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lars of additional revenue immediately after they became law. Loophole closing does not meet either requirement.

## BITTERLY CONTROVERSIAL

What the Congressional liberals know well and blandly are choosing to ignore is that tax reforms are bitterly controversial, enormously complex proposals that can be pushed through Congress only after months of lengthy hearings, intensive Committee work and acrimonious floor debate.

What they know equally well is that some of their most cherished reforms are likely to be rejected by substantial majorities in both Houses, as indeed they were only a few years ago during Congressional action on the historic Kennedy-Johnson omnibus tax reduction bill.

Some of these same proposals and an assortment of other reforms will be included in a loophole-closing message that the President repeatedly has promised both publicly and privately to send Congress later this year. The clamoring liberals are fully aware of Mr. Johnson's intentions and they have received the same firm assurances from Treasury Secretary Henry H. Fowler and Budget Director Charles L. Schultze.

## PROPOSAL MISSES

Apart from their unrealistic insistence that Congress could be persuaded to act quickly on loophole closing, the liberals' reform proposal misses badly on another count: Even if they finally managed to wrestle a complicated reform bill through Congress this year, it would not give the Government the money that it must have to reduce its big deficit and to curb the threat of an inflationary boom.

The great advantage of prompt passage of the President's clean-cut, 10 per cent surcharge plan is that the levy almost immediately would start to bring in needed money from individual income tax withholding and from both individual and corporate estimated tax payments.

But the revenue from tax reforms would come in slowly and it would come in too late.

## U.S. POLICY TOWARD GREECE

(Mr. EDWARDS of California (at the request of Mr. PRYOR) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Speaker, it is now over 4 months since a military takeover in Greece ended democratic constitutional government, apparently surprising the Palace since the rumored coup was supposed to come from a different echelon of the military. Since the "coup of the colonels," it has become clearer every day that they do not intend to gracefully relinquish power. They have been purging the officer corps on a wholesale scale, removing local officials and effectively destroying any potential political opposition. Thousands of prisoners are still being held on the island of Youra and elsewhere after brutal midnight arrests. Newspapers may print only what the dictatorship permits. Gatherings of more than five people even in a private home are illegal and a former conservative member of Parliament was recently sentenced to 5 years in prison for a violation.

Mr. Speaker, recent visitors to Greece report that even their own relatives are afraid to talk to them. There is an ominous silence on the streets and in the taverns. Meanwhile, Patakos proudly an-

nounces that the buses run on time, reminding those of our generation of the same braggadocio from Mussolini about Italian trains under Fascist rule. It is rather obvious that Patakos does not have a sophisticated public relations expert from his recent announcement that 250 Greek women have chosen to remain in jail rather than sign pledges to refrain from political activities after their release.

How such announcements can improve his public image is hard to fathom. But we cannot afford to laugh at such bumbling, Mr. Speaker. These are the ludicrous statements that only highlight the depth of the real tragedy.

I am sure that our Department of State and our President, who will be meeting with the King of Greece a few days from now, are as appalled as we are by the ruthlessness of the dictatorship. The question for our Government is what we should do to assist the return of constitutional government in Greece. We are not without fault in the creation of a climate which made the coup possible. Our most serious guilt lies in fostering the opinion that the United States considered the Papandreou, and especially Andreas, as dangerous radicals. By allowing such an attitude to be accepted as the position of the United States, we encouraged a military seizure of power. The measure of blame which can be properly laid at our door is yet to be properly assessed. I fear it is not negligible.

The "colonels" also could rely on our concern for the NATO bases and our own military position in the Mediterranean. Since the coup, our only action has been to withhold a small amount of military hardware. I am afraid that the hopes of an orderly return to constitutional government, once the new constitution is written, is a mirage. There was nothing wrong with the old constitution. Rewriting the constitution is merely a dodge to gain time for a solidification of the power of the junta.

Mr. Speaker, I most earnestly hope that our policy will not rest on such a chimeric. I include in the RECORD an article from the Washington Daily News of August 7, 1967:

BASIC AIM—TO RETAIN POWER UNTIL NATION IS REMADE: GREEK JUNTA SET FOR LONG STAY

(By B. J. Cutler)

ATHENS, August 7.—The army Junta which took over Greece in a bloodless coup April 21 has settled in for a long stay in power.

Its basic aim is to consolidate its hold, not to restore the democracy that Greeks had—and abused.

Nudged by young King Constantine, the U.S. and World opinion, the Junta has named a committee of jurists to draft a new Constitution by Dec. 1.

But the military regime itself will put the final touches on the constitution and will decide when to have it approved by the people in a referendum.

Privately, Junta members foresee elections in which no real political opposition will be allowed. This is to lead to a rubberstamp parliament, which will permit the military inner circle to rule as it does now.

Altho they say they seized power to prevent a communist insurrection, Junta mem-

bers show no taste for returning to their barracks now that the communist apparatus has been decapitated.

Instead, they insist they must retain power until the Greek nation is remade to their moralistic specifications. This means no mini-skirts, beetle haircuts, or coffee houses for youths, but plenty of church-going and compulsory schools. For grown-ups their goals are discipline, order, hard work, support of the crown, religion, nationalism, and distaste for the old political parties.

Since the Greeks are no more saintly than other people, it may be many years before the Junta considers them ready for self-government.

In the meantime, the regime is continuing to retire forcibly, Greek military officers who were not in the coup. It apparently wishes to insure that they do not rally around the King, who opposed the coup, in a counter move.

No one Junta member has emerged as a single power holder. The leaders still are Col. George Papadopoulos, 48, who runs the Premier's office; Brig. Gen. Stylianos Patakos, 53, whose tanks backed the coup and who is now Interior Minister; and Col. Nicolas Mararezos, 47, who stays in the background and directs the economy.

King Constantine, at 26, seems to be gaining prestige as the nation realizes he is cautiously pressing the Junta for a return of democratic government.

On a recent tour of the provinces, he was more warmly received than before. He is looked on as one stable factor that may lead the people back from dictatorship.

Under such a regime one doesn't take public opinion polls and people do not speak freely. Nevertheless the man in the street is viewed as neither for nor against the regime. He accepts it but is worried about how long it will last.

## BETTER

In several ways the ordinary man is better off than under the elastic and corrupt government of the past few years. He is not harassed by almost daily strikes and politically-activated mobs sturging in the streets.

His bus comes on time and the fare is lower. Jostling to get aboard is forbidden—Greeks now stand in queues. Prices have been frozen and some, including that of bread, rolled back. At squares in poor neighborhoods free movies are shown.

Tickets are not given for traffic violations and the driving has improved from terrifying to hair-raising. Employers who had the quaint habit of pocketing their workers' social security payments are now repaying millions to the state.

The press, which was buyable and lively, is now censored and dull. Books, plays, and "communist music" are banned. A few people are arrested for criticizing the regime, but some 2500 communists and suspects are still broiling in the sun on a prison island in the Aegean.

Today many Greeks agree that they were brawling, stumbling, and perhaps falling on the road to democracy. Now they are being taken on a journey thru stability and mild dictatorship. What they disagree on is: "was this trip necessary?"

## VITAL REQUIREMENT FOR AIR TRANSPORT

(Mr. FLOOD (at the request of Mr. PRYOR) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Speaker, I introduce, for appropriate referral, a bill which is intended to define a truly vital requirement in the area of air transport, including a proposal to promote a method for

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transporting outsize objects such as missile and rocket boosters and sustainers; for use in the U.S. aerospace program as a recovery vehicle in lieu of the present highly expensive system of deploying fleets of vessels and aircraft for that important mission; for the purpose of transporting fabricated building sections—HUD—preassembled bridge and tower sections, earthmoving machinery, industrial generators and transformers, storage tanks, radomes, field hospitals, airborne command-control communications centers, and, finally, for use in oceanographic research and exploration, lumbering, and petroleum prospecting.

The bill and other material follow:

H.R. 12744

A bill to provide for a temporary program of Federal assistance for research and development relating to a certain rigid airship, and for other purposes

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, as used in this Act—*

(1) The term "rigid airship" means an aircraft comprised of a fully rigid airframe contained in an envelope filled with helium gas, and shall include engines, airframes, propellers, rotors, instruments, accessories, and other ancillary equipment.

(2) The term "testing" means the operation of a rigid airship incident to the procurement of a type certificate for such an aircraft and the operation of a rigid airship, whether or not it has a type certificate, under actual or simulated conditions for the purpose of determining the operating and utility characteristics of such an aircraft.

(3) The term "modification" means any adjustment or change necessary for and incident to carrying out the development and testing of rigid airships under this Act.

Sec. 2. The Congress hereby declares that it is in the national interest to promote safety, economy, and efficiency in the national transportation system and to that end, it is the purpose of this Act to assist in the development of a rigid airship designed to transport outsized objects free from the usual constraints and hazards encountered in their transportation by land or water by providing for a temporary program of Federal assistance in the development, testing, and modification of such an airship.

Sec. 3. (a) In carrying out the provisions of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation (hereafter in this Act referred to as the "Secretary") is authorized—

(1) To prepare operating and general utility characteristics and specifications for a type of rigid airship which he determines represents a potential advance over existing modes of air and surface transportation;

(2) To provide for the development of a rigid airship for use by the Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration as a means of transporting rocket boosters and sustainers and other outsize objects and for possible use in the United States space program as a recovery vehicle in lieu of the present costly system of deployment of vessels and aircraft;

(3) To determine the potentials of a rigid airship for use by other departments and agencies of the Federal Government and by private industry for the transportation of outsized objects, including but not limited to fabricated building sections, preassembled bridge and tower sections, earth-moving machinery, industrial generators and transformers, storage tanks, radomes, field hospitals, airborne command-control communications centers, and the possible uses of such an airship in oceanographic research and exploration, lumbering, and petroleum prospecting;

(4) to provide, by contract or otherwise, for the operation of a rigid airship developed under this Act and for the utilization of the experience and knowledge of persons involved in the operation of similar aircraft.

(b) In carrying out the provisions of this Act, the Secretary shall consult with interested Federal agencies, including but not limited to the Department of Defense, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and with representatives of the aviation manufacturing industry and the air transport industry.

Section 4 (a) The Secretary is authorized to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as he may deem necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act. The Secretary is authorized to use, with their consent, the available services, equipment, personnel, and facilities of other civilian or military agencies and instrumentalities of the Federal Government on a reimbursable basis.

(b) In carrying out the provisions of section 3 of this Act, the Secretary is authorized to enter into contracts with or without advertising or competitive bidding, upon determination that the price is fair and reasonable, and with or without performance or other bonds. The Secretary may make advance, progress, and other payments under contracts entered into under this section without regard to Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (31 U.S.C. 529).

Sec. 5. The Secretary shall submit to the Congress, on or before June 15 of each year, a detailed report of his activities and expenditures under this Act, together with such recommendations, including recommendations with respect to additional legislation, as he may deem appropriate.

Sec. 6. This Act shall terminate upon the expiration of the five-year period beginning on the date of its enactment.

Sec. 7. There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

## STATISTICS ON AERON

Length: 340'.

Span: 255'.

Height: 80'.

Power: 4 Rolls-Royce "Tyne" turbo-prop engines @ 5500 e.s.h.p.

Cruising Speed: 150 mph.

Takeoff run: 3,000 ft. at max. load.

Payload (Max.) 300,000 lbs.

Range (Max.) 7,000 mi.

Operating Cost (Total) 1½¢ per ton-mile (@ 1,750 mi. range).

Estimated Cost: \$8,400,000.

## PAYLOAD

Six (6) 40 ft. containers (300,000 lbs.) range: 1,750 mi. @ total operating cost of 1½¢ per ton-mile.

Four (4) 40 ft. containers (200,000 lbs.) range: 4,000 mi. @ total operating cost of 2¢ per ton-mile.

The above bill is introduced with my absolute conviction that such a mode of transportation is vitally important to our economy and to the image of the United States as a presumed leader in the sphere of world transportation. I have long actively advocated a rigid airship and current revolutionary advances in its design and potential, to the Department of Defense and its military departments, and to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. I have received polite answers indicating generally that consideration will be accorded my proposals. In the meantime, the Soviet Union is moving apace in this field and, by its own admission, is seriously researching the use of rigid air-

ships for the same purposes as outlined in my bill. In fact, I considered it entirely possible that the Russians would display a radically new type of airship at the Paris airshow in May and June of this year. This could well be another embarrassing "first" for the Soviets—and I do not doubt their capability for a moment.

Why has the United States failed to fill an obviously glaring gap in our overall transportation system?

I sincerely urge that you give this bill serious consideration, I have readily available much conclusive information in this matter which can be presented before any committee to which it may be referred.

## VEGA CLUB OF BROCKTON, MASS., OBSERVES 75TH ANNIVERSARY

(Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts (at the request of Mr. PRYOR) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, the Vega Club of Brockton, Mass., is about to observe its 75th anniversary, and will mark the occasion with a diamond jubilee celebration on September 9. I know that all of my colleagues here will want to join me in saluting this fine organization which numbers among its membership some of the most public-spirited and devoted citizens of that city. I have long been aware of their generous activities in the community, and hope that the efforts of the Vega members and their womens' auxiliary, the Valkyrian Club will receive the encouragement they deserve to continue for a long time to come.

Among the many activities which have given areawide prominence to the club, are its Vega Male Chorus, the Vega Quartet, and the Vega Scholarships. Throughout the years, the club has been outstanding among the community's fraternal groups, and can be especially proud of its two-generation membership of fathers and sons. Founded on September 11, 1892 with 32 charter members, the club was organized "to advance and promote the social and civic interests of its members." It was incorporated on December 6, 1904, 2 years after the purchase of the site on which the present clubhouse stands. This handsome building was completed and dedicated December 14, 1917. In addition, the club acquired a fishing camp on a pond in Plymouth in 1953, and also owns the Vega Grove in West Bridgewater, the gift of Phillip Pearson of that town.

The September 9 celebration will begin with a social hour from 6:30 until 7:30 p.m. followed by dinner and dancing with a brief anniversary program. Honored guests will be widows of past members, and special guest invitations have been extended to Gov. John A. Volpe, former Senator Leverett P. Saltonstall, Mayor Sims, of Brockton, former Mayor Hjalmar Peterson, and Miss Anne Margos, as well as to myself.

Clarence Christenson will be the official host, and Fred V. Hinrichs will introduce the program as master of cere-

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monies, A special exhibit, the Historic Room, will offer guests a display of historic pictures, the club's history, and displays of memorabilia.

Ronald E. Hermanson is chairman of the anniversary committee, and serving with him are historians Arnold W. Ahlborg, Anders A. Lyman, Olof W. Olson, and Ivar E. Lyman. The souvenir program is being handled by Leslie E. Pearson, Everett B. Hedin, and catering by Warren R. Carlson and Edward W. Beale.

Other members who have devoted time and energy to the assured success of the occasion are: George H. Burgenson, Jean Kyhn, Gerald P. Johnson, W. Emery Samuelson, Mrs. John A. Johnson, Mrs. Bert Akesson, Mrs. Ronald E. Hermanson, Mrs. Donald E. Johnson, Mrs. Allen O'Brien, Mrs. Hilding Olson, Alton P. Nelson, Sr., Fred V. Hinrichs, Richard E. Youngberg, Donald E. Johnson, Robert L. Wessa, and club officers Donald E. Johnson, president, Barry Rogerson, vice president, Anders A. Lyman, secretary, Jean Kyhn, financial secretary, Robert Swanson, treasurer, Everett B. Hedin, marshal, Jon Ortendahl, club news editor, and directors George H. Burgenson, Richard E. Younger, Leslie E. Pearson, and Ronald E. Hermanson.

Again, I express my very best wishes to every member of the Vega club, and congratulations on this notable milestone in its history. May the club continue to preserve the standards of community responsibility and citizenship which have earned it the esteem and high regard of all who know of its reputation.

(Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts (at the request of Mr. PRYOR) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts' remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

## EXPORT OF ARMS

(Mr. COHELAN (at the request of Mr. PRYOR) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, there are many countries today which are desperately in need of resources for the development of their country, but which are devoting much of their capital and resources to large amounts of expensive military equipment. In many cases the need for military equipment is more imaginary than real, but the burden on these struggling countries is real.

The burden of the military effort in this, the richest country in the world, is felt in every sector of our society. We have found it necessary to cut many vital programs at home to maintain our effort in Vietnam. Consider the effect of even a fraction of the U.S. expenditure on the economy of a country whose needs are relatively much greater and whose means are relatively much less than ours.

The shipment of arms to such countries surely creates fears in the minds

of neighboring countries, which then feel the need to protect themselves with similar buildups—either for reasons of military defense or of simple prestige. Further, the presence of arms, and the mistrust of one's neighbor, leads to a greater expectation of violence, and then a greater acceptance of violence. The mechanics of preparing a country for war, even a defensive war, are such that they are hard to reverse.

I would like to join the more than 20 of my distinguished colleagues who have introduced a concurrent resolution stating the sense of Congress that the President, acting through the U.S. delegation to the United Nations should first, seek, in the appropriate forums of the United Nations, agreements among the principal arms suppliers to insure that sales and gifts of arms are restricted to minimum levels; and, second, seek to establish in and through the United Nations a procedure for full public registration of all transactions of this character.

I urge the Foreign Affairs Committee to move forward on this resolution.

This resolution seems to me a logical parallel to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty recently proposed by the United States and the Soviet Union. I believe that this would mark an important advance in our efforts toward world peace.

## THE GREEK POLITICAL CRISIS

(Mr. KASTENMEIER (at the request of Mr. PRYOR) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, 18 weeks have passed since the April 21 military coup in Greece.

In view of the deteriorating situation there and in view of King Constantine's visit to Washington next week, I believe we should today take another look at the Greek political crisis. I would like to share with you some of my thoughts in this regard.

The "colonels' junta" has arrested thousands of people and held them without formal charge, dissolved the political parties, forbade strikes, imposed a censorship of the press and the arts, voided the constitution, and abandoned any semblance of due process of law.

They rule by force of arms—and the arms were supplied by the United States.

Who are these people?

The inner group of the junta apparently numbers no more than two dozen colonels. They had served together as junior officers within the Army over a period of many years, through both conservative and liberal administrations. They appear to be nonestablishment types, coming primarily from impoverished rural families. Contrary to some accounts, they do not appear to be either thugs or bloodthirsty tyrants. They do, however, show a contempt for politics and politicians—and the workings of democracy. There are few signs that they possess the talent of government over the long haul. They rule by decree and by the gun. And their public pronouncements indicate they have no intention of stepping down.

The strong men of the junta, Papadopoulos and Pattakos, are by reliable accounts politically naive and provincial. But they are sincere. They genuinely believe their own words when they say that the coup was staged to save Greece from communism and to "purify" the nation. They are puzzled, therefore, when western democracies show some disapproval of their actions, for they believe their actions were not inconsistent with our interests.

The coup itself was not a surprise; the organizers of the coup were. For months prior to the coup, there had been widespread talk in Athens that senior Army officers and the palace, two elements which had long enjoyed U.S. backing, would move to prevent the expected electoral victory of George Papandreou's non-Communist, liberal Center Union Party. Five weeks before the scheduled election, with the Center Union apparently heading for a record majority, the sudden coup killed democracy in Greece. The colonels had swiped the plan of the palace and the generals and executed it themselves.

After the first flurry of disapproving editorials in the press of Western Europe and the United States, and some critical statements in Congress, concern for the fate of Greek democracy gradually dwindled. American policymakers, who had quite properly cut military aid to Greece, appeared on the verge of resuming it, as articles in the July 7 issues of the New York Times and Baltimore Sun indicated.

Precisely at this moment, when events were moving in their favor, the junta pulled a major public relations blunder. They revoked the citizenship of the world-renowned Greek actress, Melina Mercouri, because of critical statements she had been making.

American public opinion was again aroused, making resumption of U.S. aid untenable. Now the indications are that the United States will not resume military aid at least until the new Greek Constitution is completed in November 1967.

But let us be clear about what this new constitution is all about. It is a device, a mechanism encouraged by the United States as a test of the junta's intentions and perhaps as a vessel for some return to partial democracy. There was nothing significantly wrong with the old constitution. It would be an illusion to believe that the junta seized power because they had a passion for constitutional reform.

Even if the constitution is completed as scheduled by the 20 experts who were ordered to serve on the drafting panel there is no guarantee that it will be put into effect. Patakos has publicly stated that the junta reserves the right to alter or reject it. Furthermore, the junta will choose the time for a referendum on the constitution and then may not accept the result of the referendum or delay its effect.

What is likely to happen? What can the United States do? Where there shortcomings in our Greek policy prior to the coup? These are legitimate questions for Congress to ask.

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What is likely to happen? These are the apparent possibilities:

First. The junta will solidify itself in power and run the country indefinitely;

Second. There will be a counter coup;

Third. Disorders, terrorist attacks, and guerrilla warfare will break out, with the leadership taken by the Communists;

Fourth. The junta will honor its original pledge, and, having "purified" the nation and restored "true democracy," will return to the barracks.

On the first possibility, the junta is working hard to counter threats to it. It has no popular base, but it has the arms. Not only has the apparatus of the far left been dismantled, but over 800 military officers also have been retired. The junta is trying to defuse the power of the potentially proestablishment officers.

In the face of these developments, one might conclude that the logic of the situation points to the second possibility, a counter coup. This movement could be expected to represent the palace, some Army officers, the Navy and Air Force, and conservative interests. Presumably out of a successful counter coup would come some sort of a guided, rightwing "democracy." This analysis is based on an evaluation of what the United States seemed to favor in the 2 years of crisis which led to the April 21 coup.

If a counter coup of what may be termed the "respectable right" does not take place, or is defeated, the initiative of opposition is likely to pass to the far left. While the Communists received only 10 percent of the vote in the last election and while much of their apparatus was destroyed in the first hours of the coup, it nevertheless has the only underground organization. The Center Union is democratic—and powerless. All it had was a majority of the people. It lacks the financial and military might of the palace and the right and it lacks the conspiratorial character and foreign support of the Communists.

The fourth possibility is the most remote of all.

What can we do?

We must continue to press for the release of the several thousand political prisoners. This especially includes the former U.S. economist, Andreas Papandreu, the man who had emerged as the strongest long-run figure of the Center Union and against whose "new politics" the coup was largely directed.

We should continue to withhold military aid, or at least limit it so severely that we show that we disapprove of dictatorship in the cradle of democracy. Admittedly, there is a delicate balance beyond which we lose our leverage. But the junta will likely bend quite a way before risking a total break.

Third, we must look back and review our precoup policies, painful as this may be for some.

Our policy in Greece was cautious, conservative, King-centered, and contrary to the majority of the people. Our undisguised hostility to the Center Union, and to Andreas Papandreu particularly, can only have contributed to the atmosphere which encouraged a coup.

In the Greece of the 1960's, two strong, fairly responsible non-Communist parties had emerged, the conservative E.R.E. and the liberal Center Union. Both seemed capable of governing. Indeed, George Papandreu had seemed to prove that progressive liberalism is the best antidote to communism. Whereas in 1961 the Communist-front E.D.A. had received 24 percent of the vote in an election rigged against them, in 1964 Papandreu's Center Union triumph reduced the E.D.A. vote to 10 percent. Had the May 1967 election been held, E.D.A.'s vote probably would have shrunk further.

The normal swing of public feeling in a democracy would have probably led to a conservative victory in a year or two. But the King's action in ousting George Papandreu in June 1963—against U.S. advice, it must be said—helped make the 78-year-old political spellbinder the most popular man in modern Greek political history. Subsequently we lent our encouragement to all sorts of patched-up coalitions and stalling actions to thwart an election—and a predicted Center Union victory.

Ironically, the King may recoup his fortunes as he seems to be the most likely vehicle for a return to some kind of democracy.

Political polarization is taking place in Greece and U.S. policymakers contributed to it. Once again, "playing it safe" with "solid," anti-Communist conservatives, meant playing it dangerously in the long run.

Our options at the moment are narrow, but only if we realize the mistakes of the past will we be able to seize the opportunities of the future—when whatever action we take or do not take will influence and affect the character of Greece's return to democracy.

(Mr. VANIK (at the request of Mr. PRYOR) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. VANIK'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

## ADMINISTRATION FARM POLICY

(Mr. ALBERT (at the request of Mr. PRYOR) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, some of our colleagues on the other side of the aisle are reviving—again—the tired, tortured logic and the twisted facts regarding administration farm policy, statements that have been laid to rest—again and again—by the simple truth.

I can only surmise that these Republicans hope to wear out the defenders of the American farmer by sheer verbiage, and in that way to accomplish the "policy" of no policy that they seem to want.

Hanging its threadbare case on the tenuous hook of a meeting of the National Farmers Organization called to discuss bargaining for prices, the research sector of the minority party has

issued a list of what it chooses to call "harsh economic blows" that it says have been dealt the farmer by this administration.

Before once again knocking down these long-since familiar strawmen, I would like to note with great interest that the statement by the opposition's task force chairman makes no mention at all of the collective bargaining plans of the NFO at its Des Moines meeting. This is not surprising, Mr. Speaker. The minority party has never been a champion of collective bargaining, whether for industrial workers or for farmers.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, it is impossible to tell from the gentleman's statement whether the Republican Party is a champion of anything. There is not one constructive proposal in the entire statement. Rather, it consists of a series of hysterical negatives.

Mr. Speaker, the Democratic administration, led by President Johnson, realizes full well that the farmer is not getting his just share of the national wealth; it realizes that he is entitled to it, and that without farm programs he will not get it because, as a seller, he is, in effect, a prisoner of his buyer. This administration is looking for better ways in which to help him.

One of these possibilities is collective bargaining for farmers, a principle that has been endorsed both by President Johnson and by Secretary of Agriculture Freeman as worthy of serious study.

There has been a beginning of interest in exploring this approach among several farm groups. A study of this approach would seem to me to be a more constructive assignment for the staff of the task force on agriculture of the Republican planning and research committee than using up reams of paper and wearing out mimeograph machines reprinting old adjectives, about old events and applying the old illogic. Perhaps, Mr. Speaker, in the interests of accuracy, it is time they dropped the "G" from the GOP.

If you are old, and if you are weary, and if the application of hard intellect to hard problems is a chore, the easiest path is to lay the burden on someone else, and then head for the hills.

For the task force chairman to blame this administration for the current slump in commodity prices is like blaming the home team's manager when the ball game is rained out.

Mr. Speaker, it is a fact that because of farm programs fought for and won by this administration, often in bitter struggles, the burdensome surpluses of the fifties are gone, the market is freer of Government now than it has been for 30 years, and nearer supply-demand balance than it has been for half a century. Most of our farm programs are now voluntary.

Net farm income in all probability will be down this year, but it will be down because of factors outside administration control, such as world and domestic production and weather, and the marketing practices of farmers themselves. Do not forget that it will be down from an all-time record gross last year. And do not forget, either, that it still will exceed the