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Allen Dulles Warns 'New Look' Doesn't Change Russ Objectives



Dulles

EDITOR'S NOTE: Allen W. Dulles, director of the central intelligence agency, submitted an analysis of current Communist tactics to the house committee on un-American activities. Dulles and 120 other government officials, military leaders, educators, journalists, labor officials and political scientists are contributing statements for a symposium on the techniques of Soviet cold warfare. Following is a condensed text of Dulles' report.

CPYRGHT

I have always been impressed at our seeming reluctance to give credence to official statements which are made by political leaders in other countries when we disagree fervently with what they say or when their statements seem at the time to be bombastic or unrealistic.

For example, Hitler's "Mein Kampf," written in 1924, had a wide circulation in Germany and left a deep impression on the German people. Over here it received comparatively little attention until after the outbreak of World War II. Yet in this book was the blueprint of the Hitlerian policy of the superiority of the Herrenvolk, of the manifest destiny of the German Reich, of the anti-semitic campaigns and of the whole trend of Hitlerism.

SIMILARLY, I am afraid we Americans do not pay as much attention as we should to what Communist leaders tell us about the techniques they intend to adopt to undermine the structure of free government based on the rule of law.

A great deal can be learned from the pronouncements of the 20th Party congress, held in Moscow in February 1956. This was an extraordinary affair. Over a period of 12 days Soviet leaders poured out a cascade of verbiage — the length of the speeches corresponding roughly to their respective positions in the present Soviet hierarchy.

From Khrushchev we had an eight-hour speech and roughly 56,000 words, from Bulganin four hours and 27,000 words, from Mikoyan two hours and 14,000 words, and so on. The total amounted to some five to six million words which the patient party faithful had to endure.

The recent de-Stalinization program has rendered obsolete practically all of the history books and many standard textbooks used throughout the Soviet Union. Something has to replace these books and until the new historians can rewrite a proper Soviet history, the speeches of the Party congress can serve as a textbook.

WHILE WE read in these speeches that war is no longer inevitable, and that some kind of co-existence is possible, it is clear Soviet objectives remain basically unchanged, but, they say, can be achieved by new methods.

The Communists propose to infiltrate our free legislative systems, to take over our parliamentary governments and to use the freedom which our system of government gives to destroy all vestiges of that system.

In the light of this clear warning of intent, it may be useful to review briefly some past examples of Communist attempts to subvert free governments.

Past Communist take-overs of free countries have generally featured most, if not all, of these four elements:

The use of force from outside, or the overhanging threat of force.

The obtaining by the Communists through popular vote of at least an effective minority position.

The willingness of other parties, most often the parties to the left, but in some cases even parties of the extreme right, to join in political alliances and to admit Communists to key positions in the government.

Communist manipulation of key ministries so non-Communist elements were driven out of positions of influence.

The best example of this process is, of course, that of Czechoslovakia. Additional variants are found in the cases of Hungary and Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria.

IN ALL OF these cases, except for Czechoslovakia, the actual presence of Soviet forces on the spot played a decisive role. In Czechoslovakia some of the same effect was obtained by the presence, just across the border, of strong Soviet forces and by the fact the Soviets previously occupied Prague and many other important Czech centers and

(OVER)

CPYRGHT



Khrushchev



Stalin



Hitler



Benes

Plenty of warning

During all this period, Stalin had cultivated Benes and lulled him into a feeling of security as to Moscow's intentions. Meanwhile, the Communists were building up their control of the Czech military forces, the trade unions and the internal security policy. Finally, one of Moscow's principal "expeditors," Valerian Zorin, now Soviet ambassador to Bonn, was sent to Prague, and the minority Communist party seized power in February 1948 without firing a shot.

had been able, by their terrorist and infiltration methods, to gain a position of strength which far exceeded the numerical representation in the population at large. In fact, they prepared the way for the coup before they evacuated their troops in 1945.

Beginning in 1945, Moscow exercised heavy pressure on the free Czech government headed by President Benes. Hoping to be able to work with the Kremlin and anxious to insure quick withdrawal of Russian troops, Benes went to Moscow in March of that year.

He sought agreement on the forming of a coalition government acceptable to the Soviets which would include some of the pro-Communist emigres who had been collected in Moscow during the war and who flooded back to their home country to play roles preassigned to them by the Kremlin.

When the parliamentary government of Benes was actually reconstituted, anti-Communist forces were badly divided among four or more parties. The Communist party, as usual, presented a monolithic front.

UNDER THESE conditions, elections of 1946 gave the Communists 38 per cent of the votes. Thus they became the largest single party, their leader Gottwald was named prime minister and the Communists were able to take over certain key ministries, including interior, information and finance, with a cryp-
to Communist in charge of defense.