

*CIA 1-01 Dulles  
Buffalo*

The Director of Central Intelligence  
pays tribute to his former boss.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY

Allen W. Dulles

It was my privilege to be associated with William J. Donovan both as a lawyer between the wars and then during World War II, when I served under his command in the Office of Strategic Services. His courage and leadership made a profound impression on me. I should like to convey to you something of that impression, and some idea of what his pioneering has meant to all of us.

His interest in our national defense and security started early. In 1912, as the war clouds gathered in the Balkans, he helped organize Troop I of the New York National Guard. In 1915 he went to Poland as a member of a Rockefeller commission charged with relieving the great shortage of food there, and particularly of milk for the children. When the National Guard was mobilized in 1916, he came home to join his Troop I on the Mexican Border.

War Service

Then came his fabulous career in World War I with the 165th Infantry of the 42nd Division -- the renowned "Fighting 69th" of the Rainbow Division. Here he got his nickname "Wild Bill." The legend goes that after the regiment landed in France he ran them five miles with full packs to limber them up. As the men were grumbling with exhaustion, Donovan pointed out that he was ten years older and carrying the same

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50-pound pack. One of the men replied, "But we ain't as wild as you, Bill!" Another story has it that the honorary title was transferred to him from a professional baseball pitcher of the same name whose control left something to be desired. Whatever its origin, the title stuck.

The citations Colonel Donovan received in France tell the military story: On July 28, 1918, a Distinguished Service Cross: "He was in advance of the division for four days, all the while under shell and machine gun fire from the enemy, who were on three sides of him, and he was repeatedly and persistently counterattacked, being wounded twice." Three days later the Distinguished Service Medal: "He displayed conspicuous energy and most efficient leadership in the advance of his battalion across the Ourcq River and the capture of strong enemy positions. . . His devotion to duty, heroism, and pronounced qualities of a Commander enabled him to successfully accomplish all missions assigned to him in this important operation."

And then, for action in combat in the Meuse-Argonne on October 14, the highest of all awards, the Congressional Medal of Honor: "...Colonel Donovan personally led the assaulting wave in an attack upon a very strongly organized position, and when our troops were suffering heavy casualties he encouraged all near him by his example, moving among his men in exposed positions, reorganizing decimated platoons and accompanying

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them forward in attacks. When he was wounded in the leg by a machine gun bullet, he refused to be evacuated and continued with his unit until it withdrew to a less exposed position." "No man ever deserved it more," said General Douglas MacArthur, who had seen this action.

Three aids were killed at Donovan's side in the course of these actions. Reverend Francis P. Duffy, the chaplain of the 69th, said, "His men would have cheerfully gone to hell with him, and as a priest, I mean what I say." Several years ago General Frank McCoy, describing his close association with Bill Donovan during World War I, said he was one of the finest soldiers he ever saw in his life-long service in the Army, that he had the qualities of the ideal soldier, judgment and courage and the respect and affection of his men.

#### Law Career

In 1922 Donovan was appointed U.S. Attorney in Buffalo, <sup>NY</sup> and shortly thereafter he entered a new phase of his career. In 1924 President Coolidge reorganized the Department of Justice and called Bill to Washington to be assistant to the Attorney General, heading the Antitrust Division. Here he showed both his fearlessness in law enforcement and his intense interest in making law a practical vehicle to promote the economic welfare.

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He was firmly convinced that individual freedom is vitally linked to our system of free enterprise. He attacked restraints and monopoly with effective enthusiasm. In the Trenton Potteries case he won Supreme Court agreement that price fixing among dominant competitors is of itself illegal. He brought under legal attack such diverse industries as oil, sugar, harvesting machinery, motion pictures, water transportation, and labor unions. Yet he recognized that the uncertainties of our antitrust laws pose serious business problems, and accordingly instituted the practice of giving advance opinion on the legality of proposed mergers and other business activities that might be questioned under the law.

Offered the Governor Generalship of the Philippines when President Hoover entered the White House in 1929, Bill turned it down and went into law practice in New York City. He was shortly appointed counsel to several of the New York bar associations in connection with a general overhauling of the bankruptcy laws. During this period he also served as counsel to a committee for review of the laws governing the State's Public Service Commission. In 1932 he unsuccessfully ran for Governor of the State.

As a corporation attorney he won in 1935 the important Humphrey case, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the President could not arbitrarily remove a chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. He also

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won an important decision in the Appalachian coal case, upholding the right of coal producers to organize a joint selling agency in economic self-defense. This agency is still in existence.

During this period of corporate law practice, Bill never lost his interest in world affairs. He took time off to visit Ethiopia during the 1935 Italian invasion. He was in Spain during its Civil War, carefully observing the Axis efforts to test their new equipment in these foreign adventures.

#### Presidential Embassy

In the early days of World War II Donovan was called into action by President Roosevelt. In 1940 he was sent on a fact-finding mission to England and in 1941 to the Balkans and the Middle East. Anthony Eden told Washington that the Balkan mission had been most helpful to the British assessment of the situation there.

From the first trip, the one to Britain not long after Dunkirk, Bill had brought back to Washington a very important report. You will recall there was skepticism at that time in some quarters as to whether the British could effectively carry out Churchill's thrilling promise, "We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing-grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender." Donovan reported to Roosevelt that the British could and

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would do just that. This had a direct effect on American policy. He also warned Harry Hopkins that the Germans might strike toward Suez through French North Africa — a prophecy that soon became a reality.

Donovan also recommended to the President that the United States start preparing immediately for a global war. He particularly stressed the need of a service to wage unorthodox warfare and to gather information through every means available. He discussed this idea at length with his close friends in the Cabinet, Secretaries Knox and Stimson, and with Attorney General Jackson.

The seeds which Bill planted bore fruit. In July 1941 the President established the Office of the Coordinator of Information and called Donovan to Washington to head it. In original concept this Office was to combine the information and intelligence programs with psychological and guerrilla warfare. This proved to be too big a package for one basket, and in 1942 the organization was split. That portion of it coordinating wartime information services became the Office of War Information, and the intelligence and unorthodox warfare work, where Bill's greatest interest lay, was put under an Office of Strategic Services.

#### The O.S.S.

Truly one of the remarkable accomplishments in World War II was the organization and activity of the O.S.S. -- feats which would never have

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been achieved without Bill Donovan's leadership and his vast interest in the unorthodox, the novel and the dangerous. Starting from scratch in 1941, he built an organization of about 25,000 people that made a real contribution to the victory. Many of the deeds of O.S.S. will have to remain secret, but with the passage of time many have been disclosed.

Bill conceived the O.S.S. as a world-wide intelligence organization that could collect the facts necessary to develop our policy and war strategy. He was convinced that Axis secrets were to be found not only in Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo, but in other capitals and outposts around the world. So he immediately set about dispatching officers to key spots in Europe, Asia, and later Africa. The pay-off justified the effort. He was able to obtain information of great value from carefully established agents with contacts in Berlin, in the German High Command, and in the Abwehr, the German military intelligence service. The work of these agents gave us advance information about the development of German jet aircraft, about German work with heavy water in the effort to develop a nuclear weapon, about the V-1's and V-2's, and about the plot against Hitler.

In addition to his organization for the collection of strategic intelligence, Donovan provided means to help gather tactical information in the combat areas, forming teams of parachutists -- Americans as well as indigenous -- to drop behind enemy lines. But not content with passive intelligence, he also wanted action. He knew that well-organized guerrillas

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operating behind enemy lines in areas where the local population was friendly could wreak havoc on enemy lines of communication and tie down troops that could otherwise be used in combat. Working with our allies, he built up teams of leaders and communicators to organize resistance in the countries occupied by the Nazis, Fascists, and Japanese. There were also air drops of supplies and equipment deep behind the Axis lines in France and Italy, in Burma and elsewhere.

These action teams were well supported by a headquarters technical group, which under Donovan's guiding hand was imaginative <sup>by</sup> developing new ways to sabotage the enemy war effort and new gadgets either to harass the enemy or help our own cause — equipment ranging from the most sophisticated communications systems to a repellent used by personnel forced to bail out in shark-infested waters. Not all of the products were so practical as these. Ambassador David Bruce, one of Bill Donovan's closest associates, in a recent tribute to the General's qualities of leadership, vividly described his excitement over ideas. Ambassador Bruce wrote, and I subscribe to every word of it:

"His imagination was unlimited. Ideas were his plaything. Excitement made him snort like a race horse. Woe to the officer who turned down a project, because, on its face, it seemed ridiculous, or at least unusual. For painful weeks under his



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command I tested the possibility of using bats taken from concentrations in Western caves to destroy Tokyo [with delayed action incendiary bombs]. The General, backed by the intrigued President Roosevelt, was only dissuaded from further experiments in this field when it appeared probable that the cave bats would not survive a trans-Pacific flight at high altitudes."

Many ingenious ideas to work on the nerves of the enemy were born in another part of the O.S.S. - the Morale Operations Branch. This was the undercover psychological warfare branch of the war effort. While the Office of War Information was telling the enemy about the magnitude of the U.S. war effort and getting the facts and figures well circulated, this Branch was dedicated to confusing the enemy and breaking their will to resist.

General Donovan was convinced that there were great untapped reservoirs of information in this country about foreign areas which had become of vital interest in the war effort -- data in the archives of business organizations, information acquired abroad by American scientists, academicians, and tourists, and also that held by foreign experts residing here. He set about to collect this information and data and a mass of photographs of foreign areas. As the war reached more and more areas of the globe, this information came to have great importance.

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He also realized the importance of analyzing and presenting information to the policy makers in readily usable form - one of the most difficult tasks of intelligence. He established in the O.S.S. a major branch for research and analysis, assembling in Washington the best academic and analytic brains he could beg, borrow, or steal from the universities, laboratories, libraries, museums, the business world, and other agencies of government. Theirs was the task of probing the political and economic aspects of the war, assessing both our allies and our enemies, both neutrals and the occupied lands. Theirs also was the task of estimating Axis vulnerability and war potential and the staying power of the Russians, who even then told us almost nothing about themselves.

Bill Donovan had the qualities a great intelligence officer must have. He took nothing for granted and at the same time was insatiably curious. He had a good nose <sup>for</sup> of the news: a faint whiff of something unusual would speed his mind into a dozen possible explanations, generally as ingenious as the wiles of the enemy. He wanted to see things on the spot and judge for himself. He was constantly on the move and drove his staff wild trying to keep him from places they thought too exposed. He also put them into a state of near exhaustion trying to keep up with the pace he set himself. One of his great qualities was his dedication to the men who served under him, and his ever-readiness to give them his full support. He, in turn, had their complete loyalty, respect and affection. I vividly recall a personal instance.

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For about two years, from November 1942 to September 1944, I was working for Donovan in Switzerland, then entirely encircled by the Nazi-Fascist forces. In September 1944 the American Seventh Army, coming up from Southern France, broke through to the Swiss border near Geneva. Under orders to return to Washington to report, I had joined a group of the French underground in a secret hideout in the Rhone Valley between Geneva and Lyon to await a clandestine flight to take me to London. As far as I knew, General Donovan was in Washington and had not the slightest idea where I was hidden. After weather had held up my plane for several days, there was a knock on the door of my hideout in the middle of the night. It was one of General Donovan's aides, telling me that the General was waiting for me at the nearest available airstrip south of Lyon, which had just been evacuated by the Nazis. He had been searching the area for some twenty-four hours before he discovered where I was.

Together we flew back to London, arriving, I well remember, on that day in September 1944 when the Germans launched the first of their ballistic missiles on the British capital. It descended near the center of London after a flight of nearly two hundred miles. Both the American and the British intelligence services had been closely following the development of this missile. I have often wondered why, in this

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country, our technicians and strategists failed to see earlier the full implications of the success of the V-2, as I believe the Soviet did, and to realize much earlier in the game that the combination of the ballistic missile with the atomic bomb, which was then about to be unveiled, could change the nature of war and the security position of this country.

Few men of his time were more alert than Donovan to the new threats that might develop. In late 1944, sending a man to Cairo to take over the direction of activities at that post, he gave oral instructions to the effect that the main target for intelligence operations should now be what the Soviets were doing in the Balkans rather than German activities in the Middle East. The German threat was receding. The Soviet danger was already looming. Operations were to be adjusted accordingly, although such instructions could not be put into official writing.

Also, while the war was still in progress, General Donovan was looking forward to the peace. He foresaw the need for a permanent organization not only to collect intelligence but, perhaps even more important, to coordinate the whole government intelligence effort and see that the President and policy makers get comprehensive and consolidated analyses to guide their decisions as to our course of actions.

#### The Father of Central Intelligence

In the fall of 1944 Donovan presented to the President a paper proposing an intelligence organization operating on a world-wide scale

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and having direct responsibility to the President. While it was not to take upon itself the responsibilities of the departmental intelligence services, it would act as a coordinating mechanism for all intelligence. The paper stressed that the proposed organization would have no police or subpoena powers and would not operate in the United States. President Roosevelt expressed considerable interest in this proposal, and a week before his death in April 1945 asked Donovan to poll the Cabinet and the heads of agencies concerned for comment on it. These comments, ranging from the opinion that there was no need for such a peacetime organization to the belief that it was vital to national security, make interesting reading today.

Donovan received an Oak Leaf Cluster to his Distinguished Service Medal for his wartime work, but his plan to develop the O.S.S. into a peacetime intelligence organization was beset with conflicting views. Some would have the new organization, like the O.S.S., report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while others preferred that it be put under the Department of State. And there was controversy as to whether one individual could or should be responsible for presenting a consolidated view of the intelligence picture to the policy makers, rather than leave this the collective responsibility of the chiefs of all the intelligence

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services. No agreement had been reached by the time the war ended in August 1945, and the O.S.S. was soon ordered disbanded.

A proposal for a central intelligence organization such as Donovan had conceived was contained in the first draft of the so-called unification act submitted by Ferdinand Eberstadt to Secretary Forrestal in October 1945. And in January 1946, to preserve assets while the issue was being settled, President Truman issued the order creating the Central Intelligence Group, which later picked up some of the activities and personnel still remaining from the O.S.S. and other scattered independent intelligence activities.

Bill Donovan's dream was not yet completely realized. Congress still had to act. After extensive hearings to which General Donovan contributed important testimony, the provisions for a Central Intelligence Agency were incorporated into the National Security Act of 1947, which created a Department of Defense and set up the National Security Council to advise the President and oversee the new intelligence agency. In July 1947 final executive and legislative endorsement was thus given to the views which Donovan had been striving to have accepted. I have always felt that the decision to place the C.I.A. under the President, as Donovan recommended, was wise and necessary.

Bill Donovan's restless energy had turned elsewhere with the disbanding of O.S.S., although he never gave up his interest in the organization or stopped hammering home to the public the necessity for providing

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adequate and accurate information to the policy makers of the government in order to protect the national security. His varied talents were being called on for other important services. His legal ability and vast knowledge of German wartime activities were used to help prepare the Nuremberg trials for the Nazi war criminals. He went to Greece to investigate the murder of newsmen George Polk, a clear effort of the Communists to prevent the truth about the extent of their activities in the Greek civil war from seeping out.

The more General Donovan saw of the Soviets in action the more concerned he was with alerting the American people to the dangers. He co-authored an article in the Yale Law Journal for July 1949 presenting a "Program for a Democratic Counter Attack to Communist Penetration of Government Service." The article said:

"The Communist Fifth Column... seeks to identify itself with every social grievance. Russian espionage and subversive operations are made up of trained and skilled spy technicians and intelligence officers, propaganda specialists, experts in spreading rumors. Instruction is planned so that the agent will find it as easy for a minority to operate a labor union, or a pacifist league, or any other such movement, as it is for

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a minority group to control a large corporation when most of the stockholders take no active interest in the management."

In 1950 President Eisenhower, then President of Columbia University, presided on the occasion of the award to Bill Donovan of the Alexander Hamilton Medal, given by the Columbia Alumni Association for distinguished service and accomplishment in any of the great fields of human endeavor. In 1953 the President named him Ambassador to Thailand. At this time the ancient kingdom of Siam was a main target for Communist subversion. With a vigor that belied his years, this remarkable man of 70 threw himself into the job of helping the Thais bolster their defenses against the Communists so that this keystone of anti-Communism in Southeast Asia could continue free.

Upon his return to the United States one might have expected him to seek retirement, but nothing was further from his mind. He became National Chairman of the International Refugee Committee and the director of that group's fight against the Soviet program to induce Russians who escaped from Communism to return home. At the time of the Hungarian Revolution he turned his energies to aiding the refugees of this unsuccessful effort to win freedom from Soviet tyranny. He was Chairman of the American Committee on United Europe from its inception



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in 1949, and through this organization he continued to further the efforts of our major allies in Western Europe to achieve a greater unity in the face of Communist danger.

Even after ill health forced his retirement to Walter Reed Hospital, General Donovan continued his interest in the fight against Communism and the development of our intelligence work. In recognition of his role in the intelligence field, President Eisenhower in 1957 awarded him the National Security Medal. The citation reads:

"Through his foresight, wisdom, and experience, he foresaw, during the course of World War II, the problems which would face the postwar world and the urgent need for a permanent, centralized intelligence function. Thus his wartime work contributed to the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency and a coordinated national intelligence structure."

In February 1959 he passed away at Walter Reed among the men he had led. As soldier, public prosecutor, leader of the bar, director of the Strategic Services in wartime, public servant in time of peace, he had left his record with the nation he served so well. He was a rare combination of physical courage, intellectual ability, and political acumen. He was a mild-mannered man, with an insatiable curiosity, an unflagging imagination, and the energy to turn his ideas into action.

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The heritage of Bill Donovan is written in the national security. He awoke the American people to the need of a permanent peacetime intelligence service. He bestirred Washington into creating a mechanism whereby all the government components which receive information on what is going on anywhere in the world pool their knowledge, share their interpretations, and work together to make one unified estimate of what it means. He helped place intelligence in its proper perspective and stimulated the policy makers to recognize its role in determining American policy abroad. He was one of the architects of an organization that should keep our government the best informed of any in the world.

History's epitaph for William J. Donovan will be: He made his nation more secure.

WHY MEN CONFESS. By Q. John Boggs. (New York: Nelson. Pp. 296. \$3.95.)

The evaluation of the Chinese indoctrination process used on Americans during and immediately after the Korean War remains a topic of lively interest, and the search for antidotes to this kind of indoctrination gives purpose to continued studies of its nature. The dissemination of the Code of Conduct by the Defense Department, with its strong emphasis on training, has resulted in many attempts to synthesize current knowledge of the process in manageable and teachable form. But an oversimplified and distorted popular concept of "brainwashing" has become so well established, not only with the man in the street but with many whose association with intelligence work should make them more sophisticated or at least better informed, that the problem of furnishing a better foundation for understanding, combatting and resisting Communist indoctrination becomes formidable.

Kinhead's In Every War But One,<sup>1</sup> written in support of the Code of

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<sup>1</sup>New York: W.W. Norton. 1959

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Conduct, explicitly discounts any occult art of brainwashing, but in its straining to dramatize the need for better morale among enlisted men it bypasses the problem of preparing air force or intelligence officers, for example, for the kind of interrogation and indoctrination they may face as prisoners of the Communists. But if Kinhead's viewpoint is too narrow, it is almost impossible to round out the picture by pointing to books with a wider vista or with more specific applicability to the intelligence

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specialist. The more general books range from the obviously well-intentioned but scientifically inaccurate ones of Hunter to those like the quasi-scientific but highly controversial Rape of the Mind by Meerloo. The definitive book on the indoctrination process particularly as it pertains to the intelligence specialist is yet to be written.

Why Men Confess is certainly not the definitive book, but it does represent an important contribution to a growing literature. It treats the Communist process as one manifestation of a standard inquisitional method used by others today and in the historical past, and it becomes therefore an encyclopedia of the history of confession and a sort of concordance of literary allusions to the confession process. It does not have the journalistic polish of Hunter or Kinkaid or the sensationalism of Meerloo. The skill of a practiced lawyer has been applied to produce what is in effect a brief on the subject as seen from his experience and reading. His experience is largely in the "confessions" of the criminal courts, which are so often fallible and sometimes dictated by pathological motives; his reading has been historical, literary and scientific. As far as can be determined, he has been both catholic and thorough in these researches. Consequently, even though fault can be found with some of its conclusions, his work is very useful as a source book.

It is apparent that Mr. Rogge is more at home with historical and literary research than in evaluating scientific articles. Except in citing the Senate testimony of experts and the descriptive (rather than

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evaluative) paper of Hinkle and Wolff,<sup>2</sup> he uses scientific authorities

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<sup>2</sup>Communist Interrogation and Indoctrination of 'Enemies of the States,' " AMA Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, August 1956, Vol. 76, pp 115--174.

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inappropriately. His rather heavy emphasis on psychoanalytically based concepts that are at worst obscure and at best controversial is unfortunate. The book would be more solid if he had stuck to the approach he used with his literary and historical materials. Dostoevski, Gogol, Beck, and Godin represent much more effective documentation for his position than Reik, Berg, or Freud. Perhaps this criticism would not be necessary were it not for the blurb on the dust jacket (for which the author is presumably not responsible) "...Mr. Rogge tells us all that psychology knows about the compulsion to confess."

Mr. Rogge uses his encyclopedic concordance to argue the thesis illustrated in the following quotations:

The inquisitional method, which the communists have exploited for a quarter of a century, is a throwback to to the past and should be abandoned, especially in view of the growth and power of modern states. (p. 29)

Neither the system of legal proofs nor the use of physical force will explain the many confessions to communist, French and clerical inquisitors. But there was one thing which the different regimes of these inquisitors had in common: the inquisitional system. (p. 199)

All roads led to the same conclusion: the primitive and irrational nature of most of the mind together with the power of modern states, our own included, make it necessary to abandon not only the

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inquisitional technique but also any of its challenged fruits. The world should have done with investigative authorities questioning a suspected individual, like a powerful parent interrogating a helpless child. The inquisitional system stands in the way of the development of equalitarian societies and the growth of human beings into mature individuals. (p. 246)

Woven into ~~his~~ thesis and making up the climax is his belief that silence is a right of man that is basic, inviolable, and the only true defense against authoritarianism. The dust jacket promises a <sup>u</sup>farther application of these ideas in quoting Mr. Rogge: "Why Men Confess is the first of three books on the subject of confessions. I am now working on the next, which will deal with the First and Fifth Amendments."

THE SILENT LANGUAGE. By Edward T. Hall. (New York: Doubleday. 1959.

Pp. 240. \$3.95.)

Practically everyone in and out of government is full of ideas for practical steps to make U. S. representatives abroad more effective. Dr. Hall's book seeks to lay a theoretical basis for these practical efforts, to the extent that they are directed toward minimizing the reaction that takes place when one moves into the area of a foreign culture. Some people have chosen to call this <sup>reaction a</sup> "culture shock". Hall <sup>explains</sup> ~~describes~~ it as the "removal or distortion of many of the familiar cues one encounters at home and the substitution for them of other cues which are strange." Proceeding from the proposition that "most people's difficulties with each other can be traced to distortions in communication," The Silent Language "treats culture in its entirety as a form of communications" as it seeks to outline "a theory of culture and a theory of how culture came into being" and to present "the technical tools for probing the secrets of culture."

The author should know what he is writing about. He is an anthropologist who has travelled and worked abroad to develop principles and concepts for teaching U. S. representatives how to be more effective. He has done such teaching in the State Department, the Strategic Intelligence School, and elsewhere. He now makes this subject his business.

The study points out basic differences in languages and ways of speaking, but emphasizes the actions which speak louder than words, and

particularly the kind of communication that takes place "out of awareness". "This notion," it says, "that there are significant portions of the personality that exist out of one's own awareness but which are there for everyone else to see may seem frightening. The point, however, is a crucial one and will grow in importance as men begin to grasp its implications".

Hall makes another point of major significance for anyone who anticipates service abroad when he says: "What complicates matters, however, is that people reared in different cultures learn to learn differently."

Some readers may not be persuaded of the validity of the author's conceptual construction. His time, space, and order as communications media seem unnecessarily abstruse. His "map of culture" may be over-billed as "a mathematics of cultures". His classification of behavior patterns as formal, informal, and technical is an effort toward unattainable precision. He uses a great many words in a specialized sense when it seems that a garden variety of meaning would serve the purpose just as well.

But dissatisfactions such as these only serve to point up Dr. Hall's own contention that there is much work to be done in this field. The understanding of foreign cultures is critical to intelligence operations and to intelligence analysis; and such a considerable contribution of new thinking as The Silent Language makes can but stimulate more progress toward this understanding.

~~E. D. Saha~~



ROMMEL RUFF KAIRO. (Rommel Calling Cairo) By John W. Eppler.  
(Guetersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag. 1959. Pp. 300.)

Operation Condor was a bold, even desperate stroke aimed at placing a German resident agent in the heart of the British North African command center, who could provide Rommel with vitally needed order of battle information. It failed, partly because of bad luck, but mainly because of the almost incredibly insecure, brash "cowboy" operational methods used by the agent.

Published just on the heels of a British account of the same events<sup>1</sup>, Eppler's tale of his espionage activities in Cairo for Field Marshal Erwin Rommel during the struggle for North Africa reveals little new substantive information. Mosley's report, reviewed in the previous number of Studies<sup>2</sup>, will be of more interest to the professional intelligence officer.

Eppler has told an adventure story in a romantic, intensely personal style characteristic of much of the recent spate of German war reminiscences. The fact that a motion picture is being made in Germany based on Operation Condor is perhaps indicative of the nature of the book.

We learn nothing from Eppler about how he was spotted and recruited by the Abwehr; the story opens with his posting to Rommel in North Africa, and the first 130 pages deal with the problems and

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<sup>1</sup> Leonard Mosley, The Cat and the Mice. (London: Arthur Barker Limited, 1958. 160 pp.)

<sup>2</sup> ~~Studies in Intelligence~~ Vol. 3, No. 2, Spring 1959.

experiences of his 4,000 kilometer trip across the Sahara to reach the target area. Passing mention is given to technical intelligence preparations for the mission, such as documentation, communications equipment, clothing, etc. Inasmuch as he is arrested by British security forces on page 216, and from then on deals with his treatment by his interrogators, it will be seen that he gives relatively little space to his actual work in Cairo. Details on the recruiting of sub-agents are almost completely lacking, as well as a useful account of what, if anything, was accomplished. One incident, that of the separation of the British courier from his pouch of battle plans by the belly-dancer Hekmath Pathmy, is given; a satisfactory account of this is available from Mosley.

Eppler never again made radio contact with Abwehr base stations after his initial report upon arrival because the two special Abwehr radiomen assigned to service him had been posted too close to the front by order of Rommel and had been captured with their codes during a raid by the Long Range Desert Patrol. Eppler was cut off (eingemauert) after this in order to prevent a play-back. Eppler's radioman tried night after night without success to make contact with base station; the title of the book, in view of this, would more logically read Cairo Calling Rommel.

Mosley deals at some length with the tracking down of Eppler by British security forces. Eppler's own account adds nothing of significance to this.

This book can be safely passed by, especially by those who have read The Cat and The Mice.

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PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, by Alexander L. George. (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Company. 1959. Pp. 287. \$6.00.)

This scholarly and imaginative book by one of Rand Corporation's social scientists is of special significance because it evaluates propaganda analysis techniques actually used in an operational situation and has therefore had to consider the dynamics of politics, rather than the formal ~~organizations~~ <sup>structures</sup> to which the usual scholarly study in political science is devoted. Mr. George's <sup>✓</sup> guinea pig is the analysis of German propaganda done by the FCC's Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service during World War II. He examines it in the light of information obtained later from German war documents and German officials, which provides a unique opportunity to validate the inferences drawn from propaganda bearing on intelligence problems and questions critical to Allied policy. Some 80 percent of the FCC inferences that could be scored proved to be accurate.

The reader who does not make a specialty of propaganda analysis will be most interested in Part III, "Methodology and Applications," in which 20 case studies are presented to illustrate the broad range of intelligence problems approached by the FCC. The analysts' reasoning is reconstructed and their inferences matched against the available historical record on such important problems as the question of a German offensive against Russia in 1943, ~~the~~ German expectations in 1942 of an Allied second front in North Africa, the German public's attitude toward the Nazi information

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policy, and a predicted change in the propaganda presentation of military setbacks on the Russian front.

The first case study, on the German V-weapons propaganda, is cited as one in which the FCC analysts did not do as well as their British counterparts. The brilliant British analysis may be known to some readers. Based on the substantiated hypothesis that German propaganda would not deliberately mislead the German people about an increase of German power, it concluded that the Germans actually had some sort of new weapon and were not merely bluffing. It accurately described the German leaders' evaluation of the new weapon and made the tentative estimate, based on subtle shifts in the propaganda, that in November 1943 the Germans expected to have it ready between mid-January and mid-April 1944. This estimate proved amazingly accurate.

<sup>Mr.</sup>  
As George writes:

The deduction concerning the German leaders' private estimate of the timing of the V-weapon was based upon ingenious use of a general observation about Nazi propaganda practice. The British analyst reasoned that Goebbels would be careful not to give the German public a promise of retaliation too far ahead of the date on which the promise could be fulfilled. ...<sup>^</sup>Taking a number of factors into account, the British analyst reckoned that Goebbels would give himself about three months as the maximum period ...to propagandize forthcoming retaliation in advance.

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One of the reasons advanced for the lower caliber of FCC analyses on this problem is that the FCC analysts, unlike the British, worked on their own and were not asked to coordinate their V-weapon research with that of other intelligence specialists. They assumed that other intelligence techniques more appropriate than propaganda analysis were being applied to the problem. This lack of coordination may also have damaged the quality of their analysis in another case study cited: they were not informed of TORCH or briefed to look for indications of Nazi concern over possible invasion of North Africa, and so continued to search for signs of the Nazi attitude toward a possible second front across the English Channel or in Northern Europe.

These two cases, in both of which the analysis was directed toward predicting a major action, are not regarded as <sup>as the result of a series of circumstances with which the author</sup> exclusively typical. The author recognizes and discusses at some length the possibility that leaders may decide to forego any propaganda preparation which might reveal a planned action in advance. In either event, he points out,

The value to the policy maker of inferences assessing the nature and objectives of the major action once it is taken should not be underrated; in many cases they overshadow in importance the usefulness of having predicted the action before it occurred.

Writing for scholars and experts, Mr. George has set himself a much subtler task than presenting these interesting case studies. He

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has sought: (1) to identify general types of inference made about conditions which helped to determine the communication content (for example propaganda goals and techniques, "situational factors," and elite estimates, expectations, and policies); (2) to identify other possible determinants about which the FCC did not attempt to make inferences, and then to depict the relationship among all the various factors making up the system of behavior; and (3) to identify reasoning patterns in individual inferences and codify the more general methods, direct and indirect, that were used. Out of this thorough and painstaking study comes his cautious conclusion:

It seems that propaganda analysis can become a reasonably objective diagnostic tool for making certain kinds of inferences and that its techniques are capable of refinement and improvement.

X The book is not easy to read, in part because of both undefined and overrefined terminology. *✓ The author never defines "propaganda" - he* Apparently the author uses interchangeably the *that term* undefined terms "propaganda," "propaganda communications," "political communications," and "public communication," but propaganda is distinguished from "mass communication," also undefined. Readers may find quite confusing the relationships between propaganda analysis, communications analysis, content analysis, quantitative analysis and nonfrequency analysis. And many a reader may never get beyond a choker on page 79 of the introduction:

4. Dichotomous attributes (that is, meaning or nonmeaning characteristics which can be *predicted* only as belonging or not

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belonging to a given unit of the communication material).<sup>4</sup>

← If he persists, however, footnote 4 on page 81 will refer him to page 96, where he can learn that a dichotomous attribute is merely "the presence or absence" of a designated symbol or theme.

Addressing an academic audience which historically has tended to ~~use~~ make content analysis synonymous with counting, the author overstates his criticism of quantitative techniques in propaganda analysis. The casual reader may miss his references to the fact that quantitative techniques are important in the first elementary task of propaganda analysis, that is in describing ~~the~~ content, and his judgment that "another deficiency of FCC's procedure was its failure to make use of systematic quantitative procedures in evaluating certain aspects of Nazi V-Weapon propaganda." Debate over quantitative vs. qualitative techniques is actually beside the point. The real question is how best to combine these techniques in attacking each specific intelligence problem.

Despite these minor shortcomings, it is gratifying to find such an eminently qualified and objective expert as Mr. George reaching conclusions like the following:

Provision must be made for examining all of the output of a propaganda system and for evaluating its over-all propaganda strategy. Any division of labor which divorces trend analysis on



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individual subjects from cross-sectional analyses of the entirety of propaganda and propaganda strategy may result in incorrect or misleading interpretations of specific trends.

The propaganda analyst makes the basic assumption that propaganda is coordinated with elite policies, but he needs more concrete knowledge which he can obtain only from a set of empirically derived generalizations about an elite's operational propaganda theory. ...~~He also~~ requires knowledge about technical expertise and skillfulness of propaganda systems under scrutiny and that of individual propagandists employed therein.

The investigator must have rather specific, detailed knowledge of the propaganda organization whose output he is analyzing in order to appraise the situational context — who says it, to whom, and under what circumstances. ...Comparison of what is said to different audiences is generally of considerable value in making inferences.

In propaganda analysis, it is typical for the investigator to be concerned with establishing slight changes in propaganda lines or minute or subtle differences in the wording employed by different speakers or by the same speaker to different audiences.

~~Classification~~

COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITORS

Dear Sirs:

This letter is prompted by the suspicion that B. B. Bennett's diverting essay, "The Greater Barrier," (Studies, Fall 1958) on the need for good English prose in intelligence was not calculated only to entertain, which it did, but was also intended to instruct, which, regrettably, it did not. The very solemnity of your journal compels the assumption that behind the author's frivolous shoals ("Chaucer, Shakespeare, Conrad, O'Neill, Wolfe, Spillane" Imagine putting Wolfe in there!) lies the open water of Serious Purpose. The reader is admonished at the outset that "the time is upon us when we should face and begin to penetrate a barrier even greater than that of foreign languages — the English language barrier." Face it we then do, throughout much of the remainder of the article. But penetrate it we do not.

The article does seem about to get down to business in the section called "Spying the Land," devoted to discovering three constituent parts of the barrier, or perhaps factors which obscure its existence — "Self-Exculpation" (which is merely the universal human tendency to avoid recognition of self-guilt); the "Literary Bent" (a common subjective failing for triumph, depending on who has it); and the forced "Viability of the language," with its offspring, "linguistic chameleonism." But having identified these characteristics of bad writing, the author abandons us, the article ends. And where has he left us? (It is necessary to identify symptoms in order to

diagnose an illness, but we do not ordinarily stop there and seek to cure the disease with a mere analgesic. The proper pathology finds the agent responsible for the condition and then treats it with antibiotics, not aspirin. The problem with diseased writing is not the determination of the all-too-obvious symptoms, but the identity of the causal virus.

A word or two must be put in here in defense of the writing in the estimates, where a "predictive conclusion," your author says, is "useful only to the extent that it is precisely qualified." Can this be an accurate axiom? We think not. As a matter of fact, estimates which are too liberally sprinkled with precise qualifiers sometimes seem to lose their way. There is still room, we think, even in an estimate, for suggestions, degrees of emphasis, perhaps innuendo. For many readers, the neat shadings of probability are either lost or soon forgotten. What is more often remembered is the general drift of a paper, the over-all impression shaped by many things, qualifiers among them. Thus the writer of an estimate, though duty-bound to assign exact degrees of probability if he can, must also remember that he is usually creating more a rounded image than a sharp picture. We do not mean to rise here in defense of slovenly presentation or inexact qualification; we merely hope to refute the unkind notion that an estimate must stand or fall solely on the strength or weakness of its adverbs and adjectives, important as they are.

Moreover, the precision gained by assigning such words as "possible" and "probable" a value on a mathematical scale appears to upset your author

most of all: by using mathematics, he says, we have "departed the realm of language." The fact that a word has a mathematical meaning, however, does not entitle him to suggest that it is no longer a part of our language. Words, after all, are used to express feeling or thought, mathematical or otherwise. Should we follow his argument to its absurd end and conclude that using the word "oak" would propel us from the "realm of language" into the realm of trees?

Beyond distinguishing the estimate from other varieties, "The Greater Barrier" makes no attempt to subdivide categories of intelligence writing. That is too bad, for there is no such thing as intelligence writing in general. Not yet, anyhow. And if that's what Dr. Bennett and the Office of Training would like to establish, then woe to us all. There is not now, nor should there be, a common school of prose for, say, current intelligence, national estimates, and technical memoranda. There are certain standards of good practice common to all intelligence writing, but most such standards can be applied to all prose; Self-Exculpation, the Literary Bent, and Viability are certainly not the exclusive properties of the intelligence community.

Perhaps, in some instances, we should admit that learning to write is a hopeless task; some of us just cannot master it. Why should this be any more disgraceful than the proposition that some of us just cannot draw, or paint, or sculpture? But let us assume that most of us are not completely hopeless, and need only apply to the Office of Training for instruction in the art. No special talent is needed to draw a recognizable chair, nor any great gift to write an understandable sentence. And

presumably, with training and experience, the minimal chair or sentence can be improved upon.

Now one critical ingredient in such training and experience is not mentioned by your author and might be overlooked in the OTR. We should not begin by endlessly drawing chairs or endlessly writing sentences. First we must look at chairs. And first we must read before we write. Any normally perceptive person, exposed to a quantity of good reading, will soak some of it up. There is no point at all in instituting a course in creative writing, intelligence writing, or any other kind of writing for persons who have not read. This is not to say that reading will make it so. Not all readers are writers. But there is no such thing as a writer who has not read. And while this is — or should be — obvious, it is all too frequently forgotten.

Exhorting us to write better, to communicate more clearly, and to surmount the Greater Barrier is a pious exercise but one with little hope of practical accomplishment. It will remind those who probably cannot that they should. It may also remind those who can that they can. It may even lead to some worthwhile self-examination for those who are somewhere in between. But until Dr. Bennett loses his modesty and tells us how he penetrated the barrier, he must, in all good grace, rest content, albeit surrounded by all of us self-exculpators.

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