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ASSUMPTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE WORLD SITUATION UPON
WHICH MIGHT BE RESTED A LONG-TERM PLAN FOR US INTELLIGENCE

1. Given: The exercise involves planning for fifteen years. Under the present terms of reference, this period is divided into three sub-periods of five years each, i.e., 1965-70, 1970-75, 1975-80.

2. The assumptions section should probably begin with a paragraph or a table which takes account of:
 - a) estimated US population in 1970, -75, and -80;
 - b) estimated US GNP for these years; c) estimated US budget for these years. With respect to the budget estimates, some cognizance must be taken of the possibility of wide swings in the over-all defense component which in turn is likely to depend in large measure on other assumptions relating to the degree of tension in the world situation.

3. The kind of world situation which the US must confront and the US intelligence effort to be meshed into it will probably be a function of various combinations of

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the following two factors: a) the number of power centers of the first and perhaps second order of importance, and b) the degree of international tension,

I. The most dangerous world situation would be that characterized by many power centers and a high order of tension between them.

II. Next less dangerous, a few power centers with a high level of tension.

III. Next less dangerous, many power centers with a low level of tension.

IV. Least dangerous, few power centers with low level of tension.

4. Power Centers. We may assume with a fair degree of confidence that the number of power centers between now and 1970 is most likely to remain "a few." However, looking ahead more than five years, our confidence factor begins to decline. At this moment, the Chinese Communists seem the likeliest candidate to be joining the power center club. Obviously we cannot exclude Germany, or even Japan for that matter. Less likely, but still to be taken into account, are the UK, France; perhaps India and Indonesia. There are other potentials which are rather far out.

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5. International Tension. The rise and fall of international tension is in itself a function of many things, some of them wholly unpredictable. A principal cause for heightened tensions over the entire period will inhere in the relationship between states operating under one or another manifestation of Communist ideology, and those wanting no part of Communism. Second will be the nationalistic initiatives undertaken by new and backward states, often egged on by one or more Communist states. The above is the prescription for "wars of national liberation" which in the right circumstances can become quite substantial wars, bringing with them dramatic rises in the level of international tensions. Thirdly, there are in today's world a dozen, a score, or a few score -- depending on how you measure them -- of friction points. Just for example, today we have Vietnam, Berlin, the Dominican Republic. Tomorrow, we may have an ominous flash in Korea, in the Taiwan Strait, on India's northern boundary, in Indian-Pak relations, in Arab-Israeli relations, and so on and so on.

6. Assumptions for the period 1965-70. The most valid assumptions for this period are II and IV.

With respect to II, the real power centers for the next five years are most likely to remain the US and USSR.

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For the short-term at least, there will be a high degree of tension between the US and Communist China and a growing tension between the US and the USSR. However, the force of mutual deterrence will make the coming of all-out war between the US and USSR highly unlikely. Chinese nuclear capabilities will almost certainly not have grown in the five year period to the point where the Chinese could contemplate a nuclear attack on the US or allies of the US. Nevertheless, a substantial non-nuclear armed conflict with the Chinese is possible. Should this occur, world tensions would remain high and the risks of general nuclear war by miscalculation would rise appreciably.

7. We may likewise assume that the Chinese are presently running something of a bluff in the teeth of over-whelming US nuclear superiority and finding little or no support from the Soviet Union will temporarily knuckle under. Should this occur there would be a period again of only two power centers and a relatively low level of world tensions (IV).

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8. Note that the above rests on still other assumptions, namely no general war occasioned by accident or miscalculation, no universally recognized disarmament agreement with sure-fire census and verification procedures, no dramatic proliferation of nuclear powers consequent to technological breakthroughs in the AE and delivery systems fields.

9. Assumptions for the period 1970-75, and on to 1980. For this period we must assume a growth in the number of power centers. Unless nascent Chinese nuclear capabilities are destroyed in the preceding period, Peiping will be very much in the Big League in Asia and perhaps elsewhere. As noted above, the Federal Republic of Germany may have kicked over the traces and gone nuclear; France's force de frappe may have become a reality. There may be other significant emergent power centers. The most likely world situation in these circumstances would be I. However, III is possible.

10. The above also rests on still other assumptions. For example, subsuming I is China's achievement of a considerable nuclear stature -- so also with the FRG and France. Subsuming III is the possibility that humanity,

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every day more and more aware of the suicidal course of events, will have frightened itself into taking some sort of corrective action. This will have to involve such startling developments as the voluntary acceptance of limitations of sovereignty in behalf of collective security.

11. Over-all. Whatever the status of the world situation in the next fifteen years, we may assume that there will never be a moment when the US can be wholly certain of safe-guarding its national security by non-military means. Whatever the degree of detente, world tensions will never drop to the vanishing point. Furthermore, whatever the scale and nature of armament or disarmament, there will have to be a large and continuing national intelligence effort to guide the one and police the other.