of democracy and freedom in the world today.

I am sure that the opposing party, the Republican Party, under no circumstances could embrace the idea or the thought of giving encouragement to Hanoi to withhold any disposition toward conciliation that might bring this terrible war to an end. However, the question is, Will Hanoi interpret the Republican document as presenting the issue of whether the country supports the President in continuing the Vietnam war until an honorable peace may be obtained as an issue that is to be decided in the coming election between the two major political parties of the United States? Will that pamphlet and such utterances and such declarations give encouragement to Hanoi, no matter that it is not intended by the authors of it, to withhold any disposition to negotiate and thus let more Americans be killed perhaps between now and the time after the election? What is more logical than that such a document can give, however it may not be intended by the authors, encouragement to those on the other side that maybe, at long last, if they will hold out, the American people will repudiate our President and our policy and then they will win their evil end with the help of the people of the United States?

REPUBLICAN RESEARCH AND PLANNING COMMITTEE PAPER

(Mr. LAIRD asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the white paper published by the research and planning committee of the Republican conference, under the leadership of the gentleman from New York [Mr. GOODELL]. This scholarly paper is nothing more and nothing less than a factual account of the involvement of the United States of America in Vietnam. I think it ill behooves the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. BOGGS] and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON], on the other side of the aisle, to quarrel with this document which is documented and footnoted as to every statement. The gentleman from Texas criticizes and in the next breath admits he has never read the document. I remind these two gentlemen that it has not been the minority party in this House of Representatives that has given aid and comfort to the enemy as far as the war in Vietnam is concerned; it has been the Democratic majority in this Congress both in the other body and here that have caused the North Vietnamese and the Communists to question the credibility and the intent of the United States of America in the prosecution of this war. We have given the President of the United States support on our side of the aisle because our country is involved and because the flag of the United States is involved. We have put our country above party. But the division which exists in the Democratic Party has prolonged the war in Vietnam. The division, the deep division, within the Democratic Party in this Congress has proven beyond a question of a doubt that this party does not deserve leadership today as it cannot unite its members behind the President of the United States. This paper, my friends, does not do anything to withdraw the support of the minority party to defend against Communist aggression any place in the world. I urge all of you: Read this report. And I caution the Members on the other side of the aisle about throwing stones at our house when you have such a divided house on your side of the aisle.

Mr. Speaker, the American people are a people that would do anything to bring about a lasting peace in the world. Yet, there is no question that American servicemen are fighting and dying again in a far-off place and many of our citizens are not sure why. Our objectives in Vietnam—long-term and short-range—have never been clearly spelled out by our President. His spokesmen—from Vice President to press secretary, from Secretary of State to Secretary of Defense—have issued conflicting statements of what our purpose is, of what our prospects are, of what our accomplishments have been.

Mr. Speaker, ours is a nation at war and for the first time in memory and probably in history, our President appears unable to unite his own party—much less the country—behind the war effort. This in itself is an underlying cause of the Communists' refusal to negotiate. So long as they believe that our country is torn by internal dissension, they will continue to hope that this dissension eventually will cause the United States to dishonor its commitment in Vietnam. As long as this belief persists, the possibility of a negotiated settlement will remain remote.

This is an issue in 1966. It was not made an issue by Republicans and it needs no assist from Republicans to remain an issue. It is, after all, a fact of life that a political party in power that cannot by its leadership rally its own people behind the country's cause in time of war cannot expect, does not deserve, and probably will not receive a vote of confidence from a majority of the American people of whatever political persuasion.

I repeat, this is not an issue created by Republicans. In fact, Republicans have gone the extra step in supporting our fighting forces in Vietnam—for to do otherwise in our view would contribute to a prolongation of the war and the possibility of a miscalculation on the part of the enemy.

It remains, however, an issue to a majority of Americans and a legitimate one. It is legitimate because those who seek political power and the mantle of leadership must, when they obtain it, demonstrate to those who have bestowed it the ability to use it wisely and well. The conduct of the war in Vietnam will be judged by the American people in these terms. If the people find the present leadership lacking, they will register this finding at the polls.

Perhaps the greatest concern in the minds and hearts of Americans about

the war in Vietnam is one that has not been articulated very often or very well but that can be seen in the general mood of uneasiness that exists on this issue. In my view, that uneasiness has to do with the question: What have we learned in Vietnam? What policy have we evolved from our years of invlovement in Vietnam that will find us prepared to prevent this kind of war in Thailand, in Latin America, in Africa? What policy have we evolved that will enable us to cope with such "wars of national liberation" in a fashion that will not lead to such a drain on our country's men and material?

Is this drift and the drain on America's manpower and resources that has been the hallmark of our policy in Vietnam the prospect for future "wars of national liberation"?

Or have our leaders been attempting to fashion new policies that will work better both in preventing aggression and maintaining peace?

These questions, these concerns, this uneasiness are in the minds of a great many Americans and they have not been satisfactorally answered for the American people.

Mr. Speaker, the white paper on Vietnam published by the research and planning committee of the Republican conference has attempted to set forth the historical record of our involvement in Vietnam for the American people. It has attempted to discharge one of the vital roles of a "loyal opposition": to elicit from the administration in power a clear definition of our short-term aims and long-term objectives in southeast Asia.

Mr. Speaker, I commend the Republican white paper on Vietnam to all of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle and to all American citizens as a factual, scholarly, and comprehensive assessment of how this Nation became involved in Vietnam.

DEBATE ON THE WAR IN VIETNAM

(Mr. REID of New York asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker, I am glad today that we are having a brief debate on the war in Vietnam. It has been too long deferred in this House, and it is entirely proper that more should take place at this time, even though briefly. The clear point that is before us, I think, is the need for candor and the need for the absence of guile with regard to taking to the American people all of the facts that they should know short of national security. The clear fact of the matter is that there has been lack of clarity on the part of the administration.

Mr. Speaker, the American people do not have a full understanding of where we are headed, what our prospects are, or what our minimum terms are for an honorable peace.

Mr. Speaker, unless there is conviction based on knowledge of the facts—not just a partial or surface consensus here at home—we will lack that understanding and commitment in depth that is essential to unity of purpose in this country and respect in Peking and Hanoi.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that it is high time that the administration made a serious effort to more clearly present to all the American people the facts so that there will be deep conviction and commitment in this country based upon fundamental understanding.

REPUBLICAN WHITE PAPER

(Mr. HAYS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, someone said they were shocked and surprised at this reported white paper. I was neither. It runs true to form. It is exactly what they did during the Korean war, except their timing is a little bad this time.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. LAIRD] can stand up and talk about the deep division in the Democratic ranks.

Mr. Speaker, it is not very deep. It is a minority—a very small minority—of the Democrats who talk this way.

Mr. Speaker, I feel that it is too bad that my friend the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. LAIRD] and others could not resist the political opportunity to join these dissident Democrats at this late date, just before the election.

Mr. Speaker, I do not need any white paper to tell me who got us involved in Vietnam. I remember his name very well. It was John Foster Dulles, a part of his program of containment and massive retaliation, if you please.

But I am going to say this to you: I did not criticize him then and I am not going to second-guess him now, like you Republicans are doing.

PARTISAN INTERESTS IN NATIONAL DEFENSE

(Mr. WRIGHT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, it is always to be regretted when partisan interest on either side of the aisle takes precedence over national interest. Particularly is this so when the matter at issue is claiming the blood of American servicemen abroad.

This has happened on various occasions, not only to our shame but to our national sorrow. Surely we should have learned from experience by now. World War I was fought, so Woodrow Wilson believed and said, to make the world safe for democracy. He said it was to be a war to end wars. The fruits of that victory were utterly thrown away by blind political partisanship, stark and selfish, and the seeds of another war were sown.

When President Wilson came back to this country from the labors of the peace treaty, he encountered a climate of cold political partisanship. A little band of willful men in the U.S. Senate were more intent upon embarrassing the President than they were upon building the foundations for a lasting peace.

Wilson said then, in a memorable prophecy uttered in Colorado, that another and more catastrophic war would come within the period of another 20 or 25 years if that policy of putting partisanship above peace were followed. Still they would not listen. And, Mr. Speaker, his prophetic utterances came true.

Partisanship in world affairs, following World War I, made World War II as inevitable as the setting of the sun. The world again was plunged into the darkness of war, cities were bombed, brave men died, and babies cried at breasts that oozed blood instead of milk. And that was the hollow victory of partisanship.

Mr. Speaker, we have tried assiduously since then to develop a bipartisan policy and a bipartisan spirit. We have endeavored to cultivate a spirit that partisanship must stop at the water's edge. May this not be undone in a moment of thoughtlessness for the mere sake of imagined partisan advantage.

The days and contributions of Senator Arthur Vandenberg should not be forgotten. I say to my Republican friends. He supported the Berlin airlift, the Greek and Turkish aid programs, the NATO alliance. He sought no expedient advantage through sniping at the President. I ask them to remember the works of Christian Herter, another distinguished Republican who, in our moment of national need, offered "constructive help instead of carping criticism." Do not sacrifice his example now upon the altar of expediency.

During the administration of President Eisenhower, we Democrats in Congress did not scuttle his efforts abroad by examples of disunity at home. We gave him the backing he needed as Chief Executive and spokesman for our Nation. We backed him on NATO and SEATO, on his aid and alliance programs, and no foreign nation could question our resolute unity. We passed by overwhelming margins resolutions of support for his efforts in the Formosan Straits and in the Middle East.

Mr. Speaker, I remember very well, only a few years back, in 1960, another election year when Mr. Eisenhower was President of the United States. We had then pending on the floor of the House a legislative matter in which the President was interested. That bill was designed to back him up right here in the Western Hemisphere. He had invited the nations of the hemisphere to construct here in Washington a permanent headquarters site for the Pan American Health Organization.

I was trying to think of something to say to prevent that bill from being rejected on the floor of the House because I did not want the President of the United States to be embarrassed. And I said at the time, if we were flying over the ocean in an aircraft and you may not have picked the pilot, and he may not have been the one we personally would have chosen, no man among us would pour water or sand in the gasoline tank just to embarrass the pilot.

The analogy is good. I think, today,

accused of a number of violations of House Rules. Why are they not investigated? It is rumored that Mr. POWELL's wife gave him a power of attorney to sign checks. Is this true? A House rule apparently makes it illegal for Mrs. Powell to be paid for work in Puerto Rico. Why does the Democratic leadership not do something about this? Are the so-called reformers not saying "Let us not investigate charges against Mr. POWELL; let us just dethrone him and sweep the whole mess under the carpet"?

Third, and most important of all, Why are we not talking about real reform? Why do we not consider electing committee chairmen from the top three ranking members of the majority? Why do we not forbid hiring of relatives—many of us, including myself, have bills introduced on this subject which are before committee but we cannot get a hearing—or why do we not at least forbid the hiring of wives of Congressmen?

Mr. Speaker, it would appear that some Democratic members of the committee want to deal with their political problem, which is Mr. POWELL, rather than deal with the real problem of adopting stringent rules of ethics for Members of Congress. With perhaps a few exceptions, Members of Congress are ethical and honest. We are all being discredited but not just by the actions of one man. We are being tainted, and rightly so I believe, by our unwillingness to enforce the highest ethical standards on all of our Members. The blame for this must necessarily be placed at the door of the Democratic majority which has the clear duty to act and has refused to.

There is a decided possibility that things are getting too hot on the other side of the aisle so our Thursday morning vote will be put aside or this motion will not be offered. The Democratic leadership should cooperate with this move by Education and Labor Committee Democrats. Were this effort, halfhearted though it is, to fizzle now the American people would once again be confronted with the callous disregard of the Congress for doing the right thing. This must necessarily reflect on the Democratic leadership of this body. Time and time again we see examples of laws and standards which are rigidly applied to the general public but then are not equally applied to Members of Congress. If the Democrats do not follow through on this proposal they will most certainly be enhancing the growing feeling in America for disrespect of law and order. All too many people have reason to believe that the old advice to a Congressman that "to get along you must go along" rules our conduct here. Fortunately, we do not have to "go along" and I for one will not, even if it means joining those who may have been reluctant or negligent in the past or may have curious motives now.

I am confident Republicans will join any movement for true reform. Several weeks ago our minority leader called for a full investigation of the allegations against Mr. POWELL. Many are hesitant to join the reluctant reformers who have soiled hands themselves in terms of protecting minority rights. They seem to be saying, "Let's not investigate facts. That might involve other Members of Congress and require modernizing of House rules generally. Let's just punish POWELL. He's vulnerable." Because "black power" has been mentioned by these so-called reformers, they have unfortunately mixed racism with reform that should include all Members of the House. Yet after all of these arguments have been made, we still have one clear duty—strip Congressman POWELL of the power which, on the merits, he has lost the right to exercise by his own actions and by his own derelictions.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. GOODELL] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. GOODELL. Mr. Speaker, on August 25, 1965, the planning and research committee of the House Republican conference issued a white paper on Vietnam. At that time I said the purpose of the report was to present a clear perspective on the past in order that right decisions might be made in the future.

More than 12 months have passed. The Vietnam conflict has now become the third largest war in U.S. history. Again, in order to keep the perspective clear, an updated version of last year's study is being issued today. It is entitled "The United States and the War in Vietnam." It is factual and scholarly. I have requested that the report, along with statements made by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. FORD], the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. LAIRD], and myself at this morning's press conference, be inserted in the RECORD at this point.

The material follows:

[Congress of the United States, Republican Conference, House of Representatives]

THE UNITED STATES AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Committee on Planning and Research: CHARLES E. GOODELL (New York), *chairman;* CATHERINE MAY (Washington), THOMAS B. CURTIS (Missouri), GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB (California), ROBERT H. MICHEL (Illinois), ROBERT T. STAFFORD (Vermont), SAMUEL L. DEVINE (Ohio), WILLIAM E. (BILL) BROCK (Tennessee).

Chairman: MELVIN R. LAIRD (Wisconsin).

Vice Chairman: WILLIAM C. CRAMER (Florida).

Secretary: RICHARD H. POFF (Virginia).

Chairman, Republican Congressional Campaign Committee: BOB WILSON (California).

Ranking Republican, Rules Committee: H. ALLEN SMITH (California).

Minority Leader: GERALD R. FORD (Michigan).

Minority Whip: LES ARENDS (Illinois).

Chairman, Republican Policy Committee: JOHN J. RHODES (Arizona).

Chairman, Committee on Planning and Research: CHARLES E. GOODELL (New York).

Research Director: William B. Prendergast.

FOREWORD

One year ago the Committee on Planning and Research of the Republican Conference of the House of Representatives issued a study entitled "Vietnam: Some Neglected Aspects of the Historical Record."

This revised and updated edition of the study has been prepared to take account of the drastic change in the role of the United States in the conflict in the past year. It is being issued at the time when the size of the American troop commitment to Vietnam has reached the maximum level of American troop strength committed in Korea in the 1950's, when the war in Vietnam is on the verge of becoming the third biggest war in our nation's history, and as the flames of war are spreading ominously into Thailand.

The study has been revised to take into account these significant developments as well as the Administration's revision during the past year of its explanation of American involvement in Vietnam, emphasizing the SEATO Agreement as the reason for its present actions in Vietnam.

The purpose of this new edition is the same as that of the original report—to show how the nation arrived at the present crisis and to evaluate past policy. A clear perspective on the past helps toward making the right decisions in the future.

GERALD R. FORD,
Minority Leader.
MELVIN R. LAIRD,
Chairman, Republican Conference.
CHARLES E. GOODELL,
Chairman, Committee on Planning and Research.
SEPTEMBER 20, 1966.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The involvement of the United States in Vietnam after World War II began with the decision of the Truman Administration to provide economic and military aid in May 1950.[1]

A fragile peace was brought to Vietnam by the Geneva Agreements of 1954, partitioning Vietnam into a Communist North and a non-Communist South. Contrary to most expectations, South Vietnam survived. Indeed, with generous aid from the United States, it achieved what the late President John F. Kennedy called a near miracle between 1954 and 1960. Secretary McNamara spoke of the history of South Vietnam in this period as a "success story."

When President Eisenhower left office, there was no crisis in South Vietnam. There were problems, arising particularly from a renewal of sporadic guerrilla activity by the Vietcong. The dimensions of the problems then compared with the present situation can be gauged from these facts:

1. In 1960, there were fewer than 700 American military personnel stationed in South Vietnam to train South Vietnamese; today (late August 1966) 300,000 American troops are there to fight.

2. In 1960, there were 5,000–6,000 Vietcong regulars in South Vietnam; today 282,000 enemy troops are there.[2]

3. In 1960, no Americans had been killed in combat; as of August 20, 1966, 4,832 have been killed and almost 27,000 have been wounded, taken prisoner or are missing.

4. In 1960, and in 1962, more than 80 per cent of the land area of South Vietnam was under the control of the South Vietnamese Government; today it is about 30 per cent or less.

5. In 1960, the cost of aiding South Vietnam to the United States was $250 million—72 per cent of it economic aid; as of the

[1] The State Department has issued three useful documents on Vietnam:

"A Threat to Peace" (Dept. of State Publication 7308, December 1961) referred to herein as "A Threat"; "Aggression from the North" (Dept. of State Publication 7839, February 1961) referred to herein as "Aggression"; "Why Vietnam" (August 1965). A handy compilation of speeches and documents has been prepared by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam" (2d Revised Edition, March 1966) herein referred to as "Background."

[2] Vietcong strength in 1960 extrapolated from figures given in "A Threat," pp. 9–10. Present strength reported by Department of Defense, New York Times, August 10, 1966.

in Korea and who are continuing to give their lives in Vietnam to repel Communist aggression. It would represent an overwhelming diplomatic victory for the Communist regime and would result in a label of legitimacy for an outlaw government.

Let us make no mistake about it. If Red China is rewarded for its crimes against humanity by receiving recognition in the U.N., it will further impose its obstreperous demands with respect to expelling the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China from the U.N. In addition, such action will forever destroy the hopes of the Chinese people that their nation can be liberated from the Communist oppressors.

I am aware that the foreign aid appropriations bill contains a separate provision reaffirming the position of Congress that the United States will continue to oppose the seating of Red China in the U.N. But, we must go further than reiterating this position. We should by separate action spotlight this feature of the bill by adopting a resolution that would put this body unqualifiedly on record as opposing any move to give membership to Red China in the U.N.

In this regard I am today introducing a resolution setting forth the reasons why we should fight any move to seat Red China, and I would like to invite my colleagues to introduce comparable resolutions. Our colleague in the Senate, the senior Senator from South Carolina, is also introducing such a resolution today.

The position of Congress should be unalterable in this matter. Since 1951, Congress has passed on some 20 occasions various resolutions opposing the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, and yet there are some who argue that these resolutions are no longer in effect. Let us remove all doubt as to the intent of Congress regarding this matter. We have an obligation to the freedom-loving people of this Nation and to our allies who have stood by us in opposing the admission of Red China to support this resolution with unremitting firmness.

TRUTH IN LENDING

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. OLSEN of Montana). Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. HALPERN] is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, it is lamentable that the Congress has not yet enacted legislation to protect borrowers of money from misleading and inadequate disclosure of credit terms.

For several years now, I have been privileged to cosponsor the so-called truth-in-lending bill, pioneered by Senator PAUL DOUGLAS, of Illinois.

This legislation is urgently needed to protect consumers against loan sharks and conscious or unwitting deception in credit transactions. The basic purpose is to require that anyone who lends money or extends credit must supply the consumer with two essential facts: a statement of the total finance charge in dollars and cents, and secondly, a statement of the true annual rate of interest on the unpaid balance of the loan.

The object of the bill is to provide all borrowers, and all those who buy on an installment plan, with a full accounting of the terms of the obligation, in dollar-and-cents language. Too often, we find that buyers are confronted with confusing sets of finance charges which are all but impossible to comprehend. The Senate has collected volumes of testimony pointing to the need for accurate and intelligible disclosure of credit charges on time buying.

The Department of Defense, in May of this year, issued a directive which, in effect, applies the bill's disclosure requirements to all commercial credit enterprises located on military bases.

The Department also stated that the military services would no longer be responsible in assisting in the collection of servicemen's debts unless the loan companies concerned complied with the directive.

Today interest rates have soared, to such an extent that the homebuilding industry is in acute distress. Interest rate policy inevitably affects the individual borrower eventually, as well as those who buy on credit.

However, consumer debt continues to rise. July figures show that outstanding consumer credit rose to an alltime high of $90.7 billion, compared to $87 billion last April. The trend will continue upward, although money is very tight, and this situation underlines the urgency of providing effective safeguards against loan sharks and misleading installment terms.

Certainly the House should move to consider this important legislation. It is time that Congress acted to protect all consumers by insuring that they be supplied with a full accounting of all interest charges when borrowing money or buying on an installment plan.

REPRESENTATIVE ASHBROOK TO SUPPORT DRIVE TO STRIP CHAIRMAN POWELL OF POWERS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. ASHBROOK] is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, I for one will vote to strip Chairman ADAM CLAYTON POWELL of the powers he has so arbitrarily misused in the past. I will do this not because of any particular affinity for those who are belatedly coming to the forefront in this battle and belatedly getting disturbed about the apparent excesses of our committee chairman. I will not do this because he flouts the legal order of New York courts. I will not do this because of any personal opinions Chairman POWELL might properly have about "black power" or racial concepts which affect education and labor. I most certainly will not do it because he is a Negro.

I for one will vote to strip him of all powers or for any partial limitations on his powers because, on the merits, he has exercised them in such a manner as to bring discredit on the entire House of Representatives. Time and time again, as I have pointed out before, Mr. POWELL merely states that he is doing what every other Member of Congress does and he will not be a second-class Congressman. To sully our reputations along with his is to do great harm to the legislative branch of our Federal Government. I will vote for restricting his powers because, on the merits, I believe the seniority system should not be so blind as to accommodate the flagrant excesses and abuses of our chairman which are of record and which I have repeatedly pointed out since 1961.

It is argued by some that the Powell problem is peculiarly the problem and burden of the Democratic Party. This is partially true. Were there a Republican dominated Congress, Mr. POWELL would be minority leader and probably spend even more time in Puerto Rico or away from these Halls. This would be the obvious answer to the Powell problem. The people can ultimately accomplish this reform but it does not divest us of the immediate responsibilities we have.

Credibility to the argument that this is a problem of Democratic Party housecleaning is given by their 1965 actions. The Democrats did not hesitate to strip Representative JOHN BELL WILLIAMS of his seniority last year because of Mr. WILLIAMS' support of the 1964 Republican presidential candidate. Again, we see a curious double standard. Mr. POWELL supported President Eisenhower in 1956 and his actions since that time have surely brought more injury to their party than did Mr. WILLIAMS' efforts on behalf of Mr. Goldwater.

Yet, he is also our problem and Republicans cannot shirk from their responsibilities merely because the Democrats choose to shun theirs. The record of the Congress has been one of majority party indifference to this type of questionable conduct. Will they now add Mr. POWELL to this same list of glaring omissions in their clear duty to the American people to act? Several points should be considered carefully by the Congress and the American people.

First, among the so-called reformers who are now out to get Mr. POWELL are those who have out-Powelled POWELL in gaveling down Republicans who want fair and open hearings on vital national questions. They are the same people who stood by while Mr. POWELL used his position to accomplish an ungentlemanly discourtesy to one of our distinguished Members of the fairer sex, Representative EDITH GREEN. In the heat of debate last year he moved to close debate "right now" while she was on her feet and seeking to be recognized to speak against portions of the bill over which he was the floor leader. They stood by then, smiling, and they have stood by through all of the sins of omission and commission in the past until now they sound an uncertain trumpet to rally an army to overthrow a tyrant. Their unexplained tardiness in rising to duty in the past detracts from any luster that might be due them for now making this effort which is entirely in order and urgently needed.

Second, our chairman has been openly

spring of 1966, it was more than $13 billion on an annual basis, of which less than 3 per cent was economic aid.[3]

6. In 1960, 2,000 South Vietnamese civilians were killed or kidnapped by the Viet Cong; in 1965, 14,673 were the victims of a similar fate.[4]

7. In 1960, the physical volume of exports from South Vietnam (a good barometer of economic activity) had dropped to 46 per cent of the 1960 level of exports.[5]

President Truman and President Eisenhower sent American military personnel to Vietnam solely as advisors. During the Kennedy Administration, American airmen began to participate in combat. In 1965, American ground forces began to fight. This commitment of American troops to combat was the decision of President Johnson. It was not forced upon him by the SEATO Treaty or by any other obligation entered into by an earlier administration. Under the Johnson Administration, American forces have begun to assume the major part of the burden of fighting the Communists in Vietnam.

The policy of the current Administration has been uncertain and subject to abrupt change. The objective of the United States in Vietnam has become clouded. By proposing the Geneva Agreements as a basis for peace and by refusing to reveal its attitude toward the proposed coalition government including Communists for South Vietnam, the Administration leaves dangerously obscure the minimum peace terms which it will insist on. Is it willing to accept n Vietnam the knd of settlement reached after World War II for the satellite states of Eastern Europe and in 1962 for Laos?

To what degree miscalculation on the part of the enemy brought about the present war, no one can be sure. Miscalculation must have been encouraged by the failure to match words with deeds throughout the Geneva negotiations of 1961–62 over Laos, by the withdrawal of support from the Diem regime, by the 1964 campaign oratory of President Johnson promising that American boys would not be sent to do the job that Asian boys should do.

The Administration has consistently held off needed military action until the situation in South Vietnam reached a state of acute deterioration. It has failed to use the economic power of the nation in the conflict.

The Administration has not told the American people the truth about the military situation in Vietnam, about the mission of American troops, about war costs, about casualties, about peace feelers. This studied deception strikes at the vitals of the system of popular government.

The result of President Johnson's policies in Vietnam, according to leading administration spokesmen, has been a stalemate with neither victory nor a satisfactory peace in prospect. Secretary McNamara, usually the optimist, assesses the present situation in the words, "We have stopped losing the war," and David Bell, until recently AID Director, says there has not been "significant progress for the last 3 or 4 years" in establishing security and economic progress in the areas in which the Vietcong exercise some influence.

I. THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION

The involvement of the United States in the struggle in Vietnam that followed World War II dates from the Truman Administration. It began with a decision announced by Secretary Acheson on May 8, 1950, to send "economic and military equipment to the Associated States of Indochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development."

The decision to aid the French in Vietnam was taken after the fall of China to the Communists when the Truman administration moved tardily to apply a policy of containment to some parts of Asia.

Aid to Vietnam under that policy implied no commitment to put more than arms and equipment and dollars into the conflict. This was clear from the authoritative statement of the Truman administration's Asiatic policy given by Secretary Acheson on January 12, 1950. The mild and equivocal warning which Mr. Acheson gave to the Asiatic aggressors in that speech drew a line in the Pacific Ocean marking the outermost limits of the defense perimeter of the United States. The islands east of that line were said to be vital to the security of this country and, Mr. Acheson implied, would be defended by the United States by force. The Asiatic mainland, including Indochina (and Korea) lay beyond the defense perimeter where, according to Secretary Acheson, an attack should be met by action of the United Nations.[6]

Although the policy enunciated in January was reversed in Korea 6 months later by the commitment of American forces in warfare, the Truman administration never considered providing manpower in Indochina. In fact, it twice rebuffed appeals from the French for a pledge of air and naval support in the event that the Chinese Communist provided manpower for the conflict in Indochina.[7] In response to such appeals, the Government of the United States said only that Chinese Communist aggression in southeast Asia "would require the most urgent and earnest consideration by the United Nations."

Involvement in a costly war in Korea did not, however, prevent the Truman administration from supplying substantial aid to save Indochina from Communist conquest. Approximately $375 million of military and economic assistance was channeled to southeast Asia by the American taxpayer through fiscal year 1953.

In August of 1950, an American military assistance advisory group of 35 personnel was sent to Indochina to advise on the use of American equipment.

Despite this assistance, the situation of the French and their native forces continued to deteriorate. When President Truman left the White House, all of Vietnam above the 17th parallel except Hanoi, a narrow corridor connecting to a coastal strip around Haiphong, and a part of the northeastern T'ai Highlands were under control of the Communist Viet Minh. In addition, Viet Minh forces were in effective control of large areas south of the 17th parallel—the central highlands and the tip of the Camau Peninsula, the southernmost part of the country.

II. THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

President Eisenhower continued the program of military and economic aid to France and the Associated States of Indochina at levels set by the previous administration until the fall of 1953.[8] In September 1953, increased aid of $385 million through 1954 was promised by the United States after two modifications of French policy had been decided on—both of them measures designed to avert impending disaster.

Under the twin pressures of military reverses in Indochina and the prodding of the United States, France agreed on July 3, 1953, to take steps "to complete the independence and sovereignty of the Associated States * * * within the French Union." Although France, in 1949, by the Elysee Agreement had conferred a measure of self-government on the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, too little was given to satisfy the thirst for independence. Secretary Dulles, hailing the belated French decision of July 1953, said, "The peoples of these countries needed something of their own for which to fight."[9] There was hope that the war, even at this late date, could be cleansed of the appearance of colonialism and would no longer seem to Asiatics to be an effort by France to hold on to her possessions.

The second significant decision was incorporated in the Navarre plan—a plan of aggressive military action with increased French and native forces.

With these two conditions realized—a promise of independence for Indochina and the decision to intensify the military effort—the Eisenhower administration increased American assistance.

After the conclusion of the Korean armistice on July 27, 1953, keeping the Chinese Communists from active military participation in Indochina became one of the concerns of American policymakers. On the day of the armistice, the 16 members of the United Nations that had helped to defend South Korea issued a joint warning against Chinese Communist action in southeast Asia.[10] On September 2, Secretary Dulles warned that such aggression in Indochina "could not occur without grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina."[11]

In the spring of 1954, as the French situation became desperate, the Eisenhower administration sought to persuade other nations with interests in southeast Asia to engage in a joint undertaking to stave off collapse. On April 4, President Eisenhower sent a letter to Winston Churchill suggesting "united action" on the part of the United States, England, France, the Associated States, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines. "The coalition," Mr. Eisenhower wrote "must be strong and must be willing to join the fight if necessary."

If the forces of the United States were sent to southeast Asia, the President made it clear that they would go principally for purposes other than ground warfare. He told Churchill, "I do not envisage the need of any appreciable ground forces on your or our part." Shortly thereafter, in a letter to General Gruenther at NATO, President Eisenhower reaffirmed his intention to avoid commitment of American forces to ground warfare, writing, "Additional ground forces should come from Asiatic and European troops already in the region."[12]

[3] "Background," p. 289. Determining the cost of the war in Vietnam involves difficult accounting problems. In using the figure of more than $13 billion, we rely on Secretary McNamara's estimate of May 11, 1966 that "the incremental costs of the war are on the order of $12 billion a year at the present time," and that military aid to South Vietnam amounts to "about $795 million in the current fiscal year." (Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings, Foreign Assistance 1966, p. 672.) Economic aid to South Vietnam came to $590 million in fiscal year 1966. McNamara's estimate is close to the $13.7 billion estimate of military costs by expert accountants outside the Defense Department. (William Bowen, "The Vietnam War: A Cost Accounting," Fortune, April 1966.) This article predicts a cost of $19.3 billion annually when American forces in Vietnam increase to 400,000.

[4] "A Threat," p. 13; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings Supplemental Foreign Assistance, January 28-February 6, 1966, p. 128.

[5] International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Vol. XIX, no. 8 (August 1966), p. 308.

[6] Department of State Bulletin, January 23 and March 27, 1950.

[7] New York Times, September 14, 1951; January 14, January 29, 1952.

[8] "Background," p. 34.

[9] New York Times, July 18, 1953.

[10] New York Times, August 8, 1953.

[11] New York Times, September 3, 1953.

[12] Eisenhower, "Mandate for Change," (1963) pp. 346, 347, 353.

On June 11, 1954, Secretary Dulles, in a speech delivered at Los Angeles, detailed the conditions under which the United States would have considered additional help to the French: (1) a request for assistance from the states fighting the Communists; (2) clear assurance (from France) of complete independence to Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam; (3) an indication of concern and support on the part of the United Nations; (4) assurance of collective action by other nations along with the United States; and (5) a guarantee that France would not withdraw from the conflict once a further commitment was extended by others.

The last two conditions laid down by Secretary Dulles were the decisive obstacles to the formulation of any plan for intervention. Negotiations to bring about the formation of a coalition of nations to support the French failed because England was unwilling to participate and because France was unwilling to continue a fight which had cost more than 140,000 French casualties.

The Geneva Conference of 1954

In these circumstances the Geneva Conference opened. On May 6—the eve of the negotiations on Indochina and of the fall of Dien Bien Phu—Lyndon B. Johnson, Harry S. Truman, and other leading Democrats issued ill-timed statements condemning administration policy in Southeast Asia on vague grounds. The New York Times on May 7, under the headline, "Democrats Open All-Out Assault on Administration Foreign Policy," reported:

"An all-out Democratic attack on the Eisenhower administration's foreign policy, the first such attack since the President took office, was opened tonight.

"The effect was to put the administration on dual notice (1) that the bipartisanship of the last 16 months was breaking up and (2) that the congressional Democrats could not be counted upon for unquestioning general support in the field of world affairs."

The article quoted Mr. Johnson as saying:

"It is apparent only that American foreign policy has never in all its history suffered such a stunning reversal.

"We have been caught bluffing by our enemies. Our friends and allies are frightened and wondering, as we do, where we are headed.

"We stand in clear danger of being left naked and alone in a hostile world."

Despite this effort by the loyal opposition to pull the rug out from under the Eisenhower administration as the critical Geneva Conference opened, the United States attempted to salvage what could be saved.

Representatives of nine governments assembled at Geneva to ring down the curtain on the French empire in Asia—Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, Communist China, the United States, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (north), the State of Vietnam (south), Cambodia, and Laos. Three similar armistice agreements were concluded relating to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and a declaration was issued.

Besides stipulations on the cessation of hostilities and pledges against resumption, the armistice agreements provided for withdrawal of foreign troops and prohibited Laos, Cambodia, and the two parts of Vietnam from joining any military alliance or granting military bases to foreign powers.

The Geneva Agreements in effect recognized as Communist territory Vietnam north of the 17th parallel and two provinces in northeastern Laos—Phongsaly and Sam-Neua.

Presenting the agreements to the French Parliament, Premier Mendes-France characterized them as "cruel because they sanction cruel facts." They reflected, he declared, "losses already suffered or made inevitable by the military situation." [13]

[13] New York Times, July 23, 1954.

If anything, the territorial settlement reached at Geneva was better than the non-Communist nations deserved on the basis of the existing military situation.

Vietnam, north of the 17th parallel, had already been almost totally occupied by the Viet Minh forces. The treaty provisions formalized this conquest, but they also required the Viet Minh to withdraw from South Vietnam, vast areas of which were under their control. Some 80,000 to 90,000 Viet Minh troops were moved out of South Vietnam in the execution of the agreement.[14] Perhaps 5,000 to 6,000 melted into the civilian population and remained in violation of the Geneva Agreement.[15]

The territorial arrangements contained in the agreements were, on their face, temporary. North and South Vietnam were ostensibly established for primarily military reasons as zones for the orderly liquidation of hostilities and the beginning of peaceful reconstruction.

The armistice agreement relating to Vietnam reads that the 17th parallel "should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary." The conference declaration envisaged the reunification of Vietnam, providing for the selection of a government for the entire country by free general elections to be held in 1956.

Similarly, the assignment of two northeastern provinces of Laos as sanctuaries for troops of the Communist Pathet Lao not wishing to be demobilized was, by the terms of the agreement, temporary—"pending a political settlement."

The United States did not sign any of the three treaties concluded at Geneva nor the conference declaration. Nor did South Vietnam.

At Geneva the United States issued a unilateral declaration pledging not to use force to disturb the agreements and warning that renewed aggression in violation of the agreements would be viewed as a threat to international peace and security. At the same time President Eisenhower announced that steps would be taken to establish collective defense against Communist aggression in southeast Asia.

The attitude of the U.S. Government toward Geneva was summarized by the President, "The agreement contains features which we do not like, but a great deal depends on how they work in practice." [16]

The chief flaw of the Geneva settlement lay in provisions relating to the International Control Commissions, set up to supervise the execution of the agreements. The Commissions, composed of representatives of Canada, India, and Poland, could act only by unanimous vote in cases involving violations of the territory covered by the agreements. A veto in the hands of a Communist representative was an instrument for sabotage.

Reaction to Geneva

The negotiations at Geneva produced a flood of criticism of the Eisenhower administration's foreign policy.

Yet all of the critics flatly opposed the only step which remained to undo the Communist conquest in Indochina—the commitment of American troops to a long and costly war. General Ridgway estimated that 5 to 10 American combat divisions would have been required at the outset to win such a war.[17]

Critic MIKE MANSFIELD said, "Almost all opinions converged on one point: The United States should not become involved alone in a shooting war in Indochina." At another time, he said:

[14] "Aggression," p. 26.

[15] Bernard B. Fall, "How the French Got Out of Vietnam," New York Times Magazine, May 5, 1965, p. 113.

[16] "Background," p. 68.

[17] CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, July 8, 1954, p. 9999.

"No, I was never in favor of intervention and I am opposed to it now. I think it would be suicidal. I believe the worst thing that could happen to the United States would be to have our forces intervene in Indochina and then bog down in the jungles there." [18]

Senator John F. Kennedy said:

"I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere and at the same time nowhere, an enemy of the people which has the sympathy and covert support of the people * * *. I do not think Indochina can be saved unless the other Asiatic nations * * * are willing to take their fair part in the struggle * * *. For the United States to intervene unilaterally and to send troops into the most difficult terrain in the world, with the Chinese able to pour in unlimited manpower, would mean that we would face a situation which would be more difficult than even that encountered in Korea. It seems to me it would be a hopeless situation." [19]

Senator Estes Kefauver had this to say:

"But if the decision is to be made to intervene, I say this Nation needs more than the help of Great Britain, of Australia, of New Zealand, and of France. It must have the moral and physical support, in addition to the Philippines and Thailand, of Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon, Pakistan, and if not the help, at least the understanding of India." [20]

Senator HUBERT HUMPHREY said, "We have had our bluff called two or three times in the last month. We have been defeated at Geneva." Somewhat illogically, since he opposed military intervention by the United States, Senator HUMPHREY attributed the defeat at Geneva to cuts made by the Eisenhower administration in the defense budget.[21]

The critics were not in agreement on the basis for their attacks on the administration. Adlai Stevenson thought the United States was too rigid and inflexible in negotiations.[22] MIKE MANSFIELD thought the United States should not have negotiated at all but should have stayed away from the Geneva Conference,[23] ignoring the fact that such provisions as that permitting Vietnamese who wished to escape Communist control to move to South Vietnam were the result of the bargaining effort of the representatives of this Nation.

Finally, the critics undermined their case by conceding that the war in Indochina was lost because of French colonialism and not because of anything the United States did or failed to do. Adlai Stevenson made the point when he declared, "Had France * * * granted genuine independence in orderly, sincere stages to Vietnam, there very likely would have been no war in Indochina."

The disputed election of 1956

The final declaration issued at Geneva in 1954 (subscribed to by neither the United States nor South Vietnam) called for free elections to unify all of Vietnam in 1956. Recently Senator FULBRIGHT and others have deplored the fact that the election was not held.

At Geneva the representatives of what was to be South Vietnam "vainly protested against the partition of the country and against the principle of general elections being agreed upon when more than half of the voters would be north of the 17th parallel. It vainly asked that the whole territory and population be placed under the

[18] CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, loc. cit. and p. 10007.

[19] CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, April 6, 1954, p. 4673.

[20] CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, June 9, 1954, p. 7919.

[21] CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, June 16, 1954, p. 8342.

[22] New York Times, October 17, 1954.

[23] CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, July 8, 1954, p. 9997.

control of the United Nations until the reestablishment of peace and security would permit the holding of really free general elections." [24]

The reasons for the refusal of South Vietnam to acquiesce in the holding of the election were stated by Prime Minister Diem on July 16, 1955:

"We did not sign the Geneva agreements. We are not bound in any way by these agreements entered into against the will of the Vietnamese people. Our policy is a policy of peace, but nothing will divert us from our goal: the unity of our country—a unity in freedom and not in slavery.

"We do not reject the principle of elections as a peaceful and democratic means to achieve unity. But elections can be one of the foundations of true democracy only on the condition that they are absolutely free. And we shall be skeptical about the possibility of achieving the conditions of free elections in the north under the regime of oppression carried on by the Vietminh." [25]

There was clearly no legal obligation on the Government of South Vietnam to abide by the terms of the final declaration. The position of South Vietnam on this point was sustained by the United Kingdom, one of the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, in the following statement:

"Her Majesty's government has always regarded it as desirable that these elections should be held and has advised the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to enter into consultations with the Vietminh authorities in order to insure that all the necessary conditions obtained for a free expression of the national will as a preliminary to holding free general elections by secret ballot. Nevertheless, Her Majesty's government does not agree that (South Vietnam) is legally obliged to follow the course: * * * It may be recalled that at the final session of the Geneva Conference on Indochina * * * the Vietnamese Government formally protested 'against the hasty conclusions of the Armistice Agreements by the French and Vietminh high commands only' * * * and 'against the fact that the French high command was pleased to take the right, without a preliminary agreement of the delegation of (South Vietnam), to set the date of future elections.' " [26]

Among the staunchest opponents of the holding of the 1956 election was Senator John F. Kennedy, of Massachusetts. He issued "a plea that the United States never give its approval to the early nationwide elections called for by the Geneva Agreement of 1954. Neither the United States nor free Vietnam was a party to that agreement—and neither the United States nor free Vietnam is ever going to be a party to an election obviously stacked and subverted in advance, urged upon us by those who have already broken their own pledges under the agreement they now seek to enforce." [27]

Even Hans Morgenthau spoke against action to carry out the provisions of the Geneva declaration relating to elections:

"Free elections are very subtle instruments which require a dedication to certain moral values and the existence of certain moral conditions which are by no means prevalent throughout the world, and certainly not prevalent in either North or South Vietnam." [28]

[24] "Vietnam at the Crossroads of Asia," Embassy of Vietnam, Washington, D.C. (1960) p. 17.

[25] Francis J. Corley, "Vietnam Since Geneva," Thought, vol. 33, No. 131 (winter 1958–59), p. 564.

[26] "Vietnam and the Geneva Agreements," London, May 1956, p. 9.

[27] "A Symposium on America's Stake in Vietnam," American Friends of Vietnam, New York, 1956.

[28] Ibid.

Conditions in South Vietnam, 1954–60

As South Vietnam began its existence, the prospects for its survival were minimal. Independence was thrust upon a people without political experience and without political leadership. It had no sense of nationhood. It had no industry. And, by the Geneva declaration, it seemed doomed to being swallowed up by the Communist rulers of North Vietnam in 2 years.

Some of the difficulties facing the newly selected Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem were outlined by one observer in these words:

"The circumstances under which the man came to power were unbelievable. He faced the opposition of the Communists * * * he also had to deal with the open hostility of French military men and the remnants of the French colonial service, who regarded him as anti-French, and who expected him to last only a few weeks at the most. Then, as a consequence of a provision of the Geneva accords, authorizing free movement between the north and south zones for a limited period, more than 850,000 refugees came into South Vietnam from the Communist North Vietnam during the next 300 days, to be fed, clothed, and housed. In addition, he found that his 'full powers, civil and military,' an extraordinary grant which Bao Dai had conceded him as a condition of his acceptance of office, existed principally on paper." [29]

Yet when the Eisenhower administration left office, South Vietnam had a stable and established government.

Senator John F. Kennedy called the development "a near miracle." In his book, "Strategy of Peace," published in 1960, he said:

"In what everyone thought was the hour of total Communist triumph, we saw a near miracle take place . . . Today that brave little state (South Vietnam) is working in free and friendly association with the United States, whose economic and military aid has, in conditions of independence, proved effective." [30]

Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, on February 26, 1960, reported as chairman of the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Public Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:

"By any measure Vietnam has made great progress under President Ngo Dinh Diem in the improvement of internal security, in the creation of the forms and institutions of popularly responsible government where before few existed, and in the advancement of the welfare of the people of Vietnam. The U.S. aid program has been an important factor in that progress. It is still an important factor." [31]

The State Department's white paper of December 1961, "A Threat to the Peace," contains the following analysis of progress in South Vietnam:

"The years 1956 to 1960 produced something close to an economic miracle in South Vietnam. Food production rose an average of 7 percent a year and prewar levels were achieved and passed. While per capita food production in the north was 10 percent lower in 1960 than it had been in 1956, it was 20 percent higher in the south. The output of textiles in the south jumped in only 1 year from 68 million meters (in 1958) to 83 million meters. Sugar production in the same 1-year span increased more than 100 percent, from 25,000 metric tons to 58,000 metric tons.

"Despite the vastly larger industrial plant inherited by the north when Vietnam was partitioned, gross national product is considerably larger in the south. In 1960 it was estimated at $110 per person in the south and $70 in the north. Foreigners who have visited both north and south testify to the higher living standards and much greater availability of consumer goods in the latter.

"The record of South Vietnam in these recent years is written in services and in improved welfare as well as in cold economic indexes. A massive resettlement program effectively integrated the 900,000 refugees from the north into the economic and social fabric of the south. An agrarian reform program was designed to give 300,000 tenant farmers a chance to buy the land they work for a modest price. Under the Government's agricultural credit program aimed at freeing the farmers from the hands of usurers, loans to peasant families increased fivefold between 1957 and 1959.

"Thousands of new schoolrooms were built and the elementary school population in South Vietnam increased from 400,000 in 1956 to 1,500,000 in 1960. A rural health program installed simple dispensaries in half of South Vietnam's 6,000 villages and hamlets. An elaborate malaria eradication program was launched to rid Vietnam of its most important infectious disease. Doctors and nurses went into training in South Vietnam and abroad to serve their people's health needs.

"This is a part, a very small part, of the setting against which the Viet Cong launched their campaign of armed action, subversion, and terror against South Vietnam. It is a record of progress over a few brief years equaled by few young countries." [32]

Secretary McNamara added his testimony on March 26, 1964:

"The United States * * * provided help—largely economic.

"On the basis of this assistance and the brave, sustained efforts of the Vietnamese people, the 5 years from 1954 to 1959 gave concrete evidence that South Vietnam was becoming a success story. By the end of this period, 140,000 landless peasant families had been given land under an agrarian reform program; the transportation system had been almost entirely rebuilt; rice production had reached the prewar annual average of 3.5 million metric tons—and leaped to over 5 million in 1960; rubber production had exceeded prewar totals; and construction was underway on several medium-size manufacturing plants, thus beginning the development of a base for industrial growth.

"In addition to such economic progress, school enrollments had tripled, the number of primary school teachers had increased from 30,000 to 90,000, and almost 3,000 medical aid stations and maternity clinics had been established throughout the country. And the South Vietnamese Government had gone far toward creating an effective apparatus for the administration of the nation. A National Institute of Administration had been established with our technical and financial assistance—a center for the training of a new generation of civil servants oriented toward careers of public service as opposed to the colonial concept of public rule." [33]

The progress which, by all this testimony, was made in South Vietnam between 1955 and 1960, was due in no small part to the assistance of the United States.

Without the support of the United States, South Vietnam would have been stillborn. During fiscal years 1955 through 1961, $2.3 billion—63 percent of it for economic purposes—was provided by the Eisenhower administration. Technical assistance was given on a large scale to increase and diversify the output of the country's economy and to spur the achievement of far-reaching social reforms, notably in the fields of education and diffusion of land ownership.

[29] Wesley R. Fishel, "Free Vietnam Since Geneva," Yale Review (autumn 1959), p. 70.

[30] "Strategy of Peace," pp. 61–62.

[31] U.S. Aid Program in Vietnam, report of the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Public Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 26, 1960, p. 1.

[32] "A Threat," pp. 5–6.

[33] Department of State Bulletin, April 13, 1964, pp. 563–564.

But a viable Vietnam also required security from outside aggression and from terrorism and guerrilla activities within the country. To increase security, the Eisenhower administration proceeded promptly to form a regional defense organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and to bring South Vietnam, as well as Laos and Cambodia, within its protective cover.

Specifically to meet the threat of infiltration from North Vietnam and the depredations of guerrillas in the South, the United States provided military equipment and training to the forces of South Vietnam.

There can be no question that only the help of the United States made possible the survival of South Vietnam. Without it, everything south of the 17th parallel would have fallen to the Communists a decade ago.

No commitment of troops by Eisenhower

There is no merit in President Johnson's repeated explanation of the Nation's present military involvement in Vietnam as the result of President Eisenhower's letter of October 1, 1954, to Prime Minister Diem. The letter, as Secretary McNamara admitted on March 26, 1964, was in response to a request for "economic assistance."[34] It promised American help for the resettlement of refugees from North Vietnam and an exploration of "ways and means to permit our aid * * * to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Vietnam." * * * In the even such aid were supplied," President Eisenhower wrote, the United States would expect "assurances as to the standards of performance." The purpose of this conditional offer, he said, was "* * * to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means." This was the extent of the commitment made in this letter.[35]

More recently, the administration has deemphasized the Eisenhower letter to Diem and has argued that the present military involvement in Vietnam results from the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty signed at Manila on September 8, 1954.

This Treaty contained no advance commitment to send American troops to fight in Southeast Asia. It carefully avoided the kind of automatic response to aggression embodied in the NATO agreement, summarized in the principle, "An attack upon one is an attack upon all."

Section 1 of Article IV of the SEATO Agreement reads:

"1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

Secretary Dulles, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the SEATO Treaty, declared,

"The agreement of each of the parties to act to meet the common danger 'in accordance with its constitutional processes' leaves to the judgment of each country the type of action to be taken in the event an armed attack occurs."

Further, Mr. Dulles said, the treaty "does not attempt to get into the difficult question as to precisely how we act . . ."[36]

In the Senate debate on ratification of the SEATO agreement, on February 1, 1955, Senator H. Alexander Smith, a delegate to the Manila Conference who signed the agreement on behalf of the United States, clearly explained the nature of the commitment in these words,

"Some of the participants came to Manila with the intention of establishing an organization modeled on the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty arrangements. That would have been a compulsory arrangement for our military participation in case of any attack. Such an organization might have required the commitment of American ground forces to the Asian mainland. We carefully avoided any possible implication regarding an arrangement of that kind.

"We have no purpose of following any such policy as that of having our forces involved in a ground war.

"Under this treaty, each party recognizes that an armed attack on any country within the treaty area would endanger its own peace and safety. Each party, therefore, agrees to act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. That means, by implication, that if any such emergency as is contemplated by the treaty should arise in that area it will be brought before the Congress by the President and the administration, and will be considered under our constitutional processes. We are not committed to the principle of NATO, namely, that an attack on one is an attack on all, calling for immediate military action without further consideration by Congress.

"For ourselves, the arrangement means that we will have avoided the impracticable overcommitment which would have been involved if we attempted to place American ground forces around the perimeter of the area of potential Chinese ingress into southeast Asia. Nothing in this treaty calls for the use of American ground forces in that fashion."[37]

One academic authority, W. McMahon Ball, has written, "The treaty does not oblige the United States either legally or morally to take any course in Southeast Asia than the course it might be expected to take if the treaty did not exist."[38]

Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty clearly reserves to each signatory the right to determine the nature of its response to armed aggression and does not obligate any signatory to use its armed forces to deal with the aggressor.

Recognizing this fact, the Kennedy administration did not use American forces to repel Communist aggression in Laos. The legal commitment of the United States to Laos was the same as its commitment to Vietnam. Both of these countries of southeast Asia were brought under the protection of SEATO.

Lyndon Johnson as Vice President made it clear in 1961 that the United States had not up to that time made a commitment that obligated it to employ its military forces in Southeast Asia. In a memorandum to President Kennedy dated May 23, 1961, right after his return from a tour of Asia, Johnson wrote:

"The fundamental decision required of the United States—and time is of the greatest importance—is whether we are to attempt to meet the challenge of Communist expansion now in Southeast Asia by a major effort in support of the forces of freedom in the area or throw in the towel. This decision must be made in a full realization of the very heavy and continuing costs involved in terms of money, of effort, and of U.S. prestige. It must be made with the knowledge that at some point we may be faced with the further decision of whether we commit major U.S. forces to the area or cut our losses and withdraw should our efforts fail. We must remain master of this decision."[39]

Finally, General Maxwell Taylor in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 17, 1966, demolished the argument that the Eisenhower administration made any commitment to employ American troops in combat in Southeast Asia:

Senator HICKENLOOPER. "Now, up until the end of the Eisenhower administration, we had only about 750 military personnel in South Veitnam, did we not?"

General TAYLOR. "It was very small, something like that."

Senator HICKENLOOPER: "I think that is within 25 or 30 of the number, either way, and they were entirely devoted to giving technical advice on training to the South Vietnamese troops."

General Taylor. "That is correct."

Senator HICKENLOOPER: "To your knowledge, did we have any commitment or agreement with the South Vietnamese up to that time that we would put in active field military forces to conduct a war along with them?"

General Taylor: "No, sir. Very clearly we made no such commitment. We didn't want such a commitment. This was the last thing we had in mind." (Emphasis added)

Senator HICKENLOOPER: "When was the commitment made for us to actively participate in the military operations of the war as American personnel?"

General Taylor: "—Insofar as the use of our combat ground forces are concerned, that took place, of course, only in the spring of 1965."[40]

The New York Times of August 19, 1965, correctly stated the case when it said, "The shift from military assistance and combat advice to direct participation by American combat troops in the Vietnamese war has . . . been a unilateral American decision . . . by President Johnson."

The beginning of the Communist offensive

Although the Government of South Vietnam never established unchallenged authority in the entire countryside, a period of relative peace and stability extended from 1955 to 1959. Late in the latter year the tempo of guerrilla attacks began to assume significant proportions.

During 1960 the armed forces of the Vietcong began to increase from the level of 3,000 at the beginning of the year. During this year the Vietcong assassinated or kidnapped more than 2,000 civilians. Acts of terrorism were directed particularly against local officials in rural areas to leave the countryside leaderless.

The signal from North Vietnam for intensification of the conflict came on September 10, 1960, at the Third Congress of the Communist Party of North Vietnam with a call for the liberation of the south from the "rule of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen." In December the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam was formed by Hanoi.

III. THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

The Democratic administration which took office in January of 1961 was confronted not only with problems in South Vietnam but with far more acute difficulties in the neighboring nation of Laos. In Vietnam sporadic guerrilla attacks were going on. In Laos,

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[34] Ibid.

[35] "Background," pp. 75–76.

[36] Hearings before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, concerning Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, 83d Congress, 2d Session, November 11, 1954, Part I, p. 4.

[37] CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, February 1, 1955, p. 1053.

[38] "A Political Reexamination of SEATO," International Organization (winter 1958), p. 20.

[39] Johnson memorandum appears in William S. White's "The Professional: Lyndon B. Johnson" (1964), p. 243.

[40] Hearings before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations concerning Supplemental Foreign Assistance bill (S. 2793), 89th Congress, 2d Session, February 17, 1966, Part I, p. 450.

Communist Pathet Lao forces were engaged in a full-scale offensive that threatened the government of Premier Boun Oum.

Laos

Recognizing the seriousness of the situation in Laos, President Kennedy addressed himself to this subject in a news conference on March 15, 1961. The President said:

"Recent attacks by rebel forces indicate that a small minority backed by personnel and supplies from outside is seeking to prevent the establishment of a neutral and independent country (of Laos). We are determined to support the government and the people of Laos in resisting this attempt." [41]

On March 23 the President warned, " * * if there is to be a peaceful solution, there must be a cessation of the present armed attacks by externally supported Communists * * *. No one should doubt our resolution on this point * * * all members of SEATO have undertaken special treaty responsibilities toward an aggression in Laos." [42]

Sixteen months later the Government of the United States acquiesced in a settlement which terminated any responsibility which the SEATO powers had toward Laos and imposed on that country a coalition government including Communist representation. Acceptance of this settlement by the government of Laos recognized by the United States was brought about by suspension of American aid.

Although American spokesmen said that the United States would not negotiate on the subject of Laos until a cease-fire was in effect, on May 16, 1961, Secretary Rusk appeared at the opening of the Geneva Conference ready to negotiate. A cease-fire had, it is true, been proclaimed on May 3 but the Communists kept on fighting. How spurious the announced cessation of hostilities was can be judged from the fact that the United States on May 30 submitted to the conferees at Geneva a list of 38 Communist breaches of the cease-fire agreement. Throughout the 14 months of the Geneva Conference, violations continued. On May 7, 1962, the Pathet Lao captured the city of Nam Tha after a siege of 4 months. By May 12, the Communist forces completed the ocupation of northwest Laos in a 10-mile advance beyond the cease-fire line that compelled the United States to send 5,000 military personnel to Thailand because of the "grave threat" to that country.

The United States continued to negotiate at Geneva. It no longer even protested violations of the cease-fire.

At the outset of the Geneva Conference on May 17, 1961, Secretary Rusk said that the United States would insist on "effective controls, effectively applied to maintain a genuinely independent Laos." As a "yardstick which will influence the attitude of the United States toward the work of this conference," he laid down five principles dealing with the operation of the body which would supervise the execution of the agreement.[43] They were inspired by unhappy experience with the international control commissions established to police the Geneva agreements of 1954.

In summary, Secretary Rusk's principles boiled down to these: that no member of the supervisory commission should possess a veto power by which it might prevent the execution of decisions of the majority of the commission and that the commission must enjoy full freedom of action and of movement throughout the territory in which it was to function.

The Declaration and Protocol on Neutrality in Laos, signed July 21, 1962 (the anniversary of the 1954 Geneva Agreement) proclaimed the neutrality of Laos, required the withdrawal of foreign troops, established a control commission composed of Poland, India, and Canada, but it showed no trace of the principles laid down by Secretary Rusk when the Conference opened. Each member of the Control Commission was to possess the power to veto any decision except a decision to initiate an investigation.

Six months before the Geneva Agreement of 1962 was signed, the State Department issued an anguished complaint about the failure of the Control Commission in Vietnam to function in dealing with 1,200 incidents of alleged Communist violations of the 1954 agreement.[44]

Nevertheless, Averell Harriman called the 1962 agreement "a good agreement—better than I thought we would work out." [45]

Mr. Harriman's appraisal makes interesting reading in the light of the following remarks by Secretary Rusk two years later on June 14, 1964:

"What happened? The non-Communist nations complied with the agreements. North Vietnam and its Pathet Lao puppets did not. We promptly withdrew our 600-man military aid mission. North Vietnam kept several thousand troops and military technicians in Laos. North Vietnamese cadres are the backbone of almost every Pathet Lao battalion. This was, and is, of course, a major violation of the Geneva accords.

"Later, North Vietnam sent additional forces back into Laos—some of them in organized battalions—a second major violation.

"The North Vietnamese have continued to use, and improve, the corridor through Laos to reinforce and supply the Vietcong in South Vietnam—a third major violation.

"The Communists have continued to ship arms into Laos as well as through it—another major violation.

"The Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese Communists have compounded these international felonies by denials that they were committing them.

"But there was another major violation which they could not deny. They barred freedom of access to the areas under their control, both to the Lao Government and to the International Control Commission. The Royal Lao Government, on the other hand, opened the areas under its control to access not only by the ICC but by all Lao factions.

"The Communists repeatedly fired at personnel and aricraft on legitimate missions under the authority of the Royal Lao Government. They even fired on ICC helicopters. They repeatedly violated the cease-fire agreement. And this spring they launched an assault on the neutralist forces of General Kong Le, driving them off the Plaine des Jarres, where they had been since early 1961.

"This, in bare summary, is the Communist record of aggression, bad faith, and deception in Laos." [46]

Laos today is ripe for picking by the Communists whenever they choose to use the force necessary to take over the entire country.

Communist control of large areas of Laos has had a direct bearing on military operations in South Vietnam. The State Department noted that Laos "provides not only a route into South Vietnam but also a safe haven from which Vietcong units operate." It also asserted that "the pace of infiltration of officers and men has jumped markedly since Pathet Lao victories in Laos have assured a relatively safe corridor through that country into western South Vietnam." [47]

The importance of Laos arises less from its military significance, however, than from the fact that it tested the resoluteness of the Government of the United States. When the administration retreated repeatedly from its announced positions in the case of Laos, the Communists might well have concluded that the United States would in time back down in South Vietnam.

Averell Harriman drew a distinction between the two nations, pointing out that Laos was landlocked and could be defended only by ground forces. "In Vietnam, on the other hand," he said in a statement that has an ironic ring today, "a decision to assist the Republic of Vietnam to defend itself against the sort of attack being waged in that country would not involve the deployment of U.S. combat forces and would not require the occupation of foreign territory by the United States or other Western forces." [48]

Vietnam

In May of 1961 Vice President Johnson was sent to Vietnam. There he lavished praise on Prime Minister Diem, comparing his host to Washington, Jackson, Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill. He assured Diem that the United States was with him "all the way." [49]

The result of the Vice President's trip was a substantial increase in American aid for military, economic, and social purposes. American manpower, the Vice President reported, was not needed.

The Vice President's trip to Vietnam was the first of several by important administration figures. It set a pattern which was to be followed without variation by the others—a rash of optimistic statements on the status and future prospects of the military struggle and an extension of American involvement either in the form of aid or manpower or both.

The year 1961 saw the development of the conflict in Vietnam from covert guerrilla action to open, if still small-scale, war. In that year for the first time the Vietcong committed forces of battalion size to combat. For the first time they launched an attack on a community as important as a provincial capital. The infiltration of Communist troops from the north, facilitated by unchallenged Communist control of eastern Laos, increased. By the end of 1961, the State Department estimated that between 8,000 and 12,000 regular Vietcong troops were in South Vietnam—at least double the number present there 1 year earlier. The United States doubled its forces of military advisers in South Vietnam from fewer than 700 stationed there when President Eisenhower left office to 1,364.

In the period 1961 to 1963 the number of American troops in South Vietnam grew from 1,364 to 16,575. The amount of aid, military and economic, was increased substantially, although the exact figures for military aid are classified after fiscal year 1962.

In the late summer and fall of 1963, the internal crisis in South Vietnam arising from conflict between the Diem regime and the Buddhists produced a deterioration of the military situation and a decision by the U.S. Government to encourage a change of horses. American aid was cut back. Official statements indicating lack of confidence in the Diem government and calling for a change of personnel and policy were issued. Diem was removed in a military coup and was assassinated along with his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu.

There is general agreement now that the coup of November 1963 led to chaos in South Vietnam and resulted in substantial Vietcong gains.

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[41] "Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy," 1961, p. 185.

[42] Ibid., p. 214.

[43] "Documents on American Foreign Relations 1961," Council on Foreign Relations, 1962, pp. 311–318.

[44] "A Threat," p. 24.

[45] Washington Post, July 25, 1962.

[46] Department of State Bulletin, July 6, 1964, pp. 4–5.

[47] "A Threat," p. 10.

[48] "What We Are Doing in Southeast Asia," New York Times Magazine, May 27, 1962, p. 54.

[49] Saigon Times, May 11–14, 1961.

Strangely, the setbacks that occurred at the end of 1963 and the beginning of 1964 began only 1 month after Secretary McNamara and General Taylor returned from South Vietnam with an optimistic report. So strong was their optimism that an immediate reduction of the American force in South Vietnam by 1,000 men was announced and the prediction was made that virtually all American troops would be withdrawn by the end of 1965.

The text of the White House announcement of October 2, 1963, follows:

"Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Vietnam are capable of suppressing it. Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Vietnam can be withdrawn." [50]

IV. THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

During the administration of President Johnson the United States has become a full-fledged combatant in a conflict that is becoming bigger than the Korean War.

President Johnson has raised American troop strength in Vietnam from 16,000 at the end of 1963 to approximately 300,000 in late August 1966.

Today at least 85,000 other American service personnel are offshore or in bases in nearby countries supporting the military effort in Vietnam, making total troop strength in the area approximately 385,000.

Reliable estimates indicate that the nation's forces in Vietnam will increase to between 375,000 and 400,000 by the end of 1966 and will continue growing thereafter.

The maximum number of American ground forces at any time in Korea in the last Asiatic war in which this country was involved was 302,483.

Thus far in 1966, American casualties are running at a rate of 35,000 a year—still below the annual rate of 46,000 in the Korean War.

More and more, under President Johnson, the United States has assumed the major responsibility for the war despite the President's pledge not to commit American troops. In Akron, Ohio, on October 21, 1964, Mr. Johnson promised ". . . we are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves." [51]

Since President Johnson assumed his present office, the fringes of the war have spread in Laos and into Thailand.

Sporadic ground fighting goes on in Laos as Communist forces push toward Thailand where 25,000 American servicemen are stationed, most of whom are engaged in air operations in Laos and North Vietnam.

Thailand has been subject over the past year to small-scale but growing Communist infiltration and subversion. In the words of a top U.S. official on the scene, it "could be another Vietnam." [52] The subversion, which increasingly takes the terroristic form used in Vietnam—murder of village officials, school teachers, and police—is confined mainly to two areas—the Northeast, along the extended Laotian border, and the South, along the short border with Malaysia.

The more ominous Communist activity is carried on in the Northeast by Pathet Lao from Laos and infiltrators from North Vietnam. They seek support not only among the ten million peasants in the area, for whom Lao rather than Thai is the predominant language, but also from among 40,000 North Vietnamese refugees who migrated across Laos in the early 1950's to escape the war with the French.

Besides the commitment of a large force to ground warfare, the Johnson administration has escalated the activity of the Air Force. In February 1965 it began sustained bombing of large areas of North Vietnam. In late June 1966 it began to attack oil storage facilities in areas around Hanoi and Haiphong which had been off limits to American bombers before that time.

Along with intensification and expansion of its military activity, the Johnson administration has taken extraordinary steps to bring bout negotiations to end the fighting. In March 1965 the President announced willingness to enter unconditional negotiations, reversing the policy proclaimed by Secretary Rusk two weeks earlier barring negotiations until Hanoi showed readiness to cease aggression. [53]

The Johnson administration suspended bombing of North Vietnam for 6 days in May of 1965 and again for 37 days from December 24, 1965 to January 31, 1966. With a flamboyance rarely used in diplomacy, it then unleased a "peace offensive," sending several emissaries on a whirlwind tour of non-Communist world capitals to advertise the administration's desire for peace. It has blessed the efforts of other nations and of public and private intermediaries to bring about a conference to discuss peace. As the bombing of North Vietnam was resumed, it turned to the Security Council of the United Nations on January 31, 1966, requesting that it call a conference.

The administration has dangled a carrot before the enemy by offering "a billion dollar American investment" for the regional development of Southeast Asia, including the development of the Mekong River—a plan similar, except for the cost, to one proposed by the Eisenhower administration 10 years earlier. At the Honolulu Conference of February 1966, the administration pledged American aid in creating a new social and economic order in South Vietnam—a pledge which Vice President HUMPHREY expanded into "realizing the dream of the great society in the great area of Asia." [54]

While promising lavish use of American economic resources for Asian development, the administration has been strangely unwilling to use American economic power in support of America's fighting men. It has moved slowly to restrict the trade of North Vietnam with other nations, to end the use of free world shipping to North Vietnam, and to prevent the scandalous diversion of a substantial part of its own economic aid into illicit and hostile hands in South Vietnam.

Deescalation of the objective of the United States

As the military effort of the United States in Vienam has burgeoned and as peace offensives have waxed and waned, the pronouncements of President Johnson defining the objective of the United States have been progressively watered down.

On December 31, 1963, the President, in a letter to Gen. Duong Van Minh, said the objective was "achieving victory." [55] On July 28, 1965, the President said "our goal . . . [is] . . . to convince the Communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms." [56]

In more specific terms, the President on April 20, 1964, expressed willingness to accept "any settlement which assures the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom to seek help for its protection." [57] His speech of April 7, 1965, at Johns Hopkins University seemed to discard the freedom of South Vietnam to seek help for it protection, for on that occasion the President defined the objective in contradictory terms as "an independent South Vietnam—securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country." [58] Clearly South Vietnam would not have freedom to shape its relationship to other countries if it were barred from ties with alliances or from providing a military base to another country. Experience suggests that without an ally South Vietnam would not be securely guaranteed.

On July 28, 1965, the President seemed to discard the independence of South Vietnam as an objective. Declaring that the "purposes" of the 1954 Geneva agreements "are still our own," he asserted that "the people of South Vietnam shall have the right to shape their own destiny in free elections—in the South or throughout all Vietnam under international supervision." [59]

Again, in January 1966, the State Department, outlining American peace terms in Fourteen Points, called the Geneva Agreements "an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia." There is room for doubt that a third Geneva Agreement would succeed in bringing peace when two such agreements have failed.

The point here, however, is that to propose a third Geneva Agreement is to water down the announced objective in Vietnam. The Geneva Agreement of 1954 did not provide for "an independent South Vietnam," which President Johnson earlier declared to be the objective of his policy. It envisaged the unification of North and South Vietnam and its effect, through an election which, in the words of John F. Kennedy, would have been "stacked and subverted in advance," would have been Communist control of all of Vietnam.

The call for a return to the Geneva Agreements raises the disquieting possibility that the present administration is ready to accept in Vietnam the type of election which the United States rejected a decade ago.

Further, the arrangements for supervising the execution of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 do not meet the standards set by the President that South Vietnam must be "securely guaranteed." A supervisory commission including a Communist member armed with the power to veto decisions of the majority will never provide a secure guarantee.

In early 1966 the objective of the administration in Vietnam became murkier. Senator ROBERT KENNEDY then proposed a settlement of the war which would admit the Viet Cong to "a share of power and responsibility" in South Vietnam. This proposal in effect looked toward settling the problem of Vietnam as the problems of Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia were settled after World War II and as the problem of Laos was settled in 1962.

Although HUBERT HUMPHREY denounced the Kennedy proposal as ". . . putting a fox in the chicken coop . . . an arsonist in a fire department," President Johnson refused to

[50] "Background," p. 110.

[51] "Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson," 1963–64, Vol. II, p. 1391.

[52] Baltimore Sun, August 8, 1966. The American official quoted was Tracy S. Park, Director, U.S. Operations Mission in Thailand.

[53] Rusk, News Conference, February 25, 1965, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LII, No. 1342, March 15, 1965, p. 370.

[54] New York Times, April 20, 1966.

[55] "Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson," 1963–64, Vol. I, p. 106.

[56] "Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents," August 2, 1965, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 15.

[57] "Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson," 1963–64, Vol. I, p. 498.

[58] "Background," p. 207.

[59] "Background," p. 241.

endorse his Vice President's stand, and White House Press Secretary Moyers declined to rule out as unacceptable the inclusion of Vietcong in a South Vietnamese government selected at a peace conference.[60]

If placing Communists in a South Vietnamese government as part of a peace settlement is acceptable to the President—as it is to many influential members of his party, all the fighting in Vietnam—all the sacrifices—all the bloodshed—make no sense.

The silence of the President on the issue in the Humphrey-Kennedy disagreement suggests abandonment of the objectives stated by Secretary Rusk on January 21, 1966, "the government of South Vietnam is a matter which should be determined by the people of South Vietnam themselves. We ourselves have supported and continue to suport the idea of free elections in which the South Vietnamese people can make these decisions rather than have these decisions made for them by imposition from the outside." [61]

MISCALCULATION

The President has told the Nation, "This is really war."

To what degree miscalculation on the part of the enemy has brought about this state of affairs, no one can be sure. It is clear, however, that many of the words and deeds of the past few years could only have encouraged underestimation of the constancy and firmness of the Nation in the pursuant of its foreign goals.

The whole handling of the problem of Laos could have no result other than the conclusion that the United States would not match its words with deeds.

The administration said that it would not permit aggression against Laos to succeed, btu it did.

The administration said that it would not begin negotiating about Laos until a ceasefire had been put into effect, but it did.

The administration indicated that it would not accept a peace settlement in Laos which granted a veto to any member of the Commission established to supervise the peace, but it did.

Miscalculation was the natural result of the withdrawal of American backing for the Diem government. For the United States had pledged its support to Diem "all the way," in Lyndon Johnson's phrase in 1961. Abrupt reversal of policy leading to the overthrow of the leader whom the Government of the United States had been ardently supporting and whose downfall was a major Vietcong objective could appear only as evidence of weakening of the resolve of this Nation. Whether the error was the commitment to support Diem "all the way" or connivance in Diem's downfall, the net effect was to cast doubt on the value and durability of a pledge of support by the United States.

Miscalculation was encouraged by President Johnson's campaign oratory of 1964. In order to make his opponent appear reckless and trigger happy, the President in several statements set limits to American participation in the Vietnamese conflict which were to be exceeded after the election.

Philip L. Geyelin, foreign affairs expert of the Wall Street Journal, summarized the President's campaign theme in these words, ". . . it was not his [Johnson's] commitment to Vietnam, it was Dwight Eisenhower's; while he intended to honor it, he also intended to avoid a deeper U.S. involvement in the fighting." [62]

For example, on August 12, 1964, the President said:

"Some others are eager to enlarge the conflict. They call upon us to supply American boys to do the job that Asian boys should do." [63]

Again, on August 29, the President declared:

"I have had advice to load our planes with bombs and to drop them on certain areas that I think would enlarge the war, and result in our committing a good many American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to help protect their own land. And for that reason, I haven't chosen to enlarge the war." [64]

On September 25, the President said,

"There are those that say you ought to go north and drop bombs, to try to wipe out the supply lines, and they think that would escalate the war. We don't want our American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys. We don't want to get involved in a nation with 700 million people and get tied down in a land war in Asia." [65]

On September 28, the President said,

"Some of our people—Mr. Nixon, Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Scranton, and Mr. Goldwater—have all, at some time or other, suggested the possible wisdom of going north in Viet-Nam.

". . . We are not going north and we are not going south; we are going to continue to try to get them to save their own freedom with their own men, with our leadership, and our officer direction, and such equipment as we can furnish them." [66]

On October 21, the President said,

"We are not about to send American boys 9 or 10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves." [67]

Two days before the 1964 election, as though to put the President's campaign promises to the acid test, the Vietcong directly attacked the U.S. airbase in Bien Hoa, killing five Americans, wounding 76 and destroying several aircraft. This was a more serious challenge than the attack in Tonkin Gulf, which caused no American losses but which was met by an aerial attack on North Vietnam. This time, however, there was no response from the United States.

". . . the failure of the United States to respond to the Bien Hoa provocation," Philip Geyelin wrote, "coming on the heels of a conciliatory Vietnam line in the campaign, in which Lyndon Johnson plainly made manifest his profound disinclination to widen the war, must certainly have encouraged Hanoi and Peking in the belief that Tonkin had been a special case, and that U.S. installations could be attacked with impunity." [68]

"Perhaps," Secretary Rusk was quoted in the New York Times as saying, "the Communist world misunderstod our Presidential campaign." [69] Perhaps, indeed, it did. Perhaps the Communist world expected the President's policy after the election to conform to his campaign speeches.

One respected White House correspondent Charles Roberts of Newsweek, has written, ". . . The President . . . told me in May 1965, that he had made the decision to bomb [North Vietnam] . . . four months before Pleiku." [70] The time of decision, then, would have been October 1964 at the height of the Presidential campaign.

Whether the decision to strike at the North was made then or not, it is clear that throughout the campaign South Vietnam was perilously close to collapse. The President must have known, even as he offered assurances of no further involvement that South Vietnam would go down the drain unless the military effort of the United States was drastically augmented.

Describing the campaign, Philip Geyelin has written, "What developed was a deadly race against time; increasingly the question agonizing the war-planners in Washington and Saigon was whether South Vietnam could be kept from crumbling without a much more vigorous U.S. effort before November 3."

"Meanwhile, there were clear signs of growing anxiety, if not at the highest official level, at least at the lower working levels of the government; the experts could read the signs in the increased political shambles in Saigon, in the increased rate of infiltration, in the tide of war that was running unmistakably against the South Vietnamese. 'It is going to be close,' said one of the State Department's most reliable authorities as the U.S. election day approached." [71]

It is impossible to measure the cost of the President's deceptive campaign oratory of 1964 and the postponement until after the election of a step-up in the military activity of the United States in Vietnam. How many American casualties and how much expenditure of American economic resources might have been avoided by telling the truth in 1964 and by earlier use of American air power against important military targets will never be known.

Lack of candor on the part of the administration

The lack of candor of the administration encourages the enemy to miscalculate. It also misleads and confuses the American public. Thus it strikes at the vitals of our system of government, for, without reliable information, public opinion cannot wisely guide and restrain public policy.

The examples of lack of candor about Vietnam are legion.

The administration, for example, has consistently concealed difficulties and dangers with optimistic pronouncements and predictions.

Consider such statements as the following by Secretary McNamara:

"Actions taken there [in Vietnam] have proved effective and will prove more effective as time goes on." (Jan. 17, 1962.)

"Progress in the last 8 to 10 weeks has been great. The Government has asked only for logistical support. Nothing but progress and hopeful indications of further progress in the future." (May 12, 1962.)

"Our military assistance to Vietnam is paying off. I continue to be encouraged. There are many signs indicating progress." (July 25, 1962.)

"There is a new feeling of confidence that victory is possible in South Vietnam." (Jan. 31, 1963.)

"The major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel." (Oct. 2, 1963.)

"We have every reason to believe that [U.S. military] plans will be successful in 1964." (Dec. 12, 1963.)

"With these further measures, we felt that a start could be made in reducing the number of U.S. military personnel in Vietnam as their training missions were completed. Accordingly, we announced that about 1,000 men were to be withdrawn by the end of 1963, and expressed the hope that the major part of the U.S. military task could be com-

[60] Presidential News Conference of Feb. 26, 1966, New York Times, Feb. 27. Moyers comment: New York Times, Feb. 23, 1966, pp. 1, 12.

[61] Rusk News Conference, Department of State Bulletin, February 7, 1966, Vol. LIV, No. 1389, p. 190.

[62] Geyelin, Philip L., "Lyndon B. Johnson and the World." New York 1966, p. 195.

[63] "Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson," 1963–64, Vol. II, p. 952.

[64] Ibid., p. 1022.

[65] Ibid., p. 1126.

[66] Ibid., p. 1164.

[67] Ibid., p. 1391.

[68] Geyelin, Philip L., "Lyndon B. Johnson and the World." New York 1966, pp. 200, 201.

[69] Henry F. Graff, "How Johnson Makes Foreign Policy," New York Times Magazine, July 4, 1965, p. 16.

[70] Roberts' "LBJ's Inner Circle," New York 1965, p. 21.

[71] Philip L. Geyelin, "Lyndon B. Johnson and the World." New York 1966, pp. 193, 198.

pleted by the end of 1965, although we recognized that there might be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. advisory personnel." (Jan. 30, 1964.)

"We are confident these plans point the way to victory." (March 1964.)[72]

It would be tedious to detail the facts that showed how remote each of these pronouncements was from grim reality. Two examples will suffice.

Secretary Rusk declared in the course of a visit to Vietnam on April 20, 1964, that things were showing "steady improvement." The headline in the New York Times 2 days later read, "Reds inflict heaviest toll on South Vietnam Army." It had been the bloodiest week of the war, the Times reported, with 1,000 Vietnamese Government and 23 American casualties.

On November 29, 1965, Secretary McNamara said "we have stopped losing the war." [73] Yet, during the period when, according to the Secretary, we were losing the war, he made statements acclaiming "progress" and exuding optimism on no less than 14 separate occasions.

Neither the Congress nor the public has been accurately and fully informed about the Nation's involvement in Vietnam. American military personnel were called advisers long after they became combatants.

As American ground forces were introduced into Vietnam, the Nation was told that their "primary mission . . . is to secure and safeguard important installations like the airbase at Da Nang . . ." [74] Secretary McNamara added assurances that "they should not tangle with the Vietcong." [75]

The President announced on July 28, 1965 that the movement of 125,000 American troops to Vietnam did "not imply any change in policy whatever." [76]

The able Saigon correspondent of the Los Angeles Times, Jack Foisie wrote:

"Although the decision to commit large-scale American combat units in Vietnam is apparent, and is obvious to the enemy through the buildup of logistical bases on the central coast, authorities in Washington try to pretend that we really are not committed to land warfare in Asia, to casualties as large or larger than suffered during the Korean War." [77]

There has been a lack of candor about the casualties in Vietnam. The figures fed to the public by the Administration contradict each other and surpass belief. In June of 1965, Secretary Rusk gave a figure for South Vietnamese casualties since 1960 that was 50 per cent higher than the figure General Wheeler gave 1 month earlier. It is hard to believe that casualties in 1 month in 1965 increased so dramatically.[78]

On May 5, 1966, Representative OTIS PIKE, Democrat of New York, charged that the Department of Defense had "surreptitiously" reduced the total of Viet Cong wounded claimed since 1961 in the Vietnam war. The enemy casualty claim was cut by about half, he asserted.

Representative PIKE said the figure of 365,000 wounded was replaced with one of 182,000 in figures given the House Armed Services Committee at a secret briefing. He said the lower figure was "slipped in" because, apparently, the old one was growing so large as to be unrealistic.[79]

On April 4, 1966, President Johnson gave the startling figure of 50,000 as the number of enemy dead in Vietnam since the beginning of the year.[80] It is impossible to reconcile this figure with Defense Department estimates of changes in enemy strength. As of July 1, 1966, the Defense Department reported there were 271,000 enemy troops in Vietnam, up 41,000 from January 1. If the President's figure on deaths is accepted, the enemy's strength on July 1 could have been achieved if the enemy added 15,000 men a month to its forces and if not a single enemy soldier died in the second quarter of 1966. Secretary McNamara, however, has testified that the enemy is capable of adding no more than 9000 troops a month to its forces in South Vietnam.[81]

A correspondent of the Washington Post, Howard Margolis, after surveying casualty figures released by the administration, concluded:

"The impression all this leaves is that the publicly released statistics are more a selection of numbers intended to paint a picture that supports whatever the official view is at the moment than a realistic indication of how things are going." [82]

There has been a lack of candor about the cost of the war in Vietnam. In 1965 and again in 1966 the Administration's initial request for defense appropriations was based on outdated estimates of military needs. Congress, in January of 1966, thus had to appropriate an additional $13 billion needed for defense in fiscal year 1966. As it acted on defense appropriations for fiscal 1967, informed Members of the Congress predicted a supplementary request for $5 to $15 billion in defense funds in January 1967—after the 1966 election.

When State Department spokesmen asserted that the widespread civil disorders in South Vietnam following the Honolulu Conference had no effect on military operations, they were less than candid.

How false this war is clear from the ominous statistics released two days after such a statement was made [83]—statistics indicating that American troops sustained more than twice as many casualties during the preceding week as did the South Vietnamese.

Secretary McNamara on April 20, 1966, gave the Senate Foreign Relations Committee an appraisal of the military situation during the civil disturbances that flatly contradicted that of the State Department. The Secretary of Defense testified:

"The military operations have been at a lower level because of the political disorders in the last approximately 2 weeks . . . the number of Vietcong killed is off 40%, the number of Vietcong killed per week last week was 600, it averaged a thousand and five for the first three months of the year. The number of weapons lost by Vietnamese forces, the number of weapons captured is also off by substantial amounts.

"This reduction in military activity is customary under conditions of political disorder. It has happened every other time we have had political disorders." [84]

There has been an inexplicable lack of candor about peace feelers. On May 7, 1965, President Johnson said:

"For months now we have waited for a sign, a signal, even a whisper, but our offer of unconditional discussions has fallen on unreceptive ears. Not a sound has been heard. Not a signal has been sighted." [85]

Again on July 13, 1965 the President declared:

"I must say that candor compels me to tell you that there has not been the slightest indication that the other side is interested in negotiation or in unconditional discussions although the U.S. has made some dozen separate attempts to bring them about." [86]

But in November, 1965, the respected reporter Eric Sevareid in a Look magazine article [87] recalled an interview with the late Adlai Stevenson on August 12, two days before his death in London. Ambasador Stevenson told Sevareid that U.N. General Secretary U Thant had secured the agreement of North Vietnamese authorities to meet with a representative of the United States in Rangoon in late 1964. After the election, Sevareid wrote, U Thant renewed the offer, and this time it was Secretary McNamara who reportedly vetoed it.

The greatest shortage which the Vietnamese war has so far produced is a shortage of candor and accuracy and purpose.

RESULTS OF THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS

The measurable result of 300,000 American troops, 30,000 American casualties, and several billion American dollars since 1961 in Vietnam is a stalemate.

The administration's own assessment of the result is expressed in such phrases as "We have stopped losing the war" and "Our forces and those of our allies will not be defeated by the Communists in Vietnam."

The amount of territory controlled by Saigon today is far less than it was when Diem was overthrown. No marked progress has been made in extending the control of the Saigon government in the past two years. Estimates of the percentage of land area of South Vietnam under government control given in 1966 by Members of Congress with access to classified information range from 20 to 40 per cent.

The shrinkage in control of the population is apparent in the turnout in the two most recent national elections, 6,300,000 voted in 1963 under the Diem regime, 4,200,000 are reported to have cast ballots in the election of September 11, 1966 for the Constituent Assembly. The official estimate claims that 54 per cent of the population is under control of the Ky government.[88]

Enemy forces, despite reports of heavy casualties, have increased in South Vietnam at a rate of one half that of the American buildup. In the first 7 months of 1966, enemy forces grew by 52,000; American forces by 100,000. In August 1966, the Defense Department estimates put enemy forces at 282,000 or 177 combat battalions—far in excess of the prediction Secretary McNamara made on March 3, 1966, when he said that 155 enemy battalions "could be in South Vietnam by the end of 1966." [89]

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[72] McNamara's statements were reported in the New York Times on the dates indicated in the above text.

[73] Hearings of House Committee on Foreign Affairs concerning Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, Part II, March 30, 1966, p. 313.

[74] White House statement, "Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam" (first revision, June 16, 1965) Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, p. 230.

[75] Wall Street Journal, June 17, 1965.

[76] "President's News Conference of July 28," Washington Post, July 29, 1965.

[77] Los Angeles Times, July 25, 1965.

[78] Rusk speech, American Foreign Service Association, Washington, D.C., June 23, 1965—"From 1961 to the present * * * South Vietnamese armed forces have lost some 25,000 dead and 51,000 wounded." Wheeler speech, San Francisco, May 7, 1965, "More than 50,000 South Vietnamese soldiers have been killed or wounded in battle since 1960."

[79] Washington Post, May 6, 1966.

[80] "Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents," Vol. 2, No. 13, p. 483.

[81] Washington Post, March 4, 1966, p. A–12.

[82] Washington Post, August 16, 1965.

[83] Despite "the political turbulence in South Vietnam," Undersecretary of State George W. Ball said, "there has been no particular reduction in" military operations. "Face the Nation," CBS, April 10, 1966.

[84] Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 2859 and S. 2861, Foreign Assistance, 1966, April 20, 1966, p. 202.

[85] *Washington Post*, May 8, 1965.

[86] *Washington Post*, July 14, 1965, p. A–18.

[87] "The Final Troubled Hours of Adlai Stevenson," *Look*, November 30, 1965.

[88] Richard Wilson, *Washington Star*, Sept. 12, 1966.

[89] Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 3, 1966 reported in *Washington Post*, March 4, 1966, p. A–12.

decide whether they want the Congress to exercise its responsibilities in the field of foreign policy more vigorously or want the Congress to be a docile instrument of the President—neither effectively questioning, nor investigating, nor checking and restraining the executive branch.

The decision of the voters on these matters will have an important effect on future policy.

STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE MELVIN R. LAIRD, CHAIRMAN REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SEPTEMBER 20, 1966

Consensus politics does not work well in the field of foreign policy. A President cannot seek to agree with everybody and provide clear leadership.

In an attempt to satisfy the irreconcilable wings of the Democratic Party, the President has failed to make clear what we are fighting for in Vietnam.

The prerequisite for ending the Vietnamese War on honorable terms is a clear statement by the Administration of the short term aims and the long term objectives of our country.

The Administration speaks of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 as a basis for settling the war. Does the Administration mean that it would agree to an election in both North and South Vietnam, as provided in the Geneva Agreement of 1954—an election which John F. Kennedy said would have been "stacked and subverted in advance?"

The Administration dodges the question of whether it would settle for a peace that imposed a coalition government including Viet Cong representatives in South Vietnam.

Whether the sacrifices that Americans—particularly young Americans—are making are for any purpose depends on what kind of peace the Administration wants. If we end up with a Southeast Asia Yalta Agreement, the objective is not worth fighting for.

The "White Paper" on Vietnam clearly sets forth the deception practiced by the Democratic spokesmen during the 1964 campaign. The same approach is being followed in this 1966 election period by withholding information concerning the costs of the war and the planned escalation of the war within the next year.

With a few weeks after the November election the President will request an additional $13.5 billion appropriation for the Department of Defense and will unveil major plans to escalate the war on the ground further, particularly in the Delta area of South Vietnam.

STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES E. GOODELL, REPUBLICAN, NEW YORK, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON PLANNING AND RESEARCH, REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SEPTEMBER 20, 1966

The use of calculated and persistent deception by government strikes at the vitals of our system of popular government.

The public cannot responsibly discharge its functions of filling elective offices and guiding and restraining public policy unless it has the truth and nothing but the truth. A government which falsifies and misleads reduces the franchise to something akin to the empty ritual that passes for voting in totalitarian states.

Anyone who surveys the instances of deception cited in "The United States and the War in Vietnam" will see that it was usually the American public, not the enemy, that was deceived. The only time that the enemy may have been deceived was in 1964 when the President repeatedly and categorically announced that he would not send American boys 9 or 10,000 miles away to do the job that Asian boys should do. In this instance deception could only encourage the enemy to step up aggression. The Johnson campaign of 1964, as surely as the Acheson speech of January 1950, was a signal to aggressors that they could proceed with impunity.

No one can make wise decisions for the future without the ingredient that has been denied so far to Congress and the public—constant and accurate information about the situation in Vietnam. The flow of reliable information needed by Congress and the public will be obtained if better balance between the major parties is established in the Congress.

A better balance in Congress will also be a check on the tendency to let considerations of domestic politics influence military decisions.

It is now well known that the Democratic campaign tactics of 1964 involved a gamble which left South Vietnam near collapse.

Arthur Schlesinger has noted the "use of military operations for domestic political purposes" and has spoken of the "impression" that the military policy of the Johnson Administration is "in part undertaken in order to smother doubts about the war in the United States and to reverse anti-Administration tendencies in the polls."

It is not wise to time military actions to the exigencies of domestic politics. The enemy does not observe the same time-table. It is unjust to almost 400,000 fighting men now directly involved with the Vietnam war.

PROBE OF GUN GAP NEEDED

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FINDLEY] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, why is it that the United States—with the world's greatest technology and an annual outlay for military purposes exceeding $60 billion—is badly outgunned year after year in a highly critical Army weapon system on which our soldiers depend? What went wrong? Who mismanaged and bungled?

These and related questions are left unanswered by a 23-page white paper issued September 10 by the Department of Defense, and by a letter of August 30 to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS], chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, from Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor.

Both documents arose from statements I have made and questions I have raised concerning procurement from West Germany of the substandard Hispano Suiza H.S. 820 automatic gun.

As a result of the total inadequacy of the Army's explanations, I am today submitting to the House Armed Services Committee a list of 24 serious questions about the H.S. 820 procurement and the gun gap which I believe the record shows the Pentagon has failed to answer satisfactorily. And I am asking that a full congressional investigation of the procurement be launched, to obtain the badly needed answers to those questions.

The Army's white paper has not been publicly circulated. It has instead been handed to a few Congressmen and appropriate committees, in hopes—I believe—that its misinformation and misimpressions will discourage further congressional interest in the malodorous H.S. 820 affair, and head off support that is mounting for my criticisms of the procurement.

However, today, in the course of my presentation, I am putting in the record myself the Army's white paper—in full—along with a section-by-section demonstration of its inaccuracy and inadequacy.

Although the "white paper" seeks to do so by deception, omission, and wrong impression, it refutes in no significant way the central charges I made in my remarks to this body on September 1.

At that time I charged that, in going ahead with the gun procurement, Defense Secretary McNamara:

Compromised military needs to the advantage of German political expediency. The gun purchase became a fixed part of a deal under which Germany will buy U.S. missile destroyers;

Reversed the recommendations of high-ranking military officials and forced them to accept lowered test standards so the gun could be classified as satisfactory; and

Misinformed and misled Congress about the performance of the gun and weapon system of which it is a part.

It also reinforces the recommendations I made on September 1 that:

A crash program be undertaken to produce a workable interim weapon;

A crash program be undertaken to speed the development of the long-delayed successor weapon; and

The long and costly effort to make the H.S. 820 work be abandoned.

Indeed the "white paper," despite the clever way in which it sought to cover up facts, actually reinforces my charges and recommendations.

If this document is the best that can be said for our effort to close the gun gap, then the United States is indeed in a bad way.

Five years ago our Government determined that the Soviets had army vehicles equipped with a 14.5-millimeter automatic gun superior to our .50 caliber, a weapon dating from World War II days. We were badly outgunned and, therefore, a successor weapon was critically needed.

The Department of Defense decided on a two-phase approach to the problem: first, purchase the best immediately available weapon for interim purposes; second, proceed simultaneously on a crash basis with the development of a successor weapon.

The sad and cruel truth is that today—after 5 years have elapsed and over $6.3 million spent—a satisfactory interim weapon is still nonexistent and the development of a successor weapon by the Army itself has not advanced beyond the paper stage.

Our soldiers are still depending on weapons the Soviets surpassed years ago. This fact is all the more shocking when one recalls that Hitler used superior army vehicles to make a lightning conquest of Europe in World War II. If the gun gap was critical in 1961, it is the more so today.

"WHITE PAPER" FORMAT

The "white paper" is set in the form of "allegations" versus "facts," obviously intended to give the impression that my September 1 statement was nothing but incorrect charges which were demolished or set right by Army "facts."

In reality, most of the "facts" are merely commentary, clarification, or amplifications of my statements. In no

ports are currently supplying more than half of the domestic market in men's regular weight suits. Imports of all wool products reached an all-time high of 98.4 million pounds in 1965. This was a 54 per cent increase over 1964 and figures for 1966 show still further increases. Since the wool manufacturers of the U.S. are the only customers of the domestic wool growers, it might be emphasized that the 1965 level of wool product imports is equal to 87 per cent of the U.S. production of last year. I might note here that wool is grown in every state of the union and there are wool manufacturing establishments in 32 states.

Take man-made fibers! A decade ago, in 1956, a total of 34 million square yards of man-made fiber textiles were imported into the U.S. In 1966, they are running at an annual rate of 679 million—a 20-fold increase in 10 years; and triple the amount of the figure just since 1962. I might point out that the ratio of imports to domestic consumption of man-made fiber textiles is an important figure not yet calculated by the Government. Perhaps this is because no specific attempt at achieving international import control of these products has yet been made, in contrast to the cotton textile area where we have the LTA, and in the wool area where none of several efforts has been successful.

The tremendous increase in man-made textile imports takes on added significance when the market and consumer demand for more man-made textiles is examined. Just after World War II, man-made fibers held 21 per cent of the total U.S. fiber market. In 1965, man-mades held 53 per cent of the market. There has been a rapid shift to man-mades and blends over the past few years.

Imports of textile products of cotton, man-made fiber and wool totaled approximately 934 million square yards five years ago. Today, these imports are running at the annual rate of 2,473 million square yards.

The history of U.S. textile imports shows a close correlation between the development of demand in the U.S., built up by U.S. advertising, promotion, improved technology and research and development, and the increase in the volume of imports. Simply stated, foreign producers are feeding upon a demand created by the domestic industry, satisfying this demand on a pure price basis, underselling the U.S. item. The overseas manufacturer can in some instances offer similar goods at below U.S. manufacturing costs. This is so because foreign wage scales, often a major part of the U.S. manufacturing cost, are as much as a tenth of the wages paid to the American textile worker—who has received three and four wage increases in the past four years.

The foreign manufacturer exports his products to the American market. Often, these textiles, which compete with U.S. goods, are manufactured with money sent overseas by a benevolent America.

The United States has had a balance of payments deficit every year since 1950, with the exception of 1957. The textile industry has run a deficit in its international trade account each year since 1958. In just the past two years, the annual textile deficit has increased by a quarter of a billion dollars and is currently running at an annual rate of $644 million. This is a significant figure, Mr. Chairman, for in 1965 the textile trade deficit of the U.S. was half as large as the total deficit in the U.S. balance-of-payments.

The textile industry over the past few years has made great progress, even in the face of such unfair foreign competition. Profits have increased; yet textiles rank only 17th out of 20 in the rate of corporate profits of major U.S. industries. The textile industry has made the best record of any U.S. industry in combatting inflation. Textiles are still the "best buy" in the market, when today's cost is considered in comparison with the consumer price index. Many textile products today are selling below the 1947–49 index base of 100. This is a remarkable achievement since the textile product today is far superior to the same product of just 10 years ago. And, many of the textile products which are commonplace today were not even on the market 10 years ago.

The textile industry has not asked and does not want a subsidy from the Government. All it has asked for and asks for now is fair and equitable treatment in order to compete in the market place against foreign-made goods. The textile industry is proud of its accomplishments in the face of extreme adversities through the years. It is proud of its employees, who produce the world's best textiles. It does not wish to give up completely its markets here at home to foreign products, nor does it wish to export its jobs to overseas manufacturers.

The textile industry does not want to erect a barrier against international trade. It does, however, want to hold at reasonable levels the importation into the U.S. of textile products and apparel made of any and all fibers, natural and man-made, and blends thereof. How much of its market and how many jobs should the textile industry give away to foreign firms?

Mr. Chairman, I submit that in the district I represent—and in countless others—the textile industry is the lifeblood of our economy. And, every boatload of foreign textiles which reaches our shores is another leech dissipating the strength and energy of the American textile worker.

I support legislation such as H.R. 16831 which provides that the Secretary of Labor shall undertake an investigation to gain full information whenever any employer, or group of employers, employing a substantial number of workers in an industry, or a labor organization informs him that competition of foreign producers in United States markets or markets abroad or both has resulted or is likely to result in increased unemployment.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I wish to express my thanks to the Committee for its generosity in allowing me to come here today in behalf of over 2,000,000 textile and apparel workers and state our case for fair play for American industry.

WISDOM OF THE PRESIDENT'S COURSE IN VIETNAM

(Mr. MORRIS (at the request of Mr. EDMONDSON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Speaker, there is always a temptation to look for political or personal advantage in the actions of government.

That temptation is particularly acute in an election year.

Yesterday, our Republican colleagues here in this House gave in to that temptation.

They have tried to make personal—and political—the determined effort of this country to help the brave South Vietnamese retain their freedom, their independence, and the right to choose their own future.

In doing so, they have ignored facts.

They have slandered brave allies.

And they have paid no attention whatsoever to the actions of a determined aggressor.

They say, for example, that American forces have taken over the major burden of the fighting in Vietnam.

What are the facts?

I grant you, Mr. Speaker, that if one reads only our newspapers and looks only at our television, he gets an impression of an almost totally "American" effort.

But I would remind my colleagues that what we read—and what is really happening—are often two very different things.

We have about 300,000 American troops in Vietnam. They are fighting bravely. They are probably the best trained, best conditioned, and most highly motivated forces we have ever put into the field. And they deserve our full support, our highest praise, and deepest gratitude.

But this is only part of the story, Mr. Speaker.

First, the majority of these forces are not engaged in direct combat. As in any military operation, large numbers of men are required for other duties—for logistics and supply, for construction, for repair and maintenance—and for the thousands of other jobs that are part of a military effort.

Second, the Vietnamese have about 600,000 men in uniform and under arms. About half of them are in the regular military forces. Others are in such units as regional and popular forces, in the irregular defense forces, and combat police.

And this large force is based on a population of 15 million—not 190 million.

I have the figures here of combat casualties for last week.

Let me remind this House that 44 Americans were killed in action in that week.

But 174 Vietnamese soldiers were killed during the same period—4 times as many as the brave Americans who made the ultimate sacrifice.

And let me remind ourselves, too, that these are people who have been fighting for many years.

Yet still they fight, still they die, still they struggle on.

And I would remind the House that we and the Vietnamese are not fighting alone. Our Korean allies have a division in Vietnam and are sending another. On a per capita basis, they will soon have more men in Vietnam than we have.

The Australians have sent a regiment. The New Zealanders are helping. And in the past week, Filipino forces have begun to arrive. Thailand—even though it is fighting its own battle against Communist subversion—is helping with air transport and training.

It is quite true—as we all know—that our effort in Vietnam has expanded.

But why has it been necessary, Mr. Speaker?

The truth is that the North Vietnamese aggressors have greatly expanded their efforts over the past year to conquer the south. Regular units of the North Vietnamese Army have been moving into the south.

And our President has expanded our efforts to meet that increased threat. He has acted in response to the request of our commander in the field—General Westmoreland—who has asked for more.

STATEMENT OF HON. HORACE R. KORNEGAY, OF NORTH CAROLINA, BEFORE THE GENERAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR OF THE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, SEPTEMBER 20, 1966

(Mr. WHITENER (at the request of Mr. EDMONDSON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. WHITENER. Mr. Speaker, the textile industry is our Nation's oldest and one of our Nation's greatest industries. It has made great progress despite many hardships it has faced in its long history.

Today, the textile industry is still confronted with a problem which has beset it for a period of several years. My distinguished and illustrious colleague from North Carolina, the Honorable HORACE R. KORNEGAY, very cogently pointed to this problem in an appearance today before the General Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Education and Labor.

My very able colleague, who shares my interest in and concern for the many thousands of North Carolina textile employees, made an excellent presentation of the facts regarding importation of foreign-made textiles to the subcommittee, which is now holding hearings on the impact of imports on our economy. I commend the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. KORNEGAY] for his well-prepared testimony and I would like to share his comments with other Members, so that they may have the benefit of his knowledge in this vital matter. His statement follows:

STATEMENT OF HORACE R. KORNEGAY, MEMBER OF CONGRESS, SIXTH DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, BEFORE GENERAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, SEPTEMBER 20, 1966

Mr. Chairman, may I express my appreciation for the opportunity to appear before you today to present some of my views on the vital matter of imports to which you are now addressing your attention.

My name is HORACE R. KORNEGAY. It is my privilege to represent the Sixth District of North Carolina in the U.S. Congress. The district which I have the honor to represent is one with a fortuitous blend of agriculture, education, and business. One of the most heavily industrialized areas of the Southeastern United States, the Sixth District of North Carolina has a long and historic identification with the textile industry. Although there is a healthy diversification of industrial firms, the great preponderance of manufacturing in the region remains in textile production.

Almost half—approximately one in every two persons—of our industrial employees are engaged in the production of textiles and apparel. The home office of the largest textile concern in the world, Burlington Industries, is located in my district. The synthetics division of J. P. Stevens & Co., the world's second largest textile producing firm, is headquartered there. Cone Mills, the largest denim producer and one of the nation's leading textile organizations, has its headquarters there, as do many other outstanding textile producers whose names are familiar household words. The nation's largest producer of work clothing, Blue Bell, makes its home there. One of the first textile plants erected south of the Potomac River was constructed along the banks of Alamance Creek. Since then, textiles have been the mainstay of the area's economy.

In short, Mr. Chairman, the Sixth District is among those in the forefront of American textile production. I do not wish to prevail upon the Committee's time, for I appreciate its courtesy and indulgence, but I would like to briefly mention the position the textile industry occupies in our country.

Historically, the textile industry is our nation's oldest. Textiles triggered the American industrial revolution. The textile industry is one of the largest employers of labor in the United States, employing almost 1,000,000 people. With its principal customer, the apparel industries of our nation, the two employ a staggering total of approximately 2⅓ million Americans—or one out of every eight engaged in U.S. manufacturing.

Any industry with this amount of our total labor force certainly is an important segment of our economy which should not be ignored when considering the health of our general economy.

The textile industry's 3,000 plants are located over most of the nation, in small towns and large cities. In hundreds of instances, the textile mill is the only industrial employer and the economic life of the community is dependent upon it.

The textile industry is one of the largest purchasers and users of goods and services produced by other important American industries. The textile industry, for example, consumes two-thirds of the annual U.S. cotton crop and *all* of the U.S. wood clip. In addition, its purchases of man-made fibers and dyestuffs and other chemicals produced by the American chemical industries make these chemical industries importantly dependent upon the continued good health of their textile customers.

The textile industry is essential to our national security. It has been depicted by the U.S. Quartermaster General as second only to steel in time of war and during World War II furnished the armed services with 10,000 different items of supply. In peacetime, the industry supplies about one-third of all defense personnel procurements. Now, with the increased military activities in Southeast Asia, textiles are accounting for about 40 per cent of the defense dollar.

Textiles supply all of one of man's three basic needs—clothing—and contributes substantially to another basic need—housing.

All of this, I submit, Mr. Chairman, adds up to a very impressive complex of reasons why this Committee should give serious consideration to the maintenance and continuation of a strong and healthy textile industry.

The late President John F. Kennedy recognized the importance of the American textile and apparel industries to the economy. His "Seven Point Program for Textiles" announced in May, 1961, is a specific acknowledgement of his concern for the textile industry.

The textile industry traditionally has been a cyclic industry, with its ups and downs—and unfortunately with more drastic downs than ups. However, the Kennedy program, subsequently ratified by President Johnson, who has declared that the U.S. textile industry must be restored to good health, has provided the incentive for substantial investment by the industry for plant modernization and expansion. The results have been impressive.

The industry's general condition and that of its employees is immeasurably better than it was in the late 50's and the early 1960's. For eight years prior to August, 1964, the cotton segment of the American textile industry was forced to operate under a two-price cotton system—one for domestic mills and a lower price for cotton shipped overseas to foreign manufacturers. This unfair system took its toll and the foreign-made textile products took over much of the U.S. market from American producers.

There are several contradictory legislative and regulative ground rules under which the American textile industry must play the international trade contest. For instance, legislation limits the annual importation into this country of raw cotton to 30,000 bales of cotton of types grown in the U.S. This is equal to American mills' spinning requirements for just one day. Also, we have enacted recently the one-price cotton law intended to stimulate U.S. cotton mill consumption of American cotton fiber.

Contradicting these laws are the repeated reductions of U.S. tariffs and sundry foreign aid programs intended to help other countries to establish textile industries to export their products to the U.S.

The Long Term Textile Arrangement was entered into by 19 countries, including the United States, and went into effect in October, 1962. Briefly stated, the arrangement provided for an increase in cotton—and only cotton—textile imports into the U.S. of roughly 5 per cent each LTA year. The purpose of the arrangement was to stem the heavy flood of imported textile products into America. However, in not quite four years of the arrangement, textile imports have doubled the high rate in existence prior to the adoption of the agreement.

Let us keep in mind that this agreement involves only cotton textiles. We must consider the importation of textile products and apparel made of synthetic fibers, wool and blends thereof. In the case of wool textile imports, for example, the contradiction between government policy and Congressional legislation is apparent in that a tariff is maintained on imported raw wool as a device to encourage domestic wool growing, while at the same time the rising level of imports of fabrics and apparel made of wool is accepted. The level of imports of worsted textiles is now almost completely out of hand, equal to more than 50 per cent of domestic production.

Let's take another look at the LTA, which I must in all candor say has helped to stem the tide of huge amounts of imported cotton textiles—and this agreement, unless extended, will expire in another year. By an unfortunate choice of words in the agreement, a textile containing by weight more than 50 per cent of cotton fiber is subject to the import controls of the arrangement. A textile containing only 50 per cent by weight of cotton, the balance being synthetic fibers, is completely unregulated. This circumstance is particularly unhappy in view of the tremendous market acceptance of a whole new host of textile products made of blends of cotton and manmade fibers. As a matter of fact, one of the most popular blends is 50 per cent cotton and 50 per cent of man-made fibers, a blend unregulated by the LTA, leaving exporting nations free to ship unlimited amounts into this country.

Before the LTA became effective, cotton textile imports totaled 813 million square yards a year. Presently, cotton textile imports are running at an annual rate of 1,634 million square yards—double the base established just four years ago. Before LTA, imports were supplying just over 5 per cent of U.S. cotton textile consumption. In the year ending April 1966—the last period for which official data are available—imports supplied almost 8½ per cent of an even larger domestic market. The current ratio is about 10 per cent. We should remember that we are talking about cotton only and not the almost endless variety of other textiles not covered by LTA.

Take wool imports, which supplied 13.2 per cent of domestic consumption prior to 1961, when the Government's textile program was formulated. In March of this year, the ratio had risen to an astounding level of 21.3 per cent. As I said earlier, worsted fabric im-

And we have responded, too, to the request of our Vietnamese allies.

They have seen the increased danger. They have acted to repel the attack. And they have asked for help.

We have given it.

In short, our President and our Government have acted to meet a grave threat. They have done no less than was necessary—and no more.

For the President's policy has been—is—and will remain—to do what is required to beat back aggression and to leave the South Vietnamese free to make their own future.

He has acted with firmness—but he has acted with restraint.

And in time the wisdom of this course will be apparent to all.

SPORTSMEN BUSY AS BEAVERS

(Mr. DOW (at the request of Mr. EDMONDSON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DOW. Mr. Speaker, during the past weekend I had the privilege to visit the first annual Sullivan County Sportsman's Show which was held at Grahamsville, N.Y. This show is the newest in a long list of successful ventures undertaken by the Federation of Sportsmen's Clubs of Sullivan County.

Sullivan County, internationally famous as a resort area, is equally as well known for the outstanding fishing and hunting it provides visitors to the beautiful Catskills. The Federation of Sportsmen's Clubs of Sullivan County has over the years been the leader in projects to make hunting and fishing even better for both residents of, and visitors to, the Catskills, while at the same time promoting conservation policies to perserve this wonderful heritage of our fields, streams, and forests for future generations.

Here are some of the achievements of this worthy organization:

Organized the Catskill Deer Forum held annually since 1960;

Instrumental in opening Sunday pheasant hunting in Sullivan County.

Brought about legislation permitting the hunting of hen pheasants in Sullivan County;

Worked toward the installation of radios in conservation officers' cars;

Pressed for additional conservation officers in Sullivan County;

Brought about the marking of forest preserve lands;

Had maps made showing the location of forest preserve lands through the Fish and Wild Life Management Board;

Instrumental in having the New York State Conservation Council meet in Sullivan County in 1962 for the first time in the Catskills in 30 years;

Promoted the purchase of State lands under the $100 million bond issue;

Helped bring about the provision favoring the land owner in the party permit system;

Fought against the indiscriminate use of insecticides and for the use of a water base, rather than an oil base, in spraying programs;

Built up a 5,000-acre farmer cooperative area in the county under the Fish and Wildlife Management Act;

Supported the National Rifle Association in its fight against unfavorable firearms legislation;

Instrumental in establishing several duck marsh ponds in Sullivan County;

Brought the needs for deer management before the public by holding field trips.

Instrumental in getting a deer trapping program started in wintering years to determine their place of origin;

Worked for salary increases and reclassification of fire observers and forest rangers;

Organized, with county assistance, the first stream-improvement program in the county, on Callicoon Creek;

For the past 20 years has urged the purchase of the Mongaup Pond area for State campsite purposes, and

Assisted the conservation department in stocking 800 pheasants, 275 white rabbits, over 30,000 trout during 1966.

Organizations such as the Federation of Sportsman's Clubs of Sullivan County deserve our highest praise.

Here is local initiative at its very best, and I am sure you and the Members of this Congress join me in a hearty "well done, and keep up the good work."

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND RALPH NADER AT THE SIGNING OF THE HIGHWAY SAFETY ACT AND TRAFFIC SAFETY ACT

(Mr. FARNSLEY (at the request of Mr. EDMONDSON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FARNSLEY. Mr. Speaker, I would like to include in the RECORD an article from the New York Times of September 10, 1966, containing the texts of remarks by President Johnson at the signing of the Highway Safety Act and Traffic Safety Act and a statement issued by Ralph Nader:

TEXT OF REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND RALPH NADER ON SAFETY

(By President Johnson)

Over the Labor Day weekend, 29 American servicemen died in Vietnam. During the same Labor Day weekend, 614 Americans died on our highways in automobile accidents—20 on the battlefield; 614 on the highways.

In this century, more than one and a half million of our fellow citizens have died on our streets and highways—nearly three times as many Americans as we have lost in all our wars.

Every 11 minutes, a citizen is killed on the road. Every day 9,000 are killed or injured—nine thousand. Last year 50,000 were killed and the tragic totals have mounted every year.

It makes auto accidents the biggest cause of death and injury among Americans under 35.

And if our accident rate continues, one out of every two Americans can look forward to being injured by a car.

This is not a new problem. Ten years ago in the Senate I told my colleagues that "the deadly toll of highway accidents" demanded action. And that this was a responsibility Congress must face. Now, finally, we are facing it.

What is the answer to this shocking problem?

No magic solution

There are those who tell us better roads are the answer, or safer cars. Or tougher licenses. Or stricter judges.

We know there is no one answer, no magic solution. But we are determined to examine every answer.

We are going to cut down this senseless loss of lives.

We are going to cut down the pointless injury.

We are going to cut down the heartbreak.

Today, I sign two bills into law:

First, to protect the driver—the Traffic Safety Act will insure safer, better-protected cars in the event of accident.

Second, to achieve safer driving—the Highway Safety Act will set up a national framework for state safety programs.

The first act we sign into law is the Traffic Safety Act.

It calls for nationwide Federal vehicle safety standards to be developed first under the direction of the Secretary of Commerce, and, soon I hope, under the Secretary of Transportation.

Starting with 1968 models, American and foreign,

We are going to assure our citizens that every new car they buy is as safe as modern knowledge can make it.

We are going to protect drivers against confusing and misleading tire standards.

We are going to establish Federal research and testing centers to probe the causes of traffic accidents.

Seeks cure for disease

For years, we have spent millions of dollars to understand and fight polio and other childhood diseases. Yet until now we have tolerated a raging epidemic of highway death—which has killed more of our youth than all other diseases combined.

Through the Highway Safety Act, we are going to find out more about highway disease—and we aim to cure it.

In this age of space, we are getting plenty of information about how to send men into space and how to bring them home. Yet we don't know for certain whether more auto accidents are caused by faulty brakes, or by soft shoulders, or by drunk drivers or by deer crossing the highway.

Local and state information has been too meager. The Highway Safety Act will create a Federal-state partnership for learning these facts.

We are going to establish a national driver register to protect all our citizens against drivers whose licenses have been revoked or suspended.

We are going to support better programs of driver education and licensing and auto inspection.

We are going to ask every state to participate in safety programs—and to conform to uniform driver and pedestrian safety performance standards.

There is nothing new or radical about all this. Every other form of transportation is covered by Federal safety standards. The food we buy has been under Federal safety standards for years.

Not a luxury item

The automobile industry has been one of our nation's most dynamic and inventive industries. I hope—and I believe—that its skill and imagination will be able to build in more safety—without building on more costs.

For safety is no luxury item, no optional extra. It must be a normal cost of doing business.

But no matter how hard we try, no matter how well we work together, the full impact of these bills can be achieved only if we create a cabinet level department of transportation. So today, I call on the Congress to enact—this year—the bill which will give us that department.

We owe a great deal to many people for this historic legislation.

Today I salute them. I would like to signal out the distinguished leader, Senator [WARREN G.] MAGNUSON [Democrat of Washington]; the Senate Commerce Committee [which Mr. MAGNUSON heads]; Representative HARLEY STAGGERS [Democrat of West Virginia] and the House Interstate Commerce Committee [which Mr. STAGGERS heads], and all the members of Congress who worked so effectively.

Their leadership has given us this program. Now we need the talent to make the program work.

I am happy to announce today that one of the nation's leading traffic safety experts has already responded to our call for help: Dr. William J. Haddon Jr.—a graduate of M.I.T. [Massachusetts Institute of Technology] and Harvard Medical School, author of more than 40 publications on accidents and safety, and a distinguished public administrator.

I am nominating Dr. Haddon to be administrator of the new National Traffic Safety Agency. He and his colleagues will be working with the automobile industry to establish reasonable and realistic safety standards.

I am proud of these bills.

I am proud of the 89th Congress which took my proposals and brought forth these laws.

And I'm proud at this moment to sign these bills—which promise, in the year to come, to cure the highway disease, to end the years of horror and give us years of hope.

(By Ralph Nader)

With the signing of the traffic and highway safety acts, President Johnson launches the Federal Government on a great life-saving program. For the first time, the potential exists for finding the remedies to reduce the tens of thousands of deaths and millions of injuries arising from automobile collisions every year.

To translate potential into reality will require competent and vigorous administration of the law and new manufacturing priorities by the auto industry.

While the Government goes about setting minimum safety standards for cars, the auto companies should compete dynamically to give the people the maximum safety standards, without unjustifiably raising prices.

The humane technology needed to bring safer automobiles to the public will require not just the spur of Government action but the operational stimulus of industry conscience. Hefty doses of safety research and development by auto companies, in vibrant competition, will do wonders for highway safety.

The new National Traffic Safety Agency will require the services of dedicated and highly skilled scientists, engineers, physicians and other specialists. The agency will require leadership which administers these laws forcefully and in open public view.

Traffic safety is no place for secrecy. Above all, the new agency will require the support and the understanding of government, industry and the public. For all three should be the ultimate benefactors of this historic legislation.

GREAT WORDS OF PRESIDENTS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. FEIGHAN] is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, a few days ago I had the privilege of attending a preview of an important display in the State Department Building which was prepared by a major company located in my congressional district.

Irving I. Stone, president of the American Greetings Corp., has long been a keen student of American history, as well as a devotee of the graphic arts.

The exhibit, "Great Words of the Presidents," includes more than 75 works by senior art students at the Cooper School of Art in Cleveland, the California Institute of Art in Los Angeles, the Layton School of Art in Milwaukee, and the Minneapolis School of Art.

Each student made a visual interpretation of some statement by a President of the United States in public speeches, inaugural addresses, and official papers.

Some of the statements quoted and depicted are of special significance in this period of multitudinous national and international problems. They state the philosophy of the people of America—the way of thinking that has made our Nation great, and will keep it great.

For example, Andrew Jackson:

Eternal vigilance by the people is the price of liberty.

James Garfield:

The printing press is the most powerful weapon with which man has ever armed himself for the fight against ignorance and oppression.

William McKinley:

The strength and safety of this great nation of ours do not rest in armies or in navies, but in the love and loyalty of its people.

Woodrow Wilson:

I would rather belong to a poor nation that was free than to a rich nation that had ceased to be in love with liberty.

Franklin D. Roosevelt:

Books may be burned and cities sacked, but the truth, like the yearning for freedom, lives in the hearts of humble men and women.

Harry Truman:

The basic proposition of the worth and dignity of man is not a sentimental aspiration or a vain hope or a piece of rhetoric. It is the strongest, the most creative force now present in this world.

Dwight D. Eisenhower:

We seek victory not over any nation or people, but over the ancient enemies of us all; victory over ignorance, poverty, disease and human degradation whenever they may be found.

John F. Kennedy:

All our material riches will avail us little if we do not use them to expand the opportunities of our people.

Lyndon B. Johnson:

Yesterday is not ours to recover, but tomorrow is ours to win or lose.

This exhibit will remain at the State Department Building for a month. It will then be placed on view in the Pan American Building in New York, taken about this country and Europe as a traveling exhibit, and eventually housed in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library at Austin, Tex.

I hope that millions of Americans will see this exhibit.

I know that they will find in it something of the spirit and traditions of our great Nation.

And I am especially proud that this exhibit was produced and presented to the Nation by the American Greetings Corp., with headquarters in the 20th Ohio Congressional District.

REDWOOD CREEK IS THE PLACE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. COHELAN] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, time is runnning out on our efforts to save the redwoods. We must act soon if we are to preserve some of the few remaining redwood giants in a national park.

Only 10 percent of the original redwood forest remains today. With the exception of those trees now within the boundaries of a few isolated State parks, even these will fall to the lumberman's ax within the next few years.

The redwoods are the world's tallest living thing. They are a proud and unique natural resource of this country. They deserve to be enjoyed by future generations of Americans in the proper setting of a great national park. Only quick action on our part will make this possible.

When Congress convenes next January, I believe the crucial question will not be "whether" to establish a Redwood National Park, but "where."

The administration called this year for a limited park at Mill Creek in Del Norte County. Backed by 53 Members of the House and Senate, I have proposed a 90,000-acre park centered around the Redwood Creek Valley in northern Humboldt County.

REDWOOD CREEK IS THE PLACE

To answer this important question of "where," I am including with these remarks the thorough and thoughtful testimony of the Sierra Club's vice president, Dr. Edgar Wayburn, and its conservation director, Mr. Michael McCloskey. Dr. Wayburn and Mr. McCloskey testified with me at the Senate Interior Committee's hearings in both Crescent City, Calif., and Washington, D.C.

In addition, I am including a study prepared by Gordon P. Robinson, on the impact of the Redwood Creek Park proposal on the forest industry, and a timely article by William Bronson entitled "Behind the Redwood Curtain."

American history, the most magnificent scenes of natural beauty and astounding feats of Nature which cannot be observed elsewhere in the world—in Yosemite Falls, 1,430 feet equal to nine Niagara Falls; Crater Lake, the deepest and the bluest volcanic lake in the world; Mt. McKinley, a towering giant nearly four miles high.

I would be the last to tell you that any park system as diverse as our own National Park System, with 120 million recorded visits last year, has no problems. There are problems, but they are not insurmountable, and we believe that with the active management program now under the direction of George B. Hartzog, Jr., we can meet these problems and maintain in its finest sense the world's outstanding National Park System.

What about the future? As the National Park Service is poised to begin another 50 years of service, we might recall the advice of the novelist-playwright John Galsworthy, who said: "If you do not think about the future, you cannot have one."

I am confident that George Hartzog and the members of his staff will think deeply about all phases of park management in the immediate years ahead. I hope they will relieve overcrowding and congestion in the few National parks where it occurs. I hope that they will plan and think about the manner in which we, as a Nation and with other nations, may commemorate the 100th anniversary of the creation of the world's first National park, Yellowstone, in 1972. I hope that they will think and plan about the way in which we can play a significant role in commemorating in 1975 the 200th anniversary of the birth of this Nation as the Declaration of Independence was signed.

The National Park Service will continue to retain as a policy keystone the dual obligation to preserve the principal park features and make them available for the use of the public. The key will, of course, be a proper balance between what is to be preserved and how it can be enjoyed and used by the public. Proper planning, prudent judgment, and timely decisions affecting improvements within the parks will follow logically from a careful study and analysis of the original purpose of each area as contained in the legislation creating same.

National parks play a part in helping to enrich the human spirit, the minds and bodies of our citizens. Consequently, we are dealing in a very fragile area which is concerned as much with the conservation of human resources, as well as with natural resources, for, after all, America not only depends on its natural resources, but even more greatly upon human resources of the people—all races, religions, and nationalities who make up this great Nation that we call America—a Nation that still lifts out the torch of liberty and the warm welcome to freedom-loving people throughout the world and which does represent, in the words of Abraham Lincoln, "the last best hope of the world."

Veterans' Pension Act of 1966

SPEECH
OF
HON. JAMES H. (JIMMY) QUILLEN
OF TENNESSEE
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, September 19, 1966

Mr. QUILLEN. Mr. Speaker, yesterday we passed with overwhelming support H.R. 17488, the Veterans' Pension Act of 1966, which I supported and voted for on final passage.

I congratulate the members of the Veterans' Affairs Committee, and particularly the chairman, for the outstanding bill which they evolved out of the nearly 200 bills which they had to consider. I know that our veterans are deeply appreciative of their efforts.

It has been realized for some time that changes were needed in the veterans' pension laws, and the committee did a great service to our veterans, but I feel that more benefits are in line.

We can all take pride in the passage of this legislation for through it we have continued our duty to "care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan."

I am especially pleased that the committee included in H.R. 17488 the provision that a veteran who is 65 years of age will now be considered disabled for pension purposes, because I introduced, along with several of my colleagues, H.R. 13939 which also sought to have this regulation made.

My only regret is that through H.R. 17488 we did not raise the benefits of those veterans who are under the old part III law. I hope that we can do something for these very deserving veterans in the near future.

VN

A New Offer of Peace

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, September 20, 1966

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, apart from a military victory in Vietnam, what we are trying to achieve is peace and stability in a small southeast Asian country that cannot defend itself against invasion and aggression from outside its borders.

The way to achieve this peace is by sitting down at the conference table and negotiating. President Johnson has always said that he will go anywhere at any time to talk to anyone if there is any possibility of a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. He has now gone even further than that and challenged the Communists to set up initial stages of mutual withdrawal before negotiations begin.

In that connection I commend to the attention of our colleagues the following editorial from the Washington Daily News of September 6, 1966:

A NEW OFFER OF PEACE

President Johnson has presented a new challenge to the North Vietnamese communists. It is a challenge not to a new furious round of fighting, but to a new earnest effort to make peace.

More strongly and precisely than ever before, the President in Detroit yesterday pledged the withdrawal of American troops from South Viet Nam. He even talked about setting up a timetable for that withdrawal.

But wisely it was not the one-sided Americans-only withdrawal proposed by French President Charles de Gaulle last week. President Johnson's offer is made on the condition that the Vietnamese communists reciprocate. The three conditions are that the North Vietnamese authorities: (1) stop infiltrating men and materiel into South Viet Nam, (2) withdraw their forces already in the South, and (3) end their aggression in the South, or, as the President also put it, ensure that "might makes right will be halted."

The U.S. Government has said all this one way or another, for months and years. But in being more explicit than ever before on the subject of a timed, mutual withdrawal from the South, the President has stepped closer than ever before to the negotiating table, and beckoned the communists to meet him there.

For if the war is to end by agreement, it will not be done by rival sides putting their "timetables" into envelopes and exchanging them by mail. There are many complicated matters to be bargained over: The phases of withdrawal, the means of verifying the withdrawal, the rights (if any) of the southerners who are Viet Cong, to mention a few. And since there would be little point in discussing peace in Viet Nam while there is a related war going on in Laos and a communist-led insurrection being fostered in Thailand, those problems would have to be included. The whole matter can only be considered in face-to-face negotiations, and long and difficult ones at that.

But here at last, on the table, is a new attempt at making peace by the President, a new offer to the communists, a new opportunity to end this terrible war.

VN

Vietnam Stand Saved Indonesia

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. WAYNE L. HAYS
OF OHIO
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, September 20, 1966

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following column by Roscoe Drummond giving some views of President Marcos of the Philippines, which appeared in the Boston Globe of September 15, 1966. For the benefit of those who have expressed doubts about our policy in Vietnam, I should like to call particular attention to the statements of President Marcos that only the American presence in Vietnam prevented the fall of the Indonesia Government to Communists, and that the American presence goes far beyond the effect on the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong:

ASIAN'S ALLY'S VIEW: VIETNAM STAND SAVED INDONESIA

(By Roscoe Drummond)

WASHINGTON.—Americans have in their midst a brave Asian ally and a superb spokesman for the growing will of more Asian nations to unite in defending themselves against communist aggression.

He has earned the esteem and respect of Asians and Americans alike.

He will address a joint session of Congress today and will speak to the United Nations a few days later. I believe he deserves to be heeded and, regardless of whether one is a supporter or critic of U.S. actions in Viet Nam, he deserves to be heard.

This Asian spokesman is the young President of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos.

In advance of his speeches in the United States I would like to cite some of his views and insights not widely known.

Question—How do you think Indonesia escaped he attempted communist coup?

orable Stanley Cain, who will bring us greetings by telephone hook-up at this time.

Thank you so very, very much.

EXCERPTS OF REMARKS OF SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR STEWART L. UDALL, AT THE GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY DINNER OF THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, STATLER-HILTON HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C., AUGUST 25, 1966

If one were to write the history of the American National Park idea these five red-letter years would be singled out for special comment and celebration:

1872: the year the Yellowstone became our first National Park;

1906: the year the Antiquities Act was passed which enabled Presidents to carve National Monuments out of the public domain;

1916: the year the National Park Service was chartered;

1935: the year the Historic Sites Act was enacted; and finally,

1964: the year the Land and Water Conservation Fund was established to finance the acquisition of new parklands.

We are here this evening to celebrate the third of these landmark occasions—the Golden Anniversary of the National Park Service. But before I have my say about Steve Mather and Horace Albright and Franklin K. Lane, I would like to dwell for a moment on the world significance of the National Park idea which we originated and have nurtured now for nearly 94 years.

The inspired idea which sprang from the Yellowstone campfire had had its roots in the far-sighted thinking of men like George Catlin and Henry Thoreau. It was uniquely American—a democratic concept for a people who believed that governments should do for the Nation as a whole those things no individual or group of individuals could accomplish. The kernel of the Yellowstone idea was that the scenic wonders of any country should be preserved for all time, for all of the people, as special sanctuaries where Nature's most eloquent statements would remain unspoiled and unimpaired.

It is, I think, correct to say that this idea is a dynamic one: each generation gains new insights and insists that standards of protection and management be raised to even higher levels.

This very year trained experts of the National Park Service are at work in many countries in all parts of the globe explaining the American National Park idea and training others to copy it. It is not immodest to say that this uniquely American idea has influenced, and is influencing, land use planning on every continent.

I am convinced that when the history of the earth's human stewardship is written, no plan or conservation concept developed in the past century has done more to preserve the virgin splendor of the planet than the American National Park idea.

At the turn of the 20th Century, the National parks were administered on a part-time basis by employees of the Secretary of the Interior engaged in "miscellaneous work." The National monuments were divided among three departments of the Government—the War Department, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of the Interior.

Interested citizens espoused a unified administration for the National parks, and none with more ardor than Dr. J. Horace McFarland, President of the American Civic Association, who spearheaded a movement to establish a new Federal agency with sole responsibility for the National parks. As early as 1912, McFarland said: "Nowhere in official Washington can an inquirer find an office of the National parks or a single desk devoted solely to their management."

About this same time, Stephen T. Mather, Chicago industrialist, was in Washington and visited his former classmate at the University of California, Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane. Mather voiced his displeasure at the way some of the National parks were being run. Secretary Lane is said to have turned to his old friend and remarked: "Steve, if you don't like the way they are running the parks, you take them over."

Mather, practical man and idealist, was given the challenge to which he was to devote the rest of his life. He was appointed Assistant to the Secretary of the Interior for National Parks. In keeping his promise to help Mather on Government red tape, Secretary Lane found an able assistant in Horace Albright, whom we are deeply honored to have with us this evening. The Mather-Albright partnership was to lay a foundation and chart a long course for the progress of the National Park System.

A few months later, August 25, 1916, President Woodrow Wilson signed a bill creating the National Park Service to "promote and regulate the use of" National parks and monuments. The act also specified that the fundamental purpose of the parks was: "to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such matter and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for future generations."

The act of 1916 emphasized two broad objectives: to conserve the irreplaceable for the enjoyment of the people. Conservation and use are, in one sense, conflicting; however, this dual obligation of conservation and use has actually given dynamic thrust to the growth and improvement of the National Park System. In the general interest of the public and in consonance with the purpose of the 1916 act, conservation and use must be joined together in balance and in harmony.

Shortly after Stephen Mather began his tenure, Secretary Lane outlined these National park management principles—

First, that the National parks be maintained in absolutely unimpaired form for the use of future generations as well as those of our time;

Second, that they are set aside for the use, observation, health, and pleasure of the people;

Third, that the National interest must dictate all decisions affecting public or private enterprise in the park.

In a directive of July 10, 1964, to the Director of the National Park Service, I reaffirmed these principles laid down 48 years ago by Secretary of the Interior Lane.

The noted philosopher, Alfred Whitehead, once said: "The art of progress is to preserve order amid change, and to preserve change amid order." The changing conditions and times that are reflected today and which could hardly be viewed 50 years ago to require certain new policies.

Recognizing three distinct types of areas in the National Park System—natural, historical, and recreational—I directed that, while all areas would be governed under the same general policies, each classification would have its own particular policies and purposes.

In the natural areas, like the National parks, the primary purpose is preservation of the natural environment, including restoration of indigenous plant and animal life, and providing for appropriate use and enjoyment of the parks without impairment to the prime natural values.

The principal effort with respect to the historical sites will be the maintenance and restoration of their historical integrity. For National recreation areas, the primary objective will be outdoor recreation. The natural and scientific areas within National recreation areas will be conserved insofar as possible, compatible with the primary emphasis on outdoor recreation.

With respect to all parks, regardless of category, a master plan recognizes the purpose of each area, and will zone portions of the park to provide areas for intensive visitor-use, those with limited facilities, other areas on the threshold of wilderness, and finally wilderness itself.

Wilderness preservation was, in 1916 and will remain a keystone of National park policy. The wilderness concept has, in fact, undergirded the management of National parks for nearly a century. The National parks were set aside to preserve areas of pristine natural beauty, history, and havens of wildlife.

A strong research program in natural history and history will stand behind the planning and management of each park. The need was pointed out by the Advisory Board on Wildlife Management in the National Parks which I appointed in 1963.

We must never forget that the two greatest attractions drawing people to the National parks are superlative scenery and wildlife in abundance. Both must be protected.

In the early years of National Park administration, wildlife management stressed the obvious need of protection. Animal populations were protected from hunting, habitats were controlled from wildfire, and predators were eliminated. The tragedy of exterminating the wolf and cougar from the National parks is today realized. Cougars were effective in controlling the deer population, which, in the absence of natural enemies, expands far beyond the capacity of its food supply. There is a greater awareness today that a suitable habitat is vital to the sustaining of healthy animal populations. This habitat need not be of immense size in terms of area. Although important in National parks, protection cannot be a substitute for sufficient habitat.

The image of the National Park System today is connected in the minds of many people with Yellowstone National Park. Yellowstone and other National parks are a priceless heritage. But there is another important National Park Service responsibility that is often overlooked—that is the broad responsibility for historic preservation and the administration of historic sites. More than 150 sites—in fact, the majority of all areas in the National Park System—are primarily of historic significance. These sites are connected with the full range of our history with all its human interest and dramatic import to every American.

If we want to preserve some of the finest and best mementos of America, its grace and charm, we need to preserve some of the buildings that take us back through the years and chart the appealing story of American history. For those sites of National significance, the National Park Service may recommend preservation under the Historic Sites Act of 1935.

Progress causes inevitable change in the handiwork of Nature and threatens some of the physical remains and evidences of our culture, constituting the lifeblood of the historic veins of America. We must, of course, accept some of this change, for it is in the public interest, but Government officials at all levels must unceasingly strive to find and define the public interest. To do so, they need the help and communication of an informed public.

During the past ten years, almost 600 million dollars has been expended in the construction of needed visitor facilities. Designed properly with a view toward aesthetics, these facilities can help to protect the primary park values. Designed poorly, they can contribute to the erosion of these same features. Park design is then a vital and most important tool.

The objective of every master plan is, in fact, to design the visitor facilities with the least impact or intrusion on the most significant features and yet design them in a way and in a location so that reasonable opportunity is afforded to all visitors to observe these striking and significant features. These are the very values for which the park was set aside. We are committed to preserve them unimpaired for future generations.

These values reflect the whole gamut of

President Marcos—it was only the American presence in Viet Nam, I feel, which prevented the fall of the Indonesian government into communist hands. Not only Indonesia, but also other countries.

Question—Why do you feel this is true?

Marcos—The Communists supposedly plotted an effort to prevent a takeover by the enemies of President Sukarno. But it actually was an open and outright coup to take over the government. It was planned a long, long time ago. The situation became such that the Communists were certain, were very certain, not only of internal support but of support from outside.

Question—What intervened?

Marcos—When the American government decided to increase its aid to South Viet Nam, that knocked out all previous assumptions. But by then the Communists had begun the initial moves of their operation and it was too late for them to pull back. And very few people know this. Many leaders who were wavering in Indonesia immediately realized that the communist coup was going to fall. Also, with large U.S. forces in Viet Nam, the Red Chinese would not have either the capability or the inclination to send any help whatsoever to the Indonesian Communists. And that is exactly what happened.

Question—Then you think the U.S. action in Viet Nam has been worthwhile?

Marcos—Of course it has been worthwhile. I was against sending Philippine combat troops to Viet Nam last year because I had serious doubts about the firmness of the U.S. presence. These doubts have been wholly removed. American determination to stay until the aggression is defeated is proved beyond any question. (Philippine combat forces will soon be helping South Viet Nam defend itself.) The American presence goes far beyond the effect on the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. The fight which the Communists refer to as the "fight for national liberation" is the single most important thing that will determine the state of affairs in Asia for the next century. You can hardly imagine what might have happened if there had been no demonstration of resolution on the part of the United States.

Question—Would it be helpful to have Red China in the U.N.?

Marcos—Unfortunately, as of now, the leadership of Red China is not willing to renounce war as an instrument of international policy. To be eligible, she must be willing to live peacefully with her neighbors. When she is prepared to do so, let her leaders say so—and act so.

Cramer Calls for Halt to Reckless Federal Spending

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. WILLIAM C. CRAMER

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, September 20, 1966

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, the recent revelation that the wholesale price index increased 1.3 percent in the month of August compels me to once again take the floor and call upon this Congress and the administration to exercise fiscal restraints.

Unless restraints are imposed, this Nation will be caught in the grips of an inflationary spiral that will create even greater hardships on the American consumer and place more serious pressures on an already overheated economy.

If, for example, the wholesale price index increases at the present rate, if will reflect a 12.36 percent increase in just 1 year. By comparison, the wholesale price index only increased about 2 percent during the entire 8 years of the Eisenhower administration.

Because the greatest increases continue to be in food products, and because retail grocery establishments work on a small profit margin, we can expect that the increase in the wholesale price index will be passed along to the consumer and be reflected in still higher prices for essential foods.

As far back as January I warned that the freespending policies of the Great Society would cause runaway inflation. Hand-over-fist Great Society spending, supported at every step by this Democratic Congress, continues at a reckless pace. Runaway inflation is hurting everyone. It hurts most the senior citizen pensioner and social security recipient living on a small, fixed income. I will continue fighting against the programs and policies that are causing inflation. I will vote "no" on nonessential spending.

I would urge my colleagues to join in this effort. The first step is to vote against all nonessential spending.

The integrity of the dollar must be preserved.

Sweden's Knighting of Robert Heller a Deserved Honor

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. RALPH HARVEY

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, September 20, 1966

Mr. HARVEY of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent I include an editorial from the New Castle, Ind., Courier-Times, edition of Thursday, September 15, 1966, in the Appendix of the RECORD:

SWEDEN'S KNIGHTING OF ROBERT HELLER A DESERVED HONOR—BUT WE DON'T KNOW ABOUT THE "LOWLY BIRTH" AND "UNKNOWN PLACE"

People of New Castle have more than a casual interest in the knighting of Robert Heller by King Gustaf of Sweden. To many here he is a personal friend, while others remember him in New Castle as a young man growing up and home on vacations from college.

One probably ought not to dispute a king, but we're not so sure about King Gustaf's reference to Heller as an American of lowly birth at an unknown place . . . We have what often is referred to as the "log cabin tradition" in this country, which is simply a way of saying that we want America to be a country of opportunity for all, but Robert Heller is really not a part of the log cabin tradition. The mansion on Main Street which Macer's now occupies was his home. His father was a sophisticated gentleman who opertaed one of the most successful department stores in Indiana, and was a partner in Heller Brother Company which developed the American Beauty rose, and built an industry shipping roses all over the world. His mother was a woman of renowned beauty and grace, and a member of a distinguished family.

The king's reference to "an unknown place" may make New Castle citizens smile or wince just a little. New Castle is a small place as cities of the world go, and King Gustaf may be completely forgiven for not knowing about us. But proud as we are of Robert Heller, we have and have had other famous sons. Ward Canaday, of Toledo, one of America's leading businessmen in the twentieth century and developer of the Jeep, is among our natives. General Omar Bundy, the commander who ordered the counter attack that turned the tide of World War I, called New Castle his home. And if we were to go farther back, there were men like Judge Martin L. Bundy, who as a young man carried the first mail on horseback into New Castle and lived to become a friend and confidant of President Lincoln.

King Gustaf may not have been aware of New Castle, but here is the single Chrysler plant which makes some part for every Chrysler product, a Firestone plant that produces non-rubber items for America's automobiles, a modern steel rolling mill that is an important division of Borg-Warner, and many other significant producers of industrial products. If His Majesty's government is not using some Modernfold doors or air doors made by New Castle Products Co., it would be unusual.

New Castle was one of the first cities in America to meet the challenge of the twentieth century with a General Development Plan instituted in the early 1940s. It moves slowly, and it works rather silently, but it is moving and it is working importantly.

What King Gustaf knows very well is what Robert Heller has done for his government, and the citation leaves no doubt about this, hailing him as among the saviors of the world in a time of stress and turmoil.

Governments and economies existed in relatively separate compartments until a about fifty years ago, but since then there has been an increasing inter-relationship until it sometimes is hard to tell where one begins and the other leaves off. It is a part of Robert Heller's unique genius that he comprehends the purposes and functioning of both the economy and government, and has been able to counsel both businesses and governments in a remarkable way. His reforms for Congress, only one of which was giving the Congress a modern committee system; his modernization of the Post Office Department, and his work for the State of Indiana were labors of love for which he accepted no compensation. That he finds time and opportunity in his so-called "retirement" to assist the governments of Europe is completely in character.

Resolution of Seventh Convention of Byelorussian-American Association, Inc.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, September 20, 1966

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, this Congress has gone on record on many occasions in past years in support of the independence of the captive nations of Eastern Europe.

One of these nations is Byelorussia, and I commend to the attention of our colleagues the resolution adopted at the seventh joint convention of the Byelorussian-American Association in America and the Byelorussian Canadian Alliance

held in Cleveland from September 3 to 5, 1966:

RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE SEVENTH JOINT CONVENTION OF THE BYELORUSSIAN-AMERICAN ASSOCIATION IN AMERICA AND THE BYELORUSSIAN CANADIAN ALLIANCE, HELD IN CLEVELAND, OHIO, FROM SEPTEMBER 3 TO 5, 1966

We, the delegates of the Byelorussian-American Association in America and of the Byelorussian Canadian Alliance, who are citizens or residents of the United States of America and Canada and who at the same time keep alive firm cultural ties with Byelorussians in their homeland, do solemnly state and declare:

1. The Byelorussian people, deprived of a great part of its ethnic territory and held under the alien Communist-Russian totalitarian yoke, continues to suffer from national persecution and economic exploitation. On their own soil—in the so-called sovereign Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic—Byelorussians cannot profit from their rich natural and human resources. This wealth is being siphoned from Byelorussia by the Muscovite rulers to finance international subversion and to fortify Russian rule over the Asiatic part of the Soviet empire.

The key positions in politics, economics and culture of Byelorussia are in the hands of an alien element, hostile to Byelorussian ideals. The main task of this incubus is to Russify Byelorussians and to tighten the fetters of Soviet Russian colonialism over the land.

2. The Byelorussian people has not wavered in its unrelenting resistance to the Muscovite oppression. In the two years since the previous Convention of the Byelorussians of North America in 1964, we have witnessed, for example, repeated attempts by the Byelorussians in the Soviet Union to regain more freedom in the development of their national identity and culture. Particularly persistent efforts were made to restore the Byelorussian national past and cultural achievements and to inculcate the Byelorusisan youth with feelings of national pride. The entry into the cultural life of Byelorussia during years of hosts of nationally minded, patriotic young men and women clearly reflects a powerful reservoir of resistance to the Russian oppression.

3. In recent years, too, Soviet propaganda and an increasing number of subservient historical works have been denigrating the Byelorussian national movement, ideas of liberation, and activities of the Byelorussian emigration in Western countries. Especially sharp attacks are being directed against the Byelorussian political emigration, a fact which indicates most tellingly the importance of spiritual ties between Byelorussians in the Free World and those oppressed in the homeland. The sharpness of these attacks also serves as a measure of the Soviet colonial regime's apprehensiveness of such ties.

4. For the above-stated reasons, we firmly resolve to continue our efforts to alert the Free World to the continuing fight of the Byelorussian people for their liberty and independence. We further pledge to pass on to the younger Byelorussian generation ideals of the Byelorussian Democratic Republic, whose sovereignty was proclaimed on 25 of March, 1918, and to maintain moral and material ties with the Byelorussian people captive within the Russian colonial empire.

5. We fervently hope that now, as the Soviet-Russian regime attempts to conceal its true totalitarian nature behind a facade of pseudo-democracy, the governments of the United States of America and of Canada will continue their moral support of the Byelorussian democratic movement for the liberation of Byelorussia. We express our gratitude to the American and Canadian official bodies for the good-will, which the Byelorussian people have enjoyed in their struggle for national liberation.

On behalf of the Seventh Joint Convention of the Byelorussian-American Association in America and the Byelorussian Canadian Alliance.

NICHOLAS HOROSHKO,
Chairman of the Convention; National President, Byelorussian-American Association in America.

Rumania Taxes Mourners Who Visit Cemeteries

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, September 20, 1966

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, at a time when the Commerce Department is preparing to send a trade nation to Eastern Europe to follow out the administration's scheme of subsidizing trade out of the Communist governments, I feel there is a special significance in the article written by international columnist Dumitru Danielopol which appeared in the September 1 issue of the San Diego Union.

The article follows:

RUMANIA TAXES MOURNERS WHO VISIT CEMETERIES

(By Dumitru Danielopol)

In Communist Rumania even death is taxed.

This was revealed in Paris by Rumanian Rabbi Alexander Rubin in an exclusive interview.

The Communists, looking everywhere for cash, have now created a heavy burial tax. Another is levied if a monument or a tombstone is erected.

Yet another if flowers are planted on the grave.

Enough?

Not for the Reds.

Now a Rumanian Jew must pay everytime he visits a cemetery.

The Jews are apparently singled out because under strict Jewish rites cemeteries are visited often.

"When one is happiest and most prosperous," said Rabbi Rubin, "we believe he should visit cemeteries and understand the worthlessness of worldly things."

The rabbi also pointed to eastern European traditions.

"The Rumanian Jew, just like the Rumanian peasant with whom he has been and remained friends for centuries, is a good and friendly man," he said. "He goes to kneel before the grave of a loved one, to weed it, to plant flowers and water it. This is sacred ground."

The burial and cemetery taxes, Rubin said, have been introduced with Rumanian chief rabbi, a man named Moses Rosen.

Rubin calls Rosen a Communist stooge, who is being used to demoralize the Jewish community.

In 1958, Rubin said, Rosen established a dollar entry fee for Jewish cemeteries for the month Elul. Some 200,000 Jews had, according to their rites, to visit a cemetery at least once in that period.

Now the entrance tax has been extended to all year round.

Foreign visitors must pay $2.

Rubin points to the chief rabbi's varied activities as proof of his Communist allegiance.

He said the chief rabbi collects a government salary as chief rabbi, president of the community federation, chief rabbi of the Choral Temple of Bucharest, chief rabbi of Bucharest, and as a member of the Communist National Assembly.

Interesting Results of August Questionnaire on Major Issues

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JAMES G. FULTON
OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, September 19, 1966

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, every one of the 125,000 families in my congressional district during August has received a copy of my regular August questionnaire on the major issues facing the Congress and our country today. It is a pleasure to announce the results of this poll and publish them in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for the Members of Congress and the American people.

Our 27th Congressional District of Pennslyvania includes the large steel mills, fabricating plants, manufacturing and industrial areas in four large wards in the southern part of the city of Pittsburgh, the powerful Neville Island industrial complex of manufacturing, chemicals, and shipbuilding, also industrial and fine suburban communities, coal mining towns and farming areas in the southern part of Allegheny County, Pa.

While our congressional district has a substantial Democratic registration majority, it is independent minded and often elects Republican candidates to various offices. A majority of the local officeholders in boroughs and townships are Democratic, as well as our members in the Pennsylvania State Legislature, and the municipalities. In the city of Pittsburgh, the mayor, city councilmen, and the ward alderman elected in each ward in my district are all Democratic.

The fine people of our district trace a heritage to every nationality and color; 65 nationalities among residents makes it a real Pittsburgh "melting pot." Many of our people are proud first, second, and third generation immigrants among an older American stock. We all get along with each other very well, and treat each other as friends and neighbors. While we do have poverty and unemployment, there have been no civil rights riots, rock throwing, insults, teenage rampages, nor vandalism among our people.

From such diversity, as well as respect for law and order, it is always interesting to read and examine the results of our congressional opinion polls:

QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

[Results in percentages]

VIETNAM

Is Administration giving public adequate information regarding Vietnam? Yes 25, no 73, undecided, 2.

Should President seek Summit conference with Russia to stop their military aid and delivery of "Sam" missiles to North Vietnam? Yes 56, no 40, undecided 4.