

the dirt farmer and the tenement dweller looked to the New Deal and its successors for economic salvation. The basis for the new coalition must be not only the common good but also conscience, including not only the poor but also those too recently poor to have forgotten and those too secure to feel threatened—not only realistic black and Spanish-speaking Americans but also idealistic white Americans—not only the old-time New Dealers, interested in public power and Social Security, but also their children and grandchildren, interested in black power, Vietnam and urban blight. Those in the so-called white upper middle class including suburbanites and the well-educated and their voting-age children—once largely written off as traditional Republicans—now hold the balance of political power in the big states. Largely unorganized and uncommitted, unwilling to vote by party label only, uninterested in the old-time economic issues and party history, these voters will more easily find comfort and safety in generally following the lead of their Republican fathers, employers and neighbors unless Democratic candidates can appeal to their consciences as well as their pocketbooks.

A new coalition of conscience can bring the old Democrats and new Democrats together, combining the manpower of youthful activists and part-time housewives with that of regular precinct workers, who know what it takes to keep the party functioning. It can use the energies and skills of countless numbers of young lawyers and businessmen who have expressed to me their desire to take part in elevating American politics and who have the time, money and talent to help bring that about. Nothing would be more self-defeating than to discourage their participation by surrounding the new coalition with an ideological wall so high that only the inflexible purists of the so-called New Left would be eligible for entry. Humorous militants and narrow-minded nihilists, who want freedom for the indulgence of their own moral tastes but not for the majority of Americans (whom they denounce), do not represent the coming wave of New Politics.

On the contrary, the most important of all Democratic party traditions—the one historic trait distinguishing it through history from other parties—is its role as a broad-based, multi-interest, internally divided political party, too diverse to be doctrinaire, too big to be unanimous.

The key word in the lexicon of the New Politics is "participation." Real political power in both parties has too often rested disproportionately in the hands of a few party officials and contributors, nearly all of them white, male, affluent. Establishment-oriented and over 50, many of them more concerned about keeping their places on the political ladder than solving the national and urban crises surrounding them.

Until we change that picture, we can hardly preach to other peoples about self-determination.

Having been in power nationally for nearly all of the last 36 years, Democrats have become too accustomed to accepting leadership from the top down and changing it too infrequently. Southern dissent inside the party was expected, but liberal dissent was considered heresy. One of the brighter spots of the dreary 1968 convention in bloody Chicago was the willingness of 40 percent of the delegates to oppose the party Establishment in voting for the minority "peace" plank. That same convention terminated most concessions to the Old South, encouraged as never before the participation of black, young and grass-roots Democrats, ended the unit-rule device by which minority voices were stifled, established one commission to modernize convention rules and established still another to insist hereafter on the democratic selection of all delegates.

These developments must continue. The frustrating sense of powerlessness that many Americans feel toward remote, impersonal institutions applies to political parties as well. I am constantly asked by dissatisfied Democrats: "What can I do?" If our party is to be responsive to its members—and we cannot otherwise succeed—it is not enough that they be "involved" stuffing envelopes or ringing doorbells, important as such activities may be.

We must formulate procedures to redistribute political power to achieve the broadest possible participation in the exercising of that power. Precinct meetings open to all must have an effective voice in the formulation of policy and in the selection of both party leaders and candidates. The notion that a few men should successfully choose the party nominee for any important office regardless of whether he reflects the will of the voters is shocking.

Through direct primaries, periodic surveys and more frequent state and national platform conventions, through more open channels of communication between party members, leaders and public officials, through increased party informational and educational activities, and through a far broader financial base of small contributions, rank-and-file Democrats can obtain new confidence in party decisions, and that kind of direct participation can produce the enthusiasm and momentum that lead to victory.

A national presidential primary would be chaotic and exorbitantly expensive without assuring as representative a choice as an overhauled convention system. It would make even more difficult the prospects of an insurgent candidate. But every presidential and every senatorial or gubernatorial nominee of our party will have greater voter confidence (and surely more workers) if his policies and appeal have first been fairly tested in a contested open primary.

All this will be to no avail, however, without high-caliber candidates at every level. We need men and women we are able to appeal to all elements in the Democratic party and to independents as well, willing to campaign hard at the grass-roots level, and more inclined to explain on TV the new and current issues than to engage in blindly partisan exaggeration. Young people and intellectuals must be involved in those campaigns, their imaginative contributions welcomed regardless of their refusal to support every Democrat or every plank in their own candidate's platform. Storefront headquarters will be more important than smoke-filled hotel rooms. A candidate's convictions, commitment and ability to inspire a majority of the voters will be more important than his acceptability to a few party leaders and donors.

Increased citizen participation does not deny the need for strong leadership. On the contrary, the very turbulence and diversity that have consistently characterized the history of the Democratic party have also made it responsive to those strong personalities who survived spirited intraparty debates and led all factions to victory.

But above all, the Democratic party must not stand still. It must not be the party of the status quo. Its leadership must not be confined to the old and the established. As Edmund Burke cried out long ago: "Applaud us when we run, console us when we fall, cheer us when we recover, but let us [press] on—for God's sake, let us [press] on."

THE ARMS TRADE—PART VIII

(Mr. COUGHLIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. COUGHLIN. Mr. Speaker, last

Saturday the President announced that the long-awaited strategic arms limitation talks—SALT—between the United States and the Soviet Union would commence in Helsinki on November 17, 1969. The time was never more opportune to urge the Soviet Union to join us in discussing limitation on the international trade in conventional weapons of war.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union's aggressive arms sales policy has been primarily responsible for the current political, military, social, and economic instability in the Middle East. The size, scope, and objectives of the Soviet arms sales effort in the area, however, are seldom appreciated fully in the West. Therefore, I thought my colleagues might be interested in certain background information, charts and statistics which I have compiled that illustrate what I believe to be the true nature of the Soviet military involvement with the Arab States.

Since 1955, the Soviet Union has shipped an estimated \$7 billion worth of military equipment to non-Iron Curtain countries. This averages approximately \$500 million in arms sales yearly. Of that \$7 billion in sales, \$5 billion has gone to 10 Arab States. Egypt alone has received nearly \$2 billion in Soviet arms, and the remaining \$3 billion has gone, in varying amounts, to Afghanistan, Algeria, Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Morocco, Pakistan, Syria, and the Yemeni Republicans.

There are many reasons why the Soviets are selling arms so vigorously in the Middle East, but all are predicated—as elsewhere in the world—on the desire to destroy Western influence and to replace it with their own. In pursuit of this overall objective, the Soviets will, for instance, support "wars of liberation" such as those in Algeria and the Yemen.

Moscow will also sell arms to dilute or destroy the effectiveness of a Western military alliance—such as CENTO. Arms also are sold to protect Soviet frontiers, trade routes, and "forward facilities" in foreign countries. Sometimes, in its war for ideological supremacy, the Soviet Union sells arms to undercut Red China; on other occasions, it sells arms because it wants the money.

With few exceptions, the Soviets have never given away anything of significant value. Usually, they sell arms at low—by Western commercial standards—in interest rates, from 2 to 2.5 percent payable over a 10- to 12-year period. Occasionally, they will barter arms in exchange for commodities. One result has been that Egypt, for instance, has been forced to hock many of its cotton crops to pay for the fancy Soviet hardware.

Selling arms, the Soviets realize, satisfies the touchy pride of a poor nation; limited foreign exchange reserves are also tied up in the Soviet Union, thus restricting a poor country's trade relations with the West.

From what sources are available, it appears that all arms sales decisions come from the Politburo, and that the operative control of the Soviet arms aid program rests with the KGB, the Soviet's foreign intelligence apparatus.

In order to hide their activities, the Soviets will sometimes use their satellites

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as intermediaries. Thus, many arms sales of Soviet origin often end up in the record books as Czech, Polish, East German or Bulgarian sales since it was these countries that actually handled the transaction. We in the West should not be fooled: all arms sales, no matter which country initiated the transactions, are first cleared in Moscow.

Red Chinese arms aid to the Middle East, as in other parts of the world, is currently small in volume; it is designed primarily to undercut the West and the Soviet Union and to promote worldwide revolution. While small, the future potential for a large-scale infusion of Red Chinese arms into the area is always present, and may become a reality once the Peking regime shifts its primary concern from domestic to foreign affairs.

The Soviet infusion of weaponry into Egypt and the other Arab States represents the classic example—in terms of world peace and stability—of the conventional arms trade at its worst.

Emboldened by the huge arms supplies, Nasser provoked the 1956 war that gave the first frightening glimpse of what a major power confrontation could portend. Eleven years later, Nasser dared again to plunge the Middle East into war.

Nasser's Egypt—overarmed and underdeveloped—used the Soviet weapons to invoke war as an instrument of national policy. Moscow found it could not control Cairo once it had overarmed Egypt which, in reality, faced no military threat other than that raised by its own reckless policies directed at Israel and the West.

The Israelis were compelled to engage in a terrifying game of military catchup on which their very existence depended. Even now Israel must devote an excessive portion of its gross national product to defense.

It is obvious that most of the Arab States intend to use their Soviet and Chinese arms to destroy Israel. There is no question, for instance, that Nasser has twice gone to war with Israel because, with all that Soviet weaponry, he saw no need to settle his differences peaceably. Each time the Communist nations have pumped an additional quantity of arms into an Arab country, the Israelis, in self defense, have been forced to increase both the size of their military and the quality of their weapons. This process has continued unchecked for over 14 years and has so swollen military establishments, so weakened economies, and so destabilized political and military factors, that the threat of widespread violence of a very high order is quite possible at any moment. It is clear that the Soviet Union, far more than any other nation, provoked this situation, and still sustains it, with its massive arms aid to Arab States.

In order to give my colleagues some idea of the volume of Communist weapons currently deployed in the Middle East, I submit the following chart showing a breakdown of arms delivered by country. Also included are footnotes and short comments on each recipient country which, hopefully, will both clarify and put into proper perspective certain

aspects of the Soviet and Chinese arms aid programs not evident in the chart.

I hope that this chart will also encourage the President of the United States to take whatever steps are necessary to initiate multilateral discussions among the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, and other arms-producing countries on control of the arms trade in general and in the Middle East in particular; to take whatever other steps are necessary to begin a general debate on the subject in the United Nations; and in particular to seek to include the international trade in conventional weapons of war on the agenda for the strategic arms limitation talks.

The material follows:

MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES DEPLOYED IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS OF 1968-69¹

AFGHANISTAN²

Army

Six divisions, equipped mostly with Soviet arms.

At least 100 Soviet T-54 and PT-76 tanks.³ Soviet artillery.

Air Force

4-5 squadrons Soviet MiG-17's.
1-2 squadrons Soviet Il-28 bombers.
Some Soviet helicopters.

Navy

Afghanistan has no Navy.

ALGERIA

Army

200 Soviet T-34, T-54 and T-55 tanks.⁴ Soviet 140mm and 240mm rocket launchers.

Soviet 85mm, 122mm and 152mm howitzers.⁵

50 Soviet SU-100 self-propelled guns.
Some Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missiles.

Air Force

140 Soviet MiG-15's, -17's and -21's.
30 Soviet Il-28 bombers.
8 Soviet AN-12 transports.
4 Soviet Il-18 transports.
50 Soviet Mi-4 helicopters.

Navy

6 Soviet subchasers.
2 coastal minesweepers.⁶
9 Komar- and Osa-class missile patrol boats.
8 Soviet motor torpedo boats.

CYPRUS

Army

30 Soviet T-34 tanks.²
Some Soviet trucks.²
Some SA-2 surface-to-air missiles.²
Soviet anti-aircraft guns.⁷
Soviet and Czech small arms.⁸

Navy

6 Komar-class motor torpedo boats.⁹

IRAN

Army

Some Soviet trucks.
Soviet 57mm and 85mm anti-aircraft guns.

IRAQ

Army

300 Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks.
100 Soviet T-34 tanks.
Some Soviet SU-100 self-propelled guns.¹⁰
Some Soviet armored personnel carriers.¹⁰
5 batteries Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missiles.¹⁰

Air force

60 Soviet MiG-21's.
45 Soviet MiG-17's and -19's.
20 Soviet SU-7 fighter-bombers.

Footnotes at end of article.

8 Soviet TU-16 jet bombers.
10 Soviet IL-28 jet bombers.
About 20 Soviet transport planes.

Navy

Some Soviet river gunboats.⁹
Some Soviet Komar-class motor torpedo boats.⁹

MOROCCO

Army

35 Soviet T-54 tanks.¹¹
Some Soviet SU-100 tank destroyers.

Air Force

16 Soviet MiG-17's (in storage).
Some Soviet Yak-9 trainers.¹²
Some Soviet helicopters.⁹

PAKISTAN

Army

80 Red Chinese T-59 tanks.⁹

Air Force

40 Red Chinese MiG-19's.
28 Red Chinese IL-28 jet bombers.¹³

SYRIA

Army

150 Soviet T-34 tanks.
250 Soviet T-54, T-55 tanks.
60 Soviet SU-100 tank destroyers.
500 Soviet BTR-152 armored personnel carriers.

Soviet artillery up to 155mm.
Some SA-2 surface-to-air missiles.

Air Force

60 Soviet MiG-21's.
70 Soviet MiG-15's and -17's.
20 Soviet SU-7 fighter-bombers.
8 Soviet IL-14 transports.
14 Soviet helicopters.

Navy

2 Soviet minesweepers.
6 Soviet motor torpedo boats with Styx missiles.
17 Soviet motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons).

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Army

500 Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks.
100 Soviet T-34 tanks.
50 Soviet PT-76 tanks.
20 Soviet JS-3 tanks.
150-250 Soviet SU-100, JSU-152 and ZSU-157 self-propelled guns.¹⁴
600 Soviet heavy caliber field guns and truck-mounted rocket launchers.
800 Soviet armored personnel carriers.
100 Czech amphibious armored personnel carriers.¹⁵
15 Soviet Frog-3 surface-to-air missiles.
20 Soviet Samlet surface-to-air missiles.
180 SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (30 batteries).

Air Force

110 Soviet MiG-21's.
80 Soviet MiG-19's.
10 Soviet TU-16 jet bombers.
40 Soviet Il-28 jet bombers.
90 Soviet Su-7 fighter-bombers.¹⁶
120 Soviet MiG-15's and -17's.
40 Soviet Il-14 transports.
20 Soviet An-12 transports.
50 Soviet Mi-4, Mi-6 and Mi-8 helicopters.
150 Soviet and Czech trainers.

Navy

4 Soviet destroyers.
8 Soviet minesweepers.
18 Soviet missile patrol boats.
40 Soviet and Yugoslav motor torpedo boats.
13 Soviet submarines.
1 Soviet tank landing ship.
Some small Soviet craft.

YEMEN (REPUBLICANS)¹⁰

Army

30 Soviet T-34 tanks.
50 Soviet SU-100 assault guns.
70 Soviet armored personnel carriers.

50 Soviet light guns.
 100 Soviet anti-aircraft guns.

Air Force

30 Soviet Yak fighters (flown by foreign mercenaries).
 24 Soviet MiG-19's.¹⁷
 Some Soviet Il-10 bombers.⁹

FOOTNOTES

¹ Figures taken from "The Military Balance 1968-1969" (Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1969), unless otherwise noted.

² "The Middle East and The Arab World, The Military Context," by David Wood, Adelphi Paper No. 20, Institute for Strategic Studies, July 1965, except as noted.

³ "Arms to Developing Countries 1945-1965," by John L. Sutton and Geoffrey Kemp, Adelphi Paper No. 28, October 1966. P. 26.

⁴ Ibid., p. 23. New York Times, February 10, 1967 reports 600 tanks.

⁵ May be Red Chinese in origin.

⁶ Probably Soviet.

⁷ New York Times March 30, 1965.

⁸ Ibid., December 22, 1966.

⁹ "The Soviet Military Aid Program As A Reflection of Soviet Objectives", Georgetown Research Project, Atlantic Research Corporation, June 24, 1965. Table I, pp. 83-4.

¹⁰ Mimeograph document issued by the Institute for Strategic Studies at the outbreak of the Six Day War of 1967 listing equipment of countries involved in the war.

¹¹ Sutton and Kemp, op. cit.

¹² "The Armed Forces of African States," by David Wood, Adelphi Paper No. 27, April 1966, p. 6.

¹³ "The Diffusion of Combat Aircraft, Missiles and Their Supporting Technologies," by John H. Hoagland, Jr., and Erastus Corning III, et al. Browne & Shaw Research Corporation, Waltham, Massachusetts, 1966. P. A-14.

¹⁴ (London) Sunday Times, August 31, 1969.

¹⁵ New York Times, May 8, 1969.

¹⁶ "The Middle East and the Arab World, The Military Context", op. cit. Most of the equipment came via Egypt.

¹⁷ New York Times, December 15, 1967.

COMMENTS ON RECIPIENT COUNTRIES

AFGHANISTAN

The Soviet Union is the major arms supplier. Afghanistan first received Soviet arms in 1956; much of the equipment delivered since has been routed through Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland and Hungary.

A permanent Soviet military mission is stationed in the country, but its members are not allowed to accompany Afghan troops on maneuvers.

Soviet aid has been given to ensure that Afghanistan maintains its historical role as buffer state between the Soviet Union and Western interests to the south and west.

ALGERIA

The Soviet Union is the major arms supplier. Small quantities of arms were received from Czechoslovakia, Red China and Egypt during its war for independence. Some post-independence arms came from Cuba. Algeria was used by the Soviet Union as an arms aid transit point during the Congo violence of 1960-65.

Many Algerian army and air force officers are trained in the Soviet Union. At least ten communist countries offer political and military training courses to Algerian students.

Communist arms have been supplied to Algeria primarily to displace French influence in the area, and to acquire refueling and repair bases for Soviet planes and ships in the Mediterranean area.

CYPRUS

Great Britain and Greece are the major arms suppliers. Most of the small arms and crew-served weapons are of Swiss, Swedish and Belgian origin. Some arms were acquired from Egypt, Yugoslavia and private dealers during the troubles.

The 1964 military aid agreement with the Soviet Union reportedly states that no bloc personnel will be stationed in Cyprus.

The Soviet military aid program to Cyprus, while relatively small, is designed primarily to displace British influence, to antagonize two NATO allies (Greece and Turkey) and to enhance the Soviet political and military position in the Mediterranean and Middle East areas.

IRAN

The United States has been Iran's major arms supplier since the end of World War II. The value of U.S. military aid to Iran since 1950 exceeds half a billion dollars.

In January, 1967, the Soviet Union agreed to sell Iran \$110 million worth of arms. Iran was the first Western ally to buy weapons from the Soviets. This move was made by the Shah reportedly to erase the "U.S. client only" tag, and to encourage Washington to supply Iran with the latest military equipment (which subsequently has been done.)

On at least one occasion Iran has acted as a secret arms purchasing agent for Pakistan, who was suffering under an arms embargo imposed in 1965.

IRAQ

The Soviet Union has been Iraq's principal arms supplier since 1956. Iraqi officers and technicians have attended training courses in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. In 1963, approximately 500 Soviet technicians were stationed in Iraq. In 1966, it was reported that 58 Soviet Il-28 bombers had been transferred from Egypt to Iraq.

Soviet reasons for selling arms to Iraq are essentially the same as those for Syria and Egypt.

MOROCCO

The United States and France have been Morocco's major arms suppliers.

Morocco first received Soviet aid in 1961 when a quantity of Mig fighter planes and other advanced equipment were delivered. The only other instance of Soviet aid occurred in 1967 when spares and replacements for the above equipment were delivered.

Soviet military aid is designed to help Morocco in its border disputes with Mauritania and Algeria, and to increase the pressure on the Rabat government to end the U.S. presence in the country.

PAKISTAN

The United States is Pakistan's major arms supplier. Since 1947, the U.S. has either given or sold to Pakistan military equipment valued at an estimated \$750 million.

Following the 1965 war with India, Pakistan began to buy its arms from other sources than the United States, since a general American embargo was in force. (On at least two occasions Washington has covertly broken its own embargo by allowing several NATO allies to supply U.S. arms to Pakistan.)

Red China has supplied CENTO-ally Pakistan with a small amount of combat weapons. The aid was designed both to diminish Western influence in the country and to counter Soviet aid to India.

Pakistan recently offered to send troops to its Moslem allies in their fight against Israel.

SYRIA

The Soviet Union has been Syria's major arms supplier since 1956; however, Moscow's interest in the country seems to have waned temporarily. As far back as 1957 there were as many as 300 Soviet military and technical advisors in the country, although there are probably less today.

Despite all the Soviet aid, the Syrian military is considered ineffectual. Much of its better equipment was diverted to Egypt during the Egyptian-Syrian union.

Soviet aid to Syria was designed to destroy French, British and American influence in the country.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

The Soviet Union has been the major arms supplier to the U.A.R., or Egypt, since 1955 when \$200-225 million worth of weapons were delivered via Czechoslovakia. The presence of these arms alone were sufficient to provoke war the following year. Between 1955 and 1967 the Soviet Union delivered an estimated \$1 billion worth of arms to Egypt. To pay for each new succeeding generation of Soviet arms, Egypt has become an exporter of its second-hand arms.

During the Six Day War of 1967, Egypt lost approximately one-half of its Soviet equipment. Within a year, Moscow had completely re-equipped Egypt with even more advanced weaponry, valued at an additional \$1 billion. It is estimated that there are currently 3,000 Soviet military advisors in Egypt.

Soviet military aid to Egypt is designed to undercut Western influence in the Middle East, to protect Soviet trade routes to the Far East, to provide refueling and repair bases for Soviet planes and ships, and to provide a strategic transit point for Soviet economic, military and political aid going to other nations in the area.

YEMEN (REPUBLICANS)

The Soviet Union, using Egypt as its intermediary, has been the major arms supplier to the Republicans since 1965, possibly earlier. Soviet arms have been supplied to the Yemen as far back as 1928, although post-war interest dates from 1956 when a small quantity of arms was delivered.

Soviet and Syrian mercenaries reportedly have been flying combat missions for the Republicans. Czech guerrilla instructors are active in the army. Poison and blister gases of Egyptian origin are reported to have been used against the Royalists. Egypt denies using such weapons although the evidence is strong that the Egyptians used some type of toxic gas bomb.

Soviet interest in the Yemen complements its reasons for providing arms to Egypt.

TYPICAL COMMUNIST TERROR TACTICS CONTINUE IN KOREA AS WELL AS IN VIETNAM AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(Mr. TALCOTT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. TALCOTT. Mr. Speaker, the official attitude of Communist governments toward neighbors whose lands they covet was clearly brought home to us when the North Koreans ambushed and murdered a patrol of U.S. servicemen south of the demilitarized zone. One of the soldiers, Bill Grimes, was a native and resident of Salinas, Calif.—a young friend of mine.

Contemporary conduct as well as history continues to remind us that neither agreements nor human life are respected by the Communists.

The geographical and political divisions of Germany, Berlin, Korea, and Vietnam were designed to purchase peace for the citizens of those places who wished to determine their own livelihoods and destinies. The Communists, however, will not relent in their aggression or terror until they dominate all of these places.

I suppose I should be tolerant and meekly excuse this preplanned terrorist murder in South Korea as just another natural nationalistic exuberance. No offense intended. Planned Communist terror and aggression is somehow, and for

some unknown reason, supposed to be played pianissimo.

I believe the Congress, particularly some Members of the other body, and most citizens of this country would look upon preplanned terror and murder differently if one of the victims was one of their young friends.

We need to remember these victims and these incidents when we negotiate the Communist control of South Vietnam.

DELAY ON THE PART OF CONGRESS WILL HAMPER THE CAMPAIGN TO MAKE OEO A BETTER AGENCY

(Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, one of the most serious criticisms which has been leveled at the Office of Economic Opportunity in the past is the lack of State involvement in its programs.

In his February 19 message on the Economic Opportunity Act, President Nixon recognized the problems over the relationship of State, county, and local governments to the programs administered by OEO.

Again, in the hearings before the Education and Labor Committee it was pointed out that the partnership between the State and Federal Governments in the poverty program was a nominal one at best.

Now, however, this policy has changed. The concept of a new federalism has become a part of the OEO and efforts are being made to involve the States in a meaningful relationship with this program.

A number of major steps have been taken to heighten State involvement in antipoverty efforts. A new division of State and local government has been created to promote effective relationships between State governments and field operations. An increase of nearly 30 percent in the basic funding level for the State Economic Offices has been included in the fiscal year 1970 budget. A complete revision in the OEO directive on the role of the State Economic Opportunity Offices is being circulated for review and comment by Governors. It will dramatically increase the role of the State in the planning and coordination of programs under the Economic Opportunity Act.

I believe that this example of OEO's willingness to deal effectively with a serious problem within its program shows that the Nixon administration have made a serious commitment to the improvement of the poverty program. Delay on the part of Congress will only hamper the campaign to make OEO a better agency.

LEGISLATION INTRODUCED TO DELINEATE THE GOVERNMENT'S RIGHT TO APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES

(Mr. McCULLOCH asked and was given permission to address the House

for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. McCULLOCH. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced an administration bill which would correct two basic flaws in section 3731, title 18, United States Code, which delineates the Government's right to appeal in criminal cases.

Section 3731 divides appeals by the United States into two categories—those which may be taken only directly to the Supreme Court of the United States and those which may be taken directly to the court of appeals. The problem is this: too many cases of less than landmark significance are appealable only to the Supreme Court. A typical case might be one where the defendant moves to dismiss the indictment because he has not been accorded his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The resolution of that claim may very well involve nothing more than a question of fact. That is hardly a matter for an expedited review by the Supreme Court. Thus the Supreme Court will dismiss such an appeal because it presents no substantial Federal or constitutional question. The result is that the Government has neither a trial nor an appeal. In view of the mounting crime problem, such a result is not in the best interests of an effective administration of justice.

In addition to granting the often illusory right of appeal directly to the Supreme Court, section 3731 in some cases fails to authorize any appeal at all. The statute does not presently authorize any appeal to the court of appeals in all cases where the double jeopardy clause would permit it and where there is no direct appeal to the Supreme Court. It should. It would if the proposed legislation were adopted. However, if an indictment is dismissed for technical reasons after the jury is sworn, but before the verdict, the courts have held that no appeal is authorized.

It is important to note that those court decisions are not based on constitutional grounds but on statutory grounds only. Thus this flaw can be, must be, and should be corrected by the Congress.

I find no inconsistency between granting the United States the right to one trial on the merits and the double jeopardy clause.

The leniency of trial judges in permitting the defendant to raise an objection to an indictment at any time should not deprive the Government of its appellate rights. Such a result completely subverts traditional notions of fair play and established rights. It, frankly, encourages defense counsel to delay in making motions which could have been made before trial. The continued practice of such dilatory tactics could only lead to restrictive measures for defense counsel, such as automatic waiver of rights not pressed before trial.

The proposed legislation is therefore both constitutional and wise. I urge its prompt consideration and adoption.

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. GROSS) is recognized for 30 minutes.

[Mr. GROSS addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

THE TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES OF UNCONDITIONAL IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. WYATT) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. WYATT. Mr. Speaker, for more than 4 years now the Gallup poll has shown the issue of Vietnam to be the most urgent question of public policy, foreign or domestic, in the minds of the American people.

During these 4 years there has been a dramatic shift in public opinion about the wisdom of the policy begun in 1965 of committing large American forces to combat in Vietnam. According to the Gallup poll of August 1965, 61 percent of the people approved of sending American troops to fight in Vietnam, whereas 24 percent opposed this step. The most recent Gallup poll on this subject indicates that only 32 percent now approve of the action while 58 percent call it a mistake.

During the Korean war, public opinion shifted in the same way from approval in the initial stages of the war to disapproval in the later stages. The 65 percent of the public who approved the commitment of American fighting forces to Korea in August 1950 dwindled to 37 percent by October 1952.

In the negotiations that brought the Korean war to an end, President Eisenhower faced a problem not unlike that which confronts the Nixon administration today—an impatient public opinion demanding swift termination of the war. Eisenhower did succeed in achieving an honorable settlement in Korea ending the war 6 months after taking office. In reaching this settlement, he was aided by the fact that the public, however disillusioned about the Nation's military involvement in Korea, appeared to place its trust in the President as he strove to restore the peace. Had there been widespread public demonstrations of dissatisfaction with the course the President was pursuing to achieve peace in 1953, the end of the Korean war might not have come so speedily.

So, to millions of Americans who today are impatient for an end to the war in Vietnam, I would raise the question of whether the methods of protest currently practiced advance or retard the coming of the peace which the overwhelming majority of our countrymen ardently desire. Sincere and concerned Americans should ponder the words of the respected British journalist, Victor Zorza:

The main obstacle to a peaceful settlement now is the belief . . . that the pressure of American public opinion will in the end give the Communists all they want.

No one wants peace more earnestly than President Nixon, and he has embarked on a course of policy that leads to peace.

What the Nation needs now is a clear understanding of the President's policy

the "achievement of representative government."

If we do not manifest in decisive policy statements our intention to encourage freedom and representative government in Greece we will not only betray those who signed this moving letter, but the very basic traditions and ideals of the United States.

Salt

AN APPEAL FOR A MUTUAL MORATORIUM ON ARMS TESTING

(Mr. BIAGGI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Speaker, we are approaching a date that could be a historic turning point for a world living under the threat of nuclear warfare. On Nov. 17, the United States and the Soviet Union begin preliminary nuclear arms limitation talks at Helsinki. While I have constantly urged that such talks get underway, I have no illusions about any shortcuts for ending the arms race.

But I do believe that as a first order of business at Helsinki we must strive for a mutual moratorium on all arms testing pending the formulation of comprehensive agreements with extensive safeguards that can come only from prolonged negotiations. I think this Congress and the President should express a sense of willingness to accomplish this objective.

We have pondered too long while the world has been living under what the late John Fitzgerald Kennedy described as "a nuclear sword of Damocles." More than a year ago, our Nation and the Soviet Union pledged in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to begin arms control talks promptly. Now, at last, we are on our way to the conference table. But the luxury of time has been lost.

Therefore, America and the Soviet Union must display a more urgent determination to reverse the arms race than either has exhibited thus far.

Both sides are continuing the development of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles—MIRV's. This new type of multiple warhead will greatly expand the striking power of strategic missiles and further endanger all mankind.

It has been evident for too long that weapons systems have become more sophisticated and more destructive—and America and the Soviet Union are still locked in the arms race. We have reached the point where it is not enough to limit the buildup of strategic arms. We must instead reverse it.

I have often thought about the billions spent by the two superpowers for weapons from which there can be no survival. When I reflect upon this and then consider that we are spending billions more to sustain the arms race, I find myself deeply distressed and wonder whether the powers of the world have lost their senses.

Yes, I agree that we must be able to defend our Nation from attack. I am sure that this is the principal reason why we are moving ahead with the anti-ballistic-missile—ABM—system.

But when I think of our already overburdened taxpayers and America's grave urban problems—the ghettos and the crime and the underprivileged—I pray for an end to the arms race. Just think what we could do here in America to achieve tax relief, model cities, and equal opportunity for all if the Federal Government did not have to expend time, effort, and a fantastic amount of money to engage in an arms race with the Soviet Union. So much could be done for so many if we were able to divert some of the resources that are now required to sustain the arms race.

Take, for example, just one item: The cost of the anti-ballistic-missile system. Consider what America could do with that money alone at home if we did not have to spend it in the arms race.

I ask, therefore, that Congress help build the foundation for meaningful and effective talks at Helsinki. As a first and very important step, I urge expressions of support for a mutual moratorium on arms testing pending the outcome of an agreement with proper safeguards between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Such action would be an invitation to the Soviet Union to join us immediately in moving away from the shadows of war for the benefit of all mankind. It would also be a vivid demonstration of our good faith at the conference table on November 17.

REPRESENTATIVE WAGGONER'S EFFORTS TO SAVE OUR FRATERNITIES AND SORORITIES

(Mr. LONG of Louisiana asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and to include extraneous material.)

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Speaker, an article appears in a fraternity magazine, the Shield, of Phi Kappa Psi—volume 89, No. 4, summer 1969, pages 253-262—which goes into considerable detail about the efforts of my colleague, Representative JOE D. WAGGONER, to protect the Nation's fraternities and sororities from the meddling of HEW into their membership practices. This discussion of what has transpired in recent months is well worth the time and attention of any reader who feels as I do, that it is high time to put whatever brakes are necessary on the extralegal, sociological meddling of this Department. With unanimous consent, I insert this article in today's RECORD, as follows:

CONGRESS, FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION, AND FRATERNITY DISCRIMINATION

(By Tom Charles Huston, assistant attorney general, Phi Kappa Psi Fraternity)

(NOTE.—This is an analysis of the legislative history of the Waggoner Amendment and an assessment of the protection it provides for the fraternity system and for universities, through the 1965 Higher Education Act.)

On June 28, 1958, President John E. Horner of Hanover College wrote to the executive secretaries of national fraternities which had chapters on his campus that he had been requested by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights "to file with the agency an extensive questionnaire relating to policies in the civil rights area." According to Dr. Horner, "the questionnaire makes specific reference to the

policies of fraternities relating to the admission to the fraternities of Negro, Jewish, and non-Caucasian students in principle? How many actually have Negro, Jewish, an non-Caucasian students as members?

President Horner requested the national fraternities to provide him with the information necessary to answer these questions. In addition "to a complete statement" from them on these matters, he asked that they send him a copy of their constitution for use in the event that he received similar inquiries in the future.

The announcement that the Civil Rights Commission had begun an investigation into the affairs of college fraternities and sororities created a stir among fraternity leaders. On July 12, Louis F. Fetterly, a California attorney and leader in national interfraternity circles, wrote to the Commission about its activities. He asked for a copy of the questionnaire and an explanation of the use to which the information elicited would be put. A week later he received a reply from Cornelius P. Cotter, Assistant Staff Director for Programs, who declared that "The Commission is not at this time conducting a study related to fraternities or their admission policies." If such a questionnaire is being distributed among fraternities, he asserted, "it comes from a source other than this Commission." However, he added, "If you have reason to believe that a questionnaire is being distributed and represented as coming from this Commission, we should appreciate your help in securing additional information concerning it."

On August 12, Mr. Fetterly wrote Dr. Cotter advising him that the letterheads, return envelopes, and title on the questionnaire all indicated they came from the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Washington 25, D.C. Mr. Fetterly reported that the questionnaire was being represented as part of a nationwide survey, and the covering letter and questionnaire were apparently sent by Mr. Will Erwin, Co-Chairman of the Subcommittee on Education for the Indiana Advisory Committee to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission.

On the basis of this new information, the Commission ascertained that indeed there was a questionnaire. It had been developed by the Indiana Advisory Committee in cooperation with the Civil Rights Commission of the State of Indiana and, "due to a misunderstanding," had been mailed without prior clearance by the Washington staff of the Commission. Mr. Peter M. Sussman, Assistant Staff Director for State Advisory Committees, to whom the ball had been bounced by Dr. Cotter, explained that since this action was "contrary to established Commission procedures," he had requested the Indiana Advisory Committee to suspend any further use of the questionnaire. He went on to point out that the reference in the letter accompanying the questionnaire to a "nationwide survey" was in error: "Neither the United States Commission on Civil Rights itself nor any of its Advisory Committees outside the State of Indiana is conducting such a survey."

Less than two months later, however, fraternity chapter presidents at campuses throughout the State of Utah received a letter from Adam M. Duncan, Chairman of the Utah Advisory Committee of the Civil Rights Commission. Mr. Duncan explained that his committee had been "commissioned by Congress to make factual findings and recommendations" on problems of racial discrimination. The "function" of his committee, he went on, was to serve as a "sounding board" and "clearing house" for civil rights problems.

Mr. Duncan enclosed a questionnaire which he requested be promptly returned "in the enclosed, self-addressed and franked envelope." The questionnaire concerned the

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membership practices and internal operations of the fraternity.¹ It requested information on whether members of minority groups were accepted as members by the local chapter and, if not, whether this was due to a prohibition in either the local or national governing document. It also requested that copies of these documents be attached, or if this was not possible, that a place be indicated where the Committee could examine them.

This intrusion into the affairs of a private organization by a government agency, coming as it did upon the heels of the Indiana case, aroused protests not only from fraternity leaders, but also from members of Congress. During debate on the proposed Civil Rights Act in the House of Representatives on February 6, 1964, Congressman Edward E. Willis of Louisiana, citing these incidents, moved to amend the bill by denying to the Commission the power to "authorize any investigation or study of the membership practices of any bona fide fraternal, religious or civic organization which selects its membership."²

Congressman Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and floor manager for the bill, accepted the amendment.³ He told the House that on behalf of the Judiciary Committee he had complained to the Commission that it had gone too far and exceeded its authority. On January 29, he had received a letter from Howard W. Rogerson, Acting Chairman of the Commission, explaining that the action of the Utah Advisory Committee "was a very limited inquiry . . . into the racial practices of fraternities and sororities located at the State University."⁴ "The Utah committee," Mr. Rogerson reported, "was not interested in the practices of fraternities of sororities at private colleges. Nor was the committee interested in the practices of adult fraternal organizations, such as the Masons, which are unconnected with public institutions of higher education."⁵ The Commission was not, however, planning to pursue "even the limited Utah inquiry into the racial practices and sororities at the State University."⁶

Mr. Rogerson enclosed with his letter a memorandum outlining the legal basis for the inquiry which the Utah committee made. The final paragraph of this memorandum stated:

"We do not recommend that the Commission add a survey of practices at the State universities to its present program, but all of the factors discussed above indicate not only that there was a legal base for the Utah questionnaire, but that the Commission would have ample authority to inquire further into this matter if it chose to do so."⁷

Congressman Celler was not satisfied by Mr. Rogerson's letter and, apparently, not impressed by the reasoning of the legal memorandum.⁸ He contacted Mr. Rogerson and requested a specific answer to the question of whether the Commission intended to pursue this sort of inquiry further. Mr. Rogerson replied in a letter dated January 30, that the Commission did not have any plans to do so. He indicated that the Utah committee had no authority to take any action if the questionnaires were not answered, and it did not plan to seek further information from fraternities and sororities. He concluded with the assurance that no other questionnaires were being sent by any of the Commission's advisory committees to fraternities or social organizations.⁹

Aware that similar assurance had been followed by more questionnaires, Congressman Celler advised the House of Representatives that it was essential to get "embedded in the statute, not correspondence or promises but some definite prohibitions against some of these activities which have been complained of with reference to the Civil Rights Commission."¹⁰ He felt the Willis Amendment ac-

complished this purpose and he was happy to accept it.

Congressman Meader of Michigan, however, had doubts that the Willis proposal was explicit enough. He offered a substitute amendment which read that "nothing in this or any other Act shall be construed as authorizing the Commission, its Advisory Committees, or any person under its supervision or control to inquire into or investigate any membership practices or internal operations of any fraternal organization, any college or university fraternity or sorority, any private club, any religious organization, or any other private organization."¹¹

Congressman Meader argued that the Commission believed, as expressed in the legal memorandum sent to Congressman Celler, that it had every right to conduct inquiries into discriminatory membership practices by private associations, and to preclude such activity it was necessary to spell out in the most precise terms the limitations which Congress wished to place upon the Commission in this area.¹² Congressman Roosevelt of California raised a question regarding the definition of "private organizations."¹³ This phrase had not been included in the original Willis proposal, and Roosevelt feared that it would be construed so broadly as to limit the power of the Commission to investigate discrimination in labor unions, corporations, and other organizations not generally included in the concept of voluntary associations.¹⁴ On the basis of this objection, Congressman Meader agreed to the deletion of the phrase.¹⁵

Congressman Meader had also added another dimension to the Willis proposal by including the phrase "internal operations" in his amendment. Not only would the Commission be prohibited from investigating into membership practices of private groups, but also would be proscribed from conducting an inquiry into their "internal operations." Congressman Celler was worried that this inclusion would unduly limit the authority of the Commission.¹⁶ It was one thing, he argued, to investigate membership practices, but quite another to look into internal operations. The latter, he reasoned, might be of legitimate interest to the Commission where they involved the denial of rights granted to members of minority groups by other provisions of the Civil Rights Act. Congressman Meader was asked what he had in mind when he referred to "internal operations." "I will tell you what 'internal operations' was intended to get at," he answered. "The Masonic Order, Knights of Columbus, and many fraternal organizations like the Eagles, Elks, or secret clubs. It is not only their membership practices which should be protected but all of their internal operations."¹⁷

"Would you," asked Meader of Congressman Celler, "permit a Civil Rights Commission to demand a document of the ritual of a secret society or fraternity or sorority or Masonic order?"¹⁸ "No," the Judiciary Committee Chairman replied.¹⁹

Congressman Roman Pucinski of Illinois introduced a subject into the debate which would be hotly debated in the Senate a year later.²⁰ He objected to the amendment on the grounds that fraternities and sororities, as an integral part of a State university which received federal financial assistance, should not be permitted to discriminate on the basis of race, and therefore the Commission should be authorized to investigate their membership practices. "I know from my own experience on the Committee on Education and Labor," he told the House, "that the Federal Government is perhaps the greatest contributor to many of these universities and colleges. But we say under this amendment that while the Federal Government can spend millions of dollars in these institutions, the Civil Rights Commission cannot investigate discrimination in these fraternities."²¹

Congressman Celler replied that "In the

first place, sororities and fraternities are not supported by the Government. They receive no loans or funds directly from the Government."²² Pucinski agreed with the thrust of this argument, but maintained that "being on the campus of the university benefiting from these taxes, they are a part of the university and indirectly benefit from Federal assistance."²³ Congressman Celler countered with the simple assertion that "I do not believe that is correct,"²⁴ and the House proceeded to adopt the substitute amendment.²⁵

When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed into law by President Johnson, it contained the Meader Amendment,²⁶ which provided that:

"Nothing in this or any other Act shall be construed as authorizing the Commission, its Advisory Committees, or any person under its supervision or control to inquire into or investigate any membership practices or internal operations of any fraternal organization, any college or university fraternity or sorority, any private club or any religious organization."

This section made it explicitly clear that the Civil Rights Commission could not under the color of Federal law investigate the activities of campus fraternities. The private acts of discrimination by voluntary student groups were beyond the realm of Federal concern or, at least, beyond the realm of the Commission's concern.

Congress, in various Titles of the Civil Rights Act, empowered specific Federal agencies to eliminate discrimination in the fields of education,²⁷ employment,²⁸ voting,²⁹ and public accommodations.³⁰ A key provision was Title VI, sec. 601, which declared that "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."³¹ This policy clearly applied in the area of education where millions of Federal dollars were being expended annually in aid to colleges and universities, both public and private. The implementation of Section 601 of Title VI was to be effectuated through the issuance of regulations by the Federal departments empowered to extend Federal financial assistance.³² These regulations were to be "of general applicability"³³ and "consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken."³⁴

On December 31, 1964, Francis Keppel, U.S. Commissioner of Education, sent a memorandum to the presidents of all institutions of higher education in the United States advising them that the regulation of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare authorized under Section 602 of Title VI had been approved by the President and promulgated by the Department to become effective on January 3, 1965.³⁵ Each college or university which received Federal funds was required under Section 80.4 of the Department Regulation to file an Assurance of Compliance with the non-discrimination requirements of Title VI. Unless the Assurance (HEW Form No. 441) was filed with the Department, the institution would not be eligible for Federal assistance.

Mr. Keppel enclosed with his memorandum an Explanation of HEW Form No. 441, which presented examples of the type of discriminatory practices which were prohibited under the Department Regulation.³⁶ Of interest to educators were questions 8 and 9 which explained the effect of the Assurance of Compliance upon their administrative practices:

"8. What effect will the regulation have on a college or university's admission practices or other practices related to the treatment of students?"

"A. An institution of higher education which applies for any Federal financial as-

Footnotes at end of article.

Every year he has come in with a schedule or agenda of bills from his committee. He has followed it, I believe, as religiously as any committee in the House has been able to follow an agenda, and he has done an outstanding job. He has been thwarted time and time again by the lack of authorizations and by matters beyond his control, and I believe beyond the control of the leadership in the House.

But again, Mr. Speaker, I would like to go back to the subject of my request, and I want to emphasize to the gentleman that as far as I am concerned I will be glad to meet every day of the week, every night of the week, to get authorization bills and appropriation bills through the House.

I would also like to say to the gentleman that I conferred some time ago with most of the committee chairmen about the possibility of adjourning at a fairly early date. We received reasonable assurances, but there are two Houses of the Congress, and I was not able to get the same degree of assurance in some places as I was in others.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to make the further observation that as we approach the 11th month of the year, the House has not done anything about authorizing the antipoverty program. That is another item on which the Committee on Appropriations is stymied, and I am looking forward to some cold day in December when somebody may come racing in with his shirttail flying, wanting us to bring in an appropriation bill for that.

Let it be said that if those concerned do not get these authorization bills processed, we may not be able to take care of the appropriations for them.

Mr. ALBERT. I have no argument with the gentleman, and I recognize the gentleman's position, and unless he wants to go to the Committee on Rules for a special rule he is of necessity bound by action on the part of the authorizing committees.

I believe the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor commented on the subject of the OEO authorization during some of the colloquy yesterday.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I want to compliment the gentleman from Texas for bringing this matter up on the floor of the House, and for this rather lengthy debate on the matter, because I think that right now we have got not only a deadline, but there is a serious question as to what is going to happen in the next 6 weeks, or by the end of the year. I would also like to say this: that already the discussion is being held by various Members that from now on they would object to going over from now on, going over from one day to another, and I would even suggest that we might very well figure on starting working Fridays, and perhaps we should start working on Saturdays.

I would like to ask the majority leader if he would tell us what he contemplates in the way of the legislative program for

Monday and Tuesday in view of the request that he has just made.

Mr. ALBERT. We have the Private Calendar and the Consent Calendar. There is another bill or two out of the Committee on Rules that might be programmed if the chairman of the committee wishes to do so, and I will of course discuss this matter with the chairman.

May I say just one other thing because I want the House to have full knowledge of what is before us. So far as I know, as of now there are only 3 days left in this year prior to Christmas which are recognized and accepted as days of national importance or national holidays and they are—election day on next Tuesday, Veterans Day on the following Tuesday, and Thanksgiving Day.

We would be doing no more, insofar as I know on those days than just to accommodate Members on the Mondays before those two days, and on the Friday after Thanksgiving Day, and we are not contemplating any extended vacations. But we do think, being in session as long as we have been, that Members might be entitled to go home for Thanksgiving.

Mr. ARENDS. Might I express the hope that the majority leader will also tell the "Tuesday to Thursday Club" that they may well expect to be here on Friday from now on?

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, we have announced repeatedly, during recent announcements of the legislative programs that if it is necessary to clear the deck of bills that the chairmen are ready to bring to the floor that we will meet on Friday and if necessary on Saturday.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, I would like to make one further observation.

Having served as a member of the Committee on Appropriations for 14 years, I have an understanding of the problems of the committee. I also know that their problems have been multiplied because of the proliferation of authorization bills. A proposal has been made, and I joined in cosponsoring it, that if an authorization bill is not a law by the 30th of June of a particular year, the Committee on Appropriations may thereafter bring the appropriation bill to the floor of the House without the problem of a point of order being made against it. I think that proposal ought to be approved. It would be helpful for two reasons: First, in getting the authorization proposals through before June 30 and second, in helping the Committee on Appropriations to get its work done prior to June 30 or shortly thereafter.

Mr. MAHON. I would pose the question, what kind of buzz saw might we encounter, for example, on defense if we should bring up without authorization the defense appropriation bill, which, as the gentleman knows, has no enacted authorization this year because the committees have not been able to finalize it for us in the last 10 months? I do not know whether that would work or not.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield for just one further

comment, I appreciate what the gentleman has said. I hope his optimistic outlook of what he calls the optimism of the majority leader is not overly optimistic. We do want to finish just as fast as we possibly can.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman and withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. ALBERT)?

There was no objection.

DISCUSSIONS, IF NOTHING MORE, MAY BE HELPFUL

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, it is encouraging that American and Soviet negotiators are at long last prepared to begin discussions during November on arms limitations. The negotiations are a step toward world sanity in the arms race. But let us not place too much significance on what is happening. We should not assume that the negotiations would automatically insure progress. At this point they will show only that both sides are interested in finding out whether there is common ground to make further and more meaningful talks worthwhile.

Previous history of negotiations with the Soviets would indicate that there is a long and difficult road ahead before any genuine rollback in strategic stockpiles can be accomplished. In the meantime, it is important that the United States not indulge in the deadly luxury of unilateral disarmament. As a matter of fact, U.S. disarmament would probably have eliminated any possibility of accomplishment toward arms limitations at the conference table. The Soviets are much too clever to give up anything without a quid pro quo.

While we are effecting economies in defense expenditures we should also endeavor to modernize and to strengthen our fighting forces. This the Soviets will understand, for this is exactly what they will be doing.

The people of the world can draw some assurance from the fact that both we and the Soviets recognize the dangers of nuclear war and the cost of an arms race. Both countries should be willing to seek relief from the growing economic burden which accompanies military preparedness. Hopefully, the talks can provide the proverbial single step that marks the beginning of a long and important journey.

HIGHER PRICES? YOU CAN BE SURE IF ITS WESTINGHOUSE

(Mr. PODELL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PODELL. Mr. Speaker, periodically a corporation shows true public spirit and tender consideration for consumers and their already devastated buying power. Yesterday such a case came to light when Westinghouse Electric Corp. announced plans to raise prices on

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. ALBERT. I am just as sensitive to the further need for getting authorization and appropriation bills out of the way as is the gentleman. I think that the gentleman's committee has had before it and has passed through the House all the appropriation bills, with the possible exception of one, for which there are existing authorizations. We have urged as the gentleman well knows, that authorizing committees complete action on the authorization bills as quickly as possible. I cannot answer exactly whether the fact that we will not be programming suspensions on Monday will have anything to do with what the committees can do on Monday. I cannot answer that.

Mr. MAHON. We are on the threshold of the 11th month of the year and well over half of the President's appropriation budget—some \$81 billion, in fact—has not been processed by the House because of the lack of significant authorizations. With only 2 months of the year left, this is a most disturbing situation. The Committee on Appropriations has acted in every instance where we thought we could. But time is running, and is now short. I think we have to do something in self-defense, and I do rise in self-defense.

I now yield to the gentleman from Michigan, who on yesterday seemed to attack the committee and the Congress for not having gotten more of the appropriation bills to the President. We have virtually come to a grinding halt in our ability to bring out the appropriation bills within the rules. I repeat, we have tens of billions of dollars of appropriations bottled up because we do not have authorizations for them. What can the Committee on Appropriations do about it and what can the minority leader do about this situation, and does this request have any adverse impact on the unfortunate situation in which we find ourselves with respect to appropriations?

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, would my good friend and former chairman yield at this point?

Mr. MAHON. I am glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I want to reassure the gentleman that I did not attack the Committee on Appropriations and I did not attack the Congress but simply said that we are in this position—and the record shows that we are—where only two appropriation bills for fiscal 1970 have reached the desk of the President. I deplore this, and I am sure that the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Appropriations deplores it. I would like to make an inquiry because I think what may come to the House Monday or Tuesday could give the green light to one of the appropriation bills still in the Committee on Appropriations.

I understand that the conferees on the District of Columbia revenue bill have agreed, and it is my understanding that the Committee on Appropriations has not acted on the District of Columbia appropriation bill pending this conference report from the legislative committee. Is there any reason why, if the conference report is ready, it cannot be

considered Monday or Tuesday so that we could get the green light for this particular appropriation bill?

Mr. MAHON. I would like to yield to the majority leader for a response to this question. Let me first say that if we bring out an appropriation bill prior to the time that the legislative committee has fully acted and processed the related authorization, the legislative committee tends to be somewhat disturbed because they feel we are moving too fast and getting the cart before the horse, so to speak. In any event, we have to have a reasonable time for markup, getting the printing done, and the report down. It takes about a week or 10 days or more to do that. We cannot be expected to bring in our appropriation bill 30 minutes after the House has passed the related authorization measure.

Mr. ALBERT. The leadership insofar as I know has not been advised what day the conferees on the District of Columbia revenue bill will call up that bill. I know of no reason why it cannot be called up on any day.

I would like to say to the gentleman that I would like to keep the discussion within the confines of my request. I have only asked that suspension bills be put over from Monday until Wednesday. I have not asked that any rollcalls be put over or that any other matters not be programed on Monday or Tuesday.

I would say this to the gentleman: This is not a matter which concerns just next week. Continually committee chairmen ask the leadership to call up bills on a certain day and the leadership cannot ignore these requests. In the same manner we have requests from committee chairmen not to call up bills on certain days. We attempt to schedule bills in accordance with the request of the chairmen or members in charge of legislation reported from their committees. We have habitually tried to do this throughout the session and I think it can be said in all candor that insofar as requests from committees are concerned and insofar as rules granted are concerned on bills on which committee chairmen desire to take action we have disposed of such legislation promptly. I know that the chairmen of committees now considering authorization and appropriation bills would like to have them disposed of as soon as possible.

Mr. MAHON. Would the distinguished majority leader tell us when we might have the authorizations relating to mass transportation, to highway safety, and airport aid in order that we can properly incorporate those in the transportation appropriation bill.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, the leadership is in no position to predict when a committee is going to vote or when a chairman is going to request a rule or when a rule will be granted. I can only answer the question in that way. I do not wish to direct my remarks to any committee. I think I can say in all candor that we have discussed the matters with the chairmen of the committees which have jurisdiction over authorization bills not only recently, but over the months.

Mr. MAHON. Referring again the fact that we are on the threshold of the 11th

month of the year and the fact that we have had 14 bills and resolutions out of the Appropriations Committee this session, I wonder if the majority leader could tell us when we might expect an authorization on the foreign aid bill. The subcommittee headed by the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. PASSMAN) finished its hearings some time ago. We want to bring in a bill. When can we expect action on the foreign aid authorization bill?

Mr. ALBERT. The distinguished gentleman from Ohio is present and is a member of that committee and I am sure can give the gentleman the most recent information with reference to it.

Mr. HAYS. We voted the foreign aid bill out this morning.

Let me say to the gentleman, however, that we did not get the administration's request on the foreign aid bill until the beginning of the new fiscal year. We got it in June. It has taken a long time for the administration to line up the ducks on their side and to line up the votes in order to get it out. There have been long hearings conducted on it.

However, insofar as I am concerned—and I think I can speak for the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs—we have our local elections next Tuesday—he and I do—and I cannot expect folks to vote in congressional elections if I am not interested enough to vote in the local election such as the mayors elections, and so forth.

I have noticed that the President took time out to do some campaigning in Virginia yesterday and plans to do the same thing in New Jersey today or tomorrow although I hope he does not have any success in either instance.

But I am going to take time out on Tuesday to go home and vote. I could not care less whether the foreign aid bill comes up then or not, but it is not coming up because of that, so it will come up in a week or so, I think if the Committee on Rules gives us a rule.

And I might say to the gentleman that I do not even care whether they do that, but it is out of the committee.

Mr. MAHON. The Defense appropriation bill involves a little over \$75 billion of the appropriation budget. We do not yet have the enacted authorization for that. The military construction appropriation budget is in the area of \$1.9 billion, and there is no enacted authorization.

Is the leadership able to tell the Committee on Appropriations what we can do about those?

Mr. ALBERT. The gentleman knows that the authorization bill has passed the House. The gentleman knows that the defense authorization bill was under consideration for a long time, and I am sure for the best of reasons, in the other body.

All of these are matters we have discussed with the appropriate committee chairmen. If the gentleman feels that by putting suspensions over from Monday to Wednesday would interfere with the consideration of appropriation bills, or if I did, I certainly would not make the request.

Further, Mr. Speaker, I want to compliment the gentleman from Texas.

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than 100 other minerals intact, after the House cut most of them by a quarter. House depletion changes would have raised an added \$400 million annually in taxes from extractive industries—mostly oil and gas. This has now been scaled down to \$155 million, a cut of nearly two-thirds. Again all Americans will be forced to subsidize oil profits abroad and at home. This winter we shall all be made to pay double the going world price for every oil product. It can only be compared to picking the pocket of a person who has just been run over by a truck.

This, however, was still not enough. The depletion allowance permits oil and gas companies to deduct 27½ percent of gross income from earnings before computing taxes. They cannot, however, deduct more than 50 percent of pre-tax earnings. This provision was softened by permitting firms or individuals with gross oil or gas revenues of less than \$3 million to use the depletion allowance for up to 65 percent of their earnings. This is public sanction of increased tax evasion by the rich with a vengeance.

Almost all so-called independent producers, who are not a part of worldwide integrated oil companies, will slide neatly under this new \$3 million limitation. Compared to a major oil company, the individual who grosses up to \$3 million annually from oil or gas is small potatoes. But compare him to the average taxpayer, and he is massive privilege, indeed, this, then, is the added privileged group aided by the Senate Finance Committee. These operators, many of whom are already millionaires, do everything from extracting oil from the ground to marketing it at retail prices. In effect, the public has been told to shut up or else worse will follow. It makes as much sense as Mrs. Mao Tse Tung applying for D.A.R. membership.

The Senate even raised a similar 50 percent limitation to 70 percent for gold, silver and copper producers, who now receive a 15 percent depletion allowance. Under its poverty-stricken copper giants like Anaconda, Kennecott, Phelps-Dodge and American Smelting and Refining will save \$10 to \$25 million annually in taxes.

Here then we have the spectacle of a group of Senators, mainly from oil States, ignoring the outspoken will of the mass of our citizens. Our tax system is a masterpiece of inequities. The country has demanded reform, which the House attempted to give it, in part. Now the Senate Finance Committee has blatantly attempted to strifle and suppress what we have painfully managed to accomplish. I believe we are witnessing a deliberate attempt to destroy the entire tax reform bill.

The only historical comparison that can be drawn with this emerging abortion of a measure is the Hawley-Smoot Tariff. When need was greatest for swift tariff reductions, a privilege-oriented Congress produced the highest tariff schedules in American history up to that time. In this instance, demand for tax relief and erosion of accumulated oil tax privilege has been answered by a legislative nose-thumbing unmatched in modern times. The measure is becoming

as festooned with amendments as a Christmas tree is with ornaments. A meaningful House-Senate conference will be impossible, almost guaranteeing no bill at all. To call this tax justice or relief is to try and pass off the Manhattan Telephone Directory as the Revised Statutes.

Soon now, this legislative abortion will be wrapped in shiny tinsel, passed by the Senate and sent back to the House with somber ceremony and howls of self-congratulation. It will be accompanied by a 2-minute ovation and 50 empty speeches, then sent to the House for decent burial. Mr. Speaker, a hard-hitting grocery advertisement would make more sense than this deliberate warping of the legislative process. This Congress, if it affixes its seal of approval to such a measure, will dissipate its diminishing share of national faith at an unprecedented rate. I shall vote against any compromise such as that already emerging from the Senate Finance Committee. I hope the majority of my colleagues will do the same. Yet this, of course, will accomplish the goals for which the oil and gas industry has been so ardently and expensively lobbying.

Nonetheless, in the moment of victory, they have sown the seeds of their eventual defeat. A time of complete reform and total reckoning with this industry cannot be much longer delayed, even by their massed billions. The public has at last been enlightened as to the extent and depth of how much the oil and gas industry has been getting away with at the expense of us all. No industry in the land has abused its power more or shown such corporate blindness. They can best be compared to steel moguls of the last century, or coal barons of Theodore Roosevelt's day.

During the Pullman strike, Mark Hanna was supposed to have said to George Pullman:

Pullman, any man who won't meet his workers at least part of the way is a damn fool.

Any industry which enjoys as much power and profits as the oil and gas industry does should have yielded to the commonsense call for at least some reform. This the oil industry, in its collective nonwisdom, has refused to do.

Mr. Speaker, dire fates are promised looters, dissenters, radicals, and effete intellectuals. Those who laugh at and ridicule legitimate requests of the people are presumably safe, and will be rendered testimonial dinners by the oil and gas industry.

(Mr. DEVINE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. DEVINE'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

THE NEWLY-CREATED GENERAL SERVICES PUBLIC ADVISORY COUNCIL

(Mr. BLACKBURN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. BLACKBURN. Mr. Speaker, the newly-created General Services Public Advisory Council met for the first time late last week. This national panel was created by Administrator Robert L. Kunzig to more fully involve the public in the affairs of the General Services Administration, the multibillion dollar agency that acts as the business manager of the Federal Government.

It pleases me greatly to note that one of the 16 members of the council is from Georgia. He is Mr. John T. Wiley of Decatur. He is the assistant vice president of Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.

Mr. Wiley is to be highly commended for donating his valuable time to the cause of good government. Of course, public service is nothing new for this gentleman. He is a member of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce and has served as a director of Junior Achievement of Greater Atlanta, the United Fund, March of Dimes, and the American Heart Association. He is currently a director of the Georgia Agribusiness Council and is vice chairman of Governmental Department of the Georgia State Chamber of Commerce. Wiley is a member of the Atlanta Athletic Club, the Commerce Club, and the Gridiron Secret Society.

Mr. Wiley's vast experience will contribute much to the Council.

Mr. Speaker, it should also be noted that the creation of the General Services Public Advisory Council is another step in President Nixon's drive to make the Federal Government more responsive to the American people.

SALT TALKS AND MIRV

(Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record, and to include extraneous material.)

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I am greatly encouraged by the announcement that the Soviet Union has finally accepted the American invitation to begin talks on the limitation of strategic weapons. It was announced this past weekend that preliminary talks will begin in Helsinki, Finland, on November 17, 1969.

This is especially good news to those of us in the Congress who have expressed grave concern over the delay in strategic arms limitation talks—SALT—and the growing possibility of a new escalation in the arms race. The fact is that today we and the Russians are roughly at parity in terms of nuclear weapons and that we are both capable of destroying each other several times over. It would be sheer folly for either country to devote huge sums to the production of new and more horrible weapons when these resources could instead be devoted to peaceful purposes. There is a real need in this country today to divert these funds into domestic programs—programs designed to meet the crises of our cities, schools, and environment. And I understand that the Soviet Union is faced with a very similar problem.

As one of the principal sponsors of a House resolution proposing a mutual

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I enclose an editorial from the Washington Post of October 27, 1969:

THE SALT TALKS: A BEGINNING

It is good news that the United States and the Soviet Union have at long last agreed on a time and a place for the opening of the talks on limiting offensive and defensive strategic weapons. There was good news of another kind, as well, in Secretary Rogers' press conference remarks on the subject. For in an international negotiation of this kind, there is much ongoing internal negotiation to be accomplished too—negotiation within each government and among its separate competitive parts, each of which tries, quite naturally, to assert its particular interest and make that interest controlling in the government position as a whole. We surely have much to learn, in the prolonged and extremely difficult talks ahead, as to how the weight falls within the Administration's specially designated negotiating team and how that reflects the larger reality within the Administration itself. But for the moment there is much reassurance to be had from the fact that Secretary Rogers not only appeared as the President's spokesman on this question, but that he spoke with eminent good sense.

Mr. Rogers' remarks were low-key, easy-going, uncontentious, and above all practical. Unlike those who have conveniently forgotten the Administration's own six-month postponement of the talks in their eagerness to tax the Soviet Union with unconscionable delay, Secretary Rogers affably observed, "I'm not sure that it would help any to speculate on the reason for the delay since June. They probably wonder why we delayed from the time our Administration came into office until June—and we did it because we wanted to review the situation carefully. I think that they probably have problems of one kind or another and they have now decided to have the talks." He bashed no drums and clanged no cymbals concerning either the hopes or the fears that must necessarily attend such an exercise, pointing out that "we should not confuse the beginning of talks with success," and stressing that what we sought was a "limitation agreement [that is] mutually advantageous." His rationale for seeking such an agreement cut through a lot of misleading rhetoric on the alleged interconnection or "linkage" of this problem with all other outstanding issues between the U.S. and the Soviet Union:

"We are not talking about detente, or anything else. We are talking about whether it makes sense for the two of us to continue to spend immense amounts of money for the next five, or ten, or fifteen years on strategic weapons and end up at the end of that time in the same relative position—or whether it would be wiser to use the money for some other purpose. . . . I think they are serious about it. You can always be wrong but at the moment I would say that their attitude is serious and that they intend to approach it in the same attitude we do."

Tone apart, two particular points of substance deserve comment. One is that the decision to hold a preliminary conference to set things in motion, while remaining flexible about its form and content, probably was wise; it would be good if whatever mutual procedural wrangling and wrestling might develop could be separated in some degree from the substantive talks that follow. The other is that, while declining to disclose any moves the U.S. might be expected to make in Helsinki, Secretary Rogers showed himself not inhospitable to the idea of working out a bilateral freeze or moratorium on MIRV tests in these preliminary sessions. Such an arrangement may or may not come to pass, but gaining control over the rapid development of these destabilizing weapons should surely rank high on the Administration's agenda. They are the weapons on which the clock is ticking.

EDUCATION—THE KEY TO SURVIVAL

(Mr. COHELAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, today this House will have the opportunity to vote on a continuing resolution for the Office of Education. I will offer an amendment to allow the Office of Education to expend funds at the previously House-passed levels. The urgency and necessity of the full funding for education programs is widely recognized both in this Chamber and the Nation at large. I was gratified to see that the Washington Post again took a strong editorial position favoring the full funding for education. The editorial points out that education has been treated as a pesky poor relation in the striving for limited resources.

It is interesting to note that the Nation which prides itself as being the most powerful and well endowed is now taking second place to many of the nations of Europe in education. The present administration is not unaware of the need for more expenditures in education. Indeed, a task force commissioned by the President himself recommended enormous increases in education. It seems to me that each Member should support the House-passed level as a modest but necessary contribution to a balanced and quality education.

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 28, 1969]

EDUCATION—"THE KEY TO SURVIVAL"

"Jefferson knew that the destiny of America was inseparable from education—that in the fulfillment of the promise of this new nation education would be the key. . . . Education, long the key to opportunity and fulfillment, is today also the key to survival." So said Richard Nixon just a year ago when he was a candidate for the presidency. And he went on to pledge that "my administration will be second to none in its concern for education."

There has been no discernible movement to redeem that pledge. Indeed, in the fierce competition for attention and for federal funds in a period when economy is an administration watchword, education has been treated as a pesky poor relation. The President has come forward with a dramatic new welfare proposal; but he has displayed only indifference to the urgent educational needs set forth by a distinguished urban education task force. He has proposed immense expenditures for a new maritime program designed to "replace the drift and neglect of recent years and restore this country to a proud position in the shipping lanes of the world"; but when the House of Representatives during the summer enlarged by a billion dollars the meager appropriation he requested for federal aid to education, he opposed the increase and threatened not to spend it if the Senate should endorse the House action.

The President and his Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare persuaded one of the ablest and most thoughtful educators in the country, Dr. James E. Allen Jr., to leave the New York State superintendency of education and come to Washington as U.S. Commissioner of Education. But Dr. Allen has been accorded scant influence since he came here, as though the administration desired a symbol of excellence rather than a promoter of it.

This country, a pioneer in mass public education, is now second to many of the

countries of Europe in literacy, the most elementary index to educational attainment. Calling last month for a campaign to eradicate illiteracy in America, Commissioner Allen pointed to the shameful fact that in large city school systems in this country up to half of the students read below expectation and that about half of the unemployed youth between the ages of 16 and 21 in this country are functionally illiterate.

"Drift and neglect" have been much more—and much more seriously—the portion of the public schools in this country than of the merchant marine. For nearly half a century on one pretext or another—two world wars, two Asian interventions, a depression, an inflation—the public schools of this country have been allowed to sink further and further in arrears of the demands made upon them. School construction has not kept pace with a growing school population; the number and the caliber of teachers—and of the counselors and equipment required to complement the teachers—have lagged increasingly behind the known needs of school children.

The management of public schools is, and should be, a local responsibility. But the long neglect of the school system can be repaired only through a dramatic program of federal financial aid; the resources are simply not now available at the local level. More important still, the drive and innovation and planning for a revitalization of the public schools must come on a nationwide basis.

With the need for federal aid so urgent and so great. It is a tragedy to hear from within the administration phlegmatic talk about concentrating on research instead of on action. It is true, of course, that intensive study of educational needs and aims must continue constantly. But the schools themselves—and the children whose childhood opportunities for education can never recur—cannot now wait upon research. There are plenty of pressing and indubitably constructive uses for the billion dollars of additional money a concerned Congress wants to apply to public education. There is plenty of knowledge in the U.S. Commissioner's office to put that money effectively to work at once.

AMERICA'S COAT OF ARMS—AN OIL DERRICK RAMPANT ON A FIELD OF CASH

(Mr. PODELL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. PODELL. Mr. Speaker, our hopes for tax reform of a substantial nature lie dead, done in by the Senate Finance Committee, acting at the behest of America's oil and gas industry. The House had cut both foreign and domestic depletion allowances from 27½ percent to 20 percent, the absolute minimum of reform. Many in this House, myself among them, grudgingly accepted such partial tax relief. We hoped to at least make a start in eroding accumulated oil industry tax privileges, simultaneously affording some aid to the average taxpayer. Now the Senate Finance Committee has voted to restore much of what the House cut, leaving both foreign and domestic depletion allowances at 23 percent. Such an act is unacceptable. I consider it a legislative miscarriage, boldly offered and blatantly delivered. Our attempts at tax reform have been treated as a joke. Now they are turned into a knife aimed at enlarging oil industry preference at public expense.

The Senate Finance Committee maintained depletion allowances for more

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moratorium on multiple warhead missile testing, I am hopeful that a mutual MIRV test freeze will be one of the first items of agreement at the preliminary discussions. Secretary Rogers has pointed out that the SALT talks could last for several years. Unfortunately, we do not have that kind of time if we are truly interested in halting the deployment of MIRV since our own test series will be completed by mid-1970. And once MIRV is deployable it will be virtually impossible to control by agreement due to the complex problems of inspection that would be involved. We would thus be off to the races again as we both embarked on a costly and dangerous new arms buildup. It has been variously estimated that MIRVing our own land- and sea-based missiles will cost between \$10 and \$20 billion.

But I think people are deceiving themselves if they look on MIRV as only an unnecessary expenditure that will ultimately leave us where we now are—at a plateau of relative balance and stability. Two factors are being overlooked in such an assessment. First, during the buildup there are bound to be asymmetrical moments when the balance of power will be upset and the risks of a nuclear exchange will, therefore, be greatly increased. And second, when both sides have MIRVed their missile force will still not have the stability which we enjoy today because there will be a distinct incentive for a nation to strike first with its MIRV force: since each MIRVed missile will in theory be capable of knocking out several missile silos, in time of crisis the edge will obviously be with the side which attacks first. While I realize that our own MIRV is not intended as a counterforce weapon, the fact remains that, with increased accuracy and yield, it has such a potential. And the Russians will be basing their judgments not on our intentions, but on our capabilities.

For these reasons, I think it would be mutually advantageous for both us and the Russians to call a halt to MIRV development while there is still time. A mutual MIRV test freeze, based on national means of verification, should be agreed to at the earliest possible date, and a formal agreement involving other means of inspection should be placed at the top of the SALT agenda. This proposal has the support of one-fourth of the House membership and nearly half of the Senate membership. It has been termed by President Nixon as "a very constructive proposal."

I think President Nixon has been wise in rejecting calls for a unilateral American halt in MIRV testing. Not only would this have been dangerous, but it would have encouraged the Russians to delay even further the commencement of SALT talks while they continued to develop their own MIRV system. The subject of arms limitation must be approached in a spirit of mutuality. Unilateral actions based on blind faith and trust would only generate distrust, fear and suspicion in the longrun and jeopardize the chances for a meaningful and mutual arms control agreement.

I am sure I am joined by many of my colleagues in this body in hoping that the administration will seek to halt the

development of MIRV by proposing to the Russians that we both discontinue our testing immediately and work for an agreement to stop the "mad momentum" of the arms race.

At this point in the RECORD I include an editorial appearing in yesterday morning's Washington Post, entitled, "The SALT Talks: A Beginning." I am also including the transcript of the press conference with Secretary of State Rogers on the subject of SALT talks.

The materials follow:

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 27, 1969]

THE SALT TAKES: A BEGINNING

It is good news that the United States and the Soviet Union have at long last agreed on a time and a place for the opening of the talks on limiting offensive and defensive strategic weapons. There was good news of another kind, as well, in Secretary Rogers' press conference remarks on the subject. For in an international negotiation of this kind, there is much ongoing internal negotiation to be accomplished too—negotiation within each government and among its separate competitive parts, each of which tries, quite naturally, to assert its particular interest and make that interest controlling in the government position as a whole. We surely have much to learn, in the prolonged and extremely difficult talks ahead, as to how the weight falls within the Administration's specially designated negotiating team and how that reflects the larger reality within the Administration itself. But for the moment there is much reassurance to be had from the fact that Secretary Rogers not only appeared as the President's spokesman on this question, but that he spoke with eminent good sense.

Mr. Rogers' remarks were low-key, easy-going, uncontentious, and above all practical. Unlike those who have conveniently forgotten the Administration's own six-month postponement of the talks in their eagerness to tax the Soviet Union with unconscionable delay, Secretary Rogers affably observed, "I'm not sure that it would help any to speculate on the reason for the delay since June. They probably wonder why we delayed from the time our Administration came into office until June—and we did it because we wanted to review the situation carefully. I think that they probably have problems of one kind or another and they have now decided to have the talks." He bashed no drums and clanged no cymbals concerning either the hopes or the fears that must necessarily attend such an exercise, pointing out the "we should not confuse the beginning of talks with success," and stressing that what we sought was a "limitation agreement [that is] mutually advantageous." His rationale for seeking such an agreement cut through a lot of misleading rhetoric on the alleged interconnecting or "linkage" of this problem with all other outstanding issues between the U.S. and the Soviet Union:

"We are not talking about detente, or anything else. We are talking about whether it makes sense for the two of us to continue to spend immense amounts of money for the next five, or ten, or fifteen years on strategic weapons and end up at the end of that time in the same relative position—or whether it would be wiser to use the money for some other purpose. . . . I think they are serious about it. You can always be wrong but at the moment I would say that their attitude is serious and that they intend to approach it in the same attitude we do."

Tone apart, two particular points of substance deserve comment. One is that the decision to hold a preliminary conference to set things in motion, while remaining flexible about its form and content, probably was wise; it would be good if whatever mutual

procedural wrangling and wrestling might develop could be separated in some degree from the substantive talks that follow. The other is that, while declining to disclose any moves the U.S. might be expected to make in Helsinki, Secretary Rogers showed himself not inhospitable to the idea of working out a bilateral freeze or moratorium on MIRV tests in these preliminary sessions. Such an arrangement may or may not come to pass but gaining control over the rapid development of these destabilizing weapons should surely rank high on the Administration's agenda. They are, the weapons on which the clock is ticking.

SECRETARY ROGERS' NEWS CONFERENCE OF OCTOBER 25, 1969

Following is the State Department's release of Secretary of State William P. Rogers' News Conference, which is authorized for direct quotation:

Secretary ROGERS. Ladies and gentlemen, I thought that it might be helpful to get together with you in view of the announcement that was made in the White House at 11:00 o'clock, because I thought you might have some questions on this subject. I will do my best to give you the information that you would like to have.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you amplify a little bit on what will be treated at the preliminary discussions?

And secondly, will you tell us if there's a possibility that President Nixon and the Soviet Premier, Mr. Kosygin, might formally open the second phase of serious negotiations on the substantive issues?

A. On the second part of the question, I think the answer is no, there is no present intention of any procedure of that kind, and I don't believe that it will happen.

As far as the preliminary talks themselves are concerned, we expect that they will be exploratory in nature. The purpose of the preliminary talks is to have a free discussion about how the negotiations can be conducted.

Now, we are approaching these talks very seriously. Certainly, it's as serious a matter as we have in our nation today, and I think that the Soviet Union's attitude is the same. Certainly they say that they are very serious about these talks.

So we want to discuss how we can best approach the talks in a serious, businesslike way that will be productive.

Q. Mr. Secretary.

A. Yes.

Q. These talks have been put off time and time again. What do you think is different now about this time? Why did the Russians agree now?

A. Well, I don't know—and I'm not sure that it would help any to speculate on the reason for the delay since June. They probably wonder why we delayed from the time our Administration came into office until June—and we did it because we wanted to review the situation carefully.

I think that they probably have problems of one kind or another and they have now decided to have the talks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the question of MIRV, is it the intention of this Government to propose a freeze, a moratorium, or some other device to halt MIRV testing at the beginning of this conference so that substantive issues can be dealt with through a moratorium or a freeze?

A. Well, as President Nixon said in June, we are obviously considering the whole question of MIRV tests and possible moratorium on the tests; and that will be one of the subjects that will be considered when we start these talks.

I think that it's a complex situation. Now that the talks are scheduled to start on the 17th, why we will consider how we approach that subject.

We certainly don't intend to have any public discussion as we go along on each one of

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these issues. It's too serious a business. We're going to try as much as possible to conduct these negotiations in private.

Now, obviously, we'll keep our NATO Allies informed of the progress, and we'll keep Congress informed. But as much as possible, we want to do this in private and the Soviet Union indicates that that's their intention too.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I don't understand what you mean by saying you don't intend to have a public discussion because the issues are too serious.

A. Well, I mean, at each step of the negotiation, obviously, we will have a discussion. Eventually the public will know. But while we are talking we think it's better to do it in a private session; and we would hope that with some exceptions they will be private sessions. Do I make myself clear?

Q. Yes.

But could I ask one more follow-up question?

A. But let me say on that point, Mr. High-tower, that as I said, we will keep Congress advised, and we will keep the appropriate committees fully advised of the general approach that our Government is taking. And we'll keep our allies advised.

But we don't want to have each one of these negotiating sessions a public session, because it's a very complex subject, and we think it's so serious that it should be conducted in a businesslike atmosphere. And when it's appropriate to advise the public, we will.

Q. So you expect some public information to come out from time to time. But the negotiations, as such, are to be private.

A. That's correct.

Q. Yes.

At what level do you plan to open the talks?

A. Well, we have our delegation, that we have already announced, that is prepared to go to Helsinki on the 17th. The Chairman of that is Ambassador Gerard Smith, the Alternate Chairman is Philip Farley, there's Paul Nitze, and General Allison, Llewellyn Thompson, and Dr. Harold Brown.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'm not quite clear on whether there's going to be one meeting in Helsinki, or a series of meetings in Helsinki, that are ended by the ending of the preliminary talks—and then the beginning of the actual talks somewhere else? Or is it all going to run together?

A. Well, we can't predict it for certain. But I think it will run something like this:

We would expect that preliminary discussions in Helsinki will run for several days, maybe a few weeks, and at that time a decision will be made about a permanent site. And also, decisions will be made about how best to conduct the permanent negotiations—how many should attend, how many should be private, and whether there should be an agenda or not have an agenda—those things.

In other words, the purpose of the preliminary talks is to work it out so that we are not arguing about details and we get right down to the business of serious negotiations when we get to the permanent talks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any thought on our part of proposing some sort of limitation on anti-ballistic missiles? Or does it appear that the decision of both governments to proceed with limited deployment precludes this?

A. Mr. Scall, we are not going to discuss in advance, and hopefully not while the negotiations are being conducted, specific proposals that we are going to make.

I think I should say that the negotiations will include both offensive and defensive strategic weapons. And as you know, under NPT Treaty, we have an obligation to do that, and we are going to fulfill that obligation.

Chalmers?

Q. Could I clarify something—some of the answers you have given?

You are going to Helsinki to have a preliminary meeting of a few days to a few weeks. Now that is essentially to work out the techniques of how you have a longer range, more permanent meeting.

Does that mean that in the preliminary meeting there will be no possibility of discussing a substantive question such as the freeze of MIRV while we're having the permanent meeting?

A. No.

Q. That could happen at the Preliminary Meeting?

A. Yes, yes.

We are not going to exclude any subject from discussion at the preliminary meetings, and I don't want to be in any rigid position about how long these preliminary talks are going to last, or how we're going to discuss it. Our attitude is quite flexible.

And I think the Soviet Union's attitude is the same.

We're serious about this, and we want to conduct the negotiations in a businesslike manner, and we hope that we can avoid long arguments about the agenda, and which item will come first, and whether there's a limitation on what we can talk about, and so forth.

If we can have a more reasonable, flexible approach to negotiations, and if we can talk back and forth, and dot it with a serious intention in mind—then it's possible that these talks can be productive.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us an idea—at least what you anticipate what the general course of things is apt to be—whether you want to—whether you prefer to start with existing weapons systems and then proceed to—

A. No. I don't want to get involved in how we're going to do it—which we're going to take up first, and so forth.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I don't think that Helsinki was our original preference, as far as the site is concerned. Do you have another preference for the permanent site of the talks?

A. Well, I'm glad you raised that question, because there has been some misunderstanding about it. And let me tell you exactly how it developed:

In my discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin in June, I think it was June 11th, I said that we were ready to have talks, and that we would be prepared to have talks within a month. And I listed these places as possible sites for the talks: Geneva, Vienna, and Helsinki.

Now we did suggest Helsinki, and when Ambassador Dobrynin responded the other day, he selected Helsinki, and that was one of the places that we had suggested.

We have left open the question of the final site, and he was willing to do that, because there are some problems of communication and availability of space and other things. It's possible that some other site would be better.

We look with favor on Vienna, for example, but we are not excluding the possibility of Helsinki as the final site.

But the reason I mentioned it that fully is we didn't have any argument about the site. Helsinki was a site that we proposed. Later on, we indicated we thought maybe Vienna would be better for the reasons I mentioned, but we had no dispute about the site.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us a more clear definition of the term "strategic arms?" Does this include, for example, land based intermediate ballistic missiles?

A. No, I think I'll leave that to the negotiators. That's a subject that they will have to discuss when they get there.

Q. How does China's growing strategic power fit in, long range, with these negotia-

tions with the Soviet Union? And the threat, presumably, to both countries?

A. Well I don't think, at the moment, they are relevant. They haven't progressed far enough, and I think if we can work out something that is constructive from the standpoint of the two superpowers that we can deal with China's problem later on.

Keep in mind that the word that was used was "curbing" in this release—"Limitation" or "curbing"—and even if we are successful at working out an agreement, both the Soviet Union and the United States are going to be way ahead of China for many years to come.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you, for the benefit of the public, estimate how long you think these talks might take place?

A. No, I wouldn't want to do that.

I try to resist doing that. I noticed the other day in "Meet the Press" I made a mistake and did indicate that I thought that the answer that the Soviets would give us would be within two or three months.

So far, I've been batting pretty well, and I'm not going to make any further predictions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, who do you expect will lead the Soviet Delegation? And have you any indication either from reading the Soviet press, or in any other way, what their attitude is toward things like a MIRV moratorium, or an ABM—

A. We do not know who is going to head their Delegation. At one time it was thought that Mr. Kuznetsov would be the Chairman, but I think that he's in China now, in negotiations there, so we're not sure. And Ambassador Dobrynin did not tell me.

He did say that he thought their delegation probably would be about the same size as ours, five or six.

Q. What mechanism will be used for consulting the NATO Allies? Will they be contacted individually, or collectively?

A. Well, I think it depends, of course, upon what the consultation consists of.

I would think, generally speaking, we'll do it through the NATO organization in Brussels, but not necessarily. I don't want to be confined to that as a possibility.

In our discussions here—notification of our NATO Allies that the talks were going to start—we notified the Ambassadors in Washington.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is bound to be speculation that the beginning of these talks may have a larger meaning. Do you think that this might be the beginning of an era of negotiations?

A. Well, let me see if I can answer your question: I think this is an important step that is consistent with the President's policy of an era of negotiation, and it could be a very important negotiation. It's possible it's one of the most important negotiations our country has been involved in. And certainly, it could be one of the most important that we ever undertook with the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, we should not confuse the beginning of the talks with success of the talks, necessarily—there is quite a difference.

These talks could be abortive, they could be fruitless, or they could be highly successful in terms of mankind. And those things will be determined by the talks, themselves.

So whereas we are pleased that the Soviet Union has agreed to have these talks—we think it is a good step—we also have to be quite conscious of the fact that the mere start of the talks, themselves, is not what counts. What counts, is how successful they are.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if these talks are successful, could they lead to a form of nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union?

A. Well, words like "parity" I think are apt to be confusing.

What we hope that we can do is negotiate an arms limitation agreement which will keep us in the same relative position that we are now—and which can be verified.

Now in order to accomplish the first part of that formula, we have to be sure that the limitation agreement is mutually advantageous, that neither side gets an advantage because of the agreement.

Secondly, we have to be sure that the agreement can be verified, because if it can't and one side can cheat, then it certainly is not a viable agreement.

Now these things are very difficult matters to handle, and I don't think anybody should be confused about the fact that they are difficult. They are complex, there's mutual suspicion, the subject matter itself is very involved, and so we have to proceed with the hope that we can achieve some success—but with the full realization that it's not going to be easy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it's almost exactly a year ago today, I believe, that Nixon, then a candidate, gave a speech in which he said he would approach such negotiations only on the grounds that the United States would be negotiating from a position of superiority.

Now, at this point does the Administration feel that it's going into these talks in a position of superiority, or rough equality, or however you want to characterize it—with the Soviet Union?

A. Well I don't, as you know, I think he's used the term "sufficiency" and I think that we feel now that this is an appropriate time to enter these discussions and enter them seriously, with the hope that we can arrive at an agreement that will be mutually advantageous. And I don't want to characterize what we think. We think this is the right time to do it, and I think the Soviet Union does, too.

Q. Will you take a question on Lebanon? A. I'll take it—[Laughter.] No, I'm sorry, I don't want to get involved in anything else this morning.

Q. By "agreement" as the objective, are you speaking of the treaty that would be submitted to the Senate for ratification?

A. Well, I think that if we have an agreement, a very confidential agreement, we are thinking in terms of the treaty. Yes. And I think that that is the most likely outcome, assuming we reach an agreement.

On the other hand, I wouldn't want to be frozen in that position, because it's possible that we would want to have some kind of an agreement of a limited nature, that would not require a treaty.

But in any event, I want to make it clear that if we did something other than by way of treaty, that we would keep Congress constantly advised, and consult with them, and be sure that it met with their approval, and we would keep our allies advised.

In other words, I think the chances are that the agreement would be in treaty form; but I wouldn't want to necessarily be frozen in that position.

Q. Mr. Secretary, having talked with Ambassador Dobrynin, how do you characterize the Russian attitude? They are willing to talk, but are they enthusiastic, cautious, what can you tell us about that?

A. Well, I had long talks with Mr. Gromyko on this subject, in New York. We talked three times for three or four hours' duration, total; and I would characterize his attitude as serious.

He gave me the impression that the Soviet Union is serious about these talks. He didn't

indicate that they were entering the talks, or about to enter the talks for purposes of propaganda, and that their attitude was about the same as ours. It's a realistic attitude.

We are not talking about detente, or anything else. We are talking about whether it makes sense for the two of us to continue to spend immense amounts of money for the next 5, or 10, or 15 years on strategic weapons and end up at the end of that time in the same relative position—or whether it would be wiser to use the money for some other purposes.

Now that's just a matter of hardware.

If we can work out that kind of an agreement so that each of us feel it's to our advantage to enter that kind of an agreement, and we're satisfied that the agreement can be verified so that neither side can cheat—then it makes sense to do it.

So, I think they are serious about it. You always can be wrong but at the moment I would say that their attitude is serious and that they intend to approach it in the same attitude that we do.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect, sir, that the initiation of these talks will, itself, affect the general pattern of East-West relations? As these talks proceed, will they have, in your judgment, a relationship to the conduct of international affairs as a whole—in the Middle East, for—

A. Well, let me say this: They are not conditional in any sense of the word.

We haven't laid down any conditions for these talks.

I suppose that when you're talking with the representatives of the Soviet Union in any field, it does tend to improve the relations somewhat—especially if the talks seem to be succeeding.

Now, we are talking with them on NPT, for example. We hope that they will ratify NPT.

We are talking with them in Geneva about Seabeds Treaty—and those discussions have gone rather well.

We are going to talk with them further about chemical and biological warfare limitations.

So I suppose that all of those things tend to improve the atmosphere between the Soviet Union and the United States.

But I don't think anybody should be misled. The mere fact that those talks seem to be going well doesn't necessarily mean other things are going to go well. We would hope that they will, but I think that the invasion of Czechoslovakia demonstrated that point. Just prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, there was a feeling of detente in Europe, that things were going very well between the United States and the Soviet Union—between East and West—and unfortunately, that invasion of Czechoslovakia changed that.

So to summarize, I think that it does tend, slightly to improve the atmosphere, but we shouldn't be euphoric about the fact that we are having talks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of that, the question about Viet-Nam, which may relate to this, has the fact that you have said we are de-escalating in Viet-Nam had an effect on the Soviet attitude toward these talks?

A. Well as I say, I don't know what's had an effect on the Soviet attitude. There's no way of knowing for sure. I can speculate, but I don't think my speculation is worth any more than anyone else's.

Q. Thank you.

Q. You could try, sir. [Laughter.]

A. Well, I would rather read about it. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect the United States and the Soviet Union to enter these preliminary discussions with formal, substantive proposals on the 17th of November?

A. Well, I wouldn't think that we would start out that way, no. As I say, I think these talks will be exploratory.

I don't rule out, as Mr. Roberts asked, whether we rule out any discussion of substantive matters.

The answer to that is no.

But I wouldn't think that would be the way the discussions would start.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any indication of what the Soviet position will be in terms of willingness, or lack of willingness, to agree to things like a MIRV moratorium, or some agreements on ABM?

A. No.

Q. Thank you, sir.

COAL DUST CAN BE SHARPLY REDUCED

(Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia. Mr. Speaker, it is now possible, feasible, technologically, and economically within reason to make a drastic reduction in the amount of coal dust at the working face of a coal mine. This fact is very dramatically illustrated in the Bureau of Mines Technical Progress Report entitled "Studies on the Control of Respirable Coal Mine Dust by Ventilation," to which I referred earlier today on the floor.

The substance of this report reveals the results of cooperative tests with industry in five bituminous coal mines. In a release dated October 28, the Bureau of Mines states that "improved ventilating methods were used to reduce the concentration of respirable dust, the cause of 'black lung' disease." A high-pressure auxiliary fan in ventilating the working face resulted in a very marked reduction in the coal dust level after careful tests. At an early date, I shall make available the backup statistical data on which this report was based.

I believe this report has great significance in relation to our debate over the proper dust standard to be included in the pending coal mine health and safety legislation. It is highly unfortunate that certain unidentifiable sources within the Nixon administration felt that this report should be suppressed instead of made publicly available. Only after I sent a telegram to the President late Monday urging that he direct the Department of Interior to spring loose this report did it see the light of day. I would certainly hope, Mr. Speaker, that the administration would be more active in the future in suppressing coal dust rather than suppressing reports.

The text of this report is so significant that it should be available for the consideration of all Members. It follows:

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[Bureau of Mines Mineral Industry Health Program, Technical Progress Report 19, October 1969]

STUDIES ON THE CONTROL OF RESPIRABLE COAL MINE DUST BY VENTILATION

(By D. S. Kingery,¹ H. N. Doyle,² E. J. Harris,³ M. Jacobson,⁴ R. G. Peluso,⁵ J. B. Shutack,⁶ and D. P. Schlick⁷)

[Figures and illustrations referred to in text cannot be reproduced in the Record]

ABSTRACT

Experiments initiated by the Bureau of Mines on August 26, 1969, and recent work of others, have demonstrated the effectiveness of ventilation for controlling concentrations of respirable coal mine dust. Substantial reductions in dust concentrations have been attained by increasing the volume and rate of air movement across the face and by controlling the airflow pattern.

Ventilation experiments conducted by the Bureau using high-pressure fans as auxiliary ventilation units showed that face-generated dust could be effectively controlled in five mines employing continuous mining machines. Additional data was obtained on industry installations in two mines using similar ventilation systems. By maintaining an airflow approaching 100 fpm across the entry, the experimental system reduced the concentration of respirable dust by factors as great as 6.4. In all mines where the system was used the face-generated dust concentrations were reduced to below 3 mg/m³. Total respirable dust in two cases was above the 3 mg/m³ value because of the dust content of the intake air. In some mines, depending upon the type of coal being mined and other dust control factors in use, it was possible to obtain concentrations of less than 2 mg/m³.

Although the technology for the application of the dust control system investigated is readily available, it is evident that additional engineering studies should be made in each mine where the system is to be applied.

Conditions in some mines may require a modification of the system. On the basis of the Bureau's experience to date, further studies will be made so that the various engineering parameters encountered in underground coal mining can be evaluated.

CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions can be made from this investigation:

1. Controlled face ventilation employing a high-pressure auxiliary fan together with other components of the system will substantially reduce the concentration of respirable coal dust at the working face of underground coal mines. By maintaining an airflow from 70 to 100 fpm across the entry, results showed in all instances that the average respirable dust concentration at the continuous miner was reduced to less than 3 mg/m³. Total respirable dust in two cases was above the 3 mg/m³ value because of the dust content of the intake air. In some instances, however, respirable dust concentrations were reduced to less than 2 mg/m³.

2. Through proper engineering design of the auxiliary and main ventilating system

of the mine, the hazard due to methane will also be reduced.

3. Because of the effects of concentrations of respirable dust in the incoming air the system investigated, by itself, is not a complete solution to the respirable dust problem. For the system to be totally effective, dust controls must be applied at dust generating points in the incoming air passageways.

INTRODUCTION

Pneumoconiosis, a respiratory disease which is caused by inhaling fine particles of coal mine dust, is recognized as a major occupational health problem in underground bituminous-coal mines. Consequently, the Bureau of Mines has launched a major effort to find ways for controlling respirable coal mine dust. Studies by the Bureau and other mining research agencies have indicated that the efficient use of water and ventilation represent the fundamental approaches to effective dust control. Although water sprays on mining machines have beneficial effect as a suppression measure for total airborne dust, current spray techniques have little effect on dust in the respirable range.

Calculations based on the theory of small particle behavior and air motion indicated to Bureau investigators that an airflow of between 70 and 100 fpm across the entry should result in significantly lower dust concentrations.

After analyzing engineering studies by the Bureau of Mines and the industry, it became apparent that a method for achieving the desired entry velocity was by using a high-pressure auxiliary fan and by maintaining the end of the exhaust tubing about 5 feet from the face. This assertion was supported by the following concepts:

1. Adequate airflow at the face confines coal mine dust generated ahead of the operator and captures dust particles. Dust can then be transported by the system and discharged into the return entry, where it can be treated or collected.

2. Previous studies conducted by the Bureau demonstrated the effectiveness of ventilation for the control of methane released at the working face. Similar techniques could be effective for dust control.

METHOD OF INVESTIGATION

The Bureau's investigation was centered upon the use of an auxiliary high-pressure axial-flow direct-driven fan with variable pitch blades. The original estimated power requirements were from 20 to 40 hp. An approved fan with such requirements was not available and could not be quickly supplied by a manufacturer. Therefore, two fans, operating in parallel, each with horsepower sufficient to produce 5,000 cfm, and a fan with a 10-hp motor capable of producing 9,900 cfm, were used in the first experiment. This series was conducted in a mine where coal was being extracted by a continuous miner, from the Pittsburgh coalbed, averaging about 6 feet in height.

Although favorable results were obtained in this initial study, the fans used could not produce the desired entry velocities originally specified by Bureau engineers. A second study was conducted using a 60-hp auxiliary fan from the Bureau's experimental mine in order to obtain higher entry velocities. Because of the fan's size and power requirement, it could only be used in mines capable of accommodating it. In the second mine studied, coal was extracted with a continuous miner from the Sewickley coalbed averaging 50 to 54 inches in height. Subsequent studies were conducted in mines in the Pocahontas No. 3 and No. 4, and Illinois No. 6 coalbeds.

Dust measurements were made according to standard Bureau procedures. For the purpose of this report, samples collected with an MRE instrument contained in the instrument package mounted on the continuous

miner were used as a basis for comparison. It would have been desirable to use a personal sampler on the machine operator as the reference point. However, in some mines studied, the machine operators performed multiple tasks, requiring several different operators for each machine on a given shift. Therefore, the operator's exposure could not be used for obtaining representative data. Baseline studies of respirable dust concentrations were made wherever possible in the Bureau's studies, to establish the effectiveness of the ventilation system being tested. Figure 1 illustrates the system used throughout this investigation.

VENTILATION THEORY^{8,9}

Following the introduction of continuous mining equipment to the bituminous coalfields, increased production rates and rapid face advance led to increased frequency of methane ignitions from improper or poor face ventilation. As a part of a program to reduce this hazard, the Bureau of Mines obtained information relative to airflow patterns developed in the immediate face area by various combinations of ventilation methods and devices. Following these studies basic systems of air control were devised for dilution and removal of methane face emissions without accumulations of high concentrations in the occupied face region. Methane control and dilution was in all cases achieved by planned air circulation.

Although continuing progress has been made in face ventilation techniques, dust loading in the face atmosphere clearly indicates that ventilation systems now used are often inadequate to maintain respirable dust concentrations within acceptable limits.

Settling rates of airborne particulates less than 10 microns in diameter show that dust in the respirable size range may be transported for great distances by air currents. Because respirable dust generated at the face is transported by the air stream, ventilation techniques originally designed to control distribution and accumulation of methane face emissions can be used to confine, capture, and remove airborne dust produced at the face.

The theory for the control of coal mine dust is that dust particles smaller in size than 10 microns tend to behave in the same manner as a gaseous contaminant such as methane. Thus, the control of respirable dust is a function of the volume and velocity of air moving across the coal face. Another requirement is to maintain the zone of contaminated air as close to the face as possible to minimize the exposure of face workers.

Bureau studies on methane control methods have revealed definitive airflow patterns. These patterns are shown in figures 2 and 3. At the start of the investigation, information given on figure 2 was used to determine that exhausting air from the face in sufficient volume to assure a sustained velocity approaching 100 fpm across the entry, would result in minimizing the concentration of respirable dust. Diagrams shown on figure 3 established the need for maintaining the tubing within 5 feet of the coal face.

Experiments performed at the Bureau's experimental coal mine related horsepower requirements to air velocity and air volume under a variety of operating conditions as shown in figure 4.

From the data incorporated in figure 4 it was estimated that for entries having a 56 sq. feet area, a 15-hp, high-pressure, auxil-

⁸ Luxner, James V. Face Ventilation in Underground Bituminous Coal Mines—Airflow and methane distribution patterns in immediate face area—line brattice. BuMines Rept. of Inv. 7223, 1969, 16 pp.

⁹ Dalzell, R. W. Face Ventilation by Line Brattice and by Auxiliary Fans. Oral presentation at the National Safety Council, Chicago, Illinois, October 27-30, 1969.

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Because the Marshfield Clinic and St. Joseph's Hospital are so impressive, I was particularly eager to bring the nation's top health officer, Bob Finch, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, here today so that he might get a first-hand look at these facilities and hear the success story directly from those responsible for its operation. I wanted him to see that what I've been telling him about the Clinic is not an inflated claim of a hometown booster.

Bob Finch and I are here because we feel deeply the urgency of the problem of improving health care throughout the nation. Despite the miraculous advances that have been made in conquering disease, despite the fact that Americans enjoy a higher standard of medical care than the people of any other nation in the world, the nation faces serious problems in the field of health—particularly in the delivery of health services to people.

One of the greatest bottlenecks is the shortage of skilled personnel. There are not enough doctors, nurses, and other trained personnel to take care of today's needs, and the outlook for tomorrow is grimmer.

I feel the Defense Department can make an important contribution toward easing this problem. Some 30-35,000 military personnel who are qualified medical technicians or technologists—trained and experienced during their period of military services—re-enter civilian life each year. They include a vast galaxy of talent in 40 different skill categories as varied as a radio-isotope technician to a renal dialysis technician. By bringing together in some way these trained men and the jobs in civilian life in the field of health services for which they are qualified, I believe we can help to improve health care and avoid a waste of skill and training.

Consequently, I have directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Roger Kelley, to develop a plan that will maximize the opportunities to utilize in civilian life the valuable medical skills possessed by many servicemen. I can assure you that we will move promptly to devise and implement this plan.

This is but one of several steps which the Defense Department is taking to make more widely available the special know-how that it possesses in the field of health care. We have a study under way called the New Generation of Military Hospitals which is designed to improve service and reduce cost in the operation of such institutions. The results of this study will, I believe, have an important impact on hospitals of the future, civilian as well as military, leading to better health facilities in the future for the entire nation.

We also plan to draw upon our battlefield experience in the use of helicopters for the speedy evacuation of the wounded to places where care is available. By use of the helicopter we have saved many from death and from disability in Vietnam. The same means of swift transfer of accident victims from the scene of the accident to medical facilities can reduce the accident toll here at home.

If present trends continue, more than 56,000 Americans are expected to be killed and two million to be injured on our highways this year. In remote and rural areas, the death rate is four times greater than in urban areas because of delay in administering emergency medical treatment and transporting victims to medical facilities. According to one authority, at least 25 per cent of the 170,000 Americans who will suffer permanent disability this year in highway accidents could escape disability if they had proper care shortly after their accidents.

In order to reduce the frightful toll of death and disability on the highway, we in the Department of Defense have joined with Bob Finch's Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and other Federal agencies to form a committee that is now studying means of making the helicopter a flying ambulance here at home as it is in Vietnam. We

have great hopes for the potential benefits we can obtain from applying what we have learned in Vietnam to the medical emergency we face here at home.

Speaking of home, it is good to be back in Marshfield again. I congratulate all associated with the Marshfield Clinic and St. Joseph's Hospital for what you have accomplished. I shall continue to watch—and encourage—your progress in the important work you are doing.

REMARKS OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MELVIN R. LAIRD BEFORE THE DEDICATION OF THE MARATHON COUNTY WORKSHOP FOR THE HANDICAPPED, WAUSAU, WIS.

Those of us who have watched the growth of the Marathon County Workshop for the Handicapped since its beginnings five years ago have reason for special pride and satisfaction today.

Five years ago the only home the Workshop had from which to operate was a station wagon. Today we dedicate a building of 16,000 square feet as the new home in which the greatly expanded activities of the Workshop are to be carried on.

The Marathon County Workshop for the Handicapped has indeed come of age.

Physical facilities that men use for their activities take on a symbolic character. They become symbols of the qualities of mind and heart evidenced in the activities which take place within their walls.

This building which we dedicate will be a symbol of compassion, generosity, love, hope, and determination. For these are the qualities that will fill this structure as it is used as a place to learn and to work.

This building also symbolizes a great American tradition—the tradition of voluntary private action at the local level to help our neighbors. There is Federal money in these facilities—and I was happy to have been able to play some part as a member of Congress in securing the Federal funds that were made available to provide this new home for the Workshop. But what particularly pleases me is that today's dedication is one of the many concrete results of an amendment I was able to attach to an Appropriations bill back in 1964 which permitted private donations to be mingled with State funds in making up the State's share of the program. Two-thirds of the money that made this building possible was privately subscribed. That is a gratifying statistic to me because many people back in 1964 felt that the Laird Amendment would not produce the kind of results that I am proud today to see embodied in the Marathon County Workshop for the Handicapped. This Workshop was conceived, developed, and is being operated by private individuals, supported voluntarily by the people of this County acting in the American spirit of neighborliness.

One of the things that President Nixon is trying to encourage and expand is problem-solving by voluntary action at the local level. The Workshop is an example of this type of activity. We did not wait for Washington to get around to providing this facility for us. We did not leave the planning or its execution to an agency of the Federal Government. We who live in this section of Wisconsin saw some of our neighbors in need of help, and we acted to provide this help.

The great social and economic problems which plague our Nation will not be solved by Government alone. They will be solved only if the kind of privately-initiated and privately-directed cooperative effort on the local level, represented by the Marathon County Workshop for the Handicapped, is duplicated, magnified, and intensified from one end of the Nation to the other.

I want to pay tribute to Peter DeSantis and to all others who have made the Workshop the success it has become. I need not recount this success story in detail, but let

me mention a fact that gives one measure of the Workshop's accomplishments. This Workshop has been the entrance chamber to productive lives for 160 people so far. The earning power of these people has increased from zero to \$500,000. There is no adequate measure of the gain in confidence, satisfaction, and self-respect that this transformation has brought to these individuals.

The past accomplishments of the Workshop are, I am sure, going to be exceeded year after year. As we dedicate this building, we wish for all who deserve credit for bringing the Workshop from infancy to maturity long years of fruitful service in the future.

EUROPEANS VIEW SALT TALKS

(Mr. FINDLEY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, our allies in Western Europe are not the least bit nervous over the strategic arms limitations talks scheduled to begin November 17 in Helsinki. They seem to be thoroughly confident their interests will be protected fully by U.S. negotiators.

The relaxed attitude was very evident during the just concluded sessions in Brussels of the North Atlantic Assembly, and it was in marked contrast with concern I had noted in sessions in earlier years.

For the first time German, Italian, and French parliamentarians seemed to be completely at ease discussing privately the forthcoming talks. In earlier years they had shown anxiety about the course of bilateral talks between the super powers. This was especially evident in the comments of German delegates who said they felt their government had not been treated with proper consideration during the negotiations by the Johnson administration leading to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Italian, French, and British delegates had expressed similar concern.

In the North Atlantic Assembly just concluded a new confidence was clearly present. In my view this restoration of European confidence in U.S. negotiators stands as a significant achievement of the Nixon administration. It results from two main factors:

First. A series of NATO-wide private consultations held earlier this year in Brussels in preparation for the SALT talks. Our allies were impressed with the thoroughness and candor of the three-part series of day-long discussions which were spaced over a period of several weeks.

This was a marked change from the SALT talk consultation plans made by the Johnson administration. I learned in Brussels that only a single 3-hour discussion had been tentatively scheduled.

Second. The caution with which the Nixon administration has discussed both publicly and privately the prospect of SALT talks. The rhetoric has been restrained with notes of optimism carefully balanced with caution.

These factors give substance the pledge President Nixon made during his February trip to Europe, during which he promised close consultation with our NATO allies on all matters vital to European security.

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tee—SMC. SMC is the student counterpart of the New Mobilization Committee Against the War in Vietnam—MOBE. The New Mobilization Committee has substantially the same membership as the old mobilization committee which was headed by Dellinger, Hayden, and Davis. As would be expected, SMC is represented on the steering committee of MOBE in at least two instances. And it has apparently begun to fill the political vacuum on college and high school campuses this year left by the factional breakup of the Students for a Democratic Society.

An article entitled "Student Group Backs All War Protests" which appeared on page A-8 of the "Washington Post" of October 21, 1969, contained comments of SMC Executive Secretary Carol Lipman who estimated that more than 1,500 SMC chapters have already been established on campuses in all 50 States. According to this article, Lynn Glixon, SMC regional organizer, stated that SMC chapters are active on most of the major college campuses and at 45 high schools and junior high schools in the Washington, D.C. area. She further stated that organization has begun even in elementary schools and specifically mentioned that a SMC chapter is in the process of being formed at the Ben W. Church Elementary School in the District of Columbia.

The SMC has called for a "national student strike" on November 14, 1969, to "show there is massive student solidarity against the war." This action is planned as a buildup to a major antiwar demonstration planned for November 15, 1969, in Washington, D.C. Local colleges, universities, and high schools are being subjected to organizing campaigns and some school administrators have even provided time and space for meetings. These campaigns are centered on "freedom of speech and expression" and sold as an extension of the "public discontent" with the policies of the present administration toward the war in Vietnam.

Many students and their parents question the activities and motives of the SMC but find it difficult to combat the glib assertions of the organizers. Perhaps a look at the background of some of the principal SMC activists appearing locally would prove helpful. Carol Lipman and Danny Rosenshine from New York City and Don Gurewitz from Cleveland are presently in the Washington, D.C., area specifically to organize SMC activities.

Carol Lipman is national executive secretary of the SMC, which has its national headquarters in New York City. Local offices are maintained at 1029 Vermont Avenue NW. During 1968 she served as editor of *Young Socialist*, a monthly publication of the Young Socialist Alliance—YSA. The YSA is the youth affiliate of the Socialist Workers Party, a Trotskyist Communist splinter group which has been cited by the Attorney General as subversive. She has worked for YSA in Boston, Chicago, Detroit, and New York City before coming to Washington, D.C. Having held national officer positions with YSA, she would also be a member of the parent Socialist Workers

Party—SWP. She is also a member of the steering committee of MOBE.

Danny Rosenshine has likewise been active for several years with YSA in Detroit, Cleveland, and New York City before coming to Washington, D.C. He presently serves on a full-time basis as YSA national organizer, having previously been national field secretary. He traveled to Cuba in 1960 with a group sponsored by the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. In 1962 he attended the Soviet-dominated eighth World Youth Festival in Helsinki, Finland, and subsequently toured the Soviet Union. In early 1969 he returned from spending several weeks in Cuba. The *Militant*, published by SWP, issue of March 21, 1969, carried an article captioned "Forty Campus Dates Set for Speaker on Cuba," listing speaking engagements arranged for Rosenshine. His speeches predictably praised the Cuban brand of communism as practiced under Fidel Castro and at the same time condemned the U.S. Government. In late 1968 he was on a speaking tour of New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut, also advertised in *The Militant*. His topic at that time was "From Student Revolt to Socialist Revolution."

Don Burewitz grew up in the Washington, D.C., area but has been residing in the Cleveland area attending school in recent years. He has been active in the antiwar movement, served as leader of the SMC in Cleveland, and also participated in the affairs of the YSA and SWP. In addition to serving as a national organizer for the SMC in its recruiting campaign in the Washington area, Gurewitz is also serving on the Washington Action Committee of the New Mobilization Committee To End the War in Vietnam, which is coordinating the demonstration scheduled for November 15, 1969, in Washington, D.C.

All prominent SMC leaders have a similar background of activities and membership in the YSA and SWP.

Lipman, Rosenshine, and Gurewitz have all written articles for *The Militant* and *Young Socialist*. Both Rosenshine and Lipman have served on the editorial board of *Young Socialist*. The September 1969 issue of "Young Socialist" contains a lengthy article entitled "YSA Program for the Campus Revolt," proclaimed a statement of the National Executive Committee of YSA. A poster-type counterfold contains a likeness of "Che" Guevarra and the slogan "Smash Capital Now." Other articles include "Where Is America Going?" by Ernest Mandel, a leading European Trotskyist revolutionary who spoke at dozens of U.S. college campuses on a tour last fall.

The June 27, 1969, issue of "The Militant" contains an article by Charles Bolduc, national chairman, YSA, entitled "Why Revolutionaries Belong in YSA." This article makes the point that YSA supports the Cuban revolution; the struggle for socialist democracy in Eastern Europe; the antiwar movement; the black liberation struggle and the revolutionary nature of revolution for socialism in the United States and other advanced capitalist countries.

The *Militant* regularly carries re-

cruiting ads for YSA under such headings as "Fan the Flames of Discontent—Join YSA."

Consideration of the foregoing development raises several questions. Is SMC promoting political dissent and protest, or revolution? Is the action proposed and organized by SMC an affirmation of the political system of this Nation, or designed to further the aims and objectives of those who would destroy this Nation? Should the activities be condoned as legitimate expression of the attitudes of the youth of this country, or condemned as the workings of a disciplined cadre of revolutionaries seeking to deceive American youth? Is SMC, controlled as it obviously is by YSA, seeking merely to exercise freedom of political expression, or is SMC actually seeking to destroy the political system?

Students, parents, and faculty at our local schools should answer for themselves the above questions before endorsing or countenancing the activities of SMC.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FINDS TIME TO CONCERN HIMSELF WITH HEALTH CARE PROBLEMS

(Mr. MICHEL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, all of us in the Congress are well aware of the tremendous contributions to the concept of improved health care made by Secretary of Defense Laird while he served as the ranking Republican member of the Subcommittee on Appropriations for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

While he has handled the awesome burdens of the Office of Secretary of Defense with the quality of excellence that characterized his service in the Congress, he still somehow finds time to concern himself with health care problems, as evidenced by his remarks on Sunday, October 26, at the Marshfield Clinic in Marshfield, Wis., and on Monday, October 27, at the dedication of the Marathon County Workshop for the Handicapped at Wausau, Wis.

In his address Secretary Laird pointed out that the Department of Defense is formulating a plan for opening up service hospitals to maximize the opportunities to utilize in civilian life the valuable medical skills possessed by many servicemen. He further states that the Department of Defense is cooperating with other agencies to make the helicopter a flying ambulance here in the United States as it is in Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, the texts of Secretary Laird's remarks on these two occasions follow:

REMARKS OF HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AT MARSHFIELD CLINIC, MARSHFIELD, WIS., OCTOBER 26, 1969

We who look on Marshfield as home are proud of this Clinic. Its development to its present size and scope gives eloquent testimony to the devotion and skill of the many people who have labored to make this clinic a medical facility that ranks with the best in the nation.

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Justice REED. You can't get as much from voluntary dollars as you can from dues?

Mr. RAUH. Well, sir, a union man thinks he has paid, when he has paid his dues, he thinks he has paid for bargaining, for legislation, and for political activity. He doesn't feel he should pay a second time for political activity. That is why it is so hard to raise voluntary contributions.

Our constitution and the constitution of all unions set this up as a purpose, political action. When he pays his dues, he has paid for his political action. He may give another dollar or two to some candidate for an office, but he doesn't feel he is going to give another some more money.

We have collected a little, but never anything to do this job of making the public know our views.

Justice FRANKFURTER. Was it only the other day that unions went into politics? For years we had a great leader of labor who thought it was very bad to go into politics for the union.

Mr. RAUH. There was such a leader, sir.

Justice FRANKFURTER. So if you say a hundred years of history, there is a good deal of history the other way.

Mr. RAUH. There has been history the other way, but political life has—there is history back a hundred years. There was a period, as you suggest, when this was the view of some leading labor leaders. So what does the Government suggest that is justified?

It was trying to minimize the influence—these are the Solicitor General's commendable frankness—it was trying to minimize the influence of unions at elections.

APPENDIX D

Justice BLACK. What is the relevancy of the emphasis on the fact that it came out of union dues?

Mr. RAUH. Well, sir, if it came out of voluntary funds then everyone agrees that it is not a violation. There is nothing in the statute that says that.

For example, take COPE, that is the Committee on Political Education of the AFL-CIO. They get voluntary funds paid separately from union dues from a number of members. Everybody agrees that an expenditure or a contribution by COPE is legal. The reason everybody agrees to that is that I think the government is under some misunderstanding about the statute on this point but we agree as to the result.

They think the statute does not apply because COPE is not a labor organization. In my judgment COPE is clearly a labor organization under the statute but it does not apply if Your Honors please because Senator Taft made clear on the floor of the Senate that voluntary funds not part of dues could be used for any purpose and whatever you use the government's interpretation or ours the fact is that there has never been an indictment for voluntary monies—

Justice FRANKFURTER. You don't need Senator Taft's statement to reach that conclusion. If you will just read the statute, any labor organization that makes a contribution—if you are just the conduit of other people's money, then you are not making the contribution.

Mr. RAUH. That would be another interpretation to reach the same answer.

Justice BLACK. Is there any other fact which attempts to regulate the way unions shall spend their dues? I don't quite understand the difference. It sounds as though the theory is that union members are to be protected on how their dues are to be expended.

Mr. RAUH. The government is contending, sir, that that is the justification for this statute, that it is a protection of the minority members of the union.

Justice BLACK. Is there any statute which has attempted to regulate the way the unions must spend its money or dues?

Mr. RAUH. No. When I come to this point I would like to point out that this statute is not directed to the minority but is to take unions out of politics.

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS
LIMITATION TALKS

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, the administration's decision to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on limiting strategic armaments launches the hopes of the world once again on the difficult but redemptive road to peaceful cooperation among men.

President Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers should be commended for acting on their oft-expressed recognition that the United States and the Soviet Union have a mutual interest in restricting the arms race and reordering national priorities. As an observer at the 18-nation disarmament talks in Geneva, however, I became aware of another equally important consideration. Most of the disarmament talks in the past have chiefly affected the smaller nations. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, for example, had little effect on the military capabilities of the great powers, which could test underground; but it virtually precluded advanced nuclear development by lesser powers. Similarly the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in effect was designed to preserve the nuclear oligopoly. It is being signed by other nations at least in part because it also pledges the major powers to negotiate further disarmament among themselves.

I believe nuclear proliferation poses the greatest single threat of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. The great powers have their nuclear forces under effective control; they are experienced in dealing with nuclear technology. But the primitive nuclear contrivances of small countries could become a new and unpredictable catalyst of incalculable dangers.

Yet the nuclear powers cannot expect the nonnuclear countries to accept permanent nuclear privation in the face of great power determination to steadily expand their nuclear capability. The fact is that unless the great powers move to end the arms race the lesser powers will move to join it. This Damoclean reality will overshadow all the talk in Helsinki.

So I can only urge the administration to act with the greatest sense of urgency. I would, however, at the same time offer a warning. Though the talks are urgent, they will be frustrating; and though agreement is imperative, it will not end the arms race unless it is accompanied by prudent strategic policies on the part of both great powers. For no treaty can be devised that can anticipate the advance of technology and channel it into

peaceful uses. In the end, the arms race will be disciplined not because both sides sign a piece of paper but because both sides have previously decided they have no interest in reopening the competition at a higher and more dangerous level.

We should understand that the present high level of defense spending—and the resulting disorder of our national priorities—is not caused only by our past failures to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union. The largest surge in U.S. strategic spending—the surge that precipitated the current Soviet increases came at the very time that the Test Ban Treaty was negotiated those who might normally have opposed the enormous unilateral expansion of our forces after Eisenhower's year of sensible restraint were completely diverted by the test ban.

Thus the importance of the treaty was exaggerated and led to the spirit of euphoria that was so rudely interrupted by the Cuban missile crisis. Meanwhile, our defense spending soared; the balance maintained by Eisenhower was upset; and the Russians massively responded with spending of their own. That is our position today. We should understand it clearly.

I celebrate the new negotiations—the SALT talks. I praise the administration's decision and particularly the effective role of the Secretary of State in achieving it. But we should understand that the success or failure of the negotiations will be decided not in Helsinki or Geneva but in Washington and in the Pentagon and on the floor of the Congress where new systems will be debated. It will depend on all our foreign and defense policies and on our resolution in the international quest for peace. It will take more than a paper curtain to hem in the holocaust.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY DELEGATION OF JAPANESE GOVERNORS AND VICE GOVERNORS

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, it is my pleasure today to announce the visit in the Capital City of this great country of ours a delegation of Japanese Governors and Vice Governors.

As Members of the Senate are aware, we have a Japanese-American Governors' Conference which has been going on since 1961, I believe. Over that period of time several delegations of American Governors have visited our very friendly neighbor Japan, where we have had joint conferences and discussed mutual problems that exist within both of our very friendly nations.

It was my honor in 1965, as Governor of the great State of Iowa, to be a member of the International Governors' Conference held in Tokyo that year. As a

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result we visited a number of the prefectures in the nation of Japan. In 1966 I had the pleasure of taking an Iowa trade mission to the great nation of Japan for the purpose of negotiating and discussing possible trade potentials between the nation of Japan and my State of Iowa.

I would like to call to the attention of Members of the Senate that my State of Iowa has a sister-State relationship with the prefecture of Yamashiro, Japan; and there is a sister-city relationship between the capital city of Des Moines, Iowa, and the capital city of Kofu.

Many Members of the Senate are former Governors of their States. As I look around the Chamber, I see that a vast majority of Senators now present were Governors of their States.

They have, in the proceedings of those years, as Governors of their States, participated in the ongoing conference between our two great nations. The conference in 1967 happened to be conducted in the capital city of my State, Des Moines, and was a beneficial and fulfilling conference for both countries.

I might add, in the conference this year, our former colleagues in Japan visited a number of American States, beginning in Hawaii, and then coming to California. I know they visited Nebraska and South Carolina. They held this year's annual conference in the city of Cincinnati in the great State of Ohio.

Mr. President, there are visiting in this country today eight Governors and Vice Governors and some of their ladies. We have been pleased to have the opportunity to host them today at a luncheon at which the Japanese Ambassador, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and many Senators and Representatives have had the opportunity for friendly and neighborly discussions between the Japanese Governors and ourselves.

I merely want to announce that this ongoing relationship between our two great nations has cemented our friendship further, as it has assisted us in the past. From this level of political leadership, many times surfaces much of the national leadership of both of our two great nations and has resulted in friendly relations being established on a personal basis between the Governors of the prefectures in Japan and the Governors of the United States.

We have many ongoing and continuing friendly relationships that enable us not only in private and business generally, but in public affairs, further to cement the warmth and understanding between our two great nations.

I merely wanted to call to the attention of Members of the Senate that this delegation of visitors from Japan is among us, that they are among us in the Capital City of Washington today, and that we are deeply grateful to have the opportunity once again to be their host and bid them officially welcome to the United States of America and to hope that this relationship will continue in the years ahead.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-

sent to have printed in the RECORD the names of the members of the traveling party of Japanese Governors now visiting the United States.

There being no objection, the names were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MEMBERS OF TRAVELING PARTY, VISIT OF GOVERNORS OF JAPAN TO UNITED STATES, OCTOBER 1969

Japanese Governors and Vice Governors (by order of precedence), and prefecture: Governor Ryoze Okuda (Vice President of the National Governors' Association and Leader of the Delegation), Nara.

Governor Shunkichi Takeuchi, Aomori.
Governor Satoru Tanaka and daughter, Masae, Mie.

Governor Gonichiro Nishizawa, Nagano.
Governor Saburo Kanemaru and wife, Sakae, Kagoshima.

Vice Governor Shigehichi Iwase, Aichi.
Vice Governor Tadashi Nakamura, Iwate.
Vice Governor Masaru Taki, Oita.

Aides to Japanese Governors: Mr. Ryoji Izuchi, Deputy Executive Secretary of National Governors' Association; Mr. Masakichi Ogawa, Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of National Governors' Association.

News Media: Mr. Takeshi Tagomori, Jijit-sushin Press.

United States Department of State: Mr. Yukio Kawamoto, Escort Officer; Mr. Paul Tamura, Aide; Mrs. Paul Tamura, Aide.

National Governors' Conference: Mr. Brevard Crisfield, Secretary-Treasurer; Mr. Gene Minogue, Travel Consultant; Miss Lois Murphy, Assistant to Mr. Crisfield.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, in conclusion, let me say that in the intervening years since the beginning of the Japanese-American Governors' Conference, as delegations of Governors have visited back and forth across the Pacific Ocean almost every year since the conferences began, we have had the opportunity to discuss issues such as juvenile delinquency in our respective countries, land recovery in our respective countries, air and water pollution, economic problems in our respective countries, as well as trade relationships between Japan and the United States.

I believe that such discussions are needed all over the face of the earth. This particular conference can serve as an example of what can be accomplished between two great nations, if we merely set about on a personal relationship basis between the executives of our States and the prefectures in Japan, as well as the congressional bodies of our two great countries, further continuing the warmth and sympathetic understanding of two great peoples—Japan and the United States of America.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I move, under the order previously entered, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 2 o'clock and 26 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, October 28, 1969, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate—October 27, 1969:

IN THE COAST GUARD

The following named regular officers of the Coast Guard for promotion to the grade of Lieutenant (junior grade):

David A. Potter	George R. Perreault
Fred L. Ames	Ronald S. Matthew
Walter F. Malec, Jr.	Stephen R. Welch
William R. Hodges, Jr.	Ernest R. Riutta
Normal V. Scurria, Jr.	Edmund I. Kiley
Glenn J. Pruksma	John A. Magiera
Thomas H. Jenkins	Peter M. A. Tennis
Larry V. Grant	James W. Miles
Richard W. Schneider	Glendon L. Moyer
James T. Ingham	James L. Hested
Larry J. Olson	Paul N. Fanolis
Richard J. Asaro	Edward C. Karnis
Terry R. Fondow	John K. Kastorf, Jr.
Normal C. Edwards	George H. Mercier
Nicholas Stramandi	Richard L. Maguire
Victor P. Primeaux	Walter R. Guest
Michael J. Edwards	James C. Haedt
Joseph F. Olivo, Jr.	Phillip J. Stager
John T. Tozzi	James A. Smith
Frank J. Scraglino	Juan T. Salas
Joseph E. Casaday	Thomas E. Thompson
John H. Legwin, III	Paul Ibsen
Dennis P. Purves	Ronald L. Edmiston
Mont J. Smith	Paul V. Gorman, Jr.
Arthur W. McGrath, Jr.	Robert B. Bower
Alexander T. T. Polasky	John D. McDevitt
Kenneth B. Allen	Richard R. Clark
Richard B. Meyer	James C. Clow
Ralph W. Brown, Jr.	Douglas A. Macadam
Michael E. Towcimak	Stephen L. Swann
Ronald F. Schafer	Floyd W. Thomas
James G. Soland	Victor E. Hipkiss
Stanley M. Phillips	Robert P. Bender
Fredrick V. Minson	Richard L. Swomley
John A. Bastek	Robert B. Vanasse
Robert J. Lachowicz	Arthur F. Shires
William F. Mueller	Michael F. Herman
Kenneth J. McPartlin	Kenneth R. Riordan
John J. Mulligan, Jr.	Stanley C. Brobeck, Jr.
Leighton T. Anderson	Kevin V. Feeney
Peter A. Poerschke	Dennis M. Majerski
William C. Hain III	Peter D. Lish
James M. MacDonald	Lonnie E. Stevenson
John R. Taylor	Edward C. Cooke
Daniel J. Schatte	Christopher F. John
Larry E. Parkin	Ronnie L. Sharp
Gregory T. Wilson	Ronald P. Hough
Brian P. M. Kelly	Joel E. Karr
Dennis L. Bryant	William J. Theroux
Thomas S. Johnson, III	Graham J. Chynoweth
Ronald K. Losch	Robert E. Gronberg
Clifton K. Vogelsberg, Jr.	Dennis R. Erlandson
James T. Paskewich	Roger D. Mowery
William E. Johaneck	Anthony H. Schieck
David L. Powell	Jeffrey S. Wagner
Stephen J. Delaney	Daniel A. Gary
Daniel B. McKinley	Mark J. Costello
John R. Ryland	James L. Lambert
Theodore J. Sampson	Frank P. Murray
Thomas H. Collins	Roy C. Samuelson, Jr.
Richard W. Hauschildt	Roger B. Streeter
	Dennis L. McCord
	Richard L. Cashdollar

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in Democratic times, or because they had offended Senators, or because in other offices they had followed objectionable policies. No one could read the record without concluding that Senators in those days felt quite free to make their own appraisal of any man chosen to say the last word in our constitutional system.

Today, most Senators would be more sophisticated and more restrained in the use of their confirmation power. Ironic exceptions are Senators Thurmond of South Carolina and Eastland of Mississippi, two of Judge Haynsworth's principal backers, who have not hesitated to oppose anyone suspected of liberal tendencies. They voted against the only three nominees to the Warren Court who were put to a record vote in the Senate, Justices Harlan, Stewart and Marshall.

The question for most members of the Senate in 1969 is not one dimensional. For example, the fact that a nominee is a so-called strict constructionist in constitutional matters would not necessarily make Senators of a different outlook oppose him; it is easy to think of judicial conservatives whose high intellectual qualifications would have smothered the thought of opposition on philosophical grounds.

The point about Judge Haynsworth is that he does not have such high intellectual or legal qualifications. Few would call it a distinguished appointment.

POLICY AND ETHICS

Along with that basic ground for opposition are doubts about policy and ethics. Those who feel the doubts might say that Judge Haynsworth is a man from a narrow background who has not altogether surmounted it in his view of life and the law, and that in his commercial dealings while on the bench he has at best shown insensitivity to the appearance demanded of judges.

In short, the argument against Clement Haynsworth is not that he is an evil man, or a corrupt one, or one consciously biased. It is that he is an inadequate man for a lifetime position of immense power and responsibility in our structure of government. And any Senator who reaches that conclusion is quite entitled, in precedent and in reason, to oppose his confirmation.

Salt Gile

SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS IS OUR HOPE, SAYS SENATOR RANDOLPH

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, it is encouraging news that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to conduct preliminary discussions on the subject of strategic arms limitations.

No purpose is served by discussing the long delay in coming to this important decision, but there is no doubt in my mind that it has taken much too long. During the period prior to the agreement to begin preliminary talks, one could be excused for wondering if world powers did not understand the horrifying nature of the nuclear arms race.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur—a man associated with war who probably witnessed the development of armaments as intimately as any person of our century—stated realistically and eloquently the case for nuclear arms limitations:

Electronics and other processes of science have raised the destructive potential to encompass millions. And with restless hands we work feverishly in dark laboratories to find the means to destroy all at one blow... Global war has become a Frankenstein to

destroy both sides. No longer is it a weapon of adventure—the shortcut to international power. If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it pass even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.

That our task in the development of substantive arms control talks is only beginning is understood. I think most of our leaders and the people generally of this Nation fully realize this. We harbor no false hope—no illusions—no euphoric optimism—that firm agreements will be consummated in a day or a week or a month. The task of negotiating effective and acceptable limitations on the development of strategic weapons will be arduous and frustrating. But we must have hope and, I emphasize, we must relentlessly strive to achieve this objective.

It is a frightening mistake to view our agreements for talks with Russia as merely another attempt to control the ever-expanding arsenal of nuclear weapons. This endeavor is possibly the most critical undertaking in the history of our Nation and of the world. The final outcome will determine whether the United States and the Soviet Union will be cast into the depressing role of spending more billions of dollars in the future on nuclear weapons; whether our world will be confronted with the stark prospect of nuclear weapons proliferation; whether we will be sentenced to the terrible uncertainty of possible nuclear holocaust; and whether civilization as we know it will live or die.

Mr. President, as a cosponsor of the resolution expressing the need for a mutual halt to the testing of the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle—MIRV—I am convinced that this weapons system which possesses destructive capabilities defying imagination must be a critical element in our discussions with Russia. The reports that this will be a focus in the first stages of preliminary talks are encouraging. Control of the development of MIRV must be pressed with a sense of urgency. To accept the proposition that development of MIRV is inevitable does violent damage to the prospects for meaningful negotiations.

Further, I caution—as I have in the past—against falling into the historical pattern of arms control negotiations. It is imperative that the negotiators chart a course away from the timeworn concept of “negotiating from a position of strength.” Used by both sides, “negotiating from a position of strength” creates a vicious circle. Every party to a discussion adopting this policy would be expected to continue to escalate armaments to strengthen its position. There is no end to this. On the other hand it does not follow that any country should engage in unilateral disarmament. The United States will not do this—neither will Russia. But it does mean that the time has come to question the assumption that nations are adding to defense and security by increasing more and more the nuclear stockpiles which already contain an overkill capacity.

Our negotiators are able. Their mission is awesome. We share the hope and offer a prayer for their progress.

ONE YEAR OF THE BOMBING HALT

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, tomorrow, October 31, marks the first anniversary of the total cessation of bombing of North Vietnam.

On the occasion of this anniversary, it might be useful to reexamine the arguments that finally induced President Johnson, despite grave personal misgivings, to call off the bombing of the north. And it might be useful as well to take a hard look at the record of negotiations since we made this major concession, for the purpose of deciding whether this decision made a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam war more likely or less likely.

The total cessation came about in two stages.

On March 31, 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced the suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam, except for a limited area immediately above the DMZ.

This action was taken in response to the growing clamor in this country that we stop the bombing of North Vietnam because only in this way could Hanoi be induced to negotiate a reasonable settlement of the Vietnam war.

It is true that Hanoi did come to the conference table. But there has not been a single iota of evidence to bear out the contention that such a concession on our part would induce Hanoi to negotiate in good faith. On the contrary, the record is clear that Hanoi only hardened its stance subsequent to the partial suspension of bombing in March of last year. Even the major curtailment of our bombing of North Vietnam was rejected as trickery.

During the 1968 presidential campaign, the same critics of American policy in Vietnam again raised their voices, this time to demand the total cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. Such a concession on our part, they assured us, would lead to peace.

There were even some skeptics who went along with the demand for a bombing halt because they felt it was worth giving a try. If the bombing halt did not work, they said, there was nothing to prevent us from resuming the bombing and increasing the military pressure on North Vietnam.

In yielding to this clamor and announcing the total cessation of bombing on October 31, 1968, President Johnson once again called upon Hanoi to engage in serious negotiations.

Once again the Communists responded as they have always responded, and as they will always respond to every show of weakness or conciliation.

Instead of becoming more reasonable, they became more intransigent than ever before.

It is interesting to note in this connection that the Communists seem to have foreknowledge of the fact that internal political pressures in this country would compel the Johnson administration, despite its private statements, to agree to the total cessation of bombing without any reciprocal concession from the Communists side.

There is in the files of American intelligence a captured Communist document dated just prior to the bombing

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antilabor or insufficiently receptive to the civil rights cause. Others regard his judicial record as that of a mediocre, even careless, man. Still others feel he has devoted more than a judicious share of his time and efforts to personal business.

Many others, however, strongly back his nomination.

Almost all the Senators with these objections are focusing their public statements on the ethical matters, sidestepping the troublesome question of whether the Senate has the right to disapprove a Presidential nominee just because it disagrees with his political philosophy.

The statutory standard that the Senate must apply to the various questions about Judge Haynsworth is this: "Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in which he has a substantial interest . . . or is so related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it improper in his opinion, for him to sit."

Judge Haynsworth's opponents have cited at least eight canons of ethics that they believe the South Carolinian has violated. The principal ones are these:

Canon 4: "A judge's official conduct should be free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety . . . and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in his performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach."

Canon 13: "A judge . . . should not suffer his conduct to justify the impression that any person can improperly influence him or unduly enjoy his favor."

Canon 24: "A judge should not accept inconsistent duties . . . which will in any way interfere or appear to interfere with his devotion to the expeditious and proper administration of his official functions."

Canon 25: "A judge should avoid giving ground for any reasonable suspicion that he is utilizing the powers or prestige of his office to persuade or coerce others to patronize or contribute . . . to the success of private business ventures."

Canon 26: "A judge should abstain from making personal investment in enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in the court."

Canon 29: "A judge should abstain from performing or taking part in any judicial act in which his personal interests are involved."

Canon 33: "He [a judge] should in pending or prospective litigation before him be particularly careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to awaken the suspicion that his . . . business relations . . . constitute an element in influencing his judicial conduct."

THE PUBLIC'S VIEW

The third standard, the public's view of how a judge should behave, cannot be so easily determined. Generally, however, most Senators believe that public pressure dictates that a judge should demonstrate judgment in avoiding any appearance of unethical conduct.

The facts of the three ethical questions that form the core of the Haynsworth case and their interpretation by the judge's supporters and critics are as follows:

Corporate subsidiary questions: In 1967 Judge Haynsworth sat on a case called *Farrow v. Grace Lines, Inc.*, while he held 300 shares of stock in W. R. Grace & Co., the parent corporation of Grace Lines, Inc.

In 1966 the judge sat on a case called *Donohue v. Maryland Casualty Company* while he owned 200 shares of preferred stock and 67 shares of common in American General Insurance Company, of which Maryland Casualty was a subsidiary.

Opponents of Mr. Haynsworth's nomination contend that both these actions represented violations of the statutory ban on a Federal judge sitting "in any case in which he

has a substantial interest" and of Canon 26, on personal investments, and Canon 29, on self-interest.

Judge Haynsworth's supporters maintain that the judge's interest in each instance was not substantial and was not "in the case" but in a corporation not involved directly.

In the *Grace Lines* case, Senator Marlow W. Cook, Republican of Kentucky, argued, if the full claim of \$30,000 against the shipping line had been awarded and assessed against the common stockholders, the value of Judge Haynsworth's interest would have been reduced by 48 cents.

HOLDINGS ESTIMATED

In the Maryland Casualty case, Senator Cook called it "highly doubtful that an adverse judgment would have any significant effect" on Judge Haynsworth's holdings, which he estimated at 0.0059 per cent of the preferred stock and 0.0015 per cent of the common stock.

Litigant business relation questions: In 1950 Mr. Haynsworth was an organizer and founder of the Carolina Vend-A-Matic Company, which was to install automatic vending machines in industrial plants and other sites. His investment was \$2,400, and he became vice president and a director.

When he went on the Federal bench in 1957, Mr. Haynsworth resigned orally as vice president of the company, he now says, but company records show him continuing in that office until 1963. In any event, he remained as a director until 1963.

In September of 1963 he resigned his directorship in Carolina Vend-A-Matic pursuant to a new requirement for Federal judges promulgated by the Judicial Conference. Seven months later, he sold his stock for about \$430,000.

In 1961 and again in 1963 Judge Haynsworth sat on a case called *Darlington Manufacturing Company v. the National Labor Relations Board*. At that time, Carolina Vend-A-Matic had a \$50,000-a-year contract with the Derring-Milliken Corporation, parent company of Darlington. While the litigation was pending, a new \$100,000 contract was signed.

Between 1959 and 1963 Judge Haynsworth sat on five other cases in which one of the two litigants were companies that were doing business with Carolina Vend-A-Matic, with the volume of that business ranging from \$16,000 to \$174,000 a year.

DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE

Critics of Judge Haynsworth contend that he should have disqualified himself from sitting in all these cases, under the Federal statute involving "substantial interest." They also argue that his participation in the decisions and his continued activity in the vending machine business violated all the canons cited above.

Supporters of the judge maintain that he had no duty to disqualify himself in any of these cases because the Vend-A-Matic Company was not itself involved. In fact, they argue, he had a duty to sit.

In the *Darlington* case, the judge's backers say, his personal interest in the business that Vend-A-Matic did with Deering-Milliken was only \$390. In two of the five other cases involving Vend-A-Matic customers, he voted against the customer; in two others, only procedural questions were involved; in the fifth he voted for the customer because the other litigant was guilty of fraud.

Stock holding questions, In 1967 Judge Haynsworth sat on a case called *Brunswick Corporation v. Long*, which involved a dispute over bowling equipment leased by the manufacturer to the operator of an alley.

The case was decided on Nov. 10; on Dec. 26, a month before the decision was to be made public, Judge Haynsworth bought 1,000 shares of Brunswick stock for about \$16,000.

Opponents of Judge Haynsworth say this action was clearly improper under both the

Federal statute and the canons of ethics. The judge admits that it was a mistake, something he would not repeat either on the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.

CASE HELD UNIMPORTANT

But supporters of Judge Haynsworth argue that the Brunswick case is not significant. The most the corporation could have benefited from a favorable decision was \$90,000, and the judge had only bought 1,000 of its 18,480,000 shares. Thus his total maximum profit would have been less than \$5.

Attempting to apply the broad standard of public opinion to all these cases, the Haynsworth critics, led by Senator Birch Bayh, Democrat of Indiana, maintain that, collectively they reveal a man not as sensitive to the necessity of maintaining the appearance, as well as the fact, of incorruptibility as a Justice of the Supreme Court should be.

Senator Cook and his allies disagree. "If we now analyze these cases upon which Senator Bayh relies in terms of these common-sense principles," Mr. Cook said on the floor last week, "I do not think that anyone can seriously doubt that Judge Haynsworth must be given a clean bill of health."

"He not only was not in fact influenced by any personal interest in deciding the cases, but no reasonable person could think that he was influenced by such interest."

[From the New York Times, Oct. 19, 1969]

THE SENATE AND THE SUPREME COURT

(By Anthony Lewis)

WASHINGTON.—In their irritation at the opponents of Clement Haynsworth, some Administration officials are now saying that the issue in the confirmation fight is nothing less than the President's right to appoint Supreme Court Justices. The Senate, they argue, is trying to undermine that prerogative; Senators should support a President's choice for the Court unless he can be shown to be corrupt or incompetent.

But history contradicts that narrow view of the Senate's role. In fact, over the years, the Senate in considering nominations to the Supreme Court has rejected "a proportion far higher than for any other Federal office." So says a leading study, Joseph B. Harris's "The Advice and Consent of the Senate."

In the nineteenth century, when senatorial scrutiny was at its most rigorous, 72 men were nominated to the Supreme Court and eighteen of them—one quarter—failed of confirmation. The eighteen does not include a few others who declined the honor.

Nominees were rejected for a variety of reasons, because of their philosophy or politics or ability or temperament. Some lost in formal votes of the Senate; other nominations were withdrawn in the face of opposition.

President Madison, for example, nominated a Connecticut Collector of Customs, Alexander Wolcott, in 1811. Charles Warren, the great Supreme Court historian, said the general feeling was that Wolcott was a man of "somewhat mediocre legal ability." For that reason a Senate overwhelmingly of Madison's party rejected the nomination, 24 to 9.

GRANT'S NOMINATIONS

Grant tried three times before he could get a Chief Justice confirmed. His first choice—George H. Williams, his Attorney General—was criticized as a "second-rate" lawyer. His second, Caleb Cushing, a former Judge of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, was eminently qualified. But Senators were uneasy at the fact that he had been successively a Whig, Democrat and Republican. The opposition eventually found that he had written an innocent letter to Jefferson Davis during the Civil War and used that to rally opinion against him. Both nominations were withdrawn.

Other nominees in the last century were defeated because they were partisan Whigs

of their large number of surface-to-air missiles, or SAMs, be surreptitiously upgraded for attacking ballistic missiles?"

Or, again, "Once MIRVs have been successfully tested, is there any way to monitor a ban on their deployment without taking missiles apart at operational silos?"

WHAT ARE MOSCOW'S VIEWS

Another question [is] . . . How do the Soviets view SALT?

One obvious assumption is that the USSR has enhancement of its own national security as its primary objective. The USSR has, from time to time, expressed an interest in discussions and in doing so has noted that an agreement should apply to both offensive and defensive strategic delivery vehicles, and that the first step should be a limitation and not a reduction of armaments. But little or nothing is really known of Soviet views regarding the details of a possible agreement.

The inter-action of negotiations is almost certain to affect the way we and the Soviets answer some of the questions I've cited.

This, of course, raises the question as to what constitutes success. Certainly, a solid arrangement to limit strategic weapons systems would be a great success, and that will be our objective.

Not to achieve a specific agreement in our first efforts, however, need not signal failure. The talks could be of great value if we can establish a mechanism for contact with the USSR on strategic force matters and maintain a dialogue, which hopefully would reduce uncertainty on both sides.

BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY

I feel sure that all of you here would agree that the road ahead for SALT negotiations will be long and difficult. We will be undertaking serious negotiations in a field that is extremely complex, full of difficulties in both political and military matters, and is so basic in nature that it involves the very essence of our national security.

We are ready, willing and able to start the talks at any time and, as I have said before, are hopeful that at minimum, they will lead to a lessening of uncertainty on both sides and, at maximum, they will lead to substantive agreements to limit or even reduce strategic weapons.

THE WORKINGS OF THE MODERN ECONOMY

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the difficulties of managing a high-employment economy, most particularly of keeping the Federal budget both fiscally responsible and socially adequate, have become familiar subjects today. Our theoretical understanding of the workings of the modern economy has increased during the 23 years since the goal of "maximum employment, production, and purchasing power" was explicitly set forth in the Employment Act of 1946, but so has our awareness of the difficulties of putting theory into practice. We have learned how a flexible fiscal policy can be much more difficult to practice than to preach. We have become familiar with the difficult dilemma presented by the independent pricing power of big business and organized labor. And we have recently begun to face up to the seemingly intractable problem of allocating our budget resources in line with rational priorities.

One of the most knowledgeable and perceptive observers of our progress and our setbacks since 1946 is Edwin G. Nourse, the distinguished first chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.

In a scholarly but highly readable article, Dr. Nourse has recently summarized what he believes to be the basic tenets which have guided economic policy during the 1960's. He concludes that the practitioners of this version of the "New Economics," in their emphasis on the need to cut taxes and thus avoid a "fiscal drag," gave too little attention to the difficulties of controlling Federal expenditure and of allocating our budget resources wisely. Now, it has become imperative that we shift more of our attention to the problem of Federal expenditures.

I should like to read Dr. Nourse's concluding remarks:

Leaders and people will have to be re-educated to the duties of citizenship, the enormous social needs of the impending years, the difficulties of curbing the arms race, the space race, and the power of the industrial-military complex. They will need to be rededicated to the basic democratic principle that the burdens of military defense and civil advancement must be shared by all.

These two dilemmas of Employment Act fulfillment are not mere mechanical maladjustments, easily corrected with tools readily at hand. They run to the very fundament of human nature and the democratic way of life. They will not resolve themselves, nor will they go away just because we elaborately ignore them. They need to be faced—now—courageously—and as objectively as possible.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Dr. Nourse's article, entitled "The Employment Act and the 'New Economics,'" published in the autumn issue of the Virginia Quarterly Review, be printed in the Record.

[From the Virginia Quarterly Review, Autumn 1969]

THE EMPLOYMENT ACT AND THE "NEW ECONOMICS"

(By Edwin G. Nourse)

Alvin Hansen, more than any other one individual the father of the Employment Act of 1946, has called it the "Magna Carta of American economic planning." That is a striking metaphor, but Magna Carta was a barons' revolt against an autocratic king, whereas the Employment Act declared the intention of an already free people to use their democratic government more actively and with greater economic sophistication to advance their common interest.

Arthur Burns, easily one of the ten most wanted economists in the country, when Hansen one better by calling the Employment Act our new economic Constitution. It does make new declarations of political purpose and establishes some new structures for economic operation. But a written constitution is, after all, only a piece of paper, however noble or shrewd the perception and intent of its drafters. It simply sets in motion an on-going process of interpretation and application that will reveal the new charter's potentialities and shape its operations to ever-changing circumstances.

For a little more than twenty-two years prior to the inauguration of Richard Nixon, such an experimental process went forward under four successive Presidents, a series of seven chairmen and twenty-three members of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the rotating chairmen and changing membership of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress. That experience falls naturally into three periods: the shake-down cruise of the Truman régime, disturbed by the storm of the Korean War; the re-examination period under President Eisenhower; and the period of dashing economic and political innova-

tion under the Kennedy-Johnson succession, with Walter Heller as its presiding genius.

The intellectual, material, and political legacy which the third period left to Mr. Nixon and his fellow-Americans is described, fondly by some and caustically by others, as "the New Economics."

II

It has been remarked, quite fairly, that the New Economics is what any up-to-date economist says it is. Nor is that altogether a criticism. Economics, as a social science, must not be limited to highly generalized truths formulated from long-past experience but must also be continually advancing to the understanding of new circumstances and conditions and to the proposal of intelligent ways of dealing with them.

Probably a poll of economists and informed laymen would put "Keynesian economics" at the top of the list of explanatory labels. "Macroeconomics" might very likely come second, that is, the economics of the whole economy rather than of individual and group enterprises. Many would identify the New Economics with welfare economics or with the economics of planning. Some would see it as the economics of "deficit financing" and others more broadly as the economics of fiscal and monetary controls as a dependable apparatus of national growth and stability. Whatever the labels, one fact is clear. The New Economics is not merely an attempt to explain—and verify its explanation of—the basic forces of the economic process after the manner of a natural science. It is social and hence normative science of ends to be achieved and optimum means of reaching or consistently moving toward those objectives.

For our present purposes, the essence of the New Economics theory may be put in the form of six major propositions, with several subdivisions. The first is really an axiom: For full use of national resources—maximum production and employment—"aggregate purchasing power" or total spendings of consumers, business, noncommercial entities, foreign buyers, and government must be equivalent to the productive capabilities of the economy. If the ability or willingness to consume and/or invest falls below this level, there will be economic slack; if it rises materially above it, there will be inflation of prices and "overheating" of the economy.

The second proposition of the New Economics is that these capabilities are now so technologically great and growing that, at full employment of national resources, there would be a surplus of goods and services above the buying power of the private sector at existing rates of taxation and government spending. These tax rates, therefore, will act as a "fiscal drag" on the economy and must be lowered (or government spending expanded) if it is to attain that full productive potential.

Third, today's econometric methods and computer facilities make it possible to project these productivity and revenue trends for several years in advance with enough accuracy so that the New Economists can prescribe both the dosage and the timing of tax (and public spending) adjustments so as to alleviate "fiscal drag" and facilitate a full-employment balance of maximum production and purchasing power.

Fourth, concern about budget deficits and the size of the national debt is relegated to the limbo of "the Puritan ethic." Removal of fiscal drag (as postulated) will so unleash productive potential that lower tax rates applied to an expanded national income will soon change deficit into surplus and call for another cut in tax rates—or facilitate the funding of larger social programs.

Fifth, this activist fiscal policy must be kept flexible. Techniques of measurement and projection and of mechanistic and psychological analysis, though impressive, are

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ning Star of November 6, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GENERAL WOOD DIES AT 90, RETIRED HEAD OF SEARS

CHICAGO.—Gen. Robert E. Wood, retired chairman of the board of Sears, Roebuck & Co., died today. He was 90 years old.

Gen. Wood, who was generally credited as the builder of the modern-day Sears, the world's largest merchandising firm, died in his Lake Forest home.

Gen. Wood, a retired Army officer, joined Sears in 1924 as a vice president and went on to become president and board chairman. He also founded Allstate Insurance Co., a Sears subsidiary.

Gen. Wood was regarded throughout the world as a great leader in the merchandising field.

In 1924, the year he joined the firm, he proposed that Sears enter into the retail store field. He led the company from a strictly mail order house to a combined retail store and catalogue distribution system of international scope.

KANSAS CITY NATIVE

The first Sears retail store opened in 1925 when the firm's mail order sales totaled about \$200 million a year. Now it has more than 800 retail outlets, and the company's over-all sales total more than \$7 billion a year.

Gen. Wood became president of Sears in 1928 and chairman in 1939. He retired from active management in 1954 but continued as a director until May, 1968, when he was named the first honorary chairman of the board.

His long career was distinguished by outstanding success in both military and business fields.

Born in Kansas City, Mo., June 13, 1879, Gen. Wood was graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1900 and later served 10 years in Panama during the building of the Panama Canal. There he rose to chief quartermaster in charge of all purchasing and distribution of supplies.

During World War I he was in charge of the Army Transport Service in France and England. At 39, he was recalled to Washington, promoted to brigadier general and named acting quartermaster general and director of purchases and storage for the entire United States Army.

Gen. Wood returned to civilian life in 1919 and spent five years as a vice president of Montgomery Ward & Co., where he started his career, as a mass merchandiser, before joining Sears.

FOUNDED ALLSTATE IN 1931

In 1931, after he became president of Sears, Gen. Wood founded Allstate Insurance. Allstate now is the world's largest stock company automobile insurer and a leader in other insurance fields. Gen. Wood guided Sears through the difficult depression and World War II years, continuing an aggressive expansion program. Under his direction, stores were opened in Cuba and Latin America. Gen. Wood was the eldest of five children of Robert W. and Lillie Collins Wood. Both his maternal grandfather and his father served as captains in the Union Army during the Civil War. Survivors include his wife, the former Mary Butler Hardwick of Augusta, Ga., and five children, Robert W., of Palestine, Tex.; Mrs. Hugo V. Neuhaus of Houston, Tex.; and Mrs. William H. Mitchell, Mrs. Calvin Fentress and Mrs. A. Watson Armour III, all of Lake Forest.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Mr. SCOTT, Mr. President, on November 17, the long-awaited strategic arms

limitation talks between the United States and the U.S.S.R. will begin in Helsinki, Finland. Secretary of State William P. Rogers has described SALT action as "one of the most important that we ever undertook with the Soviet Union." On October 17, the Fourth International Arms Control Symposium met in Philadelphia. At that time Lt. Gen. John J. Davis, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, spoke on the subject "Arms Talks With Russia." His lucid and perceptive account deserves the attention of the Members of this body. It is refreshing to read such a well-considered account by a military man. I recommend the article to the Senate and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Commanders Digest, Nov. 1, 1969]

SALT AGREEMENT REACHED: ARMS TALKS WITH RUSSIA

The control of nuclear weapons is one of the most serious challenges, if not the most serious challenge of our time. Yet the challenge has really been faced up to only recently.

The United States, with the Baruch Plan, took the lead in trying to bring this powerful new force under international control, but not until the current decade has there been any meaningful progress.

The Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty were the initial steps, although they skirted the basic problem. Then came the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which is directly aimed at one important aspect of stemming the arms race—that is, helping to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which do not now have them. . . . As you know, the Seabed Treaty, which is now in the throes of multilateral negotiations, would forestall another possible form of proliferation.

But to limit or reduce nuclear weapons is clearly more difficult.

The real forerunner of our current Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) efforts, however, was the U.S. offer in 1964 to the USSR to explore the possibility of a "freeze" on the number and characteristics of both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, including bombers, missiles, and ABMs.

The USSR, although it did not categorically reject the idea, showed little interest. It asserted that the proposal was a scheme for inspecting without disarming and for perpetuating U.S. strategic superiority.

President Johnson reopened the subject in January 1967 when he proposed, in a letter to Premier Kosygin, discussions on an understanding to limit the further deployment of "strategic offensive and defensive missile launchers." When he received an encouraging reply some weeks later, we provided Moscow with broad indications of the kind of agreement we had in mind.

It would, we suggested, involve a leveling off, not an outright freeze or reduction, of strategic nuclear delivery systems, offensive and defensive. We noted that reductions could be considered at a later stage. An agreement would apply to launchers, not missiles, for purposes of simplifying verification.

Agreement was about to be reached on the date and place for the talks when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. That event disrupted the prospect of a meeting last autumn, and the change of administration in Washington necessitated further delay.

The United States stated months ago that it is ready to start the talks. . . . Meanwhile,

we are persisting with our study of the very complex problems associated with strategic arms limitations.

ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES

We believe that there are three prime objectives:

1. To maintain and, if possible, improve U.S. security;
2. To maintain deterrence, and reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war; and
3. To limit the upward spiral of strategic arms competition and reduce arms costs.

We have been fairly secure over the last decade in the sense that a relatively stable strategic relationship between the U.S. and USSR has prevailed—insofar as the use of nuclear weapons has been concerned. At a minimum, then, limitations on strategic armaments should maintain the existing stability—stable in the sense of making the initiation of nuclear war unattractive and in the sense of controlling the arms competition.

Many people believe that the action-reaction responses in strategic hardware development and deployment of both the U.S. and the USSR have resulted from the uncertainties involved—uncertainty due to lack of complete intelligence on both sides, and resulting uncertainties as to both capabilities and intentions. This has resulted in alternating policies of "keep ahead" and catch up.

They further believe that if the uncertainties could be eliminated, then there would be good prospects for substantial strategic arms control agreements. Both sides would, of course, have to be assured that their own strategic posture was satisfactory and that their own security and that of their allies would be adequately maintained on a continuing basis.

Needless to say, that is a large order.

ESTABLISHING GUIDELINES

Having worked out basic objectives, the next step in developing arms control options for consideration was to establish some principles or guidelines.

It is generally acknowledged that an agreement should impose limitations on both offensive and defensive missile systems. This has been a basic principle of the U.S. position since 1964, and it is one which the USSR has recently emphasized.

Another principle is that any agreement or reductions in strategic arms should be preceded by an agreement curtailing further build-ups. This, too, has been a fundamental U.S. view for some years.

A third guideline is that any proposal for limitations, to be negotiable, would have to be considered by each side to be in its net security interest and compatible with its national objectives. It was also agreed that any agreement would have to be subject to adequate verification.

A CRUCIAL ISSUE: VERIFICATION

A moment ago I alluded to one of the crucial issues, namely, the matter of verification. The basic question is whether we can rely solely on national means to verify an agreement or will have to insist on some means of on-site inspection—at least in some cases.

We all realize, of course, from the negotiating history on other arms control proposals that insistence on on-site inspection could pose a major obstacle to an agreement. The U.S. is not contemplating an arms control agreement based on faith; on the other hand, it does not insist that "adequate" verification necessarily means 100 per cent verification. The risks involved must be thoroughly understood.

To mention weapons systems is to call to mind one of the most difficult issues confronting us; that is, the critical interrelationships of various weapons systems. Here, one gets into such matters as MIRVs and ABMs.

A recent news article highlighted some of the problems by asking:

"If the Russians agree to deploy only a thin anti-ballistic missile system, can some

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He urged that Congress wait for its Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, which has been conducting studies since it began operations last year, to report next July on what legislation is needed, how best to meet all constitutional questions, how pornography affects adults and minors and whether it causes antisocial behavior.

But as letters from indignant constituents pour in—usually accompanied by choice examples of eroticism received in the mail—Congressmen and other politicians pay less attention to cautionary advice.

"Where is there any freedom of speech issue in that?" Representative Foreman shouted last week waving his copy of *Screw*.

Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz of New York wrote the subcommittee that he was receiving many letters from parents who "justly complain" that the contents of lurid mail fall into the hands of their children.

The Federal Government should do more to curb the spread of unsolicited smut mail," he declared.

Each of the Congressmen who have testified so far agreed. Most said they did not care whose bill was adopted so long as it would stand the scrutiny of court review.

ELECTION DAY, 1969

Mr. PEARSON, Mr. President, I wish to congratulate the voters of two great States on the results of yesterday's elections.

With Bill Cahill's landslide win in New Jersey, our Republican Party is now in control of the statehouses of all the large, northeastern industrial States. It is essentially in the statehouses where a larger, more comprehensive base must be built for our national Republican Party, and we now number 32 of the 50 in the Republican column.

I am particularly proud of the voters of the Commonwealth of Virginia, where I spent a large part of my early life. With their election of Republican Linwood Holton to be their next Governor, we have certainly seen history, in the making. There is no doubt that the two-party system, which has been growing steadily but surely in Virginia since 1952, is now an accomplished fact. Just two short decades ago, it was a difficult and lonely thing to be a Republican in Virginia. What a change a relatively few short years can make. Not only will Virginia have a Republican Governor for the first time since Reconstruction Days come next January; in last year's election five of Virginia's 10 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives went to the Republicans.

My heartiest congratulations to the people of the State of New Jersey and the Commonwealth of Virginia for their choices on election day 1969.

NEW OPTIMISM IN VIETNAM

Mr. MC GEE, Mr. President, optimism inside Vietnam has seen a recent revival, as reported in the pages of the *Washington Post* in recent days by Robert G. Kaiser in his series entitled "The New Optimists." In two installments, Mr. Kaiser reported on the success of today's pacification program, which his sources were more apt to attribute to the weakening position of the Vietcong in South Vietnam and the relative improvement of the Saigon Government's position in the countryside.

The Vietcong's high-water mark was reached in the 1968 Tet offensive, Mr. Kaiser reports, and its influence in the countryside has been declining since. All this is not to say that the war in Vietnam is near to what we would call a successful conclusion or a victory. What Mr. Kaiser's "new optimists" are saying is that things are better and that an independent Saigon Government can prevail with continued U.S. support.

I ask unanimous consent that the second and third installments of Mr. Kaiser's series from the *Washington Post* be printed in the *RECORD*.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the *RECORD*, as follows:

[From the *Washington Post*, Oct. 30, 1969]
THE NEW OPTIMISTS—II: PACIFICATION, 1969
STYLE, SEEMS TO BE WORKING

(By Robert G. Kaiser)

VINH LONG, SOUTH VIETNAM.—The French tried to "pacify" Vietnam, but they failed. So did Ngo Dinh Diem, and so have the many regimes that succeeded Diem's—all with enormous American aid. One year's progress in pacification has become the next year's disaster so often that the whole idea has an unshakably bad reputation with many Vietnamese. Many have stopped listening to the boasts.

This year's progress has a new set of promoters, a group of new optimists—including many former pessimists—who believe that the Vietcong's revolution in South Vietnam may have been defeated.

The impending defeat of the local Vietcong, which many Americans now claim to foresee, is usually not attributed to the specific successes of current pacification programs. Many believe that the pacification programs have worked this year primarily because the Vietcong have lost the ability (or the will) to fight back.

In the past pacification always failed because the National Liberation Front (or the Vietminh before it) eventually proved stronger than the regime in Saigon. Now the new optimists are predicting—privately, and not for attribution—that the Vietcong will not be able to come back, at least for many years, and never if the government can consolidate its apparent new strength.

American officials have talked about the demise of the Vietcong before. But old hands here say the new optimism differs from its predecessors, if only because its adherents include many who were always pessimists or cynics before. The revival of optimism in the last few months has come after a long period of caution and doubt that followed the 1968 Tet offensive.

The current pacification program is more than a copy of its predecessors. It is simpler and more radical. It has provided the first meaningful decentralization of government functions in the history of independent South Vietnam. And it appears more successful at the moment than any of its predecessors. But it is also clumsy, often self-deluding, and often ineffective, according to many of the men trying to make it work in the countryside.

The pacification campaign is aimed at specific goals that seem little more than commonsense objectives. They are to provide security, reduce the Vietcong's military and political strength, stimulate the economy, resettle war refugees, propagandize the government's cause and establish local government.

The Vietnamese and their American advisers have agreed on a process for achieving these goals. Ideally, the process works like this:

Government troops enter a contested area, establish outposts and force the enemy's

military forces out of the area. Then teams of "revolutionary development cadre" (known less dramatically in Vietnamese as Rural Development workers) come into the village. They undertake small public works projects, then a census of the population, conduct a flamboyant if elementary public relations campaign for the government and generally establish what is called the GVN's presence. They are followed or sometimes accompanied by appointed hamlet and village chiefs. (A village in Vietnam is a geographic area of perhaps several square miles composed of, on the average, seven hamlets.)

Once some security has been established, provincial officials and the new local appointees begin to institute the government's basic program. The RD cadre, perhaps helped by American advisers, may try to open a new school. Representatives of the Open Arms (Chieu Hol) campaign will begin propagandizing for Vietcong to rally to the government side. The "Phoenix" program will begin to gather intelligence and track down Vietcong operatives.

The government may provide financial or material aid to refugees who decide to move back to their old homes in a newly entered area. The government will organize a Peoples' Self Defense Force, give its members rudimentary training and arms. After a few months elections will be organized to choose hamlet and village councils. The elected council is then supposed to select a new village chief to replace the government's appointee.

In many parts of the country, some of these things are happening as planned. Elsewhere, some happen and some don't. Almost everywhere the government's (and their U.S. advisers) performance is erratic, but on balance there is progress.

On the ground, the ideal procedure is tempered by Vietnamese realities. Perhaps the harshest of these is the shortage of talented and honest men to fill a growing number of government posts. At their worst, local officials can be appalling.

CORRUPTION INEVITABLE

A district chief only recently removed from his job, for example, was maintaining 10 ladies in 10 different houses, giving them about \$80 a month in pin money—financing the whole operation out of government funds.

A certain amount of corruption is both expected and inevitable. Salaries of local officials are not big enough to support a man and his family. But the government is trying to apply—or says it is—new standards to the behavior of its officials. Village and hamlet chiefs are going to a special school to learn both good administration and honesty.

The 7,800 Americans working on pacification are not all suited for the work. Some experienced Americans here bemoan the low caliber of U.S. advisers. "We've got a bunch of police advisers around here that are nothing but small town misfits and failures," said one senior adviser recently. All but a few of the 6,200 soldiers assigned to pacification are in Vietnam on one year tours (which civilians often contend is too short a time to be useful).

Vietnamese realities also mean that programs described in glowing terms at headquarters briefings occasionally can look discouragingly ineffective in the field. Someone looking for weaknesses can find them.

"My PF (popular force) platoons were supposed to go on a joint night operation," a boyish American second lieutenant in the Delta explained to a recent visitor, "but they hadn't moved out, so I went down to the outpost to see why. It turned out that they were drunk—rice wine."

STATISTICS IMPROVE

The regional and popular forces have always been the weak sisters of the Vietnamese armed forces, though American and Vietnamese officials now regard them as crucial

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There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From Dodgson, Lewis Carroll, book, p. 223, copyright 1931]

"THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS"

"What sort of things do you remember best?" Alice ventured to ask.

"Oh, things that happened the week after next," the Queen replied in a careless tone. "For instance, now," she went on, sticking a large piece of plaster on her finger as she spoke, "there's the King's Messenger. He's in prison now, being punished: and the trial doesn't even begin till next Wednesday: and of course the crime comes last of all."

"Suppose he never commits the crime?" said Alice.

"That would be all the better, wouldn't it?" the Queen said, as she bound the plaster round her finger with a bit of ribbon.

Alice felt there was no denying that. "Of course it would be all the better," she said: "but it wouldn't be all the better his being punished?"

"You're wrong there, at any rate," said the Queen: "were you ever punished?"

"Only for faults," said Alice.

"And you were all the better for it, I know!" the Queen said triumphantly.

"Yes, but then I had done the things I was punished for," said Alice: "that makes all the difference."

"But if you hadn't done them," the Queen said, "that would have been better still; better, and better, and better!" Her voice went higher with each "better," till it got quite to a squeak at last.

Alice was just beginning to say, "There's a mistake somewhere—," when the Queen began screaming, so loud that she had to leave the sentence unfinished.

THE BEGINNING OF SALT

Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. President, at times an editorial is written which expresses accurately one's thinking on a particular subject. Such is the case with respect to an editorial entitled "The Beginning of SALT," published in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

I ask unanimous consent that the logical and constructive comments contained therein be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the St. Louis Post Dispatch, Oct. 20-26, 1969]

THE BEGINNING OF SALT

News that the United States and the Soviet Union will begin Strategic Arms Limitation Talks three weeks hence in Helsinki comes none too soon, and the world will hope that agreements on ending the nuclear arms race can be reached before it is too late. No one knows how long the conferences will continue, but the fact that they are in progress will of itself be a deterrent of sorts.

The Nixon Administration has been pressing for the meetings since early in June, but the Russians have delayed a response. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August upset whatever plans may have been in the making, though it was in essence irrelevant. A likely reason for Soviet delay is the Russian quarrel with China. With the recent start of Sino-Soviet talks this may be on the way to a solution, leaving Moscow free to turn its attention to SALT.

In the course of time the conferences ought to cover the whole range of nuclear weaponry—hydrogen bombs and delivery systems, multiwarhead missiles (MIRV) and anti-missile defense systems. It goes without saying that the meetings between the two super-

powers are as important as men have ever proposed. The survival of the human race may be at stake, and both sides are well aware of what is involved.

CONTROL OF PORNOGRAPHY

Mr. GURNEY, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an article entitled, "Growing Public Outrage Over Pornography Stirs Congressional Response," published in the New York Times of Monday, November 3, 1969. It seems to me that the time is long overdue for us to take affirmative action to rid the mails of salacious and pornographic materials and literature, particularly that which is directed to young children. We now have before the Judiciary Committee proposed legislation dealing with this problem which I and a number of other Senators have cosponsored. President Nixon in his October 11, 1969, message on the administration's legislative program has urged us to give high priority to legislation to control pornography. I urge bipartisan action on this most serious matter at the earliest possible moment.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Nov. 3, 1969]
GROWING PUBLIC OUTRAGE OVER PORNOGRAPHY
STIRS CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

(By Donald Janson)

WASHINGTON.—"The enclosed printed matter makes me speechless and aghast to think it can be circulated through the mail."

The remark, from a doctor in Prospect, Conn., is from one of thousands of letters recently added to the bulging files of Congressional committees considering legislation to curb the country's increasingly aggressive pornographers.

Representative L. H. Fountain, Democrat of North Carolina, testified before a House Judiciary subcommittee last week that he was receiving more mail from outraged constituents on the growth of pornography than on any subject in his 16 years in Congress.

"OUTPOURING OF FILTH"

"People in my district are furious and can't understand why we can't put a stop to this outpouring of filth," he said.

"If this Congress accomplishes nothing else, it should provide relief for the vast majority of our citizens who are demanding help in ridding their homes of this obscenity," said Representative Ed Foreman, Republican of New Mexico, as he waved a copy of the newsprint magazine Screw, with a two-page photograph of a nude man and woman on the centerfold, in front of the committee.

A staff member of a Senate Judiciary subcommittee investigating pornography said that subcommittee members were receiving more protests on pornography than on the Vietnam war.

President Nixon noted in May, in asking Congress for three new laws to stop the flood, that "American homes are being bombarded with the largest volume of sex-oriented mail in history." He reminded Congress two weeks ago that none of his proposals had been passed and urged prompt action. There is little likelihood that he will get it.

Part of the reason is that Congressmen are so eager to testify at subcommittee hearings in person rather than by submitting statements that additional hearings are being scheduled to meet the demand. Since early August, the Congressmen have been among witnesses before two House subcommittees.

Their interest is directly related to the spurt in the volume of mail they are receiving from back home.

Five more Congressmen testified last week. They are among 175 who have introduced more than 200 anti-obscenity bills, including the Administration's proposals.

HIGH COURT GUIDELINES

Shaping final legislation from this tangle is not expected until next year, not just because of the stampede to get into the act but also because of the difficult task of meeting tests of constitutionality required by Supreme Court decisions of recent years.

Under Supreme Court rulings, material cannot be banned unless it panders to a "prurient interest in sex," affronts "contemporary community standards" and is "utterly without redeeming social importance."

But about 50 million pieces of lurid material are being mailed annually, including millions of unsolicited advertisements for books and films. New approaches are being sought to keep this third-class mail from reaching homes and offices.

The President, declaring that the Administration had carefully studied "the legal terrain" of the problem, proposed the following curbs:

Prohibiting use of the mails to send to minors "material dealing with a sexual subject in a manner unsuitable for young people."

Barring use of the mails or other interstate facilities for sending advertising intended to appeal to a "prurient interest in sex."

Prohibiting, as an invasion of privacy, use of the mails to send sexually oriented advertising—even if it is not legally obscene—to any who says he does not want it.

Protection specifically for minors has not been tried before on a Federal level. This approach was prompted by a Supreme Court decision last year upholding a New York state law prohibiting the sale to minors of anything the law defined, using a separate standard for children, as obscene for minors.

The effort to bar "prurient" advertising rests on 1942 and 1951 Supreme Court decisions that commercial advertising does not have the same constitutional protection as noncommercial speech.

The invasion-of-privacy proposal would complement a law passed in 1967. It allowed anyone who received sex-oriented advertising to cut off the flow by listing his objection with the Post Office.

But the receiver had to initiate action against each publisher of smut who solicited him. The new proposal would let householders bar all such advertising from any source with a single protest in advance of receiving any smut. Advertisers would have to buy a Post Office master list of objectors and keep it current or risk heavy fines and long jail terms.

These measures—the 1967 law and the proposed expansion—were inspired in large part by a 1966 Supreme Court decision against Ralph Ginzberg, holding that, whether or not his magazine Eros was obscene, his manner of advertising it pandered to prurient interests.

Last week, the Supreme Court said it would rule on the constitutionality of the 1967 law. The complementary proposal will probably stand or fall on that ruling. Publishers of erotic wares contend that the first law violates their right of free speech by restricting distribution of ideas.

The other Nixon proposals, if adopted, would also face constitutional challenges.

"The theory that the First Amendment does not protect commercial advertising is a very shaky one," Lawrence Speiser, director of the Washington office of the American Civil Liberties Union, testified before the House Subcommittee on Postal Operations recently.

tors in the consideration of the future of that country.

Downs. Is there any danger that the hard-liners will consider moving in that direction a defeat, even though it might fulfill the stated policy aim?

MANSFIELD. No, quite the contrary. The President has made his declaration. It has met with unanimous approval as far as I know. And I agree with him one hundred percent.

Downs. Thanks again, Senator Mansfield, for being our guest this morning.

Salt

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, on Monday the United States and the Soviet Union will open very crucial talks in Helsinki on ways to scale down the strategic arms race. We cannot now tell what the outcome will be, but we are all hopeful that these talks will lead to a slowdown in the buildup of strategic nuclear weapons.

Last night Secretary of State Rogers delivered a talk before the Diplomatic and Consular Officers Retired which I feel sets the tone for the talks in Helsinki. The Secretary, of course, could not and did not detail the specific proposals which would be discussed at this first meeting in Helsinki. But he did broadly outline the desire of the United States to come to an agreement with the U.S.S.R. The Secretary's talk was filled with hope—a hope that sane men from the two most powerful countries on earth can curb what has been an unending competition in the strategic arms race. We have made some progress in limiting nuclear weapons. More needs to be done.

I feel all of us can agree with Secretary Rogers when he says that there is reason for hope because both superpowers are willing at least to discuss ways to limit the growing nuclear arsenal and increasing threat to world peace.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the full text of the Secretary's remarks.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE WILLIAM P. ROGERS, SECRETARY OF STATE

Next Monday in Helsinki the United States and the Soviet Union will open preliminary talks leading to what could be the most critical negotiations on disarmament ever undertaken. The two most powerful nations on earth will be seeking a way to curb what to date has been an unending competition in the strategic arms race.

The Government of the United States will enter these negotiations with serious purpose and with the hope that we can achieve balanced understandings that will benefit the cause of world peace and security. Yet we begin these negotiations knowing that they are likely to be long and complicated and with the full realization that they may not succeed.

While I will not be able to discuss specific proposals tonight, I thought it might be helpful to outline the general approach of our government in these talks.

I

Nearly a quarter of a century ago, when we alone possessed nuclear power, the United States proposed the formation of a United Nations Atomic Development Authority with a world monopoly over all dangerous aspects of nuclear energy. This proposal might well

have eliminated for all nations the dangers and burdens of atomic weapons. Unhappily, as we all know, it was rejected.

The implications were obvious. Others intended to develop nuclear weapons on a national basis. The United States then would have to continue its own nuclear program. It would have to look to its own security in a nuclear-armed world. Thus we established a national policy of maintaining nuclear weapon strength adequate to deter nuclear war by any other nation or nations. It was our hope then, as it is now, to make certain that nuclear weapons would never again be used.

The intervening decades have seen enormous resources devoted to the development of nuclear weapons systems. As both sides expanded their force levels an action/reaction pattern was established. This pattern was fed by rapid progress in the technology of nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems. The mere availability of such sophisticated technology made it difficult for either side by itself to refrain from translating that technology into offensive and defensive strategic armaments.

Meanwhile, strategic planners, operating in an atmosphere of secrecy, were obliged to make conservative assumptions, including calculations on what became known as the "worst case." The people responsible for planning our strategic security had to take account of the worst assumptions about the other's intentions, the maximum plausible estimate of the other's capabilities and performance, and the lowest plausible performance of our own forces. The Soviets no doubt did the same.

Under these circumstances it was difficult during these many years for either side to conclude that it had sufficient levels of destructive power.

II

Yet that point in time has now clearly been reached. As absolute levels of nuclear power and delivery capability increased, a situation developed in which both the United States and the Soviet Union could effectively destroy the society of the other, regardless of which one struck first.

There are helpful mutual restraints in such a situation. Sane national leaders do not initiate strategic nuclear war and thus commit their people to national suicide. Also they must be careful not to precipitate a conflict that could easily escalate into nuclear war. They have to take elaborate precautions against accidental release of a nuclear weapon which might bring on a nuclear holocaust.

In brief the nuclear deterrent, dangerous though it is, has worked.

The present situation—in which both the United States and the Soviet Union could effectively destroy the other regardless of which struck first—radically weakens the rationale for continuing the arms race.

Competitive accumulation of more sophisticated weapons would not add to the basic security of either side. Militarily it probably would produce little or no net advantage. Economically it would divert resources needed elsewhere. Politically it would perpetuate the tensions and fears that are the social fallout of the nuclear arms race.

So a capacity for mutual destruction leads to a mutual interest in putting a stop to the strategic nuclear arms race.

Nonetheless technology advances remorselessly. It offers new opportunities to both sides to add to their offensive and defensive strategic systems. Both sides find it difficult to reject these opportunities in an atmosphere of rivalry and in the absence of a verifiable agreement. It raises temptations to seek strategic advantages. Yet now such advantages cannot be hidden for long, and both sides will certainly take whatever counter-measures are necessary to preserve their retaliatory capability.

This is the situation in which the two sides now find themselves. Where national security interests may have operated in the past to stimulate the strategic arms race, those same national security interests may now operate to stop or slow down the race. The question to be faced in the strategic arms talks is whether societies with the advanced intellect to develop these awesome weapons of mass destruction have the combined wisdom to control and curtail them.

III

In point of fact, we have already had some successes in preliminary limitations.

We have a treaty banning military activities in Antarctica.

We have a treaty banning the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction in outer space and prohibiting the establishment of military installations on the moon or other celestial bodies.

We have reached agreement with the Soviet Union on the text of a treaty forbidding the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the ocean floors, about to be considered at the United Nations General Assembly.

These are agreements not to arm environments previously inaccessible to weapons. Manifestly there are fewer obstacles to such agreements than there are to agreements controlling weapons already deployed or under development.

But even in already "contaminated" environments there have been two important control agreements:

We have negotiated and ratified a Test Ban Treaty prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space.

We have negotiated and are prepared at any time to ratify simultaneously with the Soviet Union, a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

It should be pointed out, though, that the main objective of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is to prevent non-nuclear powers from acquiring atomic weapons. The treaty does not restrain any of the present nuclear powers from further development of their capabilities. The non-nuclear countries therefore tend to look upon the treaty essentially as a self-denying ordinance.

Accordingly, during the negotiations they insisted upon assurances that the nuclear powers would seriously pursue strategic arms negotiations. We concurred and incorporated a paragraph in the treaty which would require us to do so.

I mention this to underscore two points. First, that the disarmament agreements previously concluded have widely been regarded as confidence building, preliminary steps which hopefully might lead to more meaningful agreements on strategic arms. Second, when the United States and the Soviet Union ratify the NPT, they will agree to undertake negotiations in good faith for a cessation of the nuclear arms race.

IV

However, given the complexity of the strategic situation, the vital national interests involved, and the traditional impulses to seek protection in military strength it is easy to be cynical about the prospects for the talks into which we are about to enter.

Nonetheless some basis for hope exists. First is the fact that the talks are being held at all. The diplomatic exchanges leading up to these talks were responsible in nature. And the talks themselves will require discussion of military matters by both sides in which the veil of secrecy will have to be, if not lifted, at least refashioned. These factors lead us to the hope that the talks are being entered into seriously.

Second is the matter of timing. Previous disparity in nuclear strength has been succeeded by the situation of sufficiency of which I have already spoken. And because

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this condition will continue for the foreseeable future the time then seems to be propitious for considering how to curb the race in which neither side in all likelihood can gain meaningful advantage.

Third is a mutuality of interest. Under present circumstances an equitable limitation on strategic nuclear weapons would strengthen the national security of both sides. If this is mutually perceived—if both sides conduct these talks in the light of that perception—the talks may accomplish an historic breakthrough in the pattern of confrontation that has characterized the postwar world.

May I pause to point out again that I do not wish to predict that the talks will be easy or that progress is imminent or for that matter likely. Mutuality of interest for states accustomed to rivalry is difficult to perceive. Traditions are powerful. Temptations to seek advantage run strong. Developments in other areas are bound to have an impact on these discussions.

Both parties will approach the talks with great caution and pursue them with immaculate care. The United States and the Soviet Union are entirely capable of protecting their vital interests and can be counted upon to do so. So there is little chance that either side would accept an outcome that leads to its net national disadvantage. In our case also we would not agree to anything adversely affecting the national interests of our allies, who will continue to be consulted as the talks develop.

On the other hand we must also recognize that a prime technique of international politics—as of other politics—is talk. If these talks are serious they can lead to better understanding on both sides of the rationales behind strategic weapons decisions. This in itself might provide a climate in which to avoid compulsive decisions.

Talks need not necessarily call for an explicit agreement at any particular stage. Whether we can slow down, stop or eventually throw the arms race into reverse, remains to be seen. It also remains to be seen whether this be by a formal treaty or treaties, by a series of agreements, by parallel action, or by a convergence of viewpoints resulting from a better understanding of respective positions.

What counts at this point is that a dialogue is beginning about the management of the strategic relations of the two superpowers on a better, safer, cheaper basis than uncontrolled acquisition of still more weapons.

The United States approaches the talks as an opportunity to rest our security on what I would call a balanced strategy.

In pursuit of this balanced strategy of security we will enter the Helsinki talks with three objectives:

To enhance international security by maintaining a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship through limitations on the deployment of strategic armaments;

To halt the upward spiral of strategic arms and avoid the tensions, uncertainties, and costs of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic arms race;

To reduce the risk of an outbreak of nuclear war through a dialogue about issues arising from the strategic situation.

Some say that there will be risks in such a process. But it is easy to focus too much on the risks that would accompany such a new environment and too little on the risks of the one in which we now live. Certainly, such risks are minimal compared to the benefits for mankind which would flow from success. I am confident that this country will not let down its guard, lose its alertness, or fail to maintain adequate programs to protect against a collapse or evasion of any strategic arms agreement. No delegation to any disarmament negotiation has ever been better prepared or better qualified than the United

States delegation. The risks in seeking an agreement seem to be manageable, insurable, and reasonable ones to run. They seem less dangerous than the risks of open-ended arms competition—risks about which we perhaps have become somewhat callous.

v

I have mentioned the rewards of progress in terms of international security, world order, and improved opportunities for replacing a stalemated confrontation with a process of negotiations.

But there are also other stakes in these talks that come closer to home. On both sides of this strategic race there are urgent needs for resources to meet pressing domestic needs. Strategic weapons cannot solve the problems of how we live at home, or how we live in the world in this last third of the Twentieth Century. The Soviet Union, which devotes a much larger proportion of its national resources to armaments than do we, must see this as well.

Who knows the rewards if we succeed in diverting the energy, time and attention—the manpower and brainpower—devoted to ever more sophisticated weapons to other and more worthwhile purposes?

Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly two months ago, President Nixon said that he hoped the strategic arms talks would begin soon because “there is no more important task before us.” And he added that we must “make a determined effort not only to limit the build-up of strategic arms, but to reverse it.”

Just last week President Podgorny of the Soviet Union said: “A positive outcome of the talks would undoubtedly help improve Soviet-American relations and preserve and strengthen the peace.” To that I say “Amen.”

He added that: “The Soviet Union is striving to achieve precisely such results.” Well, so are we; and in this we have the support of the military services, of the Congress, and of the American people.

To that end this Government approaches the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks in sober and serious determination to do our full part to bring a halt to this unproductive and costly competition in strategic nuclear armaments.

NATION CANNOT AFFORD CIVILIAN-MILITARY RIFT

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, it has become all too fashionable in this country to criticize blindly those with whom we disagree. Overstated rhetoric and oversimplified conclusions serve to polarize our politics and divide our society when polarization and divisiveness are already too prevalent.

The military establishment has been a prime target of this counterproductive criticism.

Some criticize the military because it is fighting the war in Vietnam or has not yet won it, while others complain that its needs devour too much of our national budget.

However, it is well to remember that civilian decisions have shaped our policy in Vietnam and the ground rules under which it is pursued; and Congress in the past abdicated its responsibility to judge military spending.

I do not wish to imply that the military is without fault. Overoptimistic military reports contributed heavily to the disastrous policy in Vietnam and often fearsome threats were found to justify military expenditures which later proved ludicrously wasteful.

But who is at fault is not at issue. What is at issue is that continuing po-

larization is dangerous. We do not need more intense rhetoric now. Rather we need a return to reasonable discourse and common sense.

Mr. President, I believe that an editorial published in the *Fort Gateway Guide* of Waynesville, Mo., goes a long way toward bringing both reason and commonsense to bear on criticism of the military. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the *Record*.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the *Record*, as follows:

NATION CANNOT AFFORD CIVILIAN-MILITARY RIFT

Even the most hawkish supporters of America's involvement in Vietnam seem to have come to the conclusion that the war, as it has been fought, is not worth the candle. Its objectives, important as they were and are, have simply become outweighed by its immense costs in wealth, blood and domestic turmoil.

In this sense, at least, there is a kind of unity in America, though the controversy rages over how to cut the costs of the war while not abandoning utterly whatever achievements may still be salvaged from it.

Yet in our universal desire to end the war and our alarm at its divisive and inflationary effects at home, we are in danger of ignoring other, even more pernicious consequences of too precipitate and too complete a reversal of the policies and beliefs which led us into the conflict in the first place.

One of these consequences is a growing antimilitarism, which is shared both by those who view the war as immoral from start to finish and by those who once favored it but now feel that the military has let us down.

A recent news report told of widespread disillusionment among veteran career officers.

“Many of my contemporaries with 15 and 16 years of service are packing it in,” an Army lieutenant colonel was quoted as saying. “Pride of profession has kept them going, but that pride is taking a terrible battering these days.”

Air Force officer resignations jumped nearly 50 per cent in fiscal 1969 over fiscal 1968. Army resignations were up about 14 per cent. The climb was smaller in the Marine Corps while Navy figures remained the same.

The outlook for attracting new officers is dismal. ROTC recruitment on college campuses is expected to be noticeably affected by antimilitarism this year.

Americans seem to have forgotten, or no longer believe, that in this country the military is controlled by civilians. It was not a general but a civilian president who committed hundreds of thousands of American soldiers to a land war in Asia, against the long-standing warnings of some of our most eminent military men—Generals Gavin, Shoup and Ridgway, for example.

Once in the war, the armed forces fought it as well as they could with the restrictions placed upon them—restrictions that were necessary to prevent the conflict from escalating into World War III but which any armchair strategist can now see doomed it to the indecisive, endless struggle it became.

The military may be accused of deceiving three or four administrations with constant promises of a turning point or the reaching of that elusive light at the end of the tunnel. But the responsibility ultimately rests on those who gave them an impossible job to do.

“It is unjust and unwise to attack the military because they have done their best to execute directions given them by the political leadership,” writes Anthony Hartley, editor of *Interplay* magazine. “Unjust because they are not responsible for initiating policy. Unwise because too constant and

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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per column which appeared locally yesterday in the Washington Post. In the column, Messrs. Novak and Evans warned:

The tens of thousands of well-meaning war protesters set to converge on Washington Saturday will be joining a demonstration planned since last summer by advocates of violent revolution in the U.S. who openly support Communist forces in Vietnam.

Accordingly, whatever happens here Saturday, the Nov. 15 march on Washington will mark a postwar highwater mark for the American far left.

Responsible liberals have been enlisted as foot soldiers in an operation mapped out mainly by extremists—testimony to the present ineffectiveness of nonviolent, liberal elements in the peace movement.

After explaining the planning role for the moratorium which has been played by the Communist Party, U.S.A., and by the newly-invigorated Communist Trotskyite movement, Evans and Novak stated that extremists in the antiwar movement have prepared "wild scenarios for storming the White House, the Justice Department, and the South Vietnamese Embassy."

As best I have been able to learn, Mr. President, the Justice Department and the South Vietnamese Embassy are still likely targets of the extremists.

A coalition of 30 radical groups, calling itself the Revolutionary Contingent, reportedly plans to rally at Dupont Circle tomorrow evening and then march on the South Vietnamese chancery at 2251 R Street NW., to serve an "eviction" notice on the occupants.

There have been reports that one revolutionary group from New York City would like to blow up the embassy. That might have sounded a little farfetched a couple of weeks ago, but after the four serious bombings of buildings in New York City yesterday, we can believe that there are people who might go to such extremes.

It is not clear as to just what is in store for the Justice Department on Saturday evening following the mass rally on the Ellipse.

On October 30, 1969, the Liberation News Service—which provides news for the underground press—reported that plans are being made for an attack on the Justice Department. I should like to quote a few paragraphs from the Liberation News Service story:

New York.—Get your red flags ready and come to Washington, D.C. on November 15. Plans are being forged for a militant "red flag" contingent to participate in the massive anti-war demonstration in Washington and to add an additional action: an attack on the headquarters of the Department of "Justice."

The SDSers in Newark expect to organize an anti-imperialist presence within the main march on Saturday, November 15. This contingent will march together in a disciplined way, bearing red flags, NLF flags and other banners showing solidarity with the Vietnamese people.

During the big rally, the Red Flag contingent will constitute an agit prop (agitation-propaganda turn-on) unit to work to bring people to the Justice Department.

Mr. President, I understand that many citizens have deep convictions concerning the war. I, too, would like to see it come to an end.

The moratorium, however, will not stop the fighting. It may even prolong it because the antiwar demonstrations give direct encouragement to the Communist forces in Vietnam. This encouragement was summed up in a nutshell on October 22, 1969, in a broadcast of the National Liberation Front's clandestine radio station in South Vietnam. The NLF said:

The American people's brilliant success of the 15 October movement is a source of strong encouragement to our troops and people.

The fact of giving encouragement to the enemy should, in itself, deter Americans from participating in the moratorium, Mr. President.

I should also think that well-meaning citizens would want to stay out of Washington so as not to further the destructive goals of many of the moratorium planners.

There is the real possibility of violence. The Federal Government did not invent Weatherman or the Yippies. It did not conjure up the Revolutionary Contingent. Such groups are inherently vicious and existed for no good purpose. Their primary goal is destruction and violence, and, while moratorium leaders may wish to disavow them, they are very much a part of the moratorium.

Mr. President, I do not wish to predict violence during the moratorium. I hope that it will pass peacefully. But I believe that the record and the published statements of certain extremist groups in the antiwar movement give us clear warning that we need to take every precaution against the possibility of trouble.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia, I yield.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, it was with interest that I listened to that part of the statement of the Senator from West Virginia pertaining to violence and, at least, the natural appearing setup that is being created by the perpetration of violence and our concern for it.

It was with some curiosity that I listened to a former Attorney General of the United States of America on the television, I believe it was last night, in which he deplored the idea of saying that violence is going to come out of this meeting.

Apparently it was the thought of this former Attorney General that because it was the honest opinion of a present Deputy Attorney General of the United States that such violence will come about, and he says so and takes the precautions that he believes are necessary to deal with that situation, that that kind of talk will result in violence rather than avoiding and preventing it.

My thoughts went back to October 1967, when the Department of Justice under a different administration was in charge of things and plans that were submitted for the march on the Pentagon. And assurances were given that there would be no violence, that ground rules were established, that there were things that they would do and would not do, and that they would not go beyond certain lines of demarcation, and so forth. However, notwithstanding those assurances, violence did occur. And this Nation

was submitted to the shame of the world because it was not able even to protect the sanctity of peace and order around its military headquarters in the Nation's Capital.

I wonder if that is not the same type of thing that the Senator from West Virginia exercised or is certainly, at least, concerned about now, that it is nice to think in terms of coming events in a Pollyanna way, but at the same time it is well to have a little dry powder on hand and a little flint to insert in the powder horn just in case.

Would that be in line with the thinking the Senator from West Virginia has in mind with respect to the present situation?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, the Senator is correct. It would be.

I heard the same former Attorney General last night on television. My thoughts went back to Resurrection City which was set up during his tenure of office as Attorney General.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I think we should have every sympathy for those who honestly, lawfully, and peacefully demonstrate and petition their government and make their feelings and sentiments known. However, we ought to be a little realistic about it and not criticize those in charge now who are trying to be realistic and trying to do the things that they are entitled to do under the circumstances.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

CONSULTATION WITH SENATE ASKED ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, there seems to me a contradiction between the action of the White House of yesterday, preventing the Committee on Foreign Relations from being consulted or briefed concerning the Helsinki Strategic Arms Limitation talks, and the President's statement to us of today that he intends to set up a procedure to consult with the Senate concerning the conclusion of international agreements.

I would hope today's view would prevail and steps would be taken to insure that the Senate is consulted and briefed concerning SALT.

In this connection, it certainly seems incongruous that 14 NATO nations are to be briefed tomorrow by our negotiators, although we in the Senate, who will eventually have the responsibility of consenting to whatever may be the eventual treaty, are not being briefed.

NEW MOBILIZATION MARCH IN WASHINGTON

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, during the Vietnam moratorium last month, millions of Americans took part in peaceful, orderly rallies and meetings to express their strong desire for an early end to the war in Vietnam.

I supported the goals of the October moratorium, and I support now the goals of the moratorium activities planned for today and tomorrow. If the activities planned for this week by the Vietnam

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I particularly thank my good friend from Nebraska at this time for his courtesy.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, the Senate has begun debate on the confirmation of Circuit Judge Clement Haynsworth to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. It may seem odd that the debate has just begun since it has been raging for several weeks, virtually since the President's announcement of the nomination. But formal debate began on November 13.

The Committee on the Judiciary, by a vote of 10 to 7, has recommended the confirmation of Judge Haynsworth's nomination. It is now the duty of the full Senate to advise and consent or to withhold its advice and consent to the nomination. The vote will be very close, in all likelihood. The outcome may turn on one or two votes.

I hope, and I think, that Judge Haynsworth's nomination will be confirmed. He is an outstanding jurist and will bring balance and judgment to the Court.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

As in legislative session, a message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 474) to establish a Commission on Government Procurement.

The message also announced that the House had agreed to the amendment of the Senate to the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 966) making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1970, and for other purposes.

ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

The message further announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled joint resolution (H.J. Res. 966) making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1970, and for other purposes, and it was signed by the Acting President pro tempore.

(By order of the Senate, the following proceedings were conducted as in legislative session:)

APPOINTMENT OF ELLIS L. ARMSTRONG AS COMMANDER OF RECLAMATION

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, the Bureau of Reclamation now has on the job a new Commissioner, Ellis L. Armstrong, who was appointed by President Nixon to succeed my fellow Nebraskan, Floyd E. Dominy, who retired from the Federal service on October 31, after 36 years of service.

Mr. Armstrong is a native of Utah but he has worked for the Bureau of Reclamation in Nebraska, and I have noted an editorial from the people who know him best, down in the southwest corner of the State. The McCook Daily Gazette, whose editor is Allen D. Strunk, is the voice of the Republican River Val-

ley and it was particularly gratifying to me to read an editorial in the paper's edition of October 24.

The headline is, "Ellis L. Armstrong Appointment Pleasing," and I want to say it is pleasing to me as well. I have full confidence that he will carry on in the best tradition of the Bureau of Reclamation in developing their water resources of Nebraska and all of the West.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ELLIS L. ARMSTRONG APPOINTMENT PLEASING

Southwest Nebraska and Northwest Kansas is pleased and fortunate in the appointment of Ellis L. Armstrong as Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation.

The appointment of this man is gratifying to this part of the country because of his fine character and ability but particularly because we consider him a Nebraskan even though his native state is Utah.

From 1948 to 1954 Mr. Armstrong was project engineer at Trenton Dam. During that time many persons in the McCook and Trenton areas grew to know, respect and admire Mr. Armstrong and his family.

With the completion of the Trenton project, he went on to other accomplishments and became Deputy Project Manager for consultants working for the Power Authority of New York State on the St. Lawrence Power and Seaway project. He returned to Utah in 1957 to become director of highways, Utah State Road Commission, and held this position until he was named Commissioner of Public Roads, U.S. Department of Commerce.

Since May 1968 he has been assistant regional director of Region IV including parts of Utah, Nevada, Wyoming, Colorado and Arizona with headquarters in Salt Lake City.

Among his honors is being the 29th person ever elected and elevated to national honorary membership in Chi Epsilon, national civil engineering fraternity.

Mr. Armstrong fills the seat held by Floyd E. Dominy, formerly of Hastings, who like Armstrong has had a warm spot in his heart for the reclamation interests of Nebraska and Kansas.

Mr. Armstrong's appointment is indeed pleasing to this area and puts two former Nebraskans in key positions, the other being former University of Nebraska Chancellor Clifford Hardin now Secretary of Agriculture.

We are confident both will continue doing outstanding jobs in serving the nation and this area.

COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION TOMORROW

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, as in legislative session, I ask unanimous consent that all committees be permitted to meet during the session of the Senate tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE PROSPECT FOR VIOLENCE IN THE ANTIWAR DEMONSTRATIONS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, there have been persistent rumors that violence will accompany the 3 days of antiwar demonstrations which are scheduled to begin here this evening.

These rumors were attributed by Dr. Benjamin Spock on November 8 to an ef-

fort by the Government to scare people away from Washington. Spock was quoted in the Washington Post on November 9, 1969, as saying:

The government is trying in every way to intimidate people who are coming here to protest against the war.

Dr. Spock is totally wrong. The rumors have persisted, not because the Government is trying to scare anyone, but because of the extremely violent nature of some of the groups which are planning to participate in the moratorium.

These groups run the gamut of left-wing extremism, and the well organized and disciplined to fairly new brands of revolutionaries who have hastily gathered together and assumed catchy names for the convenience of identification in the press.

They are all planning to come, Mr. President—the Trotskyite Young Socialist Alliance, Weatherman, the Crazies, the Mad Dogs, the Yippies, the Anarchists, the W. E. Dubois Clubs, and Youth Against War and Facism.

I am not talking about earnest young people or older persons who believe that, by their participation, they are fulfilling their constitutional obligation as citizens. I have reference, instead, to those for whom the politics of confrontation is an end in itself and for whom violence is an instrument to be used in reaching their goal—a goal nothing less than the destruction of an orderly society and constitutional government.

These factions and certain others seek only to exploit the emotional issue of the war. While their ideological beliefs may differ, they are united in the cause of destroying our established institutions and replacing them with anarchy or a totalitarian regime.

They are, of course, going, as it were, after an elephant with a peashooter. And they will not, of course, succeed in their effort. But, as these radicals of the lunatic fringe go about their business, they may succeed in causing innocent people to be hurt.

I note that the so-called "respectable" elements behind the moratorium are already trying to disassociate themselves from any violence which may break out here either during or after the main demonstration. Pontius Pilate set a precedent for this kind of hand washing, Mr. President, and as we all know, he was not absolved for his actions. The New Mobe and anyone else who played a part in organizing the demonstration should be held to account for attracting and supporting these dregs of the New Left.

Spokesmen for Weatherman and the Yippies are being quoted now as saying that they intend to refrain from violence during the moratorium. But neither of these groups has displayed one iota of sanity or sincere conviction over any issue in the past and all of their activities heretofore have been marked by irrationality and violence. So, I think it will be quite out of character if neither organization is capable of containing itself during the 3 or more days of demonstrations which lie ahead.

I would like to call attention to the widely-circulated Evans-Novak newspa-

S 14266

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

November 13, 1969

The United Kingdom sets quotas on various wool and man-made fiber products from Japan. Italy restricts imports of various wool and man-made fiber products from Japan. France has similar restrictions on Japanese imports, but restricts imports from Hong Kong as well. West Germany has restrictions against Japan, Hong Kong, India and Pakistan. Austria has restrictions on Japanese textiles but also has an "anti-dumping and market disruption law" which permits automatic action when prices of specified textiles are considered too low. The Benelux countries have a bilateral agreement setting quotas on Japanese textiles and apparel, while the Japanese-Canadian agreement imposes quotas on some synthetics. Canada has similar agreements with Korea and Hong Kong. Denmark uses licenses to regulate textile imports from Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Switzerland employs a "price certificate system" for textile imports under which textile imports are kept out if prices are too low. This is administered through a system of import licenses for all textiles at the fabric stage and beyond, regardless of origin. However, the licenses have been granted automatically to high-cost countries. Norway and Sweden have restrictions on imports from several Asian countries. Even Japan has a global quota on imports of woven woolen fabrics under which Japan sets quotas for France, Italy and the U.S.

Mr. President, these facts amply illustrate the dilemma with which this country is faced. It is my hope this administration can reach a negotiated solution, but if our friends abroad think we lack the determination to pass a unilateral arrangement in the Congress, then they are sadly mistaken. Hopefully, such a solution will not be necessary, but let it be understood we stand ready to act if the present deadlock is not soon broken.

SALT—GIANT STEP IN THE LONG JOURNEY TOWARD PEACE

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, November 17, 1969, the day set for preliminary discussions at Helsinki, Finland, on strategic arms limitation talks, commonly referred to as SALT, could mark a historic turning point in history. Since the first atomic bomb was exploded in August 1945, mankind has lived precariously under what the late, great President John F. Kennedy described as "a nuclear sword of Damocles."

In urging Senate ratification of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, President Kennedy, quoting an ancient Chinese proverb said, "A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step." Since then additional meaningful steps have been taken toward permanent peace—the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons in outer space. Now, with the SALT negotiations, the opportunity presents itself for a giant step forward on that long journey toward permanent peace.

The armaments race between the major powers continues unabated. The insane nuclear arms and missile race between the United States and the Soviet Union has brought all mankind nearer the possibility of total destruction. Many of these armaments systems are obsolete before they even reach completion. The emphasis may change from bombs to missiles, from missiles to anti-missile missiles, to anti-missile missiles,

but the armaments race continues. Hundreds of billions of dollars and rubles are wasted on the seemingly insatiable demands of militarists of both nations for more and more weapons.

After years of this dangerous rivalry, neither our Nation nor the Soviet Union is any more secure than it was at the beginning of this decade. Every effort to develop and stockpile new superweapons has only resulted in a similar action by the other side. After each nation has developed a new one, the race starts all over again to produce new, more expensive and more sophisticated weapons.

Despite assurances to the lesser powers, the Soviet Union and the United States have used the 15 months since the signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty not to curb the armaments race but to proceed with the testing of new weapons systems.

The first order of business at Helsinki must be to seek a mutual moratorium on all testing. Then, efforts may proceed toward more comprehensive arms agreement that can only be arrived at after years of difficult and painstaking negotiations. Senators will recall that it took years of such tedious and often discouraging negotiations to arrive at the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

It is of utmost importance that none of the superweapons be excluded from the discussions—the ABM, the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, commonly referred to as MIRV's, and others. The continuing development by the Soviet Union and the United States of the testing and deployment of MIRV systems and further deployment of ABM systems must be halted.

MIRV is the major factor that could cause a tragic spiral in the arms race and preclude for many years the opportunity for meaningful arms limitation negotiations. Unless MIRV flight testing is halted soon, we may reach the point of no return toward being able to halt the mad momentum of the arms race.

We may never have a better opportunity to do so. Administration leaders and leaders in the Kremlin both appear willing to negotiate seriously. More important, it appears that both sides can negotiate from a position of approximate nuclear equality. The fact is that there is no such thing as nuclear superiority when each side has it within its capability to totally destroy the other.

The President's decision to enter into SALT negotiations is, without a doubt, his most significant act since assuming office. These negotiations are only the beginning. We harbor no false hopes that firm agreements will be arrived at in a week, a month, or even a year. The negotiations will be long, arduous, and frustrating. However, the outcome will determine whether the United States and the Soviet Union will be forced to continue to expend vast amounts of their resources and energy on nuclear weapons; whether mankind will be confronted with the bleak prospect of nuclear weapons proliferation; whether the horrible uncertainty of a horrible nuclear war will continue to hover over mankind; and

possibly whether civilization as we know it will live or die.

Mr. President, I am proud to be a cosponsor along with 41 of my colleagues of the resolution introduced by the distinguished junior Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE), calling for a halt in the testing of all multiple-warhead missiles by the United States and the Soviet Union. I can think of no better way of expressing the good faith of our Nation in the SALT negotiations than by prompt approval by the Senate of that resolution.

Mr. President, in announcing that I would not be a candidate for reelection in 1970, I stated "the most important vote of my senatorial career to date was cast in support of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty." In 14 months I shall retire from the Senate. It is my hope that before those 14 months have ended, I shall have the opportunity to cast an even more important vote—a vote for a meaningful Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.

BILLS INTRODUCED

Bills were introduced, read the first time and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. CASE:

S. 3138. A bill for the relief of Ruth E. Calvert; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MONDALE:

S. 3139. A bill for the relief of Grant J. Merritt and Mary Merritt Bergson; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF A BILL

S. 2168

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at its next printing, the name of the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCOTT) be added as a cosponsor of S. 2168, the milk quota bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR, AND HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATION BILL, 1970—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 278

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, today there are approximately 20 million Americans aged 65 or over in this country. Of these Americans, 3.2 million are restricted in their movements or confined to bed; 3 million are classified as illiterate or functionally illiterate; 4.4 million live alone, many divorced from community life; and 1.2 million are confined to hospitals or other institutions.

These people need more than a social security or welfare check to make their lives meaningful or comfortable. They need programs designed to meet their specific needs and to help them contribute to the development of their communities despite their advanced years. Title III of the Older Americans Act provides them with these programs by allocating money for training, planning, and service projects for the elderly.

November 13, 1969

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S14265

PRISONER EXCHANGE DOUBTED

WASHINGTON, October 22—State Department officials expressed doubt today whether North Vietnam had any interest in exchanging American prisoners of war for Black Panthers in the United States and said it had no information about such a proposed exchange.

The report that Eldridge Cleaver, a Panther leader in self-imposed exile, has begun discussion on an exchange with the enemy in Vietnam was issued in Chicago yesterday by Rennie Davis, one of the defendants in the Chicago Eight trial.

A State Department spokesman said that "we have no information about this report." Later, other officials said privately they doubted that the enemy would be interested in the proposed exchange.

"GROUNDWORK" PREPARED

SAN FRANCISCO, October 22—The Black Panther party said today that "the groundwork has been set" for the release of American prisoners of war if jailed Panther leaders are freed.

At a newsconference this morning, David Hilliard, the party's national chief of staff, said that the Panthers are seeking the freedom of Huey P. Newton and Bobby G. Seale, the party's co-founders.

In exchange for their release, he said, the Government of North Vietnam would free an unspecified number of American prisoners.

Mr. Hilliard added that the "final details" of the proposed exchange are being worked out by Eldridge Cleaver, the Panther's exiled minister of information.

Mr. Hilliard said that the Vietnamese would ask that Rennie Davis and David Dellinger, two of the defendants in the Chicago eight trial, along with Mr. Seale, act as the go-betweens in the proposed swap.

The proposal could become active "as soon as Davis and Dellinger are cleared to go and meet with Eldridge," Mr. Dellinger said.

CONSPIRACY TRIAL

(By Tom Hayden)

CHICAGO.—The Conspiracy trial no longer seems to be the carnival it was in the first week.

We no longer humorously refer to federal judge Julius Hoffman as "Mago" (a reference to a comic character the judge is said to resemble) but as "Adolph Hitler Hoffman."

The first 21 government witnesses have been from the Chicago police department and the FBI. Their testimony has unfolded as an attack on the movement, political ideas, language and style rather than on concrete crimes. The most concrete action charged any of the defendants so far was letting the air out of police car tires, throwing speakers at undercover agents and other trivia which defense attorney William Kunstler asserts belong in a municipal police court, not before the federal bench.

Occasionally there is a fantastic claim such as the one that Rennie Davis arranged for live television coverage in front of the Conrad Hilton hotel Aug. 27 and then ordered Mobilization marshalls to kick the line of policemen in the shins so demonstrators would be clubbed before the TV audience. On this particular charge as on many others, cross-examination revealed no shins were kicked.

The heavy emphasis in the police testimony has been on the provocative language and identity of the defendants. With a pretense at embarrassment officer after officer tells the jury that the defendants shouted, "— LBJ," "Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh" and other chants.

When defense attorneys ask police if any obscenities were used by them while clubbing demonstrators, they are given pious denials. The most any police witness has acknowledged is that he heard one officer say to another, "These little — are really tough . . ."

The Conspiracy is attempting to pinpoint the blame for the Chicago melee on authorities at the highest level and show that the trial is an integral part of a national policy to institute a legalized fascism. The Nixon administration, according to the defendants, is rigging the Supreme Court and Justice Department with reactionary political figures prepared to go beyond present Constitutional standards towards a new policy of reaction.

As examples of a move toward fascism, there are the proceedings of the Conspiracy trial itself. For example, the government has admitted illegal wiretapping of defendants but asks the court to uphold wiretapping in the overriding interest of national security. Furthermore, the prosecution case cites as "evidence" of crime speeches given before and during the convention to public meetings where there was no evidence whatsoever of a "clear and present danger to the peace."

The Conspiracy is waging a struggle coordinating the defense inside the courtroom with a political campaign on the outside to stop the trial. The defense case will try to re-enact what happened in Chicago and bring political figures such as Lyndon Johnson and Mayor Richard Daley to explain their policies. Leaders of the civil rights, academic and liberal communities are expected to testify about what happened in Chicago as well as ordinary people who were beaten or gassed in the streets.

The Conspiracy hopes to make part of its defense a "people's case" and encourages all witnesses to return to testify.

Since the trial has sparked widespread international concern, the Conspiracy hopes to turn it into a political showdown.

Dave Dellinger, at the request of the Black Panther party, announced the possibility of releasing U.S. military prisoners in Vietnam if and when the U.S. unconditionally released Bobby Seale and Panther leader Huey Newton. Panther Eldridge Cleaver has been in consultation with the Vietnamese about this. The political import is that Seale and Newton are not simply political prisoners but prisoners of war because it's a military policy the government utilizes against the Panthers.

Dellinger and Davis asked to be allowed to go to Paris to discuss release of American prisoners with the North Vietnamese delegation to the peace talks. Hoffman denied permission, but lawyer Kunstler went instead.

One of the most tumultuous scenes in the court last week was when seven Panthers were not permitted to bring a cake into the courtroom to celebrate defendant Seale's 34th birthday. Hoffman denied a request from Kunstler to celebrate the birthday. After a recess, as the defendants emerged from the conference room in ceremonial procession with the cake inscribed "Free Huey and Bobby" across it, a line of marshals wrestled the cake from Jerry Rubin.

"That's a cake-napping!" shouted Abbie Hoffman and Rennie Davis turned to Seale and said "Hey, Bobby, they've arrested your cake."

"They've arrested a cake," said Seale loudly, "but they can't arrest a revolution."

The Panthers seated in the second row shouted "Fight on!" and raised their fists.

When Hoffman ordered the spectators to be silent Seale turned to his supporters and said, "Okay, brothers, just sit in the courtroom and listen and don't say anything."

"I give the orders here, sir," said Hoffman.

"They don't take orders from a racist judge," Seale replied.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to continue for an additional 4 minutes.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hearing none, it is so ordered.

RISING TEXTILE IMPORTS FROM JAPAN

Mr. THURMOND. Next week the Prime Minister of Japan will visit in Washington for 3 days of meetings with the President of the United States on problems of mutual interest between the two countries.

We welcome the Prime Minister to this country and hope his stay will be a pleasant and meaningful one. He comes when relations between Japan and this country are relatively stable.

For over 10 years textile producing States, such as my State, South Carolina, have been viewing with alarm the steady rise in imports of cotton, wool, and manmade fiber products, the majority of which are coming from Japan.

In 1969 these imports reached a high of 3.7 billion yards, an increase of 400 million yards over 1968 and a considerable increase above the 1.5 billion yards coming into the United States in 1964.

Over the last 8 years imports of manmades have doubled roughly every 2 years. In 1969, these imports will constitute half of our total imports.

Mr. President, there is absolutely no doubt the import flow in textiles has become a flood, if not a tidal wave. Even more alarming is the fact that we have lost 33,000 jobs in textiles and apparel since January of this year. Total textile and apparel employment, which fell below 2.4 million workers in August for the first time in 15 months, continued to decline in September.

No government can ignore such an alarming trend. President Nixon made plans to solve this problem even before his inauguration, and he and his administration have given it high priority since that time. Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans has visited abroad in an effort to obtain voluntary quotas which would insure orderly progress of the textile interests of all concerned. The problem has been a generally uncooperative attitude by the Japanese Government. Ample time has expired to correct this situation. If our friends in Japan continue to keep their heads in the sand, then the Congress should take forthright action to insure the survival of our textile industry. It is my feeling that Congress would not hesitate to act.

Another point worthy of note is the fact that our textile industry is essential to the military security of our country. The textile industry was described by the World War II Army Quartermaster General as second only to steel in essentiality. In 1959 the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization made the following statement to the Senate Textile Subcommittee:

The OCDM regards the textile industry as an essential industry and considers it an essential part of the nation's mobilization base.

At the present time the textile industry is supplying an average of 200 yards of cloth for every man and woman in uniform. In all, some 10,000 textile items from socks to bulletproof vests are used by our servicemen.

In a speech last October, Stanley Nehmer, Deputy Assistant, Secretary of Commerce revealed some interesting facts. He stated:

been enlisted as foot soldiers in an operation mapped out mainly by extremists—testimony to the present ineffectiveness of nonviolent, liberal elements in the peace movement.

Moreover, heavy-handed Nixon administration reaction by Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst assures that any violence on Saturday will be blamed by liberals on the government, and the avoidance of violence will be credited by these same liberals to the self-restraint of the far left.

Although liberals belatedly spent this week in frantic eleventh-hour efforts to co-opt Saturday's march, they had plenty of advance warning. The New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (New Mobe), sponsors of the march, was formed last July in Cleveland with an executive committee dominated by supporters of the Vietcong.

The executive committee is moderate when compared with the 60-member steering committee, studded with past and present Communist Party members (including veteran party functionary Arnold Johnson). Far more important than representation by the largely moribund American Communist Party, however, is inclusion on the steering committee of leaders in its newly invigorated Trotskyite movement.

The steering committee began eclipsing the executive committee in recent weeks under the leadership of the Trotskyite Socialist Workers Party and its fast growing youth arm, the Young Socialist Alliance. Fred Halstead of the Socialist Workers Party took over planning for a march calculated to end in violent confrontation.

Participating in planning sessions were elements even more violence-prone than the Trotskyites: extreme SDS factions calling themselves the revolutionary brigade. Wild scenarios for storming the White House, the Justice Department, and the South Vietnamese Embassy were prepared.

Furthermore, the New Mobe was in closer contact with Communist Vietnamese official circles than is generally realized. Ron Young, a member of the New Mobe steering committee, journeyed to Stockholm Oct. 11-12 for a meeting attended by representatives of the North Vietnam government and the Vietcong. Reporting on plans for Nov. 15, Young urged a worldwide propaganda campaign to boost the demonstration.

The link between Hanoi and elements of the New Mobe was again demonstrated Oct. 14 when Premier Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam sent greetings to American antiwar demonstrators. Halstead, the Trotskyite leader, drafted a friendly reply to Hanoi approved by a majority of the New Mobe's steering committee. Its transmission was blocked only by the intervention of Stewart Meachem of the American Friends Service Committee, one of the New Mobe's moderates.

Thus far-left orientation of the New Mobe for weeks has worried liberal doves, including the youthful leaders of the peaceful Oct. 15 Moratorium. Sen. Charles Goodell of New York, emerging as a leading congressional foe of the war, attempted—without success—to reduce extremist influence inside the New Mobe and argued against including far leftists on the steering committee.

But the liberals, having forgotten the fate of popular front movements a generation ago and unwilling to repudiate any antiwar forces, would not actually break with the New Mobe. Any chance of that was eliminated by President Nixon's relatively hardline speech Nov. 3 and government strategy laid down at the Justice Department by Kleindienst.

Goodell and Sen. George McGovern of South Dakota, after much deliberation, accepted invitations to address the demonstration in hopes of moderating it. Similarly, moratorium leaders this week have tried to insinuate themselves into control of the

march. But the march remains essentially a project of the far left, constituting a tragic failure of leadership by liberal foes of the war.

THE MEANING OF PEACE

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, the news media tell us that on this coming Saturday, there will be a mass demonstration in Washington against the war in Vietnam.

According to what we read the demonstration will focus upon a demand for immediate withdrawal of American forces in Vietnam. I am sure that many of those who make such a demand sincerely believe they are advancing the cause of peace.

Now, Mr. President, I do not question in any way the right of Americans to protest and dissent peacefully—a right which is not enjoyed by those who live under Communist domination.

But I believe it would be well if those who are about to demonstrate were also aware of another important difference between the free world and the Communists. I refer to the meaning and purpose of "peace."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article written by Keyes Beech, the distinguished foreign correspondent of the Chicago Daily News, which was published in the Philadelphia Enquirer of November 4, 1969.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HANOI DEFECTORS WARNED UNITED STATES OF DUPLICITY, "PEACE" BLOODBATH

(By Keyes Beech)

SAIGON.—One year ago four senior Communist defectors from North Vietnam with a total of 89 years as loyal party members were interviewed on what they thought of the U.S. bombing halt over North Vietnam.

In the light of what has happened since then their comments make interesting reading. Here are excerpts:

Lt. Col. Phan Viet Dung, former Communist regimental commander: "Hanoi wants this bombing stop and the apparent peace it will bring only so that she can better prepare to gain her ends. . . . Even after the bombing is halted the Paris talks will yield nothing for the U.S. because Hanoi will then claim the halt proves the Americans were guilty. This will be just what they need to boost morale in the north."

Lt. Col. Huynh Cu, 23 years a party member: "You must take a lesson from what happened in Laos in 1962. When our North Vietnamese forces attacked we could easily have taken Vientiane. Then Ho (Chi Minh) ordered the troops to pull back rather than risk any real military intervention by the U.S."

"Now, if North Vietnam moves some troops out of the South in an apparent move to de-escalate, the South must not be fooled but must go and take back the land regardless of what Hanoi or anybody else says."

"But I don't really understand what the Americans hope to gain. This is like any other kind of trading. If you give something, you must get something. But what are you going to get in exchange? Nothing but words. . . ."

"I want to remind you what an important Japanese Communist has said. The Westerner believes war and peace are two different things. The Westerner thinks it is right to deceive people in wartime but not in peacetime."

"The Communist believes that it is also

right to deceive people in peacetime when making agreements with the enemy because the Communist believes war and peace are the same thing."

"Mao (Tse-tung) said the closer to peace, the greater the danger. Now is the time to be most alert. The idea of peace may blind you."

Lt. Col. Le Xuan Chuyen, 21 years a party member:

"Stopping the bombing is only going to lengthen the war and eventually you will suffer greater, not lesser casualties. Also you will see the antiwar movement in the U.S. become greater. You will encourage the demonstrators by convincing them they are right."

"When I first heard of the bombing halt I thought it must be a joke and I laughed. But when I realized the U.S. was serious I was dumfounded by their stupidity."

"Of course your people want peace, but if a cease-fire comes don't be happy. There will be really nothing to be happy about, for it will be sure to lead to great suffering here and many, many deaths. . . ."

"You will see, the deaths here in the South will be at least one thousand times greater. But by that time your Western press will have believed that peace is here and they will have gone home and won't be around to see it happen."

"Only the Vietnamese will be left for there is nowhere for them to go this time. There are 3 million people on the blood list and you will have condemned them."

Col. Tran Van Duc, 24 years a party member, who led 8000 men in an attack on Saigon during the 1968 Tet offensive:

"It will be impossible to get Hanoi to keep her promises. The only promise they will keep is the one they have made to themselves that nothing can keep them from eventually conquering South Vietnam."

"If there is a cease-fire many people will think that peace has really come and let their guard down. Then the Communists will act suddenly. You must be warned that when it seems like peace has come, then it will be the most dangerous time of all."

BRIEFING OF SENATORS ON SALT NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a memorandum to the Foreign Relations Committee from my Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the memorandum was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
November 12, 1969.

Memorandum to: All Members of Foreign Relations Committee.

From: Albert Gore, Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs.

The meeting in Executive Session of the Subcommittee on Disarmament, which was to be held at 4 o'clock this afternoon, is cancelled. As the notice sent to all members of the Committee yesterday inviting them to attend the meeting stated, the purpose of the Executive Session was to receive a briefing from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on the forthcoming SALT talks.

An authorized official of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency informed a member of the Committee Staff yesterday afternoon that the Agency had been instructed to refer all requests for briefings on the SALT talks, and all congressional liaison matters relating to the talks to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or to the Congressional Liaison office of the White House as the Agency had been directed not to conduct such briefings itself.

No one from the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Congressional Liaison Office of the White House, or the Department of State (which has statutory responsibility in this field) has responded to the aforesaid Subcommittee request for a briefing on the talks to begin on November 17th.

This is the first time to my knowledge that an Agency charged with a responsibility in the field of foreign affairs has not been willing, or, as in this case, free, to meet with the Disarmament Subcommittee on a subject on which the Subcommittee has had jurisdiction.

The reason for the prohibition upon the Agency's freedom to meet with and brief the Disarmament Subcommittee is beyond my understanding. It is particularly mystifying and disturbing in this case since members of the Subcommittee have been in the forefront in not only urging the necessity of this conference but have been in the forefront in both cooperation with previous Administrations and in securing approval of treaties and agreements in this field of armament limitation and control.

Inasmuch as the SALT talks will hopefully produce an agreement for some limitations regarding nuclear weapons, it is regrettable that officials charged with conducting these negotiations are prohibited from briefing responsible Members of the Senate so that the Senate will be in a position conscientiously to discharge its Constitutional responsibilities.

THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, the St. Lawrence Seaway system is without doubt a major engineering accomplishment and has stimulated the economic development and prosperity of the Great Lakes region. Although at present unable to support regularly scheduled U.S.-flag vessel service, the seaway is indeed entitled to its description as the "fourth coast" of the United States.

At the present time the Seaway is \$148 million in debt. This includes \$129 million of outstanding 50-year bonds and \$19 million of accrued interest debt. Lately, however, some proposals have been advanced stating that the seaway's debt should be assumed by the Federal Government. Proponents of seaway refinancing contend that it is the only federally supported waterway that is required to be self-supporting. They feel that this is discriminatory.

Such a position was recently stated in the Senate. The question was posed: "If the Great Lakes are free and open to all, why should the seaway linking the lakes even have toll charges?"

This is an important question. The answer is quite simple: the legislation authorizing the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation was accepted by the Senate in 1954 on the basis that the seaway would pay its own way. Let me for a moment refresh the memory of Senators and point out a statement made on the floor some 15 years ago by the late Senator Alexander Wiley. On January 13, 1954, Senator Wiley, one of the seaway's most forceful advocates, upon calling up the seaway legislation summarized the five reasons why he felt it should be passed. The No. 3 reason was that "the project would pay for itself, and the pending bill would not put an additional burden on the Treasury."

Senator Wiley no doubt felt then, as I do now, that the U.S. Treasury already has enough burdens without imposing additional and unnecessary ones.

The basic point to stress is that the Senate authorized the St. Lawrence Seaway on the condition and with the understanding that the seaway would pay for itself. Any proposal to have the Federal Government assume all or a part of the \$178 million debt, thus permitting the seaway to forfeit its obligation, would constitute a breach of terms and have very serious implications indeed.

OIL POLLUTION SETTLEMENT

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, as the conference between the Senate and the House approaches on the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1969 (S. 7 and H.R. 4148), I invite the attention of Members of both Houses of Congress to an article published today concerning the settlement of oil pollution claims arising from the *Torrey Canyon* disaster in 1967.

Although the Governments of France and England brought suits against the owners of the tanker for \$22 million, the settlement was made in the amount of \$7.2 million. As the article points out, Britain alone was estimated to have spent more than the amount of the settlement in clean up costs, and no estimate was available from France.

This settlement comes at an auspicious time, as our conference approaches and as the International Maritime Consultative Organization meets in Brussels to consider changes in international maritime law. I hope that both of these bodies will accept the principle which the Senate approved in passing S. 7 last month; that is, that the responsibility for cleanup of oil spill should not be borne by the public, but must instead be considered to be a risk of doing business.

I ask unanimous consent that the article, published in the *Washington Post*, be printed in the *Record*.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the *Record*, as follows:

FIRM PAYS TWO NATIONS \$7.2 MILLION FOR TORREY CANYON'S OIL DAMAGE

LONDON, November 11.—The American owners of the oil tanker *Torrey Canyon* paid \$7.2 million today to Britain and France in an out-of-court settlement for oil pollution claims filed after the giant ship ran aground off southwest England in March, 1967.

The payment, split evenly between the two nations, came from the *Barracuda* Tanker Corp. in Bermuda, a subsidiary of the Union Oil of California. The 119,000-ton vessel was under charter to Union Oil when it broke apart and spilled about 35 million gallons of crude oil.

The joint government announcement also said the owners had agreed to set aside another \$60,000 to compensate any claims from persons not already reimbursed by the governments for their losses.

BIGGEST SETTLEMENT

British Attorney General Sir Elwyn Jones told the House of Commons it was "full and final settlement of the claims of the two governments." Lloyd's insurance brokers said they believed it was the biggest settlement in marine history for oil claims.

Britain virtually assured itself of legal satisfaction recently when it caught the *Torrey Canyon* sister ship, the *Lake Palourde*, in Singapore harbor when its captain put in for some minor supplies.

In order to gain the ship's release, the *Barracuda* firm was required to post a bond of \$7.2 million—the precise amount of today's settlement.

\$22 MILLION SOUGHT

In the aftermath of the *Torrey Canyon* spillage, the two governments sued the tanker owner for \$22 million. But the owners claimed that under maritime law they were liable only for a certain value per ton of the ship's weight, which would have been \$4.2 million.

In addition, there was a jurisdictional problem: the ship ran aground on the Seven Stones rocks off Land's End, which is British. But its cargo damaged 40 miles of French beach as well as 120 miles of English coastline.

In view of the "uncertainties, inevitable delays and expense of litigation, complex and unique points of law involved in proving liability, and finally the difficulty in qualifying and proving damages," Sir Elwyn told Parliament "this settlement is eminently fair and satisfactory to all parties."

Britain was estimated to have spent more than \$7.2 million in 1967 to save beaches and wildlife from the oil. An estimated 50,000 sea birds perished and more than 25 million gallons of detergent were used to emulsify the crude oil so the beaches and birds could be cleaned. No French estimate was available.

The British also wanted the payment to cover the cost of the Royal Air Force bombing runs that finally destroyed the ship and sent it to the bottom. The ship reportedly was insured for \$14 million.

Because the ship was registered in Liberia, a Liberian Board of Inquiry investigated and found Capt. Pastrengo Rugiati of Genoa, Italy, guilty of "a high degree of negligence." He is reportedly a broken man, his career and health shattered.

The settlement came while international lawyers are meeting in Brussels to consider revisions to maritime law covering oil tanker accidents.

The Union Oil Co. also faces claims involving an offshore rig in the Santa Barbara channel of California that leaked in January, creating an 800-square-mile oil slick that polluted more than 25 miles of coastline.

LEROY G. AUGENSTEIN

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I invite attention to the unfortunate death of Dr. Leroy G. Augenstein, a personal friend and the distinguished chairman of the Biophysics Department at Michigan State University. He was killed Saturday, November 8, 1969, in the crash of his private plane.

Dr. Augenstein served ably and with imagination as a member of the State board of education.

His interests and pursuits were wide and varied. He was considered an expert in several fields of scientific endeavor. Regarded as a national authority in the field of genetics, he authored a book on the science of genetic manipulation entitled "Come Let Us Play God."

He had served as a research administrator for the Atomic Energy Commission. He was a national lecturer for the AEC, and was a consultant to the American Institute of Biological Sciences. He had served as science coordinator for the Seattle World's Fair.

Dr. Augenstein was also a theologian,

MIRV, Being Tested by Both Sides, Is a Key Issue at Arms Talks

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

HELSINKI, Finland, Nov. 16 —Probably no issue will dominate the American-Soviet talks on limiting strategic arms, which begin here tomorrow, more than a weapon that both sides are testing with an urgent secrecy over their missile ranges in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

The weapon is known by one of those forbidding acronyms of the missile age—MIRV, which stands for "multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle."

Not since the hydrogen bomb was developed 15 years ago and then combined with an intercontinental missile has any weapon so threatened to accelerate and expand the atomic arms race as MIRV promises to do unless its development can be checked while it is still in the test stage.

Huge Increase in Warheads

With MIRV's each side will be able to increase greatly the number of thermonuclear warheads it can launch without increasing its number of missiles. Instead of just one warhead to a missile, there will be several up to a dozen on the United States Polaris missile, for example—that can be guided to widely separated targets.

Under current plans for "MIRVing" the Polaris and Minuteman missiles, the United States would increase its strategic warheads from the current level of 2,400 to some 8,000. Similarly, if the Soviet Union places MIRV's on its large SS-9 intercontinental missile, as predicted by the Pentagon, the Soviet stockpile of strategic warheads will multiply from 1,000 to more than 5,000.

With the seemingly inexorable pace of weapons technology, MIRV is placing deadline, still unacknowledged, on the outcome of the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Halfway Through Tests

The United States is about halfway through a program of MIRV test flights that began in September, 1968, and by late next year it plans to start deploying the warheads atop Minuteman III intercontinental missiles and on the new Poseidon missile for the Polaris submarine.

Over the last year the Soviet Union has been testing triplet warheads for its SS-9 missile, and the stated presumption of the Pentagon is that

will begin to deployed "in the latter half of next year."

Whether the Soviet triplet represents a new generation of MIRV warheads is still a matter of considerable debate within the United States intelligence and military communities.

The preponderant opinion of intelligence analysts is that the Soviet triplet is a less advanced generation known as MRV, for multiple re-entry vehicle. MRV's, unlike MIRV's, cannot be guided to individual targets but fall in a cluster like the pellets from a shotgun shell.

Contradictor Testimony

Nevertheless, in the course of arguing for the safeguard missile defense system, Pentagon officials asserted that the Soviet multiple warheads seemed to be falling in an individual and uniform pattern corresponding to the displacement of the United States' Minuteman missile silos. And in testimony in August before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Dr. John S. Foster, director of defense research and engineering, offered the judgment that "the Soviet triplet probably is a MIRV."

As is being emphasized by Soviet as well as American scientists, if MIRV development is to be stopped, it will have to be in the flight test stage. Once MIRV's are deployed, aerial photography cannot detect multiple warheads, and there is no way to check on them as part of an arms-control agreement except through on-site inspection of individual missiles—a step that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is likely to accept.


A crucial issue in the forthcoming talks, therefore, is whether either side is prepared to offer or accept a moratorium on MIRV tests.

From all advance indications, the United States delegation is neither prepared nor authorized to propose a moratorium, although in a noncommittal fashion it may raise the idea to test Soviet reaction.

Resistance Rises in Pentagon

Even if the Soviet reaction is favorable, there is considerable question whether the Nixon Administration, in the ensuing negotiations, would be prepared to propose a moratorium. Considerable resistance to it is beginning to build up in the Pentagon, which in recent weeks has begun to emphasize the problems of effectively monitoring Soviet MIRV tests and to insist that no moratorium should be entered into without an accompanying limitation on Soviet development of antiballistic missiles, or ABMs.

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The New York Times Nov. 17, 1969
MIRV missiles may carry varying numbers of warheads

ment specialists inside and outside the Government, the MIRV program illustrates how weapons are developed because they are technically feasible and then acquire a life and momentum of their own that cannot be stopped even though their original justification has changed or disappeared.

The MIRV program of the Air Force and the Navy had its conception in 1960-61 when the Pentagon first began to pick up intelligence information that the Soviet Union might be preparing to deploy antimissile defenses around its principal cities.

To counter such a move, which threatened to nullify the United States retaliatory threat against Soviet cities, the Pentagon began research on "penetration aids" to overwhelm any Soviet antimissile defenses.

Decoys First Considered

Initially the Pentagon thought in terms of unarmed decoys to confuse and overwhelm the Soviet defenses, permitting some of the actual warheads to get through to their targets. But according to well-informed officials it was soon acknowledged that the decoys would have to be so heavy that it would be preferable to make "penetration aids" into actual warheads.

The first step, therefore, was to develop multiple, or MRV, warheads, such as those now carried by the A-3 Polaris missiles.

This approach was cast aside in 1964 when it was discovered that the Soviet Union was developing the large Galosh missile for its defenses, at least around Moscow. The Galosh missile—the name originated by NATO specialists—could carry a large enough warhead to destroy simultaneously several closely grouped MRV warheads.

As an alternate, therefore, the Pentagon began work on MIRV warheads, which had become feasible because of im-

proved guidance systems and the development of lighter materials to protect the war-

heads. The MIRV warheads, planners feel, would be too widely dispersed to be shot down by a single Galosh missile.

To avoid provoking the Soviet Union into a counterreaction, the MIRV program was carried forward with considerable secrecy until 1967.

Then, however, to combat military and Congressional pressures for more offensive and defensive weapons to offset the Soviet antimissile system, the Pentagon, by a decision of Robert S. McNamara, then Secretary of Defense, decided to publicize the MIRV program.

At that point, the MIRV program acquired a new impetus and justification. As one former high-ranking official put it: MIRV's became the brainchild of the McNamara whiz kids. Aside from all the military arguments, the MIRV program now had a "cost effectiveness" justification: the McNamara civilian analysts could advertise it as cheaper than building more offensive missiles to counter the Soviet antimissile threat.

Example of Key Cycle

MIRV's represent an example of the "action-reaction" cycle that has stimulated the arms race. One side builds an antimissile system and the other starts developing multiple warheads to penetrate the defense. But as one side acquires MIRV's, the other side begins to worry that its cities and its retaliatory forces will be destroyed by the new multitude of warheads so it begins building more defenses or increasing its number of offensive retaliatory missiles.

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Nevertheless, for several years, according to officials then in positions of authority, the MIRV program continued on its own technological and military momentum without questions being raised as to what effect it was likely to have on the arms race.

This oversight, as the officials describe it, is attributed in part to the very secrecy of the MIRV program as well as to its espousal by the McNamara group, which thought that with MIRV's it was keeping the military in check. But it also occurred partly because the Defense Department's Bureau of International Security Affairs—then the Pentagon's disarmament faction—was preoccupied with the antimissile issue and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency with negotiation of the treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

The arms control issue was finally joined in June and July of 1968 when a decision had to be made on whether to authorize a two-year MIRV test flight program, beginning in September, 1968.

At that point the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency made what former officials now contend was a crucial mistake. The Johnson Administration was preparing for the talks on limiting strategic arms, which were expected to begin in September. Rather than raise the issue of a halt in MIRV testing and thus cause a policy division with the military, the disarmament agency decided to present no objections to the MIRV test series.

Instead, the agency decided to enter the talks with the hope that the moratorium issue would be quickly raised, ending the Pentagon's test-flight series.

Accuracy Is Doubted

Because of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, the start of the talks was postponed for 14 months. Meanwhile the MIRV test program has proceeded to the point where even with a moratorium the Russians might wonder whether the United States was ready to deploy multiple warheads.

If one technical hope re-

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compromise agreed to by the House-Senate conferees.

Enforcement experience has proven the wisdom of the House position. Both the Departments of Justice and Treasury feel that these recordkeeping requirements are of little law enforcement value. These provisions are an unnecessary hindrance to legitimate sportsmen and provide a tremendous bookkeeping burden to the operators of small stores. Further, they are practically impossible to enforce.

To alleviate this situation, I introduced, earlier this year, a bill that would exempt sporting ammunition from the law. This legislation has been passed by the Senate as an amendment to the bill to extend the interest equalization tax. When the House is asked to act upon the Senate amendments to the interest equalization tax bill, I understand that a motion will be made to instruct the managers on behalf of the House to accept the Senate amendment—I intend to support that motion.

WHAT DO MOBILIZATION MARCHERS WANT HANOI TO DO?

(Mr. WAGGONER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WAGGONER. Mr. Speaker, over the weekend the news media, especially the newspapers reported extensively the events surrounding the mobilization march in Washington. I like everybody else, have an opinion about the mobilization march. Each individual is entitled to his or her opinion. I admit readily that there were any number of people—how many, I do not know, and neither does anyone else—who participated, who honestly thought they were doing what they ought to do to serve the best interests of this country to achieve peace.

But, Mr. Speaker, for the life of me, I do not see how anybody can classify any individual who participated in that march who carried a Vietcong or a Communist flag as being friendly toward peace or us while chanting that Ho Chi Minh would win. Mr. Speaker, they are on the other side. For this group the mobilization march was a rally around the flag, but it was a rally around the Vietcong and Communist flag.

The news media, including the newspapers and other sectors of the media, have reported their demands. They want the President to quit and bring the boys home now without concern for the consequences. They want peace, they say. I do not know an American who does not want peace. It must, however, be an honorable peace.

I have done it before, but again I am going to ask, and I am going to keep asking until somebody who supports this movement gives me an answer: What do you or they want the Vietcong to do? What do you or they want Hanoi to do? What are they being asked to do? As yet no demands have been made of the Vietcong. I ask why? Do the supporters of the movement want Hanoi to go on and win, or do they just want us to quit? It is time to speak up and rally around our flag.

SECURITY OF UNITED STATES MUST NOT BE SACRIFICED BY ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT

(Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, the first of the preliminary talks between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on arms limitations begins today. Off and on for the last 20 years such discussions were planned, or thought about, or nearly begun, but they never really got meaningfully underway. In the United Nations disarmament talks are a perennial matter for useless oratory because nobody ever really gets down to serious discussion.

Now, perhaps, meaningful negotiations dealing with the limitation of defense armaments can be taken up between the world's two superpowers. Talks, though, do not mean surrender. The U.S. defenses are the best in the world, a fact that is undeniable. What the talks hope to accomplish, however, is a halt in further escalation of the arms race. It would be nice to be able to stop the useless stockpiling and duplication of first-strike and second-strike weapons.

One strong word of caution is necessary though. The security of the United States cannot and must not be sacrificed in any agreement. For years, the Soviet Union has adamantly dismissed the proposal for an adequate system of checks. Unless we can be absolutely certain that the other side is keeping its half of any arms limitation bargain, we cannot enter into such an agreement and still feel secure as a nation against outside aggression. History only too clearly shows that the Soviets say one thing and do another. An inadvertent weakening of our defense posture by any means is the one mistake that is only made once.

THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF SURGEON GENERAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 91-193)

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read, and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and ordered to be printed with illustrations:

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to the provisions of title VII of the Public Health Service Act, as amended, I transmit herewith, for the information of the Congress, the thirteenth annual report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service summarizing the activities of the Health Research Facilities Construction Program for fiscal year 1968.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, November 1, 1969.

CONSENT CALENDAR

The SPEAKER. This is Consent Calendar day. The Clerk will call the first bill on the Consent Calendar.

PROVIDING FOR THE CONVEYANCE OF CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO THE BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, OKALOOSA COUNTY, FLA.

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 7618) to provide for the conveyance of certain real property of the Federal Government to the Board of Public Instruction, Okaloosa County, Fla.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, since the majority leadership has seen fit to schedule this bill under a suspension of the rules, I withdraw my reservation of objection and ask unanimous consent that the bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa? There was no objection.

CONNECTICUT-NEW YORK RAILROAD PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION COMPACT

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 14646) granting the consent of Congress to the Connecticut-New York Railroad passenger transportation compact.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I would like to have something in the as the record states it is going to cost if this compact is signed. I would first of all like to pose a question. Inasmuch as the RECORD states it is going to cost huge sums of money, I would like to know what it is going to cost for these two authorities to acquire the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. First, I am interested in what the total cost will be to acquire this system by these authorities.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. I must advise the gentleman that it is not really the prerogative of the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee to make inquiries into the actual financing itself. We merely grant consent for the entities, the Connecticut and New York entities, to act in concert with respect to their transportation problems.

One may note from the letter of the Governor of New York how he hopes to acquire financing, but this is not up to the Judiciary Committee to verify. That is exclusively a problem for the entities of the two States, and they themselves will have to deal with it in due course.

Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, the reason I am asking the question as to what the total cost will be is that the record before us indicates they are very proud they have already arranged for some \$58 million in State and Federal financing and hope it will go to \$80 million.

I wonder if this compact is agreed to today it will pave the way for a good

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many hundreds of millions of dollars of Federal funds to do this, rather than for the authorities to go out and sell bonds and do it in a good, businesslike way. Will the gentleman answer that question?

Mr. KASTENMEIER. If the gentleman will yield further, we do not tell the entities involved how they may do business in this connection, how they may finance their transportation authority.

As the gentleman will note from the report, there are several activities which are authorized under the compact; namely, the acquisition of assets of the existing railroad, the repair and rehabilitation of these assets, the disposition of these assets, and the operation of the service or contract for its operation.

We do understand that there will be in connection with this an application for financing. This presumably will be Federal, State, or other financing, but we are not in a position to dictate to the States or to these entities what mode they will use for financing of this particular authority.

Indeed, if it is their intention to do so, they must come to the Federal Government in due course, or the State government or other entities, and make application for financing and obtain approval, from the Department of Transportation or other agencies.

This was not within the purview of the Judiciary Committee in terms of making a judgment as to how they should proceed.

Mr. MESKILL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from Connecticut.

(Mr. MESKILL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MESKILL. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 14646 is a bill to grant congressional consent to an interstate railroad passenger transportation compact between Connecticut and New York to improve commuter transportation between the two States. The bill is cosponsored by all the members of the Connecticut delegation. It is cosponsored by members of the New York delegation representing areas interested in the improvement of commuter transportation. Similar legislation has been introduced on the Senate side and is sponsored by Senator Donn, Senator RIBICOFF, Senator JAVITS, and Senator GOODELL. This legislation has the support of both parties; it has the support of transportation-conscious Members of both States.

As you are all aware, under provisions of article I, section 10, of the Constitution of the United States, approval of the Congress is required for all interstate compacts. The legislation passed by the Legislatures of New York and Connecticut require Congress to grant its approval before December 31, 1969, for the interstate compact to become effective.

The interstate compact itself is designed to allow New York and Connecticut to enter into an agreement to improve passenger railroad service between the two States. Commuter railroad service between New York and Connecticut is sorely deficient at the present. The service is undependable, unpleasant, inefficient, and unsafe.

If Congress gives its approval to this interstate compact, New York and Connecticut can begin to modernize their ailing commuter service. H.R. 14646 will permit the two States to lease or acquire the assets of the old New Haven Railroad and contract with the Penn Central System to operate a modern, efficient commuter service.

As a result of the two-State agreement, \$56 million would be made available to improve service. The amount of \$28 million will come from a grant from the Department of Transportation. In addition each State is pledged to put up \$14 million of its own to buy new cars and upgrade the service.

The Department of Transportation has given its approval to the compact. So has the Bureau of the Budget. The Judiciary Committee has recommended that Congress grant its assent to the compact.

Mr. Speaker, improved railroad passenger service between these two States is essential. We need to diversify our systems of ground transportation. Automobile traffic clogs our highways. I am afraid it will worsen before it improves. We must act now to modernize this important part of our transportation network. We must strive for a balanced system of transportation. This interstate compact is the main hope that something can and will be done to help the long-suffering commuter who would prefer to ride the rails than to sit in long lines of automobile traffic.

Mr. Speaker, I ask the Congress to give its assent to this interstate compact. H.R. 14646 is vitally important to both Connecticut and New York.

Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, of course the gentleman has not really been able to answer the question as to how much money this proposal will cost and whether the major financing is going to be by the Federal Government. I have a suspicion that the Federal Government is the one which is going to buy this railroad and which is going to pay for operating it.

It does not seem to me that anybody has made that point, as far as I know, that they are going to be privately financed by New York brokers and investment people in New York.

Mr. MESKILL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. MESKILL. All we are being asked to do today is to confirm an agreement which has been entered into between the respective transportation authorities of the two States. This in no way commits the Federal Government to the expenditure of any funds. All we are doing, really, is giving our blessing to a legal entity which could then turn around and make application for funds. If this legal authority is not given, then there will be no legal entity to make this application. The House is not being asked in advance to commit itself to make an expenditure of funds. The only legislative bodies that have committed themselves are those of the States of New York and Connecticut.

Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. Yes. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. PICKLE. I want to ask the gentleman from Connecticut if it is contemplated that you will ask the Federal Government for funds for the operation of this compact.

Mr. MESKILL. Yes. The answer to the gentleman would be in the affirmative. It is contemplated that one-half of the \$56 million would be applied for from the DOT. The DOT has already indicated its approval with knowledge of this, and the Bureau of the Budget has also indicated its approval. What has happened here, I would tell the gentleman from Texas, is that the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad has been defunct and operating in the red and is at the point of bankruptcy. In order to continue the passenger services to the people of Connecticut, the Penn Central Railroad finally agreed to merge with and take over the New Haven Railroad, but it was only interested in taking over their freight services and not interested in their passenger services because they were not profitable. Finally approval for the takeover was given provided that the passenger services were retained. In order to retain and improve the services it would be necessary for a substantial expenditure of funds for the acquisition of rights-of-way, improvement of personal property and real estate, and also for the disposition of some property which was no longer needed. It was for the reason that the legislatures of the two States agreed to this compact, which, of course, needs the ratification of the Congress. I would also point out we are not here committing ourselves to the expenditure of funds, although we must state that there will be an application made for Federal funds of approximately \$28 million in amount. I would say further that time is of the essence here, because if this compact is not approved by the Congress by December 31 of this year by this and the other body, then the actions of both legislative bodies of the States will be void.

Mr. PICKLE. I notice that in the stipulation in the report action will be expected by the end of this year, but this further complicates the matter as far as I am concerned. Our Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House has been holding extensive hearings on this type of matter. How can we say what is the best approach to this railroad without having looked into it extensively? Over the years the Federal Government has not involved itself in the operation of any of these lines. Federal assistance in this area has been carefully avoided. If we try to find an approach to train and passenger service, I question the wisdom of committing the Federal Government to a matter of helping individual rail lines at this point.

It seems to me the entire question of passenger train service in this country ought to be tied together. I know that the New Haven is in trouble. I know many of the passenger carriers of our country are in trouble. But if we say today that we are giving a grant to this particular railroad and not to others, we might be indulging in an inconsistency.

The Metropolitan's loans include an alabaster fragment of a relief of the crucifixion that the museum purchased in 1936 but has never got around to exhibiting.

Bret Waller, the director of the University of Kansas Art Museum, and J. L. Schrader, who with Waller arranged the exhibition and has written an excellent catalogue, found the fragment when they were allowed to go through the Metropolitan's storage rooms in their search for appropriate material.

This doesn't mean that the show is made up of leftovers. Rather the reverse. It is an exhibition in which each piece is selected for its effectiveness in the development of a theme as well as for its esthetic quality.

Asked how he negotiated so many important loans, Waller said that while "nobody wants to lend something beautiful to a museum out in Kansas just so people can come and gawk at it," museums and collectors will go out of their way for an exhibition with a subject both imaginative and scholarly and with a serious educational reason for being.

It is good to know that while the Metropolitan Museum subjects this city to an exhibition as vicious as the current "New York Painting and Sculpture," it is justifying its existence in another direction.

Looking at this exhibition I kept thinking how much it would have meant to me as a student. Huizinga's book was required reading and I found it a combination of fascinating and far-removed. It took years of museum-going and travel to make it come alive, but a couple of hours in Lawrence made me want to read it again.

This is the kind of thing museums should be doing, whether they are dealing with antiquity, the middle ages, or the 20th century.

A SURVEY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the President's Commission for the Observance of Human Rights Year 1968 completed its activities on January 30, 1969, 1 year after its establishment by Executive order. The purpose of this Commission had been to give the American people a greater understanding of the principles of human rights, as found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December of 1948, and the Constitution and in the laws of the United States.

The President's Commission issued a publication entitled "For Free Men in a Free World" which has as its purpose to survey human rights in the United States. The Commission's most distinguished Chairman, W. Averell Harriman, stated:

This publication aims to advance the President's purpose in establishing this Commission, and to fulfill the request of the General Assembly for a review of our domestic laws and practices against the standards set in the Universal Declaration. If this publication can contribute to a pride in the past, and to an awareness of future needs, and a national determination to deal with the problems of human rights that confront us, it will have advanced the cause of freedom.

I applaud the fine work by the President's Commission in bringing together in a single publication such a fine commentary on human rights in the United States. During the next few days, I will offer a number of illustrations from this fine work to substantiate my continuing efforts to see the Senate ratify the Human Rights Conventions on Political

Rights for Women, on Forced Labor, and on Genocide. Certainly if the Senate will face these issues head on and meet our moral obligations to ratify them, then we will be able to say in Ambassador Harriman's word's, we will have "advanced the cause of freedom."

SALT TALKS

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, today the United States and the Soviet Union begin what Secretary of State William P. Rogers described last week as "the most critical negotiations on disarmament ever undertaken." Leaders from both countries have expressed the hope that for the first time since World War II, the two major nuclear powers can enter serious negotiations on an agreement to control offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons.

Beginning with the first American proposal for the international control of atomic energy presented by Bernard M. Baruch at the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1945, there have been repeated attempts to negotiate an arms control agreement. Our success has largely been in a number of peripheral pacts, including the most recent agreement to insure that the world's seabeds are reserved for peaceful purposes only and the nonproliferation treaty. Only by strenuous and often frustrating negotiations have we taken these initial steps. But these agreements provide a basis for today's negotiations, negotiations which will undoubtedly be strenuous and frustrating. The American people must realize that there are no quick answers in these negotiations. They may proceed for months with little evidence of agreement, but a start must be made. Throughout the negotiations in Helsinki and thereafter, the United States must be patient and resourceful, as the United States and the Soviet Union move into a new phase of the arms race, more deadly and more expensive with the development of multiple-warhead systems for intercontinental ballistic missiles and by the creation of an anti-ballistic-missile defense system.

President Nixon stated the challenge in his inaugural address:

After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation. Let all nations know that during this administration our lines of communication will be open. . . . I know that peace does not come through wishing for it—that there is no substitute for days and even years of patient and prolonged diplomacy.

Negotiation and even signing of an agreement to control strategic weapons will not bring peace to a troubled world. But this is a major step and one that we all hope will be successful.

BIAFRA: A TRAGEDY FOR HUMANITY

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, Biafra continues to be a great tragedy for all humanity, a grim exhibit of hunger and starvation. It is important to remember that while tragedy only touches us periodically, Biafra's suffering continues every day.

This month's Harper's magazine contains an article entitled "My Summer Vacation in Biafra," written by Mr. Herbert Gold. It serves as a reminder of the conditions that are destroying a generation of Biafrans. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

Another noteworthy article on the subject of Biafra was published in the Washington Post of November 14, 1969. The article, written by Jim Hoagland, of the Washington Post Foreign Service is entitled "How Many Children Dying in Biafra? No one Can Say?" I ask unanimous consent that this article also be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The article in the Post contains some shocking revelations. It is there stated:

How can I tell you how many children are dying a day? Dr. Aaron Ofekwunigwe, Biafra's leading child specialist, asked with exasperation. "Pick any number you like and I'll say it. The point is they are dying."

He spoke after walking through the grim last hope ward at the Santana Hospital, which houses 600 children suffering from Kwashiorkor, the killing protein deficiency disease.

Mr. President, I know the effort to feed the hungry in Biafra is being complicated and frustrated by the Nigerian blockade and Nigerian-Biafran relations. The shooting down of the Red Cross plane by the Nigerians on June 5, 1969, has produced the worst crisis yet. As Father Byrne, a Catholic priest on Sao Tome—the jumping off point for relief flights—stated:

We have the food; we just cannot get it to them. These children know nothing about secession, economic blockade, political involvement. They only know they are starving.

Mr. President, this Nation and all other nations everywhere must take every means, seek every opportunity, and go to any reasonable length to bring about a resumption of a full contingent of relief flights immediately. Two months from now it may be too late.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MY SUMMER VACATION IN BIAFRA

(By Herbert Gold)

I am invited by telephone by a Committee for Biafran Writers and Artists and I accept at once. The lady at the other end of the wire in New York tells me about shots and preparations and then begins to giggle. "You mean you're really going? You're not going to think about it and call back and say you can't? Do you know there isn't any place to sleep and you may not eat for a week?"

It's odd to hear her laughter across the continent.

Thinking to get some information, I telephoned a Biafran relief organization in San Francisco. The reverend in charge was in conference, but I spoke to an assistant. "I'm going to Biafra on Monday," I said.

"You're going to be off on Monday?" he asked.

"Biafra!" I said.

"Oh, Biafra," he said. "Yeah, man. Cool. Why?"

Next I called an editor to whom I suggested writing about this trip. "Oh Jesus, we're up to our — in Biafran babies." I agree. I skip those articles, too. I have an image of the swollen belly and the mournful

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eyes, and it's classified like the Vietnam war: a horror with which I continue to live, like everyone else.

GETTING THERE

Biafra makes bad dreams for people who refuse to dream.

While the moon rocket splashes down, and all over the front pages, the red-haired babies are buried in the News of the Week in Review. I'd heard about kwashiorkor, "the red-man's disease." But the hair looks more like a crispy grayish-red, and it doesn't look like hair—more like something weakly extruded by a disoriented body, and it looks as if it would break if you bent it.

"Hunger is a legitimate weapon of war," says one of the Nigerian generals. The Nigerians use it to destroy the Biafrans. The Biafrans use it to arouse the atrocity-drugged conscience of the world. The children die to these purposes.

These abstractions are not the truth of it. The truth here is suffering and the sufferers cannot tell it and I am trying to write my way out of shock. Floating through the suffering, immune and shaken, sleepless and immune, full of rage and immune.

Our party: Leslie Fiedler, literary critic; Miriam Reik, Professor of English ("Just call me Dr. Reik"). Diana Davies, who calls herself "The Pack-horse," photographer and black-belt judoka. H. Gold, who wonders what the devil he is doing here.

Jews and Ibos. "The Ibos should go home to their region."—Alhaji Usman Liman. "These people know how to make money."—Mallam Muhammadu Mustapha Mande Gyari. "There are too many of them in the north. They were just like sardines"—spawned in some estaminet? as T. S. Eliot said—"and just too dangerous."—Mallam Mukhter Bello. (These quotations are from an address by Colonel Ojukwu to the African Unity Consultative Committee meeting, Addis Ababa, August 5, 1968.)

Fourteen million people in Biafra! Hardly a tribe. We don't call the Irish or the Jews a tribe, not without some malice in there someplace.

I wouldn't have chosen this trip, but neither could I refuse it. I can only bear witness, and it's all I can do. Who is the mediator described as having lost some fine opportunities to remain silent?

"Captain Genocide" is the bomber pilot who boasts on the radio of killing children. He flies an Ilyushin, but they think he's a Belgian. About 40 per cent of the children are dead from starvation, so Captain G. is not a major producer and packager of child mortality. He relieves the protein shortage by reducing the demand. "Never to be born would be best for mortal man, but this happens only to a very few." The melancholy joke has another meaning in Biafra. Babies are born who are not born. Babies are born with death as their only and their immediate future.

Biafra was an ancient African kingdom of which little memory but the name endures. However, the name is magic and its history is becoming real again at the command of modern war.

From the *Guardian*, May 28, 1969, an editorial urging freedom for Wole Soyinka, the Nigerian playwright held in prison because of his sympathy for the Biafrans: "In order to improve Nigeria's public relations, General Gowon has lately made commendable efforts to scale down the bombing of Biafran civilians. He could win more sympathy by releasing an artist who is regarded abroad . . ." etc.

San Francisco-New York-Lisbon-Luanda-São Tomé-Biafra. The crashing through time zones, confusion of nerves in day and night, is an appropriate prelude to mass murder and desperate hope in an African rain forest.

THE PORTUGUESE ISLAND OF SÃO TOMÉ

May 29: The Biafran official has a habit I recognize—the Haitian one of grabbing his

balls at odd moments when he needs reassurance. I don't think it's merely the heat and tight underwear. "I went to law school at Tufts," he beams.

We wait at the Geronimo Hotel for permission to fly in one of the relief planes, Caritas or World Council of Churches, Catholic or Protestant. We get drunk with the fliers. The pilots are (a) Steve McQueen, (b) Steve McQueen's Best Friend, the Crazy Kid, (c) The Old Boy Who Drinks Too Much But Give Me One More Chance, Steve. There are also the British flying officer who got into some unmentionable trouble with a guardsman, a smiling Japanese, a deformed Texan whom I think of as the Forceps Baby, and subsidiary do-gooders, ironic intellectuals, machined Canadians on leave from their airlines—the full cast of an outmoded flick. They are idealists in it for the ideal of money: they can make up to \$3,000 a week. I especially like one whose real name is Johnny Cash (he showed me his driver's license to prove it) and another called Jack Frost from South of the Equator, Jack for short. When Jack heard Leslie and I are writers, he began to tell us about the Biafran children to whom he transports Formula 2, rice, and beans through the blacked-out, Mig-haunted sky.

A crowd of us hangs around the airport, trying to catch on to a flight. "The Princess" flirts with a Biafran official; she looks like Princess Radziwill, but she's a real princess. Like stop-action photography of growing vegetables, first you see her in Pucci pajamas and then one frame later she's in starched combat suit and then in a sweet limpid little frock. We drink cokes with the pilots and nervously visit toilets overflowing *à la portugaise*. The weepy American who wanted to rejoin his Ibo wife, the Italian reported who has been turned away day after day, the Swedish team, the Swiss boy journalist, and the four of us with our letters, invitations, passes, and Dr. Reik to speak for us. Three of the six planes which went out returned without landing in Biafra. "Intruder" was back.

The ground crews in shorts, stained T-shirts, with the frazzled faces of old softball coaches. "Jello and a coke!" one mechanic was yelling at the waiter. "No ice for the coke on this ——— job."

Jack Frost: "Now you just stick close to me if you want to know all about the war—what paper you say you write for?"

Johnny Cash: "Now, here's my wife and here're my four kids in Glendale. . ."

Jack Frost (as we climbed on a Super Constellation): "So you're playing Bet Your Life today, are you?" We signed the No Harm agreement. He told us the Joint Church Aid flights are called ——— Airlines. He has a whole repertory like that.

We lumbered off the runway on a Super-Connie called *Snoopy* with nineteen tons of rice and dried milk. We stretched out on the sacks. "You'll get rice mites if you sit on the rice," the pilot said amiably, "or milk worms if you sit on the milk."

The radio man said, "———, the Bomber used to fly with one of our pilots. He'd radio in and say, 'Man, I'll get you tonight.'" He was a South African.

"What about the Migs? Don't you have any trouble with them?"

He grinned. "Egyptians. Six Day War," he said.

I fell asleep, rice mites and milk worms, as we droned through the sky over tropical sea and Nigeria into Biafra and Uli Airport. He awakened me with a grin to see the flak below—pretty tangerine flashes following the sound of the aircraft.

ULI AIRPORT COMING

We arrived in a pandemonium of blacked-out airfield. Planes unloading food, pilots screaming—they have to get out before dawn; they don't want to be bombed down here, either—trucks grinding and backing,

officials greeting us and smiling. "Welcome to Biafra. Welcome to Enugu." Though Enugu has long been in the possession of the Federals, they still carry on the fiction that the Uli airstrips are really Enugu Airport. Nearby, in a blacked-out building, I heard, no kidding, a band playing, "I Ain't Got No Satisfaction"—celebrating two years of freedom.

We wandered about helplessly, looking for our contacts, nameless officials in the faceless dark. Diana asked to take a flash photograph and immediately an eager-beaver soldier boy arrested us. While he went to get an officer, I wandered off toward the music: "I Ain't Got No Satisfaction, unh, unh, UNH!" Vaguely I understood we were under arrest, but at four in the morning in the tropics, in a strange land fighting a strange war, the music seemed realer to me than a red-tape misunderstanding.

The soldier caught me at the door to the dance. "You move very fast," he said, and in his voice was hatred, suspicion, stupidity, and bucking for stripes. We were passed from bureaucrat to bureaucrat. Finally we reached the commander of the base. The sly foolish soldier said, "She took a picture."

"She did not. She asked if she could take a picture," I said.

"———, the Committee for Biafran Writers and Artists is hereby dissolved!" Miriam cried.

"In my opinion, sah," said the soldier, "she was ready to take a picture."

The Commander said, "Tut-tut." He had been a former school principal. He explained to us that they were fighting a war for survival, to the soldier that we were friends of Biafra, and wrote out an official piece of paper declaring everyone innocent—us, soldier, officers, himself. We need this man in Berkeley.

Somehow in the mess of being arrested, soaked in the rain, shuttled about, we lost our contact. We slept on chairs in the customs house. Someone brought us cold corn and coconut for breakfast, and then coffee. A man from the Ministry of Information came to get us, carrying his copy of *Le Grand Sommeil*, par Raymond Chandler.

He drove like a madman down roads blocked with stumps so the Nigerians could not use them as landing strips. At the checkpoints the guards said, "Welcome," as they pointed their antique weapons at us. *Le Grand Sommeil*? Is he putting us on?

A DAY OR TWO LATER

A blood vessel in my right eye has broken. Days without sleep, much heat, much strain. Our clothes aren't dry since the soaking of a few nights ago. Every official says, "This war, these conditions, things are rather difficult, really. We are decartelized, you know."

"Decentralization" is the euphemism for the capture of the capital, Umuahia, and all other cities. Though the Biafrans have recaptured Owerri and are moving services back into it, it is burned out, wrecked, nearly deserted, with a few stunned and starving people squatting beneath the riddled Pepsi billboard.

Stopped by the side of the road, waiting for a pass, which we needed in order to get to the place where we could get a pass which would, in turn, enable us to get a pass, I handed out protein tablets which I had carried with me. They are compressed lumps of fishy dust which had turned my stomach when I sampled them in the States. They were delicious. Diana had water in her canteen, a mouthful for each of us. The driver looked as if he were eating birthday cake and I gave him another handful. He was very thin and I asked him if he had lost weight since the war. "No, no, oh no, I was always like this."

Ibo pride, ebullience, and optimism. Plus a bit of fibbing.

We got gas at a military camp. The Biaf-

cused of an indisposition to detect a Red peril, backed up his deputy.

President Nixon, in his Latin address Oct. 31, barely touched on the threat of communism or subversion, saying just that the export of revolution could not be condoned and "a nation like Cuba which seeks to practice it can hardly expect to share in the benefits of this inter-American community."

In sum, the Nixon administration, to judge by the public record, is taking a rather calm approach to the vital question of whether Latin America needs to be more heavily militarized for a crucial crunch ahead. The official Washington consensus, to say nothing of the liberal-academic-congressional consensus, is that Latin governments do not face a serious subversive challenge. Governor Rockefeller so far has failed to make a convincing case for strengthening military programs and catering to military regimes. President Nixon would make a gratuitous and costly error if he accepted Rockefeller's military advice.

SALT—REACHING PEACEFUL PARITY

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, millions of Americans are now vitally concerned and openly debate the relative merit of our military weapons systems. The era of unchallenged military spending is ending. This is all to the good. But military spending all over the world races ahead; and unless positive actions are taken, such as arms-control agreements and a Soviet-United States detente in the arms race, this growth will continue to burden and depress us while reducing our security.

With the hope and best wishes of peaceable men everywhere, United States and Russian negotiators this week meet in Helsinki. They are coming to the Finnish capital to start talks on the most vital and sensitive disarmament issue ever negotiated. The object of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—SALT—is to find a way for both sides to agree on a plan that will limit, and perhaps some day reduce their vast nuclear arsenals. Until now the two superpowers have not touched upon the most fundamental nuclear threat: their own armories. This time the common stake in getting off the nuclear escalator is vastly large. The two powers possess something close to military parity. Each, as Secretary Rogers said last week, "could effectively destroy the other regardless of which struck first." Both nations are distracted by severe foreign problems—Russia with China and Eastern Europe, the United States with Vietnam. Both may be losing their taste for continuing the arms race. We have reached the critical point where we must talk before it is too late.

In the escalation of the arms race, our general policy has been to react to our estimates of what the Soviet Union's intentions would be. If we continue in this pattern, without agreement, there is nothing we can do to contain this inevitable spiraling arms race. It is imperative that the United States take the initiative. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has offered to suspend the development and testing of new weapons during the talks; and the precarious technological balance that helped to make the negotiations possible in the first place cannot be expected to last indefinitely.

This country has more than 1,000 land-based intercontinental missiles. It has 650 nuclear armed strategic Air Force bombers. It has 41 Polaris submarines with 656 submarine-launched ballistic missiles. With 16 missiles each and with each missile soon to be armed with three to 10 warheads, our submarine fleet alone could destroy the world.

In addition to this, we have tactical nuclear weapons in place in various spots throughout the world.

Medium-range bombers and missile sites encircle the frontiers of our potential enemies.

From public sources it is known that the United States has more than 6,500 nuclear warheads.

We have a military budget, including related space and AEC military requirements, of almost \$80 billion. There are 3.4 million men and women under arms; 1,300,000 civilians work for the Defense Department. And 100,000 companies, employing 3.8 million civilians, fill defense orders.

The military and civilian personnel not only work at home, but also, many are stationed at the 429 major and 2,972 minor bases scattered throughout 30 countries of the world.

These are the military credentials we bring to the arms talks at Helsinki.

An international research team financed by the Swedish Government published recently a bleak analysis of what was described as a runaway arms race.

It found that the world was spending more for military purposes now than its total production of goods and services at the start of the century, that arms outlays were doubling every 15 years and that efforts to control them were marginal if not illusory so far.

The study illustrates the point that since the 1963 treaty prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere or under water, that nuclear testing had been stepped up. The report warns that time was short for the current talks on limiting strategic weapons because United States progress on the development of multiple warheads would reach "a point of no return" in 3 to 6 months.

Mr. President, I would like to call to the attention of my colleagues the article written by John Hess for the New York Times on this subject, entitled "World Study Finds Runaway Arms Race, With Outlays Soaring".

In conclusion, I would like to say that "imperative" is a small word to use to emphasize the importance of the SALT talks and the need for United States' initiative to bring a halt to the arms race. I strongly endorse the importance of a Soviet Union-United States mutual suspension on the development and testing of new weapons during the SALT talks. Our best defense is peace. And we must make every attempt to bring peace to the world to give credence to our national dialog and to leave not only dreams for our children—but ominous as it may sound, a world of our children.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article by John Hess be printed in the Record, and I also ask that an encouraging, optimistic column on the Helsinki talks, written by Tom

Wicker, also published in this morning's Times, be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Nov. 20, 1969]
WORLD STUDY FINDS RUNAWAY ARMS RACE,
WITH OUTLAYS SOARING

(By John L. Hess)

PARIS, November 19.—An international research team financed by the Swedish Government published today a bleak analysis of what was described as a runaway arms race.

It found that the world was spending more for military purposes now than its total production of goods and services at the start of the century, that arms outlays were doubling every 15 years and that efforts to control them were marginal if not illusory so far.

The study demonstrated, for example, that nuclear testing had been stepped up since the 1963 treaty prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere or under water.

The report warned that time was short for the current talks on limiting strategic weapons because United States progress on the development of multiple warheads would reach "a point of no return" in three to six months.

The authors of the report believe that once that is achieved, the Soviet Union will be unwilling to halt development of comparable weapons and counterweapons. Such weapons they hold, cannot become reliable from a military viewpoint without testing, including the explosion of the hydrogen warheads.

BRITON HEADED TEAM

A sharp rise in military spending set in about 1965 and seems likely to continue; at present rates, arms outlays in the early years of the next century will exceed present world production of goods and services.

Not only is spending on arms rising faster than total production of goods and services, the gap is wider for the poor countries than the rich.

The study was sponsored by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, of which Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish economist, is chairman, and Robert Neild, a British economist and editor, is director. Another British economist, Frank Blackaby, headed the team that assembled the 440 pages of data comprising what is to be an annual yearbook on armaments and disarmament.

The work is a scholarly compendium of the world's troubles—120 armed conflicts since World War II—an analysis of armaments and the arms trade, and a history of the effort to control them. It is not optimistic.

Allowing a wide margin of error for data concerning the Communist countries, the team found that the world spent \$159.3-billion for military purposes last year, using official Communist exchange rates, or \$173.4-billion at rates adjusted for real buying power.

The United States spent \$79.3-billion of this, the Soviet Union \$39.8-billion (at the adjusted rate) and Communist China—a hazardous estimate—\$7-billion.

From 1949 through 1968, the study found, world military spending rose at an average rate of 5.9 per cent a year, after allowing for inflation. But the rate in the last three years averaged 8.9 per cent—an acceleration of 50 per cent.

SHARPEST RISE IN MIDEAST

The acceleration was far from even around the world. The sharpest rise came in the Middle East—19.9 per cent annually over the last three years. It was notable that both the victor and the vanquished in the lightning war of June, 1967, have sharply increased arms spending.

alliance among many other alliances that they had always accepted. They did not realize, as we more aged Parliamentarians realize, that what the NATO Alliance really represents in the world to-day is the greatest step of any that has been taken in the last twenty years. I also felt that there was a lack of understanding in the young of the policies that we were trying to pursue. There was a failure of communication with the age group with whom we were talking, or who were talking to us—because we allowed them free range to talk to us—and the lines of communication were really not good. I will not say they were blocked; they were not; but they were not good and we were not speaking the same language as they were speaking. It seemed to me most important that we should, somehow or other, try to bring the young people of Europe to an understanding of the importance of the NATO Alliance in any way that we possibly can.

This leads me to ask the Government whether they will urge the recognition of the North Atlantic Assembly as an official body like the Council of Europe or W.E.U., able to speak to the NATO Council and give their recommendations for discussion and advice. To-day the North Atlantic Assembly is 15 years old, and it is still an unofficial body. If it became an official body it would strengthen the Alliance through the Parliamentarians as well as through the military men. I would urge the Government to examine this possibility, as I think it would not require a very great alteration in the view they take of the North Atlantic Assembly.

My other comment on the gracious Speech must be on the United Nations and our policies there. I should like to congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, and to thank her very much indeed for her splendid work in New York. It is an extremely interesting assignment to be a delegate, as I myself know, having been for three years a delegate at three General Assemblies. It is also extremely frustrating and, at times, irritating to a great degree. Year after year the same resolutions appear, and one would often think, looking at the agenda papers, that nothing ever changed. Nevertheless, it does; and things are done. And although often one gets despairing about the United Nations it is the one and only place where people can talk and discuss, and where things do happen very often, and very often of great importance.

There is only one subject that I want to mention to-day, and that is the Middle East and the Israel-Arab problem. The noble Lord, Lord Gore-Booth, has just made a very wise analysis of the position of the Four Powers in the Security Council, and the question of the Israel and Arab problem. I should like just to add my own thoughts on this matter. Israel is a State recognised by the United Nations and by nearly all the nations, with, of course, the exception of the Arab States. I believe that even some of these would be prepared to accept the fact of Israel, given the help of European nations and the United States. By "help" I do not mean military help; I mean by world opinion simply stating the obvious, that Israel is there and will remain there for all time.

Israel has said that negotiations with Arab States would enable both sides to talk peace, instead of carrying on war, whether guerrilla war or otherwise. I should like to ask: Cannot our Government use all its influence direct to bring about a meeting between Israel and the Arabs? Instead, they support resolutions on this question which are sometimes tolerable and sometimes intolerable. The other day at the United Nations a resolution was put forward accusing the Israelis of responsibility for burning down the mosque of Al Aksa. There is no evidence at all that any Israeli would have been so foolish as to burn down any mosque. When I was in Israel after the Six-Day War I visited many mosques, one

in Hebron, on a day reserved for Moslems, and the Israeli guard would not allow me to go and see it without the permission of the Moslem in charge on that day. One of the interesting results of the Israeli administration is the way in which all the Holy Places, whether Moslem, Christian, or Jewish, are carefully looked after and freely accessible to those who want to visit them. Surely in the interests of peace our delegate at the United Nations should have abstained in a vote which, at its simplest, is a case which we would consider *sub judice*, since the trial of a person is taking place at the moment and the question of who committed this tragic act is unknown. In my opinion, it is most unlikely that it would have had anything to do with the Israeli Government. For us to vote for so biased a resolution is, in my opinion, wrong, and I must say so here.

Foreign affairs are never static; changes come every day. I think that to-day we have the opportunity of a new Government in Germany, and a comparatively new Government in France. I have hopes that their policies may lead to a détente in East-West relations, and also to a change in the policies towards us in relation to the E.E.C. I also hope—and I am encouraged by what I have heard in this debate—that a new look may come into Europe, and that we shall not lose the opportunity of seeing that that new look leads us in further steps towards world peace.

THE DARK MILITARY SIDE OF THE ROCKEFELLER REPORT

Mr. CHURCH, Mr. President, the long-awaited Rockefeller report on Latin America generates two wholly different impressions. Its proposals for adjustments in trade and economic aid are fresh, creative, and promising. At the same time, however, the report advances a remarkably stale view of the military security needs of Latin America. Ignoring plentiful evidence that the chief political trend in Latin America is toward militaristic nationalism, the report stresses development of U.S. military aid programs to strengthen Latin American governments against Communist subversion.

In a recent Washington Post column, Stephen S. Rosenfeld commented most perceptively on the anomalies in the Rockefeller military aid recommendations. I ask unanimous consent that his column be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1969]

THE MILITARY SIDE OF ROCKY'S REPORT

(By Stephen S. Rosenfeld)

Nelson Rockefeller in effect gave the President two reports on Latin America; they were released this week. One centered on the hemisphere's economic requirements and on how the United States should cooperate in fulfilling them. The other concerned what Rockefeller believes to be ever-expanding menace of Castroism, and the measures needed to meet that. So divergent in perception and policy implications are these two elements—the one heading toward economic growth in peaceful circumstances and the other heading toward vigilance and possible military confrontation—that it is hard to see how they can coexist in a single statement. Yet there they are.

To be sure, this kind of double vision is not new. Since the World War II period, when Axis penetration of the hemisphere was feared, Washington has divided its efforts between supporting Latin military establish-

ments and helping Latin political communities. More recently, as John Plank of Brookings has written: "One strand of policy has run from the era of the 'good neighbor' and the inter-American system . . . The other strand, which is not really compatible with the former one, derives from our conception of Latin America as an active theater in the cold war, one of the battlegrounds on which we engage those whom we have identified as our mortal enemies, the Communists."

Thus in the 1940s and later, our military policy was directed at preparing the Latin military for a mission of hemispheric defense. In this period, the United States opened up the Inter-American Defense College and Defense Board, the military assistance programs, sales of destroyers and submarines, and so on. The rationale for organizing the Latin military to repel a conventional foreign invasion has long since evaporated, but these programs limp on. Many Latinists believe the programs contribute heavily to Washington's militaristic reputation in the hemisphere.

In the 1960s, chiefly because of fear of Cuba, the rationale (though not always the substance) of American military policy was shifted from hemispheric defense to "internal security." Subversion, supported by or oriented toward Castro, was defined as the main enemy. The official view was that the Latin military constituted a "shield against insurgency"; behind that shield, the process of development—understood as a disruptive one—would go on.

This is Governor Rockefeller's view still. "All the American nations are a tempting target for Communist subversion," his report says. "In fact, it is plainly evident that such subversion is a reality today with alarming potential . . . of growing intensity." Predicting more Castros, he declares: "A Castro on the mainland, supported militarily and economically by the Communist world, would present the gravest kind of threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere and pose an extremely difficult problem for the U.S."

This diagnosis led Rockefeller to recommend major increases in military programs, both on the hemispheric-defense and internal-security levels. Urban terrorism, an activity so far defying control, is his special concern. Against the claim that some Latin military men serve a conservative status quo, he argues that there is "a new type of military man . . . coming to the fore and often becoming a major force for constructive social change." Is not the military anti-democratic? Rockefeller believes that few Latin countries have the sufficiently advanced economic and social systems required to support a consistently democratic system. Anyway, "the common heritage of respect for human dignity is evidenced in different ways in different nations."

As might be expected, many academics and liberals and U.S. legislators question Rockefeller's judgments in the military sphere. Politically the most important questions, however, come from the Nixon administration.

The State Department's Latin chief, Charles A. Meyer, said last July that "Communist insurgencies are currently at a relatively low ebb." Che Guevara's Bolivian fiasco "made the Cuban regime more cautious about initiating new areas of insurgency," he said. Meanwhile, Latin counter-insurgency capabilities have improved, and the appeal of Cuban-style revolutions has declined.

William E. Lang, deputy to Assistant Secretary of Defense G. Warren Nutter, scanned the hemisphere last May, found no insurgencies of consequence anywhere, and reported that "we have not seen external evidence of Cuban support for insurgency in Latin America for some months . . . 12 to 18 months." Nutter, who cannot easily be ac-

With an assist from the Vietnam war, the United States provided the largest portion of the increase. Its long-term trend was an annual rise of 7.7 per cent; the recent trend was 12 per cent. With a lag of a year or two, the Soviet Union and its allies followed this stepup—but the allies of the United States in Europe did not, except for Portugal, engaged in colonial wars, and Greece.

The increases work like compound interest, so that both the United States and the Soviet Union show cumulative gains of about 40 per cent since 1965, now accounting together for 70 per cent of the world total. The share of the poor countries is small but is rising faster than average.

The study confirmed that arms were swallowing a sharply rising share of world income. Before World War I and between the two World Wars, it estimated, the military spent 3 to 3.5 per cent of the world's resources; since then the share has risen to 7 to 8 per cent.

The change for the United States was more dramatic: from 1.5 per cent of the national product in 1913 to 2.5 per cent in the thirties and 10 per cent in the postwar period.

THE 7.5 PCT. RISE IN POORER LANDS

In the so-called developing countries arms spending has been rising at a rate of 7.5 per cent, as against a world average of 6 per cent, while output for both groups has been rising at no better than 5 per cent.

Put another way, world production is found to have multiplied about five times in the last 50 years, while arms spending has multiplied about 10 times.

On the other hand, the study reports that armed manpower has not increased significantly. The Paradox is explained by the enormous rise in the cost of weapons: the technological arms race.

Among the large Western powers, at least, it was found, the cost of military research far outshadows that of civilian research. For the United States, \$62.20 of each \$100 of military procurement is assigned to research and development, but they take only \$7.50 of each \$100 of manufacturing output.

Smaller countries can hardly compete. To the extent that they try, they find that they must market their weapons abroad to remain competitive, but the United States and the Soviet Union dominate exports.

In the race to supply the third world with weapons, the report concluded, the Soviet Union has caught up with the United States, owning largely to aid to the Arab countries. This estimate excluded shipments to North and South Vietnam.

The study represents the testimony of Robert S. McNamara, former Secretary of Defense, on how United States spending was sharply increased on an erroneous estimate of a Soviet buildup, and follows that with testimony by the present Secretary, Melvin R. Laird, on a new Soviet threat.

The authors, limiting themselves to nuclear tests reported by the Atomic Energy Commission for the United States and by a Swedish defense agency for the Soviet Union produce the following comparison of the average annual rate of testing before and after the ban:

	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	World
Before -----	24.4	12.8	39.6
After -----	32.0	9.2	46.2

The study cites evidence that many unreported tests have been conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union, and possibly by Britain and France. Most of the tests, reported or otherwise, have, of course, been underground, but the authors observe that the power and military value of underground testing have been far greater than had been expected.

[From the New York Times, Nov. 20, 1969]
IN THE NATION: A GOOD START IN HELSINKI
(By Tom Wicker)

WASHINGTON, November 19.—Since it took so long to get strategic arms limitations talks under way, it may be a hopeful sign that reports from Helsinki suggest a cordial beginning. Neither Soviets nor Americans yielded to propaganda temptations in their opening statements, both sides seemed to be addressing themselves to the same general objectives, and Mr. Nixon's message used the reassuring word "sufficiency" instead of "superiority" to describe the kind of nuclear arsenal he had in mind.

Opening-day goodwill does not, of course, guarantee long-range results, but in this case it seems particularly important. The military-minded, and hawk circles generally, in Moscow apparently fear that the talks are simply an American fishing expedition for intelligence data; while high military reluctance in Washington caused American negotiators to arrive in Helsinki without any specific proposals.

AVOIDING STALEMATE

Thus, it is extremely important just to get things going in an atmosphere of reason and goodwill. Once both sides become convinced—if they ever do—that the other genuinely wants an agreement, its scope and details should not be impossibly difficult. Taking counsel either of political fears and technical complexities, on the other hand, can produce nothing but stalemate and a continuing arms spiral.

That is why the use of the word "sufficiency" was important. "Sufficiency" is what both sides now appear to have in their nuclear strike capacities. That is to say, neither can launch a nuclear strike at the other with any hope of so completely destroying the other's retaliatory capacity that it will not be able to deliver a devastating return strike.

ELIMINATING NUMBERS GAME

If that is in fact the case, if neither side can attack the other with reasonable impunity, then each has a sufficiency of nuclear weapons to guarantee its national security, to the extent that it can be guaranteed. And this would be the case even if one or the other claimed more missiles, more warheads or more nuclear-armed submarines—as in fact the United States does claim.

If some general understanding can be established that there is nuclear sufficiency on both sides, a difficult numbers question can be eliminated from the arms limitation problem. The Soviet Union would hardly negotiate second place for itself, in numbers of weapons or total firepower, nor would the United States give up first place; but if it is established that first and second place don't really exist, that enough is enough and there is a sufficiency on both sides, then at the least a freeze on the existing nuclear balance becomes possible.

That much is crucial because the more the two sides go on with the nuclear arms race, either developing new and more awful weapons like MIRV, or tinkering with control and delivery and warning systems, the more it becomes likely that at some point one side or the other will score either an offensive or a defensive breakthrough. The danger in that is not just that a power that did so might launch a strike while it had the opportunity to do so; but also that both powers would be in constant fear of just such a breakthrough by the other, and would redouble their own spending, research and deployment—an endless cycle.

Moreover, it is hard to believe that any ultimate reduction in levels of armaments could be achieved before a period transpired in which both sides maintained, by agree-

ment, an existing balance, during which not only the good faith of each but the best methods of policing and verifying the arrangement could be tested.

THE COST ADVANTAGE

From that kind of an achievement, it would become possible at least to have discussions, on the basis of proven intentions, about mutual nuclear arms reductions. And another advantage of an initial nuclear arms freeze is that both sides could save substantial sums each needs for domestic purposes—in the estimate of Jerome Wiesner, about \$100 billion apiece in the next five years.

Of course there would be risk but if the aim is to eliminate risk, neither an arms limitation agreement nor a continuing arms race will achieve it. And as Gen. James Gavin has observed: "We're extremely venturesome in war and we ought to be as venturesome in peace. The rewards are greater."

RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN THE SOVIET UNION

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled, "Israeli Knesset Appeals to World's Parliament To Help Soviet Jews Emigrate," published in the New York Times of November 20, 1969. The article details the latest manifestation of religious persecution in the Soviet Union's long and infamous history of persecution of its Jewish citizens.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Nov. 20, 1969]
ISRAELI KNESSET APPEALS TO WORLD'S PARLIAMENTS TO HELP SOVIET JEWS EMIGRATE

(By James Fearon)

JERUSALEM, November 19.—Israel's Knesset called today on parliaments around the world to "employ the full weight of their influence" in assisting Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel.

In a move confirming a major change in Israeli policy toward the Soviet Union, the Knesset (parliament) indicated that persuasion would be replaced by pressure in seeking free emigration for Soviet Jews.

Premier Golda Meir, in a major address opening the seventh Knesset, said a 50-year campaign by the Kremlin to silence Jewish voices in the Soviet Union had failed.

Moscow should have the courage to realize this failure, Mrs. Meir said, "and allow every Jew who wants to leave the country to come here to us."

Mrs. Meir followed the disclosure earlier this month of the names of 18 Georgian Jews who wanted to leave with a new list of Soviet Jews whose requests to come to Israel also had been turned down.

The publicity surrounding the earlier announcement had indicated a dramatic break in the long years of secret negotiations with the Soviet Union to open the doors for as many of the nation's 3 million Jews who wanted to come to Israel.

In her speech to a packed Knesset chamber, Mrs. Meir indicated that the days of "quiet talks and quiet diplomacy" were over.

She said "we shall see to it that every person possessed of a conscience, Jew and non-Jew, everybody to whom freedom is dear, will surely raise his voice for the freedom of others as well."

Isser Harel, former head of Israel's Secret Service and a new member of Parliament suggested during the general debate that dis-

quiet among Soviet Jews might eventually "become a malady that could spread to other elements in the Soviet Union."

"When that day comes," he continued, "and when the Kremlin's concern over the stability of its internal regime outweighs Russia's interests abroad, they'll want to get rid of their Jews and they'll want to get rid of them fast."

Taken with Mrs. Meir's speech, the implication was that Israel, possibly with the help of other governments, would be seeking to generate the internal pressure that might lead to a change in Soviet policy barring free emigration for all citizens.

There are Israeli officials who are aware of the risk entailed in the new Israeli policy. Some have expressed concern over possible recriminations against Soviet Jews who have given their names to the publicity coming from Jerusalem.

CENSORSHIP BARS DETAILS

Censorship in Israel has long prevented references to immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel and even today bars speculation on the hearing this may now have on Israel's decision to apply public pressure on Moscow.

Mr. Harel's comment on Soviet interests abroad was an apparent allusion to Moscow's ties with Arab governments, whose leaders oppose any form of Jewish immigration to Israel. Arab leaders are convinced that Israel is basically expansionist and that large immigration will justify greater expansion.

Israeli immigration officials expect 30,000 to 40,000 newcomers this year, most of them arriving with skills from affluent countries.

In speaking of Soviet Jews the 71-year-old Mrs. Meir, herself a Russian-born Jew, said of masses of young Soviet Jews had undergone an "awakening" as a result of the 1967 Israeli victory over the Arab states.

HOLIDAY RALLIES NOTED

She said no one could explain "in terms of cold reason" how young Jews in the Soviet Union, many of whose parents had tasted prison life or experienced years in Siberian work camps, now gathered by the tens of thousands around synagogues on Simhat Torah. This is a joyous holiday that marks the completion of the annual round of reading of the Torah, the Jewish holy scriptures.

Soviet Jews have become more courageous, Mrs. Meir said, and are now declaring "that their homeland is the state of Israel."

The Premier then read off the names of those Soviet Jews who had written abroad in what she described as an attempt to publicize their inability to obtain exit visas. The hometowns of the writers included Moscow, Kiev, Riga, and Leningrad.

She read an open letter to Premier Alekssei N. Kosygin from Tina Brodetskaya, a 34-year-old Moscow woman, who was seeking to join relatives in Israel. The woman wrote that her desire to emigrate stemmed from Zionist feelings and not from hostility to the Soviet Union.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRADE MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the President and the administration are to be commended for the proposed trade program forwarded to the Congress earlier this week. This program, which must be regarded as a holding action, is significant in that it again commits the United States to pursue a policy of freer world trade—despite the considerable protectionist pressures which are growing in our land.

We in the Congress should support the statesmanship of the President as shown

by this message and give him the authority he requests to make modest reductions in U.S. tariffs. I would grant the President such authority, however, through June 30, 1972, rather than through June 30, 1973, since more comprehensive action in the trade field should be enacted before then. The last tariff cuts of the Kennedy round negotiations will have become effective on January 1, 1972, and the administration and the legislative branch should regard this as the target date to enact new, major legislation in the trade field.

At this time, the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress, of which I am the ranking Senate minority member, is preparing a comprehensive series of trade hearings, and these hearings should dovetail nicely with the Commission on World Trade, which the President has indicated he will appoint to examine the entire range of our trade policies. The Commission's Report should be available before the Joint Economic Committee issues its report. Because of this timetable, I would recommend that the President's authority to effect tariff reductions be extended only through fiscal 1972.

The President's proposals of aid for industries affected by imports—adjustment assistance—are indeed welcome. In my opinion, one of the major flaws in the implementation of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 was the extremely difficult criteria which had to be met if trade adjustment assistance were to be granted. The liberalization of the criteria is welcome and needed.

Liberalization of escape-clause provisions is also to be welcomed so long as such liberalization is part of the philosophy which recognizes—as the President's does—that "any reduction in our imports produced by U.S. restrictions not accepted by our trading partners would invite foreign reaction against our own exports—all quite legally" and that the "need to restore our trade surplus heightens the need for further movement toward freer trade."

In my opinion, the President's request of the Congress for a clear statement "with regard to nontariff barriers to assist in our efforts to obtain reciprocal lowering of nontariff barriers," is an important call for cooperation. We should meet the President's request. In this regard, the President's proposal to eliminate the American selling price as a step toward eliminating the proliferating nontariff barriers to trade is most commendable—all of us in the Congress know of the difficulty in putting forward this very needed proposal.

Finally, it is my hope that Western Europe and Japan, too, will take such an important step down the road of freer trade—that such freer trade in agricultural and industrial products indeed will lead us "in growing and shared prosperity toward a world both open and just"—and that such an open world is unattainable if reciprocity is not forthcoming.

OIL INDUSTRY MULTIFACETED

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, we recognize that the oil industry as an in-

dustry is not composed of only major oil companies, although they are the most often heard from.

I have repeatedly spoken of the difference between the struggling independent oilman and the major oil companies which enjoy phenomenal profits. The April 1969 newsletter of the First National City Bank of New York indicated that of the largest 2,250 manufacturing concerns surveyed the 99 oil companies had 25 percent of the group's total profits. That should give you one indication of the disparity between the small oilman who has to scrape and skimp to raise the funds to drill one well and the major oil companies who can afford to put up almost \$1 billion just for the right to drill for oil in Alaska.

Another group has recently taken heart and raised its voice, saying to the American public and Congress:

Don't lump us together with the major companies. We don't benefit from all the federal subsidies enjoyed by the major oil companies, yet we are part of the "oil industry."

This group is called the Oil Marketers' Committee. These are the small businessmen who market the oil to the public. Although they exist at the will of the major oil companies, they, too, have finally had enough. They have shown the courage of their convictions and published an advertisement in the Washington Post.

I ask unanimous consent that the advertisement be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, it is quite clear from the advertisement that the only ones who really benefit from all these Federal subsidies to the oil industry are the major oil companies, the ones who need the gigantic subsidies the least.

The time has come. Congress and the President must take action. If subsidies are necessary to insure a healthy oil industry, let us give these subsidies honestly. Let them pass through the same budgetary process that school lunch subsidies pass through. This will enable Congress and the public to see exactly who is getting what and how much. No longer would the major oil companies be able to skim off the cream of these Federal subsidies and leave the dregs to the independent oilmen under the guise of giving incentives to the oil industry.

The oil industry is not composed only of the major oil companies. We must recognize that and take action accordingly.

There being no objection, the advertisement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

OIL MARKETERS SAY: MAYBE THE PUBLIC IS RIGHT ABOUT OIL IMPORT QUOTAS AND DEPLETION ALLOWANCES

We want to make it clear to our government leaders and the American public that no single group speaks for the entire oil industry.

For example, this committee of marketers questions seriously whether the oil producers and major oil companies have applied any of their consumer subsidized gains to consumer needs and benefits.

As oil marketers, we believe—

1. The present Oil Import Quota system has the effect of subsidizing producers and major oil companies at up to 3c per gallon.

Interim Test Ban On MIRV Weighed

By Warren Unna

Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States is considering an interim arrangement with the Russians so that the testing of the multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) might be suspended while the current missile talks are going on in Helsinki.

"The possibility of interim agreements, such as stopping the MIRV tests while the talks are going on, is not ruled out," Sen. Clifford Case (R-N.J.) said after a closed-door briefing of the Senate Disarmament subcommittee by officials of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Pleased by Briefing

Case and Sen. Albert Gore (D-Tenn.), subcommittee chairman, emerged from the hour-long evening briefing seemingly more assured that the Nixon administration was prepared to enter into meaningful negotiations.

"It was a good briefing," Gore said. "I was pleased with the latitude available for exploration. What's going on now are preliminary talks. They are not intended to reach any commitments."

Gore said he now did not think the U.S. negotiators at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in Helsinki were being held on such a tight string by either the White House or the Pentagon that results couldn't be hoped for.

Joining Gore and Case in yesterday's secret, unannounced briefing were Sens. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman of the parent Senate Foreign Relations Committee, John J. Sparkman (D-Ala.),

John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) and Clairborne Pell (D-R.I.).

Briefing them were Phillip J. Farley, deputy director of the Arms Control Agency, Helmut Sonnefeldt, Soviet and disarmament expert on the National Security Council staff, and William W. Hancock, general counsel for the Arms Control Agency.

Security was so tight that the briefing not only was labeled "secret", but the senators were admonished three times to keep specific matters quiet.

Another briefing on the Helsinki talks was given to Senate leaders from both parties early Tuesday by Henry A. Kissinger, the President's assistant for national security affairs.

Calms Apprehensions

The briefings seemed to quiet last week's apprehensions when Gore's subcommittee first was promised a briefing before the SALT talks opened and then turned down.

President Nixon reportedly was so concerned about antagonizing a subcommittee that eventually may have to ratify a SALT treaty that he assured Congress, during his visit there last week, that the briefings would be forthcoming after the U.S. negotiators reported back from Helsinki.

Also yesterday, Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.) issued a statement terming it "unfortunate that the administration has set itself against the inclusion of senatorial observers or advisers to the SALT negotiations."

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accordance with the standard procedure relating to compacts.

PURPOSE

The purpose of S. 2734, as amended, is to give consent of Congress to the Connecticut-New York railroad passenger transportation compact, adopted by New York on June 16, 1968 (sec. 1, ch. 824, laws of New York for 1968) and by Connecticut on April 21, 1969 (sec. 1, Public Act 46 of the laws of Connecticut for 1969).

This legislation is sponsored by the Senators from Connecticut, Mr. Ribicoff and Mr. Dodd and by the Senators from New York, Mr. Javits and Mr. Goodell and recommended with a suggested amendment, which has been adopted by the Secretary of Transportation.

STATEMENT

The compact entered into by the two States relates to the continuation and improvement of railroad commuter passenger service over the Penn Central Railroad's lines between New York City, N.Y., and New Haven, Conn. It authorizes the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, a government corporation of the State of New York, and the Connecticut Transportation Authority, an agency of the State of Connecticut, acting individually but in cooperation with each other, and as conventures where they deem it advisable, to do the following (where permissible under the enabling laws of their respective States):

(a) Acquire assets of the New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad (and its successors) where needed, (b) repair and rehabilitate such assets, (c) dispose of such assets where not needed, and (d) and operate the service or contract for its operation.

By its terms, the compact legislation lapses if Congress fails to consent by December 31, 1969.

A letter dated July 28, 1969 from the Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of the State of New York to Chairman Celler, requesting the subject legislation reads as follows:

"I am seeking your help in securing the consent of Congress to a compact entered into by the States of New York and Connecticut relating to the continuation and improvement of railroad commuter passenger service over the Penn Central Railroad's lines between New York City, N.Y., and New Haven, Conn. That compact is evidenced by the enactment of two statutes, section 1 of chapter 824 of the laws of New York for 1968 and section 1 of Public Act 46 of the laws of Connecticut for 1969. A certified copy of the New York statute is enclosed, together with several uncertified copies of both acts.

"The Metropolitan Transportation Authority for our State and the Connecticut Transportation Authority for the State of Connecticut are hopeful of an early conclusion to their negotiations with Penn Central relating to the modernization and improvement program for this vitally needed commuter service which Governor Dempsey and I endorsed in late 1966. These negotiations were delayed, seemingly interminably by a host of complicated problems. Indeed, they could not begin in earnest until this past January, when Penn Central finally agreed to merge with the New Haven.

"Federal and State financing for the \$56.8 million priority capital improvement program is also assured. Moreover, we are hopeful that additional Federal funds will be granted, making possible the full \$80 million capital program which the two States originally contemplated. To this end I am asking the MTA and the CTA to reinstitute their 1966 request for funds under the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964.

"If you or your staff needs any further assistance relative to the details of the compact, the status of our financing or the nature of the projected relationship with Penn Central,

I would suggest that they be referred directly to Dr. William J. Ronan, Metropolitan Transportation Authority chairman.

"The State of Connecticut has asked for assistance similar to that which we ask of you from their congressional delegation. You may wish to coordinate your efforts with them.

"Please note that if the compact is not approved by December 31, 1969, it lapses and the legislative process would have to be started all over again in both States.

"Sincerely,

"NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER."

The first section of S. 2734 grants the consent of Congress to the compact. As noted in the above letter the committee finds merit in the compact and believes that Congress should grant its consent thereto, subject to the amendments herein made in article II of the compact.

First, article II of the compact provides that amendments and supplements to the compact to implement the purposes thereof "may be adopted by concurrent legislation of the party States." Section 2 of S. 2734 makes clear that the consent of Congress to the compact does not constitute consent in advance for any amendments or supplements to the compact which may hereafter be adopted by concurrent legislation of the party States. Any such amendments or supplements would be adopted subject to the consent of Congress before being put into effect.

Second, section 3 of S. 2734 reserves the right of Congress or its standing committees to require submission of information and data concerning operations under the compact.

Third, section 4 of S. 2734 reserves the right of Congress to alter amend, or repeal the legislation.

Attached hereto and made a part hereof is the report from the Secretary of Transportation to the Honorable James O. Eastland, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, dated November 12, 1969.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment. If there be no amendment to be proposed, the question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill (S. 2734) was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as in legislative session, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate messages from the House of Representatives on S. 632, S. 499, and S. 757.

RELIEF OF RAYMOND C. MELVIN

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the amendment of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 632) for the relief of Raymond C. Melvin, which were, on page 1, line 4, "2733" and insert "2733(b)"; and on page 2, line 3, strike out "July 4, 1964" and insert: "or about July 6, 1964".

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendments of the House.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Montana.

The motion was agreed to.

LUDGER J. COSSETTE

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the amendment of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 499) for the relief of Ludger J. Cossette, which was, on page 2, line 4, strike out "in excess of 10 per centum thereof".

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendment of the House.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Montana.

The motion was agreed to.

YVONNE DAVIS

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the amendment of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 757) for the relief of Yvonne Davis which was, on page 2, after line 3, insert:

No part of the amount appropriated in this Act shall be paid or delivered to or received by any agent or attorney on account of services rendered in connection with this claim, and the same shall be unlawful, any contract to the contrary notwithstanding. Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not exceeding \$1,000.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendment of the House.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Montana.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS
LIMITATION TALKS

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, on Monday in Helsinki the United States and Soviet delegations met to commence the SALT negotiations. While the occasion Monday was largely ceremonial, there was a note of high purpose in the statements of both delegations. Serious discussions began yesterday in what could be the most portentous negotiations affecting the survival of mankind. As Secretary of State Rogers expressed it so aptly in his speech of November 13:

The question to be faced in the strategic arms talks is whether societies with the advanced intellect to develop these awesome weapons of mass destruction have the combined wisdom to control and curtail them.

Let us hope that the enormous difficulties and complexities inherent in these

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negotiations will be overbalanced by a recognition on both sides of the mutual and reciprocal advantages to be obtained from viable arrangements to stabilize and control the strategic arms race. The negative incentive to agreement is similarly persuasive—the cost and the danger to both sides inherent in an escalation of the nuclear arms race could cast a most ominous shadow over the continued health and existence of both societies.

The immediate challenge to the United States and Soviet negotiators, once substantive discussions begin, will be to seek mutually agreeable arrangements for containing the next generation of strategic weapons now under development in both countries—ABM's and MIRV's.

In my judgment, it is regrettable that the U.S. negotiators have reportedly been instructed not to offer a mutual moratorium on the flight testing of MIRV's. The clock is running out on MIRV's, and if an agreement with respect to this new weapons development is not achieved prior to the operational deployment stage—expected some time next year—hopes for a meaningful and verifiable agreement will be diminished.

The clock is also running out with respect to ABM systems, but fortunately, the pace is slower in this instance because deployed ABM systems are easily verifiable by aerial or satellite inspection, while deployed MIRV's are verifiable allegedly only by on-site inspection.

The major address by Secretary Rogers on November 13 is a most salutary indication that U.S. policy with respect to the life and death issues inherent in the SALT talks has not been defaulted to military authorities by the concerned civilian agencies of our Government—especially the State Department. I express this view against the background of numerous press reports and "leaks" in recent weeks which have indicated that efforts by the military authorities have succeeded within the administration in curtailing the brief and the negotiating leeway of Ambassador Gerard Smith and his colleagues in the SALT talks.

In his address to the Senate on November 13, President Nixon assured us that he would seek to work out an arrangement for consultations with the Senate respecting the SALT talks which would meet our requirements and prerogatives. The President's thoughtful and cooperative remarks in this regard merit our respect and appreciation. In this spirit, I think it is unfortunate that the administration has set itself against the inclusion of senatorial observers or advisors to the SALT negotiations. The implication in the administration's position that the necessary secrecy and discretion might be comprised by the presence of Senators is not one which the Senate could find acceptable as a reason.

Extensive and detailed consultations regarding the U.S. negotiating position have been carried out with the governments of our NATO allies. Virtually without exception our NATO allies have parliamentary forms of government. Consequently, the implication that the

parliamentary leaders of Western Europe and Canada are more discreet than the congressional leaders of the United States is paradoxical and unconvincing; especially in view of the history of the congressional representatives and committees handling the most secret information.

There is an invisible third dimension to the SALT talks which is seldom mentioned—the specter of Peking. In the period since the 1962 United States-Soviet "eyeball-to-eyeball" confrontation over Cuba—and the emergence of Communist China as a thermonuclear power—it is perhaps no exaggeration to say that policymakers both in Washington and Moscow have considered the potential future threat of nuclear war with China to be as real a threat as a United States-Soviet nuclear exchange.

There is no doubt that calculations with respect to the potentiality of Chinese nuclear capabilities will be factored into the negotiating postures of both the United States and U.S.S.R. I regard this as prudent and unavoidable. Nonetheless, we must guard vigilantly against military hard-liners on both sides attempting to exploit the Chinese "threat" as an instrument to prevent agreements and controls on advanced weapons systems that are the very purpose of the SALT negotiations.

Moreover, the SALT negotiators bear the additional responsibility for attempting to shape agreements resulting from the SALT talks in such a way as to encourage, rather than discourage, Peking from eventual cooperation with international nuclear arms control agreements.

The U.S. negotiators bear an additional responsibility with respect to Communist China in the SALT talks. Our negotiators must scrupulously seek to avoid agreements with the Soviet Union which will create the impression of a United States-Soviet nuclear "ganging up" against Communist China. In my judgment, agreements of such a nature could serve to exacerbate the grave tensions between Moscow and Peking, as well as between Washington and Peking—rather than making nuclear war on the Asian mainland less probable.

In this respect, I commend to my colleagues' attention Harrison Salisbury's new book "War Between Russia and China," which sets forth the dangers and implications of a Sino-Soviet war to the nuclear security of the United States in a most persuasive and sobering fashion.

My purpose today is to hail the beginning of the SALT negotiations. I wish to conclude on a high note rather than a low note, for I am an optimist on the future of mankind. Accordingly, I believe it is altogether fitting to close with a most sincere and deserved tribute to President Nixon and the U.S. delegation led by Director Gerard Smith for the diligence of preparation, the dignity, and high seriousness of purpose with which these landmark negotiations have been opened. I believe they have every right so long as this attitude and atmosphere in the U.S. delegation persists to be confident of the support of the Senate in

their crucial and urgent search for a viable means to cap the volcano of the nuclear arms race.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS AS IN LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, has morning business been concluded?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business as in legislative session? If not, morning business is concluded.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

As in legislative session, a message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the following bills, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 1453. An act for the relief of Capt. Melvin A. Kaye;

H.R. 1865. An act for the relief of Mrs. Beatrice Jaffe; and

H.R. 14794. An act making appropriations for the Department of Transportation and related agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes.

ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

The message also announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled bill (S. 92) for the relief of Mr. and Mrs. Wong Yui.

HOUSE BILLS REFERRED

As in legislative session, the following bills were severally read twice by their titles and referred, as indicated:

H.R. 1453. An act for the relief of Capt. Melvin A. Kaye; and

H.R. 1865. An act for the relief of Mrs. Beatrice Jaffe; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 14794. An act making appropriations for the Department of Transportation and related agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Appropriations.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

The Senate, in executive session, resumed the consideration of the nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., of South Carolina, to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the Senate will soon decide whether to approve the nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth to the post of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. For over 2 months this man has undergone an examination of character, ability, and philosophy which has not been duplicated since the inquisition. In an attempt to find some reason to justify opposition to Judge Haynsworth's nomination, critics have invoked a standard of behavior that, if applied to all future nominees to the Court, would guarantee that the Supreme Court membership shall remain at eight until the millennium.

The Nuclear Arsenal: A Balance of Terror

By WILLIAM BEECHER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 17—As the United States and the Soviet Union began preliminary arms-control talks today in Helsinki, Finland, their respective nuclear arsenals were believed here to be in rough equilibrium. That is a condition many American officials say they hope to preserve.

The Soviet Union, after a rather ambitious effort to catch more and bigger land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles than the United States and is the first to have actually deployed a working, though limited, missile defense.

The United States still maintains a substantial lead over the Russians in submarine-based missiles and in long-range strategic bombers.

In the expression often used by armaments experts, the two powers have achieved a balance of terror: If either were to stage a surprise attack, the other would have enough surviving nuclear weapons to devastate the attackers.

Thus, by the premise on which American nuclear strategy is based, both should be deterred from initiating nuclear war, for such a move could be an act of national suicide.

An Early Question

United States officials say they are not sure whether Soviet officials share this premise. That is one of the first questions they hope to answer at Helsinki.

Soviet strategic writings, almost exclusively by military men, frequently scoff at the notion that if deterrence fails no one wins. Some Russian generals insist that the country with the most and best offensive and defensive systems will do the most damage to the enemy, protect more of its population and thus win such a war. Whether Russian political leaders share this view is unknown in the West.

On the answer to that question hinges much of the hope for an agreement to limit arms.

If the Russians, ultimately, will agree that deterrence is all they really want, then an agreement may be possible to limit both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons, American officials say. But a limitation agreement could prove elusive if the Russians insist on maintaining the potential to fight and survive a nuclear war, in case deterrence fails. Such a potential is known as "damage-limiting capability" or "war-fighting capability."

A comparative look at the size and character of the two countries' nuclear stockpiles provides an insight into the nature of the arms race and of the task before the negotiators in trying to stop the arms momentum caused by mutual fear.

The American strategic arsenal comprises three different systems—1,000 Minuteman and 54 Titan II land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, 450 B-52 and 86 B-58 bombers, and 41 Polaris submarines carrying a total of 656 missiles.

The stated purpose of maintaining multiple offensive systems is that if any one or two were substantially destroyed in

a surprise attack, the third could still retaliate overwhelmingly against the attacker's cities.

The United States has tested and is beginning to deploy a limited missile defense system, called Safeguard, around two Minuteman complexes in the upper Midwest. The first of these defensive missiles, however, is not expected to be ready for operation until 1974.

A principal argument that the Nixon Administration used in winning a very close Congressional fight to permit this initial deployment was that a larger-than-expected Soviet build-up of the giant SS-9 intercontinental missile, together with Soviet tests of multiple warheads for that missile, posed a serious potential threat to the Minuteman force in the event of war.

Another illustration of how the actions of one country can speed the arms race by causing a counterreaction by the other is in the case of the American MIRV, or multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle.

In 1964, the Soviet Union began deploying a new surface-to-air missile system across a wide arc in the northwestern part of the Soviet Union, passing through the city of Tallinn. This was athwart the path that any missiles fired from the United States would have to travel in attacking Russia's cities in Europe. American planners conjectured that since the United States was obviously concentrating its efforts on missiles, not bombers, the Tallinn system must be a system to defend against ballistic missiles.


The United States then determined to develop and deploy MIRV warheads that could overwhelm by sheer numbers even a heavy Russian anti-missile system. While there is still much argument within the American intelligence community over whether the Tallinn system could easily be upgraded to provide a good defense against intercontinental missiles, most analysts now agree that the existing system appears designed to knock down bombers and missiles fired from bombers, not intercontinental missiles.

Russians Were First

While the Russians in the middle fifties were the first to develop and stress intercontinental missiles over bombers as a fast, efficient system for delivering nuclear warheads, an intense American effort in the late nineteen-fifties and early nineteen-sixties—spurred by "missile gap" alarms—far outstripped the Russians.

For comparison's sake, the Soviet Union had about 250 working intercontinental missiles in June, 1966, when the American arsenal stood essentially where it is today. But in the three and a half years since then, the Russians are said to have achieved a fivefold increase, with about 1,350 missiles, including some that are still being installed. This represents about 300 more land-based missiles than the United States possesses.

About 280 of these Soviet



The New York Times

Nov. 18, 1969

Equipping most strategic missiles with separately targetable multiple warheads (MIRV's) could nearly triple warhead totals; 250 level indicates number needed to destroy 50 largest cities if attack were a surprise and unopposed.

missiles are of the SS-9 type, which could carry a single warhead of up to 25 megatons (equivalent to 25 million tons of TNT) or three warheads of about five megatons each.

Defense Department officials have testified before Congress that 420 SS-9's—if each carried a three-warhead MIRV with an accuracy of a quarter mile—could destroy 95 per cent of the United States' Minuteman on a first strike.

Thus one objective of American negotiators at Helsinki will be to freeze SS-9 construction before it reaches such potentially threatening proportions.

The Soviet Air Force includes about 150 Bison and Bear long-range bombers. It has, in addition, about 750 medium-range bombers that could be employed against targets in the United States, either on one-way missions, or round-trip with aerial refueling.

The Russian submarine force includes 28 nuclear-powered missile vessels, including a new type that resembles the Ameri-


can Polaris and carries 16 missiles instead of the three missiles carried by earlier models. All told, this force mounts about 200 missiles. Some 120 more short-range missiles are carried by diesel-electric submarines.

On missile defense, the Russians have 64 operational missiles deployed in a semicircle about 50 miles outside the western reaches of Moscow. They are known to be testing a much-advanced defensive missile.

American analysts believe the current balance between the two countries represents a standoff, with neither having the ability to disarm the other with a surprise attack.

But if either country moved to deploy heavy missile defenses, together with much larger numbers of accurately deliverable offensive warheads, the balance could become precarious indeed. It is this possibility that the Helsinki negotiations are aimed at averting.

COMPARISON OF U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS



The New York Times

Nov. 18, 1969

These charts, showing U.S. ahead in submarine-launched missiles and intercontinental bombers and Soviet ahead in land-launched and antimissile missiles, depict rough balance of strategic nuclear power. In the talks begun

in Helsinki, U.S. hopes to freeze these weapons systems, except antimissile missiles, at about present levels. To defend against the bombers, both sides have numerous jet fighter planes and anti-aircraft missiles and guns.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I would suggest that a time which would be satisfactory to everyone would be 1 a.m. on Friday.

Mr. MANSFIELD. 1 a.m.?

Mr. AIKEN. Yes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. No; I know one Member of the Senate who would be very much put out.

Mr. AIKEN. Make it 6 a.m. on Friday.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I withdraw my request for the time being. I understand the distinguished Senator from Indiana has a request to make.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, so that we may "sense" the sense of the Senate and move forward on this matter, with 2 further days of debate, with what is remaining of today as well—and I would think we could go on as long this evening and tomorrow as the leader and both sides thought necessary to accommodate those of our colleagues who have not been heard—let me propose a unanimous-consent request that we consider voting at the end of the day on Thursday, 6 p.m.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request that a vote be had on Thursday next at 6 p.m.?

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I would be constrained to enter an objection, not on my own behalf, but on behalf of Senators who want to speak, together with other Senators, at least one of whom comes from the other side of the aisle. As far as I know, he is not going to favor the position very meritoriously favored by the Senator from Nebraska, but before he departed the Nation's Capital he said that if he were present, he would object to voting at any time on Thursday.

So I do hope the Senator from Indiana will withdraw his suggestion so I will not be put to the duty of entering an objection; and I do not think the Senator from Indiana wants me to do that.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, it is difficult for me to imagine my friend from Nebraska being objectionable in any way. I am glad to withdraw the request, faced with the cold facts as they are.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I renew my request.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, what is the request? May we have it repeated?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request that the vote on the nomination be set for Friday at 1 p.m.? Without objection, it is so ordered.

The agreement reduced to writing is as follows:

Ordered. That at 1 p.m. on Friday, November 21, 1969, the Senate proceed to vote on the nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., of South Carolina, to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

[The following proceedings were conducted as in legislative session.]

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM—ANNOUNCEMENT ON A POSSIBLE ADJOURNMENT SINE DIE

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if I may have the attention of the Senate, this may be as good a time as any for me to make this announcement with respect to the rest of the year.

During a recent discussion with the distinguished minority leader, an understanding was reached that adjournment sine die would occur between December 15 and 23, probably closer to the 23d, 1969. Further, the second session of the 91st Congress will not convene before January 12, and possibly a few days thereafter.

Legislation to be considered prior to adjournment includes the following: Six appropriation bills; a tax reform and tax relief measure; draft reform; a drug bill; a crime bill, a pornography bill; a gun bill—the Lesnick bill; and, if possible, elementary and secondary education.

It is our intention to call the Senate into session early and stay late during the weeks ahead in order to finish this schedule. All Senators are advised that Saturday sessions will be scheduled during the deliberation of the tax bill.

This information is provided in order that Senators may plan their schedules between now and the beginning of the second session of this Congress.

And on that merry note, I will conclude.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Will our leader advise us about next week? As I understood earlier, there had been an announcement that there would be some kind of recess over Thanksgiving.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.

May I say it is the hope of the joint leadership, in addition to disposing of the Haynsworth nomination this week, to take up the draft reform proposal, which should not take too long; the Lesnick gun bill, which was reported unanimously—

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield—which bill?

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Lesnick gun bill, to provide that if one carries a gun in the perpetration of a crime, the carrying of the gun itself is a crime.

Mr. McCLELLAN. That bill was reported today.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Unanimously.

Sentences would be mandatory, to a degree, and a sentence imposed in such a case would be in addition to the sentence imposed for the crime itself.

Then it is my understanding that the Finance Committee may well place the tax reform—tax relief bill on the calendar Friday. It is the hope of the joint leadership to make that the pending business and to get started on the tax reform—tax relief bill on Monday, hopefully to finish it within two weeks or so.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, do I understand there will be a session this Saturday?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Not this Saturday. At the conclusion of business on Wednesday next, the Senate will have Thanksgiving Day off and Friday as well.

Mr. McCLELLAN. And Saturday and Sunday?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. DODD. I did not hear all the Senator said about the gun amendment. We did not report the amendment until this afternoon.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, and I appreciate the efforts of the Senator and the other members of the Committee.

Mr. DODD. I wanted to make that clear.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. HART. I hope to make it clearer that the majority leader is not quite accurate when he says the gun bill was reported out of the committee unanimously. I rise only to correct the Record.

Mr. MANSFIELD. When we get with in one of unanimity, I think that is pretty fair shooting.

Mr. HART. The Senator did not come that close, but he came one step shorter.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, would the Senator consider bringing up the draft bill and disposing of it prior to the end of business on Friday?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Hopefully, if conditions permit. I would like to see it disposed of this week. I would hope, when we take it up, that Senators would not spend too much time expounding their views, but would allow the matter to come to a vote as soon as possible, so that the matter could be sent to the President as expeditiously as possible.

Mr. BROOKE. If the debate on the Haynsworth nomination were concluded by Thursday, at the end of the day, would it be possible that the draft bill would be taken up on Friday and laid before the Senate?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, or possibly before, if conditions permit.

Mr. HRUSKA. Or after the vote.

Mr. BROOKE. Or after the vote; either.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.

HELSINKI: A HOPEFUL BEGINNING

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, the most momentous arms control discussions in history have opened. The United States and the Soviet Union have come together in Helsinki, Finland, to consider how best to promote their mutual security and the peace of the world through agreed limitations on strategic arms.

Yesterday's opening statements by Finnish Foreign Minister Kalvalainen, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov, and U.S. Ambassador Smith offer clear testimony to the sober determina-

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tion with which the parties approach these discussions and the profound concern which all nations have for them. As the Finnish leader put it, the so-called SALT talks "will largely determine, not only the prospects of further progress in the field of disarmament and arms control, but also the future trend of international relations as a whole."

I believe that both Moscow and Washington have come to the negotiations with the most serious intentions to reach viable agreements. A broad variety of understandings may be feasible, especially if it is made clear in these preliminary talks that the two States recognize that the only stable strategic balance open to them is one founded on a clear recognition of the fact of mutual deterrence.

While the urgency of the issues for negotiation is great, and heightened by the quickening pace of weapons technology, there is yet time to address the problem of halting another spiral in the arms race. As Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko declared some months ago, "The arms race has long become sheer madness." On that conviction, which is certainly shared by Americans, a saner foundation for peace and security can be erected.

All men can be heartened by the open-minded approach voiced at the opening session. In his charge to the American delegation, President Nixon left no doubt that the United States is ready to consider reasonable limitations on all major strategic systems, including the menacing new weapon known as MIRV and the planned ABM system. In the President's words:

We are prepared to discuss limitations on all offensive and defensive systems, and to reach agreements in which both sides can have confidence. . . . We are prepared to deal with the issues seriously, carefully, and purposefully. We seek no unilateral advantage. Nor do we seek arrangements which could be prejudicial to the interests of third parties. We are prepared to engage in bona fide negotiations on concrete issues, avoiding polemics and extraneous matters.

I take these assurances to mean that the administration is willing to consider any sensible proposal of mutual interest to the Soviet Union and the United States, including such suggestions as a moratorium of MIRV tests and a freeze on deployment of both offensive and defensive weapons.

The Soviet Union seems to bring a similar willingness to the conference table and does not appear to view the effort as another propaganda exercise. Moreover, in recent discussions with American participants in the so-called pugwash conferences, a number of prominent members of the Soviet technical elite explicitly stressed that the priority task for SALT should be an early limit on both MIRV and ABM. Since Soviet commentators have long resisted any hint of acknowledgement that ABM systems might have destabilizing implications for the strategic balance, their forthcoming stand in these conversations may herald a basic modification in the official Soviet position. That would be a hopeful development indeed, since the prospects for halting the insidious MIRV technology

will certainly perish if there is no chance for an agreed limit on the anti-ballistic-missile systems they are designed to penetrate.

Every informed person will be looking to Helsinki for the signs which will emerge there. The encouraging words I have cited are mere straws and the hard bargaining is yet to come. But the straws are bent the right way and all of us must pray that they point toward the historic agreements that will ultimately save mankind from the awesome weapons it has wrought.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the opening statements of the Helsinki conference be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the opening statements were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF FINLAND, DR. AHTI KARJALAINEN

Ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the Government of Finland it is a great pleasure for me to welcome to Finland today the distinguished leaders and the members of the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States.

We are today witnessing a historical occasion. Two major powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have decided to begin negotiations on a question which has the utmost importance and urgency, not only for themselves, but for mankind as a whole. Never has the need for putting an end to the nuclear arms race been so universally recognized as it is today. By starting these discussions the two powers which are in control of the major part of the nuclear arsenal of the world have on their part acknowledged their supreme responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Even as we realize the complexity of the task, we believe that the starting of discussions between the two leading nuclear powers is an encouraging sign of their willingness to advance in the field of disarmament and thus to continue along the road of arms control in the spirit of the treaties on a partial test ban and on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. There can be no doubt that the outcome of these talks will largely determine, not only the prospects of further progress in the field of disarmament and arms control, but also the future trend of international relations as a whole.

Ladies and gentlemen, as a neutral country which maintains friendly relations, with all nations across the dividing lines of military blocks and ideological alignments, Finland is ready to make every effort to serve the cause of peace. We are proud that you have chosen Helsinki as the site for your discussions. We wish to do our utmost to facilitate your efforts. As a spokesman for the host country I would like to express the hope that the arrangements made will meet with your approval and that the neutral ground which we offer you will be beneficial to the important task that you have before you. We will now give you the privacy that you will need.

We wish you the best of success.

Thank you.

ADDRESS BY MR. V. S. SEMENOV, HEAD OF THE U.S.S.R. DELEGATION

Esteemed Mr. Karjalainen, esteemed Mr. Smith, ladies and gentlemen, permit me first of all to express our sincere gratitude to Mr. Karjalainen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, for his warm welcome and wishes for success in our work.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. attaches great importance to the negotiations on curbing strategic arms race. Their positive results would undoubtedly contribute both to improvement in the Soviet-American re-

lations and to the consolidation of universal peace.

Unswervingly guided by the principles of ensuring lasting peace and international security, laid down by V. I. Lenin into the basis of the foreign policy of the Soviet State, the Soviet Union has always been a proponent of the implementation of the principles of peaceful co-existence, of effective measures to end the arms race and of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet moves aimed at this goal are widely supported by peace-loving states and peoples.

It is our desire to see this meeting in Helsinki successfully solving its tasks.

Curbing of the strategic arms race, limitation and subsequent reduction of such armaments—this is an important goal the achievement of which would meet the vital interests not only of the Soviet and American peoples, but also of other nations of the world.

Given genuine desire on both sides to seek mutually acceptable agreement without prejudice to the security of our states and all other countries it is possible and imperative to overcome obvious complexities and obstacles and to bring about reasonable solutions.

As regards the Soviet delegation, our efforts at the talks will be directed towards this very end.

On behalf of the U.S.S.R. delegation we extend greetings to Mr. Smith, Chairman of the United States delegation, to all its members and staff. We are hopeful that an exchange of views between us will develop in a constructive manner and create the necessary foundation for further negotiations.

In conclusion may I on behalf of the Soviet Government express our appreciation to the Government of Finland for providing opportunity to hold this meeting in Helsinki. We regard it as an expression not only of the traditional Finnish hospitality but also of the active peace-loving foreign policy of the Government of Finland which has won respect throughout the world.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GERARD C. SMITH, HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION

Foreign Minister Karjalainen, Minister Semenov, ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the United States delegation, I want to thank you, Mr. Karjalainen, for your kind words of welcome. I would also like to express the appreciation of delegation for the hospitality and cooperation of the Finnish Government in providing such a fine site for the preliminary talks on strategic arms limitation between the Soviet Union and the United States. May I thank you personally, Mr. Karjalainen, for your part in making available the accommodations for the United States delegation in this lovely city of Helsinki, the capital of a neutral country of friendly and stouthearted people.

I also wish on this occasion to extend greetings to you, Minister Semenov, and to the other members of the Soviet delegation. We look forward to working with you on the complex tasks before us. The start of these preliminary talks on strategic arms limitation is an historic occasion, for as the Secretary of State of the United States said last Thursday, the United States and the Soviet Union open today talks "leading to what could be the most critical negotiations on disarmament ever undertaken."

Mr. Foreign Minister, Minister Semenov, I have a message from the President of the United States, which I would like to read at this time.

"You are embarking upon one of the most momentous negotiations ever entrusted to an American delegation.

"I do not mean to belittle the past. The Antarctic Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and most recently the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which we hope will soon enter into force, were all

important steps along the road to international security. Other tasks remain on the agenda of the United Nations and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Today, however, you will begin what all of your fellow citizens in the United States and, I believe, all people throughout the world, profoundly hope will be a sustained effort not only to limit the buildup of strategic forces but to reverse it.

"I do not underestimate the difficulty of your task: the nature of modern weapons makes their control an exceedingly complex endeavor. But this very fact increases the importance of your effort.

"Nor do I underestimate the suspicion and distrust that must be dispelled if you are to succeed in your assignment.

"I am also conscious of the historical fact that wars and crises between nations can arise not simply from the existence of arms but from clashing interests or the ambitious pursuit of unilateral interests. That is why we seek progress toward the solution of the dangerous political issues of our day.

"I am, nevertheless, hopeful that your negotiations with representatives from the Soviet Union will serve to increase mutual security. Such a result is possible if we approach these negotiations recognizing the legitimate security interests on each side.

"I have stated that for our part we will be guided by the concept of maintaining 'sufficiency' in the forces required to protect ourselves and our allies. I recognize that the leaders of the Soviet Union bear similar defense responsibilities. I believe it is possible, however, that we can carry out our respective responsibilities under a mutually acceptable limitation and eventual reduction of our strategic arsenals.

"We are prepared to discuss limitations on all offensive and defensive systems, and to reach agreements in which both sides can have confidence. As I stated in my address to the United Nations, we are prepared to deal with the issues seriously, carefully, and purposefully. We seek no unilateral advantage. Nor do we seek arrangements which could be prejudicial to the interests of third parties. We are prepared to engage in bona fide negotiations on concrete issues, avoiding polemics and extraneous matters.

"No one can foresee what the outcome of your work will be. I believe your approach to these talks will demonstrate the seriousness of the United States in pursuing a path of equitable accommodation. I am convinced that the limitation of strategic arms is in the mutual interest of our country and the Soviet Union."

The United States delegation is deeply conscious of the responsibility we have in these talks to try to limit strategic arms in the United States and the Soviet Union. This objective concerns not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but the whole world.

AUTHORIZATION FOR COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY TO FILE ITS REPORT ON S. 849 BY MIDNIGHT TONIGHT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as in legislative session, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to file its report on S. 849, known as the Lesnick gun bill, by midnight tonight.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(Subsequently, as in legislative session, Mr. Dobb, from the Committee on the Judiciary, reported favorably with amendments, the bill (S. 849) to strengthen the penalty provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968, and submitted a report (No. 91-539) thereon.)

NEWSPAPER PRESERVATION ACT—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE—INDIVIDUAL VIEWS (S. REPT. NO. 91-535)

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, as in legislative session, from the Committee on the Judiciary, I report favorably, with amendments, the bill (S. 1520) to exempt from the antitrust laws certain combinations and arrangements necessary for the survival of failing newspapers, and I submit a report thereon. I ask unanimous consent that the report be printed, together with the individual views of the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. HRUSKA).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The report will be received and the bill will be placed on the calendar; and, without objection, the report will be printed, as requested by the Senator from Mississippi.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 13270 TO END THE INCOME TAX SURCHARGE AS OF JANUARY 1, 1970

AMENDMENT NO. 287

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, as in legislative session, I sent to the desk an amendment to H.R. 13270, the tax reform bill. I ask that this amendment be printed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received and printed, and will lie on the table.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. My amendment would end the surcharge on income taxes as of January 1, 1970.

When the surtax first was imposed, it was described as a temporary tax. At the end of this year, it will have been in effect for 21 months for individuals and 24 months for corporations.

It already has been extended once beyond its original expiration date. In my opinion, extension of the tax beyond the end of 1969 would take it out of the "temporary" category.

I give full credence to the President's good intentions in his pledge that the tax will be allowed to die as of July 1, 1970, but I fear that the temptation to extend it beyond that date will be very strong—just as was the temptation to extend it beyond its previous termination date of June 30, 1969.

Each extension of a tax makes the next extension easier.

Sooner or later—and I suspect the time is at hand—the Government begins to regard the temporary tax increase as a permanent part of the tax structure.

I think that this must be avoided. I think that the Government must keep faith with the people.

The way to keep faith with the people is to kill the surcharge on income taxes as of the end of this year.

There is evidence that many Senators have serious misgivings about extending the surtax. When a vote was taken on the question in the Senate Finance Committee, the count was only 9 to 7 in favor of extension.

I recognize that there is a pressing need to combat inflation in this country. But I submit that the best way to fight the war on inflation is by reducing spending—not by increasing taxes.

During the recent debate on the mili-

tary procurement bill, I remarked that it was essential to cut the fat from the military budget, but that we dare not cut the muscle. That statement applies with equal force to the whole budget.

I am convinced that, despite the commendable efforts of the administration to reduce the budget, there remain significant areas of fat that can be trimmed.

For one thing, the proposed budget for foreign economic aid is \$2.2 billion. That is almost double last year's authorization—an increase of a billion dollars.

I do not believe that the American people should be called upon to pay a surcharge on their income taxes to help finance this kind of increase. As a matter of fact, I am strongly inclined to vote against the entire appropriation for foreign economic aid, for I know that there is \$5.2 billion available in the pipeline to take care of contingencies.

The anticipated revenue from the surtax at the proposed rate of 5 percent for the first 6 months of 1970 is approximately \$1.7 billion, according to the Budget Bureau's September estimate. Elimination of the foreign aid authorization would more than compensate for the loss of this revenue.

As a matter of fact, if the surtax were to die on next January 1, foreign aid could be funded at a reduced level without changing the administration's budget goals.

Foreign aid is not the only area of the budget in which there is considerable fat. I feel sure that reductions can be made without damage to the Nation in the antipoverty program—in which there has been much waste and inefficiency—and in a number of other domestic fields. Furthermore, the \$2 billion reduction made so far in the military budget probably is not the limit of what can be cut without risking our security.

I admit that, if the surtax is eliminated, it will make the budgetary choices ahead of us more difficult. But I feel that we must undergo necessary discipline. We must control spending.

In the long run, controlled spending—and not repeated extensions of tax increases—will best combat inflation.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GRAVEL in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SENATE RESOLUTION 285—RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE TO STUDY POSSIBILITIES FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE EXPLORATION

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, in recent years, a number of Senators have been concerned over the high costs of the U.S. space program. Unfortunately, efforts to reduce these costs have been

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consistently met with the argument that man's thirst for knowledge and the advancement of science compel us to keep our space program fully funded.

However, a way does exist to sharply cut our costs on the space program without reducing advancements in this area. It involves sharing the benefits and costs of space exploration with the international community.

Accordingly, Mr. President, as in legislative session, on behalf of myself and Senators GOODELL, HART, MCCARTHY, MCGOVERN, MONDALE, MUSKIE, NELSON, PACKWOOD, PASTORE, SPARKMAN, TYDINGS, and YARBOROUGH, I am today submitting a resolution which would authorize the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to undertake a comprehensive study of all possibilities for international cooperation in space exploration.

The resolution reads as follows:

Resolved, That the Committee on Foreign Relations, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized under sections 134(a) and 136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, and in accordance with its jurisdiction specified by Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate, to make a full and complete study of the possibilities for international cooperation and cost sharing in the exploration of space, including, but not limited to, the desirability and feasibility of—

(1) establishing an international consortium for space missions, or

(2) utilizing the United Nations Organization, or a subsidiary organization thereof, for securing international cooperation and participation in the exploration of space.

SEC. 2. The Committee shall report its findings upon the study authorized by the resolution, together with such recommendations, including recommendations for additional legislation, as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than January 31, 1971.

SEC. 3. For the purposes of this resolution the committee is authorized, through February 28, 1971, (1) to make such expenditures as it deems advisable; (2) to employ upon a temporary basis, technical, clerical, and other assistants and consultants; and (3) with the prior consent of the heads of the departments or agencies concerned, and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to utilize the reimbursable services, information, facilities, and personnel of any of the departments or agencies of the Government.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, such a study has been sorely needed for a long time. The benefits from space exploration are certainly international in character.

We ought to realize that the moon flights, for example, are going to be just as beneficial to a person in West Germany or in England or in France or in Russia, for that matter, as to an individual American. The benefits are the satisfaction in seeing men in space and on the moon and the knowledge of how the moon, the earth, and the sun evolved. Nobody is saying that we should keep these secrets or that we are going to do so.

So everybody is going to benefit almost equally, throughout the world.

We all know that the space exploration has no military value. This particular space effort certainly does not. Of course, we have to recognize the multi-billion dollar cost of future explorations,

including those in the solar system and those beyond the solar system, and no one would maintain that there is any national value in our taking that long step for mankind. Yet, we all know that it is going to be taken.

Unless we move, and move soon, to begin to get an understanding of the possibilities of involving other countries, our taxpayers are going to be so heavily burdened that either they are going to refuse to go ahead, understandably, or we are going to have a very heavy burden of space exploration which, as I have said, will benefit all mankind, but the cost will be on the American taxpayer.

Achievements in space inure to the benefit of all mankind, not just to citizens of any one nationality. Moreover, any psychological lift or entertainment value generated by space spectaculars is shared equally by the world community. If the benefits are shared on an equal basis, why not the costs? Hundreds of millions of dollars could be saved—and should be saved—by encouraging other nations to join us in the space venture.

In the past, NASA has repeatedly asked the Soviet Union if they would cooperate and share expenses on various aspects of the space program. A list of these efforts through the end of 1967 was included in the hearings on the NASA authorization bill for fiscal 1970, and I should like to read this list because I think it sheds some light on the way NASA has approached this question in the past:

December 7, 1959.—NASA Administrator Glennan offered U.S. assistance in tracking Soviet manned flights. The Soviets replied that they would be in touch if the need arose.

March 7, 1962.—President Kennedy proposed an exchange of tracking and data acquisition stations. The Soviets did not accept.

September 20, 1963.—President Kennedy suggested in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly that the United States and the U.S.S.R. explore the possibility of joint exploration of the moon. President Johnson later reaffirmed this offer. There has been no official Soviet response.

December 8, 1964.—NASA proposed an exchange of visits by NASA and Soviet teams to deep space tracking and data acquisition facilities. The Soviets replied on August 13, 1965, that such visits were not then possible.

May 3, 1965.—NASA suggested United States/U.S.S.R. communications tests via the Soviet Molniya I. There was no Soviet response.

August 25, 1965.—At the request of President Johnson, Administrator Webb invited the Soviet Academy of Sciences to send a high-level representative to the launching of Gemini VI. At the same time, the President said that "we will continue to hold out to all nations, including the Soviet Union, the hand of cooperation in the exciting years of space exploration which lie ahead for all of us." The Soviets did not accept this invitation.

November 16, 1965.—NASA inquired about the possibility of United States/U.S.S.R. communications tests via Molniya I. On January 23, 1966, the Soviets replied that it was not possible to consider joint experiments "in the present conditions."

January 6, 1966.—Administrator Webb asked Academician Blagonravov, Chairman of the Soviet Academy's Commission on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, for a description of experiments on Soviet Venus probes then in flight in order that NASA plans for Venus probes might emphasize ex-

periments which could complement rather than duplicate Soviet work. Blagonravov replied informally that he did not have authority to describe the experiments.

March 24 and May 23, 1966.—Administrator Webb suggested to Academician Blagonravov that the Soviets propose subjects for discussion with a view to extending cooperation between NASA and the Soviet Academy. Blagonravov replied informally that the Soviets were not ready for further cooperation.

September 22, 1966.—Ambassador Goldberg, speaking in the U.N. General Assembly, said that if the U.S.S.R. desired tracking coverage from U.S. territory, we were prepared to discuss with the Soviets the technical and other requirements involved "with a view to reaching some mutually beneficial agreement."

March 27, 1967.—President Seitz, of the National Academy of Sciences, proposed to President Keldysh, of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. that the U.S.S.R. provide the United States with some results of the Luna 13 soil meter experiment in advance of Soviet normal reporting to the world scientific community in return for comparable data from future flights in the Surveyor series. President Keldysh replied 4 months later on July 28, forwarding data which had already been reported at the International Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) meeting in London.

March 27-31, 1967.—Dr. Kistiakowsky, during the visit of a National Academy of Sciences delegation to Moscow, suggested small United States/U.S.S.R. meetings to consider such topics as cooperation in weather prediction, lunar and planetary research, and orbiting telescopes. At the same time, Dr. Brown proposed that representatives of the two academies consider joint space efforts in basic science, excluding rocketry. The Soviets have not replied to these proposals.

April 4, 1967.—Administrator Webb said in his statement on the death of Cosmonaut Komarov that NASA wished to make every realistic effort to cooperate with the Soviet Union. The Soviets have not responded.

June 2, 1967.—Administrator Webb proposed to Academician Blagonravov that they meet in July at the time of the COSPAR meeting in London to review progress in the exchange of weather data as required every 6 months under bilateral agreements. Blagonravov replied on July 3 that he had been unable to arrange for the presence of the necessary Soviet experts. The required semiannual meetings had not been held since October 1965.

October 10, 1967.—President Johnson, speaking on the occasion of the entry into force of the U.N. Outer Space Treaty, listed previous U.S. offers of cooperation and said "We again renew these offers today. They are only the beginnings of what should be a long, cooperative endeavor in exploring the heavens together."

October 18, 1967.—President Seitz of the National Academy of Sciences, in a telegram congratulating Academician Keldysh on the success of Venus 4, spoke of the need to further full and prompt exchange of data on planetary exploration. Keldysh's telegram of acknowledgement made no reference to data exchange.

December 15, 1967.—President Seitz of the National Academy wrote to Academician Keldysh proposing a small working meeting between the Soviet Venera IV experimenters and the American Mariner V experimenters to compare results of the two Venus probes and to assist each other in understanding the significance of the measurements. Keldysh replied in a letter of January 24, 1968, that he would be sending proposals on this matter shortly. The proposals never came, and there has been no further Soviet response.

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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A bullet-pierced American helmet is half-covered by the sand. A tank track, churning over one of the execution trenches, has left a deep depression.

The trench to be excavated is clearly recognizable; a long, three foot wide depression overgrown with bright green grass standing out amid the coarse scrub of the dunes.

Women distribute surgical gloves and face masks. From a bottle they pour alcohol over the gauze.

Eight grave-diggers, mostly barefoot and wearing shorts, begin to open the length of the trench.

Three feet down, they find the corpses, stacked against each other in a straight line. With small shovels, sand is removed right and left of the line.

With their hands, the workers lift the bodies from the graves onto plastic sheets.

The grave-diggers lift the skull of every body out first, gently brushing away the sand.

Two men check the dental structure and the length and color of the hair. They report the results through their facemasks to four young men and girls registering all identifications in pads. A number for future identifications is put on each skull.

One unidentified victim is found to have a plastic image of Buddha on a silver chain clenched between the teeth.

The torsos of the corpses, with arms and legs huddled in the crouching, kneeling position in which the victims were killed, are lifted out by grave-diggers.

In monotonous voices, officials announce to the waiting men and women what they find as they rip clothing apart, search pockets for identification papers and military tags.

Militiaman Nguyen My, who has stood beside the trench for two hours, suddenly falls to his knee, howling like a wounded animal. Then his voice becomes a whimper and he touches a piece of uniform with the name tag of his brother Nguyen Duc. With trembling hands he pulls his dead brother's picture from his wallet, showing it around.

The brother's remains are wrapped in a plastic sheet. The package looks like the mummy of a child.

Two black-clad militiamen carry the corpse away on a makeshift bamboo stretcher. Soldier Nguyen My, crying, stumbles behind.

The day before he had found his other brother, Nguyen Doan, in another mass grave. All three had been captured during the Tet offensive. Only Nguyen My escaped.

As the hot day wears on, almost every yard of trench yields a body.

The grave-diggers run short of plastic sheets and bodies are laid out in the sand.

A woman, digging with her fingers through a heap of bones, shrieks and collapses, tears streaming down her face. She wails and beats her hands on the ground, rocking back and forth. After her husband's body is wrapped she embraces the bundle. Other women drag her away and support her as she follows the stretcher-bearers.

Some of the women return after burying one relative, looking for others. One peasant woman found her husband and two sons within two days in different execution trenches.

Such scenes are repeated along the road, to which the bodies are carried and again at the schoolhouse where they are laid out and lists of identification marks are tacked to the walls.

More than 300 unknown victims await a mass funeral unless relatives can identify and bury them in family plots.

The number of persons waiting at the graves has become larger each day.

Many citizens of Hue have tried to believe their relatives were taken away by the Viet Cong to serve as soldiers, laborers or just to be indoctrinated for the Communist cause. Now they know that the Viet Cong meant death.

PRESIDENTIAL WORLD TRADE MESSAGE

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, President Nixon has presented a balanced approach to world trade. He has recognized the need for open markets but, more importantly, he has also recognized the hardship now faced by some of our domestic industries, such as textiles. Of additional importance to my own Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is the rising level of shoe imports which I hope can be curtailed, or at least remedied, by means of effective legislation.

The President's proposed Trade Act of 1969 will provide some remedy for those industries which are adversely affected by rising import levels. Whenever increased imports are the primary cause of serious injury, relief will now be available to both the industry involved and its employees. I believe that the essence of the President's proposals lies in his assertion that—

U.S. trade policies must respect legitimate U.S. interests, and that to be fair to our trading partners does not require us to be unfair to our own people.

Free trade will not mean much to the working man who is out of a job. I hope that the President's plan will help to remedy the serious situations some of our industries now face in addition to bolstering our position on the world market.

SALT

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, on November 10, Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, one of this country's most eminent scientific authorities, delivered what I consider to be an immensely important address at the University of Chicago, dealing with the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks—SALT—between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Dr. Panofsky noted that several of the major strategic weapons systems which are coming of age at the present time have the inherent tendency to justify differing Soviet conclusions about our intentions. Thus, while the Safeguard ABM is described as a means of preserving our deterrent, it is also consistent with a plan to develop a first-strike capability. While multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles have been offered as a device for penetrating a Soviet ABM, they, too, can be viewed as a threat to the Soviet Union's deterrent forces—particularly when they are described as enhancements of our ability to strike hard targets. The fact that we are moving ahead on both in combination gives special force to the arguments of those elements within the Soviet Union who ascribe warlike intentions to the United States.

From this he draws a conclusion with which I heartily agree that—

A small step in arms limitations may be harder to negotiate and be in fact more dangerous to U.S. and also Soviet security than a large step: Because of the multiple strategic roles of these systems impeding development of just one of them may be dangerous to either side. The more restrictive the SALT treaty can be on the further evolution of MIRV's and ABM, the more substantial will be the success of the treaty in achieving stability.

In addition, Dr. Panofsky notes that in terms of policing an arms control agreement the physical activity which we would undertake in deploying other kinds of weaponry, such as bomber defenses, probably cannot be readily discerned from the early steps in deployment of such provocative systems as ABM's and MIRV's. Hence, where inspection is concerned, he points out that—

The more far-reaching the prohibition of the SALT treaty, the less important the question of cheating becomes . . . A freeze of the "status quo" at present levels of strategic armaments is easier to police than a treaty specifying agreed numbers of components (missiles, radars, etc.) of permitted strategic systems. It is easier to recognize changes than to interpret in detail what is discovered.

It is my fervent hope that the Nixon administration recognizes the significance of these arguments, and that it is moving into the SALT discussions with a firm determination to achieve far-reaching agreements.

I must say in this respect, however, that recent disclosures of the opening posture to be taken in Helsinki are most discouraging. I have been unable to see any justification for the continuation of our MIRV testing program during the months immediately preceding the talks, and I am even more alarmed to note that our negotiators do not plan to seek a mutual moratorium on MIRV tests as the first order of business. This latter, minimal step has been urged by no less than 42 Members of the Senate who are sponsoring the resolution submitted by the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE).

Mr. President, because I believe it offers a high level of understanding on the relationships between weapons now under congressional consideration and the prospects for meaningful arms control agreements, I ask unanimous consent that the statement be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

(By W. K. H. Panofsky)

After World War II representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union have sat down together 5,000 times to discuss the limitations of armaments of their two nations. In spite of these efforts to do something about the arms race both countries combined have spent \$1 trillion, that is one thousand billion dollars, on military expenses. This sum is so enormous that it is difficult to visualize: It represents approximately the total productive effort of the U.S. for a period of two years.

Why can't we do better? It is obvious that both countries have over-riding interests to do something about this madness; both countries could have used this enormous effort on more constructive pursuits than escalating the threat of one against the other. Both countries would have in fact greater security if neither had engaged in this arms race.

The achievements stemming from these 5,000 meetings have been woefully inadequate, although not totally negligible: We have the Limited Test Ban Treaty, we have the U.N. resolution banning nuclear weapons in space, and we have the beginnings at least of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nu-

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clear weapons. Yet all this is very small relative to the rate at which the arms race is progressing, and it does not take much mathematics to predict that the further we go along the road of military build-up on both sides the harder it will be to turn back without disaster.

Most arms limitation negotiations involving the Soviets and Americans have involved many other nations also; however the "strategic" arms race, that is the build-up of those weapons of mass destruction involving long-range nuclear weapons, is the province of the Soviet Union and the United States only; America and Russia possess a nuclear arsenal greatly in excess of any other nation and an arsenal vastly more than they would need to inflict total destruction on one another. It should therefore be more productive to hold bilateral talks, that is directly between the Soviet Union and the U.S., to limit the strategic arms race rather than to negotiate in as complicated a forum as the 18-nation disarmament conference (ENDC) which has been going on in Geneva for several years.

The idea of bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the U.S. was first proposed over three years ago and personally introduced to Mr. Kosygin by President Johnson and Mr. McNamara at their meeting in Glassboro, New Jersey. It appeared the talks on strategic arms limitation, generally known as the SALT talks, would have a good chance to materialize before the end of the Johnson Administration, but the cooling off of relations brought on by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia intervened and the Nixon Administration has taken its time to formulate plans of its own. Now the U.S. officially had been prepared to start talking for some time but the Soviets have just now agreed to a specific time and place for preliminary talks, to begin at Helsinki in mid-November. All this delay has occurred in the face of the formal treaty obligation assumed by both nations in connection with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to pursue seriously steps to limit their strategic weapons.

Clearly all this hesitation in the face of an overriding common interest to get rid of the burden and dangers of strategic weapons must be the result of some serious indecision and infighting on both sides of the Iron Curtain. What the conflicts are in the Soviet Union in arriving at definite plans we can only surmise—on the other hand from Congressional Hearings, public statements and newspaper "leaks" it is becoming fairly clear how the sides are drawn in the United States in trying to influence the U.S. position in the forthcoming SALT talks.

Both sides in the strategic arms race suffer from the lack of a clearly defined policy on their strategic objectives, and how each side is willing to modify its strategic objectives as a result of the SALT talks. U.S. strategy has been described in many public statements and Congressional Hearings by such jargon as deterrence, damage limiting capability, first strike capability, second strike capability, counterforce, countervalue, etc. What does all this mean? All this jargon is really a symptom of a dilemma. All military planners know "in their hearts" that should nuclear war break out, prediction of the outcome is really a hopeless task. The amount of destructive power available to both sides is so enormous that will all the computers and "think tanks" in the world one has little confidence in most conclusions of "war game" calculations. Therefore the primary stated policy of both nations has been prevention of nuclear war through deterrence, that is maintaining armaments at such a level that, should the one side attack first, then the other could strike back and destroy the opponent's society. Yet the lingering problem remains—what should be done in case deterrence fails, that is if war should break out anyhow by accident, by gradual

escalation, or by inadvertent involvement of the two super powers in conflicts stirred up by third parties. To counter this possibility the strategists have invented "damage limiting" as a strategic objective, that is they would like to be prepared to minimize damage to the home country if deterrence should fail.

What does a strategy of "damage limiting" imply? It means that we attempt to protect our population through Civil Defense and ABM, and that we direct some of our air-planes and missiles to destroy those few air-planes and missiles which have not yet been launched against us.

But here we have the dilemma: the very things we would have to do to limit damage to the U.S. in nuclear war are qualitatively the same steps we would take if we planned a "first strike" against the USSR. As we increase the "damage limiting" forces we possess, the Soviet side would conclude that we would be more difficult to deter from a sudden attack against them; in other words, if we protect our population if war should break out, then the other side would have to raise its total destructive power in order to be convinced that we would be "deterred" from striking first. Clearly this argument applies equally whether you discuss it from the point of view of the Soviets or the Americans. Therefore the strategy of deterrence and the strategy of damage limitation effectively countermand one another, yet in all official pronouncements both ourselves and the Soviets espouse both.

This ambiguity in official attitude reflects of course an internal struggle on both sides of the Iron Curtain among the traditional military men who want to retain the ability to "fight a war and prevail" even in the nuclear age, and the group of advisors, among them the majority of civilian scientists, who see sanctuary only in prevention of nuclear war. It is clear that one can not hope for much progress in the SALT talks unless both sides implicitly or explicitly agree that reducing strategic arms to a minimum deterrent level is the common objective worth striving for at this time. Both even with such a consensus there can be a wide margin of opinion as to how large a "minimum deterrent force" should be.

The current, much publicized debates on ABM and a moratorium on testing of MIRV's directly reflects the ambiguity of U.S. thinking. Let me elaborate on these controversies and how they relate to SALT.

As you know, ABM was first discussed as a defense of the cities and their population against Soviet long-range ballistic missiles. The opponents of massive deployment of ABM to defend cities, and I among them, have concluded that such a defense would be an enormously expensive technical enterprise and would buy very little; the protection offered could be negated by an increase of Soviet offensive forces at less cost than what we would have spent in providing the defense; therefore the result would simply be another step in the arms race with no increase in protection for anyone, and with much greater destruction, should war break out. This type of criticism had apparently been accepted by the Nixon Administration and accordingly the President withdrew the Johnson "Sentinel" city defense plan and instead substituted the "Safeguard" system which is intended primarily to protect the Minuteman land-based missile forces in North Dakota and Montana. In this new role ABM would increase U.S. deterrence by defending our Minuteman forces: a first attack by the Soviets could not result in destroying the ability of Minuteman to strike back. Unfortunately this strategic decision was not paralleled by a corresponding shift in engineering of Safeguard—the actual system which is now approved for deployment will do very little in protecting Minuteman, and also can easily be interpreted to be

actually a first step for a city defense. Safeguard Phase II actually is intended to be a "thin" city defense against China, but its configuration is such that the Soviets may be forced to conclude that their deterrence against the U.S. is to some extent impaired.

This situation illustrates that ABM can and does have an ambiguous role: It can either serve a purely deterrent role such as defending Minuteman, or it can assist in a damage-limiting role if it defends cities, and it is very difficult for an opponent to tell which is which.

Our view of Soviet ABM is even more confusing since we can only interpret the limited information which we have; the only ABM system which we definitely know about is a very marginal deployment around Moscow; there have been "on again, off again" systems, and there are anti-aircraft defenses which may or may not also have a potential ABM role.

The situation with MIRV is similarly ambivalent as we shall see. The term MIRV stands for "Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles." This is a fancy way of saying that a single missile can carry a number of independent warheads carrying nuclear weapons which can be targeted against several objectives at once. MIRV's again have a dual function: On the one hand they can be used as a "penetration aid" against the enemy's defenses: the enemy's ABM can be penetrated if he has too many incoming warheads to shoot at. For this particular mission MIRV's would not need high accuracy. On the other hand if MIRV did have high accuracy then it would become a threat against the other side's retaliatory force; high accuracy would make it possible to take out simultaneously such a large number of the other side's implanted missiles in a single strike to keep most of them from striking back. It is for this reason that widespread deployment of MIRV, combined with high accuracy raises a spectre of a first strike.

This MIRV threat was pointed out by Secretary Laird when he advocated the Safeguard as a defense against the Soviet SS-9, which he described as a potential MIRV. Actually the SS-9 missile, as far as we have observed, lacks essential elements to make it a MIRV; some versions of the SS-9 carry three separate warheads, but there is doubt whether each can be independently directed at separate targets. Nevertheless, because of the high explosive power of the SS-9 it would become a great threat against the U.S. Minuteman silos should it be developed into a full-fledged MIRV. A halt on MIRV testing would eliminate this danger.

The U.S. position in relation to its MIRV's has been far from unambiguous also. Historically the decision to develop MIRV's in the U.S. came as a response to penetrate a surmised Soviet ABM system which, however, did not make anywhere near as much progress as we had feared; yet our MIRV plans continued. U.S. MIRV tests appear further advanced than those of the Soviets—we have successfully tested MIRV's both for Poseidon and Minuteman; if forced to discontinue MIRV testing as a result of SALT, or a MIRV moratorium, we could still produce these devices with sufficient performance to serve in a deterrent role, i.e. to penetrate Soviet defenses.

As I mentioned above, if penetrating Soviet defenses remained the only motive, then low accuracy for U.S. MIRV's would have been sufficient. However, last year the U.S. not only undertook extensive tests of its MIRV's but also proposed a program to increase the accuracy of U.S. missiles. This would be very difficult to justify if penetrating Soviet defenses were really the only objective. In fact Secretary Laird candidly testified in the Senate that the purpose of increasing accuracy was to improve our efficiency against "hard targets." This is clearly inconsistent with the strategy of deterrence and unquestionably will give rise to Soviet fears of U.S. intent

against striking first against their missile force.

Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, tried to back-paddle from Secretary Laird's statement that upgrading of MIRV accuracy was intended against hard strategic targets. He testified in Congress that this increased accuracy was needed against such items as industrial targets such as steel mills. This statement is technically insupportable. Even if one gives industrial targets a rather substantial resistance to blast, the presently programmed yields and accuracy for both Poseidon and Minuteman III are fully adequate to give a very high probability to destroy such targets.

The first slide shows a picture of the damage to a machine shop at Hiroshima caused by the first 20 KT nuclear bomb at a miss distance over half a mile. The presently programmed MIRV's for Poseidon and Minuteman have explosive power considerably larger than that of the Hiroshima bombs and are designed for accuracy higher than the "miss" which caused the devastation in the picture. It appears difficult to justify an improved accuracy program to do better than this!

What does all this discussion of MIRV and ABM have to do with the problem of formulating a U.S. position for SALT? The next slide summarizes the conclusions from the previous discussion about the ambivalence of ABM and MIRV. We can now understand that, depending on how MIRV's and ABM's are deployed, and depending on their physical characteristics they can be viewed either as protecting the domestic deterrent forces or as threatening the deterrent forces of the other side. Specifically deployment of ABM by the Soviets has given the incentive for U.S. development of MIRV, deployment of multiple warheads by the Soviets has given an excuse for U.S. deployment of Safeguard, the possible role of Safeguard in protecting cities will give rise to Soviet fears of being able to maintain their deterrent against us, the possibility of improving the accuracy of American MIRV's appears to threaten Soviet missile silos etc. In short, because of this ambiguity, the whole ABM and MIRV complex becomes an inextricable part of the next large step of the arms race and the world would be better off without either.

It is much easier to assure compliance with treaty terms which prohibit a weapons system entirely than with a provision which permits a specified number of weapons. A "zero ABM" provision in SALT would be much easier to enforce than an agreement limiting both sides to a level corresponding to the U.S. Safeguard. Since ABM and MIRV's pose an inter-related set of problems we can see that the Safeguard decision greatly complicates the SALT talks.

It is this intertwined situation which makes the conclusion clear that a small step in arms limitation may be harder to negotiate and be in fact more dangerous to U.S. and also Soviet security than a large step: Because of the multiple strategic roles of these systems impeding development of just one of them may be dangerous to either side. The more restrictive the SALT treaty can be on the further evolution of MIRV's and ABM, the more substantial will be the success of the treaty in achieving stability.

Starting from this conclusion we are immediately thrown into the complex question of policing the terms of a treaty. We are living in an era of mutual mistrust between the Soviet Union and the U.S. This circumstance, combined with the long-standing tradition of the Soviet Union for secrecy, raises both the question of cheating by the Soviet Union against the provisions of a treaty, and of abrogation of such a treaty following clandestine preparations. We know relatively little about the decision-making processes in the Soviet Union's military strategic issues; although our technical information on Soviet systems is remarkably good,

it is nowhere as detailed as we think the information is which the Soviets have about our systems. Most people are quite pessimistic that we will be able to negotiate into the SALT treaty a substantial amount of "on-site inspection" of Soviet installations, although this possibility cannot be excluded; most of you know that lack of agreement on such inspections proved to be the stumbling block which prevented the partial nuclear test ban treaty to become a comprehensive treaty, including prohibition of underground nuclear explosions. Therefore a great deal of attention has been given to evaluating the extent to which the SALT treaty could be verified on the basis of "unilateral intelligence," that is from information which we gather through our miscellaneous surveillance techniques of Soviet activities. How effective these techniques are in detail is impossible to discuss in public; suffice it to say here that even in private there is substantial disagreement as to how good a job we can really do in verifying Soviet activities. The opponents of a far-reaching SALT treaty tend to emphasize the ease by which the Soviet could clandestinely develop and test forbidden military systems and then suddenly "trot out" completely developed military systems which would endanger the strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The spectre of "Instant ABM" and "Instant MIRV" suddenly appearing, followed by a Soviet ultimatum, is being raised. The fear of a superhuman clandestine effort on the part of the Soviets resulting in a sudden shift in the strategic balance under a treaty, has caused our more conservative military planners to oppose far-reaching arms limitation moves in the past and they are expected to do so in relation to SALT.

Yet it is true in general that under the more restrictive arms limitation agreements cheating will be much less dangerous toward upsetting the strategic balance than if the arms race continued with only small restraints. This point was illustrated above in relation to ABM and MIRV.

If one carries conservatism in military matters viewed in isolation to the extreme, any basis for a negotiable position is, of course, destroyed. The degree of absurdity to which this kind of thing can lead became apparent recently when one compares the testimony given by the Defense Department witnesses in support of the Safeguard ABM system with the testimony given to justify continued MIRV testing and deployment as needed to penetrate certain Soviet air defense systems (the SA-2 and SA-5 systems) in a possible ABM role. Specifically the SA-2 system is a very simple but very extensively deployed anti-aircraft defense in the Soviet Union; it has also been used in Viet Nam. The possibility was raised that the SA-2's would have some potential of shooting down incoming U.S. ICBM's and thereby would protect Soviet cities; the U.S. deterrent would then be endangered. At the same time when justifying the Safeguard System Defense Department witnesses maintained that a system as complex as the one proposed would be required to carry out the much simpler task, namely the job of protecting the hardened Minuteman sites.

Next I am showing a comparison of the qualitative features of the Soviet SA-2 system and the U.S. Safeguard ABM. Clearly, in trying to be conservative our Defense Department is giving the Soviets credit for an incredible performance with a very primitive system which we deny exists for the much more sophisticated devices which we are proposing should be built.

A similar degree of "one way" conservatism pervades the argument relating to our ability to verify possible Soviet violations of a SALT treaty. One of the frequently proposed measures to control the further evolution of MIRV technology and deployment would be to prohibit testing of intercontinental bal-

listic missiles which appear to carry MIRV warheads, or even to prohibit or severely restrict the test firing of such missiles entirely. The question then naturally arises as to how well we can monitor the firing of such vehicles by the Soviet Union, both in regard to the total number of firings and in terms of the characteristics of the devices under test. Naturally the experts differ in their assessment of our ability to find out what the Soviets are doing. However, as was again revealed in recent Congressional testimony, most of the debate deals with the wrong subject, namely whether we can correctly identify a few single test firings carried out clandestinely or specifically designed to hide their true purpose. What is ignored in these discussions is the total picture in which such "cheating" would have to be carried out: The Soviets would have to make a deliberate decision in the face of their treaty obligation to man a large-scale program starting from design and engineering, through a clandestine test program and leading to secret deployment, and they would then have to have the confidence that the resulting system would be reliable enough that it could be used in a first strike role against the U.S. to inflict so much damage that the U.S. could not retaliate. Even if single tests escape detection, the likelihood that this long sequence of events will remain unnoticed and will have an important military consequence is very, very small.

Focusing these discussions on the physical detectability of a single test tends to obscure the basic issue: Are the kind of risks which would be involved in pursuing cheating on the scale required affecting the strategic balance acceptable to the Soviet Union?

What we face here is a symptom of the wrong avenues we are apt to pursue when purely technical reasoning, combined with highly conservative military planning, are being considered in isolation. We are contriving situations in which the Soviets could accomplish technological feats which we could not conceive of performing ourselves and we are visualizing complex scenarios where the normally conservative Soviet military planners are pursuing a long-range, clandestine course which would shift their strategic pattern overnight once the covers were removed.

Any decisions on arms limitations involve a balance of risks to the survival of the U.S. and the World. We cannot rationally pursue a course where we are willing to take no military risks at all in pursuing arms control negotiations, while we are willing to expose ourselves to the ever-increasing risk of war and annihilation which the unchecked growth of the arms race implies.

A debate similar to the "MIRV" cheating controversy centers around possible Soviet evasion of limitations on ABM deployment. ABM's are complex systems: they require radars, computers, interceptor missiles, control centers and communications. Yet many such facilities are also common to other military installations, in particular those connected with Air Defense: I mentioned previously that in Congressional Hearings Defense Department witnesses raised a possible threat that the Soviet SA-2 and SA-5 anti-aircraft defense systems could be "upgraded" into ABM. Without arguing about the technical feasibility and costs of such a move, it is clear that revamping of Soviet Air Defense into an effective ABM would be a very large scale undertaking. Such an activity would be almost impossible to conceal; to prevent evolution of ABM by these means under the guise of improvements of Air Defense installations it would be good if SALT would prohibit new or modified Air Defense installations also. This conclusion is again part of the general pattern demonstrated before: *The more far-reaching the prohibition of the SALT treaty, the less important the question of cheating becomes.*

A second, equally important conclusion is: A freeze of the "status quo" at present levels of strategic armaments is easier to police than a treaty specifying agreed numbers of components (missiles, radars, etc.) of permitted strategic systems. It is easier to recognize changes than to interpret in detail what is discovered.

A "freeze" would tend to perpetuate for the time being many of the asymmetries between the U.S. and the Soviet Union: the Soviets are "ahead" of the U.S. in terms of total megatonnage of nuclear arms; we are ahead of them in number of bombers and missiles. Both nations could destroy the other's civilization many times over; neither side could hope to attack the other without risking its own survival. The strategic arms race would be halted and the way might be paved for future reductions. Yet only the future will tell whether in the present atmosphere of mistrust and under the spectre of large scale Soviet clandestine programs, agreement on such far-reaching, but simple, treaty terms can be reached.

The spectre of sudden emergence of hitherto secret Soviet ABM or MIRV systems developed clandestinely under a treaty has given rise to another debate which is possibly of even more far-reaching significance than the debate about the SALT treaty itself. This is the controversy about the controls on the growth of technology. All of you have been exposed to the increasing clamor about man's need to put reins on the technology of his own creation lest technology control him. We have become painfully aware that when we make decisions to improve our standard of living through new technological devices we are often very short-sighted in assessing the consequences of each new step. We are apt to balance the short-range benefit of a new device only with the immediate monetary cost. What we tend to ignore are the long-range social as well as financial costs of many of our decisions in terms of disturbing the environment through pollution, through ecological damage, etc. In the military area we are now being faced with the claim of some of our military spokesmen that we must not impede development of new military technology in order to be prepared to cope with unexpected clandestine military developments of an opponent. To put it in blunt terms—the military technicians maintain that evolution of military technology is inexorable and that we must adjust our lives and political and strategic decisions to live with that evolution. I claim that such an assumption is both dangerous to man's very existence and is also insupportable on its own merit. Our knowledge of science will indeed increase continuously—the facts of nature are there to be explored and they will not remain hidden, nor should they remain hidden. However, the step from science to military technology involves a protracted series of planned deliberate steps extending over many years; man can decide through his political processes to either undertake such steps or not to.

Although the Limited Test Ban prohibiting atomic explosions in the atmosphere and in outer space has been only a relatively minor move in the field of arms control it nevertheless is a major milestone in demonstrating that a barrier against unchecked evolution of military technology can be erected. This, of course, was the real reason why the Limited Test Ban was fought so vigorously. I see no reason why we should acquiesce to the development of the ever-increasing lethality of our weapons; if we subscribe to the belief that technology has a life of its own and that its progress in any direction, however anti-social, cannot be impeded, then it is indeed true that man has lost control over his own destiny.

I have gone far afield in discussing the specific issues underlying the debate involving the U.S. preparation for the SALT

talks, and of course I do not know in detail what the issues are which are being debated in the Soviet Union and which keep the Soviets from responding to the U.S. requests to establish a firm beginning date for the negotiations. Part of the controversial issues within the Soviet Union, I am sure, are similar to the ones debated in the U.S.; some of them may well have to do with the special problems which the Soviets are facing in regard to China, that is, how to design a possible treaty which reduces the level of armaments in the bilateral race between the Soviet Union and the USA while leaving the Soviet Union freedom of action against China. Maybe the Soviet military planners are quoting Lenin who said:

"Everyone will agree that an army which does not train itself to wield all arms, all means and methods of warfare that the enemy possesses, or may possess, is behaving in an unwise or even in a criminal manner."

This sounds disturbingly similar to the philosophy of some of the U.S. military spokesmen; if such views prevail in either the USA or the Soviet Union, we will see the Arms Race continue unabated by the results of SALT. Whatever the real conflicts are on both sides of the Iron Curtain, it is clear they involve questions which both societies have to resolve internally before meaningful negotiations can result.

I hope I have demonstrated to you that the nature of the questions underlying SALT is very profound; although many technical factors entering the decisions each nation faces are basically political. We must not identify narrow military planning with the "National Interest"; we should not confuse superiority in arms with "Security." SALT offers a new opportunity to redirect our national priorities from an unproductive and dangerous technological contest to the solution of urgent problems at home. At stake is the survival of civilization on this earth. There is very little time.

THE MEDIA

Mr. DOLE, Mr. President, it appears that former Vice President Humphrey has a short memory when he criticizes Vice President AGNEW for his statements concerning the news media.

A story by William Chapman in today's Washington Post states:

Humphrey's charges stressed that he considers Agnew's remarks and others' comments part of a premeditated and concentrated administration plan.

In another portion of the story, Humphrey accused the Nixon administration of mounting a "calculated attack" on the right of dissent and on the news media.

Just to keep the record straight, I ask permission to have printed at this point in the Record excerpts from an article published in the Birmingham News of Tuesday, June 25, 1968, and an article from the New York Times of June 25, 1968.

It is not unusual for the former Vice President to be on both sides of an issue, but in this particular case his statement concerning the news media, particularly network television, makes Vice President AGNEW's statements mild in comparison.

Former Vice President Humphrey charged that TV in particular has been used to spread the message of rioting and looting. Senators will note in the New York Times article that the Vice President is quoted as saying that it was essential that television in particular, "and radio and press secondarily," accept responsibility in riot situations.

In another quotation, Humphrey said: If the media are going to broadcast the emotional appeals of the Stokely Carmichael's and the other agitators, it is like throwing gasoline on the flames.

This certainly indicates the then Vice President's displeasure with media coverage. At any rate, I believe the articles referred to will be of interest. I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Birmingham (Ala.) News, June 25, 1968]

HUMPHREY SAYS TV "HAS SPREAD THE MESSAGE OF RIOTING AND LOOTING"

NEW YORK.—Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey says television, "in particular," has "served as a catalyst to promote even more trouble" during riots.

In an article in the current issue of Look magazine, Humphrey is quoted as saying: "I am convinced that just as the media can tell the facts to the people, they can also exaggerate and inflame the situation."

"I am not a wise enough man to make a judgment as to how the media should respond to this situation. But I do know that TV in particular has spread the message of rioting and looting, has displayed the carrying out of televisions, home appliances, groceries, etc., and has literally served as a catalyst to promote even more trouble."

Discussing other phases of dealing with riots, the vice president and Democratic presidential hopeful, says "there must be rapid introduction of sufficient manpower." He adds, however, "The emphasis must be on men rather than guns."

Humphrey also urges police to "use minimum force, but make arrests rapidly . . . arrests rather than shooting." He says police should be trained in riot control and there must be "preplanning for the integration of state, local and federal forces" to enable them to work together efficiently.

[From the New York Times, June 25, 1968]
HUMPHREY CALLS TELEVISION A CATALYST OF RIOTS

(By Val Adams)

Vice President Humphrey charged yesterday that television "has spread the message of rioting and looting" and "has literally served as a catalyst to promote even more trouble."

His comment was contained in a profile of Mr. Humphrey published in the July 9 issue of Look magazine which goes on sale today. The article included his views on how to control civil disorders and the responsibility of television, radio and the press in reporting such events.

The Vice President's criticism that TV added fuel to civil disorders was much more unfavorable than the recent report by the President's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, which analyzed the riots of last summer. That report, noting instances of sensationalism, inaccuracy and distortion by newspapers, radio and television, concluded that the media "on the whole tried to give a balanced, factual account of the 1967 disorders."

Asked to comment on Mr. Humphrey's charge, the National Broadcasting Company said it was essential to cover the news even if it were "unpleasant and unattractive." The American Broadcasting Company said it sought to televise balanced, objective reports that would not "inflame any situation."

The Columbia Broadcasting System declined direct comment but referred to an earlier statement of policy that it must report any "significant trends in our society."

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For example, the OEO lawyers in 1967 forced California Gov. Ronald Reagan to restore a \$16 million cut in the state's Medicaid program.

Sen. Murphy and his cohorts think the taxpayers should not have to subsidize suits against themselves through the legal services program. On the other hand, the law is supposed to treat everyone equally, and if the poor don't know their rights they can't receive equal treatment.

This is not a question of subsidizing troublemakers to harass public officials. This is a question of guaranteeing an individual citizen the rights that are supposed to be his.

The American Bar Assn. calls Sen. Murphy's amendment "oppressive interference with the freedom of the lawyer and the citizen."

The head of the National Legal Aid and Defender Assn. says the amendment could cause the poor to look on the legal services program "as a paternalistic handout, meant to deceive . . . not to help effectively."

OEO Director Donald Rumsfeld opposes the amendment and says he'll work against it in the House.

If we're going to have law and order in this country, those virtues are going to have to apply across the board. That means the same law for rich and poor.

SALT

THE ARMS TRADE—PART IX

(Mr. COUGHLIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. COUGHLIN. Mr. Speaker, today I have introduced a bipartisan resolution, cosponsored by 29 of my colleagues, calling for the curtailment of the global trade in conventional weapons of war.

This resolution urges the President to institute a thorough and comprehensive review of our military aid programs, particularly those aspects concerned with arms sales. It also asks the President to take the necessary steps to have the trade in arms brought up as a topic for debate in the United Nations, to initiate multilateral arms control talks among the major conventional arms producing nations of the world, and to use the power and prestige of his office to signify the intention of the United States to work to check and control the trade.

This resolution is not designed to prohibit arms sales to nations, such as West Germany and Israel, for reasons of self-defense; the purpose is to eliminate unnecessary oversupply of arms, particularly to underdeveloped nations. This oversupply constitutes much of the trade today, and contributes heavily to the current high level of international tension. It is also my hope that this resolution will, if passed, bring this entire problem to the general attention of the public.

I am pleased to note that strategic arms limitation talks are currently taking place in Helsinki between the United States and the Soviet Union. These talks offer, in my opinion, an opportunity for initiating discussions on controlling the rapidly growing trade in conventional arms.

Mr. Speaker, since Hiroshima, mankind has been rightly preoccupied with devising ways in which atomic weapons will never again be used. Yet, while we have focused our attention on this most worthy goal, we have all but ignored the critical need to control the vast proliferation

of conventional arms that has been a stark fact of life for the past 24 years.

There have been 56 wars of significant size in the world since 1945, 54 of which have been fought in the underdeveloped areas of the world. The nations doing most of the fighting do not have the capacity to make their own arms. Thus, the weapons they use to fight these wars have been imported from the major industrial powers.

Fifteen years ago, the worldwide volume of the trade in arms was \$2.5 billion yearly. Today, the trade has doubled to \$5 billion a year. It is estimated that within the next decade the trade will double yet again to \$10 billion a year. This trade is carried out today largely unimpeded by any international agreements or restraints.

The United States is the world's largest arms merchant. Through an office in the Pentagon, it currently distributes in excess of \$2 billion in arms a year to some 70 countries. The Soviet Union is the next largest arms merchant; it is distributing some \$1 billion in arms a year, mostly to the Middle East. Its aid to Arab States, in fact, has been so great that these excessive arms have led the Arab states to provoke two wars in the last 13 years and now threatens to provoke a third. Vying for third are the British and French, each of which is selling \$400 to \$500 million in arms a year. Also intimately involved in the arms trade are Belgium, Canada, Italy, West Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Red China.

In addition to these government arms merchants, there exist quite a few large private arms traders who buy and sell weapons for personal gain. Collectively, their volume of business runs to approximately \$100 million a year, only a fraction of what governments purvey. The largest private dealer in the world is the International Armament Corp., or Interarms for short, which is located just across the Potomac River from Washington in Alexandria.

Since 1945 some \$66 billion worth of armaments have been pumped into the world markets by both government and private arms merchants. This is a staggering figure. Of this total, the United States alone has been responsible for \$50 billion. We often forget that in the Atomic Age it is these conventional arms that are doing all the killing, and virtually nothing is being done to stop the proliferation of these weapons of death.

There are virtually no international regulations or agreements controlling the international trade in arms today. The few domestic rules each country has on its book are breaking down, partly because the trade is growing so fast that it is overwhelming the existing machinery, and partly because there has developed an excess of bureaucratic obscurantism, intellectual rigidity and sheer human ignorance and greed.

Beyond the horror of the conventional wars that it has helped to induce, the real danger of the conventional trade in arms lies in the fact that it may be just these arms that will trigger a nuclear war. An atomic war could break out, because a conventional war, being fought among developing nations with pistols,

rifles, tanks, and jet planes, escalates out of control and involves the super powers.

I am also concerned that the arms-selling nations are involving themselves in the trade less for real reasons of national security and more in support of sions have become less important economic reasons. In other words, nations are selling arms these days for expedience and money. The fact that a nation does not need certain sophisticated weaponry and that such a transaction may have serious long-term repercussions have become less important considerations than the short-term advantage and the international balance of payments. This is a long way from the days when we provided allies with a relatively small quantity of arms strictly for military reasons.

Selling arms, some say, is good for business, it brings in gold, keeps people employed, strengthens international relationships, keeps our friends up in the state of the art, and promotes the international flow of technology. To me and many other people, this reasoning is not only specious but ultimately self-defeating. I can think of no more misguided policy than selling arms to approximately 70 countries for the money—if that policy may result in either local killing or nuclear war.

Equally important is the question of long-term national security versus short-term political advantage. Does the huge 1969 increase in our arms sales to Greece, Chile and Morocco, for example, result in increased national security or represent an over-supply which may eventually be used against our own interests? Has anyone asked what these arms are really for or who is their enemy? Are Greece, Chile, and Morocco under imminent threat of attack, or are these arms to curry temporary favor with a government and more likely to be used for suppression or military adventures?

It is time, therefore, that a full-scale review of our policy be initiated, that the subject be debated not only in Congress, but in the United Nations and, hopefully, in other arms-selling countries as well. We want to see our arms aid policy returned to the point where it is once again subordinate to our overall, long-term foreign policy, and that, in all circumstances, it be flexible, reasonable and minimal. Today, it is none of these. To do this we need international understandings.

I have been in responsive contact with the administration on this question and have urged that useful discussions about controlling the international trade in conventional arms could take place at the SALT talks.

This resolution will strengthen our Government's position and could be the beginning of a long and necessary process of re-examination. The resolution reads in full as follows:

H. RES. 735

A resolution urging new initiatives to stem the escalating \$5 billion yearly international trade in conventional weapons of war

Whereas, the House of Representatives finds there exists a \$5 billion yearly trade in conventional weapons of war throughout the world that threatens to double to \$10 billion within the next five years, and

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Whereas, the House of Representatives finds that sold, bartered or given away arms have figured prominently in 56 wars of consequence since 1945, 54 of them fought in underdeveloped countries, and

Whereas, the House of Representatives finds that the United States Government sells more than \$2 billion worth of conventional arms each year to some 60 to 80 nations while the remaining \$3 billion are sold by 25 nations including major powers such as the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, West Germany and Italy, and

Whereas, the House of Representatives finds that the United States Government should supply arms to other nations only to the extent necessary for their self-defense and that over-supply fosters military coups d'etat, promotes economic and fiscal instability and encourages military adventures that endanger peace, and

Whereas, the House of Representatives finds that the expanding trade in armaments fuels regional and localized conflicts that could escalate out of control to involve the nuclear powers in a catastrophic worldwide atomic war: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, it is the sense of the House of Representatives that

(1) the President should immediately institute a thorough and comprehensive review of the military aid programs of the United States, particularly with respect to the military assistance and sales operations of the Department of Defense, and

(2) the President should take such actions as may be appropriate—

(A) to initiate multilateral discussions among the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and other countries on the control of the worldwide trade in armaments, and

(B) to commence a general debate in the United Nations with respect to the control of the conventional arms trade, and

(C) to use the power and prestige of his office to signify the intention of the United States to work actively with all nations to check and control the international sales and distribution of conventional weapons of death and destruction.

Joining me in this Resolution as co-sponsors are:

John B. Anderson, Republican, of Illinois.
George E. Brown, Jr., Democrat, of California.

George Bush, Republican, of Texas.
Daniel E. Button, Republican, of New York.
Shirley Chisholm, Democrat, of New York.
John Conyers, Jr., Democrat, of Michigan.
John R. Dellenback, Republican, of Oregon.
Don Edwards, Democrat, of California.
Donald M. Fraser, Democrat, of Minnesota.
Thoms S. Foley, Democrat, of Washington.
William J. Green, Democrat, of Pennsylvania.

Frank Horton, Republican, of New York.
Albert W. Johnson, Republican, of Pennsylvania.

Edward I. Koch, Democrat, of New York.
Robert L. Leggett, Democrat, of California.
Paul N. McCloskey, Republican, of California.

Joseph M. McDade, Republican, of Pennsylvania.
Thomas J. Meskill, Republican, of Connecticut.

Abner J. Mikva, Democrat, of Illinois.
F. Bradford Morse, Republican, of Massachusetts.

Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat, of Michigan.
Richard L. Ottinger, Democrat, of New York.

Edward J. Patten, Democrat, of New Jersey.
David Pryor, Democrat, of Arkansas.
Henry S. Reuss, Democrat, of Wisconsin.
Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Republican, of Michigan.

Herman T. Schneebeli, Republican, of Pennsylvania.

Charles W. Whalen, Jr., Republican, of Ohio.

G. William Whitehurst, Republican, of Virginia.

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT BILL

(Mr. DOWNING asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Speaker, the Congress provided a great benefit to numbers of Federal employees this year with the passage of legislation which enabled them to retire on the basis of the "high 3" years of their employment. This became law with the President's signature on October 20. In order to gain maximum benefits under the new law, employees had to retire no later than October 31 in order to take advantage of a 5-percent cost-of-living increase in retirement annuities. This gave them a scant 11 days to make the decision, make their plans and retire.

On October 29 a different complexion was added to the status of many employees when the Department of Defense announced the first of sweeping cutbacks in its work force. Although additional reductions were announced November 14, it undoubtedly will be several months before the full impact is known.

There are numbers of employees today who would welcome the opportunity to reconsider retirement if it still were possible for them to take advantage of the 5-percent increase which expired on October 31. I am certain that administrative and personnel officials would welcome these additional retirements because they undoubtedly would eliminate the need for a part of the reduction in force which is already starting to take effect.

I hate to see anyone lose his job, particularly when it happens as a result of circumstances over which the employee has no control. The Congress in this instance has control. I propose today a way through which we can exert a portion of that control and in so doing give certain employees a second opportunity to gain maximum retirement benefits, permit others to retain their jobs, and still accomplish the cutback in personnel ceilings which the administration has called for.

The bill which I offer today would give to all civil service employees who retire within 6 months after October 31 the same 5-percent increase in their retirement annuities.

OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

(Mr. BROWN of Ohio asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, Don Rumsfeld, when he was our colleague here in the House, was convinced of the need for increasing the involvement of local governments in the conduct of community action and other antipoverty activities.

Now that he has accepted President Nixon's appointment as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, it is gratifying to see that, as his friends expected, he has already taken positive action to assure greater local participation in OEO programs.

For example, the Director has had prepared, and is circulating for comment, a revision of OEO's regulation on the Green amendment which is intended to make it easier for local governments to designate community action agencies of their choice and to improve the quality of broad representation. Some of the changes would:

Ease the requirements relating to CAA program capability;

Provide for waiver of certain personnel policy requirements where public agencies are restricted by civil service laws and regulations;

Heighten requirements for private sector group representation on community action boards;

Reduce the minimum population standard; and

Elimination of the restriction that changes in designations of community action agencies will take effect only at the ends of program years.

In addition, OEO is planning specific program activities to increase communication between OEO and local governments throughout the Nation. For example, work already is underway to fund innovative programs designed to find better ways for local government to serve the poor. Rumsfeld also has ordered the development of training programs for OEO personnel so that they get a better understanding of the problems faced by public officials at the local level in their attempts to find solutions for the difficulties faced by the poor.

In my mind, these few examples demonstrate clearly to me that Don Rumsfeld is fully attuned to the need for more local government involvement in the activities of the OEO. He plans to be responsive to local elected officials and their problems, and has, in fact, already taken significant steps in this direction.

I commend him for his efforts in this regard.

POSTAL PROGRESS

(Mr. OLSEN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. OLSEN. Mr. Speaker, all the major recommendations that came out of the Kappel Commission, after that Commission spent a million dollars and an entire year, were embodied in an internal, administratively confidential task force report—of the O'Brien era—headed by Ronald Lee, Tim May, and Ira Kapenstein. Mr. Kappel could have foregone the more than 2,000 pages and five volumes comprising the report if he had handed the Commission staff this 38-page internal report and said, "Gentleman, this is it."

In fact, the many similarities between the Kappel Commission million dollar tome and the task force report are so great that, as I recently compared the two, I could not help but think that Mr.

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enough people care about their terrible plight—starvation, despair, and almost inevitable death.

Yet, Mr. Speaker, I have faith in the natural goodness of the American people. I believe they will respond and help the children of Biafra. I hope that every person who reads the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD will send a post card or letter with the words "End the Starvation" to: Post Office Box FOOD, Somerset, N.J.

I also want to insert a story from New Brunswick, N.J., the Home News: "Simple Plea Snowballs To Aid Biafran Kids." It touches my heart and I hope it will touch the heart of every reader:

The article follows:

SIMPLE PLEA SNOWBALLS TO AID BIAFRAN KIDS

If the fact that one Biafran child dies every five minutes doesn't provoke some action from the nation's leaders, maybe a million imploring letters on the Senate floor will.

Jack Ellery, who does the morning show for WCTC radio station in New Brunswick, had that idea in mind last Thursday when he launched a write-in campaign that he hopes will snowball into a nationwide expression of sympathy and concern for the war-torn people of Biafra.

Ellery reacted to an Associated Press report last Thursday that claimed that "over 300 Biafran children die every day of starvation." On his show the following morning he asked his listeners to write the words "end the starvation" on a post card and send it in to WCTC.

"We got a fantastic response," Ellery said later.

Jack Sutton, a Franklin State Bank executive, and Pete Sears of the Bound Brook Chronicle volunteered to help from a committee with Ellery to organize the campaign.

The Biafran Children Committee has now established a post office box, dubbed "FOOD," in Franklin. Over 400 letters a day stream into the box, and the number increases daily, according to Ellery.

"Letters are starting to come in from New York and from Massachusetts, where we have our sister stations," Ellery added. "Our slogan is, 'Will you invest six cents of your money and five minutes of your time to save a life?'"

"We're not political, we take no sides," Ellery explained. "We have no money and we seek no money. Some of our secretaries at WCTC and some listeners have volunteered to handle and sort the mail."

Ellery said he thought of advertising to help publicize his campaign, but that it was impossible since "New York radio stations are asking \$180 per minute and the New York Times wants \$7,800 for a full page ad."

He has contacted a special representative from Biafra to the U.S., who labelled Americans as "apathetic to the most tragic situation since Nazi Germany."

According to Ellery, only the French Red Cross has been successful recently in sneaking food past Nigeria's Russian Migs, but that even the nightly haul of 180 tons of food falls short of requirements. "The minimum starvation rate in Biafra is 2,100 tons of food a night," Ellery said.

Ellery's volunteer staff sorts the mail geographically, and will eventually mail each letter to the proper senator.

"If I walk into the U.S. Senate with a million letters, someone's going to do something about it," Ellery promised.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION

HON. ROBERT PRICE

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, December 1, 1969

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I wholeheartedly support the international biological program—IBP—and I am pleased that the Congress also express its support. I trust all Federal agencies and interested organizations will assist the IBP in its activities.

As a member of the House Science and Astronautics Committee, the committee which provided the primary legislative review of IBP, I am familiar with its organization, its operation, and its goals.

The international biological program is a worldwide effort by more than 50 nations to provide a truly international basis for managing the environment and preventing its further deterioration.

At present, U.S. involvement with IBP is limited. Through joining in certain of its activities, we are attempting to achieve a better understanding of the impact of: The population explosion, the effect of population increases on nature, and the effects that any changes in the balance of nature would have on mankind.

Mr. Speaker, while our present involvement with IBP is an important one, I believe we should expand it to include the entire spectrum of environmental control. Pollution is a lethal menace to all mankind, and its eradication can best be accomplished if the world works together. Pollution cannot be stopped on a nation-by-nation trial and error basis. The nations of the world must work together; the stakes are too high for any other approach.

The responsibility of the United States for environmental control is great. As a nation and as people, we have carelessly and thoughtlessly set in motion forces that threaten to ruin the air we breathe and the water we drink. In our Nation's cities, the menace is particularly deadly. In New York, for example, badly polluted air frequently causes 10 to 20 deaths a day. In Buffalo, the number of children hospitalized with asthma and skin inflammation increases significantly when the air is particularly dirty.

Environmental contamination is growing worse all the time. Our cities are becoming more smog-filled. Our streams are becoming more ridden with pollutants. Our air carries ever increasing amounts of chemical and industrial waste.

Unfortunately, as a people, we seem to have adopted a wait-and-see policy. However, I fail to see what we are waiting for. Are we waiting until the streets are littered with corpses before the general public is mobilized in defense of human health and survival? I certainly hope this is not the case.

Fortunately, certain Members of Con-

gress, with the encouragement of interested private and public organizations have spoken out on the issue, and introduced various legislative proposals to combat environmental pollution. In my view, many of these proposals, although motivated by high purpose, have been hastily conceived and poorly drawn. As a result, the Congress stands in sore need of coherent thinking and careful guidance on this issue.

I have discussed my concern with President Nixon. He has advised me that he is preparing a comprehensive legislative program to combat pollution. In concept, his program will provide the operating continuity which many of the present attacks on pollution so clearly lack. In addition, it provides a funding mechanism which will enable our Nation to conduct a long-term fight against this lethal menace in a reasonable manner.

Mr. Speaker, I am looking forward to the President's environmental quality control program with great anticipation, and I know many of my colleagues share in my enthusiasm. While we are waiting for the President's program, I urge all my colleagues to lend their support to the IBP and to both public and private appropriate domestic efforts that have as their goal, the restoration of a quality environment for all mankind.

Salt

THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE

HON. WALTER FLOWERS

OF ALABAMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, December 1, 1969

Mr. FLOWERS. Mr. Speaker, the total amount of all goods and services produced by the entire world in the year 1900 was less than military spending alone in the year 1968. Of the \$173.4 billion spent on the world's military in 1968, the United States accounted for \$79.6 billion and the Soviet Union \$39.8 billion, or a combined total of about 70 percent of it all. Mr. Speaker, I am informed further that the rate of such spending has been accelerating drastically in the last 3 years due to the increasing costs of sophisticated and highly technical modern equipment.

Therefore, Mr. Speaker, as the United States and the Soviet Union opened their arms control talks in Helsinki on November 17, there was understandably great hope on the part of people everywhere that real progress would be forthcoming. For the first time since the advent of the cold war and the arms race, there seems to be at least a near meeting of the minds of the great powers to cope finally with this challenging problem. Failing this, the specter of the strategic arms race could overshadow the national life of both nations for years to come. It is indeed encouraging that the first of these preliminary meetings has not set a stage for the usual gesturing and desk pound-

all Government bonds with a maturity of more than 5 years at a substantial loss. This loss is so substantial that it would remove hundreds of millions of dollars from the members of the Federal Home Loan Bank throughout the country and actually throw this money away. The resulting loss can only mean that the associations could make less home loans for our constituents. It seems obvious that we want to avoid this.

This loss would be so substantial that it could cause many of these associations to go into bankruptcy or at the very least, deep indebtedness. This amount of money going down the drain would remove an equal amount of money from the liquidity reserves of these associations and force them to somehow furnish additional money for liquidity, thus taking many more millions of dollars from its intended purpose of helping home owners acquire and keep their homes.

Is it not true that long-term bonds can be sold and converted into cash in exactly the same time that it takes to sell short-term bonds? Of course that is true. Accordingly, the money invested in long-term bonds is as readily available for liquidity purposes as short-term bonds would be. Then why does the Home Loan Bank Board wish to enact, promulgate, and enforce such a harmful regulation?

When the savings and loan industry was required to furnish liquidity, the individual associations were told that liquidity would be carried on their books at cost price until sold or until maturity. Any deviation from this promise would be very close to bad faith with the members of the savings and loan industry.

Any losses taken on the sale of these bonds would be wasting the money at a time when cash is so vitally necessary to the country and to the industry.

We should each make it our business to check on this situation and vigorously protest what appears to be a ridiculous and dangerous board decision. It would be very simple, I believe, for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to provide any addition to liquidity to be in the form of short-term maturities, and in a few years the old bonds would have matured. Accordingly, the problem, if any, will have been solved without this terrific wasting of reserves and traumatic damage to the associations of the industry.

This resolution also provides, in conformity with Public Law 90-505, that liquidity be required also on the amount of short-term borrowings by the savings and loan industry, and "short-term borrowings" is defined as "notes due in 5 years or less."

Of course, we all have some responsibility for passing Public Law 90-505, yet, it would seem to me that we might have been a little hasty. Certainly there is no reason whatsoever for a 4- to 8-percent liquidity on borrowed money. If a person wishes to make collection on borrowed money, he does not want to collect 4 to 8 percent of this money; he wants to collect 100 percent to this money. Four to eight percent is not a "drop in the bucket" toward paying off borrowed money.

I am giving some thought to the possibility of our changing Public Law 90-505 and eliminating liquidity against borrowed money. Somehow, liquidity does

not seem to be necessary. Resolution No. 23-377 is also being considered by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and this resolution, simply stated, would encourage the savings and loan industry, after it has "thrown this money down the sink," to carry this wasted and lost money as an asset on their statement for 10 years, charging off 10 percent every year. I do not believe that it is healthy for the industry to offer to the public a statement which comprises as assets moneys which have long since become substantial liabilities.

I have personally written to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board with reference to these matters, and upon receipt of their reply I will be in a better position to discuss it with each and every one of you. Meanwhile, I will deeply appreciate any attention and assistance you, my fellow Congressmen, can give to this most tragic situation.

MOUNT CARMEL, PA., AREA HIGH SCHOOL BAND

HON. HERMAN T. SCHNEEBELI

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, December 1, 1969

Mr. SCHNEEBELI. Mr. Speaker, during recent years a young but extremely talented group of musicians has been distinguishing itself as a high school band—namely, the Mount Carmel, Pa., Area High School Band, more popularly known as the "Mounties." Under the expert direction of Mr. Paul Semicek, the Mounties have performed around the United States and Canada, bringing fame and publicity to their home community. Recently they performed at half time at the NFL football game between the Atlanta Falcons and the Chicago Bears, and were lauded by CBS television sports for their performance, which brought the football fans to a standing ovation. On November 25, the proud and appreciative citizens of Mount Carmel honored the Mounties by celebrating Mounties Day. The following excerpt from the Shamokin News-Item of November 24, will point up the high esteem in which this outstanding high school band is held and the fine reputation they have earned. I should like to join in saluting all of the Mounties and their director, Mr. Semicek:

Congratulations are still being received by the Mounties on their excellent showing in Atlanta where they put on a half-time show at the NFL football game between the Atlanta Falcons and Chicago Bears.

Typical of the greetings was one received by Paul Semicek, high school band director, from Howard Reifsnnyder, producer of CBS television sports. The letter said:

"Dear Paul:

"Half time show featuring the Mounties of Mount Carmel Area High School for the Chicago vs. Atlanta telecast on November 16, 1969, was by far the best show I have seen this year and one of the best I have ever seen. The music was great as was the visual presentation.

"Thanks for all your cooperation and it was good seeing you again.

"Regards,

"Howard Reifsnnyder."

The Mounties received a standing ovation from the 53,000 fans in attendance at the game. It was the first time such an honor had ever been accorded to a visiting outfit in the Atlanta stadium.

Semicek noted that Robert Belerschnitt, leader of the Mounties, was shown on NFL television network program on Saturday and Sunday. Belerschnitt, one of the most colorful scholastic band leaders in the East, was caught in action as he led the Mounties in Atlanta.

An appreciative community is planning to make it a big day for the Mounties tomorrow.

A TRULY GREAT HUMANITARIAN CAMPAIGN: THE COMMITTEE TO HELP BIAFRAN CHILDREN

HON. EDWARD J. PATTEN

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, December 1, 1969

Mr. PATTEN. Mr. Speaker, the starvation of Biafran children is one of the most shocking and appalling tragedies in the modern history of mankind.

When an Associated Press story reported in late October 1969, that "over 300 Biafran children die every day of starvation," Jack Ellery, who does a popular morning show on radio station WCTC, of New Brunswick, N.J., decided to do something about it. He started a truly great humanitarian campaign.

Jack Ellery asked his radio listeners to write the words, "End the Starvation" on a post card and send it to WCTC. The response has been fantastic. With the help of Jack Sutton, a bank executive, and Peter Sears, of the Bound Brook Chronicle, Jack Ellery organized "The Committee To Help Biafran Children," Post Office Box FOOD, Somerset, N.J.

More than 400 letters a day are being received and the number is increasing every day.

Mr. Speaker, the Biafran war is now 30 months old and the human toll is unbelievable. Thousands of children have died from starvation and thousands more will die unless something is done to help them. Jack Ellery, a young man of deep compassion for people and great love for children, believes that if the post card campaign produces 1 million cards or letters and they are delivered to the U.S. Senate, the pressure of public opinion will become so great, that there is a good chance action will be taken to finally stop the starvation of children in Biafra.

This is not a campaign that is seeking money. Only post cards or letters are needed with the words "End the Starvation" and the sender's name and address included.

Mr. Speaker, when many of us think of childhood, we often think of Samuel Woodworth's poem:

How dear to this heart are the scenes of my childhood,
When fond recollection recalls them to view.
The orchard, the meadow, the deep-tangled wildwood,
And every loved spot which my infancy knew.

There will be no "fond recollection" for the children of Biafra, because they probably will not live long—unless

ing by the Soviets. Each side has seemed genuinely eager to get down to the essentials of the long bargaining bound to precede any arms agreement. Although more time will undoubtedly be spent by each side in testing the intentions of the other before thorough appraisals can be made, it is hoped that the substantive talks might begin in early 1970.

Mr. Speaker, there have already been over 3 years of preparation and mostly unnecessary delay in getting these talks started. Under the guise of displeasure over our Nation's policy in Vietnam, the Soviet Union first delayed its endorsement. After their approval was finally given and plans were in the works, then came the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, forcing cancellation by our Government. The new administration then delayed until June of this year while it reviewed U.S. policy and our bargaining position. And on October 25, the Soviet Union finally agreed to the present preliminary talks.

Early this year, the head of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. William C. Foster, said:

The technological stars and planets are now in favorable conjunction, so to speak—and they will not stay that way for long.

I think it can safely be said that the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union are in somewhat of a state of balance at this time, although in different areas one country or the other is dominant. This relative balance causes concern by those who feel that we should have a clear-cut arms superiority, but the present status may be the "favorable conjunction" that provides the conducive climate for arms talks.

Mr. Speaker, perhaps the most encouraging factor of the new found interest of the Soviet Union in looking for a solution or alternative to the arms race is the suggestion that the voice of the people of Russia is being heard over the hard line Communists. The situation, in my opinion, has gotten entirely too critical for either nation "to keep on keeping on" as we have been doing. I know that many citizens of the Fifth District of Alabama, that I have the privilege of representing, join in the hope and prayer that these preliminary talks will be the solid beginning of productive negotiations at an early date.

REASONED WORDS OF GOOD COUNSEL

HON. JAMES HARVEY

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, December 1, 1969

Mr. HARVEY. Mr. Speaker, at a time when this House is again considering vital legislation to proclaim its collective viewpoints as to the absolute need of unity in behalf and for our country in its involvement in South Vietnam, it is my privilege to bring to the attention of all Members an excellent speech delivered recently by our colleague, the Honorable F. BRADFORD MORSE, of Massachusetts.

My remarks are somewhat slanted in-

asmuch as I have long admired and respected Congressman MORSE's good judgment and sound thinking. I think, when you read over and study his remarks made on November 13, 1969, at the Lowell Memorial Auditorium, Lowell, Mass., you will agree that he has masterfully clarified the hopes of all Americans—peace in Vietnam.

He has, I believe, narrowed and eliminated false differences among Americans as to our Nation's hopes and desires. We all seek peace; we all want peace. The difference now is by what means do we achieve that goal. Congressman MORSE's remarks follow:

REMARKS OF CONGRESSMAN F. BRADFORD MORSE,
LOWELL MEMORIAL AUDITORIUM, NOVEMBER
13, 1969

I come here tonight filled with respect—for you whose convictions about our involvement in Vietnam over the past several years have demonstrably hastened the pace toward peace—for others like those to whose memory this building is dedicated who died in battles not of their own choosing, for ideals which they may not fully have understood—who gave their lives for a cause to which all men of goodwill, of all times, have aspired.

And I bring a growing measure of respect for a country—our country—whose national processes have been capable of changing the direction of our involvement in a tragic and ill-advised war in but a few months—a country strong enough, confident enough, indeed good enough to insure that the voices of those who disagree with national policy may be raised and indeed may be heard.

I speak to you, not with any sense of chauvinism—for that concept had relevance only in an earlier, less complicated day.

I do not urge unity for its own sake, for that unity would deprive our nation of the vitality that has given it strength in other difficult moments.

I seek with you only rationality rather than irrationality; I plead only for thoughtfulness rather than passion; I search for reasoned counsel which will lead to peace, rather than exercises which may delay—even thwart—its achievement.

And I address my entreaty not only to those who are gathered tonight in this place and to the thousands of other like-minded Americans, with whom I have proudly identified, who have sought for years to explain the error of our involvement in the war and have sought to correct it, but also to those other highly motivated people in our land who have supported the national leadership throughout the days of escalation and support it now in these days of de-escalation.

I trust that my comments will not be construed as a defense of the present Administration, which has been organized by my party according to the slim mandate of the American people a year ago, nor as a condemnation of any previous Administration.

For the hour is too late for partisanship. The storm is too near the horizon for anything less than an objective assessment of where we are and where we are going.

The time is upon us when we must realize that the issue at stake is not Vietnam, but the United States. The time is approaching when the issue shall not be—in spite of anyone's rhetoric—the integrity of Vietnam, but rather, the integrity of America.

To deny that polarization has been taking place in our society would be to deny that today is Thursday, November 13, 1969.

To assign responsibility for that polarization in this heated moment would be an exercise in destructive futility. But to fail to recognize that that polarization can paralyze our society and have shattering effects on the hopes of people throughout the world who

have found meaning in the basic values shared by all Americans, young and old, black and white, rich and poor, would be irresponsible myopic.

The time is upon us when we must recognize and reject demagogic posturings—be they the postures of the left or the right, of the hawks or the doves.

The time has come when we must recognize that the differences among Americans about Vietnam are today more illusory than real, in large measure because of the efforts of devoted Americans like you.

You seek an end to the war—so does your government.

You seek a withdrawal of American combat troops from Vietnam—so does your government.

You seek an end to any American military presence in Vietnam—so does your government.

You seek no American bases in Vietnam—nor does your government seek any.

You want the people of South Vietnam to have the opportunity to choose their own leaders and to reject the leadership of the present regime if they so choose—so does your government.

You want the casualties to cease, be they American, North Vietnamese or South Vietnamese—so does your government.

You want our national attention and our national resources devoted, not to war, but to improving the quality of our own society—so does your government.

You seek peace—and so does your government.

So there is little division on goals; only the means to achieve those goals are the subject of debate.

Let us therefore recognize that upon which our people agree. Let us all contribute to the attainment of peace—not by angry name-calling, nor by simplistic sloganeering, not by efforts that may frustrate and weaken the only institutions through which peace can be achieved. Instead, let us apply intellect, creativity and practical idealism to find those steps by which the common objectives may be earliest achieved.

For free men to do otherwise would be a denial of their freedom—for compassionate human beings who cherish human life to do otherwise would be a denial of their compassion.

It is my privilege to represent the five hundred thousand people who reside in the Fifth Massachusetts District in the Congress of the United States. You are among them. I ask of you, and the other Americans who have given me this trust, for reasoned counsel and thoughtful advice. I pledge to all of you that your voices shall be heard and your voices shall be heeded.

SCHOOL INTEGRATION HAS ITS LIMITS

HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, December 1, 1969

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, one of the difficulties discussing an issue as emotional and complex as school integration is that the gap between theory and facts is rarely bridged by the proponents of artificial integration.

An editorial in the Monday, November 24 Chicago Tribune objectively states views which should be reviewed and properly calls attention to the inherent limitations of school integration.

The editorial follows:

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SCHOOL INTEGRATION HAS ITS LIMITS

The futility of court decrees and administrative plans for racially balanced public schools in cities with large concentrations of Negroes has been demonstrated by experience. Accumulating evidence to this effect includes the board of education's 1969 racial headcount of students in the Chicago public schools.

Residential movements in Chicago, as shown by the 1969 and previous headcounts, tend to integrate all-white schools and then resegregate them as all-black schools in a few years.

Chicago's public school enrollment of 580,292 is 53.9 per cent black, 41 per cent white, 4.3 per cent Puerto Rican, and 0.8 per cent others. In 1968, the black enrollment was 52.9 and the white was 42.2 per cent.

Theoretically, this racial division would permit city-wide integration according to the board's definition of an integrated school, one with between 10 and 90 per cent enrollment for each race. Actually, in spite of the board's integration efforts, only 10.3 per cent of the city's black elementary school pupils and 26.9 per cent of its black high school students are enrolled in schools defined as integrated. Thus Chicago's schools are more segregated than those of the south as a whole. The best available estimate is that throughout the south this year between 30 and 40 per cent of the Negro students attend formerly all-white schools.

In the south, of course, the schools were segregated by state laws, which the United States Supreme court declared unconstitutional in 1954, whereas Chicago's "de facto" segregation is the result of housing patterns. The federal government, however, has suits pending in half a dozen northern cities to end de facto segregation, and the government's position has been upheld by federal District Judge Julius J. Hoffman in an order for the integration of schools in district 151, comprising most of Phoenix and South Holland and part of Harvey.

Judge Hoffman held that segregation, regardless of its cause, has the effect of stigmatizing Negro pupils and retarding their education, a conclusion that is disputed by many competent authorities, including Negro educators. Hoffman ordered district 151 to restructure its grade organization and to bus about 55 per cent of its total enrollment to achieve racial balance.

District 151 has appealed from this decision to the 7th United States Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled in a similar case involving the schools of Gary, Ind., in 1963, that nothing in the Supreme court's decisions or the Constitution itself requires racial mixing. The appellate court held that the Constitution "does not require integration, it merely forbids racial discrimination," and the Supreme court refused to review the case.

On Oct. 29, in a case involving 33 school districts in Mississippi, the Supreme court said "the obligation of every school district is to terminate the dual school systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools." The court has not said, however, whether de facto segregation is a dual or a unitary system, or what if anything can be done about it.

In its 1954 decision, the Supreme Court held that segregation by law denies Negro children the "equal protection of the laws" in violation of the 14th amendment. But de facto segregation is a result of the facts of life, not of the laws. Racial discrimination is unconstitutional, under the Supreme court's ruling but it does not follow that racial integration is compulsory or even possible.

If children are assigned and transported involuntarily to schools far from their homes, solely on account of their race, black or white, they too are denied the equal protection of the laws. A Constitution that is color blind protects not only the right of blacks to move into a neighborhood but also the

right of whites to move out. Enrollment in the public schools of Washington, D.C., before the Supreme court's 1954 decision was only 40 per cent black; now it is 95 per cent. Drastic measures to integrate the schools of Chicago could produce the same results.

WHO SHOULD PAY FOR CONSERVATION

HON. DURWARD G. HALL

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, December 1, 1969

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, at various times during the past few years, I have presented to the House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture, a proposal designed to elevate the economy of this Nation's farmer, while at the same time, doing much toward giving him more freedom in running his own farm operation.

The proposal called, the cropland and water restoration bill, has as one of its key features the proper care and management of our precious topsoil.

A recent article, "Who Should Pay for Conservation?" which appeared in a magazine called *The Furrow*, details in a most interesting way, some of the problems caused by poor soil management.

The article follows:

WHO SHOULD PAY FOR CONSERVATION?

Soil erosion is bad for farmers, but with modern fertilizers it's not the horror it used to be. Rich, black dirt is still precious but no longer priceless on much of North America's deep-soil farmland. At the same time, from the standpoint of the population in general, soil erosion is becoming ever more serious and costly.

Sedimentation of rivers is a problem that will worsen even if levels of sediment don't increase. That's because of ever-greater and more-intense use of our available water. The cost of muddy water is already staggering. It includes direct cash outlays of \$250 million per year in the U.S. to dredge harbors, lakes, and rivers. Every year silt displaces about a million acre-feet of storage space in reservoirs—space that costs at least \$100 per acre-foot to build. Add to this the cost of removing silt from water for municipal and industrial use and you get an idea of the cash price everybody pays for dirty water. But there's more: many soils contain durable pesticides that cling to soil particles. As soil erodes these enter into streams, rivers, and lakes, polluting the waters. Perhaps the biggest cost of dirty water is the immeasurable loss of aesthetic value in terms of natural beauty, fish, fowl, and wildlife.

When soil erodes everybody loses, and when silt stays on the farm everybody gains. This is a key point because it appears that farmers are now expected to pay more than their share of the cost of preventing siltation of waters.

Under modern farming systems (which are necessary if we are to feed ourselves), some erosion is inevitable. This loss can be greatly reduced, however, through such practices as strip cropping, contour plowing, and maintaining year-round cover, along with use of grassed waterways, terraces, water channels, and check dams to store water. All these cost a farmer something in time, effort, convenience, and money, and they don't necessarily increase profit.

Government funds have long been used in a cost-sharing arrangement to stimulate soil conservation. For certain erosion-control practices in the "preferred" category, the

stated U.S. government share is 60 percent. But it never quite works out that way and farmers usually end up paying about half the cost. For some projects, farmers are quick to see the benefits to their business and glad to pay a 50-percent share. Other worthy projects go begging because farmers can scarcely be expected to spend hard-earned cash if the main beneficiaries are several hundred thousand guys downstream.

What's needed is a rebirth of the soil conservation fervor of 25 years ago, along with recognition of this new reality: farmers have relatively less to gain now, so they should bear a relatively smaller share of the cost of soil conservation. A cost-sharing formula that doesn't take this into account isn't likely to solve the problem of muddy waters in our rivers and streams.

CITY OF SANTA FE SPRINGS—BEST SISTER CITY AWARD

HON. CHET HOLIFIELD

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, December 1, 1969

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, it gives me great pleasure to call the attention of my colleagues to the splendid achievements of the officials and citizens of one of the cities in the 19th Congressional District of California, which I am proud to represent. I am speaking of the city of Santa Fe Springs which has won the Reader's Digest Foundation Award for the best single sister city project for a city under 25,000 population in the United States, 2 years in a row.

In 1968, as a result of the vigor and cooperation of its officials and citizens, Santa Fe Springs was awarded a prize for the donation of a badly needed fire truck and fire hose to its sister city, Navjoa, Sonora, Mexico.

In 1969, Santa Fe Springs was awarded the prize for the previous year's work in designing and building the international trophy winning float for the 1969 Pasadena tournament of roses parade. This float, requiring many long hours of planning and work, was in honor of the city of Santa Fe Springs' sister city, Mersin, Turkey. This float, based upon the theme, "hands across the sea," viewed by millions of people on television, was an admirable action helping to cement the bonds of international friendship.

I would like to have the text of the Santa Fe Springs award submittal printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

1969 READER'S DIGEST AWARD SUBMITTAL

As part of the Santa Fe Springs Sister City Committee objective of planning and conducting projects which will foster mutual understanding and goodwill not only between our citizens and those of our sister cities but between people of all the world, the Santa Fe Springs Sister City Committee undertook, in conjunction with the City of Mersin, Turkey, the Honorable Talat Kulay, Consul General of Turkey, and members of the community to plan and construct a float to be entered in the 1969 Pasadena Tournament of Roses Parade.

The parade, which is viewed by millions of people around the world, would be, we felt, an appropriate vehicle for expressing our regard not only for our Sister City of Mersin, but for the entire Sister City program. It was

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tary personnel, which can be used elsewhere.

The basic issue was debated at great length on the authorization bill and ended in a 50-to-50 tie vote.

So this debate is not going to change anyone's mind. If there has been any change of mind, that change has come before this debate.

The purpose of this amendment is the opportunity for those of us who oppose the Safeguard ABM system to register our continuing opposition.

An incidental use will be gained in that the vote will offer an opportunity for some to record their change of mind on this issue in changing their vote from their vote on authorization of the system.

I want to clearly record the fact that I have not changed my mind. In fact, from what I have been told by some working on the Safeguard system—told since the authorization vote—I am all the more convinced that spending funds for the Safeguard ABM system is a tragic waste of funds and resources.

I am confident that the very near future will demonstrate the tragedy of the Safeguard ABM system and in contrast the superiority of a laser defense system.

In short, I simply cannot vote to spend money and resources on what I consider to be a defective system.

Salt

THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO SECRETARY ROGERS

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I had meant, during the morning hour today, to make a brief statement on the situation in the Middle East. Since that opportunity was not available to me earlier in the day, I take the liberty of detaining the Senate for a few minutes to make the statement now.

Today's reports of the Pravda article commenting on Secretary Rogers' controversial speech of December 9 clearly reveals Soviet intentions with respect to the Middle East—intentions that are most disquieting. While the world looks for a spirit of cooperation and responsibility in the SALT talks, the Soviet Union can hardly make a good impression when it continues to take the low road in Cairo and Damascus, while seeking to appear to take the high road in Helsinki.

Secretary Rogers' speech contained strong overtures to the moderate Arab governments and foreshadowed a tough U.S. stance vis-a-vis Israel's substantive position on the outstanding issues concerning a peace settlement. The major effort by the Nixon administration to go the extra mile to bridge the gap in the Mideast—even at the cost of undermining Israel's position—was motivated, I have no doubt, by a genuine desire to promote peace.

A Soviet diplomatic offensive against the U.S. Middle East policy, which seems now to have been inaugurated, presents a challenge for debate on the international level, which the United States should not forego. The Soviet Union is either preaching to us or scolding us on our policy without itself making any contribution to peace in this area. The whole

world agrees that there is a great danger in the Middle East. But the danger, I feel, is not so much between the great powers as it is in the possibility of the whole area once again plunging into flames with repercussions which no one can predict. While the United States announced a policy of "balance" and sweet reasonableness—a policy which I feel is well-intentioned but misguided—the Soviet Union engages in nothing more than pandering to the most intransigent positions of its radical Arab clients. The exercise is strictly one of seeking to discredit the United States without making any contribution to peace in the area.

Whatever may be the Soviet Union's intentions elsewhere, it obviously intends to play a strictly opportunistic, irresponsible and power-grabbing role in the Middle East.

The U.S.S.R. has now made it clear that its policy in the Mideast is to take a mile every time the United States gives an inch. Secretary Rogers' detailed statement of U.S. differences with Israel has not been paralleled by any Soviet indication of any differences with the unrelentingly extremist position of its Arab clients. In fact, the U.S.S.R. in the few days since Secretary Rogers' speech has aligned itself even more closely—if that is possible—with the straight propaganda line of President Nasser's United Arab Republic, even to the extent of backing the guerrilla movement in the Middle East.

The U.S. concessions in Secretary Rogers' speech have been attacked in Pravda as "tricks" of "Washington propaganda" designed to "split" the Arabs. The new U.S. policy is described as one of "support to the Israeli ruling circles in their aggressive actions, in their stubborn attempts to annex territories."

The U.S.S.R. obviously is seeking to draw the United States into a policy of entrapment there—one of extracting one U.S. "concession" after another—by constantly raising the bidding price. What is at stake is the very survival of Israel. No one can expect Israel to go back to the pre-June, 1967 situation, with Syrian guns firing down its throat from the Golan heights, with Jordanese medium artillery able to interdict the 12-mile waist of Israel and cut the country in two, and with Egypt able to cut the entry to Elath and to mobilize in the Sinai desert.

It is a matter of gravest concern and regret that the Soviet Union continues to pursue such a dangerous and irresponsible policy in the Mideast. It is a real understatement to say that the U.S.S.R. is not proceeding in the Mideast with the spirit of cooperation and responsibility that we have some reason to suspect may be in the offing regarding the SALT talks and other overall U.S.-U.S.S.R. issues. In my judgment, it is time for the Kremlin to realize that if it does want to move—in President Nixon's memorable phrase—from the "era of confrontation to the era of negotiation" it cannot make an exception of the Mideast. The issues are too serious there.

It is clear that the Soviets are not prepared at this time to respond in any

reasonable, just, or responsible manner to Secretary Rogers' high-minded—but in my judgment misguided—effort to place the United States in an "even-handed," "balanced," and intermediary posture in the Mideast. The only visible results thus far have been a strong Soviet reiteration of down-the-line support of the radical Arab position. Also, the Soviets have for the first time expressed overt support for the Arab terrorist guerrilla movement.

In this context, the low-keyed request of Prime Minister Golda Meir to President Nixon, during her recent visit to buy additional defensive arms—hopefully on less onerous terms—assumes a new urgency.

If the United States does not lose its nerve and does not allow itself to be maneuvered into pressing Israel to accept measures which could compromise its security, current radical Arab and Soviet policy will fail, the bankruptcy and total negativism of its premises will be exposed and a new era of opportunity and enlightenment can open in the Middle East. But if Israel loses her viability as a free state—either because we unwittingly encourage her enemies to think they have a chance to wage one last holy war against her, or because our "balanced" policy forces Israel into bankruptcy to maintain her military defense against such a war—it would pose the gravest implications for the United States and for the peace of the world.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from New York and congratulate him for bringing the matter before the Senate today.

I have also been interested in these developments. I have read with great concern the apparent further attempt at appeasement, which is exactly the thing that the representatives of Israel have worried about from the beginning. They were afraid that it would happen in the U.N. They asked to meet with the Arabs.

The Israelis and the Arabs are the ones concerned.

We seem now to be in the position of helping the real troublemakers in providing them with the side entrance, so to speak, so that the real meeting between the Israelis and the Arabs could not take place.

I think this is a great mistake. I think that the attempt is badly taken. And I think that the wisdom of it is very questionable.

I am certain that the position the Senator from New York and the Senator from California have taken from the beginning is a proper position.

I sincerely hope that the remarks the Senator has made today are transmitted forthwith to the Secretary of State so that he will know that some Senators are listening to this and are watching it and are knowledgeable and have some judgment as to the matter.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am very grateful to my colleague.

I will yield to no one in my desire for good relations with the Soviet Union.

However, I also feel that we have to be very clear in our own minds about certain things. We should realize that it has long been the practice of the Soviet Union to convey an attitude of cooperation and détente in one place—apparently there seems to be that kind of attitude in Helsinki—and at the same time to play the very dangerous game of brinkmanship with peace without responsibility in another place—the Middle East.

I have made my remarks today so that we may be conscious of the fact that the U.S.S.R. can carry on both kinds of policies and that our policy must be adjusted accordingly.

We cannot allow ourselves to be taken in by a cooperative atmosphere in another policy area so as to jeopardize the security of a very effective and durable ally. The adoption by the Soviet Union of an intransigent position, with which I have confidence the administration thoroughly disagrees—that is the position of the Arab States—should not induce us to make unwarranted concessions.

I think that under the guise of trying to be balanced and fair, we could be taken in.

I have made my remarks today to call the matter to the attention of the Senate.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS, 1970

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 15090) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Maine (Mrs. SMITH). I will be very brief here today because, as my colleague has pointed out, I think that most everyone has made up his mind and each has heard all of the arguments on the ABM question.

However, I should like to introduce a subject that was not involved in the previous debate—something that has come to be recognized as a new term by the Defense Department, called "cost growth." We used to call it "overruns" or the other terms that were given to it. They were meant to indicate that there was a change from the original estimate of a weapons system to the kind of figure we were dealing with when it finally ended up, or when we were making continuing appropriations.

Mr. President, I read from the statement of Mr. Packard, Assistant Secretary of Defense, when he indicated last spring, as appears in the Record of December 12, 1969, on page S16601:

Neither the Department of Defense nor the Congress will continue to tolerate large cost overruns which relate to unrealistic pricing at the time of award, or to inadequate management of the job during the contract.

The chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), on December 1, issued a statement which included 35 weapons programs and the differences which we could expect to find with between the original cost estimate and the current cost, because of any "cost growth."

In the 35 weapons systems, the ABM Safeguard was included. The chart which was released by the chairman indicated that the current estimate for the Safeguard was the same as the original estimate—namely, \$4.1 billion—and that, therefore, there had been no cost growth from the time of the original estimate to the time of the release, which was December 1.

Mr. President, I made some inquiries and I would like to report to the Senate some of the results of those inquiries.

The total cost estimate of the Safeguard ABM system has risen by \$277 million since we last considered this issue. Although the Senate Armed Services Committee reported, as I have said, on December 1, 1969 that there had been no increase in the original \$4,185,000,000 cost estimate, the Pentagon informed me Saturday, after persistent inquiry, that the cost had escalated by this amount.

The Defense Department has claimed that this 6½-percent increase has taken place since its last program status report of June 30, 1969. I do not know why such a cost growth was not reported on December 1, unless an increase of more than a quarter of a billion dollars has taken place in the 12 days since then.

Increasing at a rate of 6½ percent every 5 months, the phase I deployment of the Safeguard system will not cost the taxpayers \$4,185,000,000, as originally claimed, but rather \$13,700,000,000 by its completion in 1976. Such a projection is not at all unrealistic, for recent history has witnessed the cost of weapons systems growing by such proportions.

Further, the Pentagon's \$4.185 billion estimate was only for phase I of Safeguard, or deployment at just two sites. Should we proceed with phase II of the system, the original cost estimate of \$10.3 billion could well rise above \$25 billion. These are the expenditures that are ultimately at stake by our decisions today.

We all know of the financial crisis within our land. All of us are alarmed by seemingly unchecked inflation. During the debate on the tax bill last week, time after time, colleagues have spoken about the absolute need for fiscal responsibility.

For instance, some argued that we could not give a deduction for the medical expenses of those over 65 and not covered by medicare; we could not afford the \$255 million this would have cost us in fiscal year 1970, it was said. But the increase in the ABM during just these past 5 months exceed that, and the total ABM funds in this appropriations bill are more than three times as much.

In explaining the reasons for this cost increase to me, the Pentagon stated that 1½ percent was due to "stretchout," 2 percent was due to "design and estimate changes," and 3½ percent due to inflation. I find this last cause to be somewhat ironic.

All of us would agree that a certain step toward the control of inflation is the reduction of Government expenditures. But the truth is that the most fiscally irresponsible Government spending today is defense spending.

One reason why the cost of weapons systems increases, then, is simply because massive funds are spent for them during this time of economic instability, becoming a primary cause of inflation.

The reasons for not proceeding with ABM deployment at this time have been clearly set forth in the past. Today, in light of this new information, I wish to emphasize only one: We cannot afford it.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the fact sheet given to me on Saturday by the Pentagon confirming this cost increase be inserted in the Record.

There being no objection, the fact sheet was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

FACT SHEET

1. Secretary Laird has placed great stress since coming into office on making the Program Status Reports submitted to the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees an accurate reflection of the major weapons system acquisition programs, characteristics, and costs. The last Program Status Report submitted to you with regard to the Safeguard program was as of 30 June 1969, and showed the DOD acquisition, or DOD investment costs, expected for the Safeguard program as \$4185 M. These costs include the DOD RDT&E, PEMA and MCA for Safeguard Phase 1 for the period FY 68 through deployment of the last site.

2. The next Program Status Report on the Safeguard program is now in its final stage of review. It is expected to be forwarded shortly to the Chairmen of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. The Report on Safeguard will show a cost increase over the earlier Safeguard reports and we wanted you to have this information as early as possible. The total increase shown in the new report will be \$277 M, or a percentage increase from the earlier reported total of about 6½ percent. This increase is brought about by three basic causes.

a. The largest cause is the inflation that has occurred. In this regard, initial estimates of March and those of the 30 June report were based on the price levels as of 31 December 1968. We have now updated those costs to a 31 December 1969 level so that they will be in agreement with the budget and authorization submissions for FY 71 now being prepared. Approximately \$136 M of the \$277 M is due to this price level change, or 3½ percent of the earlier reported total program investment costs.

b. Then, too, as you realize, we have held back on major commitments for construction and PEMA until after passage of the authorization and appropriation bills. This has necessitated our delaying the Equipment Readiness Dates of the two site complexes by 3 months each. Completion of deployment of the second site complex is now delayed from the earlier scheduled July 1974 to October 1974. In other words, it has stretched out the deployment and the period over which our production/engineering base is maintained. This stretch-out has caused an increase of \$55 M, or 1½ percent of the earlier reported total program investment costs.

c. Finally, and the second largest, we have had certain changes in the estimates of several line items brought about by further estimation and study and a few necessary design changes. These together account for \$66 M of the increase, or about 2 percent of the earlier reported total investment costs.

d. In summary, then, the total cost increase shown in the next Program Status Report will be one of about 6½ percent: of