

91st Congress }
1st Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT

INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION

EXCHANGES OF SCHOLARS WITH THE
SOVIET UNION: ADVANTAGES AND DILEMMAS

MEMORANDUM

PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
(Pursuant to S. Res. 24, 91st Cong.)
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE



Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

35-305

WASHINGTON : 1969

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The subcommittee is pleased to be able to publish this original paper by Professor Robert F. Byrnes in the record of its inquiry on international negotiation.

We invited Professor Byrnes to prepare a memorandum covering the main issues in negotiating exchanges of scholars with the Soviet Union which he thought should be considered and reflected upon, and he has responded with this discerning contribution to our record.

Now Distinguished Professor of History at Indiana University, Dr. Byrnes was from 1959 to 1962 Director of the University's Russian and East European Institute. For nine years, from 1960 to 1969, he served as Chairman of the Inter-University Committee which, until this past summer, had the major responsibility for U.S. scholar exchange programs with the Soviet Union.

HENRY M. JACKSON,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security
and International Operations.*

OCTOBER 17, 1969.

EXCHANGES OF SCHOLARS WITH THE SOVIET UNION: ADVANTAGES AND DILEMMAS

By
Robert F. Byrnes

INTRODUCTION

During the last quarter century, the role of the American university and of the American scholar have quietly and gradually changed almost beyond the comprehension of even those who have participated actively in the revolution. Expansion of higher education and of access to it in every part of the country has brought more than seven million students to American campuses in the fall of 1969. These students, their faculties, the libraries which serve them both, and the entire college and university complex all face a continuing "knowledge explosion," an increase of information in most fields of study so rapid that most of what is now taught in some fields was not known as recently as ten years ago.

The role of the university in American life has so changed that the ivory tower has been demolished. Many Americans instead believe that the university, while continuing its usual functions for the rapidly growing student body, should also be the principal instrument for resolving our social problems. Indeed, many are now convinced that new knowledge generated and spread by the university is the most important factor in social and economic change.

The appearance of new fields of study, of new knowledge, especially in the sciences, and of new responsibilities is matched by growing interest in the rest of the world, especially the so-called non-Western areas, which were neglected before the Second World War. The technical revolutions in communication and in transportation, the growing appreciation by Americans of the position their country occupies in international affairs, and the general shrinking of the world have all contributed to an increase of research and instruction in areas as different as the Soviet Union and Africa. This revolution in our view of the rest of the world has been especially reflected in the increased emphasis devoted by the American educational system to the Soviet Union, largely because of the growth and outward thrust of Soviet power. As a consequence, thousands of Americans have learned Russian, have become interested in Russian history, literature and government, and have sought to analyze Soviet power and policy. Inevitably, just as American libraries have increased their resources to enable all to study the newly-discovered universe, so American universities have attempted to enable those interested in the Soviet Union to study there. This effort to encourage study within the Soviet Union has

directly involved American universities and scholars in official exchange programs with the Soviet government and has therefore created both problems and dilemmas.

Participation by American universities in formal exchange programs with a country as ideologically and politically different from ours as the Soviet Union is only one of the ways through which they have developed close relationships with agencies of our own government and with other governments as well. This position of the universities is, of course, not new, because the state universities in particular, and American colleges and universities in general, have never separated themselves from the concerns of the people and their government at the local, state, and national level. However, the ties with our national government in particular have changed since the Second World War to such a degree that a quiet revolution has taken place, and few American universities dealt with even friendly foreign governments before the Second World War. In recent years, most American universities have done extensive work overseas through organizations such as AID, largely to help universities and other educational organizations in underdeveloped countries. They have also helped to train young men and women for work in organizations such as the Peace Corps, and many of our large universities have as many as a thousand foreign students on campus, many on grants from their governments or from the American government. Scientists on campuses throughout the United States have undertaken research projects for agencies such as the Atomic Energy Commission, NASA, and the National Institutes of Health. Many institutions maintain study centers or student centers abroad, and many have direct exchange relationships with colleges and universities in other parts of the world.

In short, the role of the American university within our society and the relationships the university has with other parts of the world have both changed rapidly. The participation of American universities and their scholars in academic exchanges with countries like the Soviet Union fits into this framework, one in which the university serves its own purposes and at the same time participates in international activities which directly involve the national interest. The university's role in cultural exchanges with countries like the Soviet Union is simply more complicated and more difficult than the other kinds of work for or with governments in which many educational institutions are now engaged.

The phrase "cultural exchanges" is difficult to define. It means "an exchange of accumulated knowledge and methods which forms the present outlook of mankind and reflects best on the problems of the past, the present, and the future." Ordinarily, of course, scholars and students travel freely without any concept or framework of reciprocal giving and receiving, with an American scholar going to an institution in France about as easily as he would to one in this country, and with a French scholar coming to the United States or going to Japan with no special formalities or difficulties and with neither government involved or even informed.

Research for foreigners in the Soviet Union, however, is quite a different matter, because opportunities for Americans to study there, or for Soviet scholars to continue their work in the United States are possible, at Soviet insistence, only as part of an official cultural ex-

change agreement negotiated between the two governments. Under this agreement, specified numbers of artists, dancers, bands, athletes, delegations of specified types, movies, special publications (such as *Amerika*), and exhibitions are exchanged between the two countries, who also agree on specific forms of scientific cooperation and on participation in congresses held in the two countries. The number of men and women involved in these exchanges is small, only a few hundred each way each year, and the number of dollars or rubles involved also is not large. (In fact, the total cost [including actual cost of instruction for Soviet graduate students and scholars in American universities] of all the *academic* exchange programs with the Soviet Union since 1958 probably does not exceed \$20,000,000.) However, the importance of these developments for the scholars and the universities, and for the national interest, far outweighs their apparent significance in numbers and in funds.

The fall of 1969 provides an especially appropriate time to review exchanges of scholars with the Soviet Union because American universities have just completed their first decade of such exchanges and because ominous repression in the Soviet Union and the uneasy situation in Czechoslovakia and in Eastern Europe may raise questions in the near future about whether and how these relations can be continued.

Moreover, in the summer of 1969, the Inter-University Committee, a private organization founded by seven universities in 1956 which grew to fifty-five institutions in 1969, presented its responsibilities for exchanges with the Soviet Union and some of the countries in Eastern Europe to a new organization, the International Research and Exchanges Board, which also assumed authority for the Ford Foundation programs in Eastern Europe and for the small American Council of Learned Societies senior scholar exchange programs. The experience of the Inter-University Committee provides a fine opportunity for review, since the Committee was the earliest, the largest, and most important private organization involved in academic exchanges with any Communist country. Financed originally by the Carnegie Corporation and then supported in approximately equal parts by the Ford Foundation, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State, and the participating universities themselves, the Committee has helped to bring about an extraordinary improvement and expansion in American research and instruction concerning the Soviet Union, which was precisely its goal. Moreover, the experiences which the Committee enjoyed were not notably different from those of other private organizations, such as the American Friends Service Committee, semi-public organizations, such as the National Academy of Sciences, or government agencies, such as the Public Health Service and the Atomic Energy Commission.

The year 1969 is an appropriate time for a review also because we have apparently reached a plateau in our exchanges with the Soviet Union and some of the countries of Communist Europe, after a peak of interest in 1963 and 1964. In fact, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, which crushed high hopes for expanding exchanges with that country and with some of the other countries of Eastern Europe, may instead mark a sharp demarcation of possibilities for peaceful exchanges of all kinds with the Soviet Union and its associated states.

At the same time, while no one can estimate the time or the circumstances, we will certainly one day establish exchanges of scholars with Mainland China. Official Chinese suspicion and hostility towards the United States are similar to those in the Soviet Union, so the circumstances under which any exchange program will be established and conducted will probably resemble those which have prevailed in the last few years. However, Chinese history and tradition, and Chinese interests, are somewhat different from those of the Soviet Union, and American attitudes are even more confused, so some differences in the attitudes and arrangements on both sides will surely appear. In any case, those in the universities and in government who will be responsible for cultural exchanges with Mainland China can clearly benefit substantially from analysis of the principles and problems involved in our exchanges with the Soviet Union.

Finally, our review of exchanges of scholars with the Soviet Union should illuminate the relationships between the two countries during a very critical and dangerous period because the exchange is both a model and a symbol of the difficulties we have in dealing with each other. It helps to explain some of the criticism from the New Left of the universities for their relationship, or even partnership, with the government in Washington. It also helps illuminate the curious drift towards isolationism which has been a prominent feature of the last few years of our political life, as the American people have shown increasing resentment over the war in Viet Nam and increasing weariness over the long burden of high taxation, assistance to foreign countries, and constant international tension.

THE ADVANTAGES

Scholars and Their Universities

American universities and their scholars would naturally prefer that those interested in continuing their study in the Soviet Union be as free to travel there as they are to France or Mexico, just as they would prefer that Soviet scholars be able freely to come to this country. In fact, during the 1930's, a small number of men, including John Curtiss, John Hazard, Calvin Hoover, Philip Mosely, G. T. Robinson, and Ernest J. Simmons, were able to study in this way in the Soviet Union. Indeed, the inability of our scholars to continue their work in the Soviet Union as they did thirty years ago under Stalin is one evidence of an increase in restrictions, and in isolation, introduced there since even the grim 1930's. Because of Soviet insistence, the only way in which Soviet and American scholars can study in the other country is under a formal exchange agreement, the first of which was signed on January 27, 1958, and others of which have been signed in succeeding years after increasingly prolonged negotiations. Consequently, while these agreements do provide some protection or security for Americans studying in the Soviet Union, they are directly responsible for bringing American universities into close relations with their own government and with the Soviet government as well.

Our academic institutions and their scholars have agreed to participate in the exchange agreement because of the significant advantages they offer, the primary one, of course, the opportunity for

American scholars to increase their knowledge and understanding of Russia. In 1956, the United States had less than ten scholars who had spent an appreciable period of time in the Soviet Union. In 1969, while many scholars whose professional interest is the Soviet Union have not visited that country, approximately a thousand have spent from a month to two years studying in the country in which they are professionally interested. We have not yet produced a de Tocqueville, but our research and instruction have improved considerably because of the opportunities our scholars have had to work in Soviet libraries, to become acquainted with Soviet students and scholars, and to get some taste of the spirit and quality of Soviet society. In fact, the exchange program is now far less important to the American academic community than it was in 1958, a fact which should be made clear to the Soviet authorities.

This improved understanding of the Soviet Union has been spread throughout American society through teaching and publications, which have contributed an increasingly realistic appraisal of Soviet life and Soviet policy, one quite remote from that produced by the glories of Russian literature of the nineteenth century or by the extraordinary heroism of the Soviet soldier and Soviet citizen during the Second World War. Those who have studied in Russia have a confidence about their work from having seen and felt the element about which they teach. In the universities in particular, they have also participated in educating many of those who constitute the core of our specialists on the Soviet Union in the various branches of our government. When one considers that the military intelligence staff concerned with Russia in the summer of 1939 consisted of a colonel and a sergeant, neither of whom knew Russian and both of whom relied substantially upon the American press for information, one can appreciate the progress made.

A subsidiary benefit has been an increased understanding of American history, tradition, values, and shortcomings. This improved understanding of other cultures and of ourselves has helped American universities to contribute more effectively to help educate minorities who in the past have been denied equal opportunities. In sum, the exchange programs have helped us to provide a new definition of a liberal education and to widen educational opportunities here at home.

In an age afflicted by nationalism and by the dreadful consequences of a series of destructive wars, the exchange programs have also helped American scholars to recognize the special obligations our blessings have bestowed upon them as citizens of the world and as responsible members of a universal scholarly community. We are, in short, beginning to see the universe as a whole, as did the middle ages, when the foundations of the modern university were being laid and when the traveling scholar was even more common than today. The medieval scholar recognized and acted upon the conviction that all share the same interests and have an obligation to work together. Today, we have learned again that we have a special obligation to assist scholars in other countries who are living and working in less comfortable and free circumstances than we, a most important truth which the circumstances of our age could easily smother. In fact, the growing sense of responsibility among many of our scholars and the treatment which American universities have provided Soviet scholars in this country have constituted one of our glories.

Study in the Soviet Union has contributed in still other ways to changing American education. For example, the enthusiasm of our returning scholars, those in fields such as history as well as those who specialize in language teaching, for improving and expanding instruction in Russian has been one of the important factors in the foreign language revolution which has swept the colleges and even the high schools of the United States in the last fifteen years. Similarly, study of a society quite different in every way from ours has contributed to the expansion of area programs designed to encourage the student to study every aspect of a society, rather than just the history or the literature. This development has been one of the most important forces weakening the departmental boundaries which have traditionally separated scholars in universities. It has therefore contributed to a new, more wholesome approach towards the nature of knowledge and the field of study. In short, the openness, the excitement, and the quality of those involved in Russian studies have helped to change the nature and character of the university and to increase its involvement in world affairs.

At the same time, the organizational arrangements which American universities made to help resolve the problems which the exchange programs created have helped improve relationships among scholars and among universities. In short, bringing a number of universities together in a delicate and difficult task, with the institutions assigning administrative responsibility to one university and with the various tasks assumed by committees of scholars from many universities in different parts of the country, has helped to create new patterns of cooperation among American institutions of higher education. This has aided in breaking down the barriers which have separated American universities from one another and which had them so conscious of their sovereignty that they were self-isolated in ivory towers in an Anglo-Saxon world. Since the educational revolution has placed heavy strains upon even our resources and since American universities must learn to cooperate more, both within the United States and abroad, the experiences of this exchange program have been of considerable significance, affecting the development of joint programs towards improving libraries, administering overseas centers, and selecting and educating scholars and students from foreign countries.

American scholars who have participated in the exchange program have also increased their understanding of the Soviet system and of Soviet foreign policy, whether their main concern has been linguistics or history or government. A happy consequence of this knowledge and understanding of Soviet totalitarianism is the growing appreciation among specialists of the problems which the Department of State faces in dealing with the Soviet Union. This may in fact be one of the most important national benefits from the exchange program, because it has reduced the likelihood that unknowing scholars, operating only on what they read and typical of American "transcendental populism" and of American suspicion of our own government, would heavily criticize officials engaged in negotiations with the Soviet government in circumstances which scholars who had not left the library or the "Intourist world" could not understand.

The National Interest

From the point of view of the American government and of the American public, perhaps the greatest contribution of the academic exchange programs has been their success in maintaining a tie with a group of important Soviet citizens at a time of high tension and great hazard. In fact, the great paradox of the exchange programs has been that the universities and the scholars, by seeking primarily to advance knowledge and their own special interests, have in fact served the national interest supremely well by the effectiveness with which they have maintained this narrow bridge between the two countries. This opportunity for dialogue reinforces the tendency within the higher levels of the Soviet government towards peaceful relations with the United States and provides whatever influence we have "towards rationality, permissiveness, and openness." One should not overestimate the impact of programs such as this, but they do constitute a positive addition to the containment policy. They do to some degree soften the Soviet Union by opening a window in that closed society to the rest of the world. They do persuade the Soviet government to engage in relationships with the United States on peaceful grounds under conditions which are of mutual advantage, a practice which is regularly condemned in the Soviet Union as "ideological coexistence."

The academic exchange programs also contribute to the national interest by increasing Soviet understanding of the United States. The handful of Americans who live in Soviet dormitories and who come to know well Soviet scholars and Soviet students, the future elite of their society, inevitably provide them some understanding of the quality and of the friendliness of our society. Similarly, those Soviet scholars who work in the United States must acquire an increased understanding of the nature of our society and must have the Marxist-Leninist glasses with which they view the rest of the world to some degree cleaned. In fact, in 1964, seven Soviet alumni of the program who had each spent an academic year in an American university were serving their government in the United States, in their embassies in Washington or at the United Nations or in organizations such as TASS. This will in the long run contribute to reducing misunderstanding and fears on both sides and will help the Soviet elite to see more clearly the wider one world in which we all live. In fact, as Mr. Toynbee long ago recognized, the Soviet Union may now be learning that it is impossible to borrow Western efficiency without borrowing Western values, that it is impossible to import only a part of the West.

Finally, the exchange program provides a kind of index or barometer of the atmosphere in which Soviet decisions are made. Identifying or defining Soviet policies and the considerations underlying these positions is a difficult task complicated by lack of information and the problems we face in penetrating the Soviet mind. The exchange program, one of the few direct, constant, measurable ties we have with the Soviet government, therefore serves as an effective touchstone of larger Soviet policies. Thus, recent increased harassment of American scholars by the Soviet KGB reveals a change in the temperature or atmosphere within which all Soviet policies are decided. Moreover,

the established history and the symbolic importance of the exchanges are such that a Soviet decision to reduce them sharply or end them would constitute a most important signal about basic Soviet goals and policies.

THE PROBLEMS AND DILEMMAS

Like any complicated new program, the academic exchange is an expensive one in the time and intellectual energy of scholars and administrators it consumes. Soviet administrative rigidity and inefficiency are so vast, and Soviet ability to create and to magnify problems so great that the exchange programs probably devour more administrative time and energy per individual involved than any other academic enterprise in which an American university has ever engaged. Only intense interest and resolute good will have triumphed over these Soviet qualities, which are apparently eternal and which deserve a new Gogol.

Great universities have been especially hampered because they are not properly organized to identify their own interests in such a program or to work effectively with other universities in a national organization. Thus, it is easy to identify the specialists in Russian history or literature or government who should be encouraged to study in the Soviet Union, but few universities have recognized the other fields of study which would offer benefits for Americans.

However, the university's principal problem has clearly been its transformation into an action agency, and the main dilemma is a simple one. Should the university accept a share of responsibility for exchanges of scholars with Communist countries and in so doing defend its integrity as a free institution, while at the same time developing close relations with agencies of our own government and of the foreign government, and exposing itself to domestic and foreign criticism and to the whims of international politics? Or should it instead allow our government to conduct the programs, with the great likelihood that inroads upon the university's integrity would occur? Or should the university declare that the problems are so complicated and so alien to its experience that it should not participate in any way?

The university's decision to accept responsibility has helped break down and destroy the ivory tower and bring it into the middle of public life, and even into international politics, positions which the university and scholar have not sought and which it is hazardous for them to share. Work for the Peace Corps, for AID, and for other government agencies, and especially programs involving foreign governments, has drastically changed the nature and character of the relationship between the university and the government. Thus far, the principles and procedures established have recognized the special role free universities must always play, and the main hazards have been avoided. Moreover, everyone agrees, first, that the university today cannot be removed from the society in which it functions and which it serves, and, second, that the university in a free country must remain true to its primary educational goals if it is to serve society effectively and remain truly independent.

In the exchange programs, for example, even though the university often plays an important political role in a front line capacity, it must at all times remain a privileged sanctuary of freedom. Our educational

institutions are free and independent, suspicious of government, and accustomed to their own ways in their assigned areas of responsibility. They must remain sovereign, conduct their work of research and instruction as they see best, and have a large share in the direction of cultural relations, in which they have always had an abiding interest. In brief, "political warfare" use of the universities and of the arts is useless and in the long run destructive, even though universities, artists, and scientists operating independently, doing their own work in their own best way, do have a very powerful impact.

Relations between the Department of State and the universities have been remarkably effective and amicable because the men and women involved have so well understood the others' purposes, qualities, and problems. However, tension between American universities and the Department of State over exchange programs is natural, because the State Department has the primary responsibility for critical, delicate, and highly involved relations with the Soviet Union, which cannot be separated from relations with our allies and with other countries in the world. Moreover, while the universities are interested basically in only a small part of the cultural affairs agreement with the Soviet Union, the Department of State has responsibility for the entire agreement, which it naturally sees as a whole and which it wishes to administer in a coherent and coordinated way, keeping in mind our total foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and with other countries as well.

The particular issues of disagreement are obvious and will continue. Thus, the Department controls admission to the United States and has on occasion denied visas to Soviet scholars nominated in fields which have military significance, such as microelectronics or new types of computers, or in subjects in which the Soviet Union has refused to accept American scholars. In addition, in retaliation for travel restrictions imposed on all Americans in the Soviet Union, Soviet participants in the United States must inform the Department of State of intended travel four days before they can leave their home campus. In cases such as this, American scholars who are not informed concerning Soviet policies or concerning the larger framework in which the academic exchange resides, or who have a special personal interest in one person or one aspect of the program, frequently denounce the Department for policies which seem to them petty or senseless.

The Department of State is also vulnerable to domestic political pressures and critics, some of whom denounce the Department because "the Soviets send scientists to work on important problems in American laboratories while we send scholars to work in ancient Russian history in Soviet libraries." Some Americans and their representatives believe that the programs should be curtailed or abolished because they are convinced that the Soviet Union obtains a significantly greater advantage from them than we do. Others on occasion believe we can and should send ten thousand each year, bringing the walls of Moscow down by turning pages. The State Department, in short, is constantly vulnerable to critics and serves as a perpetual target for all Americans, some of whom have some influence on the annual appropriations for the Department and therefore for exchange programs. These pressures often cause disagreements between the Department and the universities, which resent any apparent

Departmental weakening before popular pressures and who resist suggestions from the Department which would help satisfy the most responsible of the public criticisms.

Unfortunately, the Department of State is not the only American government agency with which universities engaged in academic exchange programs have to deal. Some of these government institutions, such as the National Academy of Sciences and the Atomic Energy Commission, have exchange programs of their own, which are financed by the government but which rely on American universities to provide most of the American participants and the laboratories and libraries in which Soviet participants continue their studies. The AEC and the NAS tend to be quite independent because they are within the government, and because their programs involve scientists, in whom the Soviet Union is particularly interested and for whom, therefore, it creates more comfortable arrangements and fewer problems than it does for scholars in the ordinary academic exchange program.

However, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have raised greater problems for the American universities and their constituents, who tend to be critical of much of the government but especially critical of these two organizations. The CIA and the FBI, which have important national responsibilities, are interested in information concerning Soviet strengths and weaknesses, policies and practices. On the Soviet side, officials of the KGB almost inevitably evaluate all academic exchange programs with the Soviet Union in this context and, above all, in the perspective of their eternal suspicions and of their own extensive efforts. In fact, the universities' emphasis upon selecting young men and women of high intellectual quality with good command of Russian, considerable knowledge of the Soviet Union, and great interest in learning about Soviet society has no doubt increased Soviet suspicion.

The American scholarly organizations engaged in exchanges with the Soviet Union have done their utmost to insure that their programs provide no grounds for suspicion, but they are essentially powerless to affect the Soviet attitude. These organizations, such as the Inter-University Committee and the International Research and Exchanges Board, are interested exclusively in scholarly activities. They have no ties with the Central Intelligence Agency or any other intelligence organization. They receive no funds from any intelligence organization, and they provide them no information. The Inter-University Committee in addition warned every candidate for study in the Soviet Union not only to reject any approaches that might be made by intelligence or other government agencies, but to report any such incidents should they occur. Finally, every participant in the Committee's exchange program signed a pledge that he would undertake no activity other than the scholarly ones for which he was selected.

Even so, the existence and the activities of these government agencies have created difficulties for the American universities in their dealings with the ever-suspicious Soviet government. They have also created problems within the American academic community, in spite of the efforts of the academic organizations and in spite of the genuine care, discretion, and propriety with which these organizations have carried out their activities.

Another kind of dilemma which the universities and all of those concerned with the national interest face reflects the advantages

which the Soviet government derives from academic exchange programs. In fact, it has been evident throughout the discussions and bargaining over cultural exchanges, that tough-minded Soviet diplomats and officials have taken advantage of the abiding American concern about the international crisis and of our efforts to persuade the Soviet Union to adopt more peaceful policies. In short, they use our efforts to launch and to maintain these programs to obtain vast opportunities for themselves. American diplomats have sought not only to advance our own national interests, but have also recognized legitimate Soviet objectives, because they perceived that any agreement would have to provide benefits to both countries. However, above all, they have sought to create an international framework and atmosphere in which the two countries together could reduce the tensions which afflict us both. Basically, the Soviet leaders have taken advantage of this spirit and approach and have concentrated on their own restricted interests, while seeking to minimize our benefits and to prevent our joint escape from the present hazardous situation into a new structure and a new atmosphere. For every apparent step towards a freer world and greater international amity, they have insisted upon a parochial Soviet advantage which has not affected the commonweal, except in a divisive way, and which has indeed exposed the Americans involved to substantial criticism.

Here one must recognize that Soviet scholars, artists, and intellectuals have almost no influence on Soviet policy or on Soviet administration of exchange programs. These men and women share many of our scholars' interests. They seek to increase their knowledge within their own special field. They are eager to cooperate with other scholars. They seek the recognition and respect of other members of the international community of scholars. Above all, they look forward to opportunities to leave the Soviet Union, to go "out," for a few months or a year.

Those of the Party and the government who make the decisions are different people and have different goals. Basically, they seek to strengthen the Soviet system and to weaken ours. Their primary concern has been to obtain scientific, technical, and military information from the United States. They have, in short, sought to use the exchange programs to strengthen their economy and to obtain important information and techniques from a more advanced country. Almost eighty percent of the Soviet participants in the basic program administered by the Inter-University Committee have been scientists or engineers, while somewhat less than ten percent of the Americans have been in science or technology. Thus, the Soviet Union has obtained a significant increment to its scientific and technical knowledge from these programs, from basic knowledge concerning polio vaccines to training in econometrics and new systems of business management to the latest work in biochemistry.

In addition, the Soviet government has acquired a kind of respectability both at home and abroad, especially among the large and important class of intellectuals or intelligentsia, who have been persuaded in part by these programs that the Soviet Union is a peaceful and responsible member of the family of nations. It also believes it derives recognition, prestige, and propaganda advantages from the presence of carefully selected Soviet scholars in American universities, and the impact which life in the Soviet Union presumably has on

American scholars. Finally, it utilizes the exchange program to train specialists on the United States for work in various parts of the Soviet government.

The difference between our goals and the Soviet goals is at the root of our problems, but there are even more essential factors involved. The principal one is the Soviet system, which differs in almost every way from ours, particularly in its values and in its political organization. Recognizing and accepting this system in the atmosphere of the 1960's apparently reflects the willingness of many Americans also to accept Soviet control of Eastern Europe and the permanence of Communist control wherever it exists. In addition, we have difficulty dealing with the Soviet Union, because the economic and political levels of the two countries are different, one an advanced industrial society with a political and social democracy, and the other basically an underdeveloped society under authoritarian rule, with a highly developed military system, and motivated by suspicion and hostility towards the rest of the world.

Relations with the Soviet government and with its controlled universities therefore create a series of problems for American institutions, which are participating in formal, highly organized and even sanitized exchange arrangements with a totalitarian government, which naturally takes advantage of its negotiating position. One of the dangers is that we accept this primitive system of barter as a permanent practice, in violation of the ways in which we live and believe scholars ought to work. Moreover, the constant compromises which we have to make with the Soviet Union concerning the status of the participants, fields of study, travel opportunities, and essentials of life may weary the Americans responsible to the point that they will accept these temporary compromises as permanent. In short, it will be very difficult in the long run for Americans to be firm towards the Soviet government but gentle and humane towards the Soviet scholars, and we may drift into a type of moral demobilization.

Another great hazard for American universities is the degree of influence they surrender to the Soviet government over the direction of American scholarship. Thus, the Soviet Ministry of Higher and Specialized Education, and other Soviet officials, have denied the opportunity for study in the Soviet Union to Americans highly qualified for study there, on the ground that the subject, such as the allocation of labor resources, is not one studied in Soviet universities, or that political theory in the sixteenth century is a religious issue and therefore unworthy of study, or that everything important in Soviet agricultural problems and policies had already been enunciated by Khrushchev, whose speeches the interested American scholar could examine in the United States. In other words, the Soviet Ministry has denied admission to most Americans who wish to study the Soviet economy, modern or recent history, Soviet politics, Soviet foreign policy, and many scientific fields, while American universities through 1968 placed every Soviet scholar nominated in a field in which he could work in an American university and for which he could obtain a visa.

This Soviet practice has also led American scholars, who are mainly interested in seeing the Soviet Union, to change their research projects so that they might obtain admission under conditions dictated by the Soviet government. This has helped create an imbalance among

the fields of study within American universities which may become permanent. Thus, we have sent eighty-three historians to study Russian history, but no Americans have been admitted to analyze Soviet foreign policy or the relations between the Party and the government. The Soviet government has therefore been able to have a profound influence in fields which are important to it and has succeeded at the same time in deflecting the direction of American scholarship.

The Soviet government may also have some influence over Americans who have studied in the Soviet Union and who wish to return to the country of their special professional interest as scholars in Russian history, literature, or government. Soviet denials to some scholars of the opportunity to return for further study because of their publications or speeches can induce cautious behavior both within the Soviet Union and within the United States by American scholars. This may tend to restrict the freedoms of Americans, and it will also assist the Soviet government to keep its scholars and other intellectuals isolated and under control, which is one of its main concerns.

Another serious problem has been what one American has called the "eternal indecencies and inequities" of dealing with the Soviet Union. American scholars in most programs are not allowed to bring their children, which naturally reduces the number interested, and the Soviet government even has a quota for the number of wives allowed each year. Almost all of the Americans (295 of the first 300) who went to the Soviet Union were placed in Moscow State and Leningrad State Universities and were denied opportunities to study in research institutes of the Academy of Sciences, while at the same time, Soviet scholars have been placed in that American institution most qualified to serve them, wherever in the United States that institution might be. Thus, the great majority of American scholars have been restricted to two universities, while Soviet scholars have worked in fifty-two different American institutions.

In the largest and most important exchange program, that for graduate students and young scholars, each American participant has been treated as an *aspirant stazhor*, or probationary graduate student, regardless of his qualifications, achievements, and age. He is therefore directly subject to his Soviet professor and needs his approval for his program, for access to libraries and archives, and for study-related travel. One associate professor from the University of California who had already produced an excellent book was thus denied the right to study in Leningrad State University and to work in the Leningrad libraries on the ground that the Soviet specialist in that field in Leningrad was too busy to direct his work.

American scholars also have great difficulties obtaining access to archives, to living sources, and to some kinds of publications in Soviet libraries, such as doctoral theses. At the same time, Soviet scholars have the same access to information in this country that any American scholar does. Americans are seriously restricted in their opportunities to travel for study or study-related purposes from Moscow and Leningrad, and they ordinarily travel only in groups and accompanied by Soviet "guides," when they do travel. One young American spent forty hours obtaining permission to go to Leningrad from Moscow to

work in Leningrad libraries, even though the Soviet Ministry of Education in admitting him to the Soviet Union had assured him of this opportunity. At the same time, Soviet scholars are allowed to travel freely throughout the United States, although they do have to inform the Department of State four days in advance of leaving their campus.

Life in the Soviet Union itself constitutes a kind of permanent inequity, because of the living conditions, the frustrations, annoyances, indignities, and inefficiency, the assessment of discriminatory prices for microfilming research materials and for hotel rooms, the effort in recent years to segregate Americans from Soviet scholars and students, and the harassment to which Americans are subject.

Americans have come to consider the Soviet postal system as "the opened mail" and to realize that diaries have official readers. They are never certain who their Soviet friends are and which are involuntary informers or agents provocateurs. Some had close friends regretfully discontinue relationships because the friends were frightened by police interrogation, and all have learned never to mention one Soviet friend to another. Some were followed frequently, particularly just before they left the Soviet Union or during trips, and all of them, and their Soviet friends, came to believe that the rooms in which they lived, which often were rooms in which other Americans had lived in previous years, had listening devices installed in the walls, and that their telephone conversations were monitored. Many became justifiably suspicious of officials in the university foreign study offices, some of whom they came to know had responsibilities to the KGB, the Soviet Secret Police, as well as to the university. In addition, a small percentage of the American participants had direct and unpleasant experiences with the KGB. Seven were expelled from the Soviet Union, so far as we can determine without cause and also without consultation or advance notice to the participant's American university or to the Committee. Eighteen left early because of fear caused by Secret Police interest in their work or were urged to leave by the American Embassy because KGB interest in them had been so visibly expressed. More than twenty other participants in our major program have been criticized crudely, viciously, and without foundation in the Soviet press as spies or "ideological saboteurs."

There is no dignified or proper response to these Soviet policies and practices, which create a serious dilemma and which have been accepted in part because they do educate American scholars concerning the nature of the Soviet system. All of the Soviet actions have been annoying and irritating, and some of them have been hazardous. However, they have all been spaced in time and in quality in such a way that neither the American universities nor the Department of State considered that the threshold point had been passed.

THE SOVIET DILEMMA

The responsible Soviet officials who have decided that the Soviet Union should participate in exchange programs with the United States and who have determined to continue them are thoroughly aware of the advantages we obtain and of the challenges which exchange programs pose for them. They obviously recognize the sig-

nificant advantages which accrue to the Soviet Union, and they must believe that these advantages outweigh those we gain and the hazards to them. At the same time, there is an eternal "great debate" within the Soviet ruling group about the utility and wisdom of continuing academic exchanges. In this discussion, clearly those who decide have concluded that the benefits to the Soviet Union justify the risks taken; they would otherwise have ended the exchange program. However, this discussion continues on almost a daily basis, the "score" changes often, and those who favor exchanges may not always triumph and may not control actions taken at every policy level.

The main problem for the Soviet leadership is the challenge this new "window to the West" poses for the Soviet political system, especially the Communist emphasis on a political monopoly, on absolute control, and on carefully monitored relationships with other parts of the world. This system rests not only on Communist suspicion of others, but also on the suspicion which is a traditional and even inherent part of the Russian view of the rest of the world. The police and other members of the ruling class have become increasingly fearful of Soviet intellectuals and of Western influences upon them. Indeed, the Soviet rulers apparently believe the greatest internal threat to their system is from the intelligentsia and those most highly trained. They seem to agree with Louis XIV that "nations touch only at the top" and that outside influences, which can penetrate the Soviet system best at its upper level, must be contained and destroyed. They are convinced that "we are betrayed by what is false within." The government now headed by Brezhnev and Kosygin very much resembles that of Nicholas I in the suspicion with which it views all peoples, including its own, and in the "plot mentality" which corrodes its approach towards everyone, native or foreign, in the Soviet Union.

These beliefs and Soviet "ideological sensitivity" are reflected in the constant vigilance campaigns and in press attacks upon Soviet intellectuals, especially writers, for their alleged vulnerability to foreign ideas and influence. The Communist political system and philosophy, and the suspicion with which they view even the most loyal servitors—and the Soviet intellectuals are by and large loyal—therefore help explain the Soviet dilemma and resultant Soviet policies. The presence of Americans and other foreigners in Soviet universities, where the future elite are being trained; the published materials which they bring with them and on occasion share with their Soviet fellows; the conversations they have in their dormitories and in class; everything which Americans and others do in the Soviet Union is considered a threat. As one American expressed it: "We are propaganda, simply because of our presence here." In short, the very nature of the exchange program raises very difficult problems for the Soviet Union and places it on the horns of a fearful and continual dilemma. To obtain gains which it thinks important, even crucial, it must risk contamination of its intellectual elite and of the ideological future of the country. To obtain the advantages it seeks in the West, it must open up the Soviet Union to some degree to foreign scholars. To obtain scientific and technical and military information, and some political advantages, it must expose itself to criticism from Chinese Communists and at the same time to tolerate similar policies from the East European governments, which are even more interested than the Soviet Union in exchanges with the United States. In sum-

mary, just as the Department of State and the universities ever ponder the wisdom of continuing to endure the inequities and hazards created by the Soviet government, so the Soviet rulers constantly discuss the balance between the advantages they acquire and the "infections" which may constitute the price.

CONCLUSIONS

Most of the advantages and the disadvantages academic exchanges provide are clear, but perhaps some of the achievements of the past twelve or fifteen years should be emphasized because they are not visible. One important accomplishment is the simple survival of programs between two suspicious and hostile states, through a series of international crises, at a time when failure, cancellation, or a breach of one kind or another might have produced a great crisis. American institutions involved have demonstrated great skill and wisdom in the selection of mature and able young men and women and have ignored the occasional dramatic calls for sending massive numbers. The universities have retained their responsibility and control in a program which must be of, by, and for the universities if it is to be successful and if they are to survive as free institutions. They have honored themselves and their traditions in the way in which they have treated all Soviet scholars on their campuses. At the same time, they have successfully avoided any taint of relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency or any other intelligence organization, they have skillfully avoided taking direct part in political warfare between the two countries, and they have escaped such tragic affairs as that of Camelot. The Department of State has shown the same degree of wisdom, restraint, and skill in its work with the universities and scholars, who are acutely sensitive concerning their rights and responsibilities, and with the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Soviet government agencies, which have been vigorous and demanding in pursuit of what they consider Soviet interests.

At the same time, the exchange programs in many ways have been a failure. We are following the principles and working within the framework established in 1958 and are now more than ever committed to a program which is the antithesis of the way in which Americans believe research in other countries should be arranged. Soviet scholars and other Soviet citizens are no more free to obtain American and other Western publications than they were when the exchanges began. In fact, we have made no progress towards the hopes which Ambassador Lacy expressed in 1947 for "removing barriers currently obstructing the free flow of information and ideas" and providing benefit to both people "of free discussion, criticism, and debate on the vital issues of the day." We have not succeeded in exchanging teachers, even teachers of language; there are no joint research projects, even on subjects of common concern, such as air pollution; the exchange of radio and television programs is extremely limited and directly controlled by the Soviet government; and all American proposals for expanding the exchange program even in the present framework, such as through summer study and summer seminars, have been brusquely rejected by the Soviet government. Indeed, the programs in progress in 1969-1970 are just half as large as those the American universities

anticipated when they made their budget estimates for 1965-1970 in the spring of 1964.

In short, there has been more continuity than change in Soviet policy and practice. The stone wall of the closed society still exists, even though the powerful magnet of Western ideas and Western progress still attracts, perhaps more strongly than ever, the Soviet intellectuals still isolated behind those barriers.

Even so, the exchanges on balance have been an advantage to us, and we should continue them. In fact, both we and the Soviet Union have little choice but to continue, because ending them now would be such a dreadful blow at a time of high crisis. They constitute, in fact, a valuable opportunity to continue to work with the Soviet government and to reach Soviet citizens. We should rejoice over this opportunity, particularly because the exchange involves ideas and information, and therefore a kind of competition with the Soviet Union on grounds congenial or favorable to us in areas where freedom has given us great advantages in cultural vitality.

However, we should also appreciate the new and to some degree dangerous role the American university and scholars now occupy. For those who believe that the work of the college should be "relevant," American educational institutions in this case at least have placed themselves on the firing line. This shift places a very heavy responsibility on the universities and on all those who wish them to accept such a role.

The experience of the past fifteen years suggests that the American universities and the American government together have identified the correct principles for administering scholarly exchange programs with governments which have different ideologies and philosophies. Administrators and scholars in particular must ensure that universities remain centers of free inquiry; that they maintain the clear distinction between scholarship and political warfare and espionage; and that they be eternally vigilant in their relations with our government and with other governments as well. Above all, they should insist that our scholars are treated with the decency and dignity all men and women deserve, especially when they are guests in another country. We can achieve no great purpose by tolerating procedures which undermine the principles for which we stand.

Moreover, the role of the university, and of the scholars, scientists and artists, should be preeminent in those fields in which they have particular concern and responsibility; academic quality should be the primary factor in the selection process; the Americans selected for study in a Communist country should be men and women of maturity and stability; the selection process should be on a national basis, with recognized and competent scholars making the decisions and with scholars and graduate students in all fields of knowledge encouraged to participate.

At the same time, we have learned that academic exchange programs of this kind require the reorganization of individual universities and increased cooperative efforts among educational institutions. University administrators and scholars must maintain a high degree of sophistication if programs like this are to be successful. We must pay more attention to educating the American public concerning the significance of academic exchanges and the problems which they in-

evitably raise, if the public is to understand them and provide the necessary support in the long future.

Above all, we should have learned that the universities, the other scholarly organizations involved, and the government should work together to create a new kind of organization of public and private institutions, including the foundations, to coordinate the work involved. Our resources for exchange programs with Communist countries are too scarce to allow us to continue in a kind of free-for-all, highly competitive, and dangerous basis. Ideally, this "American Council" should be a semi-public organization, with the Board of Directors composed of private citizens nominated by the President and approved by the Senate, and with funds contributed in part by the federal government and in part by private organizations, such as foundations, universities, business and labor groups, and organizations especially interested in the arts and sciences. It should possess full authority for all cultural exchange programs with all countries ruled by Communists, and it should speak for the universities and other cultural organizations in its dealings with the Department of State and with foreign governments.

If it should prove impossible to establish such an organization—and recent unsuccessful efforts have identified a number of complications—the organizations involved in and responsible for such exchange programs should at least form a loose federal organization to pool information, to consult concerning plans and programs, and to coordinate activities. After they have learned to cooperate and to work together, they should consider combining their operations and then coordinating American programs with those of other countries in an open way so as to persuade the Soviet Union that no conspiracy was being directed against it.

Such an organization and such a program should reduce the invisible costs which academic exchanges involve, eliminate some of the friction and tension among American organizations, and reflect the pluralistic approach which Americans traditionally adopt. At the same time, they should guarantee the necessary political sensitivity. Such an organization should also serve as a shock absorber, on one side for the universities, and on the other side for the federal government, reducing the pressures to which both are now subject.

The long term goal of everyone involved in academic exchanges with the Soviet Union and with other Communist countries should remain, of course, the free movement of people and materials. In fact, the new coordinating organization should be established with the expressed hope and goal that it wither away when free movement becomes possible.

China has isolated itself, and has in general been isolated from, the rest of the world for the twenty years during which Communists have had control over that enormous country. This isolation will end one day, with new problems and new opportunities for the Chinese and for the rest of the world. Clearly, American scholars and American government officials should begin to plan now for that day, benefiting from the experiences provided by our exchanges with the Soviet Union. In particular, we should recognize that the first steps will be decisive, as they have been in our arrangements with the Soviet Union, because they will establish the structure, principles, and procedures which Communist rulers will be most reluctant to change.

We should, therefore, seek to ensure that all institutions and all fields of study be open to scholars of both countries, and that the entire area of both countries should be freely accessible. We should seek equity, not reciprocity. We should insist upon, or at least always retain the opportunity for, arrangements for exchanges of all kinds, short and long-term, of specialists and of teachers, of senior scholars and of graduate students. We should guarantee that scholars from both countries receive appropriate status and recognition, possess the right for study-related travel, and have the same access to research materials in libraries and laboratories as do natives. Finally, we should ensure that the academic exchanges not be restricted to men and women; the free flow of published materials between the two countries should be an integral part of the agreement.

The nature of the world in which the Americans, the Chinese, and the Russians live suggests that relations among these states and their peoples will remain delicate and hazardous. We shall no doubt remain locked in a shrinking world, suspicious of and hostile towards each other, unable on one hand to conquer or overthrow the other but equally unable to disengage and flee into some kind of armed security. Cultural relations in this situation will remain of considerable importance, but can never be decisive. In such a position, we in the United States should maintain our economic, political, and spiritual vitality and our military strength, cooperate with other peoples who share our general goals and who are committed to peaceful progress, and continue to demonstrate that we are as resolute as in 1776 or in 1942 to defend our interests. At the same time, we should try further to define and understand the nature of the political and economic systems with which we are engaged, to persuade them of our goals and of the kind of world we seek, and to make effective use of cultural exchange, of trade, and of other peaceful instruments to bring these goals within reach.

The situation we face is very much like the Eastern Question, devilishly complicated, deeply rooted in the past, involving numbers of peoples, and beyond easy or quick solution. Intellect and strength, grace and perseverance will both be required and expected of us. Scholarly exchanges in these circumstances provide us an opportunity to use some of our enduring strengths to assist our rivals and ourselves together to make a step towards peace.

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IV. 11 AUG 69

ROMANIA

H 1

KATUSHEV ACTIVITIES IN ROMANIA REPORTED

Katushev-Ceausescu Meeting

Bucharest AGERPRES International Service in English 1900 GMT 9 Aug 69 L

[Text] Bucharest AGERPRES 9 August 1969--Nicolae Ceausescu, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, received in the afternoon of August 9 K. F. Katushev, secretary of Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, leader of the delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that participates in the proceedings of the 10th congress of the Romanian Communist Party. The talk held during the interview proceeded in a warm, comradely atmosphere.

Black Sea Visit

Bucharest AGERPRES International Service in English 1903 GMT 9 Aug 69 L

[Excerpt] Bucharest AGERPRES 9 Aug 1969--On August 9, the delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union led by K. F. Katushev, secretary of the CC of the CPSU, visited the resorts on the Romanian Black Sea shore where they were informed about the development of these localities, the rhythm of construction, and the prospects of the Littoral as an important tourist base of Romania.

Machine-Tool Works Visit

Bucharest AGERPRES International Service in English 2045 GMT 8 Aug 69 L

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES. 8 Aug 69. In the morning of August 8, the delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union led by K. F. Katushev, secretary of the CC of the CPSU, now attending the 10th congress of the Romanian Communist Party, paid a visit to the machine-tool and aggregate works in Bucharest. The members of the delegation were accompanied by Eug Bujor Almasan, member of the CC of the RCP, and by Dimitru Lazar, deputy head of section at the CC of the RCP.

During their visit, the guests conversed with numerous workers. The members of the delegation had a meeting with the workers of the enterprise. Greeting the guests, Nicolae Popa, secretary of the party committee of the works briefly outlined the achievements of the works.

"For us"--he said--"that is an opportunity to note with satisfaction that lasting and many-sided links of friendship and fraternal cooperation are developing between the peoples of socialist Romania and of the Soviet Union. These relations are based on the community of social system, of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, on the unity of our fundamental aims and aspirations in the striving for the building of socialism and communism, in the struggle against imperialism, in defense of peace."

The secretary of the party committee of the works conveyed a heartfelt message of fraternal friendship to the Soviet communists, the working class and to the entire Soviet people.

The K. F. Katushev addressed the audience. After cordially greeting the works staff, and through it the entire working class, all working people of socialist Romania, K. F. Katushev stated that this visit left a fine impression upon the Soviet delegation.

IV. 11 Aug 69

H 2

ROMANIA

The fact that in Romania such modern enterprises are being built, is more tellingly illustrating than figures the successes recorded by the Romanian people, on its path towards socialism. The successes achieved in your country are the outcome of the selfless work of workers, peasants, intellectuals, of the fraternal alliance and cooperation of the socialist states, of the mutual assistance, that give the opportunity to the fraternal peoples to speed up the progress of the entire socialist camp.

Showing that 25 years ago when the working class became a ruling class in a series of countries, the first problem it faced was the ensuring of state independence, without which the revolutionary changes could not be achieved, K.F. Katushev stressed that this problem was settled precisely due to the fact that the young socialist states, together with the first world socialist state--the Soviet Union--created a lasting defensive alliance materialized in the Warsaw treaty, in bilateral friendship and mutual assistance treaties. It is precisely that alliance which ensured the state independence and sovereignty of the socialist countries against the imperialist plots, and it is precisely due to this fact that the peoples have acquired the possibility of working unhampered, changing the look of their countries, and building a new life.

We can state the same about the economic problems. We have at our disposal a ratified mechanism of economic and technico-scientific cooperation that allows for ampler and more complex problems to be put and solved, related to the development of the national economies and of culture in each of the socialist countries.

Referring then to the economic links between the Soviet Union and Romania, the speaker pointed out that during this year the exchanges of goods will surpass 800 million roubles.

This mutual advantageous cooperation, he said, will develop and deepen in the future, too, because it corresponds to the vital interests of our peoples. After speaking about some successes and present day preoccupations of the Soviet people on many fields, K.F. Katushev said:

We hold dear the friendship uniting the communists, the working class, and all the working class, and all the working people of the Soviet Union and of Romania. Let this friendship strengthen and develop to the welfare of our countries and of world socialism.

The speeches delivered during this meeting were repeatedly punctuated by loud applause. K.F. Katushev handed over to the host the bust of V.I. Lenin and a dummy of the Moscow television tower. The meeting of the members of the CPSU delegation with the workers of the Bucharest machine-tool and aggregate works was an enthusiastic manifestation of the friendship between the RCP and the CPSU, between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Soviet Union, friendship which has deep roots in the historic past of the two countries.

Katushev Speech Text

Moscow in Romanian to Romania 1600 GMT 8 Aug 69 L

[Speech delivered at the 7 August session of the 10th Romanian Communist Party Congress by CPSU delegation leader Konstantin Katushev--read by announcer and identified as full text]

[Text] Dear comrades, the CPSU Central Committee has entrusted our delegation with the mission of greeting the 10th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party and conveying to all communists and working people of socialist Romania the fraternal salute of Soviet communists and the Soviet people.

iv. 11 AUG 69

The CPSU is linked with the Romanian Communist Party by decades of joint struggle against imperialism and fascism and for the ideals of the working class. Our countries are united by relations of alliance within the framework of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. For the Soviet people the Romanian people are friends and comrades in arms in the lofty work of creating a new social order.

Your congress, Konstantin Katushev added, is reviewing the results of party activity carried out with regard to the guidance of all spheres of the country's life and to planning its future prospects. The work of the congress has revealed the multilateral activity unfolded by party organizations and the sustained labor of the working class, peasants, and intelligentsia in constructing the socialist society.

After the liberation from the fascist yoke, Romanian working people have, in a short period, transformed their country into a socialist state which possesses a developed industry and agriculture and advanced science and culture. The successes achieved by your country and by other socialist countries also represent a result of fraternal mutual assistance, of close cooperation in the political, economic, and military spheres. The friendship and collaboration of socialist countries protect the independence and sovereignty of each from any attempt made by imperialism, assuring them of all necessary conditions for peaceful and constructive work, for rapid advancement along the road of socialism and communism.

At present, the world socialist system exerts tremendous influence over the development of all mankind, representing the decisive force in the anti-imperialist struggle. This fact was unanimously recognized once again at the recent international meeting in Moscow of communist and workers parties. We all know what a fierce struggle the imperialists are waging against socialist countries on all fronts. In this fight our class adversaries do not hesitate to use any method beginning with the perfidious tactics of bridge-building, aimed at undermining the unity of socialist countries, at sowing discord among them, to overtly supporting all antisocialist forces and organizing counterrevolutionary plots, from attempts at economic penetration to direct armed intervention.

By showing political vigilance and proletarian solidarity in defending socialist gains, the communist parties and working people from fraternal countries not only repulse these imperialist attacks, but also deal heavy blows aimed at continuously increasing the balance of force in their favor. Life teaches us that the successes scored in the struggle against imperialism are in direct proportion to the unity of socialist countries, of the fraternal communist parties and of all progressive forces of our epoch. The example set by the heroic Vietnamese people, who have inflicted defeats on the U.S. aggressors compelling them to come to the negotiation table, strikingly demonstrates that a people rising up to fight for their independence, and relying on the support of fraternal socialist countries, on the solidarity of the world communist movement, are invincible.

The communist and workers parties which took part in the international conference have resolutely stressed that the defense of socialism is an internationalist duty communists.

IV. 11 Aug 69

H 4

ROMANIA

For communists from the socialist countries this primarily means the necessity to show major concern for continuous and close political and economic cooperation between socialist countries, for strengthening their collective defense potential.

The efforts of the socialist states, members of the Warsaw Pact, are particularly important in consolidating their defensive organizations, which insures the security of our countries in conditions of the existence of the aggressive NATO bloc, in which U.S. imperialism plays the main role, in conditions of the intensification of militarist circles and neofascist forces from the Federal Republic of Germany who want to revise the results of World War II.

Our cohesion and unity of action play an extremely important role in supporting the national liberation movement, the just struggle waged by the Arab peoples against Israeli aggression, which is encouraged by international imperialism.

The watchword, unity of action of all revolutionary anti-imperialist forces, is the most militant, most topical slogan of our time. Precisely because of this the problem of unity represented the main theme at the international conference of communists, a remarkable event in the life of the world communist movement, an important stage in the work of cementing its ranks. The conference made possible a profound analysis of the present world situation, defined the methods of peoples' struggle against imperialism, for peace, democracy, and national and social progress.

Comrades, Konstantin Katushev added, today, when socialist states have laid a strong foundation for multilateral economic development, they set themselves even greater tasks in the area of continuous economic development, technical progress to increase the people's standard of life, development of science and culture.

To solve these problems, the decisions unanimously adopted at the 23d Special Session of CEMA are of particular importance. The complex program outlined by the session on developing mutually advantageous cooperation and socialist economic integration, based on principles of socialist internationalism, respect for the principle of free consent and state sovereignty, coincides with the fundamental interests of our peoples.

One can say with certainty that communist parties from the socialist countries, promoting a consistent Marxist-Leninist policy and approaching present problems from positions of strength, will further (?strengthen) the force of the world system of socialism and its impact on world events and will consolidate the unity of world communism.

Closely rallied around the CPSU Central Committee, Soviet communists and working people warmly approve the results of the international communist meeting, the line promoted by our party in foreign policy and in the world communist movement. They unanimously support the statement made by Comrade Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who said that our party will spare no efforts in order to strengthen the unity of the communist movement and will fully carry out its international duty.

The CPSU and all Soviet people concentrate their efforts on constructing communism, on maintaining and consolidating peace. Each step along this path lead to further realizing the development of the country's economy, for the real improvement of living conditions of Soviet people, the enhancing their cultural standard, and the accumulation of new scientific and art assets.

IV. 11 Aug 69

H 5

ROMANIA

After reaching advanced positions concerning a number of important areas of scientific and technical development, our country is presently building the largest electric power systems in the world, unique electronic apparatuses, great nuclear power centers, and supersonic airliners, while realizing a vast program of space exploration. The industrial production of the USSR has more than doubled in the last 8 years, and agricultural production is more than a third greater. The system of 5 work days and 2 days off has been introduced in the country. Over 10 million people are moving into new flats each year, improving their housing conditions. Nearly 1.5 million specialists graduate yearly from Soviet teaching establishments, after higher and medium studies.

While exerting leadership over the construction of communism, the CPSU attaches great importance to problems concerning the continuous development of socialist democracy, bringing the broad people's masses into the country's management, consistently insuring the principle of comradeship in work and of other Leninist rules regarding party life, development, and strengthening the brotherly friendship between peoples of our country, educating working people in the spirit of socialist internationalism and attachment of communism.

At present, our party and all Soviet people develop their activity under the sign of preparations for the birth centenary of Lenin, the founder of our party and state, the leader of the international communist movement. The Lenin centenary will be greeted with fresh realizations in the construction of communism. We consider attachment to glorious Lenin's teaching, the realization of Lenin's teachings as a guarantee for remarkable victories in the struggle for the cause of peace, democracy, national independence, and socialism.

In conclusion, Comrade Konstantin Katushev read the text of the CPSU Central Committee message to the 10th Romanian Communist Party Congress.

The message reads: The CPSU Central Committee, on behalf of Soviet communists and all Soviet people, conveys to the delegates to the 10th Romanian Communist Party Congress, and through you to the communists and working people of the Socialist Republic of Romania, fraternal greetings and good wishes for success in the work of the congress.

In a short historic period, within the framework of the fraternal family of the people of the socialist states, the Romanian working people have achieved remarkable successes in constructing the new life. Currently the 10th Romanian Communist Party Congress is discussing a program for the continuous and multilateral development of socialist society.

We are certain that the Romanian Communist Party and all Romanian people, consistently guided by the glorious Marxist-Leninist teaching, will succeed in achieving new victories in completing the construction of socialism, in the development of economy, science, and culture, in the continuous development of the material well-being of the working people.

The present international situation, the aggressive schemes of imperialist circles, the intensification of the arms race, and the activities of imperialist blocs, the sharpening of the ideological struggle in the international arena, all this requires a well-defined class stand, the strengthening of the cohesion and unity of action of socialist countries, of the communist movement, and of all anti-imperialist forces.

IV. 11 Aug 69

H 6

ROMANIA

The international meeting of communist and workers parties played an important mobilizing role in strengthening this militant, international cooperation. The conference documents contain a program for a deployed struggle, at the present stage, against imperialism, for peace, democracy, national independence, and socialism.

The collective experience of the fraternal parties shows in a telling manner that the combination of national tasks and international development of brotherly cooperation and mutual assistance, within the Warsaw Pact and CEWA, increase the forces of each socialist country, contribute to the general consolidation of the positions of socialism in Europe and the world.

The USSR consistently promotes a policy toward developing relations of friendship with the Romanian people. The strengthening of ties between the CPSU and Romanian Communist Party and the continuous development of mutually advantageous multilateral cooperation between the USSR and Socialist Republic of Romania coincide with the fundamental interests of our peoples.

Guided by Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism, Soviet communists are constantly militating for deepening and developing fraternal relations between our parties, for the good of the Soviet and Romanian peoples, in the interest of the great cause of socialism and communism.

We wish Romanian communists new successes in the construction of socialism, in assuring a peaceful and happy life for the Romanian people.

Long live the unity and cohesion of the socialist camp of the international communist and workers movement! Long live Marxism-Leninism! signed: the CPSU Central Committee.

CEAUSESCU ACCEPTS IRAN'S INVITATION TO VISIT

Bucharest AGERPRES International Service in English 1902 GMT 10 Aug 69 L

[Text] Bucharest AGERPRES 10 Aug 69--Taking into consideration the relations of friendship between Romania and Iran, His Imperial Majesty Shahinshah Aryamehr and Her Majesty the Empress of Iran have invited Nicolae Ceausescu, president of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania, with his wife, to pay a formal visit to Iran.

The President of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania and his wife have accepted with pleasure the invitation. The Iranian visit will proceed between 1 and 8 September 1969.

CEAUSESCU MEETS ITALIAN PARTY LEADER PAJETTA

Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1400 GMT 9 Aug 69 A

[Text] Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee, this morning received Comrade Giancarlo Pajetta, member of the Politburo and of the Directione of the Italian Communist Party Central Committee, leader of the Italian Communist Party delegation to the 10th Romanian Communist Party Congress. The talks which took place on this occasion were held in a warm and comradely atmosphere.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000100230001-1 (b)(3)
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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied

STATINTL

III. 5 Aug 69

A 3

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Those parties in power devote unceasing attention to increasing the efficiency of the economy and to developing the scientific-technical revolution. In the resolutions adopted by the 23d CEMA session, socialist countries reaffirm that they consider the pooling of their efforts and economic integration necessary for increasing the efficiency of the people's economy and for developing the economic strength of the entire socialist community.

As an analysis of the latest American concepts for East Europe (?shows), the United States is not giving up its attempts to weaken the socialist community. In their own interests, the imperialists are using--and continue to try using--even the smallest difficulties which appear in the development of individual countries or the entire world socialist system. At the same time they ignore that socialism has deep roots in East Europe and that relations between socialist countries are firm and indissoluble.

IZVESTIYA ARTICLE LAUDS BRATISLAVA STATEMENT

Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1626 GMT 4 Aug 69 L

[Text] Moscow--Nikolay Novikov, writing in IZVESTIYA today, says that the conference of representatives of communist and workers parties from Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia, which took place on 3 August 1968 in Bratislava, was "an important step along the road to strengthening the unity and cohesion of the socialist countries and a considerable contribution to the struggle for reinforcing the positions of socialism and against the undermining activity of imperialism." The author stresses that the participants of the Bratislava conference expressed the will of the peoples of the socialist countries for a further rallying of their ranks for the sake of the triumph of the great cause--the building of a new and just society on earth.

The spirit of Bratislava, the article says, is socialist internationalism in action. It is the effective political cooperation of socialist states and a lofty responsibility for the destinies of socialism in not just their own countries but also throughout the world.

Recalling that in Bratislava the six fraternal parties called for a further development of the economic cooperation of socialist countries on a bilateral and multilateral basis and for an improvement in CEMA's activity, Novikov says that "the Soviet Union and other socialist states have achieved historic successes in their economic and political development thanks mainly to mutual aid and cooperation." The participants of the Bratislava meeting, the article continues, stressed in their statement that the present situation requires unrelenting effort to raise the defense capacity of each socialist state and the entire socialist community and to strengthen political and military cooperation within the Warsaw Pact. This question became a subject of particularly close scrutiny at the meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in March 1969 in Budapest.

The communist and workers parties that participated in the Bratislava conference and signed the statement, Novikov says, regarded as their paramount task implementation of all conditions contained in the unanimously adopted document. Consistent and unswerving implementation of these conditions is aimed at a still greater strengthening of the positions of socialism in each country and in the entire socialist community. This was convincingly borne out by the recent events in Czechoslovakia.

III. 5 Aug 69

A 4

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The author notes that the correctness of the assessments and conclusions made at the Bratislava conference by the six fraternal parties has been confirmed by subsequent developments. The Bratislava statement has been supported by communist and workers parties.

The experience of the struggle and a realistic appraisal of the situation in the world, Novikov concludes, clearly show that the communists and the peoples of fraternal social countries carry high above their heads the banner of socialist internationalism and constantly strengthen cohesion and solidarity of the countries of the socialist community the peoples' reliable bulwark in the struggle against imperialism and for peace, democracy and socialism.

KATUSHEV DEPARTS FOR ROMANIAN CONGRESS

Moscow TASS International Service in English 0717 GMT 5 Aug 69 L

[Text] Moscow, August 5, TASS--A delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union led by Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party Konstantin Katushev left Moscow today by air for Bucharest. The delegation went to Romania at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party to attend the party's 10th congress.

PRAGUE DELEGATION ENDS VISIT, RETURNS HOME

Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 4 August 69 L

[Text] A delegation of the Prague national committee has ended its visit to the Soviet Union. The delegation, led by Prague Mayor Ludvik Cerny, stayed in our country at the invitation of the Moscow Gorispolkom. They left for home today. The week we spent in the Soviet Union was interesting and eventful, Comrade Cerny stated before his departure. We acquainted ourselves with the work of the Moscow and Volograd gorispolkoms. Volograd a city of valor and heroism, made a great impression on us. Our visit to the USSR was very useful and the experience of Moscow construction workers has been very valuable for us. Here high-quality construction is being carried out and construction work is being widely industrialized. We are grateful to the Muscovites for their fraternal assistance in solving a number of problems and in particular to the specialist who are helping us to construct the Prague subway. Close fraternal relations between the capitals of our countries are successfully developing.

NIXON TRIP FAILS TO RESOLVE VIETNAM IMPASSE

Moscow in English to the United Kingdom 2100 GMT 4 Aug 69 L

[Text] The Soviet parliamentary paper IZVESTIYA calls President Nixon's Asian tour disappointing. It revealed that Washington's course aims at hammering together aggressive communities that differ in no way from the old pacts, and at continuing the military venture in Vietnam.

The paper says that in Saigon, the President did not take a single step towards a real peace settlement. The paper stresses that this course has no future. It adds that the only way to break the deadlock is to accept the proposals advanced by the National Liberation Front and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. These proposals are dictated by the actual situation in Vietnam and by common sense, and the United States should heed them, the paper advises.

III. 5 Aug 69

A 24

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

SOCIALIST COUNTRIES' STRUGGLE DEMANDS UNITY

Moscow PRAVDA 3. Aug 69 p 4 L

[Editorial article: "The Defense of Socialism Is the International Duty of Communists"]

[Text] The peoples of the socialist community under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist communist and workers parties are confidently creating a new society. By their labor and their glorious achievements they are steadily multiplying the socialist countries' gains in developing the economy, science, and culture, improving the people's standard of living, and strengthening the state order. The Polish People's Republic has just celebrated the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the new power. The Bulgarian People's Republic and the Socialist Republic of Romania are preparing to meet the jubilee of the 25th anniversary of their entry onto the socialist road of development. The GDR is preparing for the 20th anniversary of the proclamation of the first worker-peasant state on German soil. In a short period these countries, like the other fraternal states, have gained important victories in all fields of building a new life.

During these years, these European socialist countries have created a mighty industry, implemented important reforms in the countryside, and insured the flourishing of national culture and a continual increase in the people's well-being. In the last 10 years alone, the national income of the countries belonging to CEMA has increased by 93 percent. The CEMA countries occupy only 18 percent of the earth's territory and only 10 percent of the world's population live in them, yet they produce roughly one-third of world industrial output. These victories are eloquent proof of the inexhaustible life forces of the socialist order and the triumph of Marxist-Leninist teaching. The socialist order is becoming increasingly more mature and reveals ever more fully the advantages of its economic and socio-political organization and the true democratism inherent in it. The socialist countries international authority and their role in resolving the fundamental questions of world politics are continually growing. The Soviet Union and the other socialist states, by their example, are inspiring the working people of the capitalist world to struggle for their rights and a bright future.

The historic successes of the socialist countries are the result of the heroic efforts and selfless labor of millions of workers, peasants, and intellectuals, the communist and workers parties' skillful direction of the processes of socialist building, and the consistent implementation of Marxist-Leninist teaching in the concrete conditions of each country. At the same time, it is the result of the fraternal countries' comprehensive fruitful cooperation which is being built on the principles of mutual aid and support and principles of socialist internationalism. This cooperation, embracing all aspects of life, facilitates the resolution of important issues and helps the fraternal peoples to better fulfill the tasks set before them.

The achievements of each socialist country are the common property of the whole socialist system and each people's concrete contribution to strengthening the positions of world socialism. The support, consolidation, and defense of these gains is the international duty of all socialist countries. This conclusion, dictated by life and stemming from the interests of each socialist state and the entire socialist community, permeates the whole content of the statement of the socialist countries' communist and workers parties adopted a year ago at the Bratislava conference.

III. 5 Aug 69

A 25

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The representatives of the communist and workers parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia, in convening the Bratislava conference, proceeded from fact that the complex international situation and imperialism's subversive activities directed against the people's peace and security and the cause of socialism demanded the further unity of the countries of the socialist system. They also took into consideration the fact that the development of socialism raises new problems, the solution of which requires the unification of the socialist states efforts.

The participants in the meeting expressed the inflexible determination to develop and defend socialist achievements in their countries and to achieve new successes in strengthening of socialism's positions and rebuffing imperialism's intrigues in steadfast loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, education of the masses in the spirit of socialist ideas, proletarian internationalism, and an uncompromising struggle with the bourgeois ideology and all antisocialist forces.

The Bratislava statement says: "The fraternal parties firmly and decisively oppose their unbreakable solidarity and high vigilance to any attempts by imperialism all other anticommunist forces to weaken the leading role of the working class and the communist parties. They will not permit anyone anywhere to drive a wedge between the socialist states and to undermine the bases of the socialist social system. The fraternal friendship and cohesion in this direction meet the vital interests of our peoples and form a reliable basis on which to resolve the socioeconomic and political tasks, on which our countries communist parties are working."

The entire development of events in the world this past year has shown us the vitality and importance of the conclusions drawn in that document and their great theoretical, political, and practical significance. Time has quite manifestly confirmed that the measures being implemented by the fraternal countries for strengthening the positions of socialism and for collective defense of socialist achievements are absolutely correct and timely. Imperialist reaction has again been convincingly taught that the peoples of the fraternal countries are standing firmly on guard of socialist achievements and that any intrigues by the enemies of socialism are doomed to failure.

Speaking at the celebrations in Warsaw, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev said: "Let our class enemies harbor no illusions about finding an opportunity of cancelling out the historical achievements of socialism. Such a thing will not happen! The guarantee of this is the (creative) conscious labor of the peoples of the socialist countries, their majestic plans, and their general determination to develop their fraternal cooperation in all spheres, and to strengthen the Warsaw Pact which reliably insures the sovereignty of its participants and the security and inviolability of the frontiers of socialism in Europe. . . ."

The fraternal parties are doing great work to strengthen the might of the countries of socialism and for the broad, comprehensive coordination of efforts directed toward resolving tasks facing them and for utilizing all the capabilities contained in the new social system.

The development of the countries of socialism is characterized by an increase in the political activity of the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and all the working people; by the comprehensive progress of the socialist social system; by the further development of socialist democracy; and by the improvement of the style and methods of party, state, and economic work.

III. 5 Aug 69

A 26

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The leading role of the working class and its vanguard--the communist and workers parties--is growing stronger in the fraternal countries.

The socialist countries' deepening and improvement of economic cooperation on a bilateral and multilateral basis is continuing. These questions were widely discussed at the 23d special CEMA session, in which the leaders of the communist and workers parties and the heads of government of the CEMA member countries participated. Its decisions aimed at further widening comprehensive economic cooperation have great significance in strengthening the might of each country and the entire socialist system, in consolidating the positions of the socialist countries, and in strengthening the unity of the socialist community.

The socialist countries' close fraternal ties also find expression in their foreign policy cooperation, in the collective examination of the key problems of international life. The Budapest conference of the Warsaw Pact member states' Political Consultative Committee represented a major contribution to the struggle for peace and security. The appeal adopted in Budapest to all European countries concerning the preparation and conducting of a general European conference on questions of security and cooperation is receiving understanding and support among broad circles of the public on our continent. The Budapest conference decisions are carving a path for the settlement of urgent international problems in the interests of insuring peace and security in Europe and throughout the world.

Socialism's enormous contribution toward accelerating historical progress and to the common cause of the anti-imperialist forces received a high evaluation at the international conference of communist and workers parties. The conference noted that the world socialist system is the decisive force in the anti-imperialist struggle. Every liberation struggle finds absolutely irreplaceable support from the world socialist system, primarily from the Soviet Union. Relying upon its own constantly growing economic and defense might, the world socialist system is fettering imperialism and restricting its opportunities for exporting counterrevolution. In fulfilling their international duty, the socialist countries are rendering increasing assistance to the peoples struggling for freedom and independence and are strengthening peace and international security.

The victories of all revolutionary forces and the new world's successful opposition to the old depend to a decisive extent upon the further achievements of the socialist system upon its cohesion, and upon the ability and capacity of the ruling parties of the socialist countries to utilize the opportunities built into the new social system. Hence it follows that concern for strengthening the world system of socialism is simultaneously a concern for the world revolutionary process' development and concern for an effective struggle against imperialism. The conference confirmed that the chief orientation in the cause of the socialist system's cohesion is represented by the unswerving implementation of the principles of socialist internationalism, the correct combination of the socialist states' national and international tasks, and the development of fraternal mutual assistance and support. Life is demonstrating with the utmost clarity the ever-increasing significance of the principles of socialist internationalism which lie at the basis of relations between the countries of the socialist community.

The emergence and development of the world socialist system is an integral and organic part of the class battles in the international arena.

III. 5 Aug 69

A 27

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The enemies of the new system are not ceasing their attempts to undermine the bases of popular state power in the socialist countries, to frustrate the cause of the socialist transformation of society, and to reestablish their dominion. Thus, the conference stressed with all force that the defense of socialism is the communists' international duty. A break with internationalism, rejection of the socialist countries' coordinated actions, and a retreat from Marxism-Leninism are all inflicting harm upon the cause of socialism and upon the interests of the revolutionary struggle. The policy of the present CCP leadership is an example of this. The Mao Tse-tung group's splitting, great-power chauvinist activities on the international arena give voice to the fact that China's foreign policy has to all intents and purposes broken with proletarian internationalism and has lost its class socialist content. This ruinous course by the Mao group is meeting with a decisive rebuff by the overwhelming majority of fraternal communist and workers parties.

The establishment of the new type of international relations and the development of the socialist states' fraternal alliance is a complex historical process during which difficulties and differences can arise. The communists believe that these difficulties and differences must not break the socialist states' united front in the struggle against imperialism. The socialist system is founded upon the community of socioeconomic system and upon the coincidence of the fundamental interests and aims of the countries belonging to it. This community is the guarantee of overcoming existing difficulties and the further strengthening of the socialist system's unity on Marxist-Leninist and proletarian internationalist principles. Our Leninist party, our country, and our people have always been true to their international duty. As the CPSU Central Committee June plenum stressed, the USSR's foreign policy is playing and will continue to play a most important role in the common struggle by the anti-imperialist forces and in strengthening the might and cohesion of the community of socialist countries. It will serve as an effective instrument for frustrating imperialism's aggressive plans, preserving peace, confirming the principles of the peaceful cooperation of states with different social systems, and for supporting the peoples' liberation struggle.

Socialism's successes, its influence upon the course of world events, and the effectiveness of its struggle against imperialist aggression depend to a considerable degree upon the socialist countries' cohesion. The socialist countries' unity of action is an important factor for the cohesion of all anti-imperialist forces. Our party and the Soviet state have exerted and are exerting all efforts to insure that socialism's achievements are strong and inviolable, that the cause of socialism is consolidated and developed, and that the successes of the revolutionary forces and of the entire anti-imperialist front in the struggle for peace, democracy, national independence, and social progress, are multiplied.

MAO CONTROLS ALL FIELDS OF LIFE IN CHINA

People's Inspection Units

Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China 1430 GMT 3 Aug 69 T

["Comment on China Events"]

[Text] Dear listeners, of course, you understand clearly that the upper echelon in Peking is untiringly bragging about the results and achievements of the so-called cultural revolution.

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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Intelligence Memorandum

The Results of the World Communist Conference

Secret 9

No. 1579/69
26 June 1969

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
26 June 1969

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Results of the World Communist Conference

Summary

If the final outcome of the world Communist conference came near to satisfying Soviet goals, it was only because those goals had been progressively reduced throughout the years of haggling that preceded the conference. In the end, Moscow probably hoped to achieve little more than to convene a conference, to gain a high attendance of parties, to obtain condemnation of the Chinese, and to produce a document that would serve as a new doctrinal "reference" point and demonstrate the ideological unity of the world's Communist parties. The conference failed, however, to infuse a new sense of discipline into world Communism or to chart a coherent course of action for the national parties. The conference record and the conference documents can and will be quoted in support of views that remain divergent.

Note: This memorandum has been produced solely by CIA. It has been prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Clandestine Services.

Convening the Conference*

1. Many parties had feared from the beginning that Moscow would manipulate the China issue to restrict their independence at a conference, and these misgivings increased following the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Soviets, however, did what was required to bring the conference off. In November 1967, as the campaign to organize a consultative meeting was getting under way, they publicly disclaimed any intention of condemning China. At the consultative meeting in Budapest in February 1968 they further buried the China issue by rallying the parties to the single theme of "anti-imperialism," which might be expected to unify them if nothing else could. In the effort to prevent the issue from beclouding preparations for the conference, Moscow went so far as to propose a new method for working out a conference document. The document was to be formulated and approved by the parties before the conference took place.

2. These tactics might have made it possible for the Soviets to convene the conference as planned, on 25 November, despite the golden opportunity given certain parties to protract the process by criticizing Soviet-approved drafts of the document, had it not been for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The adverse reaction of the western European parties, chiefly Italy and France, caused the conference to be postponed twice until it was finally set for 5 June at a meeting in late March. Romania took a particularly dim view of the doctrine of "limited sovereignty" promulgated by the Soviets to justify the invasion. The Soviet Union sought to counter the reaction in Europe by applying financial and other pressures where it could. These measures worked, and the conference was assured.

**See Intelligence Memorandum 1570/69, 4 June 1969, "The Road to the World Communist Conference," for a fuller treatment of this subject.*

A High Attendance

3. From the outset, it was clear that Chinese participation in the conference was out of the question. In March 1965, when the 26 original drafters of the 1960 conference document were called to Moscow to organize a new conference, the Soviet Communist party might well have judged from the incomplete response that Albania, North Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan, North Korea and possibly Romania would be non-participants. Yugoslavia, which had been condemned at the 1960 conference, was undoubtedly written off by the Soviets early in their calculations. Cuba failed to respond to the next organizing call to the same 26 parties in November 1967, and was added to the list. As a result of the preparatory meetings in 1968, to which all parties were invited, it appeared that Romania would be a likely participant, but it became virtually certain that China's satellite parties (Burma, Cambodia, Malaysia and Thailand) would not be represented in Moscow. This meant that there were around 80 parties left that Moscow could hope to attract to the conference.

4. Ultimately, 75 parties officially participated, including Cuba and Sweden, which sent observers, and two "underground parties," reportedly Nepal and the Philippines. The appearance of Cuba gave a decided boost to the Soviets. The only significant nonruling parties that did not attend were Japan and the Netherlands. Although the Soviet party unsuccessfully sought the participation of North Vietnam and North Korea, the number of parties on hand was probably satisfactory from the Soviet point of view. Asia was underrepresented, but otherwise the gathering was truly world-wide. Attendance by the absent parties would only have further strained the already shaky facade of unity.

Condemnation of China

5. During the years of increasing difficulty with China, the Soviets have sought by various means to get a condemnation of China and an expression of solidarity from other parties. They realized, however, their efforts to humble China aroused fears in other parties

for their own independence. It was also apparent that any attempt formally to expel China from the movement would cost Moscow a meaningful international conference.

6. By late March the Soviets were in a position to take a realistic reading of the strength of the opposition. Up to that time dissent had been expressed mainly over the wording of the draft document, notably by the Italians and Romanians. The French party, previously a pleader for its independent status, had caved in by the March preparatory meeting, when it not only supported but also reportedly had a hand in formulating the draft of the document that emerged from that meeting. Smaller parties in opposition to the draft document were Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, San Marino, Mexico, Dominican Republic and Reunion. The opposition of the smaller parties on an issue like China was obviously of little concern to the Soviets, but that of Italy and Romania was more serious.

7. By the time of the final May preparatory meeting, growing tension on the Sino-Soviet border and the conclusion of the Chinese party congress led Moscow to introduce the China issue on the floor of the conference.

8. Brezhnev's keynote speech of 7 June included a major section devoted to the China question, and placed Moscow's anger with China on the conference record. In a rough box score of speeches by the 75 delegates, some 51, including the Italians, condemned the Chinese leadership explicitly; two, including Romania, adopted a neutral stance; and 19 avoided the issue, though several alluded to it by condemning "left opportunism." This was probably the single most important issue of the conference for the Soviets, and they received the show of solidarity they sought.

The Czechoslovak Issue

9. Moscow hoped to avoid discussion of the invasion altogether, and shortly before the conference the Czechoslovak party went on record urging that the matter not be raised. Nevertheless, ten parties explicitly criticized the Soviet-led invasion. Presumably

at Soviet instigation, four parties responded by defending the action, and some 60 parties did not mention it. Although this minimized what could have been a very embarrassing situation for the Soviets Moscow was forced to water down references in the conference documents to the international responsibilities of individual parties.

The Conference Record and Documents

10. The conference of 75 parties ran 13 days, 5 to 17 June. Except for the main conference document, other documents on the centenary of Lenin's birth, Vietnam, peace, Israeli aggression and solidarity with Communists under repression, ran into little opposition. The conference, apparently deferring to the insistence of parties like the French, Italian and Romanian, adopted a proposal to explore the holding of a broad-based world "anti-imperialist" congress, but significantly did not specify a target date. The main document on the "imperialist" threat and the "unity" of the Communist world, which had been the subject of controversy for over a year, underwent revision up to the final days of the conference. Its language was generalized and made vague enough to permit the parties to find in it words or phrases to support differing views.

11. The main conference document was adopted on the last day of the conference. The Dominican Republic delegate did not support the document as a whole, and did not sign. The Cuban and Swedish parties, as observers, also did not sign. The British and Norwegian delegates withheld their signatures, referring the decision whether to sign or not to their central committees. The parties of Australia, Italy and San Marino agreed to sign only one of the four sections of the document, the section in anti-imperialism. The parties of Switzerland, Sudan, Romania, Spain, Morocco and Reunion are reported to have signed with reservations.

12. Section one of the main document is a lengthy indictment of "imperialism," with the United States singled out for special condemnation. Section two describes the three forces of world revolution: the

Communist countries, national liberation movements, and the international working force. The third section calls on the parties to struggle against imperialism, which it describes as especially rampant in Vietnam. It also names those familiar "imperialist threats": NATO, West Germany and Israel. In the context of "the struggle for peace," however, this section endorses the principle of "peaceful coexistence" which permits a wide range of activity by the militants and more peacefully oriented parties. As it did in Khrushchev's formulation, the principle does not contradict the right of any oppressed people to fight for its liberation "by any means it considers necessary." At the same time, "peaceful coexistence" allows for the development of "fruitful" economic, scientific, and technical cooperation with non-Communist countries; and requires support of disarmament measures and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

13. The final section of the document on the relationship among the Communist parties is the shortest, but it proved to be the most controversial in the drafting process. It argues that the community of Communist nations, especially the Soviet Union, is the decisive factor in the "anti-imperialist struggle." It stresses that cohesion of the Communist countries will largely determine the progress of Communism and the effectiveness of its efforts to combat "imperialist aggression." Above all others, this section shows the effect of many committee redrafting sessions. It defends the need for "proletarian internationalism," mutual assistance and support, but it also speaks of the need for equality, sovereignty and noninterference in the affairs of other parties. While it is explicitly stated that there is at present no leading center in the international Communist movement, special praise nevertheless is directed to the Soviet Union as the main force of the movement and for its efforts on behalf of the Communist cause.

Conclusion

14. Given the scaled-down objectives of the Soviets, they probably can take satisfaction in having brought together 75 parties, in having produced a

final document elastic enough to be signed by the great majority of participants, and in having put on the record a series of speeches that can be cited as evidence of "overwhelming" support for Soviet views, especially on China. Moscow cannot escape the fact, however, that the conference show of unity is marred by the absence of most Asian parties, and that the 61 parties that signed the main document without reservations represent only about one third of the estimated number of party members in the world.

Action Taken on the Main Document by Attending Parties

Signed without reservations (61):

Austria	India
Algeria	Jordan
Argentina	Iraq
Belgium	Iran
West Berlin	N. Ireland
Bolivia	Ireland
Brazil	Canada
Bulgaria	Cyprus
Hungary	Colombia
Venezuela	Costa Rica
Haiti	Lesotho
Guyana	Lebanon
Guadeloupe	Luxembourg
Guatemala	Martinique
West Germany	Mexico
East Germany	Mongolia
Honduras	Nigeria
Greece	Nicaragua
Denmark	E. Pakistan
Israel	Panama

Signed with reservations (6):

Paraguay	Morocco
Peru	Reunion**
Poland	Romania
Portugal	Spain
Puerto Rico	Sudan
Salvador	Switzerland
Syria	
Soviet Union	
United States	
Tunisia	
Turkey	
Uruguay	
Finland	
France	
Ceylon	
Czechoslovakia	
Chile	
Ecuador	
S. Africa	
Nepal*	
Philippines*	

Signed only part (3):

Australia
Italy
San Marino

Did not sign at all (5):

Dominican Republic (ideological)
Cuba (observer)
Sweden (observer)
Great Britain (referred to CC)
Norway (referred to CC)

* Apparently the two parties not officially identified, but carried as "underground" parties in the list of participants.

** First reported as signing only section three of the document.

Non-attending (18):

Ruling parties:

Albania
China
North Korea
North Vietnam
Yugoslavia

Non-ruling parties
(Asia):

Burma	Malaysia
Cambodia	New Zealand
Indonesia	Thailand
Japan	
Laos	

Non-ruling parties
(other):

Iceland
Malagasy
Mauritius
The Netherlands
Senegal

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17 June 1969

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Effect of the Cuban Missile Crisis
on Soviet Strategic Force Planning

1. In October 1962 the leaders of the USSR were faced by a substantial US superiority in operational intercontinental strategic strike force and the prospect that the margin of superiority probably would continue to grow for at least another two or three years.


2. Earlier--perhaps a year or more before--the Soviet political and military leaders had probably come to the view that the limited capabilities of their intercontinental strategic forces compared with those of the US would, if not redressed, provide the US with a potential first strike capability. Soviet defense planners in making a prudent assessment of the strategic balance had probably concluded that, although the considerable Soviet strategic forces targetted against western Europe provided some measure of deterrence, the USSR would have no assured retaliatory capability with respect to the US until about 1966. By the fall of 1962, the Soviet leaders were also aware that US intelligence collection capabilities ruled out reliance on bluff and bluster.

3. These factors probably caused deep concern in the Kremlin. From the Soviet point of view, the US strategic posture not only posed a serious potential threat to the national security of the USSR, but also severely circumscribed Soviet foreign policy options throughout the world. Khrushchev probably viewed the emplacement in Cuba of strategic systems capable of reaching the US as the quickest way of redressing at least partially the strategic imbalance. Successfully carried out, it could have other immediate political returns as well. Khrushchev's Berlin objectives were probably closely intertwined with the over-all strategic goals.

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8. The comparisons of forces outlined above illustrate the vastly inferior strategic position of the USSR which probably provided the major motivation for Khrushchev's decision to place nuclear strike forces in Cuba in 1962. It seems likely that the Soviets decided not to deploy their second generation ICBM systems--the SS-7 and SS-8--on a large scale not only because of the shortcomings of these systems, but also because a crash program probably would have delayed the deployment of their third generation ICBM systems--the SS-9 and SS-11. Thus, it appears that Khrushchev decided to deploy existing medium range systems in Cuba as a stop-gap measure which would quickly and cheaply improve the relative strategic position of the USSR.

9. The attempt to convert Cuba into a Soviet strategic nuclear base can be interpreted as an admission of the inadequacy of the Soviet strategic deterrent and as a measure of the Soviet concern about the possible military and political consequences of this inadequacy. By 1961 the USSR probably was aware of the growing US capability to detect and monitor Soviet strategic force deployments and knew that it could no longer represent its strategic capability as being much greater than it actually was.

10. In addition to causing genuine apprehensions about the security of the USSR, the US superiority probably was viewed by Khrushchev as a restriction on his political flexibility in international relations--e.g., in resolving the Berlin question. The failure of his bold move probably reinforced the Soviet conviction that the USSR could not afford the military risks and political penalties of not competing with the US in a strategic arms race.

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4. The confrontation with US strategic power in the Cuban crisis probably confirmed the Soviet belief that anything less than a rough strategic equality with the US would leave them vulnerable both politically and militarily. Apparently the experience also persuaded the Soviet leaders that in order to avoid another period of strategic inferiority they would have to react more rapidly to future US plans for force improvements.

5. The failure of Khrushchev's gamble in Cuba probably did not alter the Soviet goal of achieving and maintaining a credible deterrent, but it may well have been an important factor in determining the pace, timing, and dimensions of the Soviet effort to build a strong strategic offensive capability. The Cuban experience undoubtedly provided strong support for those in the Kremlin who advocated large scale deployments of the SS-9, SS-11 and new SLBM strategic systems then under development in the USSR.

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11. A review of military programs and expenditures indicates that there was no abrupt redirection of Soviet effort immediately following the Cuban missile crisis. The relative stability in expenditures for strategic and general purpose force programs (excluding research and development expenditures) during the 1963-1965 period suggests that the Soviets decided to wait until the advanced systems then in development--e.g., the SS-9, the SS-11, and Y-class SLBM systems--would be available for large scale deployment to redress the strategic imbalance. The general size of the deployment for these systems probably was determined during this period. Continuation of the rapid rise in expenditures for research and development programs--which began in the 1950's--is an indication of the Soviet determination to pay the price of running a strategic arms race with the US. The large R&D programs undoubtedly were designed to provide the Soviet leadership with sufficient flexibility to fulfill their requirements for strategic forces under any foreseeable contingencies.

12. The Cuban missile crisis may have provided the USSR with an important lesson on the nature of a strategic arms race. The US reacted to the "missile gap" of the late 1950's with plans for major strategic programs, principally Minuteman and Polaris. The USSR, however, did not immediately respond to the US force improvement plans so that by the fall of 1962 it found itself in a worsening strategic position. Since the Cuban crisis, it appears that the USSR has attempted to anticipate the deployment of new US weapons systems and moved to offset them.

13. The expressed Soviet interest in discussing strategic arms limitation is probably prompted at least in part by their desire to preserve their current strategic position in the face of US improvements in strategic capabilities planned for the Seventies. Extension of SS-9 and SS-11 deployment and continued Soviet ABM testing may represent other Soviet responses to US plans for the deployment of MIRVs and an ABM system.

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VII. 9 May 69

A 11

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Kiem Statement

Moscow in Vietnamese to Vietnam 2230 GMT 8 May 69 B

[Text] Speaking at yesterday's session of the Paris talks on Vietnam, Tran Buu Kiem, head of the NFLSV delegation at the conference, pointed out new realistic proposals aimed at settling the Vietnam problem.

Once more, he supported the proposal to form a provisional coalition government which will include representatives of all the strata of the people.

The chief of the NFLSV delegation expressed hope that, during the lapse of the time from the restoration of peace to the holding of the elections, neither party will carry out measures aimed at forcing the people to follow its own political platform.

Tran Buu Kiem declared that the provisional government should carry out a policy based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. This means that this government should establish diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with many nations in the world, including the United States.

USSR, EGYPT FAVOR 1967 UN MIDEAST RESOLUTION

Malik UN Letter

Moscow TASS International Service in English 0801 GMT 9 May 69 L

[Text] New York May 9 TASS--The permanent soviet representative at the United Nations Ya. A. Malik presented to the U.N. Secretary General U Thant a letter in connection with his report to the Security Council on the situation in the Suez Canal zone.

The letter runs, among other things: The aggravation of the situation in the Middle East cannot be the cause of serious concern and anxiety. The situation was aggravated by the reckless policy of the Israeli top circles.

Underlying this policy is their striving to prevent a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, called for by the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967.

The top Israeli leaders are known to declare openly that the consultations of our powers--permanent members of the Security Council--in a bid to find ways and means to help reach a political settlement in this area do not at all suit them.

The Soviet Union believes that these consultations may become an efficient means of putting into life the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. During the consultations we are ready to exert every effort to have a political settlement in the Middle East reached.

What is now required is to eliminate obstacles raised on the road towards a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The interests of normalisation of the situation in that part of the world also call, undoubtedly, for strict compliance with the well known Security Council ceasefire resolutions.

The Soviet representative asked to circulate this letter as an official document of the Security Council.

III. 9 May 69

A 12

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIR

Primakov in PRAVDA

Moscow TASS International Service in English 0725 GMT 9 May 69 L

[Text] Moscow May 9 TASS--"The Israeli extremists may pay through the nose for their underestimation of the changes which took place in the Middle East and the world over in the past two years. The Israeli extremists are trying to wreck just peaceful settlement in the Middle East which would take into account the interests of all peoples in that area," PRAVDA Cairo correspondent Yevgeniy Primakov writes today.

The correspondent points out: Analysing the increased aggressiveness of the Israeli military and the successful counteraction of the Egyptian defense, one of representatives of the top Egyptian circles told him that "the United Arab Republic realizes the danger of underestimation of the enemy forces and will allow to draw itself into no ventures. Active defence actions should by no means be mixed up with this. The Arabs intend to build up their active defence, giving up no possibility to Israel to consolidate its positions on the occupied land."

The favourable response in the Cairo press to the statement of the U.N. Secretary General U Thant is indicative of the United Arab Republic's continued efforts in a bid to find a political settlement of the crisis, Primakov point out; U Thant again reaffirmed that he did not intend to withdraw U.N. observers from the Suez Canal Zone.

The correspondent stresses that settlement of the Middle East problem depends on the Israeli leadership, first of all. In this connection, Primakov recalls President Nasir's statement at a May Day meeting in Cairo. The president stressed that "if the U.N. Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, was complied with, and the rights of the Palestinians ensured in keeping with other U.N. resolutions, there would be no more outstanding problems."

PODGORNYY TO MEET CPR REPRESENTATIVE IN DPRK

Seoul Domestic Service in Korean 0600 GMT 9 May 69 B

[Excerpt] Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Podgorny will confer with the CPR ambassador to Pyongyang or a special envoy, who will be sent to Pyongyang, on the Sino-Soviet border conflict, according to a source from Moscow yesterday.

This will be the first visit by a top leader of the Soviet Union to Pyongyang since Premier Kosygin visited Pyongyang in 1965 en route to Hanoi.

✓ KOMMUNIST EDITORIAL ON MARXISM-LENINISM

Moscow KOMMUNIST No 6, Signed to Press 21 Apr 69 pp 3-14 L

[Editorial: "A Great International Teaching"; words in slantlines published in italics]

[Text] Leninism is the scientific, theoretical expression of the fundamental, universal interests of the working class and of all workers in the modern era. Continuing and developing the cause of the founders of the scientific ideology of the proletariat, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Leninism consistently expresses the cherished hopes of the working class and of working people and corresponds profoundly and comprehensively to the chief questions dictated by life and modern historical development. The cause of the revolutionary renewal of the world and the theory and practice of socialism in our day are inseparable from the name of Valdimir Ilich Lenin.

III. 9 May 69

A 14

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

One of the widespread methods of struggle against Leninism is denial of its international character and international significance and the portrayal of Leninism as a particularly "Russian," phenomenon, as a teaching allegedly corresponding only to Russian conditions. This slander of the bourgeois ideologists against scientific communism has acquired the force of a rooted prejudice among them; it is even shared to this or that extent by certain figures calling themselves socialists and even Marxists. For example, Ernst Fischer's latest booklet, "What Marx Really Said," which is graphic proof of the author's revisionist positions and of the coincidence of his views with the ideas of traditional bourgeois, anti-Marxist propaganda, asserts that Lenin, "proceeding from Marxist considerations, only "adapted the theory of revolution to the problems of tsarist Russia" (E. Fischer. "Was Marx Wirklich Sagte." Vienna, 1968, page 157). This book defines Leninism as the sum of the views "of that group (Bolsheviks) which was led by Lenin within Russian social democracy and under the leadership of which the 1917 October revolution occurred." (Ibid, page 158). Thus, Fischer propounds the ideas of the applicability of Leninism only in the background countries of the East with a predominance of peasant population and aspires to depict Leninism as one of the varieties and one of the trends of Marxism.

It is common knowledge that Leninism is the Marxism of our day, the creative development of Marxist teaching applicable to the historical conditions of the period of imperialism and the transition from capitalism to socialism on a universal scale, the theory of the revolutionary activity of the communist parties in the modern era, and the theory of building socialism and communism. Leninism is becoming increasingly widespread. Ruling the consciousness of the masses. It is difficult to find a place on the globe now where the name of Lenin would not be known--the name of the great continuer of the cause of Marx and Engels--where one would not see in the principles of his teaching and in the Leninist method the key to the solution of the urgent problems of social development. The international content of Marxist-Leninist teaching is determined primarily by the fact that it represents a theoretical generalization of the experience of the revolutionary struggle of the international working class and the workers of the entire world and of the achievements of progressive science, and that it reveals the general patterns of social development and arms the working class and all workers of the globe with a mighty weapon of struggle for the victory of socialism and communism.

It would be absurd to consider Marxism "a West European doctrine" simply because its founders lived in West Europe. Naturally, in creating their theory of social development, the founders of scientific socialism relied primarily on the experience of the most advanced countries of the 19th century from the viewpoint of the level of social life and the revolutionary process. At the same time, Marx and Engels made a profound study of and generalized universal history and the aggregate international experience of the revolutionary movement and took the gains of progressive science and culture into consideration. This made it possible for them to accomplish an extremely great change in man's social consciousness and to reveal the objective laws of the historical process, outside which it is impossible to understand the specific features of the development of individual countries. Russia, to where the center of the revolutionary movement was transferred at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries by force of objective causes, became the motherland of Leninism. However, it would be absurd to consider Leninism a peculiarly "Russian" teaching on this basis. In creatively developing Marxism, V.I. Lenin was guided by profound research into social relations not only in Russia but in the developed capitalist countries of West Europe and the United States, and he studied and generalized the new processes in the Asian countries and the experience of the international working class and national liberation movements and the achievements of progressive science.

III. 9 May 69

A 13

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Leninist ideas exert the most profound influence on the entire course of world development. Lenin's name has become the symbol of proletarian revolutions and of socialism and progress and the symbol of the communist transformation of the world.

In the struggle for the victory of communism, and constantly imbibing strength to inspiration from Leninist ideas, the communist parties,--loyal to the principles of proletarian internationalism--the workers of all countries and continents and the working people of all nations and peoples, color of skin, and race express feelings of boundless love and respect for Ilich and ascribe their best thoughts and aspirations to him. The theory and method of Leninism has been confirmed comprehensively by historical practice. Consideration of Marxist-Leninist teaching, comprehensive generalization of the practical experience of the revolutionary struggle and socialist building and of the achievements of modern scientific knowledge, and on this basis further creative development of theory--this is the law of action of all true revolutionaries and all Marxist-Leninists.

Leninism, which has an international character--the ideological foundation of international unity and the brotherhood of the workers and their joint struggle against imperialism and for socialism and communism--obliges all communists to give a crushing rebuff to any revisionist sallies in whatever form and wherever they may manifest themselves. This is natural, for when it is a question of the principles of Marxism-Leninism, of the international ideological property of the working class, and revolutionary theory, there are no and cannot be any "indifferent" communists. The meaning and significance of any philosophical teaching and of any sociopolitical doctrine are determined by their contribution to the general progressive development of knowledge and by the extent and nature of their influence on social life. Leninism has passed a comprehensive historical test in the very midst of mass historical movements, firmly entering the consciousness and the flesh and blood of the peoples and of hundreds of millions of people. The most outstanding revolutionary achievements of the 20th century are connected with Leninism--the Great October Socialist Revolution, which marked a fundamental change in the history of mankind, the complete and conclusive victory of socialism in the USSR, the formation of the world socialist system, and the magnificent social and national liberation battles and victories over capitalism won by the working class and the workers. Marxism-Leninism has become the ruler of the minds of all progressive mankind and the reliable compass of scientific knowledge and the revolutionary confirmation of the new, higher forms of social order.

For this very reason the bourgeois and the rightwing socialist ideologists are aspiring to belittle and emasculate the scientific content of Leninism and to put their own "interpretation" on it. The anticommunists are aware that in the middle of the 20th century it is no longer possible to reject scientific socialism out of hand and to oppose Marxist-Leninist teaching openly. Hence their attempts to find "contradictions" in the integral theory of Marxism-Leninism, to split up its component parts and various stages of development artificially and to counterpose them to one another. A considerable army of bourgeois ideologists--from the Trotskyite S. Hook and the professional anticommunist A. Meyer to the official American sociologist W. Rostow, father J. Bochenski, and the Jesuit A. (Shambra) [as transliterated]--are concerned to counterpose Marx to Lenin. They are leaning over backward, attempting to "prove" that the ideology of modern communism is not only not related to the authentic views of Marx, but is a "radical distortion of true Marxism." Revisionists of various stripes have chimed in actively in this numerically strong choir of outspoken bourgeois ideologists. Acting on behalf of "true scientific communism," they are preventing and discrediting the great Marxist-Leninist teaching, theory, and practice of scientific communism. Here the enemies of scientific communism are concentrating the fire of their criticism against Lenin and against Leninism.

III. 9 May 69

A 16

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Marxist-Leninists there can be no doubting the truth of the fact that the defense of the fundamental principles of the proletariat's scientific ideology and its subsequent development in accordance with new historical conditions represents a single process. The very formulation of the question of the possibility of breaking down this process--even more so that of the counterposition of its elements--is a false and artificial problem. Unfortunately, a number of authors who consider themselves Marxists are conducting an extremely fruitless discussion as to what is most important--the preservation of the purity of theory, or its development.

One has only to submit to this metaphysical formulation of the question, and any answer to it is doomed in advance to one-sidedness fraught with incorrect political and theoretical conclusions. Historical experience shows that any underestimation of the necessity to observe the principles of revolutionary theory, the necessity to protect them against any distortions, leads to a "creative" development of Marxism-Leninism in which its very essence is emasculated. The principles and method of scientific communism have been verified and corroborated by historical experiences. In emphasizing the scientific substantiation of Marxist teaching, as far back as the end of the last century V.I. Lenin said that this had been demonstrated strikingly since the time of the appearance of "Das Kapital," when on the basis of the dialectical materialist method a profound scientific analysis of the structure and development of the capitalist formation was made. Now the correctness of scientific communism has been confirmed by the entire experience of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism and the experience of the development of the world socialist system and the new socio-economic formation. All the successes of the world communist movement were made possible by the fact that its path was illuminated by proven Marxist-Leninist theory, reliably guarding against a possible descent to the positions of reformism and leftist revolutionarism.

The great Lenin taught that without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement. In all their activity the CPSU and the fraternal parties, adhering to the principles of proletarian internationalism, are guided by the single doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism represents an integrated and harmonious system of scientific principles and conclusions; it is a monolithic teaching which must constantly guard itself both against attempts at reformist "softening" and against nationalist and "leftwing"-opportunist, dogmatic distortion. Marxism's theoretical principles, which constitute the indestructible basis of the entire domestic and foreign policies of the communist party and the socialist state and the scientific foundation of socialism and communism, were defended indefatigably by V.I. Lenin. Let us recall, for example, his ardent speech against the Second International's opportunist theoreticians, who distorted the Marxist ideas on the state, revolution, and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and against the Trotskiyites and rightwing opportunists in our country.

The necessity for the defense of the fundamental principles of Leninism is felt particularly sharply now. Many extremely important theoretical tenets of scientific communism--on the proletariat's historic mission, on the dictatorship of the proletariat and the communist party's leading role in the revolution and socialist building, on proletarian internationalism, on the content and methods of building a new society, and others--have become the object of persistent attacks by bourgeois and revisionist ideologists, endeavoring in one way or another to emasculate the very principles of Marxism-Leninism. In these attacks the reformist ideologists generally speculate on the natural necessity to take new conditions into consideration, although it is perfectly obvious that a comprehensive generalization of new phenomena of scientific knowledge and social practice is only possible from Marxist-Leninist positions.

III. 9 May 69

A 15

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

All this explains why Leninism, which took shape in the bitter struggle on the international scene against the dogmas of the theoreticians of the Second International and against rightwing and "leftwing" opportunism, became the banner of the world working class movement in the era of the downfall of capitalism and the transition to socialism and communism.

V.I. Lenin studied the development of capitalism not only in Russia, although by analyzing the contradictions of Russian reality he showed that their characteristic features are in principle inherent in the entire capitalist system. On the basis of a profound study of the trends of social development on a universal scale and of an analysis and generalization of the enormous factual material of the leading bourgeois countries, V.I. Lenin revealed the essence of imperialism as the highest and final stage of capitalism and also its features and natural patterns. Guided by the ideas of Marx and Engels and the practical experience of the Soviet state, V.I. Lenin gave a comprehensive substantiation to the patterns of the formation of the communist socioeconomic formation.

Leninism is a new, higher stage in the development of Marxism and all its integral parts: Its philosophy, political economy, and scientific communism. V.I. Lenin developed and specified the most important ideas of Marxism on the leading role of the working class and its revolutionary part and on the dictatorship of the proletariat. V.I. Lenin enriched and specified the Marxist theory of revolution, drew a conclusion about the possibility of the victory of socialism initially in a few or even in one country alone, formulated the theory of the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution, and developed the idea of the combination of the proletarian revolution with the national liberation struggle. V.I. Lenin revealed the natural patterns and principal features of the transitional period from capitalism to socialism and formulated the principal problems of building socialism and communism. Leninism is the property not of a single country, but of the entire international liberation movement. Under the banner of Marxism-Leninism an enormous period of world development has passed which cannot be ignored and even less, excluded from world history.

In their time Kautsky, O. Bauer, and other socialist renegades in the West and the Trotskiyites in Russia made fierce attacks on Leninism, attempting to represent it as a product of Russian "backwardness" and peasant narrowmindedness, as a theory allegedly unsuitable for the developed capitalist countries. In opposition to the social reformist and Trotskiyite views, and in the course of a principled ideological struggle with them, the world communist movement has provided comprehensive grounds showing that the proletariat's scientific world outlook is a single, integral teaching formulated by Marx and Engels and subsequently developed comprehensively under the new historical conditions by V.I. Lenin.

In our day scientific communism is being developed creatively by the CPSU and the other Marxist-Leninist parties. Leninism today is the combat banner and the guide to action of hundreds of millions of people creating a new life and fighting for peace, freedom, independence, and socialism. Marxism-Leninism is the inexhaustible ideological wealth of the present-day communist movement. At the same time Marxist-Leninists do not regard their teaching as something invariable and ossified. The creative essence of Marxism-Leninism and its revolutionary core--dialectics--are aimed at a timely comprehension of new phenomena and processes in accordance with changing objective conditions.

The further creative enrichment of Leninism is effected by the collective efforts of the world communist movement. However, this development does not proceed apart from the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism, but is accomplished on their basis.

III. 9 May 69

A 18

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

awareness into the workers of the socialist society. The CPSU is making an important contribution to resolving the urgent problems of present-day world development and of the international communist and workers movement.

One example of the struggle against Leninism in our time is the slanderous accusation that it is of a "dogmatic" character. Those who hold these views propose that the "closed" (they have in mind class and party) character of Leninism must be overcome and transformed into some kind of "open" or "general" (that is, supraclass) doctrine. Bourgeois and revisionist ideologists are of the opinion that only this kind of manipulation is capable of insuring the scientific character and authenticity of the proletariat's ideology. Although there are certain differences in the views of propagandists of "open" Marxism-Leninism, they are united in their offensive against the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism and against its precise class bases.

Communist Party spirit is a most important principle of Marxist-Leninist ideology, a principle that conditions its strength and effectiveness. Scientific communism appeals directly and immediately to the working class and to all workers, expresses their real interests, and shows the way to the revolutionary transformation of society. To what other social forces must Marxism-Leninism be "opened?" It is politically naive to count on sympathy from the exploiter classes. The popularity of and the degree to which an ideological system is spread among this or that social group or class depend primarily on the ideology's social meaning and objectives and on how completely it expresses their real interests. Marxism-Leninism is the militant revolutionary teaching of the working class and of all workers and its whole existence is aimed at the revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeoisie's domination and at the destruction of each and every kind of exploitation and repression. On the other hand the ideology of the exploiter classes is sharply directed at suppression of the working masses and it serves the cause of justifying exploitation. Here is its social purpose, its class objective, and its party spirit. Therefore, the clash between communist and bourgeois ideologies is an expression of the class struggle in the world arena and of the struggle by the proletariat and all working people for the liquidation of exploiter relationships, the struggle for the social and national liberation of the peoples. As it is impossible to reconcile opposing classes and eliminate the antagonism between them, so too it is impossible to effect a synthesis of mutually opposed classes. Since the struggle for the minds and hearts of men is one of the basic forms of the class struggle, there can be no compromise. V.I. Lenin wrote: "People always have been and always will be the foolish victims of deceit and self-deception until they learn to seek out the interests of this or that class are behind the moral, religious, political, and social phrases, statements, and promises" (Complete Collected Works, Vol 23, p 47).

The class interests of the present-day imperialist bourgeoisie condition the tendentious, false, and mystifying character of its ideology. The fundamental divergence between the interests of the bourgeoisie--a historically doomed class--and the objective requirements of social progress prompt the theoreticians of imperialism to misinterpret reality and distort the real trends of its development. On the other hand Marxism-Leninism is the scientific ideology of the working class, which is interested in a strictly objective analysis of reality, in the liquidation of an form of social injustice, and in the cohesion of all democratic forces for a bright future.

111. 9 May 69

A 17

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Marxist-Leninists are enjoined to defend and protect these positions and to guard revolutionary theory resolutely and uncompromisingly against revisionist, reformist, and dogmatic distortions and the incorporation into it of all kinds of ideological substitutes purporting to be the "latest achievements" of scientific thought.

The staunch defense of Marxist-Leninist principles inherently entails the need and ability to apply and develop revolutionary theory creatively. V.I. Lenin's activity represents a model of the genuinely creative enrichment of theory

Lenin liked to say that K. Marx's principal work, "Das Kapital," was the result of the study of real processes, of a wealth of facts; the same can also be said of other works by Marxism's founders. Indeed, this applies fully to the works of V.I. Lenin, who relied constantly on a meticulous analysis of social reality, the generalization of revolutionary practice in the imperialist period, and the practice of socialist building. Leninism's strictly scientific method is profoundly hostile to the revisionists' constructions which are divorced from life, a distortion of reality, and speculative.

Tirelessly struggling to preserve Marxism's purity and liberating it from foul opportunism, V.I. Lenin not only reinstated Marx's and Engels' true views, but also developed them creatively in complete accordance with the new, specific conditions and with the achievements of science and social practice. It was precisely in this way that he formulated the integrated teaching of the new type of proletarian party, enriched the Marxist theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist state, and developed the teaching on the strategy and tactics of the proletariat's class struggle on the alliance between the working class and the peasantry in the revolutionary struggle; the ways of creating a socialist economy; the content and methods of the cultural revolution; and the ways of building socialism and communism.

Marxist-Leninist ideology is linked inseparably with life, with the practice of building socialism and communism, and with the struggle of the international working class and of all workers and oppressed peoples for their social and national liberation. Unity of theory and practice, a creative approach to theory, consideration of changing circumstances, and the ability to generalize new phenomena--herein lie the fundamental characteristics of Leninism--the theoretical basis for the solution of the most complex questions of the revolutionary struggle and the building of a new society. The CPSU Central Committee resolutions "on the preparations for Vladimir Ilich Lenin's birth centenary" emphasizes that "the unfading active force of V.I. Lenin's ideas consists precisely in his creative development of Marxism. The Leninist attitude to theory combined in itself revolutionary creativity and loyalty to the principles of Marxism and the connection of theory with life and revolutionary practice."

This Leninist tradition is continued by all Marxist-Leninists. Taking into account the specific character of the different countries, Marxist-Leninists throughout the world are developing and improving collectively a single and integral Marxist-Leninist theory.

Following Lenin's principles and creatively generalizing Marxist-Leninist theory, the CPSU shows the Soviet people the way to the victory of communism. In revealing the regular law-governed development from socialism to communism, the party has substantiated the primary significance of creating the material-technical base of communism which insures the victory of the new system, has developed scientific principles for the organization and control of the national economy at its present stage of development, and has theoretically substantiated specific paths for the gradual development of socialist statehood into a communist social self-governing state and also paths for improving socialist social relationships and instilling a communist

III. 9 May 69

A 20

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The anti-Marxist fabrication that Leninism is only suitable for economically undeveloped countries is refuted graphically by life. These days any unprejudiced person can see that Leninism, its revolutionary theory, its strategy, and its tactical principles are suitable and obligatory for the fraternal parties of all countries, taking their specific conditions into account.

It is well known that communists are always in favor of the comprehensive consideration of the specific circumstances of one country or another and of their social, economic, and cultural traditions and conditions and against the mechanical transference of the experience of certain countries to others. It stands to reason that one cannot replace this Marxist-Leninist attitude with the idea of the necessity for creating "a new variant of Marxism" for this or that country, for Marxism-Leninism is a single system of scientific views expressing laws of social development which are common to all countries and peoples and the whole of mankind. There cannot be Chinese, Russian, or Yugoslav Marxism. To assert such a thing would mean surrendering to oblivion the international essence of Marxism-Leninism and the universal significance of Marxist-Leninist theory and adopting the position of nationalistic ideology. Let us remember how passionately V.I. Lenin opposed those who strove to "tear" socialism "asunder" into "national compartments" and how he warned against nationalistic distortions which cause colossal damage to the interests of the world socialist revolution.

The following fact is graphic evidence of the pertinence of these warnings of Lenin's. As everyone knows, Mao Tse-tung began with the absolutization and dogmatization of Chinese experience, counterposing it to the revolutionary experience of other peoples. Thus he tried to give substantiation to China's particular path to revolution and to its ideological expression--"Sinicized Marxism." It could be shown originally that it was a question of applying Marxism to specific Chinese conditions. However, with the passage of time it became clear that under the flag of "Sinicized Marxism" Mao Tse-tung and his group had embarked on the road of anti-Sovietism and great-power chauvinism. Matters even reached the point of armed provocations by the Chinese authorities on the Soviet-Chinese border, which seriously damage the cause of socialism and peace, the common front of the anti-imperialist struggle, and the friendship of the Soviet and Chinese peoples.

Our people constantly nurture feelings of respect and friendship for the great Chinese people. They are firmly convinced that in the final analysis the difficulties in Soviet-Chinese relations will be overcome. The Soviet people are confident of the very great power of proletarian internationalism, which expresses the vital interests of the peoples of all countries. Naturally, every country which is guided by a Marxist-Leninist party will contribute something new to the forms and methods of socialist transformations. The practice of the socialist countries has enriched and specified the concept of the general natural laws, forms, and methods of socialist building and has shown the rich, complex, and multiform nature of the formation and development of a new system under one set or another of historically-specific conditions. The time taken for solving socialist tasks and especially for the formation of mature socialism having the appropriate material and technical base and developed social relationships is not uniform for different countries; it depends considerably upon the socioeconomic level at which the socialist transformations begin. But the basic natural laws for building and organizing socialist life are common to all. This is acknowledged by all Marxist-Leninists and is recorded in the declaration and statement of the 1957 and 1960 conferences of representatives of communist and workers parties.

III. 9 May 69

A 19

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The very nature of the working class--the wave of the future--a class whose interests coincide completely with the objective course of social development--conditions its interests in a true, all-round, and deep recognition of reality and in accelerating social progress. Only with a scientific understanding of the objective laws of history is it possible to implement the worldwide historic mission of the working class--the overthrow of the final exploiter system and the building of a new society on wise and just principles--and to direct grandiose construction consciously in all spheres of human activity under socialism and communism. Thus, any attempt to find social truth outside Leninism is a fruitless undertaking that has nothing in common with the interests of working people or of socialism and communism. The theoretical treasure house of Marxism-Leninism as a single international teaching is open to all the modern achievements of progressive scientific thought and to all Marxist-Leninist parties, each one of which makes its own theoretical contribution on the basis of its own experience in the revolutionary struggle. However, there are bourgeois and revisionist theoreticians who by hiding behind their demands for "openness" in Leninism, try to change it into a conglomeration of different ideas and concepts borrowed from the antisocial and philosophical doctrines that exist in our time. Those who love to introduce into Marxism-Leninism views and proposals alien to it suppose that in this way they are insuring the "up-to-dateness" of Leninism.

Of course, Marxist-Leninists are constantly analyzing theoretically and generalizing the greatest achievements of science and technology and the process of present-day social development. Marxist-Leninists also reveal what new phenomena of social science and practice are being subjected to analysis and, moreover, falsification by the bourgeois thinkers. Here Marxist-Leninists have waged and are waging an implacable struggle against the attempts of revisionist authors to replace Marxism-Leninism with an eclectic hodge-podge made up of the latest "achievements" of reactionary bourgeois philosophy, sociology, political economy, and legal and other concepts. And the attempts in this direction are being undertaken relatively intrusively by the revisionists. Periodically schemes are proposed which are calculated to cause a sensation among people who are unexact in the theoretical and political sense: To "supplement" Marxism-Leninism with abstract humanism, to replace the materialistic understanding of history with a "systemo-structural approach," to uncritically introduce into scientific communism sociological concepts, methods, and research principles, and so forth which have been borrowed from bourgeois theoreticians.

Such an interpretation of the "openness" of the theory is rejected resolutely by Marxist-Leninists; the theory of Marxism-Leninism is /closed,/ categorically and forever, to all enemies of Leninism, whether they stand openly on the bourgeoisie's positions, or whether they hide behind socialist phraseology. Any weakening, any yielding to the ideological enemies of scientific socialism would be fraught with losses for Leninist revolutionary theory--the greatest ideological asset of the international working class.

These days even many bourgeois figures have been forced to admit that socialism, created on the foundation of Marxist-Leninist theory insures accelerated economic and cultural development for all countries which embarked on its path, regardless of whether in the past they were at the stage of capitalism or precapitalism. All this, in its turn, predetermined the enormous effect of world socialism on the course of social development and the growth of the communist, workers, and national liberation movements. And now the veritable nature of the theory of Marxism-Leninism has been proved in the experience of many nations, large and small, living in various parts of the earth and the general natural laws governing the formation and development of socialist society have been elucidated.

III. 9 May 69

A 22

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Those actions were directed toward defense of socialist Czechoslovakia's national sovereignty and against the encroachments of internal and foreign enemies on the social and national achievements of a fraternal people and toward insuring the conditions for the free development of a sovereign socialist country.

The strength of the international communist and workers movement lies in its unity. The effectiveness of the struggle against the common enemy of all peoples--imperialism--depends on the cohesive actions of all present-day revolutionary forces. Marxist-Leninists see their international duty in defending and strengthening the positions of world socialism and in waging a determined struggle against imperialism and on behalf of the basic interests of the working people. The international conference of communist and workers parties, which opens in Moscow on 5 June, is destined to be an important milestone in the mobilization of the popular masses for a more active and effective struggle against imperialism. The recent session of the working group for preparation of the draft documents for the forthcoming conference and discussion in the preparatory commission of the draft of the main document for the conference showed the firm desire of communists of all continents for comradely cooperation and again demonstrated the growing aspiration of the communist and workers parties toward cohesiveness in the struggle against imperialism and on behalf of common aims on the principled basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

The course of preparations for the forthcoming conference shows that, given a sincere striving toward cooperation, even the most complex questions can be solved, and this is what the vital interests of the broadest popular masses imperatively demand. The objective community of interests of the communist parties and all ranks of the world revolutionary movement are stronger than those factors causing disagreement and divergence. The condition for the coming victory of the international communist movement is loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and to the ideas of the recognized leader of the world proletariat, V.I. Lenin, who made an enormous contribution to formulating the communist movement's strategy and tactics. Lenin raised high the banner of internationalism and educated communists and all working people in the spirit of international solidarity. With his characteristic revolutionary passion V.I. Lenin fought opportunism, adventurism, and nationalism in the international workers movement and warned the communist parties of the danger of nationalist and revisionist ideology and policy for the fate of the revolution and socialism.

Recalling their leader's behests, Marxist-Leninists of all countries are striving to strengthen the unity of their ranks on the basis of proletarian internationalism. Objective preconditions of the necessity for unity are to be seen in the fact that the communist movement has a common ideological basis--Marxism-Leninism, a common class enemy united on an international scale and capable of any perfidies and adventures--imperialism, and a common aim--the victory of the shining ideals of communism.

The social optimism of communists is based on a knowledge of social development, on belief in the forces and wisdom of the peoples, and on the experience and revolutionary tempering of the working class' vanguard--the party of communists. The reliable ideological weapon of the communist party and of the world revolutionary liberation movement through all the complex historical peripeteias is the international study of Leninism--the eternally vital source of Revolutionary thought and revolutionary action.

III. 9 May 69

A 21

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The correct combination of national and international interests in the policy of communist parties and the Leninist interpretation and practical implementation of the principles of internationalism are particularly important at this time. One ought to bear in mind that the imperialist bourgeoisie, gambling mainly on nationalistic elements and on rightwing and "leftwing" opportunists, is trying to weaken the ideological and political unity of the peoples of the socialist countries, to counterpose them one against the other, to introduce a split in the international communist and workers movement, to alienate the united front of the working people, and to blunt their class consciousness.

Recently a fabrication has been circulated by the enemies of the proletariat's scientific ideology alleging that the single Marxist-Leninist ideology and the general principles for building socialism present a threat to the national development and state sovereignty of one socialist country or another; that the USSR is at the same time a supporter of some kind of doctrine called the "limited sovereignty" of socialist countries. This fabrication has its propagandists within the United Nations. It is really blasphemous to ascribe such views and practices to the CPSU--the unwavering fighter for the equality of all peoples and for the social and national liberty of all nations. The policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government both in the field of national relations in our country and in the field of international relations convincingly demonstrates profound loyalty to the ideals of that great internationalist, Lenin.

The practice of the USSR has brilliantly confirmed that the Leninist policy insures complete elimination of all traces of the economic and cultural inequality of the people and all oppression of one nation by another and insures not merely formal, but actual equality of the working people of all nationalities. Socialism guarantees the right of the peoples to their own statehood, national language, culture and national traditions, and equal opportunities for the representatives of all nations. It enlists all people in the common cause of building socialism and communism. This is the confirmation of genuine internationalism which is implacable toward all great-power and petit bourgeois nationalist tendencies.

In interstate relations the Soviet Union, following the Leninist policy of peace and friendship among all states, has constantly supported the principle of national sovereignty from the first days of its existence. The Soviet Government voluntarily granted state independence to countries which had been enslaved by tsarism, rejected unequal treaties, and constantly advocated and advocates the independence and national sovereignty of the peoples. Thanks to its decisive contribution to the defeat of fascist Germany and militarist Japan, the USSR helped the states of Europe and Asia to restore their national independence and strengthen their sovereignty.

In its mutual relations with the socialist countries, the CPSU, like the other parties loyally following the principles of proletarian internationalism, is an active champion of full equality, strict respect for sovereignty, comprehensive close cooperation, reciprocity and mutual aid of the fraternal parties and countries, and their joint defense from imperialist intrigues. This is what V.I. Lenin taught tirelessly, stressing the indivisible unity of international and national interests in building and defending socialism.

Loyal to the principles of proletarian internationalism, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries undertook joint actions to defend socialist achievements in fraternal Czechoslovak.

III. 8 May 69

E 3

USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

"Every war," Lenin wrote, "is inseparably connected with the political system from which it arises. That same policy which a certain power and certain class within this power has pursued for a long time prior to a war will be inevitably and invariably continued by this same class, having changed only the form of action" (Complete Collected Works, Vol 32, page 79. He showed that it is impossible to correctly evaluate war without understanding its sociopolitical nature and class essence and without seeing the subordination of war to the economic and political interests of some powers and the various classes within these powers.

An important feature of Leninism is his teaching on the defense of the socialist fatherland. V.I. Lenin's great merit lies in the fact that under the new historical conditions of the 20th century he formulated the theory of the possibility of the initial victory of socialism in one country and showed the objective historical necessity for armed defense of the state of the victorious proletariat from imperialist aggressors. Lenin's immortal ideas have entered into the military program of the proletarian revolution substantiated by him and into the general plan for building socialism and communism in our country. Here Lenin proceeded from the fact that "The transition from capitalism to communism is a whole historical epoch. Until it is completed, the exploiters will inevitably preserve the hope of restoration, and this /hope/ is transformed into /attempts/ at restoration" (Complete Collected Works, Vol 37, page 264. Consequently, military defense of socialist gains is a general natural law of the stage of transition from capitalism to socialism; it is objectively conditioned by the character of the revolutionary process of the imperialist epoch and the fundamental antithesis of the two sociopolitical systems.

The profoundly substantiated Leninist tenet on the socialist state as a new, authentic fatherland of workers has made it possible to comprehensively examine the question of the essence of war and defense of the socialist fatherland. Lenin pointed out that this is a special type of war distinguished by its undoubtedly just, liberating character and its consistent revolutionary and genuinely national nature. In the defense of the socialist fatherland, Vladimir Ilich emphasized, both national and international tasks merge into one; the defense of the world's first country of victorious socialism is an international cause.

Lenin revealed the opportunities, paths, forms, and means for accomplishing the defense of revolutionary gains, for strengthening the military might of the country of victorious socialism, and for organizing and developing its armed forces.

In developing Marxism under the new historical conditions, V.I. Lenin came to the conclusion that the proletarian revolution could not manage without the breakdown of the old army--the most ingrained instrument of the old system and the most hardened bulwark of capitalist domination. Therefore, the first commandment of the socialist revolution is the liquidation of the old army, its dissolution, and its replacement with a new army.

Lenin formulated the theoretical principles and the practical plan for the creation of a new army of liberated workers and peasants, formulated the principles of Soviet military development, and revealed and characterized the principle features and sources of the might of the Soviet Armed Forces. One of the principal features of the Soviet Army, Lenin pointed out, is the fact that it is a new type of army, an army of the socialist revolution and the bulwark of Soviet power.

III. 8 May 69

E 2

USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

Pavlovskiy noted that the Soviet Union emerged from the war still more powerful, and its prestige and influence on the entire international development grew enormously.

"The rout of Hitlerite Germany and imperialist Japan and the territorial recarving of Europe and Asia started by the invaders. The borders established after the war as a result of the capitulation of the aggressor states and also as a result of agreements are just and inviolable," stated the deputy minister.

TEXT OF GEN YEPISHEV'S KOMMUNIST ARTICLE

Moscow KOMMUNIST No 6, Signed to Press 21 Apr 69 pp 60-71 L

[Article by Army Gen A. Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "Leninism--The Basis of the Education of Soviet Soldiers"; passages between slantlines published in italics:]

[Text] For more than 50 years the Soviet Army and Navy has been standing guard over the immortal cause of October and the gains of socialism. Great and splendid is the path they have traversed, a path marked by two universally historic victories over the forces of international imperialism in the Civil and Great Patriotic wars and by the noble fulfillment of patriotic and international duty.

The Soviet social and state system and the Communist Party leadership have always been and remain the basis of all the heroic accomplishments of the Soviet Armed Forces and of their might and combat glory. The all-powerful Marxist-Leninist revolutionary teaching represents the inexhaustible, life-giving source of the invincibility of our army and navy and of their successes in perfecting their combat ability and combat readiness.

V.I. Lenin, the brilliant theoretician of the proletarian revolution and the socialist transformation of society, the organizer and leader of the Communist Party and Soviet state, has also gone down in history as an outstanding military theoretician and figure. The birth of the Soviet Armed Forces and their entire heroic path are inseparably linked with his name.

Historic merit belongs to Lenin for substantiating the military program of the proletarian revolution and for formulating the doctrine on the defense of the workers and peasants fatherland and on building the socialist state's armed forces. With his works on military questions and his indefatigable and multifaceted activities, Lenin laid the foundations of a new stage in developing the theory and practice of Marxism in the military sphere.

V.I. Lenin creatively developed and enriched the ideas of K. Marx and F. Engels on war and the army and on the dependence of war and military affairs on conditions of social development and the economic and political structure of society. On the basis of analyzing the final historical stage of capitalist development--imperialism--and its economic and political essence V.I. Lenin gave a truly scientific, class interpretation of the basic patterns and features of war in the modern era and of their characteristic traits.

Lenin profoundly revealed the class essence of war. He viewed war as a sociohistorical phenomenon subordinated to the political aims of certain states and classes and as a continuation of politics by means of armed aggression.

III. 8 May 69

E 5

USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

Turning his attention to military building and combat readiness of the armed forces, Lenin considered that the most important means of intensifying the army's combat readiness and of forming high morale and military-political standards among personnel was party and political work.

He pointed out that a firm foundation for the Red Army was created by political propaganda on the front, the organization of communists in our army, and selfless struggle by the best people of the working masses. We conquered enemies on all fronts "Thanks to the existence in the Red Army of communist cells which were of enormous propagandist and agitational significance" (Complete Collected Works, Vol 39, pp 313-314. Vladimir Ilich emphasized that where political work was conducted most painstakingly among the troops there is no slackness in the army, its order and spirit is better, and there are more victories. He repeatedly reminded members of military councils, commissars, and all party workers: "Look after political work," "do not relax on political work," and he was interested in what was being done "for the improvement of political work."

In the Soviet state's military building Lenin allotted the decisive role to the leadership of the Communist Party, regarding it as an objective natural law, the very foundation of Soviet military building and its highest, immutable principle. He was continually concerned with increasing the party's leading and directive role in military building and insuring that it was conducted in precise accordance with general directives given by the Central Committee on behalf of the party and under the Central Committee's direct control.

And we are primarily obliged to the Communist Party and the CPSU's Leninist Central Committee for everything that the armed forces achieved--its high level of technical equipment, ideological and political cohesion, the remarkable morale and combat qualities of privates, sergeants and officers, the victories over imperialist aggressors, and the continual improvement of combat readiness.

Leninism, the ideology of the most advanced, most revolutionary and mighty class of modern society--the working class--is now the ideology of all Soviet people; it forms the basis of the education of all Soviet people and the formation of their communist world outlook, and it gives them the opportunity to evaluate international and domestic events from class positions and to find answers to present day problems.

The ideas of Leninism, having become the common property of the working masses, have been transformed into an enormous force which inspires and mobilizes the Soviet people to solve problems of communist building and labor and exploits for the glory of the socialist homeland.

Being the scientific foundation of the CPSU's policy and the Soviet people's education, Leninism also serves as the foundation of the Soviet state's military building for strengthening its armed forces, and for educating army and navy personnel as an inseparable part of its people, linked with it by blood ties.

Questions of military building, the creation and strengthening of the army and navy, and troop education are an inseparable, component part of the theory and practice of communist building. "The building of our army could only lead to successful results," said V.I. Lenin, "because it was created in the spirit of general Soviet building...." (Complete Collected Works, Vol 40, pp 76-77).

The Communist Party, guided by Leninism, is developing a scientifically substantiated policy on military questions and our state's military doctrine, is determining the basic tasks for the creation of our military and economic potential and for the

III. 8 May 69

E 4

USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

It is distinguished from the armies of the capitalist states both by its social nature and its political purpose. Whereas the armed forces of the imperialist states serve the interests of the exploiter classes, the Soviet Armed Forces are truly popular: they champion the workers interests and defend the gains of socialism. The Soviet Army is formed from the people, is closely connected with them, and is their loyal servant. Lenin saw the truly popular character and the indissoluble merger with the Soviets, who unite all the workers, as one of the principal sources of our army's invincibility.

The popular nature of the Soviet Armed Forces and their purpose as a weapon for the defense of the socialist state from the encroachments of imperialist aggressors was given legal force in the decree of the Council of People's Commissars, "On the Organization of the Workers and Peasants Red Army" of 15 January 1918. Lenin personally introduced substantial amendments to the draft decree, specifying the social nature of the army of the socialist state and its purpose. "The old army," this document said, "served as a weapon for the class oppression of the workers by the bourgeoisie. With the transfer of power to the workers and the exploited classes, the necessity arose for the creation of a new army which would be the stronghold of Soviet power...."

There is another distinctive feature of the army of the socialist state: It is an army of friendship and brotherhood between peoples and the bulwark of the freedom and independence of socialist nations. The USSR Armed Forces are multinational in their makeup, they represent all the peoples of our country, and they are built on the basis of the cohesion of workers of all nationalities in a single multinational military organization of the socialist state. The friendship of the soldiers of different nationalities is one of the foundations of the combat might of our army and navy. Created for the defense of revolutionary gains from the first days of its existence the Soviet Army has been permeated with the spirit of proletarian internationalism.

Lenin repeatedly emphasized the unity of the national and the international in the armed defense of the workers interests. "Now," he said, "in fighting for the socialist system in Russia, we are fighting for the socialists of the entire world (Complete Collected Works, Vol 37, Page 68). "Close military and economic alliance is an obligatory necessity," he taught, for peoples who have embarked on the path of building socialism, "for otherwise the capitalists...will crush and stifle us in isolation"; the unity of military forces is essential, retreat from this unity is impermissible, and division is a crime (Complete Collected Works, Vol 40, Page 46, 99, and 100).

In formulating questions of military theory Lenin showed that the military might of a state is determined by many conditions and factors, primarily by its economic, scientific and technical, moral and political, and own military potentials. Leninism expresses the creative development and enrichment of the Marxist tenet on the role of the moral and political factor and the moral spirit of the people and the army in the soldiers and reveals the immediate, direct connection of the dependence of moral spirit on the nature of war and its political content and aims. The classical Leninist tenet--that in every war victory is ultimately conditioned by the state of the spirit of those masses who shed their blood on the field of battle--is still topical today.

III. 8 May 69

E 7

USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

The activity of political and party organizations and all intraparty work among the troops is built on the basis of Leninist norms of party life and principles of party management, taking into account the specific qualities of individual Soviet military organizations.

The armed forces are continually aware of the CPSU Central Committee's concern for improving party and political work, the structure of political organizations and of the party apparatus, and for improving the role of army and navy party organizations. Under present conditions, the party Central Committee has outlined and is implementing a number of measures for further improving party and political work in the army and navy, among which are: Creation of political directorates in all branches of the armed forces, introduction of an institute of deputy commanders of companies and equivalent subunits in the political sector, improvement of the training system for party and political workers, and the creation of a higher military-political college.

All this has enabled a solidification of the leadership of political and party organizations, taking into account the peculiarities and characteristics of the tasks which face troops of varying operational efficiency and mobility in the activity of political organizations, and has insured a higher standard in political and educational work directly in companies, batteries, and squadrons. Party and political work in all links of the army has been enriched both in content and form, and has become more purposeful and effective. In recent years the activity and militancy of party organizations has increased and the leadership of Komsomol organizations has improved.

The network of party organizations which now exists and the deployment of communists permits party influence to embrace all basic links of the army and navy and to insure daily connections between party organizations and the nonparty masses of troops.

A growing ideological quality, strict observance of Lenin's norms of party life and the principles of party leadership are characteristic of the internal life of armed forces' party organizations. The practice established by the Central Committee of informing communists on the most important questions of the party's and country's life and of the international communist movement, and also the discussion of congress and Central Committee plenum material in party organizations are of great significance for increasing the activity and militancy of party organizations. This enriches intraparty life, spiritualizes it, and promotes the improvement of political activity by every member and candidate member of the party, and promotes persistence in implementing party policy in practice.

The CPSU Central Committee has, through the solicitation of the USSR Defense Ministry and Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, adopted a decision to hold an all-army conference of party organization secretaries, which will take place very soon. Questions of further increasing the armed forces' combat readiness at the present stage and fulfillment of the CPSU Central Committee's requirements for improving party and political work in the army and navy will be discussed, at this conference. The conference will doubtlessly be a most important event in the life of the armed forces because of its scale, nature, and content. We suggest that one of its main results will be a new upsurge in the activity and militancy of army and navy party organizations, increased efficiency of all party and political work, and an intensification of its influence on the combat readiness of units, ships, and subunits.

ILL. 8 May 69

R. 6.

USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

technical equipping of the armed forces, is improving their organizational structure, is showing concern for the training of command, political, and engineering cadres, for strengthening one-man command, is determining the content of ideological work among army and navy personnel, and is organizing party and political work among the troops.

Lenin's ideas about the role of party and political work in the armed forces lay at the foundation of the party's activity in building the party and political apparatus in the Soviet Army and Navy.

Back in January 1918 an organizational-agitational section was created within the All-Russian Collegium for the formation of the Red Army. This section was in essence one of the first political organs of our army. In the spring of the same year an institute of military commissars was introduced on instructions of the Central Committee into every unit, division and military establishment. These institutes played an important role in the army's political education and enlightenment and in strengthening within it the spirit of revolutionary discipline and a high degree of organization.

In intensifying party leadership of the army, the organization of party and political work and the building of the Soviet Armed Forces' party and political apparatus, the significance of the Eighth Party Congress was extremely great. The congress gave a rebuff to the Trotskiyites, who tried to belittle the role of military commissars and political and party organizations among the troops, and it condemned the "military opposition which was essentially against the creation of a centralized, regular army.

Speaking at a closed session of the congress on the military question, V.I. Lenin paid great attention to strengthening the party nucleus in the Red Army, to the work of military commissars, party and political organizations, and army party organizations which had been called upon to educate Soviet soldiers in the spirit of devotion to the Soviet Republic, fulfillment of their military duty, and strict discipline and constant combat readiness. On the basis of the Eighth Party Congress decision, the network of army party cells was strengthened and extended and the leadership of political organs was improved. In accordance with the congress decisions a political section of the republic's revolutionary military council was created in April 1919. In May of the same year the section was transformed into the political directorate of the republic's Revolutionary Military Council (PUR)--now the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy--which has the rights of a party Central Committee section. Thus, 50 years ago a single system of leading party and political organs of the CPSU was created in the army and navy.

The more than half-century existence of the armed forces has revealed in all their fullness and diversity the role of party and political work and the significance of political organs as combat organs of our party, as leaders of army and navy party and Komsomol organizations and as the active organizers of personnel's political education. Together with commanders having military-political authority, political organs of the army and navy are firmly and persistently pursuing the CPSU policy in the armed forces, having a creative influence on all aspects of troops' life and improving party and political work.

Party political work in the Soviet Army and Navy is based on the firm foundation of Leninism, CPSU ideology and policy; party building in the armed forces is an integral part of the Communist Party's theory and practice, and its essence is determined by Lenin's teaching on the party, and by the CPSU program and statutes.

III. 8 May 69

E 9

USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

Consequently, a most important means of building up troops' high morale and political and psychological staunchness, and resolving all tasks of raising the forces; combat readiness was, is, and always will be well-organized ideological and educational work. The Soviet Armed Forces reflect the new social relations inherent in the socialist system and the invincible and truly inexhaustible forces of the Soviet people. One of the features of the Soviet Army, as the new type of army, is the high communist consciousness of personnel, and the ideological conviction of the troops in the noble purpose of the Soviet Armed Forces and the justice of the goals set before them by the Communist Party.

In analyzing the reasons for our victories over the interventionists and internal counterrevolution during the Civil War, V.I. Lenin pointed out that we "won only because the workers and Red Army men knew what they were fighting for." "... Every worker and peasant under arms," he said, "knows what he is going for, and consciously spills his blood in the name of the triumph of justice and socialism. This realization by the masses of the goals and reasons of war are of vast importance and insure victory." (Complete Collected Works, Vol 40, p 111; Vol 41, p 121).

The communist education of troops being carried out under the leadership of the party is, in its ideological foundation, united with and inseparable from the education of all Soviet people; it is built on the basis of Leninism, and defined by the party's program and decisions of its congresses and Central Committee plenums, and by other party documents.

Beneficial, guiding influence is exerted on the process of ideological and political education by 23d CPSU Congress decisions and measures adopted by the Central Committee for further improving ideological work, overcoming subjectivist features in its content, and enhancing the role of revolutionary theory in communist building. The content of ideological and educational work has been enriched by the CPSU Central Committee theses, "Fifty Years of the Great October Socialist Revolution," the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On Preparations for the Centenary of Vladimir Ilich Lenin's Birthday," and Comrade L.I. Brezhnev's speech, "Fifty Years of the Great Victories of Socialism."

In resolving the tasks of further improving ideological work in the armed forces, we proceed from the fact that it now consists fundamentally of elucidating Marxist-Leninist theory and party policy, and the achievements of the Soviet people in the struggle to implement the decisions of the 23d CPSU Congress and Central Committee plenums, and the education of troops in a spirit of high ideological character, Soviet patriotism, friendship of the USSR peoples, and proletarian internationalism.

Mastery of Leninist theory enables army and navy communists and all soldiers to better understand the historical course of the struggle and victories of the Soviet people and the grandiose transformations brought about in our country under the leadership of the Communist Party, to evaluate from a class viewpoint international and internal events, determine their place in the struggle of the Soviet people for building the communist society, and to find the answers to present day questions.

Lenin's teaching about war and army and his ideas on the armed defense of the socialist fatherland supply the key to understanding and correctly resolving the tasks of military-political training and improving the vigilance and fighting preparedness of the forces, and serve as an important means of educating Soviet troops in the spirit of boundless devotion to the fatherland and preparedness to skillfully and bravely defend it.

III. 8 May 69

E 8

USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

Commanders, party organizations, and political organizations in the army and navy proceed in their activity from Lenin's instruction that the basic task of party and political work is comprehensively increasing the Soviet Armed Forces' might. Developing and successfully resolving questions of combat readiness, which includes a high degree of political consciousness, combat training, firm discipline with precise organization of the troops' service, faultless operation of combat equipment, and readiness by all troops to carry out their orders under any circumstances of a possible war--such is the basic link of our entire activity.

One of the peculiarities of the armed forces' present life is that Strategic Missile Forces and air defense forces are even now, in peacetime, carrying out their combat watch, while the navy's ships are performing their service on the seas and oceans, insuring the homeland's security and preservation of its state interests. All branches of the armed forces are performing responsible tasks.

The achievement of a high level of combat readiness under conditions of constantly growing demands covers not just training but also personnel education. The socialist competition, thanks to which the ranks of excellent soldiers and class specialists, excellent crews and gun-crew platoons, companies, battalions, units, and ships are swelling, has achieved a large scale. In the course of the competition new patriotic undertakings aimed at reducing times taken to complete combat readiness and the expansion of units' and subunits' combat potential are born. This means the struggle to overfulfill standards of combat work and acquisition of allied skills, achievement of mutual interchangeability in gun crews and teams, night action meeting daylight standards and hitting targets with the first shot or salvo. The initiators of such undertakings are as a rule communists and Komsomol members.

In solving the tasks for increasing troops' combat readiness, we take into account the fact that this is inconceivable without firm military discipline and a high level of organization among personnel, and that Lenin's proposition on the necessity for discipline brought up to a high standard is now particularly vital.

With the existence of various means of armed struggle, when weapons are manned by a group and are collective in nature, negligence or lack of discipline by a single soldier in a gun crew or team operating a missile complex, atomic submarine or rocket-carrying plane could lead to very grave consequences. Therefore combat watch discipline, technical discipline, and time discipline acquire great importance. Only well-trained, educated, and disciplined personnel are capable of bringing themselves and their equipment to a full state of combat readiness in a short time without confusion and fuss.

Work on increasing troops' combat readiness is extremely multi-faceted. But however many problems face us and however urgent some of them may be at one stage or another of the armed forces' development, one thing is clear under all conditions: In the total number of items which determine the combat worthiness and readiness of the army and navy, the man, cadres, and the mass of soldiers are always of prime importance; without a conscientious soldier or sailor who shows initiative, Lenin pointed out, success in war is impossible.

In the final analysis, if we have to enter into an armed clash with an enemy [yesli nam pridetsya vstupit v vooruzhennuyu skhvatku s vragom], victory will not be achieved by equipment all on its own, even if it is the most perfect kind, but by the man who is strong in spirit, knows his equipment well, and is capable of making use of all its potential.

III. 8 May 69

E 11

USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

The classic Leninist definition of the essence of war serves as a methodological foundation for a consistent, scientific definition of the social and political essence and character of a possible war with the use of nuclear weapons. A third world war, if the imperialists nevertheless succeed in unleashing one, will be a decisive class clash between two counterposed social systems. On the part of the imperialist states this war will be the continuation of the criminal, reactionary, and aggressive policy of imperialism; on the part of the Soviet Union and socialist community countries, this will be a continuation of the revolutionary policy of freedom and independence of socialist states, of insuring the building of socialism and communism, and a legitimate and justified counteraction to aggression.

The Communist Party, by sacredly fulfilling Lenin's behests, is increasing the vigilance of the Soviet people, strengthening our motherland's defense capacity, and is concerned that the armed forces should be ready to defend the achievements of socialism and crush any aggressor.

Exactly 1 year separates us from a historic date--the centenary of V.I. Lenin's birth. Having set themselves the task of making the period of preparation for the jubilee of the great leader a new stage of truly Leninist training for our cadres and all personnel, military councils, commanders, political organs, and party organizations are paying great attention to the content and quality of this training and to raising the level of propagandizing Leninist ideas as a means of strengthening the spiritual strength of the army and navy.

In studying V.I. Lenin's ideological and theoretical legacy, attention is concentrated on assimilating the revolutionary and creative spirit of Leninism and its profound party-mindedness. By studying Leninism in action and its close ties with the present, officers, sergeants, soldiers, and seamen are profoundly aware of the continuity of revolutionary traditions, revolutionary experience, and the priceless spiritual treasures which have been accumulated during the heroic revolutionary struggle of our party and people, and understand the whole vastness of the CPSU's theoretical and practical activity in putting Leninist ideas into practice.

In recent years there have been fundamental changes in military affairs, in the technical equipping of the army and navy, and in the development of all arms of the armed forces. As for the political awareness and social activity of our troops, in this respect the Soviet Army radically differs from armies of capitalist states. Its advantage was particularly shown during the Great Patriotic War, and it is revealed to its fullest extent today. We have shaped a new type of soldier--a soldier-patriot, a soldier-internationalist, educated in the spirit of communist ideology. Under the influence of the general rise in our education level and culture the spiritual makeup of soldiers and seamen has been considerably enriched. The general cultural level of soldiers has been raised, moral and military-political qualities have been strengthened, and the awareness, discipline, and organizational quality of the forces have been increased even more. The moral and political makeup of the army and navy also characterizes the fact that the party and Komsomol stratum in them now constitutes more than 80 percent.

The situation in which our armed forces are developing and improving is changing. Demands upon military cadres are growing. There is an immeasurable increase in the ideological and theoretical level of cadres themselves, of all personnel, and their spiritual demands are increasing. And this demands further improving the forms and methods of party and political work, and a varied approach to troop education.

III. 8 May 69

E 10

USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

In studying Leninism, army and navy personnel obtain a deep understanding of the nature of the Soviet state and its armed forces and of the activity of the party, striving to infuse Soviet troops with a feeling of international solidarity with the working peoples of other countries and with the revolutionary struggle of proletarians throughout the world.

Elucidation of the USSR Armed Forces' international duty, and the education of personnel in a spirit of preparedness to fight alongside their class brothers to the last drop of blood against imperialism and for the stability of socialist gains, and in the spirit of friendship with the armies of the Warsaw Pact member states--this is one of the vital tasks of our educational work.

Army and navy cadres also see Leninism as a mighty means for educating troops in the spirit of class hatred for imperialism. V I. Lenin often demanded that the class direction of Soviet troops' ideological and political education not be neglected, taking into consideration the continual struggle on the international arena of the two ideologies--bourgeois and socialist. This struggle has acquired a particularly acute character in present conditions.

Using a whole arsenal of ideological resources, the imperialists are striving to influence the consciousness of our people and to poison them with the venom of bourgeois ideology. For these purposes they are resorting to the most refined and cunning methods. In the United States, Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany, departments dealing essentially with so-called "psychological warfare" are fusing with intelligence organs.

One of the chief targets of ideological sabotage is considered by the imperialists to be the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces. Their designs are obvious: They are striving to undermine the morale of our troops. But these attempts of our enemies are futile, no one will succeed in shaking the moral and political state of our army and navy troops. However, we are aware that we must continue in the future to tirelessly expose the reactionary ideology of imperialism in any of its manifestations, to concern ourselves with the high ideological level of our spoken and printed propaganda and mass agitation, and to display political vigilance.

Leninism and the Leninist doctrine on war and the army serve as a mighty ideological and theoretical weapon in the struggle against the bourgeois ideologists, the falsifiers of military history, and the problems of warfare.

Now, when the ruling circles of the imperialist states are feverishly preparing for a new world war, the question of the origins of war and their essence and character has become one of the questions of a most acute ideological struggle.

As is well known, certain imperialist ideologists and capitalist political and military figures are trying to prove that the Leninist formula characterizing war as the continuation of politics by forcible means "has become obsolete," that it--they say--is inapplicable to nuclear warfare, and that such a war allegedly will not have a class and political content, and will not be a continuation of the politics of states and various classes. The purport of these contentions is to mislead the popular masses regarding the class and political character and real purposes of a possible war and its consequences and to conceal the role of the aggressive policies of imperialism in war's preparation and its unleashing.

III. 8 May 69

E 13

USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

The Soviet Armed Forces represent a mighty collective of steadfast and courageous defenders of the motherland, closely knit in unity of will, living a single life, and united in thought and aspiration with the party and all Soviet people.

Our army and navy are a remarkable school for communist education, comprehensive preparation and training of youth. A school for forming their civic self-awareness and ideological and spiritual maturity. During service a soldier as a rule acquires class qualifications in one or even several technical professions which are also necessary in the economy. Every year tens of thousands of communists who entered the party and went through its first school in the army and navy party organizations, and also hundreds of thousands of Komsomol members leave the armed forces for the country's enterprises, construction sites, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and higher educational establishments. And everywhere, in every part of communist building, they are conscientiously fulfilling their patriotic duty.

Inherent in the Soviet soldier, as an equal citizen of our great state, is a state-oriented approach to executing service and a profound understanding of his duty to the motherland. We will continue striving to develop these distinctive features of the soldiers, which have been cultivated by the whole system of our Soviet reality, and to form not only masters of military affairs but also active builders of communism and citizens of the Soviet land, who bear the responsibility for the fate of their socialist fatherland. In this we are constantly aware of the great help of local party, soviet, and Komsomol organs and the results of their multifaceted work on the military and patriotic education of our youth, and their military-political and technical and physical training of them for service in the army.

Military councils, commanders, and political organs will strengthen in every way the unity of the army and people and will educate personnel in the glorious revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions of the Communist Party, our people, the army and navy, and in a spirit of the desire to honorably fulfill the military duty.

The best way to mark an important date, Vladimir Ilich said, is to concentrate on unaccomplished tasks. In anticipation of the centenary of V.I. Lenin's birth, commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations in the army and navy are adopting measures to successfully accomplish tasks for the achievement of the higher thresholds of combat readiness defined in the Ministry of Defense order for 1969. A well of inspiration in the Soviet soldiers' military labor aimed at strengthening the defense capacity of the Soviet land is and will be Leninism-- an ever-living and developing revolutionary doctrine.

III. 8 May 69

E 12

USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

The attention of officers is concentrated on profound study of V.I. Lenin's ideological and theoretical legacy, the classic works of Marxism-Leninism, decisions of the CPSU, and on their own search for an understanding of pressing contemporary problems on the basis of Leninism. We are striving with the whole system of Marxist-Leninist training of officer personnel to insure the creative study of revolutionary theory and teach officers to utilize the methodology of Leninism, and on its basis to more profoundly learn the law-governed pattern for building socialism and communism, and for Soviet military building in contemporary conditions, the laws of armed struggle, and the high aims of the defense of socialist gains from imperialist aggressors, to nurture the ability to show ideological steadfastness, and resist any influences from bourgeois propaganda.

There are also various forms of mastering the Leninist theoretical legacy in the political training of soldiers, seamen, sergeants, and master sergeants. We do not believe that improving the education of privates and sergeants is a short-term affair, limited by 2 or 3 years service in the army or navy, but a prolonged process of forming a communist world outlook, starting from the school desk, continuing later at enterprises, kolkhozes, and higher educational establishments whose collectives, as it were, hand over the baton to commanders, political workers, and army and navy party and Komsomol organizations.


The most important form of training privates and sergeants is political studies, for which a considerable expansion of ideological and theoretical subjects is planned. In their years of service in the army and navy privates and sergeants have the opportunity to acquire the foundation of political knowledge and assimilate the major decisions of the CPSU and Soviet Government. Great significance is attached in the forces to the study of V.I. Lenin's biography.

The new conditions and new stage of development of the armed forces not only presuppose the further improvement of the content, forms, and methods of ideological work and its material basis but also make greater demands on commanders, political organs, and party organizations. Considering that a better-trained and educated soldier who deals with complicated combat equipment and weapons has a wider outlook and more spiritual needs and demands, we are striving to increase the general culture and qualifications of our cadres who organize the education and training of personnel.

The great and multifaceted work done by commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations on the military-political education of personnel in the ideas of Leninism insures continued strengthening of the armed forces' moral spirit. The political and morale condition of the army and navy is high. Closely united around the Communist Party, the personnel of the army and navy ardently approve and support the domestic and foreign policies of the CPSU and Soviet Government and display by actual deeds their boundless devotion to the ideals of communism. That is proved by the strenuous work of Soviet troops on increasing combat skill, their selfless actions during exercises and cruises, carrying out combat duty and service, and assimilating new combat equipment and weapons.

From the complex international situation, the intensified aggressiveness of the reactionary forces of world imperialism, and also the stepping up of the Mao Tse-tung clique's adventurist activity, which has broken away from Marxism-Leninism and taken the path of shameless anti-Sovietism, soldiers of the Soviet Army and Navy conclude that there is the need for every possible increase in revolutionary vigilance, discipline and organization, and combat readiness.

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L081208 THIRD ADD L081110 (A. YEPISHEV ARTICLE)

MOSCOW KOMMUNIST NO 6, SIGNED TO PRESS 21 APR 69 PP 60-71 L XXX

ARMY AND NAVY.

(TEXT) THE MORE THAN HALF-CENTURY PERIOD OF EXISTENCE OF THE ARMED

FORCES HAS REVEALED IN ALL THEIR FULLNESS AND DIVERSITY THE ROLE

OF PARTY AND POLITICAL WORK AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE POLITICAL

PARTY AND KOMSOMOL ORGANIZATIONS AND AS THE ACTIVE ORGANIZERS OF THE PERSONNEL'S POLITICAL EDUCATION. TOGETHER WITH THE COMMANDERS WHO HAVE MILITARY AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY, THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE ARMY AND NAVY ARE FIRMLY AND PERSISTENTLY PURSUING THE CPSU POLICY IN THE ARMED FORCES, HAVING A CREATIVE INFLUENCE UPON ALL ASPECTS OF THE LIFE OF THE TROOPS AND IMPROVING PARTY AND POLITICAL WORK.

PARTY POLITICAL WORK IN THE SOVIET ARMY AND AVY IS BASED ON THE FIRM FOUNDATION OF LENINISM, THE IDEOLOGY AND POLICY OF THE CPSU, PARTY BUILDING IN THE ARMED FORCES IS A AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE COMMUNIST

PAGE 2 RUDOPKM 7315 UNCLAS

PARTY'S THEORY AND PRACTICE, AND ITS ESSENCE IS DETERMINED BY LENIN'S TEACHING ON THE PARTY, AND BY THE CPSU PROGRAM AND STATUTES. THE ACTIVITY OF POLITICAL AND PARTY ORGANIZATIONS AND ALL INTRAPARTY WORK AMONG THE TROOPS IS BUILT ON THE BASIS OF LENINIST NORMS OF PARTY LIFE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF PARTY MANAGEMENT, WITH ACCOUNT BEING

THE ARMED FORCES ARE CONTINUALLY AWARE OF THE CPSU CENTRAL

COMMITTEE'S CONCERN FOR IMPROVING PARTY AND POLITICAL WORK, THE

STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OF THE PARTY APPARATUS, AND FOR IMPROVING THE ROLE OF ARMY AND NAVY PARTY ORGANIZATIONS.

UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS, THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAS OUTLINED AND

IS IMPLEMENTING A NUMBER OF MEASURES FOR FURTHER IMPROVING PARTY

AND POLITICAL WORK IN THE ARMY AND NAVY, AMONG WHICH ARE: THE

CREATION OF POLITICAL DIRECTORATES IN ALL BRANCHES OF THE ARMED

FORCES, THE INTRODUCTION OF AN INSTITUTE OF DEPUTY COMMANDERS OF

COMPANIES AND EQUIVALENT SUBUNITS IN THE POLITICAL SECTOR, THE

IMPROVEMENT OF THE TRAINING SYSTEM FOR PARTY AND POLITICAL WORKERS,

AND THE CREATION OF A HIGHER MILITARY-POLITICAL COLLEGE.

PAGE 3 RUDOPKM 7215 UNCLAS

ALL THIS HAS ENABLED A CONCRETIZATION OF THE LEADERSHIP OF

POLITICAL AND PARTY ORGANIZATIONS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE

PECULIARITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TASKS WHICH FACE THE TROOPS

IMPROVEMENT OF OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY AND MOBILITY IN THE ACTIVITY OF

THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND HAS INSURED A HIGHER STANDARD IN

POLITICAL AND EDUCATIONAL WORK DIRECTLY IN THE COMPANIES, BATTERIES,

AND SQUADRONS. PARTY AND POLITICAL WORK IN ALL LINKS OF THE ARMY

ORGANISM HAS BEEN ENRICHED BOTH IN CONTENT AND IN FORM, AND HAS

BECOME MORE PURPOSEFUL AND EFFECTIVE. IN RECENT YEARS THE ACTIVITY AND

MILITARY OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS HAS INCREASED AND

THE LEADERSHIP OF OMSOMOL ORGANIZATIONS HAS IMPROVED.

THE NETWORK OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS WHICH NOW EXISTS AND THE

DEPLOYMENT OF COMMUNISTS PERMITS PARTY INFLUENCE TO EMBRACE ALL BASIC

LINKS OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AND TO INSURE THE DAILY CONNECTIONS

BETWEEN THE PARTY ORGANIZATIONS AND THE NONPARTY MASSES OF TROOPS.

A GROWING IDEOLOGICAL QUALITY, THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF LENIN'S

NORMS OF PARTY LIFE AND OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PARTY LEADERSHIP ARE

CHARACTERISTIC OF THE INTERNAL LIFE OF THE ARMED FORCES'

PARTY ORGANIZATIONS. THE PRACTICE THAT WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF INFORMING COMMUNISTS ON THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF THE PARTY'S AND THE COUNTRY'S LIFE AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, AND ALSO THE DISCUSSION OF CONGRESS AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM MATERIAL IN PARTY ORGANIZATIONS ARE OF SERIOUS SIGNIFICANCE FOR INCREASING THE ACTIVITY AND MILITANCY OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS. THIS ENRICHES INTRAPARTY LIFE, SPIRITUALIZES IT, AND PROMOTES THE IMPROVEMENT OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY EVERY MEMBER AND CANDIDATE MEMBER OF THE PARTY, AND PROMOTES PERSISTENCE IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARTY POLICY IN PRACTICE.

THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAS, THROUGH THE SOLICITATION OF THE USSR DEFENSE MINISTRY AND THE SOVIET ARMY AND NAVY MAIN POLITICAL DIRECTORATE, ADOPTED A DECISION TO HOLD AN ALL-ARMY CONFERENCE OF PARTY ORGANIZATION SECRETARIES, WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE VERY SOON.

AT THE PRESENT STAGE AND THE FULFILLMENT OF THE CPSU CENTRAL
COMMITTEE'S REQUIREMENTS FOR AN IMPROVEMENT OF PARTY AND POLITICAL
WORK IN THE ARMY AND NAVY WILL BE ADVANCED FOR DISCUSSION AT THIS
CONFERENCE. THE CONFERENCE WILL DOUBTLESSLY BE A MOST IMPORTANT PAGE 5 RUDO
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EVENT IN THE LIFE OF THE ARMED FORCES BECAUSE OF ITS SCALE, NATURE,
AND CONTENT. WE
SUGGEST THAT ONE OF ITS MAIN RESULTS WILL BE A
NEW UPSURGE IN THE ACTIVITY AND MILITANCY OF THE ARMY AND NAVY
PARTY ORGANIZATIONS, AN INCREASE IN THE EFFICIENCY OF ALL PARTY AND
POLITICAL WORK, AND AN INTENSIFICATION OF ITS INFLUENCE ON THE COMBAT
READINESS OF UNITS, SHIPS, AND SUBUNITS.

COMMANDERS, PARTY ORGANIZATIONS, AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
THE ARMY AND NAVY PROCEED IN THEIR ACTIVITY FROM LENIN'S INSTRUCTION
THAT THE BASIC TASK OF PARTY AND POLITICAL WORK IS THE COMPREHENSIVE
INCREASE OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES' MIGHT. THE WORKING OUT AND

A HIGH DEGREE OF POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS, COMBAT TRAINING, FIRM
DISCIPLINE WITH THE PRECISE ORGANIZATION OF THE TROOPS' SERVICE,
FAULTLESS OPERATION OF COMBAT EQUIPMENT AND READINESS BY ALL TROOPS
TO CARRY OUT THEIR ORDERS UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES OF A POSSIBLE WAR
--SUCH IS THE BASIC LINK OF OUR ENTIRE ACTIVITY.

ONE OF THE PECULIARITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES' PRESENT LIFE IS THAT
STRATEGIC MISSILE FORCES AND THE COUNTRY'S IAR DEFENSE FORCES ARE
ALREADY, IN PEACETIME, CARRYING OUT THEIR COMBAT WATCH, WHILE THE
NAVY'S SHIPS ARE PERFORMING THEIR SERVICE ON THE SEAS AND OCEANS,

PAGE 6 RUDOPKM 7215 UNCLAS

INSURING THE HOMELAND'S SECURITY AND THE PRESERVATION OF ITS STATE
INTERESTS, ALL BRANCHES OF THE ARMED FORCES ARE PERFORMING RESPONSIBLE
TASKS.

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A HIGH LEVEL OF COMBAT READINESS OF THE TROOPS
UNDER CONDITIONS OF CONSTANTLY GROWING DEMANDS COVERS NOT JUST

TRAINING BUT ALSO THE EDUCATION OF THE PERSONNEL. THE SOCIALIST
COMPETITION, THANKS TO WHICH THE RANKS OF EXCELLENT SOLDIERS AND
CLASS SPECIALISTS, EXCELLENT CREWS AND GUN-CREWS PLATOONS, COMPANIES,
BATTALIONS, UNITS, AND SHIPS ARE SWELLING, HAS ACHIEVED A LARGE SCALE.
IN THE COURSE OF THE COMPETITION NEW PATRIOTIC UNDERTAKINGS AIMED AT
REDUCING TIMES TAKEN TO COMPLETE COMBAT READINESS AND AT THE EXPANSION
OF UNITS' AND SUBUNITS' COMBAT POTENTIAL ARE BORN. THIS MEANS THE
STRUGGLE TO OVERFULFILL STANDARDS OF COMBAT WORK AND THE ACQUISITION
OF ALLIED SKILLS IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF MUTUAL INTERCHANGEABILITY IN
GUN-CREWS AND TEAMS, ACTION AT NIGHT MEETING DAYLIGHT STANDARDS AND
THE HITTING OF TARGETS WITH THE FIRST SHOT OR FIRST SALVO. THE
INITIATORS OF SUCH UNDERTAKINGS ARE AS A RULE COMMUNISTS AND KONSOMOL
MEMBERS. MORE. RW/GILBERTSON 2, / 1238Z MAY

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L081153 SECOND ADD L081110 (A.YEPISHEV ARTICLE)

MOSCOW KOMMUNIST NO 6, SIGNED TO PRESS 21 APR 69 PP 60-71

L XXX STILL TOPICAL TODAY."

(TEXT) TURNING HIS ATTENTION TO MILITARY BUILDING AND THE
MATTER OF COMBAT READINESS OF THE ARMED FORCES, LENIN CONSIDERED
THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT MEANS OF INTENSIFYING THE ARMY'S COMBAT
READINESS AND OF FORMING HIGH MORALE AND POLITICAL AND COMBAT
STANDARDS AMONG THE PERSONNEL WAS PARTY AND POLITICAL WORK.
HE POINTED OUT THAT A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR THE RED ARMY WAS
CREATED BY POLITICAL PROPAGANDA ON THE FRONT, THE ORGANIZATION
OF COMMUNISTS IN OUR ARMY, AND BY SELFLESS STRUGGLE BY THE BEST
PEOPLE OF THE WORKING MASSES. WE CONQUERED ENEMIES ON ALL FRONTS
"THANKS TO THE EXISTENCE IN THE RED ARMY OF COMMUNIST CELLS

VLADIMIR ILICL EMPHASIZED THAT WHERE POLITICAL WORK WAS CONDUCTED

PAGE 2 RUDOPKM 7312 UNCLAS

MOST PAINSTAKINGLY AMONG THE TROOPS THERE IS NO SLACKNESS IN THE
ARMY, ITS ORDER AND SPIRIT IS BETTER, AND THERE ARE MORE VICTORIES.

HE REPEATEDLY REMINDED THE MEMBERS OF MILITARY COUNCILS, COMMISSARS,

AND ALL PARTY WORKERS: "LOOK AFTER POLITICAL WORK," "DO NOT

RELAX ON POLITICAL WORK," AND HE WAS INTERESTED IN WHAT WAS BEING

DONE "FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF POLITICAL WORK."

IN THE SOVIET STATE'S MILITARY BUILDING LENIN APPORTIONED THE
DECISIVE ROLE TO THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, REGARDING
IT AS AN OBJECTIVE NATURAL LAW, THE VERY FOUNDATION OF SOVIET
MILITARY BUILDING AND ITS HIGHEST, IMMUTABLE PRINCIPLE. HE WAS
CONTINUALLY CONCERNED WITH INCREASING THE LEADING AND DIRECTIVE
ROLE OF THE PARTY IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY BUILDING AND INSURING THAT
IT WAS CONDUCTED IN PRECISE ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL DIRECTIVES
GIVEN BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON BEHALF OF THE PARTY AND UNDER
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S DIRECT CONTROL.

AND WE ARE PRIMARILY OBLIGED TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE
CPSU'S LENINIST CENTRAL COMMITTEE FOR EVERYTHING THAT THE ARMED

FORCES ACHIEVED--ITS HIGH LEVEL OF TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT, ITS

COMBAT QUALITIES OF THE PRIVATES, SERGEANTS AND OFFICERS,

PAGE 3 RUDOPKM 7312 UNCLAS

THE VICTORIES OVER THE IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS, AND THE CONTINUAL
IMPROVEMENT OF COMBAT READINESS.

LENINISM, THE IDEOLOGY OF THE MOST ADVANCED, MOST REVOLUTIONARY
AND MIGHTY CLASS OF MODERN SOCIETY--THE WORKING CLASS--IS NOW
THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ENTIRE SOVIET PEOPLE, IT FORMS THE BASIS OF
THE EDUCATION OF ALL SOVIET PEOPLE AND OF THE FORMATION OF THEIR
COMMUNIST WORLD OUTLOOK, AND IT GIVES THEM THE OPPORTUNITY TO
EVALUATE EVENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LIFE FROM CLASS
POSITIONS AND TO FIND ANSWERS TO PROBLEMS ADVANCED BY THE PRESENT
DAY.

THE IDEAS OF LENINISM, HAVING BECOME THE COMMON PROPERTY OF
THE WORKING MASSES, HAVE BEEN TRANSFORMED INTO AN ENORMOUS FORCE
WHICH INSPIRES AND MOBILIZES THE SOVIET PEOPLE TO SOLVE PROBLEMS
OF COMMUNIST BUILDING AND TO LABOR AND EXPLOITS FOR THE GLORY OF
THE SOCIALIST HOMELAND.

BEING THE SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATION OF THE CPSU'S POLICY AND OF
THE SOVIET PEOPLE'S EDUCATION, LENINISM ALSO SERVES AS THE FOUNDATION

ARMED FORCES AND FOR EDUCATING THE ARMY AND NAVY PERSONNEL AS AN
INSEPARABLE PART OF ITS PEOPLE, LINKED WITH IT BY BLOOD TIES.

PAGE 4 RUDOPKM 7312 UNCLAS

QUESTIONS OF MILITARY BUILDING, THE CREATION AND STRENGTHENING
OF THE ARMY AND NAVY, AND THE EDUCATION OF TROOPS ARE AN INSEPARABLE
COMPONENT PART OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNIST BUILDING.

"THE BUILDING OF OUR ARMY COULD ONLY LEAD TO SUCCESSFUL RESULTS."

SAID V.I. LENIN, "BECAUSE IT WAS CREATED IN THE SPIRIT OF
GENERAL SOVIET BUILDING...." (COMPLETE COLLECTED WORKS, VOL

40 FORTY PP 76-77 RPT 76-77).

THE COMMUNIST PARTY, GUIDED BY LENINISM, IS WORKING OUT A
SCIENTIFICALLY SUBSTANTIATED POLICY ON MILITARY QUESTIONS AND
OUR STATE'S MILITARY DOCTRINE, IS DETERMINING THE BASIC TASKS FOR
THE CREATION OF THE COUNTRY'S MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POTENTIAL
AND FOR THE TECHNICAL EQUIPPING THE ARMED FORCES, IS IMPROVING
THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, IS SHOWING CONCERN FOR THE TRAINING
OF COMMAND, POLITICAL, AND ENGINEERING CADRES, FOR STRENGTHENING
ONE-MAND COMMAND, IS DETERMINING THE CONTENT OF IDEOLOGICAL WORK
AMONG THE ARMY AND NAVY PERSONNEL, AND IS ORGANIZING PARTY AND

POLITICAL WORK AMONG THE TROOPS.

THE ARMED FORCES LAY AT THE FOUNDATION OF THE PARTY'S ACTIVITY IN
BUILDING THE PARTY AND POLITICAL APPARATUS IN THE SOVIET ARMY AND

PAGE 5 RUDOPKM 7312 UNCLAS

NAVY.

BACK IN JANUARY 1918 NINETEEN EIGHTEEN AN ORGANIZATIONAL-
AGITATIONAL SECTION WAS CREATED WITHIN THE ALL-RUSSIAN COLLEGIUM
FOR THE FORMATION OF THE RED ARMY. THIS SECTION WAS IN ESSENCE
ONE OF THE FIRST POLITICAL ORGANS OF OUR ARMY. IN SPRING THE SAME
YEAR AN INSTITUTE OF MILITARY COMMISSARS WAS INTRODUCED ON THE
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE INTO EVERY UNIT, DIVISION
AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. THESE INSTITUTES PLAYED AN IMPORTANT
ROLE IN THE POLITICAL EDUCATION AND ENLIGHTENMENT OF THE ARMY
AND IN STRENGTHENING WITHIN IT THE SPIRIT OF REVOLUTIONARY
DISCIPLINE AND OF A HIGH DEGREE OF ORGANIZATION.

IN INTENSIFYING PARTY LEADERSHIP OF THE ARMY, THE ORGANIZATION
OF PARTY AND POLITICAL WORK AND THE BUILDING OF THE SOVIET ARMED
FORCES' PARTY AND POLITICAL APPARATUS, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
EIGHTH PARTY CONGRESS WAS EXTREMELY GREAT. THE CONGRESS GAVE A

THE TROOPS, AND IT CONDEMNED THE "MILITARY OPPOSITION", WHICH WAS
IN ESSENCE AGAINST THE CREATION OF A CENTRALIZED REGULAR ARMY.

SPEAKING AT A CLOSED SESSION OF THE CONGRESS ON THE MILITARY

PAGE 6 RUDOPKM 7312 UNCLAS

QUESTION, V.I. LENIN PAID GREAT ATTENTION TO THE STRENGTHENING
OF THE PARTY NUCLEUS IN THE RED ARMY, TO THE WORK OF MILITARY
COMMISSARS, PARTY AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND ARMY PARTY
ORGANIZATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN CALLED UPON TO EDUCATE SOVIET SOLDIERS
IN THE SPIRIT OF DEVOTION TO THE SOVIET REPUBLIC, THE SPIRIT
OF FULFILLMENT OF THEIR MILITARY DUTY, AND THE SPIRIT OF
STRICTEST DISCIPLINE AND CONSTANT COMBAT READINESS. ON THE BASIS
OF THE EIGHTH PARTY CONGRESS DECISION, THE NETWORK OF ARMY PARTY
CELLS WAS STRENGTHENED AND EXTENDED AND THE LEADERSHIP OF
THE POLITICAL ORGANS WAS IMPROVED. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONGRESS
DECISIONS A POLITICAL SECTION OF THE REPUBLIC'S REVOLUTIONARY
MILITARY COUNCIL WAS CREATED IN APRIL 1919 NINETEEN NINETEEN.
IN MAY THE SAME YEAR THE SECTION WAS TRANSFORMED INTO THE POLITICAL
DIRECTORATE OF THE REPUBLIC'S REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL
(PUR)-- NOW THE MAIN POLITICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE SOVIET ARMY AND
NAVY--WHICH WORKS WITH THE RIGHTS OF A PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE
SECTION. THUS, 50 FIFTY YEARS AGO A SINGLE SYSTEM OF LEADING
PARTY AND POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE CPSU WAS CREATED IN THE ARMY AND
NAVY. MORE AB/GILBERTSON 08/1220Z MAY

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L081110 FIRST OF ABOUT TEN TAKES (A.YEPISHEV ARTICLE)

MOSCOW KOMMUNIST NO 6, SIGNED TO PRESS 21 APR 69 PM 58-71 L

(ARTICLE BY ARMY GEN A.YEPISHEV, CHIEF OF THE MAIN POLITICAL

DIRECTORATE OF THE SOVIET ARMY AND NAVY: "LENINISM--THE BASIS OF

THE EDUCATION OF SOVIET SOLDIERS"; ELLIPSES AND UNATTRIBUTED

PARENTHESES AS PUBLISHED; PASSAGES BETWEEN SLANTLINES PUBLISHED

IN ITALICS)

(TEXT) FOR MORE THAN 50 FIFTY YEARS THE SOVIET ARMY AND NAVY

TRAVERSED, A PATH MARKED BY TWO UNIVERSALLY HISTORIC VICTORIES
OVER THE FORCES OF INTERNATIONAL IMPERIALISM IN THE YEARS OF THE
CIVIL AND GREAT PATRIOTIC WARS AND BY THE NOBLE FULFILLMENT
OF PATRIOTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DUTY.

THE SOVIET SOCIAL AND STATE SYSTEM AND THE LEADERSHIP OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY HAVE ALWAYS BEEN AND REMAIN THE BASIS OF ALL THE

PAGE 2 RUDOPKM 7309 UNCLAS

HEROIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES AND OF THEIR
MIGHT AND COMBAT GLORY. THE ALL-POWERFUL MARXIST-LENINIST
REVOLUTIONARY TEACHING REPRESENTS THE INEXHAUSTIBLE LIFE-GIVING
SOURCE OF THE INVINCIBILITY OF OUR ARMY AND NAVY AND OF THEIR
SUCCESSSES IN PERFECTING THEIR COMBAT ABILITY AND THEIR COMBAT
READINESS.

V.I. LENIN, THE BRILLIANT THEORETICIAN OF THE PROLETARIAN
REVOLUTION AND OF THE SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIETY,
THE ORGANIZER AND LEADER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE SOVIET
STATE, HAS ALSO GONE DOWN IN HISTORY AS AN OUTSTANDING MILITARY

FORCES AND THEIR ENTIRE HEROIC PATH ARE LINKED INSPEARABLY WITH
HIS NAME.

HISTORIC MERIT ATTACHES TO LENIN FOR HIS SUBSTANTIATION OF
THE MILITARY PROGRAM OF THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION AND FOR FORMULATING
THE DOCTRINE ON THE DEFENSE OF THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS FATHERLAND
AND ON BUILDING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOCIALIST STATE. WITH HIS
WORKS ON MILITARY QUESTIONS AND WITH HIS INDEFATIGABLE AND
MULTIFACETED ACTIVITIES, LENIN LAID THE FOUNDATIONS OF A
NEW STAGE IN DEVELOPING THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MARXISM IN

PAGE 3 RUDOPKM 7309 UNCLAS

THE MILITARY SPHERE.

V.I. LENIN CREATIVELY DEVELOPED AND ENRICHED THE IDEAS OF
K.MARX AND FPMENGELS ON WAR AND THE ARMY AND ON THE DEPENDENCE OF
WAR AND MILITARY AFFAIRS ON THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
AND ON THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY. ON THE
BASIS OF AN ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL HISTORICAL STAGE OF CAPITALIST
DEVELOPMENT--IMPERIALISM--AND OF ITS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL

ESSENCE V.I. LENIN GAVE A TRULY SCIENTIFIC, CLASS INTERPRETATION

AND OF THEIR CHARACTERISTIC TRAITS.

LENIN PROFOUNDLY REVEALED THE CLASS ESSENCE OF WAR. HE VIEWED WAR AS A SOCIOHISTORICAL PHENOMENON SUBORDINATED TO THE POLITICAL AIMS OF CERTAIN STATES AND CLASSES AND AS A CONTINUATION OF POLITICS BY MEANS OF ARMED AGGRESSION. "EVERY WAR," LENIN WROTE, " IS CONNECTED INSPEARABLY WITH THAT POLITICAL SYSTEM FROM WHICH IS ARISES. THAT SAME POLICY WHICH A CERTAIN POWER AND A CERTAIN CLASS WITHIN THIS POWER HAS PURSUED FOR A LONG TIME PRIOR TO A WAR WILL BE CONTINUED INEVITABLY AND INVARIABLY BY THIS SAME CLASS, HAVING CHANGED ONLY THE FORM OF ACTION" (COMPLETE COLLECTED WORKS, VOL 32 THIRTYTWO, PAGE 79 SEVENTYNINE). HE SHOWS WHAT

PAGE 4 RUDOPVM 7389 UNCLAS

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO EVALUATE WAR CORRECTLY WITHOUT HAVING IT UNDERSTOOD ITS SOCIOPOLITICAL NATURE AND ITS CLASS ESSENCE AND WITHOUT SEEING THE SUBORDINATION OF WAR TO THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERESTS OF SOME POWER OR OTHER AND THE VARIOUS CLASSES WITHIN THESE POWERS.

AN IMPORTANT FEATURE OF LENINISM IS THE TEACHING ON THE DEFENSE

OF THE SOCIALIST FATHERLAND. V.I. LENIN'S GREAT MERIT LIES IN THE

TWENTYTIETH CENTURY HE FORMULATED THE THEORY OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
THE VICTORY OF SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY INITIALLY AND SHOWED THE
OBJECTIVE HISTORICAL NECESSITY FOR THE ARMED DEFENSE OF THE
STATE OF THE VICTORIOUS PROLETARIAT FROM THE IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS.

LENIN'S IMMORTAL IDEAS HAVE ENTERED INTO THE MILITARY PROGRAM OF
THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION SUBSTANTIATED BY HIM AND INTO THE
GENERAL PLAN FOR BUILDING SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM IN OUR COUNTRY.

HERE LENIN PROCEEDED FROM THE FACT THAT "THE TRANSITION FROM
CAPITALISM TO COMMUNISM IS A WHOLE HISTORICAL EPOCH. UNTIL IT
IS COMPLETED, THE EXPLOITERS WILL INEVITABLY PRESERVE THE HOPE OF
RESTORATION, AND THIS /HOPE/ IS TRANSFORMED INTO /ATTEMPTS/
AT RESTORATION" (COMPLETE COLLECTED WORKS, VOL 37 THIRTYSEVEN,

PAGE 5 RUDOPKM 7309 UNCLAS

PAGE 264 TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTYFOUR). CONSEQUENTLY , THE MILITARY
DEFENSE OF SOCIALIST GAINS IS A GENERAL NATURAL LAW OF THE EPOCH
OF TRANSITION FROM CAPITALISM TO SOCIALISM; IT IS OBJECTIVELY
CONDITIONED BY THE CHARACTER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS OF THE
IMPERIALIST EPOCH AND OF THE FUNDAMENTAL ANTITHESIS OF THE TWO

SOCIOPOLITICAL SYSTEMS.

STATE AS A PRINCIPALLY NEW, AUTHENTIC FATHERLAND OF WORKERS HAS
MADE IT POSSIBLE TO MAKE A COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION OF THE
QUESTION OF THE ESSENCE OF WAR AND THE DEFENSE OF THE SOCIALIST
FATHERLAND. LENIN POINTED OUT THAT THIS IS A SPECIAL TYPE OF
WAR DISTINGUISHED BY ITS UNDOUBTEDLY JUST, LIBERATING CHARACTER
AND ITS CONSISTENT REVOLUTIONARY AND GENUINELY NATIONAL NATURE.
IN THE DEFENSE OF THE SOCIALIST FATHERLAND, VLADIMIR ILICH
EMPHASIZED, BOTH NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TASKS MERGE INTO
ONE; THE DEFENSE OF THE WORLD'S FIRST COUNTRY OF VICTORIOUS
SOCIALISM IS AN INTERNATIONAL CAUSE.

LENIN REVEALED THE OPPORTUNITIES, PATHS, FORMS, AND MEANS FOR
ACCOMPLISHING THE DEFENSE OF REVOLUTIONARY GAINS, FOR STRENGTHENING
THE MILITARY MIGHT OF THE COUNTRY OF VICTORIOUS SOCIALISM, AND

PAGE 6 RUDOPKM 7309 UNCLAS

FOR ORGANIZING AND DEVELOPING ITS ARMED FORCES. MORE AB/GILBERTSON

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L081120 FIRST ADD L081110

(A.YEPISHEV ARTICLE)

MOSCOW KOMMUNIST NO 6, SIGNED TO PRESS 21 APR 69 PP 60-71 L XXX ITS

ARMED FORCES.

(TEXT) IN DEVELOPING MARXISM UNDER THE NEW HISTORICAL CONDITIONS,
V.I. LENIN CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION
COULD NOT MANAGE WITHOUT THE BREAKDOWN OF THE OLD ARMY--THE MOST
INGRAINED INSTRUMENT OF THE OLD SYSTEM AND THE MOST HARDENED BULWARK
OF CAPITALIST DOMINATION. THEREFORE, THE FIRST COMMANDMENT OF THE
SOCIALIST REVOLUTION IS THE LIQUIDATION OF THE OLD ARMY, ITS
DISSOLUTION, AND ITS REPLACEMENT WITH A NEW ARMY.

LENIN FORMULATED THE THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES AND THE PRACTICAL

AND PEASANTS, FORMULATED THE PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET MILITARY BUILDING,
AND REVEALED AND CHARACTERIZED THE PRINCIPLE FEATURES AND SOURCES OF
THE MIGHT OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES. ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL FEATURES
OF THE SOVIET ARMY, LENIN POINTED OUT, IS CONTAINED IN THE FACT THAT

PAGE 2 RUDOPKM 7311 UNCLAS

IT IS AN ARMY OF THE NEW TYPE, AN ARMY OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION,
AND THE BULWARK OF SOVIET POWER. IT IS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE
ARMIES OF THE CAPITALIST STATES BOTH BY ITS SOCIAL NATURE AND BY ITS
POLITICAL PURPOSE. WHEREAS THE ARMED FORCES OF THE IMPERIALIST STATES
SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE EXPLOITER CLASSES, THE SOVIET ARMED
FORCES ARE TRULY POPULAR: THEY CHAMPION THE WORKERS' INTERESTS AND
DEFEND THE GAINS OF SOCIALISM. THE SOVIET ARMY IS FORMED FROM
THE PEOPLE, IS CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH THEM, AND IS THEIR LOYAL SERVANT.
LENIN SAW THE TRULY POPULAR CHARACTER AND THE INDISSOLUBLE
MERGENCE WITH THE SOVIETS, WHO UNITE ALL THE WORKERS, AS ONE OF THE
PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF OUR ARMY'S INVINCIBILITY.

THE POPULAR NATURE OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES AND THEIR PURPOSE

ENCROACHMENTS OF THE IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS WAS GIVEN LEGAL FORCE
IN THE DECREE OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS. "ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS RED ARMY" OF 15 FIFTEEN
JANUARY 1918 NINETEEN EIGHTEEN. LENIN PERSONALLY INTRODUCED
SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT DECREE, SPECIFYING THE SOCIAL
NATURE OF THE ARMY OF THE SOCIALIST STATE AND ITS PURPOSE/ "THE
OLD ARMY," THIS DOCUMENT SAID, "SERVED AS A WEAPON FOR THE CLASS

PAGE 3 RUDOPKM 7311 UNCLAS

OPPRESSION OF THE WORKERS BY THE BOURGEOISIE. WITH THE TRANSFER
OF POWER TO THE WORKERS AND THE EXPLOITED CLASSES, THERE AROSE THE
NECESSITY FOR THE CREATION OF A NEW ARMY WHICH WOULD BE THE STRONGHOLD
OF SOVIET POWER....."

THERE IS ANOTHER DISTINCTIVE FEATURE OF THE ARMY OF THE SOCIALIST
STATE IN THAT THIS IS AN ARMY OF FRIENDSHIP AND BROTHERHOOD BETWEEN
THE PEOPLES AND THE BULWARK OF THE FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE
SOCIALIST NATIONS. THE USSR ARMED FORCES ARE MULTINATIONAL IN THEIR
MAKEUP, THEY REPRESENT ALL THE PEOPLES OF OUR COUNTRY, AND THEY

ITIES IN A SINGLE MULTINATIONAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE
SOCIALIST STATE. THE FRIENDSHIP OF THE SOLDIERS OF DIFFERENT NATION-
ALITIES IS ONE OF THE FOUNDATINS OF THE COMBAT MIGHT OF OUR ARMY AND
NAVY.

CREATED FOR THE DEFENRE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GAINS, FROM THE
FIRST DAYS OF ITS EXISTENCE THE SOVIET ARMY HAS BEENPPERMEATED
WITH THE SPIRIT OF PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM.

LENIN REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THE UNITY OF THE NATIONAL AND THE
INTERNATIONAL IN THE ARMED DEFENSE OF THE WORKERS' INTERESTS. "NOW,"
HE SAID, PZIN FIGHTING FOR THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM IN RUSSIA, WE

PAGE 4 RUDOPKM 7311 UNCLAS

ARE FIGHTING FOR THE SOCIALIS OF THE ENTIRE WORLD (COMPLETE
COLLECTED WORK, VOL 37 THIRTYSEVEN, PAGE 58
SIXTYEIGHT). "CLOSE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ALLIANCE IS AN OBLIGATORY
NECESSITY," HE TAUGHT, FOR PEOPLES WHO HAVE EMBARKED ON THE PATH OF
BUILDING SOCIALISM, "FOR OTHERWISE THE CAPITALISTS... WILL CRUSH
AND STIFLEUS IN ISOLATOON"; THE UNITY OF MILITARY FORCES IS ESSENTIAL,

99 NINETY NINE, AND 100 ONE HUNDRED).

IN FORMULATING QUESTIONS OF MILITARY THEORY, LENIN SHOWED THAT
THE MILITARY MIGHT OF A STATE IS DETERMINED BY MANY CONDITIONS
AND FACTORS AND PRIMARILY BY ITS ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL,
MORAL AND POLITICAL, AND ITS OWN MILITARY POTENTIALS. LENINISM EXPRESSES
THE CREATIVE DEVELOPMENT ENRICHMENT OF THE MARXIST TENET
ON THE ROLE OF THE MORAL AND POLITICAL FACTOR AND THE MORAL
SPIRIT OF THE PEOPLE AND THE ARMY IN THE SOLDIERS AND REVEALS THE
IMMEDIATE, DIRECT CONNECTION OF THE DEPENDENCE OF MORAL
SPIRIT ON THE NATURE OF WAR AND ITS POLITICAL CONTENT AND AIMS.
THE CLASSICAL LENINIST TENET -- THAT IN EVERY WAR VICTORY IS
ULTIMATELY CONDITIONED BY THE STATE OF THE SPIRIT OF THOSE MASSES WHO
PAGE 5 RUDOPKM 7311 UNCLAS
SHED THEIR BLOOD ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE -- IS STILL TOPICAL TODAY.

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L081243 FOURTH ADD L081110 (A. YEPISHEV ARTICLE)

MOSCOW KOMMUNIST NO 6, SIGNED TO PRESS 21 APR 69 PP 66-71 L XXX
AND KOMSOMOL MEMBERS.

(TEXT) IN SOLVING THE TASKS FOR INCREASING COMBAT
READINESS AMONG TROOPS, WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT THIS
IS INCONCEIVABLE WITHOUT FIRM MILITARY DISCIPLINE AND WITHOUT A
HIGH LEVEL OF ORGANIZATION AMONG THE PERSONNEL, AND THAT LENIN'S
PROPOSITION ABOUT THE NECESSITY FOR DISCIPLINE BROUGHT UP TO A HIGH
STANDARD IS NOW PARTICULARLY VITAL. WITH THE EXISTENCE OF VARIOUS
MEANS OF ARMED STRUGGLE, WHEN WEAPONS ARE MANNED BY A GROUP AND ARE
COLLECTIVE IN NATURE, NEGLIGENCE OR LACK OF DISCIPLINE BY A SINGLE
SOLDIER IN A GUN-CREW OR TEAM OPERATING A MISSILE COMPLEX, ATOMIC
SUBMARINE, OR ROCKET-CARRYING PLANE COULD LEAD TO VERY GRAVE
CONSEQUENCES. THEREFORE DISCIPLINE OF COMBAT WATCH, TECHNICAL
DISCIPLINE, AND TIME DISCIPLINE ACQUIRE GREAT IMPORTANCE. ONLY WELL-
TRAINED, EDUCATED, AND DISCIPLINED PERSONNEL ARE CAPABLE OF BRINGING

PAGE 2 RUDOPKM 7318 UNCLAS

THEMSELVES AND THEIR EQUIPMENT TO A FULL STATE OF COMBAT
READINESS IN A SHORT TIME WITHOUT CONFUSION AND FUSS.

WORK ON INCREASING TROOPS' COMBAT READINESS IS EXTREMELY MULTI-

ARMED FORCES' DEVELOPMENT, ONE THING IS CLEAR FOR US UNDER ALL CONDI-
TIONS: IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ITEMS WHICH DETERMINE COMBAT WORTHINESS
AND COMBAT READINESS OF THE ARMY AND NAVY, THE MAN, THE
CADRES, AND THE MASS OF SOLDIERS ARE ALWAYS OF PRIME IMPORTANCE;
WITHOUT A CONSCIONCIOUS SOLDIER OR SAILOR WHO SHOWS INITIATIVE,
LENIN POINTED OUT, SUCCESS IN WAR IS IMPOSSIBLE. IN THE FINAL
ANALYSIS, IF WE HAVE TO ENTER INTO AN ARMED CLSH WITH AN ENEMY
(YESLI NAM PRIDETSYA VSTUPIT V VOORUZHENNIYU SKHVAITKU S VRAGOM),
VICTORY WILL NOT BE ACHIEVED BY EQUIPMENT ALL ON ITS OWN, EVEN IF IT
IS OF THE MOST PERFECT KIND, BUT BY THE MAN WHO IS STRONG IN SPIRIT,
WHO KNOWS HIS EQUIPMENT WELL, AND WHO IS CAPABLE OF MAKING USE OF
ALL ITS POTENTIALS TO THE FULL.

CONSEQUENTLY, A MOST IMPORTANT MEANS OF BUILDING UP TROOPS' HIGH
MORALE AND POLITICAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SOLIDNESS, AND RESOLVING ALL
THE TASKS OF RAISING THE FORCES' COMBAT READINESS WAS, IS, AND
ALWAYS WILL BE WELL ARRANGED IDEOLOGICAL AND EDUCATIONAL WORK.

PAGE 3 RUDOPKM 7318 UNCLAS

THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES REFLECT LIKE A MIRROR, THE NEW SOCIAL
RELATIONS INHERENT IN THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM, AND THE INVINCIBLE AND
TRULY INEXHAUSTIBLE FORCES OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE. ONE OF THE FEATURES
OF THE SOVIET ARMY, AS THE NEW TYPE OF ARMY, IS THE HIGH COMMUNIST

FURTHER IMPROVING IDEOLOGICAL WORK, OVERCOMING SUBJECTIVIST FEATURES
IN ITS CONTENT, AND ENHANCING THE ROLE OF REVOLUTIONARY THEORY
IN COMMUNIST BUILDING. THE CONTENT OF IDEOLOGICAL AND EDUCATIONAL
WORK HAS BEEN ENRICHED BY THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE THESES, "50
FIFTY YEARS OF THE GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION," THE CPSU CENTRAL
COMMITTEE RESOLUTION "ON THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE CENTENARY OF VLADIMIR
ILICH LENIN'S BIRTHDAY," AND COMRADE L.I. BREZHNEV'S SPEECH, "50
FIFTY YEARS OF THE GREAT VICTORIES OF SOCIALISM."

IN RESOLVING THE TASKS OF FURTHER IMPROVING IDEOLOGICAL WORK IN
THE ARMED FORCES, WE PROCEED FROM THE FACT THAT IT NOW CONSISTS
FUNDAMENTALLY OF ELUCIDATING MARXIST-LENINIST THEORY AND THE POLICY
OF OUR PARTY, AND THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE IN THE STRUGGLE
FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISIONS OF THE 23D TWENTYTHIRD CPSU
CONGRESS AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUMS, AND THE EDUCATION OF
TROOPS IN A SPIRIT OF HIGH IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTER, SOVIET PATRIOTISM,
FRIENDSHIP OF THE USSR PEOPLES, AND PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM.

PAGE 4 RUDOPKM 7318 UNCLAS

MASTERY OF LENINIST THEORY ENABLES ARMY AND NAVY COMMUNISTS AND
ALL SOLDIERS TO UNDERSTAND MORE DEEPLY THE HISTORICAL COURSE OF THE
STRUGGLE AND VICTORIES OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND THE GRANDIOSE
TRANSFORMATIONS BROUGHT ABOUT IN OUR COUNTRY UNDER THE LEADERSHIP

THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE FOR BUILDING COMMUNIST SOCIETY, AND TO FIND THE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE PRESENT DAY.

LENIN'S TEACHING ABOUT WAR AND THE ARMY AND HIS IDEAS ABOUT THE ARMED DEFENSE OF THE SOCIALIST FATHERLAND SUPPLY THE KEY TO UNDERSTANDING AND RESOLVING CORRECTLY THE TASKS OF COMBAT AND POLITICAL TRAINING AND IMPROVING THE VIGILANCE AND FIGHTING PREPAREDNESS OF THE FORCES, AND SERVE AS AN IMPORTANT MEANS OF EDUCATING SOVIET TROOPS IN THE SPIRIT OF BOUNDLESS DEVOTION TO THE FATHERLAND AND PREPAREDNESS TO SKILLFULLY AND BRAVELY DEFEND IT.

IN STUDYING LENINISM, ARMY AND NAVY PERSONNEL OBTAIN A DEEP UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET STATE AND ITS ARMED FORCES AND OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE PARTY, STRIVING TO INFUSE SOVIET TROOPS WITH A FEELING OF INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY WITH THE WORKING PEOPLE OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE OF PROLETARIANS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. MORE AK/GILBERTSON

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THE JUSTICE OF THE GOALS SET BEFORE THEM BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

IN ANALYZING THE REASONS FOR OUR VICTORIES OVER THE INTERVENTIONISTS AND THE INTERNAL COUNTERREVOLUTION DURING THE CIVIL WAR, V.I. LENIN POINTED OUT THAT WE "WON ONLY BECAUSE THE WORKERS AND RED ARMY MEN KNEW WHAT THEY WERE FIGHTING FOR." "...EVERY WORKER AND PEASANT UNDER ARMS," HE SAID, "KNOWS WHAT HE IS GOING FOR, AND CONSCIOUSLY SPILLS HIS BLOOD IN THE NAME OF THE TRIUMPH OF JUSTICE AND SOCIALISM. THIS REALIZATION BY THE MASSES OF THE GOALS AND REASONS OF WAR ARE OF VAST IMPORTANCE AND INSURE VICTORY."

(COMPLETE WORKS, VOL 40 FOURTY, 111 ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVEN; VOL 41 FOURTYONE, P 121 ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTYONE.)

THE COMMUNIST EDUCATION OF TROOPS BEING CARRIED OUT UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PARTY IS, IN ITS IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION, UNITED WITH AND INSEPARABLE FROM THE EDUCATION OF THE WHOLE SOVIET PEOPLE; IT IS BUILT ON THE BASIS OF LENINISM, AND DEFINED BY

PAGE 4 RUDOPKM 7318 UNCLAS

THE PARTY'S PROGRAM AND THE DECISIONS OF ITS CONGRESSES AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUMS, AND BY OTHER PARTY DOCUMENTS.

BENEFICIAL, GUIDING INFLUENCE IS EXERTED ON THE PROCESS OF IDEOL-

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L081310 FIFTH ADD L081110 (A. YEPISHEV ARTICLE)

MOSCOW KOMMUNIST NO 6, SIGNED TO PRESS 21 APR 69 PP 60-71 L XXX

THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

(TEXT) THE ELUCIDATION OF THE USSR ARMED FORCES' INTERNATIONAL
DUTY, AND THE EDUCATION OF PERSONNEL IN A SPIRIT OF PREPAREDNESS TO
FLIGHT ALONGSIDE THEIR CLASS BROTHERS TO THE LAST DROP OF BLOOD
AGAINST IMPERIALISM AND FOR THE STABILITY OF SOCIALIST GAINS,
AND IN THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP WITH THE ARMIES OF THE WARSAW
PACT MEMBER STATES-- THIS IS ONE OF THE VITAL TASKS OF OUR EDUCATIONAL
WORK.

ARMY AND NAVY CADRES SEE LENINISM ALSO AS A MIGHTY MEANS FOR
EXPOSING BOURGEOIS IDEOLOGY, AN MEANS FOR EDUCATING TROOPS IN THE
SPIRIT OF CLASS HATRED FOR IMPERIALISM. V.I. LENIN OFTEN DEMANDED
THAT THE CLASS DIRECTION OF ARMY TROOPS' IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL
EDUCATION NOT BE NEGLECTED, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION
THE CONTINUAL STRUGGLE ON THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA OF THE TWO

PAGE 2 RUDOPKM 7322 UNCLAS

IDEOLOGIES-- BOURGEOIS AND SOCIALIST. THIS STRUGGLE HAS ACQUIRED

USING A WHOLE ARSENAL OF IDEOLOGICAL RESOURCES, THE IMPERIALISTS
ARE STRIVING TO INFLUENCE THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF OUR PEOPLE AND TO
POISON THEM WITH THE VENOM OF BOURGEOIS IDEOLOGY. FOR THESE PURPOSES
THEY ARE RESORTING TO THE MOST REFINED AND CUNNING METHODS. IN THE
UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, AND THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC,
DEPARTMENTS DEALING ESSENTIALLY WITH SO-CALLED "PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE" ARE FUSING WITH INTELLIGENCE ORGANS.

ONE OF THE CHIEF TARGETS OF IDEOLOGICAL SABOTAGE IS CONSIDERED
BY THE IMPERIALISTS TO BE THE PERSONNEL OF THE SOVIET ARMED
FORCES. THEIR DESIGNS ARE OBVIOUS: THEY ARE STRIVING TO
UNDERMINE THE MORALE OF OUR TROOPS. BUT THESE ATTEMPTS OF OUR
ENEMIES ARE FUTILE, NO ONE WILL SUCCEED IN SHAKING THE MORAL AND
POLITICAL STATE OF OUR ARMY AND NAVY TROOPS. HOWEVER WE ARE AWARE THAT
WE MUST CONTINUE IN THE FUTURE ALSO TO FEARLESSLY EXPOSE THE
REACTIONARY IDEOLOGY OF IMPERIALISM IN ANY OF ITS MANIFESTATIONS, TO
CONCERN OURSELVES WITH THE HIGH IDEOLOGICAL LEVEL OF ALL OUR ORAL
AND PRINTED PROPAGANDA AND MASS AGITATION, AND TO DISPLAY POLITICAL

LENINISM AND THE LENINIST DOCTRINE ABOUT WAR AND THE ARMY SERVE

PAGE 3 RUDOPKM 7322 UNCLAS

AS A MIGHTY IDEOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL WEAPON IN THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST THE BOURGEOIS IDEOLOGISTS, THE FALSIFIERS OF MILITARY
HISTORY, AND THE PROBLEMS OF WARFARE.

NOW, WHEN THE RULING CIRCLES OF THE IMPERIALIST STATES ARE
FEVERISHLY PREPARING FOR A NEW WORLD WAR, THE QUESTION ABOUT THE
ORIGINS OF WAR AND THEIR ESSENCE AND CHARACTER HAS BECOME ONE OF
THE QUESTIONS OF A MOST ACUTE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE.

AS IS WELL-KNOWN, CERTAIN IMPERIALIST IDEOLOGISTS, AND POLITICAL
AND MILITARY FIGURES OF THE CAPITALIST STATES ARE TRYING TO PROVE THAT
LENINIST FORMULA CHARACTERIZING WAR AS THE CONTINUATION
OF POLITICS BY FORCIBLE MEANS "HAS BECOME OBSOLETE," THAT IT--THEY
SAY--IS INAPPLICABLE TO NUCLEAR WARFARE, AND THAT SUCH A WAR ALLEGEDLY
WILL NOT HAVE A CLASS AND POLITICAL CONTENT, AND WILL NOT BE A
CONTINUATION OF THE POLITICS OF THE STATES AND THE VARIOUS CLASSES.
THE PURPORT OF THESE CONTENTIONS IS TO MISLEAD THE POPULAR MASSES

WITH REGARD TO THE CLASS AND POLITICAL CHARACTER AND THE REAL

ROLE OF THE AGGRESSIVE POLICIES OF IMPERIALISM IN WAR'S PREPATION AND
ITS UNLEASHING.

THE CLASSIC LENINIST DEFINITION OF THE ESSENCE OF WAR SERVES AS A
METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR A CONSISTENTLY SCIENTIFIC DEFINITION

PAGE 4 RUDOPKM 7322 UNCLAS

OF THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ESSENCE AND CHARACTER OF A POSSIBLE
WITH THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. A THIRD WORLD WAR, IF THE IMPERIALISTS
NEVERTHELESS SUCCEED IN UNLEASHING ONE, WILL BE A DECISIVE CLASS
CLASH BETWEEN TWO COUNTERPOSED SOCIAL SYSTEMS. ON THE PART OF THE
IMPERIALIST STATES THIS WAR WILL BE THE CONTINUATION OF THE CRIMINAL,
REACTIONARY, AND AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF IMPERIALISM; ON THE PART OF THE
SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY COUNTRIES, THIS WILL BE A
CONTINUATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY POLICY OF FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE
OF THE SOCIALIST STATES, OF INSURING THE BUILDING OF SOCIALISM AND
COMMUNISM, AND A LEGITIMATE AND JUSTIFIED COUNTERACTION TO AGGRESSION.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY, BY SACREDLY FULFILLING LENIN'S BEHESTS, IS
INCREASING THE VIGILANCE OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE, STRENGTHENING OUR
MOTHERLAND'S DEFENSE CAPACITY, AND IS CONCERNED THAT THE ARMED FORCES
SHOULD BE READY TO DEFEND THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF SOCIALISM AND CRUSH ANY

ANNIVERSARY OF V.I. LENIN'S BIRTH. HAVING SET THEMSELVES THE TASK OF MAK-
ING THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION FOR THE JUBILEE OF THE GREAT LEADER A NEW
STAGE OF TRULY LENINIST TRAINING FOR OUR CADRES AND OUR WHOLE
PERSONNEL, THE MILITARY COUNCILS, COMMANDERS, POLITICAL ORGANS,
AND PARTY ORGANIZATIONS ARE PAYING CHIEF ATTENTION TO THE CONTENT AND
QUALITY OF THIS TRAINING AND TO RAISING THE LEVEL OF THE PROPAGANDA

PAGE 5 RUDOPKM 7322 UNCLAS

OF LENINIST IDEAS AS A MEANS OF STRENGTHENING THE SPIRITUAL STRENGTH
OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY.

IN STUDYING V.I. LENIN'S IDEOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL LEGACY,
ATTENTION IS CONCENTRATED ON ASSIMILATING THE REVOLUTIONARY AND
CREATIVE SPIRIT OF LENINISM AND ITS PROFOUND PARTY-MINDEDNESS. BY
STUDYING LENINISM IN ACTION AND IN ITS CLOSE TIES WITH THE PRESENT
DAY, THE OFFICERS, SERGEANTS, SOLDIERS, AND SEAMEN ARE
PROFOUNDLY AWARE OF THE CONTINUITY OF REVOLUTIONARY TRADITIONS,
REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE, AND THE PRICELESS SPIRITUAL TREASURES WHICH
HAVE BEEN ACCUMULATED IN THE PROCESS OF THE HEROIC REVOLUTIONARY
STRUGGLE OF OUR PARTY AND PEOPLE, AND UNDERSTAND THE WHOLE VASTNESS
OF THE CPSU'S THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN PUTTING LENINIST

IDEAS INTO PRACTICE.

AFFAIRS, IN THE TECHNICAL EQUIPPING OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY,
AND IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALL ARMS OF THE ARMED FORCES. AS FOR
THE POLITICAL AWARENESS AND SOCIAL ACTIVITY OF OUR TROOPS, IN THIS
RESPECT THE SOVIET ARMY RADICALLY DIFFERS FROM THE ARMIES OF
CAPITALIST STATES. ITS ADVANTAGE WAS PARTICULARLY MANIFEST DURING THE
YEARS OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR, AND IT IS REVEALED TO ITS FULLEST
EXTENT TODAY. WE HAVE SHAPED A NEW TYPE OF SOLDIER -- A SOLDIER-PATRIOT,
A SOLDIER-INTERNATIONALIST, EDUCATED IN THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNIST

PAGE 6 RUDOPKM 7322 UNCLAS

IDEOLOGY. UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE GENERAL RISE IN THE EDUCATED
LEVEL AND CULTURE IN THE COUNTRY THE SPIRITUAL MAKEUP OF SOLDIERS AND
SEAMEN HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLY ENRICHED. THE GENERAL CULTURAL LEVEL
OF SOLDIERS HAS BEEN RAISED, MORAL AND POLITICAL AND COMBAT QUALIT-
IES HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED, AND THE AWARENESS, DISCIPLINE, AND ORG-
ANIZATIONAL QUALITY OF THE FORCES HAVE BEEN INCREASED EVEN MORE.
THE MORAL AND POLITICAL MAKEUP OF THE ARMY AND NAVY ALSO CHARACTER-
IZES THE FACT THAT THE PARTY AND KONSOMOL STRATUM IN THEM NOW

CONSTITUTES MORE THAN 80 EIGHTY PERCENT



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V.I. LENIN'S IDEOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL LEGACY, THE WORKS OF THE
CLASSICS OF MARXISM-LENINISM, THE DECISIONS OF THE CPSU, AND ON
THEIR OWN SEARCH FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF PRESSING CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS ON THE BASIS OF LENINISM. WE ARE STRIVING WITH THE WHOLE

PAGE 2 RUDOPKM 7323 UNCLAS

SYSTEM OF MARXIST-LENINIST TRAINING OF OFFICER PERSONNEL TO INSURE
THE CREATIVE STUDY OF REVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND TEACH THE OFFICERS
TO UTILIZE THE METHODOLOGY OF LENINISM, AND ON ITS BASIS TO LEARN
TO KNOW MORE PROFOUNDLY THE LAW-GOVERNED PATTERN FOR BUILDING
SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM, AND FOR SOVIET MILITARY BUILDING IN
CONTEMPORARY CONDITIONS, THE LAWS OF ARMED STRUGGLE, AND THE HIGH ARTS OF

PAGE 3 RUDOPKM 7323 UNCLAS

POLITICAL STUDIES FOR WHICH A CONSIDERABLE EXPANSION OF IDEOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL SUBJECTS IS PLANNED. IN THEIR YEARS OF SERVICE IN THE ARMY AND THE NAVY THE PRIVATES AND SERGEANTS HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ACQ THE FOUNDATION OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE AND ASSIMILATE THE MAJOR DECISIONS OF THE CPSU AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. GREAT SIGNIFICANCE IS ATTACHED IN THE FORCES TO THE STUDY OF V. I. LENIN'S BIOGRAPHY.

THE NEW CONDITIONS AND THE NEW STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT F THE ARMED FORCES NOTT ONLY PROSUPPOSE THE FURTHER IMPROVEMENT OF HE CONTENT, FORMS, AND METHODS OF IDEOLOGICAL WORK AND ITS MATERIAL BASIS BUT ALSO MAKE GREATER DEMANDS ON COMMANDERS, POLITICAL ORGANS, AND PARTY ORGANIZATIONS. CONSIDERING THAT A BETTER TRAINED AND EDUCATED SOLDIER WHO DEALS WITH COMPLICATED COMBAT EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS HAS A WIDER OUTLOOK AND MORE SPIRITUAL NEEDS AND DEMANDS, WE ARE STRIVING TO INCREASE THE GENERAL CULTURE AND QUALIFICATIONS OF OUR CADRES WHO ORGANIZE THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL.

INFLUENCES FROM BOURGEOIS PROPAGANDA.

THERE ARE ALSO VARIOUS FORMS OF MASTERING THE LENINIST THEORETICAL LEGACY IN THE POLITICAL TRAINING OF SOLDIERS, SEAMEN, SERGEANTS, AND MASTER SERGEANTS. WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT IMPROVING THE EDUCATION OF PRIVATES AND SERGEANTS IS A SHORT-TERM AFFAIR, LIMITED BY TWO OR THREE YEARS SERVICE IN THE ARMY OR THE NAVY, BUT A PROLONGED PROCESS OF FORMING A COMMUNIST WORLD OUTLOOK, STARTING FROM THE SCHOOL DESK, CONTINUING LATER AT ENTERPRISES, KOLKHOSES, AND HIGHER EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS WHOSE COLLECTIVES, AS IT WERE, HAND OVER THE BATON TO COMMANDERS, POLITICAL WORKERS, ARMY AND NAVY PARTY, AND

AND MILITARY EDUCATION OF PERSONNEL IN THE IDEAS OF LENINISM INSURES
THE CONTINUED STRENGTHENING OF THE MORAL SPIRIT OF THE ARMED FORCES.

PAGE 4 RUDOPKM 7323 UNCLAS

THE POLITICAL AND MORALE CONDITION OF THE ARMY AND NAVY IS HIGH.
CLOSELY UNITED AROUND THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE PERSONNEL OF THE
ARMY AND NAVY IS HIGH. CLOSELY UNITED AROUND THE COMMUNIST PARTY,
THE PERSONNEL OF THE ARMY AND NAVY ARDENTLY APPROVE AND SUPPORT THE
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE CPSU AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
AND DISPLAY BY ACTUAL DEEDS THEIR BOUNDLESS DEVOTION TO THE IDEALS
OF COMMUNISM. EVIDENCE OF THIS IS THE STRENUOUS WORK OF SOVIET TROOPS
ON INCREASING COMBAT SKILL, THEIR SELFLESS ACTIONS DURING EXERCISES
AND CRUISES, CARRYING OUT COMBAT DUTY AND SERVICE, AND ASSIMILATING
NEW COMBAT EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS.

FROM THE COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, THE INTENSIFICATION

ACTIVITY, WHICH HAS BROKEN AWAY FROM MARXISM-LENINISM AND TAKEN THE
PATH OF SHAMELESS ANTI-SOVIETISM, THE SOLDIERS OF THE SOVIET ARMY AND
THE NAVY DRAW THE CONCLUSION OF THE NEED FOR EVERY POSSIBLE INCREASE
IN REVOLUTIONARY VIGILANCE, DISCIPLINE AND ORGANIZATION, AND
COMBAT READINESS.

THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES REPRESENT A MIGHTY COLLECTIVE OF STEADFAST
AND COURAGEOUS DEFENDERS OF THE MOTHERLAND, CLOSELY KNIT IN UNITY OF

PAGE 5 RUDOPKM 7323 UNCLAS

WILL, LIVING A SINGLE LIFE, AND UNITED IN THOUGHT AND ASPIRATION WITH
THE PARTY AND WITH THE ENTIRE SOVIET PEOPLE.

OUR ARMY AND NAVY ARE A REMARKABLE SCHOOL FOR COMMUNIST EDUCATION,
COMPREHENSIVE PREPARATION AND TRAINING OF YOUTH, A SCHOOL FOR FORMING
THEIR CIVIC SELF-AWARENESS AND IDEOLOGICAL AND SPIRITUAL MATURITY.
DURING SERVICE A SOLDIER AS A RULE ACQUIRES CLASS QUALIFICATIONS IN
ONE OR EVEN SEVERAL TECHNICAL PROFESSIONS WHICH ARE ALSO NECESSARY
IN THE ECONOMY. EVERY YEAR TENS OF THOUSANDS OF COMMUNISTS WHO ENTERED
THE PARTY AND WENT THROUGH ITS FIRST SCHOOL IN THE ARMY AND NAVY PARTY

STAT

L081330 SIXTH AND LAST ADD L081110 (A. YEPISHEV ARTICLE)

MOSCOW

KOMMUNIST

NO 6, SIGNED TO IRESS 21 APR 69 PP 60-71 L XXX THAN 80

PERCENT.

(TEXT) THE SITUATION IN WHICH OUR ARMED FORCES ARE DEVELOPING AND IMPROVING IS CHANGING. THE DEMANDS UPON MILITARY CADRES ARE GROWING. THERE IS AN IMMEASURABLE INCREASE IN THE IDEOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL LEVEL OF THE CADRES THEMSELVES, OF ALL PERSONNEL, AND THEIR SPIRITUAL DEMANDS ARE INCREASING. AND THIS DEMANDS FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN THE FORMS AND METHODS OF PARTY AND POLITICAL WORK, AND A DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH TO THE EDUCATION OF PERSONNEL.

KOLKHOZES AND SOVKHOZES, AND HIGHER EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS.

AND EVERYWHERE, IN EVERY PART OF COMMUNIST BUILDING, THEY ARE

CONSCIENTIOUSLY FULFILLING THEIR PATRIOTIC DUTY.

INHERENT IN THE SOVIET SOLDIER, AS AN EQUAL CITIZEN OF OUR GREAT
STATE, IS A STATE-ORIENTED APPROACH TO EXECUTING SERVICE AND A PROFOUND
UNDERSTANDING OF HIS DUTY TO THE MOTHERLAND. WE WILL CONTINUE STRIVING
TO DEVELOP THESE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE SOLDIERS OF THE ARMED
FORCES, WHICH HAVE BEEN CULTIVATED BY THE WHOLE SYSTEM OF OUR SOVIET
REALITY, AND TO FORM NOT ONLY MASTERS OF MILITARY AFFAIRS BUT ALSO

PAGE 6 RUDOPKM 7323 UNCLAS


ACTIVE BUILDERS OF COMMUNISM AND CITIZENS OF THE SOVIET LAND, WHO
BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FATE OF THEIR SOCIALIST FATHERLAND.
IN THIS WE ARE CONSTANTLY AWARE OF THE GREAT HELP OF LOCAL PARTY,
SOVIET, AND KOMSOMOL ORGANS AND THE RESULTS OF THEIR MULTI-FACETED
WORK ON THE MILITARY AND PATRIOTIC EDUCATION OF OUR YOUTH, AND THEIR
POLITICAL, AND MILITARY AND TECHNICAL AND PHYSICAL TRAINING OF THEM

FOR SERVICE IN THE ARMY.

STRENGTHEN IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY THE UNITY OF THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE
AND WILL EDUCATE THE PERSONNEL IN THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTIONARY, COMBAT,
AND LABOR TRADITIONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, OUR PEOPLE, THE ARMY AND
THE NAVY, AND IN A SPIRIT OF THE DESIRE TO FULFILL THE MILITARY DUTY
WITH HONOR.

THE BEST WAY TO MARK AN IMPORTANT DATE, VLADIMIR ILICH SAID, IS
TO CONCENTRATE ON UNACCOMPLISHED TASKS. IN ANTICIPATION OF THE
CENTENARY OF V.I. LENIN'S BIRTH, COMMANDERS, POLITICAL ORGANS, AND
PARTY AND KOMSOMOL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE ARMY AND NAVY ARE ADOPTING
MEASURES TO SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISH TASKS FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF
HIGHER THRESHOLDS OF COMBAT READINESS DEFINED IN THE MINISTRY OF
DEFENSE ORDER FOR 1969 NINETEEN SIXTY NINE. A WELL OF INSPIRATION IN
THE SOVIET SOLDIERS' MILITARY LABOR AIMED AT STRENGTHENING THE
DEFENSE CAPACITY OF THE SOVIET LAND IS AND WILL BE LENINISM -- AN
EVER-LIVING AND DEVELOPING REVOLUTIONARY DOCTRINE. ENDALL

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L081333 CORRECTION

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KOMMUNIST NO SIX,

SIGNED TO PRESS 21 APRIL 1969 (ARMY GEN. A. YEPISHEV ARTICLE CITED

BY ANATOLE SHUB), PAGE TWO, THIRD FULL GRAF, SHOULD READ XXX

'HAS BECOME OBSOLETE,' THAT IT--THEY SAY--IS INAPPLICABLE TO


NUCLEAR WAR, THAT SUCH A WAR ALLEGEDLY XXX (SUPPLYING DROPPED

PHRASE)


UPCOMING FINAL TAKES OF TEXT ARE ALREADY CORRECT AND

INCLUDE

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25X1 **LO81355 CORRECTIONS**



YEPISHEV ARTICLE MOSCOW

KOMMUNIST NO SIX, SIGNED TO PRESS 21 TWENTY ONE APRIL: PAGE FOUR

SECOND GRAF LINE FIVE SHOULD READ KXX THE CREATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND

LOB1208 THIRD ADD: PAGE ONE PENULTIMATE LINE SHOULD READ XXX


POLICY OF THE CPSU. PARTY BUILDING IN (PICKING UP SAME LINE AND
CORRECTING PUNCTUATION)

PAGE THREE FIRST GRAF LINE SEVEN SHOULD READ XXX DIRECTLY IN THE
COMPANIES, BATTIERES, AND SQUADRONS. XXX (PICKING UP SAME LINE AND
CORRECTING PUNCTUATION)

PAGE SIX FINAL GRAF LINE ELEVEN SHOULD READ XXX OF ALLIED SKILLS,
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF MUTUAL INTERCHANGEABILITY IN GUN-CREWS AND TEAMS,
XXX (PICKING UP LINE TWELVE AND CLEARING GARBLE) RW/AIREY/MUELLER

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14 March 1969

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Moscow's Handling of the Sino-Soviet Border Clash

Summary

Several hypotheses have been advanced for Moscow's prompt disclosure of the border clash of 2 March and for the high level of propaganda and diplomatic attention Moscow has given to the clash since 7 March. No single hypothesis seems completely satisfactory and it may well be that each has some validity in explaining specific moves by the government or by individual newspapers. We believe, however, that the best explanation for the Soviet propaganda effort is simply the seriousness of the clash, the desire to fix responsibility for it on Peking, and the fear that it might lead to further clashes to which the Soviets would have to respond more forcefully.

We start from the assumption that the press statement issued by the Soviet Foreign Ministry on 7 March is true in its essentials and corresponds with the information on the clash available to the Soviet leadership. That is: the clash was intentionally staged by Chinese forces; this was the most serious border clash yet between armed men of the two nations; the Soviet death toll was high and many deaths were the result of Chinese

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brutality. We do not know who owns the island in question, but we believe the Soviets thought they did or at least that it was a "no-man's land" that neither side would fight over.

Background

We believe that the border encounter caught the Russians--both in Moscow and in the patrolling unit--by surprise. Moscow's immediate reaction was probably the result of genuine concern over Chinese intentions and a desire not to be placed at a propaganda disadvantage over the incident. The Soviet version of the fracas was broadcast to the world within hours of its occurrence on 2 March.

The first reports of the clash caused a stir in Moscow on Sunday. The Soviets probably surmised that any event of this size was bound to become known and decided to get their story out first. Caught by surprise, the Soviet leaders may have feared that it was a precursor to something larger, or at least something similar, and may have considered that publicity would have a deterrent effect.

Moscow's treatment of the affair from then until 7 March was subdued. The Soviets have been extremely reluctant over the years to call attention to the Chinese claims to substantial portions of Soviet Siberia and there may have been hope that major polemical exchange on the issue was still avoidable. It is also possible that

Moscow was awaiting a definitive report on the details of the clash. By 6 or 7 March, however, the Soviet leaders probably had an exhaustive report in their hands. Furthermore, the extensive Chinese exploitation of the issue--including largescale demonstrations around the Soviet Embassy in Peking--probably prompted Moscow to respond.

Among the contributing reasons for Moscow's public response the following are most often suggested:

The Berlin Pull-back Hypothesis

This was most popular in the first days after the clash. Under this hypothesis, it is argued that the Soviets drew attention to the border clash as a means of shifting attention from Berlin where they were finding it expedient to make only a minimum demonstration of their displeasure over the West German presidential election. This seems unsatisfactory, however, because, although the Soviets promptly reported the incident, they did not make a major propaganda issue of it until 7 March--two days after the Berlin election had ended.

The World Communist Conference Hypothesis

With an eye to the world conference, Moscow has systematically attacked the Chinese leadership for many months and sought to prove that it has placed China beyond the socialist pale. Since 7 March the world conference and the border clash have been linked in some press and radio commentaries, but it has not been

Rumanian language broadcasts. While the Soviets may think that the incident will be useful to them in dealing with some of the conference attendees, they probably appreciate that it would backfire on them. Already the Italian Communists, one of the most important of the wavering parties, have publicly criticized both combatants.

The Vigilance Campaign Hypothesis

Some Soviets may indeed see the incident as a useful instrument against dissenters and liberals. This hypothesis rests, however, largely on the treatment of the clash in one newspaper, the ultra-orthodox Sovetskaya Rossiya, which has called for increased revolutionary vigilance against "subversive western ideas." Sovetskaya Rossiya has been in the forefront on this issue for the last year, however, and the bulk of the Soviet press has concentrated on more nationalistic themes.

The Leadership Differences Hypothesis

There have been no reports of differences within the leadership and the evidence in support of this hypothesis rests largely on some slight differences in newspaper coverage of the clash. The Sovetskaya Rossiya approach has already been noted, but this paper is not clearly linked with any leader. The trade union newspaper, Trud, carried the first eyewitness account of the clash on 5 March and since this paper presumably takes its

lead from trade union chief and Politburo member Shelepin there is room for some speculation. There is no indication that Trud forced the hand of other Politburo members, however. Coverage of the incident in the Soviet press has been remarkably uniform--as to the line taken, the quantity of coverage, and even the placement of stories in the paper.

The Record Establishing and Deterrent Hypothesis

The possibility of a large-scale Chinese encroachment on Soviet territory may seem remote, but the Russians are not in a position to discount it. Since 1965 they have nearly doubled their forces all along China's border until they total over a quarter of a million ground troops supported by considerable air power. This major and expensive reallocation of forces bespeaks a Soviet concern that China is indeed both a real and a potential threat to the territorial integrity of the USSR. While the Soviets have a decided military and firepower superiority in the immediate border area in the Far East, the Chinese maintain about 30 army divisions in Manchuria--a fact which is doubtless always present in Soviet military planning. Soviet uneasiness about its borders is compounded by the fact that there is very little certainty in Moscow about the rationality of present and future Chinese leaders.

By 7 March, Soviet leaders had the full story of the clash before them including what we assume to be proof that Peking intended--at least in this instance--

to escalate considerably tension on the border. Public statements of anger and national preparedness must have seemed an appropriate deterrent to any future moves.

Furthermore, the Soviets probably felt the need to rebut the Chinese, who had immediately rolled out their propaganda guns complete with massive and growing demonstrations. Memories of the seige of the Soviet Embassy in February 1967, when Russians in Peking literally feared for their lives, were probably strong. In any case, the Soviet reputation regarding other people's borders has not been too good recently and Moscow doubtless desired to protest its innocence to the world in the clearest fashion. This may also have figured in the diplomatic demarches which the Soviets made in Western capitals over the last week.

For the Future

It could be argued that the Soviets, having made a case that they were the injured party and having created an atmosphere of militant nationalism, intend to retaliate with military means. We think, on balance, that they will not do so. It would keep alive an issue which they have traditionally desired to play down and they could not be certain what sort of response it would elicit. Faced with ideological fragmentation in both East and Western Europe, girding for disarmament negotiations with the West, and faced with a resource allocation problem at home, it is improbable that they desire an inflamed border with as large and hostile an

adversary as the People's Republic of China.

This does not mean, however, that Moscow will adopt a timid attitude along the border area. The Soviets have always been extremely jealous of their territorial boundaries and an incident such as this would be more likely to harden their attitude than to cause them to fall back. This would seem to indicate, if both sides really feel strongly about the island or islands in question, that further armed encounters are distinctly within the realm of possibility.

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Calendar No. 57

91ST CONGRESS }
1st Session

SENATE }

REPORT
No. 91-55

STUDY OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY
AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

FEBRUARY 7, 1969.—Ordered to be printed
Filed under authority of the order of the Senate of February 7, 1969

Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina, from the Committee on Rules and
Administration, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany S. Res. 24]

The Committee on Rules and Administration, to which was referred the resolution (S. Res. 24) authorizing an investigation of certain aspects of national security and international operations, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the resolution be agreed to.

Senate Resolution 24 would authorize the Committee on Government Operations, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, to expend not to exceed \$105,000 from February 1, 1969, through January 31, 1970, to make studies as to the efficiency and economy of operations of all branches and functions of the Government with particular reference to—

- (1) The effectiveness of present national security methods, staffing, and processes as tested against the requirements imposed by the rapidly mounting complexity of national security problems;
- (2) The capacity of present national security staffing, methods, and processes to make full use of the Nation's resources of knowledge, talents, and skills;
- (3) The adequacy of present intergovernmental relationships between the United States and international organizations of which the United States is a member; and
- (4) Legislative and other proposals or means to improve these methods, processes, and relationships.

Moneys authorized by the Senate for the same purpose during the 88th, 89th, and 90th Congresses, and expenditures by the committee therefrom through December 31, 1968, are as follows:

	<i>Authorized</i>	<i>Expended</i>
88th Cong.:		
1st sess.-----	\$92,250.00	\$53,537.81
2d sess.-----	90,000.00	56,211.98
Total-----	<u>182,250.00</u>	<u>109,749.79</u>
89th Cong.:		
1st sess.-----	90,000.00	64,724.21
2d sess.-----	90,000.00	63,443.97
Total-----	<u>180,000.00</u>	<u>128,168.18</u>
90th Cong.:		
1st sess.-----	90,000.00	63,146.24
2d sess.-----	90,000.00	60,415.75
Total-----	<u>180,000.00</u>	<u>123,561.99</u>

Additional information relative to the proposed inquiry is contained in a letter to Senator B. Everett Jordan, chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration, from Senator Henry M. Jackson, chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Committee on Government Operations, which letter (with accompanying budget) is as follows:

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C., January 17, 1969.

HON. B. EVERETT JORDAN,
Chairman, Committee on Rules and Administration,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Reference is made to Senate Resolution 24, 91st Congress, first session, which was introduced in the Senate on January 17, 1969, requesting funds for studies as to the effectiveness of present national security methods, staffing, and processes, and the adequacy of intergovernmental relationships between this country and certain international organizations. The requested funds would cover the period from February 1, 1969, through January 31, 1970. Prior to submitting this resolution to the Senate, it was approved by the Committee on Government Operations.

Attached hereto is a projected budget for the period. It is estimated that we will require \$105,000 to carry on the work of the subcommittee during the present year.

As you are aware, our subcommittee conducts inquiries into national security operations in Washington and overseas and makes findings and recommendations for improvement as appropriate.

In the 90th Congress, second session, the subcommittee carried forward its major inquiry into the planning-programing-budgeting system (PPBS) as applied in the Department of Defense starting in 1961 and extended to most other Federal departments and agencies by President Johnson in August 1965. Hearings on PPB, held in

March and July, include testimony from Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States and William S. Gaud, Administrator, Agency for International Development. Other subcommittee publications on PPB include special memorandums submitted by Dr. James R. Schlesinger (RAND) and Dr. Frederick C. Mosher (University of Virginia); a series of background studies prepared by the staff; and summary observations on the application of PPB in national security affairs.

During the present year, the subcommittee plans to audit the progress and performance of the executive branch in improving key areas of national security and international operations.

Of the \$90,000 authorized for the subcommittee for the 12 months from February 1, 1968, to January 31, 1969, approximately \$17,000 will be returned to the Senate contingent fund. This saving reflects the fact that one professional staff position was not filled until mid-summer, and that the subcommittee's chief consultant was employed for a limited time only.

The inquiries, conducted on a professional and nonpartisan basis, are made by the Government Operations Committee in accordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate, providing that the committee shall have the duty of—

- * * * * *
- B. Studying the operation of Government activities at all levels with a view to determining its economy and efficiency;
 - C. Evaluating the effects of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative and executive branches of the Government;
 - D. Studying the intergovernmental relationships * * * between the United States and international organizations of which the United States is a member.

I shall be available to give the committee any further information desired.

The following additional information is provided: The Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations has one room (room 135) for its staff and consultants, and an adjacent utility room (135-A).

Thank you for your cooperation and with kind regards, I am
Sincerely yours,

HENRY M. JACKSON, *U.S. Senator,*
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security
and International Operations.

4

PROPOSED BUDGET

Position	Number	Annual salary	Monthly salary	Total for period of budget
STAFF				
Legal and investigative:				
Staff director (Consultants, including the chief consultant and consultant to the minority)	1	\$24,676	\$2,056.33	\$24,676.00
Professional staff member	3-4			30,500.00
Editorial and research: Research assistant	1	22,487	1,873.91	22,487.00
Administrative and clerical	1	4,179	348.25	4,179.00
Chief clerk	1	9,353	779.41	9,353.00
Intern	1	2,388	199.00	2,388.00
Total	8-9			93,583.00
ADMINISTRATIVE				
Contribution to employees health benefit programs (\$8.88 per month per employee)				532.80
Contribution to civil service retirement fund (6 1/2 percent of total salaries paid)				4,100.40
Contribution to employees Federal employees group life insurance (30 cents per month per \$1,000 coverage)				302.40
Travel (inclusive of field investigations)				2,000.00
Hearings (inclusive of reporters' fees)				1,500.00
Witness fees, expenses				2,000.00
Stationery, office supplies				250.00
Communications (telephone, telegraph)				500.00
Newspapers, magazines, documents				200.00
Contingent fund				31.40
Total				11,417.00
Grand total				105,000.00

Funds requested, Senate Resolution 24, \$105,000; funds approved by Committee on Rules and Administration, \$105,000.

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91st Congress }
1st Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT

THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION
Selected Writings

COMPILED BY THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
(Pursuant to S. Res. 24, 91st Cong.)
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE



Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

25-004

WASHINGTON : 1969

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 40 cents

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ii

FOREWORD

In our continuing study of the effectiveness of this country's national security methods, staffing, and processes, we thought it would be useful to understand more fully the negotiating methods of the Soviet Union.

In this connection, the subcommittee staff was asked to prepare a short selection of analytic materials on the Soviet approach to international negotiation, drawing on both Western and Russian sources.

There is, of course, substantial Western literature on this subject, much of it based upon experiences in World War II and the immediate post-war period—the time when we had the most intensive negotiations with the Soviet Union. Many insights provided by these earlier studies are surprisingly valid to this day. But only a few really incisive analyses based upon more recent negotiating efforts have been attempted. In a way, this underlines the value of preparing this selection of some of the best available studies, and perhaps thereby also stimulating certain new work. We are grateful to the authors and publishers for their cooperation in giving permission to reprint the papers included in this collection.

Soviet literature, unfortunately, is hardly outspoken on the subject. In recent years several Soviet books on diplomacy have been written but they do not go beyond the superficial and formal discussion of the process of negotiation as viewed from Moscow. Included in this publication, therefore, are only a few of the more revealing samples of this Soviet writing, which we arranged to have translated from the Russian. The generally primitive form of these Soviet observations, I believe, is as significant as their content.

In preparing this compilation we consulted with a number of distinguished analysts of Soviet affairs. We wish to express our special appreciation for the advice of Sergius Yakobson, Senior Specialist for Russian Affairs, of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress.

HENRY M. JACKSON,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security
and International Operations.*

FEBRUARY 26, 1969.

CONTENTS

	Page
Foreword-----	III
Western Sources	
Kennan, George F.—“The Technique for Dealing with Russia” [from <i>Memoirs 1925-1950</i>]-----	3
Leites, Nathan—“The Operational Code of the Politburo” [excerpts from RAND Corporation Monograph R-296, August 1, 1950]-----	8
Mosely, Philip E.—“Some Soviet Techniques of Negotiation” [from Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson (eds.), <i>Negotiating with the Russians</i> , 1951]-----	16
Acheson, Dean—“On Dealing with Russia” [from <i>Sketches From Life of Men I Have Known</i> , 1959; and <i>The New York Times Magazine</i> , April 12, 1959]-----	27
Nogco, Joseph L.—“The Gamesmanship of International Negotiation” [from <i>Soviet Policy Towards International Control of Atomic Energy</i> , 1961]-----	33
Craig, Gordon A.—“Techniques of Negotiation” [from Ivo J. Lederer (ed.), <i>Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective</i> , 1962]-----	38
Iklé, Fred Charles—“How Shrewd Are Soviet Negotiators?” [from <i>How Nations Negotiate</i> , 1964]-----	48
Wolfe, Thomas W.—“The Soviet Voice in the East-West Strategic Discourse” [from <i>Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads</i> , 1964]-----	55
Dean, Arthur H.—“Soviet Diplomatic Style and Tactics” [from <i>Test Ban and Disarmament: The Path of Negotiation</i> , 1966]-----	61
Conquest, Robert—“Czechoslovakia: The Soviet Outlook” [from <i>Studies in Comparative Communism</i> , Vol. I, Nos. 1 and 2, July/October 1968]-----	67
Soviet Sources	
“Diplomacy” [from <i>Diplomaticheskii Slovar'</i> (Diplomatic Dictionary), Vol. 1, Moscow, 1960]-----	77
“Lenin and Soviet Diplomats” [from article by V. A. Zorin, V. L. Israelian and Sh. P. Sanakoev in <i>O Sovremennoi Sovetskoi Diplomatii</i> (On Contemporary Soviet Diplomacy), V. Z. Lebedev (ed.), Moscow, 1963]-----	84
“Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR” [from book by Valerian A. Zorin, <i>Osnovy Diplomaticheskoi Sluzhby</i> (The Bases of Diplomatic Service), Moscow, 1964]-----	85
“Documents of Soviet Diplomacy: Two Addressees” [from book by An. Kovalev, <i>Azbuka Diplomatii</i> (The ABC's of Diplomacy), 2nd edition, Moscow, 1968]-----	89

EXCERPT FROM *The United States and Russia*
(Winter 1946)

Historically, the foreign affairs of Russia have developed along lines entirely different from those of the United States. Our most important foreign relations, historically speaking, have been along the lines of peaceable overseas trade. These have set the pattern of our thinking on foreign affairs. The Russians, throughout their history, have dealt principally with fierce hostile neighbors. Lacking natural geographical barriers, they have had to develop, in order to deal with these neighbors, a peculiar technique (now become traditional and almost automatic) of elastic advance and retreat, of defense in depth, of secretiveness, of wariness, of deceit. Their history has known many armistices between hostile forces; but it has never known an example of the permanent peaceful coexistence of two neighboring states with established borders accepted without question by both peoples. The Russians therefore have no conception of permanent friendly relations between states. For them, all foreigners are potential enemies. The technique of Russian diplomacy, like that of the Orient in general, is concentrated on impressing an adversary with the terrifying strength of Russian power, while keeping him uncertain and confused as to the exact channels and means of its application and thus inducing him to treat all Russian wishes and views with particular respect and consideration. It has nothing to do with the cultivation of friendly relations as we conceive them.

We would find it much easier to deal with Russia if we would recognize frankly in our own minds the fact that its leaders are, by their own choice, the enemies of all that part of the world they do not control, and that this is a recognized principle of thought and action for the entire Soviet machine. Let us also remember that in the Soviet Union decisions are rarely taken by individuals. They are taken by collective bodies. These collective bodies are required to proceed on the theory that the outside world is hostile to Russia and would be incapable of a generous or unselfish act toward the Russian state or people. It follows from this that no act of a foreign government could be officially recognized as an act of good will. Any Soviet official who would dispute this principle and try to demonstrate in a Soviet body that a foreign state had gone out of its way to be nice to the Soviet Union and deserved credit for it would risk—at the least—his job. Everyone in the Soviet government must assume that foreign governments act only in their own interests, and that gratitude and appreciation are unknown qualities in foreign affairs.

In this way, the machinery by which Soviet foreign affairs are conducted is capable of recognizing, and reacting to, only considerations of concrete Soviet interest. No one can argue any proposition in the councils of the Soviet government unless he can show concretely how the interests of the Soviet Union stand to gain if it is accepted or to suffer if it is rejected. This principle is applied with the most serene objectivity. In examining a position taken by a foreign state, the Russians make no effort to look at it from the standpoint of the foreign state in question or from any fancied community of aims on the part of themselves and the state involved. They assume it is dictated by purposes which are not theirs, and they examine it only from the stand-

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THE TECHNIQUE FOR DEALING WITH RUSSIA (1946)

By George F. Kennan

(Member American Embassy Staff in Moscow, 1944-46; later U.S. Ambassador to the USSR and to Yugoslavia; now Member, Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton)

It is axiomatic in the world of diplomacy that methodology and tactics assume an importance by no means inferior to concept and strategy. Over the eighteen months I had now spent on this assignment in Moscow, I had experienced unhappiness not only about the naïveté of our underlying ideas as to what it was we were hoping to achieve in our relations with the Soviet government but also about the methods and devices with which we went about achieving it. The two aspects of our diplomacy were, of course, closely related. Methodology was itself in large measure a reflection of the image we had formed of the Soviet leadership and of the manner in which it could be expected to react to various stimuli. But methodology was nevertheless a subject that deserved attention in its own right. Perhaps it was the visit of Secretary Byrnes to Moscow that caused the pot of my patience to boil over with relation to this area of our diplomacy, as it had boiled over with respect to so many others. My reaction to this boiling over was, in any case, the usual one of reaching for my pen; and at some time in the winter of 1946 I produced the first three sections of what was intended as another *magnum opus*, directed this time to the specific problem of Soviet-American relations. It was never finished. Being unfinished, my recollection is that it was never used in any way. I include . . . an excerpt from it, on the subject of the technique of dealing with Russia, which represents a crude attempt, but one of the first of its kind (the first in my recollection, at any rate), to draw up a useful set of rules for dealing with the Stalin regime. . . . (I reiterate) the *Stalin* regime. (This was, after all, the only Russian regime with which I had then had personal experience.)

The student of Soviet-American relations who reads these rules today will have, no doubt, two questions in his mind as he completes the reading of them. One is whether they have been observed in the subsequent years and continue to be observed today. The other is whether they are still applicable now that Stalin is dead and the world situation has changed in important ways. My answer to both these questions would be: only partly. . . .

WESTERN SOURCES

point of its effect on them. If the effect is favorable, they accept it without gratitude; if it is unfavorable, they reject it without resentment. We could make it much easier for them and for ourselves if we would face these facts.

In the light of the above, I would like to suggest the following rules to govern our dealings with the Russians:

A. *Don't act chummy with them.*

This only embarrasses them individually, and deepens their suspicions. Russian officials abhor the thought of appearing before their own people as one who has become buddies with a foreigner. This is not their idea of good relations.

B. *Don't assume a community of aims with them which does not really exist.*

There is no use trying to swing Russians into line by referring to common purposes to which we may both have done lip service at one time or another, such as the strengthening of world peace, or democracy, or what you will. They had their own purposes when they did lip service to these purposes. They think we had ours. For them it's all a game. And when we try to come at them with arguments based on such common professions, they become doubly wary.

C. *Don't make fatuous gestures of good will.*

Few of us have any idea how much perplexity and suspicion has been caused in the Soviet mind by gestures and concessions granted by well-meaning Americans with a view to convincing the Russians of their friendly sentiments. Such acts upset all their calculations and throw them way off balance. They immediately begin to expect that they have overestimated our strength, that they have been remiss in their obligations to the Soviet state, that they should have been demanding more from us all along. Frequently, this has exactly the opposite effect from that which we are seeking.

D. *Make no requests of the Russians unless we are prepared to make them feel our displeasure in a practical way in case the request is not granted.*

We should be prepared as a matter of principle to accompany every expression of our wishes by some action on our part proving that Russian interests suffer if our wishes are not observed. This requires imagination, firmness, and coordination of policy. If we cannot find these qualities in our foreign affairs, then we should begin to prepare for serious trouble.

E. *Take up matters on a normal level and insist that Russians take full responsibility for their actions on that level.*

Requests should not, as a rule, be taken to higher levels just because we have failed to get satisfaction on a lower level. This merely encourages the Russian bureaucracy to be uncooperative and causes our relations with high-level Soviet authorities to be encumbered with matters of second-rate importance. Instead of this, we should take our retaliatory or corrective action promptly and unhesitatingly when we do not obtain satisfaction on the lower level. It is only in this way that we can teach the Russians to respect the whole range of our officials

damage to the fabric of Russian-American relations.

6 THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION

who must deal with them. By failing to back up our subordinate officials in their dealings with the Russians, we make it difficult for ourselves to accomplish anything in the intervals between high-level negotiations. . . . The hesitations of the Russians and prejudices

[Excerpts from *The Operational Code of the Politburo*, RAND Corporation Monograph R-206, August 1, 1950. Copyright © 1951 by RAND. Reprinted by permission.]

THE OPERATIONAL CODE OF THE POLITBURO*

By Nathan Leites

(Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago)

The intention is not to discuss the major theories of Leninism-Stalinism but to discover the rules which Bolsheviks believe to be necessary for effective political conduct. . . . Unless otherwise stated, the rules given below are believed to apply (in varying degrees) to both the Leninist and the Stalinist eras of Bolshevism. . . .

The rules cited in this study fall into three categories. Some have been explicitly stated by Lenin and Stalin and appear as direct quotations from their writings. Some are so clearly implied for specific situations that Bolsheviks would easily recognize them as they appear below. Others seem to be operative among Bolsheviks but might not be recognized easily by them.

For the sake of clarity, the *general rules* of Bolshevik conduct are given in full-width text and the *examples* illustrating them, in indented text. Throughout, statements have been constructed using words and phrases from the writings and speeches of Lenin and Stalin. This results in statements which may often be imperfect, or contradictory, from a scientific point of view, but which do represent an actual pattern of Bolshevik thought. . . .

PREDICTABILITY AND UNPREDICTABILITY

1. One point of Bolshevik doctrine affirms that future developments are either inevitable or impossible. Intermediate probabilities are excluded. This is a characteristic "all-or-none" pattern of Bolshevik thought. . . .

2. Despite such beliefs in determinism, Bolshevik doctrine also contains contrasting points. Thus, although it is always asserted that the direction and end of a major historical development (e.g., the transition from capitalism to communism) is predictable, the length of time and the path such a development will take are not held to be predictable.

*NOTE BY SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF.—This pioneer study was done in 1950 and is based on the writings of Lenin and Stalin. We think it is still most interesting and we have included excerpts from some of its chapters, renumbering paragraphs in a few instances. As a reading of recent Soviet books on diplomacy indicates, Lenin is treated as a kind of "father figure" for present-day Russian policymakers and diplomats. Currently, also, the image of Stalin is being refurbished as a great, patriotic military leader in World War II.

to involve a good deal of unpleasantness. On the other hand, we need not fear that occasional hard words will have permanent bad effect on our relations. The Russian is never more agreeable than after his knuckles have been sharply rapped. He takes well to rough play and rarely holds grudges over it. Let us not forget Stalin's first reaction when he met Ribbentrop. It was to joke good-naturedly and cynically about the bitter propaganda war which had been waged for so many years between the two countries. The Russian governing class respects only the strong. To them, shyness in dispute is a form of weakness.

I. Coordinate, in accordance with our established policies, all activities of our government relating to Russia and all private American activities of this sort which the government can influence.

The Russians are quick to take advantage of conflicts, inconsistencies, and the seeking of private aims on the part of our nationals or agencies of our government. Their own system is designed to produce the maximum concentration of national energies. We cannot face them effectively unless we do all in our power to concentrate our own effort.

J. Strengthen and support our representation in Russia.

The American embassy in Moscow is the symbol of our country to the Russians. It is watched intently by many people. It must be not only the representation of our society but also a guiding brain center of our policy toward Russia. In the face of frequent neglect and discouragement, always the object of attacks by jealous self-seekers and discontented liberals, never enjoying the full backing or understanding of people in Washington, never properly staffed or properly housed, it has nevertheless managed to become a pioneering establishment in the American Foreign Service and the most respected diplomatic mission in Moscow. It could do far more and play a far greater role in the Soviet Union if it received proper support. This means that failure of the Soviet government to grant quarters and other facilities for the performance of diplomatic work in Moscow must sooner or later be made an open issue between the governments and pressure must be brought to bear to improve these conditions. It means that the mission must be adequately staffed with American personnel. Finally it means that the mission must at all times be led by someone capable of and prepared for hard and tedious work over a long period of time, someone who has in high degree the qualities of modesty and patience, who is animated solely by devotion to the interests of our country, and is generally fitted by personality and background to earn the respect of a nation unexcelled in the psychological analysis of the human individual. In the case of Ambassador Harriman, I can sincerely say that I consider these prerequisites fulfilled. But I make this observation with an eye to the future. The post of ambassador to Moscow is not a sinecure which can be lightly disposed of; and the department must be prepared to use its influence to see that it is effectively filled. The Moscow mission works, and has always worked, under strain, in the face of multitudinous obstacles. A vain, fussy, and ignorant ambassador is capable of breaking its back, and of doing lasting (if not readily apparent) damage to the fabric of Russian-American relations.

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THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION

9

In 1918, during the debates of the Brest-Litovsk peace, Lenin pointed out that the "Left Communists" were in error, not in predicting a German revolution but in assigning a date to it. . . .

3. The Party must not fall into despair if certain gains take much longer than had been estimated. On a historical scale, such differences in rate of development are minor.

4. However, it is a task of the Party to shorten as much as possible the road to (and hence the cost of) victory.

5. This can be done because at many historical junctures more than one outcome is "objectively possible." "Objective conditions" create certain "opportunities" for the Party; whether the Party will succeed in "utilizing" them and transforming them into "realities" cannot be predicted. . . .

MEANS AND ENDS

1. The ethics underlying Bolshevik behavior are rarely made explicit.

2. The fundamental law is to do all that enhances the power of the Party, the great and only instrument in the realization of communism, the great and only goal.

In 1920, Lenin said:

Our morality is deduced from the class struggle of the proletariat. . . . Communist morality is the morality which serves this struggle. . . .¹

3. In deciding upon what statements to make both within the Party and without, the leadership must not be influenced by considerations of truth. Only the impact of these statements should be considered. Bourgeois governments are held to follow the same rule.

There are occasions when falsehoods—which are obvious to all informed groups—are useful. . . .

4. The Party leadership need not be concerned with consistency in its public statements. Again, only effectiveness is important. . . .

THE CALCULUS OF THE GENERAL LINE

1. Every line of Bolshevik conduct is either prescribed or forbidden. It is prescribed if it will maximize the power of the Party. It is forbidden if it will not. There is little behavior that is merely tolerated, or recommended.

2. The Party must at all times have a "complete set" of "definite," "precise," "clear" positions on all matters: ". . . to the devil with all people with indeterminate views. . . ." (This is to counteract the fear that the Party might become the victim of "confusion," which is felt by Bolsheviks to be a Russian propensity.) . . .

PERSEVERANCE AND FLEXIBILITY

1. "There is no such thing as an absolutely inextricable position." Through perseverance, effective action can be carried out even under the most difficult conditions.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 9, pp. 475-479.

2. A Bolshevik must persevere to the end of any action, no matter how unpleasant.

In 1916, Lenin wrote to a member of the editorial board of *The Communist* (published in Switzerland) :

You write that you "are sick and tired of . . . correspondence and negotiations . . ." I understand you completely, but you must be patient! Once you have gone into the business of negotiating, it is impermissible to get nervous and fall into despair. That would not be proletarian, now, would it?²

3. "A mass without a Party . . . is incapable of perseverance." The emotions of the "masses" and of the "intelligentsia" are "unstable"; those of Bolsheviks should be stable.

4. A Bolshevik must oppose "vacillation" ("inability to maintain a definite political line," "lack of steadiness in matters of principle," "hysterical rushing from place to place"). He must also oppose lack of continuity ("incapacity for sustained effort," doing things "spasmodically" rather than "systematically").

In 1921, Lenin said :

. . . hard conditions of life give rise to vacillation for the bourgeoisie today, for the proletariat tomorrow. The hardened proletarian vanguard alone is capable of withstanding and overcoming vacillation.³

5. On the other hand, the Party must know how to adapt itself to all changes in its environment: ". . . it is our duty as Communists . . . to adapt our tactics to every change that is called forth by something other than our class, or our efforts."

In 1905, Lenin said about the agrarian policy of the Party :

The decisive point is that the conduct of the revolutionary proletariat towards the conflict between peasants and landowners cannot be the same in all cases and under all conditions of the various phases of the Russian revolution. Under certain conditions . . . this conduct must be not only one of sympathy, but of direct support, and not only one of support, but of "incitement." Under other circumstances, this conduct can and must be a neutral one. . . . It is not only our "Socialist Revolutionaries" who are full of the vulgar illusions of revolutionary democracy, but many Social Democrats who . . . look for a "simple" solution of the task, one which would be the same for all combinations.⁴

There must be no "doctrinaire attitude . . . against changes in strategy and tactics. . . ."

Flexibility is necessary to avoid catastrophe and to ensure victory.

In 1925, Stalin said :

Certain Party members maintain that since we have the New Economic Policy . . . our task should be to carry on unbendingly . . . until a general smash-up occurs. . . . What we need now is not to carry on unbendingly, but to show a maximum of elasticity. . . . In the absence of such elasticity we shall not be able . . . to keep our place at the helm. We need the utmost elasticity in order to keep the Party at the helm. . . .⁵

² V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, 3d ed., Vol. 29, p. 247.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 198.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, 4th ed., Vol. 8, p. 206.

⁵ Joseph Stalin, *Lenintam*, Vol. 1, p. 250.

The Party must never tie its hands in advance, that is, never restrict its "freedom in the choice of political means."

In March, 1918, Lenin said, rejecting a proposal by Trotsky to modify a resolution on war and peace:

We must in no case, in not even a single strategic maneuver, tie our own hands. . . . We must say that the Party Congress commissions the Central Committee to denounce all peace treaties and to declare war on every imperialist state and on the whole world as soon as the Central Committee of the Party regards the moment as appropriate. We must give the Central Committee the power to denounce the Brest-Litovsk Peace at any moment. But this does not mean that we shall denounce it immediately in the present situation. . . . We must in no case limit our Central Party body, neither with reference to the denunciation of the peace treaty, nor with reference to the declaration of a war. . . . We must not tie our hands by a resolution that we shall sign no peace treaty The peace treaty is merely a piece of live maneuvering. Either we stand on this viewpoint of maneuvering or we formally bind our hands in advance in such a fashion that we shall not be able to move.⁶

The Party "must not blindly worship the particular phase in which it may find itself at any particular time or place"; it must be ready to change its strategy, tactics, organization as changed conditions require it, without being hindered by "the prejudices and memories of what was yesterday."

6. Therefore, "If I pursue an enemy who does not move in a straight line but zigzags, then I too must zigzag in order to reach him."

7. When "the turns of history are very sharp," the turns of the Party's policy may also have to be sharp. . . .

DECEPTION

1. Bolshevik doctrine stresses the use of deception as an enemy device and the danger of not perceiving this.

In 1926, Stalin stated:

Lenin often said that it is difficult to take revolutionaries by the use of a rough fist, but that sometimes it is very easy to take them by kindness. We must never forget this truth. . . .⁷

Hence, a high degree of political insight includes a high degree of suspiciousness (i.e., the absence of "philistine trustfulness"). . . .

2. "The slogan of the Marxist workers is not to believe in words, but to check them most thoroughly. . . . Only fools believe in mere words."

Hence, in any dealings with outside groups, "we will wait for their *deeds*. We do not believe in promises." . . .

THE DANGER OF ANNIHILATION

1. In international relations it is one of the main tasks of the Party to know how to "utilize" conflicts between other states.

⁶ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, 4th ed., Vol. 27, pp. 96-97.

⁷ Joseph Stalin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 8, p. 361.

In 1920, Lenin said:

... we must know how to take advantage of the antagonism and contradictions existing among the imperialists. Had we not adhered to this rule, every one of us would have long ago been hanging from an aspen tree. . . ."

In 1921, Stalin referred to certain statements by Chicherin, then People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs:

... Comrade Chicherin is inclined to deny the existence of contradictions between the imperialist states, to exaggerate the international unanimity of the imperialists, and to overlook . . . contradictions which do . . . give rise to war. . . . Yet these contradictions do exist and it is on them that the activities of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs are based. . . . The whole purpose of the existence of a People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs is to take account of these contradictions, to use them as a basis, and to maneuver within these contradictions."

2. Wherever possible, the Party must sharpen the conflict between other states.

In 1920, Lenin said:

The practical part of Communist policy is . . . to incite one [enemy power] against the other. . . . we Communists must use one country against another.⁹

In a December 21, 1920, speech, Lenin developed the Soviet policy of offering economic concessions to American entrepreneurs in areas of the Soviet Far East then occupied by Japan. He explained that this policy was intended to bring about an intensification of the conflict between Japan and the United States. Although at the time of this speech no concessions had yet been granted, Lenin estimated that the consequences of this policy already were as follows:

... we [have] achieved a gigantic sharpening of the enmity between Japan and America and thereby an indubitable weakening of the offensive of Japan and America against us."¹⁰

CONDUCT IN DEFEAT AND VICTORY

1. History indicates that recurrent setbacks are inevitable: "Wars which began and ended with an uninterrupted victorious advance have never occurred in world history, or else they have been very rare exceptions. This applies to ordinary wars. But what about wars . . . which decide the question of socialism or capitalism?"

In 1918, Lenin said:

To think that we shall not be thrown back is utopian."¹¹

In 1925, Stalin said:

The epoch of the world revolution . . . may occupy years, or even decades. In the course of this period there will occur, nay, must occur, ebbs and flows in the revolutionary tide. . . . Since the October victory we have been living in the third stage of the

⁹ V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 279-280.

¹⁰ Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question*, pp. 104-105.

¹¹ V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 284.

¹² V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, 3d ed., Vol. 26, p. 11.

¹³ V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 321.

2. When an attempt by the enemy, or by the Party, to advance by violent means has failed, the conditions for an effective agreement between the Party and the enemy come into existence.

In 1920, Lenin said:

. . . every attempt to start war on us will mean for the states resorting to war that the terms they will get after and as a result of the war will be worse than those that they could have got without war or before war. This has been proved in the case of several states. . . . And thanks to this our relations with neighboring states are steadily improving. . . . Peace on such a basis has every chance of being . . . durable. . . .¹⁹

3. The Party must always expect outside groups to violate agreements.

In 1920, Lenin said about the policy of granting economic "concessions" to foreign entrepreneurs:

Of course, the capitalists will not fulfill the agreements, say the comrades who fear concessions. That is a matter of course, one must absolutely not hope that the capitalists will fulfill the agreements.²⁰

These attitudes imply that a "settlement" with the Western Powers—that is, an agreement sharply reducing the threat of mutual annihilation—is inconceivable to the Politburo, although arrangements with them, codifying the momentary relationship of forces, are always considered.

¹⁹ V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 250.

²⁰ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, 3d ed., Vol. 26, p. 22.

[From Chapter 10 by Philip E. Mosely in Raymond Bennett and Joseph E. Johnson (eds.), *Negotiating with the Russians*. Copyright © 1951 by World Peace Foundation. Reprinted by permission of the author.]

SOME SOVIET TECHNIQUES OF NEGOTIATION*

By Philip E. Mosely

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There is a deep-seated tradition in western diplomacy that an effective diplomat should be a two-way interpreter. He must present his own government's policy forcefully to the government to which he is accredited and defend the essential interests of his country. If he is to give intelligent advice to his government, he must also develop a keen insight into the policies of the government with which he deals and become skilled in distinguishing basic interests and sentiments which it cannot disregard from secondary ones which it may adjust or limit for the broader purpose of reaching agreement. Occasionally, as instanced by Woodrow Wilson's criticism of Walter Hines Page, it has seemed as if individual ambassadors become too much penetrated by the viewpoint and interests of the country to which they were sent and less able to press contrary views of their own governments.

No such problem of delicate balance in functions arises to plague the Soviet negotiator. This has been especially true since the great purge of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in 1938-39 and the replacement of Litvinov by Molotov in 1939. The new foreign affairs staff was recruited among the middle ranks of Soviet officials, whose entire training had been based on rigid adherence to centralized decisions and who had rarely had informal contacts with life outside the Soviet Union. The present-day Soviet representative can hardly be called a "negotiator" in the customary sense. He is rather treated as a mechanical mouthpiece for views and demands formulated centrally in Moscow, and is deliberately isolated from the impact of views, interests and sentiments which influence foreign governments and peoples. Probably the Soviet representative abroad, through fear of being accused of "falling captive to imperialist and cosmopolitan influences," serves as a block to the transmission of foreign views and sentiments, rather than as a channel for communicating them to his government

*NOTE BY SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF.—Written in 1950, this classic article describes experiences with the Soviets between 1942 and 1949. Though dated in some respects, much of the analysis is still relevant. For example: While Soviet diplomacy has certainly become better informed about the outside world, the continuing effects of dogmatism on education, on the view of the outside world, and on inter-personal and inter-national relations remain a distinctive feature of Soviet policy making and Soviet negotiation.

From 1942 to 1946 Mr. Mosely served as an officer of the Department of State in various capacities including that of Advisor to the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference, 1943; Political Advisor to the American Delegation on the European Advisory Commission, 1944-1945; at the Potsdam Conference, 1945; and at the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers at London and Paris in 1945 and 1946. He was the United States Representative on the Commission for the Investigation of the Yugoslav-Italian Boundary in 1946.

revolution, during which our objective is the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie. . . . We shall witness a succession of ebbs and flows in the revolutionary tide. For the time being the international revolutionary movement is in the declining phase; but . . . this decline will yield . . . to an upward surge which may in the victory of the world proletariat. If, however, it should not end in victory, another decline will set in, to be followed in its turn by yet another revolutionary surge. Our defeatists maintain that the present ebb in the revolutionary tide marks the end of the revolution. They are mistaken now just as heretofore . . . the revolution does not develop along a straight, continuous and upwardly aspiring line but along a zigzag path . . . an ebb and flow in the tide. . . .¹³

In 1927, Stalin said:

The fact that the Chinese revolution has not resulted in direct victory over imperialism, this fact cannot have decisive significance for the perspective of the revolution. Great popular revolutions never win through to the end on their first appearance. They grow and strengthen themselves by ebbs and flow. So it was everywhere, and in Russia too. So it will be in China.¹⁴

That is, major successes are often preceded by repeated failures: "We know that the transition from capitalism to socialism involves an extremely difficult struggle. But we are prepared . . . to make a thousand attempts: having made a thousand attempts we shall go on to the next attempt." ". . . we shall act as we did in the Red Army: they may beat us a hundred times, but the hundred and first time we shall beat them all." "Not one of the problems that we have had to solve could be solved at one stroke; we had to make repeated attempts to solve them. Having suffered defeat, we tried again. . . ."

2. It is not possible to predict how strong an "ebb" will be, and how long it will last.

3. To achieve a major advance or final victory requires a length of time commensurate to the historical importance of these events: ". . . the aim . . . [of the Party] is radically to transform the conditions of life of the whole of humanity, and . . . for that reason it is not permissible to be 'disturbed' by the question of the duration of the work."

4. A Bolshevik must always control any tendency to act inexpediently after a setback: ". . . a Marxist must be able to reckon with the most complicated and fantastic zigzag leaps of history. . . ." "Whatever the . . . vicissitudes of the struggle may be, however many partial zigzags it may be necessary to overcome (and there will be very many of them—we see from experience what tremendous twists the history of the revolution is making . . .), in order not to get lost in these zigzags and twists of history . . . in the periods of retreat, retirement or temporary defeat, or when history, or the enemy, throws us back . . . the . . . correct thing is not to cast out the old basic programs." . . .

ADVANCE

1. The Party must never show "adventurism" in its attempts to advance; that is, it must never risk already conquered major positions for the sake of uncertain further gains.

¹³ Joseph Stalin, *Leninism*, Vol. 1, pp. 220-222.

¹⁴ Joseph Stalin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 10, p. 283.

On January 20, 1918, Lenin said :

. . . it would be a quite impermissible tactic to risk the already begun socialist revolution in Russia simply because of the hope that the German revolution will break out in a very short time. In a few weeks. Such a tactic would be adventurist. We have no right to assume such a risk.¹⁵

On January 24, 1918, Lenin discussed the proposal that war against Germany should be resumed in order to maximize the chances of the German revolution :

But Germany is still only pregnant with revolution, while with us a perfectly healthy child has already seen the light of the world, a child which we may kill by beginning the war.¹⁶ . . .

RETREAT

1. Mastery in the skill of retreating is as necessary as mastery in the skill of advancing.

In 1922, Lenin said :

When it was necessary—according to the objective situation in Russia as well as the whole world—to advance, to attack the enemy with supreme boldness, rapidity, decisiveness, we did so attack. When it will be necessary, we will know how to do this again and again. . . . And when, in the spring of 1921, it appeared that the advance guard of the revolution was threatened by the danger of becoming isolated from the mass of the people . . . then we resolved unanimously and firmly to retreat. And for the past year we have in general retreated in revolutionary order. Proletarian revolutions . . . will not be able to fulfill their tasks without combining the skill in . . . attack with the skill in retreating in revolutionary order.¹⁷ . . .

DEALS

1. Any agreements between the Party and outside groups must be regarded as aiding the future liquidation of these groups and as barriers against the liquidation of the Party by them. Thus, " 'Reformism,' 'the policy of agreement' and 'particular agreements' are different matters . . . with the Mensheviks agreements are transformed into a system, into a policy of agreement, while with the Bolsheviks only particular concrete agreements are acceptable, and are not made into a policy of agreement."¹⁸

Therefore there is no essential difference between coming to an ostensibly amicable arrangement with an outside group or using violence against it; they are both tactics in an over-all strategy of attack.

In 1920, Lenin said, with reference to Soviet plans for granting economic "concessions" to foreign entrepreneurs :

The major theme of my speech will be the proof of two points, namely, first, that every war is the continuation of the policy conducted in peace, only by other means; second, that the concessions which we grant, which we are forced to grant, are the continuation of war in another form, by other means. . . . It would be a great mistake to believe that a peaceful agreement about concessions is—a peaceful agreement with capitalists. This agreement is equivalent to war. . . ."¹⁹

¹⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, 4th ed., Vol. 26, p. 407.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 3d ed., Vol. 22, p. 201.

¹⁷ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, 3d ed., Vol. 27, p. 271.

¹⁸ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, 3d ed., Vol. 26, p. 6.

In opening negotiations with any Soviet representatives except Stalin the first problem is to discover whether the representatives have any instructions at all. To discover what those instructions, if any, are requires sitting out the whole course of the negotiation, with its demands, insults, and rigidities and its always uncertain outcome

Soviet experts and diplomats cannot participate in an informal day-to-day exchange of information, comments and tentative recommendations concerning policy. Until Moscow has sent instructions they can say nothing at all, for they may fail to express the exact nuance of thinking or intention which has not yet been formulated at the center, and transmitted to them. After Moscow has spoken they can only repeat the exact formulation given to them, and no variation may be introduced into it unless Moscow has sent the necessary further instructions. The "western" habit of continuous negotiation is baffling to the Soviet diplomats, who cannot understand that their western colleagues have both the opportunity and the responsibility for presenting and even advocating policies within their own governmental operations and that, within a broadly agreed pattern of interests and purposes, they have considerable leeway in finding the most effective, and usually informal, methods of influencing their "opposite numbers" in foreign ministries or embassies

The important network of informal communication among the "western" powers, as well as the moderate latitude given to their representatives, makes for a swift pace of negotiation which arouses bewilderment and suspicion among their Soviet colleagues. Since western foreign ministries are receiving daily a flow of confidential comment on foreign views and intentions, they are forearmed with current analyses and can often give necessary decisions rapidly. "Western" diplomats also have a substantial latitude to work out agreed positions and drafts, at least on secondary and procedural matters. Thus, their minor differences are often resolved with what seems to their Soviet colleagues like suspicious speed.

Not believing in or not understanding the system of informal communication and limited individual latitude, the Soviet representatives readily fall back on the theory of "American dictation." It is easier for them to assert that the United States government has exerted political, military and financial pressure to force its will upon other governments than to take the trouble to analyze the complex and, to them, unfamiliar and unbelievable system of informal communication which usually lies behind the "automatic majorities" assembled around United States proposals. They are incredible when told that such pressure is exerted only rarely and that more often agreement is reached through give-and-take of views, by which no side gets its full position and each gets a part of it.

Sometimes the sole instructions with which a Soviet delegation enters a conference are that it is not to commit itself to anything or sign anything. . . . In some negotiations it became clear, after delivery by it of numerous charges and accusations, that the Soviet delegation had no instructions except to "report back." . . .

II

By far the most frequent situation is one in which the Soviet negotiators are bound by detailed instructions rigidly pressed. Each point at issue, large or small, then becomes a test of will and nerves. Instead of striving to reduce the number of points of friction and to isolate and diminish the major conflicts of interest, the Soviet negotiator often appears to his exasperated "western" colleague to take pride in finding the maximum number of disputes and in dwelling on each of them to the full. Even during the wartime period of relative cooperation it was noticeable that each decision to convene a three-power conference was followed by the piling up of disputes and grievances, as well as by the rapid fabrication of Soviet accomplished facts. Thus the decision to hold the Yalta Conference was followed swiftly by the unilateral Soviet recognition of the Lublin Committee as the legitimate government of Poland. While arrangements were being made to hold the Potsdam Conference, at which Poland's territorial gains in the west would presumably be determined by three-power decision, the Soviet government proceeded to turn over to Polish administration a large part of the Soviet zone. This action was, of course, an assertion of the Soviet Union's exclusive role in eastern Europe, in disregard of a political agreement to determine the western boundary of Poland jointly, and in violation of the three-power agreement defining the zones of occupation in Germany.

The closely related technique of playing up grievances was also well illustrated at Potsdam. Bitter and prolonged Soviet attacks upon the presence of British troops in Greece, the Dodecanese, Syria and Lebanon took up much time and energy. When the western negotiators had been worn down by these wrangles the Soviet negotiators could face with greater equanimity the American and especially the British protests against the brutal assertion of Soviet hegemony in Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. By their tactics the Soviet leaders had encouraged their militant supporters in Greece, had upheld their reputation for hostility to "colonialism" in the Middle East, and had fought off any coordinated western program for loosening their grip on the three satellites. . . .

The treasuring of grievances, real or imaginary, within a cycle of themes for negotiation is paralleled within the individual negotiation by the use of disconcerting ripostes and of accusations of bad-faith. One of the most important issues which confronted the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943 was whether the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile should conclude a twenty-year defensive alliance with the Soviet Union alone, or whether the building of any regional systems of postwar guarantees against a revival of German aggression should be postponed until the three major allies could resolve the problem by joint decision. . . . Early in the discussion a concrete issue of fact arose between Eden and Molotov. In a conciliatory fashion Eden began by saying, "I may be mistaken, but . . ." Before he could complete his sentence Molotov broke in harshly, "You are mistaken." His abrupt riposte was effective. Eden's presentation was disrupted. By this tactic, and by constant accusations that the western powers were trying to rebuild a *cordon sanitaire* in Eastern Europe, Molotov succeeded in evading any probing discussion of the nature and

purpose of the Soviet program of building up a security belt of its own and won British approval and American acquiescence for the first step, the conclusion of the Soviet-Czechoslovak alliance, which was signed at Moscow two months later.

III

During the course of negotiation it is often clear that the Soviet negotiators are under compulsion to try for a certain number of times to secure each Soviet point, no matter how minor. After trying up to a certain point and finding that the demand cannot be put through the Soviet representative has often given in, only to turn to the next item in dispute, over which a similarly prolonged period of deadlock ensues. What is not clear, however, is whether the number or duration of these tries has been prescribed in advance by instruction or whether it is left to the judgment of the individual Soviet negotiator to decide when he has built up a sufficiently impressive and protective record of having beat his head against a stone wall.

A good example of the "head-against-stone-wall" technique developed rather early in the negotiations of 1945-46 over the Yugoslav-Italian boundary. At the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held at London in September 1945, almost the only item of agreement was a brief instruction to the Deputies to the effect that the boundary "should be in the main the ethnic line leaving a minimum under alien rule." When the Deputies began their work at Lancaster House, in January 1946, the Soviet delegation began a strong campaign, lasting for some six weeks of almost daily argument, to remove the words, "in the main." The issue was fought over in long meetings of the four-power Commission for the Investigation of the Yugoslav-Italian Boundary, and from there it was carried into long, numerous and even more tense meetings of the Deputies.

The three words which aroused Soviet ire were extremely important. If the boundary was to follow "the ethnic line" it would reach the sea between Monfalcone and Trieste, leaving Trieste with its large Italian majority and the coastal strip of Western Istria within Yugoslavia. In the triangle Monfalcone-Gorizia-Trieste the ethnic boundary between Italian and Slovene villages is clearly marked and has hardly varied in several hundreds of years. On the other hand, if the boundary was to be "in the main the ethnic line," the Commission would have to give considerable weight to the claims of the Italian majorities in Trieste and in the coastal strip of Istria, offsetting against them the Slovene national character of several small villages in the coastal strip between Monfalcone and Trieste. If the words "in the main" were omitted it was hardly necessary to send out an investigating commission at all, with its attendant wave of turbulence, terrorization, kidnappings and murders, and the "ethnic line", pure-and-simple, could be drawn in Lancaster House.

During the weeks of intensive debate tension mounted around the green-topped table. As usual, Soviet intransigence turned the dispute into a test of staying-power. In view of the fact that public opinion still continued to regard any failure to reach speedy agreement with the Soviet government as primarily the fault of American or British "reactionaries," rather than attributing any part of it to the "all-or-nothing" Soviet attitude, it was not clear how long the western delegations would

hold out against the Soviet demand that the boundary issue be prejudged one-hundred-percent in favor of the Soviet position. In an effort to win the Soviet delegation over to a compromise the Western delegations offered to remove from the purview of the boundary commission Fiume, the islands of the Quarnero and the primarily Yugoslav-inhabited parts of Venezia Giulia; they did insist that the formula "in the main" be retained and that the commission be free to investigate the Italian and mixed areas within the region. Finally, "enough was enough," even for Soviet negotiators enamored of indefinite repetition, and the Deputies suspended their meetings without agreement on the terms of reference.

Now, at last, the Soviet delegation had, reluctantly, to inform Moscow that the Western Deputies refused to budge on this basic issue of rewriting the formula which had been approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers. This put up to the Soviet government the question of taking the responsibility for an indefinite deadlock in the negotiation of the peace treaties. After two days of marking time the Soviet delegation asked to have a meeting of the Deputies and proceeded, without outward resentment, to approve the final western-backed version of the commission's terms of reference, retaining the key words, "in the main the ethnic line." One basic factor in the Soviet decision to recede from its stubbornly pressed demand must have been that Anglo-American forces were stationed in Trieste, Pola and the Isonzo valley. If Yugoslav or Soviet forces had been in possession the deadlock would probably have been allowed to continue indefinitely. . . .

IV

One of the main pitfalls in wartime Anglo-American negotiations with the Soviet Union was the tendency to rely upon reaching an "agreement in principle," without spelling out in sufficient detail all the steps in its execution. After long and strenuous debates, studded with charges, accusations and suspicions, it was undoubtedly a great relief to reach a somewhat generally worded agreement and to go home. Prodded by manifold public and party duties, anxious to prove to themselves and to their people that current agreements and post-war cooperation with the Soviet Government were genuinely possible, facing "deadlines" with respect to the expectations of legislatures and of public opinion, the western leaders often approached these negotiations under serious disadvantages. Wooded rather than the wooer, able to deal at leisure with the manipulation of their public opinion at home, facing no deadlines, the Soviet leaders had many advantages. In this situation the western powers sometimes gained the "principle" of their hopes, only to find that "in practice" the Soviet government continued to pursue its original aims.

At Yalta the Soviet Government agreed, after very lengthy argument and stubborn resistance, to participate in a reconstruction of the Polish Government which would, it appeared, permit the survival of some political freedom for the great non-Communist majority of the people. By delays and quibblings over the execution of the "agreement in principle" during the next few months, the Soviet Government secured about ninety percent of the original position with which it had come to Yalta and thus strengthened beyond challenge the small

Communist minority in its dominant control of the country. At Yalta the Soviet Government also agreed, in return for sweeping territorial and other concessions, to deal only with the Chinese National Government as the representative of China. By turning over territory, administration and Japanese arms to Chinese Communist forces, the Russians nullified, in the areas where their forces were dominant, the principal and vital *quid pro quo* which they had promised at Yalta. When British, Canadian and American negotiators come to an "agreement in principle" they often haggle to a fare-thee-well over the implementation of an arrangement which may still be distasteful to each of them. However, they remain within the framework of the principle to which they have agreed, or else they frankly ask to reopen the agreement in principle and to renegotiate it on the grounds that further consideration has shown that they cannot carry it out. It has remained for the Soviet representatives to assert that they are carrying out "an agreement in principle" by doing just the reverse "in practice." . . .

v

In numerous instances Soviet negotiators, even when under some pressure to reach agreement, have shown that they are in mortal terror of violating any part, minor or major, of their instructions, and are extremely reluctant to report to Moscow that they cannot get every point and every wording in their own drafts. Making recommendations for even slight changes in their instructions exposes them to serious risks. It means that they consider their own superiors slightly less than omniscient. It may mean that they can be accused of giving undue weight to the viewpoint of another government and thus of "falling captive to imperialist insinuations." The result is that, even when, in a given question, the Soviet negotiator is committed to the desirability of achieving agreement, he is unable to take any initiative in finding a reasonable meeting ground of viewpoints and he is usually extremely reluctant even to present to his own government suggestions for compromise or reconciliation of differences which originate in other delegations.

A widespread lack of ease in using English or French commonly adds a good deal to the difficulties of the Soviet negotiator. . . .

One of the difficulties of Soviet-Russian vocabulary is that the word "compromise" is not of native origin and carries with it no favorable empathy. It is habitually used only in combination with the adjective "putrid." "Compromise for the sake of getting on with the job" is natural to American and British people, but it is alien to the Bolshevik way of thinking and to the discipline which the Communist Party has striven to inculcate in its members. To give up a demand once presented, even a very minor or formalistic point, makes a Bolshevik-trained negotiator feel that he is losing control of his own will and is becoming subject to an alien will. Therefore any point which has finally to be abandoned must be given up only after a most terrific struggle. The Soviet negotiator must first prove to himself and his superiors that he is up against an immovable force. Only then is he justified in abandoning a point which plainly cannot be gained and in moving on to the next item, which will again be debated in an equally bitter tug-of-wills. . . .

The western negotiator is usually able to envisage a series of minor shifts in his own and other positions. He is "pluralistic" in his approach to a solution, in the adjustments of democratic decision-making at home and in seeking adjustments of interests and views among nations. The Soviet negotiator is worried, puzzled, scornful, and suspicious when the western negotiator tries out a series of minor variations to see if the opposing positions cannot be brought closer together. To him it means only that the western representative was "not serious" in the first place. If he is willing to shift so quickly from his original position it must mean that he did not hold it in earnest to begin with and that he can eventually be forced all the way over to the Soviet position, provided the Soviet negotiator will only display "principled steadfastness" long enough and vigorously enough.

The western representative tends to assume that a minor concession here or there will facilitate achieving the common aim of cooperative action. He does not necessarily look for an immediate *quid pro quo* for each minor concession. At a later stage in the negotiation his partner will remember the facilitating concession and will yield something in turn. To him "goodwill" is both a lubricant of the negotiating process and a valuable intangible by-product. The Soviet negotiator takes a minor concession as a sign that his principles are stronger and his will is firmer than those of his opponent. He does not believe in "goodwill." He is trained to assume the ill-will of the "capitalist environment." If an "imperialist" negotiator asserts his will for peace, it means, at the best, that he is consciously in favor of peace but is unconsciously a tool of uncontrollable forces which work for war and for the final clash between "two worlds." At the worst, it means that he is trying to deceive and gain time while mouthing words of "peace." To a Bolshevik even a momentary "loss of vigilance" may have fatal consequences. The Soviet diplomat feels himself like a traveler by night in the forest who must be constantly on the watch for the smallest sound or sight of treachery. He must be unceasingly on guard against his own human tendency to "fall into complacency" and thus to underestimate the dangers which surround both him and the regime which he serves.

Soviet diplomacy is also monolithic in its method of operation and in its reactions to outside events or internal changes of stress. The American practice is to subdivide authority extensively, both at home and in foreign dealings. A military mission in Moscow, trying to work out plans for military coordination, would have nothing to say about the arrangements or conditions for lend-lease. A political negotiation, aiming to preserve the freedom of choice for an East European nation, would have no relation to another mission which might be deciding which German ships should be transferred to the Soviet Union, and all of them would have no relation to a decision concerning military and economic aid to China. No such autonomy or fragmentation of authority is felt in the Soviet conduct of its foreign policy. While it is probable that little background information on policy is communicated by Moscow to its representatives abroad, beyond that which they need individually in order to carry out their instructions, it is pretty clear that underlying attitudes are communicated rapidly to them. Thus, a negotiation over the statute of Tangier bogs down in Paris: this may be a repercussion of a crisis which has arisen in Vienna or of a note delivered in Warsaw. Bolshevist mythology is full of "chain-

reaction" concepts of causality. With the clumsy force of centralized wisdom it attempts to meet this assumed universal causal interdependence ("nothing is accidental") with its confidence in its own ability to manipulate events in accordance with its own Leninist-Stalinist dialectic, which it regards as a unique instrument for both foreseeing and bringing about the future.

VI

This is a grim picture. The Soviet negotiator is tight as a spring, deeply suspicious, always trying to exert the Soviet will-power outward and to avoid reflecting non-Soviet facts and aspirations inward, a rigid agent knowing only the segment of policy which he must carry out with mechanical precision. Does this mean that "negotiation" in any real sense of the term is impossible? Admitting that negotiation under these conditions is a very limited affair and very difficult and unrewarding, it may still be both possible and essential. But it requires a special approach. Naturally, a knowledge of Russian in its Soviet nuances is important. It is equally important to understand the role of the Soviet negotiator in relation to his own government and to its ideology. The Department of State has carried on a farsighted policy of equipping a substantial number of its representatives through language and area training and through service in missions in the Soviet-dominated areas to deal with Soviet problems, and as these young men mature in experience they will fill an important need. The Army and Air Force have also done a good deal along this line.

In the absence of informal channels of communication with Soviet representatives it is important for an American delegation to be able to determine whether the Soviet negotiators have no instructions, have definite instructions, or merely have instructions to build up a propaganda position. A well equipped negotiator can go much more thoroughly into the range of Soviet intentions if he follows the discussion in the original, without being handicapped by the opaque veil of translation. In addition he should review each document exchanged or each statement made in the light of its clear rendering into Russian. It is unfortunate, for example, that many American public figures continually speak of the need for an "aggressive policy" to counteract Soviet pressures, when they mean an "energetic" or "vigorous" policy. In Russian "aggressive" means only "intending to commit or engaged in committing aggression," and the colloquial American use of "aggressive" inevitably receives a sinister meaning in Russian translation, which is the form in which documents must be utilized by all but a handful of Soviet negotiators and policy-makers.

In conducting negotiations with Soviet representatives it is important to adopt in the beginning a single clear position, one which can be upheld logically and politically during long discussions. The Soviet delegation will not report this position as the final and strongly held one until they have had a chance to attack it from all sides. Indefinite repetition of arguments must be accepted as an inevitable preparation to negotiate. The American negotiator is inclined to make a single presentation and then to become impatient when the Soviet response makes it plain that the Soviet representative either has not understood it or does not believe it. The Soviet negotiator, of course, does not believe what he hears, but he listens for undertones of firmness or un-

certainty which tell him whether or not he is shaking the determination of his adversary. Strong but controlled feeling, rather than impatience or anger, is an effective way of giving him his answer to this question. When a position is firmly established it is often advantageous to prepare a special memorandum, accompanied by a clear and idiomatic translation into Russian, in order to be sure that one's own position is adequately reported to Moscow, the only spot at which new instructions are likely to be initiated. Oral statements of position may or may not be reported, but it is probable that every bit of written material is carefully transmitted. If some part of the English memorandum does not lend itself to clear rendering into Russian, it is useful to rewrite the English version until it can be rendered without ambiguity, for while Russian can express any thought, it does not lend itself flexibly to a literal rendering of an English concept or phrase.

Once a position has been worked out, the non-Soviet negotiator must be prepared to uphold it in detail, and for a long time. The technique of constantly trying out variant versions, which works well in the western style of negotiation, only confuses the Soviet representative, who suspects some new trick in each new variant and must subject each in turn to exhaustive interpretation. Constantly modifying one's position or the way in which it is expressed means also that the Soviet negotiator is at a loss to know what version is based on bed-rock and should therefore be reported to Moscow. Even slight shifts in position or wording increase his belief that the adversary's position is a shaky one and thus encourage him to hold out that much longer for the full Soviet position. Western negotiators are usually in a position to accept slight adaptations, but even the slightest variation must be reported back to Moscow for decision there.

Since western negotiators are generally free, in the light of previous instructions and their knowledge of their governments' overall policies, to comment at once on new proposals or statements made during the course of negotiation, they often assume that Soviet negotiators have a similar latitude and accordingly press them to express their views. When so pressed, the Soviet negotiator is always free to raise innumerable objections and criticisms. He is not free to express concordance with any part of a proposal on which he has not received instructions from Moscow. Even the "program statements" of Soviet negotiators must be reviewed or written in Moscow before they can be delivered, and therefore Soviet statements at conferences often seem to have little relation to the immediately preceding statements of other delegations.

When a negotiation is actually under way, it is useful to avoid pressing the Soviet delegation to commit itself on a new proposal or draft. During the active negotiations carried on in the European Advisory Commission, whenever a new proposal or even a redraft was first presented, it was my habit to ask questions which would clarify its meaning and implications and then to take the initiative, even if I had adequate instructions, in saying that I would have to consult my government before commenting on it, thus relieving the Soviet delegation of the onus of either declining to comment on it or else of building up a whole series of negative statements against the proposal. Then, on occasions when I had instructions on the new point at issue, I would go at once to the Soviet delegation and inform its members in detail of the American position. This meant that Moscow had before it, at the

same time, the proposal and the American position on it. When there was a certain underlying desire to reach agreements, this procedure was often effective, or so it seemed, in reducing the number of divergences by providing full background on the problem before Moscow had taken a firm position, which could later be modified only by a long and exhausting tug-of-wills. Such informal discussions, conducted in Russian, also offered an occasion for learning or sensing the often unforeseen Russian objections and suspicions and for attempting to remove or alleviate them at an early stage.

When stating a position it is well to be sparing in the use of general or broadly stated principles, and when such principles are an essential part of the position it is necessary to remember that they are not shared by the Soviet negotiator. Broad statements of principle can, however, be effectively anchored in the historic experience of one's own people and, explained in that setting, they can have a certain impact on Soviet thinking. Soviet policy-makers may then accept them as a fact which must be taken into account, even though they do not believe in them or share them.

Wherever possible it is more useful to state one's position in terms of a definite material interest, as in the case of the question of Bulgaria's obligation to provide reparation to Greece and Yugoslavia. Soviet-trained negotiators pride themselves on identifying material interests and can therefore more readily visualize them as facts to which a certain adjustment can be made. . . .

Is it worthwhile to dwell on these experiences or to talk about negotiating at all? Even during the wartime alliance against the common menaces of Germany and Japan negotiations with the Soviet government were extremely difficult and frustrating, and, aside from the advantage of having established the United Nations, even before the end of the war, as a "forum for the opinions of mankind," none of the wartime agreements on postwar cooperation has worked out as was hoped, even against hope. Since the war the Soviet government has striven by all the means in its extensive arsenal to gain and retain every advantage for its side, regardless of the fact that thereby it quickly dissipated a very large reservoir of good-will and aroused the deep alarm of all nations which lay beyond its direct control. In a period of Soviet expansion and of hope for further expansion, negotiation could have only the purpose of confusing and dividing the nations which opposed its pressure, and since the war the Soviet purpose in negotiating has not been to reach agreements with strong opponents but to intimidate weaker and adjacent countries and to undermine the stamina of its principal potential adversaries.

Protected by two oceans and remote from the direct origins of previous world wars, Americans have been accustomed to ignore the rising storm and then, once it had burst upon them, to work solely for victory over the immediate menace. Thus, they tend to feel a sharp dichotomy between "war" and "peace." When at peace they are reluctant to think of the possibility of war. When at war they concentrate solely on winning the war, as if it were a grim football match, and refuse to worry about the peace which is the goal of war. Through Lenin and Stalin Soviet thinking has fully absorbed the Clausewitz maxims that national strength and strong alliances determine the effectiveness of national policy in peace, and that in

war one must never lose sight of the aims of policy for which it is waged. To the Soviet way of thinking, conflict is inherent in the development of "capitalist" society, and cannot be wished out of existence by "subjective good-will."

Within this ongoing history of conflict, however, Soviet tactics and techniques are not inflexible. Soviet policy towards the outside world has varied markedly during the past thirty-four years. True, the outward pressure of Soviet power has marked and seared the post-1945 years and the building of a reliable counterforce is only now under way in Europe. The outline of a similar counterforce cannot yet be discerned in Asia. In western policy the building of "positions of strength" and the use of negotiation must go hand-in-hand. Building of strength and negotiating cannot be regarded as alternatives or as opposites. They must be teamed. Negotiation without strength and determination behind it is frustrating, dangerous and may be suicidal. On the other hand, when strength has been built, refusal to negotiate may precipitate a colossal struggle, which would be fought as a cruel civil war in many parts of the world,—the very conflict which western strength is being fashioned to avert.

For the time being negotiation of those issues which are negotiable between the Soviet Union and the west is, generally speaking, in abeyance. But the art of policy will be to recognize, from a position of strength, future potentialities of negotiation, not with an expectation of bringing about a lasting or worldwide relaxation of Soviet ambitions, but as a means of alleviating individual sources of tension and thus of strengthening the free world. And if negotiation must go in harness with consistent and purposeful building of strength, the art and technique of international dealings must also be broadened to take full account of the peculiar character of the Soviet approach to negotiation.

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ON DEALING WITH RUSSIA

By Dean Acheson

(Former Secretary of State)

ROLE OF NEGOTIATION IN SOVIET STRATEGY*

Why is it that so many of us who have dealt with Russian officials find that personal recollections are pretty much restricted to anecdotes, sardonic or ridiculous, to discussions, frustrating and boring? It is, I think, because no real personal relations are possible. Either those Russians with whom we have had to deal do not dare open their minds, or those who dare have nothing in them to disclose.

Sir William Hayter, formerly British Ambassador in Moscow, has come to the same conclusion. With individual Russians, he has written in the London *Observer* (October 2, 1960), it is not "possible to establish any kind of lasting or genuine personal relationship," and with "the real rulers of Russia . . . it was the distressing experience of all Ambassadors that these great men had no more to say in private than in public; the same series of gramophone records was played on every occasion; nothing emerged from these private conversations that could not just as well be gleaned from the pages of *Pravda*."

It seems almost as though Russians going abroad went to a school of dialectics, where naturally coarse manners were made intentionally offensive, and where the students were trained in a technique of intellectual deviousness designed to frustrate any discussion. For instance, if one is inexperienced enough to be involved in discussion of the merits of free thought, free expression, and a free press, the riposte is that our information media are owned and used by the imperialist-monopolists to poison and misinform the masses. How much better the wise parent who forces his children to speak the truth by punishing them when they tell falsehoods. Even better, we are told, is the Soviet government which makes the truth so abundantly available to all citizens that there is no need or place for private versions and perversions of it. This same pattern of thought can be applied to elections, in which the same benevolent Soviet system safeguards the ingenious elector from the misguidance of self-interested and ambitious men, by permitting only one candidate—in other words "the best man." After a few evenings of this sort of talk, anything is preferable.

In official negotiations the methods employed have a common root. My discovery of it, and consequent saving of my sanity, I owe to

**Sketches From Life*, 1959, 1961.

Averell Harriman. Toward the end of the war I found myself the head of an American group negotiating with a Russian group for the delivery and payment of some war surplus property when hostilities should stop. After the third meeting it dawned on me that the Russians were merely repeating the same things and that we were getting nowhere. I disclosed my frustration to Averell, our Ambassador then to Moscow, who was in Washington for consultation.

"Take a few days' recess," he advised, "then meet, give them a paper with your proposal, explain it, and recess again. This will enable them to cable Moscow and get instructions." He explained that none of our oral proposals had been sent to Moscow, since to have done so would have opened the sender to charges of being impressed by what we said, but that a written proposal was another thing. This had to be reported. To suppress it would be to assume responsibility which also could lead to criticism. This advice worked. The negotiations got nowhere; but they ended, of which there had seemed to be no possibility before.

Mr. Vyshinsky was not a formidable opponent. He was not equipped, as is Khrushchev, to use debate, discussion, and negotiation for their chief function in Soviet strategy. Unfortunately what this function is, is ill understood in non-Communist countries. I have heard people who should know better, including a head of government, say happily, "As long as we keep them talking, they're not fighting." Nothing could be more untrue: they are fighting. They are adopting a tactic specifically prescribed by Lenin to delay the crises while demoralizing and weakening the enemy. To our minds international conferences and international negotiations are so completely means for ending conflict that we are blind to the fact that they may be and, in the hands of experts, are equally adapted to continuing it. In the present century the Soviet state has perfected the use of negotiation, including negotiation by mass conference, as a method of warfare: this use long antedates the Communists. A classic example is the negotiation conducted at Canton by the Chinese with Lord Napier of Merchiston, representing the British government, in the 1830's, as brilliantly told by Maurice Collis in *Foreign Mud*.¹ The similar use of negotiation by the Communists at Brest-Litovsk in 1917-1918 and Panmunjom in 1951-1953 was worthy of the model.

Negotiation, in the classic diplomatic sense, assumes parties more anxious to agree than to disagree; parties who are, therefore, willing to make concessions in determining what shall be agreed upon. But, as a friend put it, Americans in recent years have come to see three elements in the process of negotiation. There is the element of the high school debate, in which the judges are the newspaper columnists and the Asian and African leaders are the audience. In other words, this element stresses the impression made by the negotiation, often a contrived impression, as in the Geneva Summit Meeting of 1955, rather than its outcome. The second element is the Yankee horsetrade. Here the emphasis is on outmaneuvering the opponent, on the game, rather than on any importance of the game.

The third element is the evangelical one of a revival meeting. Take the sawdust trail to salvation or suffer damnation in the fires of a nuclear hell. "There is no alternative to negotiations with the Russians"

¹ Alfred A. Knopf (New York, 1947).

is the constant theme of a well-known columnist and a prominent politician in this country and of a large section of the British Labour party. This is, of course, silly. For if there is no alternative, and if the Russians will only negotiate, as is now the case, on their own terms, then there is no alternative to surrender. But there plainly is an alternative, which is by action to change the attitude of the other party. Negotiation should not be, as some conceive it, mere talk apart from action. Negotiation and action are parts of one whole. Action is often the best form of negotiation. It affects the environment, which in large part is likely to determine the outcome of negotiation. The sputniks were powerful moves in negotiation; so was the Marshall Plan. Mr. Khrushchev at the 1960 Paris Summit Meeting, as at the New York General Assembly, was affecting the environment of international relations. He was using conference and the forms of negotiation as an instrument of war.

True negotiation with the Russians, when and how it can occur, has been admirably summed up by Sir William Hayter in the excellent article already mentioned:

Negotiation with the Russians does occur, from time to time, but it requires no particular skill. The Russians are not to be persuaded by eloquence or convinced by reasoned arguments. They rely on what Stalin used to call the proper basis of international policy, the calculation of forces. So no case, however skilfully deployed, however clearly demonstrated as irrefutable, will move them from doing what they have previously decided to do; the only way of changing their purpose is to demonstrate that they have no advantageous alternative, that what they want to do is not possible. Negotiations with the Russians are therefore very mechanical; and they are probably better conducted on paper than by word of mouth.

POSSIBLE PITFALLS ON THE WAY TO THE SUMMIT *

There is a good deal of folklore about on the subject of negotiating with the Russians. . . .

We are told, for instance, that since only Mr. Khrushchev can make decisions for the Russian Government, meetings at lower levels are foredoomed to failure; therefore, on to the summit. Again, that "the tragic experience of Geneva in 1955" came from "a grandstand conference," and that this summer's meeting should be held in private. . . .

Is it true that the only way to work anything out with the Soviet Government is by conference with the top man and his staff?

The answer is that it depends on what one is trying to work out. Matters as complex as the concerting of military and supply operations on a vast scale during a world war did require this method. Yet the method, as method, contributed nothing to real agreement on the solution of Eastern European questions. On the other hand, in 1949, arrangements for the ending of the blockade of Berlin were agreed to without meetings at any level. It depends on what the Russians find it in their interests to do.

*The New York Times Magazine, April 12, 1959.

Let us have a closer look at the events of 1949. After the coup in Czechoslovakia, Stalin had decided, in Khrushchev's later phrase, to cut out the "cancer" of Berlin. So, following the reform of West German currency, a serious problem for East Germany, the blockade of Berlin began in 1948. The United States responded with the airlift (which probably would not work today) and by a counter-blockade of East Germany. The Russians became the losers both in Germany and in their general propaganda position.

Then, at the end of January, 1949, the Soviet Government published answers by Stalin to questions submitted by a newspaper correspondent. One of these questions and its answer were most interesting. The question was whether the Soviet Government would raise the blockade if the Western powers agreed to postpone the formation of a West German state pending a meeting of Foreign Ministers to consider the problem of Germany as a whole. The answer given to this is worth quoting in full:

Provided the United States of America, Great Britain and France observe the conditions set forth in the third question, the Soviet Government sees no obstacles to lifting the transport restrictions on the understanding, however, that transport and trade restrictions introduced by the three powers should be lifted simultaneously.

Officers in the State Department believed that this might be a signal that the Soviet Government was ready to discuss an end to the blockade and counter-blockade. It was decided that the Secretary of State, in a press conference, should give a signal back.

This took the form of a bland discussion of the questions and answers in the Stalin interview. No great importance was attributed to them. It was pointed out that the formation of a West German Government could hardly be a cause of the blockade since it had not been thought of when the blockade was imposed and was not imminent at the time. Certainly the measures taken in response to the blockade would end when it did. Finally, there were these two paragraphs:

There are many ways in which a serious proposal by the Soviet Government to restore normal interzonal communications and communications with and within Berlin could be made. All channels are open for any suggestions to that end. The United States, together with the other Western occupying powers, would, of course, consider carefully any proposal made to solve the Berlin problem consistent with their rights, their duties, their obligations as occupying powers.

As I say, all of the normal channels are open. I hope you will not take it amiss if I point out that if I on my part were seeking to give assurance of seriousness of purpose, I would choose some other channel than the channel of a press interview.

At the same time, a senior diplomatic officer attending a United Nations meeting was instructed to say quite casually to a senior Russian officer at the same meeting that he had been interested in the

answers recently in the press and wondered whether they suggested anything more than the strict words of the text. The Russian officer had no information; but if he learned anything he would pass it on. In a week he did, equally casually. The answer had been very carefully prepared in Moscow. If the American officer had any specific question the Russian would do his best to get an answer.

Thus began a protracted and highly secret negotiation. The very fact that secrecy was preserved was to each of the parties a sign of the good faith of the other. In the end, it was agreed that the blockade measures on both sides would be ended, a Foreign Ministers meeting convened on the German problem, and no obligation incurred to postpone action on a West German Government since there was plenty of time for the meeting to be held before, in the normal course of events, any further steps would be taken. As the negotiations finished, other parties were brought in; they approved the plan and joined in the announcement.

The conference of Foreign Ministers which followed took weeks and accomplished almost nothing. It was an exercise in propaganda over Germany. The Russians had exhausted their capacity for adjustment, and further progress must await the development of new realities. . . .

This brings us to the second of the illusions we have mentioned about negotiating with the Russians. This is contained within the belief that it is possible to have "private" and not "grandstand" conferences of heads of governments.

President Eisenhower does not share this illusion. "It is rather difficult," he said recently, "to visualize such a thing. If you meet with a group of world leaders, it is rather hard to keep the spotlight off of it." And how does one talk informally with "batteries of interpreters and recorders and all that sort of thing? It would almost inevitably change, I think, into something rather formal."

The illusion, however, goes deeper than the belief that it is *possible* to keep these meetings private and out of the spotlight. It goes to a misconception of the role of these meetings in the Russians' strategy of negotiation. The purpose of these meetings to them is not, through discussion of a subject, to reach a resolution of it or an accommodation regarding it. These meetings are acts in themselves which are intended to affect the relative positions of the parties.

The Soviets negotiate by acts and not by debate, offer and counteroffer. Their purpose may be to separate allies, or to undermine governments with their people, or to win over uncommitted peoples. Or it may be, as in "the tragic experience of Geneva in 1955," to bring a sense of relaxation, goodwill and security, before some energetic offensive such as Soviet intervention in the Middle East.

Publicity is the lifeblood of such an operation. It is not merely, as President Eisenhower thinks, that a meeting of world leaders attracts the spotlight. It is that the purposes of the Russian leaders demand the spotlight, for the spotlight makes an act out of a speech.

Here, too, the Soviet leaders have built-in advantage, for the spotlight shines brilliantly throughout the Free World and stops at the Iron Curtain which rings their own. Their opponents and all who may support or sympathize with them are open and eager to be worked upon. But the Communist people are immune from any counteroffen-

sive, and hear only what their rulers wish them to hear. The dice are loaded in this game.

The conclusion is not, of course, that the Western powers must not go to these conferences. But it is an illusion to expect much from them, or to identify them with the process of negotiation, in the usual sense of the word. They should be recognized for what they are: dangerous and highly mobile adversary operations . . .

We can and should be ready, as we have been on occasions in the past, to use ingenuity in devising ways to give the Soviet Union reasonable assurance of its own security and demonstrate our willingness to remove causes of anxiety, if any there really are. The [arms control] negotiations at Geneva over the past years have had this purpose.

But one thing we should never do. That is to undermine the security of Western Europe—and with it the best hope we have for avoiding resort to nuclear war—by destroying the possibility of developing such a strong defensive position on the ground in Europe that any aggressor contemplating a move against it must contemplate an attack on so large a scale that nuclear war would almost certainly result. Only such a situation makes strategic nuclear power a credible threat and an effective deterrent. . . .

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THE GAMESMANSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION

By Joseph L. Noguee

(Professor of Political Science, University of Houston)

The problem of international control of atomic energy is distinctly propitious as a case study in Soviet diplomacy. Not only is it a problem that is now a closed subject, but it is one which permits examination of Kremlin policy on a vital issue from beginning to end. The choice between a national or international atom, so important in the middle and late 1940s, was a dead issue in the early years of the next decade: Soviet science and the cold war had permanently nationalized the atom.

Secondly, the topic is one that contains more than its share of the drama that is inherent in any problem of such magnitude. The Baruch Plan was almost as revolutionary in its political implications as the plan for controlled atomic fission—a formidable challenge which had to be faced. Whatever course of action Premier Stalin followed inevitably portended momentous consequences in view of the key position of the Soviet Union in world affairs.

Thirdly, a relatively complete body of documentary evidence on this subject is both available and accessible to the scholar at the present time. . . .

One of the most important features of Soviet policy toward international control of atomic energy was its duration and consistency. Given the deep-rooted nature of the Soviet aversion to internationalizing any segment of Russia's economy, it remains a question why the Soviet Government did not reject the proposals *in toto* in 1946 instead of engaging in an eight-year debate with the object of defeating the proposals? In other words, why was the Soviet rejection of international control of atomic energy an indirect instead of a direct one? To broaden the question, of what importance was the prolonged series of negotiations in the Atomic Energy Commission, General Assembly and Disarmament Commission in the promotion of Russian national interests?

Along with the leaders of every major nation, the Soviet elite recognized the world-wide pressure of public opinion for some form of control against use of atomic bombs. Premier Stalin himself commented that "the desires and conscience of people demand that the use of atomic energy for war-like purposes be prohibited."¹ Andrei Gromyko gave expression to this same force in his opening speech before the Atomic Energy Commission when he said:

¹ Interview with Harold Stassen on April 9, 1947. *Izvestia*, May 8, 1947.

If we continue to use these discoveries for the production of weapons of mass destruction we may intensify mistrust between states and keep the peoples of the world in continual anxiety and mistrust. Such a position would work against the aspirations of the peace-loving peoples who are thirsting for the establishment of a solid peace and who are making every effort to endure that their aspirations shall be transformed into reality.¹

The Soviet Union, which purported to base its foreign policy upon popular aspirations for peace and security could no more afford to neglect world opinion on this subject than could any other major nation. At the very least it had to pay lip service to this popular expression. . . .

The negotiating techniques of the Soviet Union in the United Nations were, however, considerably more complex than merely paying lip service to a universally accepted ideal. And Soviet objectives in negotiating control of atomic energy were more ambitious than solely digging the grave for international control. Considerable attention, in fact, was given by the Soviet Government to the United Nations debate to promote Soviet interests. While Soviet atomic energy policy did vacillate at times and appeared at moments confused and inconsistent, there was a broad pattern of objectives and tactics which over the eight-year period of atomic energy negotiations was both consistent and positive. Over the past decade, as negotiations for disarmament replaced negotiations for international control of atomic energy, these same objectives and tactics have dominated Soviet diplomacy.

The over-all motivation of Soviet behavior in atomic energy negotiations was to mobilize world public opinion favorable toward the Soviet Union. For their purposes the Soviet leadership divided world opinion into roughly three segments: the communist world, the Western world and that segment not encompassed by either, which can be labeled neutral public opinion. Each segment, of course, required the use of a different set of tactics, or more accurately, a stress of one particular technique over another to meet the requirements of the different objectives for the communist, Western and neutralist segments.

Broadly speaking, the Soviet objective in atomic energy negotiations vis-a-vis the communist world was to reinforce anti-Western feeling by emphasizing the aggressive intention of the United States and England. Toward the Western nations the Soviet representatives were more concerned with using the negotiations to put pressure on the United States to renounce use of the bomb. Soviet efforts to influence the neutralist nations were primarily aimed at justifying the Soviet proposals and seeking United Nations approval—at least in principle—of Soviet atomic energy policy.

Some of these objectives and the tactics used to achieve them were incompatible and there were times when Soviet policy did not seem to be consistently seeking any recognizable objective. For example, many of Molotov's or Vyshinsky's vitriolic speeches, which were directed primarily to the ears of the pro-communist world, so irritated the vast majority of United Nations representatives that some neutralist nations which might have given some support to the Russian proposals were alienated; and, some of the Soviet propaganda charges against the United States were so palpably untrue that they had the effect of discrediting some of the more reasonable Soviet claims.

¹ UN, *AECOR*, No. 2, 2nd meeting, June 19, 1946, p. 24.

The major proposals advanced by the Soviet Government were not meant to be taken literally. They were too extreme to be accepted by the majority. They exceeded even Soviet expectations. Their purpose was to put the Soviet Union in a position from which it could bargain—*i.e.*, in a position from which it could gain concessions by offering concessions. Many of the Soviet resolutions and speeches had no relevance at all to negotiating in the conventional sense of a give-and-take in negotiation. These were designed only to convey and reiterate a propagandistic theme—*e.g.*, that the Soviet Union stood for the absolute prohibition of atomic weapons or that the United States was planning to attack the Soviet Union. The Soviet representatives were not directly concerned about the truth or falsity of their statements before the various United Nations commissions and committees. What concerned them was the effect of what they said on the attainment of their objectives. They were interested in creating attitudes. They were not interested in sounding out the extent of Western demands and then attempting to reconcile these demands with those of the Soviet Government.

The distinction between communist, Western and neutralist areas of opinion which the Soviet representatives sought to influence is partially arbitrary. Rarely were Soviet propaganda efforts at any one time directed at only one area. The differing demands of each area had to be met continuously in every organ of the United Nations where international control of atomic energy was under debate.

One of the important features of the way Soviet atomic policy in the United Nations was carried out was the general uniformity of presentation before all the various organs where the subject was debated. In general, there were no significant differences in the content and tone of Soviet speeches made before the General Assembly and its committees, the Security Council or the Atomic Energy Commission and Disarmament Commission and their various working committees.

One might have expected a difference in approach to correspond with the different functions of the various United Nations bodies. The smaller working committees of the Atomic Energy Commission and Disarmament Commission, for example, were designed to facilitate an exchange of information and to reconcile conflicting points of view. When issues came before the larger United Nations organs—including the Atomic Energy Commission and Disarmament Commission—these objectives ordinarily gave way to attempts to enlist general support for or to justify a nation's policy. However, the general procedure for the Soviet representatives was to present the same kind of speeches before every body, large or small. Wherever they had the opportunity, the Soviet representatives utilized the smaller working groups to give the same long, tendentious, and hostile speeches that they gave before the Security Council or General Assembly.

It is, therefore, possible to analyze the over-all objectives sought by the Soviet representatives without identifying these objectives with a particular United Nations body or limiting them to a particular period of time. Soviet representatives used the atomic energy negotiations principally for the attainment of five objectives. They were:

- (1) To reject the American atomic energy proposals without appearing to do so.

- (2) To link Soviet policy with popular aspirations throughout the world.
- (3) To portray the policies of the Western bloc—and the United States in particular—as aggressive.
- (4) To prevent the United States Government from using its atomic superiority to gain political advantages.
- (5) To stall for time.

Toward the attainment of each of the objectives the Soviet representatives utilized a specific set of tactics which they considered most relevant. Often one particular tactic served more than one objective. One such case was the Soviet use of parliamentary tactics of diversion which served not only to stall for time, but fitted in with the Soviet goal of rejecting proposals without appearing to do so. As noted above, some of the tactics designed to facilitate one particular objective hindered the attainment of other objectives. . . .

These five objectives constituted the esoteric goals of Soviet atomic energy negotiators in contrast to the exoteric³ goals stated on the face of the Soviet proposals. It is not likely that these objectives were formulated at one time in any systematic manner; but the postwar record of atomic energy negotiations reveals that the Soviet representatives worked primarily and consistently toward these ends. Moreover, it is quite clear that these same tactics have been an integral element of all Soviet disarmament negotiations over the past fifteen years. With the changing subject matter, of course, some goals have changed. No longer, for example, do the Soviets need to stall for time to build an atomic stockpile. New objectives have replaced some of the old. More recently Soviet negotiations have been directed toward a weakening of the NATO alliance system by encouraging dissension among the Western powers and by preventing the arming of NATO forces with nuclear weapons. It is clear that the lessons of the first eight postwar years apply to the past decade and a half.

"Gamesmanship" is perhaps too facetious a term to describe the intensely serious contest in propaganda and psychological warfare that characterized Soviet-Western negotiations toward international control of atomic energy. But it does serve to emphasize several elements of this contest. Like most contests atomic energy negotiations were undertaken for stakes. In this case the stakes were political gain. Also like most contests there were certain rules to the game. . . . Unlike most contests, the rules by which this diplomatic contest was carried on were rarely—if ever—publicly delineated. Nor were the Soviet objectives ever publicly described.

If the Soviet Union had announced that its primary objectives were not prohibition and international control of atomic energy, but a rejection of control proposals, a discrediting of the United States and a stall for time, the attainment of these unexpressed goals would have

³ See Gabriel A. Almond, *The Appeals of Communism* (Princeton, 1954), pp. ix-xvii.

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TECHNIQUES OF NEGOTIATION

By Gordon A. Craig

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I

Despite the relative lateness of their admission to the Western diplomatic community, Russian rulers and their ministers were not slow in appreciating the importance of negotiation and mastering its techniques. There is no entirely satisfactory history of the origins and early evolution of Russian diplomacy; but it is clear from what accounts we possess that at an early stage the court of Muscovy carried on negotiations with the khans of Asia and the caliphs of Bagdad; and in the time of Ivan III diplomacy was as frequently used as war in adjusting Russia's relations with the Golden Horde and the Tartars of the Crimea. That prince was, indeed, engaged throughout his reign in continuous negotiation, not only with his nearest neighbors but also with the papacy, the Hapsburgs, the king of Bohemia, and the Danish court, and he was reputed to be skillful in negotiation with ambassadors from abroad, a reputation supported by the successes of his diplomacy.¹

Russian relations with the West in this early period were intermittent but of increasing scope; and by the middle of the sixteenth century the court of Moscow found it expedient to coordinate the activities of the many Greek, Italian, and other agents working for it in the West by establishing a primitive foreign office, the Bureau of Ambassadors. As the ambitions of the rulers grew, and as their eyes began to turn to areas dominated by the Turks and the Swedes, they availed themselves of those coalition-making capabilities of negotiation of which Callières was later to write, and sent envoys to seek alliances and other forms of aid in Vienna and Berlin, in Venice and Madrid, and in London, Paris, and the Hague.² Before the seventeenth century was over, the obvious advantages of continuous contact with foreign courts had led to the establishment of the first permanent missions abroad,³ and this process was pushed further by Peter the Great and by Catherine, whose policy was oriented to the West and who participated actively and profitably in the complex play of diplomatic maneuver that filled the eighteenth century. . . .

¹ J. L. I. Fennell, "Russia, 1462-1583," *New Cambridge Modern History*, 2 (Cambridge, 1958), 536 ff.

² *Histoire de la Diplomatie*, publiée sous le direction de M. Potiemkine [Potemkin] de l'Académie des Sciences de l'U.R.S.S., trans. from Russian, 3 vols. (Paris, 1946), I, 220 f.

³ Otto Krauske, *Die Entwicklung der ständigen Diplomatie vom 15. Jahrhundert bis zu den Beschlüssen von 1815 und 1818* (Leipzig, 1885), p. 144.

been jeopardized.⁴ The Soviet "game" then, was for the most part subtly played. It had to be subtle to be convincing. Where Soviet tactics were not subtle, they risked exposure and thus the defeat of the Soviet objectives.

⁴ An incident reported by Frederick Osborn, concerning America's atomic energy negotiations during 1947-1949, provides an interesting example of the Soviet attitude toward atomic energy negotiations. Before Andrei Gromyko was scheduled to return to Moscow in 1949, Osborn asked him if the two of them could not sit down together and go over atomic energy matters before Gromyko left, in order to break the deadlock that had developed over the past few years. The American representative expressed the opinion that Gromyko was sincere in his desire to find a solution and that the Soviet representative trusted Osborn's sincerity. Together, said Osborn, they might be better able to explore both their governments' positions than in the public debates on the Atomic Energy Commission. Gromyko looked at Mr. Osborn quietly for a moment and replied, "Mr. Osborn, you may be sincere, but governments are never sincere." They never had their talk. Osborn, "Negotiating on Atomic Energy, 1946-1947," in *Negotiating With the Russians*, 1951, p. 230.

The characteristics and negotiating techniques of Russia's diplomats in the early years of this association were a source of contempt, amusement, or exasperation to Western statesmen. The first Russians who visited Western countries as special envoys struck at least one observer as very little more than "baptized bears."⁴ Certainly they comported themselves as something less than human, and they made Muscovite grossness proverbial in the West by ruining the apartments assigned to them, breaking the furniture, and "leaving behind them unsupportable odors and indescribable filth."⁵ When Peter the Great led his "Great Embassy" to the West in 1697-98, his suite virtually destroyed the house in which they were quartered in London. The floors were left covered with grease and ink; the curtains, quilts, and bed linen were torn to rags; fifty chairs were broken or had disappeared entirely; twenty fine pictures were slashed and the frames destroyed; and 300 window panes were broken.⁶ Damage of this nature could not be attributed wholly to inadvertence or to lack of breeding. Much of it appeared to be a deliberate flouting of Western convention in order to demonstrate Russian superiority. It accorded with other unpleasing traits of these first embassies: rudeness in matters of protocol, scornful disregard for the laws of the land to which they were accredited, and studied incivilities in their relations with their opposite numbers.⁷

Negotiation with the Russians was always a difficult and indeed tedious business. Envoys sent abroad were provided with detailed instructions prescribing how they should act, what they should say, what tone they should use, what persons they were authorized to meet, and much more. They were never given full powers and could decide nothing without reference to higher authority. The introduction of new subjects into the course of a negotiation in train, or a suggestion that the discussion be turned to a different level, invariably led to interruptions while the Russian representative sought new instructions. Nor was the tempo of negotiation appreciably faster in Moscow on those occasions when foreign envoys were given an opportunity to deal with the tsar through his chief ministers. All too often the envoys would learn, after interminable delays, that they were expected merely to accept fiat from the tsar; and demurrers on their part were met with pressures, menaces, and expulsions that showed little respect for the accepted code of diplomatic etiquette.⁸

Finally, negotiation with the Russians was hampered by certain characteristics of Russian intercourse that always delayed and sometimes defeated understanding. Perhaps because they had gone to school in Byzantium before they established a firm relationship with the West,⁹ the Russians retained Eastern habits of thought and discourse that were irritating to Western negotiators. What John Wheeler-Bennett has called "the incalculable capacity of the Slav for interminable conversation"¹⁰ tried their patience to the utmost, while Russian arts of mystification often surrounded negotiations with impenetrable fogs

⁴ Ian Grey, *Peter the Great: Emperor of All Russia* (New York, 1960), p. 101.

⁵ P. Milloukov [Millukov], Charles Seignobos, and L. Eisenmann, *Histoire de Russie* (Paris, 1932-33), I, 229.

⁶ Grey, *Peter the Great*, p. 117.

⁷ Potlemkine, *Diplomatie*, I, 226 f.

⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 228; Wildner, *Technik*, pp. 29 f.

⁹ Wildner, *Technik*, pp. 28 f.

¹⁰ John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace*, new ed. (London, 1956), pp. 138 f.

of confusion. Even such a pronounced Westerner as Peter believed that dust should be thrown in the eyes of his Western rivals and that obfuscation should be considered an important instrument of Russian policy. Peter's servants followed this injunction. Of A. I. Ostermann it was said that foreign ministers could sometimes talk with him for two hours and, on leaving his cabinet, be no better informed than when they entered it. . . .

II

. . . Russian diplomacy in the nineteenth century was virtually indistinguishable in method and technique from that of the states with which it dealt; and the outstanding Russian diplomats could have been put to work in other services without causing the slightest inconvenience or disruption and with no need for re-training in the instruments and techniques of their craft. Their values, their language, their methods, in a word, their style was that of Western diplomats in general. . . .

It may be noted that in the latter half of the nineteenth century the Tsarist regime had every reason to put a higher valuation upon negotiation than upon such other instruments of foreign policy as war and propaganda. If in other countries the complaint was sometimes heard that the diplomats were always surrendering what the soldiers had won, in Russia it often appeared that the main function of diplomats was to make good the mistakes of their military colleagues. The skillful tactics of Orlov and Brunnov at the Paris conference of 1856 tempered the demands of the victors in the late war and freed Russia from a diplomatic isolation that might have been dangerous in the ensuing period. In 1878, the masterly diplomatic campaign conducted by Peter Shuvalov in London and Berlin extricated Russia from the insupportable position to which it had been brought by a Panslav policy. And in 1906, in the Portsmouth conference that ended the Russo-Japanese War, Witte and Rosen won a success that few would have predicted before the negotiations began. . . .

All in all, the conduct of Russian diplomacy in the nineteenth century was marked by competence and occasionally by brilliance, and, especially in conference negotiation, Russian diplomatists showed a special talent for making the most of bad cases. There was, however, nothing particularly original or distinctive about Russian practice. It was reserved for the Soviet regime to devise new techniques of negotiation, while at the same time challenging the patience and ingenuity of the West by the way in which it adapted the traditional techniques to its own purposes.

III

The Bolshevik regime began its career by announcing, in effect, that it was withdrawing Russia from the Western diplomatic community, that it intended to repudiate all legal ties made with other nations by the Tsarist government, and that it would refuse henceforth to conform to the rules and procedures that had obtained in international relations. All this was made clear to the world by the Bolshevik Decree on Peace, passed by the second All-Russian Congress of Soviets on November 8, 1917,¹¹ and by Trotsky's statement two weeks later, at the

¹¹ Jane Degras, ed., *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, I* (London, 1951), 1-3.

time of the publication of the secret treaties, when he announced the abolition of the old diplomacy and "its intrigues, codes, and lies" and promised the inauguration of an "honest, popular, truly democratic foreign policy."¹² From now on, the Peace Decree stated, negotiation would be conducted "absolutely openly before the entire people";¹³ and it was implied that intergovernmental negotiation would be minimal, especially after the restoration of peace, and that the Bolshevik regime, as a people's government, would henceforth direct its appeals and its messages to peoples rather than to their rulers. This would presumably make even the old diplomatic apparatus unnecessary, which is probably what was in Trotsky's mind when he spoke of issuing "some revolutionary proclamations to the peoples and then [closing] up the joint [i.e., the Foreign Office]."¹⁴ . . .

Trotsky himself [later] became the most eloquent advocate of a resumption of normal relations with other powers, using his influence in 1921 to conclude a final peace with Poland and to settle the boundaries of the Baltic countries and, as early as 1920, urging Lenin to conciliate Great Britain.¹⁵ To maintain contact with the bourgeois states seemed the best way of detecting, and even influencing, their intentions. Moreover, as long as Russia was an isolated power girded about by possible coalitions, it seemed expedient for Soviet diplomats to be versed in the methods of their adversaries. Before long, the classical handbooks on diplomacy and such modern studies as Satow's *Guide to Diplomatic Practice* and Jules Cambon's *Le Diplomate* were being translated and read in the Soviet Union; and at the Genoa Conference of 1922 and subsequent high-level meetings Soviet delegations demonstrated that they could, when they wished, be scrupulously correct in matters of protocol and that they had also acquired considerable facility in the use of orthodox procedures and tactics.

This return to normal methods paid dividends, as is shown by the fact that, although the Soviet Union often faced the possibility of complete isolation in the years following the Brest conference, it always escaped it. Between 1920 and 1924 it was able to establish its reputation for reliability sufficiently to win recognition from most of the Western powers, and this was accomplished in large part by patient negotiation and by the skillful use of the techniques of classical diplomacy, especially the art of playing upon the differences of the powers and appealing to their greed or their fears.

At the same time, even in this defensive period of their diplomacy, the Soviets were hesitant to commit themselves entirely to the values and procedures of the bourgeois West. If they learned to play the traditional game as well as their bourgeois colleagues, their methods were on occasion apt to be startlingly unorthodox. They frequently advanced their objectives not by direct talks with other governments but by means of their contacts with individuals and groups whose pressure might move the governments in question. Something new was certainly added to negotiating form when Karl Radek held levées for German soldiers, businessmen, and politicians in a cell in the Moabit prison in

¹² *Ibid.*, 8-9.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁴ Quoted in Theodore Von Laue, "Soviet Diplomacy: G. V. Chicherin," in *The Diplomats, 1919-1939*, ed. Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, 1953), p. 235.

¹⁵ Deutscher, *Prophet Armed*, pp. 463 ff.; and *The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky, 1921-1929* (London, 1959), p. 56.

Berlin where he had been placed after the Spartacist rising of January 1919, and whence he sought to induce his guests to use their influence in favor of a Soviet-German entente;¹⁶ and the Treaty of Rapallo, the revelation of which exploded the Genoa Conference, had been prepared by other talks like Radek's conducted by agents of Leon Trotsky in the previous two years.¹⁷ The tendency to avail itself of multiple channels of negotiation, some (like the various Comintern links) leading to groups whose activities inside friendly states were clearly subversive in nature, was one of the characteristics of Soviet diplomacy after 1920; and in the late twenties this sometimes weakened or destroyed work patiently achieved by more orthodox approaches.

In its formal negotiations with bourgeois states, Soviet diplomacy in the interwar period bore some resemblance to Russian diplomatic behavior in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Soviets had become participants in the affairs of the Western diplomatic community reluctantly and only because it was in their interest to do so, but they never became members of it in any real sense. A British negotiator wrote in exasperation in 1933 that one could get nowhere with the Soviets because they were "completely unable to see themselves in any other light than that of an aggrieved Power struggling for their noble ideals against a world of political, financial and commercial conspirators."¹⁸ In all of their dealings with Western powers, their attitude was one of inveterate suspicion, which took various forms. As in the earliest period of Russian diplomacy, rigidity and legalism became hallmarks of Soviet negotiating technique, and Soviet diplomats were as tightly bound to their instructions as were the envoys of Peter the Great and his predecessors. Their suspicion was often extended even to the framework of the negotiations, and I have written elsewhere of the way in which the Soviet representative in talks on the possibility of resumption of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union in 1929 stalled the negotiations until his own agenda was accepted instead of that drawn up by the British Foreign Office, although the differences between the two seemed inconsequential even to the expert eye.¹⁹ Aside from this, the stoutness with which Soviet representatives held to their positions in negotiation became proverbial. They were far less inclined to make concessions to their opponents' point of view than their opponents were to theirs; and, indeed, when their opposite numbers made concessions, they viewed this with uneasiness and distrust, as showing that their adversaries had been insincere in adopting their original positions and were probably plotting some dark anti-Soviet stroke.

In 1939, when the Western powers were seeking an agreement with the Soviet Union in order to check Hitler's march of aggression, this attitude toward compromise proved an almost insuperable barrier to profitable exchanges. The Soviet negotiators invariably stressed the necessity of Western concessions on the very points on which the West was most reluctant to yield; and attempts to conciliate them by giving way on lesser points merely encour-

¹⁶ Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), pp. 204-08.

¹⁷ Deutscher, *Prophet Unarmed*, pp. 56 f.

¹⁸ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, ed. E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (London, 1949 f.), 2nd series, 7, 316.

¹⁹ Gordon A. Craig, "Totalitarian Approaches to Diplomatic Negotiation," in *Essays on Diplomatic History in Honor of George Peabody Gooch*, ed. A. O. Sarkissian (London, 1961), Ch. 4.

aged them to believe that, if they persisted, the West would give way on the major ones too.²⁰ At one point in the negotiations, Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, asked the Soviet ambassador "point-blank whether the Soviet Government wanted a treaty at all; to which M. Maisky said that of course they did, and why did I ask the question? Because, I replied, throughout the negotiations the Soviet Government had not budged a single inch and we had made all the advances and concessions . . . Saying 'No' to everything was not my idea of negotiation."²¹

The difference between Soviet and Western negotiators here and on other occasions was not, of course, merely one of tactics or even of understanding. At the root of these difficulties of negotiation was a fundamental incompatibility of purpose, which the Soviets, as long as they needed economic aid or security from foreign intervention or assistance against National Socialism or material help in the Fascist war, were careful not to admit, and which the Western powers were reluctant to see. It was only after the Second World War, when the Soviet Union, confident in its mission as it had been in 1917 and conscious of its strength, once more announced its inflexible opposition to bourgeois society, that the real difficulties of negotiation with the Soviet Union were appreciated in the West.

IV

In a melancholy survey of post-World War II diplomacy, the former British Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord Vansittart, wrote a few years ago: "I have 'done' many conferences in my life but never went into one without some hope of a fairly quick result. No one could say the same today. Results are often not expected, and often not even desirable."²²

One has no difficulty in admitting the relevance of these words to negotiations on major issues between the Soviet Union and the West since 1945. In these encounters the Soviet Union has very often appeared to be returning to the tactics that characterized its conduct of negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in 1918 and for much the same reasons that prompted its behavior there. Once more it has seemed to be confident that the victory of Communism on a world scale could not be long delayed and that all confrontations between Soviet and Western negotiators must be used to encourage the forces of revolution. Once more negotiation has been used not as a means of promoting agreement but as a weapon to discomfit enemies and reveal to the world their weaknesses, the falseness of their professions, and the injustice of their claims. Once more the very act of negotiation has been transformed into a dramatic performance designed to entertain and instruct a wider public with a spectacle of enlightened Soviet representatives battling manfully against the forces of capitalism and imperialism.

In promoting this kind of negotiation, the Soviet Union has shown a great diversity of effective tactics. Not the least important of these has been the practice of universalizing its own position in the hope that the peoples of colonial areas, the uncommitted world, and significant

²⁰ An expression of Lord Strang's concern over the effectiveness of Soviet tactics is to be found in *Documents of British Foreign Policy*, 3rd ser., 6, No. 376.

²¹ *Ibid.*, No. 135.

²² Lord Vansittart, "The Decline of Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, 28 (1950), 184.

parts of the populations of Western nations would identify themselves with it. This is in accordance with the advice given by Marx and Engels in *The German Ideology* where it is written that, since "increasingly abstract ideas hold sway" in the modern world, the revolutionary class is compelled to "represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, put in an ideal form; it will give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones," and it will seek to speak "not as a class but as the representative of the whole society."²³ The Soviet Union has carried this idea over to the sphere of international politics and, by doing so, has sought to invest its views and proposals with infallibility.

The diplomatic advantage of this posture is that it can be used to make the traditional approach of Western diplomacy—the assumption of a *commerce d'avis reciproque* and the search for agreement through compromise—seem somehow morally reprehensible. At the outset of the negotiations of the foreign ministers in Geneva in 1959, Premier Khrushchev made a speech in Tirana, Albania, commenting on the Western case before it was presented. This kind of intervention into negotiations that were supposed to be private would in itself have been considered extraordinary in an earlier age, but what Khrushchev said was even more remarkable. The Western proposals, Khrushchev said,

do not contain a single element for negotiation. These proposals are not based on a desire to find a correct solution with a view to achieving that relaxation of international tension which all peoples so anxiously await . . .

The USSR sincerely wishes to come to an agreement. But we reject the principle that one party should force its conditions on the other party. Mr. Adenauer and his foreign minister, Mr. Brentano, try to force such a principle on the foreign ministers. They say: "With the USSR one must negotiate as follows: concession for concession!" But that is a huckster's approach! . . . We do not have to make any concessions because our proposals have not been made for bartering. We act on the principle that sensible solutions must be found which would not damage any country . . . Those who really strive for peace must not use methods of petty bargaining in the talks.²⁴

It is the studied inconsequence of these statements that makes them so formidable. Our position is correct, Premier Khrushchev says, and is in the interest of people everywhere. To attempt to make us give up any part of our claims betrays both the false values of the bourgeois West (the mercantile rather than the statesmanlike approach) and its indifference to the cause of peace.

Once formal negotiations get under way, Soviet tactics are designed to keep the image of a virtuous U.S.S.R. contending with cynical and unscrupulous adversaries before the world audience. Since coming to grips with concrete issues is not vital to negotiators interested largely in the dramatic potentialities of a given meeting,

²³ Quoted in Arno J. Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918* (New Haven, 1969), p. 58.

²⁴ Department of State, *Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva*, International Organization and Conference Series 8 (Washington, 1959), p. 307.

Soviet delegates disregard the spirit of Talleyrand's advice to negotiators: "*On s' arrange plus facilement sur un fait que sur un principe.*"²⁵ Instead, they keep the conversations on the level of general principles just as long as possible, knowing that this makes for endless debate and gives frequent opportunities for rhetorical fireworks. They try, at the same time, to place the Western side on the defensive by questioning their good faith and inserting into the record statements by public figures in Western countries which, they claim, show a fixed determination to resist peaceful agreement. They blandly disregard the answers to their allegations and, in general, show no obligation to answer rational arguments. As a German diplomat has written:

Troublesome arguments are not disproved but ignored. Annoying questions are not answered, but dodged by counter-questions. Proofs presented by the other side are not refuted but rejected without any argument. Their own accusations are not substantiated but merely presented and repeated *ad infinitum*.²⁶

With this sort of thing prevailing, negotiation, as a German journal noted after a conference in 1954, becomes a series of monologues with neither side listening to what the other has to say—something like "a conversation between Chinese and Basques without an interpreter."²⁷

In December 1947, at the meeting of the foreign ministers in London, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, said after one session: "I did not dream we would have insults and abuse inflicted on our countries in the manner we have had them this afternoon."²⁸ In subsequent years Western statesmen ceased to show or feel surprise when their opposite numbers engaged in egregious assaults upon the laws of elementary courtesy and taste. In the armory of Soviet negotiating weapons bad manners has been one of the most frequently used, and it is always used coldly and with calculation, with two main purposes in mind. The first is to disconcert the other side, throw it off balance, and betray it into ill-considered statements or actions. The second is to demonstrate to peoples around the world who have real or fancied grievances against the Western powers that the Soviet Union is contemptuous of the West and is honest enough to say so publicly.

This tactic is supported by methods of obfuscation practiced so blatantly that they are often more insulting than some of the speeches made by Soviet negotiators. On one occasion during the Geneva talks of 1959, the chief Soviet delegate refused to say whether or not a British re-statement of a position he had taken the day before was accurate or not, an attitude which led the British Foreign Secretary to say that the Soviets had invented something new in diplomacy, "negotiation by equivocation."²⁹ Western attempts to restrain this and other stalling tactics by requests for recess or intimations of severance of talks are answered by the Soviet charge that they are seeking to "break off negotiations," an accusation that is automatically repeated with

²⁵ Wildner, *Technik*, p. 198.

²⁶ Wilhelm Grewe, *Germany and Berlin: An Analysis of the 1959 Geneva Conference* (Press and Information Agency, German Embassy, Washington, 1960), p. 9.

²⁷ *Die Gegenwart*, Feb. 27, 1954.

²⁸ Edwin L. James in *The New York Times*, Dec. 14, 1947.

²⁹ *New York Times*, July 22, 1959.

alarm or indignation in portions of the press of Western countries, where the desire for agreement with the Soviet Union is, as the Soviets themselves know, very great.³⁰ This does not prevent the Soviets themselves from using the skillfully timed walk-out as a tactic of their own, usually accompanying it with a barrage of accusations of bad faith and unwillingness to treat and other crimes which enables them to leave the stage, as they entered it, as the heroes of the piece, and obscures the fact that the drama concluded has had singularly little real content.

If it could be predicted that all negotiations with the Soviets would be of this nature and would reach this barren result, the Western countries might be justified in refusing to agree to future talks. "It would of course be foolish," John Foster Dulles said at the conclusion of the foreign ministers' conference at Geneva in October-November 1955, "to attempt new negotiations if everything remains as it was when this last Conference came to an end."³¹ But it is—as Secretary Dulles himself made clear in the rest of his statement—impossible to make such predictions.

The first reason for this is that not all negotiations with the Soviet Union have been fruitless. In May 1958 an official of the U.S. Department of State said in a public speech: "More than once in recent years we have engaged in lengthy, laborious, acrimonious, and seemingly hopeless negotiations with the Soviet Government on particular issues, have talked for months and years without any sign of progress, and then have suddenly found the Soviet Union ready to come to terms within a matter of hours."³² The classic example of this was, of course, the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, which was concluded successfully after eight years of negotiation involving four hundred separate meetings. It cannot be assumed, therefore, that even what appear to be obviously bogus negotiations are incapable of successful conclusion.

This is true also because there is a strong possibility that the world audience before which the Soviet Union has played its negotiating dramas will become more sophisticated and critical of its performance and will begin to demand less rodomontade and bravura and more honesty of its Soviet actors. The weakness of the Soviet negotiating technique lies in its repetitive quality, and a world genuinely anxious for peace may sooner or later recognize the fact that Soviet claims of Western obstructionism and bad faith are really screens for Soviet opposition to genuine negotiation on the issues that divide East and West. Commenting on Premier Khrushchev's behavior at the United Nations in October 1960, a German newspaperman wrote that it had probably been planned in advance to impress the Afro-Asian bloc by portraying Khrushchev as a fighter and a tribune of the people, but that it had definitely misfired and would probably lead the very people whom it sought to impress to be more critical of Soviet diplomatic behavior in general.³³ To the extent that such criticism grows, it will influence future Soviet diplomacy. Just as the United States has been

³⁰ See Selwyn Lloyd's complaints about this during the Geneva talks of 1959, in Department of State, *Foreign Ministers Meeting, 1959*, p. 368.

³¹ Department of State, *The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27–November 16, 1955*, International Organization and Conference Series, I, 80 (Washington, 1955), p. 8.

³² Address by Foy D. Kohler, May 6, 1958. See *Department of State Bulletin*, 38, No. 988 (June 2, 1958).

³³ W. Leonhard, "Der Chruschtschow-Stil," *Die Zeit*, Nov. 4, 1960.

forced on occasion because of public pressure at home and among its allies to lend itself to negotiations it would rather have avoided (the 1960 summit meeting is a case in point), so is it possible that the Soviet Union may feel called upon to prove its willingness to negotiate seriously in order to avoid acquiring a reputation for negative diplomacy.

Finally, just as the Soviets were forced to abandon the new diplomacy of Brest-Litovsk because of the intrusion of the harsh realities of military power, so may the military factor compel them to become more accommodating in matters on which they appear absolutely obdurate at the present time. There is little likelihood that another Hoffmann will appear to force them into line by military action. But the general threat posed by such things as a continuation of the present stalemate on the arms control question, the prospects of ever-widening nuclear sharing, and the possibility of China's becoming a real nuclear power must be a matter of concern to Soviet statesmen; and, although there is no way of knowing if and when that concern will become great enough to make them less intractable on the big issues than they have been, it always is possible that such a change will come and that negotiations will become productive.

One of the principal tasks of Western statesmen, therefore, has been, and will continue to be, to try, when negotiations are proposed, to discover whether they are seriously meant or planned simply as another propaganda show.³⁴ They have endeavored to do this by following the procedure used by Shuvalov in 1878 and by many diplomats before him and insisting on preliminary discussions and agreements before committing themselves to formal meetings. Yet even when these attempts have failed, they have not felt justified in refusing to go to the proposed meetings. At the same time, their hopes have become far more modest than they were at the time of the Geneva summit meeting of 1955, and they no longer include the thought that there is any possibility of the Soviets reversing themselves so completely that they will return to the methods and courtesies of traditional diplomacy. Indeed, it is clear that even if the Soviet Union became convinced that it was urgent for them to negotiate settlements of outstanding issues they would remain true to the techniques they have evolved since 1917: combining the methods of hard bargaining that served them so well in the 1920s and 1930s with the arts of irritation, obfuscation, and delay that have marked much, if not most, of their cold war diplomacy. As Secretary Dulles said in January 1958: "We must, on the basis of past experience, assume that negotiation with the Communists, if it is to bring acceptable results, will be a long hard task."³⁵

³⁴ On this, see Philip Mosely, "Some Soviet Techniques of Negotiation," in *Negotiating with the Russians*, ed. Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson (New York, 1951), p. 274.

³⁵ Address, Jan. 16, 1958. See *Department of State Bulletin*, 38, No. 971 (Feb. 3, 1958).

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HOW SHREWD ARE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS?

By Fred Charles Iklé

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Soviet foreign policy has been highly successful in the last twenty years, if measured by the expansion of the Communist-controlled area and by Russia's newly won influence in many parts of the world. Yet the combined military and economic strength of the West has remained superior to that of the Communist camp during this same period of expansion. Small wonder that many people think Soviet negotiators are far shrewder and more skillful than their Western opponents and that conferences with the Russians are traps to be avoided rather than opportunities to be sought.

Undoubtedly, Soviet negotiators have certain advantages over their Western adversaries because they are backed by an authoritarian government. Western capitals, and Washington in particular, cannot develop a negotiating position on a major issue without letting the public in on some of the internal controversies. This gives Soviet delegates valuable intelligence about the strength with which Western positions are held. Moscow, of course, permits no leaks about any differences that might exist between, say, Gromyko and Malinovsky over how to approach the West on disarmament or on Berlin. Its fall-back positions remain secret, not only from newspapermen but frequently also from its own delegations. Western diplomats often complain about this wall of secrecy that makes it so difficult to find out how firmly a Soviet position is held and what sort of modifications in the Western position might lead to agreement.

Moreover, Soviet diplomats need not feel constrained by domestic public opinion as much as Westerners do. The public in Communist countries is normally poorly informed about negotiations. Knowing their lack of influence on foreign affairs, Soviet citizens hardly attempt to make their views heard—or even to formulate a view of their own. This permits Soviet diplomats to choose their negotiating tactics with greater freedom. Only in the long run, perhaps, do Communist leaders require some domestic backing for their foreign policy.

Soviet negotiators enjoy a further advantage in that they can support their long-term strategy and day-to-day tactics with fully coordinated propaganda machinery, whereas Western countries speak always with many voices. Frequently at conferences the Russians delight in citing

statements by Western opposition leaders, scientists, or journalists to refute a position of a Western government.

In short, Soviet negotiators seem to command all that is required for carrying out the most cunning strategies: complete secrecy in planning, freedom from domestic interference in execution, and the coordinated support of a powerful authoritarian regime. Given all these advantages, have Soviet negotiators really shown proportionate cunning and skill? An examination of their record, comparing some of their opportunities with the results they actually obtained, is in order.

The Marshall Plan, to take one case, will long be remembered as one of the most successful and farsighted programs of American foreign policy. What is almost forgotten is that the Russians were initially invited to participate. After Marshall's historic speech in June, 1947, British Foreign Secretary Bevin quickly seized the initiative, met with his French colleague Bidault, and asked Moscow to join in a conference at which Europe would work out its answer to the American offer. Stalin sent Molotov to Paris with a delegation of eighty-nine aides.

What did the skillful Soviet negotiator make of this decisive opportunity? He did not try to postpone West European recovery and European-American cooperation by more than five days!

True, Bevin made it clear that he would not be delayed by Soviet stalling. But why did Molotov make it so easy for Bevin? Why did he reject outright the American offer for a coordinated recovery program, instead of accepting it in principle and then discussing the details later? Why did he fail to exploit the suggestion made by some groups in the West that the United Nations should play the leading role in European recovery? Or he could have shown some interest when Bidault (conscious of pressure on his government by the powerful French Communist Party) made a last-minute effort to save the conference. With reluctant agreement from Bevin, Bidault's proposal attempted to meet some of the Soviet objections by emphasizing that the organization for European recovery would not interfere with a country's internal affairs. Yet Molotov would not give an inch, and the conference broke up. Thus Russia lost its chance to delay or influence an integrated West European recovery.

To realize the enormity of this Russian blunder, we must recall that the implementation of the Marshall Plan was not assured at that time. On the one hand, U.S. Congressional support was far from certain. On the other hand, there was considerable European backing for Russia's participation. Prior to the conference which brought Molotov to Paris, an editorial in the *London Times* said: "The strongest argument which could be placed in Mr. Marshall's hands for delivery to Congress would be the firm hope of a sound integration of the whole European economy effected by all the countries which are to benefit from American aid, and led by Britain, France, and the Soviet Union." Similarly, the *Economist* proposed that the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe be used—"in spite of its shortcomings"—as the machinery to administer Marshall aid: "Might it not

therefore be the course of wisdom to reach a compromise between the Russian and the Western views?"¹

Khrushchev showed himself an equally unskillful negotiator with his tactics on the Berlin issue, though his mistakes were of a different kind from Stalin's and Molotov's. As an example, Khrushchev spoiled his bargaining reputation by repeating again and again his threat to sign a peace treaty with the Communist regime in East Germany, each time specifying the period within which he would do so but doing nothing each time his bluff was called. An explicit threat with a time limit can be a potent weapon; however, prudent negotiators use it only when they are fully prepared to carry it out or are certain that they will not be challenged. A time limit makes it all too apparent if they are caught bluffing, and this damages the credibility of their threats in the future. History recounts few examples of a senior statesman who squandered and blunted his power to use such threats so completely as Khrushchev did.

This was not Khrushchev's only blunder. When he broke up the summit meeting in May, 1960, he spoiled a unique opportunity to extract concessions from the United States. Only a few days before he flew to Paris to meet with Eisenhower, Macmillan, and De Gaulle, he was able to denounce the United States roundly for the U-2 flights, causing major repercussions in the whole world and skillfully trapping the U.S. government in a lie. On the first day in Paris, Khrushchev played his cards well; with righteous indignation he asked for an apology from the President, which he must have known he could not get. But he did get the promise that the U-2 flights would be discontinued, while Macmillan and De Gaulle pleaded with him to start the summit meeting.

What a reversal of roles, after Khrushchev had been calling for a summit conference so long! What a chance for Khrushchev to drop the demand for apology grudgingly, as if making a generous concession, and then to confront the Western statesmen and ask for reciprocal concessions!

Khrushchev chose another tactic. He put on his rambunctious show in Paris, throwing away his dignity and his trump card. In the end it was, in a sense, he who apologized—two days later in East Berlin. To the glum East German Communists who had expected the long-announced peace treaty, he said the existing situation would have to be preserved until another summit meeting could take place.

Later, Khrushchev hinted that he had anticipated the failure of the Paris summit meeting but that his colleagues wanted him to go all the same. Perhaps Khrushchev realized that his earlier expectations were too optimistic and that the Western powers would not abandon Berlin completely. But this was a poor reason for bringing back from Paris even less than he could have gotten. Had he chosen

¹ The *Times* (London), June 24, 1947; the *Economist*, June 28, 1947. A French diplomat noted in his diary just a few days before Molotov's final *nyet*: "With a little Machiavellism, the Soviets ought to . . . insert themselves in the preparatory plan because their accession would immediately provoke its failure" (Jacques Dumaine, *Quai d'Orsay: 1945-51* [Paris: Julliard, 1955], p. 204). And two years later McGeorge Bundy reflected: "How much of the original impetus of the plan would have survived if Molotov had really sat down at Paris, deployed the enormous retinue he took with him (and one still wonders what they were doing there if this notion was not considered) and cooperated in form but not in fact?" In the mood of 1949 Bundy goes on to ask: "And if we are grateful, are we perhaps also safe for the present, from the effects of a policy of deceptive friendliness by Russia?" ("The Test of Yalta," *Foreign Affairs* [July, 1949], pp. 627, 629.)

a shrewder tactic, generously "forgiving" the U-2 incident, the Western powers could not have broken up the meeting without making at least some concessions—perhaps quite substantial ones.

According to a recent Soviet handbook on diplomacy:

[Communist diplomacy] is invariably successful in exposing the aggressive intentions of the imperialist governments. . . . It does this from the tribunes of diplomatic conferences, in official diplomatic statements and documents, as well as in the press. [This] is one of the important methods of socialist diplomacy by means of which it mobilizes democratic social opinion and the masses of people all over the world against the aggressive policies of the imperialist governments.²

Yet, when faced with some unusual opportunity for mobilizing "the masses of people all over the world", Soviet diplomacy is not "invariably successful."

Along came the issue of atmospheric nuclear tests in the spring of 1962, for example. For the previous six months the United States had confined itself to underground testing, although the Soviet Union had resumed nuclear tests in the atmosphere the summer before. But in March, 1962, the American government decided the self-imposed handicap was too great, and President Kennedy announced twelve days before the disarmament conference convened that the United States would soon have to resume nuclear testing in the atmosphere. He promised, however, that if the Soviet Union would accept a treaty with appropriate controls, "sign it before the latter part of April, and apply it immediately . . . , there would be no need for our tests to begin." Some people feared that the Russians might take advantage of that offer and make some last-minute concessions which would trap the American government into further negotiations whose only result would be postponement of its tests.

As it turned out, the Soviets were far too clumsy. Whatever their real aims, they failed to delay the U.S. tests, they did not inflict a propaganda defeat on the West, and they did not get a control-free ban against underground nuclear testing. Although at the time they probably preferred to remain free to resume their own tests later in 1962 rather than to commit themselves at once to test cessation under a treaty, they must surely have been interested in making propaganda gains and in increasing dissension between the United States and neutralist nations. For this, they had some real opportunities.

They could have encouraged the interest the British negotiators showed in a further reduction of the inspection system. "We are ready to negotiate upon any proposals for an adequate minimum of international verification," said the British Foreign Secretary Lord Home. "We are flexible and ready for reasonable compromise." *Myet*—no international verification at all, was the Soviet reply.

Opportunity for the Soviets to make some political and propaganda gains became even greater when the eight neutral nations proposed their compromise plan for a test ban. That plan essentially accepted the Soviet position that there should be no foreign inspectors in Russia but added an "international commission" to evaluate the data from national systems. The commission could, in a vaguely

² *Diplomaticheskii Slovar* (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1960), I, 466.

defined way, call on a suspected country to furnish more information and *perhaps* arrange an on-site inspection. Obviously, the United States had some serious reservations about the proposal but refrained from rejecting it.

At that juncture, Premier Khrushchev could have announced dramatically that he was not only ready to accept the neutrals' proposal but also that he would consent to combine it with the "best elements" of the Western draft, provided President Kennedy kept his word and did not start atmospheric tests, now that a treaty could be signed "before the latter part of April." Had the President rejected this outright, beginning the tests a few days later, he would have met with a worldwide storm of protest and probably with serious disagreement from Macmillan. On the other hand, had the President postponed the tests, Khrushchev would not have been committed to any treaty he did not want. As the Western negotiators were urgently trying to nail down a specific treaty text (while the expensive task force in the Pacific was kept waiting), the Soviet negotiators could have become evasive or simply have stuck to the neutrals' proposal until American patience ran out. In the end, the United States might have been forced to resume atmospheric tests with a propaganda loss far greater than it actually suffered in April, 1962.

The Soviet negotiators were not imaginative enough to try for these almost riskless gains. To be sure, they urged negotiations on the basis of the neutrals' proposal, but they refused to accept obligatory international inspection (although, without detailed specifications, "international inspection" is just a vague phrase). And while they made some threats to discourage the American tests, they failed to couple them with a dramatic offer.

Another tactical mistake of Soviet negotiators is that they often fail to exploit an "extortory" demand before it has become obsolete. After World War II they maintained their opposition to the cession of the Saar to France, apparently in the hope that France would have to ransom the Saar from the Soviet veto at a high political price. As late as 1947 it looked as if this tactic would work. Secretary Byrnes expected that: "Russia will maintain its opposition to the cession of the Saar until the final hours and then seek to secure, in exchange for agreement, French support on some other question."³ The Soviet negotiators missed this final hour. Instead they unwittingly made possible the transfer of the Saar to Germany and thus contributed to Franco-German reconciliation.

Related to the mistake of letting an "extortory" demand become obsolete is the failure to revise an unacceptable demand in time to make gains through a compromise. For example, in 1945 Stalin faced Turkey with a double demand. In this case, he not only requested a revision of the Montreux Convention but also asked for a slice of Turkish territory and a Russian base in the Straits. Originally, the United States was willing to support a revision of the Montreux Convention in Russia's favor, Great Britain was ready to go along, and Turkey would probably not have been able to resist by herself.

³ *Speaking Frankly*, p. 170.

But Stalin's additional demands for a slice of Turkish territory and a base stirred up British and American opposition. As a result, Stalin failed at the Potsdam Conference to consolidate any gain regarding the Straits. All he obtained was American and British consent to "recognize" the need for revision of the Montreux Convention. It was agreed that the next step should be the subject of direct conversations between the three powers and Turkey. But then in 1946 Stalin made the fatal mistake of renewing *all* his demands against Turkey. This aroused American opposition, and a year later Turkey received full American support under the Truman Doctrine. When in 1953 the Russians at last withdrew their demands for Turkish territory and a base in the Straits, what good was this belated concession? Turkey was now firmly in NATO, and the Western support for changing the Montreux Convention had long since evaporated.

The mistake of clinging to unacceptable demands for too long is related to the self-defeating way in which the Russians sometimes negotiate a tie-in. The tactic of a tie-in will not work if the opponent is asked to surrender more than he expects to receive. When the French negotiators at Brussels linked their consent to the Second Stage of the Common Market with an agreement on agriculture, they managed this tie-in successfully, because the sacrifices they asked of the Germans for the common agricultural policy were not such as to outweigh German interest in continued progress of the Common Market. But when Russian negotiators tried to obtain more influence in the United Nations Secretariat, they totally mismanaged the tie-in tactic. As the record shows, they tried to tie their consent to a successor for Dag Hammarskjöld to their demand for a "troika." A troika, however, would have canceled all interest the United States and other United Nations members had in replacing Hammarskjöld, whereas a more modest Soviet demand (such as for a "troika" of Deputy Secretaries) might have been accepted, particularly if it had found favor with the uncommitted nations. (In fact, the Western nations did accept some changes in the UN Secretariat in favor of the Afro-Asians.)

We can find some common elements in the shortcomings of Soviet negotiators. They often ask for a whole loaf where they could get half a loaf—and wind up with nothing. They fritter away the credibility of their threats and the value of their promises, the two key tools for every diplomat. They cannot find the right dosage of demands and inducements. Curiously, they walk out of negotiations when they should stay in, while at other times they keep on talking in violation of their own deadlines. They insult those whose good will they ought to cultivate, and become self-righteous and rigid where they ought to be ingratiating and inventive. They fight furious battles against an empty phrase or a vague principle, although they are past masters at twisting the meaning of words and at utilizing agreements-in-principle for their own ends.

In short, the shrewd and skillful negotiating style of the Soviet government turns out to be a myth. However, Western diplomats should not be too sanguine about Soviet blunders, for many of these blunders are simply a failure to take advantage of Western vulnerabilities.

On such occasions the East-West performance resembles that of two novice chess players. If one player leaves his queen unprotected and the other fails to take it, neither can be called a master.

Moreover, the very idiosyncrasies of Soviet negotiators that account for their blunders can also work to their advantage. If they are careless in having their bluffs called, they are also carefree in trying to gain through bluffing. If they miss many a chance to obligate the West by being a little more generous, they correspondingly feel no obligations to be generous where it would hurt them. And if they do not have the French dexterity in managing a tie-in so as to come out ahead, their rigidity also prevents them from becoming entangled in an exchange where they are left holding the short end. It is true, sometimes they are so stubborn that they cling to an unacceptable demand until they have missed the opportunity for a profitable compromise. But at other times, they are stubborn enough to repeat what seems to be an unacceptable demand until the opponent has changed his evaluations and accepts all or most of what they asked for. Sometimes, certainly, they are too obtuse to force Western governments into a substantial concession by beguiling Western opinion with a small concession of their own. At other times, nonetheless, this obtuseness saves them from disaster, when they can salvage a crucial position only by defying public opinion throughout the world.

Contrary to a popular image in the West, Soviet negotiators are bold rather than shrewd, brazen rather than cunning. It is not the skills attributed to a Talleyrand that the West must fear from Communist diplomats, nor are the Russians brilliant disciples of Machiavelli. What the West must beware of is the brazenness that allowed Stalin to negotiate for his East European empire while the Germans were at the gates of Moscow, the boldness that permitted Khrushchev to make this empire "unnegotiable" while trying to negotiate for Communist control over West Berlin and for the retention of his troops (if not missiles) in Cuba.

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THE SOVIET VOICE IN THE EAST-WEST STRATEGIC DISCOURSE

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CHARACTER OF THE DISCOURSE

The views of Soviet political and military leaders on problems of war and strategy are of great interest not only in the context of internal Soviet discussion and debate over military issues, but also in the context of the external strategic dialogue with the West, principally with the United States. Widespread appreciation of the fact that the modern world cannot, as President Kennedy put it, "survive, in the form in which we know it, a nuclear war"¹ accounts in part for the growing significance of the strategic dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union. This is especially true in so far as the dialogue represents a means by which the two great nuclear powers may seek to clarify the complexities and mitigate the dangers of their strategic relationship in the nuclear-missile age.

By and large, the strategic discourse to date has not been especially impressive in terms of balanced and mutually instructive discourse between the two sides. They are, after all, in an adversary relationship, which involves basic differences of purpose and policy. A broad conceptual gulf lies between them. They are not likely to find it easy to explore the interacting problems and ambiguities of their strategic positions in any dispassionate and nonpolemical fashion. Indeed, as a form of communication between adversaries, much of the strategic dialogue has been and will probably continue to be concerned with advancement of the policy interests of the two great nuclear powers in a more or less narrow sense. Each side will use the dialogue to enhance its deterrent posture, to obtain political advantage from its military power or to prevent the other from doing so, to impress the authority of its position upon allies and onlookers, and so on. In particular, the dialogue up to now has tended to center on the question whether the strategic power balance in the world favors the Soviet or the Western side. So long as the world's everyday judgment concerning the balance of military power continues to be a weighty factor

¹ Seldom has the great predicament of the modern world been summed up more simply than in these words from one of the late President Kennedy's last speeches: "The family of man can survive difference of race and religion . . . it can accept differences in ideology, politics, economics. But it cannot survive, in the form in which we know it, a nuclear war." See "Our Obligation to the Family of Man," Remarks by President Kennedy, *The Department of State Bulletin*, November 25, 1963.

in international politics, one can expect that much of the dialogue will turn, as before, on this question.

At the same time there is a perceptible tendency for both sides, in varying degrees, to look upon more precise strategic communication as a means to clarify the complexities and mitigate the dangers of their strategic relationship in the nuclear-missile age. In these circumstances, it is understandable that any new expressions of strategic thinking from the Soviet side should be scrutinized in the West with great interest. Over the past year or so there have been occasional statements by prominent Soviet political and military leaders, as well as books and articles by lesser figures, which qualify as significant contributions to the strategic discourse, not for the unassailability of the arguments they present but because they seem intended to convey messages to audiences abroad, as well as at home. One of the more notable of these contributions is the revised and somewhat expanded second edition of *Military Strategy*, written by a collective team of Soviet military experts headed by Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii. . . .

"MESSAGES" TO THE WEST

. . . The Soviet voice may sometimes contradict what appears to be the main line of Soviet policy at a given moment. On the whole, however, a fairly consistent pattern of strategic policy points is addressed to audiences abroad. Some of these points are variations on familiar themes; others appear to reflect new considerations. At the time of writing, the general pattern of the external discourse seems largely related to the critical and trying period through which the Soviet leaders have passed during the last year and a half.

During this period, difficulties plaguing Soviet agriculture and the economy made it harder to deal with the competing military and economic claims upon available resources. Within the communist bloc, the dispute with China grew increasingly bitter, as China called into question Soviet leadership of the world communist movement, while at the same time the European satellites displayed an urge for a greater measure of autonomy. Above all, in their politico-strategic relationship with the United States and the West, the Soviet leaders during this period faced some soul-searching crises of decision, the most dramatic of which was the Cuban missile showdown. These dilemmas clearly left their imprint on the strategic discourse with the West, the main lines of which have come to reflect an evident Soviet awareness of the need to adjust Soviet policy to the changing character of the strategic environment. Some particularly interesting features of recent Soviet discourse can be summed up as follows:

First, there is a persistent effort to enhance the credibility of the Soviet strategic deterrent in Western eyes. This theme, argued with greater technical sophistication than previously, is coupled with an attempt to disabuse the United States of any idea that it can count on a successful first strike or draw political advantage from its strategic position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In a sense, this double-barreled "message" seems to be the military concomitant to the political policy of détente. In effect, it warns the West not to try to stretch the limits of détente to its advantage.

Second, there is a general Soviet effort to propagate the idea, not always clearly spelled out, of mutual nuclear deterrence at the strategic level and to give an impression of doctrinal rigidity at this level by rejecting such concepts as controlled strategic warfare. This trend in Soviet discourse may relate to a sense of growing doubt among the Soviet leaders as to whether missile-blackmail diplomacy, which once looked highly promising, can in fact be used successfully to force withdrawal of the West from its stubbornly held political and strategic positions around the world.

Third, in notable contrast with the tendency to rigidify the Soviet doctrinal stance at the strategic level, there appears to be a tentative endeavor to project a less rigidly doctrinaire image than formerly with regard to the escalation potential of local conflicts. This suggests that the Soviets may wish to see the "escalation threshold" raised, perhaps in order to provide greater flexibility for local use of military power below the nuclear level and to disarm Chinese criticisms of Soviet failure to give vigorous support to "national liberation" struggles. Rather curiously, while this trend would seem to allow greater freedom of action for Soviet political strategy in the underdeveloped world, more support for softening the customary doctrinal line on "inevitability" of escalation seems to have come from military than from political spokesmen.

Fourth, related to the apparent desire in some Soviet quarters to communicate an image of greater flexibility in the support of local conflicts, there is a new suggestion in Soviet discourse that in certain potential third-power conflicts, such as local hostilities involving West Germany and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union might try to avoid expanding the conflict by withholding nuclear attacks against the United States in return for U.S. abstention. This suggestion seems to relate to a general Soviet concern to reassure the United States against the possibility of a Soviet first strike under borderline conditions in which the question of pre-emption might arise. At the same time, the Soviet position on this point remains somewhat ambivalent. There is still the veiled hint in other Soviet utterances, perhaps intended to reinforce the Soviet deterrent image, that under some circumstances the Soviet Union may entertain what would be in fact, if not in name, a pre-emptive strategy.

Finally, the Soviet voice in the strategic dialogue seems to reflect uncertainty whether the Soviet Union's best interest lies in asserting superiority over the West, at the risk of stimulating greater Western exertions and prematurely jeopardizing the atmosphere of détente, or in settling for a second-best position. Soviet policy on this question is complicated by many factors. For example, not only is the Soviet Union at a relative disadvantage in resources but, as experience shows, it has managed to live for a considerable period in a position of strategic inferiority to its major adversary without being subjected to the "imperialist attack" so often predicted. . . .

IMAGE OF THE ADVERSARY

At a time when both the United States and the Soviet Union seem to be seeking ways to clarify the complexities of their strategic relationship in the nuclear-missile age, greater importance than ever

before attaches to their perception of each other. In this regard the picture of the West that emerges from Soviet discourse of the past year or two has begun in some respects to take on more objective dimensions, notably in treating the United States as a strong but withal somewhat more responsible adversary than was formerly the case. Both editions of the Sokolovskii work were landmarks of a sort in this connection.

The first Sokolovskii volume conveyed an image of the West that in some respects departed notably from familiar Soviet lore on the "imperialist enemy." Though colored, to be sure, by serious distortions of Western motives and intentions, the work contained a relatively straightforward and generally realistic account of U.S.-NATO military strength and strategy. The revised volume largely followed the pattern of the first in this respect, again picturing the United States as a formidable and resourceful opponent. However, its appraisal of Western military strength was tempered by somewhat more stress on internal contradictions and instability of the NATO alliance.

One should caution against assuming that greater realism in looking at the United States is universal among Soviet writers, or that it necessarily connotes a softening of the basic hostility with which the West is viewed. As much of the material indicates, the premises upon which Soviet spokesmen base their interpretation of the adversary remain essentially unchanged. There is a further point to be borne in mind also. Publicly expressed Soviet views of the West more often than not are meant to serve propaganda ends of one sort or another, such as demonstrating aggressive intent in every Western move. The private Soviet assessment, on the other hand, may vary from one case to another. Thus, the image of the West reflected in Soviet public statements does not necessarily correspond in all respects with what Soviet leaders may think privately about the strategies and intentions of their opponents. . . .

FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THE STRATEGIC DISCOURSE

It would be premature in the extreme to suggest that the Soviet image of the West now mirrors reality with reasonable fidelity. Soviet perception of the West is still filtered through ideological and parochial suspicions that produce a woefully distorted picture, particularly of Western motives and intentions. At the same time, it can be said that the successive Sokolovskii editions and some other recent expressions of Soviet strategic thinking have come a little way toward presenting a more objective image of the other side.

This in itself may be a small start toward a more meaningful and mutually instructive dialogue between East and West, particularly between the two great nuclear powers on either side. Some slight change in the mode of discourse—with the discussants talking more directly to each other—is another small start that may be discerned in the present trend of affairs. It generally has seemed that the discussants in the strategic dialogue were speaking from an entirely different conceptual framework, arguing from independent systems of logic—which in fact is not far from the mark. As a result, they have talked past each other more often than not. A change in the mode and quality of discourse—if nothing else, a better mutual grasp of its technical

idiom, while unlikely to bridge the conceptual gap, might at least draw the two different systems of logic closer together.

It could be said that there is precious little evidence of improvement in the quality of Soviet discourse in such publications as the two Sokolovskii volumes, the authors' rebuttal addressed to the U.S. editors of their work, the Glagolev-Larionov exegesis on Soviet peace policy and military posture, the Nevsky commentary on problems of strategy, and other recent examples of Soviet strategic thought, not excluding the frequent sallies into this field by policy- and decision-makers like Khrushchev himself. All have more or less in common a penchant for painting the motives of the other side black, the policies of the Soviet Union white, and its superiority unquestionable—a picture which somewhat oversimplifies the situation, to say the least.

And yet, it is perhaps unwarranted to dismiss out of hand the possibility of raising the level of discourse and moving the strategic dialogue onto more productive ground. The expanded discussion of U.S. strategy in the revised Sokolovskii volume is a case in point. One may feel that the treatment of counterforce strategy was prejudiced by being used to support Soviet charges of aggressive U.S. plans and to fortify Soviet claims to an invulnerable retaliatory posture. However, the analysis demonstrated at least that the authors had done some homework and had acquainted themselves with the U.S. literature on the subject. If their rendering of the U.S. process of strategy formulation was imprecise, it showed at least an understanding of some of the factors involved, and in the process revealed some of their own concerns, including the strong dependence of the Soviet military posture on a continuing high level of secrecy. The *Red Star* commentary of the Sokolovskii authors, in itself a forensic development of a rather unusual kind in the strategic dialogue, showed several signs of Soviet desire to clarify foreign understanding of the Soviet military posture, as did the *International Affairs* article by Glagolev and Larionov and some of the other statements examined.

The question may be raised that an improvement in the quality and level of strategic discourse is not necessarily of any significant moment in itself. No matter how well informed by a common appreciation of the problems and concerns of the parties involved, strategic discourse can never substitute for military force in a world governed by the politics of power. This is no doubt true. Still, the forms and character of the strategic dialogue can influence the policies governing military power. In an age when the destructive potential of military power is so great that its use or misuse is the common concern of all, this would seem to be a sufficient excuse for improving the quality of the dialogue.

One of course should expect no miracles. The strategic dialogue is a form of communication between antagonists, not a means for abolishing hostility or for clearing up a deep-seated clash of purposes. It may help opponents to avoid mistaken impressions about each other's posture. It may, of course, have just the opposite effect, but that is a risk that exists in any event. At best, the strategic dialogue could lead to a useful end if it serves, as Walter Lippmann put it recently when describing President Kennedy's influence on the course of world events: "to convince the Soviet Union that it must perforce and that it can comfortably and honorably live within a balance of power which is decidedly in our favor."²

² *Wash. Post*, Dec. 3, 1963.

In assessing the prospects for further development of a useful strategic dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States, the relevance of understandings attained in the field of arms control should not be overlooked. Some improvement in the quality of communication concerning the strategic relationships between the super-powers already has accompanied such steps as the nuclear test-ban treaty, the Moscow-Washington "hot line" agreement, the U.N. resolution against orbiting of nuclear weapons in space, and the joint declaration of intent to cut back the production of fissionable materials.* Although the measures do not directly involve disarmament, they can be said to reflect a mutual desire, among other things, to slow the tempo of the arms race, to ease the economic burden of military preparations, and to reduce the danger of war by miscalculation. As such, they tend to complement the strategic dialogue in what might be described as a tentative exploratory effort to "manage" the U.S.-Soviet confrontation so as to keep it within controllable bounds while not sacrificing the political interests of the adversaries. How well this effort may meet the test of time and circumstances remains to be seen.

*NOTE BY SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF.--The declaration of intent to cut back the production of fissionable materials did not deal with existing stockpiles, nor did it contain agreed arrangements for inspection and verification. As it turned out, not only did the Soviets not follow our lead by reducing their production; the Soviets proceeded to *increase* their plutonium facilities.

[From *Test Ban and Disarmament: The Path of Negotiation*. Harper and Row. Copyright © 1966 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., New York. Reprinted by permission.]

SOVIET DIPLOMATIC STYLE AND TACTICS

By Arthur H. Dean

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THE SOVIET STYLE

Diplomatic style is a kind of national signature, reflecting not only official policies but also characteristics of the society from which the diplomat comes and the outlook in which he has been bred. It influences heavily the reactions of a particular diplomat and the procedures he will be likely to follow. Knowing intimately the diplomatic style of one's adversary, besides being in itself fascinating, can be a real negotiating advantage.

In considering Soviet diplomacy as a whole, two major characteristics stand out: a dogmatic expectation of hostility from the outside world and an iron determination to carry out a program previously determined in Moscow and not subject to change by the diplomat in the field.

The expectation of hostility, which arises from Communist theory and is reinforced by a selective reading of history, permeates every aspect of official Soviet diplomatic behavior. Every Western proposal on disarmament was examined meticulously by the Soviet representatives with a view to discovering its "real, nefarious purpose." Ideological warfare was expected from us, just as it was being conducted by them. In other words, the Soviet diplomat often seemed to think of himself as a "traveler by night in the forest who must be constantly on the watch for the smallest sound or sight of treachery."¹ As a result, his official stance at the conference table was rigid, often rude or at least barely polite, secretive, formal, very general, and given to diatribes and not dialogue as the safest way of dealing with almost any question. As I listened expectantly to innumerable Soviet statements, it seemed to me that both in substance and in form they concealed a curious mixture of feelings of arrogance and fear.

The result has been an inflexibility which marks both Soviet policy itself and the conduct of the diplomats charged with communicating it.² That the Soviet diplomat is determined to stand by his fixed position

¹ Philip E. Mosely, "Some Soviet Techniques of Negotiation," in *Negotiating with the Russians*, ed. by Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1951), p. 296.

² Compare James Reston's interview with Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin, published in *The New York Times* on December 8, 1965.

and that he lacks discretionary powers is certainly not news. One result is, of course, that he must wait for instructions—though rarely admitting it—before he can react to a new proposal, however logical, or suggest changes. He may, therefore, conduct “stalling” or “long-talking” tactics which may slow up the proceedings for weeks or months.

The Western diplomat, having started his schooling some years ago, is by now accustomed and impervious to the gritty official Soviet style. Indeed, given the vast differences in purposes between Moscow and the West, negotiation was bound to be a difficult and tedious process under any circumstances. This was particularly true when the subject was disarmament, directly affecting the world's military balance, at a time when none of the major political conflicts had been settled. A more flexible and unpolemical public manner on the part of Soviet representatives might have made the procedure more pleasant and perhaps less time-consuming, though without guaranteeing better results. But then, perhaps, it is impossible to think of oneself as a revolutionary and be polite to “capitalist reactionaries” as well. Quite possibly, the Soviet Union might have done better in political terms had its diplomats tried to do some serious selling of Soviet points.

There are some variations, however. The style of the Soviet diplomat reveals an interesting dichotomy. In formal sessions attended by large delegations and sometimes also by the press he presents what has come to be the traditional stern face of Soviet diplomacy, with polemics and denunciation his main tools and a scoring of propaganda points his main objective; but in private, off-the-record meetings—such as the daily ones of the cochairmen at Geneva—he can be cordial and much more reasonable. On such occasions it was possible for my Soviet opposite number and myself to talk dispassionately and intelligently about a number of controversial topics, to explore each other's meanings and interpretations, and to get down to detailed drafting. These private working sessions were a welcome relief from the time-consuming, repetitious, and by then rather banal, long-winded, and stereotyped exchanges at the official sessions. In short, experience suggests that the Soviet government assigns different functions to the two different types of meetings where the audiences differ.

We welcomed the tone of these informal discussions, although we also realized that pleasant conversations and real communication are not necessarily synonymous. We had no direct way of knowing what influence these sessions might have on Soviet policy and thinking, but proceeded on the assumption that any opportunity for the calm, uninterrupted explanation of our position on a continuing basis was better than none. We also wanted to hear the Soviet point of view in a setting free of polemics. . . .

SOVIET DIPLOMATIC TACTICS

Throughout our experience of negotiations with the Soviets, we have come to discern a pattern of negotiating tactics which carries lessons for our diplomacy, on disarmament as on other matters. A Soviet diplomat, like a skilled chess player, does not expect his opposite number to give up something for nothing, not even a pawn. However valuable for getting press headlines, unexplained unilateral

concessions by the West in the interest of stimulating reciprocal concessions only arouse his suspicion and concern. He puts in this category, moreover, any attempt to split the difference between two positions as a basis for compromise; he will take the concession as a sign of the other side's weakness and keep his own position frozen. As Philip E. Mosely put it, in an article which should be the *vade mecum* of Western diplomats, compromise "is alien to the Bolshevik way of thinking and to the discipline which the Communist Party has striven to inculcate in its members." The very word, he noted, is not native to the Russian language and is habitually used only in combination with the adjective "putrid."³

The Soviet diplomat will take advantage of any indiscretion or mistake and will stretch or cut statements to fit his political bed of Procrustes as he wishes. Thus, for example, when Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was in Moscow in February 1959 he purportedly made a seemingly casual remark to Premier Khrushchev to the effect that Western insistence on on-site inspections in connection with the proposed nuclear test-ban treaty was being made primarily to satisfy American public opinion and that actually perhaps a fixed inspection quota of any symbolic number for on-site inspections of otherwise unidentified seismic events would be acceptable. As was readily to be expected, the Soviet government immediately seized on the low number of three as *the* number and rigidly proceeded from there without regard to the available scientific data on which our position was based.

Another example of the twisting technique was the handling of the conversations of October and November 1962 in which the Soviets seized upon a nonexistent American proposal of an annual quota of two or three on-site inspections of unidentified events in a non-seismic area as a basis for an over-all agreement, though they knew perfectly well it was not. One must be prepared to resist this technique, no matter how long it may take or how often it may occur.

This brings us to another important point: the question of time. It came as a jolt during the immediate postwar period to find that Soviet diplomats often had quite a different concept of time from that of their Western counterparts. They were prepared to sit through meeting after meeting without getting anywhere, persistently repeating lines which those at the table came to know by heart. And the history of some of the conferences held at that time is rich in examples of misleading agreements which only multiplied the difficulties. It may be tempting to a Western government or diplomat, irritated by boredom or delay, to reach an agreement that merely papers over deep differences. But an agreement which does not rest on consensus and clear definitions may be worse than no agreement at all. Over-eagerness only plays into Communist hands. It pays to listen, to be precise, determined, and willing to spend a lot of time, without any sign of being impatient, angry, or annoyed. One cannot negotiate successfully with Soviet representatives against a fixed deadline. Kurt Schumacher, the German Socialist leader, has been quoted as saying: "The day you Americans are as patient as the Russians, you

³ Philip E. Mosely, cited, p. 295.

will stop losing the cold war. And the day you learn to outsit them by a single minute, you will start winning it."⁴

This Soviet lack of concern for the passage of time seems to have two main explanations. For one thing, if the Soviet aim is not to agree but to obstruct agreement, as it was during much of the disarmament talks, then, of course, the passage of time only advances the goal. Furthermore, if delay is annoying to the adversary, there is the hope that the threat of further delay will so exhaust or provoke him or arouse public opinion in his country against a "do nothing" conference that he will be willing to make concessions that he would otherwise not have made in order to have a "successful" conference. In our co-chairmen's meetings at Geneva, for example, Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov would occasionally discuss very pleasantly some point of Communist theory at great length, regardless of its relevance to the matter at hand. The other explanation may lie in the Marxist-Leninist concept, now worn somewhat thin, that time and history are on the Communists' side: thus the terms of any agreement sought tend to become ever more favorable to the Soviet side as the making of the agreement is delayed. Practically, things might not always work out that way, because the "march to the victory of socialism over capitalism" has its periods of retrenchment and tactical retreat as well as of advance. But the almost religious Marxian conviction, of which they now may not be so sure, that the general trend is in their favor undoubtedly affects the character of Soviet diplomacy.

Then there is the pitfall of the "agreement in principle," which was already a serious danger in wartime negotiations with the Soviets. Time and again—and certainly this is clear in the Soviet insistence on an agreement on disarmament first, with details of inspection and such matters to come later—Soviet negotiators will press for a general agreement, often on a principle, such as being for "peace," to which it is very difficult to object, and will charge bad faith when this is refused. They are aware of the impatience of their Western counterparts and seek to make agreement seem very close by stressing how easy it would be to record it in general terms. By pushing in this way, they hope for an agreement of such vagueness that they will be able to interpret it in their own way and act to their own advantage while professing to observe the agreement. We have only to remember the disputes about the Yalta and Potsdam agreements to realize what this can mean.

We in the West have been trained to pay attention to facts and concrete details, to reason from the particular to the general, and to build agreement on this basis; otherwise, we believe, any agreement will break down in practice. The Soviet diplomat is less concerned with agreements as legal instruments; he does not stress the factual basis but seeks an advantageous political position. This is not to imply that Soviet interest does not at some times require a detailed, hard-headed agreement. It is just to point out that at other times it may be otherwise. We must not allow ourselves to be taken in, especially in matters of disarmament and arms control, where we need extremely specific and detailed agreements and verification controls if we are

⁴ Charles W. Thayer, *Diplomat* (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 96.

not to imperil our security. Any idea of agreeing to general propositions as an encouragement to compromises on crucial matters of detail would be folly.

There is also a basic difference in how the term "in principle" is construed. To an Englishman and an American an agreement "in principle" is one based on the practical steps which the diplomat believes he can carry out in time—perhaps not in every detail but in broad outline. On the continent, including the U.S.S.R., however, an agreement "in principle" does not mean an agreement which can and will be eventually carried out. Rather it represents a common point of view at which the two still divergent viewpoints might ultimately converge if it suits either side to do so in the light of conditions existing at the time performance is required. There is no commitment to proceed. It is essential that we understand this fundamental distinction clearly, for there has been much bitterness and misunderstanding when we have not.

The "agreement in principle" approach, if successful, is often followed by the "waiving" argument. That is, the Soviet diplomat will claim that, by not pursuing a matter of detail or a specific point at the time when the general agreement "in principle" was made, the diplomat "waived" it for all time. . . .

LIMITED AGREEMENTS

A reading of the day-by-day test-ban talks over the five years of their duration reveals a long and involved tale which can, however, be boiled down to rather simple terms. On the part of the Soviet Union there was a double effort: to convince the world that it desired a test ban, yet at the same time to stave off all proposals that went beyond purely national means for detection and identification of otherwise unidentified events. There were many variations on the theme, but this is what they all amounted to on close examination. The Western position, on the other hand, was characterized by movement and a consistent effort to meet Soviet objections as far as our security and the progress of science made possible.⁵ . . .

It is fair to say that since 1946 the U. S. government has expended more man-hours and more effort on questions of disarmament and arms control than on any other one subject of international negotiation in a comparable period of time. . . .

How much progress have we made? To take the briefest tally of a complicated subject, there has been no approach to agreement with the Soviet Union on the core issues of general and complete disarmament, or even on limited measures for arms control, such as safeguards against surprise attack. On the other hand, we were able in 1963 to reach agreement on three limited matters which, though not technically disarmament measures, could help to set the scene for further agreements which might ultimately lead to disarmament: the so-called "hot line," the partial test ban, and the resolution against placing nuclear weapons in outer space. . . .

⁵ For a discussion, see Harold K. Jacobson and Eric Stein, *Diplomats, Scientists and Politicians: The United States and the Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations* (Ann Arbor: Atomic Energy Research Project, University of Michigan Law School, 1965), 3 vols (preprint).

It is a lesson of our experience thus far that a great deal of time has been wasted on the sterile issue of which should come first, a treaty on general disarmament or limited measures of disarmament and arms control. It should be apparent that whichever is practically feasible should come first. Which this is can only be discovered by face-to-face exploration of specific proposals. It stands to reason that simpler measures which involve less adjustment, fewer concessions, and a minimum of domestic problems in the states concerned will usually be more readily acceptable and comparatively easier to work out. Therefore limited measures of disarmament and arms control should receive the greater immediate emphasis. In spite of appearances, this is what has happened at Geneva, especially after the agreements of 1963. Thus, although Soviet representatives still inveigh against "arms control without disarmament" and proclaim a strong preference for "general and complete disarmament first," in actual fact they have been discussing and proposing limited measures for quite some time. It is on such measures that we should in the immediate future be putting our strongest effort, always bearing in mind that the limited steps may be the building blocks for an eventually far more comprehensive structure. . . .

President Johnson said in his message proposing the draft of [the nuclear nonproliferation treaty of] August 17, 1965, "The peace of the world requires firm limits upon the spread of nuclear weapons. . . . The time is now. The hour is late. The fate of generations yet unborn is in our hands."

This is more than a matter of willingness to negotiate. If there is any lesson in the preceding pages, it is that fundamental progress in disarmament and arms control will not be achieved at the negotiating table alone. Specific proposals will be honed, polished, and prepared for agreement there, and that is a necessary and important process. But the decision to agree, or indeed to continue the talks at all, will depend on other things. Thus, if we want to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons or indeed to get action on any other aspects of arms problems, it is primarily to the basic political relations of nations, East and West, that we must look rather than to the discussions at Geneva. In practical terms, it is the totality of our relations with the Soviet Union and the Communist world and with our allies that is here involved. . . .

[From *Studies in Comparative Communism*, An Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. I, Nos. 1 and 2, July/October 1968. Copyright © 1968 by Research Institute, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Southern California. Reprinted by permission.]

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE SOVIET OUTLOOK

By Robert Conquest

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At no time have the Russians mastered the Czechoslovak question since it began to develop late last year. Brezhnev's visit to Prague in December 1967 found a tense situation, with Novotny at the end of his tether. Brezhnev (according to confidential Czech reports) seems to have wavered, seeing the disadvantages of keeping Novotny on but only assenting reluctantly to his demotion. It is clear that at this stage the Soviet leadership had no more than an inkling of trouble ahead and, though preferring the stand-pat solution, hoped, when that ceased to look feasible, that the next best would turn out to be tolerable from the Soviet point of view— or at least as tolerable as the other makeshifts in their East European sphere.

The original Soviet hope was clearly that Dubcek, Cernik, and the liberal leadership would be Gomulka. That is, that a nationalist *and* democratic trend in the party would be taken over by men who were only nationalist, and, even so, prepared in the long run to accept the Soviet lead on major issues. After all, in Poland in 1956, while the drive had been provided by the masses and the intellectuals, the leaders of the new wave were Gomulka, Spychalski, Kliszko, and other victims of the Beirut regime, from the center of the old party. They were men who had learned nothing and forgotten nothing, and after their victory, they were able in the long run to erode and then destroy the genuine liberal forces and withdraw the concessions to liberty made in the interim. (There were, indeed, more liberal figures even in the party apparatus, but they had not at this time reached positions of adequate power.)

But the Czechoslovak situation was different. It was also different from that of Hungary, where in 1956 the party (unlike the Czechoslovak party now) gradually collapsed. The Soviet Politburo seems to have tried first the Warsaw and then the Budapest solutions—neither of them appropriate.

But a pig-headed and ignorant ruling class always makes terrible mistakes. Novotny's own fall illustrates one of the various fatal patterns which emerge in a crisis. In December 1967 he plotted to regain his position by a military coup. A list of 1200 names for arrest was prepared. But this was given away by security officers favorable to reform, and led to a hardening of the liberal feeling in the Presidium.

And this is an exact repetition of events in Hungary and Poland at the time of their crises in 1956. In both countries a list of several hundred names for arrest was drawn up—by Rakosi in Hungary and by the Natolin group in Poland—and the failure of the schemes threw moderate compromisers into the arms of the enemies of dictatorship, and at the same time further hardened the real liberals themselves in their opposition to the old system.

THE STALINIST CHARACTER OF THE SOVIET LEADERS

A clumsy and insensitive dogmatism still prevails in Russia. It is now ruled by a faceless group, almost all of whom took the first moves in their careers in the great purge of 1936-38. Kosygin went up in four steps, from shop manager in a Leningrad factory to minister, in about two years. This was at a time when the Leningrad communists were being slaughtered on an even larger scale than elsewhere. And so it was with Brezhnev and Kirilenko in the Ukraine, where there were three survivors of the 102-man local Central Committee. And in Rostov where Suslov was rising. And in Byelorussia where Mazurov now got his first political job. And so on.

Nor should we make any mistake about the parts played by these men in the purge. Official instructions were frequent against not merely enemies of the people, but also the "silent, politically spineless ones" who did not denounce them. To have been promoted in those days is a certain sign of active complicity in Stalin's terror. The physicist Weissberg noted, of those who rose in the Ukraine at the time, that "they had not even the normal advantages of youth in their favor, for the choosing had been a very negative one. They were the men who had denounced others on innumerable occasions. They had bowed the knee whenever they had come up against higher authority. They were morally and intellectually crippled."¹ As a result, the degeneration of the Soviet ruling class has been quite extraordinarily rapid. The sequence Lenin-Stalin-Malenkov-Khrushchev-Brezhnev is a dynastic disaster.

The disqualifications of these men in dealing with world problems are obvious. A. Kirilenko, who has risen from a career of petty but bloody intrigue in the provincial party committees, knows nothing of foreign reality except what he has seen in the party handouts. Even the man now actually in charge of relations with the East European communists, Katushev, has till last year been exclusively involved in the industrial politics in the provincial city of Gorky.

The much-bruited idea that it is the Soviet army leaders who have been strongest in pressing for intervention in Czechoslovakia is unsupported by any real evidence. On the other hand the recent reappointment of General Shtemenko plainly points to the contrary. Stalin's former chief of staff, degraded two ranks on his master's death, he is widely regarded in Soviet military circles as an incompetent timeserver. His present power clearly reflects a political decision to reimpose a Stalin line on the generals. And it is significant that Shtemenko has lately (*Sovetskaya Rossiya*, June 29, 1968) rejected criticism of Stalin's handling of the initial stages of the war, thus

¹ Alexander Weissberg, *Conspiracy of Silence* (London, 1952), p. 364.

contradicting earlier statements by Soviet military men including the defense minister, Marshal Grechko.

It was Shtemenko and Alexander Epishev who were reported circulating around the Warsaw Pact armies in the period preparatory to the invasion. Epishev, a particularly sinister figure, was Stalin's assistant minister of state security in the horrible Doctors' Plot period; he was imposed on the army as head of its political directorate in 1962, and promoted to full membership of the Central Committee immediately after the fall of Khrushchev. He is known to be detested by the officers, and has always been noted for his extremism—manifested, too, in continual attacks on the liberal writers.

THE MAIN SOVIET FEAR—'IDEOLOGICAL'

The main Soviet fear is clearly "ideological"; though of course it is a matter of a battle not so much against abstract ideas as against specific themes, acceptance of which involves rejecting the divine right of the *apparatus* to rule. Only when a communist country has fallen into this heresy has the Soviet Union acted decisively. The Czechoslovak party's Action Program, published on April 9, 1968, was already a partial repudiation of Soviet-style rule. The leading role of the party was not to mean "a monopoly of power in the hands of the party organs." Preliminary censorship of the press was to be "excluded."

The (quite unofficial) "Two Thousand Words" which was published in several Czechoslovak journals shortly afterwards caused even greater horror. The Soviet objections were specifically directed (as in *Pravda*, July 11, 1968) against its statements that "the leaders' mistaken policies transformed a political party, an alliance based on ideas, into an organization for exerting power"; that "parliament forgot how to hold proper debates; the government forgot how to govern properly and managers how to manage properly"; that "no organizations, not even communist ones, were really controlled by their own members." *Pravda* also objected to what it termed the document's call for mass pressure on the public organizations to ensure the removal of "party cadres and leaders, devoted to the socialist cause, who do not suit them [the authors of the appeal and their supporters]." All this was interpreted as "undermining the very foundations of the socialist state."

The letter of the five Warsaw Pact parties to the Czechoslovak Central Committee on July 15, 1968, openly said that "we cannot agree to have hostile forces push your country from the socialist road and create a threat of severing Czechoslovakia from the socialist community. This is something more than your cause. This is the common cause. . . . And we shall never agree to have these historic gains of socialism, independence and security of our peoples being put to threat." It added significantly, "We shared the conviction that you would protect the Leninist principle of democratic centralism as the apple of your eye. . . . Unfortunately events have taken another course."

Soviet charges that the Czechoslovak Communist Party was actually converting itself into a social-democratic party arose out of the latter's new draft statutes issued on August 10. This is a remark-

able document, and while it is by no means of social-democratic stamp, it certainly represents the first departure by a ruling Communist Party from the rigid principles of organization introduced in 1921. The Czech draft, while still forbidding the activity of organized factions within the party, permitted the minority "to formulate its points of view and to demand that they be recorded," to "hold its views and on the basis of fresh knowledge to demand a reassessment of its points of view," and ruled out "penalties for the expression of different opinions, providing these do not result in activity conflicting with the program and statutes of the party."

Between them, these provisions truly undermined the old principles of the Soviet-style party, with its rigid suppression of minority views, and its submission to the effective rule of the permanent *apparat*. A genuine "democratic centralism" in which for the first time the "democratic" element would carry some real weight seemed to be proposed: a fatal move, from the point of view of the old machine operators. And the fear is basically of an infection which might spread, once countenanced.

For, of course, the Soviet conduct over the Czechoslovak problem is not an isolated phenomenon. As Radio Prague put it on May 19, "Polemics carried on abroad concerning us are not always polemics with Czechoslovakia, but more with those who would like to apply Czechoslovak experiences at home." Indeed the Czechoslovak case is the greatest, but by no means the only, example of the attitude of the Soviet leadership to liberalization. In his speech of March 29, 1968, Brezhnev said flatly, "It is a grave mistake to think that Lenin's emphasis on the need for iron discipline is valid only for the period of direct revolutionary action and loses its urgency in the course of further socio-economic and democratic transformation." In fact, he registered that the *feldwebel* view of political leadership in Russia itself, as in the satellites, was as strong as ever in the Kremlin.

The April 9-10 plenum of the Soviet Central Committee was virtually devoted to the issue of dogma and discipline—on the international scale, but also internally. In Russia itself the party was called upon to "step up the offensive struggle against bourgeois ideology and actively counter surreptitious attempts to propagate views alien to the socialist ideology of Soviet society in literature, art and other works," and in general to reinforce in the Soviet citizen "ideological steadfastness and ability to withstand any form of bourgeois influence." Viktor Grishin, alternate member of the Politburo, capped this on April 22 by warmly denouncing Western "bridge-building" to Eastern Europe in the revealing phrase "ideological sabotage."

ACCELERATED PACE OF RE-STALINIZATION

In fact, we have seen in the past year or two an increasingly swift process of re-Stalinization in the U.S.S.R. Even as Brezhnev was first concerning himself with the collapse of the Novotny regime in December 1967, the trial of Ginsburg and Galanskov took place, with the suppression of the protests against it, marking a further stage in the Politburo's war on intellectual independence. And the various similar actions in the Ukraine and elsewhere will be familiar to readers.

But now a more overtly Stalinist campaign is clearly afoot. Even the long-discredited "Short Course" history of the party—embodiment of the Stalin myth—has been favorably presented (even though with comments on certain "inaccuracies") in the influential *Questions of Philosophy* (March 1968). The attacks on the Soviet historian Nekrich for criticisms of Stalin in his book on the origins of World War II, which at the time of its publication in 1965 was well received, have been accompanied by the virtual breakup of the Institute of History in the Academy of Science, which had supported him. Even the *Soviet Historical Encyclopedia* has been attacked for its not very severe criticism of Stalin, in a recent issue of the key organ of the leadership, *Kommunist* (No. 4, 1968).

As early as October 1967 it was possible for an isolated poem to appear in the literary journal *Moskva*, in which it was said of Stalin:

We justifiably revered
In his person our own might,
Made of the living man an ikon
And gazing at it we prayed.

During the critical summer of 1968 this trend became general. In June, *Oktjabr*, the orthodox literary magazine, published an appeal for the rehabilitation of novels long since discredited for their adulation of Stalin—Pavlenko's *Happiness*, in which a colonel almost faints with happiness at the prospect of a meeting with Stalin; *Donbass*, by Boris Gorbатов, where a miner is in the same condition; Alexei Tolstoy's notorious *Bread*, and so on. The magazine has also been serializing a novel in which much attention is given to Stalin's victory over the "opposition swine." At the end of May, this spilled over into a purely aesthetic Zhdanov-style action, when Anatoly Efros' production of Chekhov's *Three Sisters* was taken off as "directed against not only the lofty aesthetic ideals of the author, but also the entire tradition of the Soviet theatre." And on the other side of the picture, Solzhenitsyn's *The Cancer Ward*, due to appear in *Novy Mir*, was banned, while Solzhenitsyn himself is being subjected to a campaign of denunciation of a viciousness and violence which has not been seen since Pasternak's victimization.

In general, the intellectually stagnant Soviet system, precluded from thinking originally, is unable to deal with the problems of the new epoch, either internal or external, in a rational fashion. In Czechoslovakia the solution by force was clearly considered right from the spring of 1968. Epishev was already saying in May that the Soviet army was ready to do its duty and answer any appeal from "faithful" Czechoslovak communists for help in "safeguarding socialism" (*Le Monde*, May 5-6, 1968), and he denied the report's accuracy only a fortnight later. On a more official level, it seems that a provisional decision to intervene was taken in connection with the Warsaw Pact troop maneuvers in July. The "arms cache" discovered on July 12, the failure to withdraw the troops which had been introduced for maneuvers under the Warsaw Pact, scarcely fit any other hypothesis. But the nettle was not then grasped.

Yet delay, particularly as the September Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party impended, with its threat of voting out the remnants of the pro-Soviet faction, was no answer. By August the

Russians had got themselves into a position where each course open to them had grave disadvantages. And finally the invasion came, inadequately planned from a political point of view, and even deficient in propaganda cover.

The first calculation at the time of the invasion was plainly that Dubcek, Cernik, Smrkovsky, Dzur, and so on, could be eliminated—as well as the more outspoken liberals like Sik and Cisar. The maneuver clearly aimed at leaving a supposedly more pliant element among both ministers and Presidium members, who would be powerless against the hard-line ex-Novotnyites they would have to accept as colleagues. This also depended, to some extent at least, on getting President Svoboda to play the role of Dobi in Hungary in 1956—that is, giving his legitimation, and his acquiescence if not enthusiastic support, to a government conceived on these lines.

On the failure of this plan, the Russians are (at the time of writing) attempting to make the best of Svoboda, Dubcek, Smrkovsky, Cernik and the others, *faute de mieux*. The hope now is clearly that the presence of Soviet troops, and the new acceptance of restraints, will either hamstring the whole Dubcek line (and compromise him personally) or admit the gradual intrusion of old Stalinists into the decisive positions. If this too turns out to be an error we can expect further vacillations between contradictory and unproductive policies.

THE INVASION—TO PREVENT AN OPEN SOCIETY

For the moment, we need only recapitulate the Russian dilemma, and the Russian motivation. Unlike Nagy in 1956, the Czechoslovaks did not propose to leave the Warsaw Pact. But clearly they saw, as the Rumanians saw, that there was no real threat from the West. And it is not entirely unreasonable for the Russians to feel that a revisionist ally would not be a very enthusiastic or reliable one. Central Europe has seen many examples of alliance-switching, from Saxony's desertion of Napoleon to the turning against Hitler of Hungary and Rumania.

Nevertheless, as we have said, it appears equally plain that this military consideration did not play the major role. Soviet security in this sense is no more threatened by a potentially neutral Czechoslovakia than by a truly neutral, and noncommunist, Finland. Politically and ideologically it is another matter. The end of orthodox communism in Czechoslovakia presented the gravest possible threat to the authoritarian tradition throughout the Soviet bloc, and in Russia itself. The crucial demands at every stage, including the discussions in Moscow after the occupation, have been above all concerned with preventing the establishment of an open society in Czechoslovakia.

The disadvantages of intervention, in the sense of the political stigma to be expected before world opinion and most of the Communist parties, were certainly understood, and accepted as the lesser evil. And there is a good deal of reason to feel that from their point of view the Russians were right. "Damn braces, Bless relaxes" as Blake said. No amount of external criticism was as bad as the prospect of the undermining of the principle of *apparatchik* rule.

One of the main Soviet preoccupations over the past few years has been the calling of a conference of Communist parties. Its theme, Suslov told a consultative meeting at Budapest in February 1968, was to be an examination of how to "combine national and international tasks." The attack on Czechoslovakia shows how this is to be interpreted. And it now seems that it is most unlikely that such a conference can be called with much hope of success—almost certainly not before the end of the year, as planned. So here too a sacrifice has been made to the higher good of crushing liberty.

Nor is it only a question of Czechoslovakia. Apart from the possibilities of trouble with Rumania and Yugoslavia, there is always the possibility of Soviet intervention in the still sputtering Middle East crisis. Rumors of plans to land Soviet troops in Sinai are not so far substantiated. But the show of naval and air strength in the Mediterranean last December was already sinister.

Nevertheless, the "collective leadership" has now faced its first real crisis, and has mishandled it. This has always been the formula for intense faction fighting at the top. We are ignorant, apart from a few rumors, of the alignment in the Politburo on the invasion issue. But it seems quite certain that a mutual exchange of recrimination is going on which must have important political results in Moscow.

Meanwhile, in Czechoslovakia, the Russians have carried out their coup in the least credible way, and obtained the minimum benefit—though we shall now doubtless see an attempt to gain by other pressures what the coup failed to achieve. As to the outlook which prompted the invasion, we need only say that such actions are not undertaken by rulers confident of the stability of their regime. It amounts to further confirmation of the thesis, arrived at by an increasing number of Western students, that the U.S.S.R. is, in principle, in the classic prerevolutionary situation foreseen by Marx—of an obsolete political integument holding in all the living social, intellectual and economic forces. The recourse of the present rulers is further to strengthen the integument, rather than to understand and come to terms with the vital forces involved. In the short term, we cannot say what will happen. In the long term the policy cannot work.

such diplomacy is actually implementing. And the foreign policy of a state, as the Marxists always emphasize, is the direct continuation of its domestic policy. . . .

The socialist diplomacy of the USSR and the countries of peoples' democracy is a genuinely new and genuinely popular diplomacy, both as to its aims and its essence, as well as to its forms and methods. The essence of their diplomacy is inextricably connected with the essence of their foreign policy, and the latter is conditioned by the nature of their social and state system. In the socialist countries there are no classes and parties interested in wars or in supremacy over other countries. The peoples of the socialist countries are striving to build a Communist society and to create international conditions promoting the implementation of this great aim. The general line of the foreign policy of the socialist countries is the Leninist principle of the peaceful coexistence of states under different socio-political systems and the struggle for the preservation and consolidation of peace among peoples. The basis of the foreign policy of the socialist countries, so far as this concerns their relations with each other, is the principle of socialist internationalism, fraternal unity, and mutual aid. The struggle for freedom and independence of peoples, respect for the sovereignty of large and small states, and the building of relations between all states on the principles of full equality and mutual aid—these are the bases of the foreign policy of the socialist countries.

These aims and principles of socialist foreign policy primarily also define the basic characteristics of socialist diplomacy and its principal features, distinguishing it substantially from the diplomacy of all the exploiting states. Socialist diplomacy does not need any kind of camouflage for its foreign policy aims, since the foreign policy aims of the socialist states answer the basic interests of the peoples throughout the world and enlist the sympathies of all progressive mankind. "An overwhelming majority of the world's populations approves our peaceful policy," said V. I. Lenin in establishing the bankruptcy of the international plans of the Entente. (*Works*, Vol. 30, p. 365) In contrast to the diplomacy of the exploiting states, socialist diplomacy has a direct and open nature. "Bourgeois diplomacy," said V. I. Lenin, "is incapable of understanding the methods of our new diplomacy of open, direct statements." (*Works*, Vol. 31, p. 250) "The old world has its own old diplomacy which cannot believe that it is possible to speak directly and openly." (*Works*, Vol. 33, p. 124)

Socialist diplomacy relies on the support of the broad popular masses and strives as extensively as possible to explain to them its aims and the support of the foreign policy measures it is implementing. Socialist diplomacy views the political awareness of the popular masses in its own country as well as in other countries and the masses' understanding of international politics as one of the most important sources of its power. For this reason, socialist diplomacy in all its activity focuses special attention on bringing to the knowledge of the peoples throughout the world the truth about foreign policy and international relations.

Socialist diplomacy is deeply principled, in contrast to bourgeois diplomacy which often proffers earlier enunciated foreign policy principles and the most solemn declarations for the sake of political benefits at the given moment. Socialist diplomacy is not susceptible to

opportunistic combinations and diplomatic deals which conflict with the principled bases of socialist foreign policy. Thus, when at the 1922 Geneva Conference, the capitalist powers demanded that the Soviet state renounce its annulment of the loans and liabilities of the Tsarist and Provisional Governments and its nationalization of foreign enterprises and foreign trade monopolies, proposing instead *de jure* recognition, the Soviet state resolutely rejected these demands and subsequently acquired *de jure* recognition with the complete preservation of all principles and institutes in its system and in its domestic and foreign policy.

Socialist diplomacy combines principledness with flexibility, with a readiness for cooperation and agreement, for the concessions required to achieve cooperation and agreement, but not proceeding beyond the limits of its applicable foreign policy principles. Socialist diplomacy is combined with caution and restraint, the ability not to yield to provocations and to avoid conflicts by exercising firmness and decisiveness.

An immutable characteristic of socialist diplomacy is adherence to the word given and the obligation assumed. The diplomatic history of the Soviet state provides convincing illustrations of this. Even such a reactionary political figure as W. Churchill was compelled to state the following in the English Parliament on 27 February 1945: "No government has so precisely fulfilled its obligations even to its own detriment as has the Soviet Government." This quality of socialist diplomacy, which so sharply distinguishes it from the diplomacy of exploiting states, results from the peace-loving character of the foreign policy of socialist states and from the stability of the main lines of that policy.

Throughout the course of the history of Soviet foreign relations, and also that of other socialist states, there have been established diplomatic methods appropriate to the essence of socialist diplomacy and to its above-stated fundamental features. In the aggregate these methods form a new type of diplomatic art—the diplomatic art of socialist countries which helps them influence the international situation in the interests of the workers.

One of the primary among these methods is the method of direct diplomatic negotiations. It is used extensively by socialist states both for establishing cooperation with other states in implementing common measures for insuring international peace and security as well as for the peaceful settlement of controversial issues and for the easing of international tension. Apropos of this N. S. Khrushchev stated: "It is now clear to any sensible person that it is not possible in these times to resolve international problems by the force of arms, that there is only one way—the way of peaceful negotiations taking into account the interests of all participants, negotiations based on equal rights and mutual advantage. The Soviet Union specifically supports such a course for the resolution of international problems."

The diplomacy of socialist states is based on the sympathy and support of broad peoples' masses of the entire world. With unvarying success it exposes the aggressive intentions of imperialist governments and the diplomatic maneuvers covering up such intentions. It opens the eyes of all people to the actual state of events. It does this from the rostrum of diplomatic conferences, in official diplomatic acts and documents, and in the press. The unmasking of the aggressive plans

and actions of imperialists is one of the important methods of socialist diplomacy, assisting it to mobilize democratic public opinion and popular masses throughout the entire world against the aggressive policy of imperialist governments.

A prominent position among the methods of socialist diplomacy is assigned to advancing constructive suggestions on international problems requiring settlement, in particular on problems concerning the guaranteeing of universal security and the easing of international tension. Socialist diplomacy has invariably advanced and continues to advance such proposals both within the framework of its relations with individual states as well as on a general international scale. As far back as the first decree of the Soviet state—the peace decree of 1917—it advanced a program for universal democratic peace and new international relationships, without the enslavement of peoples, seizures of territory and secret diplomacy. In the 1920's and 30's the Soviet Government introduced a number of proposals on questions of disarmament and collective security. During World War II and the years immediately thereafter, the Soviet Government made a great contribution to defining the principles of postwar construction (within the provisions of the U.N. Charter, peace negotiations of 1947, etc.). In the postwar period, in the interests of guaranteeing international peace and security, the USSR and other socialist states advanced proposals on questions of armament reduction and banning nuclear weapons, stopping the testing of such weapons, the creation of a nuclear free zone in Central Europe (the Rapacki Plan), the collective security of Europe, the German problem, the problem of prevention of a surprise attack, and universal and complete disarmament.

Features of the constructive proposals of socialist diplomacy are their realism and political effectiveness. In distinction from the proposals frequently encountered in the practice of bourgeois diplomacy, which only outwardly are directed at peaceful objectives and in actual fact are inimical to the cause of peace and serve as a means of deceiving public opinion, the proposals of socialist diplomacy reveal the absolute possibility of practically guaranteeing the attainment of the peaceful objectives contained in them by the implementation of these proposals. An example of this was the Soviet Government's proposal for the permanent neutrality of Austria which promoted the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. Proposals of socialist diplomacy, as a rule, contain such a clear statement on international problems requiring settlement that they compel imperialist states to define their actual position on such problems and, consequently, should such proposals be turned down, they show that the imperialist states do not desire to take any real steps toward strengthening peace and opposing aggression. In such manner these proposals promote the self-exposure of imperialist governments and increase the vigilance of the popular masses.

In the struggle against imperialist aggression, the diplomacy of the Soviet state sometimes successfully has used the contradictions existing among the imperialist states to prevent the creation by them of a united front against the USSR.

V. I. Lenin taught: "It is necessary to be able to use the contradictions and differences which exist among the imperialists. All diplomacy strives to take advantage of the contradictions between opponents. But unlike the diplomacy of exploiting states, which in a majority of cases tries to use the contradictions between other states—and even artificially provokes or exacerbates them—in order to increase international tension and create a situation which would be favorable for the execution of its own aggressive schemes, socialist diplomacy uses the contradictions between imperialist states in the interests of peace, for the purpose of destroying the aggressive blocs slapped together by the imperialists and preventing their aggressive actions, and consequently, for strengthening the general security.

A model of such use of contradictions among the imperialists is the Soviet Union's conclusion of the Brest Peace Treaty which afforded the opportunity to obtain a peaceful respite and to strengthen Soviet power in the first years of the Revolution. Another example of using contradictions among the imperialists to neutralize their aggressive designs is the foreign policy strategy and tactics of the Soviet state in the years prior to World War II and during that war when Soviet diplomacy wrecked a number of attempts of world imperialist reaction to create a united front of all the capitalist states against the USSR and frustrated attempts of the ruling circles in a number of imperialist states to bring Hitler Germany into conflict with the USSR.

New methods of diplomacy are being established in the mutual relationships of the Soviet Union with the countries of peoples' democracy. This is an entirely new kind of relationship, devoid of antagonistic character and being built on the principles of proletarian internationalism and on fraternal collaboration in the name of common objectives, with full respect for the sovereign rights and national interests of each socialist country. At a time when political relations between the capitalist countries, even those allied by treaty, contain elements of antagonistic contradictions and rivalries, if not on the grounds of aspirations for hegemony of one "ally" over another, then on the grounds of aspirations to maintaining a "balance," the political relations between the socialist countries preclude any kind of antagonistic contradictions and represent an attitude of friendship and close fraternal interrelationships. In support of such relations the socialist states are applying new methods, methods of constructive activity, promoting the solidarity of the socialist countries and the coordination of their measures in the struggle for their security and for universal peace. The methods of socialist diplomacy, adopted in

the interrelationships of the socialist countries with each other, are developing directly into organizational forms of joint efforts of the internationally consolidated free peoples in these countries, in the name of the general ideals of building communism in them and preserving universal peace.*

*NOTE BY SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF.—In the aftermath of the Soviet-led five-nation invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Moscow revised its oft-repeated principle of "full respect for the sovereign rights" of each socialist country. The new doctrine of a "socialist commonwealth" run from Moscow (now commonly known as the Brezhnev doctrine) was elaborated by Soviet Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in Warsaw, November 12, 1968, as follows:

The socialist states stand for strict respect for the sovereignty of all countries. We emphatically oppose interference into the affairs of any states, violations of their sovereignty.

At the same time the establishment and defense of the sovereignty of states, which have embarked upon the road of building socialism, is of particular significance for us, communists. The forces of imperialism and reaction seek to deprive the people now of this, now of that socialist country of their sovereign right they have gained to insure the prosperity of their country, the well-being and happiness of the broad mass of the working people through building of a society free from any oppression and exploitation. And when encroachments of this right encounter a harmonious rebuff by the socialist camp, bourgeois propagandists raise a clamor around "defense of sovereignty" and "non-intervention." It is clear that this is utter fraud and demagoguery on their part. In reality these shouters do not care for the maintenance of socialist sovereignty but for its destruction.

It is common knowledge that the Soviet has done much for the real strengthening of the sovereignty and independence of the socialist countries. The CPSU has always advocated that each socialist country determine the specific forms of its development along the road of socialism with consideration for its specific national conditions.

However, it is known, comrades, that there also are common laws governing socialist construction, a deviation from which might lead to a deviation from socialism as such. And when the internal and external forces hostile to socialism seek to revert the development of any socialist country toward the restoration of the capitalist order, when a threat to the cause of socialism in that country, a threat to the security of the socialist community as a whole, emerges, this is no longer only a problem of the people of that country but also a common problem of concern for all socialist states.

It goes without saying that such an action as military aid to a fraternal country to cut short the threat to the socialist order is an extraordinary enforced step, it can be sparked off only by direct actions of the enemies of socialism inside the country and beyond its boundaries, actions creating a threat to the common interests of the camp of socialism.

Experience shows that in present conditions the victory of the socialist order in this or that country can be regarded as final and the restoration of capitalism can be regarded as excluded only if the communist party, as the guiding force of society, firmly carries through a Marxist-Leninist policy in the development of all spheres of public life; only if the party indefatigably strengthens the defense of the country, the defense of its revolutionary gains, if it maintains itself and propagates amidst the people vigilance with regard to the class enemy, irreconcilability to bourgeois ideology; only if the principle of socialist internationalism is being sacredly observed, the unity and fraternal solidarity with other socialist countries is being strengthened.

[From collection of articles entitled *O Sovremennoi Sovetskoi Diplomatii* (On Contemporary Soviet Diplomacy), V. Z. Lebedev (ed.). Institute of International Relations, Moscow, 1963]

LENIN AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS

(From Article by V. A. Zorin, V. L. Israelian and
Sh. P. Sanakoev)

V. I. Lenin evinced a particular concern with the problems of training and preparation of Soviet diplomatic cadres. V. I. Lenin taught that "policy is a science and art which does not fall from heaven and is not given free and that the proletariat, if it wishes to conquer the bourgeoisie, must work out its *own* proletarian 'class policy makers' and of such a kind that they are no worse than the bourgeois policy makers."¹ Noting that "to correct (and create anew) diplomacy is a difficult matter," V. I. Lenin also demanded a mastery of the art of diplomacy, "the study of diplomacy." He often met with Soviet diplomats, talking with them at length, receiving them before their departure for work abroad and after their return from foreign missions. In these conversations V. I. Lenin not only made a detailed explanation of the concrete tasks of Soviet foreign policy but gave invaluable counsels relative to the conduct of Soviet diplomatic representatives abroad. Thus, in a friendly conversation with S. I. Aralov, who was being sent to the responsible post of Soviet envoy in Turkey, V. I. Lenin said to him that it was necessary to learn the language, to communicate with ordinary people and public figures, and not to wall oneself off "from the workers by fences or fortress walls as the ministers of the autocratic tsar did," who bribed the Grand Viziers and the officials. V. I. Lenin said that "this is not our business. We must make friends with the people."

¹Cited from Lenin's "The Childhood Disease of 'Leftism' in Communism" his works, v. 31, p. 61.

[From *Diplomaticheskii Slovar'* (Diplomatic Dictionary), Vol. 1. State Publishing House for Political Literature, Moscow, 1960]

DIPLOMACY

In diplomatic manuals and in books on the history of diplomacy quite frequently diplomacy is defined as "the science of foreign relations," or as "the science of negotiations." Diplomacy as a basic and major means of foreign policy is a component part of politics. From a Marxist viewpoint "politics is a science and an art" (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 61). Politics should be guided by the laws of public life as revealed by science, and political activities, in order to be successful, must be based on the conclusions of science. However, the application of these conclusions for changing the actual situation in the direction of determined political objectives is an art. All of this also applies to diplomacy. Diplomacy is not the subject of a special science. The attempts of contemporary bourgeois authors to construct a "science of international relations" (Guggenheim, Wright) or a "science of international politics" (Morgenthau) are factitious and groundless. Diplomatic activity should be based on data from a number of sciences: the history of international relations, the histories of individual countries and of economic science in relation to the study of world economy and the economies of individual countries, international law, the laws of individual countries and other subjects, the knowledge of which is necessary for the correct evaluation of overall conditions and specific events of international life and the domestic affairs of various countries. Without such an evaluation diplomacy may find itself in a position where it is unable to implement the foreign policy objectives of the state.

Present day bourgeois diplomacy, as the diplomacy of an obsolescent class, is incapable of using the scientific analysis of reality for support. Although after World War II, in connection with reforms of the British and U.S. diplomatic departments, an extensive departmental scientific research apparatus and even special agencies for the "scientific planning" of foreign policy were created, by no means can the diplomacy of those countries be regarded as scientifically well-grounded, because, as a rule, it does not want to take a sensible view based on the actual state of affairs, it sets goals in opposition to the action of objective regularities determining social development, and it disregards the course of social development which is propelling new social and political forces into the world arena. This very factor constitutes one of the main sources of the miscalculations of bourgeois diplomacy and has led to a number of its serious defeats in the postwar years (for example, in China, in the Near and Middle East, etc.). In contrast to this the diplomacy of the USSR and other socialist states is scientific diplomacy. It is constructed on the foundation of Marxist-Leninist theory and knows how to use the powerful weapon of a

Marxist, i.e., truly scientific, analysis of reality and the knowledge of regularities of historical development.

"Marxism," wrote V. I. Lenin, "demands of us the most precise and objectively verified calculation of the correlation of the classes and the specific features of each historical moment. We, Bolsheviks, have always tried to be true to this demand, which is absolutely obligatory for every scientifically based policy."

In their foreign policy the USSR and other socialist states proceed on the basis of the Leninist doctrine that a historical period of simultaneous coexistence of two systems, socialist and capitalist, is inevitable, and on the basis of the scientific conclusion that it is possible under present day conditions to prevent a new world war through the efforts of peace-loving nations. Supported by a profound understanding of the objective regularities of the present epoch and guided by the principles of peaceful coexistence, socialist diplomacy has achieved important successes in strengthening the international position of the socialist states and in the struggle against the aggressive plans and actions of imperialist powers in various parts of the world.

However, the application of conclusions arrived at on the basis of analyzing international relations or the domestic affairs of individual countries to the practical actions of a diplomat cannot be compared with the application of a scientific theorem to earlier established data. The methods of diplomatic activity are based on the attainment of definite objectives, connected with a change of reality, and are used in a constantly changing situation. By no means do the methods add up to any set of standard rules, because the attainment of assigned diplomatic foreign policy objectives with the aid of these methods depends to a considerable degree on the particular operating procedures of the persons applying the methods. Accumulated as a result of long historical experience, in their application diplomatic methods are creatively supplemented and corrected in accordance with any change in the local conditions. Diplomatic activity constitutes an art, although it should be supported by the conclusions of science.

In the books of bourgeois authors diplomatic art is usually reduced to the subjective qualities of a diplomat, to the qualities of his mind and character. Thus, for example, in the words of Garden, writing at the beginning of the 19th century, it is "a certain tact, the capability of taking advantage of someone else's weaknesses and of calming an irritated country with courtesy." In the words of Kennedy, writing a hundred years later, it is "a penetrating and astute mind combined with a well-developed sense of honor." In such interpretations the social-political nature of diplomatic art is ignored. Of course, in diplomatic art, as in any other, individual capabilities cannot be disregarded. A diplomat's skill in using the forms and methods applied in foreign relations is important for the success of diplomatic activities. However, first and foremost diplomatic art has to be considered in relation to those historically developing social and political conditions in which it is growing and developing. In the final analysis diplomatic art amounts to influencing other states and the international situation in the interests of the ruling class in a given state and in the interests of strengthening the particular social and political structure which supports that state. Consequently, the methods and modes of diplomacy are closely conditioned by the objectives of that foreign policy which

SOVIET SOURCES

[From Valerian A. Zorin, *Osnovy Diplomaticheskoi Sluzhby* (The Bases of Diplomatic Service). Institute of International Relations, Moscow, 1964]

ROLE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR

By Valerian A. Zorin

What are the scientific foundations on which all diplomatic activity of socialist states rests, and what is the basis for their successful diplomacy?

The theoretical foundation of Soviet diplomatic activity is a Marxist-Leninist understanding of the international situation, of the laws of social development, of the laws of class struggle, and of the correlation of internal and international social forces, which takes account of the specific national and historical features of each country, group of countries, and continents. It is impossible to develop diplomatic activity correctly without a Marxist-Leninist evaluation of the international situation, without an understanding of the laws of social development and concrete knowledge of the situation in a particular country, and without taking into account the historical and national characteristics of a country. And it must be added that a Marxist-Leninist evaluation of international events and the formulation of a line of diplomatic struggle on this basis is a powerful element in Soviet diplomacy. As a rule, the success of the diplomatic activity of the Soviet Union is determined above all by a correct Marxist-Leninist analysis of the situation and of the correlation of forces, and on the contrary, underestimation and imperfect knowledge of the objective laws and of all the changes which are taking place in a country or in several interrelated countries are fraught with miscalculations and mistakes in diplomacy.

In his first letter on tactics in April 1917, V. I. Lenin wrote: "Marxism requires of us a most precise and objectively examined calculation of the correlation of classes and of the specific characteristics of a given moment in history."¹ V. I. Lenin considered such an approach to be an unconditionally essential requirement for "any scientific foundation for policy." For a socialist state, a scientific foundation for foreign policy and diplomacy is absolutely essential. One must not rely on the external manifestations of phenomena, but rather closely study the underlying processes in a particular country and the correlation of class forces in it, study the internal economic and political development of the country, the trends of that development in both the economic and political fields, including the correlation of forces among various political groups, between struggling classes, etc. This is an essential prerequisite for the success of diplomatic

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Pis'ma o taktike." [Letters on tactics] *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* [Complete Works], v. 31, p. 132.

activity. Only with due regard for all this is it possible to chart a correct line of conduct and the modes and methods which can be used for achievement of the foreign policy objectives established by the state.

Soviet diplomatic tactics with respect to the capitalist countries are guided by the instructions on the utilization of contradictions in the enemy camp and the attraction of allies—even if only temporary ones—which V. I. Lenin formulated in his work "The Infantile Disease of 'Leftism' in Communism." These instructions are the theoretical foundation for the tactics of socialist diplomacy.

V. I. Lenin wrote: "A more powerful opponent can be defeated only through supreme exertion and only with the *categorical*, most painstaking, thorough, careful, and skillful use of any 'breach'—even the tiniest one—between the enemies and of any contradiction of interests among the bourgeoisie of individual countries and among the various groups or formations of the bourgeoisie of individual countries, as well as of any possibility—even the slightest one—to acquire a mass ally, even though it might be temporary, unstable, precarious, unreliable, and conditional. The person who has not come to understand this has not understood anything at all about Marxism and the scientific, contemporary socialism *in general*."²

This thesis of V. I. Lenin on tactics in the political struggle is also the foundation for the diplomatic tactics, and the entire activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of diplomatic representations in the various countries rests on this Leninist thesis. . . .

An essential condition for the correct and successful implementation of the objectives of this foreign policy by Soviet diplomacy was and is its direction by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and by its Central Committee, which deals with the most pressing problems of foreign policy from day to day.

V. I. Lenin attributed exceptional importance to the everyday direction of Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy by the Party's Central Committee. In 1923, he emphasized: "Does not the Politburo discuss from a Party point of view many insignificant and important matters related to 'moves' by our side in response to the 'moves' of foreign powers in order to thwart their—let us say—stratagems, so not to have to resort to less decorous language? Is not this flexible combination of state and Party a source of exceptional strength in our policy?"³

The leadership of the Communist Party determines and has always determined the proper direction and content and the best methods of Soviet diplomacy. Following Leninist tradition, the CPSU always establishes the objectives of the foreign policy and diplomacy of the Soviet Union at its congresses and at the plenary meetings of the Central Committee. The Central Committee of the CPSU provides day to day direction of the foreign policy measures and of the diplomatic moves implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, insuring successful attainment of the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet state which have been established by the Party . . .

² V. I. Lenin, "Detskaya bolezn' 'levizny' v kommunizme." [The infantile disease of 'leftism' in communism] *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* [Complete Works], v. 41, p. 55.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Luchshe men'she, da luchshe." [Better fewer, but better] *Sochinenia* [Works], v. 33, p. 453.

In speaking of all the work of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, it is particularly necessary to emphasize that the apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a political apparatus. A political orientation, a sense of responsibility and political maturity in all its activity determine the level of work of the apparatus of this Ministry. This is why, in the selection of cadre for the apparatus of the Ministry, our Party and government always have and always will set high requirements. In his work "Better Fewer but Better," V. I. Lenin underscored the importance of joining in the Soviet state apparatus, and particularly in its more important branches, Soviet and Party cadres. He said that the union of Soviet and Party is "a source of extraordinary strength in our policy." "Hasn't anyone ever noticed," wrote V. I. Lenin, "that in such a people's commissariat as the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs such a union brings with it an extraordinary amount of benefit and that it has been practiced since its very beginning?"

The Party has always considered it basic that in the apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there should be politically mature people, answerable for each one of their steps, for the slightest mistake in the work of the apparatus has an effect on very important phases of the external political relations of the USSR. It is sufficient to utter an awkward expression at some reception or other for this to come to light in the foreign press and sometimes cause serious harm to the foreign policy prestige of the country and the foreign policy line of the USSR in general.

The second factor which should characterize the activity of the apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is efficiency, accuracy and precision in work and an attention to detail. This is a most important quality and characteristic for any worker and for the whole apparatus of the Ministry in general.

In diplomatic work there are no minor details, since often out of a petty fact there grow great events. Sometimes by means of an insignificant fact it is possible to grasp the beginning of change in the policy of one or another state and this obliges each worker of the Ministry to be very attentive even to the small facts of international life, the policy of states, and to the behavior of envoys and other diplomatic workers of these states. In particular this is the case with envoys of major powers.

Not infrequently through their questions and remarks in conversations it is possible to judge of the commencement of a shift in policy of one or another government. This, of course, also applies to the pronouncements of responsible workers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore each word of a diplomat must be well considered. Any thoughtless step might play a negative role. In important questions it is not permissible that any worker can say at his own cost and risk anything having even the least real meaning. On this point the Min-

istry has a firm centralization. However, a firm centralization of work should not exclude initiative on the part of the workers.

In the plan for the development of initiative of diplomatic workers in foreign missions the presence of relationships of one kind or another between the diplomatic officials and the governmental and societal circles of the country of residence is of great importance. Therefore relationships should be formed in a rational manner, taking all circumstances into account. It is necessary to be firm in contacts with foreigners and daily self-control should be exercised. However, the policy line looking toward an expansion of useful relationships and toward the display of rational initiative in diplomatic work should be applied consistently both in the central apparatus and in the embassies and missions.

Taking into account the serious political significance of such relationships and of personal initiative by workers for each and every diplomatic mission and for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a whole, it is essential that this initiative be coordinated with centralization in the work of the diplomatic cadres as a whole.

[From An. Kovalev, *Azbuka Diplomatti* (The ABC's of Diplomacy), 2nd edition, rev. and enl. Institute of International Relations. Moscow. 1963]

DOCUMENTS OF SOVIET DIPLOMACY: TWO ADDRESSEES

By An. Kovalev

Diplomatic correspondence and diplomatic documents, being one of the forms of diplomatic activity, bear traits essential to the diplomacy of a given state. Therefore the diplomatic correspondence and diplomatic documents of the Soviet state, as of other socialist states, in their content, and consequently in much of their form, since form is determined by content, also differ from the diplomatic correspondence and diplomatic documents of capitalist states and in the same way as socialist diplomacy as a whole differs from the diplomacy of capitalist states.

V. I. Lenin emphasized the difference in methods of socialist and capitalist diplomacy. "The case is," he said in a speech at the conclusion of the Ninth Congress of the Russian Communist Party on April 5, 1920, "that capitalist society takes decisions in everything that especially interests the citizens—the conditions of economic existence, war and peace—in secrecy from society. The most important questions, war, peace, diplomatic problems, are settled by a minuscule group of capitalists who deceive not only the masses but even often deceive parliament." He pointed out that "bourgeois diplomacy is unable to understand the methods of our new diplomacy of open, direct statements." . . .

The essence of the Leninist analysis of diplomacy of open and direct declarations does not consist in the fact that each diplomatic document must be "open" in the sense of its immediate publication, but in that it should have no other content than that which is expressed directly and openly. The principal feature that characterizes the methods of a diplomacy of open and direct declarations is the correspondence of these declarations to the real content of the commitments which they contain, to their actual intent, and the faithfulness to the agreements reached.

Soviet diplomacy has no need of masking its goals, since the goals of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union express the vital interests not only of the peoples of the socialist countries but of all peoples on earth. This policy is interested in making as wide as possible an explanation of the basic thought of measures which it has undertaken. The more thoroughly this is done, the greater understanding will be given to the foreign policy actions of the Soviet Union throughout the world and the greater attractive force these actions, which are often undertaken by means of statements with the accompanying diplomatic documents, will acquire. Therefore, Soviet diplomacy in its whole activity is making an unflagging effort to bring to the minds and

hearts of the peoples the truth about the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, the truth about international relations in each given stage of their development. Without a correct and deep understanding of the nature and character of the foreign policy activity of the socialist states a politically literate and qualified composition of Soviet diplomatic documents is impossible, since these documents are only one of the means of reaching the goals of Soviet foreign policy.

Documents of Soviet diplomacy have two addressees: they are directed both to the governments and to the peoples. . . .

[At the joint meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Revolution], L. I. Brezhnev said: "Having decisively broken with the traditions of the exploiting classes in foreign relations, with methods of secret diplomacy, with the policy of plotting behind the backs of the peoples, the Soviet regime tore up all secret treaties concluded by Tsarist Russia. In the most important questions which touch the fate of humanity, our country has undertaken to appeal not only to the governments of other states but also directly to the peoples.

"The firm democratic basis on which we base relations with all countries, with all states in the world is the recognition in reality of the equality of rights of all nations, great and small, and the recognition of the equality of all races and nationalities."

The Leninist principle of appealing in the foreign policy acts of the Soviet state and in its diplomatic documents simultaneously to two addressees—to the governments and to the peoples—is the cornerstone of Soviet diplomatic practice.

When we speak about the two addressees that does not mean that one part of the diplomatic document is drawn up so that it will be received as intended by the government which receives this document and another part by the people of that country. It is even more absurd to suppose that separate paragraphs, or even sentences, of themselves have different addressees. No, a diplomatic document is an organic whole and the two addressees—the government and the people—are completely knit together in each argument, in each paragraph, in each phrase. The severance of such a unity would lead to the diminution of the effective force of a diplomatic document and would deprive it of persuasiveness in the eyes of the governments and, what is more important, in the eyes of the people. . . .

The masses of the people to whom, together with the government, diplomatic documents are addressed, have real possibilities of exerting influence on the policy of imperialist states.

These possibilities are connected not only with the participation of the wide masses in electoral campaigns, with pressure from below on the process of formation of public opinion and on parliament, but also with immediate political actions (petitions, meetings, demonstrations, strikes) or even with a potentiality of such actions which the ruling classes cannot fail to take into account. When, as a result of the pressure of the masses, in the circles which are at the helm of government in imperialist states, there win out the supporters of a more moderate foreign policy, then the efforts of peace loving states begin

to find a certain comprehension and resonance among these circles, efforts to reach agreement are strengthened and the international situation becomes less frigid. When the pressure of the masses weakens and those groups of the bourgeoisie win out whose interests have intermeshed with the production of arms, with the "cold war," the fabrication of international crises, then events turn toward an aggravation of the international situation. . . .

Soviet diplomatic documents are designed to be catalysts of those moods which would not permit the slackening of the pressure of the masses of the people in defense of peace, freedom and the independence of the peoples. Soviet diplomacy, skillfully taking account of the individual positions and specific interests of the various capitalist countries, singles out in the policy of imperialist states those elements which might be beneficial to the cause of strengthening international security, and opens passages for those tendencies in the imperialist camp which, given the prevailing relationship of forces in the world, prefer an expansion of international cooperation to military adventures.

The first addressee, the government or governments, is usually indicated in the diplomatic document itself. The second addressee, the people or peoples, is most often implied. The presence or absence of the latter addressee in one or another diplomatic document is not, of course, determined by whether it contains a direct message or appeal to the people of a given country or to the peoples in general, although such a form of an immediate address to the peoples is quite possible in a diplomatic document. Addressing a diplomatic document to the peoples along with the governments is signified first of all in the content of the proposals and their correspondence to the interests of the masses of the people, in the structure of the thoughts and arguments developed for translating into practice these proposals, in the accessibility of the language, and in the intent that the content of the document as a whole be correctly understood not only by the government to which it is addressed but also by the people of the given country. . . .

M. Gor'kii* said that aphorisms teach one how to clench words like the clenching of fingers into a fist. Of course, a diplomatic document cannot be as strewn with aphorisms as, let us say, a work by Oscar Wilde. But it requires the knowledge of how to carry on diplomatic duels not with the fingers spread, or telling formulations; it is an undoubted advantage of a diplomatic document when a suitable role in it is given to features that stick in the memory, to the element of the unexpected, and to the effect of both thought and word. . . .

A diplomatic document acquires a greater effectiveness when in it there are phrases or paragraphs built on the method of contraposition and sharp contrast. . . .

*NOTE BY SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF.—In discussing the various methods by which diplomatic documents can be made interesting and convincing, the author points out the ways in which the writers of literary works, as, for example, Tolstol, Pushkin, Turgenev or Maiaikovskii, have employed stylistic devices to give their writings greater force and precision and suggests that, in some degree, this might serve as an inspiration to the authors of diplomatic documents. Too often, he writes, such documents use "smooth phrases [which] roll like billiard balls over the table, leaving no noticeable trace in the mind of the reader."

Essentially, however, the author's recommendation as to the style of diplomatic documents is that, in sections which drive arguments home, recourse be made to the methods of political journalism, as exemplified by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Herzen and Chernyshevskii, for these were masters in the art of using words in the solution of political problems.

A visible form, a concrete example, an emotional weight given to certain phrases and words, a touching on the strings of association appropriate to a given situation will increase the force of influence of a diplomatic document.

Let us examine from this point of view a single paragraph of a note of the Soviet government of May 20, 1963 :

"The peoples of the Mediterranean area have experienced much during their history. From the countless conflicts which shook ancient Egypt, Greece, Rome and Carthage to both world wars in this century, this area has felt all the vicissitudes of armed conflict among states. But even during the Second World War, which was rapidly extended to the African continent and spread over the Near and Middle East, there was no weapon which in its destructive force could be even remotely compared with that which is now hidden in the waves of the Mediterranean Sea or with that which could be used for a counter blow at an aggressor, if this sea is used as a center and cover for an aggressor. If worse came to worst in our time the Mediterranean Sea would become a dead sea in all the senses of that word. Many centers of civilization and culture would be threatened with a fate comparable to that of Pompeii. Even people who are free of religious views can understand the feelings of millions of Christians and Moslems in connection with the fact that in carrying out the plans of the leaders of NATO atomic weapons are found almost under the walls of the Vatican and Jerusalem, of Mecca and Medina." . . .

The fellahin of Egypt, Greek wine growers, Italian fishermen, or French workers will understand all this differently and in their own fashion. But the essence of the matter is not in this. Perhaps there arise no association with the campaigns of Caesar and Alexander of Macedon, and perhaps not all readers will know of the fate of Pompeii. There will arise other associations based on that which is handed on from generation to generation, there will be other comparisons drawn from the life experiences of the peoples of the Mediterranean. What is important is that, in influencing a receptive reader, the note awakens a realization, touches the feelings even of a less receptive reader, giving him food for thought in a direction corresponding to the content of this note. The concrete nature of descriptions, the presence of "local color," make a diplomatic document more understandable by the addressees and bring its reception nearer to that point where it ought also to merge with a correct adoption of its content. . . .

There is no patent on clever methods of drawing up diplomatic documents and it is impossible to imitate it. If even there were a wish on the part of the diplomacy of the imperialist states to borrow something from Soviet diplomacy in the sphere of preparing diplomatic documents, there is nothing to hinder it [imperialist diplomacy] in doing so, for Soviet documents are published. But the essence of the matter is that methods of diplomacy are determined by the class nature of the states whose instrument they are. In order to 'imitate' the methods of Soviet diplomacy, bourgeois diplomacy would have to change its class nature. But bourgeois diplomacy does not set itself such tasks. . . .



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ГЛАВНАЯ РЕДАКЦИЯ

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ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ

ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
Москва • 1960

Diplomaticheskii slovar'.
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В ТРЕХ ТОМАХ

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ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
Москва • 1960

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ОТ РЕДАКЦИИ

Новое издание Дипломатического словаря подготовлено большим коллективом советских историков, дипломатов, экономистов и юристов.

В Словарь включены статьи по дипломатии и международным отношениям нового и новейшего времени. Словарь содержит сведения о международных конгрессах, конференциях, организациях, международных договорах, конвенциях, декларациях и других важнейших дипломатических актах, разъясняет основные понятия из области международного права, имеющие непосредственное отношение к вопросам внешней политики и дипломатии. Значительное место занимают статьи, знакомящие читателя с дипломатической службой, функциями, правами и обязанностями дипломатов, консульской службой.

Большое внимание в Словаре уделено характеристике последовательно миролюбивой внешней политики Советского государства с первых дней его основания, а также нового типа международных отношений между странами социалистического лагеря, основанных на принципах пролетарского интернационализма. Значительно дополнены разделы о международных отношениях стран Азии, Африки, Латинской Америки, что отвечает возросшему значению этих стран в решении международных вопросов. В ряде статей освещается процесс распада колониальной системы и выход на международную арену новых независимых государств. Большое число статей посвящено международным отношениям в период второй мировой войны и послевоенные годы.

Словарь содержит краткие данные о ряде дипломатов. Статьи в Дипломатическом словаре расположены в алфавитном порядке. Курсивом выделены понятия, которым посвящены специальные статьи. Статьи об основных договорах, конвенциях и соглашениях содержат ссылки на публикации. Для облегчения пользования Словарем в конце III (последнего) тома дан тематический указатель, а также общий именной указатель. В конце каждого тома дан список основных сокращений.

Новое издание Дипломатического словаря рассчитано на широкие круги советских читателей, интересующихся вопросами внешней политики и международных отношений.

Редакционная работа над I томом Дипломатического словаря закончена в основном в августе — сентябре 1959 г.

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защите со стороны властью принимающего государства (см. *Дипломатические приемы и иммунитет*).

Д. п. прекращает свое существование в результате его закрытия, либо отзыва Д. п. аккредитующим государством, разрыва дипл. отношений или возникновения состояния войны между аккредитующим и принимающим государствами. В случае разрыва дипл. отношений, отзыва или закрытия Д. п. принимающее государство обязано уважать и охранять, даже в случае вооруженного конфликта, помещения Д. п. вместе с его имуществом и архивами. Аккредитующее государство может вверить охрану помещений Д. п., его имущества и архивов дипл. представительству какого-либо др. государства, приемлемого для государства пребывания. Во всех этих случаях государство пребывания должно обеспечить возможности, необходимые для беспрепятственного выезда членов персонала Д. п. вместе с их семьями и имуществом, в частности предоставить им необходимые транспортные средства.

ДИПЛОМАТИЯ — официальная деятельность глав государств, правительств и специальных органов внешних сношений по осуществлению переговоров, переписки и др. мирных средств, целей и задач внешней политики государства, определенных интересами господствующего класса, а также по защите прав и интересов государства за границей. Слово «дипломатия» происходит от греческого слова «диплома» — так назывались в древней Греции свдвоенные дощечки с навесенными на них письменами, выдававшиеся посланцам в качестве верительных грамот и документов, подтверждавших их полномочия. Как обозначение государственной деятельности в области внешних сношений слово «дипломатия» входит в обиход в Западной Европе с конца XVIII в.

Д. составляет важнейшее средство внешней политики государства. Иногда слова «дипломатия» и «внешняя политика» применяют в одинаковом смысле (напр., говорят о «принципах Д.» или «принципах внешней политики» того или иного

государства или правительства). Однако это не однозначное понятие. По определению В. И. Ленина, политика есть «направление государства, определение форм, задач, содержания деятельности государства» (Ленинский сборник XXI, стр. 14). Понятие «внешняя политика» охватывает как цели и интересы государства, определяющие направление его деятельности на международной арене, так и средства, формы и методы этой деятельности. Цели и интересы государства в международных отношениях осуществляются прежде всего посредством официальных сношений между правительствами, но они осуществляются также посредством торговых и культурных связей, поддерживаемых как органами государства, так и общественными и частными учреждениями и корпорациями (банками, торговыми фирмами, научными организациями, религиозными обществами и т. д.). Наконец, они осуществляются посредством применения вооруженной силы, к-рая, в зависимости от классовой сущности государства и характера его внешней политики, может служить как агрессивным целям, так и целям обороны от агрессии. Т. о., Д. является лишь одним из средств внешней политики государства. Однако среди средств внешней политики Д. занимает весьма важное место. В отличие от др. средств внешней политики, каждое из к-рых имеет свои собственные непосредственные задачи в деятельности государства, для Д. единственной задачей является осуществление внешнеполитических целей государства и определение тех путей и средств, к-рые для этого необходимы. Задача Д. заключается не только в искусном пользовании официальными формами сношений между правительствами и в успешном политическом воздействии на иностранные государства в рамках этих форм, но и в сочетании данных форм с др. средствами внешней политики для достижения поставленных государством внешнеполитических целей.

Основными формами дипл. деятельности являются: (1) дипл. конг-

прессе, конференции или совещания, т. е. периодические встречи представителей государств, начиная от глав государств, глав правительств или министров иностранных дел и кончая специальными уполномоченными из числа дипл. сотрудников различных рангов; (2) дипл. переписка посредством заявлений, писем, нот, меморандумов и т. п.; (3) подготовка и заключение международных договоров и соглашений, двухсторонних и многосторонних, регламентирующих самые различные вопросы межгосударственных отношений; (4) повседневное представительство государства за границей, осуществляемое его посольствами и миссиями, и ведение ими политических и иных переговоров с дипл. ведомством страны пребывания; (5) участие представителей государства в деятельности международных организаций, общеполитических и специальных, общих и региональных; (6) освещение в печати позиций правительства по тем или иным внешнеполитическим вопросам, публикация официальной информации о важнейших международных событиях, официальное издание международных актов и документов.

Общее руководство дипл. деятельностью осуществляется правительством, непосредственное оперативное руководство — специальным ведомством иностранных дел, возглавляемым ответственным членом правительства (министром иностранных дел).

Что касается методов Д., т. е. способов воздействия на правительство, официальных представителей, а также на влиятельные политические круги и общественность иностранных государств, к-рые применяет Д. для достижения определенных внешнеполитических целей, то эти методы весьма многообразны и не поддаются какой-либо строго определенной классификации. Конкретный характер дипл. методов зависит от условий, места и времени.

В дипл. руководствах и в книгах по истории Д. нередко Д. определяют то как «науку о внешних сношениях», то как «искусство переговоров». Д. как основное и важнейшее средство

внешней политики составляет часть политики. С точки зрения марксизма «политика есть наука и искусство» (В. И. Ленин, Соч., т. 31, стр. 61). Политика должна опираться на законы общественной жизни, открываемые наукой, и политическая деятельность, чтобы быть успешной, необходимо должна основываться на выводах науки. Применение же этих выводов для изменения действительности в направлении определенных политических целей составляет искусство. Все это относится и к Д. Д. не составляет предмета особой науки. Попытки современных буржуазных авторов konstruировать «науку о международных отношениях» (Гуггенгейм, Райт) или «науку международной политики» (Моргентау) искусственны и необоснованны. Дипл. деятельность должна опираться на данные ряда наук: истории международных отношений, истории отдельных стран, экономических наук, связанных с изучением мирового хозяйства и экономики отдельных стран, международного права, государственного права отдельных стран и др., знание к-рых необходимо для правильной оценки общих условий и отдельных событий международной жизни и внутренней жизни различных стран. Без такой оценки Д. может оказаться не в состоянии добиться осуществления внешнеполитических целей государства.

Современная буржуазная Д., как Д. отживающего класса, неспособна опираться на научный анализ действительности. Хотя после второй мировой войны в связи с реформами дипл. ведомств США и Великобритании при них был создан обширный научно-исследовательский аппарат и даже специальные органы по «научному планированию» внешней политики, Д. этих государств отнюдь не может считаться научно обоснованной, ибо она, как правило, не желает трезво учитывать действительное положение вещей, ставит цели, противоречащие действую объективных закономерностей, определяющих общественное развитие, идет наперекор ходу общественного развития, выдвигающе-

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му на мировую арену новые социальные и политические силы. Именно в этом кроется один из главных источников просчетов буржуазной Д. и ряда ее серьезных поражений в послевоенные годы (напр., в Китае, на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке и пр.). В противоположность этому Д. СССР и др. социалистических государств является научной Д. Она строится на фундаменте марксистско-ленинской теории, владеет могучим оружием марксистского, т. е. подлинно научного, анализа действительности и знанием закономерностей исторического развития. «Марксизм, — писал В. И. Ленин, — требует от нас самого точного, объективно проверяемого учета соотношения классов и конкретных особенностей каждого исторического момента. Мы, большевики, всегда старались быть верными этому требованию, безусловно обязательному с точки зрения великого научного обоснования политики». СССР и др. социалистические государства исходят в своей внешней политике из ленинского учения о неизбежности исторической полосы одновременного существования двух систем, социалистической и капиталистической, и из научного вывода о возможности во временных условиях предотвратить новую мировую войну силами миролюбивых народов. Опираясь на глубокое понимание объективных закономерностей современной эпохи и руководствуясь принципами мирного существования, социалистическая Д. добилась серьезных успехов в укреплении международного положения социалистических государств и в борьбе против агрессивных планов и действий империалистических держав в различных районах мира.

Однако приложению выводов, достигнутых на основании анализа международных отношений или внутренней жизни отдельных стран, к практическому поведению дипломата не может быть сравниваемо с применением научной теоремы к заранее установленным данным. Методы дипломатической деятельности рассчитаны на достижение определенных целей, связанных с изменением действительности, и применяются в постоянно меняю-

щейся обстановке. Они отнюдь не образуют каких-то стандартных правил, ибо достижение с помощью этих методов поставленных Д. внешнеполитических целей в немалой степени зависит от конкретного образа действий применяющих их людей. Складываясь в итоге длительного исторического опыта, методы дипломатической деятельности при их применении творчески дополняются и корректируются в соответствии с изменяющимися окружающими условиями. Дипл. деятельность составляет искусство, хотя она должна опираться на выводы науки.

В книгах буржуазных авторов дипл. искусство обычно сводится к субъективным свойствам дипломата, к свойствам его ума и характера. Так, напр., по словам Гардена, писавшего в начале XIX в., это «известный такт, способность извлечь выгоду из слабостей другого и успокоить любезностью раздраженную державу». По словам Кеннеди, писавшего сто лет спустя, это «проницательный и тонкий ум, соединенный с хорошо развитым чувством чести», умение «приспособляться к обстоятельствам». В подобных рассуждениях игнорируется социальнополитическая природа дипл. искусства. Конечно, в дипл. искусстве, как и во всяком другом, нельзя сбрасывать со счета личные способности. Умение дипломата пользоваться формами и методами, применяемыми во внешних сношениях, имеет значение для успеха дипломатической деятельности. Но дипл. искусство необходимо прежде всего рассматривать в зависимости от тех исторически складывающихся социальных и политических условий, в которых оно вырастает и развивается. Дипл. искусство в конечном итоге сводится к тому, чтобы воздействовать на др. государства и на международную обстановку в интересах господствующего в данном государстве класса, в интересах укрепления того общественного и политического строя, который поддерживает, это господство. Следовательно, методы и приемы Д. ближайшим образом обуславливаются целями той внешней политики, к-рую эта Д. практически осущест-

влияет. Внешняя же политика государства, как это всегда подчеркивают марксисты, является прямым продолжением его внутренней политики. Следовательно, характер дипл. искусства тесно связан с политическим строем и социальной природой государства, вернее государств, являющихся участниками международных отношений в данную историческую эпоху. Д., формы ее организации, ее методы и приемы следует рассматривать исторически, под углом зрения основных свойств той или иной социально-экономической формации. Д. является продуктом классового общества и развивается вместе с развитием государства.

В рабовладельческом обществе отношения между государствами заполняются их борьбой за расширение территории, за увеличение числа рабов, за захват чужих богатств, за установление политической гегемонии над другими странами. В этих условиях война, как правило, доминирует над Д. в качестве средства внешней политики, хотя отнюдь нельзя отрицать и значения Д. во внешнеполитической борьбе рабовладельческих государств. При отсутствии мирового рынка и регулярных международных связей, к-рые охватывали бы весь тогдашний мир, дипл. отношения развивались по преимуществу в отдельных географических р-нах и в сравнительно ограниченном кругу государств, хотя в отдельные периоды они поддерживались в значительно более широком масштабе. Формы Д. тесно зависели от характера государственного строя. В теократиях древнего Востока дипл. деятельностью руководили цари, в рабовладельческих демократиях древней Греции — народные собрания, в древнем Риме — сенат, а позднее — императоры. Дипл. связи поддерживались эпископскими посольствами, к-рые отправлялись в др. страны с определенной миссией и по возвращении отчитывались перед теми, кто их послал. Послы вербовались из членов царской семьи или ближайшего окружения царя (Египет, Ассирия, Вавилон), из выдающихся ораторов,

писателей, актеров (Афины), из аристократической олигархии (Рим). Отправляясь в чужие страны, они должны были привлекать союзников, обзавреживать врагов, разузнавать политические замыслы др. правительств и т. д. Иногда их деятельность приобретала весьма серьезное значение. Древнегреческий оратор и дипломат Эсхин, выступая в афинском народном собрании, утверждал, что искусный посол значит больше, чем искусный полководец. Дипл. методы, к-рые применяли рабовладельческие государства, сводились к заключению военных или политических союзов, закреплявшихся договорами о дружбе, о мире, о нейтралитете, к использованию в политических целях существующих религиозных объединений (в Греции) или к созданию более или менее широких политических объединений для борьбы с противником и т. д. Однако рабовладельческое общество не выработало ни единообразных форм организации дипл. деятельности, ни единообразных методов Д.

В феодальном обществе, напр. в средневековой Европе, в условиях феодальной раздробленности государи вели между собой непрерывные «частные войны» ради увеличения земельных владений, грабежа, умножения числа подданных, облагавших повинностями крестьян. В промежутках между войнами они вели «частную Д.», т. е. вступали в переговоры, заключали мирные договоры, военные союзы и пр. Сравнительно редкие временные чрезвычайные посольства составлялись обычно из представителей духовенства, как наиболее образованной в то время части общества. Посольства оформляли свои дипл. действия с помощью религиозных обрядов (целование креста и т. д.). Временами феодальные государи объединялись под эгидой католической церкви для совместных военно-политических мероприятий (напр., крестовые походы), и в подготовке этих мероприятий играла известную роль Д. наиболее развитая Д. того времени. Важными дипл. конференциями часто являлись церковные соборы, на к-рых нередко присутствовали свет-

ские государи и политические вопросы.

По сравнению с государствами Западной Европы поддерживали дипл. связи (с королями Русью, государствами Византии) созданные восточными и иностранными дипломатами разработанный дипломатический аппарат от древнего Рима. Византия рабовладельческое влияние через христианские также посредством

Своеобразный период феодальной дипломатии здесь в качестве форм союзов и т. п. важными событиями, по разрешению споров

На исходе феодальной дипломатии зарождалась новая дипломатия, прежде всего в папской Византии республике.

Современная буржуазная дипломатия зарождалась при капитализме на западе и на востоке вались крупные абсолютистские монархии. Политика этих династических монархов, их стремление к расширению своего могущества также к политическим интересам дворянства, буржуазии, национальному расширению государства, к захвату чужих территорий в Европе, так и в колониальном и торговом путях. Для этих интересов и дипломатические государи создавали постоянные армии и службу. Временные дипломаты находят место постоянной дипломатии XVI-го столетия, которая становится постоянной дипломатией государственной

сно государи и обсуждались политические вопросы.

По сравнению с феодальными государствами Западной Европы Византия поддерживала более широкие дипл. связи (с королевствами Европы, Русью, государствами Востока). В Византии создавалось специальное ведомство иностранных дел и имелся разработанный дипл. церемониал, в значительной мере унаследованный от древнего Рима. Помимо дипл. напалов Византия распространяла свое политическое влияние на др. страны через христианских миссионеров, а также посредством торговых связей.

Своеобразный характер носила дипл. деятельность и на Руси. В период феодальной раздробленности здесь в качестве форм Д. наряду с договорами о союзе, торговле, поселении и т. п. важную роль играли съезды князей, посредничество при разрешении споров между ними и т. д.

На исходе феодальной эпохи начинается зарождаться институт постоянного дипл. представительства — прежде всего в практике папской курии, Византии и Венецианской республики.

Современная буржуазная Д. стала зарождаться при переходе от феодализма к капитализму, когда на западе и на востоке Европы образовались крупные централизованные абсолютистские государства. Внешняя политика этих государств диктовалась династическими интересами монархов, их стремлением к увеличению своего могущества и богатства, а также к политической гегемонии, интересам дворянства и нарождающейся буржуазии, стремлением к национальному объединению и расширению государственной территории, к захвату чужих земель как в Европе, так и в колониях, к господству на морях и на мировых торговых путях. Для осуществления этих интересов и тенденций абсолютистские государства создавали постоянные армии и обширную дипл. службу. Временные посольства уступают место постоянным, к-рые на протяжении XVI—XVII вв. распространяются по всей Европе. Д. становится весьма важной отраслью государственной деятельности. По-

всеместно создаются специальные ведомства иностранных дел, к-рые руководят всей дипл. деятельностью государства и во главе к-рых обычно становятся первые министры, а нередко фактически и сами монархи.

Внешнеполитические цели, к-рым служила Д. абсолютизма, оказали непосредственное и глубокое влияние на характер ее методов. Маркс и Энгельс характеризуют Д. абсолютистских государств следующими словами: «Направлять народы друг на друга, использовать один народ для угнетения другого, чтобы таким образом продлить существование абсолютной власти, — вот к чему сводилось искусство и деятельность всех существовавших доселе правителей и их дипломатов» (К. Маркс и Ф. Энгельс, Соч., т. 5, стр. 160). Немалое влияние на характер Д. оказывало и то обстоятельство, что руководство внешней политикой абсолютистских государств сосредоточивалось в руках очень узкой верхушки господствующего класса: королей, их придворного окружения, горстки высших чиновников. Воздействие на отдельных лиц из этого ограниченного, замкнутого и к тому же сильно коррупированного круга, воздействие, к-рое осуществлялось любимыми, даже самыми беззащитными, средствами, было необходимой органической частью дипл. деятельности.

Вследствие всех этих причин в дипл. деятельности абсолютистских государств широко применялись обман, вероломство, подкупы, интриги, убийства, дворцовые заговоры и т. п. Д. западноевропейского абсолютизма черпала образцы для своих методов и приемов в Д. северноитальянских городских республик, олигархическая верхушка к-рых вела ожесточенную борьбу за торговое преобладание и политическую гегемонию. Об этой Д. один из ее виднейших деятелей и теоретиков, Маккиавелли, говорил, что ее искусство состоит в том, чтобы «скрывать словами действительность». Маккиавеллиам стал политической философией абсолютных монархий, к-рые в своих действиях руководствовались доктриной «государственного интереса»;

ны), из аристократии (Рим). Отсюда, они союзников, разублаживать др. правителей, серьезно и оратор и тай в афише утверждал, что больше, эдем. Дипл. ли рабавля, сводились или политикившихся до ро, о нейтралю в политикющих релии (Греции) или знее широких тий для боррд. Однако раво по вырах форм органисти, ни единстве, напр. в в условияхности госу- непрерывные и увеличения грабежа, умных, облагас- стьян. В проамии они вели унаши в перо- зные договоры, Сравнительно звычайные по- б. обычно из чства, как наи- в то время льства оформи- тии с помощью в (целованию знами феодаль- ялись под эги- ркви для сов- тических меро- товые походы), х мероприятий оль Д. нап — . того времени. зренниями часто в соборы, на ствовали свет-

как высшего критерия в политике, преобладающего над другими — моральными, правовыми и пр. — критериями. Сами дипломаты того времени без стеснения отзывались о Д. как об искусстве обмана. Английский дипломат XVII в. Генри Уоттон, давая определение посла, писал: «Посол есть честный муж, посылаемый за границу, чтобы лгать в интересах своего государства». Еще менее лестно отзывались о дипломатах ученые и писатели. Французский писатель XVII в. Жан Лабрюйер писал, что вся деятельность дипломатов направлена к одной цели: не быть обманутыми и обманывать других.

Разумеется, нельзя сводить к обману и лжи всю характеристику дипл. искусства абсолютистских государств. Д. абсолютизма выработала такие методы, как создание коалиций под предлогом поддержания «политического равновесия», заключение наступательных и оборонительных союзов и договоров о дружбе с целью собирания сил против будущего противника, заключение пактов о нейтралитете с целью подготовки выгодного соотношения сил в готовящейся войне, разжигание религиозных, национальных и политических раздоров и смут в иностранных государствах, ведение в них политической пропаганды. К последнему методу уже прибегал кардинал Ришелье, обращавший большое внимание на составление политических памфлетов и на их распространение за границей. Однако при всем этом личное воздействие на королей, их первых министров, фаворитов, придворных и т. д. с помощью подкупа, обмана, интриг, заговоров занимало не последнее место в дипл. арсенале абсолютистских государств. Довольно большое место в Д. абсолютистских монархий занимали вопросы, связанные с престолонаследием и с династическими браками.

В эпоху капитализма главным содержанием международных отношений становится борьба капиталистических государств за завоевание рынков, за захват «сфер влияния», за раздел, а затем, в период империализма, за передел мира, за

мировое экономическое и политическое господство. На службу задачам этой борьбы ставится и Д. Правда, буржуазная Д. на домополитической стадии развития капитализма служила и прогрессивным задачам. В XIX в. она играла немалую роль в успешном завершении национально-освободительных движений и образовании национальных государств в Латинской Америке, на Балканах, в национальном объединении Германии и Италии. Такую же прогрессивную роль играет в настоящее время Д. новых независимых государств Азии и Африки. С другой стороны, в эпоху капитализма меняются социальная основа и политический строй государства. Формы и методы Д. подвергаются заметной модернизации. Д. стала широко пользоваться экономической заинтересованностью влиятельных капиталистических групп. Продолжается использование внутренних политических разногласий в др. странах. Обсуждение вопросов внешней политики в парламентах и на страницах прессы побуждает Д. стремиться создать себе опору среди более широких кругов господствующего класса в иностранных государствах, поддерживать связи с теми или иными политическими партиями, с представителями прессы. Д. ищет новые способы воздействия на внешнюю политику иностранных государств и на политические настроения в собственной стране. Но коренная сущность Д. отнюдь не меняется. Дипл. искусство эпохи капитализма, так же как и дипл. искусство периода абсолютизма, является дипл. искусством эксплуататорских государств, т. е. совокупностью способов и средств осуществления политики, чуждой и враждебной народам и вследствие этого проводимой путем обмана народных масс как за границей, так и в собственной стране. В. И. Ленин не раз убедительнейшим образом показывал, как торжественные парадные декларации и фразы «всегда служили и служат в устах буржуазных дипломатов для обмана доверчивых и павших масс угнетенного народа» (Соч., т. 24, стр. 39). Такие дипломаты, как Та-

лейран, Клаа также бурд Д. любили Д. стремятся быть правдивым словарем тической академии, что г. войны в Д. и шенно новый ции». Однако являются ли ведливому зам ветского истор бы ни изобретены, они не что цели буря сводятся к 1 намерений и ший, к-рых и не существует. Не что в буржуа немало типич тизма. В ч отошла в прош. дипломатическ зывает В. И. с слято в самы листических ст демократических т, 25, стр. 67). « троль» парламе лигичкой являе ным, как и гарантии» в бу В. И. Ленин г вопросы: вой ческие вопросы гореткой капит манивают не т часто обманыва т. 30, стр. 42 внешней политк правительства 1 тельных групп олигархии.

Эта черта б больше усилил лизма на почв рации государс увеличивающег дарственного а ческим монопол азной Д. в определены монополии и ба ной капиталист дическая моно

политику за и Д. домонополия ка агрессивив играли напернических национальностей Амциональном Италии. и играет в независимой Африки. у капитализма основа ударства. гаются за стала шимической национальностей. Продолженнейших в др. странах в высшей и на странах Д. среди более действующего государства, или иными, с предлицет новое пошнюю по государства и ения в собрешняя существует. Дипл. ализма, так тво периода дипл. искусств государств, способов и политики, и народам и адимой путем как за граэнной стране. дительнейшим к торжественности и фразы ужат в устах тств для обнаивных масс (Соч., т. 24, маты, как Та-

лейран, Кларендон или Висмарк, а также буржуазные авторы книг о Д. любили говорить о том, что их Д. стремятся завоевывать доверие и быть правдивой. В «Дипломатическом словаре» Парижской дипломатической академии даже утверждалось, что после первой мировой войны «в Д. начинает входить совершенно новый дух, моральный принцип». Однако подобные рассуждения являются лицемерными. По справедливому замечанию известного советского историка Е. В. Тарле, как бы ни изопрялись буржуазные авторы, они не могут скрыть того, что цели буржуазной Д. неизменно сводятся к маскировке истинных намерений и к симуляции намерений, к-рых на самом деле не существует. Но удивительно поэтому, что в буржуазной Д. сохраняется немало типических черт Д. абсолютизма. В частности, отсюда не отошла в прошлое тайная Д. «Тайна» дипломатических сношений, — указывает В. И. Ленин, — соблюдается свело в самых свободных капиталистических странах, в наиболее демократических республиках» (Соч., т. 25, стр. 67). «Демократический контроль» парламентов над внешней политикой является столь же иллюзорным, как и др. «демократические гарантии» в буржуазном государстве. В. И. Ленин пишет: «самые важные вопросы: война, мир, дипломатические вопросы решаются ничтожной горсткой капиталистов, которые обманывают не только массы, но даже часто обманывают и парламент» (Соч., т. 30, стр. 454). Главные рычаги внешней политики остаются в руках правительств и их хозяев — влиятельных групп капиталистической олигархии.

Эта черта буржуазной Д. еще больше усилилась в период империализма на почве растущей концентрации государственной власти и все увеличивающегося подчинения государственного аппарата капиталистическим монополиям. Задачи буржуазной Д. в эпоху империализма определяются интересами крупных монополий и банков. В каждой крупной капиталистической стране объединении монополистов фактически

направляют внешнюю политику, руководящие дипл. посты занимают монополисты или их непосредственные ставленники, а дипл. аппарат заполняется гл. обр. лицами, принадлежащими к аристократической или плутократической верхушке. Так, в США Национальная ассоциация промышленников, в особенности ее «советательный комитет», состоящий из заправил небольшого числа монополистических компаний («Стального треста», «Сталлард ойл», «Дженерал электрик», «Дженерал моторс» и др.) оказывает решающее влияние на весь внешнеполитический курс. Среди наиболее видных американских дипломатов после второй мировой войны мы встречаем прежде всего людей, тесно связанных с монополистическими группами Рокфеллера (напр., Джон Фостер Даллес, Герберт Гувер младший, Уинстон Олдрич, Нельсон Рокфеллер), Моргана (напр., Дин Ачесон, Генри Кэббот Лодж), Диллона (напр., Дуглас Диллон) и ряда др.

Концентрация руководства дипл. деятельностью в руках небольшой горстки монополистов, так же как агрессивный экспансионистский характер внешней политики империалистических государств, не может не наложить отпечатка на характер методов и приемов современной буржуазной Д.

Однако современная буржуазная Д., особенно после второй мировой войны, вынуждена выработать свои методы и приемы в новых исторических условиях — в условиях существования на мировой арене могучих демократических сил в лице мировой социалистической системы и новых независимых государств Азии и Африки, в условиях сильно возросшей роли народных масс в политической жизни всех стран мира, в условиях новых особенностей международной жизни, вызванных значительно расширившимися потребностями международного сотрудничества, наличия широкой сети международных организаций, государственных и общественных, наличия новых каналов влияния на правящие круги государств и на общественное мнение народов и т. д.

В этих условиях Д. крупных империалистических держав обращается к нек-рым новым приемам для осуществления империалистических внешнеполитических целей. Опасаясь мирного соревнования с социалистическими странами и укрепления новых независимых государств, возникших в борьбе против колониализма, стремясь к подавлению социалистических и демократических сил во всем мире, Д. империалистических держав маскирует свои агрессивные цели посредством обвинения миролюбивых социалистических стран в агрессивных намерениях и обоснования таким путем пресловутой политики «с позиции силы», политики «балансирования на грани войны» и т. п. Она создает агрессивные военные блоки против социалистических стран под флагом оборонительных объединений, якобы соответствующих Уставу ООН. Стремясь сохранить колониальное господство, Д. империалистических держав облакает отношения политической и экономической зависимости, там где колонизаторам удается их сохранить, в форму мнимо равноправных военно-политических союзов, военной, экономической, технической и т. п. «помощи». Там, где не удается сохранить такие отношения, империалистическая Д. прибегает к старым, испытанным приемам интервенции, разжигания гражданской войны, организации заговоров, террора, давления, угроз, интриг, подкупов и т. п. Не только во взаимоотношениях с зависимыми государствами, но и во взаимоотношениях со всеми др. государствами империалистическая Д. не оставляет своих «традиционных» приемов. Современная практика их весьма многообразна, начиная от «выкручивания рук», применяемого делегацией США на сессиях Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН и кончая всей механикой «холодной войны», вплоть до субсидирования подпольных контрреволюционных организаций, ведущих подрывную деятельность против социалистических стран. Разумеется, современная буржуазная Д. в то же самое время обслуживает тенденции тех или иных

капиталистических государств к укреплению политических и экономических связей с др. капиталистическими государствами и даже тенденции отдельных капиталистических государств к укреплению политических и экономических связей с социалистическими государствами и при этом пользуется теми формами и методами, к-рые сложились в повседневной практике мирного международного сотрудничества. Однако приемы, с помощью к-рых современная буржуазная Д. обслуживает агрессивные и экспансионистские тенденции внешней политики крупных империалистических держав, являются в ней господствующими.

Для оправдания антинародной внешней политики в глазах народов в обстановке возросшей политической активности трудящихся масс буржуазная Д. обращается к специальным средствам и способам, маскирующим данную политику и придающим дипл. деятельности видимость широкой гласности. Этому служит опубликование в печати сообщений о дипл. переговорах, дипл. пресс-конференции, выступления дипломатов на политических собраниях, в печати, по радио, телевидению и т. д. Для этого же при дипл. ведомствах, а иногда отдельно от них, в качестве самостоятельных учреждений создается особая служба по делам печати и обширный пропагандистский аппарат. Д. широко прибегает и к помощи неофициальных средств пропаганды. В условиях буржуазного строя все вышеуказанные средства и способы «открытой Д.» по сути дела являются средствами и способами маскировки действительных целей и намерений правительств. Имея в виду мнимую гласность буржуазной Д., нек-рые буржуазные публицисты и авторы книг о Д. (напр., Уолтер Липпман, Гарольд Никольсон, Сибли Хаджестон) стали называть ее «повой» и даже «народной» Д. На самом деле это старая по всей своей сущности, по всему своему духу и глубоко антинародная Д., вынужденная только прибегать к нек-рым новым маневрам, уловкам и декорациям.

Подлинно новой Д. как по сущности, так и по является социализм и стран народности их Д. по сущности их по общественног строя. В социализме нет классов и партий в войнах или странами. Народы стран стремятся мунистического о нию международ легчайших осущ лкой цели. Ге внешней политики стран является мирного сосущество с различными соци кими системами и венно и упроч пародами. В селитики социализм поскольку речь шениях между сс цип социализма, брате мпомощь. Основана тики социализм ляются также бор независимость нар веренитета больш дарств и построщи ду всеми государе полного равноправ годы.

Этими целями и лической эле прежде всего и оп ные свойства соци ео принципиальны щественно отлича эксплуататорских г лическая Д. не кой бы то ни было внешнеполитическ внешней политики государств отвечая ресам народов все чают сочувствие и ного человечества. политику, — говор констатируют крах ских планов Ант громаднейшее бои

дарств к ук-
и экономии-
санитаристи-
и даже тен-
нистических
но полити-
связей с со-
арствами и
ми формами
тились в пов-
ного между-
ва. Однако
их современ-
туживает аг-
нисионистско
тики круп-
их держава,
господствую-

антинародной
авах народов
политической
и масс бур-
к специаль-
ям, маскирую-
и придающим
идность ши-
служит оуб-
сообщений о
л. пресс-коп-
дипломатов
аниях, в по-
данию и т. д.
л. ведомствах,
их, в качестве
судений соз-
тагандистский
прибегает и к
средств про-
буржуазного
ые средства
Д. по сути
вами и спо-
йствительных
правительств.
ласность бур-
буржуазные
книг о Д.
ман, Гарольд
длстон) стали
даже «народ-
ие это старая
сти, по всему
антинародная
ько прибегать
врам, уловкам

Подлинно новой и подлинно народ-
ной Д. как по своим целям и сущ-
ности, так и по формам и методам
является социалистическая Д. СССР
и стран народной демократии. Сущ-
ность их Д. неразрывно связана с
сущностью их внешней политики, а
последняя обусловлена характером
их общественного и государственного
строения. В социалистических странах
нет классов и партий, заинтересован-
ных в войнах или в господстве над др.
странами. Народы социалистических
стран стремятся к построению ком-
мунистического общества и к созда-
нию международных условий, об-
легчающих осуществление этой ве-
ликой цели. Генеральной линией
внешней политики социалистических
стран является ленинский принцип
мирного сосуществования государств
с различными социально-политиче-
скими системами и борьба за сохра-
нение и упрочение мира между
народами. В основе внешней по-
литики социалистических стран,
поскольку речь идет об их отно-
шениях между собой, лежит прин-
цип социалистического интерна-
ционализма, братский союз и взаи-
мопомощь. Основами внешней поли-
тики социалистических стран яв-
ляются также борьба за свободу и
независимость народов, уважение су-
веренитета больших и малых госу-
дарств и построение отношений меж-
ду всеми государствами на началах
полного равноправия и взаимной вы-
годы.

Этими целями и принципами социа-
листической внешней политики
прежде всего и определяются основ-
ные свойства социалистической Д.,
ее принципиальные особенности, су-
щественно отличающие ее от Д. всех
эксплуататорских государств. Соци-
листическая Д. не нуждается в ка-
кой бы то ни было маскировке своих
внешнеполитических целей, ибо цели
внешней политики социалистических
государств отвечают коренным инте-
ресам народов всего мира и встре-
чают сочувствие всего прогрессив-
ного человечества. «Нашу мирную
политику, — говорил В. И. Ленин,
констатируя крах интервенционист-
ских планов Антанты, — одобряет
громаднейшее большинство населе-

ния земли» (Соч., т. 30, стр. 365).
В противоположность Д. эксплуататорских государств социалистическая
Д. носит прямой и открытый харак-
тер. «Буржуазная дипломатия, —
говорил В. И. Ленин, — неспособна
понять приемов нашей новой ди-
пломатии открытых прямых заяв-
лений» (Соч., т. 31, стр. 250). «Этот
старый мир имеет свою старую ди-
пломатию, которая не может пове-
рять, что можно говорить прямо
и открыто» (Соч., т. 33, стр.
124).

Социалистическая Д. опирается
на поддержку широких народных
масс и стремится как можно шире
разъяснить им свои цели и смысл
осуществляемых ею внешнеполити-
ческих мероприятий. В политической
сознательности народных масс как
собственной страны, так и др. стран,
в понимании массами международной
политики социалистическая Д. видит
один из важнейших источников своей
силы. Поэтому социалистическая Д.
во всей своей деятельности уделяет
большое внимание тому, чтобы до-
вести до сведения народов всего мира
правду о внешней политике и меж-
дународных отношениях.

В противоположность буржуазной
Д., неоднократно жертвующей про-
возглашенными ранее внешнеполити-
ческими принципами и самыми тор-
жественными декларациями ради по-
литических выгод данного момента,
социалистическая Д. глубоко прин-
ципиальна. Она не склонна к конъюн-
ктурным комбинациям и дипл. сдел-
кам, идущим вразрез с принципиаль-
ными основами социалистической
внешней политики. Так, когда на
Генуэзской конференции 1922 капита-
листические державы требовали от
Советского государства отказа от
аннулирования займов и долгов цар-
ского и Временного правительства,
от национализации иностранных
предприятий и от монополии внеш-
ней торговли, предлагая взамен
признание де-юре, Советское госу-
дарство решительно отвергло эти
требования и в последующем доби-
лось признания де-юре при полном
сохранении всех принципов и ин-
ститутов своего строя, своей внут-
ренней и внешней политики.

Принципиальность социалистическая Д. сочетается с гибкостью, с готовностью к сотрудничеству и соглашениям, к уступкам, необходимым для достижения сотрудничества и соглашения, но не выходящим за рамки проводимых ею внешнеполитических принципов. Социалистическая Д. сочетает осторожность и выдержку, умение не поддаваться на провокации и устранять конфликты с твердостью и решительностью.

Социалистическую Д. неизменно характеризует верность данному слову и взятым на себя обязательствам. Убедительные иллюстрации этого дает дипл. история Советского государства. Даже такой реакционный политический деятель, как У. Черчилль, вынужден был констатировать в английском парламенте 27. II 1945: «Никакое правительство не выполняло точнее свои обязательства даже в ущерб самому себе, нежели русское советское правительство». Это свойство социалистической Д., столь резко отличающее ее от Д. эксплуататорских государств, вытекает из миролюбивого характера внешней политики социалистических государств, из стабильности основных линий этой политики.

На протяжении истории внешних сношений Советского государства, а также др. социалистических государств сложились дипл. методы, соответствующие сущности социалистической Д. и ее вышеуказанным принципиальным особенностям. В своей совокупности эти методы образуют новый тип дипл. искусства — дипл. искусство стран социализма, которое помогает им воздействовать на международную обстановку в интересах трудящихся.

Среди этих методов одно из первых мест занимает метод непосредственных дипл. переговоров. Он широко применяется социалистическими государствами как для установления сотрудничества с др. государствами в деле осуществления общих мероприятий по обеспечению международного мира и безопасности, так и для мирного урегулирования спорных вопросов и смягчения международной напряженности. Н. С. Хрущев говорил по этому поводу: «Теперь уже

любому здравомыслящему человеку ясно, что силой оружия в наши дни международные проблемы разрешить невозможно, что есть только один путь — путь мирных переговоров с учетом интересов всех участников переговоров на основе равноправия и взаимной выгоды. Советский Союз стоит именно за такой путь решения международных проблем».

Д. социалистических государств, опираясь на сочувствие и поддержку широких народных масс всего мира, с неизменным успехом разоблачает агрессивные замыслы империалистических правительств и маскирующие их дипл. маневры, открывая глаза народам на действительное положение вещей. Она делает это с трибуны дипл. конференций, в официальных дипл. актах и документах и в прессе. Разоблачение агрессивных планов и действий империалистов — один из важных методов социалистической Д., с помощью которой она мобилизует против агрессивной политики империалистических правительств демократическое общественное мнение и народные массы всего мира.

Выдающееся место среди методов социалистической Д. занимает выдвижение конструктивных предложений по требующим урегулирования международным вопросам, в особенности по вопросам обеспечения всеобщей безопасности и смягчения международной напряженности. Социалистическая Д. неизменно выдвигала и выдвигает такие предложения как в рамках взаимоотношений с отдельными государствами, так и во всеобщем международном масштабе. Еще в первом декрете Советского государства — декрете о мире 1917 — оно выдвинуло программу всеобщего демократического мира и новых международных отношений — без порабощения народов, территориальных захватов и тайной Д. В 20—30-х годах Советское правительство вносило ряд предложений по вопросам разоружения и коллективной безопасности. В годы второй мировой войны и в годы, непосредственно следовавшие за ее окончанием, Советское правительство внесло большой вклад в опре-

деление основ
ства (в соде
мирных дого
В послевоенн
социалистичес
силы предлож
чения между
опасности: по
вооружений и
оружия, о пр
этого оружия,
зоны в Центра
плана Рапаци
безопасности
скому вопрос
отражении
о всеобщем и

Особенности
предложений
являются их
действенность
редко встреч
буржуазной
только по ви
лены на мир
враждебны м
вом обмана
предложения
открывают по
ально обсе
возглашаемых
при условии
ложений в ж
служить пр
правительств
литете Австр
укреплению
Европе. Пре
ческой Д., в
столь отчетли
жащих урег
родных вопро
периалистиче
делить свою
этим вопрос
в случае от
ложекши пок
предпринять
шаги в поль
прогиводейст
мым эти пре
саморазобла
ских правит
тельность на

В борьбу
ческой агрес
сударства и
валась проти

дому человеку
ди в наши дни
мы разрешить
только один
переговор с
х участников
равноправия и
ветский Союз
путь решения
ем».

х государств,
ю и поддержку
сс всего мира,
м разоблачает
империалисти-
маскирующие
скрывающая глаза
льное положение
ет это с трици-
и документах
юнно агрессив-
ный империали-
стических методов
с помощью
против агрес-
сипериалистиче-
мократическое
и народные

среди методов
занимает вид-
ных предло-
урегулирова-
вопросам, в
осам обеспече-
ности и смяг-
напряженнос-
Д. неизменно
ет такие пред-
их взаимоотно-
государствами,
международном
ервом декрете
ва — декрете о
двинуло про-
мократического
народных отно-
шения народов,
затов и тайной
Советское пра-
ряд предложе-
ужения и кол-
ги. В годы вто-
и в годы, не-
довавшие за се-
ное правитель-
вклад в опре-

деление основ послевоенного устрой-
ства (в содержание Устава ООН,
мирных договоров 1947 и т. д.).
В послевоенный период СССР и др.
социалистические государства вно-
сили предложения в целях обеспе-
чения международного мира и безо-
пасности: по вопросам о сокращении
вооружений и запрещении ядерного
оружия, о прекращении испытаний
этого оружия, о создании безатомной
зоны в Центральной Европе (так наз.
плана Рапацкого), о коллективной
безопасности Европы, по герман-
скому вопросу, по вопросу о пред-
отвращении внезапного нападения,
о всеобщем и полном разоружении.

Особенностями конструктивных
предложений социалистической Д.
являются их реализм и политическая
действенность. В отличие от не-
редко встречающихся в практике
буржуазной Д. проектов, к-рые
только по внешней форме направ-
лены на мирные цели, а на деле
враждебны миру и служат средст-
вом обмена общественного мнения,
предложения социалистической Д.
открывают полную возможность ре-
ально обеспечить достижение про-
возглашаемых в них мирных целей
при условии проведения этих пред-
ложений в жизнь. Примером может
служить предложение Советского
правительства о постоянном нейтра-
литете Австрия, способствовавшее
укреплению мира и безопасности в
Европе. Предложения социалисти-
ческой Д., как правило, содержат
столь отчетливую постановку подле-
жащих урегулированию междуна-
родных вопросов, что вынуждают им-
периалистические государства опре-
делить свою настоящую позицию по
этим вопросам и, следовательно,
в случае отклонения данных пред-
ложений, показывают их нежелание
предпринять какие-либо реальные
шаги в пользу укрепления мира и
противодействия агрессии. Тем са-
мым эти предложения способствуют
саморазоблачению империалистиче-
ских правительств и повышают бди-
тельность народных масс.

В борьбе против империалисти-
ческой агрессии Д. Советского го-
сударства иногда успешно пользо-
валась противоречиями между импе-

риалистическими государствами для
того, чтобы помешать им создать
единый фронт против СССР. В. И.
Ленин учил: «Надо уметь использо-
вать противоречия и противополож-
ности между империалистами» (Соч.,
т. 31, стр. 410—411). Всякая Д.
стремится воспользоваться противо-
речиями между противниками. Но в
отличие от Д. эксплуататорских го-
сударств, к-рая в большинстве слу-
чаев пытается пользоваться проти-
воречиями между др. государствами
— и даже искусственно вызвать или
обострить их, — для того чтобы уси-
лить международную напряженность
и создать обстановку, благоприятст-
вующую осуществлению собственных
агрессивных замыслов, социалисти-
ческая Д. пользуется противоре-
чиями между империалистическими
государствами в интересах мира, в
целях разрушения сколачиваемых
империалистами агрессивных бло-
ков и предотвращения их агрессив-
ных действий, следовательно — для
укрепления всеобщей безопасности.
Образцом такого использования про-
тиворечий между империалистами
является заключение Советским го-
сударством Брестского мирного до-
говора, давшее возможность полу-
чить мирную передышку и укрепить
Советскую власть в первые годы ре-
волюции. Др. примером использо-
вания противоречий между импе-
риалистами для обезвреживания их
агрессивных замыслов является
внешнеполитическая стратегия и так-
тика Советского государства — годы
перед второй мировой войной и во
время войны, когда советская Д.
разрушила ряд попыток мировой им-
периалистической реакции создать
единый фронт всех капиталистиче-
ских государств против СССР и
сорвала попытки правящих кру-
гов ряда империалистических госу-
дарств столкнуть гитлеровскую Гер-
манию с СССР.

Новые методы Д. складываются во
взаимоотношениях Советского Союза
со странами народной демократии.
Это отношения совершенно нового
типа, лишенные антагонистического
характера, строящиеся на принципе
пролетарского интернационализма и
на братском сотрудничестве во имя

общих целей, при полном уважении суверенных прав и национальных интересов каждой социалистической страны. В то время как политические отношения между капиталистическими странами, даже связанными договором о союзе, содержат элементы антагонистических противоречий и соперничества, если не на почве стремления к гегемонии одного «союзника» над другим, то на почве стремления к поддержанию «равновесия», политические отношения между социалистическими странами исключают какие бы то ни было антагонистические противоречия и представляют собой отношения дружбы и тесной братской взаимопомощи. Для поддержания таких отношений социалистические государства применяют новые методы, методы конструктивной деятельности, способствующие сплочению социалистических стран и координации их мероприятий в борьбе за их безопасность и за всеобщий мир. Методы социалистической Д., применяемые во взаимоотношениях социалистических стран друг с другом, непосредственно перерастают в организационные формы совместных усилий интернационально сплоченных свободных народов этих стран во имя общих идеалов построения в них коммунизма и сохранения всеобщего мира.

Социалистическая Д. СССР и стран народной демократии осуществляет новые политические цели, применяет новые методы и играет новую роль. Это научно обоснованная Д., подлинно народная Д., это Д., к-рая добивается изменения международной действительности в соответствии с требованиями исторического прогресса и, следовательно, имеет прогрессивное значение в развитии общества. Именно вследствие всего этого социалистическая Д. неизменно добивается серьезных успехов в сложных условиях международной жизни современной эпохи.

«ДИПЛОМАТИЯ ДОЛЛАРА» — экспансионистская политика США, направленная на закабаление др. стран американскими монополиями. Впервые выражение «Д. д.» было употреблено президентом США У. Тафтом в 1912.

«Д. д.» широко использует как методы военно-политического давления и прямой вооруженной интервенции, так и предоставление кабальных займов, финансовой и экономической «помощи» в целях установления господства американских империалистических кругов в др. странах. Правящие круги США особенно широко применяют «Д. д.» (в сочетании с др. средствами давления, в т. ч. атомной дипломатией) после второй мировой войны. «Д. д.» служит оружием для борьбы с национально-освободительными движениями угнетенных народов и для поддержки реакционных режимов во всем мире; играет значительную роль в экспансионистской политике, проводимой монополистическими кругами США (см. «Взаимного обеспечения безопасности» программа; «План Маршалла»; «Доктрина Трумэна»).

ДИРКСЕН, Герберт (1882—1949) — немецкий дипломат, крупный помещик. В 1928—33 — германский посол в СССР. С сентября 1933 по февраль 1938 — посол в Японии, принимал участие в подготовке «антикоммунистического пакта». В марте 1938 был назначен послом в Англию. Занимал этот пост до сентября 1939. Находясь в Лондоне, вел секретные переговоры с представителями английского правительства о размежевании сфер влияния и о заключении широкого экономического и политического англо-германского соглашения (см. *Англо-германские переговоры (тайные) 1939*).

Дипл. архив Д., попавший в годы второй мировой войны в руки Советского правительства и опубликованный в СССР (см. «Документы и материалы кануна второй мировой войны», т. 2, 1948), содержит большой материал, разоблачающий империалистическую политику развязывания второй мировой войны, проводившуюся крупнейшими капиталистическими державами.

ДИСКРИМИНАЦИЯ в международных отношениях — установление для представителей, организаций или граждан одного государства меньших прав, чем для представителей, организаций или граждан др. государства. В порядке

Д. капитал нередко устанавливает в отношении товаров как сравнение с к товарам пр Д. является родного праг собой приме дарства, подв мероприятий. роприятиями репрессалии.

Ярким примером в отношении СССР были народни проводили п войны США лстические попытки но цели — ослаб ских стран (ческой мощи (демократии, а тиворечий и 1 ствами в импе «ДОБРОГО КА» — прово: годы XX в. в ей экспансии полушария.


Проводивши политика «бо крыто утвержд экономическое нов вмешатель ральной и Юж к концу 20-х фликт внутри юза. Рост сои; риканских стр ки» и успехи американских риод мирового анса 1929—33, тельство през таться от нек-г цих колониали выведена амер хотя из Шик так наз. мем ашулировании вельта относил силы для «зани

Пришедшее тельство през провозгласило

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"Diplomacy"
Translation of pages 457-468 of
Diplomaticheskii Slovar' (Diplomatic Dictionary), Vol. 1
State Publishing House for Political Literature; Moscow, 1960

DIPLOMACY - the official activities of heads of states, governments and special foreign relations organs in the implementation of negotiations, correspondence and other peaceful means, objectives and tasks of the foreign policy of a state as determined by the interests of the ruling class, and also for the protection of the rights and interests of a state beyond its borders. The word "diplomacy" comes from the Greek word "diploma" - the name given in ancient Greece to small folded boards with appropriate inscriptions, given to envoys as credentials and documents confirming their authority. The word "diplomacy" to designate state activity in the field of foreign relations came into use in Western Europe at the end of the 17th century.

Diplomacy constitutes a major means of official foreign policy. Sometimes the words "diplomacy" and "foreign policy" are used in the same sense (for example, reference is made to the "diplomatic principles" or the "foreign policy principles" of a particular state or government).

However, these are not synonymous concepts. According to V. I. Lenin's definition, policy (politika) is "the direction of a state, the definition of the forms, tasks, and contents of state activities" (Lenin's Collected Works, Vol 21, p 14). The concept "foreign policy" encompasses both the objectives and interests of a state which determine the course of its activities in the international arena, and the means, forms and methods of those activities. The objectives and interests of a state in international relations are realized primarily by means of official relations between governments, but they are also realized by means of trade and cultural relations, maintained both by government agencies and by public and private establishments and corporations (banks, commercial firms, scientific organizations, religious societies, etc.). In the end, they are realized by the use of armed force, which, depending on the class nature of the state and the character of its foreign policy, can serve both aggressive purposes as well as the purposes of defense against aggression. Thus, diplomacy is only one of the means of foreign policy of a state. However, among all the means of foreign policy, diplomacy occupies a most important position. In distinction from other means of foreign policy, each of which has its specific direct missions in the activity of a state, for diplomacy the sole mission is the implementation of the foreign policy objectives of a state and the determination of those ways and means which are required for such implementation. The task of diplomacy includes not only the skillful use of official forms of relations between governments and successful political influence on foreign governments within the frameworks of those forms, but also the combining of given forms with other means of foreign policy for the attainment of the foreign policy objectives of a state.

The basic forms of diplomatic activity are: (1) diplomatic congresses, conferences or meetings, e.g., periodic meetings of representatives of states, starting with the heads of states, heads of governments or foreign ministers and ending with special representatives from among various ranks of officials; (2) diplomatic correspondence by means of

statements, letters, notes, memoranda, etc.; (3) the preparation and conclusion of international treaties and agreements, bilateral and multi-lateral, dealing with the most varied questions pertinent to relations between states; (4) everyday representation of a state abroad, carried out by its embassies and missions and the conduct by them of political and other negotiations with the diplomatic agencies of the countries in which they are located; (5) participation of state representatives in the activities of international organizations, general political and special, general and regional; and (6) interpreting through press media the positions of the government on important international events, and implementing the official publication of international statements and documents.

The overall supervision of diplomatic activities is carried out by the government, and direct operational supervision - by a special department of foreign affairs, headed by a responsible member of the government (minister of foreign affairs).

As for diplomatic methods, i.e., the methods of influencing governments, official representatives, influential political circles and those members of foreign governments who use diplomacy for the attainment of determined foreign policy objectives, they are most varied and do not lend themselves to any strictly defined classification. The actual character of diplomatic methods depends on the time, place and circumstances.

In diplomatic manuals and in books on the history of diplomacy quite frequently diplomacy is defined as "the science of foreign relations," or as "the science of negotiations." Diplomacy as a basic and major means of foreign policy is a component part of politics. From a Marxist viewpoint "politics is a science and an art" (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 31, p 61). Politics should be guided by the laws of public life as revealed by science, and political activities, in order to be successful, must be based on the conclusions of science. However, the application of these conclusions for changing the actual situation in the direction of determined political objectives is an art. All of this also applies to diplomacy. Diplomacy is not the subject of a special science. The attempts of contemporary bourgeois authors to construct a "science of international relations" (Guggenheim, Wright) or a "science of international politics" (Morgenthau) are factitious and groundless. Diplomatic activity should be based on data from a number of sciences: the history of international relations, the histories of individual countries and of economic science in relation to the study of world economy and the economies of individual countries, international law, the laws of individual countries and other subjects, the knowledge of which is necessary for the correct evaluation of overall conditions and specific events of international life and the domestic affairs of various countries. Without such an evaluation diplomacy may find itself in a position where it is unable to implement the foreign policy objectives of the state.

Present day bourgeois diplomacy, as the diplomacy of an obsolescent class, is incapable of using the scientific analysis of reality for support. Although after World War II, in connection with reforms of the British and U.S. diplomatic departments, an extensive departmental scientific research apparatus and even special agencies for the "scientific planning" of foreign policy were created, by no means can the diplomacy of those countries be regarded as scientifically well-grounded, because, as a rule, it does not want to take a sensible view based on the actual state of affairs, it sets goals in opposition to the action of objective regularities determining social development, and it disregards the course of social development which is propelling new social and political forces into the world arena. This very factor constitutes one of the main sources of the miscalculations of bourgeois diplomacy and has led to a number of its serious defeats in the postwar years (for example, in China, in the Near and Middle East, etc.). In contrast to this the diplomacy of the USSR and other socialist states is scientific diplomacy. It is constructed on the foundation of Marxist-Leninist theory and knows how to use the powerful weapon of a Marxist, i.e., truly scientific, analysis of reality and the knowledge of regularities of historical development.

"Marxism," wrote V.I. Lenin, "demands of us the most precise and objectively verified calculation of the correlation of the classes and the specific features of each historical moment. We, Bolsheviks, have always tried to be true to this demand, which is absolutely obligatory for every scientifically based policy."

In their foreign policy the USSR and other socialist states proceed on the basis of the Leninist doctrine that a historical period of simultaneous coexistence of two systems, socialist and capitalist, is inevitable, and on the basis of the scientific conclusion that it is possible under present day conditions to prevent a new world war through the efforts of peace-loving nations. Supported by a profound understanding of the objective regularities of the present epoch and guided by the principles of peaceful coexistence, socialist diplomacy has achieved important successes in strengthening the international position of the socialist states and in the struggle against the aggressive plans and actions of imperialist powers in various parts of the world.

However, the application of conclusions arrived at on the basis of analyzing international relations or the domestic affairs of individual countries to the practical actions of a diplomat cannot be compared with the application of a scientific theorem to earlier established data. The methods of diplomatic activity are based on the attainment of definite objectives, connected with a change of reality, and are used in a constantly changing situation. By no means do the methods add up to any set of standard rules, because the attainment of assigned diplomatic foreign policy objectives with the aid of these methods depends to a considerable degree on the particular operating procedures of the persons applying the methods.

Accumulated as a result of long historical experience, in their application diplomatic methods are creatively supplemented and corrected in accordance with any change in the local conditions. Diplomatic activity constitutes an art, although it should be supported by the conclusions of science.

In the books of bourgeois authors diplomatic art is usually reduced to the subjective qualities of a diplomat, to the qualities of his mind and character. Thus, for example, in the words of Garden, writing at the beginning of the 19th century, it is "a certain tact, the capability of taking advantage of someone else's weaknesses and of calming an irritated country with courtesy." In the words of Kennedy, writing a hundred years later, it is "a penetrating and astute mind combined with a well-developed sense of honor." In such interpretations the social-political nature of diplomatic art is ignored. Of course, in diplomatic art, as in any other, individual capabilities cannot be disregarded. A diplomat's skill in using the forms and methods applied in foreign relations is important for the success of diplomatic activities. However, first and foremost diplomatic art has to be considered in relation to those historically developing social and political conditions in which it is growing and developing. In the final analysis diplomatic art amounts to influencing other states and the international situation in the interests of the ruling class in a given state and in the interests of strengthening the particular social and political structure which supports that state. Consequently, the methods and modes of diplomacy are closely conditioned by the objectives of that foreign policy which such diplomacy is actually implementing. And the foreign policy of a state, as the Marxists always emphasize, is the direct continuation of its domestic policy. Consequently, the character of diplomatic art is closely connected with the political structure and the social nature of states, or to be more exact, with those states which are participants in foreign relations in a given historical epoch. Diplomacy, the forms of its organization, its methods and practices should be considered historically, from the specific viewpoint of the main qualities of any particular social and economic structure. Diplomacy is the product of a class society and develops along with the development of a state.

In slaveholding society, relations among states were concentrated on the struggle for territorial expansion, for increasing the number of slaves, for seizing foreign wealth, and for establishing political hegemony over other countries. In these conditions war, as a rule, prevails over diplomacy as a means of foreign policy, although the importance of diplomacy in the foreign-policy struggle of slaveholding states can by no means be denied. In the absence of a world market and of regular international ties capable of spanning the entire world of that time, diplomatic relations developed chiefly in separate geographical regions among a relatively limited group of states, although in certain periods they were maintained on a relatively broader scale. The forms of diplomacy depended closely on the nature of the state system. In the theocracies of the ancient East,

diplomatic activities were directed by the sovereigns, in the slaveholding democracies of ancient Greece they were directed by people's assemblies, and in ancient Rome they were directed by the senate and later by the emperors. Diplomatic ties were maintained by temporary embassies which were sent to other countries on a specific mission and, on their return, reported to those who had sent them. The ambassadors were recruited from among members of the ruler's family or the very close circle of friends of the ruler (Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia), from outstanding orators, writers, and actors (Athens), and from the aristocratic oligarchy (Rome). On being sent to foreign countries, they were to enlist allies, render enemies harmless, learn the political intentions of other governments, etc. Sometimes their activities acquired extreme importance. The ancient Greek orator and diplomat Aeschines, speaking in the Athenian national assembly, maintained that a skillful ambassador is more valuable than a skillful general. The diplomatic methods which were used by slaveholding states included the conclusion of military or political alliances consolidated by treaties of friendship, peace, and neutrality, the use of existing religious societies for political purposes (in Greece), or the creation of more or less broad political coalitions for combating the enemy, etc. However, slaveholding society did not develop any uniform forms for organizing diplomatic activities or any uniform methods of diplomacy.

In feudal society, for example in medieval Europe in conditions of feudal parcelling, the sovereigns constantly waged "private wars" among themselves for the purpose of increasing their land holdings, plundering, and increasing the number of subjects and peasants bound to them. In the intervals between wars, they conducted "private diplomacy," i.e., they entered into talks, concluded peace treaties and military alliances, etc. The relatively rare temporary extraordinary embassies usually consisted of representatives of the clergy, which was the best educated segment of society at that time. The embassies legitimized their diplomatic activities with the help of religious ceremonies (kissing of the cross, etc.). At times the feudal sovereigns united under the aegis of the Catholic church for joint military-political measures (for example, the crusades), and papal diplomacy, as the most highly developed diplomacy of that time, played an important role in preparing these measures. Church councils often constituted important diplomatic conferences, they were often attended by secular sovereigns and included discussions of political questions.

In comparison with the feudal states of West Europe, Byzantium maintained broader diplomatic relations (with embassies of Europe, Russia, and states of the East). A special department on foreign affairs was created in Byzantium and there was a well-developed diplomatic ceremonial inherited to a large degree from ancient Rome. Besides diplomatic channels, Byzantium expanded its political influence to other countries through Christian missionaries, as well as by means of trade ties.

Diplomatic activities in Russia also had their peculiar nature. In the period of feudal parcelling, along with treaties on alliances, trade, colonization, etc., as forms of diplomacy, an important role was played by conferences of princes, mediation in resolving disputes among them, etc.

Toward the end of the feudal era, the institution of permanent representation made its appearance, above all in the practice of the papal curia, Byzantium, and the Venetian Republic.

Modern bourgeois diplomacy began to emerge during the transition from feudalism to capitalism, when large, centralized, absolutist states were formed in the west and east of Europe. The foreign policy of these states was dictated by the dynastic interests of the monarchists, their aspiration to increase their power and wealth and also to acquire political hegemony. It was also dictated by the interests of the nobility and the arising bourgeoisie, by the aspiration for national unity and expansion of state territory, for the seizure of foreign lands both in Europe and in the colonies, and for supremacy on the seas and the world trade routes. To implement these interests and tendencies, the absolutist states created permanent armies and an extensive diplomatic service. Temporary embassies yielded to permanent ones, which were extended throughout all of Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries. Diplomacy became an extremely important branch of state activities. Special departments of foreign affairs were created everywhere. They directed all the diplomatic activities of the state and were usually headed by the first ministers, and often actually by the monarchs themselves.

The foreign-policy goals which the diplomacy of absolutism served had a direct and profound influence on the nature of its methods. Marx and Engels characterized the diplomacy of absolutist states in the following words: "Set the peoples one against the other, use one people to suppress another, in order thereby to extend the existence of absolute power -- this is what the skill and activities of all the rulers and their diplomats who have existed until now amounted to (K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, Volume 5, page 160). The nature of diplomacy was also greatly influenced by the fact that supervision of the foreign policy of the absolutist states was concentrated in the hands of a very narrow segment of the ruling class: the sovereigns, members of their courts, and a small handful of higher bureaucrats. The influence exerted on individuals by this limited, exclusive, and, moreover, strongly corrupted circle, influence implemented by any, even the most impudent means, was a necessary organic part of diplomatic activities.

As a result of all these reasons, fraud, treachery, bribery, intrigue, murder, palace conspiracy, etc. were broadly used in the diplomatic activities of the absolutist states. The diplomacy of West European absolutism drew models for its methods in the diplomacy of the North Italian city republics, the oligarchic leadership of which struggled

bitterly for trade supremacy and political hegemony. Speaking of this diplomacy, one of its most prominent representatives and theoreticians, Machiavelli, said that the art of it consists in "concealing reality with words." Machiavellianism became the political philosophy of absolute monarchies, which were guided in their activities by the doctrine of "state interests" as the highest criterion in politics, a criterion which predominates over others, such as moral and legal criteria. The diplomats themselves at that time spoke without constraint about diplomacy as the art of fraud. An English diplomat of the 17th century, Henry Wotton, in giving the definition of an ambassador, wrote: "An ambassador is an honest man sent abroad to lie on behalf of his state." Scholars and writers spoke even less flatteringly about the diplomats. A French writer of the 17th century, Jean La Bruyere, wrote that all the activities of the diplomats were directed toward one goal: Do not be deceived and deceive others.

Of course, we cannot characterize the entire diplomatic art of the absolutist states as just fraud and lies. The diplomacy of absolutism has developed such methods as the creation of coalitions in the guise of maintaining "political balance," the conclusion of offensive and defensive alliances and treaties of friendship for the purpose of gathering forces against a future enemy, the conclusion of neutrality pacts for the purpose of preparing a favorable correlation of forces for an imminent war, the unleashing of religious, national, and political discord and confusion in foreign states, and the spreading of political propaganda in them. Cardinal Richelieu resorted to the latter method while devoting much attention to compiling political pamphlets and distributing them abroad. With all this, however, the personal influencing of kings, their first ministers, favorites, members of the court, etc., with the help of bribery, fraud, intrigue, and plots acquired an important place in the diplomatic arsenal of the absolutist states. Quite an important place in the diplomacy of absolute monarchies was assigned to questions involving succession to the throne and dynastic marriages.

The chief mission of international relations in the era of capitalism is the struggle of the capitalist states to capture markets, to seize the "spheres of influence," to divide, and then, in the period of imperialism, to redivide the world and gain world economic and political supremacy. Diplomacy is serving the tasks of this struggle. It is true that bourgeois diplomacy also served progressive missions in the pre-monopolistic stage of development of capitalism. In the 19th century, it played an important role in the successful completion of national-liberation movements and the formation of national states in Latin America, in the Balkans, and in the national unification of Germany and Italy. The diplomacy of the newly independent states of Asia and Africa is now playing such a progressive role. On the other hand, the social foundation and the political structure of the state are changing in the era of capitalism. The forms and methods

of diplomacy are being subjected to noticeable modernization. Diplomacy has begun to be utilized broadly for the economic interest of influential capitalist groups. The use of internal political disagreements in other countries is continuing. The discussion of questions of foreign policy in the parliaments and on the pages of the newspapers is prompting diplomacy to strive to create support among broader circles of the ruling class in foreign states and to maintain ties with particular political parties and with representatives of the press. Diplomacy is seeking new methods of influencing the foreign policy of foreign states and the political sentiments in its own country. However, the fundamental essence of diplomacy is not changing at all. Diplomatic art in the era of capitalism, just as diplomatic art in the period of absolutism, is the diplomatic art of the exploiter states, i.e., the combination of methods and means for implementing a policy which is alien and hostile to peoples and, as a result of this, is carried out by means of deception of the people's masses both at home and abroad.

V. I. Lenin frequently showed in the most convincing manner how formal solemn statements and phrases "have always served and are serving, through the lips of bourgeois diplomats, to deceive the trusting and naive masses of oppressed people." (Works, vol 24, p 30). Such diplomats as Talleyrand, Clarendon, and Bismarck, as well as bourgeois authors of books on diplomacy, liked to say that their diplomacy strives to win confidence and to be truthful. The Diplomatic Dictionary of the Paris Diplomatic Academy even asserts that after World War I "a completely new spirit and moral principle began to enter into diplomacy." However, such reasoning is hypocritical. In the just remark by the famed Soviet historian Ye. V. Tarle, no matter how sophisticated bourgeois authors might become, they cannot conceal the fact that the aims of bourgeois diplomacy invariably amount to masking true intentions and simulating intentions which do not really exist. Thus it is not surprising that bourgeois diplomacy preserves many typical features of the diplomacy of absolutism. In particular, secret diplomacy has by no means faded into the past. "The 'secret' of diplomatic relations," V. I. Lenin points out, "is sacredly observed in the most free of capitalist countries, in the most democratic of republics." (Works, Vol 25, p 67). "Democratic control" of parliaments over foreign policy is just as illusory as other "democratic guarantees" in the bourgeois state. V. I. Lenin writes: "The most important questions such as war, peace, and diplomatic questions are resolved by a negligible handful of capitalists who not only deceive the masses, but even frequently deceive parliament." (Works, Vol 30, p 454) The main levers of foreign policy remain in the hands of the governments and their bosses, the influential groups in the capitalist oligarchy.

This feature of bourgeois diplomacy was intensified even more in the period of imperialism because of the flourishing concentration of state power and the ever increasing subordination of the state apparatus to the capitalist monopolies. The tasks of bourgeois diplomacy in the period of

imperialism are determined by the interests of the large monopolies and banks. In every major capitalist country, unions of monopolists actually direct foreign policy. Monopolists or their direct henchmen occupy the leading diplomatic posts, while the diplomatic apparatus is mainly staffed by persons from the aristocratic or plutocratic pinnacle. Thus, in the United States, the National Association of Manufacturers, especially its "consultative committee" -- comprised of the directors of a small number of monopolistic companies (the Steel Trust, Standard Oil, General Electric, General Motors, and others) -- exerts decisive influence on the entire foreign policy course. Among the most prominent American diplomats after World War II we encounter primarily people who are closely connected with the monopoly groups of Rockefeller (for instance, John Foster Dulles, Herbert Hoover, Jr., Winthrop Aldrich, Nelson Rockefeller); the Morgan group (for instance, Dean Acheson, Henry Cabot Lodge); the Dillion group (for instance, Douglas Dillion), and a number of others.

The concentration of the direction of diplomatic activity in the hands of a small group of monopolists, as well as the aggressive expansionist nature of the foreign policy of the imperialist states, cannot but leave its mark on the character of the ways and means of modern bourgeois diplomacy.

However, modern bourgeois diplomacy, after World War II, was compelled to reshape its methods and modes under the new historical conditions -- under the conditions of the existence of powerful democratic forces on the international scene in the form of a world socialist system and the new independent states of Asia and Africa; under the conditions of the greatly increasing role of the popular masses in the political life of all the countries in the world; under the conditions of new characteristics in international life, evoked by the significantly expanded demands of international collaboration, the presence of a broad network of international organizations, state and social, the presence of new channels of influence on the ruling circles of states and on the public opinion of nations, etc.

Under these conditions, the diplomacy of the great imperialist powers turns to certain new methods for implementing imperialist foreign policy aims. Fearing world competition with the socialist countries and the strengthening of the new independent states which emerged in the struggle against colonialism, and aiming to suppress the socialist and democratic forces throughout the world, the diplomacy of the imperialist powers masks its aggressive aims by accusing the peace-loving socialist countries of aggressive designs and thus providing a basis for its notorious policy "from the position of strength," the policy of "balancing on the brink of war," etc. It creates aggressive military blocs against the socialist countries under the guise of defense alliances, allegedly in conformity with the United Nations Charter. Striving to preserve colonial domination, the diplomacy of the imperialist powers, presents relations of political and

economic dependence, where the colonizers succeed in preserving them, in the form of military-political alliances allegedly drawn up on the basis of equality, and of military, economic, technical, and other forms of aid. There where they have not succeeded in preserving such relations, imperialist diplomacy resorts to the old and tested methods of intervention, kindling of civil war, organization of plots, terror, pressure, threats, intrigues, bribes, etc. Imperialist diplomacy does not abandon its "traditional" methods not only in its interrelations with dependent states, but also in its interrelations with all other states. Its modern practices are most varied, beginning from "twisting arms," as practiced by the U.S. delegates at the sessions of the UN General Assembly, and ending with the entire mechanism of "cold war," right up to subsidizing underground counterrevolutionary organizations which wage subversive activity against the socialist countries. Of course, modern bourgeois diplomacy at the very same time serves the tendencies of a particular capitalist state to strengthen political and economic ties with other capitalist states, and even the tendencies of individual capitalist states to strengthen political and economic ties with socialist states, and in the process uses those forms and methods which have been established in the day-to-day practice of peaceful international collaboration. However, those methods prevail with whose aid modern bourgeois diplomacy serves the aggressive and exploiting tendencies of the foreign policy of major imperialist powers.

To justify the anti-popular foreign policy in the eyes of the peoples within the framework of the growing political activity of the workers masses, bourgeois diplomacy turns to special ways and means, masking a given policy and giving diplomatic activity the appearance of extensive publicity. This involves press publication of diplomatic negotiations, diplomatic press-conferences, addresses by diplomats at political meetings, in the press, over radio, television, etc. For this purpose, a special press service and a broad propaganda apparatus are set up under the diplomatic departments and sometimes separately from them, as independent establishments. Diplomacy also resorts extensively to the aid of non-official means of propaganda. Under the conditions of the bourgeois system, all the aforementioned ways and means of "open diplomacy" are as a matter of fact ways and means of masking the real aims and intentions of the governments. Having in mind the alleged publicity of bourgeois diplomacy, certain bourgeois publicists and authors of books on diplomacy (for instance, Walter Lippman, Harold Nicholson, Sisley Huddleston) began to call it "new" and even "popular" diplomacy. In actual fact, this is essentially old and intrinsically deep anti-people diplomacy, compelled merely to resort to certain new maneuvers, ruses and stagings.

The socialist diplomacy of the USSR and the countries of peoples' democracy is a genuinely new and genuinely popular diplomacy, both as to its aims and its essence, as well as to its forms and methods. The essence of their diplomacy is inextricably connected with the essence of their foreign policy, and the latter is conditioned by the nature of their

social and state system. In the socialist countries there are no classes and parties interested in wars or in supremacy over other countries. The peoples of the socialist countries are striving to build a Communist society and to create international conditions promoting the implementation of this great aim. The general line of the foreign policy of the socialist countries is the Leninist principle of the peaceful coexistence of states under different socio-political systems and the struggle for the preservation and consolidation of peace among peoples. The basis of the foreign policy of the socialist countries, so far as this concerns their relations with each other, is the principle of socialist internationalism, fraternal unity, and mutual aid. The struggle for freedom and independence of peoples, respect for the sovereignty of large and small states, and the building of relations between all states on the principles of full equality and mutual aid -- these are the bases of the foreign policy of the socialist countries.

These aims and principles of socialist foreign policy primarily also define the basic characteristics of socialist diplomacy and its principal features, distinguishing it substantially from the diplomacy of all the exploiting states. Socialist diplomacy does not need any kind of camouflage for its foreign policy aims, since the foreign policy aims of the socialist states answer the basic interests of the peoples throughout the world and enlist the sympathies of all progressive mankind. "An overwhelming majority of the world's populations approves our peaceful policy," said V. I. Lenin in establishing the bankruptcy of the international plans of the Entente. (Works, Vol 30, p 365) In contrast to the diplomacy of the exploiting states, socialist diplomacy has a direct and open nature. "Bourgeois diplomacy," said V. I. Lenin, "is incapable of understanding the methods of our new diplomacy of open, direct statements." (Works, Vol 31, p 250) "The old world has its own old diplomacy which cannot believe that it is possible to speak directly and openly." (Works, Vol 33, p 124)

Socialist diplomacy relies on the support of the broad popular masses and strives as extensively as possible to explain to them its aims and the support of the foreign policy measures it is implementing. Socialist diplomacy views the political awareness of the popular masses in its own country as well as in other countries and the masses' understanding of international politics as one of the most important sources of its power. For this reason, socialist diplomacy in all its activity focuses special attention on bringing to the knowledge of the peoples throughout the world the truth about foreign policy and international relations.

Socialist diplomacy is deeply principled, in contrast to bourgeois diplomacy which often proffers earlier enunciated foreign policy principles and the most solemn declarations for the sake of political benefits at the given moment. Socialist diplomacy is not susceptible to opportunistic combinations and diplomatic deals which conflict with the principled bases of socialist foreign policy. Thus, when at the 1922 Geneva Conference, the capitalist powers demanded that the Soviet state renounce its

annulment of the loans and liabilities of the Tsarist and Provisional Governments and its nationalization of foreign enterprises and foreign trade monopolies, proposing instead de jure recognition, the Soviet state resolutely rejected these demands and subsequently acquired de jure recognition with the complete preservation of all principles and institutes in its system and in its domestic and foreign policy.

Socialist diplomacy combines principledness with flexibility, with a readiness for cooperation and agreement, for the concessions required to achieve cooperation and agreement, but not proceeding beyond the limits of its applicable foreign policy principles. Socialist diplomacy is combined with caution and restraint, the ability not to yield to provocations and to avoid conflicts by exercising firmness and decisiveness.

An immutable characteristic of socialist diplomacy is adherence to the word given and the obligation assumed. The diplomatic history of the Soviet state provides convincing illustrations of this. Even such a reactionary political figure as W. Churchill was compelled to state the following in the English Parliament on 27 February 1945: "No government has so precisely fulfilled its obligations even to its own detriment as has the Soviet Government." This quality of socialist diplomacy, which so sharply distinguishes it from the diplomacy of exploiting states, results from the peace-loving character of the foreign policy of socialist states and from the stability of the main lines of that policy.

Throughout the course of the history of Soviet foreign relations, and also that of other socialist states, there have been established diplomatic methods appropriate to the essence of socialist diplomacy and to its above-stated fundamental features. In the aggregate these methods form a new type of diplomatic art - the diplomatic art of socialist countries which helps them influence the international situation in the interests of the workers.

One of the primary among these methods is the method of direct diplomatic negotiations. It is used extensively by socialist states both for establishing cooperation with other states in implementing common measures for insuring international peace and security as well as for the peaceful settlement of controversial issues and for the easing of international tension. Apropos of this N. S. Khrushchev stated: "It is now clear to any sensible person that it is not possible in these times to resolve international problems by the force of arms, that there is only one way - the way of peaceful negotiations taking into account the interests of all participants, negotiations based on equal rights and mutual advantage. The Soviet Union specifically supports such a course for the resolution of international problems."

The diplomacy of socialist states is based on the sympathy and support of broad peoples' masses of the entire world. With unvarying success it exposes the aggressive intentions of imperialist governments and the diplomatic maneuvers covering up such intentions. It opens the eyes of all people to the actual state of events. It does this from the rostrum of diplomatic conferences, in official diplomatic acts and documents, and in the press. The unmasking of the aggressive plans and actions of imperialists is one of the important methods of socialist diplomacy, assisting it to mobilize democratic public opinion and popular masses throughout the entire world against the aggressive policy of imperialist governments.

A prominent position among the methods of socialist diplomacy is assigned to advancing constructive suggestions on international problems requiring settlement, in particular on problems concerning the guaranteeing of universal security and the easing of international tension. Socialist diplomacy has invariably advanced and continues to advance such proposals both within the framework of its relations with individual states as well as on a general international scale. As far back as the first decree of the Soviet state - the peace decree of 1917 - it advanced a program for universal democratic peace and new international relationships, without the enslavement of peoples, seizures of territory and secret diplomacy. In the 1920's and 30's the Soviet Government introduced a number of proposals on questions of disarmament and collective security. During World War II and the years immediately thereafter, the Soviet Government made a great contribution to defining the principles of postwar construction (within the provisions of the U.N. Charter, peace negotiations of 1947, etc.). In the postwar period, in the interests of guaranteeing international peace and security, the USSR and other socialist states advanced proposals on questions of armament reduction and banning nuclear weapons, stopping the testing of such weapons, the creation of a nuclear free zone in Central Europe (the Rapacki Plan), the collective security of Europe, the German problem, the problem of prevention of a surprise attack, and universal and complete disarmament.

Features of the constructive proposals of socialist diplomacy are their realism and political effectiveness. In distinction from the proposals frequently encountered in the practice of bourgeois diplomacy, which only outwardly are directed at peaceful objectives and in actual fact are inimical to the cause of peace and serve as a means of deceiving public opinion, the proposals of socialist diplomacy reveal the absolute possibility of practically guaranteeing the attainment of the peaceful objectives contained in them by the implementation of these proposals. An example of this was the Soviet Government's proposal for the permanent neutrality of Austria which promoted the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. Proposals of socialist diplomacy, as a rule, contain such a clear statement on international problems requiring settlement that they compel imperialist states to define their actual position on such

problems and, consequently, should such proposals be turned down, they show that the imperialist states do not desire to take any real steps toward strengthening peace and opposing aggression. In such manner these proposals promote the self-exposure of imperialist governments and increase the vigilance of the popular masses.

In the struggle against imperialist aggression, the diplomacy of the Soviet state sometimes successfully has used the contradictions existing among the imperialist states to prevent the creation by them of a united front against the USSR.

V. I. Lenin taught: "It is necessary to be able to use the contradictions and differences which exist among the imperialists. All diplomacy strives to take advantage of the contradictions between opponents. But unlike the diplomacy of exploiting states, which in a majority of cases tries to use the contradictions between other states -- and even artificially provokes or exacerbates them -- in order to increase international tension and create a situation which would be favorable for the execution of its own aggressive schemes, socialist diplomacy uses the contradictions between imperialist states in the interests of peace, for the purpose of destroying the aggressive blocs slapped together by the imperialists and preventing their aggressive actions, and consequently, for strengthening the general security.

A model of such use of contradictions among the imperialists is the Soviet Union's conclusion of the Brest Peace Treaty which afforded the opportunity to obtain a peaceful respite and to strengthen Soviet power in the first years of the Revolution. Another example of using contradictions among the imperialists to neutralize their aggressive designs is the foreign policy strategy and tactics of the Soviet state in the years prior to World War II and during that war when Soviet diplomacy wrecked a number of attempts of world imperialist reaction to create a united front of all the capitalist states against the USSR and frustrated attempts of the ruling circles in a number of imperialist states to bring Hitler Germany into conflict with the USSR.

New methods of diplomacy are being established in the mutual relationships of the Soviet Union with the countries of peoples' democracy. This is an entirely new kind of relationship, devoid of antagonistic character and being built on the principles of proletarian internationalism and on fraternal collaboration in the name of common objectives, with full respect for the sovereign rights and national interests of each socialist country. At a time when political relations between the capitalist countries, even those allied by treaty, contain elements of antagonistic contradictions and rivalries, if not on the grounds of aspirations for hegemony of one "ally" over another, then on the grounds of aspirations to maintaining a "balance," the political relations between the socialist countries preclude any kind of antagonistic

contradictions and represent an attitude of friendship and close fraternal interrelationships. In support of such relations the socialist states are applying new methods, methods of constructive activity, promoting the solidarity of the socialist countries and the coordination of their measures in the struggle for their security and for universal peace. The methods of socialist diplomacy, adopted in the interrelationships of the socialist countries with each other, are developing directly into organizational forms of joint efforts of the internationally consolidated free peoples in these countries, in the name of the general ideals of building communism in them and preserving universal peace.

Socialist diplomacy of the USSR and countries of peoples' democracy is implementing new political objectives, adopting new methods, and playing a new role. This is a scientifically based diplomacy, a genuine people's diplomacy, a diplomacy which achieves changes in international reality in accordance with the demands of historical progress and, consequently, has progressive importance in the development of society. Precisely as the result of all this, socialist diplomacy invariably achieves important successes under the complex conditions of international life in the modern epoch.

Excerpt: pp 466-467 of Diplomaticheskii Slovar, Moscow, 1960.

Socialist diplomacy combines principledness with flexibility, with a readiness for cooperation and agreement, for the concessions required to achieve cooperation and agreement, but not proceeding beyond the limits of its applicable foreign policy principles. Socialist diplomacy is combined with caution and restraint, the ability not to yield to provocations and to avoid conflicts by exercising firmness and decisiveness.

An immutable characteristic of socialist diplomacy is adherence to the word given and the obligation assumed. The diplomatic history of the Soviet state provides convincing illustrations of this. Even such a reactionary political figure as W. Churchill was compelled to state the following in the English Parliament on 27 February 1945: "No government has so precisely fulfilled its obligations even to its own detriment as has the Soviet Government." This quality of socialist diplomacy, which so sharply distinguishes it from the diplomacy of exploiting states, results from the peace-loving character of the foreign policy of socialist states and from the stability of the main lines of that policy.

Throughout the course of the history of Soviet foreign relations, and also that of other socialist states, there have been established diplomatic methods appropriate to the essence of socialist diplomacy and to its above-stated fundamental features. In the aggregate these

methods form a new type of diplomatic art - the diplomatic art of socialist countries which helps them influence the international situation in the interests of the workers.

One of the primary among these methods is the method of direct diplomatic negotiations. It is used extensively by socialist states both for establishing cooperation with other states in implementing common measures for insuring international peace and security as well as for the peaceful settlement of controversial issues and for the easing of international tension. Apropos of this N. S. Khrushchev stated: "It is now clear to any sensible person that it is not possible in these times to resolve international problems by the force of arms, that there is only one way - the way of peaceful negotiations taking into account the interests of all participants, negotiations based on equal rights and mutual advantage. The Soviet Union specifically supports such a course for the resolution of international problems."

The diplomacy of socialist states is based on the sympathy and support of broad peoples' masses of the entire world. With unvarying success it exposes the aggressive intentions of imperialist governments and the diplomatic maneuvers covering up such intentions. It opens the eyes of all people to the actual state of events. It does this from the rostrum of diplomatic conferences, in official diplomatic acts and documents, and in the press. The unmasking of the aggressive plans and actions of imperialists is one of the important methods of

socialist diplomacy, assisting it to mobilize democratic public opinion and popular masses throughout the entire world against the aggressive policy of imperialist governments.

A prominent position among the methods of socialist diplomacy is assigned to advancing constructive suggestions on international problems requiring settlement, in particular on problems concerning the guaranteeing of universal security and the easing of international tension. Socialist diplomacy has invariably advanced and continues to advance such proposals both within the framework of its relations with individual states as well as on a general international scale. As far back as the first decree of the Soviet state - the peace decree of 1917 - it advanced a program for universal democratic peace and new international relationships, without the enslavement of peoples, seizures of territory and secret diplomacy. In the 1920's and 30's the Soviet Government introduced a number of proposals on questions of disarmament and collective security. During World War II and the years immediately thereafter, the Soviet Government made a great contribution to defining the principles of postwar construction (within the provisions of the U.N. Charter, peace negotiations of 1947, etc.). In the postwar period, in the interests of guaranteeing international peace and security, the USSR and other socialist states advanced proposals on questions of armament reduction and banning nuclear weapons, stopping the testing of such weapons, the creation of a nuclear free zone in

Central Europe (the Rapacki Plan), the collective security of Europe, the German problem, the problem of prevention of a surprise attack, and universal and complete disarmament.

Features of the constructive proposals of socialist diplomacy are their realism and political effectiveness. In distinction from the proposals frequently encountered in the practice of bourgeois diplomacy, which only outwardly are directed at peaceful objectives and in actual fact are inimical to the cause of peace and serve as a means of deceiving public opinion, the proposals of socialist diplomacy reveal the absolute possibility of practically guaranteeing the attainment of the peaceful objectives contained in them by the implementation of these proposals. An example of this was the Soviet Government's proposal for the permanent neutrality of Austria which promoted the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. Proposals of socialist diplomacy, as a rule, contain such a clear statement on international problems requiring settlement that they compel imperialist states to define their actual position on such problems and, consequently, should such proposals be turned down, they show that the imperialist states do not desire to take any real steps toward strengthening peace and opposing aggression. In such manner these proposals promote the self-exposure of imperialist governments and increase the vigilance of the popular masses.

In the struggle against imperialist aggression, the diplomacy of the Soviet state sometimes successfully has used the contradictions

existing among the imperialist states to prevent the creation by them of a united front against the USSR.... All diplomacy strives to take advantage of the contradictions between opponents. But unlike the diplomacy of exploiting states, which in a majority of cases tries to use the contradictions between other states -- and even artificially provokes or exacerbates them -- in order to increase international tension and create a situation which would be favorable for the execution of its own aggressive schemes, socialist diplomacy uses the contradictions between imperialist states in the interests of peace, for the purpose of destroying the aggressive blocs slapped together by the imperialists and preventing their aggressive actions, and consequently, for strengthening the general security.

Review of Article "Diplomacy" in Diplomatičeskiy Slovar (Diplomatic Dictionary), Moscow, 1960, pp 457-468

The article begins by defining diplomacy and its use: "Diplomacy is only one of the means of the foreign policy of a state. However, among all the means of foreign policy, diplomacy occupies a most important position. In distinction from other means of foreign policy, each of which has its specific direct missions in the activity of a state, for diplomacy the sole mission is the implementation of the foreign policy objectives of a state and the determination of those ways and means which are required for such implementation. The task of diplomacy includes not only the skillful use of official forms of relations between governments and successful political influence on foreign governments within the frameworks of those forms, but also the combining of given forms with other means of foreign policy for the attainment of the foreign policy objectives of a state.

"The basic forms of diplomatic activity are: (1) diplomatic congresses, conferences or meetings, e.g., periodic meetings of representatives of states, starting with the heads of states, heads of governments or foreign ministers and ending with special representatives from among various ranks of officials; (2) diplomatic correspondence by means of statements, letters, notes, memoranda, etc.; (3) the preparation and conclusion of international treaties and agreements, bilateral and multi-lateral, dealing with the most varied of questions pertinent to relations between states; (4) everyday representation of a state abroad, carried out by its embassies and missions and the conduct by them of political and other negotiations with the diplomatic agencies of the countries in which they are located; (5) participation of state representatives in the activities of international organizations, general political and special, general and regional; (6) interpreting through press media the positions of the government on specific foreign policy issues, publishing official information on important international events, and implementing the official publication of international statements and documents."

Noting that "...Diplomacy is not the subject of a special science," the article goes on to state:

"Diplomatic activity should be based on data from a number of sciences: the history of international relations, the histories of individual countries, of economic sciences connected with the study of world economy and the economies of individual countries, international law, laws of individual countries and other subjects, the knowledge of which is necessary for the correct evaluation of overall conditions and specific events of international life and the domestic life of various countries. Without such an evaluation diplomacy may find itself in a position where it is unable to implement the foreign policy objectives of the state."

Present day bourgeois diplomacy is then discussed, and it is stated that, "in contrast to this the diplomacy of the USSR and other socialist states is scientific diplomacy. It is based on the foundation of Marxist-Leninist theory and makes use of a powerful Marxist weapon, i.e., the

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authentic scientific analysis of actual events and knowledge of the laws of historical development."

The history of diplomacy is then traced from the "slaveholding societies," through the feudal epoch, and up to the present. "The mission of bourgeois diplomacy in the epoch of imperialism is determined by the interests of the big monopolies and banks."

There follows a discussion of the establishment of aggressive military blocs by major imperialist powers, supposedly within the framework of the U.N. Charter, and other methods used by imperialists to exert pressure on socialist countries. This leads to the point that the only genuinely new and genuinely popular diplomacy is the socialist diplomacy of the USSR and other socialist countries.

Socialist diplomacy is shown to be determined by the foreign policy of socialist countries, based on "Leninist principles of the peaceful coexistence of states of differing social and political systems, and the struggle for maintenance and strengthening of peace among peoples. At the basis of the foreign policy of socialist countries, insofar as relations among themselves are concerned, lies the principle of socialist internationalism, fraternal alliance, and mutual assistance. The fundamentals of the foreign policy of socialist countries also consist in the struggle for freedom and independence of peoples, respect for the sovereignty of small and large states and the building of relations among all states on the principles of full equality of rights and mutual advantage."

The portion which has been translated (pp 466-467) follows at this point.

The concluding paragraphs of this article contrast the fraternal and mutually advantageous features of socialist diplomacy with the antagonistic conflicts and rivalry peculiar to capitalist diplomacy.

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Москва • 1960

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ОТ РЕДАКЦИИ

Новое издание Дипломатического словаря подготовлено большим коллективом советских историков, дипломатов, экономистов и юристов.

В Словаре включены статьи по дипломатии и международным отношениям нового и новейшего времени. Словарь содержит сведения о международных конгрессах, конференциях, организациях, международных договорах, конвенциях, декларациях и других важнейших дипломатических актах, разъясняет основные понятия из области международного права, имеющие непосредственное отношение к вопросам внешней политики и дипломатии. Значительное место занимают статьи, знакомящие читателя с дипломатической службой, функциями, правами и обязанностями дипломатов, консульской службой.

Большое внимание в Словаре уделено характеристике последовательно миролюбивой внешней политики Советского государства с первых дней его основания, а также нового типа международных отношений между странами социалистического лагеря, основанных на принципах пролетарского интернационализма. Значительно дополнены разделы о международных отношениях стран Азии, Африки, Латинской Америки, что отвечает возросшему значению этих стран в решении международных вопросов. В ряде статей освещается процесс распада колониальной системы и выход на международную арену новых независимых государств. Большое число статей посвящено международным отношениям в период второй мировой войны и послевоенные годы.

Словарь содержит краткие данные о ряде дипломатов. Статьи в Дипломатическом словаре расположены в алфавитном порядке. Курсивом выделены понятия, которым посвящены специальные статьи. Статьи об основных договорах, конвенциях и соглашениях содержат ссылки на публикации. Для облегчения пользования Словарем в конце III (последнего) тома дан тематический указатель, а также общий именной указатель. В конце каждого тома дан список основных сокращений.

Новое издание Дипломатического словаря рассчитано на широкие круги советских читателей, интересующихся вопросами внешней политики и международных отношений.

Редакционная работа над I томом Дипломатического словаря закончена в основном в августе — сентябре 1959 г.

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КИЙ

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ СЛОВАРЬ

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профессор *Г. И. Тункин*, профессор *Б. Е. Штейн*.

ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ

ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
Москва • 1960

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защите со стороны властей принимающего государства (см. *Дипломатические привилегии и иммунитет*).

Д. и. прекращает свое существование в результате его закрытия, либо отозвания Д. и. аккредитующим государством, разрыва дипл. отношений или политическими соглашениями войны между аккредитующим и принимающим государствами. В случае разрыва дипл. отношений, отозвания или закрытия Д. и. принимающее государство обязано уважать и охранять, даже в случае вооруженного конфликта, помещения Д. и. вместе с его имуществом в архивах. Аккредитуемое государство может вверить охрану помещений Д. и., его имущества и архивов дипл. представительству какого-либо др. государства, приемлемого для государства пребывания. Во всех этих случаях государство пребывания должно обеспечить возможности, необходимые для беспрепятственного выезда членов персонала Д. и. вместе с их семьями и имуществом, в частности предоставить им необходимые транспортные средства.

ДИПЛОМАТИЯ — официальная деятельность глав государств, правительств и специальных органов внешних сношений по осуществлению переговоров, переписки и др. мирных средств, целей и задач внешней политики государства, определяемых интересами господствующего класса, а также по защите прав и интересов государства за границей. Слово «дипломатия» происходит от греческого слова «диплома» — так назывались в древней Греции сводчатые дощечки с нанесенными на них письменами, выдававшиеся посланцам в качестве верительных грамот и документов, подтверждавших их полномочия. Как обозначение государственной деятельности в области внешних сношений слово «дипломатия» входит в обиход в Западной Европе с конца XVIII в.

Д. составляет важнейшее средство внешней политики государства. Иногда слова «дипломатия» и «внешняя политика» применяются в одинаковом смысле (напр., говорят о «принципах Д.» или «принципах внешней политики» того или иного

государства или правительства). Однако это не однозначные понятия. По определению В. И. Ленинна, политика есть «направление государства, определение форм, задач, содержания деятельности государства» (Ленинский сборник XXI, стр. 14). Политика «внешняя политика» охватывает как цели и интересы государства, определяющие направление его деятельности на международной арене, так и средства, формы и методы этой деятельности. Цели и интересы государства в международных отношениях осуществляются прежде всего посредством официальных сношений между правительствами, но они осуществляются также посредством торговых и культурных связей, поддерживаемых как органами государства, так и общественными и частными учреждениями и корпорациями (банками, торговыми фирмами, научными организациями, религиозными обществами и т. д.). Наконец, они осуществляются посредством применения вооруженной силы, к-рая, в зависимости от классовой сущности государства и характера его внешней политики, может служить как агрессивным целям, так и целям обороны от агрессии. Т. о., Д. является лишь одним из средств внешней политики государства. Однако среди всех средств внешней политики Д. занимает весьма важное место. В отличие от др. средств внешней политики, каждое из к-рых имеет свои собственные непосредственные задачи в деятельности государства, для Д. единственной задачей является осуществление внешнеполитических целей государства и определение тех путей и средств, к-рые для этого необходимы. Задача Д. заключается не только в искусном пользовании официальными формами сношений между правительствами и в успешном политическом воздействии на иностранные государства в рамках этих форм, но и в сочетании данных форм с др. средствами внешней политики для достижения поставленных государством внешнеполитических целей.

Основными формами дипл. деятельности являются: (1) дипл. конг-

рессы, конференции или совещания, т. е. периодические встречи представителей государств, начиная от глав государств, глав правительства или министров иностранных дел и кончая специальными уполномоченными из числа дипл. сотрудников различных рангов; (2) дипл. переписка посредством заявлений, писем, нот, меморандумов и т. п.; (3) подготовка и заключение международных договоров и соглашений, двухсторонних и многосторонних, регламентирующих самые различные вопросы межгосударственных отношений; (4) повседневное представительство государства за границей, осуществляемое его посольствами и миссиями, и ведение ими политических и иных переговоров с дипл. ведомством страны пребывания; (5) участие представителей государства в деятельности международных организаций, общеполитических и специальных, общих и региональных; (6) освещение в печати позиций правительства по тем или иным внешнеполитическим вопросам, публикация официальной информации о важнейших международных событиях, официальное издание международных актов и документов.

Общее руководство дипл. деятельностью осуществляется правительством, непосредственное оперативное руководство — специальным ведомством иностранных дел, возглавляемым ответственным членом правительства (министром иностранных дел).

Что касается методов Д., т. е. способов воздействия на правительство, официальных представителей, а также на влиятельные политические круги и общественность иностранных государств, к-рые применяет Д. для достижения определенных внешнеполитических целей, то эти методы весьма многообразны и не поддаются какой-либо строго определенной классификации. Конкретный характер дипл. методов зависит от условий, места и времени.

В дипл. руководствах и в книгах по истории Д. нередко Д. определяют то как «науку о внешних отношениях», то как «искусство переговоров». Д. как основное и важнейшее средство

внешней политики составляет часть политики. С точки зрения марксизма «политика есть наука и искусство» (В. И. Ленин, Соч., т. 31, стр. 61). Политика должна опираться на законы общественной жизни, открываемые наукой, и политическая деятельность, чтобы быть успешной, необходимо должна основываться на выводах науки. Применение же этих выводов для изменения действительности в направлении определенных политических целей составляет искусство. Все это относится и к Д. Д. не составляет предмета особой науки. Попытки современных буржуазных авторов конструировать «науку о международных отношениях» (Гугенгейм, Райт) или «науку международной политики» (Моргентау) искусственны и необоснованны. Дипл. деятельность должна опираться на данные ряда наук: истории международных отношений, истории отдельных стран, экономических наук, связанных с изучением мирового хозяйства и экономики отдельных стран, международного права, государственного права отдельных стран и др., знание к-рых необходимо для правильной оценки общих условий и отдельных событий международной жизни и внутренней жизни различных стран. Без такой оценки Д. может оказаться не в состоянии добиться осуществления внешнеполитических целей государства.

Современная буржуазная Д., как Д. отживающего класса, неспособна опираться на научный анализ действительности. Хотя после второй мировой войны в связи с реформами дипл. ведомств США и Великобритании при них был создан обширный научно-исследовательский аппарат и даже специальные органы по научному планированию внешней политики, Д. этих государств отнюдь не может считаться научно обоснованной, ибо она, как правило, не желает трезво учитывать действительное положение вещей, ставит цели, противоречащие действительным объективным закономерностям, определяющим общественное развитие, идет наперекор ходу общественного развития, выдвигаящие

являет часть
ина марк-
аука и пе-
Сов., т. 31,
и опираться
жизни, от-
литическая
успешной,
ываться на
не же этих
ействитель-
ределенных
авалет пе-
ся и к Д.
ета особой
енных бур-
струировать
ах отноше-
или «науку
и» (Морген-
Боснованы,
жизня опи-
ук: истори-
ний, исто-
номических
линем миро-
ники отдель-
ого права,
отдельных
ях необхо-
енки общих
ытий меж-
внутренней
Без такой
аться не в
ищения
лей госу-

ая Д., как
неспособна
ализ дейст-
второй ми-
реформами
и Велико-
создан об-
зательский
плане орга-
нировании»
этих госу-
т считается
бо она, как
о учитывать
ие вещей,
ацию дейст-
юмерностей,
вной разви-
ходу обще-
ывдвигающе-

му на мировую арену лозие со-
циально и политические связи.
Именно в этом кроется один из
главных источников прочетов бур-
жуазной Д. и ряда ее серьезных
поражений в последние годы
(напр., в Китае, на Ближнем и Сред-
нем Востоке и пр.). В противополож-
ность этому Д. СССР и др. социа-
листических государств является на-
учной Д. Она строится на фундаменте
марксистско-ленинской теории, яв-
ляется могучим оружием марксистско-
го, т. е. подлинно научного, анализа
действительности и знанием законо-
мерностей исторического развития.
«Марксизм, — писал В. И. Ленин, —
требует от нас самого точного, объек-
тивно проверяемого учета соотно-
шения классов и конкретных осо-
бенностей каждого исторического мо-
мента. Мы, большевики, всегда ста-
рались быть верными этому требо-
ванию, безусловно обязательному с
точки зрения великого научного обос-
нования политики». СССР и др. со-
циалистические государства исходят
в своей внешней политике из ленин-
ского учения о необходимости истори-
ческой полосы одновременного сосу-
ществования двух систем, социалисти-
ческой и капиталистической, и из
научного вывода о возможности в со-
временных условиях предотвратить
новую мировую войну силами миро-
любивых народов. Опираясь на глу-
бокое понимание объективных зако-
номерностей современной эпохи и руко-
водясь принципами мирного сосу-
ществования, социалистическая Д.
добилась серьезных успехов в укре-
плении международного положения
социалистических государств и в
борьбе против агрессивных планов
и действий империалистических дер-
жав в различных районах мира.

Однако приложение выводов, до-
стигнутых на основании анализа
международных отношений или внут-
ренней жизни отдельных стран, к
практическому поведению дипломата
не может быть сравняемо с приме-
нением научной теоремы к заранее
установленным данным. Методы дип-
ломатической деятельности рассчитаны на дости-
жение определенных целей, связан-
ных с изменением действительности,
и применяются в постоянно меняю-

щейся обстановке. Они отнюдь не
образуют каких-то стандартных пра-
вил, ибо достижение с помощью этих
методов поставленных Д. внешнепо-
литических целей в немалой степени
зависит от конкретного образа дейст-
вий применяющих их людей. Скла-
дывалась в итоге длительный истори-
ческий опыт, методы дипл. дея-
тельности при их применении твор-
чески дополняются и корректируются
в соответствии с изменением окру-
жающих условий. Дипл. деятель-
ность составляет искусство, хотя
она должна опираться на выводы
науки.

В книгах буржуазных авторов
дипл. искусство обычно сводится к
субъективным свойствам дипломата,
к свойствам его ума и характера.
Так, напр., по словам Гардена, жи-
вавшего в начале XIX в., это «из-
вестный такт, способность извлечь
выгоду из слабостей другого и усмо-
кнуть любезностью раздражающую
державу». По словам Кеннеди, жи-
вавшего сто лет спустя, это «про-
ницательный и тонкий ум, соеди-
ненный с хорошо развитым чувством
чести», умение «приспособляться к
обстоятельствам». В подобных рас-
суждениях игнорируется социально-
политическая природа дипл. ис-
кусства. Конечно, в дипл. искусстве,
как и во всяком другом, нельзя
сбрасывать со счета личные способ-
ности. Умение дипломата пользо-
ваться формами и методами, приме-
няемыми во внешних сношениях,
имеет значение для успеха дипл.
деятельности. Но дипл. искусство
необходимо прежде всего рассмат-
ривать в зависимости от тех истори-
чески складывающихся социальных
и политических условий, в к-рых
оно вырастает и развивается. Дипл.
искусство в конечном итоге сводится
к тому, чтобы воздействовать на др.
государства и на международную
обстановку в интересах господст-
вующего в данном государстве класса,
в интересах укрепления того обще-
ственного и политического строя, к-рый
поддерживает это господство. Сле-
довательно, методы и приемы Д.
ближайшим образом обуславлива-
ются целями той внешней политики,
к-рую эта Д. практически осущест-

влияет. Внешняя же политика государства, как это всегда подчеркивают марксисты, является прямым продолжением его внутренней политики. Следовательно, характер дипл. искусства тесно связан с политическим строем и социальной природой государства, вернее государств, являющихся участниками международных отношений в данную историческую эпоху. Д., формирующая ее организацию, ее методы и формы следует рассматривать исторически, под углом зрения основных свойств той или иной социально-экономической формации. Д. является продуктом классового общества и развивается вместе с развитием государства.

В рабовладельческом обществе отношения между государствами заключаются в их борьбе за расширение территории, за увеличение числа рабов, за захват чужих богатств, за установление политической гегемонии над другими странами. В этих условиях война, как правило, доминирует над Д. в качестве средства внешней политики, хотя отнюдь нельзя отрицать и значения Д. во внешнеполитической борьбе рабовладельческих государств. При отсутствии мирового рынка и регулярных международных связей, к-рые охватывали бы весь тогдашний мир, дипл. отношения развивались по преимуществу в отдельных географических р-нах и в сравнительно ограниченном кругу государств, хотя в отдельные периоды они поддерживались в значительном более широком масштабе. Формы Д. тесно зависели от характера государственного строя. В теократич. древнего Востока дипл. деятельностью руководили цари, в рабовладельческих демократич. древней Греции — народные собрания, в древнем Риме — сенат, а позднее — императоры. Дипл. связи поддерживались законодическими посольствами, к-рые отправлялись в др. страны с определенной миссией и по возвращении отчитывались перед теми, кто их послал. Послы вербовались из членов царской семьи или ближайшего окружения цари (Египет, Ассирия, Вавилон), из выдающихся ораторов,

писателей, актеров (Афины), из аристократической олигархии (Рим). Отправляясь в чужие страны, они должны были привлекать союзников, обезвреживать врагов, разузнавать политические замыслы др. правительств и т. д. Иногда их действительность приобретала весьма серьезное значение. Древнегреческий оратор и дипломат Эсхин, выступая в афинском народном собрании, утверждал, что искусный посол значит больше, чем искусный полководец. Дипл. методы, к-рые применяли рабовладельческие государства, сводились к заключению военных или политических союзов, закреплявшихся договорами о дружбе, о мире, о нейтралитете, к использованию в политических целях существующих религиозных объединений (в Греции) или к созданию более или менее широких политических объединений для борьбы с противником и т. д. Однако рабовладельческое общество не выработало ни единообразных форм организации дипл. деятельности, ни единообразных методов Д.

В феодальном обществе, напр. в средневековой Европе, в условиях феодальной раздробленности государства вели между непрерывные «частные войны» ради увеличения земельных владений, грабежа, уменьшения числа подданных, облагавших повинностями крестьян. В промежутках между войнами они вели «частную Д.», т. е. вели переговоры, заключали мирные договоры, военные союзы и пр. Сравнительно редкие временные чрезвычайные посольства составлялись обычно из представителей духовенства, как наиболее образованной в то время части общества. Посольства оформляли свои дипл. действия с помощью религиозных обрядов (целование креста и т. д.). Временами феодальные государства объединялись под эгидой католической церкви для совместных военно-политических мероприятий (напр., крестовые походы), и в подготовке этих мероприятий играла известную роль Д. или наиболее развитая Д. того времени. Важными дипл. конференциями часто являлись церковные соборы, на к-рых нередко присутствовали свет-

ские госуда-

тически по-

По сравне-

дательствами Э-

тии поддер-

дипл. связи

Русью, госу-

Византии со-

домство ин-

разработани-

значительно-

от древнего

жалов Визан-

политическое

через христи-

также посред-

Своеобрази-

дипл. деятель-

период феодал-

здесь в качес-

говорами о

лении и т.

связи близ-

разрешении

На исходе

чисает зарод-

инного дипл.

прежде всего

курви, Виза-

республики.

Современн.

зарождаться

данства к

западе и на

дальше круп-

абсолютстве

нии политиче-

валясь дина-

монархов, их

чество своего

а также к

интересами

действ. бурж.

национальн.

ширению гос-

рии, к захв.

в Европе, т.

подвигу на

говым пут.

этих интере-

политические

постоянные

службе. Крест-

нают место

протяжения

пространств

становится

государствен-

Афиня), из аристократов (Рим). От этих стран, они звали союзников, ов, разузнавать для др. правительств их действительность серьезное чешский оратор и выступал в афинской, утверждая, значит больше, коведет. Дипл. деятели рабовладельцев, сводились нах или политически-экономический до-о мире, о нейтральную в политически-экономический (в Греции) или и менее широких инициатив для борьбы. Однако различие во выражении форм организации, ни единство, напр. в зна, в условиях бытности государственности непрерывно ради увеличения и, грабежа, умдациях, облагораживания. В провинциях они вели выступали и перемирные договоры, др. Сравнительно чрезвычайные по-иные обычно из ведения, как пай-ей в то время осельства оформ-ления с помощью (делов) (целью) (сменами феодаль-ными) (под эги-дией) для соци-альных меро-приятий (частых) (мероприятий) роль Д. нап — Д. того времени. (форенциями) часто (ные) (соборы), на (искусствовали) свет-

ско государя и обуславливал политические вопросы.

Но сравнительно с феодальными государствами Западной Европы Византия поддерживала более широкие дипл. связи (с королевствами Европы, Русью, государствами Востока). В Византии создавалось специальное ведомство иностранных дел и имелся разработанный дипл. церемониал, в значительной мере унаследованный от древнего Рима. Помимо дипл. каналов Византия распространяла свое политическое влияние на др. страны через христианских миссионеров, а также посредством торговых связей.

Способный характер носила дипл. деятельность и на Руси. В период феодальной раздробленности здесь в качестве форм Д. наряду с договорами о союзе, торговле, поселении и т. п. важную роль играли съезды князей, посредничество при разрешении споров между ними и т. д.

На исходе феодальной эпохи начинает зарождаться институт постоянного дипл. представительства — прежде всего в практике малой курии, Византии и Венецианской республики.

Современная буржуазная Д. стала зарождаться при переходе от феодализма к капитализму, когда на западе и на востоке Европы образовались крупные централизованные абсолютные государства. Внешняя политика этих государств диктовалась династическими интересами монархов, их стремлением к увеличению своего могущества и богатства, а также к политической гегемонии, интересами дворянства и нарождающейся буржуазии, стремлением к национальному объединению и расширению государственной территории, к захвату чужих земель как в Европе, так и в колониях, к господству на морях и на мировых торговых путях. Для осуществления этих интересов и тенденции абсолютные государства создавали постоянные армии и обширную дипл. службу. Временные посольства уступают место постоянным, которые на протяжении XVI—XVII вв. распространяются по всей Европе. Д. становится весьма важной отраслью государственной деятельности. По-

всеместно создаются специальные ведомства иностранных дел, к-рые руководят всей дипл. деятельностью государства и во главе к-рых обычно становятся первые министры, а нередко фактически и сами монархи.

Внеполитические цели, к-рым служила Д. абсолютизма, оказали непосредственное и глубокое влияние на характер ее методов. Маркс и Энгельс характеризуют Д. абсолютистских государств следующими словами: «Направлять народы друг на друга, использовать один народ для угнетения другого, чтобы таким образом продлить существование абсолютной власти, — вот к чему сводилось искусство и деятельность всех существовавших доселе правителей и их дипломатов» (К. Маркс и Ф. Энгельс, Соч., т. 5, стр. 160). Немалое влияние на характер Д. оказывало и то обстоятельство, что руководство внешней политикой абсолютистских государств сосредоточивалось в руках очень узкой верхушки господствующего класса: королей, их придворного окружения, горстки высших чиновников. Воздействие на отдельных лиц из этого ограниченного, замкнутого и к тому же сильно коррумпированного круга, воздействие, к-рое осуществлялось любыми, даже самыми беззастенчивыми, средствами, было необходимой органической частью дипл. деятельности.

Вследствие всех этих причин в дипл. деятельности абсолютистских государств широко применялись обман, вероломство, подкупы, интриги, убийства, дворцовые заговоры и т. п. Д. западноевропейского абсолютизма черпала образцы для своих методов и приемов в Д. североитальянских городских республик, олигархическая верхушка к-рых вела ожесточенную борьбу за торговое преобладание и политическую гегемонию. Об этой Д. один из ее виднейших деятелей и теоретиков, Маккиавелли, говорил, что ее искусство состоит в том, чтобы «скрывать словами действительность». Маккиавеллизм стал политической философией абсолютных монархий, к-рые в своих действиях руководствовались доктриной «государственного интереса»,

ов и политику службу за-
тавител и Д.
Д. на домопо-
развития ка-
и прогрессив-
она играла
нормально-
необходимых
ни националь-
атинской Аме-
национальном
и и Италии.
ую роль играет
новых незави-
ии и Африки.
эпоху капита-
талияна основа
ий государств.
одвергается за-
Д. стала ин-
экономической
влиятельных
рупп. Продолже-
ие внутренних
асий и др. стра-
тросов внешней
птах и на стра-
кдает Д. стре-
тору среди более
осуществляющего
х государств,
теми или иными
ниями, с пред-
Д. ищет новые
на внешнюю по-
с государств и
строении в соб-
коренная суще-
ществует. Дипл.
питализма, так
существо периода
ея дипл. иекую-
ких государств,
о способов и
ния политики,
ной народом и
оводимой путем
асс как за гра-
твенной стране.
бедительнейшим
как торжествен-
арации и фразы
служат в устах
матов для об-
и наивных масс
ь (Уоч., т. 24,
моматы, как Та-

лейран, Вларендон или Влемарк,
а также буржуазные авторы вроде
о Д. любил гордиться тем, что их
Д. стремится завоевывать доверие и
быть правдивой. В «Дипломатиче-
ском словаре» Парижской диплома-
тической академии даже утвержда-
лось, что после первой мировой
войны «в Д. начинает входить сове-
ственно новый дух, моральный при-
нцип». Однако подобные рассуждения
являются лицемерными. По спра-
ведливому замечанию известного со-
ветского историка Е. В. Тарле, как
бы ни изощрялись буржуазные ав-
торы, они не могут скрыть того,
что цели буржуазной Д. неизменно
сводятся к маскировке истинных
намерений и к симуляции намере-
ний, к-рых на самом деле не су-
ществует. Не удивительно поэтому,
что в буржуазной Д. сохраняются
немало типических черт Д. абсолю-
тизма. В частности, отнюдь не
отойшла в прошлое тайная Д. «Тайная»
дипломатических спонсирований, — ука-
зывает В. И. Ленин, — соблюдается
своя в самых свободных капита-
листических странах, в наиболее де-
мократических республиках» (Соч.,
т. 23, стр. 67). «Демократический кон-
троль» парламентов над внешней по-
литикой является столь же иллюзор-
ным, как и др. «демократические
гарантии» в буржуазном государстве.
В. И. Ленин пишет: «самые важные
вопросы: война, мир, дипломати-
ческие вопросы решаются ничтожной
горсткой капиталистов, которые об-
манывают не только массы, но даже
часто обманывают и парламент» (Соч.,
т. 30, стр. 454). Главные рычаги
внешней политики остаются в руках
правительств и их хозяев — влия-
тельных групп капиталистической
олигархии.

Эта черта буржуазной Д. еще
больше усилилась в период импери-
ализма на почве растущей концен-
трации государственной власти и все
увеличивающегося подчинения госу-
дарственного аппарата капиталисти-
ческим монополиям. Задачи буржу-
азной Д. в эпоху империализма
определяются интересами крупных
монополий и банков. В каждой круп-
ной капиталистической стране объе-
динения монополистов фактически

направляют внешнюю политику, ру-
ководящие дипл. посты занимают
монополисты или их непосредствен-
ные ставленники, а дипл. аппарат
заполняется гл. обр. лицами, при-
надлежащими к аристократической
или плутократической верхушке.
Так, в США Национальная ассо-
циация промышленников, в особен-
ности ее «совещательный комитет»,
состоящий из заправил небольшого
числа монополистических компаний
 («Стального треста», «Стандард ойл»,
«Дженерал электрик», «Дженерал мо-
торс» и др.) оказывает решающее
влияние на весь внешнеполитический
курс. Среди наиболее видных аме-
риканских дипломатов после второй
мировой войны мы встречаем прежде
всего людей, тесно связанных с моно-
полистическими группами Рокфел-
лера (напр., Джон Фостер Даллес,
Герберт Гувер младший, Уинтроп
Олдрич, Нельсон Рокфеллер), Мор-
гана (напр., Дин Ачесон, Генри
Кэбот Лодж), Диллона (напр., Ду-
лас Диллон) и ряда др.

Сосредоточение руководства дипл.
деятельностью в руках небольшой
горстки монополистов, так же как
агрессивный экспансионистский ха-
рактер внешней политики импери-
листических государств, не может
не наложить отпечатка на характер
методов и приемов современной бур-
жуазной Д.

Однако современная буржуазная
Д., особенно после второй мировой
войны, вынуждена выработать
свои методы и приемы в новых исто-
рических условиях — в условиях су-
ществования на мировой арене мо-
гущих демократических сил в лице
мировой социалистической системы
и новых независимых государств
Азии и Африки, в условиях сильно
возросшей роли народных масс в по-
литической жизни всех стран мира,
в условиях новых особенностей меж-
дународной жизни, вызванных эпа-
нительно расширившимися потреб-
ностями международного сотрудни-
чества, наличия широкой сети меж-
дународных организаций, государст-
венных и общественных, наличия
новых каналов влияния на правящие
круги государств и на общественное
мнение народов и т. д.

В этих условиях Д. крупных империалистических держав обращается к некоторым новым приемам для осуществления империалистических внешнеполитических целей. Обладая мирного соревнования с социалистическими странами и укрепление новых независимых государств, возникших в борьбе против колониализма, стремясь к подавлению социалистических и демократических сил во всем мире, Д. империалистических держав маскирует свои агрессивные цели посредством обвинения миролюбивых социалистических стран в агрессивных намерениях и обоснования таких путем пресловутой политики «балансирования на грани войны» и т. п. Она создает агрессивные военные блоки против социалистических стран под флагом оборонительных объединений якобы соответствующих Уставу ООН. Стремясь сохранить колониальное государство, империалистических держав облачает отношения политической и экономической зависимости, там где колонизаторам удалось их сохранить, в форму мнимого равноправных военно-политических союзов, военной, экономической, технической и т. п. «помощи». Там, где не удастся сохранить такие отношения, империалистическая Д. прибегает к старым, испытанным приемам интервенции, разжигания гражданской войны, организации заговоров, террора, давления, угроз, шантажа, подкупов и т. п. Не только во взаимоотношениях с независимыми государствами, но и во взаимоотношениях со всеми др. государствами империалистическая Д. не оставляет своих традиционных приемов. Современная практика во всем многообразии, начиная от выкручивания рук, примененного делегацией США на сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН и кончая всей механикой «молотной войны», вплоть до субсидирования подпольных контрреволюционных организаций, ведущих подрывную деятельность против социалистических стран. Разумеется, современная буржуазная Д. в то же самое время обслуживает тенденции тех или иных

капиталистических государств к укреплению политических и экономических связей с др. капиталистическими государствами и даже тенденция отдельных капиталистических государств к укреплению политических и экономических связей с социалистическими государствами и при этом пользуется теми формами и методами, которые сложились в повседневной практике мирного международного сотрудничества. Однако приемы, с помощью которых современная буржуазная Д. обслуживает агрессивные и экспансионистские тенденции внешней политики крупных империалистических держав, являются в ней господствующими.

Для оправдания антинародной внешней политики в глазах народов в обстановке возросшей политической активности трудящихся масс буржуазная Д. обращается к специальным средствам и способам, маскирующим данную политику и придающим ей видимость деятельности широкой гласности. Этому служит опубликование в печати сообщений с дилл. переговоров, дилл. пресс-конференции, выступлениями дипломатов на политических собраниях, в печати, по радио, телевидению и т. д. Для этого же при дилл. ведомств, а иногда отдельно от них, в качестве самостоятельных учреждений создается особая служба по делам печати и обширный пропагандистский аппарат. Д. широко прибегает и к помощи неофициальных средств пропаганды. В условиях буржуазного строя все вышеуказанные средства и способы «открытой Д.» по сути дела являются средствами и способами маскировки действительных целей и намерений правительства. Имен в виду мнимую гласность буржуазной Д., некоторые буржуазные публицисты и авторы книг о Д. (напр., Уолтер Липман, Гарольд Никольсон, Снели Хадлетон) стали называть ее «новой» и даже «народной» Д. На самом деле это старая по всей своей сущности, по всему своему духу и глубоко антинародная Д., вынужденная только прибегать к некоторым новым маневрам, уловкам и декорациям.

Подлинной Д. как таковой, так и является со стороны тех стран, которые несут их последствия. В условиях войны и во время стран, которые мушкетеры и другие между собой цели внешней политики стран являлись с различным классическим и у народов. На политическом несколько раз в международных отношениях между стран социализма, монополи. От таких социализм является также независимости верности государства и после ду всеми год полного ранее года.

Этим целям империалистической Д. прежде всего выше свойственны ее принципиально существенно она эксплуататорской империалистической Д. бы то ни было внешнеполитической империалистической Д. государства от расам народов чают социализма нового человека политикой, — конституции ских планов громадийнае

государств к укрупнению и экономическим, капиталистическим и даже тоталитаристическим тенденциям внешнеполитических связей с государствами и в теми формами политическими в повсеместного международного. Однако в рамках современных обеспечивается адекватно политическим кругам держав, господствующим

в международной политике народов и масс буржуазии, маскирующую и придающую видимость широким охватом, в прессе-конференциях дипломатов, в публичных выступлениях и т. д. и т. п., в качестве средства по делам пропагандистский и прибегает к иным средствам пропаганды буржуазного характера. По сути, средствами и методами действительных правительств, а гласность буржуазных правительств, а также «народные» книги о Д. (например, Гарольд Хаддистон) стали и даже «народные» это старая история, но всемогущая международная политика прибегает к трюкам, уловкам

Подлинно новой и революционной Д. как по своим целям и сущности, так и по формам и методам является социалистическая Д. СССР и стран народной демократии. Сущность их Д. неразрывно связана с сущностью их внешней политики, а последняя обусловлена характером их общественного и государственного строя. В социалистических странах нет классов и партий, заинтересованных в войнах или в господстве над другими странами. Народы социалистических стран стремятся к построению коммунистического общества и к созданию международных условий, облегчающих осуществление этой великой цели. Генеральной линией внешней политики социалистических стран является ленинский принцип мирного сосуществования государств с различными социально-политическими системами и борьба за сохранение и упрочение мира между народами. В основе внешней политики социалистических стран, поскольку речь идет об их отношениях между собой, лежит принцип социалистического интернационализма, братский союз и взаимомощь. Основами внешней политики социалистических стран являются также борьба за свободу и независимость народов, уважение суверенитета больших и малых государств и построение отношений между всеми государствами на началах полного равноправия и взаимной выгоды.

Этими целями и принципами социалистической внешней политики прежде всего и определяются основные свойства социалистической Д., ее принципиальные особенности, существенно отличающие ее от Д. всех эксплуататорских государств. Социалистическая Д. не нуждается в какой бы то ни было маскировке своих внешнеполитических целей, ибо цели внешней политики социалистических государств отвечают коренным интересам народов всего мира и вступают в сочувствие всего прогрессивного человечества. «Нашу мировую политику, — говорил В. И. Ленин, констатируя крах интервенционистских планов Антанты, — одобрят громадное большинство населе-

ний земли» (Соч., т. 30, стр. 365). В противоположность Д. эксплуататорских государств социалистическая Д. носит прямой и открытый характер. «Буржуазная дипломатия, — говорил В. И. Ленин, — неспособна понять приемов нашей новой дипломатии открытых прямых заявлений» (Соч., т. 31, стр. 250). «Этот старый мир имеет свою старую дипломатию, которая не может поверить, что можно говорить прямо и открыто» (Соч., т. 33, стр. 124).

Социалистическая Д. опирается на поддержку широких народных масс и стремится как можно шире разъяснить им свои цели и смысл осуществляемых ею внешнеполитических мероприятий. В политической сознательности народных масс своей страны, так и др. стран, в понимании массами международной политики социалистическая Д. видит один из важнейших источников своей силы. Поэтому социалистическая Д. во всей своей деятельности уделяет большое внимание тому, чтобы довести до сведения народов всего мира правду о внешней политике и международных отношениях.

В противоположность буржуазной Д., неоднократно жертвующей провозглашенными ранее внешнеполитическими принципами и самыми торжественными декларациями ради политических выгод данного момента, социалистическая Д. глубоко принципиальна. Она не склонна к конъюнктурным комбинациям и сделкам, идущим вразрез с принципиальными основами социалистической внешней политики. Так, когда на Генуэзской конференции 1922 капиталистические державы требовали от Советского государства отказа от аннулирования займов и долгов царского и Временного правительства, от национализации иностранных предприятий и от монополии внешней торговли, предлагая взамен признание де-юре, Советское государство решительно отвергло эти требования и в последующем добилось признания де-юре при полном сохранении всех принципов и институтов своего строя, своей внутренней и внешней политики.

Принципиальность социалистическая Д. сочетается с гибкостью, с готовностью к сотрудничеству и соглашению, к уступкам, необходимым для достижения сотрудничества и соглашения, но не выходящим за рамки проводимых ею внешнеполитических принципов. Социалистическая Д. сочетает осторожность и выдержку, умение не поддаваться на провокации и устранять конфликты с твердостью и решительностью.

Социалистическую Д. неизменно характеризует верность данному слову и взятым на себя обязательствам. Убедительные внешнеэкономические результаты этого дает дипломатическая история Советского государства. Даже такой реакционный политический деятель, как У. Черчилль, вынужден был констатировать в английском парламенте 27. 11. 1945: «Никакое правительство не выполняло точнее свои обязательства даже в ущерб самому себе, нежели русское советское правительство». Это свойство социалистической Д., столь резко отличающее ее от Д. эксплуататорских государств, вытекает из миролюбивого характера внешней политики социалистических государств, из стабильности основных линий этой политики.

На протяжении истории внешних сношений Советского государства, а также др. социалистических государств сложились дипломатические методы, соответствующие сущности социалистической Д. и ее внешнекавалитным принципиальным особенностям. В своей совокупности эти методы образуют новый тип дипломатического искусства — дипломатическое искусство социализма, которое помогает им воздействовать на международную обстановку в интересах трудящихся.

Среди этих методов одно из первых мест занимает метод мирных, дипломатических переговоров. Он широко применяется социалистическими государствами как для установления сотрудничества с др. государствами в деле осуществления общих мероприятий по обеспечению международного мира и безопасности, так и для мирного урегулирования спорных вопросов и снятия международной напряженности. Н. С. Хрущев говорил по этому поводу: «Теперь уже

любому здравомыслящему человеку ясно, что силой оружия в наши дни международные проблемы разрешить невозможно, что есть только один путь — путь мирных переговоров с учетом интересов всех участников переговоров на основе равноправия и взаимной выгоды. Советский Союз стоит именно за такой путь решения международных проблем».

Д. социалистических государств, опираясь на сочувствие и поддержку широких народных масс всего мира, с неизменным успехом разоблачает агрессивные замыслы империалистических правительств и маскирующие их дипломатические маневры, открывая глаза народам на действительное положение вещей. Она делает это с трибуны дипломатических конференций, в официальных документах и в прессе. Разоблачение агрессивных планов и действий империалистов — один из важных методов социалистической Д., с помощью которого она мобилизует против агрессивной политики империалистических правительств демократическое общественное мнение и народные массы всего мира.

Выдающееся место среди методов социалистической Д. занимает выдвигание конструктивных предложений по требующим урегулирования международным вопросам, в особенности по вопросам обеспечения всеобщей безопасности и снятия международной напряженности. Социалистическая Д. неизменно выдвигала и выдвигает такие предложения как в рамках взаимоотношений с отдельными государствами, так и во всеобщем международном масштабе. Еще в первом декрете Советского государства — декрете о мире 1917 — оно выдвинуло программу всеобщего демократического мира и новых международных отношений — без порабощения народов, территориальных захватов и тайной Д. В 20—30-х годах Советское правительство внесло ряд предложений по вопросам разоружения и коллективной безопасности. В годы второй мировой войны и в годы непосредственно последовавшие за ее окончанием, Советское правительство внесло большой вклад в опре-

дипломатическая Д. неизменно выдвигала и выдвигает такие предложения как в рамках взаимоотношений с отдельными государствами, так и во всеобщем международном масштабе. Еще в первом декрете Советского государства — декрете о мире 1917 — оно выдвинуло программу всеобщего демократического мира и новых международных отношений — без порабощения народов, территориальных захватов и тайной Д. В 20—30-х годах Советское правительство внесло ряд предложений по вопросам разоружения и коллективной безопасности. В годы второй мировой войны и в годы непосредственно последовавшие за ее окончанием, Советское правительство внесло большой вклад в опре-

этому человеку
жизни в наши дни
лема разрешить
в только один
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в раниорации и
Советский Союз
ли путь решения
блает.

ких государств,
ше и поддержку
масс всего мира,
том разоблачает
а империалисти-
и маскирующую
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тельное положение
нает это с три-
авций, в офици-
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ажных методов
Д., с помощью
тет против агрес-
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о среди методов
Д. занимает выд-
гивных предло-
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ности и смит-
той напряженно-
сти Д. неизменно
ает такие пред-
ях взаимоотно-
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ства — декрете о
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ющения народов,
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ности. В годы вто-
ры и в годы, пе-
ледопавшие за се-
тское правитель-
ой вклад в опре-

доляне осов поелно. много усурой-
ства (в содержание Статьи ООН,
мирных договоров 1947 и т. д.).
В послевоенный период СССР... да
социалистические государства...
предложения в целях обеспе-
чения международного мира и без-
опасности; по вопросам о сокращении
вооружений и запрещения атомного
оружия, о прекращении испытаний
этого оружия, о создании безатомной
зоны в Центральной Европе (та наз.
плана Рапацкого), о коллективной
безопасности Европы, по герман-
скому вопросу, по вопросу о пред-
отвращении внезапного нападения,
о всеобщем и полном разоружении.

Особенностями конструктивных
предложений социалистической Д.
являются их реализм и политическая
действительность. В отличие от не-
редко встречающихся в практике
буржуазной Д. проектов, к-рые
только во внешней форме направ-
лены на мирные цели, а на деле
враждебны миру и служат сред-
ством обмена общественного мнения,
предложения социалистической Д.
открывают полную возможность ре-
ально обеспечить достижение про-
возглашаемых в них мирных целей
при условии проведения этих пред-
ложений в жизнь. Примером может
служить предложение Советского
правительства о постоянном нейтра-
литете Австрии, способствовавшее
укреплению мира и безопасности в
Европе. Предложения социалисти-
ческой Д., как правило, содержат
столь отчетливую постановку под-
лежащих урегулированию междуна-
родных вопросов, что вынуждают им-
периалистические государства опре-
делить свою настоящую позицию по
этим вопросам и, следовательно,
в случае отклонения данных пред-
ложений показывают их немедленное
предпринять какие-либо реальные
шаги в пользу укрепления мира и
противодействия агрессии. Тем са-
мым эти предложения способствуют
саморазоблачению империалистиче-
ских правительств и повышают бла-
гательность народных масс.

В борьбе против империалистиче-
ской агрессии Д. Советского го-
сударства иногда успешно пользо-
валась противоречиями между импе-

риалистическими государствами для
того, чтобы помешать им создать
единый фронт против СССР. В. И.
Ленин учил: «Надо уметь использо-
вать противоречия и противополож-
ности между империалистами» (Соч.,
т. 31, стр. 410—411). Всклая Д.
стремится воспользоваться противоречиями
противоречиями между противниками. Но в
отличие от Д. эксплуататорских го-
сударств, к-рая в большинстве слу-
чаев пытается пользоваться проти-
воречиями между др. государствами
— и даже искусственно вызвать или
обострить их, — для того чтобы уси-
лить международную напряженность
и создать обстановку, благоприятст-
вующую осуществлению собственных
агрессивных замыслов, социалисти-
ческая Д. пользуется противоречиями
между империалистическими
государствами в интересах мира, в
целях разрушения сколачиваемых
империалистами агрессивных бло-
ков и предотвращения их агрессив-
ных действий, следовательно — для
укрепления всеобщей безопасности.
Образцом такого использования про-
тиворечий между империалистами
является заключение Советским го-
сударством Брестского мирного до-
говора, давшего возможность полу-
чить мирную передышку и укрепить
Советскую власть в первые годы ре-
волюции. Др. примером использо-
вания противоречий между импе-
риалистами для обезвреживания их
агрессивных замыслов является
внешнеполитическая стратегия и так-
тика Советского государства в годы
перед второй мировой войной — во
время войны, когда советская Д.
разрушила ряд попыток мировой им-
периалистической реакции создать
единый фронт всех капиталистиче-
ских государств против СССР и
сорвала попытки правящих кругов
ряда империалистических госу-
дарств столкнуть гитлеровскую Гер-
манию с СССР.

Новые методы Д. складываются во
взаимоотношениях Советского Союза
со странами народной демократии.
Это отношения совершенно нового
типа, лишённые антагонистического
характера, строящиеся на принципе
пролетарского интернационализма и
на братском сотрудничестве во имя

общих целей, при полном уважении суверенных прав и национальных интересов каждой социалистической страны. В то время как политические отношения между капиталистическими странами, даже связанными договором о союзе, содержат элементы антагонистических противоречий и соперничества, если на почве стремления к гегемонии одного «союзника» над другим, то на почве стремления к поддержанию «равновесия», политические отношения между социалистическими странами включают какие бы то ни было антагонистические противоречия и представляют собой отношения дружбы и тесной братской взаимопомощи. Для поддержания таких отношений социалистические государства применяют новые методы, методы конструктивной деятельности, способствующей сплочению социалистических стран и координации их мероприятий в борьбе за их безопасность и за всеобщий мир. Методы социалистической Д., применяемые во взаимоотношениях социалистических стран друг с другом, непосредственно перерастают в организационные формы совместных усилий интернационально сплоченных свободных народов этих стран во имя общих идеалов построения в них коммунизма и сохранения всеобщего мира.

Социалистическая Д. СССР и стран народной демократии осуществляет новые политические цели, применяет новые методы и играет новую роль. Это научно обоснованная Д., подлинно народная Д., это Д., в которой добивается изменения международной действительности в соответствии с требованиями исторического прогресса и, следовательно, имеет прогрессивное значение в развитии общества. Именно исследование этого социального Д. неизменно добивается серьезных успехов в сложных условиях международной жизни современной эпохи.

«ДИПЛОМАТИЯ ДОЛЛАРА» — экспансионистская политика США, направленная на захватление др. стран американскими монополиями. Впервые выражение «Д. д.» было употреблено президентом США У. Тейлором в 1912.

«Д. д.» широко использует как методы военно-политического давления и прямой вооруженной интервенции, так и предоставленне кабальных займов, финансовой и экономической помощи в целях установления господства американских империалистических кругов в др. странах. Праздничные круги США особенно широко применяют «Д. д.» (в сочетании с др. средствами давления, в т. ч. атомной дипломатией) после второй мировой войны. «Д. д.» служит оружием для борьбы с национально-освободительными движениями угнетенных народов и для поддержки реакционных режимов во всем мире; играет значительную роль в экспансионистской политике, проводимой монополистическими кругами США (см. «Взаимного обеспечения безопасности» программа; «План Маршалла»; «Доктрина Трумэна»).

ДИРКСЕН, Герберт (1882—1949) — немецкий дипломат, крупный помещик. В 1928—33 — германский посол в СССР. С сентября 1933 по февраль 1938 — посол в Японии, принимал участие в подготовке «антикоммунистического пакта». В марте 1938 был назначен послом в Англию. Занимал этот пост до сентября 1939. Находясь в Лондоне, вел секретные переговоры с представителями английского правительства о размежевании сфер влияния и о заключении широкого экономического и политического англо-германского соглашения (см. *Англо-германские переговоры (тайные) 1939*).

Дипл. архив Д., попавший в годы второй мировой войны в руки Советского правительства и опубликованный в СССР (см. «Документы и материалы кануна второй мировой войны», т. 2, 1948), содержит большой материал, разоблачающий империалистическую политику развязывания второй мировой войны, проводившуюся крупнейшими капиталистическими державами.

ДИСКРИМИНАЦИЯ в международных отношениях — установление для представителей, организаций или граждан одного государства меньших прав, чем для представителей, организаций или граждан др. государства. В порядке

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