


IG RECOMMENDATIONS

Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP70-00211R000800040011-6 ACTION TAKEN



4E06

STAT

PROCEDURES

1. *OS will do Reply to the*
That the Office of Security conduct a survey of the Agency's procedures for classified-document control to insure proper compliance with Executive Order 10501 and pertinent Agency regulations.

2. *OL will Reply*
When bulk deliveries are made such as RI pouches, the recipient usually signs the Courier Receipt without inventory of the contents. To provide better document control, it is recommended that a manifest-type receipt be prepared for the contents of RI pouches, and the courier insist on inventory and receipt at time of delivery.

3. *Joint Effort - OS will initiate*
That an Agency handbook be prepared and published that would consolidate all official directives on the subject, and make it easier for clerical help to follow instructions by setting forth examples and illustrations.

4. *OS. This should be part of a Mgt. Summary*
That representatives from the Office of Logistics, Office of Personnel, and Office of Security meet to consider and adopt better ways and means to prevent the improper transmissions of classified material that sometimes occurs when postage slips are lost or become detached from the registered mail or package.

() INDICATES OUR COMMENTS

1. NOT RESOLVED OS feels that recommendation is too broad in scope, that they now actually do this on a continuing basis. They also advise any component on a request basis. Handling of classified paper is actually a part of most security surveys in Headquarters and Overseas. OL does not think there has been any change in procedures within the Agency as a result of the IGS recommendation. (This recommendation appears to be more a Records Mgt problem than either OL or OS.)
2. NOT RESOLVED OL thinks this would be too time consuming. Courier does not physically handle each document and therefore should only be responsible for 1 package, box, etc. If an inventory of bulk shipments were to be insisted upon then logically an inventory of an envelope would be reasonable, also. (This seems to get into the category of another and different problem - the internal distribution, receipt, and control of mail and seems not really a courier problem.)
3. NOT DONE Security thinks OL should do it. There is some feeling in OL that such a HB would consist largely of OS instructions and should be initiated by them. Another OL point of view is that the present Correspondence Manual should be expanded to include this material. (The basic thing which needs doing appears to be a tightening up of the Security Regs on this matter - to state precisely what OS requires in the way of Courier Receipts-Document Receipts. There is a possibility of orientation of ^{new} couriers while still in the Personnel Pool. It seems that what's really needed is an orientation type manual for new couriers which would also include the material the IG is concerned about.)
4. NOT RESOLVED OS thinks Mail and Courier Br/OL should come up with the answer to this. A solution to the problem has not been found. *(The reasonable approach is that MCB should not mail it. Any package or envelope requiring postage which cannot be matched with a postage slip should be checked with the sender.)*

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5. *OL will Ref*
Instruct all couriers to: (1) Deliver classified material to the addressee or authorized-named representative only. (2) Request proper identification from all recipients prior to delivery of classified material. (3) Under no circumstances deliver classified material to unauthorized persons.

6. *OL-OCR*
The Chief, OCR Liaison, prepare a memorandum for all Agencies and Departments with whom couriers make contact, requesting their cooperation in asking CIA couriers to identify themselves properly before turning classified materials over to them. All offices in CIA to be similarly notified and requested to ask couriers to show their courier's identification credentials.

7. *OL will Ref*
Provide courier-drivers with a trip manifest or similar card to report times of arrival and departure at all facilities visited. Require supervisors to take daily readings of speedometer mileage as a check against the trip manifest.

8. *OL will Ref*
That the Office of Logistics and the Office of Security jointly investigate the feasibility and practicability of reducing the number of delivery points in the Pentagon (now numbering) by the establishment of a special center at the Pentagon to be manned by two or more Agency employees whose duties will include internal delivery and collections to these offices.

5. NOT FULLY RESOLVED *one delivery point desirable*
OS has the understanding that OL is handling this. OL Mail and Courier does not think this approach practical in as much as they have from people involved. OL feels they take every precaution to get material in proper channels now, and if couriers report infractions of other agencies to our Security, the system may be looked upon as a sort of Gestapo.

6. DONE *(see fact)*
Requests for this cooperation sent to other agencies concerned by OCR/LB in March 1960. of Liaison Staff informs me that memos were only sent to Army, Navy, Air Force, and State; Liaison Staff can give us exact info and a sample of the memo if needed. Some indication that Army was put out about it since they couldn't see the point in challenging a courier who comes 4-5 times a day.

7. DONE A Trip Manifest was prepared by M & C Br and is now in use - shows arrival and departure; driver, time, and mileage.

8. NOT RESOLVED
OL has taken no action. OS feels this is basically an administrative problem rather than a security one, however they would review and approve or disapprove any procedural change from a Security point of view. Security does feel that the proposal is desirable. (Indications are that the number of delivery points has increased. Establishing a facility in the Pentagon doesn't seem to be the answer, rather it would only further acknowledge the fact that we are doing internal delivery service for other Agencies, . The new DIA may help consolidate deliveries to Army, Navy and Air Force, however 3 delivery points have already established for them.

IG RECOMMENDATIONS

Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP70-00211R000800040011-6 ADDITION TAKEN

ADMIN SECURITY

9. *OS will reply* That the focal point in the Office of Security be designated the office of record for maintaining a complete roster of all headquarters couriers and courier equipment and that the Director of Security provide a staffing slot for a full-time courier inspector.
10. *Wait Until Mem Completed* That 1) the DD/S issue a directive to all units of the Agency employing individual couriers not assigned to the Mail and Courier Branch, Office of Logistics, to provide the Office of Security their names together with a list of offices (outside CIA) visited; the courier schedule and routes; type of transport used, precautions employed to protect classified mail in transit; types of clearances issued to its couriers and to submit all subsequent changes in courier status as they occur; and 2) the Office of Logistics in coordination with the Office of Security review these data to eliminate wherever practicable duplication of courier services, courier routes, and courier vehicles.
11. *OS will reply* Individuals so affected to be reported to the Office of Security for arms requalification without delay. (Failure to qualify in use of Firearms.)
9. Not Resolved. OL keeps a listing of their own Personnel. OS thinks this is an administration matter for Mail and Courier Branch. Also that control would be easier if all Couriers were under one courier service. OP does not plan on working on this until the matter of classification is settled which they are now into. (We have a list of all Couriers carried on the Agency T/O.)
10. *Not Done. A.S. doesn't recognize this as a function belonging to them. O.S. Through their own security of 96% has some idea of courier routes, etc. O.L. has taken no action.*
11. RESOLVED Neither OL nor OS thinks this is an accurate reflection of the situation. OL says they automatically request requalification examinations at 6 months intervals. (Security is now developing a way of issuing a firearms credential that will be acceptable to FAA under their new Regs) The real thing at issue here should be, who says where and under what conditions may a courier rightfully use his weapon.

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12. That the DD/S request the Director of Security to extend his current technical interrogation program to all Agency couriers; and that he be instructed to initiate a positive CI program designed to minimize the damage to National Security and embarrassment to the Agency should a serious breach of security occur.

OS will uph

13. Paragraph 11. b. (4), Agency Regulation Revised, 24 February 1959, states that the Director of Security is to, "develop and conduct internal counterintelligence programs to detect and prevent hostile penetrations of the Agency establishments through its employees." Paragraph b. (5) goes on to state that the Director of Security is to "establish safeguards necessary to prevent physical penetration of the Agency establishments by unauthorized individuals..." Nowhere in the regulations is specific mention made of couriers or the Agency Courier System, nor requires the Director of Security to give this activity special attention.

14. When courier escort is not provided, all vehicles used by couriers will be equipped with a fireproof safe for storage of classified material while in transit. Wherever feasible, a two-way radio telephone should be installed in courier vehicles.

OS will uph

12. & 13. NOT FULLY RESOLVED OS feels their current program actually does a comprehensive job in the CI field. All couriers are given the poly annually. Couriers are given an exhaustive check when hired, and given a closer check than an ordinary applicant. Security does think, however, that they miss some people who are performing courier duties simply because they are not under the OL courier system ~~and~~ *and* the other larger courier groups which they know to be in existence. OS thinks it against Agency policy to place covert agents within the courier staff, conduct covert surveillance, etc.; but that their investigation of all reputed, indicated, or suspected compromises really adds up to an effective CI program. OS plans to look into the overall courier service again when the move is completed.

14. DONE IN PART Three courier cars have been equipped with safes in the trunks. Radios have not been installed. Occasionally at night they do have the use of an OCI vehicle with radio. (The safe-in-the-trunk business is not entirely satisfactory, to use them in town draws too much attention.) (Chief Highway Br. OL says to equip 3-4 cars with radio, install a receiver-transmitter and to get a channel from FCC would probably cost about \$5,000.)

TSD safe

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ACTION TAKEN

ORGANIZATION

- Mgt. Staff.*
15. That the Management Staff conduct a study of the various courier systems at Headquarters with a view of reducing duplication.
(Note - By memorandum dated 12 March 1960, the DD/S issued instructions to the Chief, Management Staff, to proceed with such a study under the following terms of reference:

"... to conduct a study of the Headquarters Courier Systems for the purpose of eliminating any unnecessary duplication or overlapping of separate systems, recommending at the same time any improvements or economies in services, methods, and controls which may seem to you desirable. The detailed information gathered by the Office of Security is available to your staff.")

- OS and Hqs.*
16. The DD/S instruct the Director of Security to establish a point within the Office of Security to coordinate on all matters relating to the Headquarters Courier Systems, and the individual security of couriers themselves and the Courier System.

15. ?

16. DONE Physical Security Division, considers himself this focal point.

STAT

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 15px;"></div>		
2	7D-24, Headquarters		
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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
Remarks:			
<p>Colwell:</p> <p>Attached is the Office of Logistics response to the IG's Report. There is still debate on responsibility for preparation of the Agency Handbook. We think this will be settled through findings in our survey which we will report to you later.</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE	
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 15px;"></div> 604-1016 16th St. NW		Records Admin Officer 4/10/62	
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