

AA-10.3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT : Comments on IG Requirements Study

1. As has been stated by others, we feel that the survey recognizes the problems and deficiencies in the present system but only proposes half measures. The general thrust of the IG recommendations is to inflate the importance of CGS but without proposing any real change in its mission and functions.

2. We have examined the obvious possibilities for a major shift in the CGS role, such as complete centralization or complete decentralization. While these ideas are in many ways attractive, it is probably unrealistic to expect their implementation against the natural opposition of various Agency elements. However, we do feel that the DDS&T should strongly urge the following changes in the CGS mission:

a. Divest CGS of responsibility for requirements for data exploitation.

b. Divest CGS of responsibilities for requirements for intelligence collection by photographic and electronic sensors.

3. The rationale for these two suggestions is simply that there already exist satisfactory mechanisms for keeping the books on technical exploitation and collection requirements.

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NPIC and NSA have their own bookkeepers and there is no need for CGS in the data exploitation loop. Similarly, COMOR should serve as broker for photographic requirements while SPINT Staff could do the same for electronic collection requirements. CGS is not needed in either area.

4. Comments on specific recommendations in the IG study are given below. Those recommendations which are not cited are those which we have no comments on.

#5 - In basic agreement, although it should be recognized that for critical problems exceptions would have to be made.

#8 - Agree, but only if CGS mission is limited to human source requirements.

#13 - We think that in most cases preparation of a collection guide is a waste of time.

#14 - We doubt whether this is useful.

#15 - This idea has merit, but why couldn't the data be furnished directly to FMSAC and OSI without going through CGS?


#16 - Not necessary if we get CGS out of the SIGINT business as suggested above.

#17 - This is not a problem in the missile and space field.

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#20 - This is unnecessary in the light of our recommendation to get CGS out of the SIGINT business.

#23 - The DDS&T/DDI "Recce" meeting held 25X1A weekly prior to the COMOR meeting serves this function.



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