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NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

~~D R A F T~~

~~ADWHEELON~~ [redacted]

(11/3/65)

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A. ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

An Executive Committee <sup>will</sup> ~~shall~~ be established to formulate, guide, and regulate the NRP. ~~It will~~ consist of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. ~~It will provide~~ a ~~final decision forum~~ <sup>ing</sup> for the National Reconnaissance Program. ~~The Executive Committee~~ <sup>specifically</sup> [redacted] ~~will~~ [redacted]

1. Examine the reconnaissance requirements provided by USIB against technical and fiscal capabilities, so as to establish an appropriate level of effort for the NRP. In this role it will rely largely on cost effectiveness and technical feasibility analyses prepared by the DNR and the component elements of the NR Organization.
2. Approve or modify the consolidated NR Program and its budget as forwarded by the DNR.
3. Initiate and assign responsibility for research and preliminary design studies in CIA and/or DOD for new systems through the DNR in response to USIB requirements.

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4. Allocate development responsibility for specific reconnaissance problems to DOD or CIA, and establish guidelines for mutual support where appropriate. It shall be free to use technical advisory groups as necessary.

5. Assign operational responsibilities to either DOD or CIA for various types of manned overflight missions, subject to the concurrence, as appropriate, of the 303 Committee.

6. Review periodically the essential features of the major program elements of the NRP.

B. ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE:

To insure the coordination of CIA and DOD reconnaissance activities and to provide a single point of integration for the planning and budgeting of the National Reconnaissance Program, a Director of National Reconnaissance will be appointed by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence, who will report to the Executive Committee on all matters affecting the NRP. Specifically, he will:

1. Be kept fully and completely informed

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of all reconnaissance activities in CIA and DOD.

2. Coordinate CIA and DOD use of the space launching, tracking and recovery facilities.

3. Coordinate film processing of CIA and DOD activities so as to make best use of the primary Eastman-Kodak facility at Rochester, the backup Air Force capability at Westover, and field processing centers.

4. Prepare a coordinated and consolidated NRP budget for examination and approval by ExCom. This budget will be based on submissions from appropriate elements of CIA and DOD.

5. Ensure the flow of funds from the NRP appropriations to CIA and appropriate DOD elements in lump sum transfers each fiscal year. Incremental funding from reserve or reprogramming sources will be used only for supplemental programs approved by ExCom.

6. Deal with the operating head of the CIA or his designated alternate on all matters

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of policy, coordination, or guidance. He will not exercise command control over operating elements of CIA or its personnel.


7. Assume such command responsibilities over DOD elements of the NRP as the Secretary of Defense may designate. He will establish suitable lines of coordination with those line components which do not respond directly to him.

8. Sit with the USIB for the matters affecting the NRP.

9. Appear before the 303 C ommittee with appropriate operating elements of CIA or DOD to secure approval for overhead reconnaissance missions.

C. RESEARCH AND PRELIMINARY DESIGN:

1. Research on reconnaissance technology and preliminary design of new systems will be encouraged and supported in both CIA and DOD. It will be supported by a lump sum allocation from NRP funds to each group in like measure at a level to be established each year by the Executive Committee.



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2. A prescribed fraction of these resources-- perhaps 20% to 40%--will be earmarked for support of basic research on reconnaissance technology\* to stimulate and assure the future vigor of this field. CIA and DOD will keep each other fully informed of <sup>their respective activities in this area</sup> ~~such progress~~ to avoid unwitting duplication and encourage joint exploitation of new techniques.

3. Preliminary design and small technical feasibility demonstrations of new reconnaissance systems will also be funded from this innovation resource. Such work can grow out of requirements <sup>negotiated with USIB, COM USCOM & COM DNR,</sup> ~~passed down through the USIB/EXCOM/DNR chain,~~ proposing solutions to outstanding needs for improvements <sup>in</sup> ~~to~~ existing capabilities, or can result from spontaneous initiative in the CIA and DOD participating elements

However, it is important that the DNR and ExCom receive each month a comprehensive report on the initiation, status, or conclusion of such efforts. In this way, competitive study efforts will be recognized, approved or discouraged, and synchronized for later decision actions.

\*(i.e., films, lens figuring, readout links, cross section reduction, etc.)

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4. It is intended that these funds and their products represent the flexible cutting edge of the reconnaissance program. They should not be used to fund actual development or operational activities.

D. SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT:

1. When a new system concept has been sufficiently well defined and its technical feasibility established to the satisfaction of its proponents, the DNR, the ExCom and its advisors, it would be included in the inventory of the NRP. At this point, it should receive necessary funding from line items in the budget identified with these systems. These funds would then be allocated to CIA and/or DOD, to whom specific developmental responsibility has been assigned by the ExCom.

2. The operating element of CIA and/or DOD assigned development responsibility for a new system will be responsible for selecting and supervising capable contractors, for establishing such systems engineering support as they deem necessary and rendering periodic reports on program progress to the DNR and ExCom.

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3. Satellite reconnaissance systems are characterized primarily by the payload cameras, spacecraft, data recovery system as well as by their boosters. The interface between the launch system and payload is <sup>of critical importance</sup> ~~often crucial and the~~ planning for compatible checkout and launch facilities, boosters, tracking, and recovery ~~needs~~ <sup>must</sup> to proceed with the payload development. The DNR will ~~establish and facilitate lines~~ of technical and programmatic communication ~~between the groups in CIA and DOD responsible for payload development and the satellite support elements of the Air Force.~~ The DNR will be responsible for the success of this interface, ~~as well as the compatibility and coordination of the totality of payload interfaces with the Air Force.~~ The responsible agency may call on other elements of the NRO for support (contracting, security, technical, etc.) ~~as needed, but will carry the responsibility and authority for the success of the program in this R&D phase.~~

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4. A normal phase of satellite development programs is the initial flight testing in orbit and engineering proof of the completed payload system. These flight tests will be the primary responsibility of the payload developing group in CIA or DOD, ~~subject only to the compatibility of such operations with the operational missions and other flight tests coordinated by the DNR.~~ In ~~specific terms, this means that the test planning, mission profile and engineering supervision~~ not range safety of the flight would ~~lie with the developers.~~ They <sup>would</sup> be expected to include as many intelligence targets as ~~were~~ <sup>are</sup> consistent with the primary development so that any film recovered would have intelligence value. ~~However, the planning and control of such flights--~~ ~~once scheduled by the DNR--~~ would fall primarily to ~~the developing group.~~ When a system had been successfully demonstrated and declared operationally reliable, it would enter the operational phase.



E. ROUTINE OPERATIONAL PHASE:

1. When the satellite payload has been successfully developed, it becomes a part of the operational assets of the NRP. The payloads together with appropriate boosters, launchers and tracking stations represent the NRP capability to obtain orbital photography, and accordingly represent part of an orderly program to acquire such intelligence in response to USIB requirements, target lists and priorities. The DNR must play the central role in planning this program. It involves far-sighted budgeting for payload production as well as booster procurement and modification. It involves judicious scheduling of operational launches from fixed resources, in addition to development flight tests. It requires a plan with sufficient flexibility to respond to changing world situations and the corresponding intelligence needs. It is a complex managerial task for which a single individual must in the last analysis be responsible.



2. Both the long range requirements for satellite missions and the shifting targets for specific flights come properly from the intelligence community in which all elements of the Government have<sup>a</sup> voice. The community has named COMOR as the staff to provide these requirements in an orderly way, subject to approval by USIB.

3. The Satellite Operations Center is the next step in that sequence of events. Its function is to plan specific mission coverage in light of COMOR target requirements. It does so by first studying the spectrum of orbital choices available. These are supplied by various groups on the West Coast and represent specific launch vehicle propulsion capabilities, current range safety restrictions, etc. These feasible orbits are then computer analyzed in Washington to optimize target coverage in light of sun angle, predicted weather conditions and target priorities. An orbit is selected and camera programs established for this mission.

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*is determined by the mission and transmitter computerized guidance to the camera authority*

*as distinguished from general*

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This is basically an intelligence function.

This process works somewhat differently for spotting [redacted] (CORONA) search payloads. In the

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case of CORONA coverage, the SOC has played a ~~historic~~, central role. ~~The camera programs are transmitted to the assembly, integration and checkout~~ [redacted] operated

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by CIA where the cameras, film, spacecraft and reentry vehicle are mated and programmed. The assembled payload is then taken to Vandenburg, and after further checkout, launched into orbit by the Air Force and its contractors.] Until

the spring of 1963, the Satellite Operations Center was involved solely in CORONA and ARGON and was located at CIA Headquarters next to

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COMOR) and in immediate communication with the West Coast facilities. It was moved to the

*was used as a well in CORONA ARGON flights*

Pentagon so as to control [redacted] LANYARD, although mission guidance to the etc. In practice the [redacted] systems rely less however is not yet determined by the SOC

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[redacted]

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*with a view to understanding its function to include guidance*

R&D flights. The SOC is an intelligence function should be used to provide the intelligence input for mission guidance of all satellite operations. ~~procedures will differ~~

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between [redacted] capacity of [redacted]


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which should be at the center of intelligence activities, communicating detailed intelligence requirements to the launch site for the regularly scheduled missions.

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4. The individual satellite payloads are quite different, both in concept and operation. Different teams of contractors and Government supervision produce and bring them to condition for launch as integrated payloads. It seems desirable to continue the present system of providing separate assembly, integration and checkout facilities for the individual systems and contractor teams. Quite different types of test equipment are required. In practice this means separate buildings at VAFB. In CORONA and ARGON, this is accomplished first at the  and then finally at Vandenburg prior to booster mating. Payload components are bought off at the factory and Government responsibility extends forward to the launching--with ample contractor support. It is therefore necessary that the individual payload assembly, integration, and checkout facilities at VAFB be administered by the CIA or DOD component responsible for the payload.

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5. Although most of the responsibility of the developing team is fulfilled when a satellite payload is declared operational, there are persuasive arguments for extending this responsibility indefinitely into the operational phase. The most compelling argument is that payloads systems are being continually improved--and should be. The remarkable improvement of CORNOA from monoscopic to stereo and then to doubled film capacity via double recovery vehicles is an example. Furthermore, these <sup>film systems</sup> are extremely delicate instruments and no two <sup>payloads</sup> ~~systems~~ are really alike, and <sup>quite</sup> ~~the~~ Continuity from factory to launch <sup>is therefore essential.</sup> of the contractor-Government team responsible <sup>is therefore</sup> ~~is~~ vital. This does not ~~mean~~ mean that the camera contractor ~~or CIA~~ should fire a THOR or ATLAS. It does mean that there is no point in the production <sup>operational</sup> ~~launch and recovery~~ sequence when <sup>one</sup> you can safely eliminate the payload team completely from the operation. The CORONA program recognized this and has representatives of CIA and its contractors present at each ~~step~~ step of an operational mission--but with varying

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degrees of authority. In the case of   
the Air Force payload development group under  
General Greer do<sup>e</sup>s the same.

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6. Once a satellite payload is launched  
in orbit, it enters a crucial period of real  
time tracking, monitoring and control. Tracking  
and telemetry recording from low altitude  
photography is accomplished by the Air Force  
stations. This data is transmitted to the  
Satellite Operations Center in Sunnyvale, California,  
where their operation is run. In the case of  
CORONA, *inflight decision include*  
~~a CIA representative is part of the team~~  
~~which continuously monitors the AGENA/payload~~  
~~combination in orbit and makes~~ decisions to recover  
if a malfunction is suspected. *and transmission*  
~~They also transmit~~

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Photographic

film recovered physically from satellites requires developing and duplication before it is transmitted to NPIC and other consumers. CIA has established and continues to fund [Redacted]

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a special processing facility at Eastman-Kodak's laboratories in Rochester, N. Y., which, because of EK's enormous research and technical base, represents the primary developing facility for photographic emulsions. The Air Force has created

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and funds [Redacted] a competitive facility

manned by [Redacted] uniformed Air Force personnel at Westover Air Force Base in Massachusetts (ASPPL).

Thus far, there is little dispute about the relative quality of the two groups and ASPPL has confined themselves to making duplicate positives and doing image quality evaluation, which is quite helpful.

However, both EK and CIA are concerned by ~~NRO actions to trim progressively the EK capability~~ that a substitution is intended eventually. This was raised explicitly during the past month and Dr. McMillan asked in a belligerent way if this was of concern to CIA. It certainly is, in view of the vast importance

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of superior original processing, and it is  
proposed that EK's unique capability and facility  
be re-established as the prime processing center,  
not subject to progressive erosion.

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
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
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\* PROJECTS IN R&D STATE - DECISION TO ADOPT AS SYSTEM, AND FUND, AND FINAL DECISION RE IMPLEMENTING AGENCY TO BE MADE BY EXCOM.

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
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
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*Project in R&D state - Decision to adopt as system and fund and final decision of re implementing agency to be made by exec.*

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
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