

ROGERS INFURIATED BY CIA 'SCARE YARN'

Helms reported source of 'USSR-may-bomb-China' story

By R. H. SHACKFORD
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

Secretary of State William P. Rogers is trying to dampen down what is reported to be a CIA-inspired scare story that Soviet Russia may be thinking about destroying Communist China's nuclear installations with a surprise air strike.

Mr. Rogers and his associates fear that the widely publicized report — the source of which is understood to be Central Intelligence Agency director Richard Helms — will damage the secretary of state's efforts to establish a policy of American neutrality in the Sino-Soviet word and border war.

The White House in California has not been heard from on this latest intra-administration controversy. Nor is it known whether Mr. Rogers feels strongly enough to make an issue of it with President Nixon.

But if it should precipitate a showdown, Mr. Helms is unlikely to carry as much weight with Mr. Nixon as Mr. Rogers, who is an old and close friend of the President.

OTHER COMPLICATIONS

What is most disturbing to State Department officials is that giving even a little credence to the idea of a Soviet pre-emptive strike against China plays into the hands of the Soviet propagandists.

In addition, it could complicate the Nixon-Rogers efforts to work with the Soviets on disarmament, the Middle East and Vietnam if the Kremlin wants a pretext for further delay. The Chinese are expected to regard the report a "proof" that the United States is ganging up with Russia against China's nuclear effort.

For a couple of months Soviet officials have been trying to peddle all kinds of scare stories thruout th. world to woo sympathy and support against the Chinese.

A State Department spokesman conceded that there have been "rumors" that the Russians might at some stage "take out" the Chinese nuclear installations. But he added that these have been unconfirmed and come, at best, from second-hand sources.

ANYTHING POSSIBLE

Department officials take the position that anything is possible in the Russian and Chinese worlds. But what is probable is something else.

With that caveat, most of the experts — on both Soviet and Chinese affairs — lean to the theory that the "rumors" of a possible Soviet strike against China are part of Moscow's war of nerves against Peking.

Credibility of the "rumors" of a possible Soviet strike at China's nuclear installations was put into perspective this way by one observer:

"If the Soviet Union is, in fact, planning a surprise attack on China, it is unreasonable to believe that the Kremlin hierarchy would tell low-level officials and authorize them to discuss it with non-Russians."

EXPECTS NO STRIKE

On his recent return from Asia, and after several days of discussion with top U. S. officials in Hong Kong, Mr. Rogers said:

"The best judgment is that probably the Soviets will not use its forces to strike against China, and probably the Chinese will not strike Russia. The Russians would be

faced with a very serious problem if they made a strike . . . then they would be involved in a land war with 800 million Chinese. On the other hand, the Chinese Communists realize that they are not really able militarily to cope with the Soviet Union."

Nevertheless, for many months the Soviet Union has been going to extraordinary lengths to persuade other countries to join them in Moscow's anti-Chinese crusade. On March 29 and June 14, the Soviet government delivered to the State Department written statements giving Russia's versions of the difficulties along the Chinese border.

At his last press conference, Mr. Rogers told of the abnormal diplomatic activities of the Soviets this way:

"The Soviets have gone to embassies all over Western Europe and this hemisphere presenting their case against the Chinese, which is really quite unusual."

Officials explained today that these Russian diplomatic overtures in no way suggested Soviet military action. On the contrary, the Soviets were arguing that they were threatened by the Chinese.

Why the rumors?

The Soviet-Chinese border fights and rumors of a Soviet plan to bomb China's nuclear arsenal may be part of an intricate battle of strategy Moscow hopes will produce a change in

Chinese leadership, according to Dr. Richard C. Thornton, consultant to the State Department on Asian affairs. He offered this analysis of the situation in an interview with United Press International:

- The current border clashes are Soviet "probes" aimed at pressuring China and opening the way for establishment of new, independent border republics in China. Dr. Thornton predicted one to three of these republics, perhaps in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang, and all controlled by Soviet Puppets, will be established within the next six months.

- As a result, the Soviets have to be pre-

pared to face the threat of a retaliatory attack from Chinese nuclear-tipped missiles which are in the final stages of development. The threat, therefore, that the Soviets might try to knock out the Chinese nuclear missile installations before the Chinese could strike is a real one.

- The Soviets would not want all-out war with China and so would hope the puppet border republics and the pre-emptive nuclear attack, if they decided to risk it, would fragment Chinese leadership. The result could be a civil war, or perhaps the emergence of pro-Soviet forces erased from power during Mao Tse-Tung's proletarian cultural revolution. (UPD)

INTERPRETIVE REPORT

CIA Leaked Sino-Soviet Story—Why?

By HENRY BRADSHER
Star Staff Writer

A number of similar news stories said yesterday that the Russians might have leaked word they were considering bombing Chinese nuclear installations as a psychological warfare move against Peking.

The stories attributed word of the alleged Soviet thinking to "intelligence reports" or just simply "reports."

None of the dispatches explained what psychological warfare considerations there might be in having word of a possible Soviet pre-emptive strike at China come from Washington.

The motive remained unexplained because CIA Director Richard M. Helms, the source of the news dispatches, does not talk much about why they do things at the Central Intelligence Agency and, apparently, he was not asked.

Old Rumors

Rumors of a possible Soviet attempt to destroy China's nuclear weapons potential before it got too dangerous had been circulating for some time.

The rumors sounded strangely like echoes of a U.S. discussion two decades ago. Then some "big bomber men" called publicly for the United States to eliminate Soviet nuclear installations before the Soviet Union became dangerously armed with atomic bombs.

Now the Kremlin's version of hawkish generals were rumored to be advising a quick blow against the Chinese gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchow, another plant at Patow, the test site at Lop Nor and other nuclear installations.

The State Department had been hearing such rumors for a couple of months.

Moscow Believed Cautious

It did not put too much importance on them, preferring to believe Moscow is too cautious to do it. Continuing border clashes were one thing, but attacking vital Chinese sites would lead to a bigger, more disastrous war than the Soviets wanted, State Department experts thought.

The State Department even had heard the Russians were checking with allies, and friendly Communist parties on what the reaction might be to a pre-emptive strike. It had

heard "rumors," meaning unconfirmed reports, a spokesman said, but he added diplomatically that perhaps they were "reports," meaning somewhat more reliable.

John A. Scali, who reports from the State Department for the American Broadcasting Co., arranged for a selected group of diplomatic correspondents to lunch with CIA Director Helms.

From that luncheon Wednesday emerged the stories saying Moscow was checking around on what the reaction would be to a hypothetical strike on Chinese nuclear installations.

A "Backgrounder"

The luncheon was held on a "background" basis, meaning that reporters present could not identify the source of their information in their stories. The Star did not have a reporter present, and printed a version of the backgrounder transmitted by United Press International.

The "reports" of what the Soviets might be thinking, said the stories, had come first from Communist party contacts of the CIA in Italy and other West European countries then from Eastern Europe. They were a little vague, coming from sources of varying credibility, according to the news stories.

But the newspaper headlines and the 30-second broadcast summaries focused attention on the possibility of a Soviet pre-emptive strike rather than on the vagueness. There was plenty of attention here and abroad to the stories, with some of the versions going abroad being second-hand dispatches of foreigners uninvited to meet with Helms.

Helms Psychology?

The dispatches faithfully reflected the suggestion that the Russians might be engaging in psychological warfare. There was an implication that Moscow wanted to warn Peking to quit stirring up border trouble—if, in fact, it is the Chinese rather than the Russians who are doing the stirring, which is uncertain from this dispatch.

So, was Helms trying to warn Moscow not to strike at China? Was Helms engaged in a little psychological warfare of his own to try to head off an attack which would

here think would escalate into a war with world-wide repercussions?

"We think this kind of war would be injurious to all people, and we hope it doesn't occur," Secretary of State William P. Rogers said Aug. 20. Pravda, the Soviet Communist party newspaper, seemed to agree. It repeated yesterday

earlier Soviet charges that the Chinese are preparing for war, adding:

"No continent would be left out if a war flares up under the present conditions, with the existing present-day technology, with the availability of the lethal weapons and the up-to-date means of their delivery."

28 AUG 1969

Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000300010009-5

U.S. Fears Chance of Sino-Soviet War Is Rising

Russia Reported Eying Strikes at China

A-Sites

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writer

Reports reaching Washington relating to a possible Soviet strike at the Chinese nuclear complex have increased Nixon administration alarm about the chances of a war between the two Communist giants.

According to these reports, at least two in number, the Russians have been making discreet inquiries of some fellow Communist leaders, both those in power in Eastern Europe and some out of power in Western Europe, on what would be the reaction to such a Soviet strike. There are no reports on the responses.

It appears that the inquiries were first made at the world Communist gathering in Moscow last June and later repeated at another place. That could not be ascertained yesterday.

The reports are considered authentic but it is conceded that they might somehow have been surfaced as part of the Kremlin's psychological warfare against the Peking regime of Mao Tse-tung.

The rising tension between China and the Soviet Union, most marked since the clashes on the Siberian border in March, has led American officials to draw up scenarios of what Moscow and Peking might do and what the United States reaction could be. It is understood there has been a National Security Council study.

The sense of alarm over a possible war has been steadily rising in Washington for months. The border clash in Central Asia last month considerably accentuated the alarm.

One key official who only a month earlier had rated the chances of a major Chinese-Soviet fight at about 10 per cent recently said that the chances now are only slightly less than 50-50. This sort of talk is now also widely heard among those who follow Soviet and Chinese affairs.

As viewed here there are at least three major possible Soviet tactics:

1. A punitive action such as an extensive border clash, initiated by Moscow as it is believed was the case last month in Central Asia, in which a large Chinese force would be destroyed by superior Soviet power.

2. Attempts to subvert the racial minority groups in Sinkiang on the Chinese side in Central Asia where anti-Peking feeling is thought to run high.

3. A preventive strike, by air or on the ground.

This latter, by far the most serious and thought likely to lead to major conflict if not all-out war, includes the strike at the Chinese nuclear complex about which the new reports are concerned. It is believed that such an attack would be with conventional bombs.

Perhaps the single most critical target in such a case would be the gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchow which makes the fissionable material for Chinese nuclear weapons.

However, the advantages that the Soviets enjoy in terms of logistics in Central Asia are thought to be missing in Siberia. There, in the Soviet Far East, the Soviets are dependent on the single double-track Trans-Siberian railway which runs close to the Chinese border in many places and which could be cut by raiding parties. This would be especially true in the long winter months when the Amur and Ussuri river borders are frozen.

It is the virtually unanimous view of those here who follow China that the Peking government would retaliate if there were a Soviet strike of any importance. But there is a division of opinion as to whether Peking would use its nuclear weapons.

The Chinese lack a missile capability but do have a few Soviet-made bombers and many Soviet fighters that could be modified to carry bombs. The Soviets have mounted a massive defense in Siberia but there can be no guarantee that a plane or two would not get through. Such important Siberian cities as Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk and Vladivostok are barely on

The Nixon administration had proclaimed a public policy of not taking sides in the Chinese-Soviet dispute but rather of trying to improve relations with both countries. Moscow and Peking, however, appear to remain suspicious that the United States will join the other against it.

There has been minimal official public comment here on the possibility of a Chinese-Soviet war. On Aug. 20, however, Secretary of State William P. Rogers told a group of college students that "our best judgment is that border clashes and incidents will continue" since "we are convinced that the hostility between them is deep." He expressed hope such clashes would not turn into a war.

Rogers went on to say that China watchers in Hongkong had told him the Soviets had the capability to "take over a good section of the country near Peking and probably Peking itself." However, it is widely felt here that the Soviets would shrink from such a major attack lest they become bogged down in a major land war in China much as were the Japanese in the pre World War II period.

Recent polemics from Moscow and Peking show the intensity of feeling. Soviet Communist Party chief Brezhnev in June charged that China was preparing to wage "both an ordinary and a great nuclear war" and declared that the Soviet people "are not intimidated by shouting." Other Russians have rattled their own nuclear weapons.

Anatoly V. Kuznetsov, the prominent Soviet writer who recently defected in Britain, told the New York Times in London that the great fear of the ordinary Soviet citizen today is China. He said Russians fear a Chinese attack and believe war cannot be avoided. Even though Kuznetsov broke with his own government he put all the blame on the Chinese.

A Peking broadcast on Aug. 14 charged that the Soviets have "built a series of airbases and guided missile bases along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders" and have "plotted to gather some of the satellite troops of the Warsaw so-called 'international columns' to oppose China."


The current issue of Peking Review contains a scathing denunciation of "the new Czars" in Moscow. It especially attacked Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's recent friendly words about President Nixon's call for an "era of negotiation" to replace confrontation. Gromyko was charged with reverting the Nixon formula and with having "prostrated himself before it."

Some Soviet watchers have concluded that the Kremlin leaders have decided there is no merit in waiting for Mao's death in hopes he would be followed by leaders who would repair the breach with Moscow.

It also is theorized here that Soviet military leaders have been making the case that the Chinese before long will have an invulnerable nuclear capability and thus the time to strike is now. But earlier American estimates of Chinese nuclear development have proved to be overoptimistic, judging by known tests.

Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000300010009-5

continued



August 28, 1969

By Joseph P. Mastrangelo—The Washington Post

Map of Soviet-Chinese border area shows locations of known Chinese nuclear plants and test sites. Other such major border clashes this year as well as some of the sites known to U.S. authorities have not been disclosed.

Russia Said To Ask Raid Reaction

Reportedly Considers Attack On Peking's Atom Facilities

By PAUL W. WARD

[Washington Bureau of The Sun]

Washington, Aug. 27—Reports indicating that the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime at Moscow is considering trying to bomb Communist China's atomic installations out of existence are beginning to be taken seriously in the international community of diplomats here.

Chief among them are intelligence reports that Soviet Communist party leaders have been taking soundings on the subject among their opposite numbers in both Eastern and Western Europe.

Contributing also to the sober turn in the speculation here are intelligence reports to the effect that the Soviet Union has doubled its forces along its China border; that they now total about 30 divisions (nearly 500,000 men) as against 15 divisions four years ago, and that they include mobile missile launchers.

State Department officials, citing conflicts in the reports about Soviet soundings of other Communist parties, continue to profess about them a skepticism which also colored a statement William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, made a week ago.

Addressing a group of students winding up their summer employment as "executive interns," Mr. Rogers was asked: "What do you people feel the chances are that the Soviet Union will use a nuclear strike against China."

"I think the best judgment is that probably it will not do so," Mr. Rogers answered.

He added, "The Russians would be faced with a very serious problem because, although if they made a strike against Communist China they could take over a good segment of that area up near Peking—they probably could even take over Peking—but then they would be

come involved in a land war with 800,000,000 Chinese.

"That would be a very difficult thing for them to handle, and I think they are quite aware of that, even though they have moved military equipment up toward the Chinese border."

Mr. Rogers went on to volunteer a commentary on the possibilities of Peking initiating a Sino-Soviet war.

"The Chinese Communists, I think, realize that they are not really able militarily to cope with the Soviet Union; so we rather doubt that they would initiate a major attack," Mr. Rogers said.

"Very Permanent"

Then, referring to the more than 430 Sino-Soviet border clashes that Peking claims have occurred this year and blames on Moscow, including the latest one on August 13, Mr. Rogers added:

"Our best judgment is that the border clashes and incidents probably will continue to recur. We are convinced the hostility between the two is very deep and very permanent. We are quite conscious, though, of the fact that these border incidents always can flare up into something neither side really intends, and I must say our position as a government is that we hope that doesn't happen."

"There are some people," he continued, "who argue, 'Well, it would be a good thing for the United States to let the Soviet Union and Communist China engage in a fairly sizable war. We don't think so. We think warfare anywhere is harmful to the total world community, and we think this kind of war would be inju-

rious to all people, and we hope it doesn't occur."

Other members of Washington's international community privy to the intelligence reports about Moscow's soundings said the reports came first from Italy, then West Germany, and in rapid order thereafter from East European countries.

Three Categories

Speaking of conflicts among the reports, they divided them into three categories, the first consisting of reports that Soviet leaders, as hosts in June to an international conference of Communist parties at Moscow, had merely lectured their guests about "the great threat from China."

The second category comprised reports that the Russians had warned the leaders of just some countries' Communist parties that Peking might escalate the border situation and general hostility to a point where the Russians might have to take military action.

To the third category, the reports' collators assigned those they called the "most extreme"—meaning, they explained, reports that Moscow has been telling its Warsaw Pact allies that the Soviet Air Force might have to "take out" Communist China's nuclear arms installations and wants to know what attitude its allies would take in that event.

The collators professed to know that some of the Soviet Union's East European allies are concerned lest they be called on to aid it in a Sino-Soviet war. They also suggested that the looser language appearing in their recently negotiated mutual defense pacts with the Soviet Union may be a reflection of that concern.



Marquis Childs

Laird-Helms Confrontation On ABM Is Being Sanitized

AS BACKGROUND for the antiballistic missile debate in the Senate that has just begun is the record of one of the most curious confrontations in the history of a body that has seen so much of human squalor and human nobility. That record is now in the Pentagon being sanitized, which means often that only the blanks are left in a puzzle to be solved by a few specialists with inside knowledge.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird became acutely sensitive, as he carried the Administration load in the ABM controversy, at the suggestion that his estimate of the Soviet missile threat differed from that of Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Laird told Chairman J. William Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he would like to appear with Helms to show there was no real difference between them.

Fulbright, after consulting

Committee members, proposed that the confrontation be in open rather than closed session. This was, of course, impossible, since the CIA director never testifies in public. It was extraordinary enough that he should appear with a high-ranking cabinet officer who had challenged the Committee to prove any disagreement between them. For those who have labored to make the CIA a strictly professional, nonpolitical organization this seemed above and beyond the call of duty.

SOME MONTHS earlier Helms had given the Committee a professional estimate—the agreed estimate of the intelligence community—of what the Soviets were doing to build a defensive wall with anti-ballistic missiles. Helms' careful appraisal, in the top-secret category, was very much in the minds of Committee members as the two men faced them. The extent of the Soviets' ABM defense relates directly to Laird's main argument—that the Russians are building a first-strike capability which would wipe out America's Minutemen and make a retaliatory strike impossible.

Helms had testified that the Soviet military planned a city-wide defense of Moscow with their ABMs, known in the Pentagon code as Galosh. They had planned to install more than 100 launchers.

But then, and this was the dramatic thrust of Helms' testimony, after 60 to 65 launchers were put in place a halt was called. The best evidence was that doubts had increased about Galosh's effectiveness. The development was stopped so that with further research a breakthrough might result in a truly defensive weapon. This is the case made by many opponents of the Nixon Administration's Safeguard ABM, who argue against spending \$7 billion to \$11 billion to deploy the missiles when so much doubt still exists as to their capability.

As to the Tallinn line around Leningrad, Helms' testimony was similar, although with rather less supporting evidence. Tallinn had also been planned as a city-wide defense, using the same, in effect, experimental launchers.

With the confrontation continuing hour after hour, tensions built up in the Committee room. Helms squirmed, as one Senator put it later, but he did not back down. His original estimate of Soviet ABM capability stood for the record. For a civil servant who has tried to avoid public controversy it was an extremely difficult position.

AFTER SIX months in a post as demanding as any in Government Laird is the supersalesman. Even those most strongly opposed to his views on ABM and the testing of the multiple-warhead missile, MIRV, take a charitable view of his role. That is what he has been told off to do in a position he certainly did not seek. If he pushes too hard at times—his mother is reported to have said, "Mel, you sound as though you're trying to scare people"—it is the zeal of the earnest, small-town advocate weighted down with a responsibility almost too much for any solitary human being.

His trial by fire comes at a time when, whether he understands it or not, the political atmosphere is rapidly changing. A brush with Fulbright at an earlier hearing was indicative. In a preamble to a broad policy statement Laird remarked that responsibility for the Nation's security was now his. Fulbright responded by saying that it might be well to realize that the Congress has some share of this responsibility.

How much the commitments resolution, calling on the Executive to consult with Congress before committing American men and money to ventures that might mean another Vietnam, really means, the support for it was significant. The vote of 70 to 16 said a lot about attitudes not only on Capitol Hill but in the country. The danger signals are flying, as they were flying for Lyndon Johnson before he walked off the scene of battle. Shrewd politician as he was rated, he failed to read those signals until it was too late. And that may say something to the present occupant of the White House.

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WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP

Is Laird Briefing Us Too Much?

By ORR KELLY

Ever since he moved into the Pentagon last January, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird has been pouring out an almost steady stream of previously secret information about the Soviet Union.

He has talked about the SS9 missile, tests in the Pacific of some form of multiple warhead for the SS9, the rate at which the Russians are deploying intercontinental missiles and the rate at which they are building submarines.

In the process, he has been accused for saying too much, of saying too little and of distorting the intelligence estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency to bolster his case for a missile defense system.

How much validity is there to these criticisms?

Of the three, the least likely to be valid is the criticism that Laird's appraisal of Soviet capabilities in the future differs from the official National Intelligence Estimate, because the procedure by which the NIE is arrived at specifically provides for dissenting views, which become part of the estimate.

As part of his job as the principal foreign intelligence adviser to the President, Richard Helms, the director of central intelligence, is responsible for preparation of the NIE.

The process starts with the President or a request from the National Security Council for an estimate on some problem of foreign intelligence. The request goes to the Board of National Estimates, which reports directly to Helms as director of central intelligence.

The members of the 12-man board or their staff get together with representatives of the Defense and State Departments and other agencies that might be involved and divide up the work. When the drafts

come back from the various agencies, a member of the board's staff puts them together in preparation for a series of meetings by the board.

When they have finished their work, Helms takes the report to the U.S. Intelligence Board, of which he is chairman. The board includes representatives of the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, the State Department's Office of Intelligence Research, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

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"One of the beauties of the system is that there is a complete sharing of all information among the agencies, so that everybody is working from the same set of facts," Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., former executive director of the CIA, wrote in his book on "The Real CIA."

Planning for military purposes normally goes beyond the NIE to what is known as the "greater-than-expected-threat." In other words, plans are normally made for the worst that might happen rather than for what appears likely to happen—even if the Pentagon agrees with the NIE. Because of the long time it takes to develop and produce new weapons, military planning also normally reaches out beyond the time in which the NIE has any real certainty.

The criticism that Laird is saying both too much and too little has more basis in fact.

So far as the intelligence community is concerned, it would be happy if no one ever said anything about what has been learned about the activities of other countries, friend or foe.

Part of the problem is that any revelation of what we

know—or think we know—lets a potential enemy know how much we know and how accurate our information is.

An even more serious part of the problem is that any revelation could expose the sources of information. This is the area in which intelligence officials are most touchy because it can endanger the effectiveness and even the lives of intelligence agents.

On the other hand, Laird may well be telling us less than we need to know for a fully objective look at the threat posed by the Soviet Union.

He has said, for example, that the Russians are testing a multiple warhead on the SS9 and that the warheads seem to fall in a pattern corresponding to the way our Minuteman missiles are deployed. This information comes from a destroyer waiting out in the Pacific near the impact area.

But what if he has additional information—as he almost surely does—that comes from sources less obvious than a destroyer. Is he free to make that public, too, without seriously endangering sources of information? Probably not.

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This is a problem that has been with us for a long time and one that we can never wholly avoid.

People in the government at the policy-making level are going to try to use as much information as they can to prove the wisdom of what they have decided to do—as the administration is now doing in the case of the Safeguard missile defense system.

But no one—and especially none of the critics of what the administration has set out to do—can ever be satisfied that the information being made public is, if not the whole truth, at least a close approximation of the truth.

Around
The World

Chinese Atomic

Missile Test Seen

LONDON — China will soon test a nuclear missile with a range of 6000 miles that could give the country second-strike nuclear capability in the 1970s, The London Sunday Times said in an article yesterday.

The article was written by Francis James, an Australian journalist who visited China's Lop Nor nuclear testing site earlier this year and took pictures of missile and nuclear bomb plants.

James, who specializes in religious journalism, said he interviewed Wei San-fu, a top Chinese nuclear scientist, who said China had made seven nuclear tests, beginning with a bomb using enriched uranium built with Russian help in 1964, and ending with an H-

bomb on Christmas Eve, 1967, entirely Chinese-made of lithium 6.

NEWSLINK
18 MAY 1969

THE PERISCOPE

SUPER-YARD FOR SOVIET SUBS

The Russians have started producing submarines at the rate of eight Polaris-type submarines a year and fourteen atom-powered attack and other combat subs for an annual production of 22. By comparison, the U.S. built two submarines last year. The Soviets have the world's biggest submarine yard, highly automated and entirely under cover. This permits all-weather operations and shields the yard from photo-satellite surveillance. However, the U.S. has a wide lead in Polaris-type missile submarines with 41; so far the Soviets have completed seven.

Agent of Doom

At an age when many men begin to crumble under the wear and tear of life, Rupert Sigl seems the epitome of psychological good health. A solidly built man whose face does not betray his 40 years, Sigl is calm, intelligent and quietly self-assured. Which is somewhat remarkable considering the fact that for twenty years he has been a Soviet spy—and that when he defected to the West not long ago a jubilant U.S. intelligence officer hailed the event as "one of our great postwar coups."

An Austrian who served as a junior officer in Hitler's Wehrmacht, Sigl was recruited by the foreign intelligence branch of Russia's KGB shortly after World War

him out of East Berlin and off to the U.S.

Once they began interrogating Sigl, U.S. intelligence officers found him far more of a gold mine than they had hoped. For one thing, he had violated a basic canon of intelligence work by maintaining notebooks which included the names and telephone numbers of many of his agents. Beyond that, he proved to have an almost incredible faculty for dredging up the particulars of "cases" with which he had dealt years before.

Detained: Within days of Sigl's defection, suspected Soviet agents throughout Europe and in Brazil suddenly began to vanish from sight. But many of them were not quick enough; already, some fourteen people, including two in the U.S., have been detained by Western intelligence agencies on the strength of Sigl's revelations. Among the suspects currently in custody: Darley Opusumah, a former employee of the Ghanaian Embassy in Bonn, and Dr. Franz von Westendonk, a former legal expert for the Common Market who specialized in industrial and economic intelligence.

Presumably, moreover, this is only the beginning of the damage that Sigl's defection will do to KGB networks abroad. According to U.S. intelligence officers, the number of "interesting names" that Sigl brought with him runs to well over a hundred. And in the months ahead, as CIA interrogators seek to stimulate Sigl's memory with photos and the recollection of incidents past, still more names seem sure to emerge. In fact, said one U.S. official last week, Sigl's knowledge of Soviet espionage operations is so vast that "it will take years before we can evaluate all this stuff."



Rupert Sigl: One of the boys

II and worked successively in Brazil and in the huge Karlshorst espionage center in East Berlin. As a foreigner, he could never aspire to the highest rungs of the KGB, but in time his talents won him such respect that he came to be regarded as "one of the boys" and was given a key assignment as an "agent handler."

For all his ability, however, Rupert Sigl was not happy in his work, and two years ago he made a discreet approach to West German intelligence. Largely because they feared he might be a Soviet plant, the West Germans refused to have anything to do with him. But a year ago a determined young CIA officer in Germany persuaded his superiors to take Sigl on as a double agent. And in mid-April, by now thoroughly convinced of Sigl's bona fides, the CIA quickly whisked