March 7, 1990 roved For Release 2005/07/25ALCIATRON70B003288000300060020-7

The same thing could happen, eventually, to the President's cherished rent supplement plan, though no one is conceding that yet. Neither Congress nor the voters back home have ever warmed to the idea, a fact not lost upon the Johnson Administration. So, while Mr. Johnson is proposing a rent supplement expansion, he clearly is not putting all his rental housing chips on supplements but, indeed, is doing what Mr. Weaver resisted a year ago—choosing "a wholly new instrument," the interest subsidy proposal. The Weaver team offers no explanation for this turnabout other than to admit the political unattractiveness of rent supplements.

And finally, having wrested away the upper hand, you beseech Congress to ratify your lead.

"To achieve our housing goal, we must move from low to high production," the President's message implores. "We can make that shift only if the challenge summons the commitment" of all segments of society but "most importantly, the Congress."

Now that you upstarts are back in your places, follow me.

IRAEL AMBASSADOR SEEKS PEACE BETWEEN ARABS AND JEWS IN HIS MAIDEN SPEECH BEFORE THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB

(Mr. FEIGHAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, it was my privilege to attend the luncheon held Wednesday noon at the National Press Club in Washington to hear a very profound address by His Excellency Maj. Gen. Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador to the United States from the State of Israel. The Ambassador had just presented his credentials the day before and this was his maiden speech.

The general theme of the address was the willingness of the Israel Government to negotiate a peace settlement between the Arab Republic and the State of Israel, which would eradicate the animosity existing between the Arabs and the Jews.

I believe that his approach to this problem is sound.

The question and answer period, which was conducted by National Press Club President Allan Cromley, chief of the Washington bureau for the Daily Oklahoman and the Oklahoma City Times, was one of the most stimulating ones that I have ever heard. The questions were very penetrating and the Ambassador, who is a former major general, and in a great measure responsible for the Israel victory in the 6-day war, gave every indication that he is as equally qualified to pursue the cause of peace as he was in the cause of victory during the hostilities last June.

I recommend to all Members of the House that they read the complete text of Ambassador Rabin's address before the National Press Club, which, under leave granted, I include, along with items which appeared in the Washington Post and the Washington Daily News today: Address by HIS EXCELLENCY THE AMBASSA-DOR OF ISEARE, MAJ. GEN. YITZHAK RABIN, BEFORE THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, WASHI-INGTON, D.C., MARCH 6, 1968

I am very glad to have this opportunity of meeting the distinguished press corps of this Club, at a time when I am assuming my

duties as my country's Ambassador to the United States.

Nine months have passed since the Six-Day War. Nine months is a considerable stretch of time, especially in the Middle East. Yet it cannot be said that its aftermath stands in any relation to the clear and decisive military victory of last June. The question that has no doubt been posed and will be posed is what has been achieved in the war, what has not been achieved, and what are the main problems confronting Israel today and tomorrow.

WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED

First I should point out what is known as "before and after" in any war or confrontation. There is much wisdom in hindsight; since unhappily it is not possible to be one hundred percent wise in foresight.

The primary and major achievement of the war was the removal of the immediate threat to the very existence of the State of Israel and its people. In the latter part of May and early June 1967, we witnessed a determined attempt on the part of the Arab States to destroy Israel. We were faced with our most difficult political and military situation since 1948. The Six-Day War removed this immediate threat, but for how long cannot yet be said. This achievement would have been itself enough. But we have achieved much more than that. Some of our achievements can be seen with certainty, and others I am quite sure will emerge in future.

The obvious achievements are as follows: (1) The Arab armies threatening Israel were beaten, particularly that of Egypt, and to a lesser extent the Jordanian forces, and to a still lesser extent those of Syria. The Iraqi Air Force suffered a limited setback. The damage inflicted was for the most part on material such as aircraft, tanks, artillery, trucks, and military infrastructure, and to a more limited extent on manpower. In round figures, about 1,000 tanks were destroyed, 450 planes, some 1,400 artillery pieces of various kinds, and many thousands of vehicles. The Arab forces lost about $1\frac{1}{2}$ billion dollars worth of equipment. This destruction was of major military significance during the war. The Arab armies ceased to be a factor capable of preventing further Israeli advance beyond the present cease-fire lines. However, today, nine months later, it can be said that massive Soviet aid has almost entirely replenished the Arab losses, in some cases with equipment of superior quality.

(2) The second achievement, I believe, will last longer than the first one. The Arab Armies suffered a major blow to their morale and self-confidence in waging a successful war against Israel on their own. It is very difficult to evaluate this kind of achievement. We have no way yet of quantifying psycho-logical factors. However, we learned only before the last war the difference between Arab logic and our own. Moreover their own logic does not always dictate their actions. Emotional factors and mass hysteria characterized the events that led up to the Six-Day War, despite any logic or rational interests of the Arabs themselves. In my own view, the real recovery of the Arab forces and restoration of their confidence for another all-out war with us is not a matter of a few months, always assuming that they will think logically, and that we are concerned with an Arab-Israeli war, without any intervention on the part of a Great Power from outside our region.

(3) The third achievement is that of the major improvement in Israel's lines of defense, namely the current cease-fire lines. Israel holds territories greater in area than she did on June 4th, 1967, and despite that our border lines today are a great deal shorter than they were then. Moreover, they lie along natural and artificial obstacles which completely alter our defensive capacity in the event of a renewed attack. Our border with Egypt, for instance, was previ-

ously some 300 kilometers in length; today it is about a third of that. The previous border was entirely exposed to armored attack. Today it rests along a natural obstacle, if we can so call the Suez Canal. The Canal is 170-200 meters wide, and it should present a serious obstacle to the Egyptian army. Further, the over-all strategic picture has completely changed. The previous Israel-Egyptian border (I refer not to the Gaza Strip but to Sinai) was about 130 kilometers from Tel Aviv, with Cairo 350 kilometers away. Today it is quite the reverse, and this is of decisive significance for having a better warning against air attack. The picture has similarly changed in the vital part of our border with Jordan. The fact that the West Bank is under our control has cut the length of our border line by nearly one third; and that border line runs along the natural barrier of the Jordan River. This and the reunion of Jerusalem have removed the danger of shelling of our population concentrations in the heart of Jerusalem and along the coastal region. In the Syrian sector, too the constant threat to our border settlements is removed, and we enjoy defense in depth of decisive topographic significance.

WHAT HAS NOT BEEN ACHIEVED

It would not be appropriate to speak in terms of what we failed to achieve, for the simple reason that the war was not initiated by us. It was forced on us. It was not we who wanted it. Our major achievement of the war is no doubt that our enemy failed to achieve its aim. But it must be admitted that after it was over, we might well have thought that the very dimensions of their military defeat, the very extent of their collapse, evident as it was, would produce a change in Arab attitudes and policies toward us.

The Six-Day War might surely have demonstrated to the Arabs the futility of a continuation of their hostility and belligerency. Their vast efforts over a good number of years to create armed forces capable of destroying us had proven of no avail. They expended the best of their resources, in terms of wealth and manpower, on their armed forces, instead of on internal economic development. For all that, it was demonstrated that all our neighbors, in concert, were unable to defeat us, although we were on our own, with no outside help.

It might have been reasonable to expect that the complete failure of these Arab policies would bring some change, either in these policies or in their regimes. No one can say with certainty that this was the final war in the Arab-Israel conflict. The Six-Day War is over, but the Seventh Day, the Day of Rest, has not yet come to Israel.

We might ask ourselves why the war has not so far led to the logical abandonment of a policy of belligerency against Israel. For twenty years it has brought nothing but defeat and disaster upon the Arab world. There is no ready answer, but I would suggest two main reasons:

(1) The first is that the very hatred of Israel that the Arab leaders have nourished amongst their people has come to limit their own freedom of manoeuvre in view of considerations of their public opinion at home. Over the years they have utilized their public information media and their school system, right down to the kindergarten leyel, to promote and nourish this hatred of Israel. Military and totalitarian regimes do not change overnight. In the first place, it is very difficult for the Arab States to rid themselves of a policy they have preached for many years. Since 1948 the Arab States have followed a consistent policy of active nonacceptance and non-recognition of Israel. Only special circumstances and a leader of courage and conviction are required to divert the Arab world from its present path and policy.

(2) I have no doubt that the Six-Day War can provide the basis and circumstances H1784

for such a change in Arab policies. Were the conflict insulated from certain other, outside factors, we might well have already been witness to such a change. But this unfortunately, has not happened, and the Arab States have more than a mere feeling that a Great Power is backing them up, and holding out hopes of their recovering what they lost in war, without budging from their basic polical support from the same Great Power is breathing new hope amongst some Arab leaders, and they believe that if they play their cards well, they need not abandon their policy of war. So far, President Nasser's most recent pronouncements to his people show no abatement in his beligerent attitude and objectives regarding Israel.

I doubt whether the Great Power would like to see a renewal of the war, particularly not in the immediate future. But I would say that she would not like to see a peace settlement and an end to the tensions in the region unless it be on her own terms. The continued tension and instability in the area was one of the factors which enabled her to establish herself in the Middle East, to extend her influence and establish a military presence in the area. The Arab military defeat, especially that of

The Arab military defeat, especially that of Egypt, was a defeat for her, too. What was demonstrated was her failure to train an effective Egyptian Army, despite all the manifold efforts of the past thirteen years. And she, too, must surely be a little anxious that the Egyptians may draw certain conclusions about her failure to promote Egyptian policies successfully.

The two major obstacles to any fundamental change leading to normal Israel-Arab relations based upon peace and mutual respect are the psychological moment in any departure from the old emotional policies towards Israel, and the firm backing of the Great Power in question.

THE MAIN PROBLEMS FACING ISRAEL

Therefore the main problems facing Israel now, overriding any other problems, are as follows:

(a) To bring about a real change in the inter-relations between the Arab countries and Israel, which means a real and lasting peace.

(b) Or as long as this goal has not been achieved, to prevent a renewal of the war. We have the right to live our life in peace

and security. I know that the Arab-Israel conflict is not a simple one. But I am sure that all problems can be solved once the Arabs stop dreaming that it is possible to de-stroy Israel, accept Israel as a fact, recognize and live with her. Therefore we say to the Arabs now let's sit together and negotiate a peace settlement. We don't say that we are going to stay wherever we are now. We are ready within the framework of this kind of negotiation to come to an agreement on the recognized and secure boundaries of the future. But if you are not ready to talk peace with us, if you are not ready to abandon your policy of seeking Israel's destruction, why then do we have to withdraw even one inch? Just to hand you back the areas which served in the past and will serve in the future as a springboard for your aggression? Let us finish the state of war by establishing good and really friendly relations that will be of benefit for all our peoples.

We must strive towards a real peace but at the same time strengthen Israel's capability to prevent any attempt by the other side to return to the use of force. The stronger we are, the better are the prospects of achieving peace in the area. There is a famous saying to it takes two to make peace but only one to make war. We are ready for peace—we still lack the second partner to make it.

It might be that the road to peace will be 'long but there is no doubt in our minds that it can and will be achieved. We know that it will entail suffering and sacrifice for Israel, but we are sure that we have no other choice. We hope that peace-loving countries will understand and support our efforts to achieve a real and lasting peace in the Middle East.

ISRAEL ENVOY TAKES HARD LINE ON TALKS (By Charles M. Roberts)

Israel's new ambassador to the United States took a hard position yesterday on the critical issue of face-to-face negotiations with the Arabs.

Maj. Gen. Yltzhak Rabin, a hero of the six-day war last June, told an overflow crowd at a National Fress Club luncheon that he doubted that any "real results" could be achieved "unless the other side will be forced to talk with us."

If they do not agree to meet face-to-face, he added, it will mean the Arab states do not recognize Israel.

United Nations special emissary Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish ambassador in Moscow, has been working on a plan to have both sides meet with him, but not necessarlly face-to-face, in his Cyprus headquarters. While there have been reports of agreement on this, American officials insist that is not yet so.

CAN HOLD PRESENT LINE

Rabin strongly suggested that Israeli forces will not withdraw "even one inch" unless the Arabs agree to "sit together and negotiated a peace settlement."

He added that Israel is able, from a military point of view, to hold its present ceasefire lines "two, five 10 or even 20 years." "We are ready to wait," he said; "we are

"We are ready to wait," he said; "we are going to wait where we are until we achieve a peace."

Most of the harder aspects of the Israell position came in reply to questions. His prepared address was not quite as tough in tone.

One point in the prepared address, however, backed up Rabin's remark about sitting it out for years, if necessary, on the present lines. He said that the war had reduced the size of the Israeli-Egyptian border that has to be defended from 300 kilometers (about 240 miles) to about a third of that, and that the Jordanian border likewise is now much shorter.

BETTER WARNING

Furthermore, said Rabin, the fact that the Egyptian border is now on the Suez Canal "is of decisive significance for having a better warning against air attack."

While the Soviets have "almost entirely replenished" Arab arms losses, said Rabin, recovery of Arab confidence for another allout war "is not a matter of a few months." However, Soviet backing has bolstered Arab hopes, he said.

Robes, he said. Rabin said Egypt's President Nasser has shown "no abatement in his belligerent attitude and objectives." In reply to a question, Rabin speculated that any change of government in Cairo would be "toward more freedom and a more democratic way of running Egypt."

The Ambassador, while deploring American arms aid to Jordan, said he had "no doubt" that it was better "to have someone other than the Russians in Jordan."

Rabin was highly complimentary to France because "we won the war with French planes." He said Israel now will "try every source" for new planes since "it doesn't seem that we're going to get" the planes ordered from France.

RABIN LEAVES THE DOOR AJAR(RING) (By R. H. Boyce)

A statement here by Israel's new ambassador to the U.S. that Israel will not "stay forever where we are now" was intended to encourage Arabs to enter peace talks, U.S. diplomatic sources said today.

diplomatic sources said today. Remarks by Maj. Gen. Yitzhak Rabin at a National Press Club luncheon yesterday were viewed as the clearest statement yet of the Israeli position on withdrawal from Arab territories occupied since last June's six-day war. Gen. Rabin said:

"We say to the Arabs now, let's sit together and negotiate a peace settlement. We don't say that we are going to stay forever where we are now. We are ready within the framework of this kind of negotiations to come to an agreement on the recognized and secured boundaries of the future."

Egypt long has insisted that Israel must withdraw before negotiations could begin. Israel wants talks first to decide where the boundaries would be. But official Israeli public statements have not been clear because the Israel government is divided on territorial conditions.

Also, the two nations have differed on interpretation of a United Nations resolution of last Nov. 22 which called for Israeli withdrawal "from territories occupied" but carefully did not say "all" the territories. It also urged termination of states of belligerency, and acknowledgment of the rights of all Middle East states to live in peace "within secure and recognized boundaries."

Egypt has said it would negotiate if Israel would commit itself to the resolution, meaning withdrawal. Israel's acceptance of the resolution has been qualified.

Gen. Rabin, making his first public statement as Israeli envoy here, said: "If you (Arabs) are not ready to talk peace

"If you (Arabs) are not ready to talk peace with us, if you are not ready to abandon your policy of seeking Isruel's destruction, why then do we have to withdraw even one inch, just to hand you back the areas which served in the past and will serve in the future as a springboard for your aggression?"

Gen. Rabin said the talks must be direct, "face to face," which has long been an Israeli condition. But he softened this by adding that "this might be in the presence of Jarring. Gunnar Jarring is a Swedish diplomat authorized by the UN to attempt to bring Israel and the Arabs together.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA TEACHERS STRIKE

(Mr. TALCOTT asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. TALCOTT. Mr. Speaker, today a group of Washington, D.C., teachers called at my office.

I was most unfavorably impressed. I am certain that this group of teachers did not accurately represent the total teacher corps of the District schools. If they were representative, our schools are in dire trouble.

These teachers would set poor examples for any student.

One had a fifth-grade boy with herneither was well groomed. The boy's grammar was considerably below satisfactory. He had little respect for private, personal effects in my office. He spoke up in our conversation. His teachermother thought this was perfectly permissible because he "knew a good deal about this problem." He did not mind missing a day of school.

One teacher who claimed to be a teacher of congressional activities in her school, believed that few Congressmen worked from Friday to Tuesday.

Not one of them knew more than a modicum about the Congress.

They were not considerate enough to call or make arrangements for an appointment. They showed little consideration for my time even though they knew they were keeping me from attending a committee meeting.

Approved For Release 2005/07/25 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300060020-7