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No. 92

House of Representatives

HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS

The House met at 11 o'clock a.m.
The Chaplain, Rev. Edward G. Latch, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Abide in Me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine; no more can ye, except ye abide in Me.—John 15: 4.

Spirit of God, pressed by the insistent demands of public duty and pursued by the details of daily routine, we are glad for this quiet moment of prayer when in all reverence of mind and heart we may kneel at the altar of Thy presence and find that in Thee our souls are restored, our strength renewed, and our faith takes on new life.

We, the Members of this body, conscious of our responsibilities as the leaders of this great Republic, unite in praying for Thy guidance as we faithfully endeavor to do our best for our people and what is right in Thy sight. Give to these Representatives the will to work together for the good of our Nation and for the benefit of all our people.

Grant unto them and to all of us the spirit to resist the pressure of selfish appeals, and to our people may there come the insight to realize that sacrifices must be made by all and that there is no substitute for honest labor and genuine faith. In the midst of a changing world abide with us and hold us steady now and always. In the Master's name we pray. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Arrington, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed, with amendments in which the concurrence of the House is requested, a bill of the House of the following title:

H.R. 5424. An act to authorize appropriations for procurement of vessels and aircraft and construction of shore and offshore establishments for the Coast Guard.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed bills, joint and concurrent resolutions of the following titles,

in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 1281. An act to authorize the appropriation of funds to carry out the activities of the Federal Field Committee for Development Planning in Alaska;

S. 1566. An act to amend sections 3 and 4 of the act approved September 22, 1964 (78 Stat. 990), providing for an investigation and study to determine a site for the construction of a sea-level canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans;

S.J. Res. 88. Joint resolution authorizing the operation of an amateur radio station by participants in the XII World Boy Scout Jamboree at Farragut State Park, Idaho, August 1 through August 9, 1967; and

S. Con. Res. 30. Concurrent resolution to print a report entitled "Mineral and Water Resources of Alaska."

CORRECTION OF VOTE

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 97 I am recorded as not voting. I was present and I voted "yea." I ask unanimous consent that the permanent RECORD and Journal be corrected accordingly.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

A call of the House was ordered.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 132]

Abbutt	Fascell	Purcell
Arends	Fino	Riegler
Ashley	Frelinghuysen	Ronan
Aspinall	Fuqua	Ruppe
Ayres	Gubser	Satterfield
Brown, Calif.	Hanna	St Germain
Brown, Mich.	Herlong	St. Onge
Celler	Hosmer	Smith, N.Y.
Clark	Jones, Mo.	Sullivan
Collier	Kelly	Talcott
Conyers	Kupferman	Thompson, N.J.
Corman	McEwen	Widnall
Dawson	Mathias, Md.	Williams, Miss.
Dingell	Moorhead	Willis
Dow	O'Neal, Ga.	Young
Eilberg	Pelly	Younger

The SPEAKER. On this rollcall 381 Members have answered to their names, a quorum.

By unanimous consent, further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION

Mrs. GREEN of Oregon. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Special Subcommittee on Education be allowed to sit this afternoon.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Oregon?

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I object.
The SPEAKER. Objection is heard.

PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE ON RULES TO FILE PRIVILEGED REPORTS

Mr. COLMER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Rules may have until midnight tonight to file certain privileged reports.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Mississippi?

There was no objection.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS, 1968

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 10738) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, and for other purposes; and pending that motion, Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that general debate be limited to 4 hours, the time to be equally divided and controlled by the gentleman from California [Mr. LIPSCOMB] and myself.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Texas.

The motion was agreed to.

H 7061

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill H.R. 10738, with Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill. By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the unanimous-consent agreement, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON] will be recognized for 2 hours and the gentleman from California [Mr. LIPSCOMB] will be recognized for 2 hours. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, this is a rather memorable day in the history of the Congress and in our service in the Congress in that the bill being presented for the consideration of the Committee today is the largest single appropriation bill ever presented to the Congress.

Mr. Chairman, this means that this is the largest single appropriation request ever presented to any legislative body in the history of the world.

Back in World War II, the War Department appropriation bill for fiscal year 1944 carried funds in the sum of \$59 billion.

Then, just before the outbreak of the war in Korea, we had all of the appropriation bills lumped into one package. It was a single-package appropriation bill. That bill provided funds to cover all of the departments and agencies of Government, including the Department of Defense, but even it carried an amount of less than \$34 billion. So, by any comparison, we are undertaking today to deal with astronomical sums heretofore unmatched which involve the fortunes and the destiny of our country—and for that matter, the world—not to mention the impact which the expenditure of these funds will have upon our own domestic economy.

OVERALL APPROPRIATIONS SUMMARY FOR THE SESSION

Now, Mr. Chairman, it is my opinion that this is a good time to level with everyone on such questions as when we will adjourn, a matter over which many of us have no special control, and on what we have done appropriationwise to date.

We have already considered and passed through the House of Representatives at this session 10 bills from the Committee on Appropriations. This bill, if passed, will make the 11th appropriation bill passed by the House of Representatives during this session.

Mr. Chairman, with the passage of this bill, we will have acted upon \$126.9 billion of the President's budget requests for appropriations. We will have acted upon about 85 percent of the requests for appropriations which we will probably be asked to act upon this year, and we may be prone to feel that we are sail-

ing along pretty well toward an early adjournment. However, if we should indulge that fond hope, we would probably be in error and headed for disappointment, because the Committee on Appropriations, after the passage of this bill, must come to a screeching halt with respect to the five remaining bills scheduled for enactment at this session. Even though this is the 13th day of the sixth month of the year, and only 17 more days remain before the new fiscal year begins, the Congress has not enacted the necessary authorizations for the five remaining appropriation bills.

For the reasons we stated we cannot move with expedition until we have authorizations for such things as Coast Guard procurement, the poverty program, military construction, foreign aid, the atomic energy program, the space program, and a number of others. So, this is about the end of the road—we are at a pause—until we get the necessary legislative authorizations. The next bill will have to come after the next fiscal year begins. I would add that our appropriations hearing on the unfinished bills have largely been completed, except for the closing supplemental bill.

The five remaining bills will cover some \$20.9 billion of known budget requests plus any last minute supplements.

I am not critical over the lack of authorizations because I realize we need to give very close attention to all of these authorizations.

To see the aggregate picture, we would have to add to the \$126.9 billion which we will have acted upon when we pass this measure, and the \$20.9 billion-plus remaining—about \$15.2 billion which is automatic because these sums represent so-called permanent appropriations which include principally the interest on the national debt. For the entire session, the budget requests for appropriations will total about \$163,000,000,000, more or less.

Mr. Chairman, I wanted to make these preliminary remarks in connection with the whole fiscal picture. Appropriate figures will be put in the RECORD in more detail.

There are those who have said that there is no way to keep up with the appropriations business. There are ways, and one way is to note carefully the information which is being printed from time to time in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. I cite the RECORD for today, and for March 23, May 25, and June 5. There will be other reports on the status of the appropriations business in the coming weeks and months.

For example, I am going to write every Member of the House, a letter again this week and give some of these basic facts in order that we may all work together, I hope, in a continued, concerted effort to hold the line on spending, at least to bring the appropriations down to as low a level as may be reasonably possible.

For the forthcoming fiscal year 1968, the tentative administrative budget deficit projection in January was \$8.1 billion—resting, however, as always, on a number of legislative actions. That projection was recently revised upward by the executive branch to \$11.1 billion, an increase of \$3 billion. The revenue projection was lowered by \$1.5 billion; estimated expenditures were elevated by \$1.5 billion.

As to the tentative character of the projected deficit for fiscal 1968, I pointed out on the House floor on January 24—the day the President's new budget was submitted—that even if only a handful of selected budget assumptions and contingencies did not materialize, the administrative budget deficit for 1968 could go as high as \$18.3 billion, and supplied the details in tabular form. And in a letter to all Members of the House on March 14, I said:

Even the \$8.1 billion deficit for fiscal 1968 hinges significantly on Congress enacting the 6 percent surtax proposal, a postage increase, an acceleration of corporate tax collections, and approval of \$5 billion of participation certificates. The proposed pay increase is in the budget at \$1 billion. If just this series of actions is not approved by Congress, for instance, the estimated deficit would be \$18.3 billion!

This is not the time to discuss whether there should be a tax increase. But these shifts in the budget outlook, joined with the contingencies and uncertainties still surrounding the revised \$11.1 billion budget deficit figure, have evoked estimates of an administrative budget deficit upward of \$24 to \$29 billions in fiscal 1968. This alone should compel us to greater prudence in conference dealings, in considering the \$20 billion, plus in budget requests remaining to be voted on, and in voting on all legislative authorizations.

With this defense bill today, we will have reduced the President's January budget by \$3,039,000,000. This is considerably better than was done last year. It is considerably better than was done the year before. Maybe it is not good enough, but the bills which have passed have passed almost by a unanimous vote. So I assume that generally the will of the Congress has been accomplished in making the \$3 billion reduction.

We do not know what the other body will do. Out of the 11 appropriation bills, it has acted on, I believe, four, it is impossible to tell what the final outcome will be on appropriations at this session. There must be a meeting of the minds on the part of both bodies, the House and the Senate. We hope we may increase the level of reductions in the forthcoming bills.

Mr. Chairman, under leave granted, I include a summarization of the totals of the appropriations bills to date:

June 13, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 7063

Summary of action on budget estimates of appropriations in appropriation bills, 90th Cong., 1st sess., as of June 13, 1967

[Does not include any "back-door" type appropriations, or permanent appropriations¹ under previous legislation. Does include indefinite appropriations carried in annual appropriation bills]

	All figures are rounded amounts		
	Bills for fiscal 1967	Bills for fiscal 1968	Bills for the session
A. House actions:			
1. Budget requests for appropriations considered.....	\$14,411,000,000	2. \$112,477,000,000	\$126,888,000,000
2. Amounts in 11 bills passed by House.....	14,238,000,000	2. \$109,611,000,000	123,849,000,000
3. Change from corresponding budget requests.....	-173,000,000	-2,866,000,000	-3,039,000,000
B. Senate actions:			
1. Budget requests for appropriations considered.....	14,533,000,000	9,073,000,000	23,606,000,000
2. Amounts in 4 bills passed by Senate.....	14,457,000,000	8,954,000,000	23,411,000,000
3. Change from corresponding budget requests.....	-76,000,000	-119,000,000	-195,000,000
4. Compared with House amounts in these 4 bills.....	+219,000,000	+90,000,000	+309,000,000
C. Final actions:			
1. Budget requests for appropriations considered.....	14,533,000,000	1,458,000,000	15,991,000,000
2. Amounts approved in 3 bills enacted.....	14,394,000,000	1,383,000,000	15,777,000,000
3. Comparison with corresponding budget requests.....	-139,000,000	-75,000,000	-214,000,000

¹ Permanent appropriations were tentatively estimated in January budget at about \$15,212,066,000 for fiscal year 1968.
² Includes advance funding for fiscal 1969 for urban renewal and mass transit grants (budget, \$980,000,000; House, \$925,000,000).
³ And participation sales authorizations as follows: Total authorizations requested in budget, \$4,300,000,000; total in House bills, \$1,946,000,000.

I would like now if I may, Mr. Chairman, to turn to a discussion of this huge measure which is before us. The late Clarence Cannon, longtime chairman of the Appropriations Committee, looked with a great deal of disfavor upon a practice that has grown up in committees when the members arise and heap praise upon the members of the committee in control of the bill or of the subcommittee, including eloquent praise of the staff. This is not supposed to occur in well-ordered committees, but since this bill is so big, I believe a few encomiums would be permitted if I can be brief.

DEFENSE APPROPRIATION BILL, FISCAL YEAR 1968

I would say that no committee of the Congress is, in a general way, much stronger than its staff, and I challenge any committee to produce a better staff than we have on the Committee on Appropriations. It is not large, but I believe it is better to have a good, professional, experienced staff than to have a large staff overflowing almost into the corridors who may be tempted to engage in make-work activities.

I would say further than the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SIKES], who is the ranking majority member of the Defense Subcommittee, has been especially helpful. He has often presided when I have been at other subcommittee hearings.

The gentleman from California [Mr. LIPSCOMB] has distinguished himself on the minority side as a man of great stature, industry, and ability.

I pay these special compliments to these two gentlemen—and I withhold nothing from other members of the subcommittee who have been likewise faithful in the performance of their duties.

We have heard of a credibility gap and maybe I just created one here in these words of praise but I think not.

It was said that we were not given the truth last year as to defense appropriation requirements and spending. Well, this issue has been greatly exaggerated and overstated.

In the defense bill last year, we were told early in the session that the financial planning assumptions upon which the budget was based last year presumed that the war would end before June 30, 1967. Nobody thought that it would actually end at that time. But the conflict was escalating rapidly and it was difficult to calculate with precision the exact requirements. We were told that other requests would be made to us, but that they could not and would not be presented until a later date when more precise requirements would be known.

This situation brought on a lot of controversy and argument. But we were told generally what the facts were. Besides that, we knew them from our own analyses and we did not need to be told of the situation.

But the budget this year for defense is based upon entirely different financial planning assumptions and the complaints applied to the 1967 defense budget cannot be applied to the 1968 defense budget which is before us.

The January defense budget which is before us assumes that the war in Vietnam will continue throughout the fiscal year 1968 and into fiscal year 1969.

So this budget may be adequate—although I admit I doubt it—but my doubts do not arise because of any fear of misrepresentations having been made to the Congress. I just have the feeling that as the result of the progress, or the lack of progress, being made in the war in Vietnam costs will go beyond those which were calculated in the January budget.

The January budget is predicated upon having fewer than 500,000 men in Vietnam during fiscal 1968. There are indications that we may require more than 500,000 men. Therefore, I say there is considerable likelihood that additional funds may be required later in the year.

Anyone who wishes to read the material available knows this. It has already been made clear in testimony before congressional committees including the Appropriations Committee.

There is another factor here. If you calculate from the Treasury Department statements, the spending for defense—and I mean the whole Department of Defense—it will be observed that the spending rate in March and April was higher than that which was estimated in the budget.

In 1 month it was \$300 million higher. Whether it will continue that way, it is impossible to predict.

We may have a supplemental request later in the fiscal year, but it will not be because of any lack of forthrightness on the part of the President and the Secretary of Defense and the administration generally.

So I did feel it proper to make these contrasts between the bases of the budget for the fiscal year 1967 and fiscal year 1968.

BASIS OF COMMITTEE ACTION

Now you may ask "Why in Heaven's name is a reduction in the defense budget being recommended in this bill in the sum of \$1.2 billion at a time when costs may be greater and at a time when we are engaged in a war?"

This, I think, is a pertinent question and requires discussion at this time.

I would say to the House that in previous years we have often said, "You have overfunded certain programs. We are going to reduce a certain activity by a certain number of dollars, but since we know you are going to need this money in the same general area for other programs which we think are underfinanced, we are going to leave this money in the bill."

This year we decided that this approach would tend to cause less control over funds. We provided funds based upon our analysis of the justifications presented. If additional funds are needed for some escalation of the war beyond that which is anticipated in the budget, the Defense Department can come and ask us for more money.

If you will get a copy of the report and turn to page 2, you will find that the total budget request is \$71.5 billion and the total amount recommended in the bill is \$70.3 billion.

You will also note that while this is the largest bill ever considered by this Government as a single appropriation bill, it is only \$65.5 million above the total appropriation for similar purposes for the current fiscal year. The total appropriation for fiscal 1967 was made in several bills: the regular appropriation bill, the defense supplemental bill, and the increased pay costs in the second supplemental. So this is not a great addition to the amounts provided for the current fiscal year.

If you have time to read three pages in this report, I recommend reading page 3, which discusses the committee approach to the bill, a portion of page 3 and page 4 which discuss the scope of the bill.

When we discuss the scope of this bill, we find that the committee added in this bill \$404 million above the budget, funds not requested but generally opposed by the administration.

The pages referred to follow:

H 7064

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

June 13, 1967

COMMITTEE APPROACH TO THE BILL

The budget request before the Committee totals \$71.6 billion. The estimated carryover of unexpended funds on July 1, 1967, is \$43.7 billion. The sum of the carryover funds and the \$70.3 billion recommended in the bill equals \$114 billion.

In its review of the budget, the Committee determined that in some instances funds were requested for purposes which, in the judgment of the Committee, did not require appropriations at this time. Such funds are deleted from the bill.

The Committee found that, in some instances, funds requested in the budget were not needed for the purposes requested. These funds have also been deleted. This appears to be the most logical approach to a Defense budget at this time.

Although considerable sums are involved in the total recommended reductions, and world developments may create the requirements for substantial funds in addition to those recommended, it did not seem appropriate to provide such sums in the bill as "blank check" amounts to be used for purposes which had not been justified before the Committee or discussed by Defense witnesses.

The Committee is, however, of the opinion that funds over and beyond those carried over from previous years, and those included in the pending bill, will probably be required for fiscal year 1968. The tempo and cost of the war in Southeast Asia are on an upward trend. The costs of wars can never be projected precisely. The actions of the opponent weigh heavily on such matters. No decision has been made to increase military manpower above those strengths provided for in the estimates. Rates of consumption of ammunition, aircraft loss rates, and so forth, are based on the latest data available at the time of budget submission. If additional amounts are subsequently requested, they will of course be given a high priority.

The action of the Committee is based upon the budget request before it; efforts have not been made to anticipate the effect of future world events on Defense needs. The highly dangerous situation in the Middle East emphasizes the absolute requirement for the continuation of a high level of military strength which the accompanying bill seeks to assure.

Emergency funds and other fiscal authority granted to the Department provide flexibility to meet unbudgeted and unanticipated events, and to permit both the Executive and Legislative Branches the time to react to such events.

The reductions recommended by the Committee will not hamper the war effort in Southeast Asia. They are made in programs not directly related to the prosecution of the war. The Defense Department estimates that of the \$71.6 billion of new funds in the budget about \$20.3 billion will be required for the war and about \$51.3 billion will be required for Department of Defense efforts in other programs. This compares with the \$70.2 billion appropriated for fiscal year 1967 of which the Department estimates about \$21.3 billion will be required for the war in Vietnam.

SCOPE OF THE BILL

The budget estimates for fiscal year 1968, for the military functions covered by this bill, total \$71,584,000,000, including a proposed \$30,000,000 annual indefinite amount. The accompanying bill provides for appropriations of \$70,295,200,000, a decrease of \$1,288,800,000 below the estimate. Appropriations for fiscal year 1967, including the Supplemental Defense Appropriation Act, 1967, and applicable amounts of the Second Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1967, total \$70,229,622,000. The amounts recommended in the bill for 1968 are, in the aggregate, an increase of \$65,578,000 above the appropriations for 1967.

Of the reductions recommended by the

Committee, \$467.7 million was made mandatory by the exclusion from the authorizing legislation of \$301.1 million for fast deployment logistics ships and \$166.6 million for conventional destroyers. Other reductions are related to program changes occurring since the budget was formulated as, for example, a slow down in the F-111B aircraft program occasioned in part by the crash of one of the test aircraft.

It should be pointed out that the net reduction of \$1,288,800,000 consists of overall reductions of nearly \$1.7 billion offset by increases of slightly over \$0.4 billion. The increases stem from the funding of certain procurement and research and development items authorized by Congress over and above the budget, and from the Committee position that certain military capabilities should not be permitted to be reduced during the forthcoming fiscal year.

Each of the items and its relation to the previous general discussion will be covered in more detail later on in this report.

A summary of additions and decreases follows:

[In millions]	
Additions:	
Continuation of B-52 strength.....	\$11.9
Continuation of Air Force Reserve Components airlift capability:	
appropriation increase.....	12.1
(Within available funds) -	(14.4)
EA-NA aircraft.....	106.7
A-6A modifications (within available funds).....	(30.0)
DLG(N), full funding on nuclear power guided missile frigate.....	114.8
DLG(N), advance procurement.....	20.0
C-130 airlift aircraft.....	60.0
C-7 Caribou aircraft.....	12.5
CX-2 aeromedical evacuation aircraft.....	16.0
Aircraft modification in support of Southeast Asia future requirements.....	25.0
ASW—(fund highest priority items within available funds) -	(33.0)
AMSA—in support of authorized program.....	25.0
Total, appropriations recommended above budget.....	404.0
Decreases:	
Fast deployment logistic ships, failed of authorization.....	301.1
Conventional destroyers, failed of authorization.....	166.6
Recoupments of excessive unobligated balances.....	251.0
Civilian employment.....	136.0
Multi-service aircraft, support procurement.....	125.0
F-11B program stretch-out.....	78.2
Technical manuals and data.....	75.0
Tactical and support vehicles, including autos.....	55.8
Resources management system.....	52.7
Commercial airlift rates (new CAB authorized).....	48.9
AID/DOD realignment of S.E. Asia functions.....	47.4
Contract termination charges funding policy on.....	46.9
Permanent change of station travel (Army).....	44.0
Revised ship conversion program.....	42.1
Research, and Federal Contract Research Centers.....	22.8
Management studies, and studies & analyses.....	22.4
Support of Eastern Test Range.....	15.0
Army overcoat material.....	14.6
Boards of Civil Service Examiners.....	8.9
All others.....	138.4
Total reductions in appropriations below budget.....	1,692.8

CONTINUATION OF B-52 BOMBER STRENGTH

The additional funds were provided for the following purposes: For a continuation of B-52 strength equivalent to three squadrons. Forty-five planes were scheduled for elimination from the fleet late in the year, for the continuation of which we provided \$11.9 million.

RESERVE AIRLIFT CAPABILITY

For a continuation of the Air Force Reserve components airlift capability, we provided \$12.1 million to keep eight Reserve units and three National Guard units in operation.

We added these funds because at this troubled time of war in the Far East and the threat of war in other areas of the world, including the Middle East, we did not think we ought to deprive ourselves of B-52 strength or airlift strength. So we took this action.

ADDITIONAL EAGA AIRCRAFT

We provided \$106 million for certain aircraft, for the use of the Marines in Southeast Asia, as to which, I believe, no one could complain.

COST OF WAR IN VIETNAM

I would point out that in the bill before us about \$20 billion is scheduled for the cost of the war in Vietnam and about \$51 billion is for the overall cost of operating the Defense Department.

We did not make reductions which we felt would impinge in any significant way upon our war effort in Vietnam. The reductions made would not have direct application to the war in Vietnam.

We provided, above the budget, for the modification of certain types of aircraft required in Vietnam.

NUCLEAR PROPULSION FOR SURFACE NAVAL VESSELS

We provided for additional ships for the nuclear Navy. With the passage of this bill we will have provided for the Navy 111 ships which have nuclear propulsion.

I will not go into detail on that. The funds are given in detail in the report.

I see the gentleman from South Carolina standing, the eminent and able and articulate chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services. He had the audacity to walk by me, as I spoke earlier, and in reference to my statement that I challenged any committee to produce a better staff than we have on the Appropriations Committee, he said very boldly but in a low tone, "I challenge you."

I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RIVERS. I thank the gentleman. What I said, Mr. Chairman, was that I accepted the gentleman's challenge about staff, as the gentleman knows.

Mr. MAHON. That is correct.

Mr. RIVERS. I just wanted to be certain. I do agree with the chairman, that he does have one of the finest staffs.

Mr. MAHON. We do, and the other committees, including the Armed Services Committee, have able staffs. The staffs of the various committees are very important to the welfare and work of the Government.

Mr. RIVERS. I believe the gentleman has a magnificent staff. There is no question about that.

I want to ask the gentleman about nuclear propulsion for ships. Do we prop-

June 13, 1967

H 7065

erly take care of the nuclear propulsion for surface ships? What about the two DLGN's which our committee inserted to give this country surface nuclear propulsion?

Mr. MAHON. We agreed with the gentleman's committee as to the requirement for nuclear powered guided missile frigates. With respect to these nuclear frigates, we fully fund one, and we provide \$20 million for long leadtime items for the other, which in the judgment of the committee will in no way defer or delay these important ships.

Mr. RIVERS. What does that mean in terms of numbers of ships? Last year we funded one, this year we have funded another. That makes two. Then the gentleman appropriates for long leadtime items for one more ship? Is that correct?

Mr. MAHON. That is what we have done.

Mr. RIVERS. So the gentleman's committee has satisfied the authorization?

Mr. MAHON. Yes; we have in that we have fully funded one nuclear powered frigate and provided for long-lead-time procurements for another. This will provide for an orderly procurement program. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. RIVERS. Two ships including one with long leadtime items. I want the Congress to understand that we have now four of the nuclear surface ships. Four is all we possess. This will give us six, and with long leadtime items for one more. The strongest nation on earth will have only the capacity for seven surface nuclear ships. This is so ridiculous that it is ridiculous. It is so disgraceful that it is disgraceful.

Mr. MAHON. There is considerable controversy between the executive and the legislative branches as to the nuclear powered ships, but we have funded in whole or part, all of those authorized.

PROCUREMENT OF ADDITIONAL AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT

Now, in this bill, in addition to the nuclear ships about which we have had colloquy, there are funds provided above the budget for additional airlift aircraft, the C-130 airlift aircraft; and \$12.5 million for the C-7 Caribou aircraft. We have provided for additional aeromedical evacuation aircraft.

We provided \$25 million above the budget for development of a new long-range bomber, the followon to the B-52 called AMSA.

REDUCTIONS BELOW THE BUDGET ESTIMATES

Now, as to the decreases, and I will only cover them very rapidly here they are detailed in the table I inserted earlier, \$467.7 million in decreases results from the failure of authorization. That includes funds requested for conventional destroyers and for fast deployment logistic ships. They were eliminated from our consideration for lack of authorization.

Then we reduced certain funds because we thought that some of the programs were overfunded—not that we were against the programs, but we thought they were overfunded.

I would remind my colleagues, if anyone thinks we have been niggardly in this bill—which we have not—that if we pass this bill and it becomes the law, the

Department of Defense will have available to it for the next fiscal year the total sum of \$114 billion for the functions covered by the bill. That is the sum of \$43.7 billion in carryover funds and the \$70.3 billion in funds carried in this bill.

We made a reduction in the F-111B program, the Navy version of the F-111, in the sum of about \$78 million. We did it in large measure because test aircraft No. 4 crashed, and this delayed the program. Instead of funding 20 of these Navy planes as requested, we would fund 12 in this bill.

We made some reductions in various programs otherwise, some on permanent change of station travel, some on research and development, and some on the support of the Eastern Test Range, and on other matters.

We made total reductions in the amount of \$1,692.8 million, and we made increases in the amount of \$404 million, making a total decrease in the budget estimates of \$1.3 billion, as shown in the excerpts from the report which have been inserted in these remarks.

CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES

I believe it would be well to talk a bit about civilian employees. There was a request for approximately 50,000 additional civilian employees. About 17,000 plus were requested as substitutes for military personnel needed in Vietnam and elsewhere. The others were for general utilization in the Department of Defense.

We made a reduction of 1,150 employees from the budget estimates.

ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM

I should mention the antiballistic missile program, which is the most expensive program, in many ways, confronting the Nation within the Defense Department. Prior to this year, we had appropriated \$4 billion for research and development on ABM systems, including the Nike X, the Nike Zeus, or any concept involved in defense against the ballistic missile. Last year, we provided \$600 million for the ABM. This year we are providing in this bill something over \$700 million. In the military construction bill other funds will be considered.

We have provided the amount of the budget estimate for the ABM, except for \$11 million. We made a reduction of \$11 million in the ABM program because witnesses testified, upon inquiry, that there was \$11 million which could not be used during fiscal year 1968 as a result of the fact that no final decision had been made toward deployment of the ABM system.

I should like to make reference to the fact that some complain there is no declaration of war between the United States and North Vietnam. There are several philosophical positions on this subject. Probably the course which we are following gives us more flexibility, and it is more adaptable to the requirements.

But I would say that the passage of this bill today will unequivocally establish the fact, in my judgment, that the House of Representatives is in support of the war effort in Southeast Asia, because if we vote for this bill we will vote for approximately \$20 billion to carry on the war. I would estimate that prob-

ably 99 percent of the Members of the House will vote for the bill. The world should interpret this, friend and foe alike, as an evidence that the elected Representatives of the people in the House of Representatives are in support of the prosecution of the war for freedom in Southeast Asia.

I would say further that in previous bills, most recently in the supplemental bill for Vietnam of \$12 billion, we have expressed our support of the war effort. It is not that we are entirely happy with the progress of the war, or all of the tactics being followed, but we are in support of the overall objectives of the nation.

I think, then, unless there are some special questions, this is about as much as need be said at this opening of the debate on this bill.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I think that the committee ought to be commended for having rejected the demands for a most substantial increase in civilian personnel. I think the committee should also be commended for taking note of the overlapping and duplication of certain training of civilian employees. Whatever else I may have to say about the action of the committee, I do want to commend them in regard to those things about which I have just spoken.

Mr. MAHON. I thank the gentleman for those comments.

Mr. GROSS. May I ask the gentleman this question: I do not want to go over a lot of figures. The gentleman read them off rather rapidly. Some of them are astronomical. But do I understand now that the total bill this year, when everything is totaled up, will be somewhere in the neighborhood of \$163 billion, or was it \$141 billion that the gentleman gave?

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman now is not discussing defense only but the overall budget?

Mr. GROSS. The overall budget. I should make that plain.

Mr. MAHON. The \$163 billion figure is the probable, or now indicated overall total budget estimate of appropriations for the year, including the fiscal 1967 supplementals of some \$14.4 billion which we have already had. These, of course, included the \$12 billion plus for Vietnam, and the total also includes some \$15.2 billion of so-called permanent appropriations—mainly interest on the debt—that must be counted in the totals but which will not come before us for a vote.

Mr. GROSS. So the funds that carry over from the two supplementals already approved in this session of Congress are taken into consideration in the figure that the gentleman gave us with respect to this bill, or are they excluded?

Mr. MAHON. The defense portion of those are included in the total defense expenditures. They are not included in the \$70.3 billion.

Mr. GROSS. They are not included in this bill?

H 7066

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

June 13, 1967

Mr. MAHON. No.

Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman.

I have one other question. Can the gentleman give us an estimate of the monthly cost of the war in Vietnam as of this time?

Mr. MAHON. I would say that if you would divide 12 into about \$21 billion, you would have something in that general area.

Mr. GROSS. I was under the impression some time ago that the total rate of spending in Vietnam for the conduct of the war was some \$2 billion a month. Somewhere I seem to recall a figure of between \$4 billion and \$5 billion which was expended in the war in the month of March. I can understand in some months there could be an increase.

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman knows that even with all of the computers in the Government, it is impossible for anyone to determine just what spending should be assigned to Vietnam in every case and what should be assigned generally to the overall defense program of the country.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. SIKES. I think it would be helpful to point out in connection with the cost of approximately \$25 billion in the last fiscal year there were some one-time build-up costs and construction costs that will not have to be repeated during the current fiscal year. Hopefully this year the cost may be less.

Mr. GROSS. I see. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, at the outset I would like to join the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations and the chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense in commending the work of our staff and the other committee members with whom I serve.

Mr. Chairman, the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON], chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, has presented to the members of the committee an excellent report on the bill.

Mr. Chairman, the bill before the House of Representatives today, H.R. 10738, will provide appropriations of new obligational authority in the amount of \$70,295,200,000 for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1968. This bill provides appropriations for the regular military functions, including our Nation's military assistance related to the conflict in Southeast Asia. The bill does not provide for other military assistance, military construction, military family housing, or civil defense. These other requirements are considered in other appropriation bills.

The fiscal year 1968 defense budget request as submitted to the Congress by the President was \$71,584,000,000. The Appropriations Committee, after lengthy hearings and after exploring all the categories of our military programs, found it necessary to make some additions to and reductions from the President's request.

The committee total program recom-

mended additions above the budget are \$481.4 million, of which \$77.4 million will be financed from available funds making the total net appropriations above the budget \$404,000,000. The total committee reductions to the budget amount to \$1,692,800,000 for a net reduction to the President's budget request of \$1,288,800,000.

It must be emphasized that where reductions were made they will have no adverse effect on our ability to carry out our activities in Southeast Asia.

Funds are deleted when in some instances it was determined the purpose, in the committee's judgment, for which they were requested were not needed. Other reductions were made mandatory by program exclusion from the authorizing legislation and other reductions are related to program changes.

The additions to the budget were made necessary because the committee has taken the position that certain of our military capabilities should not be reduced during the coming fiscal year as recommended by the Secretary of Defense and we have added amounts for other items which were authorized and known to be needed but not requested by the Secretary of Defense.

The bill before us is of great importance in that it represents in dollars over one-half of all budgeted activities of the U.S. Government for the 12-month period beginning July 1, 1967.

Funds provided in this bill will affect directly or indirectly the daily activities of probably every American and every American institution, both public and private, in the coming 12-month period and in the period beyond.

Though it is difficult to comprehend fully the magnitude and complete significance of all aspects of this fiscal year 1968 appropriation for the Department of Defense, what can be easily comprehended is that these funds are vital and they are necessary to serve and preserve the vital interests and purposes of our Nation.

Some of the items in my opinion possibly could have been higher, others lower. But the bill represents the combined judgment as to the appropriate amount that should be provided. I support H.R. 10738 as reported by the committee.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count.

Sixty-three Members are present, not a quorum. The Clerk will call the roll.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 133]

Abbutt	Dowdy	Rallsback
Anderson,	Eckhardt	Reid, N.Y.
Tenn.	Fuqua	Resnick
Arends	Gubser	Rumsfeld
Ashley	Hays	Ruppe
Ayres	Herlong	St. Onge
Bell	Hosmer	Sisk
Carter	Howard	Smith, N.Y.
Celler	Ichord	Stelger, Ariz.
Clark	Irwin	Teague, Calif.
Conyers	Jones, Mo.	Thompson, N.J.
Corman	Kelly	Widnall
Cowger	McEwen	Williams, Miss.
Davis, Wis.	Mathias, Calif.	Willis
Diggs	Pelly	Young
Dow	Pool	Younger

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee having had under consideration the bill H.R. 10738, and finding itself without a quorum, he had directed the roll to be called, when 383 Members responded to their names, a quorum, and he submitted herewith the names of the absentees to be spread upon the Journal.

The Committee resumed its sitting.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. LIPSCOMB].

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Of immediate concern is the war in which we are engaged in Southeast Asia. Defense expenditures contained in this bill which are attributable solely to Southeast Asia operations are impossible to determine precisely. Although the administration estimated that about \$20.3 billion of the budget will be required for the war, the question properly asked: Will that be enough? The actual costs could well be running to a magnitude of \$25 to \$30 billion or more per year.

The Defense Appropriations Subcommittee has taken every opportunity to assure that every program directly related to our Southeast Asia operations is adequately funded.

Even though the Secretary of Defense at the hearings stated that the war has been adequately funded, his statements were made several months ago and it is now becoming increasingly clear that the administration may again have to come to the Congress with a defense supplemental request for fiscal year 1968. Recent statements by administration spokesmen, including the President, made after our hearings had concluded, indicate to me that the administration may have once again delayed a decision to realistically fund the war effort.

It is not appropriate to provide sums in the bill as "blank check" amounts without first having Defense witnesses justify the purposes and needs for funds. Therefore, if for any reason increased funds are needed the administration should come forward with a funding request without delay. The President and the Secretary of Defense should submit such estimated funding needs before action on this bill is completed by the Congress.

The tremendously expensive Southeast Asia military operations are having a direct, and in some instances an adverse effect, on some facets of many of the defense programs which are in the budget before us. It cannot be otherwise when one-quarter or one-third of the budget and perhaps a like amount of our military combat units are directly involved with that war. If priority programs in this budget, not related to the war, are known to be in need of funds Congress should also be informed of such needs.

I have directed these comments to the war in Southeast Asia in order to point out that although it is true that this defense budget is the largest ever proposed since World War II, the dollar figure by itself can be a dangerously misleading indicator of the degree of security it provides both for today and for the future.

June 13, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 7067

Today this Nation possesses in total the most powerful military might in the world. But we must remind ourselves of that which our enemies know well. Today our military resources may well be stretched thin and the Department of Defense should evaluate the adequacy of its resources. In this regard the testimony before the committee indicates a need for concern.

For example, General Greene, Commandant of the Marine Corps, said on March 16, 1967, in response to a question about the deployment of additional troops to Vietnam:

Our present situation is this: We have some 73,000 Marines ashore in South Vietnam today. We are unable to deploy additional troops and at the same time to maintain our rotation base and also to be ready to handle other contingency requirements, for example, in the Caribbean, Mediterranean, and Europe.

If we were to deploy additional units, which of course we could do very rapidly, in order to maintain them in the Western Pacific we would have to mobilize.

Statements such as these indicate the seriousness of the situation we face today and the need for constant attention by the Congress to military capabilities and plans.

COMMITTEE APPROACH TO THE BILL

The committee report on the Defense appropriation bill before the House today is a comprehensive document which should be read and studied carefully by every Member of Congress.

It discusses broad areas relating generally to the management and administration of the Department of Defense and the defense programs which are of concern to the committee.

One of the broad areas where reductions are recommended relates to studies and analyses. The committee is concerned about the upward trend in expenditures in the Department for studies and analyses on many nontechnical matters. Sometimes studies are contracted for which are not really needed or used. Sometimes it appears studies are resorted to as devices which delay and defer decisionmaking.

As discussed in the report, though it is recognized that there is a need for outside studies in some cases, if Federal personnel cannot operate without the help of outside studies and reports, they could be replaced with personnel who can. The committee has therefore reduced the budget request amounting to \$22.4 million for management studies and studies and analyses.

The committee also deleted funds for the so-called resources management system. This action, again, was taken only after the matter was thoroughly studied, weighed, and evaluated. While it is perhaps true that significant changes should be made in the budgeting and accounting system of the Department, it was the considered opinion of the committee that placing this system into effect as planned could bring about massive change which to some extent would temporarily diminish congressional control. Also it could produce inflexibility of program struc-

ture. As pointed out in the report, the Department could perhaps conduct more extensive tests than those already conducted to determine the merits and feasibility of the program. The report indicates that the committee would not object to further testing of a new system provided the breadth of the test does not exceed one major command per military service. The budget reduction pertaining to the resources management system in the bill amounts to \$52.7 million.

The committee also took note of potential problems in the area of fiscal management relating to carryover funds for various items of procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation. Funds for such projects generally are made available until expended because often the timing on such items is not known or there are other uncertainties or complications. This is certainly understood. But this also means that unexpended funds carried over can and do accumulate. As stated in the report the accumulation and continuation of large unobligated balances is an indication of poor management and could threaten congressional control of the appropriation process.

The committee has emphasized that a constant review must be maintained and funds recouped where no longer needed for their original purposes. Reductions have been made in various accounts totalling \$251 million because of the committee's assessment as to the availability of accumulated funds that can be recouped in lieu of new appropriations.

The number of civilian employees in the Department of Defense has been increasing sharply. The increase is out of proportion to the demands placed upon the services by Southeast Asia operations in the opinion of the committee. The bill therefore contains significant reductions in the funds requested for new personnel. For fiscal years 1967 and 1968 the average increase in civilian personnel in the Defense Department is 171,905. Of this 75,000 are related to the civilian-military substitution programs, under which certain positions staffed by military personnel are being filled by civilians. The remainder, however, about 96,400, are new positions. The Department estimates that of the total amount an increase of 49,439 is for fiscal 1968. The bill recommends an overall reduction of 18,150 civilian positions, which represents a reduction of 36.7 percent of the increase requested for fiscal year 1968. The reduction is not related to the civilian-military substitution program. Its purpose is to cut back on the huge increases the Department is proposing for its work force and to help reverse the trend toward undue growth of Federal agencies.

The action deemed necessary by the committee in these and related activities indicates in my opinion the need for improved administration and programs in many areas throughout the Department of Defense.

A summary of additions and decreases made by the committee follows:

[In millions of dollars]

ADDITIONS	
Continuation of B-52 strength	11.9
Continuation of Air Force Reserve components airlift capability: Appropriation increase	12.1
(Within available funds)	(14.4)
EA-6A aircraft	106.7
A-6A modifications (within available funds)	(30.0)
DLG(N), full funding one nuclear powered guided missile frigate	114.8
DLG(N), advance procurement	20.0
C-130 airlift aircraft	60.0
C-7 Caribou aircraft	12.5
CX-2 aeromedical evacuation	16.0
Aircraft modification in support of Future Southeast Asia requirements	25.0
ASW (fund highest priority items within available funds)	(33.0)
AMSA (in support of authorized program)	25.0
Total program increases	481.4
Less financing from available funds	-77.4
Total appropriations recommended above budget	404.0
DECREASES	
Fast deployment logistic ship, program failed of authorization	301.0
Recoupments of excessive unobligated balances	251.0
Conventional destroyers, failed of authorization	166.6
Civilian employment	136.0
Multiservice aircraft, support procurement	125.0
F-111B program stretchout	78.2
Technical manuals and data	75.0
Tactical and support vehicles, including autos	55.8
Resources management system	52.7
Airlift commercial rates (new CAB authorized)	48.9
AID/DOD realignment of Southeast Asia functions	47.4
Contract termination charges, funding policy on	46.9
Permanent change of station travel (Army)	44.0
Revised ship conversion program	42.1
Research, and Federal contract research centers	22.8
Management studies, studies, and analyses	22.4
Support of Eastern Test Range	15.0
Army overcoat material	14.6
Boards of Civil Service examiners	8.9
All other	138.4
Total reductions in appropriations below budget	1,692.8
Net reductions in appropriations below budget	1,228.8

NEED TO EVALUATE MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

The responsibility for managing our Defense Establishment is an awesome responsibility. This Nation must be grateful that there are always those who are willing to come forward and shoulder that responsibility. Recognizing the magnitude of the managerial responsibilities and services rendered does not preclude the requirement to evaluate the past and present performance of that management.

It is the task of any management to make decisions and the success or failure of management is reflected by the results. Decisions made today by the De-

H 7068

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

June 13, 1967

partment of Defense will determine our military capabilities and the Nation's welfare tomorrow.

The performance of the DOD management, therefore, must be evaluated in terms of our military posture—in terms of our military capabilities to influence actual and potential events such that the interests of this Nation are protected and advanced. If our interests are anywhere not protected because of the lack of a capability to exert military superiority, this then would reflect adversely on the management of our Defense Establishment.

STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE

The overall power advantage which a nation holds over its enemies and which enables it acting alone or in concert with its allies effectively to control the course of military and political situations is its "strategic advantage."

We must be concerned with what is happening to our Nation's strategic advantage.

Although our military posture is built around many varied forces, it is the forces which serve primarily for strategic purposes which make the greatest apparent contribution toward achievement of strategic advantage. In the budget structure they are called the Strategic Forces.

STRATEGIC FORCES

In the Strategic Forces there are offensive forces such as land- and sea-based ballistic missiles, bombers, missiles launched from aircraft, and reconnaissance elements. The defensive Strategic Forces consist of such items as manned interceptor aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, warning, surveillance, and control systems.

If our Strategic Forces make up the largest part of our military posture which are needed for our national security, the question which must be asked is: Should we permit the Soviet Union or any other nation to acquire a capability greater than our own in any element of the Strategic Force structure?

Should there be any doubt that America must possess strategic advantage if our vital interests and purposes are to be served and preserved? If there are any reasonable doubts whatsoever of the extent of Soviet or any other nation's strategic capabilities, should not those doubts be resolved by positive decisions which favor our own capabilities? The management of our Defense Department has been asked these questions in many ways on many occasions.

For instance, Secretary of Defense McNamara, on March 6, 1967, was asked if there could be any reasonable doubt as to the extent of the intercontinental ballistic missile capability of the Soviet Union, even if we credit the Soviets with the capability to deceive our intelligence gathering means. The Secretary, in reply, expressed his belief that our intelligence estimates could be off but only slightly. Though the remainder of his response was classified, a significant insight into some of the disagreement that exists on this point was provided when General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked to comment on the Secretary's response. General Wheeler said:

As a matter of fact, I am not in full agreement with what the Secretary said. There are several things which I believe worthy of comment. First, the Soviets are, as shown in the last year, increasing very substantially their deployment of hardened ICBM's. I said in my statement on the ABM that the Joint Chiefs do not know whether the offensive and defensive buildup of the Soviets indicates they are seeking strategic superiority or strategic parity.

DECISIONS AFFECTING STRATEGIC FORCES

Several instances can be cited which indicate the adverse effect on our Strategic Forces due to Defense Department decisions.

The manned bomber aircraft, such as the B-52, is an element of our Strategic Offensive Forces. It is capable of carrying nonnuclear as well as nuclear payloads. The requirement for that type aircraft is well established. Yet, in this past year three B-52 bomber squadrons were phased out at an accelerated rate, and even though the Congress last year specifically provided for the continued operation of these squadrons through fiscal year 1967.

And unbelievable as it may seem in view of the significance of the B-52 to our Strategic Forces and the action taken by Congress last year, the President's budget as presented to the committee this year again called for a phase-out of another three squadrons.

The committee has added funds to the bill to continue the B-52 bomber force at a level of 600 aircraft.

It is essential that an advanced manned strategic aircraft—AMSA—be available as a replacement for the B-52 which is aging and is no longer in production. Yet the Office of the Secretary of Defense reduced by \$25 million the funds which were requested by the Air Force for fiscal year 1968 and which are required in order to move ahead with the AMSA. The go-ahead for the continued AMSA development must be given so that the operationally capable aircraft will be available when it is needed. The committee deemed it necessary to again emphatically support AMSA at a higher level and \$25 million was added to this bill. The bill makes \$51 million, the \$26 million requested, and the \$25 million added, available only for the AMSA program.

The Congress 1 year ago provided \$55 million above the budget estimate to maintain a production capability for the F-12 long-range interceptor aircraft, the most sophisticated fighter-interceptor there is in the world. As stated in the report on the Defense appropriation bill for fiscal year 1967, those funds were added because such action was deemed desirable for our military security. Those funds to this day have not been released to the Air Force by the Office, Secretary of Defense. Failure of the Secretary of Defense to allocate the funds in a timely way for F-12's has already resulted in a loss of the option to keep the production plant warm. This, in turn, has caused a serious delay in the available operational date of the aircraft and it is evident there will be need for an increased amount of funds in order to start up the production plant when a decision is finally made.

As in the case of AMSA, the delay in the go-ahead for the interceptor aircraft

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by the Defense decisionmaking process could create a gap both in capabilities and in numbers of our aircraft.

~~Our antiballistic missile system—~~ ABM—program is another example involving a strategic force of where funds added by the Congress have not been effectively utilized.

The Soviets have been building and deploying their ABM system for some time and the administration policymakers have known of those Soviet activities.

And, as to offensive missiles which could be used against us. General Wheeler pointed out that the Soviets are increasing very substantially their deployment of improved ICBM's, while the Secretary himself told the committee it believed that Red China too is pursuing its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs with high priority.

The arguments which favor a go-ahead decision are well known and they in my opinion are sound. There is almost unanimous agreement by our top military leaders and other responsible American officials that this Nation must have an antiballistic missile system. A decision is needed which will keep us moving at least enough to stay even with and perhaps catch up to the Soviets.

Gen. Harold Johnson, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, expressed his feelings to the committee on March 10, 1967, on the need to begin immediate deployment of an ABM. General Johnson said:

Now, one cannot argue against discussing the issues that are to be discussed with the Soviets, you cannot argue that at all. However, the uneasiness that I feel is basically this: When do we stop discussing and when do we reach a decision point?

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff this year again firmly and strongly stated the position of all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who have for years unanimously supported the position that this country should now proceed to deploy Nike X. The Joint Chiefs' recommendation is based on the requirement to maintain the total strategic nuclear balance clearly in favor of the United States. Up until this moment no decision has been made to begin deployment of an ABM system.

General Wheeler once again presented the cogent reasons which compels this Nation to proceed with no further delay. He reminded the committee of the information from the intelligence community, and made public in the last year, that the Soviets are deploying one and possibly two ABM systems. He disclosed that the intelligence community also believes the Soviets will probably extend and improve their ABM defenses over the coming years and he stated the Soviets have accelerated the deployment of hardened intercontinental ballistic missiles.

General Wheeler gave this assessment to the committee on March 6, 1967:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff don't know whether the Soviet overall objective is strategic nuclear parity, or superiority. In either case, we believe that their probable aims are one or more of the following.

First, to reduce the United States assured destruction capability—that is, our ability to destroy their industry and their people.

Second, to complicate the targeting problem which we have in directing our strategic forces against the Soviet Union.

June 13, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 7069

Third, to reduce U.S. confidence in our ability to penetrate Soviet defenses, thereby reducing the possibility that the United States would undertake a preemptive first strike against the Soviet Union, even under extreme provocation.

Fourth, to achieve an exploitable capability, permitting them freedom to pursue their national aims at conflict levels less than general nuclear war.

It should be remembered that those words are the combined judgment of all of the highest ranking military leaders of our Nation.

The statement clearly tells us the Soviet overall objective is to achieve strategic nuclear parity or superiority over the United States. It gives clear indication that the Soviet decisionmakers long ago concluded it is to the Soviet's interests to expand Soviet defensive and offensive deployment.

While doubts arise concerning our strategic advantage, the Soviets are decisively building their capabilities thus "permitting them freedom to pursue their national aims at conflict levels less than general nuclear war."

Congress has repeatedly made its position clear on various of our pressing national needs in these and other defense areas. It has done so in the hearings and in reports and by congressional action. Frequently funds have been added for specific items where it was the judgment of Congress that increased funding was called for. While we can and do supply funds and strongly recommend action, the Secretary of Defense on numerous occasions has completely refused to put the funds to use for the stated purpose. In the interest of our national security it is vital that Congress continue its efforts to see that needed programs are advanced and funded.

AIRLIFT OF THE AIR FORCE RESERVE COMPONENTS

As the buildup in Vietnam developed, the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard were requested by the Military Air Command to help meet our air transport needs. They responded effectively and well, providing many thousands of flying hours and thousands of tons of transported cargo to Vietnam and elsewhere. The Air Guard and Reserve continue to make this valuable transport contribution to our national welfare.

In spite of this the Defense Department last year attempted to phase out three airlift units of the Air National Guard. The units which it attempted to inactivate are located at White Plains, N.Y.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; and Van Nuys, Calif.

The Defense Department again attempted to inactivate those units and it also scheduled for phase out during the final quarter of fiscal year 1968 the unit at Homestead, Pa. These four units last year produced a total of 18,125 productive flying hours, flying a total of 16,014,673 ton-miles. The Defense Department also planned to phase out eight Air Reserve airlift units during fiscal year 1968.

Obviously these and other airlift units are making a very meaningful contribution to our effort in Southeast Asia. They are also a valuable source of training and a valuable source of trained personnel for any emergency situations.

It was known at the time the 1967 Defense supplemental appropriation bill was under consideration that the Defense Department planned to inactivate the three units by July 1, 1967. It was clear that moves to put the inactivation into effect, such as issuing termination notices to personnel or reassignment of aircraft, would have had to begun some time ago, very likely before action would be completed on this regular Defense appropriation bill which is now before the House. For that reason the Supplemental Defense Appropriations Act, 1967, which was approved on April 4, 1967, contains provisions requiring that not less than 40 Air Force Reserve troop carrier and airlift groups and not less than 25 National Guard airlift groups shall be maintained during fiscal year 1968. The effect of this is to maintain the airlift groups at their present level.

The bill before us provides \$26.5 million—\$12.1 million in appropriations and \$14.4 million in available funds—for continuation of Air Force Reserve components airlift capability as called for by Public Law 8, 90th Congress, the 1967 Defense supplemental appropriations bill.

RETENTION OF B-52 AIRCRAFT

The committee has provided funds amounting to \$11.9 million over and above those requested in the budget in order to provide for the continuation of 600 B-52 aircraft in fiscal year 1968. The amount provided is based on the further continuation of this number into fiscal year 1969.

As proposed in the Defense budget, this represents yet another area where action was taken contrary to the express direction of Congress and which would reduce our defense capabilities. Last year, in response to a proposal to phase our three B-52 squadrons from the fleet, Congress added \$6 million to the Defense bill specifically pointing out that the additional funds were to main the B-52 fleet at 600 aircraft. In spite of this, however, the Defense Department proceeded with a modified phaseout of 45 B-52's, placing 20 in storage and 25 in what it termed a ready status.

In view of the obvious need for bomber aircraft capability and the fact that Congress took special care to emphasize our need in this area in connection with the Defense appropriation bill last year, it is highly disturbing that this phaseout should have been carried out even in a modified way. It is even more disturbing that for fiscal year 1968 the Department of Defense has come to the Congress with plans—to phase out an additional 45 B-52's. Fifteen would be placed in mothballs and 30 in units in ready status.

Certainly the situation in the world today shows a great need for keeping our strategic bombing force at as full and complete a level as possible.

The B-52 can play a most significant part in the case of airborne alerts of our Strategic Air Command. Airborne alert is a unique method of providing a show of force during periods of crisis with a portion of our nuclear capable forces. At the time it is in operation, those aircraft airborne are not subject to a surprise attack from either intercontinental or submarine-launched ballistic missiles. As

such, they constitute a force capable of immediate attack, if required.

We do not know what kind of engagement we would be called upon to fight in the future. For this reason we must maintain our best options against a threat we cannot predict with certainty. As we have seen in the case of Vietnam and other areas it is to our benefit to have flexibility in our operational capabilities. Our goal must be decisive strategic superiority.

The B-52 is also of importance to the Air Force in meeting its collateral responsibilities such as conducting anti-submarine warfare and protecting shipping, interdicting enemy seapower through air operations, and in laying mines from the air. These are missions of obvious far-reaching importance and the B-52 is necessary to help fulfill these responsibilities.

It is vital to retain the B-52 highly trained efficient crews together so that they would be available should the situation call for their service. The Department of Defense however, in addition to going ahead with the inactivation against the express direction of Congress, actually accelerated its phase out schedule from the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1967 to the third quarter in order to finance additional civilian personnel authorized by the Secretary of Defense and in order to make additional pilots and other personnel available elsewhere.

PILOT SHORTAGE

Personnel is the most important asset of our military services. Yet the budget and testimony throughout the hearings concerning the management of personnel resources in the Defense Department depicted what to me seems an incongruous situation. The budget requests an increased number of civilians on the payroll while the services have been denied the numbers of military personnel which they had requested. And this while we are at war.

For example, the Air Force request for military personnel was reduced by almost 26,000 by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. With that action the Defense Department is actually planning a net reduction of 11,500 in the military personnel strength of the Air Force in the coming 12 months. On the other hand, the DOD planned to increase the civilian strength of the Air Force by 5,863 during the same period of time.

It was in the category of military personnel available to fly aircraft, however, that the most glaring example of acts of omission or commission in personnel management were revealed. Each of the services—the Army, the Navy, the Marines, and the Air Force—are short pilots.

The pilot situation in many instances is serious. Since it takes many months to train a pilot, this shortcoming will not be rectified soon and it is obviously the result of an accumulation of past actions compounded by 2 years of war in Southeast Asia.

The hearings revealed the office of the Secretary of Defense disagreed with an Air Force request to increase its pilot production rate. As a consequence, the total number of pilots by which the Air Force requested to increase its previously

H 7070

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

June 13, 1967

approved pilot production program was reduced by 376.

The OSD disagreement with Air Force pilot training needs was particularly evident as concerns Air National Guard pilots for which the Air Force requested 299 pilot training spaces. This request was denied and the Guard was left with 145 spaces—the same number it had previously. This in spite of the fact that the increased pilot production is needed now by the Guard to meet the forced attrition losses which it can foresee occurring 2 years from now. This, also in spite of the fact that the Air Force pilot training course to which Guardsmen are sent, is the only reliable source of Air National Guard pilots.

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau believes that a lack of Air Force training facilities is the reason pilots cannot be trained at the rate requested.

The Army, too, is in critical need of aviators. Its shortage is of several years' standing and it will not meet its flight training program objectives for sometime into the future. Testimony of Army witnesses shows that the Army requested a training rate of 800 pilots per month. The OSD cut that rate to 610 per month.

Admiral McDonald, Chief of Naval Operations, stated the Navy's case this way on March 15, 1967:

We do have urgent pilot needs brought about by low pilot training quotas in the early sixties and by the severe pilot retention problems we face today.

More detailed information presented the committee reveals that the shortage of Navy pilots will become increasingly severe. The short fall of pilots in the coming year is expected to reach almost 2,700 and regardless of whether the Southeast Asia war ends or not it will take 3 or 4 years to overcome the pilot shortage in the Navy.

Present capabilities for training Navy pilots are taxed to the limits. The Navy cannot train them at a rate greater than now planned because of the overload to its training command. According to Navy Capt. W. R. Flanagan of the Bureau of Personnel, the Navy's capacity to train pilots is limited by its limited physical plant, by its limited number of trainer aircraft, and by its shortage of instructors and maintenance personnel.

The Marine Corps estimates its pilot shortage now at approximately 850 and that this shortage will grow to over 1,000 in the coming year. It was revealed at the hearings that the Marine Corps was unable to go to a wartime pilot manning level in South Vietnam. Incredible as it may seem the marines are fighting a war using peacetime pilot manning levels.

The committee provided in full the amount of funds requested by the Defense Department for aircraft pilots. This includes flight pay and other related personnel costs, training programs, flying hour programs, and so forth.

In the time since the hearings concluded the Air Force announced a program of "selective retention" which apparently is based in part on its need for pilots. However, it seems to me that the pilot shortage problem is one which probably will require additional action by each of the services. If there is a need

to open additional training bases or a need for additional trainer aircraft or for any other reason additional funds are needed, I feel certain those funds will be provided by the Congress once the Department of Defense comes forward and makes known those needs.

THE NAVY VERSION OF THE TFX AIRCRAFT,
THE F-111B

The F-111B aircraft which the Navy is trying to satisfactorily develop is an outgrowth of the TFX program which was established with the insistence of the top level of the Department of Defense that both the Navy and the Air Force should develop an aircraft of common basic design. In the case of the TFX the Navy and Air Force versions have both suffered from compromise in performance by the emphasis on commonality.

Including the funds in this bill, over \$5 billion will have been appropriated for all purposes for the various Air Force and Navy versions of the F-111-type aircraft and their associated systems.

The President's budget request included \$418.1 million for R.D.T. & E. and procurement of a Navy aircraft and missile weapon system which is known as the F-111B/Phoenix system.

Because so many years have now elapsed since its need for such a weapons system was first conceived, the Navy, this past year restudied what its requirements might be.

The Navy, by its study and examination of all available evidence this past year confirmed that the Soviets might possess a highly sophisticated threat capability against the fleet by the mid-1970's. The study indicated that the developing F-111B/Phoenix system will meet the Navy's needs for the mid-1970's if the system's performance matches the performance assumed in the study and if the aircraft can meet the Navy's carrier suitability requirements.

It is increasingly apparent that the Navy F-111B was the most ill-advised undertaking to come out of the TFX program which is now over 5 years old. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral McDonald, told the committee that if it were possible to start over again he would not follow the course established by the Defense Department. The Admiral testified:

I would have designed a plane giving full consideration to the weight limitations that are imposed upon operations from an aircraft carrier.

As of early this spring the Navy had five research and development F-111B aircraft flying. Aircraft Nos. 4 and 5 had been put together in a laborious and expensive superweight improvement program. From flight tests of Nos. 4 and 5 the Navy hoped to obtain important information on the flying qualities, performance and carrier suitability of its version of the TFX. Preliminary evaluation flights of those two aircraft began on March 16, 1967. Tragically, one of those planes, No. 4, crashed on April 21, which date was after the committee had heard most of the testimony concerning the F-111 programs. From the testimony a possible overall 2-year slippage in the program had been indicated. Unfortunately, the loss of the

No. 4 aircraft means there may well be as much as 6 months or more additional slippage to the date by when the Navy will find out if the aircraft it is attempting to develop will be satisfactory or not.

Four preproduction models of the F-111—funded for in the fiscal year 1966 program—are scheduled for delivery beginning with No. 6 about 1 year from now. As of the time of the hearings, complete specification weight changes had not been determined but it was believed that the full package of weight changes would be incorporated in aircraft No. 7.

In addition to the weight problems there have been several other problems of continuing concern to the Navy and to the committee as the development and testing program unfolds.

For example, pilot visibility has been inadequate for safe carrier landing; the plane has been tall heavy and a more favorable balance needs to be achieved for carrier deck operations; and this Navy development aircraft has now grown tremendously in size.

Also, the need for an improved engine with greater thrust across the entire thrust spectrum has been determined. An improved engine is now in the development stage with a hoped for delivery schedule to begin early next year. Aircraft No. 8 would be the first aircraft to include all change for the new engine now required.

Also of continuing concern to everyone is the escalated cost figures. The original 1962 estimates for the Navy F-111B program was for a unit flyaway cost of \$3.5 million. Program changes up to last year on the Navy's version have resulted in an estimated unit flyaway cost of \$8.0 million armed with Phoenix missile system. Additionally, over the same time period the estimated cost for support equipment for each aircraft has increased to \$3.0 million from \$800,000.

As a consequence of these problems it is impossible for the Navy to determine whether or not the production aircraft will be something they consider satisfactory.

Clearly much yet needs to be learned in the test and development stage of the Navy's version of the TFX.

Admiral Bowen, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Development, testifying on April 5, 1967, said:

We do not really know whether this plane [the F-111B] is satisfactory for Navy purposes as envisaged until we have completed the flight test of the plane incorporating the final configuration.

Because of the difficulties encountered which have led to slippages and slow-down in the program occasioned in part by the crash of one of the test aircraft, the committee determined it could not recommend the full \$287 million budget request and reduced it by \$78.2 million for the F-111B.

Further the bill contains a limitation which states that the \$208.8 million recommended in the bill shall be available for the F-111B aircraft program only.

The committee took this action to keep these funds under better control of the Congress. If for any reason the F-111B program does not proceed in a timely

June 13, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 7071

manner or if it should be cancelled because of all the difficulties being encountered, the Secretary of Defense could not reprogram or transfer these funds to some other program.

It is to be hoped that the Department of Defense will eventually come up with an aircraft which will meet the Navy requirements. Whether the aircraft which eventually develops will still be designated the F-111B is immaterial. What is needed by the Navy is an aircraft which can fulfill a Navy mission.

NIKE X

Including the funds in this bill, nearly \$5 billion will have been provided by Congress for a ballistic-missile defense system. It is our Nation's principal effort to provide defense against attack by intercontinental missiles or missiles launched by submarines.

The committee is firmly of the view that funding is required to continue essential research, development, test, and evaluation of the Nike X system. There is little controversy concerning such R.D.T. & E. efforts and the bill contains \$442 million for this purpose.

The question as to whether and when to begin deployment of the system is controversial and the committee noted the combined opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which did call for immediate deployment. Over 3 months have now elapsed since the testimony was heard.

The Secretary of Defense on the other hand proposes that no action be taken to begin deployment of Nike X pending the outcome of discussions with the Soviet Union. The Soviets of course are capable now of directing ICBM's against us and are themselves building at least one and perhaps two ABM systems for their own defense. Last year, aiming at the deployment of an ABM system, the Congress added \$167.9 million. Those funds were not used in fiscal year 1967. For initial deployment, the accompanying bill provides \$298 million, which is in addition to the \$168 million appropriated in fiscal year 1967 for this purpose.

In commenting on the reluctance to begin to deploy the Nike X system on the part of the administration, our committee report states:

It would appear that the initiation of deployment of "light" or "thin" defense, now, may very well be a most useful first step toward whatever level of ballistic missile defense ultimately appears necessary.

In other words, the report, adopted unanimously by the committee, says: "Get going."

NUCLEAR ESCORT SHIPS

The Defense appropriation bill before the House shows the continuing strong support of the House Appropriations Committee for nuclear propulsion in our major surface warships and, of course, in our submarines.

The bill contains \$134,800,000 for two nuclear-powered guided missile destroyer leaders. These ships are known as the DLGN. Of the amount appropriated, \$114.8 million is for the full funding of one DLGN, and \$20 million is for advance procurement for the second ship. I would personally prefer full funding for both ships.

The budget request of \$166.6 million for escort vessels was for two conventionally powered destroyers. Authorization to construct such ships was denied however in the Defense Authorization Act of fiscal year 1968 and the two nuclear powered escort vessels were authorized instead.

The action in this bill and in the Defense authorization bill represents meaningful progress in the long, continuing struggle toward gaining acceptance by the Defense Department of the concept of nuclear powered surface ships.

At least four major fleet escort ships—destroyers or frigates—are assigned to each aircraft carrier. These escorts are designed to operate either on independent missions against enemy targets or as part of a coordinated protective screen to destroy enemy aircraft, missiles, submarines, and surface ships that attack the force.

The Department of Defense did not request any major fleet escorts in the fiscal year 1964, 1965, or 1966 shipbuilding programs. In the fiscal year 1966 program, Congress, on its own initiative, authorized \$150,500,000 for a new nuclear powered frigate—DLGN—appropriated \$20 million for procurement of long leadtime items for this ship, and urged the Department of Defense to include the funds required for completion of this ship in the fiscal year 1967 budget request. The Department of Defense did not proceed with the procurement of long leadtime items, nor did they ask for funds for the nuclear frigate in the fiscal year 1967 budget.

However, the Department of Defense did ask for two nonnuclear guided missile destroyers in the 1967 program.

The fiscal year 1967 authorization act authorized the two nonnuclear guided missile destroyers, reauthorized one nuclear frigate, and authorized \$20 million to be appropriated for procurement of long leadtime items for another nuclear frigate.

The House Appropriations Committee recommended that Congress appropriate funds for a nuclear frigate, and further recommended that funds not be appropriated for the nonnuclear destroyers. These recommendations of our committee were incorporated in the fiscal year 1967 Defense Appropriation Act. As the bill emerged from conference, money was provided to fund one nuclear frigate and provide funding for the procurement of long leadtime items for an additional nuclear frigate.

The fiscal year 1967 Defense Authorization Act included a provision that:

The contract for the construction of the nuclear powered guided missile frigate for which funds were authorized under Public Law 89-37, and for which funds are authorized to be appropriated during fiscal year 1967 shall be entered into as soon as practicable unless the President fully advises the Congress that its construction is not in the national interest.

The Secretary of Defense has now released to the Navy the funds for construction of one nuclear frigate, the DLGN-36, but he has not released funds to initiate procurement of the long leadtime items for the second nuclear frigate.

In the fiscal year 1968 Department of Defense budget request the Secretary of Defense again requested two nonnuclear destroyers, but failed to request funds to complete the second nuclear frigate. On May 23, 1967, both the Senate and the House accepted the conference report of the House-Senate Armed Services Committees on the fiscal year 1968 Defense authorization bill which provided that the two nuclear frigates be substituted for the two nonnuclear destroyers requested by the Department of Defense and agreed to a provision in the authorization bill that:

The contracts for the construction of the two nuclear powered guided missile frigates shall be entered into as soon as practicable unless the President fully advises the Congress that their construction is not in the national interest.

In its action on the bill before the House now, the House Appropriations Committee continues to support the position that we must have more nuclear-powered surface warships. Furthermore, it is clear that all future major fleet escorts should be nuclear powered.

The committee, as set forth in the report, expects the Department to proceed with the construction of the one DLGN, the advance procurement of the other, and to request funds for the construction of the remaining authorized DLGN in the fiscal year 1969 shipbuilding program.

The Department of Defense should proceed with the contracts for the construction of both nuclear-powered frigates in fiscal year 1968 as soon as practicable. We must get on with building more nuclear-powered surface escorts for our nuclear carriers.

This subject has been thoroughly, repeatedly studied and considered by responsible committees of Congress. The facts clearly support the action being taken by Congress to provide all nuclear-powered escorts for our nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.

SUMMARY OF THE BILL

TITLE I—MILITARY PERSONNEL

H.R. 10738 contains a total of \$21,927,800,000 for military personnel. This is for pay and allowances for clothing, subsistence, permanent change of station travel, and other personnel costs. The amount in the bill is a decrease of \$73.2 million below the budget estimates. A substantial portion of the reduction comes as a result of recently announced reductions in the rates for commercial airlifts. Another major portion of the decrease results from savings possible in Army travel costs as proposed in the budget.

Language in the bill provides for an average strength of the Army Reserve personnel of not less than 260,000 and not less than 400,000 in the National Guard.

TITLE II—OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

Funds provided in the bill for operation and maintenance total \$18,994,200,000 for fiscal year 1968.

This title covers generally the every day expenses involved in running the military establishment, including force units in training and combat; medical care for personnel and their dependents;

H 7072

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

June 13, 1967

to operate logistics support systems; command controls; communications systems; dependents overseas education; for the support of free world forces in South Vietnam; and to operate base establishments in support of these functions.

The funds support an active inventory of 34,468 aircraft, 938 active ships, 204 service hospitals, 54 major service supply depots, the direct hire of 905,195 civilian employees, and support of 628 active military installations.

As proposed in the bill, the "Operations and maintenance" is reduced by a net amount of \$352.8 million, none of which are directly related to our operations in South Vietnam. These include such areas as savings because of reduced commercial air carrier rates, a cutback in the amount of additional civilian employees requested, reductions in excessive management studies by independent firms, a holdup in the implementation of a proposed new resources management system, a reduction in the enrollment of the overseas dependents education program, and various other reductions.

TITLE III—PROCUREMENT

The total contained in the bill for procurement is \$22,261,200,000. This is a reduction of \$655.8 million below the budget estimates. Basically, the funding provided under this title is to allow the Defense Department to secure equipment and weapons systems.

For the Army \$5.5 billion is contained in the bill to procure ammunition, weapons, and vehicles, aircraft, guided missiles and necessary supporting equipment. This includes funds for fixed and rotary wing aircraft, surface-to-air missile systems, for potential procurement of long leadtime components for missiles, radars and ground support systems for the Nike X antiballistic system, and surface-to-surface missiles. It provides funds also for such items as tracked combat vehicles, tanks, self-propelled artillery, and air defense guns.

For the Navy and the Marine Corps, \$2.9 billion procurement funds are provided in the bill for fixed and rotary wing aircraft, missiles, and related equipment.

The sum of \$1.42 billion is provided for the construction of 28 new vessels and conversions of 21. The types of vessels involved range from ballistic missile submarines, submarine tenders, nuclear guided missile frigates and destroyers to amphibious ships, minesweepers and patrol ships, and auxiliary craft. For other procurement for the Navy and the Marine Corps a total of \$3,011,000,000 is provided for ordnance, weapons systems, communications and electronic equipment, ammunition and other items.

The amount provided for Air Force aircraft procurement is \$5.59 billion. This is for procurement of combat, air-lift, trainer, helicopter and aeromedical aircraft, for modifications and support programs. \$1.34 billion is contained in H.R. 10738 for the procurement of a variety of missiles, including ballistic, air-to-air, air-to-ground, and target drone missiles. Other Air Force procurement funds for munitions, vehicles, electronic and other supporting equipment totals \$2.4 billion.

The Defense Supply Agency, the Defense Communications Agency, and other Defense-wide activities are funded at \$40 million in the bill.

TITLE IV—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

H.R. 10738 provides \$7.1 billion for research, development, test, and evaluation for the military services.

The funds included in this title are vital to our overall defense effort so that new weapons systems can be pursued aggressively and purposefully to maintain our military effectiveness.

The funds provided are to move ahead in such critical fields as the antiballistic missile, antisubmarine warfare, missile development, and a host of other projects throughout the services.

The amount provided represents a reduction of \$171.2 million in the amount requested for research, development, test and evaluation. Reductions were made in the request for funds for the Federal Contract Research Centers and for studies and analyses generally.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, the bill before us today, H.R. 10738, provides necessary funding for our defense program in our National interest.

The committee and the staff worked long hours, weeks and months on the measure to get it in the best shape possible, in our judgment, to bring before the House for consideration.

When so many billions of dollars are involved there are bound to be areas where cuts and modifications can be made. We have attempted to the best of our ability to locate these areas and where they were found recommend reductions from the amounts requested in the budget.

All the time, however, we were ever mindful of our needs in Vietnam and no reductions were made which directly or indirectly will affect our efforts in Southeast Asia.

In other instances it was our decision that additional funds must be provided and this we have done. These have been discussed in detail on the floor here today and in the report.

In those cases where I have commented critically on aspects of the defense program today I have done so because in my opinion certain things need to be aired and discussed in the best interest and welfare of our Nation.

I urge the House to support H.R. 10738.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. Is this F-111B plane now costing \$9 to \$11 million per copy?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. The original flyaway cost 5 years ago was \$3.5 million. At the present time it is estimated that the F-111B flyaway cost is \$8 million plus support equipment costing about \$3 million, or an estimate per unit of \$11 million.

Mr. GROSS. This is one of the most disgraceful chapters in the history of the Department of Defense. Beginning with the award of this contract to the firm to

which the contract went, the General Dynamics Corp. at Fort Worth, Tex.—and I am not going into details for the gentleman knows the story better than I do—but it is one of the most disgraceful chapters in the history of the Department of Defense. I want to commend the gentleman for the searching inquiry that he gave this matter in the hearings before his committee. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I thank the gentleman. I know that he has been in the forefront in trying to keep tab on the F-111 program up, as he refers to it, the TFX. There is a great deal of additional information to be disclosed in the days and months to come.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I was interested in the observation which the gentleman made that the Department of Defense has identified, out of the funding represented in this bill, approximately \$20.6 billion as being attributable directly to the cost of the war in Vietnam.

I noted then that the gentleman went on to say that in his opinion the real cost of that war probably amounted to between \$25 and \$30 billion a year. The question which I would put to the gentleman is simply this: Does the gentleman therefore believe that in addition to this bill it is likely we will have a supplemental appropriation bill in the amount of \$13 to \$18 billion? Is that a correct inference?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. No. I did not give a figure such as that, but I have confidence that we will have a figure which I estimate at this time will vary anywhere from \$3 to \$8 billion. It is our estimate, which we verify from the cost of the efforts in Vietnam. I believe it is recognized by the Committee, that we are going to be faced with an additional supplemental bill.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. If the gentleman will yield further, I suppose the other variable in the picture is the possibility of escalation, about which we read something in the paper just this morning.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. If we have to send additional personnel to Southeast Asia, if the attrition rate of our aircraft increases, if the sinking of our ships and other factors increase, if the use of ammunition increases, we will be faced with additional supplemental appropriations, and I must say this is recognized by our committee.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. If the gentleman will yield further, I merely want to add to what has already been said. I compliment the gentleman on an extremely fine and informative statement. The information he has presented, especially with respect to the reluctance of the Department to proceed with the advanced manned strategic aircraft, and the information with respect to the F-111B program and the TFX program should be spread on the Record. The

June 13, 1967

gentleman has made a good contribution in pointing them out today.

Mr. MAHON, Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SIKES].

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SIKES, Mr. Chairman, it is disappointing to note that some of the top people in the Pentagon are leaving Government service. Among these are Defense Deputy Secretary Vance, Under Secretary of the Navy Baldwin, and Admiral McDonald, Chief of Naval Operations. I do not think too much can be said about the caliber of these men or the quality of their contributions to American defense. Each of them has been outstanding in his field and each will be sorely missed. It is not easy to replace such men and the Pentagon has been fortunate to have had their services.

It has been stated that this is the largest appropriation bill in history. It has been estimated that the House is being asked to approve a billion dollars every 5 minutes. All of this bears out the fact that even though we are fighting an undeclared war, it is one of the biggest in American history. It should also be pointed out that this measure provides the most effective defense package in history. The committee has seen fit to recommend some deletions and some additions. All of them are sound. The additions are of particular moment in that they strengthen our defenses in areas which obviously are very important—AMSA, ASW, EA-6A aircraft, nuclear frigate, airlift capability, the continuation of B-52 strength, and others.

I think it is almost certain to be found that we have not faced up to the full requirements for funding the Vietnamese war. We have, however, approved the budget estimate. If the present scale of fighting continues through another fiscal year, the cost will be nearer \$30 billion than \$20 billion. Possibly, and hopefully, this scale of fighting will diminish, and so will the costs.

Before we get too deeply into the details of this bill, let us consider the amazing success of the Israel forces in the Middle East. This compels a very careful analysis by U.S. strategists of Israel tactics on the field of battle. By defeating the armies of three nations in less than a week at the cost of 679 dead, they have accomplished a feat unmatched in the history of warfare. We and our allies have lost as many in the same period in Vietnam with very little to show for it and I do not deny their sacrifice.

I realize full well that the circumstances are entirely different. Neither terrain or foe are comparable. But there should be lessons to be learned. Significantly, the Israelis made all-out and best use of their facilities, including full use of airpower. For most of the time that we have been in Vietnam, we have fought a one-handed war, despite the protests of U.S. field commanders. It goes on and on and the casualty lists mount. More and more Russian equipment is being brought in to offset our air superiority and the losses there, too, in men and planes, are piling up. Now we are told

that the Russians are bringing in medium range missiles with which to strike U.S. bases or Vietnamese cities from North Vietnam. The American people want the Vietnam war won, for they are concerned with the fact that it goes on and on and the end is not in sight.

The total cost of the war to Israel was \$100 million. The U.S. Defense Establishment costs twice that much every day for 365 days a year, year in and year out.

It should be noted that the Israelis did not allow themselves to be influenced by third parties. They wasted no time with useless diplomatic flip-flap, or the endless cacophony of the U.N. They looked after Israel's interests first and talked afterwards. These facts it would be well to keep in mind. Again, there may be nothing significantly new or different in what they did on the field of battle, but it is well to remember that the winds of change blow constantly. What was good that we read in yesterday's books may be outdated today. We must be certain that Israel's military leaders have not learned something that we have failed to teach our own.

Even so, it has been a long time since the Communists have won an important victory in Vietnam. An effort has been underway for months to mount a sustained and effective offensive by the North Vietnamese regulars. Presumably such an offensive would include a substantial part of that country's remaining effective forces. North Vietnam desperately needs a major victory for the morale of its own people, for that of the Communist world, to provide grist for the Communist propaganda mills and for the doves in this country who still want to go to the conference table.

To the credit of the U.S. forces, they have kept the Communists off balance to the point that their offensive still is not underway. Their supply lines continually are being disrupted. Their concentrations of manpower and equipment are under steady harassment. This should indicate that the military situation in Vietnam is well in hand. But it does not take into consideration the fact that half of South Vietnam's area or more still is outside the control of the South Vietnam Government. Some of it is safe only by day. Despite the presence of half a million U.S. forces who have acquitted themselves magnificently, a very large part of Vietnam is Communist-controlled or Communist-infiltrated. The actual job of fighting and even that of pacification has fallen more and more upon American soldiers.

The most productive area, the delta, is largely in Communist hands. I have pointed out many times that the delta is the principal food reservoir of Vietnam, but its abundant rice crops benefit the Communist armies and the Communist supporters, even the North Vietnamese, more than it benefits the South Vietnamese. By whatever means are necessary, we should insure the clearing and pacification of the delta before another year runs out. U.S. forces which were intended to help alleviate this situation have had to be moved northward to the area of the DMZ to meet the new offensive threat which is building there.

The problem before us is equally divided between securing the countryside and pacification. Because of poor performance, or waste, or black market, or some of all of these, it has been necessary to place the problem of pacification in military hands also.

There is growing awareness that the situation behind the lines in Vietnam has been deteriorating. The pacification program in many areas is failing to secure the countryside and win over the peasant. Our troops can win battles but behind the battlelines the communities are strongly laced with Communist sympathizers. The job of weeding out the Communist infrastructure, organizing the village population, and economic development is considered the weakest link in the strategic concept. This is the crucial key to an allied victory or eventual defeat of allied aims and justification of American sacrifices.

We know that our field commanders want additional forces and there doesn't seem to be much doubt that they will have been made available. We still have a long, long way to go. During the past year, we have gained some in territory held and in population controlled. But the percentage gained is small compared to the size of the effort put forth. From this point forward, it may be possible to roll up the enemy forces and to get on with the job of pacification at a more rapid pace than has heretofore been possible. If the threatened offensive can be contained and defeated decisively, the end of the fighting could come much more rapidly than now appears in prospect.

In the meantime, the fighting appears more and more to be an American responsibility. This is hard to fathom. We have spent much time, money, effort, and equipment—yes, lives—in helping to develop effective Vietnam forces. The results have not fulfilled expectations. Many people wonder why more effective use cannot be made of the Vietnam forces. It is their war. It is time that the U.S. high command found a way to secure more effective support from the Vietnamese toward insuring their own freedom. For years we have heard of the importance of spending the taxpayers' money to help build up forces of other nations so that in time of emergency those forces, rather than American, would bear the brunt of the fighting. Regretfully, history records but little in practice to justify that theory. There are exceptions, particularly in the case of Korea.

I think it important that there be full understanding of the concern of the committee about the proposed reorganization of the Reserve components. You will have noted the language in the report on page 7 which deals specifically and clearly with this subject. This language is intended to prevent the disbanding of combat units in a time of serious danger to the United States unless the proposals have been fully justified before the proper committees of Congress and until such time as formal legislative expression can be made.

The proposed reorganization of the Reserve components is altogether too

similar to the merger proposal which would have eliminated the Reserves a few short years ago. Since that time, it is significant that the Reserves have gradually been whittled down and so has morale. Beginning with a strength of 300,000, they were reduced step by step to the present level of 260,000 which is provided for in the accompanying bill. The reorganization plan, however, would reduce them further to 240,000 and eliminate all combat units.

By way of history, the present reorganization plan was submitted by the Department of the Army to the Section 5 Committee which is charged with responsibility in these matters. The Section 5 Committee is made up of officers from the Regular forces, from the Guard, and from the Reserves. Despite OSD support for the reorganization plan, it was approved by a vote of only 11 to 10. The plan would strip all combat units from the Reserves, including four brigades and 316 smaller units, with an authorized strength of more than 50,000 men in combat units. It would eliminate 15 divisions in the National Guard. A total of 400 combat units would be affected. Ten of the 21 who serve on the Section 5 Committee supported plans to give combat units to the Reserves also.

It will have been noted that we have in the bill before the House a floor of 260,000 for the Reserves and 400,000 for the National Guard. There also is language in section 638 which was added to deal with a threatened merger at an earlier date. That language is largely meaningless insofar as the present problem is concerned because it refers to unexpended balances rather than to the total appropriation. Since action must be taken at this time to show the interest of Congress, we have written language into the report which we feel is strong and meaningful. Our procedure avoids legislation on an appropriation bill. It gives further opportunity to the Committees on Armed Services of the House and Senate to take any legislative action which may be required. Such an opportunity is before the Congress in H.R. 2 which has passed the House and which is awaiting action in the Senate. H.R. 2 will have to be amended to be effective in the present case but at least it provides a vehicle to which amendments are germane. I would call attention to the fact that under the language in our report, a reprogramming action would be required to accomplish the realignment which has been proposed. This would require at least a measure of compliance with the intent and interest of the Congress in knowing more about the proposal by the Department of Defense.

Essentially, then, we have been asked to approve carte blanche a plan which has not been reviewed by Congress. In fact, Congress has not even been given the courtesy of a request for approval—during or after the budget submission.

Faithfully the liberal press has parroted the Pentagon propaganda supporting the cutback in combat units in the Reserve components. They say this will result in better trained and more effective units. I fail to see what magic units can be trained, adequately equipped, and

combat sharpened in the Guard but not in the Reserves, or by what magic battle effectiveness in either Guard or Reserves can be gained through disbanding combat units and making their trained personnel into clerks and food handlers.

It is very obvious that we live in a world of crisis. We have just gone through a very serious period in the Middle East and it cannot be said today that all the problems in that area have been resolved. We are confronted with a requirement for more troops in Vietnam. The field commanders there have requested them and it should be obvious that they are necessary. Vietnam, which started out to be a little war, has become one of the biggest in our history. We are spread thin. If there should be another crisis anywhere which involves American forces, it will also almost certainly be necessary to call up the Reserves. For some strange reason, they have not been used except in very limited numbers in the Vietnam war where the Reserve components could have contributed much.

If preparedness is to be insured by this bill, we should not, in its passage, approve by indirection the loss of combat units. Preparedness should be a central theme of this Nation's policies. It is obvious that our Nation may at any time need every trained military man that it has. If this is true it is equally obvious that we should be strengthening, not weakening, all our forces including the Reserves; that dedicated, trained, and experienced manpower, organized and ready, and the drill strength Reserves of both the National Guard and the USAR be given full support and encouragement to carry out the assignments which may at any moment be theirs.

Again, this would not be the case if the new plan for reorganization of the Reserve components is carried out as proposed by the Secretary of the Army. Under this plan, as I stated, the organization Reserves would be composed entirely of support forces. All combat elements now in the Reserves would be transferred to the National Guard or abolished. In substance, the Reserves would become hewers of wood, bakers of bread, and carriers of water. I do not decry the function of support forces. Without them no army can win. But I am concerned, and seriously concerned, with the proposal to abolish 15 National Guard divisions; to abolish four infantry brigades which I am informed are now full strength and capable; and to abolish several hundred USAR combat units, with their 50,000 trained and experienced men. It would appear that in the thirst for economy or merger of the Reserves, as the case may be, would not be sufficiently compelling to cause a weakening of the Nation's military capability in the face of its serious commitments worldwide, in a time of grave international pressures.

The objections to the new plan are widespread. They come from highly-placed individuals in and out of the military. Included in these objections is a statement by the national executive committee of the Reserve Officers Association which includes members of all

branches of the service and a statement from the Senior Reserve Commanders Association. These individuals know what the effect of such a reorganization would be. Please note, however, that the Congress is not attempting to say to the Pentagon that it can or cannot carry out a reorganization. We realize that reorganizations sometimes are necessary. We simply are asking that the proposed realignment be deferred pending such time as formal legislative expression can be made in the matter.

The bill and the report before you make no mention of it but it is entirely possible that serious damage is being done to the Navy's selected or drill pay reserve. During the past 4 years the strength of this force has been cut from 155,000 to 126,000 despite the fact that the Joint Chiefs have approved a strength for the Naval Reserve forces of 160,000 and despite the fact that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy have for 3 years recommended to the Defense Department an increase for the Naval Reserve to reach this planned strength. The fact that the situation is serious is emphasized because the Navy's Selected Reserve is a "D" Day reserve which cannot depend upon fillers to build it up to strength when reporting for active duty. It has been estimated that more than \$7 million is needed to build the drill pay program to 132,000 people by the end of the next fiscal year.

Let me get into other areas. I cannot say that we have accomplished anything significant in this bill toward attainment of an anti-ballistic-missile system. A year ago on good authority that the Russians were building such a system this committee provided funds to initiate construction of a system of our own. The money was not used although the Secretary of Defense confirmed late in the year that a Russian system is under construction. We have money in this year's budget to continue testing but that is about all. The committees of Congress, the House and the Senate, the Joint Chiefs, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force agree that the United States should have an antiballistic-missile system. But the Secretary of Defense disagrees. His word is law in the Pentagon. We are embarked on one of those strange quests in which America sometimes finds itself. Instead of providing for our own defense, we hope to convince the Russians by talk that they should dismantle the anti-ballistic-missile system they are building. Throughout her military history Russia has not had a break like this. Months have passed and they still are busily engaged in building an anti-ballistic-missile system to protect their nation and to readjust the balance of military power in their favor. But they say they are willing to talk about it. That does not provide me with any substantial degree of comfort. Talk is poor defense against effective weapons. The comparative inactivity of the United States in this field undoubtedly will encourage the Russians to continue discussions while stepping up their own anti-ballistic-missile deployment. Every week that goes by widens

June 13, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 7075

the gap and increases the danger to the United States and to American citizens.

Now to manned aircraft. Throughout this bill it will be noted that there is a gradual scaledown of manned aircraft. In fact were it not for the efforts of this committee and the Congress we would be much weaker today in manned aircraft than we now are. It is proposed to continue that scaledown even for fiscal 1968 when the Nation is very definitely engaged in a serious war which is testing our military resources. There are altogether many people in the Pentagon who still seem to look upon the war in Vietnam as a minor engagement to be carried on one-handedly while the grand scale of the Pentagon's program for some mythical future engagement is carried forward as the primary objective. It would occur to me that the primary objective of the Department of Defense should be to win whatever war we find ourselves engaged in and to do so as quickly as possible and to think of the grand program later.

There may be new danger in the Russian submarine threat with their missile launch capability and their threat to American shipping. During recent years there have been few indications of stress by Soviets on submarine construction. Apparently this resulted from Soviet emphasis on their anti-ballistic-missile system and even on the belief that the Soviet submarine program was sufficient in numbers and capability for any requirements that might be placed upon it. It does not now appear that this is the case. There seems to be a renewed emphasis on Russian submarine program with a high degree of modernization. For a long time the United States held the edge in the submarine field in quality even though badly outnumbered. This picture can rapidly change if indications of improvements and progress in the Russian submarine are borne out. It is entirely possible that we should be placing much more emphasis on submarine construction to reflect Soviet increases in numbers and their added defensive capability.

This is the best report that has accompanied any defense appropriations bill. It deals more carefully and explicitly with the background of our funding problems than any previous report, and spells out the particular reasons for each of the committee's important actions. Reading it will take time, but it is well worthwhile.

A great deal of work is required for a measure of the magnitude and detail of this one. The services of a great many people go into it. Long hours through many days of hearings and study are required. Each of the committee and staff members with whom I have worked are due a large measure of appreciation for the product which is before you. However, I would like particularly to call your attention to the very dedicated effort of the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. LIPSCOMB]. I suspect that he has put in longer hours and given more effort to the bill than did any other individual. His contributions were monumental and he, particularly, is worthy of credit.

This is not to take credit from the chairman of the committee, the distin-

guished gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON], whose great contributions to defense are so well recognized. It is his leadership which has insured a balanced defense program time after time when those in the Pentagon seemed disposed to follow too closely the defense panacea of the moment.

The cuts that have been made are not crippling. It is a healthy thing that the committee has faced up to the fact that military expenditures must not, because of their nature, be immune from the same close scrutiny that should be given to other governmental expenditures. Since the serious buildup began in Vietnam, it has not been possible to make meaningful cuts. The continuous escalation of warfare has meant an anticipated need for more money than that being appropriated each year. This situation is understandable, but in itself it is productive of carelessness and waste. It should now be obvious to the Pentagon that Congress is again looking carefully at expenditure and will expect an equally careful scrutiny by the Department of Defense as expenditures are made. At least in some instances where cuts were made, they could have been deeper. Yet the committee does recognize the necessity of leaning over backward to provide funding for all the items needed to support the fighting forces. The cuts set forth in this bill are an indication of renewed interest on the part of the committee in obtaining savings where savings are possible.

When you consider the fact that we are involved with a deficit between \$14 and \$29 billion, it is time to think about savings and to wonder whether we really cut deeply enough; particularly in the fields which are not associated with winning the war in Vietnam and which smack so strongly of bureaucratic buildup at so many levels. There are areas which offer promise for further reductions in spending. I am not at all certain that we have cut deeply enough into proposed additions for civilian personnel or that we have tightened the lines enough on the nonprofit corporations.

The nonprofit institutions are the organizations which are set up to provide services to the Government by contract and who attract for their operating personnel individuals who are not willing to work for the salaries paid to Government employees. The organizations have borne a charmed life. There seems to be too little indication of an effort by the Pentagon to require them to hold down expenditures or to require a realistic return from the projects assigned to them. Admiral Rickover, who is one of the most capable thinkers in the Pentagon, has stated repeatedly that the Department of Defense needs more in-house capability rather than contract or nonprofit operations. Certainly the hour is late and Congress should be reestablishing a measure of control on continued expansions in noncombat areas. I have long been convinced that the Pentagon is running studies into the ground. At any time witnesses do not have an answer to a congressional query, they say the matter is under study.

The rapidly escalating number of civilian employees now in the Department of

Defense is to me an equal cause for concern. Every year we hear of savings in the operation of the Pentagon, but each year there is a mounting wave of higher costs. I question that there is really much that can be substantiated in the way of real, not theoretical, savings, in many of the activities which are carried on there. The United States employs nearly 3 million civilians worldwide. The number has increased by several hundred thousand in the past few years. Mushrooming Washington shows where most of them have found a happy home.

A part of the civilian buildup has to do with substituting civilians for military. Testimony reveals that there is no plan to convert these jobs back to military slots when the fighting in Vietnam has ended. This means maintaining a very large civilian establishment and a cutback in the Military Establishment when conditions return to normal. I do not think this is a healthy program. Obviously, we cannot have an all civilian Military Establishment. We must have people in uniform to fight battles and win wars. They need promotion opportunities. We can have so many civilians in the Military Establishment that there will be no place for military personnel other than in overseas defense posts. That adds to the problem of separation of families. In time of emergency we would have fewer military personnel to report to battle stations and there would be the problem of delay which would result from requirements to train additional personnel to fill the ranks. I just do not think this program has properly been thought through.

Very possibly many of the studies which are designed to evaluate Pentagon programs are useless or irrelevant or both. The entire field has been studied by the Government Operations Committee and their findings are scorching. They show duplication and ineffective conclusions and too frequent disregard of the findings of the studies. This is the sort of thing our committee seeks to eliminate. There are too many cases of studies made of studies and nothing concrete to show savings to the Government.

There are areas of activity in which I am sure the taxpayer would welcome a greater show of zeal on the part of governmental negotiators. Some of these, such as the case of U.S. negotiations for compensation for U.S. bases and operating facilities in France, are in the hands of the State Department, rather than OSD. It would be very well, however, at whatever level, to urge U.S. negotiators to work harder to get something of value for whatever property we leave in France or wherever. The French appear to believe that they can get our installations and nonmoveable equipment for little or nothing. Frequently this is what happens and the taxpayers are tired of it. So far we have just exactly nothing to show for our efforts.

Now finally this: Because we have carried on the war in Vietnam while adhering to a policy of business as usual at home; because we have leaned over backwards to keep from exposing the average American to any hardship or deprivation as the result of war, there are many who have overlooked some very significant

facts. It should be emphasized that there are some among us; those who bear the brunt of battle, those who bear the burden of keeping open supply lines and their families, who are in a war. They are bearing a burden just as serious and frequently, just as great and just as dangerous as that in any major crisis in our country's history. For those who carry the load in Vietnam the exposure to danger, the separation of families, the inconveniences which most people knew in prior wars when our whole Nation was mobilized in once again a way of life. The fact that most Americans are not personally involved in the war does not diminish the sacrifices required of the fighting men and their families, and it should result in greater appreciation for them on the part of the rest of us. They have performed magnificently and they are entitled to the respect and admiration of the American people. There has been an example which should not be overlooked even by those who conduct demonstrations, burn draft cards, and desecrate the American flag.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIKES. Of course I yield to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. RIVERS. Is the gentleman satisfied with the Hébert bill on the reorganization of the Reserve or the Guard?

Mr. SIKES. H.R. 2, which the gentleman aptly refers to, is an important measure that has twice passed the House and which now awaits the action of the Senate. That bill, while it would not now deal specifically with this situation, would not now deal specifically with this situation, would at least prove to be a vehicle to which germane amendments would be applicable as an expression of the congressional interest and intent in this matter.

Mr. RIVERS. Within the framework of this proposal by the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. HÉBERT], and Senator RUSSELL has assured me—and it is the first time he has done it—is such that he will schedule this bill for hearings. If he does, it will certainly pass. Within the framework of this bill, is it not the gentleman's understanding and assurance that we can work out, by legislative and congressional mandate and action, a mandate to protect the integrity of the Guard and of the Reserve components?

Mr. SIKES. It would be my hope that the problem of Reserve reorganization can be dealt with in this manner. That is exactly the reason we have placed language in our report to deal with the subject rather than writing new law into the bill itself. Our committee has leaned over backwards in an effort to avoid legislating in an appropriation bill.

Mr. RIVERS. Well, of course.

Mr. SIKES. We have asked that the reorganization be deferred through the medium of the language of the committee report until such time as an expression of the Congress could be manifested through regular legislative channels.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, I think the gentleman and his committee have done a wise thing.

And, further, Mr. Chairman, I can assure the gentleman that we on the House Committee on Armed Services do have the same concern. We are going to keep the numbers as they are, and the integrity of these units will be preserved, if humanly possible, in this area.

Mr. Chairman, I want the distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. SIKES] to continue his great assistance to us, because the gentleman knows so much about it and we do need his help.

But, again, I want to congratulate the gentleman for helping us save those units from those people in the Pentagon who are seeking to change our policy in the Guard and in the Reserves until the Congress clearly stepped in and stopped it.

Mr. SIKES. I appreciate very much the comments of the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS], the gentleman who has contributed so much to the defense of America.

Mr. Chairman, permit me to warn that what is desired here for the preservation of combat units will not be attained simply by the language of the report, or by the language of H.R. 2 as it now is written. H.R. 2, however, does provide a vehicle to which amendments dealing with the subject can be offered.

Further, Mr. Chairman, I would like to call attention to the fact that the language of our report and the reprogramming action required thereunder, would require at least a measure of compliance with the intended interest of the Congress in learning more about the justification of the proposals which are made by the Department of Defense on the Reserve components.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. SIKES. I yield further to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RIVERS. Not necessarily indispensable to the consideration of this Congress, because we could provide that the divisional setup shall be maintained, if we have the assignment of missions or units.

Mr. SIKES. That is correct. And, we recognize that reorganizations are necessary from time to time in order to keep the military forces modern and effective.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, I would much rather have a responsive force cut up in smaller units than have larger forces with no missions and no equipment, as has been true in the past.

Mr. SIKES. That is the point. Today, however, the Congress is particularly disturbed about the proposed elimination of combat units as such.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. LAIRD].

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I join with the distinguished gentleman from Florida in paying tribute to the chairman of this subcommittee, the Honorable GEORGE MAHON, of Texas, for the diligence and hard work that has gone into this committee report.

I particularly pay tribute to the gentleman from California who sat in this committee and spent more time studying this bill and the justifications and the

statements of the various witnesses than any other member of the committee.

This committee report is a compromise report, worked out under the leadership of the gentleman from Texas and the gentleman from California after many hours of testimony, morning and afternoon every day in each of the weeks of the last 5 months.

This is a good committee report—the best committee report that has ever accompanied a defense appropriation bill since I have had the opportunity of serving on the Committee on Appropriations in 1953.

This is one of the best reports that has ever come from the Committee on Appropriations accompanying a bill covering the national security costs of our country. It is a good report in many respects because it faces up to the many challenges which we as a nation must face during the next few years.

It points up some of the weaknesses of the Department of Defense, as far as the management of that Department is concerned, as far as the planning and programming of that Department are concerned, and also it recognizes for the first time that we are not clearly and adequately estimating the defense costs of our Nation as far as the third largest war which this country has ever been involved in is concerned and that is the war in Southeast Asia, in Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, I support H.R. 10738, the largest single appropriation measure ever considered by the Congress. The distinguished chairman of our committee, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON] and the ranking minority member of our committee, the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. LIPSCOMB] have done their usual outstanding job in outlining the contents of this bill.

For my part, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make some general comments about the bill and the report and then briefly discuss some of the larger questions that concern all Americans.

ABSENCE OF ADDITIONAL VIEWS

First, Mr. Chairman, let me point out that there are no "additional views" attached to the report this year. I am pleased to report this and would like briefly to explain why the minority members of this subcommittee did not submit "additional views" to the fiscal 1968 report as we have for the past 2 fiscal years.

Basically, there are two reasons.

First, agreement was reached in markup among all members on several major items contained in this bill. One of the more significant is the language contained in our report—House Report No. 349—on page 3 which clearly indicates that substantial additional funds will be required for Southeast Asia activities in fiscal year 1968.

My own view, Mr. Chairman, after hearing the testimony so far before our committee, is that the administration has once again underestimated Southeast Asia requirements by a minimum of \$5.5 billion for fiscal year 1968.

The second reason there are no "additional" or "minority" views is that our deep concerns about the future posture of our country in the national security

June 13, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 7077

arena especially in the decade of the 1970's and beyond were amply spelled out in last year's additional views contained in House Report No. 1652 and in my own extensive remarks which appear in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD dated June 28, 1966.

Since very little has changed in the intervening period, there seems to be no compelling reason to restate our very deeply held views on these vital matters.

I will very briefly summarize those concerns a little later in my remarks, Mr. Chairman.

VIETNAM REQUIREMENTS UNDERFUNDED—
AGAIN

No member of this committee, majority or minority, can take pride in the fact that the experience of the fiscal year 1966 and 1967 Southeast Asia requirements is to be repeated again in fiscal year 1968, albeit on a somewhat smaller scale.

In fiscal year 1966, Southeast Asia requirements were underestimated in the original budget by some \$15 billion.

In fiscal year 1967, Southeast Asia requirements were underestimated by over \$13 billion.

In this budget, Southeast Asia requirements, on the bases of our hearings these past 5 months, are underestimated by a minimum of \$5.5 billion. There is evidence that they could well go much higher.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me it would be much better in a time of war to state accurately the defense needs of our Nation. This is a minimal requirement.

Actually, it would probably be far better to overstate defense requirements in a time of war rather than coming back the following January each year with substantial supplemental requests after all or most domestic appropriations measures have been adopted.

This would be the fiscally same course to follow.

This would be the prudently wise thing to do.

Mr. Chairman, the budget that is submitted to this committee is supposed to be based upon a ground force level in Vietnam of 500,000 men during the fiscal year 1968. That is 500,000 ground forces, plus 87,000 Navy, and 100,000 Air Force personnel, all engaged in this, the third largest war in the history of our country.

Yet the Department of Defense and the President in submitting this budget have once again underestimated the cost of this conflict, and in the budget submission the figure of \$20.3 billion is used when every member of our committee on either side of the aisle knows full well that this is an underestimation of those costs.

According to my informants in the Department of Defense—and my informants have been better about cost figures than the direct testimony of the Secretary of Defense in both fiscal 1966 and fiscal 1967—using the same criteria that was used in figuring the \$20.3 billion, the expenditure rate in Southeast Asia war costs for April and May is closer to \$4 billion a month. The annual cost of the war in Vietnam is closer to \$28 billion for fiscal year 1968 than it is to the estimates

given in the budget submitted early in January.

Why do I think it is important to point this out now? It is important for us to have these cost figures before the Congress as we review the various domestic programs that are going to be considered by this Congress in the next few months. We have been fighting the Vietnam war on the basis of "Fight now, pay later," for too long. The situation has developed here where in both fiscal 1966 and 1967, we have had supplemental requests of \$13 billion-plus at the start of each new session of Congress.

After all the domestic programs have been funded, then we come up with a supplemental approach to finance the costs of the war. In every major war that this country has ever been involved in people have been willing to make sacrifice after sacrifice in order to cover the costs and support the fighting men that are assigned by our Commander in Chief wherever they happen to be assigned. And I say that the American people today are also willing to make sacrifices, but in order to make those sacrifices, the costs must be estimated on a fair and accurate basis, and the people must be told in advance what those costs are.

With supplemental requests of over \$13 billion in 1966 and supplemental requests this year of over \$13 billion, always coming in after the domestic programs have been funded, the Congress is unable to establish a clear set of priorities as far as funding various programs in the Federal Establishment, in this federal system of ours, and it is time, it seems to me, that we recognize that in periods of war it is better to overestimate your stated expenditure rate, your stated appropriation rate, than to underestimate it to the extent that it has been underestimated by the current management in the Department of Defense.

CREDIBILITY

The problem, Mr. Chairman, is that this administration attempts to blame the war in Vietnam and the consequent increases in defense spending for the "national sales tax" we call inflation and for the deteriorating state of our economy, not to mention the prospective massive deficit we are facing in this fiscal year and in fiscal year 1968.

Yet, Defense spending since 1960, as we have seen, has risen 68 percent while nondefense spending has skyrocketed some 97 percent.

If more accurate forecasts had been submitted with the original budgets in fiscal years 1966, 1967, and 1968, there is no question in my mind that Congress would have more responsibly and thoroughly scrutinized nondefense programs and the prospect of a massive deficit of over \$25 billion in fiscal year 1968 probably would not have been as likely.

Mr. Chairman, the budget deficit for fiscal year 1968 was originally estimated at \$8.1 billion. That estimate has now been officially revised to some \$11 billion.

Members of this Subcommittee on Defense are also members of the full Committee on Appropriations and must pass judgment on the funding requirements of all other levels of Government activity.

We are also Members of the Congress who are required to judge all authorization levels when they come to the floor of the House for final action.

Our responsibility to our own conscience and to all our colleagues in the Congress cannot be appropriately discharged in the face of incomplete or misleading information.

Yet, this is precisely what we have had to contend with in increasing degrees during the past 2 years.

The inflation we faced last year and today, the sluggishness of our economy, the inappropriateness of some of the legislative actions this Congress has approved in the past 24 months, the prospects of a large and apparently necessary tax increase—all of these problems and many more can be attributed in part to an incomplete understanding by Congress of the true and largely predictable requirements of Southeast Asia activities in the past 2 fiscal years.

Mr. Chairman, in no area of national need—domestic or foreign—can this Congress fulfill its responsibilities adequately until it insists upon and obtains full, complete and accurate information from the executive branch of our Government.

It is this which has led us to the position we are in today, where domestic expenditures have increased by 97 percent since 1960, while Defense expenditures have increased only by 67 percent—at a time when we are engaged in a massive war.

At no time in the recent history of this country—either in the time of World War I, or World War II, or in the Korean conflict—did domestic expenditures go up at a rate of 97 percent. As a matter of fact, during World War I, and during World War II, and during the Korean conflict, just the opposite was the case in the administration of our budget and fiscal matters.

Mr. Chairman, a budget is nothing more than the fiscal plan of our country. It is sent to the Congress at the start of each year to give some indication on the part of the executive branch as to what the fiscal plans are for the next fiscal year. The credibility of the budgets that have been submitted have been completely discounted as far as Defense is concerned during each of the last 2 fiscal years, and the same thing is true this year. I point this out not in the interest of criticism.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count. [After counting.] Fifty-three Members are present, not a quorum. The Clerk will call the roll.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

	[Roll No. 134]	
Abbutt	Celler	Hanna
Anderson,	Clark	Heckler, Mass.
Tenn.	Conyers	Herlong
Arends	Corman	Hollifield
Ashbrook	Daddario	Hosmer
Ashley	Diggs	Kelly
Ayres	Dow	McEwen
Battin	Dowdy	McFall
Berry	Fuqua	Moss
Brown, Calif.	Gubser	Pelly

H 7078

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

June 13, 1967

Pepper	St Germain	Widnall
Pickle	St. Onge	Williams, Miss
Pool	Skubitz	Willis
Resnick	Smith, N.Y.	Young
Ruppe	Thompson, N.J.	Younger

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. PRICE of Illinois) having assumed the chair, Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill H.R. 10738, and finding itself without a quorum, he had directed the roll to be called, when 387 Members responded to their names, a quorum, and he submitted herewith the names of the absentees to be spread upon the Journal.

The Committee resumed its sitting. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. LAIRD] has 11 minutes remaining.

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, the point that I was attempting to make before the quorum call was that this bill does not fund the war effort in Southeast Asia.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, I think the gentleman should take the well. He looks better down there and he was doing so well, and on a matter of this importance I think he should address the Committee from the well of the House.

Mr. LAIRD. I want my distinguished friend, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, to be completely comfortable. Although I might be more comfortable where I am now standing, I will yield to his suggestion and take the well.

Mr. Chairman, additional war costs will be funded in a supplemental appropriation bill which will come before the Congress early in the second session of this 90th Congress.

The expenditure rate in Vietnam will be closer to \$28 billion than the \$20.3 billion which is earmarked in this appropriation bill and as set forth by the President in his budget as submitted to the Congress. This is true on the basis of the present rate of expenditure of ammunition, and the present steaming rate in Southeast Asia today.

Ammunition and steaming costs are underestimated by in excess of \$1,500,000,000 in this bill on the basis of the present use of ammunition and fuel in Vietnam in the third quarter and now in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1967.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LAIRD. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. MAHON. I would like to exchange views with the gentleman from Wisconsin, if he will permit.

Is it not true that last year we were told that under the assumptions underlying the military budget for the fiscal year 1967, the current fiscal year, if the war should continue beyond June 30, 1967, that additional funds would be required?

That is question No. 1, which I am sure the gentleman would answer, "Yes."

Mr. LAIRD. The answer to that question is, "Yes." But to further amplify that answer, even if the war had ended on the 30th of June 1967, I am sure the distinguished gentleman from Texas knows full well that a supplemental ap-

propriation bill would have been needed and necessary in order to restore the drawdown on stocks and supplies, the loss of aircraft, and the loss of helicopters that would have been needed in order to put the Defense Establishment in the same position in which it was 18 months earlier.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. LAIRD. I am happy to yield to my distinguished chairman.

Mr. MAHON. Everyone I know of, in and out of Government, thought that in all probability the war would continue beyond June 30. Therefore, the gentleman from Texas now on his feet, and the gentleman from Wisconsin, and many others said early last year that there would have to be a supplemental appropriation. The Defense Department, the President, and many others said that there would have to be a supplemental bill. We shouted this view from the housetops. It was well known.

Mr. LAIRD. They said that after they were pressed, but they never admitted they would need a supplemental if the war would have ended on a certain given date. This was a false assumption to start with in drawing budgets.

At no time in the history of warfare or defense planning has any administration, to my knowledge, assumed a given date that a war would end. This has never happened in the history of any military establishment or in the history of any country in the world that a given date was picked upon which the war would end, and they would draw budget assumptions based upon a given fixed date for the end of the war.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. LAIRD. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. MAHON. Of course, it is true that in making any budget certain assumptions must be made. Some of them may be arbitrary. I myself felt that the assumptions underlying the fiscal 1967 defense budget were not as realistic as they should have been but the assumptions were clearly delineated.

Mr. LAIRD. I know the gentleman does not like to use the word "phony," but they were false, were they not?

Mr. MAHON. They were not false and they were not phony. They were based upon technical budgetary assumptions.

Mr. LAIRD. I do not think it is a very technical assumption to project the way on which a war is going to end and base assumptions on that date.

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman knows that the war was escalating rather rapidly and it was impossible to tell exactly how much money would be needed. We were told that additional funds would be needed if the war continued. It can be argued that a more definitive figure should have become available earlier. I am not arguing that point. The purpose of this colloquy, in my judgment—

Mr. LAIRD. If the distinguished gentleman will permit me, he is defending the assumption that was used in the 1967 budget that on a certain date the war would end. If that was such a good assumption to make in the fiscal year

1967, why did they not use the same assumption in 1968? The gentleman from Texas knows full well that they did not use the same assumption in the 1968 budget.

Mr. MAHON. The fiscal year 1968 budgetary assumptions are entirely different, in most ways, from those for fiscal 1967. So while you and I shouted from the housetops last year that there would have to be a large supplemental, this year the situation is quite different because the budgetary assumptions are different.

Mr. LAIRD. I agree absolutely with the gentleman that the supplemental will be just about half the supplemental of this year.

Mr. MAHON. My point is, that we all agree there will probably have to be a supplemental because the expenditures for the war will very likely go beyond those which were calculated in the January estimates. Even though a greater number of troops than those present now have been funded in the budget, we think it very probably will go beyond that figure. The estimated personnel figure for Vietnam is less than 500,000. We believe the figure will very probably go higher. Therefore, we think there will have to be some additional funding. The fact that we did not fully fund the costs of the war in fiscal year 1967 early in the year did not influence the war effort, in my opinion. It may have influenced some other things.

Mr. LAIRD. The gentleman from Texas knows full well that it did influence some other things. However, when we get into the other parts of our fiscal planning, in the other areas of fiscal responsibility in which the Congress has certain responsibilities, we can easily see that by underestimating these costs and by using a false assumption—that the Secretary of Defense, as well as others in the administration, knew was a false assumption, to pick out of the hat a date when the war is going to end—that is certainly the way to mislead people as to what the total overall fiscal plan of our country should be.

Mr. MAHON. But the gentleman from Texas and the gentleman from Wisconsin were in no way misled, and assuming our colleagues have confidence in us, they knew all along that there would be a heavy supplemental, and that defense costs would soar. Therefore, when the Great Society programs and domestic programs generally were considered, it was known that there would be additional sums needed. So this should not have adversely influenced Members of Congress.

Mr. LAIRD. The Members full well know that when the Secretary of Defense was asked at the press conference in January 1966, about the projection I made that the supplemental request for 1967 would be well over \$10 billion, he said it was false. He came right out and said it was false. And my assumptions were correct, and his were wrong. I see the Secretary of Defense in this budget has not used the same assumptions he did in 1967. The assumptions are somewhat different. But I would never want to be in a position of arguing that the assumptions he used in 1967 were a

June 13, 1967

H 7079

proper means of estimating defense expenditures while we were engaged in the third largest war this country has ever been engaged in. He would have been a great Secretary of Defense if we had been at peace during his tenure, but unfortunately we are at war, and in estimating costs and budgets, we have to let our people know what the costs are, so that they can tighten their belt in other areas of the economy.

Mr. MAHON. I am not enamored of the defense budgeting system which was employed for the current fiscal year, but I want to proceed further. There are assumptions underlying the 1968 budget, to the effect that the war will continue throughout fiscal year 1968—that is, through June 30, 1968, and beyond that time.

Mr. LAIRD. For at least that amount of time. The assumption goes far beyond; there is no cutoff date on June 30, 1968. The war is a continuing thing and projections are in this budget.

Mr. MAHON. But the additional costs will be required for 1969. So my point is, if one lacks agreement with the budgetary system for the current fiscal year, he should realize fully that if the war does not escalate beyond the present estimated level, the probabilities are that if there is a supplemental—and there probably will be—it will be relatively small as compared to the supplemental of 1967.

Mr. LAIRD. I agree with the gentleman from Texas. It will be less than the supplemental for 1967, but it will be a sizable supplemental. If the manpower level goes above 500,000 troops on the ground, then we will have to have a much larger supplemental, a supplemental of at least \$5.5 billion. But even if the war stays at the projection of 500,000 troops on the ground, we will still have to have a supplemental appropriation bill for 1968. We could take examples. Ammunition for destroyers—right now I can tell the gentleman on the basis of information I have from the Defense Department—was underestimated at the very time the Secretary of Defense was making his budget submission to the Defense Appropriations Committee by many millions of dollars.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. LAIRD. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. MAHON. It is true that we reduced the defense budget by \$1.6 billion. We also added-on \$400 million. We made a net reduction. We do not feel that these reductions will interfere with the war effort. We are supporting the committee report and the funds requested in this bill, because neither the gentleman from Wisconsin nor I believe that we should at this time give a blank check for an undetermined amount of money which may later be required. We would rather they would lay the further requests before us in clear terms when the need is more apparent.

Therefore, the fact that the costs of the war may to some extent be unfunded is in no way a reason why we should increase the budget or attempt to guess as to what the additional figure may be, or

provide a blank check to the Executive for expenditure of funds which have not been justified.

Mr. LAIRD. I agreed with the gentleman from Texas.

The reductions made here in no way will affect the war in Vietnam. It is a reflection on the part both of the majority and of the minority members of the committee that we should have tighter control over budgetary processes so far as the Department of Defense is concerned. This is what we have tried to set forth in our committee report, which is agreed to by both the majority and the minority members.

Mr. MAHON. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to touch on one or two other points of general concern to all Americans in connection with our Defense Establishment

NEED FOR A BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION

Mr. Chairman, I referred earlier to the additional views submitted by the minority members of this subcommittee last year. In connection with those views we, together with other Members of Congress, introduced a resolution calling for the early establishment of a Blue Ribbon Commission, made up of the highest calibre experts from both the civilian and military communities, to conduct an independent and objective evaluation of the projected defense posture of this country.

My own rather extensive defense of the need for such a commission is contained in my remarks of last June 28 alluded to earlier.

Those of us who introduced this resolution did not do so lightly.

We came to the conviction that it is vitally needed only after deep deliberation and much soul-searching and after noting the grave concern felt and publicly expressed by leading members of both parties in and out of Congress, by high-ranking military officers, by past holders of the Nation's highest positions in the Department of Defense—both military and civilian—and by almost universal concern in the journals and publications of this country that deal primarily with defense matters.

We came to this conviction as well after noting the cavalier disregard on the part of the Office of Secretary of Defense with respect to clear direction by Congress in several vital matters, with respect to unanimous recommendation on the part of the Joint Chiefs, and with respect to the apparent reliance in that office on preconceived assumptions that often fly in the face of all available evidence.

We came to it finally, Mr. Chairman, because it is no longer possible to rely on the unsupported pronouncements of the highest officials in the Department with regard to the most vital matters of concern to Congress in discharging its constitutional responsibilities in the area of national security.

SUMMARY OF CONCERNS

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like briefly to restate in summary fashion the principal concerns that point, in my judgment, to the need for early estab-

lishment of such a Blue Ribbon Commission.

First, the defense structure of any nation is determined by that nation's foreign policy.

Primarily, it is our belief as stated in last year's additional views that certain basic changes have taken place in the defense policy of the United States since 1961. These changes need immediate evaluation by this impartial Blue Ribbon Commission. Among the changes, the following are particularly significant:

First, a changed attitude toward the cold war and, as a result, a different assessment of the potential and current threat;

Second, a changed attitude toward the desirability or necessity of pursuing advanced weapons development as vigorously as possible; and

Third, a changed attitude toward those areas of defense and defense planning which should receive priority.

In foreign policy, the basic assumptions upon which the administration appears to base its defense strategy include the following:

First, that there has been in recent years a reduction in tensions between the free world and the Communist bloc—except China—and that further accommodations in the future can be anticipated and should be encouraged;

Second, that our military force structure should be related primarily to the "visible" threat posed by potential adversaries;

Third, that nuclear war is as unthinkable to the Communists as it is to the United States and the free world and that, therefore, the balance that is being achieved between the Soviet Union and the United States with regard to strategic forces should not be upset;

Fourth, that the United States should continue to assume a posture of response both in the area of "crisis control" such as Vietnam and in the area of weapons development; and

Fifth, that the threat from world Communism has, in fact, eased during the course of recent years and, therefore, any attempt to maintain a decisive superiority in the years ahead would reverse this trend.

In defense policy, the basic assumptions would include:

First, that the aggressive pursuit of advanced weapons development such as the antiballistic missile system—ABM—or the advanced manned strategic aircraft—AMSA—would lead to a "reaction" on the part of the Communists that would accelerate the "arms race" and that, therefore, whenever possible, such decisions should be stretched out, studied to death, or postponed.

Second, that the level of effort in new weapons systems should be tied, predominantly, to what the potential enemy is doing and that the determination of what "the other side is doing" must be based on "visible" information.

Third, that the Defense Establishment must be prepared to execute and implement a strategy of "flexible response," one that permits the United States to gradually escalate any conflict and that

will not force us into the dilemma of "humiliating retreat or nuclear war."

It is our belief that many of the assumptions that guide our foreign and defense policy may be unrealistic and incorrect. The experience of the past 6 years bears out this contention. The importance of a complete evaluation of these assumptions cannot be overstated.

We believe that there has not been a reduction in tensions but rather a reduction in our desire to recognize Communist actions for what they are.

We believe that our military force structure should not be related to the "visible" threat but rather to the capabilities of the Communists and to the fulfillment of our own national objectives.

We believe that nuclear war should be "unthinkable" to the Communists but that this country should not base its plans on that illusive hope.

We believe that the strategy of response both with regard to crisis situations and with respect to weapons development should give way to a strategy of initiative. We would define a "strategy of response" as one in which this Nation permits a situation to become so serious that it must take extraordinary steps even to return to the status quo, and a "strategy of initiative" as one in which this Nation, when it first sees the possibility of a situation developing, will take steps to prevent its becoming a crisis situation either with respect to potential conflicts or to new advances in weapons development.

We believe that the threat from world communism has not eased and that, therefore, it is of the utmost importance that this Nation maintain a decisive superiority in offensive and defensive weapons.

We believe that the Soviet Union is not "leveling off" its effort in advanced weapons development and that it is, as a matter of fact, aggressively pursuing new development both in outer space and inner space. Secretary McNamara's belated admission of this last November should make this fact clear, Mr. Chairman.

Finally, we believe that under the policies of the past 5 years, rather than escape the dilemma of "humiliating retreat or nuclear war," we have actually enlarged that possibility, in effect, adopting policies that have reduced rather than increased our options.

To reverse this situation, four basic requirements are necessary:

First. A more objective and realistic assessment of the threat coupled with a thorough reevaluation of our foreign policy;

Second. A return to greater participation by and acceptance of military judgment in what are predominantly military affairs;

Third. A more aggressive pursuit of research and development especially in the area of advanced weapons; and

Fourth. A reassessment by the Congress of its own role in the area of national security.

There is, in our judgment, little possibility that these requirements can or will be fulfilled unless the initiative comes from the Congress. It is for this

reason that we have called for and strongly support the establishment of a blue ribbon commission of military and civilian leaders to reassess and reevaluate the defense posture of this Nation now and for the future.

Only in this way, Mr. Chairman, can the American people be reassured that this Nation is buying the very best defense consistent with the long-term best interests of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin has expired.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WHITTEN].

(Mr. WHITTEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WHITTEN. Mr. Chairman, I do not expect to take much time on this particular topic, but the discussion between the gentleman from Wisconsin and my chairman, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON] brings to mind the fact that if we would finance the Defense Department as we did during World War II, and as I believe we should be doing now—that is, by providing funds as they are needed instead of trying to fully fund in advance—this discussion would be needless.

I look back to 1955, when we were discussing this matter on the floor, and to my remarks at that time. I pointed out that as a result of full funding the Defense Department had continued to buy airplanes which would not fly because they had the money and did not want to cancel the contract because that might cause unemployment. There are many similar examples.

There may be some jockeying for position here between my colleagues on the committee.

I do not want to let this statement conclude without also commending the very fine work done by our chairman, the gentleman from Texas and by the other members of the subcommittee. This is a long and detailed and complex bill.

I do say again that this argument about whether something is full funded or not might have some repercussions in a political way. I do not know, but any department which has in addition the funds in this bill some \$40 billion or \$50 billion of unspent funds, and a great amount of money not obligated, is a department about which there is no need to worry whether it has enough money to finance itself for the next year.

There might be some argument about the wisdom of funding some domestic programs or whether we should do this or should not do some other things. The point I want to bring out today is the fact that I have gone back through the records to 1961. For that whole period I cannot see where a single thing has worked out like the Secretary and his associates at the Pentagon anticipated it would. I cannot see today where anything in Vietnam today is in line with the way it was projected and estimated to us by our experts and throughout that whole time the Secretary of Defense has imposed his will not only on the Defense Department but has consistently tried to

virtually eliminate or weaken the Reserves and National Guard combat units.

Here again, we find public announcement, without congressional approval or knowledge, by the Secretary of Defense that he is going to abolish combat units of the Reserves and the Guard. This action is unsound. Our committee has again disapproved such action and has called upon the Secretary to hold such action up unless approved by the Congress.

TIME TO CHANGE OUR COURSE

Mr. Chairman, we need to review to reassess, and, I believe change our foreign policy. I can see how years ago you may have had high hopes for the United Nations when it was created, but I cannot see how those same folks would have any hopes for it now, having had observed its failures, right up to recent weeks.

Mr. Chairman, after World War II, we went around the world injecting ourselves into the internal affairs of just about every nation that would let us help them with foreign aid, underwriting the incumbent governments, governments which sold our goods to their people for what the traffic would bear.

Of course, once the governments we aided got thrown out the new government had no use for us. That is the answer to the feeling against us in so many areas around the world.

All nations engaged in the recent war in the Mideast were recipients of our aid—as a matter of fact we first went into Vietnam with foreign aid. We see the results, a war with no apparent end, unless we change our course.

Let us take further stock of our position today and think about how we got there.

Think of it. Only a few short years ago we were confronted with communism in Cuba. This was halfway around the world from Russia and a place greatly to her disadvantage. When her hand was called, she got out. Where do we confront communism today? We are halfway around the world, with all of the disadvantages on us and with the advantage with communism.

We have read the word "Vietcong" so frequently in the press that most folks today do not stop to realize that the Vietcong are the South Vietnamese who do not agree with us and are trying to throw us out of their country. They are not North Vietnamese but South Vietnamese. Those South Vietnamese who give us lukewarm support we call South Vietnamese.

There are six volumes of hearings here. I challenge you to read them and come out with any feeling that the South Vietnamese on our side want to put out very much themselves except to satisfy us. Why have we had to put our soldiers in there? Because though we could train the South Vietnamese to the point of using this equipment themselves, all too frequently too many had little desire to fight. If they had had half of what the Israelis showed last week, there would be a different story. The war would likely have been over. Besides, we don't know who is with us and who is not.

June 13, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 7081

On another point we are here today presuming that we can continue to spend \$20 billion to \$25 billion a year in Vietnam and that our economy can stand it. Well, can it? We turned down the other day an increase in the ceiling on our national debt to \$375 billion, a level we are bound to reach if we follow our present course. It has been estimated that we have an inflationary spiral of \$27 billion this year. That means \$27,000,000,000 loss in the value of our savings. I know that the Defense witnesses testified we had an average of 7 percent inflation each year. In other words, it costs 7 percent more each year to buy the same thing that you bought the year before. How long can our economy stand up to this course without a crackup?

Now, what am I getting to? I am saying that we owe it to the men we have in South Vietnam, trying to help people who do not have the enthusiasm for themselves as their South Vietnamese relatives whom we call the Vietcong, have for driving us out.

Our supply lines reach half way around the world. We are greatly committed with millions of men behind the 460,000 in Vietnam. We have recommitted ourselves to Southeast Asia to the point that Russia could have called us to task in the Middle East and likely would have if the Israelis had not been victorious so quickly. Who knows, our tie down in the Far East may have set off Egypt. Could they not tweak our nose in Berlin? Or any where else where we have commitments. We need to get this war over, or get it in condition to turn fighting over to the South Vietnamese Government, with every advantage on their side. Unfortunately we do not seem to have a plan to win.

If you will read these hearings you cannot find a plan to win. The best that I can point out to you about our plan to win is that the Secretary says: "We will stay there until they get convinced they cannot win." When a smaller country like Vietnam can tie up the United States and leave us wide open to trouble in the Middle East, Africa, and everywhere else, it is a sorry day. We certainly should not let this condition continue. I am no military man, but neither is Mr. McNamara. I have sat in on a good many defense hearings. I started listening to defense problems and plans long before the Secretary. I went on this committee in 1943, but I am certainly no expert. I do believe I am just enough of an expert, however, that I would leave these military decisions up to the military, including those that the Secretary of Defense has appointed. It is my belief that we have reached the point where we have to go all out. I know many of my colleagues on the committee will agree with me on this and I have reason to believe many military leaders agree. I believe we must go all out to push the Vietcong back and to bring a collapse of North Vietnam's ability to support.

Now, as for fear China may get in the war. We should think of Israel. If we are afraid of China under the present conditions, would we not be more afraid 10 years from now when she has had 10 years in which to progress? When I say

we need to go all out to get rid of the Vietcong, and to bring North Vietnam to her knees, we must then at least say to the lukewarm South Vietnamese that we say we are trying to free, "All right. We have given you equipment; we have trained you. We have broken the enemy's force. If you have any heart in you, then take this equipment and get going, because we have done our share."

I do not see any other way open to us. I say to you today the only plans to win that you will see in these hearings are that we hope to stay there until they decide that they cannot win—and all the time the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese win each day they keep us tied down.

Now, Mr. Chairman, the Vietcong group of South Vietnamese—one can see that they have an issue. They are like the Israelis. They are instilled with a desire to push foreigners out of what they consider their land. And, I seriously question whether we should have ever gone there. But we are there, and I say that we owe it to our boys who are fighting to see that they are permitted to win. We need to win in the interest of the safety of our country. We must get this war over with for as long as it continues we will be over-extended over the world, dangerously so.

And, thirdly, Mr. Chairman, our economy calls for getting this war over. Do not let them tell you that the GNP—the gross national product—is increasing at so great a rate that we can stand a \$25 billion war in South Vietnam year in and year out without a crack up in our domestic economy.

Mr. Chairman, what is the gross national product? I asked our Director of the Bureau of the Budget when the hearings first commenced this year about this, and he said that the gross national product is the value of goods and services. They count the face value of services on the ground that you would not pay for those services unless they are worth it. But, you know, they put the same face value on governmental services, governmental programs, even though they may be completely wasteful. In other words, the more you waste in the case of governmental services, the more your GNP is. So, the more worthless governmental services you have the greatest the GNP and therefore the more such programs they say "we could afford."

Mr. Chairman, I say that it is time for us to put up and not to shut up, to issue the necessary orders to win for these boys whom we have over there; to issue the order to clean out these North Vietnamese from South Vietnam, for we have the power with which to do it. And, Mr. Chairman, when we have done that, we should said to the South Vietnamese, in addition to training, expertise, and the tremendous amount of equipment which we have furnished you, we have given you every advantage over your enemies, now, like Israel, you take it and go from here.

Now, Mr. Chairman, no one can win for those who do not have the desire to win. We should put it up to them.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. MINSHALL].

(Mr. MINSHALL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I am indeed honored to have been on this great Defense Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. I do not think that there is any more important committee in the House and, certainly, none that is harder working and one which spends more hours listening to the testimony of experts from the Department of Defense than do we, the members of the Defense Subcommittee.

Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not pay tribute to my distinguished colleague, the chairman of this committee, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON], and commend the gentleman for the fair and impartial manner in which he conducts our hearings. You have already heard about the gentleman from California [Mr. LIPSCOMB]. He has worked like a Trojan this year on this most important bill. Unfortunately, because of committee conflicts not all committee members have been able to be there to help him as much as we would like, but the gentleman from California [Mr. LIPSCOMB] has carried the ball in a magnificent manner and has performed an outstanding job. We Members of the House are very indebted to both of these men, the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON], and the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. LIPSCOMB].

Mr. Chairman, I wish to bring to the floor of the House my grave misgivings and reservations about the \$208.8 million which is being committed in this fiscal year 1968 bill for procurement of 12 F-111B airplanes for the Navy.

Mr. Chairman, during our long hours of hearings which extended over a period of several months, we on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee heard testimony from the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their top echelon military and civilian backup witnesses.

Out of these hearings have come six volumes involving more than 3,500 pages of testimony cleared for publication, and thousands more pages of top-secret information were deleted for either reasons of security or as part of the Pentagon's policy of deleting material for political purposes, but the testimony which has been permitted to stand open for public inspection still is sufficient to give some insight into the opinions of the military experts. And from that testimony, even with its numerous deletions, it is not difficult to discover overwhelming arguments against the Navy version of the TFX or, as it has come to be known, the F-111B.

Let me quickly capsulize the stormy history of the TFX, Navy version, as it was originally called. The TFX is now labeled, as I have said, the F-111B, and it is the brainchild of Defense Secretary McNamara who, in 1963, said he wanted a fighter aircraft of great dependability for joint use by the Navy and the Air Force.

This concept of commonality would save at least \$1 billion, according to Sec-

retary McNamara. The award of the contract for the TFX touched off a controversy which is raging as of this day, and 4 years later one thing is clear: General Dynamics, with headquarters in Fort Worth, Tex., has failed to develop an aircraft for the Navy at its Long Island, N.Y., plant which, despite repeated design changes, fails to measure up to the minimum standards set by the Navy for introduction into its inventory.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MINSHALL. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, I am sure the gentleman, when he referred to a single-engined plane, did not actually mean a single engine.

Mr. MINSHALL. I will say to the gentleman, No, I did not. I have on some glasses that do not improve my eyesight for close work.

Mr. FLOOD. I would say to the gentleman that my glasses do not help, either.

Mr. MINSHALL. I presume I will have to go back to my original glasses. I thank the gentleman for calling that to my attention and correcting me.

Even these standards for the Navy version of the F-111B have been reduced drastically from original design specifications to satisfy the ego of those who originally conceived the dual purpose, commonality approach for our military aircraft.

Any dollar savings which might have been achieved by the commonality concept have been canceled out long ago.

Mr. Chairman, I do not come to the floor today as a military expert, but I have listened intently to the experts, and the experts on the record and frequently off the record are overwhelmingly against the Navy F-111B. Based on testimony before our Subcommittee on Defense, and statements of the highest ranking naval officers, both in the committee and out of the committee, the F-111B at its very best is an "iffy" aircraft. Why is it "iffy"? The plane was originally hailed as having a dual mission as a fighter-interceptor and as an aircraft platform for launching attacks against a possible threat in the 1970's.

Some contend that this threat may never materialize. Be that as it may, one thing is certain: The F-111B's capability to meet such a threat does not exist today, nor is it certain it ever will exist. Economy and efficiency were major boasts of Secretary McNamara's much-touted commonality concept which we were told would save billions of dollars. The F-111B originally was estimated at \$2.8 million per copy, per plane, if you will. Today procurement costs, depending on who is giving the figure, the figure averages out to \$8 million or \$9 million per plane. American taxpayers are being asked to gamble an additional \$208.8 million on an aircraft which is already more than 2 years behind schedule. American taxpayers are being asked to procure a Navy plane which is still at least a year and a half from even being tested on and off a carrier's deck. The initial testing of a changed key prototype will not be done until November of this year.

Original design and specifications have been thrown out the window. Future prototypes will look different and be different especially as to weight and flying characteristics.

It is a changed aircraft with a changed mission.

American taxpayers are being asked to take a chance that the Navy can overcome serious problems of overweight which affect the plane's range, speed, acceleration, maneuverability, fuel consumption and weapons carrying characteristics.

Recently, I gave serious thought to striking out procurement funds for the Navy F-111B, in this appropriation bill.

The situation recalls one that confronted me several years ago when the defense bill came before this Chamber. I am sure that many members of this defense subcommittee remember the situation. It was about the Bomarc. At that time I was a relatively new member of the defense subcommittee, and even though I have gained a total of 9 years' experience on the subcommittee, I certainly do not now consider myself a military expert and I do not pretend to be a prophet. But I do remember in 1960, despite strong pressures, I armed myself with information that I had received both in the subcommittee and from private sources on the question of reliability regarding the Bomarc missile. Like the F-111-B the Bomarc had a bad history of throwing good money after bad after repeated tests and repeated failures. In committee I led a fight as a result of which the air force finally agreed to cut \$160 million from the Bomarc funds.

My efforts to eliminate the remaining \$200 million for Bomarc were defeated later on the House floor.

At the height of the Bomarc controversy, Phil G. Goulding, military affairs reporter for the Cleveland Plain Dealer—and I emphasize again—I did not then nor do I now claim to be a military expert but Phil G. Goulding's views on defense matters were considered expert enough in 1960 and his opinions were so highly valued in this area that he subsequently was tapped by Secretary McNamara to serve in the post he now fills at the Pentagon as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

In his report on efforts to cut Bomarc funds, Goulding wrote in the May 1, 1960, Plain Dealer:

Rep. William E. Minshall (R) of Cleveland probably is more responsible than any other man for cuts of hundreds of millions of dollars being made in the Bomarc anti-aircraft missile program . . . Chief supporter of the third-term Republican has been the missile itself, which stubbornly refuses to pass its flight tests and which has lagged behind its development schedule. If Minshall is right, and if reductions now recommended by the House Appropriations Committee are upheld he will have earned his \$22,500 salary for the next 3,000 years.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MINSHALL. I would only add one thing and that is the gentleman who is now standing, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FLOOD] is probably just as responsible, if not more responsible for helping to delete these funds than I.

Mr. FLOOD. That is all very fine, but it is only partly so. I did start at them about the Bomarc missile a number of years ago, but I dropped the ball and the gentleman in the well picked up the ball and did a lot of research and work on it and carried it through to where we now know where it is as of this afternoon. We have information but because of its classification, we cannot divulge it.

But I can remember using the expression on the floor at that time in the earlier days and in meetings with the Air Force people that this missile will not even be good enough to knock the starlings off the Archives Building in Washington where we are having a lot of trouble with that problem.

Mr. MINSHALL. I remember the gentleman making that statement—and it is just as true today as it was then—if not more so. Only, I might add further that what the gentleman mentioned, which is classified, secret, bears out what the gentleman has said.

Mr. FLOOD. Could the gentleman give us at least the amount of money—would the gentleman consider that classified or would he consider the whole document classified?

Mr. MINSHALL. I would be glad to do that. I have it in another document here that is not classified.

The Bomarc program was subsequently curtailed but not before nearly—in answering my colleague's query—nearly \$3 billion tax dollars went down the drain.

In all candor, I feel that this will be the fate of the F-111B. But in view of the world situation, I am not pressing for elimination today of these funds. I am giving the Secretary of Defense the benefit of every doubt for the sake of the security of our country. I hope that he is right.

As I said earlier, we have had days of testimony on the F-111B. Much of it has been deleted from the printed hearings for security reasons, and I might also say stamped "Secret" in many instances merely to protect Pentagon political interests.

Let me refer you to just a few excerpts which escaped the military censor's red pencil in this year's printed hearings.

On page 839, part 2, of our hearings:

Secretary Nitze: We do not have a F-111B which contains in it the changes which we think are either desirable or necessary to give us full confidence in carrier suitability.

Yet we are asked to spend more than \$200 million to procure them 12 such aircraft.

On page 847, part 2, of this year's hearings, the following colloquy:

Mr. Minshall: . . . If you had it to do all over again would you follow the course the Defense Department has or would the Navy start over and design its own airplane?

Admiral McDonald, Chief of Naval Operations: I wasn't here at that time, Mr. Minshall. If I had been around at that time I might not be here now. . . . No, I would not have done it that way.

Mr. Minshall: What would you have done? Admiral McDonald: I would have designed a plane giving full consideration to the weight limitations that are imposed upon operations from an aircraft carrier.

June 13, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 7083

But they want us to procure 12 such planes immediately.

Look at page 234, part 4, of the hearings.

This colloquy is with Vice Adm. Thomas F. Connolly, Deputy Chief of Naval Air Operations:

Mr. Minshall: . . . There are a lot of things about the F-111B that have not been proven or checked out. Is that a correct statement?

Admiral Connolly: That is right.

Mr. Minshall: But you ask in this budget for 20 aircraft, F-111B, a bird that has not been checked out yet?

Admiral Connolly: Of course, Mr. Minshall, I am up here defending the President's budget.

And that is the crux of the Navy's argument when all is said and done. They are defending the President's budget—Mr. McNamara's budget, in reality, and they are being stifled in voicing their criticism.

The current issue of the Saturday Evening Post, in its excellent article, "Is This Plane a Billion Dollar Bungle," contains this significant quote in regard to the F-111B:

"There is a fear of recriminations," one highly placed source explains. "Most Navy people feel we have to go along on this and keep our mouths shut or there won't be any Navy."

Even so, sifting through the voluminous hearings, we find the Navy admitting to a serious lack of pilot visibility in the F-111B. Admiral Connolly, on page 229, part 4, himself says:

There is a lot of work to do on the airplane. There are configuration changes to make the visibility for the pilot better.

The combat ceiling of the aircraft is considerably lower than was originally considered desirable. Dr. Robert A. Frosch, the Assistant Secretary for the Navy for Research and Development, admitted on page 402 of part 3 that the Navy does not know whether the plane will flunk or pass all of the tests.

He told our subcommittee:

On the basis of flight tests with the final configuration aircraft we cannot expect to know that until next year.

I asked in subcommittee and I ask again on the floor today: Why does the Navy want the F-111B when it is such a questionable aircraft based on the testimony we have heard in years past? Look at what Adm. F. H. Michaelis replied to me under questioning a year ago in our defense subcommittee—and he was in charge of the program. The date was April 19, 1966. I asked him his opinion of the F-111B.

Admiral Michaelis replied:

It is a very questionable aircraft for carrying out the Navy mission . . . questionable to perform the missions for which it was designed in the Navy.

The Navy's lack of enthusiasm for the TFX is conspicuous on the record.

I assure you that, off the record, it is far more emphatic.

I debated long and hard with myself about introducing an amendment today asking that the \$208.8 million procurement money for the 12 F-111B's be eliminated from the budget.

I know all of the facts about this aircraft. I feel strongly that it is as big and perhaps even more costly a mistake than Bomarc.

If this were 1960, when Bomarc was the issue, I would not hesitate for a moment to ask this House to eliminate procurement funds for the Navy's TFX.

Fortunately there were alternatives to Bomarc.

But under Defense Secretary McNamara there is no alternative to the F-111B.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MINSHALL. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Gross].

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding and I want to tell him of my appreciation for his good work on the Appropriations Committee. Apparently the committee got better answers from the military than it did from the civilians in connection with the F-111 planes. I was most interested to read on page 839 of the hearings the following colloquy:

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Does the Navy have in its possession now a F-111B that is carrier-suitable?

Secretary NITZE. We do not have a F-111B which contains in it the changes which we think are either desirable or necessary to give us full confidence in carrier suitability.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. So the answer is "No."

Secretary NITZE. We have not yet tested it on the carrier. The contractor claims it should be in its present configuration, but we do not believe that.

Mr. MINSHALL. Why not just say "No," Mr. Secretary?

Secretary NITZE. I want to be precise.

Mr. MINSHALL. "No" is a pretty precise word.

Secretary BROWN. Some things can be precise without being accurate.

This appears to be another contribution to the credibility gap and evasion that seems to flourish in the Department of Defense under Secretary McNamara.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I will let the gentleman decide that for himself. I think the record speaks for itself. There were some evasive answers on this subject, many of which do not appear in the printed record, but I believe this colloquy the gentleman has so well pointed out typifies the response of the Pentagon to the F-111B program.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MINSHALL. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's remark that in spite of his reservations on this system, at this juncture in world affairs, the situation being what it is, he does not propose to offer an amendment to further curtail or cut back or slow down this program. I feel very strongly that any such an amendment would be a grave mistake. The Navy says it needs this plane. It is not true that, in spite of any of the developmental problems that have occurred, as might be fully understandable in any such revolutionary new program, this program, according to the Navy and the Air Force, still represents the greatest single advance in the state of aerial war-

fare, wrapped together in a single package, that we have ever had. This is how Secretary Nitze and the program project officers expressed it to me and it seems to me that they should know.

Mr. MINSHALL. I believe when the history is written, we will know more about that.

I would like to point out I believe the F-111B part of the program will be the most significant failure—if the gentleman has been listening to my remarks—that we have ever had in this country since the Bomarc boondoggle.

Mr. WRIGHT. I am sure the gentleman does not want it to be a failure.

Mr. MINSHALL. I certainly do not. I said in my remarks I hope Secretary McNamara is right, and that is why I gave him the benefit of every doubt and did not move to strike out the funds for the Navy version of the TFX commonly known as the F-111B.

Mr. WRIGHT. I believe history will prove Secretary McNamara right. I, having had some familiarity with the program, believe it will be a truly great success.

Mr. MINSHALL. The gentleman should know about it. He is from Texas and he should know.

Mr. WRIGHT. That is exactly correct. I have had the privilege of following this program very closely since its inception. The F-111B, however, is not made in Texas but in New York. But if I had been from California or Florida or any other State, knowing what I do about this program, I would be just as strongly for it.

Mr. MINSHALL. I would like to conclude by saying: that despite the fact that it cannot perform its original mission, the substitution of existing aircraft might or might not be feasible.

This is not 1960. The world climate has changed radically from those cold war days.

International tensions are near the breaking point. We are in a hot war in Vietnam. We have just witnessed an explosion in the Middle East. The world is holding its breath until a new trouble spot erupts.

And, thanks to the omnipotent man in the Pentagon, we are stuck with the Navy TFX, at least for the immediate future.

In deciding not to offer an amendment striking procurement funds for the F-111B, I can only echo the words of the eminent Senator RUSSELL of Georgia:

If (McNamara) is right, we will save a few dollars.

If he is in error, may a benign Providence save these United States.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. ANDREWS].

Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, first I should like to pay my respects to our distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON]. I have served under three chairmen of the full Appropriations Committee during my tenure in office, and I have yet to see one who in my opinion has done

a better job than has the gentleman from Texas.

This is a big bill. It is the biggest bill that will come before the Congress—\$70,-295,200,000—to provide the weapons of war for our servicemen who are today engaged in what I consider to be one of the worst wars, if not the worst war, this country has ever been involved in.

There are high ranking members of the military who have agreed with that statement; namely, that this is the worst war this Nation as ever been engaged in.

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, it seems that only those who have relatives in the jungles of South Vietnam are concerned about this war. The man on the street, who has no son or no relative in South Vietnam—and the Members know it—has an attitude of "I couldn't care less."

I want to pay my respects to that little country of Israel. I hope the leaders of this country will learn something from the actions of Israel last week. I believe the record of that war is one of the most brilliant chapters ever written in the history of wars.

A little nation, completely surrounded by enemies, outnumbered three to one both in personnel and in equipment, with full knowledge of the fact that Russia was threatening to go to the aid of her enemies, won a war in the unbelievable time of about 5 days.

It was for one reason, Mr. Chairman. Israel fought that war to win. Israel carried out the statement made by the late General MacArthur, that in war there is no substitute for victory.

Israel cared nothing for the threats of Russia. Figuratively speaking, she used the words of Admiral Farragut when she said, "Damn the Russians, full speed ahead." And, bless her heart, she came out victorious because she fought that war to win.

My great concern, Mr. Chairman, is that our people are not fighting the war to win in South Vietnam. Either one of two things is happening. Either we are not fighting to win, or we cannot win. It is one of the two.

I will say that if this great and powerful Nation, the most affluent nation in the world, cannot whip a little country like North Vietnam, which is not as big as the State of New Jersey—a little nation that has no air force and has no navy—then we have no business in the war business, and we ought to beat our swords into plowshares and declare to the world that we are a nation of Quakers and get out of the war business completely.

Something is going on that I cannot pinpoint. I know that I have talked to many, many, many military men.

I have been on this committee for 23 years. I asked a very high-ranking officer, "Do you have enough equipment?" His answer was, "Yes, sir." I asked, "Do you have enough planes?" He said, "Yes, sir." I asked, "Do you have enough guns and ammunition?" He said, "Yes, sir." I asked, "Well, why can you not whip that little country of North Vietnam? What do you need to do it?" His answer was, "Targets—targets."

Now, you know, if we had sent a team of experts all over the world looking for the very worst place to commit our troops, that team of experts would have come back with a report that would have had South Vietnam high on the list as being the worst place to commit troops.

During those 23 years I have been on the committee military men have told me and the committee that in a guerrilla-type war you cannot hope to win unless you have a superiority of 10 to 1. We have nothing like that superiority today in South Vietnam.

According to the latest reports, we have approximately 435,000 men in South Vietnam. General Westmoreland recently said he needed 200,000 to 250,000 more troops in South Vietnam. The French stayed there for 10 years fighting. They had the best troops in the world down there, members of the Foreign Legion. The French had 600,000 troops in South Vietnam. Did they win? The answer is no. I do not believe you can win a land war in Southeast Asia. You must have a superiority of 10 to 1. One man in the jungle with a rifle is worth 10 men out in front of him.

My prediction here is that if this war continues to be fought as it has been for the last 6 years, we will be there at least another 20 years. To say that this great Nation is pinned down in South Vietnam is an understatement. We are pinned down by a little nation that will not rate 75th in the family of nations. That little nation today has the most powerful, the most affluent nation in the world pinned down. And I say that is an understatement.

We can win if we fight to win, in my humble opinion. I think the most courageous decision ever made in the history of this Nation was made by former President Harry Truman when he ordered the use of atomic weapons at Hiroshima. He served notice on the Japanese Government, "You surrender within 3 days or expect further bombings." Hearing nothing from the Japanese on the third day the second bomb fell on Nagasaki, and the war ended, and literally thousands of lives were saved, because we had planned for the first week in November of 1945 what would have been the bloodiest invasion in the history of the world. Maybe some of you men were in the Pacific at that time waiting for the invasion onto the main islands of Japan the first week in November of 1945. The courageous action of Harry Truman brought that cruel World War II to an end. That second bomb which fell on Nagasaki was the last bomb that we had in our arsenal. We could not have gotten additional bombs until March or June of 1946.

I think we can win this war if we fight to win, but if we continue going as we have for the last 6 years, we will never win. I told the Secretary of Defense when he was before the committee, we have to get tough in order to win this war. Power is the only thing that the Communists understand. I remember when I served as district attorney in Birmingham, Ala., an old police officer told me, "You must never pull a gun on a man unless you are ready to kill him." The same advice is

good for a nation that commits troops to battle. Never send troops into battle unless you are willing to back them up with every resource at your command. And, not to do that for those kids in South Vietnam is a criminal shame and an injustice.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Alabama has expired.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman from Alabama 2 additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama is recognized for 2 additional minutes.

Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, I told the Secretary, "Mr. Secretary, let us win this war. The people are getting restless. Our casualty lists are going up now to the point where the number killed runs anywhere from 250 to 300 a week. Now, let us pick up that telephone and call those people in Hanoi and tell them we will give them 30 days to get out of South Vietnam, and if you are not out within 30 days, then we are going to bring you to your knees. We think we can do it with conventional weapons but, frankly, I would have no compunctions about using the big weapon to bring this war to an end and thus save the lives of young Americans."

Mr. Chairman, there are those who say that it might jeopardize the lives of the people in this country. So what? This is war. And, we all should share the burden. And I am thinking of that kid in the snake-infested, malaria-infested, sniper-infested jungle. That little fellow's life is in danger 24 hours a day. I hope that we can follow the courage of Israel and Harry Truman and bring this nasty, dirty war to an early conclusion.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Ohio, the ranking minority member of the full Committee on Appropriations [Mr. BOW].

(Mr. BOW asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate what my distinguished friend, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Andrews], had to say about what happened in Israel, because what I am going to speak about today took place over there, since I think that war—and I believe the gentleman from Alabama would perhaps agree—was won by civilian soldiers, their reserve components—a great many of them—rather than the Regular Army units over there.

So, Mr. Chairman, I would like to talk a little about the realignment of the Guard and the realignment of our Reserve combat units.

Mr. Chairman, I was very much disturbed when I learned that the Pentagon had decided to wipe out 15 National Guard divisions and a number of Reserve units and set up eight divisions and absorb many of those that were being taken over.

Mr. Chairman, I think every member of this Committee has in the past had great pride in the Guard units of their respective States. I know I have great pride in the great 37th Division of the State of Ohio.

June 13, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 7085

Mr. Chairman, in 1963 four Guard units were deactivated, the primary reason being given for the elimination of these divisions was the alleged inefficiency resulting when command was divided.

Now, Mr. Chairman, that is exactly what they are doing in this reorganization plan. They are dividing the command. They are taking these divisions and setting up brigades and assigning many of the brigades of your States to other States.

Now, all of this was done without the consent or the knowledge of the Congress of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, permit me to cite to the Members of the Committee section 104 of the United States Code which states that no change in the branch, organization, or allotment of a unit located entirely within a State may be made without the approval of its Governor.

Section 104(c) goes on to say:

To secure a force, the units of which when combined will form complete higher tactical units, the President may designate the units of the National Guard, by branch of the Army or organization of the Air Force, to be maintained in each State and Territory, Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, and the District of Columbia. However, no change in the branch, organization, or allotment of a unit located entirely within a State may be made without the approval of its governor.

The plan was made by the Pentagon was taken up with the adjutants general of the various States in Indianapolis a few weeks ago prior to its being considered by any committee of this Congress. I believe after they had made their plan and met with the adjutants general they took it to one of the subcommittees of the Committee on Armed Services but not to the Congress.

I have been advised they take great pride over at the Pentagon in the fact that nine Governors have already approved of this plan after some weeks, nine out of 50. I know at least one Governor who has vetoed the plan.

What I am disturbed about is how they can go ahead in the executive branch of the Government and take away these units from the States without any consideration of the Congress. I say to you that the Congress has the authority, as the law provides, to take some part in the determination of the setup of these organizations.

I have been greatly tempted to offer an amendment to this bill which would limit and prohibit the Defense Department from making these transfers. It could be done with a limitation. However, the distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. SIKES] offered an amendment to the report. He accepted one amendment which I offered to his report. And I call your attention to that on page 7 under realignment of Army Reserve components, in which is said:

The Committee has considerable misgivings over the prospect of disbanding combat units of the Reserve Components in a time of crisis. The proposal for a major realignment

And we go on to say why. Then we say in the report and direct, "that the proposed realignment be deferred pending such time as formal legislative expression can be made in the matter."

It seems to me, when a Committee on Appropriations directs them to withhold until there is legislative authority, that the Defense Department should accept that direction. And with the statement made here on the floor by the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS], who said the other body is going to consider H.R. 2, and that he was opposed to the realignment and the taking down of these divisions, I am with some reluctance going to withhold my limitation amendment.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOW. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman should be commended for his interest in this important subject. I am sure he would want me to call attention at this point to the fact that the action of the Committee on Appropriations in directing that this reorganization not be affected pending further action by the Congress was unanimous on the part of a 51-member committee and, that only in deference to the fact that ours is an appropriation committee and not a legislative committee, was the language placed in the report rather than written into the bill as a binding limitation.

Mr. BOW. The gentleman is correct. I may say to the gentleman I was prepared at that time to offer the limitation in the committee, but the gentleman's language as amended in the report caused me to withhold the offering of the amendment. I am going to withhold the amendment today, on the basis that the Defense Department will take cognizance of this discussion and of the language in the report, until H.R. 2 is acted on by the other body and comes out of conference and until there has been a conference on this bill.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOW. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I want to join the distinguished gentleman from Ohio in his remarks and support him one hundred percent. I believe that with the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Bow] laying this on the record, it will help the Department of Defense to realize that the Committee on Appropriations, by the language in the report, means exactly what it says.

I believe it is incumbent upon the Department of Defense to withhold this realignment until it gets some good and adequate expressions of the Congress of the United States as to just what should be done and how it should be done. Therefore, I commend the gentleman in the well for his remarks and offer him my support.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOW. I am delighted to yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, my colleague, the gentleman from Ohio, as usual has made an outstanding statement regarding the realignment of the National Guard and the Reserve units throughout the country. He is certainly to be commended and I join him in everything that he has said.

At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read an article which appeared in the Cleveland Press concerning the 37th Division which my good friend, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Bow] has mentioned.

The article is as follows:

TAPS FOR THE 37TH?

Unless the order is reversed, Ohio's proud 37th Infantry Division is about to slip into history after having helped make it for a half century.

The death warrant for the Buckeye corps, identified by its round red and white shoulder patch, was handed down yesterday when the Defense Department announced its retirement after maneuvers this summer. It is part of the Pentagon's streamlining program for the Army National Guard.

For Ohio National Guard officials, the news was not surprising. More than two years ago the Pentagon announced its modernization intention, and many observers expected the 37th to be demobilized then.

Writing at that time of the 37th's impending retirement, Press Military Editor Robert Stafford said: "It has a record of gallantry in combat unmatched by any other National Guard division, of conduct above and beyond the call of duty in three wars, and of patriotic response to any call to service in peace as well as war."

Stafford pointed out that the 37th's record is all the more impressive because it was compiled by "weekend warriors"—the civilian-soldiers suddenly called to fighting duty. They became professionals fast, though, as the Germans can testify in World War I (Meuse-Argonne front) and the Japanese in World War II (Bougainville).

Eight members of the 37th have won Medals of Honor. One of them was Pvt. Rodger Young whose heroism was memorialized in the famous "Ballad of Rodger Young."

The fighting 37th, 1917-1967, Ohio—and the nation—can be proud.

Mr. BOW. I appreciate the gentleman's remarks and am glad that he has read this statement from the Cleveland Press into the RECORD.

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOW. As always I am delighted to yield to my good friend, the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. LAIRD. I thank my distinguished friend, the gentleman from Ohio, for yielding to me at this time.

I know of my colleague's long interest in the National Guard and the record of the State of Ohio Guard units. I too come from a State that has a long and distinguished history with our 32d Division during World War I, in World War II, and again during the Berlin crisis. It was one of two National Guard divisions that were called up by President Kennedy. It was combat ready in a very short period of time.

I think it is important that the language suggested by the gentleman from Florida and the gentleman from Ohio and contained in this report be called to the attention of every Member of this Committee.

I am confident that the Department of Defense will honor this language and that a congressional committee will be given an opportunity to have a thorough review in connection with the bill, H.R. 2, which is currently before the other body.

I have been assured that in the case of Wisconsin our National Guard unit

H 7086

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

June 13, 1967

can maintain some identity of its own by probably changing its name from the "32d Division" to the "32d Brigade." It will be an independent brigade.

I think it is important that this be thoroughly reviewed by the legislative committees of both the House and the Senate and that the language sponsored by the gentleman from Florida and the gentleman from Ohio does just this. I think they have made a valuable contribution to this report and to the consideration of this bill, and I commend them for their interest and the job that they have done in behalf of the National Guard and the Reserve.

Mr. BOW. I thank my colleague, the gentleman from Wisconsin.

May I say in addition, that under the change suggested of calling the division a brigade rather than a division, it would no longer be a complete unit and the plan contemplates the elimination of major generals and a couple of brigadiers and at least eight colonels. In other words, the divisions will be eliminated if they are changed to brigades.

These men have been trained for command. And this is the important element. If you are going to keep manpower, this is important. But you are going to have stretcher bearers, cooks, bakers, and others to fill it up. You will take from the top echelon all these combat-ready divisions.

Mr. LAIRD. Of the Reserve. The gentleman is talking about the Reserve. The National Guard brigade will be a combat brigade.

Mr. BOW. But you are going to lose your top officers. You are going to lose eight colonels in that division and you are not going to have a complete unit. You are not going to have artillery support. I recognize the brigade as one thing. Some of these brigades will be under the command of other States and National Guard units.

I should like to make one other statement and then I shall be glad to yield to both of my friends who would like me to yield. I would like to point out why I believe Congress has a great stake in this. Does the Congress have anything to do with it, or is it Mr. McNamara's computers that can do all of these things?

I would like to refer to the Constitution of the United States, which many of us forget to read at times. What does the Constitution have to say about this?

In article I, section 8 of the Constitution there appears the following language, giving powers to Congress. The Congress has the power—

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

That is the responsibility of Congress. Continuing to read:

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment

of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;—

Not by the Secretary of Defense.

There are four, five, or six paragraphs in the Constitution outlining the authority of the Congress.

Some of you will say to me, "The President is the Commander in Chief."

That is correct. Let us turn to the language of the Constitution that gives him his authority, after reading these paragraphs on the authority of the Congress in this matter. Under the Constitution, which we have taken an oath to support and defend, article II, section 3, states:

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.

He is the Commander in Chief. He will decide where we are going to bomb and to send troops after we raise them, after we get up the organization of them. That is our responsibility, not the computers in the Pentagon.

So I urge my friends that if we get into this question in H.R. 2, where if we find they have violated this direction in the committee report, the Congress will accept its responsibility under the Constitution and see to it that these units are not destroyed.

I would like to speak a little more about the units, but first I yield to my friend from Pennsylvania.

Mr. FLOOD. I thank the gentleman. As the gentleman knows, some of us have been at this for a number of years. I compliment the gentleman on his position, especially his reference to the Constitution. Of course, my leader on this subject is the distinguished gentleman from Florida, both on the Reserve and the Guard. I rise only to join with my friend, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. LAIRD]. I am from Pennsylvania. Of course, everyone has heard of the 28th Division. You do not have to go beyond that.

Mr. BOW. I might say to the gentleman that I congratulate him. The 28th Infantry Division is going to stay in existence. It is not one of the 15 divisions that have been taken away. But the 28th Infantry Division of Pennsylvania will include a Pennsylvania brigade, a Maryland brigade and a Virginia brigade.

So the great old Pennsylvania division of the hometown boys is now going to be infiltrated.

Mr. FLOOD. Except that a number of years ago my grandfather had trouble with some of those fellows at Gettysburg, and they found that if you cannot lick them, you join them.

Mr. BOW. The gentleman is correct, and it raises a rather interesting question about how they are going to get along with each other.

Mr. FLOOD. Oh, just like we do here.

Mr. BOW. Fine.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOW. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BRAY].

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I congratulate the committee for making this very fine effort, which we hope will be

successful, to save the destruction of the Guard and Reserves. I read very carefully the section of the report entitled "Realignment of Army Reserve Components," which is on page 7 of the report. I do want to say that it does express the intent of Congress, that the Secretary of Defense go no further in destruction of Guard Reserves until Congress has the time and the opportunity to do something about the matter.

I want also to mention that for the last 6 years there have been organizations, reorganizations, and attempted reorganizations and rumors of reorganizations, each of which would make the Guard and Reserves a weaker and less effective force.

I do want to say we must do everything we possibly can to save and strengthen the Guard and the Reserve. The constant reorganization, the constant threat of reorganization, is destructive of the morale of any unit. That is academic. The fact that the Guard and the Reserve have been able to maintain their morale and their willingness to perform—in spite of the tremendous handicap that has been placed upon them by this constant changing policy and the constant attempt to reduce and reorganize and reorganize, which has been going on now for 6 years—is very commendatory of the officers and men of those services.

Also I want to mention here an article in the New York Times of June 13, 1967, by Charles Mohr, entitled "Rapid Mobilization of Reservists a Key Factor in Israel Victory." The article is as follows:

RAPID MOBILIZATION OF RESERVES A KEY FACTOR IN ISRAEL VICTORY

(By Charles Mohr)

BANIYAS, SYRIA, June 12.—The Israeli Army is a highly professional striking force but it is composed overwhelmingly of amateurs.

Israel's military reserve and mobilization system, a model of efficiency, constituted one of the major factors in the quick victory achieved against the Arabs.

The army that destroyed six Egyptian divisions in the desert, conquered Jerusalem and dislodged the Syrian Army from fortified hill positions did not exist physically four weeks ago. It existed in the card indexes of the offices of reserve units in every Israeli town and city. Some of the best units were combat-ready only twelve hours after commandeer taxis began delivering call-up notices to Israeli homes, mostly on the evening of May 20. Even "sloppy" units were ready within 48 hours.

It is this reserve-mobilization system that gives Israel a highly responsive striking force without imposing on her the burden of supporting a large regular army. It is a volunteer army in a real sense. During the present crisis some reserve units had a 108 per cent response to the call-up as overage and discharged reservists tried to get back into combat units.

There were almost no evasions of the call-up orders. "Next to Nasser," said a lieutenant colonel, "our biggest obstacle to success was people arguing with us and trying to get in the action."

LIFE ENDS AT 45

"I don't know about other countries," said another officer, "but in Israel the male climacteric comes at 45 when you must leave the active reserves. We say life ends at 45."

For the ingenious, however, there are ways to see action after 45 and they were eagerly taken advantage of. Part of the Israeli war plan is to mobilize a large number of civilian

June 13, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

vehicles. The owners of such vehicles have the right to volunteer to drive them even if overage, and most owners did so almost joyously.

There is universal conscription for both boys and girls, the former serving 30 months and the latter 20 months, usually at about age 18.

These conscripts spend their entire active service in training because the Israeli staff believes that only a superbly trained army can protect the country. No time is wasted on garrison duty or in occupying static defense posts. Normally a special border police force guards the nation's frontiers.

REGULAR FORCE IS SMALL

Thus the conscripts in service are not really a part of the "regular" army, although the description is usually applied to them. The true regulars consist only of a small group of officers of the rank of captain and above and senior noncommissioned officers—a nucleus around which the army is built at full mobilization.

After national service training men are assigned to reserve units and remain in them until age 45. Those reservists keep basic personnel equipment, such as fatigue uniforms, webbing boots, at home.

Like most democratic nations, Israel has a grumbler's army in peacetime, and a 90 percent response to annual training call-ups is considered good.

"Every device of the human imagination is used to avoid the training call-ups," an officer said, "and although by law we are allowed to call men up for 30 days each year, political pressures mean that most men get less than a week's training each year, which is not enough.

"But when war comes, all this changes and the same men who have fought for exemptions fight to get back in."

The call-up notices are usually delivered at night or in the evening by taxi drivers and other messengers because, as one staff officer says, "They are at home then and that is when you catch your fish."

One Haifa civilian who fought his way to this Syrian town described it this way: "I came home from a drive with my wife and children and there it was—greetings!"

The summoned reservist makes his own way to the armory or storehouse of his unit, where he is issued weapons, ammunition and other equipment. None of this is as smooth or easy as it may sound for the small number of regulars who must maintain these stores in a state of readiness.

"Even the flashlight issued to a company commander must be filled with fresh batteries," said one regular.

Ideally, the plan is that every tank and jeep should be able to start at a touch of the ignition button. Fuel is regularly changed, batteries are checked and radiators are kept flushed.

The military system is built around a philosophy that is almost totally offensive and does not anticipate prolonged defense. Israel's military doctrine is essentially to attack, but first, to plan for the attack.

On the first day of the war, 25 Arab airfields were bombed and strafed, some repeatedly, within three hours. On the Syrian front, assault infantry units knew far in advance exactly how they would tackle Syria strongpoints.

Though discipline sometimes seems informal, that does not mean it is lax. Instant and determined response to combat orders is expected and officers who let an attack bog down may be removed almost immediately from command.

This article very clearly shows that the reserves of Israel were most effective. Perhaps if the Secretary of Defense would discuss the use made of reservés in the recent Egypt-Israel war

with the Commander of the Israel Army, he might receive some good advice as to strengthening of the Guard and Reserves instead of weakening them.

Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.

In conclusion, I would like to say that in World War I the Guard units of the various States were immediately called into action and the Guard units served admirably and with great distinction throughout that world war. Our 37th was one of those.

Then came World War II, and one of the first divisions activated was the 37th Division of Ohio. It made the long trek back to the Philippines and the return of the Pacific and South Pacific to victory. It was my great honor to be with them, not as a member of the division, but as a war correspondent with the 37th Division, from the landing at Lingayen through the trip down into Manila, through the liberation of Manila, and the liberation of Baguio, through the battles up over Balate Pass and down into the Cagayan Valley. I saw this great division operate. May I say it is one of the very few divisions that left this country early in the war with Maj. Gen. Robert S. Beightler, commanding—one of our great commanding officers. And after Bougainville and Guadalcanal and going up through the Pacific, it returned victorious after the war, with Major General Beightler still commanding the division.

Very few divisions in World War II went out with their original commanders and came back with them.

These units have been depended upon for the preservation of our freedom over the years. They have been ignored and now are being decapitated. Fifteen States are going to lose these great divisions.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that the Defense Department will pay heed to this language in the report and that it will not be necessary again to discuss this question until the House has had an opportunity, with the Senate, to bring in legislation which will protect these fine units.

Mr. Chairman, the plan contemplates the elimination of one major—general officer—and eight—colonel or lieutenant colonel—subordinate commands within each combat division. The headquarters scheduled for deactivation are integrated units possessing the required tactical, logistical, and administrative capabilities for command and control of their subordinate units. Long years of training and close coordination is necessary to train these cohesive command and staff entities. There appears to be no evidence of any replacement for these control headquarters which would retain the years of experience and close coordination.

The proposed plan will require such a multitude of headquarters to clear command and control matters that efficiency will be lost. For example, the 38th Infantry Division based in Indiana has brigades in Ohio and Michigan. Three Governors, three adjutants general, three State headquarters detachments,

and two U.S. Army areas will become involved in all actions of the 38th Division.

Command and control of a combat division requires a highly trained and effective team of commanders and staff members at all levels. The higher the level of command the more complex and demanding the mission becomes. Confidence is gained through experience and frequent contacts between all levels of command and staff. The requirement to coordinate all matters with such a multitude of higher headquarters is unrealistic.

An infantry division deactivated, and replaced with an infantry brigade consisting of a headquarters and three infantry battalions represents a loss of 927 officers, ranging in grade from second lieutenant to major general, and the years of experience represented by their total commissioned service.

Based on commissioned service, and only minimum times in each grade, the officer personnel of an infantry division represent a minimum of 4,113 years of military experience.

Mr. Chairman, may I refer to the proven competency of National Guard officers.

National Guard officers have proven efficiency through all periods of service. The following extracts from Jim Dan Hill's book "The Minute Man in Peace and War" shows various comparisons between Regular Army and National Guard officers during World War II.

At the time of induction in 1940 there were 21 major generals in the Regular Army and 21 major generals in the National Guard. As of January 1, 1945, five, or 23 percent, of the Regular Army major generals were still in the service and that nine, or 42 percent of National Guard major generals were still in the service.

At the time of induction in 1940 there were 45 brigadier generals in the Regular Army and 74 brigadier generals in the National Guard. As of January 1, 1945, 26 or 57.8 percent, of the Regular Army brigadier generals were still in the service. As of June 30, 1945, 43, or 58.1 percent, of the National Guard brigadier generals were still in the service.

At the time of induction in 1940 there were 704 colonels in the Regular Army and 273 colonels in the National Guard. As of January 1, 1945, 273, or 39 percent of the Regular Army colonels were still in the service, and that 148, or 54 percent of the National Guard colonels were still in the service.

Of the 1,100 lieutenant colonels inducted in 1940, 883 were still in the service at the end of the war.

Of the 1,379 majors inducted in 1940, 1,129 were still in the service at the end of the war.

Of the 14,604 company grade officers inducted in 1940, 12,405 were still in the service at the end of the war.

Additionally, 3,168 enlisted men held reserve officer commissions and were commissioned when inducted in 1940. Of these, 2,686 were still in the service at the end of the war.

More than 75,000 National Guardsmen received commissions through the officer candidate school program during World War II.

It is of particular significance that the losses expressed in the various grades were results of all factors, from losses in combat to physical disability, but that the age in grade policy established just before Pearl Harbor caused more separations than any other single cause.

Let us consider the impact of reorganization on unit efficiency.

The redesignation of units will in many instances, involve a change of branch which results in changes in mission, organizational structure, equipment requirements, personnel, and required skills.

This so-called "streamlining," while effectively accomplished on paper, renders redesignated units relatively ineffective during the transition period required to completely effect the change due to the following:

First. Negates existing training results, and generates a requirement for the development of new training programs.

Second. Time required for procurement of new and/or different equipment.

Third. Lack of qualified officer and noncommissioned officer personnel in the new branch.

Fourth. Loss of time and continuity as a result of adjustments in command structure.

Fifth. Increased administrative requirements—administrative actions, records, supply transactions, and so forth.

Sixth. Effect on morale.

Let us consider also the loss of hard skills as a result of deactivation of divisions.

Inasmuch as the retention and placement of personnel in the National Guard is predicated on authorizations contained in tables of organization and equipment, the deactivation of divisions and their replacement with brigades will render hard skilled and professionally qualified personnel in the following categories as excess: Fixed- and rotary-winged aviators; medical and dental professional personnel; legal professional personnel; signal, engineer, and logistical career field personnel; and, maintenance personnel.

It is noted that all artillery with the divisions is eliminated without an apparent replacement. With five artillery battalions to be lost in each division this is an elimination of 75 battalions.

Military doctrine as taught in the U.S. Artillery and Missile School requires the assignment of minimum necessary artillery to the combat division. It is axiomatic that additional artillery must be available to the divisions from corps and Army.

No provision appears to have been made in the troop list for artillery to reinforce that contained organic to a combat division.

Mr. MYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOW. I am delighted to yield to my colleague.

(Mr. MYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MYERS. Mr. Chairman, it is with deep concern that I discuss with you, my colleagues of the House of Repre-

sentatives, a proposal recently announced by the Defense Department to reorganize again the Reserve components of the Army.

The Secretary of Defense acknowledged in his annual posture statement on the military forces that he could not merge the Army Reserve into the National Guard. The Congress, following months of investigation in depth and extensive hearings, has twice rejected the Defense Department's proposal to merge the Army Reserve into the National Guard, and has established the requirement for maintenance of separate components in the appropriations bills and the Reserve bill of rights which has been passed by the House of Representatives in this session as H.R. 2.

In December 1965, the Secretary of Defense ordered 748 Army Reserve units inactivated, saying this was necessary in order to eliminate the low-priority units. He declared these low-priority units were not needed in the Army's contingency plans.

All six combat divisions of the Army Reserve were inactivated and approximately 55,000 well-trained Army reservists were affected in the 748 units eliminated.

These inactivations were ordered by the Secretary of Defense in direct defiance of the expressed wish of the Congress that the action should not be carried out until the Congress had an opportunity to review the proposed unit inactivations.

The Defense Department said the inactivations had to be completed by December 31, 1965, in order to eliminate units that were low priority and were not needed under the contingency plans. It hastened to accomplish the destruction before the Congress came back into session in January.

At the same time, it should be noted that there were twice as many low priority units in the National Guard, also presumably not part of the contingency plans, but the Guard's units have not been touched.

I would not in any way cast a reflection on the fine dedication and service of the officers and men of the National Guard. However, I cannot but wonder at the Defense Department's deliberate and persistent moves in these last 24 months to destroy the Army Reserve in violation of the desires of Congress.

The Secretary of Defense has further said in his posture statement of this year that, since the Congress has not approved the merger of the Army Reserve into the National Guard, he was directing the Secretary of the Army to find other ways of accomplishing the same objectives. In other words, under orders from the Secretary of Defense, the Army must find ways to reorganize the Reserve into the Guard and thus to circumvent the will of the Congress.

The words are not the same, but the intent is clear.

And so the Army has now prepared this new reorganization proposal which should be reviewed with that background in mind.

I am informed that this reorganization proposal includes the following:

First. Inactivating all combat and combat service support units in the Army Reserve. This includes four high priority, immediate ready brigades that are part of the required contingency force structure.

Second. A reduction of the Army Reserve's strength to 240,000, which is 20,000 below the minimum strength of not less than 260,000 mandated for the Army Reserve by the Congress.

Third. Establish the strength of the Guard at 400,000.

Fourth. Eliminate the 15 low-priority Guard divisions and convert them to brigades.

The effects of this reorganization—which is nothing more than a further piecemeal implementation of the merger—are far reaching with a heavy impact of Reserve component readiness that the casual announcement of the Defense Department does not reveal or indicate.

Consider these untold facts:

First. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not recommend or approve a reduction on the Reserve components below 660,000—400,000 for the Guard and 260,000 for the Army Reserve. I am told their recommendations for the Reserve components are said to exceed 660,000.

Second. The four-star commanding general of the U.S. Continental Army Command which is responsible for training and preparing for combat all the units going to Vietnam has not concurred with the plan because of the loss of unit readiness it would cause.

Third. The chief, Army Reserve, a man of 40 years' experience in the National Guard, Regular Army, and the last 17 years in the Army Reserve, does not concur with the plan. The chief, Army Reserve, is responsible for the personnel, training, and equipping of the entire Army Reserve.

Fourth. The Army staff is reported in disagreement on the proposal, even though the matter is one of special interest to the Secretary of Defense personally and a proposal which the Regular Army has been "expected" as "good soldiers" to support.

This is evidenced by the fact that when the Section 5 Committee voted on the plan that vote "approved" the plan by a slender margin of only one vote—11 to 10.

In the committee there are seven National Guard members who may be presumed to have voted for the proposal. The seven Army Reserve members were 100 percent against it. This left the seven Regular Army general, members of the Army staff agencies divided 4 to 3 on the proposal.

Fifth. The General Staff Committee on Army Reserve, made up of seven Regular Army members and seven Army Reserve members voted 9 to 5 against the proposal. They also voted to keep combat units in the Army Reserve and to maintain an average strength in the Army Reserve of not less than 260,000.

Sixth. More than 200 well-trained, Immediate Ready Army Reserve units with a strength of almost 40,000 would be inactivated under the plan, only to turn about and immediately reactivate new

June 13, 1967

identical units in the Guard, or upgrade, train and equip low priority Guard units in order for them to reach the already existing immediate ready standards of the Army Reserve units that would be inactivated.

Seventh. All units of the Army Reserve are now Immediate Ready, high priority units that are part of the contingency plan requirements.

Eighth. The Guard's structure now includes more than 100,000 in the low priority category, not part of contingency requirements. Yet, the Pentagon is pushing for the inactivation of the Army Reserve's high priority units that are essential to the contingency plan.

Ninth. In the Army Reserve alone, tremendous turbulence would result from this proposed reorganization. It would disrupt more than one-third of the entire Army Reserve and many thousands of dedicated, trained men will be left with no units in which to train.

The Congress traditionally has supported the needs of the national defense and the Nation's security has been regarded above all else. The element of cost has been a secondary consideration.

However, we cannot overlook the cost to the taxpayer, especially when a proposal is submitted which has apparently subordinated real military requirements and the needs of the national defense to other considerations of questionable nature.

This reorganization would destroy well-trained units of the Army Reserve that are needed in our contingency plans only to activate or build up other similar or identical units in the Guard. The trained officers and men of these Army Reserve units would, for the most part, be lost, just as they were in December 1965 when the previous large scale Reserve inactivations took place.

These units of the Army Reserve and their personnel have been trained and equipped at great expense and now we are to be asked to condone their inactivation only to turn around and activate the same type units in the Guard, or to take low priority units in the Guard and bring them up to the standards of the already existing Army Reserve units being inactivated.

This defies understanding.

There seems to be no real military justification for the plan.

We know from the hard lessons of the 1965 inactivations of the 748 Army Reserve units that their personnel will not volunteer for service in the Guard. When those units were inactivated, the end result was that only about 2 percent of the Army reservists volunteered for service in the Guard. The rest of those 55,000 reservists were largely lost.

The Army Reserve, in 1965, had six combat divisions, all with outstanding World War II records. Some of these in 1965 had reached an advanced state of training that included company level Army training tests and live fire exercises with close-in overhead artillery and air support.

It was at this point the Secretary of Defense, with the glib comment that their people would be absorbed and trained in other needed units, proceeded to inactivate these divisions.

Many of those officers and men of the inactivated units have found no other units in which to train. For a while, a large number were carried as over-strength in units where they had no specific assignments or requirement. As of now, almost the entire 55,000 have been lost.

Some few officers and men are continuing to hold onto reinforcement training units which they formed after the inactivations, and which are meeting with no pay and almost no support from the Army. The Deputy Secretary of Defense promised these RTU's would receive support, but it is noted that there is no funding for such support in the 1968 budget.

I have often thought, especially in light of recent ominous international developments, that we may wake up one day and wish we had those six fine Army Reserve divisions. In fact, if newspaper reports are correct, we are sending men and units into battle today who are less well trained than the units and men affected by the 1965 inactivations and who also may have had less training than those units and men the Secretary of Defense is now proposing to eliminate from the Army Reserves.

This new plan becomes more inconsistent when you consider that the Defense Department is about to call up some 31,000 Army Reservists as "punishment" for not participating in the Reserve program. The public has not been told that the majority of these men cannot participate because there are no units left in their areas.

A callup of Reserves if needed for the defense of our country, is one thing. But to "punish" these men when they are caught in a situation beyond their control that was created by the Pentagon itself is a highly questionable action.

Yet, at this moment the Pentagon is proposing to inactivate more units, making it impossible for more men to meet their military obligations.

There is talk of mobilization of Reserves. This has become a matter of almost daily speculation.

There was a recent press report of a 15,000-man—division size—unit having been formed in Vietnam from bits and pieces to meet an urgent troop requirement just below the DMZ.

Press reports of a few weeks ago said the 1st Armored Division is now being stripped in order to form a new brigade to meet Vietnam troop needs.

There are continuing reports of pilot shortages.

General Westmoreland is known to want and to need more troops. When the speculation arose only a few months ago that Vietnam troop needs might rise as high as 600,000, these predictions were ridiculed by the Pentagon. Yet today we are nearing that figure and new speculation raises the estimates.

It is in the face of these facts that we are being presented with a Pentagon proposal that will reduce the Army Reserve to a new low, will inactivate important high priority units, drastically lower unit readiness, will eliminate such needed units of the Army Reserve as

immediate ready brigades and aviation units staffed with skilled personnel and pilots, and which will create new and widespread turbulence and loss of morale in the Army Reserve.

This seems almost unbelievable, but it is true.

I view these developments with the greatest alarm.

There is a clear and, I believe, urgent need for the Congress to stand firmly on its previous rejections of the Reserve-Guard merger and to refuse to be hoodwinked by this new proposal. It cannot be justified as being in the national interest any more than the first merger plan which the Congress found to be poorly planned and would damage our national security. This new proposal is, if anything, worse than the first one.

The Congress must stand firm on its present language in the appropriations bill and the Reserve bill of rights—H.R. 2.

It must be made clear once and for all that these bills mean what they say and that the maintenance of strengths and the preservation of the separate components is a matter of high interest to the Congress. The Defense Department must understand that the Congress will expect compliance with the language of the bills which state that the National Guard will maintain an average annual strength of not less than 380,000 and the Army Reserve an average strength of not less than 260,000.

There must be no compromise.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FLOOD].

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, as all of us know, nothing sounds as sweet to the ears of a Congressman as the sound of his own voice. It is rather late in the afternoon. It is rather late in this bill.

First, I do not want the Members to believe that I am sailing under false colors with these black glasses. I have got a "bum" right eye. I did not walk into a barroom door, as I want the Members to see. It just leaks, somehow. The appearance is perfectly proper and entirely legitimate.

Second, I understand, after some 20 years of service on this committee, what the rules are and what one should or should not say, but I am a natural maverick and nonconformist. Otherwise, how could one expect anybody with a mustache like this to be elected to Congress from the heart of the coal fields? So one has to be sort of a nonconformist.

I want to say the same thing now that I said about this time last year, and at about this time of the day.

I hope there will be no quorum call, because this is one of my annual speeches. I desire to talk to these real hard core interested persons.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FLOOD. I yield to my friend from Missouri.

Mr. HALL. I should like to accommodate the gentleman with a quorum call. I, too, believe it is a perfidy and an injustice to the Nation to consider a \$71 billion appropriation bill, worthy as its intent may be, with so few Members on the floor. Only my respect for the

self-styled nonconformist gentleman of Pennsylvania, and his expertise here in this area and particularly in the defense features of the Panama Canal Zone, plus my desire not to "set him down" in the middle of a good speech, precludes my point of order.

Mr. FLOOD. I agree with that, but, as the gentleman knows, these are not trained seals. We are all prima donnas. We all have rights.

The redeeming feature of this is that it expresses great confidence, it is an extraordinary exhibition of confidence, in the chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense, from the great State of Texas, that in his sublime hands would rest the fate of the Nation and of this great bill.

Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Chairman, I agree with the gentleman. I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman please withdraw his point of order?

Mr. DEVINE. Does the gentleman not want the Members present to hear him?

Mr. FLOOD. I am probably the last speaker. There is only an amendment, or perhaps two, for consideration. I am satisfied with the sound of my own voice and that of the gentleman.

Would the gentleman please withdraw his point of order?

Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw the point of order.

Mr. FLOOD. Now, my remark about being a nonconformist is this: I have been on this committee for many more years than many of you can recall. This is largely for the new men who are here. I regard the members of this subcommittee with an esteem and respect which is difficult to fathom. You sit there for 5 or 6 hours a day, for 5 and sometimes 6 days a week, for 5 months at a time and then consider supplementals, and you develop an affection and a regard for your colleagues that you reserve only for members of your family. I have said it is true on my side now down South—and I was raised in the South, although how long ago is none of your business—and this is not unparliamentary language, Mr. Chairman, but the word "damnyankee" down there is one word and not two. In some parts of the State of Pennsylvania where I come from "damndemocrat" is just one word, too. Now, these damndemocrats on this subcommittee go on like Tennyson's brook, forever and forever.

As I have told you, I have been on there 20 years, and I have been low man until this year when we had the good fortune to bring in the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. SLACK] and my good friend from New York [Mr. ADDABBO], who have contributed much and who in the years ahead will bear a great deal of this burden. How these men can do what they do is beyond me. Everyone of these Democrats up to the subcommittee chairman does a tremendous job.

The distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. LARR], sits to my right as the ranking Republican on Health, Education, and Welfare, the second biggest bill, which we brought in just a short time ago. We miss GERRY FORD. It

was a loss to the Republican Party, I think, and to this House and to the Nation when GERRY had to leave us after 15 years to take over the mantle of leadership. He did his homework.

Mr. RHODES of Arizona we have seen here for years. As a leader how he got there I do not know. I do not know the rules on your side. They write their own there. On our side we do not have any rules. We would not dare to have a caucus. I have been at one caucus in 20 years, and the blood was so thick on the floor that we have not had one since.

Now let me tell you this: This is what I would like the public to hear. You all know—oh, I slipped there when I said "you all"—you see what influence will do—the public should know that never have I heard in 20 years acrimony, vilification, abuse, or one word of partisan politics on either side of the aisle on this Subcommittee on Defense. Not once in 20 years. In view of the tremendous and fantastic problems involved, just try and match that. You cannot match it. It is unbelievable. That is the way we come to you today.

The trouble with this bill now is years ago I could talk here for an hour because I was mad about things that were not in it or mad about things that were in it. Every year it is getting tougher and tougher for me to talk 10 or 15 minutes, because I have fewer and fewer things to get mad about. I have some things—some things.

I went down, Mr. Chairman, to the launching of the greatest fighting ship in the world 3 weeks ago, the great fighting aircraft carrier, the *John F. Kennedy*, named after our beloved and revered President. My heart was in that, but I never felt so bad in my life as I did when she started down the ways. And, Mr. Chairman, if you have never been to the launching of a great fighting ship, when it is started afloat, and after the bottles of champagne have been broken, and she starts slowly to move down those ways, and the band plays "Anchors Aweigh," and if the lump is not in your throat, there is something the matter with you—there is something the matter with you. I have been to 50, and the last one was just like the first one.

But you know, Mr. Chairman, what the trouble was. Mr. McNamara and "Mr. McNamara's Band" at the Pentagon made one of the most shocking errors and mistakes in the history of our military Establishment. The trouble is, Mr. Chairman, that that great carrier is not nuclear powered. That is a disgrace. She was obsolescent the minute she hit the water. That broke my heart, because I came to this floor and I beat my breast and pulled handfuls of hair out of my head and did everything but get down on my knees and pray to you that a nuclear carrier as provided for under my proposed amendment, should be constructed. I got a lot of votes, but not enough.

So, Mr. Chairman, we have gotten no place, and I am mad about that. I feel better right now, however.

But, second, this bill fully funds one nuclear frigate and the money for lead-

time on a second nuclear frigate is made available.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania has expired. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 additional minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. FLOOD. I thank the distinguished chairman of the full Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. Chairman, the money providing for leadtime procurement is made available.

Mr. Chairman, I introduced an amendment in the subcommittee to fully fund both of these two nuclear frigates, conforming with the authorization act. That is the practice of the Committee on Appropriations. But, that does not impress them. I had the vote of my distinguished friend from Alabama [Mr. ANDREWS], and I say to the gentleman now, Mr. Chairman, never as long as I am on this subcommittee will I ever again vote for a combat ship of the line which is not nuclear powered—never, never again. I hope you do not; I hope you do not.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FLOOD. I yield to my distinguished friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. HOLIFIELD].

(Mr. HOLIFIELD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I thank my distinguished friend, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FLOOD], for yielding. The gentleman knows how dear to my heart this subject matter is, and how dear to the heart of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is this subject. That committee has been fighting, along with the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations, for this very objective which you have achieved in today's bill.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to compliment the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FLOOD] for his stand on this matter over the years and also I wish to compliment the Committee on Appropriations for the courageous position that it has taken. They are 100 percent right.

Mr. Chairman, it is also a great pleasure for me to stand up and add my humble commendation to the words that the gentleman from Pennsylvania has just spoken and for the action which the gentleman's Committee on Appropriations has taken.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, I know the position of the distinguished gentleman from California as chairman of the committee dealing with this subject, and I know the position of my distinguished friend from South Carolina, whom I call "cousin," the great chairman of the great Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

Mr. RIVERS. First cousin.

Mr. FLOOD. Yes, first cousin.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FLOOD] for his defense of nuclear propulsion of surface ships.

Mr. Chairman, I told the Secretary of Defense that so long as I occupy the chairmanship of the Committee on

Armed Services, there will never be another conventional-powered carrier. I have also gotten word to the DOD that there will be other frigates, nuclear-powered, for the future.

Mr. Chairman, we never received any help out of the Department of Defense, but we have come up with these two nuclear-powered frigates. We had quite a fight with the other body in the conference, but it is wonderful to have the backing of the great Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the backing of the great Committee on Appropriations, working in conjunction with the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. Chairman, one must remember that if it were not for the Congress, we would not have a singular nuclear-powered submarine today. The Congress has been the beginning of all this.

Mr. Chairman, it is just refreshing to me to see the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Flood] with his strength back again, making his own appealing plea and defending the things that ought to be done. May God bless the gentleman.

There will never be another like you. Thank God you are on our side.

Mr. FLOOD. I am for you also.

You know, he is a very fast studier, Mr. Chairman, because I just wrote that out for him about 3 minutes ago, and how he memorized it so fast I do not know.

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, I yield to quite a character. If you ever heard this man on the back of some admiral, chewing him out as a cross examiner, it would do your heart good because he will never allow a witness to get away from him without losing at least one ear. So I yield to my friend from Wisconsin [Mr. LAIRD].

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

I would like just to substantiate what he had said about partisan votes in our committee. We have never had a partisan vote in our committee since I first went on the committee in 1953; by partisan vote I mean one in which we divided on in our committee on the basis of our political associations.

Mr. FLOOD. I will say to the gentleman that is correct.

Mr. LAIRD. We put aside all partisan politics. We try to make our decisions based on what is best for the national security of the country with defense appropriations.

Mr. FLOOD. The gentleman does not mean we have never had some very stiff arguments, does he?

Mr. LAIRD. Oh, we certainly have had some very stiff arguments, that is true.

Mr. FLOOD. The gentleman does not mean that I have not had trouble with him, and that he has not had trouble with me, but we always got along.

Mr. LAIRD. But we have always gotten along. We have been able to resolve our differences. Our dispute here is with the Department of Defense. We are disappointed in their not going forward with the nuclear frigate last year. We appropriated lead time money for this last year.

Mr. FLOOD. That is right.

Mr. LAIRD. What I am afraid of is that they may very well hold back, insisting upon conventional power again. This would be a great mistake because we just built an obsolete carrier. When we launched it, the launching was on the television all over this country, and that carrier was obsolete the day it was launched.

Mr. FLOOD. Can you imagine sitting there with me when she went down those ways? It would break your heart.

Mr. LAIRD. I was glad I was not there with you because it would have broken my heart, too.

Mr. FLOOD. I want to add just one more additional thing, even though I dislike taking up this additional time and holding things up:

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 5 additional minutes.

Mr. FLOOD. I will not take that much time. I will do it in English.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized for 5 additional minutes.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, there is one thing that sooner or later we must take a look at. I do not know who is going to do it, but somebody must take a look at it, and that is this business in the Department of Defense of making it mandatory that every officer must serve a tour of duty in almost every bureau or department in the hope that he will become Chief of Staff of the Army or the Air Force, or commander in chief of naval operations in the Navy; that he must have a couple of years of service in every office in the Pentagon. This is simply 19th century thinking, it is an obsolete thing and it should be corrected. I do not know how we would do that, but as a result of that what we get is appalling incompetence in those sections. The fiscal people and the budget people are good, but when they send up line officers, we should not have line officers coming up there in the first place, and they do not like it, and I do not blame these officers, especially officers from four-striper up. They do not want to be here. They want to be with the fleet, or they want to be with the troops, and I do not blame them. That system should be changed.

I hope as soon as we can that a proper committee or a special commission be named to revise that entire procedure which is an archaic and obsolete method of filling these bureau chiefs. It is a dangerous and a bad thing.

Finally this: I know the Fourth of July is approaching, and I am going to make some speeches on the Fourth of July, and so are you.

I do not intend this as a rehearsal—I do not want to try it—but I would just like to say this. I hope for obvious reasons that there is not one vote in this House against this bill—not one.

Now I can understand why a handful of my friends may have voted against the supplemental bill for South Vietnam. That is pretty clear and understandable. But there is less than \$20 billion out of the \$71 billion in this bill for Vietnam. In all conscience—as strong as you feel on that subject, I would hope, as I say

for obvious reasons, that this be a unanimous vote as a warning and as a sign to the world. I know this bill and I know what is in it, so far as finite man can know with a can of worms like this—and it is a can of worms. But make no mistake about this. We on this subcommittee know, and I now report to you, if you have any doubts, the United States of America is the richest, the strongest and the most powerful nation on the face of this earth—bar none. There is not a nation or a combination of nations in the world that does not know it.

We did not ask for this job. God knows we did not ask for this job. But we have it and, Mr. Chairman, that is the way it is going to be. There is only one thing for a leader to do, a leader must lead or quit, lead or get out. Two laps around the track, and go to the showers, hand in your uniform, get out or leave. Mr. Chairman, from now on this Nation intends to lead, whether anybody likes it or not.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania has expired.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may require to the gentleman from New York [Mr. HORTON].

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 10738, a bill making appropriations for the Defense Department in the fiscal year which begins July 1.

Other than the crisis years of World War II, this measure directs the spending of more money than ever before in the history of our Nation for the common defense. I rejoice not in the establishment of such a record. Yet, I recognize its necessity both to assure our deterrent posture in a world frequently strained by the ambitions of arms and to insure the fulfillment of American commitments in Southeast Asia.

If this bill related directly to the question of how we should pursue our military course in the next year, I might be inclined to comment further; for there are questions on my mind, too, about the effectiveness of our military strategy in ending the aggression in Vietnam. But, that is not what is really before us today. Our Constitution vests the President with the responsibility to direct military engagements. His departments have come to Congress asking appropriate funds to carry out this responsibility.

Our colleagues on the Appropriations Committee have given these requests their laborious and dutiful attention, amending them where they felt it needed, reducing them where they believed it prudent, and affirming them where their wisdom counseled them to do so. The committee report and the statements we have heard today from our colleagues who took the testimony and then wrote the bill offer their own evidence of the competent and comprehensive determinations which surround the committee's recommendation.

As I stated a moment ago, the sheer size of this bill is indicative of the strategically imperiled world in which we live. That it should require of the resources of the United States \$70 billion in 1 year to maintain democ-

racy's defenses can only be viewed as regrettable. And, I feel certain I share the feeling of so many of my fellow Congressmen and citizens that a much better world would result if this Nation could devote similar financial strength to pursuits like education, housing, urban revitalization, health, and pollution control.

Still, reality makes us realize that without the freedom protected by such defense expenditures, even that which we now are applying to these peaceful undertakings simply could not be.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. RHODES], a member of the committee.

(Mr. RHODES of Arizona asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RHODES of Arizona. Mr. Chairman, there is really nothing lower anywhere than the junior member of a subcommittee, on the minority side. Recognizing that fact, I wish to inform my colleagues, and I am sure they will receive this knowledge gratefully, I do not intend to consume all of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to try to prove that I am a great military strategist—because I am not a great military strategist—I have not been on this committee long enough.

But I have been on the committee long enough to form a great and lasting admiration for the other members of the committee and for the staff of the committee. It has been said that this is a hard-working committee. It is a hard-working committee.

It has been said that the members are devoted to their duties. They are devoted to their duties.

It has been a great experience for me to be able to be on the committee, to compare notes and to listen to the incisive questioning by the members of the committee of those who come from the Pentagon building to justify their budget.

This is a \$70 billion budget. It started out to be \$71 billion. As befits my station on the committee, I am going to do some nit-picking. Somebody has to nit-pick a little bit and I think in my position I can do a good job of it.

The item I am going to talk about is three-tenths of a millionth of this particular budgetary request. The item I am going to talk about amounts to \$20,000.

If you will turn to page 75 of part V of the hearings, you will see the following colloquy under the heading of "Beautification Program":

BEAUTIFICATION PROGRAM

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What was the item you mentioned about the report on natural beauty?

Mr. HORWITZ. This is money provided to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What has this to do with the Defense Department?

Mr. HORWITZ. It is our share of this program, and of course we do have our real estate holdings where we carry out certain programs to keep them looking nice.

(Off the record.)

Mr. ANDREWS. Is that amount for beautification an assessment against the Defense Department?

Mr. AIRHART. If I remember correctly this was the President's report.

Mr. ANDREWS. The so-called beautification program?

Mr. AIRHART. That is right.

Mr. ANDREWS. I believe you stated you made the contribution because it was assessed.

Mr. AIRHART. The Budget Bureau would make a determination as to each participating agency's share of the cost.

Mr. ANDREWS. I assume then all or most of the Government agencies are assessed so much for beautification.

Mr. AIRHART. I should think this would include a great many of them, not all.

Mr. Chairman, the meaning of all of this is that someone in the President's office decided that various branches of the executive department should be assessed for some beautification program somewhere. The Bureau of the Budget decided how much each of them was to pay, assessed them accordingly, and the money was put into a beautification program for some purpose somewhere, we know not what or where. In fact, the people who testified from the Department of Defense were not very firm in their own knowledge as to where this particular sum of money went. I do not know how much total money was raised by the executive department in this way, but it seems to me obvious that this is a clear circumvention of the power of the Congress to appropriate.

Going on, Mr. Fisher was asked where this money came from. I will read the colloquy:

Mr. LIPSCOMB. And then there was a reprogramming action taken?

Mr. FISHER. Internally.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. For you to obtain the \$20,000 to pay your share?

Mr. FISHER. We financed it from internal resources.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Have you told us where you obtained the money to do this, from what funds?

Mr. FISHER. No, sir; we have not.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. This is what you are going to tell us for the record?

Mr. FISHER. We will; yes, sir.

(The information following:)

The \$20 thousand was derived from within the OSD funding due to the refinement of Supplies and Materials estimated requirements.

As one member of the Appropriations Committee, I would like to serve notice on the executive department that this sort of thing, which is apparently a brandnew gimmick, had better stop. We do not intend that this type of circumvention of the authority of the Congress—actually the duty of the Congress as set forth by the Constitution—will be thwarted by operations such as this carried out through the Bureau of the Budget or any other part of the executive department.

Now, some more nit picking, but this is a little bigger nit because I imagine if what I propose were done, it would save something like three one-hundred-thousandths of the \$70 billion which we are appropriating. This involves the duplication of effort amongst the three services insofar as service schools are concerned.

For example, each of the services has a Judge Advocate General School. It is true that the main Judge Advocate General School is the Army school located at Charlottesville, Va. But the other two services also have JAG schools.

The same Code of Military Justice applies to personnel of the armed services. The laws which pertain to them may not be identical, but they are certainly almost identical insofar as their approach is concerned. I defy anyone to put forward a cogent argument as to why it is necessary to have three separate Judge Advocate General Schools. It seems to me they could very well be consolidated into a Department of Defense Judge Advocate General School, and I, for one, recommend that this be done.

As a former JAG officer—I might say a retired JAG officer—I happen to know that before long new arrangements will have to be made in Charlottesville or elsewhere for the Judge Advocate General School of the Army. When this is done, I hope that the school will be made into a DOD school, and the officers from all services, who are lawyers and who need to be oriented or trained in military justice, will be sent to this particular school.

Other schools in the same category concern training for hospital corpsmen.

It is my understanding that all three services train their corpsmen differently. On chaplain schools, I cannot imagine why it would be necessary to have three different chaplain schools. Certainly the finance schools of the three services could be consolidated, as could all of the management types of schools.

I do not have any idea how much money could be saved, Mr. Chairman, if the schools of the types I have mentioned were consolidated, but I daresay it would be a rather substantial sum. I venture to say it would be at least equal to three one-hundred-thousandths of this very large budget.

One of the topics often mentioned by members of the subcommittee during the course of the hearings was a concern that this Nation was becoming myopic concerning our responsibilities in Vietnam—that our concentration on Vietnam was so deep, so intense, that we were neglecting our duties and responsibilities throughout the world.

I noticed in the newspapers not too long ago a mention of the fact that we probably have 40-some treaties with other nations involving some obligation or another on the part of the United States of America. None of us wants the United States not to be in a position to fulfill treaty commitments. But I do not know what these commitments are.

One thing I definitely suggest is that there be some sort of high-level meeting between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, so that at least the latter may be informed—if he is not already—as to what the possible military commitments of this Nation might be, as a result of these treaties.

When we think of the magnitude of the commitment in Vietnam, when we think of what could have happened in the Middle East not too long ago, when we think of what could happen in South America and other areas of the world in which we are interested and in which we have treaty obligations, we realize that we in Congress are facing a task, in carrying out the responsibilities of this

June 13, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 7093

Nation, of a magnitude which we probably cannot even visualize.

We realize that the executive branch also is facing the responsibility of planning for future actions which they probably cannot visualize.

I hope that some day there will be an inventory made of these responsibilities, that we may face up to them realistically in the cold hard light of the late 20th century, to determine whether or not we as a nation really can survive the type of burden which we apparently have assumed throughout the years, and to make if necessary some agonizing reappraisals as to our national responsibilities, squared with our national ability to discharge those responsibilities.

In doing this, of course, it is going to be necessary for us to make certain very basic assumptions. Many of our responsibilities were assumed when the use of nuclear weapons was contemplated, if necessary, to fulfill them. If we are going to carry out those same responsibilities with conventional weapons, then we have a brand new game as far as training, procurement, and logistics of our Armed Forces are concerned. We have new decisions to make as to our national economic ability to fulfill these responsibilities under the rules of the game as they now exist. It is important that we make these basic decisions and square them with the action which the rest of the world might reasonably expect us to take in the event of aggression elsewhere in the confines of our globe.

I believe it is also necessary that we look at one very important part of our defense arsenal as it exists today. Throughout the hearings, whenever the Air Force and the Army or the Navy were in the room testifying, they were queried concerning their pilot training programs. The Air Force had 2,956 pilots programed for training in fiscal year 1967. In 1968 this goes up to 3,492. I, for one, hope that this is enough, but I am not satisfied that this is enough—for this reason: We have been fulfilling our pilot requirements in Vietnam and elsewhere by taking some actions which a lot of us never thought would be necessary to take.

One of the actions is to take people from jobs which are not flying jobs and put them back in the cockpit after years of limited flying and at ages which are far advanced from those which one ordinarily ascribes to a combat pilot, and then send them out to combat.

I should say, in the next breath, these older pilots have certainly acquitted themselves beautifully. They are fine pilots. They are good men.

At the same time, one wonders for how long we should rely on this type of pilot reserve. In other words, should we not be training more people so that it is not necessary to take pilots out of nonflying jobs and put them back in the cockpit? Many of them are literally "flying grandfathers," capable though they may be.

Also, is it really a good thing to take pilots out of nonflying jobs and send them back to pilot duties?

In many instances it is true, I am sure, that there are jobs which can be handled by nonpilots just as well as any pilot can handle them. However, in the

Air Force, by the nature of its mission, there are jobs which should be filled and must be filled by pilots.

I hope that in our zeal to hold down pilot training and our necessity to man aircraft we have not set up ground rules for filling jobs which take pilots out of jobs they should fill. I suspect we have done this.

I hope the Department of Defense will engage in a reappraisal of this whole situation to make certain that the pilot training program is adequate to fulfill all the needs of the Air Force, but also that, pilots will continue to have the opportunity to move into command and staff positions not directly related to flying.

We are told that already there are pilots who are doing a second tour of duty in the Vietnam theater. Rotation of military personnel certainly is to be desired. I believe all of us agree this is a fine morale factor. When one rotates a man from his tour of duty and then a year later sends him back, I wonder how good a morale factor that is?

I recognize the need for pilots, but at the same time we should grind into the need for pilot training some question of whether this is the type of thing we want to do, or whether we should train more pilots than we are now.

Mr. Chairman, in closing I also want to express my agreement with the committee in insisting that we maintain certain airlift capabilities of the reserve arms of the Air Force. The C-5 is to be a great airplane. I hope that we will proceed posthaste to build it and to deploy it. Certainly it is not now built and it is not now deployed.

Therefore, at this time, in order to fulfill the commitments which we have not only in Vietnam but also in other parts of the world, it seems to me to be great wisdom on the part of the Congress to insist that the National Guard airwings which were scheduled for deactivation be retained as active units of the Air National Guard.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. SLACK], a member of the subcommittee.

Mr. SLACK. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this legislation.

Mr. Chairman, one of the less imposing dollar items in this multibillion-dollar bill, amounting to a total of only \$134.8 million, provides funds for the construction of a nuclear-powered guided missile destroyer leader, and for advance procurement activity on another ship of the same class. This item is not large as today's military expenditures go, but it appears to be a forerunner of events to come.

During recent years there has been growing a conviction in the minds of many that all major naval vessels will one day be nuclear powered. But during those same years there has been a reluctance on the part of defense planners to move firmly away from conventionally powered vessels.

It is quite true that nuclear-powered vessels cost more in the construction and preparation stages. For the same amount of money we can obtain more vessels of

comparable size if they are conventionally powered than if nuclear powered. But measured over a span of years, it now appears that no defense funds are actually saved through the construction of conventionally powered vessels.

It was pointed out during the hearings that new naval vessels being built today may reasonably be expected to provide for our defense during the next 35 years, or into the 21st century. Viewed from this standpoint we would do well to ask ourselves whether or not the Congress should not take a stronger position with regard to planning and procurement of nuclear-powered vessels now.

The quick crisis which developed in the Middle East focused our attention on the possibility that we may be required to establish a military presence in several parts of the world at once during some series of international events. Speed of deployment and flexibility of logistics is critical in a situation of this kind. The vessels which can get there fastest and stay on station longest will have the greatest value to us. The world outlook today does not offer us any assurance that a future year will not find us faced with two or three critical situations separated by thousands of miles of ocean. Prudence would suggest that we be prepared to the best of our ability for such a set of circumstances.

During the hearings it was also testified that to bring our Navy up to full cognizance of all modern developments would cost some \$15 to \$20 billion. As a worldwide power we must have a Navy with worldwide capabilities, so it follows that modernization of the Navy is not actually a subject which offers many alternatives for debate.

During the coming years we will find that the money must be spent and the modernization must be effected. The debate will center upon the question: how best can the goal be accomplished, and will feature the nuclear versus conventionally powered vessel. But today we are much less in the dark about the true costs of operating the two types effectively. We have had experience by trained naval officers to study, and that experience is being gained every day in the waters of Southeast Asia.

The comparison between operation of nuclear and conventionally powered vessels in support of our South Vietnam commitment appears to be leading to the unavoidable conclusion that our first-line fighting forces must all be nuclear powered if we are to rely on maximum efficiency on the high seas in our national defense.

(Mr. SLACK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABBO], a member of the subcommittee.

(Mr. ADDABBO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, the House today has the task of passing on the largest single defense appropriations bill in the history of this country. After

months of study and review, the Appropriations Committee—of which I am a member—now asks this body to approve more than \$70 billion for our national defense during fiscal year 1968. I want to assure my colleagues that the committee, under the leadership of its distinguished chairman [Mr. MAHON] and ranking minority member [Mr. LIPSCOMB] has approved only those expenditures which proved under rigorous investigation to be absolutely necessary to our national defense.

About three-tenths of the proposed appropriation, or more than \$21 billion, represents the rising cost of the war in Vietnam. Because the action of the opponent, as it may either increase or decrease, is unpredictable, costs in Vietnam cannot be precisely projected. Nor did the committee attempt to anticipate the effect of future world crises, such as the Middle East war, on our national defense requirements. I concur with the other committee members in the belief that we must continue to improve our ability to deal with international crises as they may occur.

I lament as I know many others do the fact that the greatest part of our budget, year in and year out, must be devoted to securing our homefront and those of our allies from the threat of useless and despicable aggression. I am dismayed to think that we are spending more each year fighting a protracted war in Vietnam than we are on all the new domestic programs combined. Just think what a fraction of this proposed defense expenditure could do at home to aid the poor, improve health care and facilities, upgrade education, discourage crime—in short, treat the maladies which permeate America and, especially her cities.

Defense spending is not permissible but mandatory. It is like medicine which is necessary for staying alive. As we strengthen our defense we also seek ways and means to a lasting peace and until a better remedy is found a strong defense is still one of the best deterrents to possible all-out aggression by those who would try to destroy free and independent nations.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FINDLEY].

(Mr. FINDLEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I was much impressed with the presentation just a few minutes ago of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Bow], in which he set forth quite clearly and properly the constitutional responsibilities of the Congress in respect to military forces; that is, not only the responsibility to raise armies and navies but the responsibility to regulate them.

This is truly a bill to raise an army, to provide for the paying of the men and their equipment. It does raise some additional constitutional questions which I attempted to raise at a rather late hour in connection with the draft bill several weeks ago.

When engineers build a larger engine, they generally put a bigger brake on it. Through the years the Presidency has

certainly become a more powerful institution with each succeeding year. Yet, except for the limitation to two terms, I cannot think of any respect in which the Congress has seen fit to put additional braking power upon the Office of the Presidency. For example, I raise the question: What limitations are placed on the President of the United States in respect to the military forces to be created by this bill? Can he send these forces on his own personal decision any place in the world for almost any type of mission? In the absence of a declaration of war, does the President really have this authority? We face the possibility if not the prospect of the President sending another 200,000 or 300,000 combat forces to South Vietnam. Upon what legal authority will the President undertake such an action? Would it be the Gulf of Tonkin resolution? Was this really an explicit act on the part of the Congress authorizing the President to go that far in that region of the world so as to put a half a million people into combat? I question really whether the Congress has measured up to its constitutional responsibilities in recent years. The responsibility, the duty—not just the right, but the duty—to declare war. It seems to me that we have really shirked our duty, and I direct this criticism at myself as well as others.

We seem to have been willing to let the President, on his own, make a fateful decision to send military forces into battle on the Asian mainland. Does the President have adequate authority to send half a million soldiers to other places in the world if, in his opinion, the national interest so directs? Could he send them into the Middle East, for example, if war should break out and he should decide that this is really what ought to be done?

In other words, has the Congress yielded completely in these modern-day circumstances to the Executive the Congress right to declare war?

To me, Mr. Chairman, these are sober questions that deserve our attention.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. MONTGOMERY].

(Mr. MONTGOMERY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to limit my remarks to page 7 of the report made by the Committee on Appropriations pertaining to the realignment of the Army Reserve components. My friend, the Congressman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Flood], said that he was the last speaker of the day on the Democratic side. I certainly agree with him, because I cannot compare with him. Also he said that "damnyankee" was one word, and I certainly want to agree with him on that, too.

I would like to commend the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, the Congressman from Florida [Mr. SIKES], and also the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Bow], in seeing that these statements were inserted asking the Department of Defense to come to the

Congress before they realigned the National Guard and the Reserve forces of this country.

Mr. Chairman, it just does not make sense to me at this time to eliminate these National Guard units and these Reserve units, when our country, as this report says, is in a time of crisis.

Now, Mr. Chairman, most of the National Guard divisions that will be eliminated by the Secretary of Defense are in camp right now training. These 15 divisions are in camp right now.

You know, Mr. Chairman, Secretaries of the Department of Defense in the past have tried to update and not eliminate these National Guard units.

Mr. Chairman, I recall that the 36th Division in World War I—at least I was told today—had a cavalry regiment that fought in World War I. They did not do away with the 36th Division when they brought in tanks and mechanized the division. They eliminated the cavalry regiment and put in an armored regiment in place of the cavalry regiment.

Mr. Chairman, when they had the horse-drawn artillery, they did not eliminate these divisions, but the Secretary came in and ordered that there be brought into the division the self-propelled artillery weapons.

Mr. Chairman, my point is that you do not have to eliminate a division or a Reserve unit in order to bring it up to date or to build it up to the present war level. You can still keep the individuality of the various units involved.

Mr. Chairman, it is said that these are good National Guard divisions, and they are.

Mr. Chairman, I quote the 31st Division which is composed of men from Mississippi and Alabama. These divisions, when in camp, are graded by Regular Army officers and enlisted personnel sent to these divisions by the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Chairman, the 31st Division in 1965 had 88 individual-type units or batteries—company-sized units. These 88 units which were graded by Regular Army personnel who grade them as being superior, excellent, satisfactory, or not satisfactory—in 1965 all 88 of these units received a superior rating which indicates that they were proficiently trained and ready to fight.

These are the units which the Secretary of Defense is trying to eliminate.

In 1966 this same division—and these same figures will hold true for other divisions of the National Guard—of the 88 units that went to camp, 81 received a superior rating by regular Army personnel and seven received a satisfactory rating.

Mr. Chairman, it is the opinion of others—it is not my opinion alone—that if you eliminate these National Guard divisions and these Reserve units, and if you realign them, it is going to take at least 3 years during which to bring these new concept brigades and these new Reserve units up to the trained level that these National Guard divisions and these Reserve units have at this time.

Mr. Chairman, insofar as I am concerned this is a very important point.

June 13, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 7095

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Florida.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I wish to compliment the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. MONTGOMERY] for a very sound statement and for his strong interest in this matter.

Further, Mr. Chairman, I wish to agree with the gentleman that it is a lot simpler, less costly, and more effective to keep a combat-trained man in a combat unit than it is to convert him to a carrier of water, a hewer of wood, or a baker of bread.

Mr. Chairman, we must have proper logistical support units. We cannot win wars without them. However, it just does not make sense to convert combat-trained units to logistics support units.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I certainly agree with the statement of the distinguished gentleman from Florida and I thank the gentleman for his remarks.

Mr. Chairman, another real danger that I see—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Mississippi has expired.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, another real danger that I see—and I would like the Members of Congress to hear me out on this—is that in most States you are going to lose individual units. For instance, I can use my State as an example where we now have 120 company- and battery-sized units located throughout the small towns of my State which are participating National Guard units. However, under the new proposal, we will have to cut back to 79 units. That represents a reduction of 41 units. However, the problem under the new proposal is where you have a company- or battery-sized unit, you could end up under this new proposal with a platoon or even a squad.

I certainly think at that time it is unreasonable and unbelievable and certainly not in the best interest of the country to realine these National Guard divisions and also the Reserve units, and I hope the Secretary of Defense will heed the request of Congress.

I recall to the Members of Congress that the concept of citizen-soldiers is older than this Nation itself. Certainly Congress should be consulted when such sweeping action is taken by the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. WRIGHT].

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, because of the well-intentioned comments of my friend, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. MINSHALL], and because of certain other things that have been said and written with regard to the F-111 program, I should like to take this time simply to accentuate the positive. I want to bring to the attention of the Members of this House some of the really fine advances that this program does symbolize and embody. The F-111 is a magnificent aircraft and all of America has ample cause to be extremely proud of it.

Those pilots who took the F-111 plane to the Paris air show, Col. Ray O. Roberts and Maj. Robert K. Parsons, returned reporting that it had been the sensation of the entire show. They reported that the Russians had been so impressed that they had spent hours walking around it, looking at it, photographing it and even asking if they might scrape a bit of metal from its wings to take back with them. This clearly indicates—

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WRIGHT. Of course I will yield to the gentleman, but I have only started.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to just make the record clear and state that the F-111 that was at the Paris air show was the Air Force version of the F-111, it is the other version of the F-111, the so-called F-111B with which I was critical.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's elucidation. It is true that the planes demonstrated in Paris were F-111A's. But I believe the worldwide reaction to the stunning new developments in this program applies with equal force to both versions.

Mr. MINSHALL. They are two different airplanes, weightwise, flight characteristics, and in many other respects.

Mr. WRIGHT. Of course, they are two slightly differing versions of the same basic design, in spite of the best efforts of the Defense Department to achieve the maximum degree of commonality.

Mr. MINSHALL. That commonality concept has gone out of the window. The Air Force version of the F-111 is as different as night is to day with respect to the Navy version.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's deep interest. I did not ask him to yield earlier until he had spoken for about 10 minutes, and I have only 3 or 4 minutes remaining in which to emphasize some of the really positive advances achieved in this revolutionary new development in airpower. Permit me, therefore, to emphasize those things which apply to both the Navy and Air Force versions of the F-111.

We have all heard a lot about commonality. I believe it is a valid goal to achieve. Adm. T. F. Connally, Deputy Chief of Naval Air Operations, after flying the plane, said he believed that Defense Secretary McNamara was right. Admiral Connally expressed his own opinion that the commonality factor would save many hundreds of millions of dollars in the follow-on programs and in parts and maintenance. He spoke enthusiastically of the performance characteristics of the F-111B. He said, "I think this F-111B is going to land on that carrier like a lady." I have talked personally with Secretary Nitze and the Navy project officers, and I have no doubt of their enthusiasm for this program.

But let me mention just two or three things that have not yet been brought out in this debate. I believe you will see why the Navy spokesmen are enthusiastic for the F-111B. It brings together in one package the greatest number of totally revolutionary new advances in the state

of the art of air-to-air warfare that we have ever seen in the United States.

First, of course, is the swept-wing design, the first of its kind. It is truly revolutionary and extremely significant. By extending the wings at a 90-degree angle from the fuselage the plane is capable of very low speed takeoffs and landings. This, of course, is extremely important on aircraft carriers and on short, hastily built jungle landing strips. But with the wings swept back alongside the fuselage, it can fly 2½ times the speed of sound. One plane contains both extreme capabilities. This makes it the most versatile combat aircraft ever developed by American industry.

Another extremely significant innovation is the modulated turbo-jet engine which, for the first time in jet aircraft, will permit a wide range and a rapid change in speed. Heretofore military jet aircraft have had, let us say, to coin some terminology, just two gears, low gear and floorboard. There were only two choices—either subsonic speed or full jet power. But with the modulated turbo-jet engine in the F-111, we do not have to just kick on the afterburners and go from a very slack speed into top speed. Our pilots will have a wide range of speeds where they can modulate and make much more flexible the speed and maneuverability of the aircraft.

Nothing has been mentioned in this discussion about the truly revolutionary new radar fire control system. This is an almost unbelievably spectacular advance in target tracking and controlled firepower. Better by far than anything that any nation has conceived in the past, the F-111's fire control system is capable of firing simultaneously at six targets, and while destroying those six targets, it can maintain a constant computerized tracking of 16 more simultaneously. This fantastic new development has been tested and proven in more than 8,000 hours of ground and airborne operation. It works. There has never before been anything like it in the history of warfare.

An equally dramatic thrust forward is involved in the Phoenix air-to-air missile in the F-111. It will extend the effective range of air-to-air missileery by as much as five times the present distance. Think of it. With this new system it will be possible to destroy targets in the air from five times the distance. Consider the advantage.

In other words, if we can knock out a target that is 10 miles away today, this new forward-looking missile system will be able to knock that target out from 50 miles away.

The airplane also embodies a new ejection capsule system, which for the first time, will work at extremely low levels on the ground and on the water, and insure the survivability of the pilots.

Each one of these new systems is a daring and truly spectacular advance in the art of aerial warfare and, wedded together as they are in this revolutionary new airplane, they constitute the greatest potential advance in aerial combat capability that the Nation has ever put together in a single production program.

So I am sure you can see why I say that it is high time to accentuate the

H 7096

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

June 13, 1967

positive about the F-111. There is no need to be the least bit defensive about it.

It is inconceivable to me that the Congress would want to delay by 2 weeks or 2 days—let alone 2 years—the entry of this badly needed weapons system into our inventory.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. HOLIFIELD].

(Mr. HOLIFIELD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I have come to the floor of this House many times before to discuss the issue of nuclear propulsion for the surface warships of our Navy. On May 29, 1967, I told you about the commissioning of the nuclear frigate *Truxtun* and the sad state of affairs represented by the recent christening of the nonnuclear aircraft carrier *John F. Kennedy*. The *Kennedy* could have and should have been nuclear powered.

On May 8, 1967, I spoke in support of the fiscal year 1968 defense authorization bill presented on the floor of this House by the distinguished chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, the Honorable L. MENDEL RIVERS. That bill, as originated in the House and as subsequently agreed to in a Senate-House conference and signed into law by the President on June 5, 1967, authorized three new nuclear submarines, long lead-time procurement funds for a third nuclear aircraft carrier, and two new nuclear powered guided missile frigates which Congress substituted in place of two nonnuclear destroyers requested by the Department of Defense. This law, Public Law 90-22, represents a forward step toward equipping our Navy with the finest in nuclear powered surface warships—a step which is badly needed and long overdue.

The bill before the House today appropriates funds for these nuclear-powered warships. In my capacity as a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy I have delved deeply into the factors involved in the value of nuclear propulsion for warships. As you all know, the Joint Committee has studied and analyzed the question of nuclear propulsion for submarines and surface warships for many years. This intensive review was required before the committee could recommend to Congress the research and development effort necessary to build a nuclear Navy "second to none."

As I stated before, the defense appropriation bill for fiscal year 1968 includes funds for two nuclear-powered frigates substituted by Congress in place of two nonnuclear-powered destroyers requested by the Department of Defense. Further, the appropriation bill includes funds for performing the contract definition of a new class major fleet escort called the DXG; the Armed Services Committee Report No. 221 dated May 2, 1967, on the fiscal year 1968 defense authorization act and House Report No. 270 dated May 22, 1967, on the Senate-House Armed Services Committee conference contain language which prohibits using any of these funds for the design of any major

fleet escorts not powered with a naval nuclear propulsion plant—a step which I also endorse. Of course, the intent of this provision is not to confuse you with the nomenclature used for various types of ships; the intent clearly is to provide all nuclear escorts for our nuclear aircraft carriers—no matter whether they are called DLGN, DDGN, DXGN, or DXN's, or anything else.

The aircraft carrier continues to be one of our prime naval attack weapons. It provides a movable platform from which to launch airplanes wherever they may be needed. It is a floating airbase complete with maintenance and repair facilities. It has proved to be a vital asset in support of our military activities in Vietnam. The tremendous problems and expense of building up land airbases in Vietnam continue to demonstrate the great advantages of the aircraft carrier concept.

However, to fully exploit the full potential of the carrier task group, everything possible must be done to minimize the logistic support required to sustain the ships in a combat environment. Elimination of the requirement for a continuous supply of propulsion fuel makes nuclear-powered ships valuable. This became abundantly clear to the members of the Joint Committee when we studied this problem in 1963 and prepared our report on nuclear propulsion for naval surface vessels. See the December 1963 Joint Committee report entitled "Nuclear Propulsion for Naval Surface Vessels."

The Department of Defense has finally come to realize this, in the case of aircraft carriers—after Congress repeatedly pointed it out. They still have not recognized this important truth in the case of ships built to escort nuclear carriers.

In fact, I saw an interesting item in Sunday's Washington Post about Navy Secretary Nitze being designated to replace Cyrus Vance as Deputy Secretary of Defense. The article said:

Perhaps one of Nitze's greatest accomplishments there (as Secretary of the Navy) was to use McNamara's own yardsticks—cost-effectiveness—to convince a doubtful Secretary that all carriers in the future should be nuclear powered.

I do not mind letting Secretary Nitze have some credit.

As I was saying, we must be able to operate attack carrier task forces anywhere on short notice. Nuclear propulsion in our naval striking forces will greatly enhance our capability to operate our carrier task forces throughout the oceans of the world—without the entangling logistic support problems created by conventional fuel requirements and free from the constant changes in the worldwide political climate.

Our one nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, U.S.S. *Enterprise*, which is now deployed for the second time in Vietnam, has set record after record since she joined the fleet 5 years ago. She has proven so effective in battle in Vietnam that the Secretary of Defense requested a new nuclear-powered attack carrier in last year's bill, asked for advanced procurement funds for the third nuclear carrier this year and has told Congress that

he intends to ask for the remainder of the funds for the third carrier next year and another in a future year.

At least four major fleet escort ships—destroyers or frigates—are assigned to each aircraft carrier. These escorts are designed to operate either on independent missions against enemy targets or as part of a coordinated protective screen to destroy enemy aircraft, missiles, submarines, and surface ships that attack the force.

The facts behind the action recommended by the House Armed Services Committee and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to proceed now on a nuclear-powered surface escort warship building program can be assessed by review of the reports I identified in my floor statement of May 8, 1967. To this list I should add House Report No. 270 dated May 22, 1967, on the conference of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees concerning the fiscal year 1968 defense authorization bill.

In addition, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is currently preparing for public release a report prepared by the committee staff on the issue "Nuclear Propulsion for Major Fleet Escorts" and a record of executive hearings held this year on the naval nuclear propulsion program.

The committee staff report, of about 450 pages, will give the complete history of nuclear propulsion for naval surface warships. It will be a document that will be useful to every person who is interested in the national defense of our country. It is well documented. It will furnish the complete story on this problem of whether we should go back to the days of the sailing vessels, you might say, by using oil, because oil today in the propulsion of our naval vessels is just as obsolete as sails were when oil took over.

This report and the record of hearings provide a complete chronology of the positions of key people in Congress, the Navy, and the Department of Defense from 1961 when the *Enterprise* first went to sea up to as recent as May 29, 1967. It also specifically considers all the studies and correspondence provided to Congress by the Navy and the Department of Defense since 1961 on the issue of whether or not the Navy should have nuclear-powered surface warships. These studies and correspondence are published in the report to the maximum extent permitted by consideration of our national security.

I am sure you will agree that the case is clear and well supported that we, the Congress, will have to take extraordinary steps if the Navy is to get the number of nuclear-powered major surface vessels they need. It is certainly clear that the Navy does not need more "studies" on this issue. No one has ever won a war with paper studies.

The present Middle East crisis clearly supports the conclusion reached by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, and the Senate and House Appropriations Committees that the Navy proceed now building nuclear-powered major warships. This crisis supports the position of Congress that it is not in the

June 13, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 7097

best interest of this country, either short term or long term, to continue building nonnuclear major surface warships, as has been repeatedly proposed by the Department of Defense.

While only a small fraction of our domestic consumption of petroleum comes from the Middle East, more than half the petroleum products used in Vietnam have been coming from Persian Gulf sources. On June 7, the Secretary of Defense announced that he was invoking an emergency plan to provide petroleum products for our forces in Southeast Asia without being dependent upon the Middle East. This plan involves more than doubling the number of tankers which have been supplying our Southeast Asian forces.

In addition to the possibility of losing these Mideast petroleum products at their sources for political reasons, the closing of the Suez Canal will further increase the difficulty of transporting petroleum products since tankers will now be forced to take the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope. I commented publicly on the importance of nuclear power in warships to decrease our military dependence on petroleum supplies last Saturday.

Over and above the obvious difficulty and increased cost involved in this move, I hope you all remember that no one is attacking these logistic supply forces, no bombs dropped, no shells fired, or no torpedoes fired at these tankers. Our surface Navy, fortunately, has been fighting a "War College" exercise where nobody is firing at them. They have every possible advantage.

The Joint Committee hearing record and report documents some history which is pertinent to this situation and I would like to summarize some of this for you.

For example, how many remember that it was largely due to our submarine and air attacks on the Japanese fuel supply lines from Southeast Asia to Japan during World War II that the Japanese war machine was beaten to its knees, very much shortening that war in the Pacific?

Do you remember when the Atlantic Coast beaches of the United States were coated with oil from sunken tankers—our tankers sunk by German U-boats right off our own coast? We lost some 130 tankers to German U-boats in World War II.

Our logistic support forces are potentially more vulnerable today—with the advent of foreign nuclear submarines and longer range aircraft and missiles.

To assess the importance of reducing the liquid fuel required by naval striking forces through the utilization of nuclear propulsion, it should be borne in mind that the monthly usage rate of petroleum products for the Navy's ships and aircraft in Southeast Asia today is as great as the maximum monthly rate the Japanese were able to import petroleum products into the home islands during World War II. The quantity of ship and aircraft fuel currently required per month for the carrier strike groups alone in Southeast Asia is two-thirds as much as the average monthly requirement for the U.S. carrier strike forces in the 5 months of the Palau campaign—one of the peak naval operations of World War II in the Pacific.

About one-third of this total is for carrier propulsion fuel, about one-third for escort fuel, and the remaining one-third for aircraft fuel. Thus, nuclear power in the carrier would reduce the fuel requirements in the logistic pipeline by one-third and nuclear power in the escorts would reduce the fuel pipeline to the striking forces by another one-third.

The Chief of Naval Operations pointed out over a year ago that—

The compelling reason for the Navy's strong recommendation for nuclear power in surface warships is based on the increased survivability and tactical flexibility which derive from freedom of dependence on propulsion fuel oil logistic support.

The dependence of U.S. air power on the fuel distribution system in the western Pacific is well known. The vulnerability of the system to attack, particularly the overland and terminal fuel distribution required for land-based air operations, is a matter of concern. While the Navy's underway replenishment groups are considered to be less vulnerable, they can also be brought under attack. Current utilization of *Enterprise* and *Bainbridge* is reducing our dependence on fuel oil and thus strengthening our total air posture in Southeast Asia. The introduction of CVAN68 and other nuclear-powered warships could be of critical importance to the efficient projection of air power during the early 1970's."

From the above you can see that the Chief of Naval Operations appreciates the importance of nuclear propulsion in minimizing logistic support requirements. However, it appears that other officials in the Department of Defense have either forgotten these lessons or feel that for some reason they can be ignored.

How often must history repeat itself before these lessons are learned by the people in a position of responsibility in the Department of Defense; before they pick up the step of the drummer leading the way toward a modern Navy for this country?

The bill before you is an important step as it provides funds for two more nuclear-powered guided missile frigates to escort our nuclear aircraft carriers. An overwhelming vote of support should make it clear to the Department of Defense that the American people, through their elected representatives in Congress, believe this is the direction this country should go.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, it is understandable that there are several Members who are trying to stop the Defense Department from reorganizing the Reserve components; however, the fact is that the structure of our Army Reserve components desperately needs reorganizing. It lacks 989 units which are needed. It has 1,076 units which are not needed. Only by correcting this situation can the structure be made to conform to that which the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously say is required. And only if the Joint Chiefs recommendation is met, can we get the readiness we need.

None of us are wise enough to know exactly how many artillery battalions, ordnance companies, combat brigades, divisions, special forces, and other units the Reserve components ought to have. That is the job for professionals. To try to substitute our judgment under the circumstances seems to me outrageous.

The Reserve Subcommittee of the

Armed Services Committee on which I sit has been fully briefed on the proposed reorganization. It provides the Governors with the forces which they need for local disturbances while at the same time continuing the U.S. Army Reserve at virtually its current strength. Furthermore, the plan is not intended for implementation for another 2 months—a schedule purposely designed to enable the Congress to be fully informed with respect to the plan and to permit further consideration of H.R. 2, a bill which this House passed overwhelmingly only 4 months ago and which explicitly endorses the authority of the military to establish, reorganize, or deactivate units as required by contingency and war plans.

We have no business, particularly at a time when we have nearly 500,000 men in Southeast Asia and over 200,000 men in Europe in telling the military professionals that they cannot put our Reserve forces into the condition necessary to adequately serve the national interest. To the contrary we ought to be telling the Army to get on with the job.

Mr. Chairman, to set the record straight on the proposed realignment of our Reserve components, I submit, in addition, the following statements from the Department of Defense:

REALIGNMENT OF ARMY RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD APPROVED BY SECRETARIES McNAMARA AND VANCE

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Deputy Secretary Cyrus R. Vance announced today that the Army has proposed, and they have approved, a plan for realigning the Army's Reserve and National Guard forces to improve significantly the early deployment capability and combat readiness of the United States Army's Reserve Forces.

The realignment, to be started this year and to be completed by next summer, is designed to provide Army Reserve Forces as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense in April 1967, and to bring the Army's Reserve Component structure into balance with contingency plans and the supporting equipment program.

Because of its serious imbalance, the present Reserve Component structure has serious readiness deficiencies. More than a thousand units in the current structure are not needed. Most of these surplus units are manned at only 50 percent of full wartime strength and no equipment is being procured for them. At the same time, the Army Reserve Forces need almost a thousand units it does not have.

The Reserve Forces will be realigned to:

- a. Bring the force structure into conformity with that needed to satisfy military requirements and for which equipment procurement has been authorized.

- b. Update the Reserve Force structure.
- c. Provide adequate forces for the needs of each state.

- d. Locate the units in the proposed structure geographically and in relation to population so that in the event of mobilization the burden is shared equitably among states and populations.

- e. Diminish the need to assign involuntarily to reserve units individuals who have completed two or more years on active duty.

Under the proposed reorganization, the Army's Reserve Components will consist of units with a total paid drill strength of 640,000. Units in the new structure will be manned at an average of more than 90 percent of full wartime strength. The new structure will be supported with equipment, technicians, spare parts, and all the other es-

H 7098

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

June 13, 1967

entials necessary to achieve required readiness.

The structure of the Army's Reserve Components under this new plan will consist of eight combat divisions, 18 brigades, 13 Training Divisions and the necessary supporting units to reinforce the Active Army and to provide the support required for the Reserve units.

At present there are 23 divisions, 11 brigades and 13 training divisions in the Army's Reserve Components. Of the 23 divisions, only 8 are manned at 80% of full wartime strength. The remaining 15 low-priority divisions are manned at 50% of full wartime strength. Equipment is not being procured for the 15 low-priority divisions.

The realignment plan continues paid drill units in both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. The paid drill strength in the Army National Guard would be 400,000 and 240,000 in the Army Reserve.

The Army National Guard will consist of 8 divisions, 18 brigades, other combat and combat support units, and service support units necessary to maintain equipment and to satisfy state needs. Sufficient forces will be allocated to the states to meet requirements for units needed in the event of civil disturbances and natural disasters.

The Army Reserve will consist of mobilization base units, including 13 training divisions, two maneuver area commands, the Army Reserve schools, and the service support units except those necessary to provide for the Army National Guard and state needs.

The allocation of all combat and combat support units to the National Guard will give the Guard the units most relevant to state missions and will provide a basis which has not existed heretofore for allocating a given type unit to the Guard or to the Reserve. There is precedence for this action in the Reserve Components of the Air Force. In the Army, the Army National Guard is presently composed of approximately 84% of combat and combat support units. The United States Army Reserve, on the other hand, consists primarily of Mobilization Base and Service Support units with about 79% of its strength in units of that type.

The transition from the current structure to the proposed structure will be accomplished by:

- a. Consolidating each of the existing 15 low-priority Army National Guard divisions into a high priority divisional or separate brigade.
- b. Forming a division base and high priority divisional bridge from each of the eight existing high priority National Guard divisions.
- c. Forming the additional 19 divisional or separate brigades needed from the 11 high priority brigades now in the structure and from low-priority units being discontinued.
- d. Organizing the resulting 8 division bases and 42 brigades into force of 8 high priority divisions and 18 brigades.
- e. Utilizing the Immediate Reserve and the residual assets of the Reinforcing Reserve to form the remaining units required in the proposed structure.

The Selected Reserve Force will be substantially unchanged.

The Army estimates that approximately 92% of the units in the proposed structure will consist of units in the current structure which will continue in being with no change, or will be continued after making a moderate conversion such as the conversion of a 105-mm battalion to a 175mm battalion. Eight percent of the units in the proposed structure will be newly activated. A significant proportion of these activations would be required in any event, because units that do not now exist, or do not exist in the number required, must be added to the structure.

The plan is intended for implementation

after the 1967 summer field training has been substantially completed, and will be completed before the beginning of summer field training 1968 so that all units may then attend training in their realigned configuration.

Secretary McNamara emphasized the importance of the reorganization in order that the total force structure—Active and Reserve—will have the units required to enable the Army to respond promptly in meeting any emergencies that may arise in the future.

Detailed stationing plans will be worked out by the Commanding General, Continental Army Command for the units in the Army Reserve and by the Chief, National Guard Bureau and State Adjutants General for the units in the Army National Guard.

STATEMENT OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, CYRUS R. VANCE, REGARDING REALIGNMENT OF ARMY RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD, MADE JUNE 2, 1967

The Reserve Forces of the United States are in the best shape in their history but more needs to be done. Secretary McNamara and I yesterday approved an Army plan to strengthen further the combat readiness of the Reserve Forces for contingencies anywhere in the world.

The Army's plan is based on an assessment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of what Reserve Forces our nation needs, and what forces are surplus.

When the Army received the results of the Joint Chiefs' analysis, Secretary Resor and General Johnson developed this plan, designed for streamlined readiness and sustained effectiveness.

Our country must have a modern and up-to-date reserve forces structure. What we want and what we must have are reserve forces, manned, trained and equipped, to carry out missions within a balanced force structure.

This is precisely the objective of the Army's plan. The realignment will assure maximum effectiveness. The fighting edge of the reserve forces will thus be further sharpened.

This plan is the culmination of six years of effort to improve the readiness and effectiveness of our reserve forces. Six years ago our reserve forces lacked readiness objectives that were adequately linked to our contingency war plans. Thousands of units throughout the country were undermanned and ill-equipped. Many were surplus to our military requirements. Major steps to correct these deficiencies were taken in 1962 and 1965, and a third will be taken with this new Army plan. In the process we will have eliminated more than 3500 unneeded units, and will have added to our force structure more than 2000 needed units. We feel that great progress has been made over the last six years. The plan which is now before us will give us a balanced, ready, and effective reserve force.

The proposed reorganization will eliminate about 1000 unneeded units in the Army National Guard and the Army Reserves, and will create approximately 1000 new units. These activations will make the reserve forces compatible with the Active Forces and will give us an improved support structure for both Reserve and Active Forces.

National Guardsmen and Reservists under the realignment plan will know that they are fulfilling a heightened role in our nation's defense. Our civilian leadership and our military commanders will know that they have balanced reserve forces on which they can count for rapid response if necessary. And the American people will know that this major gain in national defense can be maintained for years to come at the minimum cost possible.

Our reserve forces have served the nation

in an outstanding manner in the past. This realignment will give them even greater opportunities for more effective service to our nation in the future.

STATEMENT OF MR. STANLEY R. RESOR, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, JUNE 2, 1967

Gentlemen, as you came in you were issued a press release which has a number of charts attached that provide information concerning the proposed Reserve Components reorganization we are announcing today.

There are several matters which I would like to emphasize with regard to this proposed reorganization.

Under the reorganization plan which we are announcing today the Army's Reserve Components will have 8 combat divisions, 18 brigades, 13 training divisions and the required reinforcing and supporting units with a total paid drill strength of 640,000. Units in the proposed structure will be manned at an average of over 90 per cent of full wartime strength and will be fully supported with equipment, technicians, and spare parts.

The Army National Guard will have a paid drill strength of 400,000 and will include 8 combat divisions and 18 combat brigades. It will also include the necessary service support units to provide essential maintenance. The Army Reserve will have a total paid drill strength of 240,000 and will include 13 training divisions, whose mission is to prepare individuals for combat, 2 maneuver area commands, the USAR schools and service support units.

The plan will achieve the following major objectives:

It will bring the reserve force structure into conformity with that needed to satisfy military requirements and that for which equipment procurement has been authorized. It will give the reserves the 8 combat divisions, 18 brigades and supporting units recommended by the JCS.

It will update the reserve force structure to conform to modifications which have been made in the Active Army over the last two years.

It will continue to provide adequate forces for the needs of each state.

It will locate units geographically and in relation to population so that the burden of mobilization will be shared equitably among the states and population.

It will diminish the need to assign involuntarily to reserve units individuals who have completed two or more years of active service.

Unlike the reorganization proposal which we made in 1965 and 1966, the current plan will maintain units and paid drill strengths in both National Guard and the Army Reserve.

The proposed reorganization can be accomplished without an unacceptable degree of turbulence. Ninety-two per cent of the units in the new structure, measured in terms of total strength, will be units already in the current structure which will be continued with no change or with merely a conversion to closely related types of units.

The Selected Reserve Force consisting of 3 divisions, 6 brigades and 150,000 men will remain substantially unchanged except for modernization of certain support units to conform to changes made in similar units in the Active Army.

We intend to begin implementing the plan after field training is completed this summer. This will permit Congress time to take action on pending legislation which may be relevant to the plan. A major portion of the reorganization will be accomplished by consolidating existing units not required by current plans into new units which are required. This will enable us to retain most of the trained personnel now in the Reserve Components.

June 13, 1967

STATEMENT OF GEN. HAROLD K. JOHNSON, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY, JUNE 2, 1967

In their annual review of the military forces the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyzed the requirements and military force levels needed to fulfill the requirements of the national military strategy. From this analysis, it was determined that the forces in the Army's Reserve Components should consist of 8 divisions and 18 brigades, together with other combat, combat support, and service support units to augment and complement Active Army forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that all of the units in the Re-

serve Components be fully equipped and properly supported to enable them to engage in sustained land combat promptly when called upon to do so.

When this reorganization is completed and when the resulting force reaches the prescribed strengths, equipment levels, and readiness, it will meet the requirements for Reserve Components in the Army as we see them today and in the foreseeable future. The establishment of the Selected Reserve Force was a first step in reaching a higher state of readiness. The proposed re-

organization will permit additional improvements in readiness.

I want to pay special tribute to those members of the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve who have devoted so much time and energy to the security interest of our country. A new opportunity now presents itself which will require an intensified effort and renewed devotion on the part of these individuals. I know that it is their basic purpose to continue to devote their talents and energies to the nation's security and that all other interests become secondary.

Comparison of present and proposed Reserve component structure

Unit category	Present structure				Proposed structure ¹			
	Army National Guard	U.S. Army Reserve	Total	Manning level	Army National Guard	U.S. Army Reserve	Total	Manning level
	Thousands	Thousands	Thousands	Percent	Thousands	Thousands	Thousands	Percent
IMMEDIATE RESERVE UNITS								
Air defense	7.4		7.4	85	10		10	100
Units to round out Active Army	77.0	88.7	165.7	80		45	133	90
Brigades (now 11 brigades, to be increased to 18 brigades)	43.6	15.9	59.5	75-80	65		65	90
Mobilization base and training units	8.7	66.9	75.6	75-100	9	66	75	90-100
8 division forces	164.8	72.5	237.3	75-80	222	110	332	90
Support to other services	2.5	11.4	13.9	70		14	14	90
State headquarters and U.S. Army Reserve schools, staff and faculty	3.9	4.6	8.5	100	6	5	11	100
Subtotal	307.9	260.0	567.9		400	240	640	
REINFORCING RESERVE UNITS								
Other divisions (15 divisions, Army National Guard)	96.3		96.3	50				
Nondivisional units	13.6		13.6	50				
Command headquarters, divisional	.7		.7	100				
Subtotal	110.6		110.6					
Total	418.5	260.0	678.5		400	240	640	

¹ Breakout of strength between Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve and between categories is approximate and subject to refinement.

Comparison of present and future structure

Unit	Present structure				Future structure		
	Army National Guard		U.S. Army Reserve, Immediate Reserve ²	Total	Army National Guard	U.S. Army Reserve	Total
	Immediate Reserve ¹	Reinforcing Reserve ²					
Combat divisions	8	15	0	23	8	0	8
Training divisions	0	13	0	13	0	13	13
Command headquarters, divisional	0	5	0	5	0	0	0
Combat brigades	7	0	4	11	18	0	18
Maneuver area commands	0	0	2	2	0	2	2
Air defense battalions	44	0	0	44	31	0	31
Field Army support command	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Support brigades	0	0	3	3	0	4	4
Adjutant General units	36	0	96	132	47	116	163
Civil affairs units	0	0	77	77	0	51	51
COSTAR units	0	0	38	38	40	208	248
Finance units	1	0	18	19	0	53	53
JAG units	0	0	196	196	0	226	226
Hospital units	15	0	107	122	0	121	121
Military police battalions	6	0	4	10	11	0	11
Public information units	34	0	25	59	0	35	35
PSYOPS units	0	0	8	8	0	6	6
Garrison units	0	0	18	18	0	4	4
Terminal units	0	0	19	19	0	19	19
Total companies and detachments ⁴	2,520	1,480	3,575	7,575	2,900	3,400	6,300
Paid drill strength (thousands) ³	307.9	110.6	260	678.5	400	240	640

¹ Manned at 80 percent or higher or full wartime strength; necessary equipment being procured.
² Manned at 50 percent of full war-time strength; no equipment being procured.
³ Manned at 90 percent or higher or full wartime strength; to be fully supported with equipment, technicians, and spare parts.

⁴ Approximate.
⁵ Fiscal year 1967 budget strength.

MAJOR UNITS CURRENTLY IN THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
 Immediate Reserve divisions and brigades normally manned at 80% war-time strength for which equipment is being procured.

- UNIT AND LOCATION**
- 80th Armored Division, Tennessee.
 - 50th Armored Division, New Jersey.
 - 26th Infantry Division, Massachusetts.
 - 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania.
 - 80th Infantry Division, North Carolina.
 - 38th Infantry Division, Indiana.
 - 42d Infantry Division, New York.
 - 47th Infantry Division, Minnesota.

- 53d Armored Brigade, Florida-South Carolina.
- 86th Armored Brigade, Vermont-Connecticut.
- 29th Infantry Brigade, Hawaii-California.
- 69th Infantry Brigade, Kansas-Missouri.
- 92d Infantry Brigade, Puerto Rico.
- 258th Infantry Brigade, Arizona-Missouri-Virginia.
- 67th Infantry Brigade (Mech), Nebraska-Iowa.

Reinforcing Reserve divisions (National Guard) manned at 50% war-time strength for which no equipment is being procured.

UNIT AND LOCATION

- 27th Armored Division, New York.
- 40th Armored Division, California.
- 48th Armored Division, Georgia.
- 49th Armored Division, Texas.
- 29th Infantry Division, Virginia-Maryland.
- 31st Infantry Division, Alabama-Mississippi.
- 32d Infantry Division, Wisconsin.
- 33d Infantry Division, Illinois.
- 36th Infantry Division, Texas.
- 37th Infantry Division, Ohio.
- 39th Infantry Division, Louisiana-Arkansas.

H 7100

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

June 13, 1967

41st Infantry Division, Washington-Oregon.
45th Infantry Division, Oklahoma.
46th Infantry Division, Michigan.
49th Infantry Division, California.

MAJOR UNITS IN THE ARNG UNDER THE PROPOSED REORGANIZATION PLAN

Eight divisions and eighteen brigades, all to be manned at 90% full war-time strength and fully supported with equipment, technicians and other essentials for readiness.

UNITS AND LOCATION

26th Infantry Division

Hq and Base, Massachusetts.
Brigade, Massachusetts.
Brigade, Massachusetts.
Brigade, Connecticut.

28th Infantry Division

Hq and Base, Pennsylvania.
Brigade, Pennsylvania.
Brigade, Maryland.
Brigade, Virginia.

30th Infantry Division *

Hq and Base, North Carolina.
Brigade, North Carolina.
Brigade, Georgia.
Brigade, South Carolina.

38th Infantry Division

Hq and Base, Indiana.
Brigade, Indiana.
Brigade, Michigan.
Brigade, Ohio.

42d Infantry Division

Hq and Base, New York.
Brigade, New York.
Brigade, New York.
Brigade, Pennsylvania.

47th Infantry Division

Hq and Base, Minnesota.
Brigade, Minnesota.
Brigade, Illinois.
Brigade, Iowa.

30th Armored Division

Hq and Base, Tennessee.
Brigade, Tennessee.
Brigade, Alabama.
Brigade, Mississippi.

50th Armored Division

Hq and Base, New Jersey.
Brigade, New Jersey.
Brigade, New York.
Brigade, Vermont.

Infantry Brigades (Sep) (14): Arkansas, California, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin.
Infantry Brigades (Mech) (Sep) (2): Nebraska, Texas.

Airborne Brigade (Sep) (1): Alabama.
Armor Brigade (Sep) (1): California.

Current and proposed paid drill strength of Army National Guard by State

State	Current	Proposed †
Alabama	15,283	15,355
Alaska	2,253	1,940
Arizona	2,948	2,800
Arkansas	7,720	8,050
California	22,332	21,958
Colorado	2,987	2,706
Connecticut	6,392	5,800
Delaware	3,130	2,800
District of Columbia	1,714	1,705
Florida	8,333	7,549
Georgia	7,613	8,800
Hawaii	4,253	4,595
Idaho	3,408	3,319
Illinois	11,563	11,338
Indiana	11,596	10,489
Iowa	8,333	7,811
Kansas	8,401	7,300
Kentucky	5,502	4,957
Louisiana	7,726	7,890
Maine	2,788	2,800

* Infantry vs. Mechanized status is under study.

Current and proposed paid drill strength of Army National Guard by State—Continued

State	Current	Proposed †
Maryland	6,843	6,467
Massachusetts	15,001	14,877
Michigan	9,999	9,750
Minnesota	10,850	9,653
Mississippi	10,928	10,500
Missouri	9,299	8,450
Montana	2,477	2,443
Nebraska	4,861	4,334
Nevada	880	950
New Hampshire	2,280	2,243
New Jersey	14,761	14,183
New Mexico	3,398	3,267
New York	24,765	24,520
North Carolina	11,262	11,037
North Dakota	2,993	2,600
Ohio	15,892	14,991
Oklahoma	8,974	8,400
Oregon	6,718	6,309
Pennsylvania	18,753	17,943
Puerto Rico	6,923	7,000
Rhode Island	3,343	2,900
South Carolina	11,053	9,714
South Dakota	4,145	3,757
Tennessee	11,734	10,588
Texas	17,225	17,409
Utah	4,886	4,618
Vermont	3,144	2,900
Virginia	7,698	7,761
Washington	6,757	5,804
West Virginia	3,576	3,066
Wisconsin	9,942	9,940
Wyoming	1,681	1,564

† Approximate.

CURRENT LOCATION OF U.S. ARMY RESERVE TRAINING DIVISIONS MANEUVER AREA COMMANDS AND SUPPORT BRIGADES

UNIT AND LOCATION

Training divisions

100th, Kentucky.
104th, Washington, Oregon.
108th, North Carolina, South Carolina.
70th, Michigan, Indiana.
76th, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Maine.
78th, New Jersey.
80th, Virginia, Maryland.
84th, Wisconsin.
85th, Illinois.
89th, Kansas, Colorado, Nebraska.
91st, California.
95th, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana.
98th, New York.

Maneuver area commands

87th, Alabama.
75th, Texas.

Support brigades †

103d, Iowa.
301st, New York.
377th, Louisiana.

Mr. McCLURE. Mr. Chairman, according to an article in This Week magazine last Sunday, all of the wars in America's history have cost \$500 billion. The bill before us today is thus equivalent to 14 percent of that figure. When you add what was appropriated in supplementals earlier this year, you will find that the 90th Congress already has authorized defense spending totaling as much as the entire cost of all American wars prior to World War II.

And so I cannot help wondering why it is, with these billions upon billions available for our defense effort, we stagger on and on through a seemingly endless stalemate in Southeast Asia? What, indeed, will it take to achieve victory or even a face-saving settlement? If this budget cannot do the job, then it probably cannot be done.

The root of the problem must lie with those who administer the program.

† Under proposed reorganization, one new brigade will be added.

Strangely enough, it is in the civilian offices at the Defense Department where the will to win is about as obscure as the reasons given for our presence in Vietnam in the first place.

Mr. McNamara's conduct as Secretary of Defense has given rise to that new phenomena, the credibility gap. On more than one occasion, he has flouted the expressed will of Congress. Against the advice of this Nation's foremost military experts, the Secretary has relied solely on the F-111 to fill our bomber requirements. He has practically invited missile attacks on this country by stubbornly refusing to build an adequate anti-ballistic-missile defense.

Furthermore, I think that any man who has misjudged the costs of the Vietnam War by \$15 billion as the Secretary did in fiscal 1966 and by \$13 billion as he did in fiscal 1967 has a right to expect criticism of his performance. It probably would be presumptuous of a freshman Congressman to call for the resignation of a Cabinet official. So, I shall merely say that I heartily endorse any such expression on the part of my colleagues and wish them Godspeed in their efforts.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, as I have done in similar cases in the past, I shall vote for this enormous defense appropriation because there really is no alternative, as I see it. In today's world, we must maintain the strength of our Defense Establishment and our forces in Vietnam must have the equipment and supplies they need.

In the bill before us, there is no way of determining how much of the total is to be used in Vietnam or in the process of bombing North Vietnam, and therefore it is not practicable to propose amendments to limit or reduce these amounts. If amendments to this effect are offered, I shall be inclined to support them.

I compliment the committee for the reductions it has made in the budget requests, but I am disturbed that the committee has proposed additions to the administration's requests totaling over \$400 million, and I intend to propose an amendment that would reduce these add-ons.

It is imperative that, in these days of economic strain, we conduct our affairs in as economical a way as possible. If the Department of Defense, having carefully studied the matter, concludes that an expenditure is not needed, I am inclined to support that judgment.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I believe this concludes the general debate on the bill.

I hope that the hearings and the report, which are available to all Members, as well as the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of today, will enable all of us to be generally familiar with the huge operations of the Department of Defense. I hope that that familiarity will instill a confidence in, and support of, the defense operations of our Nation.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read. The Clerk read as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following sums are appropriated, out of any

June 13, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 7101

money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, for military functions administered by the Department of Defense, and for other purposes, namely:

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that on page 1, line 6, where the words "Department of Defense" appear that the letter "s" be deleted so that the words will read "Department of Defense".

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

PRACTICE, ARMY

For the necessary expenses of construction, equipment, and maintenance of rifle ranges, the instruction of citizens in marksmanship, and promotion of rifle practice, in accordance with law, including travel of rifle teams, military personnel, and individuals attending regional, national, and international competitions, and not to exceed \$21,000 for incidental expenses of the National Board; \$428,000: *Provided*, That travel expenses of civilian members of the National Board shall be paid in accordance with the Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. MCCARTHY

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. McCARTHY: on page 13, strike out line 19 and all that follows down through and including line 6 on page 14.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is very simple. It would strike \$428,000 for the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice. This money is used for ammunition and the loan of rifles to National Rifle Association clubs. The present law requires that groups which want this Federal aid must join the National Rifle Association.

I offer the amendment because I do not believe that the Government of the United States should subsidize an organization which espouses vigilantism within the confines of the United States. I refer to a suggestion in the May issue of *The American Rifleman*, the official organ of the National Rifle Association, that citizens acquire firearms to form civilian posses in order to provide a potential community stabilizer against the threat of urban rioting.

I would like to quote briefly from this editorial:

Mob action on a scale unprecedented in the modern United States has ravaged community after community in recent years . . . With homefront safeguards spotty and uncertain, the armed citizen represents a potential community stabilizer. His support of law and order, whether as a civilian member of the posse comitatus or as one of the unorganized militia, defined as "the whole-body of able-bodied male citizens," could prove essential.

I suggest to you that this is a prescription for mass mayhem, for taking the law into one's own armed hands. This \$428,000 is only part of about \$2 million this organization gets annually under this kind of program.

This morning's issue of the *Washington Post* quotes the executive vice president of the organization as stating they

were given the job of checking out the suitability of groups that get Federal guns "because we have the expertise and know-how."

I say that expertise and know-how did not prevent them from running an editorial like the one to which I referred, or from carrying on their membership rolls the head of the lunatic-fringe Minutemen.

I suggest also that they do not need the money for they are prosperous, having assets of almost \$11 million, partly because of their tax-exempt status under section 501 a—and I quote the IRS—"an organization exclusively for the promotion of social welfare."

I think we know it as a lobbying organization. But it is not registered under the Lobbying Act. I think they have performed a disservice to this country in fighting reasonable firearm legislation. We are going to hear about arming the Arabs. I suggest to you that because of the lack of effective firearms laws, we have permitted the arming of very militant far left and far right antagonistic groups, groups like the Black Panthers and the Minutemen. This situation represents a force for instability, especially in the coming hot summer.

Mr. Chairman, I think this whole practice is at best questionable, and I certainly think that the record shows that the NRA is not a proper or responsible conduit for Federal guns and ammunition, and that we could save the taxpayers \$428,000 by adopting this amendment.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. BINGHAM. I would like to commend the gentleman from New York for bringing this matter to the attention of the Committee, and I would like to be associated with his remarks and I shall be glad to support his amendment.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SCHEUER. I would like to commend the gentleman, and I support him most wholeheartedly. I do this as a Member who has enjoyed for decades the use of firearms. As a young fellow I was a member of a National Championship Rifle Team, and earned the "Expert Rifleman" citation of the National Rifle Association. I have been a member of rifle and pistol clubs for almost all my life. I own a wide variety of sidearms, shotguns, and rifles. At my home in a locked box I have what constitutes a veritable arsenal of weaponry. My four kids aged 7 to 15 all handle pistols, rifles, and shotguns, with skill, respect, and care. The NRA plays a useful educational role in teaching Americans, myself included, how to use firearms prudently and skillfully. But I am persuaded from their recent published statements and activities, that they should play no formal official, governmentally sanctioned, and subsidized role, directly or indirectly, in the training of our citizenry in the use,

and more importantly, in the purposes of the use, of firearms. It is a relationship between a private group and our defense agencies that is bad in principal and worse in practice. It should be brought to a prompt halt by the passage of this amendment.

(Mr. SCHEUER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that I understand the purposes of the amendment offered by the distinguished gentleman from New York. His remarks were directed against the National Rifle Association, but if we look at the language of the bill, it has no reference to the National Rifle Association. His amendment strikes at the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice.

Possibly the amendment was inspired by a story in one of the local newspapers that NRA is subsidized by the U.S. Treasury. This is not the case. The National Rifle Association gets no subsidy from the U.S. Government. Nor has it provided arms and ammunition to either of the groups named by the distinguished gentleman.

The National Rifle Association, by helping to carry out the duties and responsibilities which are assigned by law to the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice, is actually subsidizing the U.S. Treasury. What is done represents a service to the Government which is not paid for from Government funds.

I believe the principal point we want to consider today is that we have a program which has been carried on since 1903 to train young men in the use of arms in the realization that this could be helpful to them and to our country in case of war. The clubs and the individuals who participate are carefully screened.

Nothing is taken from the active forces by making arms and ammunition available for this purpose. The rifles and the ammunition which are used generally are obsolescent or overage, but in the hands of the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice they serve a very useful purpose. I believe this is better than making them into scrap or selling them as surplus into what may be irresponsible hands.

I would like to point out that this program has been going on since 1903 when Elihu Root, as Secretary of War, sponsored the program. During that time the program has worked well. The people have found it useful. No one has tried before in my 27 years here to kill the program. Now, when we are at war it is an inopportune time to do so. If that is the purpose of the amendment, it simply falls on its face, because it would eliminate the directing force of the program, the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice, and accomplish nothing useful.

H 7102

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

June 13, 1967

Mr. MAHON, Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, when we return to the House, I shall ask unanimous consent to place in the Record at this point a breakdown of the funds carried here.

They include \$159,000 for the civilian personnel to operate the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice, for example. There is also included \$80,000 for the travel of civilian teams to the National Rifle and Pistol matches. At the 1966 national matches, held at Camp Perry, Ohio, 46 rifle and 56 pistol teams, representing 49 States and Puerto Rico, participated. Funds for the lease of Camp Perry, Ohio, which is the site for the national rifle matches, are included in the \$428,000 provided for this activity.

The material referred to follows:

The primary mission of the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice is to promote marksmanship training with military type individual small arms among able-bodied citizens outside the active services of the Armed Forces, to formulate policy governing civilian marksmanship programs, and to formulate rules and regulations governing the National Trophy Matches.

The training program of the National Board is conducted through civilian shooting clubs and schools scattered throughout the United States. As of 30 June 1966, there were 387,947 individuals enrolled in 5,789 clubs and schools.

The \$428,000 requested for FY 1968 is not intended to cover all the expenses of the marksmanship program carried out by civilian clubs. The ammunition and targets furnished constitute only a fraction of the year's requirement of the average shooter. Most of the ranges used are privately owned and maintained and the instructors contribute their own time as a public service. The Board's program is a stimulant to get young men interested in shooting with military weapons and to maintain a corps of instructors to teach young men to shoot properly. In return for the assistance given, the recipient must agree to fire one of the U.S. Army's qualification courses with a military weapon and the clubs must report the results of the firing in order to remain eligible for assistance the following year.

Funds for personnel costs in FY 1968 will support the present personnel authorization, 22 civilian positions. The reduction of \$3,000 in FY 1968 represents the savings in the number of working days and the elimination of overtime costs.

Funds requested for travel in FY 1968 are \$43,000 below the FY 1967 level. U.S. teams will participate in one international shooting match in FY 1968, the Pan American Games, to be held in Winnipeg, Canada in July 1967. The cost will be \$19,000.

As in FY 1967, \$80,000 is requested for the travel of civilian teams to the National Rifle and Pistol Matches. At the 1966 National Matches, held at Camp Perry, Ohio, 46 rifle and 46 pistol teams, representing 49 States and Puerto Rico, participated in the matches.

Funds for the lease of Camp Perry, Ohio, as a site for the National Matches are continued at \$50,000 a year. The original lease provided payments of \$150,000 a year for the first four years (FY's 1961-1964) and \$50,000 a year for the remaining 21 years of the lease.

The amount requested for badges, medals and trophies, \$17,950, is the same amount as requested in FY 1967. This item includes all marksmanship awards issued to civilians and all trophies, plaques and medals awarded at the National Matches.

Target funds required in FY 1968 are estimated to be \$53,000, which is \$18,700 less than the amount required in FY 1967. During FY 1967, the Army adopted a new high-power rifle target. In order to keep the civilian marksmanship program in line with the Army's training methods, an initial issue of these targets was made to all clubs firing high-power rifles. It is anticipated that the requirement for FY 1968 will be reduced since many clubs will have a stock of the new target on hand.

Equipment requirements for the National Matches, \$25,000, are continued at the FY 1967 level. This item includes all of the non-expendable equipment used at the matches, to include range equipment, mess equipment, bedding and the many miscellaneous items necessary to support approximately 7,000 competitors and 2,900 support personnel.

Mr. MAHON, Mr. Chairman, I ask for a vote on the amendment.

Mr. FLYNT, Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON, I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. FLYNT, Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York. In opposing this amendment, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SIKES] and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON].

The reasons given by them clearly demonstrate that the overall national benefits derived from this program far exceed the \$428,000 provided for in this item of the bill.

The National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice, since its establishment in 1903, has fulfilled an important function in training servicemen and civilians alike in the fundamentals of knowledge and use of firearms.

This knowledge and use of weapons has been in the national interest and there are few, if any, examples in which the knowledge and proficiency thus gained have been for any criminal activity, anywhere, at any time.

The author of the amendment undoubtedly has not reviewed the 64-year history of this board and the functions which it has performed. If he had done so, I am confident he would have come to the unmistakable conclusion that it has been a good program, and has justified its existence and continuance over the years.

Insofar as I have been able to learn, the history and record of the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice does not form a basis for the story which appeared in the newspaper this morning. Contrary to the contents of this newspaper story, the organization referred to therein has contributed much more to this program than the entire amount provided for in this item of this appropriations bill. Mr. Chairman, if any change should be made in either the language or the amount contained in this item of the bill, the amount should be increased to at least equal the amount provided in fiscal year 1967.

Mr. Chairman, I oppose the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York and I urge that it be rejected.

(Mr. FLYNT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LIPSCOMB, Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON, I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LIPSCOMB, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I wish to join the gentleman and others in opposing this amendment. The National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice has promoted rifle marksmanship instruction over a great number of years. It has encouraged U.S. participation in many international smallarms competition. These funds provide for our participation in the coming Pan American games. It is a worthwhile operation.

I encourage the Members to vote down the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. McCARTHY].

The amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

PROCUREMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND MISSILES, ARMY

For expenses necessary for the procurement, manufacture, and modification of missiles, armament, ammunition, equipment, vehicles, vessels, and aircraft for the Army and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps; purchase of not to exceed five thousand passenger motor vehicles (including eleven medium sedans at not to exceed \$3,000 each) for replacement only; expenses which in the discretion of the Secretary of the Army are necessary in providing facilities for production of equipment and supplies for national defense purposes, including construction, and the furnishing of Government-owned facilities and equipment at privately owned plants; and ammunition for military salutes at institutions to which issue of weapons for salutes is authorized; \$5,475,000,000, to remain available until expended.

Mr. GROSS, Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GROSS, Mr. Chairman, I take this time to ask the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee or some member of the subcommittee to provide us with a estimate of the amount of military equipment which is proposed to be purchased abroad. I have in mind, I would say to the distinguished gentleman, the proposal by this Government to buy some \$60 million to \$80 million worth of military equipment in Great Britain.

May we have some figures, if it is available, as to how much of the \$70 billion in this bill is going to go for military equipment purchased in foreign countries?

Mr. MAHON, Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS, I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. MAHON, I should like to give some information on that subject to the gentleman from Iowa.

The United States has sold over \$11 billion in military equipment to our allies in the 5-year period from fiscal year 1962 through 1966.

Mr. GROSS, I would say to the gentleman that I am not asking about how much we have sold. I am asking how

June 13, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 7103

much this Government is going to buy in foreign countries?

Mr. MAHON. I was about to say that we have sold \$11 billion worth and we propose to buy \$325 million worth. That is the quick answer.

Mr. GROSS. Is that the total, \$325 million?

Mr. MAHON. I do not believe it would include all items. I do not have a list of items before me. If one calls oil military equipment, we must remember that a lot of oil is bought overseas.

Mr. GROSS. It was publicized in the newspapers a few days ago that the United States was considering the purchase of 200 executive-type jet airplanes from Great Britain. Did this come before the gentleman's committee? Does the gentleman know anything about the purchase of 200 jet executive-type planes? If so, why do we buy them in Britain and who is going to use them when they get to this country?

Mr. MAHON. We are buying from Canada, under this bill—and it is above the budget estimate, by the way—a few copies of the Caribou aircraft, in the total sum of \$12.5 million.

Mr. GROSS. What about the executive-type planes they are talking about buying?

Mr. MAHON. Offhand, I do not think those would be involved here. Perhaps some other member of the subcommittee is able to provide some further information on your inquiry.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. There have been some ideas expressed as to the possible future procurement of aircraft of this type, but there is nothing in this particular bill for a procurement of jet-type executive aircraft such as has been mentioned by the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. If purchased, who is going to get these British executive-type planes, and why does this Government not buy Jet Stars made in this country or some other similar type of plane made in this country?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I am all for keeping it in this country. I do not believe in this particular type of procurement being accomplished with foreign firms.

Mr. GROSS. I do not understand why we are buying some \$325 million worth of military equipment from Great Britain or from any other country. We have the capacity to produce all we need in this country. We hear about poverty in this country every 15 minutes. What is wrong with our employing more Americans?

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I am glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. MAHON. Are we not taking care of American industry and labor in selling \$11 billion worth of military equipment to our allies in a 5-year period? What is wrong with that?

Mr. GROSS. Everything in the world is wrong with it. We are getting an awful good lesson right now out of the Middle East. We armed those nations and then

they started fighting and tearing each other up. Now we are getting the word over in the Committee on Foreign Affairs that we probably will be asked to put up many millions of dollars in order to patch things up again. That is what is wrong with it.

Mr. MAHON. We did not sell \$11 billion in military equipment to the Middle East countries. I referred to our allies.

Mr. GROSS. How cockeyed contradictory can we get in this country when we talk about peace, spend millions of dollars a year on a disarmament agency, and then peddle \$2 billion worth of arms a year around the world? How contradictory can we get?

The CHAIRMAN: The Clerk will read. The Clerk read as follows:

PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES, NAVY

For construction, procurement, production, modification, and modernization of aircraft, missiles, equipment, including ordnance, spare parts, and accessories therefor; specialized equipment; expansion of public and private plants, including the land necessary therefor, and such lands, and interests therein, may be acquired, and construction prosecuted thereon prior to approval of title by the Attorney General as required by section 355, Revised Statutes, as amended; and procurement and installation of equipment, appliances, and machine tools in public or private plants; \$2,946,500,000, to remain available until expended of which \$208,800,000 shall be available only for the F111-B aircraft program.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BINGHAM

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. BINGHAM: On page 16, line 14, strike out "\$2,946,500,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$2,839,800,000."

(Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, my amendment would be to eliminate the \$106.7 million that has been added on to the request for the EA-6A aircraft. It is an item which appears on page 4 of the committee report under the summary of additions recommended by the committee.

Mr. Chairman, I do want to commend the distinguished committee for the conscientious job I know they have done in making reductions in the requested appropriations, but I am seriously concerned at the amount of over \$400 million in add-ons. I propose this amendment as a way of pointing up the problem.

This sum of \$106.7 million was not requested by the Defense Department but apparently was made by the Department of the Navy. In this era, when we are faced with inflation and when there are great demands from all sides for expenditures that are necessary, we should economize to the extent we can. When the Defense Department has studied the matter and has come up with the conclusion that this request from the Navy Department should not be met, I believe that it would be wise and economical for this body to go along with the Department of Defense.

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BINGHAM. I will be glad to yield

to the distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. LAIRD. Does the gentleman from New York intend to submit amendments on all of the add-ons which we made?

Mr. BINGHAM. No, but, as I said, I am concerned about the total amount of add-ons.

Mr. LAIRD. This add-on for the EA-6A is in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee on Armed Services of both the House and the Senate.

It is true that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Department of the Navy appealed the decision of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense did not support this particular item. But the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations did support it. The House Committee on Armed Services supports it, the Senate Armed Services Committee supports it, and the conference committee agreed to this particular add-on.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I want to state to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. LAIRD] that I am aware of that. I am proposing this amendment as a way of protesting the fact that such heavy additions have been made to the request submitted. This item is also the type of expenditure which I believe has to do at least, in part, with the intensified bombing of North Vietnam with which I and other Members of the House of Representatives are not in agreement. It is difficult to make out from the hearings on this item—part 4, pages 209 to 212—just what the facts are.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

(Mr. MAHON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, the Congress has authorized \$106 million, through legislation sponsored by the Committee on Armed Services, for these EA-6A aircraft for use in the war in Southeast Asia.

The Joint Chiefs, who have primary responsibility in connection with the war, have recommended these aircraft and have stated that they are urgently needed by the Marines in order to fight the particular type of war in which they are involved.

Mr. Chairman, it is my opinion that it would represent a serious blow to our defense effort should the Congress deny the funds provided herein for the EA-6A aircraft.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. PIKE. I thank the distinguished gentleman from Texas, the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, very much for yielding to me at this time.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that I appreciate on behalf of Marine aviation in general the fact that these aircraft have been added. They are not essentially a bombing aircraft. They are electronics jamming aircraft. They are designed to save American lives by jamming the radars and the SAM's of the North Vietnamese.

H 7104

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

June 13, 1967

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, the Marines need these planes very, very badly and I commend the Armed Services Committee for having added them to the authorization. I further wish that all these planes were available at this moment in Vietnam where they are badly needed. This is a new plane for a vital mission and we have very few of them.

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Texas for yielding to me at this time.

Mr. Chairman, this is one of the most important additions made by the committee from the strategic standpoint of the prosecution of the war in Vietnam. It is the most important of any that the committee added.

Mr. Chairman, I would caution the members of the Committee today against voting for this amendment. This amendment should be defeated. These add-ons are necessary in order to protect the lives of our fliers and in order to see that the war is prosecuted on a much safer basis from the standpoint of our service personnel.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, the record of the committee hearings is full of instances where witnesses have stated, one after the other, that this is the greatest single need in additional aircraft. This plane is not a bomber, as has been previously pointed out. Primarily, it is an electronics aircraft, and one which illustrates a state of the art in aircraft design not heretofore reached.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. BINGHAM].

The amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read. The Clerk read as follows:

SHIPBUILDING AND CONVERSION, NAVY

For expenses necessary for the construction, acquisition, or conversion of vessels as authorized by law, including armor and armament thereof, plant equipment, appliances, and machine tools, and installation thereof in public or private plants; procurement of critical, long leadtime components and designs for vessels to be constructed or converted in the future; and expansion of public and private plants, including land necessary therefor, and such land, and interests therein, may be acquired and construction prosecuted thereon prior to approval of title by the Attorney General as required by section 355, Revised Statutes, as amended; \$1,420,000,000, to remain available until expended: *Provided*, That none of the funds herein provided for the construction or conversion of any naval vessel to be constructed in shipyards in the United States shall be expended in foreign shipyards for the construction of major components of the hull or superstructure of such vessel.

Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might ask a question of the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. Chairman, the committee report states on page 47 that the Committee on Appropriations will expect the Defense Department to proceed with the advance procurement of the second fiscal year 1968 nuclear frigate, and that the committee will expect the Defense Department to request funds for the full construction of the second nuclear frigate in the 1969 shipbuilding program.

Is that statement, Mr. Chairman, sufficient to insure that the Defense Department will actually build this second fiscal year 1968 nuclear frigate?

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield to me, I would say the answer to the question is "No." The language is not sufficient to compel the Department of Defense to build the additional frigates that are provided for in this bill. You can lead a defense official to water, but you cannot make him drink, and that is the problem here. I believe these funds will be used, and I certainly would want to emphasize that it is the position of the committee, and I am sure of the House, that we should proceed with all deliberate speed with the construction of these ships for the nuclear navy. I believe this is the wave of the future in navy warfare.

Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee. Then, Mr. Chairman, would it be proper to say that it is clearly the intention of the Committee on Appropriations and, therefore, the intention of the House, that they should be built?

Mr. MAHON. I say to the distinguished gentleman, who has distinguished himself in the field of nuclear propulsion in the Navy, that it certainly is the view of the committee, and I believe of the House, that the Department of Defense should proceed with construction.

I commend the gentleman for his interest.

Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee. I thank the distinguished chairman.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BYRNES OF WISCONSIN

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin: On page 17, line 9, before the period, add the following: "*Provided further*, That none of the funds herein provided shall be used for the construction of any naval vessels in foreign shipyards."

(Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, first I do want to congratulate the subcommittee that has had the responsibility of preparing this bill and bringing it to the House. There has been a mammoth job, and I believe we should all express a feeling of appreciation to them for the job they have done. Because I offer an amendment certainly should not be interpreted as being critical of the work of the committee.

Mr. Chairman, I do believe here is one area, however, that a change should be made in the bill as it comes to us.

I would ask the members of the Committee to take the bill as reported by the committee and read the last five or six lines of the first paragraph on page 17 where, after making the funds available,

the \$1.42 billion for shipbuilding and conversion, Navy, there is a proviso in the bill:

Provided, That none of the funds herein provided for the construction or conversion of any naval vessel to be constructed in shipyards in the United States shall be expended in foreign shipyards for the construction of major components of the hull or superstructure of such vessel.

We already have, therefore, a limitation on the construction of all major components of naval vessels abroad, but the interesting thing is that there is no restriction about having the whole ship built abroad.

What I suggest, Mr. Chairman, is that we should add this additional proviso that none of the funds herein shall be used for the construction of a naval vessel in foreign yards.

The reason this comes to my attention is the fact that there is a practical situation that has been developing and is before us today, in a sense. This appropriation provides for the funding of seven vessels called MOS, ocean mine sweepers. Their duty is mine sweeping and mine hunting, and they operate in support of our amphibious forces.

It is a combat ship. It is a ship of new design, new advance design, according to the words of the Navy, a prototype.

The seven that are funded in this bill are seven out of 16 that it is proposed to be built. We have already authorized and funded in previous years nine of this type vessel, but none of them has yet been contracted for or bids let.

Four were authorized for construction in fiscal year 1966. Five were authorized for construction in fiscal year 1967.

This bill contains seven for 1968.

But what is the plan of the Defense Department? The plan is to give all 16 ships of this new prototype and new vessel of advanced design—that they all are to be given to the British for British construction.

The nine that have already been funded are for 1966 and 1967. Of course, we cannot touch that by legislation here. So there is nothing we can do in a sense, I suppose, to affect their intention to go ahead and let the contracts on those nine.

But I suggest to this House that we should have the responsibility of at least having seven of the 16 constructed in yards here so that we can maintain in this country an expertise with regard to the construction of this type of vessel and so that we do not lose the know-how and experience in building this type or class of vessel.

In my judgment, we should not place sole and immediate reliance upon a foreign source 3,000 miles away and beyond our control. Where are we going to get this type of ship when foreign yards either cannot or will not build them in case of some future emergency?

To me, it is utter folly to put all of our eggs in one basket and then put that basket abroad. All I am suggesting here is that we say to the Navy or to the Department of Defense that these seven—these seven out of 16, at least let us let the contracts for their construction to American yards.

June 13, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 7105

Mr. GARMATZ. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I am completely in favor of the distinguished Member's amendment to restrict expenditures under this bill to American yards.

As chairman of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, on many occasions I have been told by witnesses that it is unnecessary to restrict construction of merchant ships to American yards because the necessary know-how to build merchant ships during wartime would come from the fact that Navy ships are being built in American yards.

I must say that I am not persuaded at all by this argument and the very fact that an amendment such as this has become necessary amply supports my misgivings with respect to maintenance of an adequate shipbuilding base in the United States.

True it is, that up to the moment only a few isolated contracts have been given out abroad and only a few more bids have been sought. But, nevertheless, the intent to build abroad is evident and I am firmly convinced that it is wholly detrimental to the United States.

I am aware of the argument in favor of building abroad—that our airplane industry receives large orders from abroad and that we must do something to spend some of these profits in Britain and elsewhere, but I feel that our ultimate survival in case of war is far more important than a balance-of-payment matter, and that we can assure our future only by having the necessary skills within our immediate control.

We cannot count on Britain or Japan to build our warships or our merchant ships in case of an emergency. We can only rely on our own strengths and skills, and we must keep these skills alive.

Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GARMATZ. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Virginia, a member of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Chairman, I completely concur in the statement just made by the gentleman in the well, the chairman of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee of the House. He is knowledgeable in this matter and has made a good statement.

I am also in sympathy with the intent of the amendment just offered. For some reason it seems to me the administration is intent on building our ships in foreign yards. For what reason I cannot know. We talk about the balance of payments. Certainly this is not going to contribute to a solution of our balance-of-payments problem by building ships in foreign yards.

We talk about keeping the employment level high. This is taking employment away from these people. We talk about maintaining the state of the art. We are certainly not helping that. Right at this moment the Secretary of Transportation is trying to sell a maritime policy which has as one of its cornerstones the building of ships abroad. I think it is time that we stop this.

Implements of war, such as naval ships and maritime vessels which will be used and are necessary in time of war, should

be built at home. I intend to support the amendment.

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GARMATZ. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. MILLER of California. I thank the gentleman from Maryland. I have had the privilege of serving with him on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee for many years, and I subscribe to the thought that he has submitted here.

When are we going to learn? Those of us who can remember 1917 remember that one of the things that was the pacing item of that war was the buildings of ships to supply logistically our troops abroad. Many of us still remember the old saying that the wooden ships we built were built with wood so green that they could still hear the birds singing in the trees.

Then came World War II, and again the pacing item was shipping to support our foreign efforts.

Are we going to forget, or have we forgotten the lessons of these two wars?

I remember when a group of people representing a foreign chamber of commerce came before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and pled that this country abandon its merchant marine because we had other resources, and let them handle the sea traffic of the world as they need no great natural resources. What would happen to our foreign exports if we should become dependent upon foreign shipping? This is what we are rapidly coming to. I thank the gentleman for his very fine statement.

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GARMATZ. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. LAIRD. I would like to add to what the gentleman from Maryland said. I think this is a reasonable amendment which has been offered. It does not demand that all 16 of these minesweepers be built in the United States. It says that instead of all 16 being built abroad, at least seven of the 16—just seven—be built in the United States so that we can maintain this capability which could be very important at some future time. I agree with the gentleman from Maryland. I hope the chairman of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, will accept this amendment because it is a good amendment and it should be accepted.

Mr. GARMATZ. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. I have before me a statement of the position of the administration on this issue. The effect of the pending amendment is that we deny the Navy the right to let Great Britain compete for the construction of some minesweepers.

It is not proposed that these ships be built abroad unless the bidding abroad is below that proposed by shipbuilders in this country.

I would like to read a portion of the statement with respect to this matter:

1. The US has sold over \$11 billion in military equipment to our Allies in the five year

period, FY 62-66. As a general principle the US must be willing to procure selected equipment abroad for use by US Forces as part of large scale foreign purchase programs in the US under competitive arrangements consistent always with our principal interests in military preparedness, security of our equipment and our own political and economic objectives. To eliminate ships from any such small selective purchases abroad is to provide a special and unwarranted privilege to one military equipment industry at the expense of others.

We do not propose to eliminate purchase of some aircraft in Canada. No, just the special purchase of this type of ship. Now I will continue to read the statement:

2. Specifically the UK committed itself to purchasing over \$2 billion in equipment from the US industry over the next ten years. The US in return committed itself to purchasing \$325 million of equipment from UK industry on a competitive basis over the same time period.

This is a matter of commitments which have been made. If we do not buy the ships, then we have to buy aircraft or something else, because we are committed.

The United Kingdom has already confirmed orders for approximately \$1.3 billion and has committed itself to follow-on costs of over \$700 million over the 12-year period of the agreement. The United States has confirmed \$143 million was for ships, \$100 million for aerospace industry items, and the balance in miscellaneous Army and supply items. Based on prior consideration of the shipbuilding problem by the DOD and Congress, the United States has additionally committed itself to placing 16 minesweepers, 2 AG's and 2 salvage tugs into competition between United Kingdom and United States industries in addition to many other aerospace and ground items. This competition involves 9 MSO's for which funds have already been appropriated by the Congress, and 7 MSO's, for which funds are in S. 666. This would bring the total ships to be placed into competition abroad under the United Kingdom arrangement to \$143 million if the United Kingdom industry successfully competes, out of a total shipbuilding appropriation for these three years of \$6.2 billion or less than 2.5% of the total new shipbuilding program not counting the backlog of about \$7 billion in United States shipyards. To place the shipbuilding industry in a privileged position as proposed by the Byrnes Amendment even for this small percent would not only be unfair to all other United States industries but would place the DOD in a position of being unable to carry out a commitment entered into formally with the United Kingdom and previously discussed with the Congress of the United States.

I underline the word "commitment." We are committed. Members of Congress from districts where they produce aerospace equipment and aircraft should get up under this technique and offer amendments to prohibit the carrying out of these arrangements.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. MAHON was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I will continue reading the statement:

3. The proposed amendment prohibits all types of ships. However, the record shows that it is the purchase of the minesweepers which probably involves only three shipyards in the United States which is at issue. These ships were selected by the U.S. Navy for competition by United Kingdom industry in 1965.

While they are slightly longer than previous MSO's, there are no new basic techniques involved in the hull portion—and the US Government will furnish all of the complicated equipment to be installed on the ship from US sources. The basic changes in hull specifications are similar to those already incorporated into coastal minesweepers being built in US shipyards. Thus it is the opinion of the Department of Defense that there is no need to provide a special privilege to the few shipyards who have indicated an interest in competing on these ships.

I say, as a matter of fairness to our colleagues, if we are to do this for the shipbuilding industry then we ought to do it for the aerospace industry and for other industries in the United States. Since we have sold \$11 billion worth of military equipment abroad it seems to me we ought to be willing to buy a small fraction of our equipment abroad.

Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. I might say that Admiral Fahy told our committee:

This is part of the exchange program for the British buying the F-111 or TFX, and our share of supporting them is to let them bid in on MSO's and ATS's and the two AG's.

Mr. MAHON. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. And he did say that price would be taken into consideration.

Mr. MAHON. Of course prices will be taken into consideration.

Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. DOWNING. I thank the gentleman.

Of course we all know that if this is put out to competitive bidding the United States will not have a very good chance, because our costs of things here are so much higher. They will underbid us. It will go to Great Britain.

Mr. MAHON. But, in return for their buying the F-111's, we have committed ourselves to buy other items.

Mr. DOWNING. Who committed us, on an industry that is sick? We are trying to revive the shipbuilding industry. We have no maritime industry. Some of our yards are folding. Why was a commitment made which would further hurt a sick industry?

Mr. MAHON. A commitment is a commitment, and a strong and powerful nation ought to stand by its commitments. We ought to vote down this amendment.

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. Do we have a commitment that we will fund this in this bill?

The gentleman is not telling us that somebody has made a commitment that all this has to be done, that the Congress even has to fund the seven involved here. That is up to the Congress, as to whether we will authorize these seven and fund them.

Mr. MAHON. They have been authorized, and this is providing the funds for the ships.

We have committed ourselves to buy certain amounts of material from the British. The Navy has selected these wooden-hull minesweepers, and we are going to furnish the technical equipment for them.

Why not stand by our commitments?

What is wrong with that?

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. Who made the commitments?

Mr. MAHON. The U.S. Government.

Mr. GROSS. Who made the commitments for the U.S. Government?

Mr. MAHON. The Department of Defense.

Mr. GROSS. That means Robert Strange McNamara?

Mr. MAHON. It means the Department of Defense, and he happened to be the Secretary at the time.

I would hope we could at least let these ships be completed in this country and in Great Britain and that we will not try to take an action which would be equivalent to the great and proud United States welsling on its commitments.

Mr. GROSS. Is this the same individual who closed down the shipyards?

Mr. MAHON. No one is advocating that we close down shipyards. We may possibly have too many, but no one is proposing that we close them down.

Mr. GROSS. He did close them down. The same McNamara closed them down.

Mr. MAHON. Other shipyards than those which would be involved here.

Time marches on.

Mr. CEDERBERG. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

I would urge the Members to give it very serious consideration. I believe there is more at stake than the three shipyards which are involved.

I admit a particular interest in this because I have one of the small shipyards in my hometown. I know the difficulty that the small yard has today in competing. The yard in my district has already lost bids to British concerns. Saying that the American yard has a right to compete with the foreign yard is just nonsense because it is absolutely impossible for American shipyards to compete with British shipyards. It just cannot be done.

Now, let me tell you another reason why I am opposed to allowing these ships to be built in Great Britain. The Navy now has a new method of awarding contracts on ships for the Navy. The shipyard in my area over the years built many Navy ships—guided missile destroyers, destroyers and destroyer escorts—on the Great Lakes that go up through the St. Lawrence Seaway to the ocean. But now the Navy, when it lets bids for these ships, will let a bid for a large number of ships for one yard whereas in the past they would break these bids up so that they could keep a mobilization base. Now, this yard and others on the Great Lakes and other

small yards do not get an opportunity to compete on this Navy work. So what you are doing is allowing the smaller yards that can build these ships to go out of business. You are requiring them to compete with Great Britain. With the present policy of the Navy in shipbuilding, allowing only the very largest yards in this country to build these Navy ships, we are leading to the destruction of the small yards. The small yards that have historically had a part in the shipbuilding business—and I might say have done a very efficient job in providing ships to the Navy—are about to go out of business. I do not think this is fair. I do not think it is fair for our own Navy to have a kind of construction program which makes it impossible for these yards to bid effectively and also places them in competition with foreign yards.

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CEDERBERG. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. These 16 ships would involve around \$120 million.

Mr. CEDERBERG. Let us say it is \$120 million out of about \$2 billion—I do not know how much the gentleman from Texas said was involved here, but certainly they can find some other items for this \$120 million and keep these shipyards in business. It would give these smaller yards an opportunity to compete among themselves within the United States without having to compete with foreign yards. It is impossible for them to compete. If you want to put some shipyards in this country out of business, just vote this amendment down and that is exactly what you are going to do.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

(Mr. PIKE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I think all of us recognize the great emotional appeal of buying anything we can get in America and never buying anything anywhere else. We in New York are not indifferent to the problems of shipyards. We even used to have a shipyard in New York, too. We do not have a naval shipyard there any more. It is gone. The gentleman from Virginia, who is a very articulate spokesman for a very excellent shipbuilding area has said that if this amendment does not pass we are not going to buy these ships in America. He says the American yards will not have a chance. This is another way of saying in the final analysis that they are going to be obtainable cheaper if this amendment does not pass. The ships will be procured at a lesser cost in open competition. I do not think that the American taxpayer is going to be outraged at the concept of spending a little less money to buy some of these ships.

Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that anyone is going to be too unhappy if we buy something of equivalent value at a lesser price somewhere else.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I am not in favor of doing this all over the place. I do recognize the peculiar problems of the American shipbuilding industry. But we

June 13, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 7107

cannot buy anything ever, anywhere abroad, without stepping upon the toes of some American industry.

Mr. Chairman, there has never been a proposal to buy anything anywhere that did not offend someone; I do not care whether it was ships or planes or engines or tanks or fabrics or buttons or wine, you name it.

Mr. Chairman, we do have a tremendously favorable balance of trade and we have a tremendously favorable balance of commercial trade. We have a tremendously favorable balance of military trade.

Mr. Chairman, the chairman of the committee has properly pointed out how tremendously favorable this balance is. We just cannot hope to sell and sell abroad and never, never ever buy abroad.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that this amendment will be defeated.

Mr. RHODES of Arizona. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PIKE. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from New York has made a statesmanlike speech. I support his position and wish to associate myself with his remarks.

Mr. PIKE. When I read it in the RECORD tomorrow, I may perhaps wish I had made it myself.

Mr. ZION. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I have in my files a newspaper clipping from Hong Kong dated about 16 months ago, when I was there. It announced a big contract for a Hong Kong shipyard to build barges for the United States, apparently because the States were incapable of building them themselves.

Mr. Chairman, this was an interesting contract because it provided a substantial profit to these Hong Kong shipbuilders. I was a little bit distressed about it at the time, and I am considerably more distressed about it now, because through the Hong Kong Harbor goes about one-half of the gross national product of Red China, without which we would not be facing all of this armament in North Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, if we are going to continue to support these countries which are stabbing us in the back in Vietnam by giving them valuable contracts instead of producing the items ourselves, then it is my opinion that we shall continue to see "Vietnams" occur all over the world.

Mr. Chairman, I am very much in favor of the amendment and I hope that my colleagues will join me in my effort to see that we stop helping these countries that are killing our men in Vietnam.

Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ZION. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to answer my friend, the gentleman from New York, who was talking about the economics of this matter.

If we are just interested in economy I am sure these ships can be built cheaper in Japan. That nation can build ships for about half of what the Western World can.

Of course, I realize we have to have reciprocal trade. I know that. But my argument is that when we reciprocate we should pick an industry that is not sick. We should pick a vibrant industry, one that can stand the shock of this. But we are picking on an industry that needs help.

Mr. Chairman, I have watched the hydraulic turbine industry dwindle in about 10 years' time when they had 10 firms who were manufacturing this huge equipment, and today we have only three. Primarily that was because our Government has been constrained to award turbine contracts abroad because they can get them cheaper. Therefore we have ruined an industry which can produce these valuable pieces of machinery, and as a result we have lost some of the valuable know-how. I do not want to see that happen here.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I shall not take the full 5 minutes, but simply want to point out again that the Congress has authorized the action which is proposed in the bill. Acting on the authorization by Congress, the U.S. Government has entered into an agreement which very definitely is favorable to us in that Britain will buy many more times as much from us than we propose to buy from them. Since our Government, acting on the authorization by Congress, has in good faith entered into an agreement; to abrogate that agreement by an amendment here today would leave us in a very bad light, worldwide. I cannot believe the Congress wants to put our Government in the position of having to repudiate its own agreement. It would not place the U.S. Government in good light in its negotiations on many important subjects throughout the world at this critical time.

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I will not take the full 5 minutes, but in view of the discussion which has just gone on, I would like to say to the gentleman from New York that I was glad to oppose the amendment to delete the EA-6A from the bill.

Of course the F-111 aircraft involved in this matter. But there is no contract on the part of the British Government to buy the TFX. There have been no contracts placed in the United States for the TFX on behalf of the British Government.

The gentleman from Wisconsin has merely asked that of the minesweepers that are going to be built this next year, seven of the 16 to be built in the United States—only seven of the 16, in order to maintain some capability here in America to build this new type minesweeper.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to just point out that as far as the cost differential is concerned, this is tied in to a great extent to labor wage rate contracts in the shipbuilding industry.

If you wish to go to the country that can build the ships the cheapest, then

you follow the argument of the gentleman from New York. The ships can probably be built much cheaper in Japan. As the gentleman from Virginia has said, and the gentleman from Maryland said earlier, there is a 40-percent differential as far as Great Britain is concerned. The amendment asks only that seven of the 16 minesweepers be built in the United States next year. This is all tied in with the TFX procurement. There has been no contract from Great Britain on this. There cannot be a real and final commitment made on the part of the U.S. Government until the Congress appropriates the money, and there has been no appropriation for these seven ships that are being authorized in this bill.

Mr. Chairman, I ask that this amendment be agreed to.

I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, unlike the States of Maryland, Texas, and New York, the State of Iowa has not a single shipyard.

I want to see Americans employed in shipyards as well as elsewhere in our industries because the American labor has been and always will be the best market for our American farm products. I want to see American labor employed. I know of no reason why—and at this time of all times, when the British are running supplies into Haiphong to help kill Americans in Vietnam—I see no reason why we should go to Britain for a dime's worth of anything. You tell me why. The chairman of the committee talks about billions of dollars of military equipment that we are selling around the world these days.

Mr. MAHON. We are selling to Britain, if the gentleman will yield.

Mr. GROSS. What is that?
Mr. MAHON. We are selling billions of dollars of military equipment to Britain.

Mr. GROSS. And do you have the slightest knowledge as to what they owe us? They are our biggest debtors from World War I and right down to the present day? They owe us more billions of dollars than any other country in the world. There is not the slightest assurance that they will pay us for anything that they get. These leeches have been on our back for years. Let us stop this business of going to Britain for ships. If you want cheap ships, as one of my colleagues said just a moment ago, go to Japan.

Mr. MAHON. The Congress has authorized these ships and the law provides a means for the type of action proposed in this bill.

Mr. GROSS. The Congress does the authorizing, not the Secretary of Defense. It is certainly right that the Congress do the authorizing.

Mr. MAHON. That is right and the Congress has approved the budget program for these ships and has not restricted the program.

Mr. GROSS. Let us just make the start here today to cut down on those who demonstrate every day that they are

H 7108

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

June 13, 1967

not in our camp. Instead of giving us help in Vietnam the British are helping to supply the enemy. If the British are friends, who needs enemies?

Mr. JOELSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I take this time to ask the gentleman from Iowa what is the basis of his statement that British ships are supplying the sinews of war to Hanoi, because it is my understanding that that is not the case.

Mr. GROSS. Does not the gentleman know that British ships are running into Haiphong?

Mr. JOELSON. I do not know anything of that sort. I would like to know if the gentleman has his own State Department—because I have been told by our State Department that that is not happening.

Mr. GROSS. Of course, that is happening.

Mr. JOELSON. That is not happening and I would like to ask the gentleman what he bases his statement on.

Mr. GROSS. I base my statement on the fact that they are running ships into Haiphong.

Mr. JOELSON. The gentleman has never taken a trip out of this country so I assume that he has not seen it. I would like to know what information he bases his statement on.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JOELSON. I would like an answer from the gentleman who made the statement.

Mr. GROSS. Do I have to take a trip to Vietnam to read a newspaper or to read the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? The gentleman from Michigan will give you the figures.

Mr. JOELSON. I would like to know the newspaper that made that statement.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I will tell you where it comes from.

Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JOELSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield no further and yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, since the gentleman raised his question, I have taken this time to set the record straight. Just a few days ago I stood in this very spot and reported to the Members of the House here that during the month of May there were nine free world ships that carried cargo to North Vietnam, seven of which fly the British flag. One was from Malta and one was from Cyprus.

Now last Thursday, if the gentleman will take the trouble to look in the Record—

Mr. JOELSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. The gentleman declined to yield to me and I have 5 minutes and I ask for the courtesy of being able to respond to the question the gentleman has raised.

As I was saying, if the gentleman will look at the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of Thursday last, he will see that I have included there a list of 829 ships that have

sailed to the port of Haiphong during the last 2 years.

Of these 829 vessels, 210 were flying free world flags. More than 25 percent of all cargoes from any source whatsoever that have gone to North Vietnam during the last 2 years has been carried on free-world-flag ships. What more does the gentleman want? If you will see me later, I will give you the name of every ship, its tonnage, the date it was in the harbor, and everything else.

The gentleman should know this. Of the nine ships that went to North Vietnam during the month of May, one of the ships—and I cannot tell because this is classified—was carrying strategic cargo to the enemy. Now, you will have to use your own imagination as to what this strategic cargo was, but if you will see me after the debate is concluded, I will tell you.

If the gentleman wants me to yield, I am now happy to yield.

Mr. JOELSON. Yes, I would ask you the same question that I asked the gentleman from Iowa. What is the source of your statement that British ships are supplying North Vietnam?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I got this information from the Department of Defense, and I will take you to the safe in my office and show you the whole list. What more do you want?

Mr. JOELSON. All I can say is that I do not resort to confidential information. I have been informed publicly, as have many other Members of Congress, in White House briefings that free world ships—British ships—are not supplying North Vietnam with supplies.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I will take the gentleman to my office with me right now and I will show him this material. It is classified "Secret." I cannot divulge it, but I will give you the name of every one of the 829 ships that has been to North Vietnam for the last 2 years.

Mr. JOELSON. Well, if it is classified "Secret," I am surprised that the gentleman would disclose it.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. BYRNES].

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin) there were—ayes 119, noes 61.

So the amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:
Sec. 637. None of the funds provided herein shall be used to pay any recipient of a grant for the conduct of a research project an amount equal to as much as the entire cost of such project.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. VANIK
Mr. VANIK. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. VANIK: On page 43, line 8, insert a new section 638 as follows:

"Sec. 638. None of the funds provided herein shall be used to pay for the travel and subsistence of civilians not in the employ or service of the United States Government attending national and international rifle matches."

Renumber present section 638 and subsequent sections accordingly.

Mr. VANIK. Mr. Chairman, I submit herewith an amendment which would

strike out the appropriations for the travel and subsistence for the civilian components of rifle teams attending national and international rifle competitions. My amendment is directed toward present practices under the law which permits the participants to have a "rifle match junket" at the expense of the taxpayer.

Every year the National Rifle Association utilizes Camp Perry in Ohio during the months of August and September involving the attendance of approximately 8,000 participants who travel to and from Camp Perry at public expense and who are billeted on the campgrounds.

Camp Perry is owned by the State of Ohio but it is leased and used by the Department of Ohio National Guard, Army Reserve summer training, and the national rifle and pistol matches conducted by the Department of the Army and supported by the civilian marksmanship program.

Earlier this year I requested the Department of Defense to make available the facilities of Camp Perry as a summer camp for 5,000 disadvantaged young people of central Cleveland areas. It seemed to me that such a program would be very helpful in removing these young people from difficult and trying environmental conditions in their home communities for at least a short period to time. The purpose of my suggested program was to provide a camp facility for thousands of young people who had never been exposed to the experience of camp life.

Mr. Edward J. Sheridan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, advised me on May 19, 1967, that although Camp Perry is owned by the State of Ohio, it is used by the Department of the Army for the national rifle and pistol matches during the months of August and September.

From the standpoint of priorities, it seems to me that the facilities of Camp Perry would be more prudently used as a summer camp for needy young people than as a sharpshooters assembly ground.

It has just come to my attention that, in addition to providing for the travel and subsistence of 8,000 participants of the national rifle matches at Camp Perry, the Department of Defense spends an additional \$2.7 million to provide personnel and facilities to support the 8,000 trainees during the training period. In addition, 3,000 active members of the U.S. Army are assigned to Camp Perry to take care of other needs of the training group during this training period.

While 3,000 Army personnel are doing training and porter work for the civilian participants at the Camp Perry training program, young men, 29,000 in the month of August alone, are being drafted to do military work in their stead.

It seems ridiculous for the taxpayers of America to pay for the travel, billeting, and ammunition expended by private citizens involved in these rifle matches. The National Rifle Association justifies the utilization of public moneys on the basis of its service as a community stabilizer. It seems to me that we might do an infinitely better job of stabilizing communities of discontent through the establishment of a summer camp pro-

June 13, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 7109

gram for the young and the development of training and educational programs for the other groups.

I therefore urge that this Congress halt its practice of providing a Government-subsidized junket to Camp Perry and the adjacent resort areas for the sole benefit of private citizens who have no official connection or obligation to the U.S. Army or its objectives.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

[Mr. SIKES addressed the Committee. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. VANIK].

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. PRICE of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I wish to commend the Appropriations Committee for its forthright stand on nuclear propulsion for naval warships. My responsibilities on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Armed Services Committee have given me an excellent opportunity to learn what new dimensions nuclear propulsion gives to military warships. I believe that anyone who takes the time to study the facts will conclude that nuclear propulsion is indispensable to any Navy which is to be effective.

Before I comment on some specifics on nuclear power in the bill before us, I want to express my satisfaction and state my agreement with the beautifully worded and succinct statement on "Studies and Analyses" in the Appropriations Committee report on page 5. I can testify to the truth of the following excerpt from this section in the committee's report:

There is some feeling that studies are resorted to as devices to procrastinate expensively, thus deferring decision until the point in time may be reached when a decision is unnecessary because the original need has disappeared.

I strongly support the committee's statement that we must curtail the proliferation of studies since so many studies are used as excuses for not taking responsible action.

I note with pleasure the House Appropriations Committee action discussed on page 47 of the committee report No. 349 to fund construction of one nuclear-powered guided missile frigate—DLGN—in fiscal year 1968 and to fund advance procurement of another nuclear frigate in fiscal year 1968. The report states:

The budget estimate proposes the amount of \$166,600,000 for the construction of two conventionally-powered guided missile destroyers (DDG). These funds were denied in the authorization legislation and two nuclear-powered guided missile destroyer leaders (DLGN) were substituted. The Committee recommends the appropriation of funds for the construction of one additional DLGN and advance procurement of another DLGN

at a total cost of \$134,800,000. The bill has been reduced by the net difference of \$31,800,000. The Committee will expect the Department to proceed with this construction and advance procurement and to request funds for the construction of the remaining authorized DLGN in the fiscal year 1969 ship-building program.

Further, Public Law 90-22, the fiscal year 1968 defense authorization law which the President signed on June 5, 1967, requires that:

The contracts for the construction of the two nuclear powered guided-missile frigates shall be entered into as soon as practicable unless the President fully advises the Congress that their construction is not in the national interest.

With these clear statements of the will of Congress, it should be apparent to the Secretary of Defense that it is the mandate of Congress that the Navy have more nuclear-powered major fleet escorts for its nuclear aircraft carriers.

Further, it should be clear to the Secretary of Defense that work on these nuclear-powered warships should proceed immediately, using the \$20 million appropriated by Congress last year in Public Law 89-687 for advance procurement for a fiscal year 1968 DLGN. The Defense Department has procrastinated long enough making ineffectual cost "studies" as an excuse for not proceeding with a course of action that is obvious to all here in Congress; an area which has been examined in depth and is supported by the five cognizant committees of Congress: The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees have all concluded it is necessary and desirable to build more nuclear-powered escorts for our nuclear aircraft carriers, ships that will be in our fleet into the 21st century. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the House Armed Services Committee, and the House Appropriations Committee have further concluded it would be wasteful to continue building nonnuclear escorts for our nuclear aircraft carriers. It is even worse to continue to delay building nuclear escorts while the question is "studied" more; while our Navy is becoming obsolete before our very eyes.

At the conclusion of my remarks I would like to include a brief statement made by Senator PASTORE, chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and one made by the gentleman from California, Congressman CHET HOLIFIELD, vice chairman of the Committee, last Saturday on the lesson we should learn from the latest crisis in the Middle East. I believe both of these gentlemen make some very important points. It is my pleasure to note that the bill before us reflects this lesson.

I want to congratulate the distinguished members of the House Appropriations Committee and especially the distinguished chairman for their clear stand on this issue.

The statements referred to follow:

SENATOR PASTORE STRONGLY URGES NAVY TO "GO NUCLEAR"—SAYS MIDDLE EAST CRISIS SHOWS NAVY'S ACHILLES HEEL

The recent crisis in the Middle East, with the resulting interruption of oil supplies and

the closing of the Suez Canal, clearly illustrates the importance of using nuclear propulsion for all capital warships of the United States Navy, it was pointed out today by Senator John O. Pastore, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Senator Pastore, who is noted for his strong support of a nuclear Navy, stressed the importance of supporting the recent Congressional action of changing two conventionally powered major fleet escort ships requested by the Department of Defense to nuclear powered ships. Senator Pastore said:

"The recent announcement by the Secretary of Defense for an emergency plan to provide petroleum products for our military forces in Southeast Asia, which will require doubling the number of oil tankers for the long trip around the Cape of Good Hope, reemphasizes the critical importance of reducing the Navy's dependence on fuel oil. It is with no intention of criticizing past decisions by the Secretary, but rather with the hope that we may move forward in the best interests of the national defense of the United States, that I recommend the Defense Department join with the Congress to insure that all future capital vessels of the United States Navy will be nuclear propelled."

Senator Pastore continued:

"With this in mind, the Defense Department should carry out the Congressional decision that the two major fleet escorts the Department of Defense needs and asked for this year will be nuclear powered."

Senator Pastore emphasized that he and other members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy have repeatedly recommended nuclear power for all capital warships.

"The evidence based on detailed studies and analyses made by the Joint Committee overwhelmingly supports the need for a nuclear Navy—Let us eliminate this Achilles' heel now."

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS EMPHASIZES NEED FOR NUCLEAR SURFACE NAVY

(Statement by Congressman CHET HOLIFIELD, vice chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy)

We all know about the crisis in the Middle East and of the efforts by our Government and others to permanently end the fighting. I wonder how many of us have thought about some of the side aspects of this crisis.

Two specific events come to my mind. One is the closing of the Suez Canal, and the second is the stoppage of oil from the Middle East to the United States and other Western nations.

While only a small fraction of our domestic oil consumption comes from the Middle East, news reports indicate that more than half the petroleum products used in Vietnam have been coming from Persian Gulf sources. While the United States has sufficient petroleum resources to supply the needs of our armed forces, we are now faced with having to transport fuel from the United States to Southeast Asia without use of the Suez Canal as a shortcut. Diverting tankers around the Cape of Good Hope can add several weeks to a tanker's voyage.

On June 7 the Secretary of Defense announced he was invoking an emergency plan to provide petroleum products for our forces in Southeast Asia without being dependent on the Middle East. This involves doubling the size of the fleet of tankers which have been used to supply our Southeast Asian forces.

Doesn't this sound like a good case for our Navy having nuclear power in our major surface warships; our aircraft carriers and their escorts?

This year again Congress has had to take the lead in trying to modernize our Navy. Congress changed two non-nuclear major fleet escorts (DDG's) requested by the Sec-

H 7110

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

June 13, 1967

retary of Defense to nuclear powered frigates (DLGN's).

The Suez crisis in 1956 should have shown us the danger to our vital military supply lines overseas. We should have seen the "handwriting on the wall." But apparently we didn't learn from this experience. That "writing" clearly showed that the United States should go to nuclear propulsion for its major surface ships. Yet that "writing" has to this very day been continuously ignored by the Department of Defense by asking for conventional escorts rather than nuclear escorts.

This week, with the closing of the Suez canal, the same "writing" has again appeared on the wall. How many more times will the Department of Defense permit this warning to remain unheeded? Will the Secretary of Defense now carry out the clear mandate of Congress, or will it take a national catastrophe—when it is too late—for him to change his mind?

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read. The Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 641. This Act may be cited as the "Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1968".

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BROWN OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BROWN of California: On page 44, immediately following line 23, insert a new section as follows:

"SEC. 642. Money appropriated in this Act shall be available for expenditure in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, only to the extent that expenditure thereof shall not result in total aggregate net expenditures of all agencies provided for herein beyond 95 per centum of the total aggregate net expenditures estimated therefor in the budget for 1968 (H. Doc. 15)."

(Mr. BROWN of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, I have some trepidation about usurping the role of one of the more distinguished members of the minority in offering this amendment, but I do so because I think it is time we recognized that our responsibilities for economy in Government extend not only to the civilian agencies but to the heretofore sacred cow of the Defense Department. I would like to pay tribute to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Appropriations for the work he has done here this afternoon. I very much regret that I did not observe or was not present for all of the debate here, because I am sure that there would have been pointed out the epic-making nature of this legislation.

Mr. Chairman, we have before us an appropriation bill which is the largest appropriation bill in the history of this country except for possibly one year during World War II. The chairman of this committee has lucidly presented the arguments for the expenditure of a sum of money equal to the total revenues of the entire United States from the date of its inception up to approximately World War II. The amount of money represented by this bill is equivalent to the total gross national product of approximately one-third of the human race.

I think we have failed to recognize the significance and the importance of this

and the tremendous job which the chairman of the committee has done in presenting all of the arguments in favor of this expenditure that we have here. It is staggering to the imagination to realize that this Congress for 150 years struggled over the appropriation in total of an amount of money that we have disposed of here this afternoon in 3 or 4 hours. It makes you wonder whether these early Congresses were actually living up to their responsibilities.

What I have done in this amendment I think all of you are quite aware of. I put a restriction on the expenditure of this money to 95 percent of the amount in the budget estimate. The committee has already reduced the amount of the bill by approximately 2 percent, so what we are actually talking about here is a curtailment of about an additional 3 percent of the deferral of the expenditure of this money.

You may ask as to where this can be cut.

Mr. Chairman, I have a number of suggestions which I would like to offer which I feel are valid.

Mr. Chairman, it is my opinion that beyond the shadow of a doubt, we could cut an additional \$2 billion, which is approximately what we are talking about, off this bill in any number of different ways. One way I would suggest would be for example that we cease the bombing of North Vietnam.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I would not be at all surprised but what the Department of Defense will recommend this step be taken in the near future. But, nevertheless, I think it would be appropriate for the Congress to exercise its responsibility in dealing with this legislation in such a way as to put a little pressure upon the Department of Defense to take this step.

Further, Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that we could save, perhaps, one-half billion dollars by deferring the expenditure for the purpose of obtaining information, the expenditure which is contained in this bill, for the antiballistic missile system, a system which all of us know from many talks on this floor, is merely going to involve this Nation in the expenditure of another \$30 billion or \$40 billion, with no net increase in the security of the country.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BROWN of California. Yes, I shall be happy to yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I do not recall—and will the gentleman refresh my memory—how many times the gentleman has voted for the so-called Bow amendment, or an amendment comparable to that, this year or last year.

Mr. BROWN of California. Every time it has been offered to a Defense bill.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, the gentleman has never voted for it as a reduction in expenditures for any civilian agency?

Mr. BROWN of California. Not to my knowledge.

May I suggest also another area which was hinted at by the distinguished gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Gross], who

pointed out the fact that we are spending quite a bit of money in military aid. The gentleman from Iowa pointed out the fact that most of this money is wasted. It is my opinion that we used up quite a bit of our Defense appropriation money in the weapons which we gave or sold to Lebanon, to Jordan, and to some of these other Arab countries in the last few weeks. I am not sure that this contributed to our security or to their security.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. Brown].

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise and report the bill back to the House with sundry amendments, with the recommendation that the amendments be agreed to and that the bill as amended do pass.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 10738) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, and for other purposes, had directed him to report the bill back to the House with sundry amendments, with the recommendation that the amendments be agreed to and that the bill, as amended, do pass.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the bill and all amendments thereto to final passage.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not, the Chair will put them en gros.

The amendments were agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

MOTION TO RECOMMIT

Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?

Mr. BROWN of California. I am, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. Brown of California moves to recommit the bill H.R. 10738 to the Committee on Appropriations with instruction to that committee to report it back forthwith with the following amendment: On page 44, immediately following line 23, insert a new section as follows:

"Sec. 642. Money appropriated in this Act shall be available for expenditure in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, only to the extent that expenditure thereof shall not result in total aggregate net expenditures of all agencies provided for herein beyond 95 per centum of the total aggregate net expenditures estimated therefor in the budget for 1968 (H. Doc. 15)."

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the motion to recommit.

June 13, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 7111

The previous question was ordered.
 The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion to recommit.
 The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the yeas appeared to have it.
 Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
 The yeas and nays were refused.
 So the motion to recommit was rejected.
 The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill.
 Mr. MAHON, Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
 The yeas and nays were ordered.
 The question was taken; and there were—yeas 407, nays 1, not voting 25, as follows:

[Roll No. 135]
 YEAS—407

Abbutt	Cowger	Hagan
Abernethy	Cramer	Haley
Adair	Culver	Hall
Adams	Cunningham	Halleck
Addabbo	Curtis	Halpern
Albert	Daddario	Hamilton
Anderson, Ill.	Daniels	Hammer-
Anderson,	Davis, Ga.	schmidt
Tenn.	Davis, Wis.	Hanley
Andrews, Ala.	Dawson	Hanna
Andrews,	de la Garza	Hansen, Idaho
N. Dak.	Delaney	Hansen, Wash.
Annunzio	Dellenback	Hardy
Ashbrook	Denney	Harrison
Ashley	Dent	Harsha
Ashmore	Derwinski	Harvey
Aspinall	Devine	Hathaway
Baring	Dickinson	Hawkins
Barrett	Diggs	Hays
Bates	Dole	Hébert
Belcher	Donohue	Hechler, W. Va.
Bell	Dorn	Heckler, Mass.
Bennett	Dowdy	Helstoski
Berry	Downing	Henderson
Betts	Dulski	Hicks
Bevill	Duncan	Holtfield
Blester	Dwyer	Holland
Bingham	Eckhardt	Howard
Blackburn	Edmondson	Hull
Blantion	Edwards, Ala.	Hungate
Blatnik	Edwards, Calif.	Hunt
Boggs	Edwards, La.	Hutchinson
Boland	Eilberg	Ichord
Bolling	Erlenborn	Irwin
Bolton	Esch	Jacobs
Bow	Eshleman	Jarman
Brademas	Evans, Colo.	Joelson
Brasco	Everett	Johnson, Calif.
Bray	Evins, Tenn.	Johnson, Pa.
Brinkley	Fallon	Jonas
Brock	Farbstein	Jones, Ala.
Brooks	Farrell	Jones, Mo.
Broomfield	Feighan	Jones, N.C.
Brotzman	Findley	Karsten
Brown, Mich.	Fino	Karth
Brown, Ohio	Fisher	Kastenmeter
Broyhill, N.C.	Flood	Kazen
Broyhill, Va.	Flynt	Kee
Buchanan	Foley	Keith
Burke, Fla.	Ford, Gerald R.	King, Calif.
Burke, Mass.	Ford,	King, N.Y.
Burleson	William D.	Kirwan
Burton, Calif.	Fountain	Kleppe
Burton, Utah	Fraser	Kluczynski
Bush	Frelinghuysen	Kornegay
Button	Friedel	Kupferman
Byrne, Pa.	Fulton, Pa.	Kuykendall
Byrnes, Wis.	Fulton, Tenn.	Kyl
Cabell	Galifianakis	Kyros
Cahill	Gallagher	Laird
Carey	Gardner	Landrum
Carter	Garmatz	Langen
Casey	Gathings	Latta
Cederberg	Gettys	Leggett
Celler	Giammo	Lennon
Chamberlain	Gibbons	Lipscomb
Clancy	Gilbert	Lloyd
Clark	Gonzalez	Long, La.
Clausen,	Goodell	Long, Md.
Don H.	Goodling	Lukens
Clawson, Del	Gray	McCarthy
Cleveland	Green, Oreg.	McClory
Cohelan	Green, Pa.	McClure
Collier	Griffiths	McCulloch
Colmer	Gross	McCade
Conable	Grover	McDonald,
Conte	Gude	Mich.
Corbett	Gurney	McEwen

McFall	Poage
McMillan	Poff
Maddonald,	Pollock
Mass.	Pool
MacGregor	Price, Ill.
Machen	Price, Tex.
Madden	Pryor
Mahon	Pucinski
Mailiard	Purcell
Marsh	Quile
Martin	Quillen
Mathias, Calif.	Rallsback
Mathias, Md.	Randall
Matsunaga	Rarick
May	Rees
Mayne	Reid, Ill.
Meeds	Reid, N.Y.
Meskill	Reifel
Michel	Reinecke
Miller, Calif.	Reuss
Miller, Ohio	Rhodes, Ariz.
Mills	Rhodes, Pa.
Minish	Riegler
Mink	Rivers
Minshall	Roberts
Mize	Robison
Monagan	Rodino
Montgomery	Rogers, Colo.
Moore	Rogers, Fla.
Moorhead	Ronan
Morgan	Rooney, Pa.
Morris, N. Mex.	Rosenthal
Morse, Mass.	Rostenkowski
Morton	Roth
Mosher	Roudebush
Moss	Roush
Multer	Royal
Murphy, Ill.	Rumsfeld
Murphy, N.Y.	Ruppe
Myers	Ryan
Natcher	St Germain
Nedzi	Sandman
Nelsen	Satterfield
Nichols	Saylor
Nix	Schadeberg
O'Hara, Ill.	Scherle
O'Hara, Mich.	Scheuer
O'Konski	Schneebett
Olsen	Schweiker
O'Neal, Ga.	Schwengel
O'Neill, Mass.	Scott
Ottinger	Selden
Passman	Shipley
Patten	Shriver
Pepper	Sikes
Perkins	Sisk
Pettis	Skubitz
Philbin	Slack
Pickle	Smith, Calif.
Pike	Smith, Iowa
Pirnie	Smith, Okla.

Snyder	Ullman
Springer	Utt
Stafford	Van Deerlin
Staggers	Vander Jagt
Stanton	Vanik
Steed	Vigorito
Steiger, Ariz.	Waggonner
Steiger, Wis.	Waldie
Stephens	Walker
Stratton	Wampler
Stubblefield	Watkins
Stuckey	Watson
Sullivan	Watts
Taft	Whalen
Talcott	Whalley
Taylor	White
Teague, Calif.	Whitener
Teague, Tex.	Whitten
Tenzer	Wiggins
Thompson, Ga.	Williams, Pa.
Thomson, Wis.	Wilson, Bob
Tierman	Wilson,
Tuck	Charles H.
Tunney	Winn
Udall	Wolf
Ullman	Wright
Utt	Wyatt
Van Deerlin	Wylder
Vander Jagt	Wylie
Vanik	Wyman
Vigorito	Yates
Waggonner	Zablocki
Waldie	Zion
Walker	Zwach
Wampler	
Watkins	
Watson	
Watts	
Whalen	
Whalley	
White	
Whitener	
Whitten	
Wiggins	
Williams, Pa.	
Wilson, Bob	
Wilson,	
Charles H.	
Winn	
Wolf	
Wright	
Wyatt	
Wylder	
Wylie	
Wyman	
Yates	
Zablocki	
Zion	
Zwach	

who have spoken on the Department of Defense appropriation bill today may have permission to revise and extend their remarks in the body of the RECORD and include pertinent additional material.
 The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?
 There was no objection.
 Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I also ask unanimous consent that all Members of the House may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the bill just passed and to include extraneous matter.
 The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?
 There was no objection.

(Mr. PATMAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)
 [Mr. PATMAN'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]
 (Mr. PATMAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)
 [Mr. PATMAN'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

ADMINISTRATION BILL FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF FEDERAL SAVINGS BANKS INTRODUCED BY BANKING AND CURRENCY CHAIRMAN WRIGHT PATMAN

(Mr. PATMAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, President Johnson, in his Economic Report submitted to the Congress last January, recommended that Congress enact legislation providing for Federal charters for mutual savings banks, "to enlarge and strengthen our system of thrift institutions." In making this recommendation, the President referred to his previous request for such legislation contained in his 1966 Economic Report, but not acted upon by the 89th Congress. Yesterday I introduced this legislation for myself, the gentleman from New York [Mr. MULTER], the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BARRETT], the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MOORHEAD], the gentleman from Rhode Island [Mr. ST GERMAIN], the gentleman from Texas [Mr. GONZALEZ], the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. MINISH], and the gentleman from New York [Mr. BINGHAM]. Hearings were held last year on similar bills, but no action was taken by the full committee. The present bill is very similar to the previous bills, but incorporates provisions reflecting the enactment of the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966.

Mr. Speaker, I insert at this point in the RECORD a section-by-section analysis of the administration's new bill to authorize the establishment of Federal sav-

NAYS—1
 Brown, Calif.
 NOT VOTING—25
 Arends
 Ayres
 Battin
 Conyers
 Corman
 Deggell
 Dow
 Fuqua
 Gubser
 Herlong
 Horton
 Hosmer
 Kelly
 Patman
 Pelly
 Resnick
 Rooney, N.Y.
 St. Onge
 Smith, N.Y.
 Thompson, N.J.
 Widnall
 Williams, Miss.
 Willis
 Young
 Younger

So the bill was passed.
 The Clerk announced the following pairs.
 Mr. St. Onge with Mr. Hosmer.
 Mr. Dingell with Mr. Horton.
 Mr. Thompson of New Jersey with Mr. Widnall.
 Mr. Dow with Mr. Gubser.
 Mr. Williams of Mississippi with Mr. Ayres.
 Mrs. Kelly with Mr. Battin.
 Mr. Rooney of New York with Mr. Arends.
 Mr. Fuqua with Mr. Younger.
 Mr. Herlong with Mr. Pelly.
 Mr. Patman with Mr. Smith of New York.
 Mr. Corman with Mr. Willis.
 Mr. Resnick with Mr. Conyers.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members

H 7112

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

June 13, 1967

ings banks, followed by the text of the proposed legislation:

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF A BILL TO AUTHORIZE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FEDERAL SAVINGS BANKS

Section 1. Short title. The unnumbered first section states the short title, "Federal Savings Bank Act."

TITLE I. FEDERAL SAVINGS BANKS

Chapter 1. General provisions

Section 11. Definitions and rules of construction. Section 11, the first section of title I, contains certain definitions and general rules.

The term "mutual thrift institution" would mean a Federal savings bank, a Federal savings and loan association, or a State-chartered mutual savings bank, mutual savings and loan association, mutual building and loan association, cooperative bank, or mutual homestead association.

In turn, "thrift institution" would mean a mutual thrift institution, a guaranty savings bank, a stock savings and loan association, or a stock building and loan association, and "financial institution" would mean a thrift institution, a commercial bank, or an insurance company. By a special definitional provision in this section, the term "financial institutions acting in a fiduciary capacity" as used in sections 53 and 54 would include a credit union, whether or not acting in a fiduciary capacity.

"State" would mean any State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and any territory or possession of the United States.

The term "merger transaction" would mean any transaction between or among any two institutions, at least one of which is a Federal savings bank, which will result in a merger or consolidation or pursuant to which any of such institutions, otherwise than in the ordinary course of business, acquires any assets of, or assumes liability to pay any deposits made in or share accounts of, or similar liabilities of, another of such institutions.

As used in relation to a merger transaction, "resulting bank" or "resulting institution" would refer to a bank or other institution (whether or not newly chartered in connection with the transaction) which, after its consummation, and as a result thereof, carries on the business or any part thereof theretofore carried on by one or more parties to the transaction.

Section 12. Rules and regulations. Section 12 authorizes the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to make rules and regulations, including definitions of terms in title I.

Section 13. Examination. This section provides for general and special examinations by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board or Federal savings banks, and also provides that the Board may render to any bank or officer or director thereof such advice and comment as it may deem appropriate with respect to the bank's affairs.

Section 14. Reports. Section 14 provides that the Board may require periodic and other reports and information from Federal savings banks.

Section 15. Accounts and accounting. The Board would be authorized by section 15 to prescribe, by regulation or order, accounts and accounting systems and practices for Federal savings banks.

Section 16. Right to amend. The right to alter, amend, or repeal title I would be reserved by section 16.

Chapter 2. Establishment and voluntary liquidation

Section 21. Information to be stated in charter. This section makes provision for the contents of charters for Federal savings banks.

Section 22. Issuance of charter for new bank. A charter for a new Federal savings bank could be issued by the Board on the

written application (in such form as the Board may prescribe) of not less than 5 applicants and upon the making of specified determinations by the Board, including a determination that there has been placed in trust or escrow for an initial reserve such amount, not less than \$50,000, in cash or securities approved by the Board as the Board may require, in consideration of transferable certificates to be issued by the bank in such form, on such terms, and bearing such interest or other return as the Board may approve.

Section 23. Issuance of charter for a converted bank. Subsection (a) of this section would authorize the Board to issue a charter for a converted Federal savings bank on written application (in form prescribed by the Board) of the converting institution and determination by the Board among other things that (1) the converting institution is a mutual thrift institution and (2), if the converting institution is a Federal savings and loan association, the conversion has been favored by vote of two-thirds of the directors and two-thirds of the votes entitled to be cast by members.

To such extent as the Board might approve by order, and subject to such prohibitions, restrictions, and limitations as it might prescribe by regulation or written advice, a converted bank could retain and service the accounts, departments, and assets of the converting institution.

Subsection (b) of the section provides that the Board shall not issue a charter under subsection (a) unless it determines that, taking into consideration the quality of the converting institution's assets, its reserves and surplus, its expense ratios, and such other factors as the Board may deem appropriate, and making appropriate allowances for differences among types of financial institutions, the converting institution's history has been of a character "commensurate with the superior standards of performance expected of a Federal savings bank".

Section 24. Conversion of Federal savings banks into other institutions. Under subsection (a) of section 24 the Board, on written application of a Federal savings bank, could permit it to convert into any other type of mutual thrift institution, on a determination by the Board that (1) two-thirds of the directors have voted in favor of the proposed conversion, (2) the requirements of section 45 have been met, (3) the conversion will not be in contravention of State law, and (4) upon and after conversion the institution will be an insured institution of the Federal Savings Insurance Corporation (i.e., the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, whose name would be changed to Federal Savings Insurance Corporation by section 201) or an insured bank of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Subsection (b) of the section provides that no institution into which a Federal savings bank has been converted may, within ten years after the conversion, convert into any type of institution other than a mutual thrift institution which is either a bank insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or an institution insured by the Federal Savings Insurance Corporation, regardless of whether the later conversion took place directly or through any intermediate conversions.

Enforcement of this prohibition would be by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in the case of an institution having a status as an insured institution of the Federal Savings Insurance Corporation and by the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the case of an institution having a status as an insured bank of that corporation. On a determination that a violation had taken place, the relevant board, by order issued not later than two years after any such violation, could terminate such status without notice, hearing, or other action. For the purposes of this

subsection and subsection (a) of section 26, the terms "conversion" and "convert" would be defined as applying to mergers, consolidations, assumptions of liabilities, and reorganizations, as well as conversions.

Section 25. Voluntary liquidation. A Federal savings bank could not voluntarily go into liquidation or otherwise wind up its affairs except in accordance with an order of the Board issued under section 25. Upon application by such a bank, the Board could permit it to carry out a plan of voluntary liquidation upon a determination by the Board that (1) two-thirds of the bank's directors have voted in favor of the proposed plan, (2) the requirements of section 45 have been met, (3) there is no longer a need in the community for the bank, or there is not a reasonable expectation that its continued operation will be financially sound and successful, and (4) the plan is fair and equitable and in conformity with the requirements of section 26.

Section 26. Distribution of assets upon liquidation. Subsection (a) of section 26 provides that on liquidation of a Federal savings bank under section 25, or liquidation of any institution while subject to the prohibition in subsection (b) of section 24, the net assets after the satisfaction or provision for satisfaction, in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Board may prescribe, of all proper claims and demands against the institution, including those of depositors or shareholders, shall be distributed to the Federal Savings Insurance Corporation. In the case of institutions subject to subsection (b) of section 24, the claims of depositors or shareholders are to be limited to amounts that would have been withdrawable by them in the absence of any conversion (as defined in said subsection) while the institution was so subject.

The object of this provision is to deter conversions of Federal savings banks to non-mutual operation and to deter unneeded voluntary liquidation of Federal savings banks. Under section 24 Federal savings banks are prohibited from converting *directly* at one step into any other type of institution except a mutual thrift institution insured by the Federal Savings Insurance Corporation or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Section 26 is designed to deter, to the extent of its provisions, the conversion of a Federal savings bank *indirectly* or *by successive steps* into an institution other than such an insured mutual thrift institution.

Subsection (b) of section 26 provides that on liquidation of a Federal savings bank otherwise than pursuant to section 25 the net assets remaining after the satisfaction or provision for the satisfaction, in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Board may prescribe, of all proper claims and demands against the bank, including those of depositors, shall be distributed to the depositors in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Board may prescribe.

Section 27. Authority of Board. This section authorizes the Board to make rules and regulations for reorganization, liquidation, and dissolution, merger transactions, and conservatorships and receiverships, and to provide by regulation or otherwise for exercise during conservatorship or receivership of functions by depositors, directors, officers, or bodies which may select directors.

Chapter 3. Branching and merger

Section 31. Branches. Under section 31 a Federal savings bank could establish a branch or branches with the approval of the Board, upon a determination by the Board that (1) there is a reasonable expectation of the branch's financial success based on the need for such a facility in the locality, the bank's capitalization, financial history, and quality of management, and such other factors as the Board deems appropriate, (2) its operation may foster competition and