CONFIDENTIAL

25X1C

[redacted]

13. (Unclassified - GLC) Received a call from Miss Dexheimer, in the office of Senator Edward Brooke (R., Mass.). She was interested in receiving Nigerian press summaries for the period beginning with the fall of Biafra to the present. After checking with [redacted] 25X1A I advised Miss Dexheimer that the materials are being prepared and would be delivered to her as soon as they were available. 25X1A

[redacted]

JOHN M. MAURY
Legislative Counsel

cc:
ER
O/DDCI

25X1A [redacted]

Mr. Houston
Mr. Goodwin
DDI
DDS
DDS&T
OPPB
EA/DDP
Item #12 - CI Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Monday - 26 January 1970

1. (Confidential - GLC) Guy McConnel, on the staff of the Senate Appropriations Committee, called on behalf of Bill Woodruff and asked if the Director could brief the combined Senate CIA Subcommittees this Wednesday or Friday, 28 or 30 January. I later advised Woodruff that Wednesday was a National Security Council meeting day but that the Director could adjust his schedule in order to give the briefing on Friday. Woodruff subsequently confirmed this for 10:30 a.m. Friday, 30 January, and said the invitees (Senators Fulbright, Mansfield and Aiken) would be included. He said the briefing would be the usual world wrap-up, covering the Soviet and Chinese missile threats and such "hot spots" as the Middle East, Vietnam and Laos. He also said that we should be prepared to discuss Bolivia.

2. (Secret - GLC) Accompanied Mr. Carl Duckett, DDS&T, to a briefing of Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) and Miss Dorothy Fosdick and Mr. Richard Perle, of the Senate Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations staff, on Soviet and Chinese missile programs. Senator Jackson was present for approximately one hour and 15 minutes of the two hour session. After Senator Jackson's departure, Mr. Perle asked if he could be provided with documentation on the SALT talks. Mr. Duckett suggested that he first try former contacts in the Department of Defense (specifically Johnny Foster).

25X1A

Senator Jackson took me aside and talked with me about [redacted] who is presently working for the Air Force in New Mexico and who is interested in Agency employment. The Senator gave me a copy of [redacted] résumé and a Form 57. We are to look into employment possibilities for [redacted] and be back in touch with the Senator.

25X1A

25X1A

SECRET

SECRET

JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Friday - 23 January 1970

1. (Internal Use Only - GS) Received a call from Miss Diane McCormick, in the office of Representative Ken Hechler (D., W. Va.), who requested an employment interview for Mr. [redacted] 25X1A After checking with [redacted] 25X1A in the Office of Personnel, I advised Miss McCormick that an appointment has been scheduled for this afternoon at 3:30.

2. (Confidential - GLC) Called George Murphy, on the staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and told him that the article in Sunday's New York Times about the Soviets distorting maps was essentially accurate and that I would discuss this in greater detail with him the next time I saw him.

3. (Secret - JMM) Met with Messrs. John Blandford and Frank Slatinshek, Chief Counsel and Counsel, House Armed Services Committee, whom I briefed on:

a. recent developments re SS-9 and SS-11;
b. increased infiltration rates in Vietnam;
c. Libya's problems in training pilots and maintenance personnel for new French aircraft;
d. fact that Agency had no solid information re MyLai incident;
e. our understanding of reorganization going on among defense intelligence agencies.

Blandford expressed concern that we "had been caught flat-footed" by the Libyan coup (see Memo for Record).

4. (Secret - JMM) Met with Ed Braswell, Senate Armed Services Committee staff, whom I briefed on recent developments regarding Soviet SS-9 and SS-11 tests and North Vietnam infiltration trends.

Braswell said that Senator Stennis was anxious for a roundup briefing by the Agency prior to hearing from the Defense Department on 18 February. Braswell said that main interest would probably center on Soviet ICBM deployment, MRV testing, and the implications and prospects of the SALT talks.

SECRET

SECRET

JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Wednesday - 7 January 1970

1. (Internal Use Only - GS) Received a call from Barbara Wallace, in the office of Representative Howard Robison (R., N.Y.), who requested an employment interview for [redacted] 25X1A After checking with [redacted] 25X1A in the Office of Personnel, I advised Barbara Wallace that an appointment has been scheduled for this afternoon at 2:00.

2. (Unclassified - JMM) In response to a request from Sy Friedin, in the office of Senator Thomas J. Dodd (D., Conn.), regarding [redacted] 25X1A now in Washington [redacted] I told Mr. Friedin that we know something about this man but would prefer not to become involved directly. I suggested that he seek information from the State Department, the FBI and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Friedin said Senator Dodd had become quite interested in the case, suspected that [redacted] 25X1A was up to no good, and would undoubtedly follow up with inquiries to Secretary Rogers, Mr. DeLoach of the FBI, and Mr. Farrell of INS. Friedin said he would let me know the results of these inquiries.

3. (Secret - JGO) Met with Mr. Richard N. Perle, on the staff of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Senate Government Operations Committee, and updated his security clearances. Appropriate documentation was completed. Mr. Perle noted in passing that he and Miss Fosdick will be working with Senator Henry Jackson (D., Wash.) and the Armed Services Special Committee on SALT.

4. (Confidential - JGO) Returned to Miss Lorena Daddario, in the office of Senator Edward Kennedy (D., Mass.), the original letter from Dr. Held to the Senator concerning reduction of certain support of Hungarian refugee activities in Paris. This letter was forwarded by the European Desk, Department of State, for return to the Senator's files. (See Journal item of 5 January.)

SECRET

Harriet T. (O'Brien) Stevens of Dallas, Texas, who since their marriage in 1877 had accompanied him during many travels on the frontiers and had shared the hardships of his upward climb as well as its compensating features.

Mrs. Stevens knew her husband's capacity and had always encouraged him in accepting greater tasks. She promptly replied, "Ever since you left Maine in 1874 you have been training yourself for this, the greatest engineering project in the world, and now it is offered you. Please telephone at once and tell the Secretary that you will accept." This ended Stevens' reluctance, and President Roosevelt appointed him as chief engineer of the Isthmian Canal Commission, effective July 1, 1905.

Before departing for the Canal Zone, the new Chief Engineer visited Oyster Bay, Long Island, to see the President, who described affairs on the Isthmus as being in a "devil of a mess." Stevens understood the difficulties likely to be encountered, but felt thoroughly competent to handle the situation. However, to avoid any possibility of later misunderstanding, he outlined to Roosevelt the conditions of his acceptance: That he was to have a "free hand in all matters"; that he was not to be unduly hampered by any authority, "high or low"; and that he would remain with the project until, in his own judgment, its success or failure was determined.

The President approved these terms and directed Stevens to communicate about the project directly with him rather than through routine channels. When Stevens pointed out that such procedure might result in conflicts with the War Department, Roosevelt waved this point aside, stating that everyone there knew his views.

Then, to impress his desire for action, President Roosevelt told the story of the man of sudden wealth speaking to his newly employed butler: "I don't know in the least waht you are to do—but one thing I do know, you get busy and buttle like hell."

Arriving with Chairman Shonts at Colon on July 25, 1905, Chief Engineer Stevens found a most desperate condition indeed, with general disorganization in the canal work, and with employees "scared out of their boots, afraid of yellow fever, and afraid of everything." The only thing that had kept many on the Isthmus was lack of transportation to go home. In fact, more employees returned to the United States on the ship that carried Stevens to the Canal Zone than had been brought there on it.

At a conference of high officials the same evening on the spacious veranda of Governor Charles E. Magoon's home in Ancon on the Pacific side of the Isthmus, attended by the Governor, Chief Health Officer William C. Gorgas, and Chairman Shonts, Chief Engineer Stevens correctly estimated the most urgent needs: housing and feeding of employees, sanitation and health, recreation and morale, and an adequate and revitalized organization. Within the short period of one week Stevens correctly appraised the overall situation and decided what to do: rehabilitate and double track parts of the Panama Railroad, which he then described as a "phantom railroad," establish commissaries for all employees, build a hotel, the Tivoli, place available labor on housing and sanitary work, design proper track levels in Culebra Cut and a rail transportation system for the disposal of spoil in mass excavation, and organize the forces for construction. Stevens' extensive experience in comparable situations in frontier areas of the United Stats enabled him to form needed judgments accurately and quickly.

Stopping all unnecessary canal construction activities, he sent excess men to the United States, informed that they would be notified when to return. Others were placed on immediate necessities. Having previously accepted the mosquito theory of disease propagation, Stevens became an ardent supporter of Colonel Gorgas in health and sanitation matters.

A man of imposing stature and commanding personality, then 52, Chief Engineer Stevens tramped the entire length of the Canal Zone viewing the various works and observing the topography. Walking with the energy of youth, he radiated the confidence of the natural leader. Often speaking to employees, he told them that there were only three diseases on the Isthmus: "Yellow fever, malaria, and cold feet; and the greatest of these was cold feet."

Prior to the appointment of Stevens, President Roosevelt had designated an International Board of Consulting Engineers of 13 members to consider and recommend the type of canal. Until that question was answered, Stevens was seriously handicapped. Nevertheless, he went ahead with the excavation of Culebra Cut, which work would be useful no matter what the decision, and on alternate plans, which he wished to have ready in anticipation of whatever verdict the Government might reach.

Reporting to the President on January 10, 1906, this engineering board split. Eight members, including five Europeans, voted for the sea-level type; and the five remaining members—all Americans—for the high-level-lake and lock type. The minority report, which reflected the views of Chief Engineer Stevens, was prefaced by Alfred Noble, a distinguished American member of the International Board.

Meanwhile, on the Isthmus, Stevens thoughtfully examined the significant angles affecting the question of type. Though initially inclined on first arrival toward the popular idea of a sea-level canal, he approached the solution of the problem objectively. Interpreting the topography in the light of operational and navigational needs, as well as engineering and construction problems and the hazards involved, he decided for the high-level-lake plan with the Atlantic terminal dams and locks at Gatun, and the Pacific terminal dams and locks in one group at Aguadulce—a hill south of Miraflores. This was essentially the plan originally presented in 1879 by the French engineer Adolphe Godin de Lepinay, the originating and forgotten genius of the basic plan for the Panama Canal as eventually constructed.

In a special message to the Congress on February 19, 1906, transmitting the report of the International Board, President Roosevelt summarized its main points but strongly supported the high-level-lake plan. He invited special attention to the fact that "the chief engineer, who will be mainly responsible for the success of this mighty engineering feat, and who has therefore a peculiar personal interest in judging aright, is emphatically and earnestly in favor of the lock-canal project and against the sea-level project."

When testifying at Congressional hearings in Washington in January 1906, Stevens advocated the high-level plan with a conviction that no one could shake, and voiced his determined opposition to the sea-level idea. But one appearance as a witness by this engineering leader was not enough.

In June he was again called to Washington and led in the historic debate. Testifying before committees of the Congress, preparing refutations to statements by sea-level advocates, and drafting addresses for Senator Philander C. Knox, Chief Engineer Stevens faced the great crisis of his canal career.

He went to Roosevelt for assistance but discovered that the President had become lukewarm in his stand. As one who believed in the vigorous handling of superiors as well as subordinates, Stevens talked to him like a "Dutch uncle." Roosevelt was again convinced and thenceforth stood behind Stevens like a brick.

In the end, with the strong support of the President, Secretary of War Taft, and the Isthmian Canal Commission, the plans of Chief Engineer Stevens prevailed. In an act approved June 29, 1906, the Congress adopted the high-level-lake and lock plan. That was the great decision in building the Panama Canal that made its success possible. It is no wonder that the statesmanlike actions of Stevens won the admiration of informed and experienced engineers on the Isthmus!

Regardless of what may have been urged at the time as to the merits of the so-called sea-level design, the existing Panama Canal was constructed substantially in accordance with the plan recommended by Stevens, approved and accepted by the President and the Congress. It has proved an eminent success in both peace and war. The transit since opening the canal on August 15, 1914 through June 30, 1968 of 403,230 vessels of various types of all nations, with just tolls measurably reflecting the costs of construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection, completely establishes the wisdom of the 1906 decision. Moreover, in addition to its strategic value for national and hemispheric defense, the Panama Canal has been of incalculable benefit to world shipping and to the great ports of our country that serve such shipping. Moreover, the Canal Zone has been an island of stability in an area notorious for endemic revolution and endless political instability.

The day after approving the act of the Congress as to type, June 30, 1906, President Roosevelt showed his confidence in Stevens by appointing him as a member of the Isthmian Canal Commission in addition to his position as Chief Engineer. His star was ascendant.

Unfortunately, the minority report, following previous French studies, provided for the construction of the Pacific locks in two sets, separated by the small intermediate-level Miraflores Lake. Instinctively recognizing this division of locks as a serious error in operational design, Stevens, early in 1906, had recommended to Chairman Shonts in Washington the combination of all Pacific Locks at one location. But he did not present this well-founded proposal with the detailed functional justification required to secure the attention it merited. Nor had there been any ship-transit experience in the canal upon which to base such justification.

Returning to the Isthmus on July 4, 1906, Stevens resumed studies of the Pacific lock situation. A month later, on August 3, he approved a plan for placing all Pacific locks in one group of three lifts, south of Miraflores with the terminal dam and locks between two hills, Cerro Aguadulce on the west side of the sea-level section of the Canal, and Cerro de Puente on the east. This location would have provided the same lock arrangement at both ends of the canal, avoiding a traffic choke at Pedro Miguel, enabling uninterrupted summit-level navigation from the Atlantic locks to the Pacific, and supplied a lake-level traffic mobilization anchorage at the Pacific end of the canal to match that at the Atlantic end—a plan identical with the original conception of De Lepinay, afterward urged by Colonel William L. Sibert, a member of the last Isthmian Canal Commission.

At that time, however, Stevens was under great pressure to start construction. Opponents of any canal at all were seeking some means to delay the enterprise. Advocates of the sea-level idea, stung to the quick by their defeat in the Congress, were set, ready to strike at any change in the approved program as indicating weakness in the high-level plan of Stevens. These two forces together represented a political and economic power that he could not safely ignore.

In the light of subsequent events, it is indeed regrettable that Steven's foundation studies for the consolidation of the Pacific locks, which were necessarily made in great

haste, proved unsatisfactory. He did not dare to jeopardize the project by further delay. Still confident, however, that this important question would rise again, he voided his plan twenty days later, on August 23, 1906, marking it, "not to be destroyed but kept in this office," and proceeded with the plan for separating the Pacific locks as approved by the minority of the International Board of Consulting Engineers.

Many years later, as a result of World War II experience, there was developed in the Panama Canal organization, following the suspension in May 1942 of the 1939 Third Locks project then under construction, what proved to have been the first comprehensive plan for the major increase of capacity and operational improvement of the Canal as derived from marine operations, known as the Third Locks—Terminal Lake Plan. Submitted to higher canal authority it attracted immediate attention and quickly won approval by the President as a post-war project.

Published as a technical paper in the February 1947 issue of the *Proceedings* of the American Society of Civil Engineers the Third Locks—Terminal Lake proposal, because of its inherent logic and "comparatively low cost," has had a wide appeal as the proper form for increasing the capacity of the Panama Canal. Moreover, it has been strongly supported in the House and Senate.

Let us now return to events of 1906. President Roosevelt, after the great decision as to type of canal had been made, was free to visit the Isthmus as he had long wished to do. Under an itinerary prepared by Chief Engineer Stevens, Roosevelt's visit in the U.S. Canal Zone and to the Republic of Panama, November 14–17, 1906, marks a highlight in Isthmian history—the first time any President of the United States had set foot on foreign soil.

In January 1907, in the midst of a crisis over construction contracts, Chairman Shonts, after receiving an offer to head a large transportation merger in New York, resigned effective March 4, 1907. News of this produced another sensation on the Isthmus. All promptly looked to Stevens as their natural leader and a man of destiny. But even he had been hard pressed for many months protecting the interests of the canal project. Realizing that he had brought order out of chaos, that all basic decisions had been made, that he had formed an effective organization for completing the canal, and that construction was well underway, Stevens felt his creative mission had been fulfilled and, on January 30, 1907, wrote his resignation to the President, expressing his desire to return to railroad work. To his close associates, however, he revealed his disgust and irritation at Washington officialdom, government red tape, and frustrations.

Of two civilian chief engineers, the first had left after one year's service and now the second was planning to leave after two years. The canal could not be satisfactorily constructed with such frequent changes in engineering leadership. Roosevelt acceded to Steven's request but, determined to secure continuity in direction, said "I propose now to put it in charge of men who will stay on the job till I get tired of having them there, or till I say they may abandon it."

He selected Major George W. Goethals, an outstanding engineer officer of the Army as Steven's successor, and reorganized the Canal Commission, effective April 1, 1907. The other engineering members were Majors William L. Sibert and David D. Gaillard, and Rear Admiral Harry H. Rousseau, a former chief of the Navy's Bureau of Yards and Docks. Col. William C. Gorgas, the great sanitarian, who had come to the Isthmus from Cuba in 1904 and had been appointed a member of the commission on recommendation of Stevens, was also named. Two civilian members, Jackson Smith and J. C. S. Blackburn, were later succeeded by Colonel H. F. Hodges and Maurice H. Thatcher, the latter afterward becoming a distinguished member of the Congress, after whom the Thatcher Ferry Bridge across the Pacific end of the Panama Canal is named.

Notwithstanding the resignation of Stevens, President Roosevelt, in recognition of his tremendous contributions, on March 4, 1907, appointed him Chairman of the Isthmian Canal Commission, making Stevens the first to hold both positions of Chairman and Chief Engineer. It is noteworthy that neither this reorganized commission nor its predecessor included members experienced in navigational operations.

Stevens planned to leave the Isthmus on April 7, 1907, when the employees arranged a mammoth farewell reception at Colon attended by many throughout the Canal Zone and from the Republic of Panama. In addressing the throng, he gave generous credit to his predecessor, John F. Wallace, for the organization that Stevens had inherited. He revealed that two years previously, on taking charge, he was almost as overwhelmed by the vastness of the preparatory work to be done as had been the President. He added that "until Colonel Gorgas had lifted the dark cloud which the unsanitary conditions placed over the work," he was doubtful of success.

Appealing to the men as their friend to take their "little differences and complaints" to Chief Engineer Goethals and not to Washington, Stevens predicted that the canal would be open to traffic by January 1, 1915. That was a very close estimate indeed, for it was opened on August 15, 1914.

As evidence of the esteem in which he was held canal employees presented Stevens with two bound volumes containing 10,000 signatures requesting him to reconsider his resignation and remain, a gold watch, a diamond ring, and a silver table set. The last included a tray showing the completed canal. Stevens was greatly moved by the exceptional demonstration. He knew that it marked the end of an outstanding chapter in his career.

Long before the departure of the S. S. *Panama*, full-dressed in honor of her distinguished passenger, the largest crowd since United States occupation of the Canal Zone gathered on the pier. At noon, the Isthmian Canal Commission band, which Stevens had established in 1905, played Auld Lang Syne. The *Panama* slowly left her dock and headed toward the sea, amid the cheers of the spectators and whistles on vessels in Limon Bay. Stevens, standing at the rail with his young son, John F., Jr., looked on, pale and sad.

After returning to the United States, Stevens continued his upward climb in the railroad industry, becoming one of the most distinguished railroad officials of the Nation. In 1917, after United States declaration of war against Germany, he went to President Wilson in search of an active assignment in the war. As Russia was then an ally and in urgent need of competent railroad advisers in connection with its war transport problems, the availability of Stevens was timely. Appointed as Minister Plenipotentiary and Chairman of the United States Railway Mission to Russia, he undertook the difficult tasks involved in operating and improving its rail systems. Later, from 1919 to 1923, he was president of the Inter-Allied Technical Board supervising Manchurian Railroads.

In these positions, he observed the start and early years of the Communist revolution. Accurately assessing the tremendous scope of that world conspiracy, he was among the first responsible observers to alert leaders in the United States as to its significance and dangers, among them his friend, Ira E. Bennett, distinguished editor of the *Washington Post*.

Returning home in 1923, Stevens later became president of the American Society of Civil Engineers, and received many honors, including the John Fritz Medal for great achievements. He died at Southern Pines, N.C., in 1943, at the age of 90, keen in mind to the end.

The significance of Stevens' canal contributions, though substantially obscured for a time, has gained stature with the years and has been recorded in authoritative writings. He rescued the project from probable disaster; assembled a major part of the plant and organized the engineering and construction forces, planned the main features of the waterway and brought about the great decision for the high-level-lake and lock type canal, launched the enterprise into the era of major construction, and guided the work until its success was a certainty. He clearly foresaw the necessity for a major change in the Pacific lock arrangement, for which he developed a plan. Subsequent studies of canal operations, in both peace and war, have established that this plan would have supplied the best operational canal practicable of economic attainment—striking evidence of the high quality of his insight. It is no wonder that the United States in 1962 honored the memory of Stevens at the scene of one of the great chapters of his career by the designation of Balboa's principal traffic circle as 'Stevens Circle,' having at its center a monument inscribed with Goethals' words, "The Canal Is His Monument."

A man of eminent vision whose great gifts were harnessed to practicality, Stevens, by his genius and industry, became the greatest construction engineer in American history. His tremendous services can now be viewed in historical perspective. They establish him as the basic architect of the Panama Canal.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Du Val, Captain Miles P. Jr. *And the Mountains Will Move: The Story of the Building of the Panama Canal.* Stanford University, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1947.

——— *Isthmian Canal Policy—An Evaluation* U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (Annapolis, Md.) Vol. 81 (Mar. 1955), pp. 263–75.

——— "Panama Canal." *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Chicago, Ill.), Vol. 17 (1969), pp. 205–12.

Flood, Hon. Daniel J., *Isthmian Canal Policy Questions* (H. Doc. No. 44, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.) Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966.

Sibert, William, William L., and John F. Stevens. *The Construction of the Panama Canal.* New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1915.

Stevens, John F., *An Engineer's Recollections.* New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1936.

Stevens, John F., *"The Truth of History." History of the Panama Canal; Its Construction and Builders.* Ed. Ira E. Bennett, Washington, D.C.: Historical Publishing Co., 1915; pp. 210–24.

Roosevelt, President Theodore. Message to the Congress Recommending the High Level Lake and Lock Type Canal as designed by John F. Stevens, February 19, 1906.

Roosevelt, Theodore. "Monroe Doctrine and Panama Canal." *Theodore Roosevelt—An Autobiography.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920.

SENATOR BROOKE URGES PRESIDENT TO POSTPONE MIRV DEPLOYMENT

Mr. BROOKE. Secretary Seamans has testified today that the United States will begin deployment of the Minuteman III MIRV system in June of this year. The continued momentum deployment of this potentially destabilizing technology is highly disturbing. It could have the most unfortunate consequences for the impending SALT negotiations.

I do not know how the Soviet Union will react to the United States continued efforts on this program but it is unlikely that they will abandon their own multiple warhead technology—the technology which poses the gravest threat to the U.S. deterrent—if our own country has deployed such systems.

There is no military justification for deployment of the U.S. MIRV on the timetable originally planned. The heavy Soviet defenses which it was designed to penetrate do not exist and could not be installed in the immediate future. In the interests of serious diplomacy and strategic stability, the United States has every reason to stretch out MIRV deployment.

We should refrain from premature commitment to weapons which add not to our security but only to the complexity of arms control. In a nuclear age genuine security must ultimately rest on mutual restraint, not mutual recklessness.

The tragic drift toward deployment of these dangerous weapons highlights the urgency of prompt Senate action on the resolution proposing a joint Soviet-American moratorium on MIRV testing. Unless a moratorium of this type is adopted in the coming months, continued testing of MIRV systems will surely lead to accurate counterforce weapons which will threaten the land-based missiles on which both countries depend so heavily. Forty-three Senators have cosponsored this proposal and I profoundly hope that the Committee on Foreign Relations will quickly report this vital resolution. It is essential that the Senate offer its counsel to the President on this matter.

I urge the President to postpone this unwise deployment. Such a postponement could afford time to explore controls over MIRV tests and deployment when the SALT talks resume next month. Coupled with other strategic arms limitations, these controls would be of inestimable value to world peace and security. Delaying MIRV deployment while these issues are examined will in no way jeopardize the national interest. I pray that the President will delay MIRV deployment in order to preserve the maximum opportunity for the discussions at Vienna to bear fruit. No decision of his presidency will be more momentous.

ABA'S POLITICAL OBJECTIONS TO THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION CARRY LITTLE WEIGHT

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, when the Committee on Foreign Relations considered the Genocide Convention in 1950, the opposition of the American Bar Association was of sufficient importance and weight to induce the committee to shelve the convention. The ABA's strong objection to ratification 20 years ago was based on its consideration of the constitutional issues involved. The weight and prestige of the ABA in constitutional matters was so great that not only did the Senate committee put aside further consideration of the convention, but the committee also let it be known that it was reluctant to reconsider the issue until the ABA shifted its position.

So, Mr. President, the Genocide Convention has remained in obscurity in the backroom of the Foreign Relations Committee for the last 20 years waiting for that moment when a shift in the ABA's position accompanied by a positive message from a new President strongly endorsing ratification would again bring it to life.

Hope for reconsideration of the Genocide Convention was reborn when Secretary of State Rogers asked Attorney General Mitchell for his views. The Attorney General, a strict constitutional constructionist, indicated to the Secretary of State that he found no objections to American ratification. Secretary of State Rogers thereupon sent the Genocide Convention to the White House urging the President to support and endorse it.

Shortly thereafter President Nixon strongly endorsed the Genocide Convention. He stated that 75 other nations had already ratified it, and that from the viewpoint of international prestige and moral leadership it was essential for the United States to ratify it as soon as possible.

I was confident that the strong backing of the President and his closest advisors in the areas of foreign affairs and domestic-constitutional law would overcome any remaining hesitation that might still exist in the American Bar Association. My confidence that the ABA would resoundingly reverse its 20-year-old opposition was heightened by the fact that those very divisions of the association intimately concerned with questions of criminal, constitutional, and international law all strongly came out in support of ratification.

By a slim four vote margin, though, the ABA failed to reverse itself and failed to endorse the Genocide Convention. The association rejected the advice of its own constitutional, criminal, and international law experts such as Solicitor General Erwin Griswold and former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach.

But, unlike 1950, the ABA's objections were no longer based primarily on constitution or legal grounds. Even an opponent of the convention, who had formerly opposed it on a constitutional basis, stated at the ABA's February meeting that he now agrees that Human Rights Conventions can properly be the subject of treaties.

This time, the ABA's prime concern on the Genocide Convention was its potential impact on certain groups—for example, Vietnam POW's, the My Lai perpetrators, or the Black Panthers and other dissident groups here at home. What is significant is that the ABA's newfound concern is essentialy political and emotional. It is not legal, and it certainly is not constitutionally based.

Mr. President, while I may have disagreed with the Senate's reluctance to take up the Genocide Convention in the past, I have at least been able to understand the Senate's deference to the ABA's legal and constitutional objections. The ABA has great expertise and influence in this area, and it is possible to see why the ABA's position has been accorded considerable weight.

But the ABA is no longer basing its main objections solely on these grounds. It has ventured outside its area of expertise, and into the political arena. Of course, I do not question its right to do this. But I do question whether its opinion in the political sphere should be treated with the type of deference it has been accorded in the past.

Mr. President, where political judgments are to be made, the arbiter should be U.S. Senate. For advice, the Senate can be expected to turn to the Chief Executive, and his Attorney General, and his Secretary of State. These offices have now come out squarely for ratification of the Genocide Convention. These are the views that should count; not those of the ABA.

I sincerely hope the Foreign Relations Committee will keep this in mind when hearings are held on the Genocide Convention—hopefully in the near future.

OUR ENVIRONMENT: WE CAN SAVE IT—SPEECH BY SENATOR EAGLETON

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the junior Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON) has been a valuable addition to the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution since he came to the Senate a year ago. He has quickly become a leader in the battle to protect our environment.

One of Senator EAGLETON's most valuable contributions to this effort has been his understanding of what is needed to turn back the tide of pollution and decay in America: money. There is no substitute for a strong and lasting financial commitment. In a speech which the Senator delivered at the Kansas City Press Club last month he made this point very well. "Both government and private purse strings must be loosened—now." I commend to the Senate Senator EAGLETON's analysis of the needs of our programs to protect and enhance the quality of our air, our water, and our land. I ask unanimous consent that his address be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was being ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OUR ENVIRONMENT: WE CAN SAVE IT

(By Senator THOMAS F. EAGLETON)

Throughout history man has struggled against his environment, seeking to withstand nature's often capricious destructiveness and to harness the elements where possible and make them work for him.

Over the centuries we succeeded well at this vital game, learning to live in a sometimes uneasy but always respectful peace with our surroundings.

Man, with his intelligence, has more often been the user than the used, but nature always retained its mastery, bringing flood and drought, hurricane and tornado, at will.

But 20th century, technological man, unlike his forebears no respecter of nature has changed all that—hopefully not irrevocably, although we do not know.

Man is now beating his age-old rival—not consciously or fairly, not by direct attempts to control natural forces for some good purpose, but accidentally, indirectly, by the side-effects of a consumer-oriented technology that didn't think or care about what its garbage was doing to the elements on which we all depend for life.

You need only look around. America the Beautiful is rapidly becoming America the Noxious. We are the richest, most industrialized nation in the world. Befitting that lofty position, we produce one-half the world's industrial pollution—and a vast amount of human pollution. It is visible everywhere:

In the choking, brownish smogs that hover over our cities, blotting out what used to be blue skies. They are the visible part of the 172 million tons of smoke and fumes our factories "produce" every year, combined with the exhaust fumes from our 83 million cars, which alone are responsible for 60% of urban air pollution.

In the clogged highways—to build which we pave over 1,000,000 acres of oxygen-producing trees annually—and the even more packed auto junkyards, into which we discard 7 million cars each year.

In our once-beautiful rivers, lakes and streams, filled with human and industrial waste—50 trillion gallons of the latter annually. We all know that few of our waterways are fit for humans to swim in. Many of them are no longer fit for fish, either—more than 15 million fish were killed by water pollution last year. Or, for that matter, for the forms of aquatic plant life that keep waterways "living." As I am sure you know, ecologists say that Lake Erie is turning into a Dead Sea—aging long before its time—because the phosphates and nitrates dumped into it by municipal sewage plants and detergent manufacturers, as well as unrestricted agricultural wastes, have killed the plant life, which deprives the lake of oxygen and therefore fish, and allows weeds to take over. They predict it may turn into a swamp.

That's Lake Erie, not just some neighborhood fishing hole. It doesn't sound possible—but it is more than that. It is a fact.

The litany of doleful examples is virtually endless. So are the statistics: 28 million tons of waste paper, 48 billion used cans, 28 billion bottles each year.

You know the problem as well as I do. You only have to go outside and take a deep breath, or try to taste the drinking water in a glass through the chemicals needed to purify it.

The heartening thing is that the problem has finally been recognized—by the air-breathing, water drinking public—for the immense and serious one that it is. And a growing body of ecologists, with people listening at last, is capable of pointing out the dangers and showing ways to surmount them.

There is one essential component in the answer to the urgent question of how to reverse this dangerous path we have been following: Money. We must spend enough money on research, facilities and the enforcement of stringent anti-pollution standards to clean up our air and water. Anything less would be ineffective tokenism.

And the American people have made it clear that they don't want tokenism—they want clean air and clean water and more space for recreation and the removal of eyesore junkheaps. They know the cost will be heavy. They know they will have to bear that cost themselves, both as taxpayers and as consumers.

I think we are ready, as a nation, for a victory over pollution. While the anti-pollution field is new, the "start of the art" in terms of the necessary technical know-how is quite advanced in some fields.

Cement plant emissions, for instance, can be controlled almost entirely. The know-how is there. Only the will—or the public-generated demand—to spend the money is lacking among some cement plant owners. Electric power plants are among the worst industrial air polluters. Their dangerous emissions, too, can be controlled by existing anti-pollution devices, at the cost of only an extra few cents a month on our electricity bills.

Most of the federal legislation needed to fight pollution is already on the books, thanks almost entirely to Senator Edmund S. Muskie, who authored the 1963 Clean Air Act, the 1965 Water Quality Act, the 1967 Air Quality Act and now has legislation pending to improve the existing laws. He is the leading pollution authority in the Senate and my eyes have been opened by serving on the Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee, which he chairs.

Now President Nixon has joined the pollution fight. His environmental message to Congress Tuesday was welcome—it's good to have the White House with us.

I must point out that nearly all of the President's proposals either are contained in existing law or are logical extensions of existing law. Most of the new things he said are already embodied in pending legislative proposals introduced early this year by Senator Muskie. A few of his proposals were brand new and innovative and merit further study, but generally these relate to minor improvements, rounding off the rough edges, so to speak, although his proposal that lead be removed from gasoline was important and worthwhile.

I cannot overemphasize that what is really needed to make anti-pollution legislation work—whether it be current or new legislation—is the commitment of sufficient money. This is what is meant when we speak of priorities—we must commit more to environmental control, admittedly at the expense of other programs.

The federal government is going to have to make good on its promises to help local governments pay for secondary and tertiary sewage treatment facilities.

Also, government and the public combined are going to have to pressure reluctant industry to stop fouling our air and our water.

Industry must be made to accept the fact that it must treat as a cost of doing business its anti-pollution devices to clean up smokestack emissions and fluid wastes—which means, of course, that this extra cost will be passed right along to the consumer in the form of higher prices. A bitter pill to swallow? Perhaps, but I am convinced the public has decided it would rather swallow this than the kind of air it has been swallowing in recent years.

We must be discriminating in the way we apply the necessary funds to the problems, for the solutions to them differ markedly. Let me sketch the major pollution areas briefly, one by one.

Water Pollution.—The President's recommendations for river basin plans, regional treatment facilities, effluent standards, court action for the violation of standards, revision of enforcement procedures and extension of standards to navigable waters are consistent with proposals made by Senator Muskie earlier. I think all of these are good.

What we also need is a great deal more federal money. Sen. Muskie has proposed spending $12.5 billion in the next five years as the federal one-half share for building $25 million in municipal waste treatment facilities.

President Nixon has proposed $10 billion over the next four years, only $4 million federal and $6 million local. He recommends $1 billion for fiscal 1971. This is five times what he was satisfied to spend only one year ago when the popular appeal of pollution issues had not reached its present intensity. But it is still well below the $1.25 billion which Congress has already authorized for water pollution control in fiscal 1971.

Air Pollution.—The Air Quality Act of 1967 was a mechanism for combatting air pollution on a regional basis with the federal and state governments acting as partners.

Under the Act, 57 Air Quality Control Regions—covering the nation's major air pollution problem areas—will be established. These regions are meeting the timetable of the act by setting regional emission standards, and this year some of them, including Missouri's two regions, will take the final step by setting their implementation plans detailing enforcement procedures.

I think the Muskie regional concept is a sound approach, and I think it will work.

President Nixon has raised the question of national ambient air quality standards. His proposal is extremely ambiguous, but different formulas to accomplish this have been studied in the past and found severely wanting. If his proposal is a means of assuring early and equitable air pollution control, I am for it. If his proposal is a back-door attempt to eliminate public participation in determining the quality of air people will breathe, I am against it.

We need research to step up our technological capacity to stop pollution of our air. For fiscal 1970 Congress appropriated $45 million for research, but the President has asked for only $27 million for fiscal 1971. I think his sense of urgency is lagging.

The problem of enforcement of air pollution standards on a smokestack-to-smokestack basis is far too great a task for the federal government to try to cope with. That is one more reason I believe in the regional approach advocated by Sen. Muskie. But the federal government needs to provide more grant money to regional air conservation commissions to acquire the know-how and manpower to set proper emission standards and enforce them if the job is to be done. The Nixon proposal for stiff court fines for violators is a good one—and one which has been already proposed by Senator Muskie.

There are two other types of air pollution I think should be handled in different way.

The first is auto pollution, responsible for the majority of urban smog. When Detroit said recently it would take 10 years to fully develop the technology to make an emission-free internal combustion engine, I have to say I was astounded.

I have much more faith in the technological capability of the big auto makers than that. I think they can do it in much less time—with the proper encouragement. This is a case where stringent national emission standards set by Congress will be necessary—and on a strict timetable of achievement—if HEW will not force the issue itself. The President has now moved properly in this area and HEW is setting a tougher timetable of compliance with federal standards.

Consumers can be of inestimable help here, too. They must demand cars that do not pollute . . . and accept responsibility for keeping them that way.

Already it may be too late. Most of the cars built without anti-pollution devices in 1969—was sold by the millions—will still be polluting the air a decade from now, even if clean-exhaust cars are then the norm.

As we are toughening regulations on cars, we also should be regulating trucks and buses, as anyone who has ever waited behind a bus for a traffic light to change well knows.

Then there are emissions from jet planes—which the Nixon message failed to mention. The admnistration apparently does not want any any legislation to be written giving HEW affirmative power to regulate jet emissions, as I found out in an Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee hearing I participated in last week.

Administration witnesses said they preferred to go by the current voluntary compliance agreement they have reached, applicable to about half of the commercial jet planes. This would have the effect of removing 70% of all *visible* jet pollution from engine smoke by 1972.

But here again the state of the art is not advanced. The voluntary agreement will do nothing about other, invisible, jet exhaust pollutants such as nitrous oxide and hydrocarbons because no way has yet been found to remove them and keep jet engines run-

families from moving out of the neighborhood? If we do either, who decides who moves, who stays?

The example, of course, is fanciful. We do none of this. No one has had the political temerity to propose a law that would send soldiers to pick people up and move them, or to block the way and prevent them from moving. No one stands up and says this is the moral thing to do.

Stated thus baldly, the immorality of doing such things is perfectly clear. No one thinks it moral to send policemen, or the National Guard bayonets in hand, to corral people and force them into a swimming pool, or a public park or a cocktail party when they do not wish to go.

No one pretends this is moral—for all that anyone may deplore people's prejudice—because everyone can see that to do this is to make of our society a police state. The methods, whatever the differences in intent, would be no different from the tramping boots of the Communist, Nazi or Fascistic police states.

All this being fanciful, no one proposing such things, it may seem we have strayed far from the school integration program. But have we?

The essence of that program is that we have tried to apply to our schools the methods we would not dream of applying to other parts of society. We have forced the children to move.

There are many things wrong with the forcible transfer of children from school to school to obtain the "proper" racial mix. It is, for one thing, wasteful of time, energy and money that could better be applied to making all schools better.

To this practical objection there is also the fact that in concept it is arrogant. The unspoken idea it rests upon is that black children will somehow gain from putting their black skins near to white skins. This is the reverse coin of the worst segregationist's idea that somehow the white children will suffer from putting their white skins near to black skins.

Both are insolent assertions of white superiority. Both spring from the same bitter seed.

Still, the practical difficulties might be surmounted. The implied arrogance might be overlooked, on the grounds that the alleged superiority is not racial but cultural; or that, further, both whites and blacks will gain from mutual association. That still leaves the moral question.

Perhaps it should be restated. It is moral for society to apply to children the force which, if it were applied to adults, men would know immoral? What charity, what compassion, what morality is there in forcing a child as we would not force his father?

It is a terrible thing to see, as we have seen, soldiers standing guard so that a black child may enter a white school. You cannot help but cringe in shame that only this way is it done. But at least then the soldiers are standing for a moral principle—that no one, child or adult, shall be barred by the color of his skin from access to what belongs to us all, white or black.

But it would have been terrifying if those same soldiers had been going about the town rounding up the black children and marching them from their accustomed school to another, while they went fearfully and their parents wept. On that, I verily believe, morality will brook no challenge.

Thus, then, the abyss. It opened because in fleeing from one moral wrong of the past, for which we felt guilty, we fled all unaware to another immorality. The failure is tragic because in so doing we heaped the burdens upon our children, who are helpless.

MUST WE TURN BACK?

Does this mean, as many men of good will fear, that to recognize as much, to acknowledge the failure of forced integration in the schools, is to surrender, to turn backward to what we have fled from?

Surely not. There remains, and we as a people must insist upon it, the moral imperative that no one should be denied his place in society, his dignity as a human being, because of his color. Not in the schools only, but in his livelihood and his life. No custom, no tradition, no trickery should be allowed to evade that imperative.

That we can insist upon without violating the other moral imperative. So long as he does not encroach upon others, no man should be compelled to walk where he would not walk, live where he would not live, share what company he would shun, think what he would not think, believe what he believes not.

If we grasp the distinction, we will follow a tragic failure with a giant step. And, God willing, not just in the schools.

ADDRESS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT BEFORE TRUNK AND TUSK CLUB

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, last week it was the pleasure and honor of the Trunk and Tusk Club, a Republican fundraising organization, to have had the Vice President of the United States, SPIRO AGNEW, address them.

This speech covered the legal and ethical questions of the Chicago trial. It was so well done that I would like to afford Senators the opportunity of reviewing it. I ask unanimous consent that the speech be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

The gathering here in Phoenix, Arizona, is a partison one. We can be justly proud of our partisanship for President Nixon has accomplished much in the past year.

It is tempting—and indeed it may be fitting—to give a partisan speech before a partisan audience. Tonight, however, I would like to forgo that temptation and talk to you and all Americans about a national problem.

I refer to calculated assaults on our last bastion of individual rights, the administration of justice.

The trial of the Chicago Seven—or eight, as the original docket read—has now been concluded. The jury has reached its verdict, the judge has passed sentences, and the appeal procedure has begun.

This trial served as the stormy footnote to the turbulent 1968 Democratic National Convention. The trial itself should have tested the constitutionality of the 1968 Civil Rights Act. I say should have because that issue may have been obscured by the contest of personalities and a script written for drama rather than the administration of justice.

I do not intend to comment on the conduct of the trial nor the finer points of law. The point is not what these particular men—judge, advocates, defendants and spectators—did in this particular time. What is significant is what disruption does at all times to the system of justice.

I contend that if our courts are not sanctuaries of dispassionate reason we cannot have justice. We cannot have social or civil progress. Emotional demonstration and guerrilla theatre must end at the court house door. The rights of petition and assembly do not extend into the halls of justice although they are appropriate when lawfully exercised outside. Within the courtroom, dissent must be orderly and supported by logic. The rule is persuasion, not intimidation.

As Supreme Court Justice Hugo L. Black cautioned in 1966:

"Once you give a nervous, hostile and ill-informed people a theoretical justification for using violence in certain cases, it's like a tiny hole in the dike; the rationales rush through in a torrent, and violence becomes the normal, acceptable solution for a problem. . . . A cardinal fact about violence is that once initiated it tends to get out of hands. It's limits are not predictable."

A corollary conclusion is . . . violence rewarded breeds further violence and perpetual violence ultimately produces a brutal counterreaction.

Civil disobedience, at best, is a dangerous policy, since it opens the path for each man to be judge and jury of which laws are unjust and may be broken. Moreover, civil disobedience leads inevitably to riots, and riots condoned lead inevitably to revolution. This is a clear and present danger today.

"Justice is founded in the rights bestowed by nature upon man. Liberty is maintained in the security of justice." These two sentences are inscribed on a wall of the Justice Department building in Washington. I do not believe the first sentence is true.

I doubt that justice is founded in the rights of nature, because we know that nature is not always just. Each generation of youth discovers the beauty of nature anew and is stunned by the magnitude of it, perhaps to the extent of confusing beauty with justice. Yes, nature is beautiful. But it can also be brutal and predatory.

We might ask what justice exists in the jungle where carniverous animals devour the weak and gentle? What justice is there in life where disease often cripples and kills the young and good?

What we regard as justice today does not exist by virtue of nature, but by the free will of mankind. Justice began the day we rejected the nature of savages and started something called civilization. Civilization progressed as we challenged and contested with the bestiality in ourselves. It advanced as we began to conquer the natural forces of fire, flood, famine and disease.

No, I do not believe that natural rights or human rights or even legislated rights can flourish without sufficient definition and protection under a judicial system.

For so long as we have free will, so long as we attempt to separate right from wrong, we are contributors to our own destiny or our own doom.

No natural or human right is enforceable except as a civil right. It is only when society acknowledges it as a right and backs it by the power of the state and the respect of a majority of its responsible citizens that that right exists.

If we consider the time it has taken civilization to progress from primitive savagery to sophisticated jurisprudence, we realize some amazing facts. Five hundred million years of evolution preceded the present state of civilization. Barely 2,500 years have passed since the early laws of Moses and Hamurabi established the foundations of justice. Only seven centuries ago, the Magna Carta produced the principle that a nation and its leaders would "deny justice to none, nor delay it."

So those who condemn civilization for not having moved fast enough are wrong. At the same time those who would be complacent are just as wrong. A look at Nazi Germany, Communist China or Castro's Cuba proves that ten centuries of civilized progress can be destroyed overnight.

If civilization is still a veneer, then civilized justice clearly requires constant, tender and protective care. Out of progress have come some painful lessons. We have learned that there must be a framework for justice. In America, the Constitution provides the ground rules for freedom, justice and order. The Constitution establishes basic rights and in doing so imposes corresponding responsi-

bilities. The Constitution also establishes a representative government empowered to enact laws and Courts which may rule on them.

Laws may conflict with other laws and with constitutional rights. Constitutional rights supersede laws. The Courts alone can resolve these conflicts. They stand independent of all other branches of government. Federal court judges are appointed for life to secure their personal independence from past, present and future influences. Society has encased its courts in these protective layers because it values justice. Justice depends on dispassion and compassion as well a knowledge of the law. But passion has no place in the courtroom. Raw passion has never contributed a thing to the administration of justice.

Nor has pressure. The citizens of this country are free to pressure Congress. They may petition and parade and protest before the President. They may howl and yowl and tax our patience. But when they move open rebellion into the court room, they remove from our midst all hope of justice.

The case of the Chicago Seven proves this point. The trial could have provided a significant test of the constitutionality of the 1968 antiriot law.

As it happened, the outrageous courtroom conduct totally obfuscated the constitutional question. Instead of a clear test of law we saw a perverse display of arrogance, vilification and childish braggadocio.

The Chicago Seven were not interested in the Constitution nor in improving justice. Defendant Abbie Hoffman said, "this trial isn't about legal niceties. It's a battle between a dying culture and an emerging one."

Except for one traumatic lapse, the Civil War, our culture has peacefully evolved for 181 years at an almost revolutionary speed. We have moved from a concept of "laissez-faire liberty" to a recognition that liberty requires continuous care. We have learned that it is not enough to say all men are equal and all enterprise, free. We must assure equal opportunity and secure fair play.

During the course of this century alone we have restricted the "anything goes liberty," which led to robber barons and watered stock; which permitted monopolies and prevented labor unions. We have advanced individual liberty by providing social security, unemployment insurance, collective bargaining, medicare and medicaid. We have struck down laws giving sanction to discriminatory practices. We have witnessed an unprecedented—and some feel excessive—protection of individual liberties. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, we have enacted laws affording equal opportunity where the motivation was humanistic and compassonate, not legalistic.

This peaceful revolution has, to a great extent, been the product of our courts. The Courts are the operating rooms of freedom where cancerous invasions of individual and group rights are excised by trained judicial surgeons so that the patient—our free society—can survive. And while the operation is performed on an antiseptic atmosphere, the patient does not remain in quarantine. He returns to everyday life strengthened and more vital.

Our courts do not need lectures from self-appointed social critics. They do not need the antics of the guerilla theatre. They do not need lawyers who confuse themselves with disciples of a new cult. They do need skilled advocates to be catalysts to the cause of justice and reporters who have not predetermined the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The Courts have been put above and beyond the rough and tumble for a reason. The Judicial branch does not represent a majority nor a minority, but all society past, present and future. Elected officials in the Executive and Legislatve branches are directly responsible to their electorate, they are subject to pressure. The Judiciary is independent. The Supreme Court is responsible to its own conscience and to posterity. The Courts are a bastion in defense of individuals and minorities. But decisions are made to favor the majority not the minority but to fairly interpret the Constitution and laws of the United States.

The case of the Chicago Seven concerns neither the rights of the majority nor the minority. It concerns the right of society to be protected against a mob. It points once again to the dangerous confusion between a minority and a mob. A responsible minority has rights and any law-abiding political minority has the right under our Constitutional system to persuade our people to make it a majority.

A mob represents neither a political majority nor a minority. A mob is a mob—unruly, mindless, passionate, inchoate, coercive and oppressive. It represents only a dangerous threat to democracy, individual civil rights and progress. It invites tyranny and repression.

Today's left-wing extremists like to invoke the revolutionary principles of our nation's founding fathers as their precedent. There is no parallel. That is the New Left's Big Lie.

The founding fathers rebelled against a system which deprived them of the right to be represented and the right to dissent. Today's revolutionary has both of these rights. But lacking a constructive purpose, he finds no logical way to bring others to his point of view. So he engages in destruction for the sake of relieving his frustration with himself.

The founding fathers proposed a positive system of government . . the most superb social organization in human history. Today's radical thought is solely negative and nihilistic in content.

Those who advocate revolution and those who encourage them pervert the ideals of our founding fathers and distort the facts. Those who smash windows and seize university buildings destroy by their injustice whatever justice their cause ever had.

If we confuse these people with legitimate political minorities, we do a cruel disservice to every minority group in this country.

If we romanticize the revolutionary's role in present America, we diminish the efforts of every responsible, conscientious citizen.

If we capitulate before their terroristic tactics, we endanger the fabric of our freedom.

We stand at an extraordinary moment in our nation's history—a moment which demands nobility from ordinary men.

We are challenged to exercise calm in the face of moral outrage.

We must enforce the law with dispassion and disregard the provocation of passion.

We must distinguish the mob from the minority and not find any minority guilty for the sins of a mob.

We must not tolerate abuse nor violence by a mob yet continue to assure the rights of petition and public assembly.

These are formidable challenges for humans without inexhaustible patience. In a time of incessant confrontation, it is all too easy to begin to hate. It is all too effective to initiate repressive measures. Yet, if we fall prey to hate and repression, the mob has won. Destroying a mob is relatively easy; the difficulty lies in not destroying ourselves.

One of the wives of the convicted Chicago defendants said, "we will dance on your graves." We cannot let this happen anymore than we can permit our court rooms to become circuses; our campuses, bedlams; our streets, battlegrounds.

We are not going to retreat to Dark Age repression and we cannot go forward to enlightenment without sanity and reason.

So we are going to stand our ground with patience and dignity.

The months and years ahead will not be easy. But no one has ever said that freedom was easy. And I am confident that our culture will emerge stronger and wiser for the test.

Confrontation is not novel to our citizens, only its form is new. We have faced dictators before . . . only they had foreign accents. Now we face an enemy within, and, as Abraham Lincoln said: "If destruction be our lot we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of freemen we must live through all time, or die by suicide."

Ladies and gentlemen, suicide is alien to the American spirit. Ours is the spirit of John Paul Jones; we "have not yet begun to fight."

THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS—PROSPECTS FOR LIMITING THE ARMS RACE

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, recently Mr. Boris Yarochevsky, correspondent for the Soviet Union Tass news agency interviewed me here at the Capitol and I took the liberty at that time to give him my thoughts about the possibilities of improved relationships between his country and the United States.

In view of the objective reporting of my statement, I ask unanimous consent that the Tass news story be inserted at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR SYMINGTON

(By Tass Correspondent B. Yarochevsky)

WASHINGTON, February 20.—The idea about the need to establish control over arms race is gaining ground among the wide circles of U.S. public and is ever stronger supported by U.S. Congressmen.

Senator Stuart Symington gave an interview to a Tass correspondent in which he commented on the strategic arms limitation talks between the Soviet Union and the United States that will be resumed in April in Vienna. Senator Symington said that these talks provide an excellent opportunity to start tackling the problem on which the destiny of entire mankind largely depends. If we fail to stop the dangerous and costly race of missile and nuclear armaments, the history might not give us another such chance he said.

We pin great hopes on the talks with the Soviet Union, Symington said. If further and even more dangerous spiralling of the arms race is prevented, more funds, efforts of the best scientists and material values will be given to the improvement of life of our peoples and the solution of the problems facing mankind.

The Senator said that the talks in Vienna must provide basis for the improvement of relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States, must help remove distrust and suspicions. The fact that every one of the two countries can destroy the other binds us to approach the program of arms limitation with complete responsibility and with the awareness of its importance for the destinies of our peoples and entire mankind.

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President I always felt that the fight for environmental quality must be a cooperative venture. Citizens,

all levels of government, and private industry must recognize the problems and work hand in hand to solve them. Armco Steel Corp. with large plants in Pennsylvania has shown a willingness to move forward. I ask unanimous consent to reprint in the RECORD the attached letter from Mr. C. William Verity, Jr., president of Armco Steel Corp., and excerpts from Armco's booklet describing its pollution control efforts.

There being no objection the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ARMCO STEEL CORP.,
Middletown, Ohio, February 18, 1970.

Hon. HUGH SCOTT,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SCOTT: The spotlight of national publicity has created increased public awareness of the serious problems of air and water pollution. But the picture is not all dust and dirt, smog and grime.

Armco and many other companies have been quietly meeting and solving pollution problems for years. Armco is committed to clean water and clean air at all of our operations. We are sincerely proud of our accomplishments and would like you, as a concerned public official, to know where we stand as we enter the 1970's.

Since we launched our accelerated air and water pollution control program in 1964, Armco has invested about $75 million in equipment to improve our environment. Several of our major plants are now virtually pollution-free. By the end of this year or early in 1971 every Armco Steel plant will be operating new facilities to control air and water quality.

Our efforts in this important fight are now gaining increasing national recognition. A few days ago the National Society of Professional Engineers selected the air and water pollution systems at our Middletown, Ohio Works as "one of the outstanding engineering achievements of 1969."

Enclosed is our new booklet which contains a progress report and our commitment to bring our share of industrial pollution under full control.

We would be happy to have your comments, suggestions and support in this challenging, costly, but vital long-range effort.

Sincerely,

BILL VERITY.

ARMCO STEEL CORP.

There was a time when clear-water creeks and a walk around the block for a fresh breath of air were taken for granted in this country.

No more. "Unsafe for Swimming" warnings and dust-stained sidings are becoming signs of the times.

What went wrong? Nothing—and everything. We just found that we could live a whole lot better if the things we need could be mass produced. That resulted in the industrial revolution.

Smoke-filled skies were once a sign of prosperity. Now they're a sign of destruction. As a result, millions of Americans are now concerned with the pollution prosperity built.

This booklet is a progress report that was created to show you how one company—Armco—has set about to analyze and correct its part of the growing problems of air and water pollution.

We're proud of the distance we've come, and we're determined to continue this costly and difficult job until we can report that pollution at Armco has been licked.

There is still a lot of work to be done. But we feel it's important that you realize that pollution abatement to Armco isn't just a couple of nine-letter words.

They're fast becoming a very large reality. A reality that had already cost Armco over $97 million by the end of the 1960's. To eliminate all existing sources of pollution will require an additional $50 million.

A reality which commands the talents of engineers, research scientists and operating employees working around the clock to correct old problems and make sure we don't create new ones. Consistent with Armco's policy, all new facilities will be built with the best available air and water pollution abatement equipment.

Wordsworth said, ". . . and 'tis my belief that every flower loves the air it breathes." It is our belief that you and your family and their families for generations to come should be able to breathe the air they love.

BUTLER WORKS

A remarkable example of the tendency of man to pollute his environment was found in the earliest existence of the Grecian city of Troy. Archeologists say that the people of Troy merely dropped their food scraps on the floor (bones and everything else apparently) and went on living on top of them. Gradually the floor level rose and eventually the door would not open. Their solution? They merely adjusted the door.

Armco's pollution abatement started 40 years ago at the Butler, Pa., Works. As early as 1929, the plant safety pumped mill waste to large settling basins. An acid neutralization plant came along in '37 and a second pickle liquor treatment facility was installed in 1943.

In 1953, management authorized an experimental water clarifier that served as the forerunner of many of today's modern clarification techniques.

At the start of the '70's, Butler Work's six old open hearth furnances are part of the dusty past.

In October, 1969, Butler began operation of a modern electric furnace shop. The new, bright blue shop is complete with high energy scrubbers which wash dirt particles from the air.

Very clean air, however, often results in very dirty water. So Butler engineers literally had to move mountains to make room for the second of three water clarification units. Engineers whacked the tops off a couple of good sized Pennsylvania hills before they had room to locate their electric shop and new anti-pollution equipment.

All-in-all, the effort Butler Works has put into pollution abatement has underwritten the future of the lush, green country that surrounds the plant and nearby Connequenessing Creek. As of November 1969, this plant ranked among the cleanest industrial plants in the world.

AMBRIDGE WORKS

The Ambridge, Pa., Works is located on the banks of the Ohio River where the river defies common knowledge and flows north. North, that is, before it starts winding its way 1,000 miles to the south, bound for the Gulf of Mexico.

Ambridge Works hasn't really ever had to worry about population. The smoke that once rose from a lone power plant stack was brought under control in 1962 by a "dry cyclone" dust remover.

Water problems were eliminated from the plant two decades ago. Today, water that isn't cleaned and recirculated is allowed to settle clear, then skimmed free of oil before being allowed to flow back into the Ohio—well above state standards for water purity. There are now no polution problems at Ambridge.

THE FUTURE

But what of the future? In nature there's neither reward nor punishment—just consequences. Armco therefore, has chosen to attack the pollution problems of the future instead of sitting on its abatement laurels.

For example, Armco now has a special section of research and technology devoted to fundamental studies in pollution abatement.

A new process for separating waste oils that was developed in this laboratory is now being successfully used in full-scale operation.

When Armco engineers design any new facility, they automatically build in ample pollution controls. No more clean-up and add-on.

Armco scientists devote themselves to pollution problems far in the future. Take noise pollution. Instead of building, then correcting inherent noise problems, our scientists and engineers are striving to design noise-free facilities.

Then there's the problem of by-products. Today the disposal of solid residue is a continuing operating cost, but research is underway to develop means of reusing some of these by-products to help defray a part of the cost of pollution abatement.

One of the steel industry's remaining unsolved pollution headaches is that of periodic emissions of gas and smoke from coal coking operations. The company is working with other steel companies, universities and the government to develop reliable control techniques to solve this difficult operating problem. Control devices will be added to all Armco coke plants as soon as such devices are developed.

We've about reached a point in history in which our society will deny any group, steel company, motorist, city sewage plant or homeowner the right to threaten our environment.

As the Armco Policy on Pollution Abatement states, with support from legislative bodies, private groups—and you—it is realistic to hope for improvement, and to dream of a day when our lakes and rivers and skies are clean again.

Whatever needs to be done, it's clear that a major clean-up has started. The immediate challenge, we believe, is not only to stop pollution from becoming worse as both population and industry continue to grow, but to roll it back.

It is our belief that you and your families should be able to enjoy the earth you've inherited.

At Armco, pollution is out. Clean air and water are in. You have our pledge.

MENTAL HEALTH OF CHILDREN

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, the board of trustees of the American Psychiatric Association have recently pledged full support for the thoughtful and far-reaching conclusions contained in the Report of the Joint Commission on the Mental Health of Children which was published in 1969.

In the February issue of the Journal of American Psychiatry the trustees give their "enthusiastic approval and support of the spirit and principles underlying the findings of the Joint Commission on Mental Health of Children."

As one who supported the formation and work of the Joint Commission and is committed to implementing its major recommendations, I am encouraged and heartened by the trustees' statement.

With the full consultation and assistance of many interested persons, we are now preparing a program to implement the major recommendations of the Joint Commission report to establish a national child advocacy system. As a result, I

hope to introduce legislation on this subject in the near future.

Mr. President, the excellent statement of the American Psychiatric Association is worthwhile reading for everyone. I ask unanimous consent that it appear at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

POSITION STATEMENT ON CRISIS IN CHILD MENTAL HEALTH: CHALLENGE FOR THE 1970's, THE FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH OF CHILDREN

(This statement was approved by the Board of Trustees of the American Psychiatric Association on December 12, 1969, upon recommendation of the Association's Task Force on the Report of the Joint Commission on Mental Health of Children, comprised of: J. Cotter Hirschberg, M.D., Stanislaus Szurek, M.D., Milton E. Senn, M.D., Kent Zimmerman, M.D., Exie Welsch, M.D., Richard S. Ward, M.D., Walter E. Barton, M.D., and Robert L. Robinson, ex officio

(The trustees have requested the task force to continue its work of studying and recommending positions on the technical reports of the Joint Commission as necessary, and also to advise on implementation of the Joint Commission's recommendations.)

FOREWORD

The final report of the Joint Commission on Mental Health of Children is vast in scope and detail. Its many recommendations, reaching into all areas of national life, do not lend themselves to blanket endorsement. They call for extensive study, adaptation, and modification to accord with political, social, and economic realities in the long-range process of implementation. In the course of that process in the years ahead, the Association will be called upon to adopt many "positions" on specific proposals of the Commission. But there is, we believe, an obligation on the part of the Association to offer an initial reaction to the report and some extended commentary about its findings and recommendations by way of suggesting a stance of organized psychiatry with which it is hoped the overwhelming majority of psychiatrists will agree.

The following commentary is offered in that context. It is largely based on the findings of a task force appointed in 1968 to formulate a position statement on the Commission's final report for consideration by the trustees. The trustees are most grateful to the task force for its assistance.

APPROVAL AND COMMENDATION

The trustees hereby record their enthusiastic approval and support of the spirit and principles underlying the findings of the Joint Commission on Mental Health of Children. The Association may be prideful that it was instrumental in initiating the Commission in 1965. We wish to express our grattitude and congratulations to all who made possible so great an achievement, and most especially to Senator Abraham Ribicoff, who spearheaded the authorizing legislation in the Congress, to the many allied organizations and agencies that participated, to the officers and staff of the Commission, and to the hundreds of professionals and concerned citizens from our own and cooperating disciplines who gave to the effort so much of their knowledge and time.

It is the intent of the Commission in its final report to alert the nation to its past failures in meeting the needs of young people from birth to adulthood, the price that we are paying and must pay for our failure, and the promise that lies in remedying that neglect. It pleads for a new kind of society, a child-respecting society, and it projects a comprehensive blueprint for structuring it. In the new society there will be three priorities of equal emphasis: 1) the provision of comprehensive services to ensure the maintenance of the health and mental health of all children and youth; 2) the provision of all needed remedial services for all children in trouble—the mentally ill, the delinquent, the mentally retarded, and other handicapped children and youth; and 3) the establishment of a highly structured advocacy system at every level of government to ensure that the first two goals are in fact realized and sustained.

In our view the Commission's program is thoroughly in accord with the American tradition and, in our affluent society, is economically feasible. If such a program were to capture the imagination of the American people and their leaders, its gradual implementation would bring about desperately needed changes in the quality of American life and would, in due time, vastly strengthen the nation's resolve and capacity to deal with its awesome problems. Adoption of the goals and the intent of the recommendations would, in the Commission's own words, "rekindle the spirit of generosity, of magnanimity, of neighborliness, of gentleness and compassion, and of zest and adventure that are part of the American heritage."

SPECIFIC COMMENTARY AND INTERPRETATION

Some matters of emphasis

It is important that the psychiatrist reader understand that the final report goes far beyond an assessment of the clinical needs of the mentally ill and retarded children and youth. Indeed, while the report pledges equal priority to social, economic, and educational measures to promote mental health on the one hand, and to remedial measures to meet the clinical needs of the mentally ill on the other, by far the greater portion of the text is devoted to the former.

The fact that so many experts from so many disciplines were able to agree on the Commission's comprehensive and innovative program for the nation is, of course, one of the report's outstanding virtues and imparts to it a quality of great historical significance.

Nevertheless, the trustees feel compelled to point out that had the work of the Commission and its final report been closely focused around the psychiatrist's view of the needs of the child, the relative emphasis on preventive and remedial needs would have been more balanced. While the clinician's view of the needs of the emotionally ill child is adequately and even admirably stated in parts of the report, it is by no means highlighted. Nor have the lengthy sections dealing with environmental reform been properly conceptualized to relate to the clinician's view of the child's needs in various stages of development.

Because they are not sufficiently highlighted in the report, we urge upon all concerned with carrying out the Commission's program that the following general considerations are by far the most critical ones in planning comprehensive health services for children aged one to five.

Provision for identification, comprehensive diagnosis, and treatment of childhood mental disorders is, indeed, of equal importance with provisions for prevention and the promotion of mental health.

There is telling need and promise of extremely productive results in improving our presently inadequate medical services to the child in his first five years of life, especially by providing family planning services, sound prenatal care, improved obstetrical management, and comprehensive pediatric services. In the age range one to five it is the general physician, the obstetrician, the pediatrician, and the child psychiatrist who can play the most telling roles in providing these services.

Well-baby clinics have been the principal agency to serve mother and child after birth. But in general they are of service only during the first year of life and, in the main, are primarily limited to pediatric assistance. Also, our day care centers, as presently conceived, are inadequate to meet the needs of children under five because of their relative divorcement from the interplay of child and family. A new mechanism, a new "thing," something that might be titled "child and family development center," is needed to ensure the availability of comprehensive health services, including not only pediatric care but also genetic counseling, child neurology, child psychiatry, obstetrics, gynecology, and related services.

We also urge—as the Commission has not—that the newly developing community mental health centers be viewed as a major potential resource for the delivery of services to children. Indeed, we believe that provision for such services should be specifically added to the present five requirements of community mental health centers in their regulations governing federal funding of such centers.

In projecting the kinds of needs that must be met in a total network and continuum of services, we would have them structured around the following headings:

1. Services to normal children and normal families concerned with developmental and situational tasks. These services are both preventive and actual and include such community resources as pre- and post-natal health services, well-baby clinics, day nurseries, preschool programs, family and children's agencies, public health nursing, and other public health services.

2. Services to normal children with problems in growth and development, which would not require specialized psychiatric help but could be handled by such community resources as the family physician or pediatrician, school health clinics, recreational services, vocational services, and the community resources offered within many church-related activities.

3. Services to families in trouble.

4. Services to children who demonstrate a need for early intervention for minor emotional disturbances of an order that can be handled by psychologically and educationally aware agencies and educational programs and remedial services.

5. Services to emotionally disturbed children who need specialized psychiatric treatment but who are still able to reside in their own families and their own communities. Such services would include special educational programs in the schools, pediatric-psychiatric outpatient services, community mental health clinics, therapeutic nursery schools, group casework and group psychotherapy, and therapy for parents and families.

6. Services for emotionally disturbed children who need placement away from their families either because of their own degree of emotional illness or because of disrupted family structure, but children who are still able to function within their own communities. Such services would entail foster care, boarding families, adoptive homes, group homes, and community youth centers.

7. Services to children with severe emotional illness requiring hospitalization in residential treatment centers, or inpatient psychiatric centers, or children's psychiatric hospitals for treatment and rehabilitation to facilitate their early return to family and community. Such services may be provided in a general hospital, in a community mental health center, or a specialized psychiatric hospital for children followed by aftercare and rehabilitation. Child psychiatric hospital care must be upgraded to ensure adequate staffing and treatment programs, the provision of proper schooling and vocational rehabilitation, as well as concomitant casework with the parents and often with the entire family.

With reference to state hospital care for emotionally ill children, the Commission has

ployees violates the provisions of the U.S. Constitution relating to freedom of speech and the freedom to assemble peaceably to petition for the redress of grievances. This portion of the Executive Order may be unconstitutional and void also due to their "chilling effect" on the right to peaceful effectuation of change through legislative means and on the right of legitimate concerted activities of working people.

Also under Section 19, the provision is made in the Order that unless the complaint of violation of this section is covered by a grievance or appeals procedure, the complaint will be filed with the Assistant Secretary of Labor who will decide the case and direct appropriate remedial action (see Section 6(a)(4) and 6(b)). Thus, the remedy may be available in this Executive Order for disciplinary action against supervisors or management officials who violate employee or union rights; it all depends on how the Assistant Secretary of Labor interprets this section of the Order. To-date, the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations, Mr. Usery has given *no* indication that he intends to interpret his powers under the Order so as to allow him to take disciplinary action against supervisors or officials in management.

Section 20: The use of official time for *consultation and meetings* between management and unions is made subject to negotiation between the parties. In President Kennedy's Executive Order such consultation and meetings were on official time. Now, it is a matter of negotiations between the parties. Employees representing unions who are engaged in *negotiating agreements* between labor organizations and government agencies will *not* be on official time. Management, of course, may be on official time during negotiations.

Section 21: Allows agreement between unions and government agencies for voluntary dues check offs from employees' pay.

Section 22: Adverse Action Appeals: No change from Executive Order 10988.

Section 23: Federal government agencies are required to issue policies and regulations for the implementation of Executive Order 11491, no later than April 1, 1970. "Insofar as practicable," agencies must consult with representatives of employee organizations in connection with implementing this part of the Order. It will be interesting to see how much and what kind of consultation will be provided by the various government agencies in issuing policies and regulations to implement the Order.

Section 25: Provides for the collection and dissemination of labor-management information needed by government agencies, labor organizations and the public. This is potentially a very important part of the Executive Order; again, it all depends on how it is interpreted and carried out by the Department of Labor and the U.S. Civil Service Commission.

Section 26: Executive Order 11491 was signed on October 29, 1969, and is effective on January 1, 1970, except Sections 7(f) and 8, relating to formal and informal recognition (see Sections 24(b) and 24(c)). President Kennedy's Executive Order 10988 and his Memorandum of May 21, 1963, entitled "Standards of Conduct for Employee Organizations and Code of Fair Labor Practices," are revoked as of January 1, 1970.

In conclusion, the new Executive Order holds out a promise for the establishment of better labor-management relations in the federal service. Meanwhile the NALC must and will continue its attempt to establish labor-management *by law* as a solution to the problems facing employees and employee unions in the federal service.

It is our opinion that the value of the executive order now depends upon meaningful regulations since the order itself left us wanting.

OFFICE ON WHEELS

HON. CLARENCE D. LONG

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, February 26, 1970

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, for almost 2½ years now I have been using a mobile office to keep in touch with my constituents. On Saturdays, I travel to different communities throughout my district to find what help people seek and to get their suggestions on legislation. Recently a college student, Mr. Robert W. Russo of Cockeysville, Md., wrote a paper for one of his classes using my office on wheels as a subject. Bob was kind enough to give me a copy of his delightful article which I should like to share with my colleagues today:

OFFICES ON WHEELS

Every two years the people of America go to the polls and elect their government officials. For the majority of voting Americans casting their ballots may be their only involvement in politics. We have created a communications gap between elected officials and their constituents due to a lack of dialogue regarding key issues.

Clarence D. Long, Democratic member of the House of Representatives from the Second Congressional District of Maryland, realizing that this gap has been the downfall of many elected officials, had decided to make an exception to the rule of an unknowing constituency. Since his election to the House of Representatives seven years ago, he has been traveling to local Post Offices, not to bring his political message to the people, but rather to hear their problems, suggestions and to determine how he can best serve those he represents. Two and one half years ago, the Congressman purchased a small van-bus and created what is today a popular and welcome sight in Baltimore and Harford Counties—the Office on Wheels.

The Office on Wheels is the Congressman's traveling headquarters. Every other Saturday you can find Mr. Long inside the van, weather permitting, talking to his people. "It's a problem solver. The purpose of the Office on Wheels is to find out what the people want." According to the Congressman, "It helps me find out just what the people are thinking about."

With the Congressman are four staff members. One, his secretary, Mrs. Marge Davidson, keps a tally of requests, records names and addresses, and specific requests. Mrs. Hope, quite an appropriate name, is the other secretary who deals only with employment problems. When called upon she can produce a listing of governmental and private business openings which the Congressman can recommend to these people. Ed Andrews, a member of the Washington staff, is the initial contact for the people. He has them fill out a mimeographed form with their names, addresses, and problems or suggestions. When asked if the records were kept, Mr. Andrews answered, "You'd better believe it! I just carried 10 boxes of them into the office for processing." Chris Pfrommer, who has been with Mr. Long since his election, acts as a liaison between the people and the Congressman, making sure all the information is filled out on the form then introducing the people to Mr. Long.

This reporter traveled to the Essex Post Office to find out just how effective the Office on Wheels is. At least 40 people had already seen the Congressman that morning and in the next hour 20 more came in. Mr. Andrews said that it was a rather slow day. Usually 70 to 100 people saw the Congressman each time the Office rolled. The majority of people were over 40, well-dressed, and seemed a little nervous.

A quick polling of the people indicated that it was their first visit. One woman said that she was having trouble getting foster children from the Welfare Department. She had applied and was qualified, but the red tape had kept the children from her for over a year now. After many letters and phone calls, she was here to see if Congressman Long could help in any way. "I have raised two children of my own. They're both married and have families of their own. I know there are a lot of children without homes and we want to help. But every one at the Welfare Department passes the buck. That's no way to treat a taxpayer." When she left Congressman Long's office, she had a smile of confidence on her face. "He said he would write a letter for me. I know I'll get the children real soon."

"It is not very often that I get complaints about my work in Congress or Congressional work at all. Usually, people have requests to make," said the Congressman. Most people need help in solving a problem where they haven't been able to get satisfaction anywhere else. Getting draft deferments, social security payments, and helping high school kids get into college are the most popular. Topping the list are veterans benefits and employment problems. Most of the people are satisfied after they talk with their Congressman, and according to his staff, most of the people get what they need, if the request is reasonable.

"But we get some good ones," the Congressman stated. "One man came into the van carrying a dirty old towel, which had really seen its best. He told me this was taken out of his stomach, having been placed there by an army doctor during an emergency operation. The towel had really messed up his system. I was a little skeptical, but he had documentation from a doctor at Johns Hopkins Hospital. He wanted me to get compensation for him. I found out later from a lawyer friend of mine that he had carried this man's case to the Supreme Court, and lost. But most of the people are quite nice about their requests. The great majority are reasonable, and we try to help."

"We have saved literally hundreds of lives and placed countless people in jobs. One soldier came to me with a big problem. He had been railroaded by an Army court on homosexual charges. I spent a whole day arguing to get him a new trial. Finally, they granted him a new trial and he was exonerated from all guilt. The blame was placed where it belonged."

Congressman Long is very satisfied with the results of his Office on Wheels. He said, "The biggest problem in government today is communications. The higher up you get, the more isolated you get. There is nothing more isolated than a big General. I just wish Generals and the President would get out and meet the people informally, not carrying a specific message, just to hear what the people want." When asked about the Office on Wheels, Congressman Long said, "It's like radar: you give out a beam and you get a reaction, People who get remote make mistakes."

Over the last two and one-half years the Office on Wheels has traveled extensively in Baltimore and Hartford Counties just to listen to the people; and over 6,000 people have had problems solved, found jobs, and gotten veterans payments. The Office on Wheels is a red tape cutter, a sounding board for problems and ideas, and a way for the Congressman to learn what his people want. The Office on Wheels is a unique service from Congressman Long to his people. It has made him truly a representative of the people, for the people, and by the people; and made him one of the most popular Congressmen to date receiving 59.1% of the vote in 1968. In

...ds of Congressman Clarence D. Long. ...rat from the Second Congressional ...ict of Maryland, the Office on Wheels ...reat." And that is the opinion of almost ... of the 6,000 people who have visited the ...obile headquarters of their representative to Congress.

CAN SALT STOP MIRV?

HON. WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, February 26, 1970

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Speaker, unfortunately, with each passing month, the chance for a meaningful flight test moratorium on the MIRV gets less likely. The word is, in fact, that the flight test program is being speeded up, thus, narrowing even further the already slim hope of a moratorium with the Soviets.

I would like to recommend, for the attention of my colleagues, an article appearing in the New York Times Magazine section on February 1, 1970, "Can SALT Stop MIRV?" by the nuclear physicist, Ralph Lapp.

The MIRV is a perfect example of a weapons system that completely eluded the scrutiny of the Congress. In fact, if we could have effectively frozen the testing of this program a year ago we would have had a unique chance of reaching a plateau in the arms race. However, I would venture to say that 90 percent of the Congress had never heard of the MIRV until it had been in production for over 1 year. This is a tragic lesson I hope we do not repeat.

I insert the above-mentioned article in the RECORD at this point:

CAN SALT STOP MIRV?

(By Ralph E. Lapp)

Next October the arms race will enter a new and deadly phase as the U.S.S. James Madison leaves the Groton, Conn., yards and begins its sea trials. The 425-foot-long SSN 627 is currently being refitted with 16 oversize launch tubes capable of holding a Poseidon ballistic missile. Each Poseidon will mount 10 nuclear warheads having more than twice the explosiveness of the atomic bombs dropped on Japan.

The Madison is the first of 31 nuclear submarines to be converted to carry MIRV's—multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles. A single Poseidon missile is thus capable of striking at 10 Soviet targets which could become 10 super-Hiroshimas. Beyond that, however, the appearance of the MIRV raises the terrifying possibility that the nuclear deterrent could be in the process of being transformed from a retaliatory, second-strike weapon to a "first-strike" weapon—i.e., one that would remove the deterrent by enabling one side to knock out the other's missiles before they could be fired, thus leaving the victim largely helpless to strike back. By 1975, when the last Poseidon-firing submarine leaves its yard, a total of 4,960 MIRV's will be deployable at sea—or, to be more precise, undersea. By that time the U.S. Navy will have spent a grand total of $18-billion on the Polaris-Poseidon Strategic Missile System.

This programed multiplication of U.S. Naval nuclear firepower represents a quantum jump in the arms race and as such it is a prime item on the agenda of the SALT (strategic arms limitation talks) meeting at Vienna this spring. The men at the SALT table must ponder such questions as:

Is a MIRV test ban negotiable? Would a stoppage of tests arrest this ballistic development?

If each side arms its missiles with MIRV's, can any meaningful limit be made for strategic missiles?

Given a limit to nuclear missiles, would verification of compliance be possible?

If there are mainly negative answers to these questions then the SALT talks will not lead to a treaty limiting arms and the world may witness a vast expansion of strategic-weapon arsenals. It is no exaggeration to state that today the United States and the Soviet Union are perched on a narrow plateau separating the destructive technologies of the past decade from those of the seventies.

MIRV, then, is an apocalyptic acronym. It is a newcomer to public print, having first been officially released in the Sept. 29, 1967, issue of Life magazine in an interview with Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara. "We can now equip our boosters with many warheads," said the defense chief, "each of which can be aimed at a separate target. We call this MIRV. . . ."

Mr. McNamara also disclosed that the United States had two MIRVed missiles—the Poseidon and the Air Force's Minuteman III. The latter is a 60-foot-long, three-staged, land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM, Type LGM-30G) carrying three nuclear warheads. Each of these three MIRV's is 10 times more powerful than the A-bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.

Actually, Hanson Baldwin had revealed Poseidon's MIRV nature in a New York Times account on Aug. 13, 1967. The former military editor of The Times wrote: "Because of its greater power, Poseidon can carry multiple warheads and each of them might be individually programed against separate targets." All that Mr. Baldwin omitted was the acronym. That was itself classified "SECRET" by the U.S. Air Force, thus confining even official discussion of the new development to a very tight community of persons within defense circles.

The MIRV concept was first aired in the trade press by Space Business Daily, whose Aug. 9, 1965, report referred to a MIRV contract to be awarded to Boeing. The same publication had reported in its April 21, 1964 issue: "The Air Force Ballistic Systems Division planned to issue a request for proposal on April 28, 1964, for a program of investigation to determine the feasibility of developing a guidance system for multiple maneuvering warheads that could be directed toward a variety of targets."

The first details of MIRV technology were revealed on Dec. 13, 1967, when Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. gave a speech in Dallas, Tex. The Pentagon's director of research and engineering, who has devoted his professional career to weaponry, disclosed that MIRV stands for "multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle." Dr. Foster, however, preferred to call it a "space bus," because the payload is a cumbersome package "which contains many individual re-entry vehicles with thermonuclear warheads."

Enough is now known about MIRV technology to permit an accurate description of this modern Hydra. For example, let us make a hypothetical projection to that most calamitous day in history when the President of the United States is compelled to press the button authorizing and commanding the U.S. Minuteman force to be launched. This is not to suggest that the United States plans to use its MIRV's for a first strike—although such a possibility must occur to the minds of Soviet military planners. Doomsday date is Nov. 7, 1978.

Once the button is pressed, man turns the entire issue over to computers. The latest satellite-acquired data on Soviet targets have been coded and stored on magnetic "targeting tapes." Now this magnetic memory is "implemented." Through an elaborate communications linkage—MICCS (Minuteman Integrated Command and Control System)—an innocuous-looking computer card bearing the code numbers is slipped into a computer at each Minuteman control site. At the root tips of MICCS, underground command posts go into high gear, carrying out swiftly the various double-lock and verification procedures needed to launch the missiles from their concrete underground silos.

At the silo site, an automatic sequence of operations is set in motion. Inside the giant three-stage missile, the flight control system is readied, the MIRV "brain" receives its target instructions, should they be different from those already programed. The massive reinforced steel silo cover begins to slide back. The process is completely automated; the nearest human being is a sugar-beet farmer a mile down the road from the fenced-in Minuteman site.

A thousand buried missiles are poised, ready for ignition, capable of being stopped now only by a countermand. It never comes. The huge first stage of a Minuteman III based in North Dakota at the Minot Air Force Base ignites with a roar and a huge blast of flame fills the tower chamber. Slowly, it seems, almost lazily, the giant missile emerges above earth, freeing itself from its concrete nest, and, gathering speed, zooms straight up through a thick cloud layer. Stage 1 burns out, is decoupled by explosive connectors, and the second stage ignites as the less-heavy missiles streaks upward on its ballistic course. It, too, cuts out on command and the third stage accelerates the "payload" to its 4-mile-per-second velocity.

At this point, only four minutes after the President pressed the button, the space bus and its three nuclear warheads are committed to a ballistic course of some 5,000 miles in range and they will climb to a zenith some 700 or 800 miles above the earth's surface. A ballistic course is essentially that of a rock thrown in space; in the absence of a retarding atmosphere, its range is fixed by its final velocity and its angle of projection, just as in the case of an artillery shell.

The space bus begins to function by shedding the upper shroud that protected it on its travel through the resisting air. It is important to stress that the vehicle is entirely on its own; it is not linked to earth for command. An entirely independent guidance system is packaged in microminiaturized form and includes accelerometers, gyroscopes and a sophisticated computer. The fast-spinning gyros, an ingenious triple set of whirling "tops," serve to establish a stable platform in space for the vehicle so that changes in direction can be sensed. Accelerators are gadgets capable of measuring minute changes in velocity, the all-important factor in determining the range of the MIRV. The computer must absorb the various data inputs on the velocity and orientation of the space bus and at the same time check with its memory bank, where it has stored the target information.

The wizardy of space navigation was made evident by the uncannily accurate flights of Apollo XI and Apollo XII. These, of course, were masterminded at the Houston control center. Minuteman III uses essentially the same technical base for its guidance. However, in our hypothetical and disastrous example, we shall target Novosibirsk, a city with a population of more than a million, rather than a dead spot on the moon.

The Minuteman III computer reads out the target coordinates of Novosibirsk, queries its instrument colleagues aboard the space bus for their information, computes the im-

pact point and calculates the velocity and direction changes required to dispatch the first-round MIRV on target. The computer then directs the space bus to execute this corrective maneuver by firing small "vernier" jets for the proper number of seconds. This accomplished, the guidance unit rechecks for accuracy and, reassured, the computer gives the electronic command: "Fire One." MIRV "A" is nudged on its course and flies free.

MIRV "B" is given very slight guidance changes to target an industrial section of Novosibirsk and to back up MIRV "A" in case a heavy antiballistic missile (ABM) defense is encountered.

The third round of the Mark 12 nuclear ammunition is then directed to Stalinsk, a city of half a million people some 180 miles southeast of Novosibirsk. All three rounds are fired within a minute. They soar over the North Pole and arc down across Siberia.

Having dispatched its trio of lethal missiles, the space bus adds insult to injury by detonating a series of small TNT charges that blow it into several dozen pieces. These proceed to descend on still another target area, presenting enemy radars with a vexing problem of identification.

The three MIRV's themselves are sleek reentry vehicles of "super beta" design, with needle noses and flared tails. Nine feet long and two feet in girth, they are engineered to produce minimum images on radar screens and thus make detection difficult. With their metallo-ceramic heat shields, they easily survive the heat of re-entry, and each explodes high over its target, triggered by an altitude fuse. The high air burst maximizes the area of destruction on the city below it, spreading heavy damage over 15 square miles.

The mechanics of MIRVing introduce cumulative errors in accuracy. The first round, for example, explodes a quarter of a mile from the aim point, but the third round veers slightly off course, exploding 0.4 miles from the aim point—not a matter of much solace to the citizens of Stalinsk, however.

Cities are large targets and the projected MIRV accuracies are greater than necessary to hit the vast majority of Soviet city targets. Striking at a hardened missile silo, on the other hand, calls for highly precise fire. Our hypothetical attack would impose heavy damage out to a radius of more than two miles from the aim point in the case of a city. A Minuteman III warhead would have to impact within 400 yards of a missile silo in order to knock it out of commission. It is because U.S. experts feel that most Minuteman MIRV's would not come within this impact distance of an aim point that they feel the Soviets should not worry about the U.S. striking first with a wave of Minuteman launchers. But by 1978, MIRV technology will be far advanced over its present status.

Soviet planners must assume the worst—a first strike on Soviet missile silos. This first-strike psychosis, although normal for a military mentality, is absolutely catastrophic for the arms race, since it goads each side into making more missiles to survive a possible first strike and present the attackers with nuclear retribution. Given an emergency in which the United States found it was under attack with warheads aimed at its missile silos, it might out of fear unleash its entire Minuteman force in a vast spasm response. This would be the path to nuclear demnation.

In effect, the MIRVed ICBM is a magazine-loader mechanism that multiplies the warhead throw power of each missile launched. It is this multiplying power that so confounds the problem of strategic arms limitation, since a count of missiles silos would not be meaningful unless one could also count the warheads inside. Orbiting cameras routinely send back to earth detailed photographs of missile sites, but they cannot peek under the silo covers and see what is inside. Even if the silo covers were thrown open for inspection, the MIRV nose cone gives no clue as to its contents. One needs a screwdriver to make an inventory of how many MIRV's are inside. Not even the most optimistic SALT man hopes for screwdriver-type inspection.

Poseidon, a two-stage missile, 34 feet in length and 30 tons in weight, also is MIRVed on the space-bus principle. Each missile has 14 barrels, but not all are used for warheads. Some are used to hurl decoys or other penetration aids, such as radar-blinding aluminized glass fibers, called chaff. A number of lightweight decoys can be substituted for the weight of one Poseidon warhead, which weighs about 200 pounds. Decoys are used to feint the defenders into using up antiballistic missiles, thus allowing real warheads to penetrate to their targets.

While the MIRV technique allows many separate targets, it also allows a single target to be bombarded with a sequence of time-spaced warheads. This is a simple but effective technique to outwit the ABM's, which might otherwise kill a number of warheads simultaneously if they descended in a cluster. (The Polaris A-3 warhead aboard U.S. nuclear submarines today is a cluster of three nuclear explosives all fired shotgun-style at the same target.)

To put MIRV in proper perspective as a weapons system, we need to enumerate the critical milestones in the past quarter of a century. First, there was the A-bomb in 1945, followed by the thousand-fold more powerful H-bomb in 1952-54 and then by the ICBM in 1957. The strategic forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union are keyed to these developments and nuclear deterrence today balances on the respect each side has for the other's nuclear strike power.

Under the McNamara management, the U.S. strike forces built up to a level of 1,000 Minuteman ICBM's, 54 Titan II's and 656 Polaris SLBM's (submarine launched ballistic missiles). Total throw power: more than 2,500 warheads as of 1970.

The Soviet strategic arsenal includes about 280 SS-9 heavyweight ICBMs, slightly more than 1,000 other ICBM's—mostly liquid-fueled SS-11's of Minuteman warhead power and solid-fueled SS-13's of less power—and roughly 300 SLBM's. Total throw power: about 1,700 warheads. However, the big U.S. worry is that the SS-9 can be adapted to carry three huge warheads or as many as 20 MIRV's of Minuteman III power.

Soviet tests with their enormous SS-9 missile show that they are using a triple warhead, although presumably most of the deployed SS-9's still mount a single warhead. There is much controversy within the U.S. intelligence community about the nature of the SS-9's multiplication technique. Separate warheads have been observed to splash down in a triangular pattern, leading defense officials to fear that the SS-9 is aimed at knocking out Minuteman silos. Whatever the present SS-9 warhead dispatch techniques, it is certainly reasonable to assume that military technologies on both sides of the Iron Curtain are convergent—i.e., produce the same or similar weapons systems.

From the U.S. standpoint, the most peaceful move the Soviets could make in the next year would be to terminate deployment of the SS-9's. Continued production of these mighty missiles will make more pronounced the Pentagon's fears that the Soviets are building up a first-strike force. Such a move by the Soviets would infuse optimism into the SALT discussions on arms control.

A number of persons deeply concerned about the stopping of the arms race believe that the best thing that could come out of the SALT talks would be a moratorium on MIRV tests. They hope, more than believe, that cessation of the missile tests would produce an unfinished technology and leave the military reluctant to deploy unproved weapons systems.

The difficulty with a MIRV test ban is that it is very late in the day to stop the technological clock that seems remorselessly to tick away. To understand this situation we need to go back and trace the origins and development of MIRV.

The top authority on the subject, Dr. Foster, described the origin and purpose of MIRV in an exchange with Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana that is buried in Part 4 of Fiscal Year 1969 Defense Appropriations (Page 2310):

Q. Is it not true that the U.S. response to the discovery that the Soviets had made an initial deployment of an ABM system around Moscow and possibly elsewhere was to develop the MIRV system for Minuteman and Polaris?

A. Not entirely. The MIRV concept was originally generated to increase our targeting capability rather than to penetrate ABM defenses. In 1961-62 planning for targeting the Minuteman force it was found that the total number of aim points exceeded the number of Minuteman missiles. By splitting up the payload of a single missile (deleted) each (deleted) could be programed (deleted) allowing us to cover these targets with (deleted) fewer missiles. (Deleted.) MIRV was originally born to implement the payload split-up (deleted). It was found that the previously generated MIRV concept could equally well be used against ABM (deleted).

Dr. Foster's "aim points" could scarcely have been confined to Soviet cities. The U.S.S.R. has only about 50 city targets of Hiroshima size and a total of some 200 cities with populations greater than 100,000. A Soviet planner reading Dr. Foster's statement would not have to overly suspicious to assume that the United States was targeting Soviet missile silos with Minuteman ICBM's.

Target experts call cities "soft" and missile silos "hard." In general, a first strike seeks to hit at "hard" sites and thus deny retaliatory fire that would impose unacceptable damage on the attacker. A second strike launched in response to a first strike would be aimed at destruction of the attacker's cities and industrial complexes, but it is primarily the great loss of life that is the knife-edge on which mutual terror is balanced.

It would be tragic in the extreme if a foe were to be ignorant of the damage he would sustain in the event of nuclear war. For this reason, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara provided the Soviet leaders with a Pentagon print-out of the probable damage to be expected by an attack with "X" hundred Minuteman warheads. The Strangelovian damage table which follows was released for publication Feb. 1, 1968:

SOVIET POPULATION[1] AND INDUSTRY DESTROYED

Number of delivered warheads	Total population fatalities[2]	Industrial capacity destroyed (percent)
100	37,000,000	59
200	52,000,000	72
400	74,000,000	76
800	96,000,000	77
1,200	109,000,000	77
1,600	116,000,000	77

[1] An urban population of 116,000,000 is assumed for the year 1972.

[2] Fatalities are calculated on the basis of "prompt response"—i.e., death within 24 hours.

McNamara's advertisement of overkill probably confirmed the secret damage tables already compiled by Kremlin experts. The important thing here was not to communicate what Soviet *military* experts already knew, but to make absolutely certain that

Soviet *political* leaders were not in the dark about the degree of national damage they would suffer in the event of nuclear war.

The Pentagon's damage table contains a qualification which is turning out to be a prime energizer of the arms race and an immense obstacle to the success of the SALT talks. It is the word "delivered," applied to warheads. U.S. military planners cannot count on having every missile warhead reach its target. For example, a Soviet first strike could kill a Minuteman ICBM in its silo, or the missile might fail to launch, or to be correctly guided. Or, at the other end of the trajectory, the warhead might be killed by a Soviet antiballistic missile.

MIRV, defense officials explain, is the "We Shall Overcome" answer to Soviet ABM's. By multiplying the total number of warheads attacking Soviet targets, we insure penetration of a sufficient number of them to inflict unacceptable damage. In a second strike, of course.

But do the Soviets interpret the vast expansion of the U. S. strategic strike force—approaching 10,000 MIRV's in 1976—as merely insurance of a second-strike capability? Or do they look upon it as a first-strike force?

Soviet strategists may be excused for being skeptical when they look over U.S. pronouncements on MIRV. We may add to Dr. Foster's answer to Senator Mansfield the following:

President Johnson on Jan. 18, 1965, stated: "Poseidon will have double the payload of the Polaris A-3, and will be twice as accurate. Its effectiveness against a hardened target will be greatly increased through incorporation of pentration aids."

A Jan., 1968, Defense Department statement on MIRV's reads: "They will be far better suited for destruction of hardened enemy missile sites than any existing missile warheads."

Defense Secretary Laird on April 1, 1969, asked for additional funds "to significantly improve accuracy of Poseidon (MIRV) missiles, thus enhancing its effectiveness against hard targets."

Dr. Foster on May 13, 1969, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee: "The Polaris-type submarine is ideal as a second-strike weapons system, although it could be used in first-strike operations."

The feasibility of using MIRVed warheads in a first strike at missile silos hinges on the matter of accuracy. In the early nineteen-sixties, ICBM's had a C.E.P. of two to three miles—i.e., the circular probable error, or the radius of a circle within which 50 per cent of the warheads hit, was two to three miles. By 1969, the C.E.P. had dropped below one mile and was headed down to half a mile. In five years, given more testing, the accuracy should shrink to a quarter-mile, and by the late nineteen-seventies some experts believe guidance systems will land warheads within several hundred feet of the aim point. It should be added that some experienced missilemen are skeptical of such claims.

The U.S. Defense Department has concentrated its best efforts on development of MIRV accuracy. A total of $2.2-billion was spent on MIRV programs by midsummer of 1969, when the first flight tests of Minuteman III and Poseidon were made. This program is scheduled for completion by June, 1970.

Senator Edward W. Brooke (R., Mass.), a member of the Armed Services Committee, hoped to interrupt the seemingly inexorable course of technology when he proposed, last April 24, that the two great nuclear powers suspend testing of MIRVed missiles. He noted that "if MIRV is not controlled prior to deployment, it will probably not be controlled at all," and that "the present opportunity for strategic arms control is highly perishable. Indeed, it is measured in months."

Nine months have passed since Sen. Brooke's proposal, and MIRV tests are still going on—and the James Madison is moving ever closer to receiving Poseidons. Accuracy attained in MIRV tests for Poseidon appear to satisfy the U.S. Navy's strategic requirements for nuclear retaliation. But even when the Poseidon research and development phase is completed next June, it is unlikely that the Navy will place much confidence in the new weapons system unless it can be periodically tested at the Atlantic Missile Range. Data released in mid-December show that the U.S. Navy conducted 167 tests of its Polaris A-2 missile and 142 tests of the A-3. Many of the tests are believed to have been "redundant"—i.e., not absolutely essential to operational confidence in the weapons system.

By June of this year the U.S. Navy will have spent $1.3 billion so far on development of the Poseidon system, and $3.4 billion on submarine conversion and missile procurement.

The U.S. Air Force appears to have put more emphasis on missile accuracy than has the Navy. Confusion on this score must intensify Soviet worries about a U.S. first strike. Is the Air Force preoccupation with missile accuracy simply an exercise in perfectionism—in stretching technology to its attainable limits? Or is it a deliberate accurate enough to dig Soviet missiles out of their protective silos?

These perturbing questions are not resolved by the extreme secrecy surrounding MIRV. One thing seems clear; no nation would want to make a first nuclear strike at another using a weapons system that had not been adequately tested. Therefore, a MIRV test ban might be a very useful restraint of technology, provided that it is agreed to before either side tests enough MIRV's to be confident of the system. And one must add an important qualification—namely, the test ban would have to come before either side believes the other to have reached this point of confidence.

The Air Force has carried out almost 150 tests of its Minuteman I and II missiles. If a MIRV test ban occurs before the Air Force completes its current series of Minuteman III tests, one might jump to the conclusion that a test ban would undercut military confidence in this new weapons system. The facts are that developmental tests will be completed this spring, and that the system is already under production. While more tests will be programed, these will come under the heading of reliability and readiness testing. In the case of Minuteman III, many of the subsystems common to Minuteman I and II have already been extensively tested. When the Soviets first made overtures about SALT talks two years ago, a MIRV test ban would have been a highly useful device, but the MIRV clock has been ticking away steadily and a test ban this year would be much less valuable.

If a MIRV test ban is to be accepted by the United States there would have to be provision for inspection of test violations. U.S. authorities privately make much of the fact that the Soviets have deployed the mammoth SS-9 missile—each one costing probably $30-million—which has greater value for a first strike than the Minuteman III. To understand this asymmetric situation we need to take a closer look at the SS-9.

A close-up look at the SS-9 is something that a U.S. strategist would dearly love. As it is, he must be content with blowups of photographs taken by satellite cameras, and with studying the ballistic data about SS-9 tests. U.S. intelligence experts have concluded that the SS-9 is a highly accurate missile capable of hurling a single warhead having the power of 20 to 25 megatons—roughly a thousand times the power of the bomb that eviscerated Nagasaki. If this immense payload is split up into three separate re-entry vehicles (RV's) then each RV could carry from 3 to 5 megatons, depending on its design and how it was targeted. (If SS-9 RV's targeted points hundred of miles apart, the megatonnage would be reduced because propellant would have to be provided to stear the warheads to their widely separated targets. Defense officials now give conflicting testimony about the SS-9's RV's, some saying they are independently targeted, and others saying that they are capable of being thrown only in a cluster.)

Whatever may be the status of the SS-9's present technology, few doubt that it is capable of carrying five or six times as many warheads as Minuteman III. It is this asymmetry that so alarms many defense officials. They feel that at the rate the Soviets are deploying the SS-9 missile, they will soon be capable of targeting the entire force of 1,000 Minuteman ICBM's. This was, in fact, the very basis of Defense Secretary Laird's case for turning the Sentinel antiballistic missile system into a means of protecting Minuteman silos.

Any *quid pro quo* in arms limitation is obviously made very difficult when the strategic systems to be limited represent unequal fire power. One could arrange a quota system for battleships because there was little ambiguity about such naval vessels. But land-based missiles can and do mount payloads of quite dissimilar power. MIRV upsets the simple arithmetic of one-for-one missile limitation and introduces a complex calculus.

The SALT negotiators will need great ingenuity to work out the higher mathematics of arms control and, perhaps, even greater inventiveness in educating their constituents in the new math of strategic arms limitations. That this will be a slow process is seen by the fact that in the 1969 meetings at Helsinki the SALT men did not even get around to discussing MIRV technology.

The basic dilemma of the would-be arms controllers is that they have no simple rule to equate nuclear fire power on either side of the Iron Curtain. The SS-9 and Minuteman III represents very considerably different throw weights. If the SS-9 can be fitted with six times as many re-entry vehicles as Minuteman III, the SALT talkers must fix some limit to SS-9 deployment that will satisfy U.S. experts that no Soviet first-strike capability will exist in the future. Since the Soviets have continued deploying SS-9's, they will soon have 300 of them.

According to a statement made last month by Defense Secretary Laird, the Soviets are increasing the rate of the SS-9 deployment. This SS-9 deployment is viewed as constituting an annihilatory threat to the U.S. land-based ICBM's. Many Senators hold the view that the Soviet Union has a very specific intent for its SS-9 capability. Senator Strom Thurmond, for example, recently stated:

"To sum up, then, Soviet strategic thinking contemplates a first strike, the Soviets have the capacity to build towards first strike, and they expect to be able to destroy our ICBM's without receiving a crippling blow in return."

Senator Thurmond did not reveal his reveal his source of intelligence, but clearly the fear of a first strike now dominates the defense scene.

The arms-control deadlock is so serious that a number of defense intellectuals have become convinced that some bold step will have to be taken to make any headway. Some of these men have turned heretical and have urged that the Minuteman ICBM system be abandoned, arguing that a system so shaky that it has to have its private ABM defense, which in turn is so shaky that it needs inner defenses to protect its radars, is not much of a deterrent. Rather, it becomes an invitation to aggression.

Asking the U.S. Air Force to give up its land-based missiles is real heresy. The fact

that it is seriously proposed indicates how intractable the arms-control situation is becoming. It would undoubtedly precipitate a controversy that would make the Air Force-Navy clash on the B–36 look like a tea party. But it is becoming painfully evident that a failure to plan for the future control of weapons systems has brought us to our present impasse.

A way out of the arms race might be an agreement to work toward eliminating all land-based strategic missiles, relying instead on ocean-based systems like Poseidon. In this case, the size of the submarine hull and its practical limitation impose a near equality on the throw power of each side. In effect, by going to submarines as the sole basis of missile deterrence, we more or less standardize the size of the "first stage" of a "three-stage" missile. In this case, the first stage is the submarine itself. The submarine becomes the unit of fire power, and neither side attempts to limit MIRV; it simply accepts the throw power of all the missiles carried on board.

If the arms race cannot be brought under some measure of control in the early nineteen-seventies, the problems of agreements at a later date will be severely complicated by the onrush of weapon technology. MIRV is by no means the ultimate in the instrumentation of war. It is, in fact, only a preface to a whole series of acronyms—ABRES, ULMS, SABMIS, SAM–D and others too secret for alphabetical obscurity. ABRES, for example, stands for Advanced Ballistic Re-entry Systems. It is a defense program involving MIRV technology started in 1965; to date, $540-million has been spent on this development. By the late seventies, weapons will come into existence that will make even today's emerging MIRV's look crude. Instead of "dumb" warheads that pursue a fixed ballistic course, the new systems will feature "semismart" reentry vehicles that home on their targets—and even take evasive action to avoid interception.

The art of projecting bombs is very old, dating back to very early days of warfare, but it did not start to become a science until Niccolo Fontana Tartaglia, an Italian mathematician, studied trajectories. His treatise on gunnery, first published in 1537, contained an observation that bears reproduction now:

"One day, meditating to myself, it seemed to me that it was a thing blameworthy, shameful and barbarous, worthy of severe punishment before God and man, to wish to bring to perfection an art damageable to one's neighbor, and destruction to the human race."

Tartaglia's self-admonition seems most remote from the ballistics of the James Madison, which puts out to sea this year and which in January of next year will be deployed with Poseidons on board. But Tartaglia was surely on target with his thoughts when we realize that a single nuclear submarine could visit the nuclear destruction of 160 Hiroshimas on another nation.

THE GREAT AUTOMOBILE CONSPIRACY

HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, February 26, 1970

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, Americans throughout the country have begun to realize how very serious the problem of pollution is—in the air, in the water, and on land.

Many of them have also come to realize that they must do whatever they personally can to help improve our environmental quality.

One type of pollution—that in the air, is costly in dollars and in health. And one of the primary polluters of the air is the automobile.

Some people feel that their personal involvement in the fight against pollution equipment when they buy a new car. Such equipment is available as a result of the strict automobile emission standards in the State of California.

But recently, there have been reports that some people have been virtually prevented by the automobile industry from making their automobiles pollution free.

According to Jack Anderson, whose column today discusses this "Car Runaround," both the Ford and Chrysler motor companies are attempting to discourage the sale of the auto pollution equipment on new cars being sold in States other than California. And for those who are determined enough to insist upon the antipollution equipment, the companies make it a slow and arduous process.

The question is why is the Federal Government so far behind the government of the State of California? Certainly, there should be national auto emission standards equal to, if not greater than, those of California.

For too long, the automobile companies have been promising that they would do their utmost about the problem of pollution. But promises they made 15 years ago are still unfulfilled. Little or nothing has been done despite the fact that automobile pollution has been a problem for years.

It is obvious that the American people cannot allow the automobile industry make the decision for them as to how soon the automobile will be pollution free.

The time for begging and cajoling the industry to do something has gone. We must have action, and the way to spurn such action would be for the Federal Government to get tough with the manufacturing.

We have been too lax, too long about adequate automobile emission standards and by doing so, we have slowed down the antipollution process.

The State of California has taken the lead. The time has come for the Federal Government to take its rightful place in the leadership against automotive pollution.

If American citizens are willing to pay for antipollution devices on their cars, they should be able to obtain them.

The time has come for the Federal Government to stop pussyfooting around with the auto industry.

The time has come for the Federal Government to show the automobile manufacturers that it means business—that air pollution is destroying our environment and will be wiped out.

I include in the RECORD the portion of Jack Anderson's "The Washington Merry-Go Round" which appeared in the February 26 Washington Post and deals with this subject:

THE WASHINGTON MERRY GO-ROUND: CAR RUNAROUND

If anyone outside California walked into a Ford or Chrysler showroom and ordered a new car with the advanced air pollution equipment now required by California law, he would be told he couldn't have it.

Although the devices are the best available, this column has learned that Ford and Chrysler are actively discouraging their sale outside California.

The price manuals issued by both companies to their dealers across the country state unequivocally that the special anti-pollution equipment is available on California cars only.

Furthermore, the Chrysler computer system is programmed to reject automatically any order for the equipment should one come in from one of the other 49 states.

Spokesmen for both Ford and Chrysler, nevertheless, acknowledged to this column that there was no reason why a determined buyer, willing to wait a little longer for his new car, could not obtain the special device.

Thus both companies admit they have issued false information to their dealers, which is bound to discourage the purchase of pollution-control equipment.

The equipment in question is a system which curbs pollution from the evaporation of gasoline in fuel lines, tanks or carburetors. It costs about $40.

A Ford spokesman said the company "thought it was advisable to test this system for a year to perfect the design and service techniques" before making the equipment available nationally.

He acknowledged, however, there was no doubt that the system worked effectively and he said no particular service problems had been encountered.

YOUTH SERVES AMERICA

HON. ROBERT PRICE

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, February 26, 1970

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, as we are all too well aware, militant youths have vented their venomous spleen on many of our social institutions. In the process, the police departments in many of our Nation's cities and towns have been targets of vicious attacks.

To find a vivid illustration of the type of behavior I am referring to, one need turn no further than the just concluded Chicago conspiracy trail. Regrettably, behavior such as the defendants exhibited before and during the trial has been the subject of extended treatment by the media and the press. In fact, it seems that whenever youthful groups of militant malcontents gather and demonstrate, the media and the press is there to record and circulate their outrageous activities. While I am confident that such is not the case in every instance, this happens so often that in the minds of many adults, American youth in general is becoming increasingly suspect.

As a direct result of this growing climate of dissatisfaction with youth, there is a tendency on the part of some people to overlook the fact that most American youths are not militants of anarchists. On the contrary, many of them are vitally concerned with the state of the Nation. In addition, their concern takes a positive rather than a negative direction.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues one example of the kinds of positive actions

that youth is taking in an effort to contribute to society.

An editorial appearing earlier this week in the Washington Evening Star stated that more than 125 college students have registered to take the civil examinations for the New York City Police Department. These students are not attempting to join the police force in an attempt to fulfill childhood dreams and fantasiers; rather, they are trying to render a greatly needed community service. They realize what the militants ignore; namely, that creative involvement in social problem-solving, and not senseless destruction of social institutions is the true measure of individual concern.

The students in the New York experiment are not fleeing to Canada to evade their military obligations; neither are they traveling to Cuba to harvest Castro's sugar cane. Instead, they are working within society in an effort to improve society. This is the right way, this is the American way.

I urge all my colleagues to read the following editorial. Perhaps the budding New York program should be experimented with throughout the Nation. After all, municipal police departments deserve the best of everything America has to offer. Both the needs of social order and the needs of social justice demand nothing less.

The editorial follows:

COLLEGE COPS

In New York City, more than 125 upperclassmen at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, as well as Union Theological Seminary other colleges, have signed up to take the New York City examination for the police force.

They are not dropouts, actual or potential. They are, presumably, students concerned with the future of their society and their own contribution to that future. They also are students who have heard the powerful persuasion of New York Police Sergeant David Durk, a 1957 Amherst graduate now a Ph.D. candidate in public administration and sociology at New York University.

Sgt. Durk's plea is simple and to the point. "If you really care about cities," he tells potential recruits, "if you really care about individual people, don't join the Peace Corps or VISTA. Become a policeman."

This statement flies in the face of the conventional wisdom of the New Left, in which police are "pigs" and oppressors of the masses, but as Sgt. Durk goes on to say, "The victims of crime today are overwhelmingly poor and mainly black. As a cop you can have a real and emmediate impact on the lives of people that is totally unlike any other alternative before you."

Sgt. Durk's program makes sense from every point of view: the raising of the sights of the police force as a community service organization, the channeling of youthful idealism into effective outlets and even such more distant goals as the breaking down of false occupational barriers raised by the increase of the college population.

The program he speaks for is a very hopeful one as part of the continuing attack on the problems of the cities. May it be successful in New York and be adapted to other cities, including our own.

CALIFORNIA BANK BURNED—COMMUNIST AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA—III

HON. JOHN R. RARICK

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, February 26, 1970

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, a wire service story from Santa Barbara, Calif., recounts the burning of a bank in what is euphemistically referred to as a "disorder" in the Isla Vista community, 6 miles from the campus of the University of California.

The story also reports that William M. Kunstler, who is under sentence for criminal contempt of court in Chicago, made a "campus speech" which was followed by the outbreak of fires and window smashing. Readers of the Washington Star, however, are not told that the rioting and burning followed a harangue by Kunstler in which he repeatedly urged his young listeners to "take to the streets" in support of the revolution.

The California episode is typical of the standard technique of Communist agitation following conviction of any of their number. It is the course of action which all of us can expect as long as there is any possible gain for the subversives.

Since Kunstler is supposed to defend H. Rap Brown in another riot and arson case in Maryland next month, it is not a bad idea for the appropriate authorities in the Free State to consider whether or not his conduct as an officer of other courts merits his admission as an officer of the Maryland courts, even pro hac vice, or whether he should be denied a forum for further incitement to violence.

Notably, the appropriate authorities in the District of Columbia are looking into disciplinary proceedings in the case of Virginia ACLU attorney Philip Hirschkop, sentenced for a similar contempt by a Federal judge here.

Pertinent newsclippings are included in my remarks:

[From the Washington Star, Feb. 26, 1970]

EIGHT HUNDRED PROTESTERS BURN BANK IN SANTA BARBARA

SANTA BARBARA, CALIF.—Rampaging demonstrators protesting the "capitalist establishment" burned down a Bank of America branch early today while outnumbered police and firemen watched helplessly.

Police reinforcements were called in as about 800 protesters watched the flames burn out the inside of the one-story, brick building. Then a solid front of 240 helmeted officers swept through the campus community, Isla Vista, dispersing the crowd without a confrontation.

Retreating protesters threw rocks at advancing policemen, injuring 15 to 20 of them—none seriously—deputies said.

Police said they arrested 34 young persons for investigation of failure to disperse.

Deputies said later the situation was "pretty much under control" and that officers were dispersing about 200 stragglers scattered along streets and alleys.

The one-square-mile Isla Vista community is populated mainly by apartment-dwelling students from the adjacent University of California campus six miles north of Santa Barbara.

The demonstrators, numbering 1,000 last night, said they were protesting the war in Vietnam, the "capitalist establishment" that financed it, and what a student spokesman called "increasing police repression aimed at stifling political dissent."

One demonstrator, Kevin McElhinny, 17, San Jose, Calif., said the bank was under siege "because it was there, it was the biggest capitalist establishment thing around."

Another demonstrator who wouldn't give his name said the bank "is an example of American capitalism which is killing people all around the world and in the United States."

The outbreak of fires and window smashing followed a campus speech yesterday afternoon by William M. Kunstler, a defense attorney in the Chicago riot trial. All the windows of the same bank branch were smashed in the start of the trouble Tuesday afternoon.

Sheriff James W. Webster had described the situation as "completely out of hand" last evening. He asked Gov. Ronald Reagan for National Guard troops, but Guardsmen were not mobilized.

The bank fire was set by several protesters who rolled a gasoline-soaked trash bin in through a smashed window, and set it ablaze against a wall, deputies said. Students from a nearby fraternity put out the blaze, but protesters fired it up again just before midnight.

Before the sweep of the area, helicopter officers using a bullhorn and a powerful spotlight ordered the demonstrators to disperse, but few did.

Shortly before the bank fire, demonstrators overturned and burned a patrol car after the two outnumbered deputies fled. It was the second patrol car burning of the three-day disturbance.

The bank manager said an undisclosed amount of money was in the bank's fireproof vault and he did not expect to find it damaged.

Firemen had been ordered to stay away from the bank blaze for fear demonstrators might attack them.

"We went to the fire but the sheriff's men lined across the street wouldn't let us by," and Fire Capt. Clarence Saletti. "They feared for our lives because of the demonstrators."

[From the Washington Star, Feb. 26, 1970]

COURT DISCIPLINE PANEL PROBES "D.C. 9" LAWYER

(By Donald Hirzel)

Lawyer Philip Hirschkop, who received a 30-day jail sentence for contempt during the recent trial of the "D.C 9," has been referred to the U.S. District Court's Committee on Admissions and Grievances for disciplinary action.

Hirschkop's case was turned over to the committee by Judge John H. Pratt, who presided at the trial of the nine defendants charged with vandalizing the Washington offices of the Dow Chemical Co.

The committee could reprimand Hirschkop, suspend him from practice or disbar him.

The judge refused to comment on the situation yesterday, but it was learned that the committee already has reviewed the transcript of the trial for evidence of contempt by Hirschkop.

Write to these people—phone these people—tell them what is happening to your children. Ask them to help. Ask them to call on their Congressmen and Senators for help.

Finally, we must all remember that we are right. That in the end, right will triumph, even though there may be a rough road ahead for a few months. Right and justice are on our side, and we shall prevail.

So let's all work together, confident that what we do to protect our children will succeed.

Freedom of choice is still the law of the land, and the law of the land is on our side.

ACDA, STATE, AND DOD REPLY ON U.S. GOALS AT SALT TALKS

HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, February 5, 1970

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I thought it would be of interest to my colleagues to read some recent correspondence between the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the State Department, the Defense Department and myself on the issue of our goal at the SALT talks. The letter to the ACDA is identical to those sent to the other two agencies. While I found part IV of Secretary Rogers' speech, included below, most informative, I am still rather disappointed at the minimal amount of information being given to the Congress on this most urgent topic. Our need to be adequately briefed on the issues must not be slighted.

The material referred to follows:

DECEMBER 8, 1969.

GERALD C. SMITH,
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SMITH: I would like to know what our goal is at the SALT talks.

Are we seeking a formalized treaty arrangement, or a more informal agreement to pursue parallel strategic arms limitations? The distinction is an important one.

I look forward to hearing from you on this matter.

Sincerely,

LEE H. HAMILTON, M.C.

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
Washington, D.C., December 11, 1969.

Hon. LEE H. HAMILTON,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN HAMILTON: Thank you for your letter of December 8, 1969 inquiring about the arrangements that might emerge from SALT.

A most helpful statement regarding the goals of these talks was made by Secretary Rogers in his speech of November 13. I have enclosed a copy of that speech. Also enclosed is a copy of the President's message to Mr. Smith at the opening of the talks.

At this time I believe it is too early to forecast precisely what form the ultimate arrangements might take. Those arrangements would, of course, have to be consistent with the requirements of the Constitution and the relevant statutes.

I hope the attached material will be helpful, and we appreciate your interest in this most important subject.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM W. HANCOCK,
General Counsel.

ADDRESS BY HON. WILLIAM P. ROGERS, SECRETARY OF STATE, NOVEMBER 13, 1969

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Next Monday in Helsinki the United States and the Soviet Union will open preliminary talks leading to what could be the most critical negotiations on disarmament ever undertaken. The two most powerful nations on earth will be seeking a way to curb what to date has been an unending competition in the strategic arms race.

The Government of the United States will enter these negotiations with serious purpose and with the hope that we can achieve balanced understandings that will benefit the cause of world peace and security. Yet we begin these negotiations knowing that they are likely to be long and complicated and with the full realization that they may not succeed.

While I will not be able to discuss specific proposals tonight, I thought it might be helpful to outline the general approach of our government in these talks.

I

Nearly a quarter of a century ago, when we alone possessed nuclear power, the United States proposed the formation of a United Nations Atomic Development Authority with a world monopoly over all dangerous aspects of nuclear energy. This proposal might well have eliminated for all nations the dangers and burdens of atomic weapons. Unhappily, as we all know, it was rejected.

The implications were obvious. Others intended to develop nuclear weapons on a national basis. The United States then would have to continue its own nuclear program. It would have to look to its own security in a nuclear-armed world. Thus we established a national policy of maintaining nuclear weapon strength adequate to deter nuclear war by any other nation or nations. It was our hope then, as it is now, to make certain that nuclear weapons would never again be used.

The intervening decades have seen enormous resources devoted to the development of nuclear weapons systems. As both sides expanded their force levels an action/reaction pattern was established. This pattern was fed by rapid progress in the technology of nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems. The mere availability of such sophisticated technology made it difficult for either side by itself to refrain from translating that technology into offensive and defensive strategic armaments.

Meanwhile, strategic planners, operating in an atmosphere of secrecy, were obliged to make conservative assumptions, including calculations on what became known as the "worst case." The people responsible for planning our strategic security had to take account of the worst assumptions about the other's intentions, the maximum plausible estimate of the other's capabilities and performance of our own forces. The Soviets no doubt did the same.

Under these circumstances it was difficult during these many years for either side to conclude that it had sufficient levels of destructive power.

II

Yet that point in time has now clearly been reached. As absolute levels of nuclear power and delivery capability increased, a situation developed in which both the United States and the Soviet Union could effectively destroy the society of the other, regardless of which one struck first.

There are helpful mutual restraints in such a situation. Sane national leaders do not initiate strategic nuclear war and thus commit their people to national suicide. Also they must be careful not to precipitate a conflict that could easily escalate into nuclear war. They have to take elaborate precautions against accidental release of a nuclear weapon which might bring on a nuclear holocaust.

In brief the nuclear deterrent, dangerous though it is, has worked.

The present situation—in which both the United States and the Soviet Union could effectively destroy the other regardless of which struck first—radically weakens the rationate for continuing the arms race.

Competitive accumulation of more sophisticated weapons would not add to the basic security of either side. Militarily it probably would produce little or no net advantage. Economically it would divert resources needed elsewhere. Politically it would perpetuate the tensions and fears that are the social fallout of the nuclear arms race.

So a capacity for mutual destruction leads to a mutual interest in putting a stop to the strategic nuclear arms race.

Nonetheless technology advances remorselessly. It offers new opportunities to both sides to add to their offensive and defensive strategic systems. Both sides find it difficult to reject these opportunities in an atmosphere of rivalry and in the absence of a verifiable agreement. It raises temptations to seek strategic advantages. Yet now such advantages cannot be hidden for long, and both sides will certainly take whatever countermeasures are necessary to preserve their retaliatory capability.

This is the situation in which the two sides now find themselves. Where national security interests may have operated in the past to stimulate the strategic arms race, those same national security interests may now operate to stop or slow down the race. The question to be faced in the strategic arms talks is whether societies with the advanced intellect to develop these awesome weapons of mass destruction have the combined wisdom to control and curtail them.

III

In point of fact, we have already had some successes in preliminary limitations.

We have a treaty banning military activities in Antarctica.

We have a treaty banning the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction in outer space and prohibiting the establishment of military installations on the moon or other celestial bodies.

We have reached agreement with the Soviet Union on the text of a treaty forbidding the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the ocean floors, about to be considered at the United Nations General Assembly.

These are agreements not to arm environments previously inaccessible to weapons. Manifestly there are fewer obstacles to such agreements than there are to agreements controlling weapons already deployed or under development.

But even in already "contaminated" environments there have been two important control agreements:

We have negotiated and ratified a Test Ban Treaty prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space.

We have negotiated and are prepared at any time to ratify simultaneously with the Soviet Union, a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

It should be pointed out, though, that the main objective of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is to prevent non-nuclear powers from acquiring atomic weapons. The treaty does not restrain any of the present nuclear powers from further development of their capabilities. The non-nuclear countries therefore tend to look upon the treaty essentially as a self-denying ordinance.

Accordingly, during the negotiations they insisted upon assurances that the nuclear powers would seriously pursue strategic arms negotiations. We concurred and incorporated a paragraph in the treaty which would require us to do so.

I mention this to underscore two points. First, that the disarmament agreements pre-

viously concluded have widely been regarded as confidence building, preliminary steps which hopefully might lead to more meaningful agreements on strategic arms. Second, when the United States and the Soviet Union ratify the NPT, they will agree to undertake negotiations in good faith for a cessation of the nuclear arms race.

IV

However, given the complexity of the strategic situation, the vital national interests involved, and the traditional impulses to seek protection in military strength it is easy to be cynical about the prospects for the talks into which we are about to enter.

Nonetheless some basis for hope exists.

First is the fact that the talks are being held at all. The diplomatic exchanges leading up to these talks were responsible in nature. And the talks themselves will require discussion of military matters by both sides in which the veil of secrecy will have to be, if not lifted, at least refashioned. These factors lead us to the hope that the talks are being entered into seriously.

Second is the matter of timing. Previous disparity in nuclear strength has been succeeded by the situation of sufficiency of which I have already spoken. And because this condition will continue for the foreseeable future the time then seems to be propitious for considering how to curb the race in which neither side in all likelihood can gain meaningful advantage.

Third is a mutuality of interest. Under present circumstances an equitable limitation on strategic nuclear weapons would strengthen the national security of both sides. If this is mutually perceived—if both sides conduct these talks in the light of that perception—the talks may accomplish an historic breakthrough in the pattern of confrontation that has characterized the postwar world.

May I pause to point out again that I do not wish to predict that the talks will be easy or that progress is imminent or for that matter likely. Mutuality of interest for states accustomed to rivalry is difficult to perceive. Traditions are powerful. Temptations to seek advantage run strong. Developments in other areas are bound to have an impact on these discussions.

Both parties will approach the talks with great caution and pursue them with immaculate care. The United States and the Soviet Union are entirely capable of protecting their vital interests and can be counted upon to do so. So there is little chance that either side would accept an outcome that leads to its net national disadvantage. In our case also we would not agree to anything adversely affecting the national interests of our allies, who will continue to be consulted as the talks develop.

On the other hand we must also recognize that a prime technique of international politics—as of other politics—is talk. If these talks are serious they can lead to better understanding on both sides of the rationales behind strategic weapons decisions. This in itself might provide a climate in which to avoid compulsive decisions.

Talks need not necessarily call for an explicit agreement at any particular stage. Whether we can slow down, stop or eventually throw the arms race into reverse, remains to be seen. It also remains to be seen whether this be by a formal treaty or treaties, by a series of agreements, by parallel action, or by a convergence of viewpoints resulting from a better understanding of respective positions.

What counts at this point is that a dialogue is beginning about the management of the strategic relations of the two superpowers on a better, safer, cheaper basis than uncontrolled acquisition of still more weapons.

The United States approaches the talks as an opportunity to rest our security on what I would call a balanced strategy.

In pursuit of this balanced strategy of security we will enter the Helsinki talks with three objectives:

To enhance international security by maintaining a stable US-Soviet strategic relationship through limitations on the deployment of strategic armaments.

To halt the upward spiral of strategic arms and avoid the tensions, uncertainties, and costs of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic arms race.

To reduce the risk of an outbreak of nuclear war through a dialogue about issues arising from the strategic situation.

Some say that there will be risks in such a process. But it is easy to focus too much on the risks that would accompany such a new environment and too little on the risks of the one in which we now live. Certainly, such risks are minimal compared to the benefits for mankind which would flow from success. I am confident that this country will not let down its guard, lose its alertness, or fail to maintain adequate programs to protect against a collapse or evasion of any strategic arms agreement. No delegation to any disarmament negotiation has ever been better prepared or better qualified than the United State delegation. The risks in seeking an agreement seem to be manageable, insurable, and reasonable ones to run. They seem less dangerous than the risks of open-ended arms competition—risks about which we perhaps have become somewhat callous.

V

I have mentioned the rewards of progress in terms of international security, world order, and improved opportunities for replacing a stalemated confrontation with a process of negotiations.

But there are also other stakes in these talks that come closer to home. On both sides of this strategic race there are urgent needs for resources to meet pressing domestic needs. Strategic weapons cannot solve the problems of how we live at home, or how we live in the world in this last third of the Twentieth Century. The Soviet Union, which devotes a much larger proportion of its national resources to armaments than do we, must see this as well.

Who knows the rewards if we succeed in diverting the energy, time and attention—the manpower and brainpower—devoted to ever more sophisticated weapons to other and more worthwhile purposes?

Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly two months ago, President Nixon said that he hoped the strategic arms talks would begin soon because "there is no more important task before us." And he added that we must "make a determined effort not only to limit the build-up of strategic arms, but to reverse it."

Just last week President Podgorny of the Soviet Union said: "A positive outcome of the talks would undoubtedly help improve Soviet-American relations and preserve and strengthen the peace." To that I say "Amen."

He added that: "The Soviet Union is striving to achieve precisely such results." Well, so are we; and in this we have the support of the military services, of the Congress, and of the American people.

To that end this Government approaches the Strategic Arms Limitations Talk in sober and serious determination to do our full part to bring a halt to this unproductive and costly competition in strategic nuclear armaments.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR GERARD SMITH AT THE OPENING OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS AT HELSINKI, FINLAND

You are embarking upon one of the most momentous negotiations ever entrusted to an American delegation.

I do not mean to belittle the past. The Antarctic Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and most recently the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which we hope will soon enter into force, were all important steps along the road to international security. Other tasks remain on the agenda of the United Nations and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Today, however, you will begin what all of your fellow citizens in the United States and, I believe, all people throughout the world, profoundly hope will be a sustained effort not only to limit the build-up of strategic forces but to reverse it.

I do not underestimate the difficulty of your task, the nature of modern weapons makes their control an exceedingly complex endeavor. But this very fact increases the importance of your effort.

Nor do I underestimate the suspicion and distrust that must be dispelled if you are to succeed in your assignment.

I am also conscious of the historical fact that wars and crises between nations can arise not simply from the existence of arms but from clashing interests or the ambitious pursuit of unilateral interests. That is why we seek progress toward the solution of the dangerous political issues of our day.

I am nevertheless hopeful that your negotiations with representatives from the Soviet Union will serve to increase mutual security. Such a result is possible if we approach these negotiations recognizing the legitimate security interests on each side.

I have stated that for our part we will be guided by the concept of maintaining "sufficiency" in the forces required to protect ourselves and our allies. I recognize that the leaders of the Soviet Union bear similar defense responsibilities. I believe it is possible, however, that we can carry out our respective responsibilities under a mutually acceptable limitation and eventual reduction of our strategic arsenals.

We are prepared to discuss limitations on all offensive and defensive systems, and to reach agreements in which both sides can have confidence. As I stated in my address to the United Nations, we are prepared to deal with the issues seriously, carefully, and purposefully. We seek no unilateral advantage. Nor do we seek arrangements which could be prejudicial to the interests of third parties. We are prepared to engage in bona fide negotiations on concrete issues, avoiding polemics and extraneous matters.

No one can foresee what the outcome of your work will be. I believe your approach to these talks will demonstrate the seriousness of the United States in pursuing a path of equitable accommodation. I am convinced that the limitation of strategic arms is in the mutual interest of our country and the Soviet Union.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., December 17, 1969.

Hon. LEE H. HAMILTON,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN HAMILTON: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of December 8 concerning SALT.

I understand that Mr. William W. Hancock, the General Counsel of ACDA, has already written to you in response to an identical letter you sent to that Agency. As he pointed out, it is too early to forecast what form possible arrangements that might emerge from SALT would take. Whatever the arrangements, they would, of course, be designed to conform to Constitutional and statutory requirements.

Thank you for your interest in these negotiations. As the Secretary has indicated, progress thus far in the preliminary talks has been encouraging.

Sincerely yours,

H. G. TORBERT, Jr.,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., December 22, 1969.

Hon. LEE H. HAMILTON,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. HAMILTON: The Secretary of Defense has asked me to reply to your letter of December 8, 1969, concerning our goal at the SALT talks.

I agree with you that there is an important distinction between a formalized arms limitation treaty and an informal agreement. However, at this early stage of our contacts with the Soviet Union, it would be inappropriate for the Department of Defense to make any statement on the desired form of agreement. The results of the complex negotiations on the content of a possible agreement will certainly influence the President's decision with respect to its form.

I trust you will understand that we cannot supply a more explicit response to your question at this time.

Sincerely,

YUAN-LI WU,
Deputy Assistant Secretary.

A 16-YEAR-OLD'S MATURE REFLECTIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION

HON. VANCE HARTKE

OF INDIANA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Friday, February 6, 1970

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, on a recent trip to my native soil in southern Indiana my attention was called to a speech given not long ago by a 16-year-old student at Tell City High School, Mr. William Harry Hollander. Presented to Post No. 2113 of the American Legion, the speech stresses those dynamic and creative elements in our Constitution which help to keep it a vital and living document in a changing world.

I was so struck by the thoughtfulness and cogency of young Mr. Hollander's remarks that I wanted to share them with Senators. I, therefore, ask unanimous consent that Mr. Hollander's speech be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE CONSTITUTION IN A CHANGING WORLD

In 1787 one of the most important documents in the history of mankind was written. The United States Constitution, drafted at a critical point in our nation's history, was intended to bind the young nation together and it did that job well. The United States had suffered through a period of economic and political instability in the years immediately following the revolutionary war. The weak framework for the law of the land, The Articles of Confederation, was clearly not strong enough to hold the nation together for very long and so the states decided to strengthen the Articles by calling a convention to reform them in 1787. Fortunately, the men appointed to the convention were foresighted enough to see that the articles should be discarded and a new constitution written. "The whole human race will be affected by the precedings of this convention", said Governor Morris, who headed the committee that eventually wrote the final draft. The delegates faced a tremendous challenge. The examples of the past suggested the seeming impossibility of a large-scale republic. But this revolutionary generation was not dismayed and eventually that is what they called for. When the convention was finished Benjamin Franklin, who was one of the delegates, was asked by a a lady, "Well, Doctor, what have we got a republic or a monarchy?" "A Republic," replied the sage, "if you can keep it."

Remarkably, America has kept it. The failure of others to do so points up the stability of our constitution. In the period of American history since the constitution was adopted France has gone through five constitutions and has switched from a republic to a monarchy and back to a republic. In 1789, again in 1848, and once again in 1871 France was hit with uprisings not planned and instigated by conspirators but rather spontaneous revolutions by the mass of the French people and in 1948 virtually the entire continent of Europe was hit as well. Russia may provide the best example of a revolutionary climate. Its' rulers frankly proclaimed autocracy the first and best principle of government. In 1917 the autocrats fell and the communists took power. But these are not the only examples. History is filled with the stories of governments that failed to keep up with times and were overthrown.

Somehow, America has escaped violent revolution. Only once in our one hundredninety year history has the strength of the government been seriously jeopardized. It is not that America has not had its dark moments. Many foreign governments would have toppled during the depression of the 1930's but even at that time the American government remained stable, sustained by a new President elected in the midst of that depression. Political assassinations have toppled governments in other nations, yet the United States passed sadly but smoothly through the assassinations of four American Presidents in its relatively short history.

What is the key to America's stability? I feel that it lies in the Constitution, the backbone of our system. Certainly few nations can boast of a constitution that has not been rewritten in two centuries and fewer still can boast of a more stable government today.

Violent revolution is virtually impossible in a nation whose political system is, by definition, concerned with the rights and interests of every citizen. But, in a nation of 200 million it is easy for the system to become detached from the people and if a nation is to survive it must keep in touch with the people, and with the times. That is where the American system, as outlined in the Constitution excels.

History shows us how times change. The French monarchial system had worked for many years but by 1789, when it was overthrown, it was obviously not working. For years the Russian people lived under autocracy but finally in 1917 they grew tired. In both cases the times had changed but the governments had not. Here in the United States one could hardly expect a constitution written when only four million people lived in this country and the best roads were those of packed mud to effectively govern a nation of 200 million in the jet-age without changing drastically. And it is true: America's Constitution has changed. The ideas set forth in 1787 remain but the forms of these ideas are unrecognizable.

The United States Constitution has many built-in methods of change. Three are very obvious. The first one is perhaps the most exciting and the most dramatic example of democracy in action. That is, of course, the election. Through a national election every four years and periodic state and local elections, Americans can vote to in effect "overthrow" their government. Certainly the results of many past elections have made radical changes in government policy. But, it must be pointed out that these changes were made peacefully and by the will of the majority of the people. The second method, making amendments to the constitution is used less frequently, but can make just as dramatic a change in the nation. The United States Constitution has been amended only fifteen times since the Bill of Rights was adopted in December of 1791. But some of our most important and controversial changes have come about by amendments.

The third method is probably used the most, yet recognized the least. That method lies in the awesome power of the courts to interpret the constitution. By changing interpretations to fit the times the federal court system is largely responsible for keeping the constitution one of the most important and respected documents in our changing world.

But, if this document is to help us solve the problems facing our nation today we must first resolve to live under it. Those who preach violent revolution, no matter how small a minority they are, are ignoring the basic idea of the constitution: peaceful change. They cannot be allowed to inflict their methods on the government, though if we, as a government, are to survive we must at least listen to the views of all people. We must learn from the histories of other governments that a group of people whose views are not listened to and heeded by the government are inclined to do away with or at least violently change that government. We have seen that America's Constitution provides for the peaceful change that can make violent change unnecessary. But, we must make sure at all times that our machinery for change is in good working order for if it falters for even a moment we will be in serious jeopardy. In these changing times the constitution is facing a serious challenge but it has been challenged before and it has always survived. The Constitution was not meant to be an old, musty document, spoken of only in history books but rather a live, changing guideline for a nation on the move. As "Time" magazine observed in its January 5th issue of this year, "Most middle Americans and most radicals share one blind spot: they tend to forget that both the form and the content of the United States government have undergone enormous changes over the years and that the Constitution will tolerate much more change without having the entire system collapse."

Defending the American Constitution alone is not enough. We must make sure that the Constitution is in fact keeping up with the times, is not alienating large groups of society, and thus is not in itself breeding revolution.

Abraham Lincoln said in 1861, "This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing government they can exercise their constitutional rights of amending it or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it." To me those lines represent the most valuable section of the United States Constitution:—the section that provides for changing what is wrong.

Today, it may be that our political parties are growing too detached from the people, that too few people are choosing our candidates. It may be that younger people, with increased education, deserve the right to vote at an earlier age. Dozens of other possible problem areas in our government have been pointed out; certainly all do not need changing, but the least we can do is explore into them.

That is the challenge of the 1970's: to find what is wrong and change it while holding on to what is right. If the constitution will continue to change, and I think it can, America will gain from the experience.

As Benjamin Franklin told the lady after the Constitutional Convention, "you have a republic if you can keep it."

ADDRESS BY JAMES D. HITTLE

HON. CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, February 5, 1970

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, recently I was privileged to introduce the Honorable James D. Hittle, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, to the Greater East Lansing Chamber of Commerce, East Lansing, Mich., who gave a most enlightening, provocative speech on the current situation in Vietnam. I commend it to the attention of my colleagues and include his remarks in the RECORD:

REMARKS BY HONORABLE JAMES D. HITTLE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS), AT THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE GREATER EAST LANSING CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, KELLOGG CENTER, MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, EAST LANSING, MICH., JANUARY 15, 1970

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

It is a pleasure for me to be with you this evening. I'm glad to be here for the very simple but real reason that I can join with you in remembering the man who was your friend and my father.

For me to be present on the occasion of the first "Senator Harry F. Hittle Award" is an experience which I cherish and will long remember. It is not necessary to speak to you regarding my father's contributions to our State, his old-fashioned concept that public service is a normal duty of citizenship, and that our form of government is one of the finest achievements of man.

However, I do want to tell you that from the rare vantage point of a son observing his father, I was impressed early in life by his devotion to our principles of law, our form of government, and the essential common sense of our citizens. In his quiet and sincere way, he had a deep and abiding affection for all of you in this community. As many of you will recall, he was a man of great moral strength, and firmness of spirit, and had the determination to achieve that which needed to be done for the betterment of our community.

At the same time, along with such strength of character, he had, as many of you will also remember, deep compassion for his fellowman. He was a worthy antagonist in the courts and in the political forum. Yet, I well remember that he never had a personal enemy. He refused to personalize opposition. In a real sense he lived by the wise, but oft-forgotten proverb, that life is too short to engage in personal animosity.

And so tonight, on behalf of my mother, my sister, and for myself, I take this occasion to thank you for remembering my father with this first annual award which you have so generously established in his memory.

Tonight I would like to talk with you about what we all recognize as one of the most important issues of our time. I refer to the Vietnam War. I would like to pass on to you some of my thoughts as to those who are fighting there for freedom, and also, my opinions, based on repeated visits to Vietnam, as to the soundness of President Nixon's policies of Vietnamization.

Let me say right at this point that anyone today who has serious misgivings about the character and the patriotism of American youth should go to Vietnam—and those misgivings will be dispelled.

Officers and NCOs who have commanded in World War II, Korea, and now in Vietnam, are high in their praise of today's young American fighting man. They say without exception that the young serviceman today is by far the best we've ever had in the Armed Forces.

Of course, the reference to the magnificent services being performed by young Americans serving in Vietnam brings us squarely face to face with probably the most important single issue facing our Nation.

It is the issue of supporting our Nation and our Commander-in-Chief—The President—in this difficult time.

It is the natural role of responsible and understanding American citizens to make it crystal clear, through a show of patriotic solidarity that the protesters, the dissenters, and the faint-hearted are *not the majority of* the American people.

During my recent visit to Vietnam, I was repeatedly told by our fighting men, many serving their second tours of duty there, that they hoped that the President would be supported fully in his Vietnamization policy and the resulting properly timed measured withdrawal of U.S. Forces. They said that if he gets this backing from the American people—as I am sure he will—their efforts in South Vietnam will come out successfully.

I know that I need not tell you of the danger of the proposals for a precipitant withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam.

The President of the United States clearly set forth the pitfalls of such a dangerous policy when he spoke in clear terms to the American people a few months ago.

As the President so well pointed out, such a precipitant withdrawal would allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in North Vietnam 15 years ago. At that time the Communists murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died a slow death in the slave labor camps.

And, of course, our precipitant withdrawal would endanger well over a million Roman Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the north. These are people who value freedom of religion and the desire to worship God in their own way above all worldly possessions. They left their farms, their homes, their personal possessions and fled south, often with little more than their Bible.

On one of my visits to Vietnam I had the opportunity to talk with one of these Catholic refugees from the north. We sat in a quiet corner of a side street tea-room in Saigon. He has, today, a very modest job—but enough to provide food and some sort of roof for his family. And, he has, he said, freedom. I asked him what would happen if the Communists should take over South Vietnam. He thought for a moment and said, "The answer is simple. There would be nothing but torture and death for my family and myself."

Are those who are today advocating a precipitant pull-out willing to sacrifice a million people, such as this man and his family. Apparently, such sacrifice is acceptable to some.

Just because the bloodletting and torture would take place on the other side of the world doesn't make it any more acceptable from the moral standpoint.

There's one thing that Americans should well know: that freedom is indivisible, and that the destruction of freedom anywhere means the destruction of some freedom everywhere.

A precipitant withdrawal from South Vietnam would mean also, as the President so pointedly stated, that it would be the first defeat in our Nation's history and that it would end worldwide confidence in American leadership.

You and I know full well that no nation can survive and reach the fulfillment of its destiny by letting down its friends, breaking its word, and running scared before the oppressor.

If history teaches anything, it is that nations, like people, cannot with impunity break their pledge or shirk their responsibilitities.

I am confident that we all shared a sense of reassurance and new confidence when the President told the Nation on November 3rd that he was not going to take the easy way out; he was not going to endanger the quest for peace by a precipitant withdrawal. That he would not, in effect, preside over a retreat that would trigger a disaster of immense magnitude.

By leading us in a policy of standing firm on our word, by our pledge, to our allies and friends, and being faithful to ourselves, the President also is moving toward the goal that Americans devotedly hope for. That goal is a firm and honorable peace.

We Americans treasure peace but we know that peace at any price is the easiest thing to get. All we have to do to get that kind of peace is to surrender. We also know that peace at any price is not really peace. It's the silent peace of the concentration camp—the blood splattered wall—the mass graves. But achieving an honorable peace is not a unilateral endeavor. After listening to the President's point-by-point account of the actions he has initiated in the quest for peace, one can only come to the simple but inescapable conclusion that failure to achieve peace in Vietnam rests firmly with Hanoi and not with the United States and our allies.

In his search for the end to the conflict, the President has adopted the policy of Vietnamization of the struggle in South Vietnam. It means to shift gradually the responsibilities of peace winning to the South Vietnamese.

Of course, those, including the faint-hearted, who criticize our stand in Vietnam against oppression say that the South Vietnamest won't carry their own load and that they won't fight. Well, let me say that this could very well be sheer falsehood and vicious propaganda.

Let me give you a few facts about the lie that the South Vietnamese won't fight.

Let's approach it this way: the number of battle casualties is a good indicator of the willingness of a people to fight. So, let's take the matter of South Vietnam's military combat dead. Since 1961, almost 100,000 South Vietnamese troops have been killed defending their country against Communist aggression. This by any count is a heavy toll. Yet, the real significance of war casualties is in relation to the proportion of total population.

If we project South Vietnam's casualties into our U.S. population, which is about 13 times that of Vietnam, we can better appreciate the impact of the war on the Vietnamese.

The South Vietnamese combat dead total is the equivalent of over one million combat dead for the United States.

This means, in turn, that on a percentage of population basis, the total of military war dead suffered so far by South Vietnam is: More than 13 times our total in World War I; over three times our total in World War II; about 36 times our total in the entire Korean War.

Therefore, when judged on a relative basis with what our own nation suffered in our great struggles against oppression, South Vietnam measures up extremely well.

South Vietnam has, by every measure, set forth a high example of opposition to communism, and of sacrifice, devotion to freedom and determination to keep it.

What South Vietnam has paid and is paying in blood to stay free deserves the commendation, not the condemnation, of freedom-loving people.

And still the South Vietnamese are fighting and dying to turn back Communist ag-

policy questions which might arise during the review. The Committee has also requested GAO to limit the distribution of the report prior to its release by the Committee.

Medicare is administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA), Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). Illinois Medical Service (Blue Shield) has been operating under a contract with SSA to make payments of Medicare claims for physicians' services in several counties in Illinois, including Cook County.

In accordance with certain SSA regulations, issued in August 1967, payments under the supplementary medical insurance portion (part B) of the Medicare program could be made for the professional services rendered to Medicare patients by supervisory or teaching physicians in a hospital in cases where the physicians are the patients' attending physicians and provide personal and identifiable direction to interns and residents who are participating in the care of their patients.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

From April 1968 to April 15, 1969, when, at the direction of SSA, Blue Shield suspended making payments of APCCH claims, APCCH had received about $1.6 million in payments under part B of the Medicare program for the services of attending physicians.

The GAO review of patient medical records of Cook County Hospital indicated that the professional services billed by APCCH and paid by Blue Shield had been furnished, in almost all cases, by residents and interns at the hospital and showed only limited involvement of the attending physicians in whose names the services had been billed.

The GAO review of the hospital medical records applicable to selected Medicare claims for attending physicians' services showed that:

For 60 of the 72 initial visits for which billings had been made, the medical records supporting the specific services billed disclosed no involvement of any attending physicians, although the SAA regulations provided that the attending physicians should review the patients' histories and physical examinations and personally examine the patients within reasonable periods after admission. (See p. 29.)

For 129 of 747 follow-up visits billed, no notations had been made by any physicians, including residents or interns, to indicate that physicians had seen the patients. For the remaining 618 visits, which were supported by physicians' notations, attending physicians had been identified as involved in providing the services for only 35 visits and residents and interns had been identified as providing the services for nearly all the remaining visits. (See p. 31.)

The medical records applicable to 38 consultations for which the Medicare program had been billed disclosed no involvement of the attending physicians in whose names the services had been billed. (See p. 34.)

Hospital records in nine of 18 cases involving charges for operating room surgery did not indicate that attending physicians had been present during the operations. (See p. 37.)

Hospital records in 31 of 39 cases involving charges for minor surgical procedures did not indicate that attending physicians had been specifically involved. (See p. 40.)

Officials of APCCH and Cook County Hospital advised GAO that generally the services were provided to the patients under the direction of attending physicians responsible for the patients care but that evidence of such direction was not incorporated into the patients' medical records.

RECOMMENDATIONS OR SUGGESTIONS

Although in April 1969 SSA issued new and more comprehensive guidelines which were intended to clarify and supplement the criteria for making payments for the services of supervisory or teaching physicians, GAO suggested that SSA inquire further into the propriety of the charges being allowed when the circumstances outlined above existed at hospitals.

AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

HEW pointed out that SSA, by letter dated April 9, 1969, had directed Blue Shield to suspend further payments to APCCH. HEW stated that it would inquire further into the specific circumstances described by GAO. (See p. 68.)

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, the unanswered questions here are: First, Who forget these false medicare claims? Second, to whom and for what purpose has the money been diverted? And third, why was the Social Security Administration so late in taking action to protect the taxpayers' interests once these discrepencies were discovered and who in this Government agency was responsible for this laxity?

WE NEED PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP FOR WAGE-PRICE GUIDELINES

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the Consumer Price Index advanced by 6.1 percent last year. Thus, in a year when the administration proclaimed that it was fighting inflation, prices continued to rise at an exceedingly high rate.

The administration relied almost exclusively on tight money as a means of stopping inflation. It certainly proposed very little in the "fiscal" field where Congress intervened to cut back the President's requests by $5.6 billion. If the President had really tried, he would have proposed large cuts last year in military spending, a reduction in space spending, and a slowdown in highway construction and public works. Furthermore, his advocacy of the SST directly contradicts the rhetoric of fighting inflation.

In addition to failure in the fiscal policy field, there has been failure elsewhere too. The major area where much more could have been done and should have been done is in leadership from the White House against large wage and price increases. I am not talking about controls; I am talking about guidelines. These are important because the industries involved, in most cases, are far from competitive in the classical sense. Prices are "administered," or there are only two or three firms so that "jawboning" can work.

It did work in the past. In 1968, those industries subjected to White House jawboning had price rises of only 1 percent compared with almost 3 percent elsewhere.

But in 1969, without "jawboning,' the same group had a price rise of 6 percent while others moved up only 3.5 percent.

On Sunday, Hobart Rowen, in the Washington Post, wrote about this issue in some depth, quoting Arthur Okun, formerly of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the work of Gardiner Means and Adolph Berle, among others. I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Rowen's article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 25, 1970]

ALL WON'T BE SOLVED BY BALANCED BUDGET

(By Hobart Rowen)

This time, President Nixon came down hard on the problem of inflation; a year ago (and this is admitted privately in high administration councils) the problem was vastly underestimated.

For a while, it may be recalled, the President wasn't sure that the income tax surcharge needed to be extended. And it wasn't until early March, 1969, that the administration understood the extend of the business investment boom.

But now, says the President, he can think of no action more important than "for the Congress to join this administration in the battle to stop the rise in the cost of living."

The pity of it, however, is that the President seems just as determined this year as he was last to give labor and management a free hand to get whatever the traffic will bear in wages and prices.

We may—hopefully—learn more from the Economic Report due to go to Congress shortly. But the President's entire anti-inflation program, is based on the classic Republican belief that all will be solved by balancing the budget.

Excessive federal expenditures, uncompensated by a sensible tax policy, have doubtless contributed to inflation. But the federal government has been running a surplus for more than a year, in company with a monetary policy so tight that interest rates are the highest in more than 100 years.

Still, prices move up. Even as the economy failed to show real growth in the fourth quarter, the consumer price index was rising at a faster rate than when Mr. Nixon took over.

There is always a lag, we have been assured, between the imposition of a policy of restraint and actual results in terms of lesser rates of inflation. But the time has dragged on, and some administration insiders confess that there should have been results long ago.

Last year's rate of inflation—6.1 per cent of the consumer index—cannot be sustained. Yet, even the most optimistic administration men warn that there cannot be much progress this year.

Many business leaders would be willing to gamble on a temporary resort to wage and price controls, along the lines recently suggested by former Treasury Under Secretary Robert V. Roosa. This was openly espoused last week by many builders and moneymarket men at the National Association of Home Builders convention in Houston. Even more of them urge selective controls on credit by the Federal Reserve.

But the President seems determined to rely on expenditure control—and on that alone.

Perhaps the most significant phrase in the speech was this: "It is time to quit putting good money into bad programs; otherwise, we will end up with bad money and bad programs."

This reflects the urging of Arthur F. Burns that more attention be paid to "zero-base budgeting"—the requirement that an agency justify each year the case for its entire appropriation, not just the increase over a previous year's.

No doubt, this is sound doctrine. It could lead to elimination of much bureaucratic federal waste. But it isn't likely to do much about 1970's inflation.

The President properly assigns a good share of the blame for inflation to his Democratic predecessors. But he is stuck with his own record for 1969—and not the least of administration failures has been its own inability to limit expenditures, as it promised to do.

Beyond that, however, Mr. Nixon refuses to recognize that in the absence of any pressures from the White House on what Arthur Okun calls "responsive" industries, prices shoot up higher than they otherwise would.

There is more than just politics in this charge. Okun, who was Lyndon Johnson's Economic Council chairman, recently revealed that LBJ's jawboning was far more extensive than publicly reported. And it paid off.

In 1968, for example, those industries that were pressured to minimize their price hikes boosted prices an average of 1 per cent, while all other commodities on the industrial wholesale commodity index (including those that rejected LBJ's urgings) rose 2.9 per cent.

But last year, after Mr. Nixon made it clear that jawboning was out, the "responsive" group rose 6 per cent, while all others moved up 3.5 per cent. (See table below.)

Okun's data makes clear that there is a wide area of price discretion in some segments of American industry. This has been amply documented over the years by Gardiner Means and Adolph Berle; and in a recent study of 1969, Means suggests that a realistic inflation-control policy must deal directly with corporations and unions who have a unique power to generate a part of the inflation.

For example, can the administration continue to ignore the spectacle of sharply rising steel prices at a time when steel production, if not actually down, is barely stable?

If the President's anti-inflation program for 1970 is nothing more than contained in the State of the Union message, 1970 is likely to be just as troubled a year as 1969. It could, in fact, be worse: at least, in 1969, there was no recession.

CHANGES IN PRICES OF SELECTED COMMODITIES—1969 COMPARED WITH PRIOR PERIODS

	Relative importance (percent)[1]	Annual rate, percent change[2] 1969	1966–68	1968	1967	1966	1961–65
Selected petroleum products:							
Gasoline	2.772	3.5	−0.6	−0.9	−3.6	2.8	−0.9
Crude	.843	4.8	1.0	.7	.9	1.2	−.1
Middle distillate	1.053	3.7	2.9	−1.3	5.9	1.6	.4
Sulfur products:							
Sulfur	.014	−33.3	18.1	7.7	39.3	9.8	1.6
Sulfuric acid	.085	0	9.9	3.7	21.0	6.0	1.7
Tires and tubes	1.221	2.2	3.0	1.7	4.2	3.1	−.2
Paperboard	.669	5.0	−1.8	−2.8	−3.3	.7	−.1
Glass containers	.375	5.3	3.3	9.1	0	1.1	.6
Cigarettes	.890	6.6	3.6	1.6	5.0	4.2	.8
Newsprint, standard	.426	3.3	2.2	0	2.1	4.6	−.3
Photographic supplies	.346	3.4	2.2	2.0	5.1	−.5	.8
Passenger cars	5.818	1.9	1.2	1.2	1.9	.3	−.7
Tin cans	.301	2.7	2.3	3.0	4.1	0	2.3
Laundry equipment	.242	1.2	1.7	2.4	2.8	−0.1	−1.3
Selected steel products:							
Finished	4.247	6.8	1.6	2.2	1.3	1.3	.4
Semifinished	.272	5.7	1.4	.3	2.9	1.0	.3
Selected nonferrous metals:							
Aluminum ingot	.143	8.7	1.7	3.0	2.0	0	−1.2
Aluminum ingot, alloyed	.058	7.2	2.5	4.6	1.9	1.0	
Aluminum shapes	.660	6.7	1.2	2.4	1.1	.2	−2.5
Copper wirebar	.386	24.3	5.3	10.2	5.9	0	3.7
Copper and brass shapes	.743	27.9	4.1	−4.2	5.7	11.5	3.6
Wire and cable	.809	22.2	1.7	−3.8	2.3	7.0	−3.5
Listed items	22.463	6.0	1.7	1.0	1.9	2.1	.1
All other (nonlisted industrials	77.537	3.5	2.3	2.9	1.9	2.3	.5
All industrials	100.0	4.0	2.2	2.5	1.9	2.2	.4

[1] Fraction of industrial wholesale price index in December 1968 accounted for by commodity.
[2] Year figure represents change during year, e.g., 1969 is period from December 1968 to December 1969. 1966–68 is thus December 1965 to December 1968.

Note: Extra inflation? The above table, compiled by Dr. Arthur M. Okun, shows components of the wholesale price index he believes responded to the administration pressure from 1966 to 1969. He concludes that somewhere between ½ and 1 percent of extra inflation in the wholesale index can be attributed to President Nixon's announced intention not to attempt to influence price and wage actions.

SALT

LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL) is necessarily absent from the Senate today. I ask unanimous consent that a statement which he had planned to make, along with an article published in the Scientific American magazine, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement and insertion were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR GRAVEL

The January, 1970, issue of Scientific American contains a closely-reasoned and challenging article by two of the leading U.S. authorities in the field of arms control and disarmament, Professor G. W. Rathjens of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Professor G. B. Kistiakowsky of Harvard University. Their article, entitled "The Limitation of Strategic Arms," provides one of the best arguments I have seen for giving first priority in the forthcoming SALT talks with the Soviet Union to a ban on MIRV testing and deployment and a freeze on further ABM development.

I made a similar plea in my speech in the Senate on January 20, entitled "SALT—The Case for An In-Place Halt." I share the view that only through a comprehensive initial agreement to freeze the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union at the current level of rough parity can we begin to halt the expensive, dangerous, and futile arms race in which we are now engaged.

In my speech I did not stress the budgetary impact of such an agreement, although it would be immense. The Scientific American article presents what I believe are realistic projections for the next decade, which show that the annual savings in our strategic-forces budget of a halt in MIRV and ABM development would be roughly $1 billion in fiscal 1971, from $6–10 billion by fiscal 1975, and as much as $11–15 billion or more by fiscal 1979. All these figures are stated in constant-value 1969 dollars.

I scarcely need to overemphasize the tremendous opportunities for progress in such fields as education, urban development, and enhancement of our environment that such a redirection of resources could mean.

[From Scientific American magazine, January 1970]

THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS

(By G. W. Rathjens and G. B. Kistiakowsky)

The preliminary phase of the strategic-arms-limitation talks ("SALT") between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. was conducted in a convivial atmosphere and with a refreshing lack of familiar rhetoric. The road ahead for the negotiations nonetheless remains a steep and slippery one. The fact that the talks were delayed for as long as they were by both sides is not an encouraging sign. The initial unwillingness of the Russian leadership to negotiate because of the American involvement in Vietnam and the subsequent unwillingness of the American leadership to negotiate because of the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia both reflect a failure to perceive the extraordinary and possibly fleeting nature of the opportunity presented at this particular juncture in the arms race and a failure to recognize that the strategic-arms confrontation can and should be largely decoupled from other sources of conflict between the two superpowers. More recent delays, first by the U.S. and then by the U.S.S.R. reinforce the view that on both sides there has been a fundamental failure in the ordering of priorities—a failure to recognize that the dangers to national security associated with arms-control agreements can be far less than those inherent in the ongoing arms race.

As the substantive phase of the arms talks is about to begin, it is still not obvious that policy-making circles of the two superpowers have consonant views about such basic questions as what objectives strategic forces serve, what relative roles offensive and defensive strategic forces play and what the desired effects of limitations on such forces are. If it should develop that there is no agreement on these points, it may not be possible to negotiate any meaningful limitation on strategic forces.

This article is written in the hope that by stimulating discussion of these questions the differences between the two powers may become more clearly understood and in time narrowed. Even if the talks fail to produce significant agreement, a better grasp of the issues involved will be in the ultimate interest of everyone.

A number of recent developments make the prospects for successful negotiations seem to be more favorable now than they might have been some years ago. Advances in the strategic reconnaissance capabilities of the superpowers (chiefly in the area of surveillance by artificial satellites) are steadily reducing the need for intrusive inspection to establish the degree of compliance with possible future agreements. Thus the thorny issue of verification may be less of a barrier to agreed arms limitation than it has been in the past. In addition the rapid growth of Russian offensive-missile forces has effectively erased a disparity with the U.S. that existed in the past, thereby making an arms-limitation agreement a more realistic possibility. Finally, there is the growing popular realization—at least in the U.S. and presumably also in the U.S.S.R.—that each side already has an enormous "overkill" capacity with respect to the other, and that further escalation in strategic-force levels would entail tremendous costs and new dangers at a time when both countries are confronted with a host of other pressing demands on their resources.

Although these developments would seem to favor successful negotiations, they are possibly outweighed by developments on the other side of the ledger. The most troublesome items are two emerging technical capabilities: multiple independently targeted reentry vericles (MIRV's) and anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) defenses. It is frequently argued that the development and deployment of either (or particularly both) of these systems by one superpower could lead to a situation in which a decision to attempt a preemptive attack against the other's strategic forces might be considered rational. Indeed, some strategic planners contend that the threat is so great that offsetting actions must be started even before it is clear whether or not the adversary intends to acquire either a MIRV or an ABM capability. It is our belief that such arguments are largely fallacious and are made without real appreciation of the fact that a thermonuclear war between the superpowers, considering the vulnerability of the two societies, is a totally irrational policy choice. No combination of tactics and weapons, offensive and defensive, could provide either power with sufficient assurance that at least a small fraction of its adversary's weapons would not be successfully delivered, thus inflicting in retaliation damage that would be clearly unacceptable.

We are confronted here, however, with a paradox that will haunt the rest of this discussion. Unilateral decisions regarding the development and procurement of strategic-weapons systems, and hence planning for arms-control negotiations, have been and will continue to be greatly influence by a fundamentally simpleminded, although often exceedingly refined, form of military analysis. This approach, sometimes characterized as "worst-case analysis," invariably ascribes to one's adversary not only capabilities that one would not count on for one's own forces but also inputes to him a willingness to take risks that would seem insane if imputed to one's own political leadership. Thus, the U.S. will react to Russian MIRV and ABM programs, and vice versa, whether or not national security demands it. Even if the reaction is totally irrational, it nonetheless becomes as much a part of reality as if the decision were genuinely required to preserve a stable strategic balance. We reluctantly accept the fact that in both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. policy will be influenced excessively by those military planners and their civilian allies who persist in behaving as if a thermonuclear war could be "won," and in asserting that responsible political leaders on the other side may initiate it on that assumption.

The development of a strategic nuclear capability by lesser powers, particularly China, seems also destined to complicate efforts to curtail the strategic-arms race between the superpowers. Here there are essentially two problems. First, what was said earlier about the unacceptability of nuclear war between the superpowers may be less applicable to conflicts between emerging nuclear powers, because their political leadership will be less knowledgeable about the effects of nuclear warfare and because the nuclear stockpiles involved will, at least initially, not be large enough to ensure the destruction of entire societies Thus, with proliferation, the probability of thermonuclear war is likely to increase, and the superpowers will have a real basis for concern about their becoming involved. Second, a phenomenon not unlike the much discussed action-reaction effects of ABM defenses and MIRV's is likely to come into play. Nuclear proliferation may complicate Russian-American efforts to curtail the strategic-arms race even more than the objective facts warrant, as each superpower overreacts not only to the development of new centers of nuclear power but also to the other's reaction to them.

In fact, the rising threat of nuclear proliferation is already increasing the pressure in the U.S. (and probably in the U.S.S.R.) to develop defenses that might be effective at least for a few years against emergent nuclear powers. The enthusiasts talk about neutralizing completely the effects of such developments; the realists propose measures aimed at reducing the damage that might be inflicted in the unlikely event of a nuclear attack by a smaller power. Unfortunately the capabilities that might prove effective, for instance an ABM system adequate to cope with first-generation Chinese missiles, would probably lead the other superpower to expand or qualitatively improve its strategic forces.

The other major considerations that will have a bearing on the prospects for SALT are domestic. As the failure of American policy in Southeast Asia and its implications become apparent, it seems likely that there will be a sharp reaction in an important segment of American society, with the polarization of attitudes proceeding even further than it has in the past year or two. It will be a difficult time for arms-control negotiations. Indeed, the strategic-arms-limitation talks are likely to be a divisive factor in the same way that the recent debate on the Safeguard ABM system was.

The situation in the U.S.S.R., although less clear, seems no more promising. The controversy between China and the U.S.S.R. might lead one to expect that accommodation and cooperation with the West would be increasingly attractive to the Russian leadership. But that controversy, like the recent Russian difficulties in eastern Europe, is also likely to be a factor in reinforcing the trend toward orthodoxy and conservatism within the U.S.S.R., which is hardly a favorable augury for an arms-control agreement.

Thus for SALT to be successful will require not only that the two governments be sincere in approaching the talks but also that they be prepared to display leadership and steadfastness of purpose in dealing with domestic opposition. On both sides there will have to be a rejection of many of the premises on which military policy has been at least partially based for two decades, for example the importance of "superiority" in strategic strength, the concept of "winning" a thermonuclear war, and the view that one can build meaningful defenses against a thermonuclear attack. The leadership in each nation will be confronted with arguments about the great risks inherent in various kinds of agreement—barely feasible (or at least not provably unfeasible) developments that might be taken advantage of by an adversary. Such arguments will undoubtedly resemble those to which the Kennedy Administration had to respond, when in connection with the nuclear-test-ban treaty it was asserted that the U.S.S.R. might conduct nuclear tests behind the moon or behind the sun to our great disadvantage. If agreement is to be reached, such arguments will have to be judged for what they are: nightmares of people who have focused so narrowly on such problems that they simply lack the perspective for weighing the risks of agreement against the risks implicit in continuing the arms race without any agreed constraints.

In the case of the U.S. the President will have a special problem and a formidable challenge, perhaps the greatest faced by any American leader since President Wilson's effort at the end of World War I to gain acceptance for his views regarding the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. Although most Americans, including probably a majority of those who supported President Nixon in his campaign for the Presidency would support him in his efforts to reach an arms-control agreement, almost certainly the conservative wing of the President's political supporters will counsel him to exercise extreme caution in approaching SALT. In so doing this latter group will give unwarranted weight to the technical and military risks that might be involved in any agreement under consideration. It is equally certain that the military will attempt to influence him with similar arguments, both through its direct channels and through its Congressional allies.

It is inconceivable that any meaningful agreement can be reached if the views of these groups should prevail. They need not, of course. Exercising broader judgment, the President can reject such advice and, ass uggested above, draw on very substantial nationwide support for an agreement. Should he choose to do so, he will be in a better position to make his decision politically acceptable than would have been the case for any of his recent predecessors, or for that matter for his opponent in the last election. There is almost certainly a sizable segment of the American body politic that could accept a decision by President Nixon to conclude a very far-reaching agreement as a result of SALT that would not accept a similar position were it offered by, say, a liberal Democratic president.

President Nixon's prospects for such an achievement will be enhanced if the SALT negotiators make substantial progress in the next few months. With momentum established as a result of some limited agreement, and with the prospects of broader agreements before them, both the American and the Russian leadership might well make the judgment that it would be worthwhile to expend the political capital that might be required to effect broader agreements. If, on the other hand, the talks bog down in procedural discussions or in defense of obviously non-negotiable positions, the political leadership in both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. will be in a weakened position in dealing with those who are most skeptical and fearful of an agreement. Thus the importance of early limited agreement in connection with SALT cannot be overestimated.

In what areas might such limited agreement be immediately feasible? In order to answer this question we must first examine some of the technical realities of the present strategic balance. We believe that for the foreseeable future technilogical considerations will continue to make nuclear offensive forces dominant over nuclear defensive forces. In other words, we assert that, as has been the case since the initial deployment of theromnuclear weapons, it will be easier to destroy a technologically advanced society than to defend one. What can and should be done both in structuring strategic forces in the absence of agreement and in agreeing to limitations is critically dependent on whether or not this judgment is correct. There is some dispute about its correctness in the U.S. For example, some assert that with recent developments in ABM technology it may be possible to offset the effects of an incremental expenditure on offensive capabilities by a similar or even lesser expenditure on defenses. Nonetheless, we share the prevailing view that defense of population, at least against a determined adversary with comparable resources, is essentially hopeless.

To facilitate discussion we shall now define two terms that have come to be applied to strategic forces and to their uses. By "damage limitation" we mean the prevention of damage to industry and population in a nulcear war or the reduction of such damage to below the levels that might be expected without the use of certain damage-limiting measures or systems. Antiaircraft or ABM defenses of cities would be categorized as being damage-limiting systems. The use of civil defense measures such as population shelters

or evacuation of threatened cities would be regarded as damage-limiting measures. So would be attempts to limit the adversary's ability to inflict damage by preemptively attacking any component of his offensive strategic 2 forces. By "assured destruction" we mean the destruction with high confidence of the adversary's society. Measures to achieve such destruction, or systems that might be used for the purpose, would be characterized as assured-destruction measures or systems. They include the use of offensive missiles and bombers against civilian targets, as distinguished from strictly military targets.

With these definitions we recast our earlier statement about the relative roles of offensive and defensive strategic weapons to assert: *In the superpower confrontation any attempt to build significant damage-limiting capabilities can be offset by changes in the adversary's assured-destruction capabilities.* To take a specific example, attempt to limit and reduce the damage to American society by deploying ABM defenses (including appropriate civil defense measures) can be offset by qualitative and quantitative improvements in the adversary's offensive capabilities at a cost to him certainly no greater than the cost of the damage-limiting measures taken. What is more, we believe that by and large such responses will occur, in spite of the fact that realistic security considerations do not necessarily require a response. Even a very large-scale and technically sophisticated American ABM system could not be counted on to prevent totally unacceptable destruction in the U.S. by a Russian attack—even by an attack launched in retaliation after the Russian forces had already been preemptively struck. Such an American ABM system would in no way make our strategic forces more useful as political instruments, and hence no Russian response would really be required to preserve the effectiveness of the U.S.S.R.'s assured-destruction forces. Because of fear, conservatism and uncertainty, however, it seems a foregone conclusion that a fully compensating buildup in Russian strength would follow.

There may, of course, be circumstances in which damage-limiting efforts will be effective. Each of the superpowers would temporarily be able to maintain a strategic posture that might greatly limit the damage to it in a conflict with a lesser nuclear power such as China. This will be particularly true if a preemptive, or "counterforce," attack against the lesser power's strategic nuclear forces is not excluded.

Moreover, if a nuclear exchange between the two superpowers should ever occur, parts of the strategic forces in being at that time probably would be used for active defense or in attacks on the strategic forces of the opponent. Thus they would be used in a damage-limiting role. Their effect would not be great, however, simply because the overkill capacity of each superpower's assured-destruction capabilities is so enormous. Both superpowers almost certainly now have the ability to destroy at least half of the adversary's population and three-quarters of his industrial capacity in spite of any damage-limiting measures that might be undertaken by the other. This situation has come about as a result of two factors. A strategic doctrine has developed, at least in the U.S., that has called for the maintenance of a very great assured-destruction capability under all conceivable circumstances. The doctrine has been one that could be easily implemented simply because thermonuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems are cheap in terms of the damage they can inflict on civilian targets.

This tremendous buildup of offensive forces means that the effectiveness of the last weapons used in destroying another society (in fact, the effectiveness of something like the last 90 percent of all weapons used) would be relatively small, since those already expended would have left so little to destroy. The amount of life and property saved by damage-limiting efforts would be dwarfed by the amount destroyed by weapons whose delivery could not be prevented.

We believe this situation will not change significantly in the near future. Any realistic approach to limitations on strategic armaments in the near future must almost certainly be in the context of the maintenance of very great assured-destruction capabilities. Agreements that would embody quite different strategic balances might result if any of several changes were to occur: technological breakthroughs that would lead to the dominance of the defense over the offense, the development of a high degree of trust between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the willingness of both nations to accept intrusive inspection, or an increased appreciation that strategic forces designed to inflict much lower damage levels would also serve effectively as a deterrent. We do not see any of these changes as short-term possibilities.

Because the assured-destruction, or damage-inflicting, capabilities of the two superpowers are so large and so varied, the present strategic balance is remarkably insensitive to either qualitative or quantitiative changes in strategic forces. Even major changes in force levels, including the neutralization of entire systems (for example all bomber aircraft), would not be likely to have major effects on the damage levels one would expect each of the superpowers to suffer in a nuclear war. Worldwide radioactive fallout might be reduced significantly, but as far as the superpowers are concerned, cross-targeting with other systems would ensure that all major population and industrial centers would continue to be in jeopardy. When considered in the framework of the virtually certain collapse of an entire society, changes of a few percent in fatalities, which is all one might expect with foreseeable changes in strategic-force levels, are not likely to affect political decisions. Although it may have been correct some years ago to characterize the balance of terror as a "delicate" one, it is not so today, nor is it likely to be so in the foreseeable future. It will not be easily upset. Opponents of the Safeguard ABM decision have argued with some effect (although obviously not with complete success) that the U.S. deterrent was most unlikely to be in jeopardy at any time in the near future simply because of its diversity and because of the improbability of the U.S.S.R.'s being able to develop damage-limiting capabilities and tactics that would effectively neutralize all the deterrent's components.

We have argued so far that one general premise on whose acceptances a successful SALT outcome depends is that the offense will continue to dominate the defense for the foreseeable future. A second technical generalization that may be equally important is: *The uncertainty about the effectiveness of damage-limiting capabilities will be considerably greater than about assured-destruction capabilities.* This statement can be supported by a number of arguments. First, the characteristics of the target against which assured-destruction capabilities would be used (population and industry) will be known with some precision and will change only slowly with time. On the other hand, the characteristics of the systems (and the environment) against which damage-limiting capabilities must operate (adversary's warheads, delivery vehicles and launch facilities) will be generally less well known and more susceptible to rapid variation, both in quality and in number, at the option of the adversary. Second, some of the damage-limiting systems (such as ABM defenses, antiaircraft defenses and under some circumstances antisubmarine warfare, or ASW, systems) must function at the time chosen by the adversary for his offensive, whereas for assured destruction there is a much bigger "time window" during which performance will be acceptable. The effectiveness of submarine-launched missiles in destroying cities will not depend much on the instant of launch. Third, damage limitation generally will involve the use of more intimately completed systems (for example the radars, computers and missiles of an ABM system), inviting the possibility of "catastrophic" technical failures. All these factors tend to make the advance estimates of the effectiveness of assured destruction systems far more reliable than estimates of damage-limiting systems.

The inherent uncertainty in effectiveness that characterizes the performance of damage-limiting systems has been of profound importance in the Russian-American strategic-arms race. Each side has reacted to the development, or even the possible development, by the other of damage-limiting capabilities by greatly strengthening its offensive forces—to the point of overreaction because of the conservative assumption that the adversary's damage-limiting forces will be far more effective than they are in fact likely to be. For example, the uncertainty about the possible deployment and effectiveness of a large-scale Russian ABM defense has provided the primary rationale for the U.S. decision to introduce MIRV's into both land-based and sea-based missile forces, the net effect being a severalfold increase in the number of warheads these forces will be able to deliver. Barring unforeseeable technical developments, we must expect that the great uncertainty that characterizes the performance of damage-limiting systems will continue, and we must base our approach to SALT on that assumption.

If one accepts the judgments we have made about the relative effectiveness of defense and offense, about the insensitivity of assured-destruction capability to changes in force levels and about the uncertainty that characterizes damage-limiting efforts, one is led to some possibly useful generalizations about the forthcoming substantive phase of SALT.

First, the level of damage that each of the superpowers can inflict on the other is not likely to be altered significantly in the near future. Measures that might possibly be agreed on could change the level of damage that each side could inflict on the other by at most a few percent. Therefore the problem of the reduction in damage in the event of war should probably be given low priority as a short-term negotiation objective. More realistic objectives of the negotiations could be to lower the level of tension between the superpowers and so reduce the probability of nuclear war.

Second, apart from possible worldwide fallout effects and domestic political considerations, neither side need be much concerned about the possibility of modest, or even substantial, expansions in the strategic offensive forces of the other side, nor about precise limitations on those forces, as long as the other side does not have a damage-limiting capability. Because of the large overkill capacities discussed above, even large increases in strategic forces will have little military effect.

Third, measures to constrain the introduction or improvement of damage-limiting systems, particularly those whose performance is expected to be highly uncertain, merit high priority. The introduction or improvement of damage-limiting capabilities by either side is likely to result, as we have noted, in an excessive reaction by the other. Because of the insensitivity of the strategic balance to modest changes in force levels, a move toward the development of a narrowly circumscribed damage-limiting capability by one side could in principle be tolerated without undue concern by the other. Such a move might be perceived, however, as an indicator of the adversary's intent to develop

an across-the-board damage-limiting capability. (Witness Secretary of Defense Laird's public reaction to a possible Soviet SS-9 MIRV capability.) This, coupled with the fact that a development of damage-limiting capabilities can be offset rather quickly and cheaply, virtually ensures a reaction. The overall effect of such an action-reaction cycle on the ability of each side to inflict damage on the other is likely to be small, but the expenditures of both sides on strategic armaments are likely to be much increased, as will be the tensions between them.

Fourth, owing to the large uncertainty that characterizes the effectiveness of damage-limiting systems and tactics, the two superpowers will face a very troublesome dilemma if, on the one hand, they try to develop effective damage-limiting capabilities with respect to emerging nuclear powers and, on the other, they attempt to limit the strategic-arms race between themselves. With a few exceptions, such as a deployment of Russian intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM's) in Siberia, the measures that could have long-term effectiveness against a third country's nuclear strength would appear to the other superpower to foreshadow an erosion in its own assured-destruction, or deterrent, capability. This creates an authentic problem of conflicting desires. We would hope that in efforts to deal with this problem the usefulness of damage-limiting capabilities with respect to the lesser nuclear powers would not be overrated. Although such damage-limiting capabilities probably would be effective in reducing damage in the event that a lesser power attempted a nuclear attack against one of the superpowers, we question whether either superpower would ever be willing to take action against a lesser power on the assumption that damage-limiting efforts would be 100 percent effective, that is, on the assumption that "damage denial" with respect to a lesser power could be achieved. Considering one's inability to have high confidence in the effectiveness of damage-limiting measures, and considering the effects of even a single thermonuclear weapon on a large American or Russian city, we doubt that efforts to develop damage-limiting capabilities with respect to the smaller powers would materially increase the options the superpowers would have available for dealing with these powers.

With this background in mind one would be in a good position to evaluate the relative desirability of limiting various strategic systems if each were unambiguously useful only for damage limitation or assured destruction. Unfortunately many existing or prospective strategic systems may play several roles, a factor that greatly complicates the problem.

Of all the ambiguous developments now under way none is more troublesome than MIRV. The development of a MIRV capability may facilitate the maintenance of an assured-destruction capability by providing high assurance that ABM defenses of industry and population can be penetrated. Given sufficient accuracy, reliability and yield, however, MIRV's may also make it possible for a small number of missiles to destroy a larger number of fixed offensive facilities, even if they are "hardened" against the effects of nuclear weapons.

Although the effectiveness of a given missile force in a damage-limiting preemptive attack against an adversary's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force might be much increased through the use of such MIRV's, is does not necessarily follow that the deployment of the MIRV's would make such a strike more likely. As we have noted in the context of a confrontation between superpowers such an attack would surely be irrational, no matter how severe the crisis, simply because no responsible political leader could ever have high confidence in the effectiveness of the attack and in the effectiveness of the other damage-limiting measures that would be required to keep the damage from a retaliatory response down to acceptable levels. Although MIRV's are not likely to have much actual effect on the willingness or ability of nations to use strategic nuclear forces to attain political objectives, we must accept the fact that arms policies will, to a substantial degree, be based on the assumption that they might be so used.

Beyond that, there is the problem of the impact of MIRV's on events if a crisis should ever escalate to the point where limited numbers of nuclear weapons will have been employed by the superpowers against each other. At some point in the process of escalation it is likely that one or both powers would initiate counterforce attacks against the other's remaining offensive forces. Such an attack would probably come earlier if one or both sides had counterforce-effective MIRV's than if neither did.

Because of what we regard as unwarranted, but nevertheless real, concern about MIRV's being used in a preemptive counterforee attack, and because of more legitimate concern that once a thermonuclear exchange has begun MIRV's may make further escalation more likely, MIRV development may well have a critical impact on the outcome of SALT, and for that matter on the force levels of the two sides independent of the talks. It is generally, although not universally, accepted that the tests of MIRV's have not yet gone far enough for one to have confidence that their reliability and accuracy would be sufficient to assure their effectiveness in a counterforce role against hardenedICBM'sfl On the other hand, the MIRV principle is now demonstrated, and the expectation is common that with perhaps the second generation of such systems, if not with the first, MIRV's will be effective as counterforce weapons.

If no constraints are put on the development of MIRV's, it is likely that each superpower will go ahead with such development and (in the case of the U.S. at least) an early deployment program. This will be regarded as particularly urgent if ABM deployment continues, or even if there continues to be evidence of significant research and development that might later lead to ABM deployment. Assuming that MIRV programs do continue, each superpower will perceive in the other's deployment a possible threat to its fixed-base ICBM's and will react to counter that threat. The U.S. has already begun to do so in deciding to go ahead with an active ABM defense of Minuteman sites; the Safeguard program. Acceleration in the U.S.S.R.'s missile-launching submarine program and a possible mobile-ICBM program are plausible reactions to the U.S. MIRV programs.

We anticipate that in the absence of agreements the technological race will go much further. It seems likely that the arguments to "do something" about the vulnerability of fixed ICBM's will increase in tempo and will carry the day in both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Superhardening alone will be perceived to be a losing game, considering how easily any moves in that direction could be offset by further improvements in missile accuracy. A defense of the Safeguard type will probably also be judged to be a losing proposition. A very heavy defense with components specifically optimized for the defense of hardened ICBM's might be one response. There is likely to be even further reliance on mobile systems; missile-launching submarines, new strategic bombers and, in the case of the U.S.S.R., probably mobile ICBM's. It is conceivable that fixed ICBM's may be given up altogether, although the arguments we have advanced against the acceptability of attacking them preemptively would still be valid.

It is also likely in the absence of agreements that one or the other of the superpowers will deploy ABM systems that will provide more extensive and effective defense of population and industry than either the present Russian defenses around Moscow or the projected Phase II of Safeguard. Defense against a Chinese missile capability may be the rationale, but it is to be expected that the other superpower will respond to any such deployment both by emulation and by increasing its strategic offensive capabilities.

Whereas the strategic-forces budget of the U.S. now amounts to about $9 billion per year (excluding some rather large items for nuclear warheads, research and development, command and control, communications and intelligence actvities), outlays for strategic systems could well double by the mid-1970's. Continuing large expenditures on strategic systems are probably also to be expected in the U.S.S.R.

As we have stated, there appears to be no basis for expecting SALT to lead to significant reductions in the assured-destruction capabilities of the superpowers. Therefore other objectives must command our attention. The most important objective is of course to reduce the probability that a thermonuclear exchange will ever take place.

The major factors affecting that probability are likely not to be simply technical but to be largely political. They involve the degree of tension that will exist between the superpowers based on international political considerations, on domestic politics in each country and in an important sense on the strategic-arms race itself. We believe that in contrast to some previous eras, when the motivations for continuing arms races were largely political and economic conflicts, the strategic-arms race now has a life of its own. For instance, the strategic-weapons programs of the other than on the levels of tension between the two countries. If this race can be attenuated, it would have a number of effects that would result in a diminution of tensions and hence in a reduction in the risk of war. That is perhaps the major reason for the urgency of a serious SALT effort. Keeping budgets for strategic forces at low levels is desirable in its own right in that significant resources, both financial and intellectual, will be freed for more constructive purposes. More important, in the U.S. lower military budgets will diminish the role of what President Eisenhower termed the military-industrial complex: those who have a propensity for, and in some cases obviously a vested interest in, the acquision of more armaments and in exciting and maintaining an often unwarranted attitude of alarm and suspicion regarding an adversary's intentions. Lower military budgets in the U.S.S.R. would almost certainly have a similar desirable effect.

A poorly designed agreement could of course prove to be a vehicle for increasing suspicion and tension. Venturing into the realm of unprovable value judgments, however, we assert that it is not beyond the wit of man to design agreements that would result in there being less objective cause for concern than if the strategic-arms race continues unabated. In general, it would seem that any understanding that slowed the rate of development and change of strategic systems would have an effect in the right direction.

Beyond affecting the probability of a nuclear exchange's beginning, one would like to see strategic forces structured so that there would be at least some possibility that, if an exchange started, it would not have to run its course. A necessary but of course not sufficient condition for this is that there be no particular advantage to be gained from precipitate launch of more nuclear weapons after a few have been dispatched. By this criterion vulnerable ICBM's would seem to be the quintessence of undesirability. If both

sides have them, each will recognize that if they are withheld, they may be destroyed.

Whether or not MIRV development and deployment will be controlled may not be a question for the SALT negotiators to consider, because of the inability of one side or the other to decide in a timely fashion the position it wishes to take on the issue. The rate of MIRV development is so rapid that the question may thus be settled before the substantive phase of the talks is well advanced. If such development is still in doubt, however, either because the talks get to such substantive issues very quickly or because of a moratorium on MIRV testing, MIRV limitation should be an issue of the highest priority.

The arguments for preventing deployment of MIRV's advanced enough to be effective counterforce weapons are persuasive. They have been made at great length elsewhere (for example in public hearings before committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives). We simply summarize here by pointing out that if MIRV deployment is prevented, it may be possible to freeze the strategic balance at something approximating its present level. Most of the incentive to defend hardened ICBM's or to replace them with mobile systems will have been reduced, if not eliminated.

The arguments for continuing MIRV testing and then deployment because MIRV's may someday be required to penetrate an adversary's ABM defenses are not convincing. There is little doubt that currently designed U.S. MIRV's could be deployed on a time scale short compared with that required for deployment of any significant Russian ABM defenses. Accordingly there is no need for any MIRV deployment pending firm evidence that the U.S.S.R. is beginning the construction of such defenses. And there is no need for further research and development tests unless a counterforce capability is intended. For similar reasons the U.S.S.R. should also abstain from further multiple-warhead tests and deployment, which it can do at no great risk to its security.

Essential to the survival of an agreement not to test MIRV's would be a prohibition of large-scale ABM deployment. If ABM systems were deployed, the pressures to deploy MIRV's and to test them frequently in order to maintain confidence in their reliability would be overwhelming. Furtherraore, there would undoubtedly be great domestic pressures to develop and test more sophisticated penetration aids. Under such circumstances neither side could have any confidence that the other was not developing counterforce-effective MIRV's. An ABM freeze would be a logically required companion measure to any agreement prohibiting MIRV's.

Assuming that ABM deployment and MIRV testing are both frozen, the other important component of a strategic-arms-limitation agreement would be an understanding to maintain something like parity in ICBM-force levels by freezing these levels or preferably reducing them, and if necessary permitting replacement of fixed-base ICBM's by mobile systems whose levels could be verified by unilateral means. In the absence of such a measure there would be the possibility of one side's gaining such a superiority in missile strength that, with improved accuracies and even without MIRV's, would enable it to knock out a large fraction of its adversary's forces by delivering a counterforce attack against them. The reasons for concern about such a possibility have been identified above: the probability of arms-race escalation and the reduction in whatever small chance there may be of a nuclear exchange's being terminated short of running its suicidal course.

If the development of MIRV's that are perceived by the adversary to have counterforce capability cannot be prevented (and we are pessimatic about preventing it), the relative importance of some of the measures discussed above will be changed materially. A prohibition on large-scale ABM deployment would still be desirable, but it would be less important; it would not in this case prevent the MIRV genie from escaping the bottle. Moreover, continuing development and deployment of MIRV's would make a large-scale ABM defense unattractive simply on cost-effectiveness grounds.

A provision permitting the replacement of fixed ICBM's by mobile systems would seem virtually unavoidable because of concern about the vulnerability of the ICBM's to counterforce attack. Indeed, in the interest of stabilizing arms at low levels, and to minimize concern about damage-limiting strikes, agreements could probably include measures that would enhance the viability of mobile systems. An area of agreement that would seem to merit most serious consideration would be prohibition on certain improvements in antisubmarine-warfare capabilities. Actually the possibility breakthroughs in antisubmarine warfare is extremely remote. It is probable that through noise reduction, extension of missile range and other techniques the gap between ASW capability and the capability of the missile-launching submarine to escape detection and destruction will widen rather than narrow. Yet it seems likely from recent debate in the U.S. that the present American leadership, and presumably the leadership of the U.S.S.R. as well, would be reluctant to rely solely on a missile-launching submarine force for deterrence, given the possibility of further ASW development by its adversary. Constraints on ASW such as a limitation on the number of hunter-killer submarines would increase the acceptability to both sides of relying more heavily on missile-launching submarines for deterrence.

Similar arguments might be made for limitations on or curtailment of air defense. Such moves would seem less realistic on three counts. First, compliance with limitations on air-defense capabilities could probably not be verified with unilateral procedures as well as could limitations on ASW systems, or for that matter on ABM systems. Intelligence on short-range antiaircraft systems is likely to be poorer than on hunter-killer submarines, specialized ASW aircraft or large-sized components of ABM systems. Second, the overlap between tactical and strategic antiaircraft capabilities is considerable, and neither superpower is likely to be willing to greatly reduce tactical antiaircraft capabilities in the context of SALT. ASW capabilities (except for destroyers) would, on the other hand, have little role other than attack against an adversary's missile-launching submarines. This is far truer now than it was a few years ago because the realization is more widespread that a major war involving large antishipping campaigns is extremely unlikely. Third, neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. is likely to have enough confidence in bombers to rely much on them in a missile age even if air defenses are constrained, whereas both superpowers obviously are prepared to rely heavily on submarine-launched missiles.

Finally, if counterforce-effective MIRV's were a reality, and if as a consequence both sides were to place reliance very largely on mobile systems, additional offensive weapons on one side could not be used effectively to limit the other side's ability to retaliate. Considering this fact and the fact that since strategic-force levels are already at least an order of magnitude larger than is rationally required for deterrence, there would be little incentive for either side to acquire additional offensive capabilities. Also in this situation it would hardly matter if either side were to introduce new assured-destruction systems such as, for example, small mobile ICBM's that could not be easily counted.

Even this incomplete discussion shows that the strategic balance between the superpowers is likely to be very different depending on whether or not MIRV development and ABM deployment are allowed to continue. Both possibilities will have a serious impact on future strategic postures, but with respect to ABM deployment nothing much is going to happen overnight. Dealing with the issue of MIRV development, although perhaps no more important, is far more urgent. That is why it is the watershed issue for SALT. If counterforce-effective MIRV's (and large-scale ABM deployment) can be stopped, the present strategic balance of force levels may endure for some time. If such MIRV's are deployed, the balance will unavoidably change in qualitative ways. How large an escalation in the arms race will result will depend on whether agreement to constrain or cut back other strategic systems could still be negotiated.

We have attempted here to present an objective analysis of the prospects for various agreements to limit strategic armaments. In so doing we are aware that many of our readers will be dismayed that our discussion has been in the context of each superpower's preserving the capability of destroying the other. This has been so not because we ourselves favor the continuing retention of huge stocks of thermonuclear weapons but because we have tried to be realistic. The distrust that exists between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. will induce both to preserve the capability of destroying the other; such a capability, as we have noted, is unfortunately easier to attain than an effective defense of one's own society, whether or not there are agreements on strategic armaments. Both superpowers will preserve this capability because they see it as the only effective deterrent to the war that neither wants or could win.

The most that can reasonably be expected of the forthcoming talks is a move toward a strategic balance where (1) uncertainties about the adversary are reduced and with them some of the tensions; (2) each side can inflict a level of damage on the other sufficient to destroy its society but neither feels a need to maintain a great overkill capability as a hedge against possible damage-limiting efforts by the other; (3) there will be an improved chance that a thermonuclear exchange, should one begin, would be terminated short of running its course, and (4) the levels of expenditure on strategic armaments are lower, so that larger fractions of the resources available to each society can be used for more constructive endeavors.

We believe that the realization of these objectives would be a tremendous accomplishment and one that is possible without the solution of the deep-seated political problems of the Russian-American confrontation. To go further will require dealing with those problems. We do not believe, however, that the superpowers can afford to delay attacking the strategic-arms race while trying to solve political differences. Regrettably the situation with respect to technical developments (MIRV's, ABM defenses and nuclear proliferation), and quite possibly with respect to domestic politics as well, will probably make strategic-arms-limitation negotiations less likely to be successful several years hence than now. Time is of the essence, and we write with a feeling of urgency. Although our tone is pessimistic, we do not despair. We are convinced that latent public support for an agreement could be exploited by effective political leadership on both sides to reverse the trends we have lived with for two decades.

CONTROLLED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES ACT OF 1969

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3246) to protect the public health and safety by amending the

estimated seven North Vietnamese battalions in a successful four-day siege against the government outpost of Muong Soui, straddling the Plain of Jars' western edge. The significance of the action lay less in the enemy victory than its timing; it came as an unusually bad rainy season posed particularly difficult supply problems for the less mobile communist forces.

Moreover, the North Vietnamese didn't stop at Muong Soui. They pushed south and west, severing road links to the royal capital and probing at Long Cheng, northern nerve centre of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and operations base for General Vang Pao's so-called secret army.

The enemy's steamrolling drive shattered the morale of government forces and brought U.S. and Laotian officials to the verge of despair. In late summer the shaken officials decided to hit back hard. A secrecy-shrouded counter-offensive was launched, marked by fierce American aerial pounding and increased American logistical support. The government won back Muong Soui, regained the Plain of Jars and reduced the length of the enemy dry season campaign, which usually ends in May.

Vientiane officials now try to downplay the late-summer action, particularly the Americans' role. They talk of government troops "waltzing in" to the Plain of Jars, finding that the North Vietnamese had abandoned it, leaving behind large amounts of supplies. These officials have a theory to explain that strange turn of events: shortly after Ho Chi Minh's death in early September, they say, enemy forces must have been hurriedly recalled to North Vietnam because of the unsettled situation in Hanoi. So hurried was the recall, they theorise, that cumbersome supplies and equipment had to be left behind.

These officials have no evidence to support that theory. Moreover, when pressed in a private interview, a top-ranking American official conceded that the September events "weren't exactly quite so simple." He admitted that "some pressure" had been applied to enemy encampments before government forces advanced. Some pressure? Could it be, he then was asked, that the pressure consisted of unusually intensive American air attacks? "Look," he said, "let's just say there was considerable pressure and leave it at that. I can't discuss this any further."

So now American officials and government forces await retribution. In the event of a strong enemy strike, Vientiane undoubtedly is ready to accuse the other side of escalating the conflict. Hanoi, however, will surely view the move as a response to the government's late-summer offensive—which was prompted, of course, by the enemy's June assault. The name of this game is escalation. It has been played before by both principals in Vietnam.

So far as is known, the stepped-up US role in the war has not produced a commensurate boost in the number of Americans involved. That figure, according to reliable estimates, is between 400 and 500 of the more than 1,000 US government employees stationed here. No American combat forces operate in Laos.

US officials deny the conflict in escalating and discount the possibility of Laos evolving into another Vietnam. They say the fighting will remain limited, largely because Washington and Hanoi both want it that way. Some of these officials resent the recent furor about Laos, and the Senate subcommittee hearings that developed from it. The whole thing, they say, was needless and probably will prove harmful.

"Most of the senators in those hearings knew what has been going on here," says one embassy source. "They've been kept well-informed. Nothing has been hidden from them." He describes the week-long Washington hearings, which ended early in November, as a "gimmick." Some senators' goals, he says, were to arouse unwarranted public concern and capitalise on it.

At the hearings' end, Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the influential Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said that US operations in Laos had been conducted without the knowledge or consent of Congress. He concluded that Washington's involvement in Laos was "most unusual and irregular—if not unconstitutional."

Senator Fulbright demanded the fullest possible public disclosure of that involvement; he also demanded, by implication, a reassessment of the US role by top administration policymakers, including President Nixon. Thus far he has achieved neither. There have been no indications, moreover, that either full disclosure or far-reaching reassessment by the administration is imminent.

Early this month the US State Department made it clear it wanted to prevent for security reasons much of the subcommittee's report being released. As a result the subcommittee took the stance that a censored version would distort the real picture in Laos so it would release nothing until it was satisfied an accurate version would be allowed to be published.

Not surprisingly, some American officials here believe that and public debate about Laos would be harmful. "Publicly discussing a policy can have the effect of locking you into it," explains one source. "It's much easier to back off from a policy if you haven't officially adopted it." He neglected to mention that it also is easier to maintain a policy—especially a controversial one—by avoiding public debate on it.

Ironically, those most in the dark about Laos are the American people. More than simply being unaware of the scope of US operations here, they have yet to be told by their government that their nation is militarily involved in Laos. American officials still seek to officially conceal US violations of the 1962 Geneva Accord, which bars all forms of foreign military intervention in Laos. They contend that Hanoi's refusal to concede the presence of North Vietnamese troops here makes it diplomatically unfeasible for Washington to act otherwise.

Consequently, everyone in Vientiane, from the Russian ambassador to the *mamasan* of the legendary White Rose, knows what the Americans are doing here. But the American public remains ignorant of the fact that their government is arming, training, supplying, transporting and directing approximately 70,000 Laotian troops in a war which threatens to get out of hand.

Instead of setting the record at least partially straight US officials here do things like allowing Vang Pao to declare recently, before a sizable contingent of visiting journalists, that his Meo forces fight with antiquated weapons, inadequate communications and inconsequential American support. As he was speaking, American F-4 Phantom jets roared overhead, several American observation planes were parked nearby and three cargo-laden American transport planes landed in quick succession at his official Sam Thong base. After denying he even received indirect US military support, Vang Pao calmly climbed into an unmarked American helicopter, guarded by Laotians carrying American-made M-16 automatic rifles, and was flown back to his secret Long Cheng headquarters by a three-man American crew.

Vang Pao and official verbiage notwithstanding, American involvement in the Laotian conflict takes the following principal forms: In addition to 75 military advisers listed as embassy "attaches", about 300 men are employed in a variety of clandestine military activities supervised by the CIA. Although technically civilians, many CIA agents in Laos are former Special Forces soldiers recruited because of military expertise and Vietnam experience.

These ex-Green Berets train government troops, assist wide-ranging reconnaissance teams and plan guerrilla and psychological warfare operations. They wear combat fatigues and work out of three main camps, where they administer rigorous training in jungle warfare, guerilla tactics, communications handling and weaponry.

The CIA also maintains and largely controls Vang Pao's army of approximately 15,000 fulltime troops. Official instructions to the contrary, CIA personnel occasionally accompany these forces on combat forays. More than 20 agents have been killed in Laos. Among the most recent CIA casualties was Phil Werbisky, a former Special Forces captain widely known for his exploits during the early days of Vietnam. He was killed in the government's late-summer offensive.

"These guys are tigers," says an American personally acquainted with many CIA agents in Laos. "They're tough, intelligent guys who know how to handle themselves. They're not afraid to mix it up out in the jungle." The American is a civilian engineer who befriended many agents while helping to build airstrips on several of their remote outposts. "They came to Laos because they were fed up with having their hands tied in Vietnam," he says. "Here they're doing things the way they want to, and getting better pay for it as well."

An important CIA adjunct in Laos has the innocuous title of "Requirements Office". It is staffed by about 90 men, most of whom also are ex-military types. Their function may be inconspicuous, but it is not innocuous. Stationed at field level, requirements officers—called ROs—handle the distribution of arms and ammunition, as well as general logistics. They are vital to any military operation mounted by the government.

Learning about these activities prompted Senator Fulbright to raise a key question about the CIA's role here: since its function ostensibly is to gather information, why is this agency running a war in Laos? "I don't approve of this kind of activity at all," Fulbright said. "But if it is in the national security interest to do this, it seems to me it ought to be done by regular US army forces and not by an intelligence-gathering agency." He added that the National Security Act, which created the CIA, "never contemplated this function" for the agency.

The CIA mission chief in Laos is Lawrence Devlin, listed as a "political officer" in the US embassy. Unlike most political officers, however, Devlin flatly refuses to see reporters. For all anybody knows, he might agree on that last point with Senator Fulbright, who stressed that he was not criticising the CIA. "The agency is just following orders," Fulbright said.

Cargo and military supplies—as well as personnel—are ferried throughout Laos by Air America and Continental Air Services, private charter firms under contract to the US government. They are better known as the "CIA Airlines", and most of their pilots are ex-air force officers. Reporters are allowed to accompany flights involving rice drops to refugee camps, but are banned when military cargoes are carried.

"Why do you guys always ask about weapons and ammo shipments?" pilot Jim Walsh asked me. Walsh, 38, is an ex-air force officer who has worked in Laos for Air America since 1962. "You know we're not allowed to talk about such things," he said.

Another form of American air service in Laos constitutes the most direct US involvement in the fighting. Under the euphemism of "armed reconnaissance flights", Thailand-based American jets and bombers have mounted aerial bombardments equal to the pounding taken by North Vietnam prior to the bombing halt in 1968. The Ho Chi Minh trail in southeast Laos has been the prime target of American air attacks, but enemy encampments and troops on the Plain of

wars came under heavy fire during the recent government offensive.

Money for many US operations in Laos is cloaked in the budget of the mammoth Agency for International Development, or channelled through other unobstrusive conduits. The scope of American financial support of the neutralist Royal Lao government testifies to the effectiveness of such cover. Total American assistance here is reliably estimated at between US$250 million and $300 million per year. Of that, only the technical aid budget—about $60 million—is made public. The rest, undisclosed, goes almost entirely for military purposes.

US officials here stress that American money and manpower expenditures in Laos are miniscule compared to those in Vietnam. Washington is spending about $30,000 million a year in Vietnam, and has lost almost 40,000 servicemen there. Less than 200 US personnel—mostly airmen—have been killed in Laos. A small, covert conflict fought by volunteers may not be especially laudable, they say, but it beats a big bloody one battled by draftees.

Perhaps, but what happens when a little war threatens to escalate into a huge ugly one like Vietnam? As Tom Wicker pointed out this month in the New York Times as he discussed the prospect of Hanoi presenting a choice to the US of seeing Laos fall or engaging ground troops in battle. He wrote: "This 'choice' does not yet seem to have been presented and while North Vietnam is under heavy manpower, logistical and economic pressures from its undertakings in Vietnam, it probably won't be: but in an ironic twist on the domino theory, anything that puts an end to those presures in the South, including defeat for Hanoi as well as victory or a negotiated settlement, could cause North Vietnam to try either to recoup or to keep up its momentum in Laos."

A top embassy official in Vientiane argues: "There is no chance of this turning into another Vietnam. We know the mistakes made in Vietnam, and we have no intention of repeating them. Hanoi understands our position here. We seek no wider war."

Does it sound familiar?

SALT: THE CASE FOR AN IN-PLACE HALT

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, paragraph 2 of section 2, article II of the U.S. Constitution reads:

> He (the President) shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.

It seems evident that the Constitution makes it incumbent upon the Senate to advise the executive branch throughout the treaty-making process—and to be kept advised in turn by the Executive—so that the advice and consent of the Senate in the making of the treaty can truly be ascertained.

Note that the Constitution does not employ the word "concluded," but says that treaties shall be made with the advice and consent of the Senate.

This is not simply a constitutional obligation to be dutifully honored. It makes good sense for both executive and legislative branches.

The executive branch must know what treaties the Senate would be willing to approve to know the range of measures open to its negotiators. Especially important, we must avoid an impasse in which the Senate refuses to provide the two-thirds majority required to ratify a treaty already agreed upon by the Executive.

With this in mind, I wish to address myself to the problems and opportunities presented by the opening of the strategic arms limitation talks—SALT—between ourselves and the Soviet Union. I wish to give advice on a kind of treaty to which I would be prepared to give my consent.

Mr. President, it appears we now enjoy a political and strategic climate in which it may be possible to end the Soviet-American arms race.

The best way to bring this about may be to negotiate an immediate interim freeze on certain tests and the deployment of all American and Soviet strategic weapons. In other words, Mr. President, what I am suggesting is an as is, where is, in-place halt.

Many Members of this body hope that the forthcoming talks will result in significant agreements on arms control. But the range of alternative proposals that could lead to agreements is severely limited.

There are only three basic possibilities. First, we might seek a series of partial agreements. We might, for example, try to limit only ballistic missile defenses, or the testing and deployment of multiple warheads, or the introduction of new families of strategic weapons.

Second, we might seek an agreement only on the total numbers of offensive and defensive weapons. Thus we might, for example, permit each side to have 1,500 missiles and 500 missile defense interceptors. The permitted quotas could be used in a variety of ways.

Under such an agreement, missiles on land might be transferred to ships, and so on. Such an agreement, of course, would not halt the qualitative arms race in which each permitted missile can be made larger, or fitted with a more powerful or more efficient warhead.

Third, we might seek an "in-place halt." Such an agreement would freeze not only numbers but characteristics of weapons and their modes of deployment. This would truly bring the arms race to a full stop for a period of a few years.

It is important not to lose sight of the many political and strategic advantages of negotiating the third type of agreement.

It would avoid the time-consuming negotiation of partial measures complicated by an ever-changing strategic and political context. Unlike a loose overall agreement, which would limit only the quantity of weapons, the "in-place halt" would also prohibit a qualitative arms race.

Moreover, an "in-place halt" would preserve the rough parity in strategic weapons that is acknowledged by both sides, and therefore would not jeopardize the security of either the United States or the Soviet Union.

I believe that to seek, initially, less than an "in-place halt" would be a serious political and strategic error.

Any partial approach is less likely to lead to successful negotiation, less likely to produce Senate ratification, and less likely to succeed in the basic aim of halting the arms race.

And, even if an overall agreement on numbers is achieved, the result might be not only disillusioning but dangerous if an accelerated qualitative arms race ensues.

Strategically, a failure to exploit the present opportunity for a successful halt to the arms race may have an adverse effect on American security.

From the most secure nation in the world, we have become one of the countries to be directly attacked if a nuclear war that nobody wants should somehow occur.

Our security can be still further eroded by the development of ever more destructive and less controllable weapons. Political incidents that occur in the midst of an ever-changing strategic context are more likely to trigger war than those which might occur after an arms halt had calmed the international waters.

For these reasons I believe the "in-place halt" has strong political and strategic advantages, but I recognize that there are bureaucratic reasons why these advantages may be overlooked.

The SALT talks pose a dilemma for our military planners. On the one hand, they want to be able to continue buying the weapons they find desirable. On the other hand, they would like to negotiate a halt so that the other side would stop buying these very same weapons.

At each stage of negotiations, our military planners are torn. They would like to have a missile defense, but they do not want the other side to have one.

They would like to have multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles—MIRV—but they do not want the other side to have them.

There is a real risk that, at the critical stages of negotiation, our military planners will feel a stronger desire to get the weapons they want rather than to achieve an agreement that would deny those weapons to the other side. Thus, the military planners may prefer the approach of seeking quantitative limits only—an approach that leaves the way open for a qualitative race.

Not only would such massive loopholes be both unfortunate and dangerous, but the Senate might well refuse to ratify such a treaty. Military planners tend to be more interested in what the treaty permits them to do. But the Senate is apt to be more concerned about what the treaty permits the other side to do.

I believe that we are at the time in our history when the Senate may not find it desirable to retain the freedom to continue increasing our nuclear missile forces at the cost of permitting the other side to do the same.

SECTION 2

Any discussion of the strategic weapons problem must begin with what the United States and the Soviet Union already have.

The United States is ahead in sublaunched missiles and intercontinental bombers. The Soviet Union is ahead in land-launched missiles and has made a beginning on a missile defense around Moscow.

Over the past few years, while the United States has been making qualitative improvements, the Soviet Union has

been attempting to catch up quantitatively.

However, we see that the United States is still ahead in total nuclear warheads and, according to these plausible projections, would continue to be ahead even if both sides added multiple warheads.

This seems an excellent time for an "in-place halt." It would, in particular, prevent the enormous escalation shown on chart two when multiple warheads are added.

Furthermore, this shows the irrelevancy of who's "ahead" today. Two hundred and fifty warheads are necessary to destroy 50 cities, with the assumption that five warheads are assigned to each city.

We now have enough warheads to destroy these 50 cities 15 times over, with five warheads for each. Remember that the destructive power of *each* of these warheads averages more than *50 times* that of the Hiroshima bomb. The Soviet Union has a similar "overkill" capacity.

All this is merely another way of saying what everyone really knows. Nuclear war would be mutually devastating for the United States and the Soviet Union. No political leader would have any chance of destroying the other country without having his own country destroyed.

Of course, such a leader would plan to destroy initially as many opposing weapons as he could so as to limit the retaliatory force of the other side.

But even on paper, the problem of destroying enemy missile-firing submarines on station is widely acknowledged as insurmountable. And the problem of mounting a successfully coordinated simultaneous attack on these, as well as other weapons systems, introduces a further order of uncertainty if not impossibility.

For these and other reasons, a calculated attack by either side even an attack based on fear of a preemptive attack—has properly become unthinkable.

Adding more advanced weapons systems does not further reduce the probability of such an attack. If more sophisticated weapon systems are brought at the price of letting the other side also buy more, fears of an automatically triggered nuclear war more than likely will rise, rather than fall. In these considerations lie the strategic argument for a comprehensive *"in-place halt."*

What would a comprehensive "in-place halt" be like? It would simply prevent any chance in the numbers and kinds, and modes of deployment, of land-launched missiles, sub-launched missiles, intercontinental bombers and anti-missiles. In particular, steps would be taken to ban further flight tests of MIRV's and their deployment on existing missiles.

How long could such an "in-place halt" last? It could last as long as the two powers wanted to make it last. It could, for example, be a 2-year agreement upon which further agreements would be based.

Later agreements might well call for the mutually balanced destruction of land-based missiles, which are increasingly recognized as obsolete.

Here we would have real disarmament—a reduction in the number of weapons whose inadvertent, or untimely use might lead to an otherwise avoidable holocaust.

The purpose of such an "in-place halt" would be to blunt the forward thrust of the arms race and give the negotiators a stable strategic context in which to reach further agreements.

Let me summarize the practical advantages of such an agreement.

First of all, an "in-place halt," rather than a more limited agreement, is the only kind of treaty that would completely halt the arms race.

Second, a partial, or a less restrictive, agreement could actually lead to a stimulation of the arms race. For example, if we negotiate an agreement limiting only missiles, or MIRV's, both sides will make correspondingly greater efforts on antiballistic missiles.

If the agreement limits only antiballistic missiles, more funds will be expended on offensive missiles.

In other words, a partial limitation can encourage substitute expenditures on weapons that are not prohibited by the agreement.

For these reasons, it is also true that: The strategic implications of an "in-place halt" are easier to assess than those of partial measures. After all, an "in-place halt" maintains the situation that we now have—one that we understand quite well and are willing to accept.

A less comprehensive agreement raises many uncertainties. What new weapons might be built? What agreements might later fail to be achieved?

In terms of future uncertainties, it is easier to end the arms race at one stroke than by measures.

This is also true of the difficult matter of inspection. It is easier to verify compliance with an "in-place halt" than it is to verify compliance with more limited agreements.

Inspection simply becomes a search for anything new or for unusual strategic activity. For example, it is not necessary to keep track of shifting missile deployments to see that numbers are kept within an agreed quantity. In this case both sides would be bound to insure that no more missiles or warheads of any kind are added.

From a security point of view, an "in-place halt" may also be easier to justify than more limited agreements. The security of both sides is considered to be protected by the uneasy arms balance that exists today. The political leadership on both sides probably would prefer to ratify what exists than to risk an unknown strategic future and face the monumental expenditures which an escalation of the arms race would demand.

And, as a result of this, a negotiating posture that calls for an "in-place halt" is more readily understandable to all parties.

We live in an age of cease-fire. And this notion can also be applied to the arms race. It will require hard bargaining to do away with weapon systems. But it need not take hard and long bargaining to stop the present arms race. In my opinion, the current political and strategic climate makes an "in-place halt" a realistic proposal.

President Nixon has said we have "sufficiency" in our defense posture. And the Defense Department does not doubt that we are secure.

There are, then, no prospects for improving our security in a continuing arms race. Why not offer to stop now?

If the Soviet Union declines to accept the agreement, then all will know that we at least tried. We will still have the option at that time to pursue more limited agreements.

In any event I think there is a real possibility that if we take the initiative and offer this proposal at the forthcoming talks in Vienna on April 16, the entire arms race can be brought to a halt.

Such an as is, where is, "in-place halt" would be the best possible beginning to the end of the arms race.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S FIRST YEAR

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, today marks the first anniversary of the inauguration of Richard M. Nixon as the 37th President of the United States.

In his first year in office, the President has compiled an outstanding record of performance—a record that has earned him the high praise and strong support of his fellow countrymen.

A significant analysis and appraisal of the first year written by Garnett D. Horner, appeared yesterday in the Washington, D.C., Sunday Star.

I ask unanimous consent that a copy be reprinted at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Sunday Star, Jan. 18, 1970]

NIXON'S FIRST YEAR

(By Garnett D. Horner)

During his first year in office, President Nixon has given American foreign policy a definite new direction and moved in numerous ways to make the government work better at home.

His calm, unspectacular but firm leadership and realistic approach to the nation's problems at home and abroad seem to fit the mood of the country.

Public opinion polls attest that the majority of Americans believe he is doing a good job.

Nixon himself is far from satisfied with the results of his efforts since he became President a year ago Tuesday. He is not the kind of man ever to be satisfied.

Two of the toughest problems confronting the President a year ago—the Vietnam war and inflation—persist. But there has been progress, and he feels he is on the right course to solutions.

Nixon can be proud of many accomplishments in other fields.

Intangible but, comforting, there seems to have been an increase of public confidence in government under Nixon's leadership. Knowledgeable officials claim American prestige abroad has risen, too.

Nixon's associates attribute much of the increased respect for the American presidency at home and abroad to the way he asserts leadership. This is hard to define.

However, he conveys a sense of knowing fully what he is doing when he makes a decision.

He explores all the options open to him with advisers and outsiders who may have something to contribute. Then he makes his own decisions, often overruling his closest advisers. For example, when he was preparing to report to the country on Vietnam last Nov. 3, many told him he would have to withdraw more troops, and propose a cease-fire to win public support.

He overruled those points of view to pursue the course he felt was right—and the speech he gave on Nov. 3 is generally credited with promoting increased public confidence in his Vietnam policy.

FOREIGN COMMITMENTS

Similarly, at a cabinet meeting at Camp David last summer, the President overruled some of his advisers to go ahead with the family assistance program he proposed to Congress to shift the nation's welfare systems from a services strategy to a jobs and income strategy.

With Nixon avoiding spectacular promises and dramatic rhetoric, some of the most significant developments of his first year in office may have been largely buried under headlines about Vietnam moratoriums and battles with Congress so far as public attention is concerned.

One of the most important of these developments was the President's promulgation of the "Nixon doctrine." Applied specifically to Asia when the President proclaimed it at Guam July 25, the basic philosophy of this doctrine is guiding administration policy in Latin America and elsewhere in the world.

Essentially this policy tells the nations of Asia and other regions: The United States is not going to solve your problems for you; you work out your own ways to deal with them and we will help where we can, but not fight your wars for you or dictate your economic development programs. It encourages initiatives by the countries of the region to develop their own defense and economic improvement arrangements.

This "new direction" for American foreign policy reverses the post-World War II predominant role of the U.S. as the policeman and prime economic planner of the free world. It does not mean American withdrawal from the Pacific or any other part of the world.

The U.S. would keep its commitments, would still have a role, but encourage local and regional initiatives.

Lack of any progress in Vietnam, peace negotiations has been a big disappointment of Nixon's first year.

Still, the Vietnam situation is pretty well reversed from a year ago. American troops are being gradually pulled out instead of poured in, as South Vietnamese forces take over greater share of the burden of defending their country.

The fighting has de-escalated. During the latest week for which figures are available—the week ending Jan. 10—American casualties were listed at 98 dead, as compared to 151 for the same week a year ago.

Developments in other foreign policy and national security areas during the first year of the Nixon administration have included:

A beginning toward opening communications with Communist China. Nixon has made it known that he is prepared to have serious, concrete and he hopes constructive talks with the Red Chinese. He considers that the 800 million people on the Chinese mainland—some 25 percent of the human race—are a reality that cannot be ignored.

A Nixon order banning American manufacture, storage or use of biological and chemical warfare weapons. As well as humanitarian grounds, his decision was based on a conviction that once germ warfare was used it might not be controllable and could spread death all over the world.

Beginning of talks with the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitation after the most thorough and systematic preparation ever made for any disarmament negotiations by this country.

The President's visit to key allied nations in Europe early in his administration to carry out his campaign pledge to give more attention to Europe and to consult with America's allies before negotiating with its foes—laying the basis for co-ordination of allied viewpoints in the SALT talks with Russia.

His round-the-world trip in midsummer, starting in Asia where his knowledge and understanding of their problems won the respect and confidence of the leaders of the nations he visited, and climaxing with a tremendously enthusiastic reception in the streets of Bucharest that tended to lift the Iron Curtain a bit.

A noticeable lack of vilification and personal attacks against Nixon in the Soviet press and by Soviet leaders during the past year, which administration officials believe may result from the conciliatory but firm tone the President has used in seeking an era of negotiation.

On the domestic front, Nixon entered the White House under the handicap of having Congress under control of the opposition party—the first President in 120 years to do so.

Still, there was progress on some issues and the first session of the 91st Congress ended with the Republican President's personal relations with the Democratic leaders of the House and Senate described by intimates as quite good, and these leaders much more cooperative, especially in the foreign policy field, than a year ago.

The major thrust of the Nixon administration domestically has been reform—an effort to make the government work better in delivering services to the people.

The word "reform" recurs in much of the legislation the President proposed to Congress. He won draft reform and tax reform bills. His postal reform proposals are still pending.

Among the legislative proposals for which Nixon personally fought and won were his program for limited deployment of antiballistic missiles and extension of the surtax. His major defeat was the Senate turndown of his nomination of Judge Clement F. Haynsworth for the Supreme Court.

Much of the administration's "reform" produces few headline-making results, but can have long range effects of major importance.

One of Nixon's first acts as President—seven days after entering office—was to order uniform regional boundaries and headquarter cities for operations of government departments and agencies around the country—an unspectacular but efficiency-promoting move.

To assure orderly development of policies involving programs carried out by different agencies, the President created the Urban Affairs Council, the Environmental Quality Council and the Rural Affairs Council. This means, for example, that a school aid program of HEW will be coordinated with a housing aid program of HUD in the UAC. It means full consideration given to such facts that a mass transportation system helps unemployment by providing a way for unskilled workers living in the inner city to get to jobs in new factories on the outskirts.

Considered by the administration as one of its most profound reforms is the "new federalism" concept—a change of course in the way the federal government conducts its business. The basic concept is that a government service should be performed at the level of government—federal, state or local—where it can most effectively be done. Some things the federal government can do better; many it has been doing could be done better by the states or local governments, is the idea.

NEW FEDERALISM

The "new federalism" involves considerable decentralization of government.

To make it work requires more money at the state and local government levels. So Nixon proposed a revenue-sharing plan to plow back to the states, without any strings, a percentage of federal revenues. Congress has not acted on the proposal.

One of the simple reforms Nixon proposed was incorporated in the tax reform bill—to stop levying income tax on people the government defines as poor. He found the government had been collecting about $600 million a year from the poor—enough to finance about one-third the budget of the antipoverty agency.

Most of Nixon's actions during his first year in office have been in line with what he said during his 1968 campaign he would do.

During that campaign, one of his statements that may strike him now as among the most profound was that "it is an inescapable fact of our national life today that we cannot afford to do all that we wish."

He has had to postpone many things that he would have liked to do in order to meet the overriding necessity, as he sees it, of holding down federal spending in order to combat inflation.

Rising uncontrollable government expenditures, such as interest on the national debt, have forced cuts elsewhere to the tune of some $7 billion during the current fiscal year.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

REPORT ON OPERATIONS UNDER THE FOOD STAMP ACT OF 1964

A letter from the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, for Marketing and Consumer Services, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on operations under the Food Stamp Act of 1964 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1968

A letter from the Chairman, Federal Power Commission, transmitting, for the information of the Senate, a copy of the publication "Statistics of Privately Owned Electric Utilities in the United States, 1968" (with an accompanying document); to the Committee on Commerce.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, or presented, and referred as indicated:

By the PRESIDENT pro tempore:

A resolution of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Kentucky; to the Committee on the Judiciary:

"SENATE RESOLUTION NO. 12

"A resolution honoring the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

"Whereas, January 15 is the anniversary of the birth of the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; and

"Whereas, throughout his life Dr. King exemplified the principles of adherence to law and of bettering the law through lawful change; and

"Whereas, Dr. King has become the symbol to all Americans of the power of passive persuasion; and

"Whereas, there is now before the Congress of the United States House Resolution 7703,

Official Says ABM Won't Harm SALT

By Warren Unna
Washington Post Staff Writer

The U.S. arms control chief told a House committee yesterday that expanded deployment of the Safeguard antiballistic missile system would not hamper missile talks with the Russians. But in the Senate, ABM opponents launched a campaign to block further deployment.

Gerard Smith, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and chief negotiator for the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) coming up in April, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that he thought Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird's plan for wider deployment "will not prejudice the SALT talks, not make them (the Russians) lose interest."

"I have no problems of conscience here," Smith said. "I am not echoing a party line."

But then he added: "It is difficult for me to see a (negotiating) process that went on indefinitely while the Soviet Union continued to build up its offensive missiles . . .The appetite for negotiations will not persist if the strategic arms competition goes on full blast."

Smith intimated that research now is being conducted on ways to carry out on-site inspection of the multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV), without having to pry too deeply by lifting the nose cone to count the components.

He also said he disagreed with his predecessor, William Foster, arms control chief under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, who recently declared the cause of peace was worth the risk of adopting a workable inspection system that might not be absolutely foolproof.

Meanwhile, Sen. Philip A. Hart (D-Mich.) announced that he and Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) would try to block the administration's proposal of adding to the ABM sites in Montana and North Dakota a third site at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri.

Hart and Cooper led the Senate opposition to the initial ABM deployment measure last year and lost out by a tie vote.

Hart told a news conference that he saw little change in last year's negative votes and thought some senators who supported the measure last year would not go along with further ABM deployment until they saw how the prototype tested out.

Meanwhile, John S. Foster Jr., Pentagon director of research and engineering, told two Senate committees that the Soviets now have 275 large SS-9 strategic missiles deployed or under construction and that more ABM deployment would be a "major step" to protect U.S. land-based missiles.