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(11/3/65)

A. ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

An Executive Committee shall be established to formulate, guide, and regulate the NRP. It will consist of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. /It will provide a final decision forum for the National Reconnaissance Program./ The Executive Committee shall:

1. Examine the reconnaissance requirements provided by USIB against technical and fiscal capabilities, so as to establish an appropriate level of effort for the NRP. In this role it will rely largely on cost effectiveness and technical feasibility analyses prepared by the DNR and the component elements of the NR Organization.

2. Approve or modify the consolidated NR Program and its budget as forwarded by the DNR.

3. Initiate and assign responsibility for research and preliminary design studies in CIA and/or DOD for new systems through the DNR in response to USIB requirements.

NRO and Navy
review(s) completed.

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4. Allocate development responsibility for specific reconnaissance problems to DOD or CIA, and establish guidelines for mutual support where appropriate. It shall be free to use technical advisory groups as necessary.

5. Assign operational responsibilities to either DOD or CIA for various types of manned overflight missions, subject to the concurrence, as appropriate, of the 303 Committee.

6. Review periodically the essential features of the major program elements of the NRP.

B. ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE:

To insure the coordination of CIA and DOD reconnaissance activities and to provide a single point of integration for the planning and budgeting of the National Reconnaissance Program, a Director of National Reconnaissance will be appointed by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence, who will report to the Executive Committee on all matters affecting the NRP. Specifically, he will:

1. Be kept fully and completely informed

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of all reconnaissance activities in CIA and DOD.

2. Coordinate CIA and DOD use of the space launching, tracking and recovery facilities.

3. Coordinate film processing of CIA and DOD activities so as to make best use of the primary Eastman-Kodak facility at Rochester, the backup Air Force capability at Westover, and field processing centers.

4. Prepare a coordinated and consolidated NRP budget for examination and approval by ExCom. This budget will be based on submissions from appropriate elements of CIA and DOD.

5. Ensure the flow of funds from the NRP appropriations to CIA and appropriate DOD elements in lump sum transfers each fiscal year. Incremental funding from reserve or reprogramming sources will be used only for supplemental programs approved by ExCom.

6. Deal with the operating head of the CIA or his designated alternate on all matters

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of policy, coordination, or guidance. He will not exercise command control over operating elements of CIA or its personnel.

7. Assume such command responsibilities over DOD elements of the NRP as the Secretary of Defense may designate. He will establish suitable lines of coordination with those line components which do not respond directly to him.

8. Sit with the USIB for the matters affecting the NRP.

9. Appear before the 303 C ommittee with appropriate operating elements of CIA or DOD to secure approval for overhead reconnaissance missions.

C. RESEARCH AND PRELIMINARY DESIGN:

1. Research on reconnaissance technology and preliminary design of new systems will be encouraged and supported in both CIA and DOD. It will be supported by a lump sum allocation from NRP funds to each group in like measure at a level to be established each year by the Executive Committee.

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2. A prescribed fraction of these resources--perhaps 20% to 40%--will be earmarked for support of basic research on reconnaissance technology* to stimulate and assure the future vigor of this field. CIA and DOD will keep each other fully informed of such progress to avoid unwitting duplication and encourage joint exploitation of new techniques.

3. Preliminary design and small technical feasibility demonstrations of new reconnaissance systems will also be funded from this innovation resource. Such work can grow out of requirements passed down through the USIB/EXCOM/DNR chain, proposing solutions to outstanding needs or improvements to existing capabilities, or can result from spontaneous initiative in the CIA and DOD participating elements [redacted] However, it is important that the DNR and ExCom receive each month a comprehensive report on the initiation, status, or conclusion of such efforts. In this way, competitive study efforts will be recognized, approved or discouraged, and synchronized for later decision actions.

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*(i.e., films, lens figuring, readout links, cross section reduction, etc.)

4. It is intended that these funds and their products represent the flexible cutting edge of the reconnaissance program. They should not be used to fund actual development or operational activities.

D. SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT:

1. When a new system concept has been sufficiently well defined and its technical feasibility established to the satisfaction of its proponents, the DNR, the ExCom and its advisors, it would be included in the inventory of the NRP. At this point, it should receive necessary funding from line items in the budget identified with these systems. These funds would then be allocated to CIA and/or DOD, to whom specific developmental responsibility has been assigned by the ExCom.

2. The operating element of CIA and/or DOD assigned development responsibility for a new system will be responsible for selecting and supervising capable contractors, for establishing such systems engineering support as they deem necessary and rendering periodic reports on program progress to the DNR and ExCom.

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3. Satellite reconnaissance systems are characterized primarily by the payload /cameras, spacecraft, data recovery system/ as well as by their boosters. The interface between the launch system and payload is often crucial and the planning for compatible checkout and launch facilities, boosters, tracking, and recovery needs to proceed with the payload development. The DNR will establish and facilitate lines of technical and programmatic communications between the groups in CIA and DOD responsible for payload development and the satellite support elements of the Air Force. The DNR will be responsible for the success of this interface, as well as the compatibility and coordination of the totality of payload interfaces with the Air Force. The responsible agency may call on other elements of the NRO for support (contracting, security, technical, etc.) as needed, but will carry the responsibility and authority for the success of the program in this R&D phase.

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4. A normal phase of satellite development programs is the initial flight testing in orbit and engineering proof of the completed payload system. These flight tests will be the primary responsibility of the payload developing group in CIA or DOD, subject only to the compatibility of such operations with the operational missions and other flight tests coordinated by the DNR. In specific terms, this means that the test planning, mission profile and engineering supervision /not range safety/ of the flight would lie with the developers. They would be expected to include as many intelligence targets as were consistent with the primary development so that any film recovered would have intelligence value. However, the planning and control of such flights--once scheduled by the DNR--would fall primarily to the developing group. When a system had been successfully demonstrated and declared operationally reliable, it would enter the operational phase.

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E. ROUTINE OPERATIONAL PHASE:

1. When the satellite payload has been successfully developed, it becomes a part of the operational assets of the NRP. The payloads together with appropriate boosters, launchers and tracking stations represent the NRP capability to obtain orbital photography, and accordingly represent part of an orderly program to acquire such intelligence in response to USIB requirements, target lists and priorities. The DNR must play the central role in planning this program. It involves far-sighted budgeting for payload production as well as booster procurement and modification. It involves judicious scheduling of operational launches from fixed resources, in addition to development flight tests. It requires a plan with sufficient flexibility to respond to changing world situations and the corresponding intelligence needs. It is a complex managerial task for which a single individual must in the last analysis be responsible.

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2. Both the long range requirements for satellite missions and the shifting targets for specific flights come properly from the intelligence community in which all elements of the Government have voice. The community has named COMOR as the staff to provide these requirements in an orderly way, subject to approval by USIB.

3. The Satellite Operations Center is the next step in that sequence of events. Its function is to plan specific mission coverage in light of COMOR target requirements. It does so by first studying the spectrum of orbital choices available. These are supplied by various groups on the West Coast and represent specific launch vehicle propulsion capabilities, current range safety restrictions, etc. These feasible orbits are then computer analyzed in Washington to optimize target coverage in light of sun angle, predicted weather conditions and target priorities. An orbit is selected and camera programs established for this mission.

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This is basically an intelligence function. This process works somewhat differently for 25X1D [redacted] search payloads. In the 25X1 NRO 25X1A case of CORONA coverage, the SOC has played a historic, central role. The camera programs are transmitted to the assembly, integration 25X1A and checkout [redacted] 25X1A [redacted] where the cameras, film, spacecraft and reentry vehicle are mated and programmed. The assembled payload is then taken to Vandenburg, and after further checkout, launched into orbit by the Air Force and its contractors. Until the spring of 1963, the Satellite Operations Center was involved solely in CORONA and ARGON and was located at CIA Headquarters next to COMOR and in immediate communication with the 25X1A West Coast facilities. It was moved to the Pentagon so as to control [redacted] LANYARD, etc.

[redacted]

25X1 The SOC is an intelligence function NRO

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which should be at the center of intelligence activities, communicating detailed intelligence requirements to the launch site for the regularly scheduled missions.

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4. The individual satellite payloads are quite different, both in concept and operation. Different teams of contractors and Government supervision produce and bring them to condition for launch as integrated payloads. It seems desirable to continue the present system of providing separate assembly, integration and checkout facilities for the individual systems and contractor teams. Quite different types of test equipment are required. In practice this means separate buildings at VAFB. In CORONA and ARGON, this is accomplished first at the

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[redacted] and then finally at Vandenburg prior to booster mating. Payload components are bought off at the factory and Government responsibility extends forward to the launching--with ample contractor support. It is therefore necessary that the individual payload assembly, integration, and checkout facilities at VAFB be administered by the CIA or DOD component responsible for the payload.

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5. Although most of the responsibility of the developing team is fulfilled when a satellite payload is declared operational, there are persuasive arguments for extending this responsibility indefinitely into the operational phase. The most compelling argument is that payloads systems are being continually improved--and should be. The remarkable improvement of CORNOA from monoscopic to stereo and then to doubled film capacity via double recovery vehicles is an example. Furthermore, these are extremely delicate instruments and no two systems are really alike, and the continuity from factory to launch of the contractor-Government team responsible is vital. This does [redacted] mean that the camera contractor or CIA should fire a THOR or ATLAS. It does NOT mean that there is no point in the production, launch and recovery sequence when you can safely eliminate the payload team completely from the operation. The CORONA program recognized this and has representatives of CIA and its contractors present at each [redacted] step of an operational mission--but with varying

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degrees of authority. [redacted] 25X1 NRO

6. Once a satellite payload is launched in orbit, it enters a crucial period of real time tracking, monitoring and control. Tracking and telemetry recording from low altitude photographic satellites is accomplished by the Air Force stations. This data is transmitted to the Satellite Operations Center [redacted] 25X1 where their orbital operation is run. In the case of CORONA, a CIA representative is part of the team at the Satellite Operations Center which continuously monitors the AGENA/payload combination in orbit and makes decisions to recover if a malfunction is suspected. They also transmit camera program changes received from the SOC to the satellite so as to take advantage of changing weather. [redacted] 25X1 NRO We believe that this participation is natural and desirable; it is an essential ingredient to the mission and

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a strong support to the DNR in discharging his responsibilities for successful operational missions.

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

It is clear that all of these systems have a common launching site and similar boosters. The on-orbit control and readout varies considerably, but involves an appropriate mixture of groups for each task.

7. Processing intelligence data received from reconnaissance satellites divides into two subjects: SIGINT and photographic. Magnetic tape recordings of SIGINT data relayed from satellites goes eventually to NSA where it is analyzed with the help of other

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elements of the intelligence community (mostly SAC and to a lesser extent CIA). Photographic film recovered physically from satellites requires developing and duplication before it is transmitted to NPIC and other consumers. CIA has established

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and continues to fund [redacted] for FY 65) a special processing facility at Eastman-Kodak's laboratories in Rochester, N. Y. because of their enormous research and technical base,

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[redacted] represents the primary developing facility for photographic emulsions. The Air Force has created

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and funds [redacted] for FY 65) a competitive facility manned by 350 uniformed Air Force personnel at Westover Air Force Base in Massachusetts (ASPPL). Thus far, there is little dispute about the relative quality of the two groups and ASPPL has confined itself to making duplicate positives and doing image quality evaluation which is quite helpful. However, both EK and CIA are concerned by NRO actions to trim progressively the EK capacility that a substitution is [redacted] This was raised explicitly during the past month and Dr. McMillan asked in a belligerent way if this was of concern to CIA. It certainly is in view of the vast importance

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of superior original processing, and it is proposed that EK's unique capability and facility be re-established as the prime processing center, not subject to progressive erosion.

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