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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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to U.S. officials. Upon his release, Professor Barghoorn made the interesting remark that "under Soviet law one can be accused of conducting intelligence activity merely by walking down the street, especially if one has hostile intentions against the Soviet State—hostile, that is, in the opinion of the appropriate authorities."

It was only after President Kennedy ordered the postponement of a new cultural exchange agreement and stated publicly that the incident might affect the sale of wheat to the Soviet Union that Soviet authorities released him. Similarly, in the more recent Kazan-Komarek case, the Czechs effected the release of a United States citizen only after visas were denied Czechs wishing to visit the United States, and only after it was hinted that credits for purchases in this country would not be extended by the Export-Import Bank.

By the same token, we should not overlook the complicity of the Soviet Government in the Kazan-Komarek case. It was the Soviet Union which diverted a scheduled international aircraft to facilitate the seizure of an American citizen. Did the Soviet Union pause to consider that such an action might damage the case of the consular convention which it knew would shortly be before the U.S. Senate? Apparently not.

The point is that this convention is not going to deter Communist governments from falsely arresting U.S. citizens on trumped-up "espionage charges." Professor Barghoorn was arrested in Moscow, where we have a fully-staffed embassy capable of dealing with such incidents. He was released because of pressure from Washington and a threat to postpone or cancel certain things which the Soviets wanted. Likewise, Mr. Kazan-Komarek was arrested in Prague, where we also have an embassy, and was released only because the Czechs feared that we would actually go ahead with our threat to cancel commercial credits.

Now, far more attention has been given to the possibilities that this convention will enhance Soviet intelligence capabilities in this country. I do not think there is any question that Soviet intelligence operations will benefit if consulates are established, and I base this conclusion on what is generally known about the intelligence apparatus of the U.S.S.R. Nor do I have reason to doubt that the presence of some U.S. consular officials in a Soviet city will add to our own knowledge of current Soviet affairs. But I suspect that, given the nature of Soviet society—that is to say, a police state which has always maintained an extremely strict internal security apparatus aimed as much at its own citizens as at foreigners—we will benefit less from such an arrangement than will the Soviets. The argument that ours will be the greater advantage assumes that American consular agents and other officials will have approximately the same access to Soviet citizens and their sources of information as Soviet agents presumably will have to U.S. citizens. That assumption is patently unrealistic.

However, I do not claim competence to discuss in great detail the question of internal security in the United States. The record of Soviet performance throughout the world is generally known, and has recently been described in a book known as *The Penkovskiy Papers*.

One Senator has pointed out quite correctly on the floor of the Senate that real espionage agents—i.e., deep-cover agents—do not operate openly from diplomatic and consular establishments. But we should not fail to consider the question of whether the presence of one or more Soviet consulates would increase the organizational efficiency of the Soviet espionage apparatus.

In the end it will be for our own internal security officials to decide whether the expansion of Soviet intelligence operations

constitutes a manageable problem. It is my understanding that this issue is still under consideration.

Another point of interest relating to the convention is the provision of Article 2, Paragraph 2 stipulating that consular officers shall be entitled to further the development of commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations. Would this include the right for us to establish libraries and dissemination centers for books, articles, pamphlets and other printed information pertaining to life in the United States? Would an interested Soviet citizen be able to read U. S. newspapers at an American consulate? And if he were able to do so, would he be discouraged from doing it regularly? What would be within the rights of Soviet consular officials in the United States in this respect? What would they be allowed to distribute?

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, before concluding my statement, I would like to return to the broader considerations governing my views of the instrument now before this Committee.

There is a widespread opinion that the Soviet Union is now embroiled in overwhelming domestic and foreign problems, and that these problems have gradually forced the Soviet leaders to steer a "more realistic and pragmatic" path in dealings with their own people and with the world. Many hold that the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was the great watershed of American-Soviet relations.

It is argued that the dispute between the Soviet Union and Communist China, coupled with the "polycentric" process in Eastern Europe has caused the Soviet leaders to make new assumptions about the West in general, and about the United States in particular. Some, observing certain readjustments and reorganizations in the Soviet and East European Communist states, go so far as to argue that these countries are "becoming capitalistic." There are even some who go beyond these positions to argue that the United States and the Soviet Union are on a "convergence footing," and that it is only a matter of time before the two nations will perceive that commonly held interests will "force" them to act together to preserve world peace.

It is certainly true that the form of the Soviet threat to the United States and, for that matter, to Western Europe, has changed. But it is, in my judgment, an error to say that its nature has changed. It is also true that there have been changes within the Soviet Union, and that on first glance they appear to constitute "liberalization." In fact, there have not yet been introduced in the Soviet Union (or in the "polycentric" East European States) *institutional guarantees* for a real liberalization. Any student of democracy would agree that such guarantees must be made permanent before one can speak of true liberalism.

While we in the West speak of conciliation with, and change within, the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership constantly reaffirms that the goals of the two "opposed systems" are absolutely irreconcilable. Typical of this constant reaffirmation is the statement made by Leonid Brezhnev just two weeks ago on the "Current Tasks of the Young Communist League." He said:

"We must not overlook the fact that we are living at a time of bitter class struggle of two worlds—the world of socialism and the world of capitalism. In the field of ideology, as in other fields of our relations with the world of capitalism, socialism is in a state of historic offensive, capitalism [is] on the defensive. The ideological influence of socialism, the impact of our Marxist-Leninist ideology, of our successes in the upbuilding of a new society upon the minds of the masses in the capitalist countries is tremendous. This influence is mounting day

after day, eroding the pillars of capitalism from within."

He also said: "We regard ourselves part and parcel of the world system of socialism, a detachment of the world army of fighters for freedom . . . [and] for the victory of socialism and communism all over the world."

As one who observes the activities of the international Communist movement, I find this statement in accord with the traditional foreign policy of the Soviet Union, and in accord with its historical and oft-repeated goals. It is a matter of record that the Soviet Union has shifted, but intensified, its strategic operations directed against the United States, which is regarded as the principal "enemy." It is also a matter of record that the Communist movement itself has expanded rather than contracted. There are some 90 Communist Parties in the world today, with a membership of approximately 50 million. Fourteen Communist states exercise governmental power, forty operate clandestinely, and thirty-six function "legally." The *overwhelming majority* of these Communist Parties, it should be noted, support the Soviet Union and its policies.

In the past ten years, and despite the differences between the Soviets and the Chinese, the Communist movement has undergone a degree of consolidation, and the strategic emphasis has shifted to the underdeveloped world. Most striking evidence for this statement is the so-called Tricontinental Movement established in Havana in January 1966. It has been a source of astonishment to me that virtually no official attention has been given to the Tricontinental Movement. These developments are of direct concern to this Committee and to both branches of Congress. They relate to the consideration of our over-all foreign policy, as well as to the consideration of pacts such as the consular convention.

The available evidence shows that the Soviet Union is making a substantial commitment in Latin America through this Havana-based organization. That commitment is to a broad-based revolutionary struggle, including armed struggle. As the *Pravda* editorial of December 7, 1966 put it:

"It has been shown that the securing of a peaceful international atmosphere increases the opportunity for the victorious development of the class struggle by the proletariat and the struggle by the oppressed peoples for their social and national liberation in any form, including through national liberation wars."

If we ignore the standard Communist clichés in this statement, we will see that the Soviet Union clearly sides with the program for subversion and armed insurrection which comes under the heading of "national liberation warfare," and which is the essence of the "Tricontinental Movement."

It was in this spirit that the Vietcong representative in Havana, Nguyen Duc Van, said in an interview on January 5 of this year: "Within a short time there will be not just one Vietnam, but many Vietnams, and the Yankees will not be able to handle so many attacks at the same time."

Thus, when we speak of the "dialogue" with the Communist world, we should keep in mind that the Communists, including the Soviet Union, have one language for the industrialized West and another for the rest of the world. Which of these diametrically opposed approaches should we take as genuine and sincere?

The assumptions underlying the process of bridge-building to the East are, in my view, not in accord with present realities. The record shows that the Soviet Union and its allies do not enter into agreements, such as the one before this Committee, on the basis of good faith. Instead of genuine bridges with a two-way traffic, the Soviet

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Union seeks a temporary escape hatch which will provide a measure of security and stability while it achieves certain other goals—most notably an expansion of its power and influence, hopefully with Western assistance.

The consular convention, as a part of the "package" of agreements which form the basis for "building bridges" is, under present conditions, clearly premature.

**BISHOP PIKE'S DISSERVICE TO CHRISTIAN RELIGION**

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, according to an Associated Press article published in the Washington Evening Star of February 8, 1967, Bishop James A. Pike has urged the young men of this country to disobey the legally constituted authority invested in the President and refuse to enter the Armed Forces. I should like to point out several aspects of this extraordinary suggestion by the Bishop:

First, Bishop Pike is urging our youth to act on a mass basis, instead of on the basis of individual decision.

Second, his statement that "Johnson is not willing to negotiate" is in direct contradiction of every pronouncement the President and his top officials have made on the subject, and is an imputation of dishonesty.

Third, he characterizes the moral duty of men to obey their lawful superiors under lawful rules of war as "murder," a tendentious term to say the least.

All of this I find deeply disturbing in a man who sets himself up as an arbiter of ethics. Moral science requires the utmost detachment and objectivity. Moral problems cannot be solved in the midst of emotion-laden controversy. Bishop Pike does himself a disservice, and a disservice to the Christian religion which he claims to represent.

Moreover, the position which he urges is highly undemocratic, in contradiction of what one would suppose to be the principles of the organization for which he works, the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. The procedures which Bishop Pike urges are not the principles of democracy as it is understood in our American Republic.

Mr. President, Bishop Pike turns the basic right of dissent into pure anarchy. When he proposes dissent on a mass basis he is urging mob action, and the overturning of the fundamental assumptions of free government. He sets up his own whims as the rule of popular action. He deliberately seeks to short-circuit the democratic process.

I, myself, have often dissented from actions and policies pursued by the President. It is entirely possible that I may dissent from them in the future. But for dissent to be democratic, it must remain within the rules of government. The genius of the American system is that it provides procedures for a wide variety of free expression, and offers orderly methods for minority opinions to leaven the quality of government. Neither the tyranny of the minority nor the tyranny of the majority holds sway in the United States. Both minority and majority have opportunity not only to be heard, but to affect directly the course of legislation and executive action. The rights of both are protected by order.

But free government assumes that all citizens must abide by the decisions of the democratic process. For that process, as I have just pointed out, is not simply majority rule, but a rule in which all can affect government to some extent. When Bishop Pike calls for mass dissent from the democratic process, he is placing an intolerable burden upon the organs of the state. It is a burden which will lead to the collapse of order, and to the collapse of freedom. For this reason, Bishop Pike's proposal is subversive of this Nation's self-interest and survival. And when American youth are dying to assure that survival, Bishop Pike's proposal is tantamount to treason.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an article entitled "Pike Suggests Youth Refuse To Go to War," published in the Washington Evening Star of February 8, 1967.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

**PIKE SUGGESTS YOUTHS REFUSE TO GO TO WAR**  
GETTYSBURG, PA.—Bishop James A. Pike says that if President Johnson refuses to negotiate for peace in Vietnam, the young men in this country, "as a last resort," should refuse to go into the armed forces.

"Peace in Vietnam depends on Johnson's willingness to negotiate," the former Episcopal bishop of California said yesterday at a news conference on the Gettysburg College campus. "What's holding us up is that Johnson is not willing to negotiate.

"As a last resort, we would give serious consideration to conscientious objection on a mass basis. The boys should stick together in refusing to go in.

"The alternative of being put into a penitentiary is better than having to murder people."

Bishop Pike said that although he faked an eye test to join the Navy in World War II he could not in good conscience go to Vietnam.

"I do not believe it is just war," he said. He added however, that he is opposed to the United States pulling out of Vietnam because it would leave that country "in a chaotic state." He said we should stay there and negotiate, but that the bombing should be stopped.

Bishop Pike, who resigned as bishop of California last year to join the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions at Santa Barbara, came to Gettysburg Monday to deliver a two-day series of lectures.

**LADIES GARMENT WORKERS PRAISE RAISE IN MINI-WAGE**

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, I commend to the attention of Senators, a resolution of the International Ladies Garment Workers' Union commending President Johnson and Congress for their unstinting efforts in the last Congress to amend the minimum wage Act. The 1966 Fair Labor Standards Act amendments, beginning February 1, will provide millions of American citizens increased wages and the dignity that comes with a fair wage.

I consider it highly significant that the ILGWU, which was born in strife and has fought long and hard to see that every working man and woman is able to earn a living wage, considers this legislation a "pillar of progress."

While citing the rapid advances in so-

cial legislation in recent years, the union properly reminds us of the "still unfinished business before the Nation, including expansion of social security and unemployment insurance programs." In urging swift passage of this important legislation by the Congress, the ladies garment workers' union call upon their own 442,318 members, all labor and the community to work toward that accomplishment.

The text of the resolution addressed to President Johnson reads:

In America's continuing war against poverty, the minimum wage of \$1.40 an hour that goes into effect February 1, 1967 represents a major advance. It lifts earnings for millions of low income families, spurs economic growth, provides greater employment opportunity and raises the standard of living for the entire Nation.

This giant step forward is a dramatic reminder of the rapid and real advance we have made toward the goals of the Great Society. In two years, the Johnson-Humphrey administration has brought greater Civil Rights to minorities, better education to the poor, more medical care for the aged and the needy, job training for the unemployed—hope to those once without hope.

This administration has demonstrated that there is still unfinished business before the nation with the President's proposal further extending of Great Society goals including expansion of social security and unemployment insurance programs.

We urge the Congress of the United States to act speedily on these proposals. We call upon our members to join with other forces in the labor movement and the community to urge speedy passage upon their Congressional representatives.

We call upon our affiliates to keep members informed on vital legislation before Congress, on voting records of Congressmen and on the need to give active grass roots support to the Administration in its battle to realize the Great Society. This campaign in which we seek to join with all labor and liberal elements is not merely to realize present legislation but also to prepare for the crucial Presidential and Congressional elections of 1968.

In thanking you for your foresight and determination in this battle, we wish to enroll in your army for the continuing crusade to win the objectives of the Great Society. You have not failed the people of this Nation, we will not fail you.

LOUIS STULBERT,  
President, International Ladies Garment Workers' Union.

**STRATEGIC BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION**

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, one of the most critical issues facing our Nation today is the strategic balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. In this regard, the controversy over the production and deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile system is of prime importance. In my judgment, Congress should take action similar to that which it took last year in providing funds for preproduction engineering and development for our own antiballistic system.

The February issue of Triumph magazine, which is a Catholic journal of news and opinion, contains an article entitled "Soviet Missile Power: A Credible Threat' Now." The article was written by an individual who is identified only

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as Xenophon and is an illuminating discussion of recent Soviet developments in the field of ballistic missile defenses. The individual who wrote the article is obviously quite knowledgeable in this field and makes an irrefutable argument in favor of the U.S. production and deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile system.

The article has been reprinted in the current issue of U.S. News & World Report. The facts contained in the article bear heavily on the decision which will be facing Congress on this question. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SOVIET MISSILE POWER: "A CREDIBLE THREAT"  
Now  
(By Xenophon)

The United States is again at a crossroads in its efforts to deter a major nuclear war. The present crisis is traceable primarily to our lag in the development and deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system capable of effective defense against an attack by the Soviet Union. Secretary of Defense McNamara recently acknowledged our inadequacy when he admitted that the Soviet Union is already engaged in the deployment of an advanced ABM system.

The crisis is heightened by apparent advances in the Soviets' offensive capability, notably in the area of multiple warhead technology. The urgency of the situation is evident not only to U.S. military experts and intelligence officials, but also to our Western European allies, who look to us for the technology and weapons needed for their own protection.

So far the Johnson Administration has reacted to the Soviet challenge by again postponing the deployment of an ABM system, hoping that diplomacy, possibly resulting in a new nuclear treaty, will persuade the U.S.S.R. not to exploit its present lead.

#### THE BACKGROUND

The dilemma confronting and threatening us has a history starting in the late 1940's. It may be better understood by tracing the major developments affecting U.S. missile strategy since then.

President Truman's 1949 decision to develop the super bomb established the basis of U.S. strategic policy for the next fifteen years. In view of the almost simultaneous development of a thermonuclear weapon by the U.S.S.R., his decision came none too soon. The hydrogen bomb not only multiplied the potential striking power of U.S. manned strategic bombers, but by reducing warhead weight paved the way for favorable reconsideration of a previous decision to refuse approval for the development of ballistic missiles.

U.S. strategic policy soon adapted to the technical advances of the missile age. The concept of balanced offensive and defensive forces that had prevailed when our principal strategic weapon was manned aircraft faded into obscurity. It was replaced by the strategy of deterrence based on retaliation with massive strikes by nuclear weapons. With the perfection of solid propellants for ballistic missiles, which made possible the development of the Polaris missile, for underwater launch, and of ICBM's, which could be launched from underground silos, U.S. policy shifted farther still from defensive concepts. More recently, there has been a concentration on those offensive forces capable of a "second strike"—forces, that is, that can survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy and retaliate with a counterstrike. The threat of wholesale nuclear destruction, therefore, came to be regarded as an adequate

deterrent to a nuclear first strike against the nation, which it has so far proved to be.

Early proposals to work out a plan of defense against ballistic missiles met with widespread skepticism in political, military and scientific circles. A group of military personnel and scientists in the Army, however, believed that an effective defense system utilizing missiles to intercept missiles could be constructed. It was not until 1958 that the Army was authorized to go ahead with research on such a system. Initially, the project was thought of as a highly refined follow-up to the Army's Nike series of anti-aircraft systems, and was called the Nike-Zeus, "Zeus" being the name of the proposed interceptor missile.

Nike-Zeus used two radar systems separately operated: one for acquisition of the incoming, or target, missile; the other for tracking the target missile and guiding the intercepting missile. By the early 1960's the Army had proved through tests that ballistic missiles could be intercepted with missiles for a radiation "kill" on the incoming warhead within the necessary radius.

These tests failed to satisfy skeptics who pointed out that in the Army's interception tests the operators had prior knowledge of the approximate time of launch and the trajectory of the target missile. In addition, experiments with missile-borne "decoys" had already provided proof of their feasibility. Radar at that stage had little discrimination capability to distinguish between actual warheads and decoys other than the operator's limited capacity to differentiate "blips" on his screen.

Despite these objections, the Army team working on the project was sufficiently encouraged by the success of the initial experiments to seek funds for "pre-production engineering" for the system. Since the experimenters had adopted a "point" defense system, its deployment required the mass production of radar equipment and missiles for each designated point to be defended (key cities presumably). Production of the components of the system was expected to take some years. This "lead time" could be reduced by pre-production engineering—that is, by designing the machinery to produce the system's basic components concurrently with the development of the more refined components of the system.

The Army's request for pre-production engineering funds was first rejected in the last year of the Eisenhower Administration. The request has been made repeatedly since then, but despite continued improvements in the Nike-Zeus system, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations have consistently turned it down.

By 1963 the total investment in research and development of the Nike-Zeus system had passed \$1.5 billion. It had demonstrated by performance that it was equal to the Soviet system (according to intelligence information on the latter) in its ability to defend selected points against nuclear missile forces. Improvements in radar, moreover, had made it possible to distinguish warheads from decoys with fair reliability.

#### FIRST SOVIET DEPLOYMENT

The Army's request in 1963 for pre-production engineering funds—to be included in the fiscal year 1964 appropriation—gained impetus from the by then certain knowledge that the Soviet Union was hard at work on an anti-ballistic missile and had, in fact, deployed ABM equipment in the vicinity of Leningrad.

The Army estimated that the total cost of protecting some twenty-five U.S. cities would run to \$15 billion; the Department of Defense predicted it would come to more than \$20 billion. Both estimates included the \$1.5 billion already spent on research and development. They covered a deployment and operation period of ten years, with maximum expenditure in a given year of approxi-

mately \$3 billion. The immediate need for pre-production engineering funds, however, amounted to only \$200 million. But to have granted that request would, as before, have amounted to a commitment to deploy an ABM system.

The Administration, through Secretary of Defense McNamara, countered with a proposal to undertake development of another, more sophisticated, system, the Nike-X. This proposal called for the use of a new missile, the Sprint, and an advanced radar system, which would incorporate and integrate the radar functions of acquisition, evaluation and tracking of the target warheads. The Sprint missile, it was claimed, would utilize far higher acceleration capabilities and intercept targets at lower altitudes than the Zeus missile, although the latter would still be employed to make initial interceptions at greater distances. Sprint's capabilities were designed to improve radar's ability to distinguish between actual warheads and decoys by allowing more time for evaluation of the incoming targets in a dense atmospheric environment.

By now close observers began to notice inconsistencies in the Administration's opposition to ABM deployment. At the same time the Administration was urging the Congress to appropriate some \$600 million for research and development of the advanced Nike-X system, President Kennedy advised a news conference that he doubted that any workable ballistic missile system was technically feasible. Indeed, Mr. Kennedy's scientific adviser at the time, Dr. Jerome Weisner, asserted in a paper read later at the 1964 Pugwash Conference that such a system could not be perfected, and if it could, should not be deployed by any nation.

Nevertheless, grave concern over the continued delays in an administrative decision for deployment was expressed by the Senate Armed Services Committee's approval of appropriation of funds for pre-production engineering of Nike-Zeus over the adamant objection of the Secretary of Defense. However, the Senate overruled the committee's action and merely approved funds for the development of the Nike-X project.

Even before acting on appropriations for the fiscal year 1964 the Senate had been confronted with a new factor in the ABM controversy. This factor emerged when the Senate's consent was asked during the summer of 1963 to the partial nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

By the time the treaty was negotiated and signed by the U.S., the Army had completed its design for ABM missiles and satisfactorily tested and proved the warheads to be used. The Administration stressed this point as part of its argument that no further testing was needed. However, opponents of the treaty maintained that it would inhibit the ABM project and place the U.S. at a relative disadvantage to the U.S.S.R. in this field. They based their position on reports of U.S. intelligence that the Soviet Union had tested an ABM system in a nuclear environment, whereas we had not. As a result of these tests the Soviet Union could be assumed to know whether, and to what extent, its ABM radar would operate in the presence of nuclear radiation. The treaty, opponents argued, would preclude U.S. testing of an ABM system in a nuclear environment and thus prevent us from ascertaining its reliability with any degree of certainty.

The issue of whether a nuclear test ban might cripple the U.S. in the ABM field was never really joined during the Senate hearings. True, there was some testimony suggesting the possibility of adding whether an ABM system would function in a nuclear environment from data extrapolated from the underground nuclear tests that the treaty did permit. But the idea was never seriously urged as an adequate answer to the problem.

One reason is that underground tests could hardly determine whether radar can "see through" the radiation caused by the detonation of the warhead of an interceptor missile, so as to be able to acquire, evaluate and track a "follow-on" target missile.

Curiously, in this connection—or it may not be so curious—the official and semi-official arguments advanced over the past three years to justify the continuing opposition of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to the deployment of an ABM system have never included as a reason for inaction, have not even hinted at, this obviously critical difficulty: that the U.S. does not know whether the best ABM system it is now able to build will operate reliably in a nuclear environment. This explanation would probably strike many as more convincing than the anti-deployment arguments that have actually been offered, for instance, that the system costs too much; yet it would amount to a stunning admission of potential weakness, and inevitably raise the question of whether those primarily responsible for the country's security have prudently discharged their duties in permitting this apparent disparity with Soviet technology to arise.

Despite the denial of funds for pre-production engineering, the Nike-X system has enjoyed a relatively high level of expenditure for research and development since 1963, and has progressed beyond the hopes of its most ardent supporters. Not only has the high acceleration Sprint missile been developed successfully; but the Zeus missile itself has been improved, particularly through increased range. Moreover, radical improvements in ABM radar have made feasible the utilization of the Zeus at increased ranges. Multifunction array radar, which can perform the functions of the several types previously used with enormously increased effectiveness, has proved the ABM concept highly reliable in this particular, and at the same time revealed the possibility of deploying the system on a broader scale and at lower costs than previously deemed possible.

Indeed, had the present capability of the Nike-X system existed in 1963, the opponents of ABM deployment would have had far greater difficulty in preventing appropriations for pre-production engineering.

Since that time, however, new factors have entered the equation that both increase the urgency of the problem and further complicate it.

In 1965 (when requesting funds for fiscal 1966) the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously recommended an appropriation for ABM pre-production engineering and a commitment for deployment of the system. In 1966 the Joint Chiefs were again unanimous in this recommendation; and for fiscal 1967 the Congress for the first time authorized and appropriated funds for pre-production engineering on the Nike-X system, despite the Administration's opposition. Yet to date, with more than half of fiscal 1967 passed, the Administration has not released the appropriated funds for expenditure.

The previously unobtainable unanimity of the military and Congress' reversal of its own position were not without cause. During the period of the formulation of the military budget for fiscal 1966 the Joint Chiefs became aware from U.S. Intelligence that the Soviets had begun serious deployment of an advanced ABM system. In 1966, more than a year later, this information was communicated to the Congress.

#### THE TIME EQUATION

The U.S.S.R., at this point, had progressed well beyond the deployment of ABM's around a major city or several cities; it had developed a comprehensive, advanced and expensive system. Even more important, the Soviet system is evidently not a "point" defense system, but an "area" defense system. It is geared, that is to say, not only to defend cities and concentrations of weaponry, but

to protect military installations that have already been widely dispersed as a means of blunting the effectiveness of an enemy attack. Although U.S. Intelligence is aware of the deployment of the Soviet system, it is not able to assess confidently the system's operational capability. The measure of Soviet confidence in its system is indicated, however, by the large commitment of resources to its installations—substantial allotments of money and materials, as well as scientific and technical talent.

Time factors are particularly crucial in the deployment of a major weapons system of this kind. The deployment of an American ABM system is estimated to require five years at a minimum, starting with the moment of the decision to deploy. The Soviets, having productive facilities substantially inferior to ours, will in all probability require an even longer period for complete deployment. The extent of the U.S.S.R.'s present lead depends on when the decision for deployment of its advanced system was made and production begun.

#### THE SHIFTING BALANCE

The effect of Soviet ABM deployment on America's capacity to deter nuclear war—in the absence of any such defensive system in this country—is dramatic and profound.

Such a development raises doubts, at the very least, as to whether U.S. retaliatory strikes can destroy the Soviet Union, assuming the Soviets strike first. Therefore, if the Soviets have confidence in the capability of their ABM system, the completed deployment of the system could be the factor that tips the balance in favor of a Soviet decision to risk a nuclear strike. (The odds favoring such a decision would be affected, of course, by the nature of the man or group that holds power in Moscow at the moment; while any Soviet leadership must be assumed to be willing to make the strike if the odds are right, the enemy estimate as to whether the odds are right will necessarily reflect human and political factors not strictly connected with the military equation.)

A further consideration must be kept in mind. Even should the U.S.S.R.'s confidence in the capacity of its ABM system prove unfounded—i.e., should the Soviets attack, and then discover that their ABM system has failed—it remains that the U.S. objective of deterrence would also have failed. The effectiveness of a deterrent depends not on whether retaliation will inflict unsupportable damage on a potential attacker, but on whether the attacker *thinks* he will incur such damage.

This is an important part of the reason why proponents of immediate deployment of the Nike-X system are approaching the problem with such urgency. They believe that nothing less than actual deployment by the U.S. will offset the all-too-subjective factors in the equation of deterrence.

But the issue no longer remains this clear-cut. New developments outside the ABM field have further complicated the issue for U.S. policymakers.

In the past, objections of various administrations to deployment of the best available ABM system—notably as expressed by Secretary McNamara, who has borne the burden of the case against deployment—have been based primarily on doubts as to the effectiveness of such systems, doubts framed in terms of their "cost-effectiveness" as compared with the cost-effectiveness of improved offensive forces. Mr. McNamara has also insisted that deployment of an ABM system cannot be justified, unless accompanied by an extensive shelter program. Moreover, he has questioned whether an ABM system can be effective against a massive attack of sophisticated missiles. It should be noted in this latter regard, however, that until very recently McNamara has attributed to the Soviet Union an offensive missile capability considerably smaller than

that required for a very large sophisticated attack.

All of these considerations have been affected by recent breakthroughs in weapons—but not only in the ABM field. Comparable advances have been made in offensive systems. The potential significance of these latter developments, together with Soviet ABM deployment, would seem to require a complete reassessment of U.S. deterrent capabilities and deterrence policies.

Recently, the U.S. has cautiously disclosed that the employment of multiple warheads on a single missile is not only theoretically feasible, but within the competence of the existing art of weaponry. Now, there would be little advantage to landing several small warheads, instead of one large one on a single target. Therefore the significance of the multiple warhead development obviously lies in the capacity of such weaponry to direct the several warheads carried by one missile to individual targets separated by substantial distances. The Soviets *may* be less advanced in this area, but they are certainly close abreast of U.S. multiple warhead technology.

The full importance of this comparatively new development becomes apparent only when contemporary multiple warhead technology is viewed in the light of the Soviets' long-held advantage in the thrust capacity of ballistic missiles. The U.S., as the testimony on the nuclear Test Ban Treaty clearly revealed, has considered infeasible the development of large-yield warheads, or of missiles with the thrust necessary to lift such warheads. The Soviets, by contrast, have emphasized larger warheads, as well as the missile delivery capability to lift them to target.

Several factors account for these different trends in missile development. On the one hand, the superior U.S. productive capacity lends itself to the acquisition of a large number of missiles. On the other, U.S. industry and population are significantly more concentrated than the industry and population of the U.S.S.R. It is not surprising, therefore, that the U.S. has emphasized a larger number of missiles, with smaller warheads, designed to cover a greater number of targets; while the Soviets have emphasized fewer missiles, with larger warheads, designed to cover the comparatively fewer American targets.

The reasons for this disparity in weapons system strategy help explain why the development of a multiple warhead capability—assuming the level of development on each side is the same—gives a heavy *relative* advantage to the U.S.S.R. The Soviets can offset their inferior capacity to produce missiles in large numbers by equipping their fewer large-thrust missiles with the multiple warheads made available by the new technology. By comparison with this gain on the Soviet side, the addition of multiple warheads to our weaponry adds relatively little to the U.S. offensive capability.

The importance of this relative advantage may be grasped by considering a single aspect of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear balance. Advances in multiple warhead technology now raise the possibility that the Soviet Union, having substantially fewer missiles than the U.S., but missiles equipped with multiple warheads, can consider feasible an effective first strike, not only against U.S. cities, but against U.S. retaliatory forces.

The far-reaching effect of this development can be seen by calculating its potential impact on the existing U.S. numerical superiority in strategic missiles. According to released Defense Department figures, the U.S. has about 1,054 ICBM's and some 650 Polaris missiles, a total of approximately 1,700. U.S. Intelligence has assessed the strength of Soviet ICBM's at less than 400, giving the U.S. a numerical superiority in strategic missile delivery vehicles of between 4 and 5 to 1. (Such a wide disparity has been con-

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sidered an essential element of U.S. deterrent strategy because of the initial advantage that automatically accrues to the side that strikes the first blow.)

Yet this further factor must be taken into account. The average lift capability of U.S. strategic missiles is a weight equivalent to one megaton. Few of the Soviet ICBM's have a lift capability of less than 7 megatons, and most are 10 megatons or more.

It follows that if both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. converted the lift capability of their strategic missiles to multiple warheads of approximately one-third megaton size, the U.S. would multiply the number of its deliverable warheads by a factor of three, while the Soviets would multiply the number of their deliverable warheads by a factor of 21 to 30.

Worse still: if the Soviets do indeed manage to deploy (as they may be on the brink of doing) an ICBM capable of lifting the weight of their 100 megaton warhead, the U.S.S.R.—with as few as twenty such missiles equipped with multiple warheads of one megaton each—could acquire the capability of striking 2,000 targets, more than the entire existing U.S. strategic missile arsenal can now cover.

This potential diminution of the U.S. deterrent capability resulting from probable Soviet gains in offensive weaponry makes clear why the issue of ABM deployment is so critical. If the Soviet offensive capability is relatively increased; if the U.S.S.R. is able to defend itself against such missiles in the U.S. retaliatory force as might survive a Soviet first strike (our Polaris missiles, for instance); and if the U.S. continues to postpone the deployment of any ABM system—then the danger is very grave indeed.

It is also clear that the ABM issue is no longer simply "to deploy or not to deploy." In the light of our Intelligence estimates of advances in Soviet defensive capability, the U.S. must decide if the Nike-X system, even if deployed, would be adequate. For Nike-X, even with its extended range and improved capability, remains essentially a "point" defense system—feasible for defense of a city, but hardly practical, particularly from a cost standpoint, for defending the deliberately wide geographical disbursement of the U.S. ICBM force. Therefore, the U.S. must consider whether to initiate development of an area-type ABM system. A possible alternative is to concentrate our ICBM's and deploy the Nike-X system to defend offensive missile concentrations as well as cities.

It goes without saying that whatever decision the United States makes regarding ABM deployment must take into account the emergence of Red China as a nuclear power and its prospective entry into the ranks of nations possessing delivery vehicles of intercontinental range—possibly within the period required for complete deployment of an American ABM system.

#### POLITICAL MISJUDGMENTS

ABM deployment by the U.S. would also have a major impact on NATO and Western Europe, particularly Germany. Inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons has been a prime objective of U.S. policy. A pressing concern of the Soviets, on the other hand, is the possibility that West Germany may acquire nuclear weapons. A tacit bargain in these matters is the principal U.S. hope for obtaining a treaty banning the proliferation of nuclear weapons. To this end, the U.S. has denied to West Germany even a substantial voice in the control of NATO's nuclear weapons, a policy that has been responsible in no small part for the deterioration of NATO as an effective defensive force.

Yet West Germany, and indeed all of Western Europe, are targeted by hundreds of Soviet short- and medium-range nuclear missiles, a matter of greater concern by far to Western Europeans than the threat of Rus-

sian and satellite armies. Therefore, should the U.S. deploy an ABM system for its own protection, we must anticipate serious demands by our Western European allies to build a similar system—possibly as an alternative to maintaining large numbers of U.S. troops in Europe. Moreover, a denial of such purely defensive nuclear weapons for our NATO allies would prove hard to justify.

And therein the dilemma: the deployment of an ABM system by West Germany, although it would substantially neutralize the Communist military threat to Western Europe, would almost surely end whatever Soviet interests now exist in a non-proliferation agreement.

In fine, the gravity of the decision now facing U.S. policymakers is the result of a series of political misjudgments—above all, misjudgments of the intentions of the Soviet Union. The partial Test Ban Treaty, signed in 1963, was publicly interpreted by the Administration, and by much of the communications media, as a signal that the Soviet Union had learned a lesson and had abandoned efforts to achieve nuclear superiority. U.S. Intelligence has accumulated voluminous evidence indicating a quite different disposition on the part of the Soviets, but the public impression of a genuine nuclear detente between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. has been permitted to persist.

Even as the Test Ban Treaty was consummated, the Soviets were launching a broadscale research and development program for qualitative breakthroughs in strategic weaponry. The Soviet attempt to develop new ICBM's was pressed on an unprecedented scale, and has even been publicized to a degree by displays in military parades. Of still greater significance, the U.S. has been aware of the U.S.S.R.'s effort to increase its capacity to produce weapons-grade nuclear material.

By contrast, the American effort in the field of strategic weaponry has steadily diminished since the signing of the Test Ban Treaty. In fiscal 1962 U.S. expenditures for strategic forces totaled more than \$11 billion. Since then U.S. expenditures for strategic forces have declined each year; in fiscal 1967 they reached a low of \$6.5 billion.

To the charge of procrastination and failure to meet the challenge of Soviet strategic weaponry developments, Secretary McNamara has consistently replied that the U.S., through continuing research, was "keeping the options open," on various strategic systems. But it is now clear that the option time is running out. Unless decisions are made soon, the danger of nuclear war could vastly increase to say nothing of the danger of successful nuclear blackmail.

#### CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

#### THE CALENDAR

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of items on the calendar in sequence, beginning with Calendar No. 15, Senate Resolution 21.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

The Senate proceeded to consider the resolution (S. Res. 21) to provide addi-

tional funds for the Committee on Finance.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that members of the staff of the pertinent committees be given the privilege of the floor today during the consideration of the money resolutions on the calendar.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR FOR SENATE RESOLUTION 16

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, due to a clerical error, the name of the distinguished junior Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] was not included in the list of cosponsors of a resolution introduced by my distinguished colleague, the senior Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH], Senate Resolution 16, to create a standing Committee on Veterans' Affairs, while it was being held at the desk.

Therefore, at Senator RANDOLPH's request, I ask unanimous consent that the name of the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] be added at the next printing of Senate Resolution 16.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

#### ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF BILL

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, because of a clerical error, the name of the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH] was omitted from the list of cosponsors of S. 917, the Safe Streets and Crime Control Act of 1967. I ask unanimous consent that Senator RANDOLPH's name be added to this bill at its next printing.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.



The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### PROPOSALS IN THE PRESIDENT'S CONSUMER MESSAGE POINT THE WAY

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, President Johnson, in his consumer message, sounded a new note in our national life. The President has served notice that the American people can and we must be protected in our homes, our daily lives, our economic decisions, and in this complicated and interdependent world in which we live.

Life, in the age of the caveman, had its dangers. Man developed means to cope with them. Life today also has its dangers, its risks, its hazards, its uncertainties. We cannot eliminate these elements of life. We can take steps to help a prudent man to face these factors and learn how to live with them. The reasonable and farsighted proposals set out in President Johnson's consumer message point the way.

The proposals extend virtually to every facet of modern living. They each deserve our most serious consideration but at this time I would like to discuss three of them.

The National Commission on Product Safety is important to every home in America. Who among us is not aware of the hazards which lurk in the technology-crammed houses of the country today? The National Commission on Product Safety should provide the users of products with some assurance of safety. The Commission should provide manufacturers of products with assurance that their mass-production techniques for giant markets will not be thrown into chaos because of differing and conflicting State and local laws aimed at assuring product safety. A joint resolution to establish such a Commission has been introduced in the Senate by Senators Magnuson and Cotton, and in the House by Congressman Moss.

Amending the Flammable Fabrics Act of 1953 should go far toward reducing the 3,000 deaths per year caused by burns from clothing fires. The act will also be broadened to include interior furnishings, such as upholstery, foam padding, draperies, and rugs.

Any nation which suffers more than 12,000 deaths each year and more than \$1½ billion in property losses due to fires, clearly needs a national fire safety program. There is no simpler argument for it. I cannot imagine any rational argument against it. But we are not creating a new bureaucracy here. The rationale behind the proposal envisions support and expansion of existing programs, wherever possible.

It may be argued that no message is perfect, and no draft legislation is ideal. One thing, however, is clear. This message from President Johnson, and the legislative proposals contained in it can-

not be ignored. The needs of people, babies, growing children, housewives, working men and women, businessmen, are displayed before us here and now.

The rest, of course, is up to the legislative process. It is my fervent hope that the President's proposal will be given speedy consideration, rapid direction, and ultimate success by Members of the Senate.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

#### URBAN REHABILITATION

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, in the February 1967 issue of the Practical Builder magazine a very fine and thought-provoking article is published, entitled "A Realistic Look at Rehabilitation."

I ask unanimous consent to have this article printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

##### A REALISTIC LOOK AT REHABILITATION

Rehabilitation offers the biggest single area of expansion for the building business today.

To the ill-prepared, it also offers plenty of pitfalls that have left many builders with a very bad after-taste and vows of "never again."

However, the growing number of success stories and the slump in housing starts are making rehabilitation attractive to many builders.

Few builders can ignore the increasing number of programs directed towards pumping vast sums of money into our cities' worst slums.

Despite the actual dollars or units involved, "rehabilitation is a job of massive financial and human investment that can best be accomplished by the private sector," according to David Rockefeller, president of the Chase Manhattan Bank of New York City. What, exactly, is rehabilitation?

If you ask one hundred experts you get one hundred different answers.

The Department of Housing and Urban Development has never clearly defined rehabilitation.

"Rehabilitation is not a program of tinkering with a ranch house in the suburbs, nor is it splashing a little paint over the cracked plaster of a rundown tenement," says HUD Secretary Robert C. Weaver. "To do a rehabilitation job across the nation of enough size and quickly enough to avoid creating less housing than becomes obsolete, rehabilitation must become a major new industry."

James Henderson, rehabilitation director of the Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority, says, "remodelers who have been doing rehab say that home builders are the ones who should be."

Rehabilitation is not remodeling warmed over and called by a new name. It is a whole new industry.

"The great step forward is urban rehabilitation," says builder Phillip Lindy of Philadelphia. "It's a different world, but the potential is great. It starts people moving in rather than out."

Rehabilitation involves the conversion, de-conversion and reconversion of dwelling units and non-residential buildings. It starts with buildings that have become uninhabitable by acceptable standards of decent, safe and sanitary housing.

The normal goal of rehabilitation is to bring these buildings up to minimum standards prescribed in the building code. But most often, when rehab work gets started, the end result is a quality standard much higher than the minimum. While the exact size of the rehab market may never be

known, many experts, including HUD Secretary Robert C. Weaver, estimate it at between eight and nine million dwelling units. This does not include the non-residential rehab market, which is estimated to exceed \$10 billion.

According to Larry Blackmon, past president of NAHB, our national housing goals should include an annual volume of 500,000 rehabilitated dwelling units.

At this rate, it would take at least eight years to rehabilitate the homes and apartments of four million urban families now living in substandard housing, providing no additional units sank below the line.

According to recent figures from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, there are \$12 million in rehab projects in progress and another \$30 million reserved under various FHA programs in New York, Chicago and Pittsburgh.

In addition, there are \$9 million in rehab projects under way in New York and Chicago under various public housing programs, with another \$6.5 million reserved for future projects.

In Philadelphia, a joint public housing-private enterprise experimental program to rehabilitate about 1500 vacant, single-family rowhouses nears completion.

However, the rehab market is not limited to the major cities. For example, a recently-announced urban renewal project in Evansdale, Iowa, calls for the rehabilitation of 750 homes and apartments.

A similar project in Georgetown, Tex., will require the rehabilitation of over 200 dwelling units.

In Lorain, Ohio, over 500 buildings, mostly residential, but with some light commercial, will be rehabilitated under a new urban renewal program.

##### HOW TO TAP THE MARKET

There are several ways a builder can get into the rehab market. He can bid for or negotiate contracts with any of the numerous public, quasi-public and private bodies which are sponsoring rehab projects.

Some cities, such as New Haven, Conn., maintain lists of approved rehab contractors, which are distributed to residents of federally-designated urban renewal or code enforcement areas.

In many instances, the builder buys, rehabilitates and resells homes and apartment buildings. He may do this on his own or as part of a sponsoring group, to take advantage of federal programs for rehab.

Briefly, these programs include:

Section 220—Loans for rehabilitation of homes and apartment structures is federally-designated urban renewal and code enforcement areas, insured by FHA at a 6% interest rate.

Section 221(d)(3)—Loans to non-profit and limited dividend sponsors for rehabilitation in cities with federally-certified workable programs for community improvement. Loans are insured by FHA at both 3% and market interest rates.

Section 221(d)(4)—Loans to sponsors, with no limitations on profit, anywhere in the nation, insured by FHA at market rate.

Section 213—Loans for rehabilitation and conversion of rental apartments to cooperative units anywhere in the nation, insured by FHA at market rate.

Section 231—Loans for rehabilitation of housing for the elderly, insured by FHA at market rate. Both 90% and 100% loans are available, depending on the type of sponsor.

Section 115—Direct loans up to \$10,000 and direct grants up to \$1500 to property owners in designated renewal and code enforcement areas for rehabilitation. These loans and grants are made directly to property owners, not to builders.

The details of these programs are not nearly as important as understanding rehabilitation financing.