

Staff of 15,000 Is Directed From Only Partly Secret Sylvan Virginia Area

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ing funds without the bureaucratic restraints imposed on other government agencies, the C.I.A. soon found Joseph M. ...

So pervasive was the C.I.A. influence that the agency was widely accused of the assassination of Moscow's man, Premier ...

Money and shiny American automobiles, furnished through the logistic wizardry of Langley, are said to have been the deciding factors in the ...

More Than Meney By the Congo period, however, the men in the ...

And so the C.I.A. kept growing in size and scope. By the time Moise Tshombe had returned to power in the Congo ...

This, apparently, was a job for the Defense Department, but to avoid a too obvious Army involvement, and in the interests of speed and efficiency, the Government again turned to the C.I.A.

It could engage 20 British mechanics with their own tools and furnish the tactical expertise from its own ranks or from Americans under contract.

Moreover, some C.I.A. agents eventually fell overboard. Some combat missions themselves in support of South African and Rhodesian operations.

But it was pleased by the overall success of the operation. Not only no planes were lost and all civilian targets were avoided.

Meanwhile, in Other Areas...


In the years of the Congo effort, the C.I.A. was also smuggling Tibetans in and out of Communist China, ...

For all this, the C.I.A. employs about 15,000 persons and spends about a half billion dollars a year.

Its headquarters, the brain and nerve center, the information repository of this sprawling intelligence and operations system, is a modern, eight-story building of precast concrete and inset windows ...

Some of the achievements of these experts are prodigious, if reports filtering through the secrecy screen are even half accurate. For instance: ...

In the early nineteen-fifties, C.I.A. shipping experts, through their expertise, spotted the first shipment of Soviet arms to Cuba before the vessels ...



HOME OF THE CIA: Central Intelligence Agency has its headquarters at Langley, Va., near the Potomac River

a \$30-million appropriation for a new, unitary headquarters was inserted without identification in the budget of another ...

While the whitish-gray building is undoubtedly as secure as a fortress, guards, gates and elaborate electronic devices can make it, the location is hardly secret. A large sign on the George Washington Parkway ...

There, beyond the affable guard at the gate, is the large, rectangular structure with four wings, the ground-level windows barred, which stand in the white symbol of what is supposed to be an invisible operation.

For organizational purposes, C.I.A. headquarters is divided into four divisions, each headed by a deputy director — plans, intelligence, science and technology, and support.

What the Divisions Do The Division of Science and Technology is responsible for keeping current on developing techniques in science and weapons, including nuclear weapons, and ...

The Division of Support is responsible for procuring equipment and for logistics, communications and security, including the C.I.A. code.

The Division of Plans and Operations performs the basic functions of the agency. It organizes, plans, directs, and controls the hand and brain, the dagger and the lamp, the microscope and the megaphone of the intelligence profession. Their presence under one roof has caused much controversy that has swirled about the C.I.A. since the Bay of Pigs.

It is the responsibility of the Intelligence Division to assemble information from all sources, and to produce daily and periodical intelligence reports for the President and the National Security Council.

All information — military, political, economic, scientific, industrial — is first for the division's file. There is no more than one-fifth — by volume and not necessarily importance — of information from agents overseas under varying depths of cover.

Most information is culled from foreign newspapers, scientific journals, industry publications, the reports of the government departments and intelligence services and foreign broadcasts monitored by C.I.A. stations around the world.

All Sorts of Experts The Intelligence Division is organized by geographical sections that are served by resident specialists from almost every profession and discipline — linguists, chemists, physicists, biologists, geographers, engineers, psychiatrists and even geomorphologists and geologists and foresters.

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Some anthropologists at C.I.A. headquarters devote their time to helpful studies of such minor — but strategically crucial — societies as those of the ...

It is the agency's boast that it could staff any college from its analysts, 50 per cent of whom have advanced degrees and 30 per cent of whom have ...

Sixty per cent of the Intelligence Division personnel have served 10 years. Twenty-five per cent have been with the C.I.A. since 1947, when the ...

The Division of Plans is a cover title for what is actually the division of secret operations. It is charged with all those stratagems and wiles — some as old as the hills — that are associated with the black and despised art of espionage and subversion.

The operations of the C.I.A. go far beyond the hiring and training of spies who seek out informers and defectors. It was the Plans Division that ...

It was the Plans Division that masterminded the ouster of the Arben government in Guatemala in 1954, the overthrow of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 ...

Among the triumphs of the Plans Division are the development of the U-2 high-altitude plane, which between 1956 and 1960, when Francis Gary Powers was shot down by a Soviet rocket, photographed much of the Soviet Union; the digging of a tunnel into East Berlin from which C.I.A. agents tapped telephone cables leading to Soviet military headquarters.

It was the Plans Division that Premier Khrushchev's secret speech to the 20th party conference in 1956 denouncing Stalin's excesses and brutalities.

The C.I.A. analysts of the Intelligence Division, in the opinion of many experts, are aware of the embedded nature of its plans and frustrations of people just emerging into nationhood. Thus they are likely to be more tolerant than the activists in the Plans Division of the fanatical nationalism and socialist boyaud nationalism of the leaders in former colonies and more flexible than many of their counterparts in the Department's cautious and legalistic diplomats.

In discussing the Portuguese territories of Angola of Mozambique, for example, the analysts are sure to take the new situation that change is inevitable; that the United States has a stake in the new world.

The State Department, on the other hand, tends to be diverted by Portuguese sensitivities and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization base in the Azores.

One State Department official said that there are more liberal intellectuals per square inch at the C.I.A. than anywhere else in the government.

The operators and agents of the Plans Division, on the other hand, are described as more conservative in their economic outlook and more single-minded in their anti-Communism. This is particularly true of those engaged in deep-cover operations, many of whom are ex-military people or men formerly in the Office of Strategic Services of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

home, and like them are sympathetic to the underdeveloped countries.

The C.I.A. agents abroad fall into two groups — both under the Plans Division. First, there are those engaged in the really dirty business — the ones and counterespies, the saboteurs, the leaders of paramilitary operations, the suborners, operate under deepest cover, and their activities become known only when they are unfortunate enough to be caught and "surfaced" for political or propaganda purposes.

While such operatives may be known to "the chief of station" or the top C.I.A. officer, rarely known to the American Ambassador, although he may sometimes be aware of their mission. In fact, these deep agents are not known to the C.I.A.'s Intelligence Division in Washington, and their reports are not identified to it by name.

Correspondents of The New York Times say they have never, with certainty, been able to identify one of these agents, although they have on occasion run across some unaccountable American of whom they have known the suspcions. Often unknown to each other, the deep agents masquerade as businessmen, tourists, scholars, missionaries or charity workers.

There are those agents, by far the larger number, who operate under the cover of the official diplomatic mission. In the mission register they are listed as political or economic officers, Treasury representatives, consular officers or employees of the International Development (the United States foreign aid agency) or United States Information Agency. The C.I.A. chief of station may be listed as a special assistant or as the top officer on the political office.

Not Very Secret This official cover is so thin as to be meaningless except to the host government. These agents usually are readily identifiable. The chief of station is recognized as the man with a car as big as the Ambassador's and a house that is comelier — better, in Lagos, Nigeria — better.

In practically all the allied countries, the C.I.A. agents identify themselves to host governments, and actually work in close cooperation with Cabinet officials, local intelligence and police.

In some embassies the C.I.A. agents outnumber the regular political and economic officers. In a few they have made up as much as 75 per cent of the diplomatic mission.

The chief of station often has more money than the Ambassador. Sometimes he has been in the country longer and is better informed than the Ambassador.

For all these reasons the host government, especially in underdeveloped areas of the world, may prefer to deal with the chief of station rather than the Ambassador, because he is more likely to have readier access to policy-making officials in Washington.

Top Quality People Obviously the number of agents abroad is a closely held secret, but from even such close Presidential advisers in the past as the historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. in his book "A Thousand Days," Mr. Schlesinger states that those "political cover overseas" number almost as many as State Department employees.

The actual number, however, is believed to be considerably less, probably around 2,000. The secrecy of identification can lead to some amusing situations. One when Alan Dulles, then C.I.A. director, visited New Delhi, ever known "spook" (C.I.A. man) was set up in an anteroom of the embassy to greet him. At that moment a newspaper correspondent was engaged in deep-cover operations, many of whom are ex-military people or men formerly in the Office of Strategic Services of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

It has been said, however, that many of the agents who are essentially informed had outstripped the State Department.

Almost without exception, in action.

correspondents of The New York Times reported that the men at the top overseas were of high competence and discipline, "extremely knowledgeable" and "generally somewhat better than those in State work and dedication."

The C.I.A. screens and registers applicants, because it is quite aware of the attraction that secrecy holds for the psychopath, the misfit and the immature person.

The greatest danger obviously lies in the area of special operations. Although it is generally agreed that the C.I.A. — overt and covert — have been for the most part men of competence and character, the C.I.A. has also permitted some limited intelligence and operations capability to get through its screen and has even assigned them to sensitive posts, with disastrous results. One example was the assignment of a man known as "Frank Bender" as contact with Cuban exile leaders during the preparation of the Bay of Pigs operation. A German refugee with only a smattering of Spanish and no understanding of Latin America or Latin character, Bender antagonized the more liberal of the leaders by his bullying and his obvious partiality for the Cuban right.

At one time these field offices sought out scholars, businessmen, students and even ordinary tourists whom they took to be planning to be behind the Iron Curtain and asked them to record their observations and report to the C.I.A. Very little of this ascertained is done any more, probably because of some embarrassing arrests and imprisonment of tourists and the fact that the C.I.A. deals frankly with businessmen. It repeatedly does not compromise with their traveling representatives.

Most of the work of domestic field offices involves contact with industry and universities. For example, an agent, on inspection of a factory, will seek evaluation of captured equipment, analysis of the color of the sky, or the production capacity from the size of a factory, or the content of articles in technical and scientific journals.

The Human Inadequacy In greater secrecy, the C.I.A. subsidizes, in whole or in part, a wide range of enterprises — "private" foundations, book and magazine publishers, schools of international studies in universities, law offices, "business" of various kinds and foreign broadcasting stations. Some of these perform real and valuable work for the C.I.A. Others are not much more than "mail drops."

Yet all these human activities, all the value received and the dangers surmounted, all the trouble averted and all the setbacks endured, do not describe the work of the C.I.A. For the most gifted of analysts, the most carefully chosen of agents — like all human beings — have their limitations.

Men are fallible and limited, and the demands on the C.I.A. are almost infinite; that is why, today, some of the most valuable spies are not human and some of the most omnipotent agents hunt through the heavens, and above.

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How C.I.A. Put an 'Instant Air Force' Into Congo, to Carry Out United States Policy

How C.I.A. Put 'Instant Air Force' Into Congo

Intervention, Invasion, Spying All in a Day's Work

Following is the second of five articles on the Central Intelligence Agency. The articles are by a team of New York Times correspondents consisting of Tom Wicker, John W. Finney, Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy and other members of The Times staff.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 25—

At the Ituri River, eight miles south of Nia Nia in the north-east Congo, a government column of 600 Congolese troops and 100 white mercenaries had been ambushed by a rebel force and was under heavy fire. Suddenly, three B-26's skimmed in over the rain forest and bombed and strafed a path through the rebel ranks for the forces supported by the United States.

At the controls of the American-made planes were anti-Castro Cubans, veterans of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, three years before. They had been recruited by a purportedly private company in Florida. Servicing their planes were European mechanics solicited through advertisements in London newspapers. Guiding them into action were American "diplomats" and other officials in apparently civilian positions.

The sponsor, paymaster and director of all of them, however, was the Central Intelligence Agency, with headquarters in

Langley, Va. Its rapid and effective provision of an "instant air force" in the Congo was the climax of the agency's deep involvement there.

The C.I.A.'s operation in the Congo was at all times responsible to and welcomed by the policy-makers of the United States.

It was these policy-makers who chose to make the agency the instrument of political and military intervention in another nation's affairs, for in five years of strenuous diplomatic effort it was only in Langley that the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon found the peculiar combination of talents necessary to block the creation of a pro-Communist regime, recruit the leaders for a pro-American government and supply the advice and support to enable that government to survive.

From wire-tapping to influencing elections, from bridge-blowing to armed invasions, in the dark and in the light, the Central Intelligence Agency has become a vital instrument of American policy and a major component of American government.

It not only gathers information but also rebuts an adversary's information. It not only organizes its own far-flung operations but also re-

sists an adversary's operation.

Against the Soviet Union alone, it performs not only certain of the services performed in Moscow by the K.G.B., the Committee for State Security, but also many of the political, intelligence and military services performed by pro-Soviet Communist parties around the world.

When the Communist and Western worlds began to wrestle for control of the vast, undeveloped Congo in 1960 after it had gained independence from Belgium, a modest little C.I.A. office in Leopoldville mushroomed overnight into a virtual embassy and miniature war department.

This was not to compete with the real United States Embassy and military attachés but to apply the secret, or at least discreet, capacities of the C.I.A. to a seething contest among many conflicting forces.

Starting almost from scratch, because the Belgians had forbidden Americans even to meet with Congolese officials, the C.I.A. dispersed its agents to learn Congolese politics from the bush on up, to recruit likely leaders and to finance their bids for power.

Capable of quickly gathering information from all sources, of buying informants and disburs-

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