

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 91-1517), explaining the purposes of the measure.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

House Concurrent Resolution 785 as referred would provide (1) that (with the permission of the copyright owner of the book, "Our American Government and How It Works: 1001 Questions and Answers," by Wright Patman, Member of Congress, published by Bantam Books, Inc.) there be printed as a House document, as soon as practicable, for maximum usefulness to Members of the 92d Congress, with emendations, the pamphlet entitled "Our American Government. What Is It? How Does It Function?" and (2) that there be printed 1,084,000 additional copies of such document, of which 206,000 copies would be for the use of the Senate (2,000 per Member) and 878,000 copies would be for the use of the House of Representatives (2,000 per Member). Copies of the document would be prorated to Members of the Senate and House of Representatives for a period of 60 days, after which the unused balances would be distributed by the respective Senate and House document rooms.

The amendment approved by the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration would reduce the Senate allotment of the publication from 206,000 to 103,000 (from 2,000 to 1,000 per Member). This action by the committee was motivated by the fact that certain Members of the Senate still have considerable quantities of the previous edition of the document available for distribution. The committee has also amended the title of the concurrent resolution to properly identify the compilation to be printed.

The printing-cost estimate, supplied by the Public Printer, is as follows:

<i>Printing-cost estimate</i>	
To print as a document (1,500 copies)-----	\$1,191.07
981,000 additional copies, at \$72.39 per thousand-----	71,014.59
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Total estimated cost, H. Con. Res. 785, as amended-----	72,205.66

CORRECTION IN THE ENROLLMENT OF H.R. 4605

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask that the Chair lay before the Senate a message from the House on House Concurrent Resolution 797.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FANNIN). The Chair lays before the Senate House Concurrent Resolution 797, which will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

H. CON. RES. 797

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Clerk of the House of Representatives, in the enrollment of the bill (H.R. 4605) to amend the Tariff Act of 1930 and the United States Code to remove the prohibitions against importing, transporting, and mailing in the United States mails articles for preventing conception, is authorized and directed to strike out "title 18" in section 6(2) and insert in lieu thereof "title 39".

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of the concurrent resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the concurrent resolution was considered and agreed to.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at an appropriate time there be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, with a time limitation of 3 minutes on statements made therein.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1971—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments to the Senate to the bill (H.R. 19590) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, and for other purposes.

I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FANNIN). Is there objection to the present consideration of the report?

(For conference report, see House proceedings of today.)

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, this conference report represents the efforts of the second committee of conference to resolve the differences between the two Houses with respect to the Department of Defense appropriation bill for fiscal year 1971. The first conference report was tabled on my motion earlier today, and the second committee of conference met in two sessions today to resolve the matters in the first conference report that were opposed by a number of Members of the Senate. I will comment on these points in detail during the course of my introductory remarks.

Earlier today, there was a full debate on the issues involved in the new language adopted in our second conference, and I will not take the time of the Senate to again discuss the issues involved.

The committee of conference agreed

on appropriations totaling \$66,595,937,000, which is—

Under the budget estimates of \$68,745,666,000 by \$2,149,729,000;

Over the Senate bill of \$66,417,077,000 by \$178,860,000; and

Under the House bill of \$66,806,561,000 by \$210,624,000.

As this bill passed the Senate, it represented a reduction of \$389,484,000 in the House-passed bill, and, as I have stated, the committee of conference agreed to increases in the Senate bill of only \$178,860,000; so that the Senate conferees maintained considerably more than half of the Senate decrease.

The conference committees met on six separate occasions, and these meetings involved approximately 14 hours of deliberations. Just as the Senate conferees were determined to maintain the position of the Senate, so the House conferees were determined to maintain the position of the House, and the recommendations of the conference committee represent the honest efforts to compromise the differences in the two versions of the bill.

I want to call attention to the fact that the task of the Senate conferees was extremely difficult in view of the letter the Secretary of Defense sent to the conference committee. In this letter, the Secretary requested the conference committee to recommend appropriations totaling \$67,209,100,000, which amount would have been \$402.6 million over the House bill and \$792 million over the Senate bill. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point a copy of the Secretary's letter, referred to as Exhibit A.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXHIBIT A
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C.

HON. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
Chairman, Department of Defense Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: We have carefully considered the actions of the House and Senate on the 1971 Defense Appropriation Bill (H.R. 19590). The bill as it passed the House would provide \$66,906.6 million, a reduction of \$1,939.1 million from the request. The Senate Bill would provide \$66,417.1 million, which is \$389.5 million below the House Bill and \$2,328.6 million below our original request. After reconsideration, and taking into account the latest information available to us, we find that we require a minimum of \$67,209.1 million. This is \$402.6 million above the House Bill, \$792 million above the Senate Bill, and \$1,536.6 million below our January request.

I cannot emphasize too strongly that the FY 1971 budget estimates we submitted in January were rock bottom, the lowest amounts consistent with our national security needs. Adjusted for pay and price increases, that budget was about 20% (over \$17 billion) below FY 1968, the peak war year. In the same constant dollars, the FY 1971 budget was about \$5 billion (7%) above the prewar FY 1964 level. Incremental war costs in FY 1971 are more than twice \$5 billion; baseline forces have been cut sharply from the FY 1964 level. Defense spending comprised 34.6% of the FY 1971 Federal budget total—the lowest percentage since FY 1950. Defense spending as projected in the FY 1971 budget would be 7% of the gross national product—the lowest percent-

age since FY 1951. From the June 1968 peak, the budget projected a drop of 639,000 military personnel and 142,000 civilians by June 1970, a total drop of 781,000 direct personnel, removing most of the wartime buildup. Defense-related employment in industry will fall by over one million in the same period, so that the total manpower impact of Defense cutbacks is about two million jobs. Outlays for procurement, construction and RDT&E (war costs included) as projected in the budget for FY 1971 were below the prewar (FY 1964) level in constant dollars. The baseline force costs projected in the FY 1971 budget (that is, the total budget less the incremental cost of the war) are the lowest since before the Korea buildup. The same is true of baseline military manpower.

Our sharply-reduced budget request must also be considered in terms of the national security threats we face. The threat certainly has not lessened since 1964. As you know, the intervening years have been a great expansion in Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities, and a massive buildup in their naval forces. Soviet activities in the Middle East and elsewhere are a source of increasing concern. The invasion of Czechoslovakia has served to remind us of the reality of the threat on the Continent. The years since 1964 have also seen a steady growth in the nuclear power of the Chinese People's Republic. It is threats such as these, and the continuing needs of the war effort, which we have had to balance against the need for achieving a minimal budget in the long-run interests of the American economy. The same weighing of threats and resource requirements played a central role in the evolution of the Nixon Doctrine. Full support and implementation of this doctrine is vital to the maintenance of adequate national security with minimal Defense budgets; our 1971 requests represent a long step in this direction. We need your understanding and full support as we move through this transition. I especially ask that you consider the impact of 1971 budget actions upon the posture we must achieve for the 1970's. Two key elements are modernization and the maintenance of a strong R&D effort; both of these are very much involved in our appeal of some of the cuts made in the FY 1971 bill. The Nixon Doctrine will continue to require a high level of effort in these areas. Looking somewhat ahead, it must be recognized that there will be a growing need for aid to our allies, offsetting some of the budgetary savings from cutbacks in U.S. forces. In short, we were fully aware of the need to present the lowest possible Defense budget, consistent with our national security needs. Cuts as deep as those in the Bill as it stands cannot be accommodated within our minimal requirements for national security.

In the eleven months since the estimates were prepared, there have been many changes involving specific estimates and items, frequently involving a decrease in the amount necessary. The House and Senate took account of these items in appropriation actions, and, as noted, we have accepted many of the specific reductions. The changes, however, work both ways, and it must be understood that many changes have caused increases in the amounts necessary. For example, the change in plans with respect to Southeast Asia deployments which made it possible for us to accept sharp House cuts in Marine Corps appropriations also produced an increase in Army costs.

The House added \$58.5 million in critically-needed funds for our Vietnamization program, \$23.9 million to cover increased Air Force and Navy program needs, plus \$150 million added on the Floor to meet a part of the mandatory operating increases that were not foreseen when the estimates were prepared. All of these items were deleted by

the Senate, on the basis that they were not included in detail in the budget, and should be included in a supplemental request. Such a course of action is simply not practical. With the year half over, we do not even have our regular bill. We cannot be optimistic regarding action on a supplemental. Of greater significance is the fact that Congressional action on our estimates, which has extended nearly one year since their preparation, has involved making reductions for unforeseen decreases in every case where they were identified. Had our bill been enacted earlier the unforeseen decreases would have been available to meet the increases we now face. In short, we cannot operate the Defense budget on a ratchet basis, eliminating all decreases that materialize in 11 months and failing to recognize any increases. It is essential that the Senate Bill be increased to cover these mandatory increases which have materialized since the estimates were prepared.

Our major areas of concern are covered in the balance of this letter, with details enclosed.

MILITARY PERSONNEL

We accept reductions of \$250.2 million in our original military personnel appropriation requests. We request restoration of \$93.3 million to the House Bill for permanent-change-of-station travel, and of \$4 million to the Senate Bill for the Air Guard and Reserve Programs.

In an action aimed at cutting costs and providing greater stability for military personnel, the House Bill reflects a reduction of \$95.2 million for permanent-change-of-station travel. This was based upon a flat 10% cut in the FY 1971 budget estimate, reduced to 7.5% in recognition of the fact that the first three months of the year had passed. I want to emphasize that we are in complete agreement with the objectives of reducing permanent-charge-of-station moves, and we have taken many actions in this regard. Incentives are offered to encourage personnel to extend tours of duty in Vietnam, thereby reducing the number of moves. The extended early release program eliminates the need for moves related to short-term assignments late in a member's period of service. Assignments to short term areas are now handled in such a way as to minimize the movement between training and overseas. CONUS vacancies are filled, insofar as practicable, with overseas returnees. The FY 1971 budget requests for PCS in the Army and Navy are about 14% below the FY 1970 level, in spite of price increases of about 5% (the new air transportation tax, and increased transportation and storage charges). Allowing for this, the FY 1971 program is about 20% below FY 1970 on a comparable basis; it is this lower level which the House proposes to cut.

The further sharp cuts proposed by the House are clearly impractical at this time. The House assumed that the reductions could take effect on October 1, 1970. Actually, the bulk of our moves were even then programmed well into calendar 1971. This of course is a necessity, in order to provide adequate notice to the members involved, in addition to operational reasons. At this late date, reductions could not take effect until the last few months of the fiscal year. The House, while apparently concerned with rotational travel, applied the cut to all moves—including accession and separation travel, hardship moves, and moves to short-tour areas such as Vietnam. Nearly half of the Army's FY 1971 estimate is for moves related to Southeast Asia. In practice, then, a cut would have to be applied to a relatively small share of the total moves in the last few months of the year, and would create extreme uncertainty and hardships. There is already a great deal of turbulence in military manpower programs due to the large strength cutbacks and major redeployments now underway. Such conditions produce a great deal of unpredictability, and

the need for more moves that would be necessary in a stable situation. In the face of this, as I have noted, we have already projected a drop of nearly 20% (in constant dollars) in Army and Navy moves for FY 1971. Under the circumstances, the further sharp cut reflected in the House Bill simply cannot be accommodated in this area. I must urge restoration of \$93.3 million of this reduction, to provide the amounts approved by the Senate for the four appropriations involved.

The Senate made reductions of \$2 million each in the personnel appropriations for the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard based on "historical overstatement of requirements." The enclosures make clear that the present requirements are not overstated and that the Senate amount would force a cutback in Reserve on-board strength and in Air Guard pilots. In light of the increasing importance of these Guard and Reserve forces to our overall readiness posture, such developments would be deplorable. These cuts, amounting to a total of \$4 million, should be restored to the Senate Bill.

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

Our current request for operation and maintenance is \$122.4 million below the estimates originally submitted to the Congress. This is the net of \$300.4 million in specific reductions, reflected in both Bills and accepted by the Department, partially offset by \$177.9 million for cost increases not foreseen when the budget estimates were submitted at the start of the year.

Restoration to the Senate Bill. We request an increase of \$177.9 million to the Senate Bill, to provide:

\$150 million (\$50 million each for the Army, Navy and Air Force), which was added on the House Floor to cover part of the very large mandatory increases that have occurred in on-going programs.

\$23.9 million to cover the costs of 5 Air Force Reserve squadrons equipped with C-130 aircraft.

\$4 million for Deep Freeze.

\$35 thousand for the promotion of rifle practice.

It must be emphasized that the \$150 million added on the House Floor is not required for "new programs," but to cover a part of the mandatory cost increases in on-going programs. These increased costs cover such items as (1) transportation rate increases (+\$63.4 million), (2) activity and deployment changes related to South Vietnam (+\$73.5 million), (3) slippage in RED-COSTE implementation (+\$39.3 million), (4) increased operations and readiness of the Sixth and Seventh Fleets (+\$51.4 million), (5) increased civilian personnel costs due to average salary increases (+\$78.6 million), (6) other rate and cost changes (+\$11.4 million); for a total mandatory cost increase in Operation and Maintenance accounts of \$320.6 million. These costs must be absorbed within available funds, making restoration of the \$150.0 million (\$50 million each for Army, Navy and Air Force) to the Senate Bill an absolute necessity.

In the development of the President's Budget, plans were included to retire 5 C-119 Air Force Reserve Squadrons. It has been subsequently determined that these Reserve Squadrons are required and should be retained and equipped with C-130 aircraft. The C-130 aircraft are now available for equipping these units, but \$23.9 million is required under "Operation and Maintenance, Air Force" to cover operating costs during FY 1971. I urge restoration of \$23.9 million to the Senate Bill to meet this important requirement.

The President's FY 1971 budget request contained \$4.4 million in O&M, Navy for logistic support of the DEEP FREEZE scientific effort. This request was about \$4 million less than prior years and in line with

the House Committee's guidance in FY 1970 that the Navy commence phasing out its funding support of this effort. The effect of this reduction would have been to cancel 80% of the scientific effort in FY 1971. Subsequently, the Antarctic Policy Group recommended:

(a) That the program be maintained at the current annual level.

(b) That the National Science Foundation, commencing in FY 1972, budget for both the scientific and supporting efforts, with the support being provided on a mutually acceptable reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis.

(c) That other aspects of program management and safety of operations remain as heretofore set forth in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-51 of August 3, 1960.

The National Security Council endorsed this course of action and the Chairman of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees were informed on July 10, 1970 by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management. The House Bill includes the extra \$4 million required, and I urge addition of this amount to the Senate Bill.

As detailed in the enclosures, the Director of Civilian Marksmanship has been unable to accomplish assigned missions under present funding levels, and the additional \$35 thousand provided in the House Bill would meet the highest priority requirements. I ask that \$35 thousand be restored to the Senate for this program.

Restoration to the House Bill. We ask that \$26 million be restored to the House Bill involving specific cuts which were restored by the Senate. This includes:

\$9.7 million for the Army—\$8 million to restore part of the cut for automatic data processing, where the House cut presupposed a higher level of rental savings than has actually materialized, and \$1,876,000 for civilian manpower, to avoid duplicating the very sharp cuts otherwise being made.

\$7.5 million for the Navy—\$7 million to provide for continuing with the 15% directed cut in headquarters staffs, but avoiding duplicate budget cutting actions, and \$500,000 for implementation of the joint uniform military pay system, a much-needed reform.

\$2.8 million for the Marine Corps to avoid duplication in civilian personnel and headquarters cuts, similar to the situation outlined for the Navy.

\$6 million for the Air National Guard. The decrease in flying hours mentioned in the House Report was recognized in the budget estimates, but higher fuel costs nonetheless resulted from a change in force mix. In addition to this, there have been sharp further increases in operating costs. Unless the House cut is restored, it will be necessary to make a sharp cut in flying hours, thereby degrading combat readiness.

Logistics Management Institute (LMI). The House Report stated that "the Committee is of the firm opinion that the use of the Logistics Management Institute should be cut back immediately and the contract eventually terminated." (Page 46, House Report 91-1570). The Senate Report makes no reference to LMI. Studies and recommendations made by the LMI have resulted in very substantial savings that are fully documented. The studies have also significantly improved the effectiveness and efficiency of Defense logistics operations. At a time when resources available for our Defense requirements are being so drastically reduced, it is more important than ever that increased emphasis be given to the identification of opportunities for improvement in the management of the logistic resources that remain available. It is requested that the Conferees specifically address this matter, approving continuation of the LMI effort at an effective level.

Senior Advisers in Vietnam. Outstanding

Army personnel are selected to serve as senior advisers to province and district officials in Vietnam. These personnel play a vital role in the Vietnamization effort, and every effort is made to persuade them to volunteer for 18-month tours, despite the personal risks involved in such duty in forward areas. A family leave plan is offered as an incentive to such personnel. The House and Senate Bill would provide for this program in different ways. The appropriation language in the House Bill provides a limitation of \$4 million for emergencies and extraordinary expenses, within which \$366,000 for the senior adviser program could be accommodated. The Senate Bill provides a limitation of \$3,634,000 for emergencies and extraordinary expenses, \$366,000 less than the House Bill, but would cover this program in a new clause added to general provision 807. Either version is acceptable to the Department, since either would provide for the continuation of this essential activity. If the Senate version is adopted, we will, in consonance with the Senate Report, submit a legislative proposal early in the next Session of the Congress.

PROCUREMENT

We request appropriations of \$16,419.3 million for procurement. This is \$175.5 million above the House Bill, \$449.2 million above the Senate Bill, and a net of \$939.3 million below our request as submitted in January. This is the net of \$1,356.8 million in reductions which we accept, offset in part by \$417.5 million added by the House for shipbuilding.

Army procurement. We request \$2,931.7 million, which is \$1.4 million below the House Bill and \$1.7 million above the Senate Bill.

We ask that the House Bill be increased by \$147.2 million to restore specific reductions, and decreased by \$148.6 million to reflect other reductions made by the Senate, for a net reduction of \$1.4 million. The increases include:

\$34.9 million for the LANCE missile (including spares and modifications), apparently deleted by the House on the basis of a misunderstanding of the technical status of this program. We request full restoration, for reasons set forth in a classified enclosure.

\$20 million for the Land Combat Support System (including spares) needed to provide adequate support for the SHERIDAN/SHIL-LERAGH and TOW missile systems. This is the only equipment now available for maintenance support of these systems. The House action, if sustained, would lead to a costly break in production.

\$28.8 million for the XM 705 1¼ ton truck. The House action was based on the observation that the XM 705 may be "excessively overengineered and gold plated," and that the upcoming evaluation of the XM 715 may prove the latter vehicle to be superior. The XM 705 is guaranteed and warranted to meet the Army requirement. The FY 1971 funds are required to fund the second year of the XM 705 multi-year contract, or to pay termination charges and initiate procurement of the modified 715 should evaluation results warrant such a decision. Failure to provide these funds would cause delays, higher costs, and serious breaks in support for Army and other users of these vehicles.

\$9.2 million for the M557A1 Command Post Carrier to avoid a degradation of military readiness and to avoid high termination costs and other disadvantages if a highly successful contract, now in its third year, is placed in jeopardy.

\$38.2 million for the improved HAWK missile. Failure to provide these funds would result in a six month break in production, and add significantly to program costs. Technical problems are receiving concentrated attention. There is an urgent operational requirement for the improved HAWK to replace the basic HAWK system, which was designed in the mid-1950's and has been fielded for over 10 years.

\$16.1 million for 4 other systems, including \$5.8 million for NIKE HERCULES modifications; \$1.1 million for repair parts and support vehicles; \$4 million for field artillery radar (RATAC); and \$5.2 million for landing craft. Details are enclosed.

We ask that \$1.7 million be added to the Senate Bill for Land Combat Support System modifications. This will provide for improvements that are essential to the performance and reliability of the system.

"Procurement of Aircraft and Missiles, Navy." We request restoration of \$122.1 million to the House Bill, to provide the \$3,127.9 million reflected in the Senate Bill. This includes program increases of \$222.1 million above the House Bill, offset by a \$100 million transfer from the stock fund reflected in the Senate Bill. The program increases include:

\$40 million for the A-6E aircraft deleted by the House, on the basis that the system is subject to extensive further test and evaluation ("fly before buy"). Actually, there are only three basic subsystem changes to the A-6A: radar, computer and armament control unit. The first two have been proven in other aircraft, and the armament control unit is a low-risk item. Reduction of A-6E procurement to 6, as in the House Bill, will cause sharp increases in unit costs and other extra costs because of actions already taken under the Continuing Resolution. This \$40 million reduction should be restored.

\$92.3 million for the E-2C aircraft. These aircraft, in addition to the E-2Bs mentioned in the House Report, are needed to meet existing force level deficiencies for airborne early warning aircraft. Beyond this, and contrary to the statement in the House Report, the E-2C cutback would cause plant loading problems and result in higher costs.

\$43.3 million House reduction for Avionics shop test equipment for the S-3A, F-14A and E-2C aircraft. If these funds are not restored it will be necessary to stop production on this equipment, with re-start costs estimated at \$13 million for FY 1972. It will be necessary to invest in interim test equipment for FY 1971 at a cost of \$27 million. Since the type of equipment is specified in the aircraft contracts, this House cut could result in delay claims. All three aircraft would be delayed. Unless these funds are restored, the FY 1972 requirement would be \$92.1 million, with additional FY 1971 requirements of \$27 million—not including claims. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is personally monitoring this program, to assure that only essential test equipment is purchased. I urge restoration of this \$43.4 million.

\$32.2 million for the AV-8A Harrier, added by the Senate to permit the maximum amount of production effort in the United States.

\$14.2 million for aircraft spares, associated with the restoration of funds for the A-6E and E-2C.

"Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy." As Secretary of Defense, I have consistently emphasized the priority requirements for fleet modernization and have stated that the shipbuilding increase of \$435.0 million included in the Authorization Bill represents the highest priority requirements after those included in the President's Budget request. The House Appropriation Bill provided \$417.5 million for the ships authorized as follows:

	Millions
One additional nuclear attack submarine (SSN)-----	\$166.0
Advance procurement for 1 additional nuclear attack submarine (SSN) for FY 1972-----	22.5
One submarine tender (AS)-----	102.0
One destroyer tender (AD)-----	103.0
Service craft-----	24.0
Total -----	417.5

All of these ships are required and will substantially add to fleet capability. The increase in the USSR fleet threat and modernization of the Soviet Navy makes this a necessary investment. Of particular concern is the Soviet submarine force—both in numbers and modern submarines. This makes the restoration of the Nuclear Attack Submarine (SSN) for FY 1971 (\$166.0 million) and Long Lead-time components for an additional SSN in FY 1972 (\$22.5 million) of special urgency.

With respect to the SSN, advance procurement to support the additional submarine was budgeted in FY 1970 and is under procurement. The current contract proposals for the FY 1971 buy of SSNs contain the option to add the additional SSN, so immediate action can be taken to initiate construction of the boat.

The Department of Defense urges conference approval of the House allowance, and addition of \$417.5 million to the Senate Bill.

"Other Procurement, Navy." We request an appropriation of \$1,487.3 million as provided by the Senate, an increase of \$43.9 million above the House Bill. This increase is the net of \$55.8 million in cuts restored by the Senate, less \$11.9 million in additional Senate cuts which we accept. The \$55.8 million in increases include:

\$30 million for the MK-48 torpedo. These funds are essential to make it possible for the Navy to request quotes on sizable quantities of these critically-needed torpedoes, securing active competition and the best possible unit costs in the follow-on production. For reasons detailed in the enclosures this would be impossible under the House amount.

\$14.5 million for the MK-46 torpedo. Most of this amount has already been obligated under the continuing resolution, and there is in addition a critical need to proceed with proof and test prior to delivery to the fleet. It is essential that this cut be restored.

\$4.9 million for ship alterations (Short Stop), for reasons detailed in a classified enclosure.

\$4 million for the CBU-55/B cluster bomb, for which the technical problems cited in the House Report have recently been resolved.

\$2.4 million for AN/SPS-40 radar improvements, to provide needed improvements in detection capability and reliability. These funds have already been obligated, and costly termination charges would be involved if they are not provided.

"Procurement, Marine Corps." We request an appropriation of \$175.9 million as reflected in the Senate Bill, an increase of \$4.2 million above the House Bill to provide the required amount for the XM 705 1¼ ton truck. As detailed in the enclosure, this restoration is necessary to avoid the loss of readiness and higher costs that would be associated with continued operation of obsolete equipment.

"Aircraft Procurement, Air Force." We request an appropriation of \$3,231.3 million, which is \$28.3 million above the House Bill and \$30 million above the Senate Bill. The requested addition to the House Bill is the net of \$38.9 million in increases, less \$10.6 million in additional Senate reductions, which we accept. The increases from the House Bill include:

\$27.7 million for B-52 and FB-111 modifications (SRAM). This missile is urgently needed, and the test program is continuing to provide encouraging results, as detailed in a classified enclosure. Denial of these funds would severely disrupt this program, as described below for "Missile Procurement, Air Force."

\$11.2 million for F-111 aircraft spares. In this case, it appears that the House Committee reduced the initial spares request by \$11.8 million, proportional to the drop in the quantity of aircraft. As detailed in the en-

closure, spares funds are requested on the basis of the amounts necessary to be committed in FY 1971; the reduction in aircraft quantities reduces the FY 1971 spares requirement by \$600,000. The \$11.2 million restored by the Senate should therefore be added to the House Bill.

We request an addition of \$30 million to the Senate amount to provide for the International fighter aircraft, which is being procured in accord with the Nixon Doctrine to provide our allies (particularly in Asia) with a self-defense capability, allowing us to reduce U.S. forces abroad. The required statement of our decision to proceed with this aircraft was in preparation at the time of the Senate Committee's action on the FY 1971 appropriations and has now been provided to you. Unless the required funds are provided, the planned program will have to be stretched out, resulting in disruption and some additional costs. I request that this \$30 million be restored to the Senate Bill.

"Missile procurement, Air Force." We request appropriation of \$1,380.4 million as reflected in the Senate Bill, an increase of \$8.1 million above the House Bill. This is the net of \$58.1 million in increases, less a \$50 million transfer from the stock fund reflected in the Senate Bill. The increases include \$3.2 million for Minuteman operational base launch and \$54.9 million for the AGM-69A (SRAM) and related spares. This missile is urgently needed, and the test program is continuing to provide encouraging results, as detailed in a classified enclosure. Moreover after consultation with the House Appropriations Committee, the Air Force entered into a contract late in FY 1970 (with FY 1970 funds), to secure maximum continuity between the R&D and production effort. Under the House Bill these advantages would be lost, and it would be necessary to completely redesign the SRAM production program and renegotiate the FY 1971 production contract. The operational base launch is considered essential by the President. This item is explained in a classified enclosure.

"Other procurement, Air Force." We request appropriation of \$1,345.1 million, the Senate amount, which is \$36.1 million less than the House Bill. The Senate made reductions of \$42.5 million below the House Bill, all of which we accept, but restored \$6.4 million for operational base launch. We ask that the Conferees recognize this requirement.

"Procurement, Defense Agencies." We request an appropriation of \$45,310,000 as in the Senate Bill, which is \$6.4 million more than the House Bill. The additional \$6.4 million is to provide for purchase (instead of leasing) of two computers used for the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). The WWMCCS ADPE update program represents an important step in control and economic use of ADPE in command and control and intelligence. The review cited by the House Committee has been completed, a Development Concept Paper has been approved, a request for proposal (RFP) has been issued, and a cost threshold of \$45.2 million for 15 new machines has been established. In addition, we have decided to establish some third generation IBM equipment as a second standard and to retain 17 to 22 of these machines. This retention will reduce software conversion costs by \$25 to \$50 million. The program cost of \$½-1 billion or more cited in the Appropriation Committee report is incorrect; current estimates are provided in the enclosure.

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION

We request RDT&E appropriations of \$7,062.5 million. This is \$107.8 million above the House Bill, \$102.4 million above the Senate Bill, and \$283.1 million below our original request. Allowing for the fact that the Bill now includes \$58 million under

RDT&E for the S-3A which we had requested under procurement, our current request is \$341.1 million below the estimate submitted in January.

I must request these RDT&E fund restorations as a matter of the highest priority. I am aware of the deep Congressional concern regarding certain aspects of our RDT&E programs, and of the reasons for such concern. I had similar concerns when I became Secretary of Defense, and I personally conducted an intensive review of all significant development programs and took steps to tighten our management in this area. This has had significant results. Consider, for example, that the budget request for FY 1970 was \$8,222.4 million. Our requests for FY 1971 was \$876.8 million below that figure. Allowing for one year's intervening inflation, the drop in the budget request is well over \$1 billion. Our FY 1971 request for budget authority (\$7,845.6 million) was \$23.2 million below the amount actually provided in FY 1970. The amount which we are now requesting for FY 1971 is \$306 million below the amount actually provided for FY 1970. Once again, if we allow for inflation, the cut in real terms is more than half a billion dollars from 1970 to 1971.

Our current request of \$7,062.5 million (and this includes the funds shifted from procurement for the S-3A) is about the same as the RDT&E programs of prewar years. RDT&E budget authority was \$6,993 million in FY 1963, and \$6,984 million in FY 1964. Pay and price increases since 1964 amount to about \$1.7 billion, so that the prewar program would cost about \$8.7 billion in FY 1971. We will be proceeding in FY 1971, and covering war costs, within a program level that has been cut more than 20% below prewar.

These figures take on far more meaning when we look at the comparable Soviet effort. We now have a reasonably good assessment of the magnitude of the Soviet effort compared to ours; the comparison is based on the numbers and characteristics of major weapons systems available to each side for production. The assessment shows that the annual Soviet military RDT&E effort now is more than \$10 billion, expressed in terms of equivalent U.S. effort. We don't know whether the Soviets will continue the steady expansion of their effort at a rate of 10-13% per year. In any case, we have good reason to believe that the Soviet RDT&E effort in FY 1971 will be about 20-50% more than the U.S. effort now authorized.

This difference is extremely serious. It means that, if continued, the USSR will develop major weapons systems which we will not. It means that our technological lead—essential to overcoming their security barriers and to compensating in part for their numerical superiority—will vanish in a few years. It means that we will then not be able to understand much of our intelligence data on Soviet developments nor know how best to counter Soviet technological surprises. In contrast to the steady Soviet increase in the training and use of engineers and scientists in defense RDT&E, our assets of trained researchers are declining, as you are well aware from the employment statistics.

The budget cuts also result in a sharp reduction in R&D flexibility. A large portion of the requested budget is devoted to approved ongoing programs. To cut these would result in inefficient scheduling, greater expense and lost time. Thus, the cuts have to be taken from the new programs, the new ideas, and the feasibility demonstrations needed to reduce the possibility of technological surprise. The effect of the overall 6% cut thus translates into a very drastic cut in efforts associated with new ideas and new programs. The Soviets, with their greater effort, will have few such constraints.

I mentioned earlier that I undertook a thorough review of our RDT&E efforts soon

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after I assumed this office. One result, already noted, was a significant cutback in RDT&E programs in selected areas, leading to a sharp drop in our budget request. Another result of that review was a significant strengthening of my own conviction that our R&D program represents our most vital long-range defense investment and must continue to be supported with significant resources.

The cuts in RDT&E represent a calculated risk—one comparable to the risks taken elsewhere in this minimal budget. Our present technological superiority gives us a short period of time in which we might afford a reduced U.S. effort while assessing the Soviet RDT&E progress and intent. But the stakes in this kind of decision-making are enormous. The consequences of Soviet achievement of technological superiority cannot be overstated.

The background just presented is of very great importance to understanding our serious concern with the deep RDT&E program reductions reflected in the House and Senate Bill, and why we feel that partial restoration is essential to meeting our minimal national security needs.

We request restoration of \$107.8 million to the House Bill, to provide for items approved by the Senate. These include:

\$3.8 million for the Pershing missile system, needed to complete the planned R&D effort in support of the change in the primary mission of the Pershing.

\$2 million for the Army to develop a standardized family of electric power sources for use by all services.

\$7 million for the destroyer helicopter system (LAMPS), needed to move the program into the contract definition phase and to avoid the cost increases inherent in program stretchout.

\$10 million for the Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy (SCAD) to continue development of this important penetration device.

\$23.5 million for the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), to avoid the need for contract renegotiation (for which the estimated additional cost would be \$40 million, permitting orderly progress on this badly-needed system).

\$53.8 million for the Minutemen program, including \$34 million for rebasing and \$19.8 million for operational base launch.

\$6.7 million for several highly-important classified programs of the Defense Atomic Support Agency.

We request that \$102.4 million be added to the Senate Bill, to provide for critically-needed programs approved by the House. Senate made a large number of specific reductions, as follows:

Army, 29 items, \$18.8 million.

Navy, 43 items, \$32.7 million.

Air Force, 38 items, \$43.6 million.

Defense Agencies, 1 item, \$1.5 million.

It is correct that the requirements for some of these items have declined. On the other hand, requirements for other items (those specified by the Senate for reduction, plus additional items) have increased since the budget estimates were prepared. Accordingly, I urge that \$102.4 million be added to the Senate Bill, to provide the level of funding in these areas as approved by the House.

COMBAT READINESS, SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

The President's Budget included a request for a separate appropriation of \$300 million to be used to increase the readiness of South Vietnamese forces in accordance with the President's plan for Vietnamization of the war. The funds to be used for this purpose represent one of the highest priority program requirements in the budget.

In order to provide the Congress with complete information concerning proposed use of funds requested, on May 16, 1970 the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees were provided full details, by appropriation and line item, of requirements for \$349.4

million for the purposes of the appropriation. These requirements had been validated by the Service Secretaries and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Subsequently, on September 9, 1970, the Committees were furnished a statement of revalidated requirements totaling \$358.5 million.

Based upon the data provided, the House Bill included \$358.5 million for this appropriation. The Senate reduced the amount to \$300.0 million.

The requirement for \$358.5 million is valid and needed to meet urgent requirements for support of South Vietnamese forces. Delay in implementation of the full program pending Congressional action on a supplemental would jeopardize the support of these forces and adversely affect progress toward Vietnamization. I urge approval of the House amount.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Senate Bill would amend Section 843 by adding the words "or Cambodia." This language would add Cambodia to otherwise identical prohibitory language in the DoD Appropriation Act for 1970 (Section 643 of PL 91-171). The language of the 1970 Act was incorporated into the President's budget for FY 1971 (proposed Section 838). The basic question, therefore, is the prohibition this amendment would place on the introduction of American ground combat troops into Cambodia.

The President in his June 30th report on Cambodia gave a number of guidelines for U.S. policy in Cambodia. Among these were the following which relate to U.S. personnel:

There will be no U.S. ground personnel in Cambodia except for the regular staff of our Embassy in Phnom Penh.

There will be no U.S. advisers with Cambodia units.

We will conduct—with the approval of the Cambodian Government—air interdiction missions against the enemy efforts to move supplies and personnel through Cambodia toward South Vietnam. We do this to protect our forces in South Vietnam.

The President further commented as follows on this aspect of U.S. policy the following evening in his live television interview, "A Conversation with the President:"

Question: Do you feel that you can give categorical assurances now that we will not send ground troops back into Cambodia no matter what?

Answer: I indicated when this operation was begun two months ago . . . that once we had completed our task successfully of cleaning out the sanctuaries that then it would not be necessary and I would not consider it advisable to send American ground forces back into Cambodia.

I can say now that we have no plans to send American ground forces into Cambodia. We have no plans to send our advisers into Cambodia. We have plans only to maintain the rather limited diplomatic establishment that we have in Phnom Penh and I see nothing that will change that at this time.

Question: You can't fore swear in a final way . . . that is what the Senate seems to want.

Answer: I think that anybody hearing the answer that I have just given would certainly get the impression and would incidentally be justified in having the impression that the President of the United States has no intention to send ground forces back into Cambodia, and I do not believe that there will be any necessity to do so.

When you say, can I be pinned down to say that under no circumstances would the United States ever do anything, I would not say that, but I will say that our plans do not countenance it, we do not plan on it, and under the circumstances, I believe that the success of the operation which we have undertaken, as well as what the South Vietnamese will be able to do, will make it unnecessary.

Thus, while the President has indicated his *intention* not to introduce American ground combat troops into Cambodia, this amendment goes a step further, a step which the President refused to go, and purports to impose a categorical prohibition regardless of the circumstances. The President has indicated that he will meet his responsibility as Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces to take the action he considers necessary to defend the security of our American men. This amendment attempts to interfere with the President, ability to meet this responsibility. It should not be enacted.

PERIOD OF AVAILABILITY OF PROCUREMENT AND RDT&E APPROPRIATIONS

The House Bill would convert the no-year appropriations for shipbuilding, other procurement, and RDT&E to multiple-year appropriations, available for five, three and two years, respectively. Multiple-year appropriations would be very complex and costly to administer. Specifically:

Regulations, manuals, and computer programs would have to be changed at all levels throughout the U.S. and overseas areas on a retroactive basis.

Personnel throughout the world would have to be trained in these new procedures—an immense job on a retroactive basis.

Beginning about the middle of this fiscal year, it would be necessary—retroactively—to change hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of transactions already processed.

The 14 accounts on the books of the Treasury would grow to 28 by next July (if not immediately), and ultimately to 82.

Treatment of reimbursable transactions, change orders, prior-year adjustments, and many other areas would have to be specified.

Reprogramming understandings would have to be thoroughly revised.

We would be trying to change the system while it was running, and at the same time making sharp reductions in administrative personnel.

The enactment of multiple-year appropriations would present us with some immediate budgetary problems, including the following:

Our FY 1972 request would have to be \$500 million to \$1 billion above that required under present ground rules, unless we propose reappropriations or similar action.

Unless we propose reappropriation, we would go to Congress asking for full financing of new programs, while holding \$500 million to \$1 billion in old balances we did not intend to use. This would defeat the purpose of the House Bill.

On the other hand, if we proposed reappropriation—or if any of the four Committees did so—we would in effect have returned to the no-year appropriations of today, but adding the administrative burden and greatly confusing the authorization-appropriation.

For FY 1971, unless the new appropriations are merged with prior balances, we will have sustained an additional \$1 billion cut, because our unprogrammed balances could not be applied to finance the FY 1971 program as contemplated in the budget and in the action otherwise taken by the House.

The Senate bill would:

1. Require, beginning June 30, 1971, the withdrawal of overage unobligated balances from the control of the Department of Defense and direct their return to the Treasury, while otherwise retaining the no-year character of the appropriations involved, and

2. Require the Comptroller General to examine the internal accounting system of the Department of Defense for determining the amounts to be withdrawn and make a report to the Congress as to the adequacy of the system.

We strongly favor the Senate Bill, and urge its adoption.

Conversion to multiple-year appropriations involves issues that are far too complex, with consequences that are far too great, to be resolved in the rush of completing action on our FY 1971 Bill. The Senate Bill meets the objectives expressed by both Committees. It would provide a clear and final cutoff point, without the serious problems involved in converting to multiple-year appropriations. It would take effect immediately, and older balances would be written off as of the end of next June. Consequently, I urge that the Senate Bill be adopted. If there continue to be reservations regarding this matter, we would be happy to make a full presentation to both Committees, early in the next Session. At that time, we could explain in detail our plans for operation under the provisions of the FY 1971 appropriation, the problems inherent in multiple-year appropriations, and suggest changes or refinements. Following that, I would hope that we would have a reasonable amount of notice to effect any changes which the Congress might direct.

BUDGET FLEXIBILITY

Section 836 of the Senate Bill merges the various transfer authorities heretofore provided, and provides a single limit of \$700 million upon transfers, as compared to \$600 million provided under three separate provisions in the House Bill. The Senate Bill requires approval of the Office of Management and Budget and prompt notification of the Congress of all transfers made pursuant to this authority; the Senate Report specifies that this new section shall be a matter of "special interest" under the established reprogramming procedures, and therefore will require prior approval by the Committees.

The added measure of flexibility provided by the Senate Bill is essential to the effective management of Defense programs. During the past two years the Defense budget has been significantly reduced, to the point that the Department's flexibility to meet unforeseen requirements has been severely limited. The full effect of such reductions is much greater than the individual program changes required by authorization and appropriation action. This makes it essential that additional flexibility be provided to the Department of Defense to transfer funds between appropriations to meet emergencies and the most urgent needs of national defense within the appropriations provided by the Congress. The unpredictability inherent in the current world situation makes it essential that the Department of Defense be able to react to changes necessary to provide for the strongest possible Defense posture within resources approved by the President and the Congress. Sharp Congressional reductions in our FY 1971 requests have reduced our flexibility. Some of this flexibility can and should be restored by the increased transfer authority provided in the Senate Bill. I strongly request enactment of this provision.

RELATIONSHIP OF RESEARCH TO MILITARY OPERATIONS

Section 845 of the Senate Bill would provide that funds may not be used for research projects unless they have a direct and apparent relationship to a specific military function or operation. This matter has already been considered by the Congress this year, and the language now appearing in the Senate Bill was rejected in favor of Section 204 of the FY 1971 Defense Authorization Act (PL 91-441) which provides that funds may be used only for projects which, in the opinion of the Secretary of Defense, have a potential relationship to a military function or operation. I believe that the Authorization Act should be allowed to stand. It is not sound policy to raise again an issue that was resolved by legislation enacted less than two months ago. Our objections to the language of the Senate Bill have not changed. This language could be interpreted to require the

Department to discontinue support for basic research, at the very moment when our technical leadership is being challenged strongly, when we must act to ensure that our R&D program is revitalized through a greater emphasis on genuinely exploratory work. If the Department were to move out of relatively basic and applied research the country would no longer be able to depend as effectively upon many of the best scientists in the country for work on defense problems. I urge deletion of this provision from the Senate Bill.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Both the House and Senate Reports would impose limitations upon the amounts for public affairs activities. The Senate version is preferable. The Senate Report more explicitly defines the applicability of the limitation to cases "... where such functions constitute the primary mission of an organization element..." The Dollar amount specified in the Senate Report covers the amounts required for Defense Agencies and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also, the Senate Report specifically excludes security review activities from the scope of the limitation. For these reasons, I ask that the Conferees, in addressing this matter, endorse the Senate Report.

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY PERSONNEL

Section 846 of the Senate Bill provides a limitation of 133,000 upon the number of military and civilian personnel assigned to the Intelligence and Security Program after June 15, 1971. We do not object to a ceiling of 138,000, and I assure you that we will comply. We do object, however, to making this a provision of law. A future emergency could require a greater number of personnel, at which point it would be necessary to seek a change in the law. This might not be possible on a timely basis. With the understanding that we will comply with this limitation, I request that this provision be deleted.

In closing I wish to express our appreciation for your thorough consideration of our national security needs, and for the opportunities you have afforded us to present our views each step of the way. We have certainly benefited from this interchange. I again wish to stress that we have reached the positions outlined above only after a careful review of the facts in each case including a full consideration of the actions of the House and Senate and the reasons for such actions in the Report of each Committee. We have found it possible to accept a large part of the financial adjustments in either version of the bill, but we urge your favorable consideration of the matters at issue that are covered in this letter.

An identical letter is being sent to the Chairman of the Department of Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations. Please do not hesitate to call upon us if we can be of assistance.

Sincerely,

Mr. ELLENDER. The recommendations of the committee of conference are explained in the statement of the managers on the part of the House included in the conference report. However, I will take a few minutes to comment on several matters that I feel are of special interest to some Members.

During the discussions of the bill on the Senate floor, I made it clear that the recommendations of the committee did not include any funds for programs and activities that were not in the budget, even though the bill as it passed the House included \$653,935,000 for nonbudgeted items and the Secretary of Defense requested the committee to recommend an additional \$354,599,000 for

nonbudgeted items. The Senate conferees were not successful in our efforts to maintain the Senate position with respect to these nonbudgeted items, and the recommendations of the committee of conference includes funds for the following nonbudgeted items:

Operation and maintenance, Army. The House bill included \$50,000,000 for "unforeseen operational costs," which amount was disallowed by the Senate. The committee of conference included \$40,000,000 for this purpose.

Operation and maintenance, Navy. The House bill included \$50,000,000 for "unforeseen operational costs," and an increase of \$4,000,000 for Operation Deepfreeze—Antarctica program—both of which were disallowed by the Senate. The conference agreement includes \$40,000,000 for "unforeseen operational costs," and the \$4,000,000 for Operation Deepfreeze.

Operation and maintenance, Air Force. The House bill included \$50,000,000 for "unforeseen operational costs," and \$23,900,000 for the cost of retaining five Air Force Reserve units that were scheduled to be deactivated. The Senate disallowed both of these increases. The conference agreement includes \$40,000,000 for "unforeseen operational costs," and the \$23,900,000 for the five Air Force Reserve units.

Mr. President, I want to call attention to the fact that, even though we have increased these three "Operation and Maintenance" appropriations, the amounts recommended by the conference committee are still below the budget estimates by the following amounts:

Army, \$63,313,000,
Navy, \$13,512,000—net, and
Air Force, \$19,364,000.

I may say, Mr. President, that these \$50 million amendments I referred to were made on the floor of the House. In agreeing to these increases, the Senate conferees not only considered the fact that we were within the budget estimates for each of these large appropriations but also that most of these operation and maintenance costs are determined by the number of men in the service concerned and the level of operations in various areas. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a fact sheet—referred to as exhibit B—prepared at my request by the Department of Defense, giving details on each of these increases I have mentioned.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXHIBIT B

HOUSE-SENATE CONFERENCE FACT SHEET: OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

A. UNFORESEEN COSTS (HOUSE FLOOR INCREASE)

In floor action, the House added \$150 million of Operation and Maintenance funds for unforeseen costs which have been identified since the submission of the President's Budget. The Senate deleted these funds because they were add-ons to the original budget.

In fact, the funds are required to cover mandatory cost increases in on-going areas and are not to be used for "new" programs. These increased costs cover such items as (1) transportation rate increases (+\$66.4 million), (2) activity and deployment changes related to South Vietnam (+\$73.5

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million), (3) slippage in REDCOSTE implementation (+\$39.3 million), (4) increased operations and readiness of SIXTH and SEVENTH Fleets (+\$51.4 million), (5) increased civilian personnel costs due to average salary increases (+\$76.6 million), and (6) other rate and cost changes (+\$44.3 million); for a total mandatory cost increase in Operation and Maintenance accounts of \$353.5 million. These costs must be absorbed within available funds, making restoration of the \$150.0 million (\$50 million each for Army, Navy, and Air Force) an absolute necessity.

The only alternative available to the Defense Department if such funds are not restored is further personnel reductions to free funds to cover these mandatory costs. Planning for a supplemental is not a feasible course of action since immediate action is necessary to live within funds appropriated. A delay of 60-90 days would make the necessary adjustments impossible, if a supplemental were not forthcoming or were ultimately approved in a lesser amount.

The specific areas requiring additional funds are:

Army

Transportation rate increases, \$32.6 million.
Military Airlift Command—Cargo and Mail (effective May 1970), 10 percent.
Command Airlift—Cargo and Mail (effective July 1970), 5 percent.

Military Sealift Command (effective Jan., Mar., July and Sept. 1970): Cargo, 8.5 percent. Bulk POL, 15.4 percent.

Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service—CONUS Port Handling (effective July 1970), 4 percent.

Change in RVN Deployments, \$40.8 million.

The FY 1971 President's Budget was developed on assumed manpower level in South Vietnam. Since December 1969, when the budget was developed, there have been significant changes to the budget plan. These changes are due primarily to decisions which have been publicly announced regarding the mix of forces between Army and Marines which are to be withdrawn from Vietnam. Army forces are remaining longer and the Marine forces are being withdrawn at an accelerated rate. The cost of maintaining these Army forces in Vietnam, representing approximately 15,000 military man-years above the President's Budget level, is \$40.8 million for the Operation and Maintenance, Army appropriation. These costs are above what has been included in the Army's FY 1971 President's Budget.

Slippage in implementation of plan to transfer responsibility for operation of European missile battalions (REDCOSTE), +\$39.3 million.

Increased Civilian Personnel cost due to changes in the composition of the work force and increased cost per civilian man-year supported. This increase is above the legislated pay raise, +\$42.6 million.

Airport and Airways Revenue Act (PL 91-258). This Act, which was enacted after the submission of the FY 1971 budget, requires the Army to pay a tax on air movements, +\$3 million.

Totalling \$158.3 million for the Army.

Navy

Increased tempo of air operations in Mediterranean, \$14.7 million.

Spare parts to provide increased readiness and reliability of Sixth Fleet ships, \$6.7 million.

Increased tempo of ship operations in Mediterranean, \$5.9 million.

Improved base support at Rota and Souda Bay, \$1.4 million.

Increased costs related to SEA carrier based attack sorties and Marine SEA attack sorties in Seventh Fleet and Vietnam, \$18.7 million.

Vietnamization/Coastal Radar and VNN supply system, \$4.4 million.

Spare parts pipeline to support increased readiness and reliability of Sixth and Seventh Fleet ships, \$10.7 million.

Spare parts pipeline to support increased readiness and reliability of Sixth and Seventh Fleet Aircraft, \$12.0 million.

Increased transportation of ammunition to support SEASIA air operations, \$3.2 million.

Increased transportation costs due to MSTs tariff rate increase effective March 1970 (dry cargo 8.4%, POL 9.4%), \$5.6 million.

Increased depot handling and storage of ammunition to support SEASIA air operations, \$6.4 million.

Totalling \$89.7 million for the Navy.

Air Force

Peruvian Earthquake Expense, \$0.2 million.
Aero-Medical Evacuation, \$5.4 million.

Special Airlift—SEA Related, \$7.8 million.
Training of Free World Forces, \$10.0 million.

Delayed Inactivation of Bien Hoa, \$6.5.
Combat Readiness Training, \$3.0 million.

Increase in Civilian Average Annual Salaries, \$36.0 million.

Rail Rate Increases, \$1.7 million.
Stock Fund Surcharge Increase, \$3.1 million.

P.L. 91-258, Airway & Airway Development Act, \$5.3 million.

MAC Rate Increase, Effective 1 May 1970, \$20.0 million.

MSTS Rate Increase, \$3.5 million.
MAC Passenger Rate Increase, \$3.0 million.

Totalling \$105.5 million for the Air Force.

B. AIR FORCE RESERVE SQUADRONS, \$23.9 MILLION

In the development of the President's Budget, plans were included to retire 5 C-119 Air Force Reserve Squadrons. It has been subsequently determined that these Reserve Squadrons are required and should be retained and equipped with C-130 aircraft. The C-130 aircraft are now available for equipping these units, but \$23.9 million is required under Operation and Maintenance, Air Force to cover operating costs during FY 1971.

The House Bill approved this amount, but the Senate deleted the House add-on.

It is strongly recommended that the Conference approve the House position—adding \$23.9 million to O&M, Air Force. Awaiting supplemental action, with its uncertainty, would not provide an adequate basis for continuing these units in the Reserve force structure.

C. DEEP FREEZE, +\$4 MILLION

The President's FY 1971 budget request contained \$4.4 million in O&M, Navy for logistic support of the DEEP FREEZE scientific effort. This request was about \$4 million less than prior years and in line with the House Committee's guidance in FY 1970 that the Navy commence phasing out its funding support of this effort.

The effect of this reduction would have been to cancel 80% of the scientific effort in FY 1971. Subsequently, the Antarctic Policy Group recommended:

(a) That the program be maintained at the current annual level.

(b) That the National Science Foundation, commencing in FY 1972, budget for both the scientific and supporting efforts, with the support being provided on a mutually acceptable reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis.

(c) That other aspects of program management and safety of operations remain as heretofore set forth in BUBUD Circular A-51 of August 3, 1960.

The National Security Council endorsed this course of action and the Chairmen of the Senate and House Appropriations Committee were informed on July 10, 1970 by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management.

The House Bill added \$4 million to the Navy's request for this unbudgeted requirement; but this amount was deleted by the Senate.

It is recommended that the House position be approved. The uncertainty of a supplemental precludes planning for the higher level unless the House bill is approved.

NAVY SHIPS

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, the House-passed bill included \$417,500,000 for the following ships that were included in the Department of Defense Procurement and Research and Development Authorization Act, but which were not included in the President's Budget:

One nuclear attack submarine, \$166,000,000;

Long leadtime items for an additional nuclear attack submarine to be fully funded in the fiscal year 1972 budget, \$22,500,000;

One submarine tender, \$102,000,000;
One destroyer tender, \$103,000,000; and
Service craft, \$24,000,000.

The Senate disallowed the funds for these nonbudgeted ships. The committee of conference devoted a major portion of its efforts in attempting to resolve this matter, and the committee finally agreed to the inclusion of \$188,500,000 for the following:

One nuclear attack submarine, \$166,000,000, and

Long leadtime items for an additional nuclear attack submarine to be fully funded in the fiscal year 1972 budget, \$22,500,000.

In agreeing to the inclusion of this \$188,500,000 for these nonbudgeted ships, the Senate conferees did not change their position with respect to this matter of modernizing the fleet. In reporting the bill to the Senate, the committee stated in its report:

The Committee is fully aware that the existing age and condition of many ships requires an extensive program for the modernization of the fleet, and the Committee is anxious to participate in a comprehensive program to increase the effectiveness of the Navy. However, it is the view of the Committee that a program of this magnitude must proceed through the orderly appropriation process which requires both authorization and budget requests from the President.

This is still the position of the Senate Committee on Appropriations.

INTERNATIONAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

The President's budget and the House bill included \$30,000,000 for the continuation of the international fighter aircraft program. The Senate disallowed the total amount for this program. The Senate committee's recommendation for the disallowance of these funds was based on the lack of adequate information on the program. I ask unanimous consent that the comments on this program appearing on page 156 of the committee's report and referred to as Exhibit C be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, Exhibit C was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXHIBIT C

EXCERPT FROM SENATE REPORT NO. 91-1392, PAGE 156

International Fighter Aircraft (Freedom Fighter).—The House allowed the budget estimate of \$30,000,000 for the continuation of development and production of the International Fighter Aircraft, which is in accord with the Authorization Act. The committee recommends the disallowance of the \$30,000,000 allowed by the House for this pro-

gram. In approving the \$25,000,000 included in the fiscal year 1970 program for this aircraft, the committee stated in its report:

"The committee has taken no affirmative action on the proposal [International Fighter Aircraft]. In the event the Secretary of Defense determines to proceed with the development and procurement of this aircraft, he is requested to so advise this committee of his decision along with a full statement on the basis for his decision." (S. Rept. No. 91-607, p. 84).

At this date, the Secretary of Defense has not complied with the above request, even though a contractor was selected on November 20, 1970.

The committee's recommendation for the disallowance of these funds is based on a total lack of information on the program. The justifications submitted in support of the budget request and the statements of representatives of the Department of Defense and Air Force did not provide the committee with adequate information on which to base a decision, and as stated above, the Secretary of Defense has not complied with the committee's request for detailed information on the basis for his decision to proceed with the development and procurement of this aircraft. Attention is called to the fact that as the Department of Defense Procurement and Research and Development Authorization Act passed the Senate it did not include funds for this program, however, the \$30,000,000 authorization was restored in the Conference Committee on that legislation.

In recommending the disallowance of these funds, the committee calls attention to the fact that no part of the \$28,000,000 provided for fiscal year 1970 had been obligated as of December 1, 1970. It is the view of the committee that these available funds are more than adequate to fund this program through the current fiscal year.

The committee expects the Department of Defense and the Air Force to submit the same type of information in justifying the request for funds for this program as is submitted for aircraft that are to be included in the Air Force's inventory.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, on November 20, 1970, the Department of Defense announced the award of a contract for the development and production of this aircraft. However, the statement requested by the committee in its report on the fiscal year 1970 bill was not received until December 10, 1970. I ask unanimous consent that this letter, with appropriate security deletions, be printed in the RECORD at this point as exhibit D.

There being no objection, exhibit D was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXHIBIT D

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C.

HON. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Your committee has requested a full statement on the basis of our decision to proceed with development/procurement of an International Fighter Aircraft (IFA). In a related action, on 4 December 1970, your committee deleted the FY 71 IFA appropriation of \$30 million.

This letter is a statement of the basis for the decision to proceed with the IFA. It also gives information which relates to concurrent Air Force reclama action to restore \$30 million of FY 71 funds which will be used to maintain the program's contractual schedule.

A basic purpose of the IFA is to meet the needs of our allies under the principles of the Nixon Doctrine that will permit them to shoulder a greater portion of the common de-

fense burden, allowing the U.S. to reduce manpower abroad.

The IFA is designed primarily to provide air defense of allied territory as well as close air support for local defense forces. This capability is required to meet the threat from the increasingly sophisticated air forces of Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam. Potential recipient nations for the aircraft include South Vietnam, Thailand, South Korea, and the Republic of Free China.

As a matter of background information, on 20 November 1970 Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans, Jr., announced that the Northrop Corporation's F-5-21 aircraft had been selected as the winner of the IFA competition. On 24 November he authorized the Air Force to award the contract to the Northrop Corporation of Hawthorne, California.

This decision followed seven months of evaluation, analysis, and competition among four potential producers: McDonnell-Douglas Corporation, LTV Aerospace Corporation, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, and Northrop Corporation. The competition was focused on providing US Allies and friends with a credible self air defense capability at the most reasonable cost. Economy of procurement and operation, reliability, simplicity and maintainability, in line with capabilities of the intended recipients, were also emphasized.

The IFA has a remarkable performance, especially when considered against the design constraints for economy and ease of maintenance. The maximum speed will be [deleted] Mach at [deleted] feet, with a combat ceiling of [deleted] feet. A maximum payload of [deleted] pounds of fuel and armament can be carried for close air support. In the counter air role, the IFA has a mission radius of [deleted].

Current program planning anticipates procurement of about 325 aircraft in fiscal year increments over a five or six year period. Each annual increment, of course, will be contingent upon Congressional approval. The first test aircraft is scheduled for delivery in [deleted] and the first production aircraft in [deleted]. A 325 aircraft production run would result in a total weapon system acquisition cost of \$698.6 million, of which \$10.1 million would be allocated to development.

To insure that this capability can be achieved within program funds, careful attention has been devoted to the selection of personnel and techniques to manage the program. A System Program Office has been established at the Aeronautical Systems Division at Wright Paterson AF Base. A major initial objective of this office has been to devise management methods to insure program economy and efficiency. Cost/Schedules Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC) will be used to measure the contractor's performance. In this way, any deviation from contract cost, schedule, and performance will be reported early, thereby assuring that necessary management actions may be taken in a timely manner.

The aircraft will be procured by a fixed price incentive (FPI) contract. The sharing arrangement will be 70/30; ceiling price will be 120% of target price; and target-profit will be 10% of target cost. The contract is based on a production rate of 10 per month; however, it includes an option of plus or minus 50% within each fiscal year increment to allow maximum flexibility in meeting funding limitations and/or threat development. The contract contains a foreign sales clause for recovery of nonrecurring RDT&E costs in the expectation that the aircraft may be subsequently sold to foreign nations.

If you desire more detailed information, representatives of the Air Force are available to meet with you, committee members or members of your staff, as you might desire.

I trust this now satisfies the Committee's needs.

Sincerely,

DAVID PACKARD.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, the conference agreement includes \$18 million for the continuation of the development of this aircraft, which amount along with \$28 million made available in fiscal year 1970 will provide \$46 million, which is adequate to maintain the Air Force's scheduled program. I want to make it clear that the action of the committee of conference does not constitute a full production decision on this aircraft. It was the intent of the conferees to provide adequate funds to continue the development program, which includes five test aircraft, and to provide \$8.8 million for long leadtime items to support the production of this aircraft in fiscal year 1972, if such a decision is made by the Congress.

SECTION 838—SUPPORT OF FREE WORLD FORCES

The Senate amended section 838 of the bill dealing with funds for the support of free world forces to include the following provision which was included in section 502 of the Department of Defense Procurement and Research and Development Authorization Act:

Provided further, That nothing in clause (1) of the first sentence of this subsection shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos.

The House conferees strongly opposed this provision on the ground that it tied the hands of the President in his efforts to bring about a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia. However, they finally agreed to accept this amendment if the following provision were included, which is applicable to all of section 838:

Provided further, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support of free world or local forces in actions designed to promote the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. Forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

The Senate conferees accepted this proposal.

I was surprised to learn that there was considerable opposition here in the Senate to this provision, and as I stated, it is one of the issues that prompted me to move to table the first conference report and send the bill back to conference to attempt to get the House conferees to recede on this point.

I regret to inform the Senate that the House conferees were again adamant on this provision, and after considerable discussion in the second conference on this matter, the Senate conferees accepted the following new proviso:

Provided further, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support of actions required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. Forces from Southeast Asia, or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

I am convinced that in order to obtain an agreement in the conference committee, we had to accept this proviso.

Mr. President, I think the intent of this provision was fully discussed in a colloquy here on the floor earlier this evening. However, as chairman of the Senate conferees, I want to make my position on this matter abundantly clear. It is certainly not the intent for the executive branch of the Government to interpret this proviso as the authority for a large-scale invasion, by South Vietnamese or other free world forces, of North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, or any other country, and I am confident it will not be so interpreted.

Throughout the consideration of this bill, and especially with respect to the \$2½ billion that is authorized for the support of free world forces, it has been my position that these funds were to be used in order to restrict the scope of the present conflict in Southeast Asia, and I know of no possible way to place an interpretation on these various provisions that would justify an expansion of this conflict.

SECTION 843—INTRODUCTION OF AMERICAN GROUND FORCES INTO LAOS, THAILAND, AND CAMBODIA

The House-passed bill included section 843, which read as follows:

Sec. 843. In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand.

The Senate amended this section to include Cambodia.

As with section 838, the House conferees also opposed this amendment on the ground that it tied the hands of the President in his efforts to bring about a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia. It was clear to the Senate conferees that the House conferees would not accept the Senate amendment to include Cambodia in this section unless it was amended to include the following proviso:

Provided, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit the President from taking action in said areas designed to promote the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. Forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

After considerable discussion, the Senate conferees agreed to the amendment.

There was also strong opposition expressed to the addition of the proviso in the first conference, and this was the other issue that prompted me to move to table the first conference report.

I am happy to report that the Senate conferees were successful in their efforts to delete this objectionable language from the bill. As agreed to by the second conference committee, section 843 of the bill reads as follows:

In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand.

RELEVANCY OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPONSORED RESEARCH PROJECTS

The Senate bill included the following provision with respect to the relevancy of Department of Defense sponsored research projects:

Section 845. No part of the funds appropriated in this Act may be used to carry out any research project or study unless such project or study has a direct and apparent relationship to a specific military function or operation.

In substance, this is identical to the provision included in the Department of Defense Procurement and Research and Development Authorization Act, 1970, that was available to the fiscal year 1970 research and development program.

The House conferees were strongly opposed to the Senate amendment and insisted that this matter had been covered by the enactment of section 204 of the Department of Defense Procurement and Research and Development Authorization Act, 1971—Public Law 91-441. This provision reads as follows:

Sec. 204. None of the funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense by this or any other Act may be used to finance any research project or study unless such project or study has, in the opinion of the Secretary of Defense, a potential relationship to a military function or operation.

In view of this opposition, the Senate conferees had to recede on this amendment.

Mr. President, I believe the report of the conference committee represents a fair and reasonable resolution of the differences between the two Houses, and I urge the adoption of the report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota is recognized.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have order? Will the Chair ask Senators and others to desist in their conversations?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.

The Senator from North Dakota may proceed.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, there is little I can add to the comments of the distinguished chairman of the committee, the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER), than what I had to say on the floor earlier this afternoon.

Mr. President, the amount of money provided in this bill is far below that which the Secretary of Defense deems necessary and is far below what the Joint Chiefs of Staff deem necessary for the defense of this country.

To me an adequate national defense should be the top priority of all. The money being spent for the various kinds of domestic programs is so great that this is the best possible appropriation that I believe could be obtained in this Congress.

We cannot continue this way for long, however; otherwise we are certain to become a second-rate military power to Russia with all of the consequences that would follow from such a course.

Mr. President, I do urge adoption of the conference report as the best possible bill that could be obtained in the Senate and in the House.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the Senator from Mississippi, the Senator from Louisiana, the Senator from North Dakota, and other Senators had a very important exchange with the members of the Foreign Relations Committee earlier

in the evening. I do not wish to go over that ground; and I shall not. I assure the Senator that I will be very brief. However, I do think that it would be very useful if the Senator from Louisiana would agree that this whole colloquy be made part of the debate in respect to the approval of the conference report, which undoubtedly will issue shortly. Would the Senator mind if I ask unanimous consent to do that?

Mr. ELLENDER. No, indeed. I had intended to do that.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have that colloquy printed at this point in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(Accordingly, the following colloquy, which occurred earlier in the day, is printed at this point in the RECORD:)

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I was very much interested in the debate that took place earlier on the Department of Transportation conference report. The procedure that was followed was the same as that followed by me this morning, when I moved to table the conference report on the Department of Defense appropriation bill, and request a further conference.

Mr. President, it is not my purpose to debate the issues at the moment, but I simply wish to lay before the Senate what took place in the second conference. As is known, we had the first conference over a week ago, and we had 4 long sessions before we were able to come to a conclusion.

After the report was filed, I sought to bring it up, but because of the strong opposition expressed by several Members of the Senate to two of the provisions in the conference report, I felt that we could not obtain a vote within a reasonable period of time. It was for this reason I moved to send the bill back to conference.

In the second conference—which took place today—we had two meetings. I think we have reached a conclusion that will be favorably received by the Senate. I will put in the RECORD information on the new agreements. It is my hope that the Senate will adopt this second conference report because it is imperative that this bill be enacted into law before the adjournment of this Congress.

The first conference retained the Senate amendments to sections 838 and 843 of the bill. The difficulty arose because the House insisted on putting two provisos in the bill which were not acceptable to quite a few Members of the Senate. Those provisos, were attached to the so-called Fulbright amendment, which is contained in section 838, and the so-called Cooper-Church amendment, which is included in section 843. All that language was included, as I have said, in the first conference report that was presented to the Senate with those objectionable provisos.

With respect to section 843 I wish to point out that in the second conference, the House agreed to strike the objectionable proviso, and we in turn agreed to strike the word "Cambodia," so section 843 now reads as it originally passed the other body. It is applicable only to Laos and Thailand.

With respect to the Fulbright amendment, which was included in section 838, that language remains intact, but the House conferees insisted on the inclusion of a proviso which did not materially differ from the proviso that was in the first conference report. This new proviso reads as follows:

Provided further, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support of actions required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia, or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

Mr. President, in order to have all the language before the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that all of section 838, as it was agreed to in conference, be printed at this point in the Record, together with the proviso I have just read.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SECTION 838(a)—SUPPORT OF FREE WORLD FORCES

SEC. 838. (a) Not to exceed \$2,500,000,000 of the appropriations available to the Department of Defense during the current fiscal year shall be available for their stated purposes to support: (1) Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces; (2) local forces in Laos and Thailand; and for related costs, on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine: *Provided*, That none of the funds appropriated by this Act may be used for the purpose of paying any overseas allowance, per diem allowance, or any other addition to the regular base pay of any person serving with the free world forces in South Vietnam if the amount of such payment would be greater than the amount of special pay authorized to be paid, for an equivalent period of service, to members of the Armed Forces of the United States (under section 310 of title 37, United States Code) serving in Vietnam or in any other hostile fire area, except for continuation of payments of such additions to regular base pay provided in agreements executed prior to July 1, 1970: *Provided further*, That nothing in clause (1) of the first sentence of this subsection shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos: *Provided further*, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support of actions required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. Forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the language in section 843, minus, of course, the language that was deleted in the second conference.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SEC. 843. In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, as I have said, this Congress must not adjourn until we complete action on the Department of Defense bill. I thought that the members of the first conference had done a good job. When objection

was made in the Senate to the provisos included in the bill, we returned to conference with the results we have discussed.

I am very hopeful that Senators will study this action and approve it so that the bill can be sent to the White House for the President's signature.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, I wish to join in the statement made by the distinguished chairman of the committee. He certainly did all he possibly could to resolve the differences in the way that the Senate could agree.

We had more than 250 amendments in disagreement. I think all of them have been resolved, with the exception of one on which there may be some disagreement. But the House conferees did go part way with us on amendment No. 52, which the Senator just discussed, the one in which the distinguished Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) is interested. The House went part way on it, and I am certain this is as far as they are going to go, so I hope that this conference report will be adopted.

Time is running out. The House is not going to agree to more conferences. Many Members of the House will be attending a funeral tomorrow. The day after that is the day before New Year's. So I see no possible chance, unless this conference report is adopted, that there will be a Defense bill and that there will even be a continuing resolution. The problem then rests with the Senate whether there will be a Defense appropriation bill or whether there will not be one. I can understand that there are some strong feelings with respect to Southeast Asia and the possible expansion of the war there. This may have been the problem a year or two ago, but certainly President Nixon has made his position clear that there will be no expansion of the war—and certainly public opinion would not stand for it, so I do not see any necessity for all these amendments trying to limit the constitutional powers of the President. I think that if this amendment were studied carefully, the Senate would approve it. It is the only one now in disagreement, No. 52.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if I may have the special attention of the membership, I should like to refer to the very fine work which has been done here by the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER) and the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. YOUNG), as well as other members on the conference—excepting myself, of course. This is a very difficult and delicate situation that this language has to deal with. The Senator from Arkansas has dealt with it in his skillful way. I think that the conference has come up with something that meets the requirements and the necessity for the military time, and the necessity for meeting the requirements of the restrictions avoiding an expansion of the war, which I never have favored, of going into Cambodia with the idea of sustaining that government regardless. I am not interested in our going in there as

a matter of carrying on the war that we are unfortunately engaged in now.

Mr. President, I want to extend my remarks further to say on this situation we are confronted with, with only 3 or 4 days left in this session, that we have been working on the bill and the authorization bill, too, for almost 12 months and almost 6 months of the fiscal year have already expired. So that in these last few days we must pass this Department of Defense bill. I believe it will be in this Chamber by noon tomorrow, or very soon thereafter.

Let us remember, too, that this matter of a continuing resolution, which is the law now, dies with this Congress. It will be as dead as Hector and we will have this monstrous military machine worldwide, with a war going on, and no money so far as the present situation is concerned. Therefore, I hope that all Senators will study this matter and that all Senators will put their shoulders to the wheel and pull together and push together to get the bill passed at a very early date.

Mr. President, now I wish to discuss the results of the meeting of the conferees today on the defense appropriations bill. Two sections were revised and resulted in compromise language which, in my opinion, is eminently fair to both the House and the Senate. Both of these sections relate to the use of defense funds in Southeast Asia.

The first of these, Mr. President, concerns Senate amendment No. 52 set forth on page 45 of the bill.

As the Senate may recall, this amendment, adopted in the Senate, repeated the language in the military authorization bill and contained the limitation as follows:

Nothing in clause (1) of the first sentence of this subsection shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos.

In the previous conference language was added which was also retained with slight modification in the conference just concluded. The proviso is as follows:

Provided further that nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support of actions required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

Mr. President, the conferees agreed that all of amendment No. 52 should be retained along with the revised House proviso.

Mr. President, the retention of the Senate language will insure that the so-called Fulbright floor amendment from which this language is taken, will stand and be enacted as a matter of law. It is certainly my intention that none of these funds referred to in clause (1) will be used to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos.

As we all know, the military aid proposal has been passed and provides a military assistance program for Cambodia.

The added House language merely allays any fears on the part of the House that this restriction would in any way prohibit actions designed to promote a safe and orderly withdrawal.

Let me emphasize, Mr. President, that there is no intent to permit an expansion of the war with any of this added language. There is no intent to authorize the use of South Vietnamese or other free world forces to go to the rescue of the Government of Cambodia or Laos with the use of these funds. I consider that the colloquy between myself and Senator FULBRIGHT on the procurement bill still stands—that is, that none of these restrictions are intended to prevent actions intended to keep the sanctuaries clear and to prevent Vietnamization. At the same time the line is clear that it is not meant to provide a device for military support of these two governments with Department of Defense funds.

I would also emphasize that the language in the authorization bill still remains law.

AMENDMENTS NOS. 54 AND 55

Mr. President, the other amendments relate to the use of funds for U.S. ground troops. Senate amendments Nos. 54 and 55 had the effect of saying that no funds shall be used to finance U.S. ground combat troops into Cambodia. The previous conference report contained language which was similar to what I have already discussed which added the proviso stating that this section—843—was not intended to prohibit actions designed to promote the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia or aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

Mr. President, in the conference action today amendments Nos. 54 and 55 and all of the House-added proviso was dropped. As we know, in the Military Assistance Act there is a prohibition on the use of funds for U.S. ground troops in Cambodia. New section 843 will now prohibit the use of funds for the introduction of American ground troops in Laos or Thailand.

Mr. President, the House in effect receded on amendments Nos. 54 and 55. The only matter in the Senate bill that was not contained in the version passed by the Senate on this issue is the additional language in section 838. I do not believe this additional language weakens the intent or the purpose of the so-called Fulbright amendment. The entire package of the revisions to sections 838 and 843 is a reasonable one and I think the Senate should adopt the conference report when this matter is brought to a vote.

LARGER ISSUE INVOLVED

Mr. President, a fundamental issue is involved in the pending conference report on the Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1971. This bill has been before the Congress for almost 12 months and has been worked on continuously. It is a bill of which the Senate can be proud. The President's request of \$68.7 billion was reduced to \$66.8 billion by the House or \$1.9 billion and the Senate made further reductions of \$389 million which resulted in a bill of \$66.4 billion. The final conference amount was \$66.6 billion which was \$2.15 billion be-

low the budget request. For the Senate to reject this conference report at this time is to say the bill in all its totality should not be adopted as a matter of law in its present form.

I wish to raise another issue. The continuing resolution under which the Department of Defense is now operating expires with the close of this Congress on January 3. If we do not enact another law either in the form of this Appropriations Act or another continuing resolution, the entire Department of Defense operation will come to a halt. This could be a national calamity of untold proportions. The Senate, as a reasonable legislative body, cannot allow such action.

Mr. President, there must be a vote on this appropriation bill and I urge the Senate to work its will on this matter and adopt the conference report.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I certainly do not wish in any way to criticize the Senate conferees. They have been confronted with an extremely difficult situation. I had hoped that they would strike all of the language that has been referred to as my amendment. The amendment was the same as the language carried in the Defense authorization bill. I had assumed that that would be acceptable to everyone concerned since it was in the authorization bill. But the additions that have been made to it by the House conferees could be interpreted as nullifying the intent of the amendment, in my opinion. I think that what the Senator from Mississippi has in mind about this matter is very similar if not the same as mine—that is, not to expand the scope of the war and not to authorize the payment with our money for the Vietnamese Army to go in and occupy indefinitely the territory of Cambodia—or Laos for that matter—but Cambodia is the one that has been primarily and directly involved. But Laos is a concern also, particularly in view of a recent news story quoting Admiral Moorer. I do not believe that is what the Senator from Mississippi wants, either. I certainly do not want that.

It is difficult to deal with the legislation. I would have preferred that the language of my amendment and the proviso put in by the House conferees be stricken. This kind of problem is difficult to deal with in an appropriation bill.

I would like to ask the distinguished Senator from Louisiana about his interpretation of it.

The Defense Authorization Act contains the same prohibition as Senate amendment No. 52 in the appropriation bill. Does the manager of the bill consider that the terms of the amendment in the authorization act apply to the \$2½ billion appropriated by this bill, in spite of the fact that a proviso has been added in the appropriation bill?

Mr. ELLENDER. Not unless it is repeated in the appropriation act. I wish to tell my good friend from Arkansas that one of the reasons the House insisted on this language was that the House has already voted on the issue. The Senator well knows that the matter of the release of American-held prisoners is highly emotional. They insisted that that language be left in the bill

because, as I said, they had already voted on it. For that reason they insisted that language should remain. There was no way to change their minds.

The agreement we made is final, in my view. It is the best we could obtain.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Of course, I say to the Senator, it depends on how we interpret this language. Does he consider that the language added by the House broadens the restrictions of the amendment carried in the authorization bill?

Mr. ELLENDER. I do not think it does. If the Senator will read the proviso carefully he will note that it makes it clear the funds can be used for actions by the South Vietnamese and other free world forces to facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Southeast Asia and also to aid in the release, if possible, of American prisoners of war.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Where?

Mr. ELLENDER. Well, wherever they are.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In North Vietnam?

Mr. ELLENDER. Yes, but the President has that right, if he wants to exercise it, right now. The Senator knows that an effort was made about 2 or 3 weeks ago to rescue prisoners of war in North Vietnam. But the point I want to make is that, as I said, the House insisted on retaining this language because it had already voted on the matter, and it certainly was not in a position, as I was told, to go back and revoke what it had done last week.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I want to make it clear—I will ask the Senator—it is not clear that this language relates only to the support of Vietnamese or other free world forces, and not our own forces—

Mr. ELLENDER. That is right.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct?

Mr. ELLENDER. That is correct.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In other words, this could not be interpreted in any fashion as a restriction on the President as to what he does with American forces?

Mr. ELLENDER. No.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Whether he has the constitutional right to use American forces to invade North Vietnam or Laos or any other place is another question and is not involved in this particular issue.

Mr. ELLENDER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What bothers me about the language that has been added by the House is that it seems not to be a restriction, but to be an authorization and a recognition of his right to use American money, money appropriated here, to support the South Vietnamese, the Thai, or Korean forces for an invasion of North Vietnam. This is what has bothered me all along. That is why I said that I would much prefer that all of this language be stricken rather than to be in a position of having language which would authorize our paying for the South Vietnamese Army to invade North Vietnam for the alleged purpose of dealing with prisoners.

I think this is very dangerous language. It would be in a sense an invitation to the South Vietnamese to undertake such a project, and we would be authorized by this bill to support that army.

Mr. ELLENDER. Of course, the Senator has a right to his own interpretation.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, how does the Senator interpret it? Does he interpret it that way?

Mr. ELLENDER. No. I do not think that this language can be considered as an authority to use the funds for a large-scale invasion of North Vietnam by the South Vietnamese. We have made it clear that these funds cannot be used to support the South Vietnamese in actions to support the governments of Laos and Cambodia. However, this proviso makes it clear that these funds can be used to support South Vietnamese and other free world forces in actions designed to bring about the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia, and to aid in the release of American prisoners of war.

As I said, what was intended and what the House voted on was simply to give the President the right to support Vietnamese and other free world forces in order to help extricate Americans from Southeast Asia if it becomes necessary. It is just that simple. And that is all that language means.

Of course, the Senator could interpret it in any way he pleased. I do not think such an interpretation is valid.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, it certainly is meaningless then. I do not know what it is intended to mean.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, as I said, the House insisted on it since they had voted for it last week. They did not feel they could go back to the House and have the language that was voted on stricken, particularly when it dealt with such an emotional subject as prisoners of war. The point was made on many occasions by the author of the amendment, Representative Whitten of Mississippi, that the House had already voted on approving the use of Vietnamese and other free world forces if necessary to help extricate American prisoners of war.

The House conferees took the position that they did not want to go back to the House and say, "We did not mean what we voted for last week." They insisted on it. We tried to have them withdraw this language, but to no avail. That is the best we could do.

Mr. President, as I said, I do not care how long we might deliberate in conference, I do not believe it would be possible for us to have the House delete the language in question.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, what bothers me about this kind of language, especially in an appropriation bill, is that it is language that no legislative committee has ever considered or held any hearings on in order to determine precisely what it means. Some who read it may think that it authorizes the President, not to use our troops to release our prisoners, but to hire the South Vietnamese Army and to pay them to go north for the purpose of releasing American prisoners of war.

In other words, it could be considered to be authority to expand the war. Again, I hate to always be referring to this, but the sad experience we had with the previous administration with reference to such resolutions as the Gulf of Tonkin forces me to do so. We were sold on that

resolution on the ground that this was the way to stop the spread of the war, that this was the way to convince North Vietnam that it was in their interest not to have a widening of the war and that this was what was intended by it.

It was later used as authority for conducting war by the preceding administration. We are all familiar with that story. I do not want to say anything further about that aspect of it.

I think that if the Senator from Louisiana and the Senator from Mississippi, the conferees, could at least help, if we are faced with a fait accompli. They could say that they do not understand the language that way and that they think it would be a gross distortion of the meaning of the Senate conferees that this be construed as authority to pay for Vietnamese troops or any other free world troops—Thai, Korean, or any other—to mount an invasion of North Vietnam for an alleged purpose of freeing prisoners of war in this case. I do not believe that is what the Senate intended.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, first of all, I commend the conferees.

Mr. President, I understand somewhat the mood of the House. They did pass in late November a resolution after the Son Tay raid by a vote of 347 to 35. The Senator from Kansas had a somewhat similar resolution adopted by the Senate unanimously with the assistance of the Senator from Arkansas.

I share the concern of the Senator from Arkansas.

There is no question in mind of the Senator from Arkansas about the right to use American troops to rescue American prisoners. He does not question that right?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, in this case he did use our troops.

Mr. DOLE. A question is raised by the Senator from Arkansas on the use of South Vietnamese or other troops.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This does not relate to our own troops. This proviso relates to the use of our money to pay for foreign troops for the purpose of rescuing American prisoners of war and/or other purposes.

Mr. DOLE. The question raised by the Senator from Arkansas concerns the proviso that "nothing in this section shall be construed," and so forth.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. By foreign troops.

Mr. DOLE. But the Senator from Arkansas would not object if an opportunity presented itself where American prisoners of war could be freed by South Vietnamese?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We are not discussing that. If the Senator is asking me whether I would prefer to have a mounting of an invasion of North Vietnam for this purpose, an all-out invasion to overrun it, I do not think that I would as a matter of policy. But that is not the issue here.

Mr. DOLE. I did not suggest that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I raise no question about the President's authority to do what he did. I raise a question only about the wisdom of the operation, not know-

ing whether any prisoners were there. It was not a question of whether he had the right to do it as the President. I did not raise that point at the time.

I think the Senator knows, as he has already stated, that a very similar resolution passed the House.

We get into an entirely unrelated question, however. We are talking now only about, if we withdraw, what we are going to do in the way of paying for operations by South Vietnamese and other troops.

I advocated and urged the conferees to take all of this language out when I saw the complexities that had arisen. I had originally thought from this language without the proviso in the authorization bill, there would be no objection to it. Normally, that language having been accepted once before, one would have thought there would be no objection, but they simply turned it around. Often, in many cases the authorization language is carried over into the appropriation bill, but here this proviso could have the effect of changing the whole purpose and be used as additional authority, if someone wants to stretch it that far.

The Senator from Mississippi emphasized to me privately, and I think he indicated a moment ago, the use of these foreign troops to protect our own troops in connection with withdrawal or the process of Vietnamization was what he had in mind. I believe he does not think this provision would authorize paying for expenses of the South Vietnamese Army to occupy Cambodia or Laos or to support either of those governments independent of the direct relationship of the situations there to our own troops.

Mr. DOLE. It appears to me that since we are withdrawing from Southeast Asia, that that is the purpose of the proviso, to make certain we do not limit the forces of South Vietnam or the free forces in assisting us from withdrawing from Southeast Asia, or in the event of the proper rescuing of American prisoners. I fail to detect any escalatory language. It is restrictive but does make provisions to help us withdraw from Southeast Asia.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The South Vietnamese do not always have the same objectives we have. There has been a long and ancient rivalry between Cambodians and the South Vietnamese, as well as between the Thais and Cambodians. To assume that their objectives are the same as ours is not supported by the facts. Our objective is to withdraw troops, as announced by the President. I thought the language originally written and adopted in the authorization bill was satisfactory to everyone. In view of the action of the House conferees I think it would be much better not to have this language. If we are faced with accepting this I hope the Members of this body would make it very clear, if they so believe, that this should not be interpreted as any authorization for our supporting a South Vietnamese army to take over the occupation of Cambodia, Laos, or North Vietnam, because that is a matter for them to do independent of us.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I will yield the floor or I will yield to the Senator, whichever the Senator desires.

Mr. ALLOTT. I would like to have the Senator yield to me, if he would.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. ALLOTT. As a member of both of these conferences and a member of the Defense Subcommittee on Appropriations, I have been a participant in all of this. I understand the Senator's concern. This morning I thought for a while, frankly, in the conference that we could prevail with the suggestion that we strike all of this language.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. ALLOTT. It should be a good lesson to all of us to quit placing all these limitations on these bills; then we would not get into so much trouble. But we could not prevail and although the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER) has expressed it adequately, I would like to make some observations.

The question that arose was the question over the prisoners of war and upon this matter they were absolutely adamant. To a man they said absolutely that having voted once to put in the prisoner of war words and having voted once, they could not and would not go back to conference. They were as adamant on this one point as any group I have ever seen.

Looking at the legislation that came out, and section 838, as it now stands before the Senate, it states:

Not to exceed \$2.5 billion—

And then skipping some words—

shall be available for their stated purposes to support: (1) Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces; (2) local forces in Laos and Thailand; and for related costs, on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine.

And then it is provided that the first proviso is not a burden to our troops and we will skip some language.

Then it states:

Provided further, That nothing in clause (1)

That is the Vietnamese and other free world forces—

of the first sentence of this subsection shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the government of Cambodia or Laos.

So taking subparagraphs (1) and (2) above, and applying the limitation below that, I think the Senator will concede he has all he wants, going that far.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. That is the same as in the authorization bill.

Mr. ALLOTT. That is correct.

Now, coming to the language that follows, and I believe the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER) may correct me, if I am wrong, they offered some language, we amended that, and I am sure this is not the original language they offered.

Mr. ELLENDER. Basically it is.

Mr. ALLOTT. But it was changed by us around the table.

Mr. ELLENDER. Yes.

Mr. ALLOTT. The language states:

Provided further, that nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support of free world or local forces in actions designed to promote the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of United States troops from Southeast Asia.

I am sure that does not bother the Senator.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No, as interpreted by the Senator from Mississippi and other language he put into the report.

Mr. ALLOTT. Now, we come to the last few sentences, which is cause of concern to the Senator, and in view of the way he has been burned in the past, I can understand it:

Or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

I explained the House attitude on that. Now, the only question left is whether this is to be broadly interpreted, such as the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was stretched a few years ago. Is this to be taken as a resolution to permit these forces we are talking about in the beginning of section 838 to mount an invasion of Cambodia or Thailand or North Vietnam under the guise that it is done for the liberation of prisoners?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.

Mr. ALLOTT. I can only say this to the Senator. As far as I am concerned, there is no such element in it, and I am sure, listening to the conferees in the House all day, there is no such element as that in the minds of the conferees from the House.

I am sure if the distinguished Senator from Maine were here, and she was another member of the conference, she would say the same thing. Other members of the conference were the Senator from Louisiana, the Senator from Arkansas, the Senator from Missouri, the Senator from North Dakota who is behind me. They would all say exactly the same thing; that this is to be considered and interpreted in a restrictive manner and that is it is strictly what it says, which is to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

Let me say for myself, and I am sure every member of the conference committee will agree, that as far as this is concerned, not one of us would vote for this language if we thought it meant by interpretation the possibility of an invasion, which the Senator from Arkansas is so concerned about. I do not know that I personally can add more than I have except to try to eliminate all of these other things and to bring it down to this one question and say this is how we all feel about it. I am sure no one disagrees with me.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Certainly.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. I want to associate myself with the remarks made by the distinguished Senator from Colorado. There is no intent to broaden it. In fact, there is no possibility of that with South Vietnamese troops now in Cambodia. The fact that they are there makes this language more limiting in nature. There are two purposes for the assistance—our withdrawal of troops

and rescuing our prisoners. We do have about 75 prisoners in Cambodia. There might be a problem there. If there is, I do not think there could possibly be objection to trying to get them out. The South Vietnamese are presently helping Cambodia. I think this language to some extent serves the purpose of the language sponsored by the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. COOPER. I will read the language which was first offered by the House conferees. The House language follows.

Provided further, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support of free world or local forces in actions designed to promote the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia.

The House language which is now presented to the Senate is more limited, and restricted. It reads:

nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support of actions required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces . . .

I was very interested in the statements made by the Senator from Colorado, the Senator from North Dakota, and the Senator from Louisiana, all conferees. They provide an interpretation of this section. Would they say the proviso must be construed to mean that our support of Vietnamese or other free forces goes only to their use to insure and to protect the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia?

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. That is exactly what the language says.

Mr. COOPER. We have argued for months in the Senate over the war power of the President. It has been interpreted many times on this floor that he has the power as Commander in Chief to protect American forces. I do not think there is any question about that. The differing ways that the power can be used is subject to debate, but in the present case—that is, regarding the war in Vietnam I believe the colloquy between the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) on December 15 established very well what that power means.

Do the Senators who are conferees agree that the proviso which appears in the conference report is designed chiefly for the protection of our Armed Forces under the constitutional power of the President?

Would the Senator from North Dakota answer that question?

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. That would be my understanding of it.

Mr. COOPER. What does the Senator from Colorado say?

Mr. ALLOTT. Yes; I shall be glad to answer for myself. Probably the right person to answer is the chairman of the committee, but the answer is "Yes."

Mr. ELLENDER. That is my answer.

Mr. COOPER. The concern I have about the language has been expressed by the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT). But, I must say that the President of the United States and the Secre-

tary of State have said publicly that the policy of the administration is withdrawal of our forces. In convention with the express policy of the President the interpretation given today is of extreme importance.

Inasmuch as the language in question is the House language, I would like to ask the Senate conferees if their interpretation of the language is as important and as binding as the interpretation of the House managers?

Mr. ALLOTT. I would like to be corrected if either the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. Young) or the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. Ellender) have a different understanding, but in listening to all the discourse I detected not one word that would indicate that their interpretation of this language would be any different than the one we have tried to place on it on the floor. There was not one word said in the whole conference to indicate otherwise.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I would like to put in the Record the explanation in the report of the defense authorization bill for this year on the provision which led up to the amendment. I refer to the Armed Services Committee's report of July 14 and its explanation of the intent of the Armed Services Committee. I would certainly take it that this section, with the proviso, is still consistent with what the Senator has expressed.

Mr. ALLOTT. That is correct.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I ask unanimous consent that that portion of the report be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the extract was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

In making this clarification it must be clearly understood that there is no intent to broaden the authorization beyond the support of participation in border sanctuary and related operations in order to protect U.S. forces in Vietnam or to accomplish protective reaction strikes. The purpose of the clarification is to make clear that the use of Defense funds is authorized for support in those areas of Cambodia where for the purposes of Vietnamization or the protection of U.S. troops military action becomes necessary.

There is no intent to permit the use of DOD appropriations under this authority to support Vietnamese and other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Cambodian Government.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I also ask unanimous consent that a part of the debate at that time be printed in the Record, so we will have a legislative record.

There being no objection the extract was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Aug. 20, 1970]

AMENDMENT NO. 812

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I call up my Amendment No. 812.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read the amendment (No. 812) as follows:

"On page 19, after the period in line 8, insert the following: 'Nothing in clause (A) of the first sentence of this paragraph shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free

world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos.'

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no unanimous-consent agreement on this amendment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is no agreement on this amendment. After conferring with the Senator from Mississippi, we are not prepared at this time to make an agreement, but I would like to make a statement, and then we will either arrive at a time later or go to a vote.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, do we expect to vote on this amendment tonight?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I really do not believe that we can dispose of the amendment this evening. It is too late. There is a complication about it. I think we ought to open the debate and perhaps, tomorrow, agree on a time to vote on it, somewhere around 12 o'clock. This is the way I see it now. I do not think we ought to agree now.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, we have a unanimous consent agreement for a vote at 12 o'clock.

Mr. STENNIS. We can arrange it tomorrow. I would like the debate to start.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I shall make my statement on the amendment now.

The amendment would carry out the intent of the Armed Services Committee by prohibiting the use of Department of Defense funds to finance Vietnamese or Thai military operations in support of the Cambodian Government. In addition, it would go one step further and prohibit use of Defense Department funds for military actions by these countries in support of the Laotian Government.

The Armed Services Committee's report states:

"There is no intent to permit the use of EOD appropriations under this authority to support Vietnamese and other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Cambodian Government."

The committee is to be commended for drawing the line on use of U.S. tax dollars to finance a war by proxy in Cambodia. Recent events prove that its concern over growing U.S. involvement in propping up the Lon Nol government, through third countries, is well justified.

According to press reports a de facto military alliance exists between South Vietnam and Cambodia. Nearly 2 months after all U.S. ground forces were taken out of Cambodia, 20,000 Vietnamese troops are still spread throughout much of the country, fighting side by side with Cambodian units. Apparently, it is now standard practice for U.S. aircraft to provide close air support for Cambodian units in the thin guise of "interdiction" operations.

The extent of Thailand's current involvement is not yet clear. But the State Department has admitted that tentative—I repeat, tentative—have been reached with Thailand for sending 5,000 "volunteer" troops to Cambodia. That was the report I referred to in connection with the former amendment.

The State Department spokesman said on August 14:

"The nature and extent of whatever support we may provide will depend in part on arrangements worked out between the Thai and Cambodian governments, including the training and disposition of the troops involved."

I interpret this as meaning, in plain English, that we will foot the bill for whatever deal the Cambodians and the Thais decide to make among themselves. Unless the Congress acts it is likely that the American taxpayers will again find themselves the hapless victims of a fait accompli by the executive branch which sucks the United States ever deeper into the quagmire of Cambodia.

The history of the U.S. relations with the Asian nations that, at our urging, send troops to Vietnam is replete with deception and coverup by executive branch officials. Both the Congress and the public have been victimized by a conscious policy to hide the facts about the nature of the agreements with South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. If it were not for the diligent work of Senator Symington's subcommittee the public would still be in the dark about the price exacted from us by those countries. I am sure that the Thais would welcome a United States promise to make Cambodia a profitable operation for their troops, as we did for them in Vietnam.

In any debate over paying other countries to fight a war in Cambodia for us, which is what this amendment is all about, we should not lose sight of a fundamental lesson from our experience in Vietnam: wherever American tax dollars for waging a war go, the American flag inevitably follows. There will be no winning of the war in Cambodia on the cheap, by paying foreign forces to do the fighting. Once the decision is made to try to save Cambodia with foreign troops the die will be cast and our involvement—and our unwritten commitment to save Cambodia—escalated. What will the President do, for example, if Communist forces threaten Thailand in response to a Thai move into Cambodia? Will he be likely to refuse to answer Thailand's call for help under the SEATO Treaty? The possible consequences of encouraging the Thais to go into Cambodia are far more serious than the tens of millions of dollars it is likely to cost us. The cost may very well be a far wider war.

T. D. Allman, the experienced and perceptive reporter who was banished by the Cambodian Government several days ago, had an article in the July 23 issue of the Far Eastern Economic Review describing the growing U.S. involvement in the war. He ended by quoting a neutralist ambassador in Phnom Penh, who said:

"From the very beginning Lon Nol and Sirik Matak were absolutely confident that the United States would rescue them. They seem to have been completely right."

It appears that only through action by the Congress can they be proven to have been wrong.

My amendment goes a step beyond the committee's position by prohibiting U.S. funding of Vietnamese military operations in support of the Laotian Government. It is, I believe, a logical extension of the committee's intent, and but another step in the Senate's attempt to establish outer limits on American involvement in what has become a general war in Southeast Asia. The Senate has now gone on record twice as saying to the executive branch that it cannot go beyond certain bounds in prosecuting the war. It has said, in effect, that "although we may be up to our neck in the quagmire, we are not going to march in over our head." This amendment builds on the Senate's action of last December in prohibiting the sending of U.S. ground troops to Laos or Thailand, and on the Cooper-Church amendment prohibiting further U.S. involvement in the war in Cambodia. Thus far the executive branch has chosen to ignore the Senate's intent in passing the Cooper-Church amendment. By providing U.S. air support to Cambodia forces and in agreeing to pay Thai forces to fight in Cambodia, it has emphasized the danger of delaying further in drawing the line to deeper involvement in either Cambodia or Laos.

My amendment is also consistent with the administration's policy on Laos, as I understand it. On May 18, Secretary Laird when questioned before a subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee concerning possible incursions by United States or Vietnamese forces into Laos said:

"The important thing . . . to bear in mind is that a force engaged in combat or carrying out an operation in the border area quite possibly could have crossed the border when it was engaged in combat. It is necessary, from time to time, as far as the South Vietnamese are concerned, to do that, but I want it made very clear that there has been no change. Their mission is not a ground combat mission or a search-and-destroy mission or anything like that. Their activities are in connection with either a battle that is being carried on at a particular time or the air interdiction campaign or rescue operations that may be carried out on the Ho Chi Minh Trail."

Later, when asked specifically by Senator GORE if the "rules of engagement" applicable to U.S. forces applied to Vietnamese forces as well, he said:

"The rules of engagements so far as South Vietnamese and U.S. forces located along the border with Laos are concerned are still the same."

Yet, pressures have been at work to send the Vietnamese Army into Laos. Two days before Secretary Laird assured the Foreign Relations Committee that the United States did not support a Vietnamese invasion of Laos, a Laotian Defense Ministry spokesman, according to the New York Times, "suggested that, from a military point of view, it was necessary that South Vietnamese forces intervene to help 'clean up' Laos." And news reports periodically appear stating that the Vietnamese are preparing to do just that.

On July 25 the Washington Star cited reports—

"Vietnamese army commanders are eager to obtain political permission for a major strike into Southern Laos."

The same story reported:

"Laos Communists have accused the United States of 'preparing a dangerous military adventure' with U.S., South Vietnamese, Thai, and Lao troops in the panhandle of southern Laos."

In recent days, the Pathet Lao have charged that the United States has sent Vietnamese army units into Laos. Such charges by the enemy have often proved to be very close to the mark in the past.

The possible consequences of a Vietnamese move into Laos are grave. The Chinese-owned Hong Kong Standard has warned that an escalation of the war into Laos "will inevitably bring in the Communist giants" and reminded its readers of China's intervention in Korea. I do not believe that the Congress should leave any opening for the Vietnamese to escalate the war in Laos or risk provoking China into intervening. The only way to lock the door to Vietnamese adventurism in Laos is to cut off the money. That is the purpose of the second part of my amendment.

I feel confident that members of the Armed Services Committee had no desire to authorize U.S. financing of Vietnamese support for either the Cambodian or the Laotian Governments. But the change in the existing law proposed by the committee, opens the door to financing Vietnamese troops wherever they may be. Existing law authorizes Department of Defense funds to be used to support "Vietnamese and other free world forces in Vietnam." The committee proposes to change that to read:

"Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces."

Although the committee's stated intent was to make it clear that U.S. funds can be used to support Vietnamese operations in the Cambodian sanctuary area and for "protective reaction strikes in these locations," the change in language permits the executive branch to foot the bill for any operations the Vietnamese choose to undertake, including an invasion of Laos or China. And it would also permit the financing of any Thai opera-

tion in Laos or Cambodia as long as it is claimed that the action is to aid Vietnamese forces in these countries.

There is certainly no assurance that the executive branch will follow the committee's restricted intent when the language in the statute is far more broad. And, the Senate has no assurance that the House conference report will not seize upon a generous—and quite different—interpretation of the new wording, superseding the effect which the Senate committee hoped to achieve. If the legislative history is confused, we can be sure that the executive branch officials who will be implementing this authority will choose the broadest interpretation possible. The only practical way to insure that the language is not used to finance Vietnamese military adventures in Cambodia and Laos is to say so in the statute.

The Senate is slowly but surely imposing effective limits on U.S. involvement in this tragic war. To approve the language in the bill, as now written, would reverse that process and invite a further expansion of the war by the Vietnamese and the Thais, using an American proxy. I hope that the Senate will continue to build on the record of the past and adopt this amendment by an overwhelming margin.

Mr. President, as I conceive this amendment, it is, as I said, a further step in the same direction taken by the Cooper-Church amendment, which was passed by this body only recently. It is also consistent with the amendments offered by the Senator from Kentucky and others last December on an appropriation bill, forbidding the sending of American ground combat troops to Laos and Thailand.

All we are saying now is that money in this bill shall not be used to finance Vietnamese troops to go into Cambodia or into Laos.

There is an article in today's newspaper, supplementing what I have just read from other newspapers, indicating that the Vietnamese are preparing and anxious to go into Laos.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article by Murrey Marder, published in this morning's Washington Post, and other articles on the same subject.

(There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:)

[From the Washington Post, Aug. 20, 1970]

ALLIED ROLE SEEN BASIS OF LAO CHARGES

(By Murrey Marder)

Allied sources acknowledged yesterday that clandestine reconnaissance units operating in Laos may be the target of the latest Communist charges of war escalation.

For years there has been secret penetration of the Laotian border from the South Vietnamese side by allied patrols, air spotters, and sometimes raiding parties, hitting the Ho Chi Minh infiltration trail area. It was not determinable yesterday, however, if these covert actions suddenly have been intensified or not.

The latest public charge by the pro-Communist Pathet Lao that the United States introduced Saigon "army units" into Laos could be an attempt to forestall an anticipated South Vietnamese bordercrossing attack in force, U.S. sources noted, or it could be for psychological warfare purposes.

Washington and Saigon sources concede that their military planners are urgently pressing for sizable border crossings into Laos. But these sources say both capitals still regard such operations as too hazardous in domestic and international political terms for the Nixon administration to risk at this time.

The Defense and State Departments in Washington and official sources in Saigon

yesterday reiterated their carefully phrased standard disclaimers concerning operations in Laos. These statements are designed to sound like sweeping denials; however, they contain semantic loopholes to circumvent official acknowledgment of clandestine operations.

American spokesmen, in answer to questions, again denied there are any "U.S. ground combat troops in Laos." The Defense spokesman noted that United States aircraft, including helicopters, engage in "air interdiction" against the Ho Chi Minh trail and in "rescue operations which contribute to the safety and security of U.S. and allied personnel," and that the South Vietnamese government has denied sending its "troops" into Laos.

Neither this statement nor one by a State Department spokesman, however, faced the question of whether U.S. helicopters are dropping South Vietnamese patrols into Laos.

"PROTECTIVE REACTION"

A State spokesman went a bit further but still stopped considerably short of the question. He noted that in the past it has been stated that: "Small groups of South Vietnamese have had to cross the border in 'protective reaction' operations; those forces may or may not have been accompanied by American advisers."

A new variation on what the Pathet Lao charges is going on was broadcast late Tuesday night. It claimed the United States is sending "Saigon puppet units" into the Dak Lang area of Saravane province "so as to coordinate action with the Lao puppet (anti-Communist) troops there."

From Saigon the Associated Press reported that despite official denials there, sources said most of the reconnaissance patrols going into Laos "are led by U.S. helicopters along the 200-mile Ho-Chi Minh trail in the lower panhandle of Laos to spot targets for American bombers."

[From the New York Post, Aug. 10, 1970]

THAIS GETTING UNITED STATES INVOLVED?

(By William J. Coughlin)

BANGKOK, THAILAND.—Thailand's growing participation in the Cambodian conflict has widened U.S. involvement there, according to diplomatic sources.

Both Thai and U.S. officers here said last week that the U.S. appears to have a clear obligation to come to the aid of Thailand if Bangkok's efforts to support the Lon Nol government provoke attack by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces.

A high American official said he believes the U.S. would act under such circumstances.

SEATO OBLIGATIONS

Unlike its position in regard to Cambodia itself, the U.S. under the SEATO pact is pledged to defend Thailand in the event it is attacked by Communist aggressors. In the view of both Thai and U.S. diplomatic sources here, that covers any North Vietnamese counterattack which might be touched off by Thai actions in Cambodia.

Thus, the U.S. might be even more deeply committed in the Cambodian conflict than the Administration's Congressional critics have charged.

Thai police forces already have crossed the Cambodian border in actions against the Viet Cong and sources here report that Cambodian government troops have gone over the boundary to seek sanctuary in Thailand. But, thus far, no Thai regular ground forces are believed to have been committed to Cambodia.

Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman said last week that his country would send regular Thai forces into action in Cambodia if the Thai border is threatened or if the overthrow of the Cambodian government appears imminent.

CITES ASSURANCE

Asked whether the U.S. then, would still have an obligation under the SEATO pact to defend Thailand against outside attack, the foreign minister expressed the belief it would.

Thanat is aware, however, that the pertinent article of the SEATO treaty calls for action in accordance "with Constitutional processes," which possibly could bring the Senate into the act.

There has been some question whether there is a requirement for unilateral American action under the treaty.

But former U.S. ambassador to Thailand Graham A. Martin was asked by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) during hearings in November on U.S. commitments.

"Do you believe that under the SEATO treaty, we were and are committed to defend Thailand against Communist aggression and that if we did not go to their defense if they were attacked by a Communist country, we would be violating the treaty?"

Martin replied, "Yes, I do." Later, he named North Vietnam as one of the possible aggressors.

[From the Washington Post, Aug. 15, 1970]

THAI AID ACCORD CONFIRMED BY UNITED STATES

(By Murray Marder)

The State Department confirmed yesterday "tentative" agreement for American military aid to send Cambodia about 5,000 "volunteer" troops recruited or trained in Thailand. State Department Press Officer Robert J. McCloskey said "the United States has made it clear that we look with favor" on such "Thai-Cambodian cooperation."

"The nature and extent of whatever support we may provide," he said, "will depend in part on arrangements worked out between the Thai and Cambodian governments, including the training and disposition of the troops involved." McCloskey reiterated that "no final overall agreement on U.S. support for troops recruited or trained in Thailand" has yet been reached.

It was under newsmen's questioning that McCloskey acknowledged that what has been decided so far could be described as a "tentative" agreement for U.S. aid for 3,000 Thai troops described as "ethnic Cambodians" and about 2,000 Cambodians now being trained in Thailand. Labeling these troops as Cambodians and "volunteers" enables Thailand to contend it is sending no Royal Thai government forces into Cambodia.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) charged yesterday that the reported U.S.-aid intentions, if carried out, "would represent the second violation of the Senate-approved Church-Cooper amendment within a week's time."

The "first" violation, said Church, "was the disclosure that direct American air support is now being extended to Cambodian troops."

Officially, the Nixon administration denies it is engaged in direct air support; it claims this is "air interdiction" of Communist forces in Cambodia to prevent them from remounting a challenge to U.S. troops in South Vietnam. Senate critics counter that this is semantic trickery.

After intense debate, the Senate on June 30 passed an amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act sponsored by Sens. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) and Church. It would forbid retaining any U.S. forces in Cambodia, using U.S. funds for other nations' combat forces in Cambodia or providing U.S. combat air support for Cambodian troops.

Church said yesterday that "each passing week reaffirms the wisdom of the Senate" in prohibiting the use of "mercenaries" in

Cambodia, and rejecting opponents' contentions that the Cooper-Church amendment was "moot" because all U.S. troops were being withdrawn from Cambodia by June 30.

He said he was "dismayed" to hear of "another instance of the abuse that flows from unchecked executive power."

The Cooper-Church amendment was tabled by the House on July 9 on a 237-to-153 vote, without debate, and sent to Senate-House conference where the foreign military sales bill now languishes. Administration sources indicate they hope to circumvent the Cooper-Church barrier on money to support third-country forces in Cambodia by drawing on funds for direct U.S. aid to Cambodia.

[From the Washington Star, Aug. 11, 1970]

GROUND ATTACK INTO LAOS WEIGHED

(By Ott Kelly)

Ground operations by non-Americans to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos are under serious consideration at the Pentagon, but no decision to recommend such an operation is imminent.

One official who keeps a close watch on the situation in Southeast Asia was asked about periodic reports that a major military operation against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in southern Laos and northern Cambodia might be mounted by South Vietnamese, Thai, Cambodian and possibly Laotian troops.

"We are constantly assessing our air effort to stop men and supplies moving down the trail," he said, "and trying to determine if the job might be better done with people on the ground. But nothing along those lines is close to a decision."

Such an operation probably would be a relatively quick in-and-out attack similar to the South Vietnamese penetration deep into northeastern Cambodia in the latter stages of the operation against the sanctuary areas.

The major force in such an operation almost certainly would be contributed by the South Vietnamese.

The Cambodians and the Laotians both have plenty of trouble without going looking for more.

The Thais probably are capable of carrying out such an operation, but as one official said, "the Thais have a very low risk-taking propensity."

American forces are specifically barred from taking part in any such operation on the ground by a congressional restriction which prohibits spending money for ground combat operations in Laos or Thailand.

Although this restriction is frequently overlooked by those who fear an expansion of the American involvement in the war in Southeast Asia, defense officials are very much aware of the limit.

While the restriction would not prohibit the use of South Vietnamese troops in Laos, it would restrict the use of American helicopters to carry them into battle and American artillery to support them.

Even if such an operation across the border into southeastern Laos should be carried out, it likely would be limited in scope and duration because of the lack of American assistance.

"The dollar is the driving force there," one official said, "and there just aren't many dollars for operations not connected with getting Americans out of Vietnam."

This restriction also makes it unlikely that any of our allies in Southeast Asia will embark on any other, more ambitious military operations that have a certain appeal to the Pentagon from a strictly military textbook standpoint.

If forces were available, there probably would be a considerable military advantage to placing a blocking force in the north central section of Cambodia, close to the borders

of Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam where two major rivers, the Mekong and the Sekong join.

Although their efforts are hampered by the monsoons, the North Vietnamese are attempting to establish a firm supply line through that area, using the two rivers as the basis for their transportation system.

At this point, the Sekong is the key river, because it flows southwest from the Laotian town of Attapeu, now in North Vietnamese hands. The river joins the Mekong below the impassable Khone Falls.

A sizeable ground force in that area could either block the enemy supply line or force the North Vietnamese to fight in that relatively uninhabited area far from their home bases.

But the likelihood of anything but relatively limited in-and-out attacks in the near future is virtually nil.

[From the Far Eastern Economic Review, July 23, 1970]

CAMBODIA: INTO AN ICEBERG WAR

(By T. D. Allan)

One reason the Cambodian government is increasingly optimistic about its chances for military survival is that the United States and South Vietnam, with US-supplied funds, are on the way to adding approximately three divisions of trained and equipped troops to the National Khmer Armed Forces.

According to well-informed sources here, American and South Vietnamese officers and soldiers have begun training the first elements of two divisions of Cambodian troops at installations in South Vietnam. Another 10,000 or so South Vietnamese troops of Cambodian ancestry are being trained, and will be stationed permanently in Cambodia.

The programme, which began soon after US ground troops left Cambodia on April 29, apparently is being funded with a mixture of US-supplied South Vietnamese funds, American funds originally allocated for South Vietnamese military assistance, and direct US aid to the Cambodian government. The cost of the programme apparently surpasses publicly announced American aid commitments to Cambodia, which so far total only US \$9.9 million.

Elements of the first division to be trained in South Vietnam, according to Phnom Penh sources, are being trucked and flown across the border to South Vietnam in company-sized groups. Sources familiar with the training programme leave little doubt that the US is bearing the major financial and training responsibility, even though the programme technically is part of a bilateral South Vietnamese-Cambodian accord: "The American in charge is on his fourth tour in Vietnam," said one of the sources. "In Korea one time, he killed 29 communists with a shovel. Those Khmers may be going in gentle Buddhists but they are coming out tigers."

According to other sources, US personnel already have trained several battalions which have moved into Cambodia recently. They are Khmer Krom units—forces made up of members of South Vietnam's Cambodian minority. According to these sources, Khmer Krom troops in Cambodia soon will total about 10,000. About 4,000 belong to the American-trained and financed Mike-force, which long served as an elite mercenary force in South Vietnam. The rest are composed of Khmer Krom troops drawn from regular South Vietnamese units, given intensive training and sent to Cambodia.

Two of these newly-formed battalions arrived there several weeks ago aboard a convoy of US donated transport trucks. According to one source more Khmer Krom are coming. They will continue to be paid with US funds sent through South Vietnamese channels.

The Khmer Krom soldiers are equipped with American weapons, and have been ac-

December 29, 1970

companied by two US-paid Australian mercenary officers. US embassy sources here, asked to comment on the financing of the Khmer Krom units, said, they had "no knowledge" that they were being paid by Washington. But Khmer Krom officers say that "we are being paid through US aid."

The mass training programme for Cambodian soldiers was announced here last week. According to official sources, an initial 10,000 troops will be trained, and government sources say they will be followed by an equal number of trainees before the end of the year.

A decline in the level of communist military activity, a protective ring of US air strikes and South Vietnamese ground operations, and the psychological effect of what Cambodian officials here regard as an unequivocal American commitment to the survival of their regime, have combined to produce a semblance of euphoria in this isolated capital.

Only three weeks ago, when communist troops cut most of Phnom Penh's overland links with the outside world, imminent communist attack was expected here. Now, Cambodian Premier Lon Nol feels optimistic enough to predict "victory in the near future."

The optimism reflects significant evolution in the Cambodian situation. Fluidity has given way to a more stabilised situation in which the communists control most of the less densely populated areas, the government, with foreign help, holds the capital and several of the major provincial capitals, and a less dramatic but very debilitating struggle continues in the in-between areas.

The US air force has begun to fly around-the-clock sorties, in Cambodia, not only against enemy sanctuaries but in tactical support of the Cambodian forces. Evaluations of the Cambodian situation have adjusted to the realities of war. What three months ago would have been considered a major communist attack is now interpreted as a government success if it does not result in a further dramatic erosion of the situation. By absolute standards, communist attack have not declined greatly.

Many sources here believe that the partial lull is the result of a North Vietnamese decision to continue to give priority to the war in South Vietnam. "A lot was destroyed in the sanctuaries," said one intelligence source. "But a lot is still out there. We assume the Vietcong now are infiltrating back in to retrieve their caches and re-establish bases near the South Vietnamese border."

If the Cambodian government's optimism that the communists have been checked in Cambodia is therefore unfounded, its confidence in a fundamental American commitment to their cause seems increasingly justified.

"From the very beginning," commented one neutralist ambassador in Phnom Penh last week, "Lon Nol and Sirik Matak were absolutely confident that the United States would rescue them. They seem to have been completely right."

[From the Far Eastern Economic Review, July 23, 1970]

SOUTH VIETNAM: ARVN-HALF

SAIGON. Some clutched the booty of war. Others played nervously with their ancient weapons. Some, too sick or tired to stand, lay on the parade ground in the hot sun. And others dressed in the tattered remnants of uniforms three decades old, squinted at the neatly-dressed throng of South Vietnamese soldiers who had come to stare at the survivors of the Cambodian Army's Northeast Regional Command.

"This is just like 1964," said one Saigon officer who could not believe his eyes. In front of him were several Khmer soldiers wearing aluminum cooking pots as helmets, brightly-colored woolen scarves securing the

pots to their swarthy heads. A nine-year-old boy with double bandoliers of machine gun ammunition across his chest stood at attention, holding a machine gun. NCOs wearing muddy shower shoes and French battle jackets from the other Indochina War barked instructions in guttural Khmer. And an unidentified Cambodian major, resplendent in new olive fatigues and American jungle combat boots, dashed fowl-like around, spluttering incoherent French, English and Vietnamese.

But looking at what was left of Cambodia's 54th Battalion it was difficult to accept the Vietnamese officer's comment that the Khmers looked like ARVN back in its blackest days. The Cambodians looked far worse.

And now, ostensibly at least, it was up to ARVN to straighten up these troops, dress them in modern army uniforms, and teach them contemporary military tactics. After five weeks of "refresher" training at Lam Son National Training Centre in the mountains near Nha Trang they will be sent back to Cambodia to replace some of the 18,000 South Vietnamese troops fighting across the border and Cambodianise the war.

Yet despite Saigon's boast that it will be the Vietnamese who will be training the 54th—and four other battalions numbering 577 men each evacuated from Ratanakiri last month by ARVN—it will be the Americans who will be providing the cash and the real meat of the advice and refitting. Washington has not acknowledged this, of course, but then, as it does in Laos, it has its reasons.

Training began simultaneously at Lam Son for some of the 10,000 Cambodian Army recruits scheduled to receive instruction in South Vietnam. Although on the surface it looked as if the ARVN sergeants rounding up the green young men from Phnom Penh were firmly in charge the US was footing the bill. Moreover the large American advisory teams at Lam Son and at two other camps are also actively involved in their training.

Plans for the scheme were drawn up by the Americans at the Military Assistance Command in Saigon and the training began with the South Vietnamese acting as the perfect front for what is in reality a new American investment, and involvement, in the Indochina War.

The United States first showed interest in training Cambodian troops in May when the Lon Nol government, recognising that it could never train, equip and arm enough men in time to meet attacks from its enemies, appealed to Washington again for military aid.

The United States agreed to provide small arms, ammunition, trucks, high military equipment, and serving for Cambodian Air Force planes as part of a \$7 million publicly-acknowledged package deal. The plan to train Phnom Penh's troops also was included in the agreement but because it was thought this might be too large a pill for the American public to swallow it was decided to "allow" the South Vietnamese to do the training, a source close to the project said.

When the five battalions, plus about 4,000 dependents were snatched out of Bo Kheo and Labanslek after fighting off the North Vietnamese for several weeks (some of the battalions had lost as many as 200 men), it was also decided to extend the training agreement and for the US to support them too. Transported in US Air Force planes they will undergo extensive schooling and rearming under the training extension.

How much the training of the recruits and the troops is costing the American taxpayer is a closely guarded secret. But more important is the fact that the US agreed to do it secretly, using ARVN as a front, to further disguise its growing involvement in the Cambodian fighting.

Said one American officer, concerned about possible over-expansion of the U.S. military

effort in Indochina: "I am afraid we are on the road to involvement at the worst in another Vietnam, at the best another Laos. Despite what the president says there is a tacit agreement here that we are not going to allow Cambodia to go under. And we are already involved in that. You know how we are 'now involved' militarily in Laos. That's the way we are nearly 'not involved' in Cambodia."

The eight weeks instruction adds up to a crash course. ARVN recruits get twice that and even ARVN's training is considered hurried by America standards. They will drill with old World War II U.S. carbines and light machineguns in company-sized arms (about 100 men each) and then will be shipped back to Cambodia as complete companies with their carbines. At the moment, the Americans are concerned about the Khmers having to face up to the North Vietnamese fully automatic AK-47s with their outdated American equipment. "The feeling here is that they should all get M-16s or at least captured AKs," said one adviser. "We are trying to do something about it."

SOUTHERN-FRIED CHICKEN

South Vietnam three months ago sent 40,000 of its American-trained, American-equipped and American-paid troops hurtling into Cambodia in a series of invasions under the codename "Operation Total Victory". The South Vietnamese forces may have persuaded many Cambodians that the Vietcong were the lesser of two evils, as they tore up the previously placid Cambodian countryside with orgies of firepower which even their American advisers found impressive.

South Vietnamese senior officers, notably General Do Cao Tri, a former ambassador to Taiwan, made pronouncements reminiscent of early American statements on Vietnam. A score of South Vietnamese military planners noisily took over the general headquarters here, in the process displacing a number of Cambodian counterparts—including the prime minister's brother—from their offices. Initial tension between the Cambodians and their newfound South Vietnamese friends was exacerbated by Cambodian massacres of Vietnamese civilians and the South Vietnamese habit of looting every village they liberated on behalf of the Lon Nol government.

Now all that is changed, officially at least. Like the Americans, the South Vietnamese are engaged in the difficult business of doing a great deal for the Cambodians while trying to appear to be doing very little.

In Phnom Penh, the South Vietnamese low profile is most evident.

The embassy and residence occupy two small villas. Charge d'Affaires Tran Van Phuoc keeps to himself—when not engaged in frequent conferences on policy matters with Lon Nol and Vice Premier Sirik Matak.

Phuoc, indeed, was specifically chosen to blend into the Phnom Penh scene. He was born in 1918 in the south Cambodia provincial capital of Takeo, attended Phnom Penh's exclusive Lycee Sisowath, and speaks Cambodian so fluently that most of his meetings with Cambodian officials are conducted in that language.

The South Vietnamese officer corps, which works on a counterpart basis with the Cambodian general staff, also affects a low posture. "We are simply here for liaison," insists a South Vietnamese colonel. "If you need any information you should go through Saigon. Or better yet," he grinned, "contact the Cambodians. They are in charge here."

In fact, the South Vietnamese army corps plays as central a role in Cambodia as similarly placed American officers do in Saigon. They have the final say on all Cambodian military plans, provide transport, logistics and munitions for the Cambodian forces, and on many occasions have overruled the en-

tire Cambodian general staff on matters of strategy and tactics.

But no South Vietnamese flag files at the South Vietnamese military headquarters in Phnom Penh, and no South Vietnamese soldiers or officers can enter the capital without specific permission. "Even General Tri and General Dzu [the two South Vietnamese generals responsible for Saigon operations in Cambodia] must have permission to come here," says a South Vietnamese source, "and they aren't going to get it very often. They've also been told to give up press conferences on Cambodian soil." By whom? "President Thieu has taken a personal interest in this affair."

The low profile extends, less strongly, into the Cambodian countryside. In principle, South Vietnamese troops no longer occupy the territory they secure for the Cambodian authorities. They have orders to stay away from densely populated areas and to turn over to Cambodian troops towns they have taken from the communists.

The South Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia, despite the low profile, amounts to a relationship similar to that of a power over a protectorate. As of last week:

Khmer Krom troops of South Vietnamese citizenship assured the defense of Phnom Penh, and occupied surrounding villages.

12,000 to 40,000 South Vietnamese troops, depending on the needs of the moment, assumed the major responsibility for patrolling most of the countryside which remains nominally under the Cambodia government's control. Every major battle in Cambodia during the past two months has pitted South Vietnamese troops against the Vietcong and North Vietnamese. The Cambodians have not won a major battle since the South Vietnamese expeditionary force arrived.

Several thousand South Vietnamese logistics and staff personnel provided all logistics and most planning for the Cambodia forces. The logistics range from flying in guns and ammunition in transport planes to Phnom Penh to providing helicopters and advisers for Cambodian assault missions.

South Vietnamese helicopter gunships and artillery provided fire support for Cambodian troops on a regular basis.

An unknown number of South Vietnamese troops were moved into the border sanctuaries to continue the task of replacing US troops.

South Vietnam, serving as a funnel for US funds, was providing an undisclosed amount of material and direct financial support for the Cambodian government, according to sources here.

The South Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, therefore, despite its low profile, has become the major Cambodian defense. "This is only temporary," said one South Vietnamese commander, who spoke with an American accent picked up in the US. "It's their war." But the Cambodians, in any real sense of the word, have stopped fighting their own war. A typical episode of the Cambodian war occurred just north of Phnom Penh recently.

An air and water-borne South Vietnamese force of 5,000 men launched a search-and-destroy operation in a densely populated area on the peninsula formed by the Tonle Sap and the Mekong River. Cambodian villagers told reporters that the Vietcong had evacuated the area several days before. But there was no Cambodian liaison officer present, let alone any Cambodian troops. The soldiers spread through the countryside nonetheless and from the bank of the Mekong, smoke could be seen rising from the burning villages. A South Vietnamese artillery battery at 30-second interval fired random "harassment and interdiction" fire into the Cambodian countryside, despite the fact that

there was no longer anyone there to harass or interdict Cambodian villagers.

A dozen South Vietnamese river craft were spread along the river front; eight American-provided helicopters were parked in a nearby field.

A South Vietnamese helicopter pilot sat in the shade with a basket of chickens at his side. He dressed and talked like an American.

"I didn't steal this chicken," he said anticipating the question. "I paid for it." He then went on to explain the search-and-destroy action in the Texas accent he had learned at flight school in the US. "So you see," he concluded, "this is just like an American operation."

Indeed, the South Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, complete with low profile, an excess of firepower and a built-in callousness toward the villagers, seems all too surely to resemble the first days of the American involvement in South Vietnam.

[From the Washington Star, July 25, 1970]

REDS WARN U.S. ON LAOS

(By Henry S. Bradsher)

HONG KONG.—Lao Communists have accused the United States of "preparing a dangerous military adventure" with U.S., South Vietnamese, Thai and Lao troops in the panhandle of southern Laos.

In a small-scale forerunner of this, the "Lao Patriotic Front" has charged South Vietnamese and Thai troops are already fighting alongside Lao government troops in the area.

The accusation follows reports in Saigon that Vietnamese army commanders are eager to obtain political permission for a major strike into southern Laos.

AIM HO CHI MINH TRAIL

The goal would be the cutting of the complex of routes from North Vietnam through the panhandle which are collectively known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

If they could be cut west of the northern part of South Vietnam the benefits of cutting off Communist supplies now being claimed for the southern part of the country as a result of attacks on Cambodian sanctuaries might be obtained for almost all of South Vietnam and for Cambodia, too.

It is, however, a very big "if."

The ruggedness of the terrain and the probable determination of Hanoi not to lose overland access to South Vietnam and Cambodia could turn any attempt to pinch off the trail in Laos into a major new theater of indefinite warfare.

PERIL TO NEUTRALITY

A major military move into Laos, as distinct from the current semi-secret operations there of U.S., Thai and possibly also—as the Communists charge—South Vietnamese force would create political problems.

It would endanger the grayed remains of Prince Souvanna Phouma's claim to Neutrality for Laos, as established in theory by the 1962 Geneva agreements.

In an apparent effort to bolster the appearances of neutrality and thus try to stave off a military move into the panhandle, Lao Communists have been making new efforts to open talks with the prince's government in Vientiane.

Prince Souphanouvong, leader of the Pathet Lao which forms the Communist core of the "Lao Patriotic Front," has announced that he is sending a messenger to his half-brother Souvanna Phouma.

SEEKS BOMB HALT

The messenger also will seek to arrange for the two sides to meet and discuss "the cessation of U.S. bombing so as to ensure safety" for broader political talks.

Souvanna rejected in March a proposal for political talks which was tied to his telling the Americans to stop bombing. His

military position in northern Laos depends upon U.S. airpower, and the U.S. position in Vietnam depends upon bombing of the trail in the panhandle.

Souphanouvong, who is assumed by Vientiane observers to be under Hanoi's influence, is believed in Vientiane to be more concerned with getting the panhandle bombing stopped than in advancing positions in the northern Laos of his North Vietnamese-led forces.

His sending a messenger now suggests eagerness to get talks started despite Souvanna's position.

WIDE PLAN POSSIBLE

That he is acting as part of a wider plan was suggested by an announcement that the International Control Commission is prepared to police any political arrangements which can be reached.

This was announced in the name of all three ICC members. Canada has long been willing, but Poland has shown such willingness only when it got the word from Hanoi via Moscow. The ICC chairman, India, also has sought Soviet clearance before doing anything.

This political maneuvering comes, as the Lao Communist accusations indicated, at a time of intensifying military and diplomatic activities.

The "Lao Patriotic Front" issued its statement in Sam Neua, the Pathet Lao capital, Monday and it was broadcast in sections concluding Thursday. It marked the eighth anniversary of the 1962 Geneva agreements.

LENGTHY SUMMARY

The statement contained a lengthy summary of U.S. activities in Laos which it contended violated the agreements. The summary was called from American congressional reports, press reports and other sources.

It said that when U.S. troops went into Cambodia, many Thai army battalions "were sent by the United States." To the Lao panhandle. At the same time, "the United States ordered the Saigon puppet army to launch operations in southern Laos."

South Vietnamese commando units are operating in the panhandle, the statement said. It added, "On May 19, a U.S. Defense department spokesman said: 'United States advisers are authorized to accompany South Vietnamese forces' during operation in Laos."

"The joint operations by Lao and Thai troops and the intrusions of Saigon puppet troops into southern Laos show that the United States is preparing a dangerous military adventure in this area in the face of new developments in Cambodia," the statement said.

FOUR-PARTY AXIS

It referred to "busy diplomatic activities (which) have taken place among Vientiane, Bangkok and Phnom Penh" lately, with Saigon also involved.

On May 28, it said, the Lao army commander secretly visited Bangkok. On June 8, the head of Lao military intelligence and others visited Phnom Penh, it said, and on June 15 the head of Cambodian intelligence was in Vientiane.

"Thus, a four-party axis among the anti-Indochina Indochinese and the anti-Asia Asians has been formed to put into practice the 'Nixon Doctrine,'" the statement said.

In this situation, it added, "the United States and the ultra-reactionaries in Laos are pressing Souvanna Phouma to 'reshuffle his cabinet' in Vientiane. They have threatened to stage a coup d'etat in order to cow Souvanna Phouma into implementing their plans strictly and actively."

It is this danger of Souvanna's being pushed into agreeing that South Vietnamese and Thai troops could openly enter his country that Souphanouvong is believed to want to head off by his new attempt to get talks started.

[From the Washington Star, May 11, 1970]
U.S. GROUND ATTACK URGED BY LAOTIANS
 (By Tammy Arbuckle)

PAK SE, LAOS.—Laotian rightist leaders here said the United States should hit the Ho Chi Minh trail in south Laos at the same time it is attacking Cambodian sanctuaries.

They said as long as the Communist Vietnamese are using the Ho Chi Minh trail in eastern Laos to send reinforcements and material to Cambodia and South Vietnam, the U.S. effort in Cambodia cannot be fully effective.

The Lao military criticized President Nixon for setting time and territorial limits on American actions in Cambodia. "The North Vietnamese will withdraw to the west then return and rebuild the base areas when the Americans leave," a Lao general said.

Laotians said they expect the Communists to become active in northern Cambodia and to try and build up the Red Cambodian indigenous movement in these areas, supplied from new sanctuaries in Laos, Cambodia border areas.

The Lao military reaction was sparked by enemy moves in military region IV, the southern half of the Laos panhandle. Pak Se is military region IV headquarters.

Heavy fighting is going on now at Phou Luan, the highest point of the rice-rich Bolovens Plateau, 30 miles north of the Lao-Cambodian border.

"If they get the Bolovens they can hide and feed five divisions," the south Laos commander, Gen. Bounphone Mahaparak, said. North Vietnamese forces are grouping west of Saravane, which is the best access route to the plateau.

The Laos lost the province capital of Attopu last month, opening the Sekhong River Route into Cambodia.

Current U.S. military help to Laos in this area is confined to Army advisers, Air Force forward air controllers, air logistics and Central Intelligence Agency operatives who lead tribal guerrillas from small airstrips on the eastern edge of the Bolovens Plateau.

[From the New York Times, May 16, 1970]
LAOTIAN AIDE SEES NEED FOR SAIGON ARMY'S HELP

VIENTIANE, LAOS, May 15.—A Laotian Defense Ministry spokesman expressed today the growing concern of the military command over the situation in southern Laos and suggested that, from a military point of view, it was necessary that South Vietnamese forces intervene to help "clean up" Laos.

The spokesman, Col. Thong Phanh Khosky, said during a news conference that the North Vietnamese on May 9 had seized the large village of Tang Vay, 57 miles from the town of Savanaket, and today were encircling the Nong Boua Government post 19 miles from Tang Vay. He suggested that the North Vietnamese wanted to open new communications links in Laos to increase their supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam and Cambodia.

"From a strictly military point of view a South Vietnamese intervention to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail would be a necessity," the colonel said.

The North Vietnamese were today increasing their threat to the city of Saravane northeast of the Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos where 2,400 civilians have been evacuated in the last few days, Colonel Khosky said.

[From the Washington Star, June 6, 1970]
KY URGES ALLIES TO KEEP REDS OUT OF SANCTUARIES

SAIGON.—South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky returned here today from a two-day official visit to Cambodia, warning that the allies' Cambodian operation could become a "failure in the future" if the enemy is allowed to return to its former border sanctuaries.

"If we are just satisfied with the results we have gotten until now and we stop our move and go back and sleep and discuss politics, then the enemy will come back in a few months," Ky told newsmen.

"If we do nothing and then the enemy comes back, the success of today will be the failure in the future," he said after his arrival at Tan Son Nhut airport.

He said the future intentions of the allies were more important than the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong ability to fight.

The vice president, met at the airport by U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and other ranking U.S. and South Vietnamese officials, conferred with Cambodian Premier Lon Noi during his Phnom Penh visit.

Ky said he had gone to Cambodia to discuss closer cooperation between the Cambodian and South Vietnamese armed forces. He said he was "very pleased" with the results of the talks.

But Ky, who has stated there is no deadline for the withdrawal of South Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, said he could not elaborate on the military aspects of his Cambodian talks. The United States plans to withdraw its forces from Cambodia by the end of this month.

Ky announced that South Vietnam plans to train 4,000 Cambodian residents of South Vietnam and send them to buttress the Cambodian army.

"What we are doing now is to protect our common interest," Ky said. "They've helped us, they kicked Sihanouk out and now in return we are helping them."

In response to a newsman's question, the vice president said that if the Laotian government asks for assistance in fighting Communist forces, "we would do our maximum to help them." But he did not elaborate.

Ky said he expected "no real hard problems in the future," concerning Cambodia's Vietnamese residents, thousands of whom were placed in detention or refugee camps following the Cambodian coup that ousted Prince Norodom Sihanouk as chief of state in March.

The vice president said he had negotiated the abolition of the afternoon curfew that had been imposed on Vietnamese in Phnom Penh, Cambodia's capital.

Vietnamese in "remote and insecure provinces" will be moved into Phnom Penh until security is restored, Ky said. He added that the South Vietnamese government would repatriate those who wished to leave Cambodia.

[From the Washington Post, May 21, 1970]
KY RIDICULES JOINT PULLOUT TALK AS SILLY
 (By Robert G. Kaiser)

SAIGON, May 21.—Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky this morning ridiculed the notion that South Vietnamese troops would withdraw from Cambodia when American forces do as "a silly argument of silly people."

Ky declared that "we will not let anybody tie our hands" to prevent continued prosecution by South Vietnam of the war in Cambodia. He said the South Vietnamese forces had the capabilities to fight on the Cambodian front and in Vietnam simultaneously.

Ky's remarks, delivered at graduation ceremonies of the Vietnamese War College in Saigon, were the toughest yet heard from a senior Vietnamese official on the increasingly sensitive subject of South Vietnamese operations in Cambodia after June 30.

It appears that the South Vietnamese government is determined to continue those operations after President Nixon's deadline for the withdrawal of American troops from the Cambodian front.

NIXON'S STATEMENT

[When President Nixon announced May 9 that "all Americans of all kinds, including advisers, will be out of Cambodia by the end of June," he was asked whether the South

Vietnamese would abide by the same deadline. He answered: "No, they do not I would expect that the South Vietnamese would come out approximately at the same time that we do because when we come out, our logistical support and air support will also come out with them."

[Last Saturday, White House officials in Key Biscayne said they had every reason to believe the South Vietnamese forces would withdraw from Cambodia on approximately the same timetable as U.S. forces.]

Such determination to flout the wishes of the United States has been seen here before, but this time it appears to be more serious than previously.

Whether President Thieu would use such harsh language as Ky's "silly people" remark in this context is doubtful. But the Thieu-Ky relationship sometimes resembles the Nixon-Agnew relationship: the vice president here, as in the United States often does the President's tough talking, though Thieu's language on the issue has been more restrained, he has also said there is "no deadline" for his forces in Cambodia.

[Wednesday, Lt. Gen. Do Cao Tri, commander of South Vietnamese troops operating east of the Mekong River in Cambodia, was asked about reports from Washington that a South Vietnamese withdrawal would be linked with the U.S. pullout, according to news dispatches.

"I have not heard that from the Vietnamese side," he said, adding that the Saigon troops "are not under any restrictions, like U.S. forces, unless President Thieu orders us back to our territory."

[Asked how long South Vietnamese troops might remain in Cambodia, Tri replied: "That depends on the enemy. * * *"]

[From the New York Times, May 9, 1970]
THIEU ASSERTS LON NOL AGREES ON TROOPS
 (By Terence Smith)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, May 8.—President Nguyen Van Thieu said tonight that he and Premier Lon Nol of Cambodia had worked out "agreements in principle" for South Vietnamese troops to conduct continuing military operations in eastern Cambodia.

In addition, Mr. Thieu said the two Governments had discussed the feasibility of a South Vietnamese naval blockade of the Cambodian coast line and principal port—Kompong Son, formerly called Sihanoukville—to prevent the North Vietnamese from bringing in military supplies by sea.

"Our navy is capable of guarding the whole coast," Mr. Thieu said. "We have the ships and we think it would be a good idea."

Mr. Thieu made it clear that South Vietnamese troops would not be bound by the restrictions President Nixon has placed on the United States forces operating in Cambodia.

Mr. Nixon promised Congressional leaders last Tuesday that American troops would withdraw from Cambodia by the end of June and would penetrate no deeper than about 20 miles without Congressional approval.

Mr. Thieu said: "We have no deadline, no limits. We will move on intelligence. When there is a target, we will strike it."

Mr. Thieu discussed the Cambodian situation and other topics at a small dinner at the Presidential Palace. Eight foreign correspondents—seven Americans and one European—sat with him at a table under the elm trees on the palace grounds while the President talked for four hours about the situation in Indochina.

Relaxed and expansive in an open-necked blue sportshirt, Mr. Thieu said he was in daily contact with the new Cambodian Premier through the South Vietnamese delegation established last week in Phnompenh. The two countries have had no formal diplomatic relations since 1963.

"I have a friend," he said, laughing, when he was asked about his earlier contacts with the Cambodian regime. "We keep in touch."

The President said he and General Lon Nol had come to their "agreement in principle" about South Vietnamese operations in eastern Cambodia two or three days before President Nixon announced on April 30 that United States troops would cross the Cambodian border to clear out North Vietnamese and Vietcong sanctuaries.

He said Premier Lon Nol had requested support from South Vietnamese forces for the general defense of Cambodia east of the Mekong River.

In the short term, Mr. Thieu said, the agreement would involve direct South Vietnamese military assistance and probably the naval blockade. He said he had already supplied some 4,000 American-trained ethnic Cambodian troops from the South Vietnamese forces, but he expected that more would have to be sent to Phnompenh to bolster the position of the Lon Nol Government.

In the long term, he said, the South Vietnamese would take on the job of training the Cambodian Army, which Mr. Thieu described as weak and poorly equipped. "But they have the manpower," he said, "and we can provide the advice."

Mr. Thieu said he believed that the next six months would be critical for the war as well as for political leaders.

"If Lon Nol and Cambodia stand for the next six months," he said, "then I think Mr. Nixon will win the Congressional elections this year and be re-elected in 1972, because then the operations will have proven a success."

"Also," he said, "if we keep up the pressure on the Communists for the next six months, then I think they will have no choice but to negotiate a settlement or fade away."

[From the Christian Science Monitor
Aug. 3, 1970]

OPPOSITION SEEN ON EFFORTS TO WIDEN VIET WAR—JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PROPOSALS SAID TO OFFER THREE OPTIONS
(By George W. Ashworth)

WASHINGTON.—The Joint Chiefs of Staff are proposing a significant expansion of the allied war effort in Indo-China.

According to well-informed sources, papers prepared for the chiefs by the joint staff and now being circulated support:

The coordinated use of Thai and South Vietnamese forces to move against enemy troops in northern Cambodia and southern Laos.

Use of allied troops for operations within the demilitarized zone that separates North and South Vietnam.

The proposals already have run into opposition within the Pentagon. According to a dictate of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, all proposals of the joint chiefs concerning Indo-China must be given a thorough review by his civilian staff before they reach the secretary for final consideration.

Under the new review system, instituted by Mr. Laird after the decision was made in April to launch allied attacks inside Cambodia, defense review of proposals would be formally finished before reaching the White House.

According to sources, however, the White House already has received at least informal indications of what the chiefs now are seeking.

NEW CHAIRMAN FUNCTIONING

The proposals are among the first major papers prepared under the new chairmanship of Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, who replaced retired Gen. Earle G. Wheeler in early July as chairman of the joint chiefs.

Some officials believe the proposals may reflect the beginnings of a somewhat harder line on major defense issues under the new

chairman, who is deeply interested in the war.

According to sources, the proposals are essentially grounded in the belief that the allied effort in Cambodia caused the enemy forces deep distress and that much could be gained by applying continued pressure.

There is feeling among many military men that continued hitting at the enemy, wherever concentrated, could keep Hanoi off-balance, thus saving American lives and preventing buildups that could threaten allied forces in the several theaters of the war zone.

The proposals pertaining to Laos and Cambodia would call for substantial United States logistical backing and the use of American airpower to bolster Thailand and Vietnamese forces on the ground.

According to sources, Admiral Moorer told the defense civilian hierarchy that the Thais and Vietnamese could fight with American support as proposed with no necessity to increase war expenditures during the current fiscal year.

That point is heatedly disputed by officials in other Pentagon offices. Certainly it would be harder now than before to take such actions since the budgetary allowances for the war have been cut drastically.

Expenditures for the war peaked at about \$29 billion annually in 1968. They began falling as American disengagement got under way in 1969. Current estimates put the war expenditures at about half of the peak level.

As the administration budget is predicated on fairly steady drops in war costs, it might be difficult to finance anything that would keep expenditures level over a long span, much less rising.

The chiefs present three options in the paper on Laos and Cambodia now being circulated.

The first is to continue doing what is now being done, i.e. support the Vietnamese with limited activities in the sanctuary areas, but not deeper into Cambodian territory now being occupied by the enemy.

The second calls for use of Thai and Cambodian forces in portions of northern Cambodia and southern Laos now occupied by North Vietnamese and their allies.

The third option is the same as the second, with the addition of U.S. ground forces.

According to administration sources who have seen the paper, the third option is discounted, largely because of congressional feelings toward use of U.S. forces outside Vietnam and because of the present mood of the public.

The first option, essentially what is being done now, is described, as one source put it, "with a lot of bad words" that make it seem less attractive.

That leaves the middle-road option, and that is what the chiefs now are pushing.

Opposition here largely revolves around a deeply held belief that such activities as the chiefs now are proposing increase instability and spread allied forces thinly without any guarantees of success.

While there is little doubt that the Thais and the Vietnamese could batter the opposition—given heavy American help—the opposition response would be uncertain, as would results, and dangers could be posed for Vietnamization, which many officials continue to view as the Indo-Chinese concern of greatest magnitude at this point.

DEEP CONCERN EVIDENCED

While the views of Gen. Creighton W. Abrams are not known on these new proposals, he has evidenced deep concerns in the past, particularly toward the close of the allied operations in Cambodia, lest Vietnamese and American attentions be allowed to wander too far from the business at hand in Vietnam.

More administration is steadily becoming more deeply involved in Cambodian military

affairs, but the President and his closest advisers apparently still adhere to the view that the United States should help Cambodia as it can, short of U.S. troop involvement. That, they believe, must not come.

If the North Vietnamese are indeed preparing to take over Phnom Penh and destroy the Lon Nol government, then disruptive attacks against them in present gathering points and strongholds should disrupt that. But few believe the North Vietnamese are willing now to indulge in such a risky venture. If this is the case, then allied activities could not prevent anything that is not going to happen anyway.

The proposals relating to the DMZ are quite another matter. The chiefs would be interested in receiving approval for allied operations inside the DMZ.

This will be opposed by those who see no threat justifying such a change and would not like to complicate the situation at the DMZ or cause deterioration of the situation created by the "understandings" that preceded the bombing halt over the north.

RESUMPTION OF DEBATE

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This quotation is from one of the most recent articles:

Allied sources acknowledged yesterday that clandestine reconnaissance units operating in Laos may be the target of the latest Communist charges of war escalation. . . .

Washington said Saigon sources concede that their military planners are urgently pressing for sizable border crossings into Laos. But these sources say both capitals still regard such operations as too hazardous in domestic and international political terms for the Nixon administration to risk at this time. . . .

From Saigon the Associated Press reported that despite official denials there, sources said most of the reconnaissance patrols going into Laos "are landed by U.S. helicopters along the 200-mile Ho Chi Minh trail in the lower panhandle of Laos to spot targets for American bombers."

All these articles raise this question, and suggest that preparations for such ventures are being made and that the expectation is that the Vietnamese forces will move into Laos.

So I submit that if we meant what we said when we adopted the Cooper-Church amendment and the other amendments which were adopted last year, this amendment is entirely consistent with that action.

I am very much afraid that if we do not adopt this amendment, with the changed language in the existing law, even in spite of the fact that the committee in its report said this is not intended to finance Vietnamese forces, the House probably would not agree with that, and that the administration, the executive department, in connection with preparations being made, would choose to say that the legislative record is fuzzy and not precise and they should go ahead, because the law, it seems to me, could easily be construed to authorize it.

So I do hope that the Senate will accept this further step, consistent with what we did in the previous steps, to restrict our involvement in the war in Cambodia and in Laos.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I am very glad that the distinguished Senator from Arkansas and the distinguished Senator from Mississippi have decided that we would not vote on this matter tonight, because I think we have to give it some thought.

I understand perfectly what the Senator's amendment intends to do. At the outset, I have some reservations about two points: First, whether this would involve the United States in the governmental decisions of

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another country; and, second, if we decide that this is all right, how we control this money when we give it in a lump sum. We do not know which dollar is being used for which purpose.

These are the two questions that come immediately to my mind, and I appreciate the time to think them over tonight. I certainly understand the Senator's concern, and I might even reach the point of agreeing with him in that concern. But I would like to hear the amendment debated a little further, so that we can understand what we do, for example, if, under this lump sum of money that we appropriate for Southeast Asian use, in separating the dollars that might be used by the South Vietnamese for sending South Vietnamese forces into Laos from the money they use to send troops into Cambodia, or use to fight their own portion of the war.

I would hope that during the course of the debate tomorrow, the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations would give us his thoughts on those two subjects.

The question of our involvement in telling another government what to do does not present such a big problem with the Senator from Arizona as how we control the funds when we know they are not identified. We have just gone through an amendment in which we discussed this, in which the funds are asked of us in a lump sum. No report is made that says that one, two, three, four, and five, "We spent the money in these particular ways."

I hope that some time during the debate we can get some thought as to how this can be controlled, so that if the amendment is adopted, it will be effective and not just be another exercise in semantics on the floor of the Senate that the State Department could get around easily.

Those are my concerns, and I look forward to tomorrow and an opportunity to hear more about it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I appreciate the Senator's comments, and I would not minimize the difficulty in sustaining the kind of relationship we have with the government of South Vietnam.

As a matter of fact, practically all their funds do come from us, directly or indirectly; and if we wish to encourage them to invade Laos or Cambodia with their forces, of course they will do it. If we wish to discourage them, I think we can have great effect upon them.

What bothers me most of all is that I think the idea has grown up in Saigon that the United States is their captives. As evidenced, I submit the statement made by the Senator from South Carolina that they are helping us. This is an attitude of many people—that the Saigon government is helping us. It is our war, seems to be the view, and they are coming in very graciously to help us—that is if we pay them to help.

However, not too long ago, most Americans were under the impression that we were helping them. But we get these different points of view. If I understand the Senator from South Carolina, he really believes that this is primarily our fight, because he views this fight as one directed against a worldwide international Communist conspiracy and he believes it is our responsibility to fight that conspiracy, wherever it is. Apparently it is purely incidental that this particular fight is in South Vietnam, but primarily it is our fight, and the Vietnamese and others have been gracious enough, with enough pay, to help us. I think that is the way he views it, and I am sure other people view it that way, also. It all depends on the way one looks at these fights, whether they are taking place in South Vietnam or in the Middle East or in Berlin.

Of course, I do not agree with his analysis, and I do not believe that was the justification that President Johnson originally gave us—

whose basis for intervention in Vietnam changed almost daily, according to the criticism.

It reminds me a little of the ABM. About every 2 weeks there is a different justification for it. Secretary Rusk and President Johnson had the same flexibility of justification as to why we were fighting in Vietnam.

I say to the Senator that I appreciate the difficulty, but I do think that, in view of our investment—the cost to this country, and so forth—we, the Congress and the Nation, ought to have something to say about where our money is used and whether or not our money should be used to finance the Vietnamese in Laos or Cambodia.

The Armed Services Committee, itself, has changed this language. I pointed out that they have changed the existing language "would not appear to authorize." Now why did the committee change the language? I think it was to make way for attacks on the sanctuary, just the sanctuary. I say to the Senator from Mississippi, is that not what he—

Mr. STENNIS. If the Senator would yield to me now—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes; I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. I appreciate that, and I would like to get the floor to give a chronological development on that point.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am perfectly willing to yield the floor because I think it is that change in language, together with the committee report, which precipitated the amendment. I immediately began to wonder what was the purpose. All I am trying to do is to implement what the committee said was its intention. I should like it to be put in the law, because I have seen often how these interpretations in committee reports, if they do not suit the executive branch, are ignored in practice.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. President, it is well for us to come to this point, to state the committee's position as we understand it. I call attention here, and I think this is an historical development, step by step, which is important and is a part of the legislative history that we draw in here together, and it may well have a bearing.

I have before me, first, title 4 of the general provisions of the bill as it came to our committee from the House, in connection with these funds, which is really what we have been calling all these years: foreign military aid. That ordinarily came through the Foreign Relations Committee.

Until a few years ago, when the war thickened, by common consent, it was sent to our committee, under rather broad language, because of the proximity of things there. Some of this foreign aid was granted to pay the Philippine Army, and the Korean Army, some was for equipment, and some was for this and that. They had given us a report on these items, but it never has been defined with great particularity. For most of it, there is good reason for that, because it is more or less picking up and paying the cost of a battle. The Army moves on. Over the years, though, they have given us an accounting, of a kind. Last year, we put this at a \$2.5 billion ceiling. The language read as follows—in the House bill—which was a re-script of the language last year:

"Funds authorized for appropriation for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes in support—"

And here comes the foreign aid, military aid—

"Vietnamese and other free world forces in Vietnam."

I emphasize those last word, "in Vietnam." When this bill passed the House, the sanctuary in Cambodia had not arisen. When

the bill was before us, this battle of the sanctuary was going on, full tilt. So we struck out the words, "in Vietnam." The battle had moved beyond Vietnam. That was, though, consistent with the argument made here that this was not an invasion of Cambodia. It was an extension of the battlefield. So we took out the words "in Vietnam" as being too limited. Our purpose was to cover the sanctuary battle and things that had happened in connection with it. We did not know, then, how far it would go. It was not our purpose, though, to launch into a broad authorization here of unlimited support with military aid to sustain, to guarantee, or to underwrite the Government of Cambodia. We looked upon that as another war. I did. And I think that was the prevailing sentiment in the committee.

After striking out those words, "in Vietnam", we wrote the language this way:

"To support (a) Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces."

I go over that again:

"(a) on line 4 of page—of the Senate—"
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Nineteen.

Mr. STENNIS. Page 19, right. I thank the Senator.

"To support Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces.

Now, at that time, Vietnamese forces were over in Cambodia. There was a battle going on over the sanctuary. Understand now, that none of this money goes to U.S. soldiers or to their cost in anyway. This is all foreign military aid. Then that was the way we covered in the body of the bill support of these forces over in Cambodia who were supporting the Vietnamese forces. They were supporting us, too, in a way.

But that is the way we covered the area of the sanctuary and we did not know how far that was going to extend. In the report, we spell out here now, further, what was meant. I refer to page 106 and read briefly from the middle of that page:

"The committee is of the opinion that the phrase 'in Vietnam'—"

Meaning in the House bill—
"should be the subject of clarification and, therefore has substituted the words 'in support of Vietnamese forces'. The reason for the substitution is to make clear the use of the authority for the purpose of supporting non-U.S. free world forces with respect to the border sanctuary and related area operations in Cambodia, and the protective reaction strikes in these locations. This clarification is for the purpose of protecting U.S. troops and the acceleration of the Vietnamization program."

In other words, at that time, this battle was still going on, the extent of it was not known, and it was our idea not to stop in the middle of the battle or to put on any restrictions, however far this went, as long as it was protecting U.S. troops or accelerating the Vietnamization programs that would be legal.

Then, on the top of page 107, the language covers the point—part of the point, in a way—I read from page 107—when I say report, I mean the official report of the Senate committee on the bill filed July 14, 1970:

"In making this clarification it must be clearly understood that there is no intent to broaden the authorization beyond the support of participation in border sanctuary and related operations in order to protect U.S. forces in Vietnam or to accomplish protective reaction strikes. The purpose of the clarification is to make clear that the use of Defense funds is authorized for support in those areas of Cambodia where for the purposes of Vietnamization or the protection of U.S. troops military action becomes necessary."

Now that is broad enough, and we intend it to be broad enough to include areas of Cambodia as long and as far as it was con-

nected with the sanctuary or any program that the President was carrying out. That paragraph on page 107 is as clear as language can make it. We made it broad enough to cover anything connected with our activity there, our Vietnamization, and, that our troops could go back in another sanctuary under like circumstances. That is what it was intended to cover, going back in for the same purpose.

Then they put the negative here:

"There is no intent to permit the use of DOD appropriations under this authority to support Vietnamese and other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Cambodian government."

That means the Cambodian Government as such in a movement beyond the reasonable limits of what we had already described. That is the way the bill is before the Senate and the way it explains it is, I think, clear.

I do not think there is any ambiguity dealing with the vague situation we had to deal with which changed from day to day.

I want to make it clear that we intended then to cover the authority of the President; if there arose again the need to clear out sanctuaries so that he could do it so far as this was concerned and could pay for military aid to help those that were fighting with the Vietnamese and us, although we used the word "Vietnamese."

I lay that down as a part of the history and part of the situation that led up to the amendment that the Senator has offered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. Let me cite right there the part of the Senator's amendment. I think it ought to come in the Record at this point. The language of the Senator's amendment provides:

"On page 19, after the period in line 8, insert the following: 'Nothing in clause (A) of the first sentence of this paragraph shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos.'"

Let us leave out the words "or Laos" for just a minute. I think it does complicate it. It reads "to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia." That is apart from or in addition to what has already been described. That is my interpretation of it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, with respect to the language the Senator has just read, I sought to use the language of the Armed Services Committee report as nearly as I could.

There are a couple of questions I would like to ask the Senator. I think my amendment would put into the statute what the Senator described just now as what he intended to achieve by this change in language. That is the way I and my staff interpreted the amendment, that it would put into the statute what we believe the Senator intended by his statement in the report. If that is so our only difference is as to whether it ought to be in the statute or not.

I suppose this reflects our relative trust as to whether the Executive will follow the committee report rather than the statute. Maybe the Senator has great confidence that the Executive will follow the report. However, I think it is better to put the language in the statute. We do not seem to differ.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may I ask the Senator a question at that point, because he has raised a point there. Is it the Senator's interpretation of the bill, as written now, and the report that there is no prohibition in any

way on the battle of the sanctuaries, so-called? Then, my next question would be whether there would be any prohibition on additional sanctuaries.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I was going to raise that very point. What is a sanctuary? After all, that has already taken place.

If the Senator is concerned that this same situation of the sanctuary matter might arise again, that does not bother me too much.

What I am trying to avoid is becoming really involved in a close-scale operation in support of the Government of Cambodia and the Government of Laos.

I say that is the language of the Senator's own report. It denies military assistance to the Cambodian Government from these funds.

Two things occur to me about the sanctuaries.

First, is their definition. The President described them, as the Senator well knows, and set a limit of 2 1/2 miles, I believe, and said that he did not propose to go beyond that point with our troops.

It was generally conceded that was the limit of the sanctuaries as of that given date.

The President also made the argument—and I do not wish to misquote him, but I will describe what he said—that he regarded that incursion, as they use the word, into Cambodia as simply part of the war in Vietnam and not an invasion of another country.

I believe that is a fair way to state it. He said, therefore, that he did not need any additional authority, that the attack on sanctuaries was not a violation of the sovereignty of Cambodia.

The Senator has described the chronological development of this matter. If that is true, either the Senator is saying that the President went in there without authority or that he is trying to rectify that matter now.

If he did not have authority, I do not see why we need to change the language.

If his action then was authorized, then it is still authorized. I do not object to that, if that is it. So why not leave the language like it was.

Mr. STENNIS. In the House bill?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. I do not know how the Senator can get away from the fact that by insisting on this language in order to give the President authority to operate in the sanctuaries, he must be saying the President did not have this when he invaded the sanctuaries before.

Mr. STENNIS. I think it is purely academic for us to argue about the battle of the sanctuaries now. That is over.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with that statement.

Mr. STENNIS. What is done is done. At the time he wrote this language, the battle was still going on, so far as that is concerned. We were not in favor of bringing a bill to the floor that someone could jump on and say, "This bill limits what the President is now doing."

So we intended to enlarge it and did enlarge it and also added language that says that as long as the Vietnamization program—and that is a little indefinite—is protecting our men—and that is a little indefinite, but those are the general terms that are used—this money could be used for these foreign troops.

If the Senator agrees that the President did have authority to use the money, talking about military aid, in a recurrence of this kind in the future, why it seems to me that that would end the argument. It is a clear-cut agreement. And I do not see any use for the amendment, leaving Laos out for the time being.

But I want to be frank. I believe we are almost together, and we just want to make a record of it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. My intention in offering the amendment was to express my explicit agreement with the Senator's statement in

the report. That was my purpose; to show I agree with the Senator's sentiment expressed in the report. My difficulty is that I was afraid the language in the bill itself did not accurately and forcefully enough reflect the Senator's intention. My intention is the same as his. I do not want us to get involved in all-out support of the Government of Cambodia—and that is what the report said—or of the Government of Laos.

Then, the only question is, how to tie that down so that the administration would be in agreement with the Senator and me. It is not that I disagree with the Senator but we might find ourselves in disagreement with future administrations.

Mr. STENNIS. You cannot control the administration in these words. Let us stay away from that, if we may. I will be frank with the Senator.

If the Senator agrees the situation would be clear for these purposes I have stated—Vietnamization, and that includes withdrawal and for the protection of our troops; and that another sanctuary would be permitted, I think that ends the argument about the Senator's amendment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It seems to me it ends the argument, I agree, the Senator agrees, and the Senator from Arizona agrees. If there is any need for new language, and the House has that language, and we say that language means this, they would have no reason to say otherwise, and that would end it because we do not need new language. Why do you not revert to the House language and say that all agree it will allow the President to do what he has already done? Otherwise, you are bound to have say, "If you do not agree with that, he did it without authority to go in there in the first place."

Mr. STENNIS. No; we could go back to the House language; it could be argued again that the President exceeded his authority.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not make any argument. The Senator and I agree he did not. We accepted that.

Mr. STENNIS. But there are others.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Who would dare do that?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator from Arizona. I see now why we did not agree to a time limitation. This is a difficult matter.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I think we are much closer to agreement than it would seem.

I would like to ask the Senator from Arkansas if his amendment would cover the type help we have been giving; and I refer to two parts. Would it prevent tactical air support in Laos?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This only deals with funds for foreign forces. This does not deal with funds for our forces. This is only foreign aid which the Senator was talking about.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I wanted to make that clear.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It does not deal with our own forces.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Would it prevent the use of helicopters by the South Vietnamese in support of Laotian troops, say, in the Plaines des Jarres?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It might. The Senator refers to South Vietnamese troops in support of Laotian troops in the Plaines des Jarres.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think it would. We are trying to avoid becoming involved by our associates, whatever it is, and drawn into an overt war in Laos. It would not make any difference if it were in Laos or Cambodia. We are trying to apply the same principle. The only difference might be there are more sanctuaries in Cambodia. I am perfectly willing to agree with the Senator's idea about sanctuaries.

I think it would prevent paying South Vietnamese forces to go to the support of Laotian forces in helicopters, on foot, or in trucks, or in any other way.

Mr. STENNIS. I wanted to propose that we leave Laos out of this amendment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator posed the question.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I asked about Laos because I think this is the thrust of the Senator's amendment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I am referring now to the border between Laos and that portion of South Vietnam that is close to North Vietnam. If South Vietnamese forces were used to upset any sanctuaries that might develop in that area, would this run contrary to the Senator's amendment?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No; to be consistent, I think there are some sanctuaries right on the border. To be consistent I do not know how I could distinguish between them.

Senators will remember the theory of the President in explaining the incursion; that it was not an extension of the war; that it was not an incursion into a foreign country. That is about the way he put it.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Then, he had to have whatever authority he had with respect to the war.

That is why I think there is a logical inconsistency in saying now he must have this change to make it legal. The reverse has to be that it was not legal before. You cannot have it both ways. I would rather have it the old way and commit myself to accept his theory that he was entitled to go into the sanctuaries to protect our own troops and our program in Vietnam.

What we are really after is expansion of the war into two other countries, and I think that is what the committee said—support of the Government of Cambodia; it is almost a replay of the Vietnam war. That is what the Senator from Kentucky was saying, and I thought the committee agreed.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I can assure the Senator this was not the intention of the committee. We at no time proposed any language to support a new government.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.

Mr. GOLDWATER. What we want to make sure of in our language is that we do not prevent the South Vietnamese from taking care of situations that are similar to the one the President had to decide on in connection with Cambodia.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The sanctuaries.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Yes. I would hate to see us accept language that would prevent that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We do not seek that, but we do seek to prevent the South Vietnamese or the Thais, with our money, from going in there and building a full-fledged partnership with the Government of Cambodia and drawing us in.

Mr. GOLDWATER. My interpretation of the committee language is that it does that. I think it spells out plainly that we are not supporting the governments of these other countries.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But the change in language—if you will leave the language as it has been without this change, and with this legislative history, I would be satisfied. People will say, "Why did you change that language? It must mean something. The House did not have it." People assume that it means something.

Mr. STENNIS. May I answer the Senator?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think it would be better to take it out and we would agree what it means.

Mr. STENNIS. It means to cover the sanctuary situation as it was going on when that language was written, or as it may recur. It means nothing more.

The Senator agrees he would approve that, so we are at home base.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I approve it. The only trouble is, will the administration approve it? The administration has not approved it. I

agree on that and we should get the language into the bill.

Mr. STENNIS. Let me suggest this. This matter goes to conference. The language of the House bill will be in conference. The language of the Senate bill will be in conference, and so far as it relates thereto, the report language will be before the conferees. What the Senator from Arkansas has said will be before the conferees. That is true of the Senator from Arizona, the Senator from Mississippi, and other Senators who may have discussed this matter here. If we leave Laos out, are we not together on this problem?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not quite see why, if we agree to this rather broad interpretation that the Senator from Arizona mentioned, we should leave Laos out. What is "bugging" the Senator on Laos? I do not understand it.

Mr. STENNIS. Leave it out of this amendment because it is an altogether different situation.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, not altogether.

Mr. STENNIS. The Ho Chi Minh Trail is there.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We are not going to bother the Ho Chi Minh Trail. We had that out on the Cooper-Church amendment. I am not trying to bother the Ho Chi Minh Trail. What I am trying to do is to avoid becoming involved in support of these countries against internal civil wars they may get into. That is how we get dragged in behind them.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator asked me why I want to leave Laos out. If I may finish my answer now, the question is, Why does the Senator from Mississippi suggest that we strike the words "or Laos" out of the amendment? An altogether different situation is involved. We have been in there a long time. We went into Cambodia just for the sanctuary battle.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What does the Senator mean when he says "We have been in there a long time"?

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator knows we have been in there for a long time. The Ho Chi Minh Trail is there. We bomb it constantly.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Oh, yes; but I am not talking about that.

Mr. STENNIS. Let me finish. We have all the complications that go with that. We provide some military aid to the Laotians. The Senator is familiar with that. It is in the bill. Cambodia has been left out, as the Senator knows. The situation in Laos is known. It is stabilized. The language in the Senate bill is exactly as it is in the House bill. The language that says we can still aid the local forces is still in the bill. We have no such language for Cambodia.

So, like it or not, good or bad, Laos has a status, and it is a part of our battleground, just as the sanctuary was.

I think we could agree on something if the Senator would leave Laos out of the amendment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. As I have said, I am not bothering what we ourselves do. The amendment will not bother what we give to the Laotians. It is simply saying, "Look, we do not want our so-called allies from Thailand and Vietnam to go up and get us further involved. We have some degree of control over what we are doing."

It will not disturb what has been the past practice in Laos. The Senator says that Cambodia is not provided for, but the administration right now, according to word that we have—and this is an additional reason why the amendment is important and it is coming up here to brief us on it—is in the process of negotiating a very substantial aid program for Cambodia. I think that is a very dubious proposition, but they are in the process of doing it.

The Senator says that they were left out of the bill, but it is not left out of the planning of the administration, although no presentation has been made to our committee on

this matter. Of course, the President has discretion, up to \$50 million, to take funds designated for one country and give them to Cambodia; but no aid was contemplated for Cambodia at the time we considered the bill. This is a new deal.

That fact makes it all the more important that we make it explicit that we do not want to get bogged down in another war like Vietnam or Cambodia or Laos. I do not expect the amendment to affect what has been going on in Laos—that is, the bombing of the trail, our assistance to Laos, or what our people are doing there—because it does not affect that. It is to keep the Vietnamese or the Thais from dragging us into another war. In a word, that is the purpose of the amendment.

Mr. STENNIS. So the Senator from Arkansas is saying that anything we have going on in Laos now is not to be affected in any way by the amendment he offers?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Not that I know of. The reports in the newspapers as of today—I know it officially—indicate that the South Vietnamese are getting ready to mount an invasion. I hope that is not true; but in my opinion that is not acceptable. What I was referring to was what has been the traditional operation; what was going on 2 or 3 months ago, such as the bombing. Recent actions are what I would exclude. If they have been doing something else in the last day or 2, that is what I would object to.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator would exclude anything such as might have happened in the last 2 or 3 days.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Exactly; anything such as has been published in the newspapers as having taken place quite recently.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator would exclude anything that has been taking place in recent days. He does not intend by his amendment to exclude—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. To exclude what we call the traditional operations—

Mr. STENNIS. In Laos?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. That was the whole thrust of the amendment of the Senator from Kentucky. He did not want to have us become further involved in Laos. But his amendment related to Laos and Thailand. He did not include Cambodia; we got into that later. This is entirely consistent.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I hesitate to get into the debate because I think the Senator from Arkansas has made his point clear. I merely repeat—we have talked it over so many times—that his purpose is to prevent these funds from being used to get the United States involved in support of Cambodia through the use of Vietnamese troops.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct. It is not intended to be a rollback. I do not intend it to be a rollback, but to stop the operations from going further.

Mr. STENNIS. May I ask the Senator from Kentucky a question out of order? The Senator has heard what I have said concerning the situation as I see it. Does he agree that it is correct?

Mr. COOPER. I agree that what the Senator from Mississippi and the Senator from Arkansas have agreed on is correct, yes. I favor the language that the Senator from Arkansas has proposed, because it makes so clear that the activities on the Ho Chi Minh Trail would not be curtailed.

Mr. STENNIS. I think we have had a most helpful exchange and a very fine presentation. I do not think we can dispose of the amendment tonight. There are other amendments from our committee that I would like to have a chance to speak to or to have colloquy on with any Senator who wishes to speak to them.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I wish to compliment the Senator from Mississippi for his contribution and for making it very clear that he does not approve of expanding the war by

proxy into U.S. support of the Cambodian-Laotian action. There is confusion about this, and there is considerable concern that it might be expanded if we do not take real, positive steps to prevent it. I am very much pleased that the Senator from Mississippi thinks as he has just expressed himself.

Mr. STENNIS. I have told the Senator from Arkansas everything that is on my mind. I want to make it clear that I am a "sanctuary man," and the Senator from Arkansas agrees to that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I accept that I am not trying to roll back anything; I am trying to prevent any advance.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from Arkansas for yielding. I believe the debate has been profitable.

I understand that other Senators desire recognition, so I do not claim the floor any longer.

[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Aug. 21, 1970]

RESUMPTION OF DEBATE

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, what is the pending question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending question is on the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas. It is amendment No. 812.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I hope that we can dispose of this amendment very soon. I hope that some Senators will remain in the Chamber for at least a brief period of time. The Senator from Mississippi wishes to make a statement. We had a long colloquy of an hour and a half or 2 hours on yesterday.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is anticipated that we will take up the pending business, which is the Fulbright amendment, then the Byrd amendment, and that we will then go into the consideration of the Public Works appropriations bill. If we possibly can, we will try to finish the appropriations bill this afternoon. So, everyone is on notice.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I insist on order. This is an important amendment that is of interest to every Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, on yesterday afternoon we had a very interesting and thorough colloquy regarding this amendment.

The Senator from Mississippi and I are very close in our views on this amendment. The amendment seeks to put into law the language of the committee report and add Laos. The Senator and I have discussed an understanding of this amendment and what the committee intended.

I think that we mean to accomplish the same objective. It is primarily a question of whether this language should be in the law and Laos included.

I yield to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. It is possible that this matter can be disposed of, if that is the will of the Senate. It is a highly important matter. I think that every Senator here ought to have a chance to be heard. It is a little complex, but we will not relash it.

I heartily agree with the Senator from Arkansas that we had a colloquy here yesterday that very fully, I think, and clearly stated the position of the Senate Armed Services Committee in this question of certain funds for military aid in South Vietnam and all the Indochina area.

My remarks now relate to amendment 812, the matter now before the Senate. Briefly stated the position of the Senate committee was that we approve the expenditure of these funds over into Cambodia on the sanctuary—the principle of destroying sanctuaries, and forays that had to do directly with the Vietnamization program, the withdrawal of our troops, and the protection of our troops.

Our interpretation was that that language permitted the President even to use this money to go back in on a sanctuary matter, if necessary. We took this up when the battle was going on over there.

The amendment of the Senator from Arkansas places a limitation on clause A, as pointed out by the colloquy that we had. I think it is a part of what was intended as a part of the law.

So I said to the Senator this morning if his amendment goes to conference we will have at the conference table the bill as passed by the House, and that has the language in it "in Vietnam" which we thought was too narrow. We took that out and substituted the language I already described. Then, we will have before us the Senate language and also the Senate report and we will have the Senator's amendment. All of that material will be in conference.

We had a splendid discussion here yesterday which was participated in by the Senator from Arkansas, the Senator from Arizona, the Senator from South Carolina and others. I do not recall the names of all the Senators who participated but the substance of the colloquy was that we are not limiting the sanctuary idea—the destruction of it—limiting the support of the Government—period. That is it.

I feel we could accept this amendment.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I had only one feeling of doubt, as I expressed yesterday, and that would concern the interpretation of our possibly interfering with activities of another government. I studied this proposal last night. I think the language the Senator proposed would not do that.

We are not saying to South Vietnam, "You cannot attack Laos." We are saying "You cannot expect any help from us if you do it."

I think the language of the Senator from Arkansas is clear on that point. I think the colloquy yesterday established the fact that neither the Senator's language of the committee, nor the language of the House will preclude the use of our tactical air support of the Laotian army when they call for it.

I must say that is a limited time of year, when the monsoons are over there, as the Senator knows. This would include the use of a helicopter drop but it would prevent the use of our ground forces at any time. I would certainly support any move in that direction and would deny funds to South Vietnam for support of any invasion of theirs. If they want to do it on their own, with their own money it is up to them.

I think the amendment, as the distinguished chairman has said is one we can take to conference. I think, having slept on it overnight, it is better language than we came up with, and we worked a long time on this because we were in the middle of the Cambodian sanctuary move and we were very anxious that the language we reported to the Senate would indicate that the committee did not want to support any government, not only in Southeast Asia, but any place.

I certainly hope, Mr. President, we can take this to conference and that it will prevail.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. It appears that this amendment is in line with the committee report and also from the colloquy yesterday between the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, and the distinguished Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), exactly what it means. It has been interpreted more clearly now, and I think it would be proper and wise for the Committee on Armed Services to go along with this amendment. I would suggest to the chairman that we do go along with it. As far as I am concerned, I am willing to go along with it.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from Mississippi mentioned a number of Senators a while ago. The Senator from Kentucky has been extremely interested in trying to define the limits of the engagement in Southeast Asia. He has made a great contribution to the Senate's consideration of this subject.

I interpret this amendment and the intent of the committee to be quite consistent with the intent of the Cooper-Church amendment, that is, to prevent an expansion of the war. The amendment does not relate to our own activities but to those of countries that could be financed under the authority of this bill.

I again reiterate this pertains to the possibility of our financing military activities by the South Vietnamese or the Thais in support of the governments of Cambodia and Laos. I believe everybody agrees that we should not do that. It seems to me intolerable that we should finance that kind of activity.

I am very pleased the chairman will accept the amendment and take it to conference.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MILLER. So that we are absolutely clear on this point, the Senator knows the Thais are concerned about possible incursions into Cambodia which, in turn, could pose a threat against Thailand. Does the Senator see anything in his amendment which would preclude some of this support for Thailand forces operating actually in Cambodia but for the purpose of avoiding attack on their own country?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am bound to say it would prevent us from financing from these funds Thai forces which might fight for the Lon Nol government. If they want to do it on their own we cannot stop them. But we do not have to pay the bill. This is somewhat like the subject we discussed yesterday. We have been paying these people far more in bonuses than we give in combat pay to our own troops. That is not a good practice and it distorts our whole relationship with these countries.

In this case I would interpret the DOD funds are not to be used to support Thai forces that go into Cambodia to support the Lon Nol government. That is one of the objectives of the amendment.

Mr. MILLER. The Senator from Iowa understands the sentiment is not to allow Thai troops to go into Cambodia in support of the Lon Nol government. But that was not the question.

The question was with respect to the use of these funds to allow Thai troops to go into Cambodia, not to support the Lon Nol government, but to help them protect Thailand from a fairly imminent attack on Thailand from Cambodia. There has been the problem of some incursions coming in from Laos, into the northern areas of Thailand.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. They were not involved. The Senator is expanding the concept into a whole new area.

We are talking about operations by the South Vietnamese in the sanctuaries and for the protection of our troops in Vietnam. That is what the money under this authority is limited to.

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My interpretation is that the Senator's example is forbidden by this amendment. We are not going to finance the Thais; they can finance their own operations in Cambodia, if they choose to intervene.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. It might better be explained by saying that if the Thai government wants to attack anybody at any place that is their business. They do it on their own but not with our money.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is true. We are not trying to tell the Thais they cannot attack Burma or China, but that none of our money will be used to finance their doing it.

Mr. MILLER. I think what I am getting at is that we are so prone to think about privileged sanctuaries along the border of South Vietnam that we overlook the fact that we can have privileged sanctuaries in Laos or the western area of Cambodia, which bases would or could pose a threat to Thailand.

That is the type of situation that I am directing my question to. There is a great deal of difference between taking care of a sanctuary situation in the western part of Cambodia which poses a threat to Thailand and sending a lot of troops into Cambodia and supporting the Lon Nol government. I am trying to bring that situation out because I believe the example I put in the Record is not one we would want to cover by this amendment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not know that I have anything to add to what I have said. That is not the policy of the committee, as I understand it, as expressed in the report.

Mr. MILLER. May I ask the distinguished chairman what the policy of the committee would be on that point?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, this is all reflected in the committee report. I think the best way to get it in proper focus is to read the committee amendment and the committee report.

The House bill and the Senate version of the bill expressly provide that this money can be spent for local forces in Laos and Thailand, so there is no doubt about that, and it is left as it was in the House bill.

Let me read the committee language first, on page 19 of the bill, line 4. It states that the funds are to be made "available for their stated purposes to support: (A) Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces, (B) local forces in Laos and Thailand." We took the words "in Vietnam" out because that was too narrow to cover the sanctuaries. We wanted to cover the sanctuaries.

We define that further in the report on page 106:

"The Committee is of the opinion that the use of the authority in section 401 of the fiscal year 1970 act (and its related appropriation act provision) to support South Vietnamese and other free world forces in border sanctuary operations in Cambodia and in protective reaction strikes in these same areas was correct. Such action is in line with the policy of Vietnamization which in turn has and will continue to assist in the reduction of U.S. forces in Vietnam and the protection of such U.S. forces as remain in Vietnam. Doubt has been expressed by some that because of the use of the words "in Vietnam" in this section, as to whether any support for South Vietnamese or free world forces outside of Vietnam in the sanctuaries of Cambodia is authorized. The Committee desires that there be no misunderstanding about the authority for those important actions and has accordingly changed the language of this section to remove all such doubt.

"In making this clarification it must be clearly understood that there is no intent to broaden the authorization beyond the support of participation in border sanctuary and

related operations in order to protect U.S. forces in Vietnam or to accomplish protective reaction strikes. The purpose of the clarification is to make clear that the use of Defense funds is authorized for support in those areas of Cambodia where for the purposes of Vietnamization or the protection of U.S. troops military action becomes necessary."

And that means the action we were in when the report was written or any future actions of that kind; and the Senator from Arkansas agrees with that—

"There is no intent to permit the use of DOD appropriations under this authority to support Vietnamese and other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Cambodian Government."

So money from this bill cannot be used for anything that is primarily in support of the Cambodian Government. The money provided in the bill can be used for anything that goes with the Vietnamization program, the withdrawal program, the protection of our troops, the destruction of sanctuaries. We have heartily agreed on that. That is the extent of the amendment. I think it is time we get it clearly understood. I cannot go any further than I have.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arkansas yield to me so I can ask the Senator a further question?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MILLER. I appreciate the Senator from Mississippi's explanation.

As I understand it, the last sentence that we read—

"There is no intent to permit the use of DOD appropriations under this authority to support Vietnamese and other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Cambodian Government."

actually is expanded still further by delimiting the type of sanctuary operations to those which are pretty much related to U.S. forces in South Vietnam, and that if there are sanctuary operations that are not so related, then the proscription would apply?

Mr. STENNIS. Generally that is correct; yes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas.

The amendment (No. 812) was agreed to, as follows:

On page 19, after the period in line 8, insert the following: "Nothing in clause (A) of the first sentence of this paragraph shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos."

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I appreciate very much what the Senator from Colorado and other Members of the Senate have said, because these are difficult matters to interpret. Even if it is not in the law, it ought to be persuasive on those who have to carry out the law.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I know the Senator from Idaho wants the floor, but will the Senator yield to me for a brief remark? The Senator from Idaho has been waiting very patiently.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. I shall shortly yield the floor.

Mr. ALLOTT. I would like to just say that many of us here are lawyers, and one of the traits of lawyers is that nothing any other lawyer writes is completely satisfactory to them. We call them the t-crossers and the i-dotters.

I realize that if others were trying to accomplish this purpose, they would put this language in different words, as

would the Senator from Kentucky. We tried to put it in simple language, having in mind always that one thing we were up against was that they absolutely would not bend. Having adopted it once in the House, eliminating the prisoner of war language would not get very far.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I would like to say, first of all, that I have just been informed that the House has just approved this conference report by a vote of 234 to 19.

Now, I want to ask the distinguished Senator from Louisiana a question or two concerning the conference report. The bill, as originally passed by the Senate, contained a provision which prohibited the funding of American ground combat forces in Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia. The Senator will remember that, at the request of the distinguished Senator from Kentucky and me, the Senate Appropriations Committee added "or Cambodia" to the restriction which formerly had covered only Laos and Thailand. To that restriction then, as the bill originally came back from conference, a proviso had been inserted by the House conferees, so that the provision then read as follows:

In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos, Thailand, or Cambodia: *Provided*, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit the President from taking action in such areas designed to promote the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

The first question I would ask the Senator is this: Has that proviso, in its entirety, including the original Senate addition of the words "or Cambodia," been stricken from the conference report?

Mr. ELLENDER. Yes, it has.

Mr. CHURCH. So that, as the bill now stands, there is no language in the Defense Appropriation Act which would affect the use of American troops in Cambodia; is that correct?

Mr. ELLENDER. That is correct.

Mr. CHURCH. That would mean that the controlling language restricting the use of American troops in Cambodia would be found in the supplemental authorization bill. I should like to read that language into the Record at this point.

As passed by the Senate and later approved by both Houses and sent to the President, the language contained in the supplemental authorization bill reads as follows:

In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act may be used to finance the introduction of United States ground combat troops into Cambodia, or to provide United States advisers to or for Cambodian military forces in Cambodia.

Is it not the Senator's understanding that this language, presently contained in the supplemental authorization bill, the bill which authorizes the Cambodian aid

program, would be the only language pertaining, and therefore the controlling language with reference to barring the introduction of American combat forces or advisers into Cambodia?

Mr. ELLENDER. Yes, the Senator is correct.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I think it might be appropriate, in the light of the answers that the distinguished Senator from Louisiana has given me, to include at this point in the RECORD, once again, a letter I received on December 19, 1970, from the Secretary of State, making it clear that it is the intention of the administration to accept this language of limitation, and to conduct the Cambodian aid program in conformity with it.

The letter reads:

DEAR SENATOR CHURCH: Confirming Assistant Secretary Abshire's conversation with you, I should like to reaffirm that the administration's programs and policies and intentions in Cambodia in no way conflict with section 6 of H.R. 11991—

The section, incidentally, which I have just read into the RECORD— or with the concerns expressed in the colloquy on the floor of the Senate on December 15, 1970.

The letter is signed by William P. Rogers.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the colloquy referred to in the letter, appearing on pages S20185 through S20186 of the RECORD for December 15, 1970, be reprinted at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the colloquy was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I do not think I shall take more than a few minutes. I wish to address a question to the Senator from Alabama. I direct the attention of Senators to this question because it is a matter of some importance.

I wish to direct the attention of the Senator from Alabama to page 7 of the bill as now printed, and that part that provides, beginning with line 1: "none of the funds authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act may be used to finance the introduction of United States ground combat troops into Cambodia."

My question to the distinguished Senator from Alabama is as to his interpretation of this limitation on the President about financing the introduction of U.S. ground combat troops into Cambodia.

Is that language intended to be a prohibition on the President's going into Cambodia with U.S. combat troops to meet a situation like the sanctuary battle that we had last June and July, which proved to be directly connected with the arsenal, the armory, and everything else that goes to make war on our men in South Vietnam, and which proved to be beneficial? Would the Senator from Alabama speak to that point?

Mr. SPARKMAN. As I recall, when the President announced that we were going into Cambodia, he gave us the reason that it was to protect American troops—American people, American citizens—who are in South Vietnam. It was for that purpose. The sanctuaries imperilled those citizens and that was his purpose for going in there.

I may say that in the committee discussion I raised the question as to whether or not this language would permit the use of American forces to protect American lives in South Vietnam, as was done before. I shall be very glad to check on this, but, as I recall, the

answer was that that would be a presidential power, that he would be exercising his own powers, and that this language did not prohibit that.

The distinguished Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), a few minutes ago, said something about the constitutional powers question still being unresolved. We all admit that. I would be very glad if the Senator from Idaho would say something on this.

Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, the question of the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services goes to the heart of the debate that took place this spring and summer on the Cooper-Church amendment. Since we had much time—7 weeks—to explore the question, we discussed it at considerable length.

In the course of the debate, it was recalled that in times past the President had invoked his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief to order rescue operations, to take precautionary action to protect American troops in the field threatened with an imminent enemy buildup that posed a serious danger to them, and that, within the framework of past precedent, there is an area of discretionary action open to the President as Commander in Chief.

The exact definition of that power has never been attempted in the past. Congress has never undertaken to define it with precision. The best answer must rest upon the precedents.

However, I would not want it to be thought that writing this language into the bill has little or no effect. Far to the contrary. No one has contended, based on the precedents, that the President can make general war or deploy an army in a foreign country on his authority as Commander in Chief.

This language would clearly prevent the deployment, for an extended period of time, of a substantial number of American troops in Cambodia. If the President intended to do that, the money is not made available for that purpose, and it would be necessary for him to return to Congress and ask our consent. But it is true that, as Commander in Chief, within a limited area, the President has power to initiate action designed to protect American troops in the field.

Mr. STENNIS. If I may ask the Senator this question, with reference to the battle of the sanctuary, the areas that the President invaded this summer, to destroy ammunition, and so forth, would the Senator think that his language prohibits a repetition of that if the facts are similar and conditions are pressing?

Mr. CHURCH. If there were a particular concentration just over the border which constituted a serious, imminent threat, that could be suddenly struck and destroyed, that might fall within the President's powers as Commander in Chief. However, I could not say to the Senator that undertaking an extended invasion of Cambodia with a large American expeditionary force for six or eight weeks falls within the scope of his power under the Constitution as Commander in Chief.

This whole question was fully explored in the course of the earlier debate.

From a conversation I had with the President last evening, it is my understanding now that he no longer takes exception to the limiting language. He feels it conforms with his own policy in Cambodia. He says he has no intention of sending back troops. He no longer persists in objecting to language of this kind. I could not say, however, that this prohibition in the bill would not preclude an invasion of Cambodia on the scale that took place and for the length of time that occurred last summer. I feel it would.

Mr. STENNIS. On that point right there, the Senator understands that no President, no Commander in Chief, no Army field commander, can tell how long it would take to

carry out an objective. They go into the unknown. Also it takes time to prepare for such an attack on a sanctuary. So the President and his advisers might have to have 3 or 4 weeks, or even longer, to prepare. It is a deliberate act. It is not an extreme, rash act.

So the Senator would not preclude, then, a bona fide effort, the planning of an attack, an invasion, technically, of the country to clear out and clean out a sanctuary that was an imminent threat to our men in South Vietnam?

Mr. CHURCH. I would say, in reply to the Senator that, in the first place, there would be nothing to preclude whatever any planning on any military mission. Yet on the basis of precedents, the President's power as Commander in Chief to undertake military action is strictly limited to actions restricted both in scope and time, and which are directly related to the need to protect American troops in the field.

Mr. STENNIS. While I am on that, the Senator does recognize that it takes time, and cannot always be foretold exactly?

Mr. CHURCH. Yes, I appreciate that there is no way to foretell precisely the length of an intervention.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GRAVEL. I yield to the Senator from Vermont for an observation.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I do not think the Committee on Foreign Relations now takes a position much different than it took last spring. If an incursion is necessary for the safety of our men, there would be no objection, but an invasion, which, as stated by the Senator from Mississippi, would require a long time in preparation and probably a long time to carry out, would have to be reported back to the Senate before it was undertaken. The committee did make a sharp distinction between an incursion and an invasion.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. GRAVEL. I yield to the Senator from Alabama.

Mr. SPARKMAN. May I say that I did not understand that the Senator from Mississippi was speaking of an invasion. The term "incursion" was used, I think, in referring to it. But I think it is the objective that is controlling—in other words, the protection of American lives.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct, and my question was based on the incursion or the thrust, rather than a large scale invasion.

Mr. SPARKMAN. To protect American lives. Mr. STENNIS. Primarily to protect the lives of our soldiers, our military men. I did make the point that sometimes it took weeks even to plan an incursion and get ready for it.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I wish to say that there is nothing in here that intends to limit the President's constitutional powers to act in an emergency in order to protect American lives.

Mr. STENNIS. I appreciate the Senator's answer; and, if I may respond quite briefly to the Senator from Idaho, Mr. President, I do not think it is definitely known, according to the precedents of history or according to this debate, just what the extent of the President's powers as Commander in Chief is. I think it depends greatly on the circumstances. I do not want any hard law here that would create any cloud or any doubt in any President's mind as to what his responsibilities are. I want to leave him with the responsibilities as well as the powers. If we do not leave the powers and the responsibilities with him, then it is not his fault or he is not to blame, and we have no head of State to that extent.

Mr. SPARKMAN. There is no effort here to limit the President's emergency powers or his constitutional powers.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes. That is why I am so concerned about this. The point first came up, as far as written law is concerned, in the military procurement bill. The battle of the

sanctuaries was on then, and we put language in there that was approved by this body, that he would not be restricted as long as it was tied to our men and their safety in the drawdown. The battle over that language is going on now in appropriation bills and elsewhere, as well as here.

It seems to me that the colloquy has made it clear that this language does not take any of the responsibility nor the power away from the President of the United States to do what he thinks is reasonably necessary, within reasonable limitations of time, in destroying arsenals, armories, armies, or anything else that is in close proximity to our borders, which we have designated by the general term "sanctuaries," as in the past.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, may I make one observation? Will the Senator yield for that purpose?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. CHURCH. It is perfectly true that it does not lie within the power of this body, even if we were to harbor an intention to do so, to curtail the constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief.

What we seek to do here is assert congressional powers over the spending of the public money. That is within our authority. It is clear, as far as my evidence indicates, that the President is now willing to acquiesce in a limitation of this kind imposed upon the funds made available in this bill and in other bills, vis-a-vis Cambodia.

It follows that if the President were later to decide that it is in the national interest to repeat an extended, full scale military invasion of Cambodia, he would come back to Congress and ask our consent.

We are exercising our power. I recognize that it is not within our reach to undermine such constitutional powers as vest in the presidency in the role of Commander in Chief.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I want to make this record tonight because I believe this conference report represents the culmination of an attempt that has gone on now for more than a year to write a statutory limitation on the extension of American military involvement in the Indochina war. That effort began when the first Cooper-Church amendment was adopted by the Senate last December, written into law, denying funds for introducing American combat troops into Laos or Thailand.

That provision still stands as part of the law, being included once again in the pending bill.

The effort was renewed in May and June of this year, during the extended debate on the second Cooper-Church amendment, adopted at the end of June by the Senate, but then rejected by the House of Representatives. At that time, the administration was unwilling to accept any statutory limitation on the use of American combat troops in Cambodia.

Now we come to the climax of the struggle, in the closing days of this Congress. The administration's position has changed. The President now indicates a willingness to accept a statutory prohibition against the introduction of either American ground combat forces or advisers into Cambodia, and thus the principal goal of the Cooper-Church amendment of last May and June has been achieved.

I think it is a historic moment, Mr. President, because to my knowledge this is the first time in the history of the United States that Congress has undertaken to write limitations into the law

applying to the deployment of American troops abroad in the course of an ongoing war.

Two years ago now, or nearly so, the Senate passed a commitments resolution, in which it undertook to commence a reassertion of the prerogatives of the Senate in the field of foreign policy—prerogatives that had eroded away with the constant expansion of executive power. Tonight I think we see the largest step yet taken in the restoration of the Senate's role under the Constitution to participate responsibly in limiting American involvement and commitments abroad. So I think, Mr. President, this is a very significant occasion for the Senate.

I express my deep appreciation to the distinguished Senator from Kentucky for the continuous and steadfast effort he has made through the many months of this debate. Without his help, this could not have been accomplished, as all of us know. With his help, it was evident from the start that ours was a bipartisan effort endorsed by the majority leader (Mr. MANSFIELD) and the dean of Senate Republicans (Mr. AIKEN), involving many Republicans as well as Democrats, and that its purpose was not to embarrass a Republican President, but rather to recover for the Senate its right, power, and authority in the field of foreign policy—an authority conferred upon it and vested in it by the Constitution of the United States, but one that had been permitted to erode, through the years, nearly to the point of extinction.

So I am happy to give my support to this conference report. I hope that the Senate will adopt it. I congratulate the conferees on the Senate side for their efforts to resolve what I know was a most difficult problem, and my compliments also go to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), whose understanding of the problem and his love for this institution are quite beyond question.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I shall be brief. I wish to speak for a few minutes while the Senate conferees are in the Chamber, and while the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations remains here.

First, let me thank my colleague, the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), for his very kind statement. It has been a great joy and opportunity for me to work with him for over a year. His abilities, courage and statesmanship stand out before the country. I am glad that at last the Congress of the United States and the administration have agreed that ground forces shall not be introduced into Cambodia without the consent of Congress, and I think that position is generally understood.

As to the language—the proviso—before the Senate, I would have preferred that all the language had been stricken, or a substitute for the second clause in the proviso had been written to provide that the constitutional power of the President as Commander in Chief shall not be limited with respect to the pro-

tection of our Armed Forces. But we must deal with this language before us.

I must be frank. I believe the proviso leaves a loophole so far as language is concerned. That possibility has been greatly reduced and may have been wholly reduced by the interpretation of the conferees. I believe the most important and significant interpretation by the conferees who have spoken is that this proviso shall be used only to insure the safe withdrawal of our troops. It is an interpretation which comes very close to, if not exactly in line with, the constitutional power of the President to protect the troops, which he has. Nevertheless the language is somewhat loose. It could be used by the executive—and I do not suggest that it will be used—for a much broader purpose than the protection of our troops, as they withdraw.

But I should like to say that when we have heard the statements of Senate conferees—and if I give an incorrect interpretation of the statements of the conferees, I hope they will object—when we have heard the statements of the conferees, including the distinguished chairman of the Senate conferees, Senator ELLENDER, and the interpretation of the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, Senator STENNIS, in this body, as we do the word of all the conferees, the interpretation of the ranking Republican member, Senator MILTON YOUNG, and the Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT), a high ranking official in the Republican Party in the Senate, the agreement of the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE), the important questions by the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), the questions which the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) and I have asked and the responses from the conferees I believe that the debate provides an interpretation, and a narrow one, to the language of the proviso.

It is a proviso which would permit the President to support the Vietnamese or other free world forces in assisting the United States in withdrawing its forces and for their protection. If I am wrong in that judgment, I hope I will be told so by the conferees.

I must say that it is upon this basis, and not upon the language—which is loose—it is upon the basis of interpretation by these conferees, honored men of the Senate, that I shall accept the judgment of the conferees and the Senate. Otherwise, I would oppose this report.

I would like to pay my respects to the Senate conferees, able and respected men, for their faithful work.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I would feel it remiss on my part if I did not pay special tribute tonight to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT).

As this conference report now stands, there is no proviso modifying the statutory restriction against the use of American troops or advisers in Cambodia. Let that be perfectly clear. The proviso on which so much of the discussion has centered relates to an amendment first offered by the distinguished Senator from

Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) and has to do with the use of money in the bill for the purpose of paying foreign troops—South Vietnamese, Thai, Laotian—who may be engaged in combat activity in Cambodia and Laos.

I would have preferred that the original Fulbright amendment might have been accepted without any qualification, and I join with the expression that has just been made by the Senator from Kentucky in that regard. But in view of the interpretation laid upon the qualification, the very restrictive scope given it, I think that I can support the conference report when it is brought before the Senate later this evening.

I should like to conclude, Mr. President, by saying that this prolonged effort to restore to the Senate its intended constitutional role in foreign affairs would never have occurred but for the leadership of the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT). It was he who first brought the Committee on Foreign Relations out from behind closed doors. It was he who held the series of public hearings which educated the Nation on the nature of this war and demonstrated that outstanding American citizens of unquestioned patriotism had cause to oppose the war for reasons that they felt were intimately related to the best interests of this country.

It was he who brought the commitments resolution to the floor of the Senate and secured its passage here. Throughout the whole period, it has been the Senator from Arkansas who has sought, more than any other Member in this Chamber, to restore to the Senate its rightful place in fashioning the foreign policy of the United States.

So I want to pay tribute to him tonight, as we reach what I think is a very historic milestone in that lengthy and legitimate effort. Without his leadership, it could not have happened.

(This marks the end of the colloquy which occurred earlier in the day and which, by unanimous consent, was ordered to be printed in the RECORD at this point.)

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am sure that by now we all understand each other as to the reasons for the concerns in the Senate. If it had not been for the bad experience we had resulting from our voting for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, without looking closely enough at its wording, I do not think we would be now looking so hard into the meaning of these words. But we had a President—and I do not in any way denigrate that President, because he was our President and he was within his prerogatives to do what he did—who carried around a faded copy of this document in his pocket, for years after its validity had probably passed. At least that was the apocryphal story. I do not think anyone can blame any of us for worrying and for taking every conceivable precaution to see that we are not embarrassed in the same way again.

I listened to the Senator from Louisiana very closely. The Senator very properly has defined and spelled out more clearly what we are contemplating in this much disputed proviso respecting

what we are willing to fund with respect to the actions of Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions covered by the proviso.

The Senator has very carefully put that understanding on the same ground that the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) put it, which I thought was classic, in a rather famous exchange with Senator CHURCH on December 15. The Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) said:

It seems to me that the colloquy has made it clear that this language does not take any of the responsibility nor the power away from the President of the United States to do what he thinks is reasonably necessary, within reasonable limitations of time, in destroying arsenals, armories, armies, or anything else that is in close proximity to our borders, which we have designated by the general term "sanctuaries," as in the past.

Someone might later claim that this proviso would support funding the Vietnamese troops in an invasion or ground interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. That would be quite an operation. There have been press rumors that such plans are contemplated by some people. Theoretically as a lawyer I could claim support for such a far out undertaking under these words if it were not for the colloquy we have had here on these understandings. I do think that the Senator from Louisiana and this colloquy have now made it crystal clear that such a thing would not come at all within our understanding and intent. We understand that what is referred to is really conditioned by the parameters established by Senator STENNIS, the fact that it is apportioned to need, that a sanctuary action is reasonably necessary, and that it is apportioned to a limited period of time. Senator STENNIS used the words "reasonable limitations of time." We are talking about relatively short periods of time; and we are talking about close proximity to where our troops are deployed in South Vietnam. It relates to actions having direct relationship to the safeguarding of our own troops.

Mr. President, we have had unsatisfactory experience with the results of trying to control the executive in war actions by power of the purse.

As a Senator, I will vote for this conference report because to do otherwise would I believe really tax the American system, and tax it in a way which I cannot conceive of its being strained, when the men who are the conferees and are the heads of responsible committees, and those Members who have the deepest concerns and who are in agreement with each other as to the true meaning and the true purpose we have in mind. I would therefore consider my affirmative vote to be a change of position which, in my judgment, would lock in our reliance upon these understandings established in colloquy because of any question about our colleagues here in the Senate.

I assure this to the Senator from Louisiana and the Senator from Mississippi, for I think any Member of the Senate would stake his life on their honor. But we do need them when there may be a temptation by officials outside this chamber to seek authority which we know

does not exist but which someone may try to find. When one tries to do something, he will always try to find a lawyer to tell him how he can do it and not what cannot be done.

I am going to vote for the conference report on the basis of the understandings and agreements we have put together in debate. It is a change of position for me and others, in placing reliance upon that basis. I cannot conceive and I hope it would never happen in our country that any executive or executive agent, cabinet officer, or others would seek to do other than the clear intention we express in this appropriation which is so big it "boggles" the imagination.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I will be brief.

I wish to express my great satisfaction in the way this matter has turned out. This bill and its predecessors have been before the Senate and our committees for 12 months. I think this is a final solution that resolves the consensus of opinion. I am happy that those on the other side, if I may use that term, see a foundation for coming together.

I want to make clear, though, that we must leave that authority with the President to act in the circumstances as outlined by the Senator from New York with reference to Vietnamization, the protection of our troops, or the invasion, reinvasion, or incursion, whatever the Senator might call it, of Cambodia, if reasonably necessary to carry out the protection and the drawdown, which has many problems.

I do not predict by any means that those problems are over. I am also interested in keeping the responsibilities in the President. I have warned on this all the time. Let us give him the authority and keep the responsibility on him. He is the Commander in Chief and the chosen man in our process of election. I want to be sure he has that authority and I believe he does under this bill. I want to be certain he has the responsibility. Certainly, we do not have it; no one else in the Government has it. He has to carry that responsibility along with the authority.

I think we owe a debt of gratitude to the Senator from Louisiana and the Senator from North Dakota. They took the lead in this matter and they worked on this in an honest and sincere conference, and I think we are in safe hands.

I believe the President, when he has analyzed this, will be satisfied.

I want to add one more point. The Senator from North Dakota talked about the reductions in the budget, and these are sizable reductions; but I am certain in my mind we have not cut any of the bone or muscle out of the necessary preparedness or necessary military program for fiscal year 1971.

I express great joy as a Senator that we are going to get this bill passed during this calendar year rather than to have to carry it over into another Congress and proceed without a continuing resolution, which is a bad habit we have gotten into.

I hope that next year, before the fiscal year is over a month old, maybe we

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can have this bill in final form and get back to the fiscal year and have things more orderly and better understood.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for one brief observation?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. First, I see no inconsistency whatever in anything the Senator said. I think the faith I expressed is completely compatible with responsibility in the President. Second, and a very important point to me and other colleagues, I do not think people like me exclude any operation, even invasion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. All we say is, "Mr. President, if that is where you want to go, come to us and let us bear our constitutional right and responsibility, as well." It is important we make clear we exclude nothing. The only difference is we say we do not feel the President can do such things on his own. That is an important distinction.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I previously mentioned in earlier colloquy that is included in the RECORD that I think this is a very important occasion for the Senate. This is a very large bill also in terms of the money involved.

Therefore, I ask for the yeas and nays on final passage.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I wish to point out that our colleague, the distinguished Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL), formerly chairman of the Committee on Armed Services and now the chairman of the Subcommittee on Appropriations, is absent. Since this report, I have not had a chance to communicate with him, but I know he approves what is being done here tonight. He has played such a major part and has been such a guiding hand in years past. Even this year his hand is in the authorization bill. We appreciate what he has done.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I wish to ask one question of the Senator from Louisiana. Am I correct in my understanding that the bill about to be agreed to is now under the budget for the military department?

Mr. ELLENDER. Yes, by \$2,149,729,000.

Mr. HOLLAND. I warmly commend the distinguished Senator and his associates.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the conference report.

On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. ANDERSON), the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. DODD), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. MCCARTHY), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA),

the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS), the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. TALMADGE), the Senator from Maryland (Mr. TYDINGS), and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. YOUNG) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK) would vote "yea."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) is absent on official business.

The Senator from Hawaii (Mr. FONG), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER), and the Senator from Delaware (Mr. WILLIAMS) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK) and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) are absent because of illness.

The Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT) is detained on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) would each vote "yea."

On this vote, the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) is paired with the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD). If present and voting, the Senator from Texas would vote "yea" and the Senator from Oregon would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 70, nays 2, as follows:

[No. 457 Leg.]

YEAS—70

Alken	Griffin	Muskie
Allen	Gurney	Packwood
Baker	Hansen	Pastore
Bayh	Harris	Pearson
Bellmon	Hartke	Pell
Bennett	Holland	Percy
Bible	Hruska	Prouty
Boggs	Hughes	Proxmire
Brooke	Jackson	Randolph
Byrd, Va.	Javits	Saxbe
Byrd, W. Va.	Jordan, N.C.	Schweiker
Cannon	Jordan, Idaho	Scott
Case	Kennedy	Smith
Church	Long	Sparkman
Cook	Magnuson	Spong
Cooper	Mansfield	Stennis
Cotton	Mathias	Stevens
Cranston	McClellan	Symington
Curtis	McGee	Thurmond
Dole	McIntyre	Williams, N.J.
Ellender	Metcalfe	Yarborough
Ervin	Miller	Young, N. Dak.
Fannin	Mondale	
Gravel	Murphy	

NAYS—2

Goodell

Gore

NOT VOTING—28

Allott	Hart	Ribicoff
Anderson	Hatfield	Russell
Burdick	Hollings	Stevenson
Dodd	Inouye	Talmadge
Dominick	McCarthy	Tower
Eagleton	McGovern	Tydings
Eastland	Montoya	Williams, Del.
Fong	Moss	Young, Ohio
Fulbright	Mundt	
Goldwater	Nelson	

So the conference report was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendments in disagreement will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Sen-

ate numbered 14 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed, insert: \$2,908,500,000.

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 26 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed, insert: \$3,219,300,000.

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 31 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed, insert: \$1,338,700,000.

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 49 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted, insert:

"SEC. 836. Upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is necessary in the national interest, he may, with the approval of the Office of Management and Budget, transfer not to exceed \$600,000,000 of the appropriations contained in this Act between such appropriations, to be merged with and to be available for the same purposes, and for the same time period, as the appropriation to which transferred: Provided, That the Secretary of Defense shall notify the Congress promptly of all transfers made pursuant to this authority."

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 53 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted, insert:

"SEC. 842. (a) Appropriations heretofore made available for Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army; Procurement of Aircraft and Missiles, Navy; Other Procurement, Navy; Procurement, Marine Corps; Aircraft Procurement, Air Force; Missile Procurement, Air Force; Other Procurement, Air Force; Procurement, Defense Agencies; and Special Foreign Currency Program shall not be available for obligation after June 30, 1973. Appropriations heretofore made available for Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, shall not be available for obligation after June 30, 1975. Appropriations heretofore made available under the headings Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army; Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy; Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Air Force; and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense Agencies shall not be available for obligation after June 30, 1972. Each such appropriation shall be merged with and shall be available for the same time period as appropriations made in this Act under the same head.

"(b) Section 642 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1970 (Public Law 91-171, approved December 29, 1969), in hereby repealed."

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendments of the House to Senate amendments numbered 14, 26, 31, 49, and 53.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Louisiana.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have included in the RECORD at this point a tabulation giving the 1970 appropriation, budget estimate, House allowance, Senate allowance, and conference allowance on each appropriation included in the bill.

There being no objection, the tabulation was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION BILL, FISCAL YEAR 1971 (H.R. 91-9590)

Item	1970 appropriation	Fiscal year 1971 budget estimate	House allowance	Senate allowance	Conference agreement	Increase (+) or decrease (-) conference agreement compared with—				
						1970 appropriation	Fiscal year 1971 budget estimate	House allowance	Senate allowance	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
Title I—Military personnel:										
Military personnel:										
Army	\$8,875,391,000	\$7,923,700,000	\$7,422,450,000	\$7,861,750,000	\$7,842,450,000	-\$1,032,941,000	-\$81,250,000	+\$20,000,000	-\$19,300,000	
Navy	4,858,531,000	4,402,300,000	4,360,100,000	4,377,100,000	4,368,600,000	-133,931,000	-33,700,000	+8,500,000	-8,500,000	
Marine Corps	1,649,952,000	1,494,200,000	1,422,700,000	1,430,600,000	1,426,700,000	-223,252,000	-67,500,000	+4,000,000	-3,900,000	
Air Force	6,498,189,000	6,096,000,000	5,373,350,000	6,002,425,000	5,988,350,000	-509,839,000	-107,650,000	+15,000,000	-14,075,000	
Reserve personnel:										
Army	338,725,000	336,500,000	334,750,000	334,750,000	334,750,000	-3,975,000	-1,750,000			
Navy	141,935,000	144,200,000	142,100,000	142,100,000	142,100,000	+165,000	-2,100,000			
Marine Corps	49,000,000	54,100,000	52,050,000	52,050,000	52,050,000	+3,050,000	-2,050,000			
Air Force	82,092,922	86,200,000	86,200,000	84,200,000	85,200,000	+3,107,078	-1,000,000	+1,000,000		
National Guard personnel:										
Army	403,403,855	387,100,000	387,100,000	387,100,000	387,100,000	-16,303,855				
Air Force	110,694,676	108,500,000	108,500,000	106,500,000	107,500,000	-3,194,676	-1,000,000	-1,000,000	+1,000,000	
Total	23,007,914,493	21,032,800,300	20,689,300,000	20,778,575,000	20,734,800,000	-2,273,114,493	-298,000,000	+45,500,000	-43,775,000	
Title II—Retired military personnel: Retired pay defense										
	2,859,000,000	3,194,000,000	3,194,000,000	3,194,000,000	3,194,000,000	+335,000,000				
Title III—Operation and maintenance:										
Operation and maintenance:										
Army	7,467,751,079	6,332,000,000	6,269,011,000	6,228,687,000	6,268,687,000	-1,199,064,079	-63,313,000	-324,000	+40,000,000	
Navy	5,242,824,000	4,804,000,000	4,731,910,000	4,685,410,000	4,729,410,000	-513,414,000	-74,590,000	-2,500,000	+44,000,000	
Marine Corps	428,458,120	356,600,000	399,943,000	402,743,000	402,743,000	-25,715,120	-46,143,000	+2,800,000		
Air Force	6,530,100,000	6,176,500,000	6,167,136,000	6,093,236,000	6,157,136,000	-372,964,000	-19,364,000	-10,000,000	+63,900,000	
Defense agencies	1,160,866,917	1,162,100,000	1,125,750,000	1,125,750,000	1,125,750,000	-35,116,917	-36,350,000			
Army National Guard	315,003,601	287,400,000	287,400,000	287,400,000	287,400,000	-27,603,601				
Air National Guard	345,201,780	343,600,000	337,600,000	343,600,000	343,600,000	-1,601,780		+6,000,000		
National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice:										
Army	54,000	65,000	100,000	65,000	100,000	+45,992	+35,000		+35,000	
Claims, Defense	39,000,000	39,000,000	39,000,000	39,000,000	39,000,000					
Contingencies, Defense	5,000,000	10,000,000	5,000,000	5,000,000	5,000,000		-5,000,000			
Court of Military Appeals	736,000	780,000	780,000	780,000	780,000	+44,000				
Total	21,534,995,495	19,512,045,000	19,363,630,000	19,211,671,000	19,359,606,000	-2,175,389,495	-152,439,000	-4,024,000	+147,935,000	
Title IV—Procurement:										
Procurement of equipment and missiles, Army										
	4,259,329,911	3,226,000,000	2,933,100,000	2,930,000,000	2,908,500,000	-1,350,829,911	-317,500,000	-24,600,000	-21,500,000	
Procurement of aircraft and missiles, Navy										
	2,621,705,517	3,427,700,000	3,005,800,000	3,127,900,000	3,017,900,000	+396,194,453	-409,800,000	+12,100,000	-110,000,000	
Shipbuilding and conversion, Navy										
	2,495,899,014	2,578,900,000	2,694,400,000	2,276,900,000	2,465,400,000	-30,499,014	-113,500,000	-229,000,000	+188,500,000	
Other procurement, Navy										
	1,438,890,930	1,541,400,000	1,443,400,000	1,487,300,000	1,487,300,000	-1,590,990	-54,100,000	+43,900,000		
Procurement, Marine Corps										
	500,848,000	200,000,000	171,700,000	175,900,000	175,900,000	-324,948,000	-24,100,000	+4,200,000		
Aircraft procurement, Air Force										
	3,405,800,000	3,314,900,000	3,203,000,000	3,201,300,000	3,219,300,000	-186,500,000	-95,600,000	+16,300,000	+18,000,000	
Missile procurement, Air Force										
	1,448,100,000	1,530,600,000	1,372,300,000	1,380,400,000	1,377,200,000	-70,900,000	-153,400,000	+4,900,000	-3,200,000	
Other procurement, Air Force										
	1,576,200,000	1,489,600,000	1,381,200,000	1,345,100,000	1,338,700,000	-237,500,000	-150,900,000	-42,500,000	-6,400,000	
Procurement, Defense agencies										
	61,600,000	49,500,000	38,910,000	45,310,000	38,910,000	-22,690,000	-10,590,000		-6,400,000	
Total	17,858,373,452	17,358,600,000	16,243,810,000	15,970,110,000	16,029,110,000	-1,829,263,462	-1,329,490,000	-214,700,000	+59,000,000	
Title V—Research, development, test, and evaluation:										
Research, development, test, and evaluation:										
Army	1,608,282,938	1,717,900,000	1,608,500,000	1,589,700,000	1,600,200,000	-8,082,908	-117,700,000	-8,300,000	+10,500,000	
Navy	2,203,660,000	2,197,300,000	2,156,200,000	2,130,500,000	2,137,900,000	-65,760,000	-59,400,000	-18,300,000	+7,400,000	
Air Force	3,069,053,300	2,909,700,000	2,701,100,000	2,744,800,000	2,744,100,000	-324,953,300	-165,600,000	+43,300,000	-700,000	
Defense agencies	450,752,486	470,700,000	438,900,000	445,100,000	443,600,000	-7,152,486	-27,100,000	+4,700,000	-1,500,000	
Emergency fund, Defense	75,000,000	50,000,000	50,000,000	50,000,000	50,000,000	-25,000,000				
Total	7,406,748,624	7,345,600,000	6,954,700,000	6,960,100,000	6,975,800,000	-430,948,624	-369,800,000	+21,100,000	+15,700,000	
Title VI—Combat readiness, South Vietnam forces, Defense										
		300,000,000	358,500,000	300,000,000	300,000,000	+300,000,000		-59,500,000		
Title VII—Special foreign currency program										
		2,621,000	2,621,000	2,621,000	2,621,000	+2,621,000				
Total, Department of Defense appropriation bill	72,667,032,144	68,745,666,000	66,806,561,000	66,417,077,000	66,595,937,000	-6,071,095,144	-2,149,729,000	-210,524,000	+178,860,000	

1 Procurement of equipment and missiles, Army, \$25,000,000.
 2 Procurement of aircraft and missiles, Navy, \$43,000,000.
 3 Shipbuilding and conversion, Navy, \$150,000,000.
 4 Other procurement, Navy, \$18,000,000.
 5 Procurement, Marine Corps, \$2,000,000.
 6 Aircraft procurement, Air Force, \$59,400,000.
 7 Missile procurement, Air Force, \$14,000,000.
 8 Other procurement, Air Force, \$14,000,000.

9 Research, development, test, and evaluation, Army, \$18,000,000.
 10 Research, development, test, and evaluation, Navy, \$15,000,000.
 11 Research, development, test, and evaluation, Air Force, \$18,000,000.
 12 Research, development, test, and evaluation, Defense agencies, \$5,000,000.

Note.—Does not include the following amounts that were proposed for rescission (prior year balances) but were included in budget estimate to fund fiscal year 1971 programs:

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the conference report was agreed to.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

SURVIVOR ANNUITIES OF CIVIL SERVICE RETIREES—STATEMENT OF POSITION ON VOTE

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, I desire the RECORD to show that had I been present and voting at the time of the Senate's consideration of S. 437, con-

taining an increase for the retirement benefits of former Presidents of the United States, I would have voted "yea." At that time I was attending another meeting and was called by telephone and told that voting was in progress. I arrived 2 minutes after the vote was over. I have a statement in connection

Congress of its legitimate right to override a Presidential veto.

The bill was recorded as having been received at the White House on Monday, December 14. He had from that date until midnight of December 25 to sign it into law or to veto it by conventional means—that is, to return the bill to Congress with a veto message.

If the President had done the latter, I believe both Houses could easily have mustered the support to override. It is significant that during Senate and House passage, the family doctor bill encountered only three opposing votes—one in the Senate and two in the House.

The minority leadership of both Houses obviously recognized the merits of the bill and the critical need for favorable action. The senior Senator from Pennsylvania, HUGH SCOTT, was a co-sponsor of the bill on the Senate side. Our colleague, Mr. GERALD FORD, cast his vote for the bill on consideration in this Chamber.

I share with Senator RALPH YARBOROUGH of Texas, the chief Senate sponsor of the bill, deep regret that the President could not muster the fortitude to place his position formally before the Congress to be sustained or overridden.

I deplore the course of action followed by the President in this instance and I am convinced it warrants challenge as being contrary to the intent of the Constitution.

The routine veto procedure was available to the President. During 7 of the 10 days provided for Presidential consideration of bills passed by the Congress, we were in regular session and available to receive his veto message. Even after adjournment to a time certain, appropriate officers of the Congress had been authorized to receive messages from the President for disposition upon its return.

The President must have been fully aware that the holiday recess would end some 48 hours after the pocket veto became effective. Under no ordinary circumstances during any session of Congress could a routine veto procedure exercised by the President on a Saturday have been acted upon any earlier than the succeeding Monday. Obviously, the holiday adjournment of Congress to a time certain could not have prevented the President from returning a veto message if he had any desire to do so.

Therefore, I personally can draw no conclusion but that the President lacked the courage of his convictions in seeking to dispose of this important health measure in this manner.

By his action, he has challenged the Congress to spell out in terms which cannot be distorted by whim the precise role of the pocket veto in our legislative process.

THE DISTURBING SITUATION WITH- IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Boggs) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call attention to a very disturbing situation within one of this Nation's vital industries—the airline industry. As we all know, most industry groups are re-

fecting the impact of the national economic downturn. In many cases profits are down, and in some cases, notably among transportation carriers, profits have been wiped away.

Dead last, reports the Air Transport Association, at rock bottom in the changes in earnings scale in this country between 1968 and 1969, are the airlines. During 1969, the major U.S. airlines ranked at the bottom of the list of industry groups, both regulated and unregulated, with a decline in profitability of 74.4 percent from 1968. Among other regulated industries, earnings of the trucking industry dropped 11 percent and rails 17 percent, while intercity buses showed a 1.6-percent increase in profits and electric utilities a 6.1-percent increase.

As a result of poor earnings performance, the decline in the market price of airline common stock has been more than three times greater than the decline in the Dow Jones industrial average. While the Dow Jones index has fluctuated slightly since June 1966 before dropping 21.4 percent by June 1970 for instance, the airline stock index steadily fell 70.1 percent during the same 4-year period.

Yet during this period, the Civil Aeronautics Board did not approve any fare increases for the airlines until last year. If we look at prices for transportation in the post World War II period, we find that the revenue per revenue passenger mile for rails increased 61 percent, for buses 95 percent, and for airlines 17 percent. Even the two 1969 fare adjustments have not reversed the trend of declining earnings, and in many cases have been substantially offset by rapidly rising costs.

Bad as this seems, the situation this year is even worse, with the airlines expecting to end 1970 with their financially worst year on record. The plight of the airlines will not be relieved next year, unless a substantial fare increase is allowed very soon.

The CAB has said it would defer any additional fare increases until the conclusion of its ongoing fare investigation, a wide-ranging examination of the airline industry that hopefully will result in Government approval of a new fare increase.

But the airlines cannot wait out the winter. Although the CAB believes it can finish its investigation by early next year, the chances are that Board review of the examiner's recommendations will take some time and the air carriers will not be in the position to implement any resulting fare increase until late spring or the summer of 1971.

Consequently, it is my earnest hope that the CAB will see its way clear and approve one of the fare increase packages currently proposed by a number of airlines, and that the Board will see the wisdom of granting an increase, in the 10-to-12 percent range, that will do the job required.

TRIBUTE TO THE HONORABLE WILLIAM H. AYRES OF OHIO

(Mr. BOW asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. BOW. Mr. Speaker, 20 years ago I came to this House with a very dear friend who has served with me for these 20 years, who is leaving the Congress, my good friend and neighbor, WILLIAM AYRES.

As Members know, BILL AYRES has served diligently in these halls on the Committee on Veterans' Affairs as well as on the Committee on Education and Labor. He has been beloved by the people of his district and has served them well.

He comes from just a few miles from my home. We share the same airport, the Canton-Akron Airport. He has worked hard and diligently over the years to make it one of the finest in the country.

Mr. Speaker, his service to his constituents in every way has been outstanding. I am sure that all of the Members of the House are going to miss BILL AYRES. The veterans of the Nation owe a debt of gratitude to this fine Congressman for his work in their behalf.

I see my distinguished friend from Illinois on the floor who also came into the Congress with that class, and I am sure that he will remember those early days of 20 years ago, the humor and the good will which we have had with our friend, BILL AYRES, who will be leaving the Congress at the end of this session. It is our hope, however, that he will not be leaving Washington.

Mr. Speaker, I shall be glad to yield to the distinguished minority leader, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. GERALD R. FORD).

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, I am deeply grateful that the gentleman from Ohio has yielded to me in order to provide an opportunity to say a word about my very dear friend BILL AYRES.

I have known BILL AYRES in a very intimate way socially. His wife and my wife and our families have been together many, many times. The Ayres family is one of the nicest, finest, the Fords have ever known.

For 20 years I have known BILL AYRES as an outstanding legislator. He worked himself up the ladder to a position as ranking minority member on the vitally important Committee on Education and Labor. He also worked his way up the ladder as a member of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. So at one time he could have been the ranking minority member on both of these outstanding committees. He served upon those committees with superb excellence. He is a legislator who knows how to get things done in a skillful, quiet, efficient, effective way.

I do not think BILL AYRES made a reputation for a multitude of speeches on the floor of the House or in the well of this Chamber, but when he spoke, what he said made sense and what he did in committee and what he did outside in trying to get legislation that would be workable and effective through the House, BILL was a master.

Naturally, I deeply regret that BILL will not be back with us, No. 1, because of the contributions he has made in the House of Representatives, but, secondly, because I think he could have in an even more meaningful way expanded his influence for good government and good legislation.

N72490

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

December 29, 1970

BILL AYRES is a close personal friend. I shall miss him very, very greatly, legislatively and otherwise. I have no idea at the moment what his future plans are, but I just hope that a person with his experience and his capability will find a place to make continued contributions to a better America. We need him and the country needs him.

My wife Betty who was a very close friend of Mary Ellen Ayres who was one of the finest in every respect. BILL and Mary Ellen, two of the best—we will miss you badly and have been the beneficiaries of your friendship. Good luck and God bless you.

Mr. BOW. I thank the distinguished minority leader.

Mr. SPRINGER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOW. I am delighted to yield to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois.

(Mr. SPRINGER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPRINGER. Mr. Speaker, 20 years ago this coming January 13th, the 82d Congress convened. In that new congressional class there were 60 freshmen. There were 39 new Republicans and 21 Democrats. I believe that there are no Democrats left in that class. Out of the 39 Republicans, the gentleman in the well, Mr. Bow of Ohio, the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. BELCHER, myself, and the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. AYRES, and the gentleman from Indiana, ROSS ADAIR, I believe are the only ones that are left from that class.

Mr. BOW. If the gentleman will permit an interruption, I think that the gentleman from Indiana, BILL BRAY, came with that class.

Mr. SPRINGER. The gentleman is correct—and BILL BRAY. So there are six left out of 60, which gives some idea of the attrition.

It has been a great pleasure to serve these 20 years not only with the distinguished gentleman in the well, but also with BILL AYRES, who comes from the same State.

I have visited in Akron in the past, and spoken before the Summit County Bar Association, and have become sufficiently acquainted in the city of Akron to know the great respect in which BILL AYRES and all of his family are held.

It has been a great pleasure for us to know BILL AYRES and his wife socially as well as a Member of this great legislative body. My children grew up with his children and attended the same schools in some instances, so we have known them on a rather intimate basis during all of this time.

BILL AYRES came from a district which is overwhelmingly registered in the other party. It has been remarkable that he has been able to hold this district with that kind of registration for a period of 20 years. In my opinion the only reason he has is because he has been a remarkable Congressman, not only remarkable in the fact that he has been able to get things done, but also by the fact that he is easy to know, he serves his people

well, and he actually knows the business which he is about.

BILL AYRES is the kind of a fellow who represents everybody, regardless of party. After you know him a while, and you find that easy way that he has of knowing you, you can well understand how well the people like him in his own district.

I hope that BILL will be in Washington as a part of this administration after he leaves here on January 3. But I do know that Elsie and I, if he leaves Washington, will certainly miss him and his very gracious wife, because of the great association we have had together. But whatever BILL AYRES does, I want to pay tribute to him for the kind of legislative record that he has made in the Congress, and the way in which he has conducted himself as an individual. In my estimation as a legislator he has been of the highest order.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOW. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I also had the pleasure of coming to the Congress in the same class with BILL AYRES. I learned to have a very high respect for BILL in the years that I have known him. He was a hard worker. Of course, he had a good sense of humor, and if you were feeling down and you met him he always would say a word to you, and he would make you feel better.

He is a man who has always been the kind to develop a feeling of trust and happiness in the world. In addition to that, he was a tireless worker on both of the committees on which he served. I have gone to him many times on legislation brought before his committee, and he was a Member from whom you could get information as to what really was in the bill, and the good points and the bad points. I will say frankly that I have never discussed a matter with him but what he had a great depth of understanding on the subject of that bill, and the information that he gave me was always good.

I think about the highest compliment you could pay to a Member of Congress is that as a member of his committee you feel perfectly free to ask his advice, and that you trust him on the information and the advice he gives you.

BILL AYRES has had a difficult district for many years, a district in which you had to overcome a majority in order to win. Districts such as that finally pay no attention as to the results that have been obtained in the past. We are very deeply sorry that BILL AYRES lost. But he has been a great Member of this body, and a Member who will be sorely missed. I certainly hope that as a Member of this administration he continues to assist in good government on the other side of the Hill, downtown, just as he has done for the many years that he has been here.

Mr. BOW. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Indiana.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. BOW. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the service of WILLIAM H. AYRES in the Congress.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS, 1971

Mr. MAHON submitted the following conference report and statement on the bill (H.R. 19590) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, and for other purposes:

CONFERENCE REPORT (H. REPT. No. 91-1799)

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 19590) "making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, and for other purposes," having met, after a further full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its amendments numbered 13, 16, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 30, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 40, 41, 44, 54, 55, and 57.

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate numbered 7, 10, 12, 22, 24, 43, 44, 45, 47, 50, 51, and 56, and agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 1: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 1, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$7,842,450,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 2: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 2, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$4,368,600,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 3: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 3, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$1,426,700,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 4: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 4, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$5,988,350,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 5: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 5, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$85,200,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 6: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 6, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$107,500,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 8: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 8, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment

insert "\$6,268,687,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 9: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 9, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$4,729,410,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 11: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 11, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$6,157,136,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 17: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 17, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$3,017,900,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 20: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 20, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$2,465,400,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 28: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 28, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$1,377,200,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 35: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 35, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$1,600,200,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 37: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 37, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$2,137,900,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 39: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 39, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$2,744,100,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 42: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 42, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$443,600,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 52: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 52, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment insert: "Provided further, That nothing in clause (1) of the first sentence of this subsection shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos; Provided further, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support of actions required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. Forces from Southeast Asia, or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 58: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 58, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed by said

amendment insert: "Sec. 845. After June 15, 1971, no part of the funds in this Act shall be available to support in excess of 138,000 personnel of the Department of Defense (military and civilian) assigned to activities managed under the Intelligence and Security Program of the Department of Defense."

And the Senate agree to the same.

The committee of conference report in disagreement amendments numbered 14, 26, 31, 49, and 53.

GEORGE MAHON,
ROBERT L. F. SIKES,
JAMIE L. WHITTEN,
GEORGE W. ANDREWS,
DANIEL J. FLOOD,
JOHN M. SLACK,
JOSEPH P. ADDABBO,
JOHN J. RHODES,
GLENN R. DAVIS,
LOUIS C. WYMAN,
E. A. CEDERBERG,
FRANK T. BOW,

Managers on the Part of the House.

ALLEN J. ELLENDER,
RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN,
JOHN STENNIS,
STUART SYMINGTON,
MILTON R. YOUNG,
MARGARET CHASE SMITH,
GORDON ALLOTT,

Managers on the Part of the Senate.

STATEMENT

The managers on the part of the House at the further conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on certain of the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 19590) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, and for other purposes, submit the following statement in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon and recommended in the accompanying conference report as to each of such amendments, namely:

SENATE AMENDMENTS PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO

The House, on December 16, 1970, adopted the first conference report on the bill (H. Report 91-1759) and then adopted motions relating to amendments reported in technical disagreement. Four amendments of the Senate which had been reported in technical disagreement—Nos. 15, 18, 29, and 48—were concurred in by the House without change. Thus, those four amendments are not at issue in the accompanying conference report or amendments in disagreement.

TITLE I—MILITARY PERSONNEL

Military personnel, Army

Amendment No. 1: Appropriates \$7,842,450,000 instead of \$7,822,450,000 as proposed by the House and \$7,861,750,000 as proposed by the Senate. The sum available for Permanent Change of Station Travel is \$505,391,000 instead of \$485,391,000 as proposed by the House, and \$524,691,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Military personnel, Navy

Amendment No. 2: Appropriates \$4,368,600,000 instead of \$4,360,100,000 as proposed by the House, and \$4,377,100,000 as proposed by the Senate. The sum available for Permanent Change of Station Travel is \$221,465,000 instead of \$212,965,000 as proposed by the House, and \$229,965,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Military personnel, Marine Corps

Amendment No. 3: Appropriates \$1,426,700,000 instead of \$1,422,700,000 as proposed by the House, and \$1,430,600,000 as proposed by the Senate. The sum available for Permanent Change of Station Travel is \$101,225,000 instead of \$97,225,000 as proposed by the House, and \$105,125,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Military personnel, Air Force

Amendment No. 4: Appropriates \$5,988,350,000 instead of \$5,973,350,000 as proposed by the House, and \$6,002,425,000 as proposed by the Senate. The sum available for Permanent Change of Station Travel is \$398,760,000 instead of \$383,760,000 as proposed by the House, and \$412,835,000 as proposed by the Senate. The conferees are in agreement that a reduction of \$16,075,000 shall apply proportionately to Communications and Intelligence as proposed by the House.

Reserve personnel, Air Force

Amendment No. 5: Appropriates \$85,200,000 instead of \$86,200,000 as proposed by the House, and \$84,200,000 as proposed by the Senate.

National Guard personnel, Air Force

Amendment No. 6: Appropriates \$107,500,000 instead of \$108,500,000 as proposed by the House, and \$106,500,000 as proposed by the Senate.

TITLE III—OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

Operation and maintenance, Army

Amendment No. 7: Provides \$3,634,000 for emergencies and extraordinary expenses as proposed by the Senate instead of \$4,000,000 as proposed by the House. This action is associated with amendment number 48.

Amendment No. 8: Appropriates \$6,268,687,000 instead of \$6,269,011,000 as proposed by the House, and \$6,228,687,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The House agrees to the Senate increase of \$1,700,000 for civilian personnel and the increase of \$8,000,000 for Automatic Data Processing operations. The conferees agree to an amount of \$40,000,000 for unforeseen operational costs instead of the \$50,000,000 included by the House and deleted by the Senate.

Operation and maintenance, Navy

Amendment No. 9: Appropriates \$4,729,410,000 instead of \$4,731,910,000 as proposed by the House, and \$4,685,410,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The House agrees to the Senate increases for civilian personnel and headquarters operations of \$500,000 and \$7,000,000 respectively. The Senate recedes from its decrease of \$4,000,000 for the Antarctic Operation. The conferees agreed to an amount of \$40,000,000 for unforeseen operational costs instead of the \$50,000,000 included by the House and deleted by the Senate.

Operation and maintenance, Marine Corps

Amendment No. 10: Appropriates \$402,743,000 as proposed by the Senate instead of \$399,943,000 as proposed by the House.

The House agreed to the Senate increase of \$1,500,000 for civilian personnel and \$1,300,000 for Marine Corps headquarters operations.

Operation and maintenance, Air Force

Amendment No. 11: Appropriates \$6,157,136,000 instead of \$6,167,136,000 as proposed by the House and \$6,093,236,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The conferees agreed to the House allowance of \$23,900,000 for the retention of five Air Force reserve units and the conferees agree to an amount of \$40,000,000 for unforeseen operational costs instead of the \$50,000,000 included by the House and deleted by the Senate.

Operation and maintenance, Air National Guard

Amendment No. 12: Appropriates \$343,600,000 as proposed by the Senate instead of \$337,600,000 as proposed by the House. The House agreed to the Senate increase of \$6,000,000 for aircraft fuel and oil and other operational costs.

National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice, Army

Amendment No. 13: Appropriates \$100,000 as proposed by the House instead of \$65,000 as proposed by the Senate.

TITLE IV—PROCUREMENT

Procurement of equipment and missiles, Army

Amendment No. 14: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to appropriate \$2,908,500,000 instead of \$2,933,100,000 as proposed by the House, and \$2,930,000,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Under Aircraft, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$62,000,000 for LOH helicopters as proposed by the Senate instead of \$64,200,000 as proposed by the House; the amount of \$2,100,000 for OV-1 aircraft modification as proposed by the Senate instead of \$3,500,000 as proposed by the House; and the amount of \$8,000,000 for avionics/armament spares as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$10,300,000 as proposed by the House.

Under Missiles, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$51,900,000 for the XMIM-72A Chaparral Missile as proposed by the Senate instead of \$76,400,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees agreed to provide a total of \$58,200,000 for the XMIM-23B Improved Hawk missile, instead of \$43,200,000 as proposed by the House and \$81,400,000 as proposed by the Senate, with the understanding that no fiscal year 1971 production would be contracted for, with the added funds used to stretch out the production already under contract. This action will provide sufficient time for necessary tests of this missile scheduled during fiscal year 1971.

The conferees agreed to the amount of \$8,300,000 for Nike-Hercules modifications as proposed by the Senate instead of the \$3,000,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees agreed to the amount of \$34,900,000 for the initial production of the XMGM-52A Lance missile as proposed by the Senate. The House had provided no funds for this purpose.

The conferees agreed to the amount of \$5,300,000 for XMGM-31A Pershing missile modifications as proposed by the Senate instead of the \$10,300,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees agreed to the amount of \$15,000,000 for the Land Combat Support System (LCSS) and \$5,000,000 for LCSS, spares as proposed by the Senate. The House had provided no funds for this purpose. The conferees also agreed to provide \$1,700,000 for LCSS modifications as proposed by the House. The Senate had deleted the funds requested for such modifications.

Under Weapons and Combat Vehicles, the amount of \$13,000,000 for the M577A1 Tracked Command Post Carriers as proposed by the Senate was agreed to by the conferees instead of \$2,800,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees agreed to delete the amount of \$6,400,000 for the Chaparral missile carrier, and the amount of \$1,300,000 for the Vulcan Gun Shop Test, as proposed by the Senate, instead of funding these items in those amounts as proposed by the House. The conferees also agreed to provide \$23,900,000 for M16A1 rifles as proposed by the Senate instead of \$27,100,000 as proposed by the House.

Under Tactical and Support Vehicles, the conferees agreed to provide the amount of \$28,800,000 for the XM705 1½ ton truck and \$1,100,000 for XM705 truck initial spares. The House had not allowed these funds. None of the funds made available for the XM705 1½ ton truck are to be obligated for that purpose until after the evaluation of the modified M715 truck is completed and a determination made that the latter vehicle will not essentially meet Army requirements. If it is determined that the modified M715

truck will essentially meet those requirements, the funds provided for the XM705 truck may be used for termination of the existing XM705 production contract, and funding of the initial procurement of the modified M715 truck.

Under Communications and Electronics Equipment, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$9,300,000 for STARCOCOM Communications (Other) as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$10,800,000 as proposed by the House; and the amount of \$53,000,000 for Defense Communications Planning Group projects as proposed by the Senate instead of \$78,000,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees agreed to delete the amount of \$600,000 for the RC-292 Antenna Group and \$1,100,000 for the SB-22 Switchboard as proposed by the Senate. The House had funded these items in those amounts.

The conferees agreed to restore the \$4,000,000 House reduction for the RATIC Field Artillery Radar Sets as proposed by the Senate with the understanding that any future procurement of this equipment shall be from a domestic producer.

The conferees also agreed to the amount of \$11,400,000 for miscellaneous items under \$500,000 as proposed by the Senate instead of \$14,400,000 as proposed by the House.

Under Other Support Equipment, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$800,000 for the LCM landing craft and \$4,400,000 for the LCU landing craft as proposed by the Senate. The House had not provided funds for these purposes.

The conferees also agreed to the deletion of \$16,500,000 for a classified project as proposed by the Senate. The House had allowed those funds.

Under Production Base Support, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$182,500,000 for provision of industrial facilities as proposed by the Senate instead of the \$187,100,000 as proposed by the House.

Amendment No. 15: Authorizes the transfer to this appropriation of \$50,000,000 from the Army stock fund. It was concurred in by the House without change on December 16, 1970 and thus is not at issue in the accompanying conference report or amendments in disagreement.

Amendment No. 16: Makes funds available for obligation until June 30, 1973, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended" as proposed by the Senate.

Procurement of aircraft and missiles, Navy

Amendment No. 17: Appropriates \$3,017,900,000 instead of \$3,005,800,000 as proposed by the House and \$3,127,900,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Under Aircraft, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$112,500,000 for twelve A-6E Intruder Attack Aircraft and \$11,400,000 for A-6H aircraft initial spares as proposed by the Senate, instead of the \$72,500,000 for six A-6H aircraft as proposed by the House. The House had provided \$5,700,000 for A-6E aircraft, initial spares to support only six aircraft.

The conferees agreed to the amount of \$64,000,000 for the AV-8A Harrier (V/STOL) attack aircraft as proposed by the House, instead of the \$36,200,000 as proposed by the Senate. The agreement of the Committee of Conference is based on the procurement of these eighteen aircraft in the United Kingdom.

The conferees agreed to the amount of \$23,000,000 for the E-2C Hawkeye Early Warning Aircraft, in addition to the \$20,000,000 in advance procurement funds provided in the bill for the fiscal year 1971, instead of the \$92,300,000 as proposed by the Senate. The House had deleted the latter amount. The conferees also agreed to delete the \$8,500,000 allowed by the Senate for E-2C initial spares, as proposed by the House. The \$43,000,000 total thus provided for long lead-time items is in full accord with the current Department of Defense plan to award a pro-

duction contract for eleven such aircraft in fiscal year 1972. The action of the conferees should in no way be construed as an effort to delay this important program.

The conferees also agreed to the amount of \$72,000,000 for Variable Avionics Shop Test (VAST) equipment as proposed by the Senate, instead of the \$28,600,000 as proposed by the House.

Amendment No. 18: Authorizes the transfer to this appropriation of \$100,000,000 from the Defense stock fund. It was concurred in by the House without change on December 16, 1970, and thus is not at issue in the accompanying conference report or amendments in disagreement.

Amendment No. 19: Makes funds available for obligation until June 30, 1973, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended", as proposed by the Senate.

Shipbuilding and conversion, Navy

Amendment No. 20: Appropriates \$2,465,400,000 instead of \$2,894,400,000 as proposed by the House, and \$2,276,900,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The conferees agreed to the amount of \$166,000,000 for an additional SSN-688 class nuclear attack submarine above the President's budget, and \$22,500,000 in advance procurement funds above the President's budget for another SSN-688 class submarine to be funded in fiscal year 1972, as proposed by the House. The conferees also agreed not to provide other funds above the President's budget in the following amounts and for the listed purposes:

AS submarine tender.....	\$102,000,000
AD destroyer tender.....	103,000,000
Service craft	24,000,000

The Senate had not allowed any of the funds provided by the House for Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, above the President's budget.

Amendment No. 21: Makes funds available for obligation until June 30, 1975, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended", as proposed by the Senate.

Other procurement, Navy

Amendment No. 22: Appropriates \$1,487,300,000 as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$1,443,400,000 as proposed by the House.

Under Ship Support Equipment, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$900,000 for Submarine batteries as proposed by the Senate instead of \$4,200,000 as proposed by the House; the amount of \$4,900,000 for SHORT-STOP electronic warfare system ship alterations as proposed by the Senate, instead of no funds as allowed by the House for that purpose; and the amount of \$500,000 for small boats as proposed by the Senate instead of \$1,800,000 as proposed by the House.

Under Communications and Electronics Equipment, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$2,400,000 for the AN/SPS-40 radar set as proposed by the Senate, instead of no funds as allowed by the House for that purpose. The conferees agreed to delete the \$4,000,000 allowed by the House for miscellaneous items, as proposed by the Senate.

Under Aviation Support Equipment, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$4,000,000 for the CBU-55/B (Fuel Air Explosive) cluster bombs. The House had allowed no funds for that purpose.

Under Ordnance Support Equipment, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$14,500,000 for the MK-46 torpedo as proposed by the Senate, instead of no funds allowed for that purpose as proposed by the House; the amount of \$110,600,000 for the MK-48 torpedo as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$80,600,000 as proposed by the House; and the amount of \$30,800,000 for Ordnance Replenishment spares as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$34,100,000 as proposed by the House.

Amendment No. 23: Makes funds available for obligation until June 30, 1972 as proposed

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by the House, instead of "available until expended" as proposed by the Senate.

Procurement, Marine Corps

Amendment No. 24: Appropriates \$175,900,000 as proposed by the Senate instead of \$171,700,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees agreed to the amount of \$4,200,000 for the XM705 1 1/4 ton truck as proposed by the Senate. The House allowed no funds for that purpose. The same understanding with respect to this truck set forth under Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army, will prevail under this appropriation.

Amendment No. 25: Makes funds available for obligation until June 30, 1973 as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended", as proposed by the Senate.

Aircraft procurement, Air Force

Amendment No. 26: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to appropriate \$3,219,300,000 instead of \$3,203,000,000 as proposed by the House, and \$3,201,300,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Under Aircraft, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$9,200,000 for F/RF-5A/B aircraft as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$10,300,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees agreed to provide the amount of \$18,000,000 for the International Fighter Aircraft, instead of the \$30,000,000 provided by the House. The Senate had allowed no funds for that purpose. The action of the conferees does not constitute a full production decision on this aircraft.

Under Modification of Inservice Aircraft, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$99,000,000 for modification of B-52/FB-111 aircraft to accommodate the Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM), as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$71,300,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees also agreed to the amount of \$14,000,000 for Additional SEA Requirements as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$17,000,000 as proposed by the House.

Under Aircraft Spares and Repair Parts, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$31,000,000 for F-111 aircraft initial spares as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$19,800,000 as proposed by the House. In addition, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$399,400,000 for replenishment spares as proposed by the Senate, instead of the \$405,900,000 as proposed by the House.

Amendment No. 27: Makes funds available or obligation until June 30, 1973, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended", as proposed by the Senate.

Missile procurement, Air Force

Amendment No. 28: Appropriates \$1,377,00,000 instead of \$1,372,300,000 as proposed by the House and \$1,380,400,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Under Ballistic Missiles, the conferees deleted the amount of \$3,200,000 for LGM-III Minuteman II/III Operational Base Launch Program as proposed by the House instead of allowing that amount for that purpose as proposed by the Senate.

Under Other Missiles, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$99,500,000 for the AGM-4 Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM) as proposed by the Senate, instead of the 0,000,000 as proposed by the House. The conferees also agreed to the amount of 0,800,000 for SRAM initial spares as proposed by the Senate, instead of the \$5,400,000 as proposed by the House.

Amendment No. 29: Authorizes the transfer of this appropriation of \$50,000,000 from the fence stock fund. It was concurred in by the House without change on December 16, 70, and thus is not at issue in the accompanying conference report or amendments in agreement.

Amendment No. 30: Makes funds available for obligation until June 30, 1973, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended", as proposed by the Senate.

posed by the House, instead of "available until expended", as proposed by the Senate.

Other procurement, Air Force

Amendment No. 31: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to appropriate \$1,338,700,000 instead of \$1,381,200,000 as proposed by the House and \$1,345,100,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Under Munitions and Associated Equipment, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$731,000,000 as proposed by the Senate, instead of the \$752,900,000 as proposed by the House.

Under Electronic and Telecommunications Equipment, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$5,000,000 for cryptographic equipment as proposed by the Senate, instead of the \$9,000,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees agreed to delete the \$6,400,000 for the Minuteman Operational Base Launch Program as proposed by the House instead of allowing such amount for that purpose as proposed by the Senate.

The conferees agreed to delete the amount of \$800,000 for Elimination of Compromising Emanations as proposed by the Senate instead of allowing such amount for that purpose as proposed by the House.

The conferees also agreed to the amount of \$5,000,000 for Training Equipment as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$5,800,000 as proposed by the House; the amount of \$41,000,000 for spares and repair parts as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$44,200,000 as proposed by the House; and the amount of \$11,400,000 for Class V Modifications as proposed by the Senate, instead of the \$13,200,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees further agreed to a general unspecified reduction of \$10,000,000 as proposed by the Senate. This reduction was based on the fact that there are prior year balances available in that amount which can be used to fund fiscal year 1971 programs.

Amendment No. 32: Makes funds available for obligation until June 30, 1973, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended", as proposed by the Senate.

Procurement, Defense agencies

Amendment No. 33: Appropriates \$38,910,000 as proposed by the House instead of \$45,310,000 as proposed by the Senate. The conferees agreed that the funding of \$6,400,000 for the procurement of automatic data processing equipment for the World-Wide Military Command and Control System would be deferred until the General Accounting Office has reported on the feasibility and cost of the system.

Amendment No. 34: Makes the sum appropriated for Procurement, Defense Agencies available for obligation until June 30, 1973, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended" as proposed by the Senate.

TITLE V—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION
Research, development, test, and evaluation, Army

Amendment No. 35: Appropriates \$1,600,200,000 instead of \$1,608,500,000 as proposed by the House and \$1,589,700,000 as proposed by the Senate. The Conference agreement includes \$15,300,000 for the Pershing Missile System as proposed by the Senate instead of \$11,500,000 as proposed by the House. A total of \$6,000,000 is provided for Electrical Power Sources as proposed by the Senate instead of \$4,000,000 as proposed by the House.

The conference agreement provides for a general reduction of \$14,100,000 instead of specific reductions in low priority programs totaling \$24,600,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 36: Makes the sum appropriated for R.D.T. & E., Army available for obligation until June 30, 1972, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended", as proposed by the Senate.

posed by the House, instead of "available until expended" as proposed by the Senate. *Research, development, test, and evaluation, Navy*

Amendment No. 37: Appropriates \$2,137,900,000 instead of \$2,156,200,000 as proposed by the House and \$2,130,500,000 as proposed by the Senate. The Conference agreement provides \$3,500,000 for the LAMPS Destroyer Helicopter System as proposed by the House instead of \$10,500,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The conferees are in agreement on a general reduction of \$18,300,000 instead of specific reductions in low priority programs totaling \$32,700,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 38: Makes the sum appropriated for R.D.T. & E., Navy available until June 30, 1972, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended" as proposed by the Senate.

Research, development, test, and evaluation, Air Force

Amendment No. 39: Appropriates \$2,744,100,000 instead of \$2,701,100,000 as proposed by the House and \$2,744,800,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The Conference agreement includes:

(1) No funds for the Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy program, as proposed by the House, instead of \$10,000,000 as proposed by the Senate.

(2) \$61,000,000 for Minuteman Rebasing as proposed by the Senate instead of \$27,000,000 as proposed by the House. The sum provided deletes the amounts requested for the Mobile Minuteman and Hard-Point Defense concepts, as stated in the Senate Report.

(3) \$87,000,000 for the Airborne Warning and Control System as proposed by the Senate instead of \$63,500,000 as proposed by the House.

(4) \$10,500,000 for the Minuteman Operational Base Launch program instead of no funds as proposed by the House and \$19,800,000 as proposed by the Senate. The sum provided is only for equipment at Vandenberg Air Force Base and the Western Test Range needed for range improvement and not related only to the Minuteman Operational Base Launch program.

In deleting funds requested for the Minuteman Operational Base Launch Program, the conferees are in agreement that if a firm decision is made that such firings are required and will be conducted, consideration will be given to a budget request in a future fiscal year.

(5) A general reduction of \$25,000,000 instead of specific reductions in low priority programs totaling \$43,600,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 40: Makes the sum appropriated for R.D.T.&E., Air Force available until June 30, 1972, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended" as proposed by the Senate.

Research, development, test, and evaluation, defense agencies

Amendment No. 41: Makes sum appropriated for R.D.T.&E., Defense Agencies, available until June 30, 1972, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended" as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 42: Appropriates \$443,600,000 instead of \$438,900,000 as proposed by the House and \$445,100,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The amount of \$3,500,000 is approved for Climate Modification Research (Nile Blue) as proposed by the Senate.

The conferees restored the \$1,500,000 reduction in the laser program which was proposed by the Senate.

The conferees agreed to a \$3,000,000 general reduction for the Defense Atomic Support Agency.

Emergency fund, Defense

Amendment No. 43: Deletes specific transfer authority as provided by the House which is now covered in Section 836.

TITLE VI—COMBAT READINESS, SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES, DEFENSE

Amendment No. 44: Appropriates \$300,000,000 as proposed by the Senate instead of \$358,500,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees strongly favor the Vietnamization program of the Department of Defense but believe that the \$600,000,000 in transfer authority provided under Section 836 of the bill could be used to provide for any additional requirements for this program. If additional funds are required above that which could be obtained under the transfer authority, the President can submit a supplemental request to the Congress.

Amendment No. 45: Deletes transfer authority of \$150,000,000 which was proposed by the House. All transfer authority is included under Section 836 as general authority.

TITLE VII—SPECIAL FOREIGN CURRENCY PROGRAM

Amendment No. 46: Makes the appropriation for the Special Foreign Currency Program available for obligation until June 30, 1973, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended" as proposed by the Senate.

TITLE VIII—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Amendment No. 47: Section 807. Imposes a ceiling of \$136,700,000 as proposed by the Senate instead of \$184,400,000 as proposed by the House on funds available for the schooling of minor dependents of military and civilian personnel stationed in foreign countries.

Amendment No. 48: Section 807. Involves language authorizing rest and recuperation trips for dependents for senior advisers in Vietnam who voluntarily extend their tour of duty. It was concurred in by the House without change on December 16, 1970, and thus is not as issue in the accompanying conference report or amendments in disagreement.

Amendment No. 49: Section 83. Reported in technical disagreement. The Managers on the Part of the House will offer a motion which will provide general transfer authority between appropriations totaling \$600,000,000 instead of specific transfer authority of \$600,000,000 as proposed by the House and general transfer authority of \$700,000,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The Committee of Conference is in agreement that all transfers made under this authority shall be considered to be matters of special interest to the Committees on Appropriations under the reprogramming procedures.

Amendments Nos. 50, 51, and 52: Section 838. (1) Imposes a limitation of \$2,500,000,000 on funds available to support Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces and local forces in Laos and Thailand. (2) Limits payments to members of free world forces to the amounts which can be paid for equivalent services to members of the Armed Forces of the United States. (3) Limits U.S. financed military support of Governments of Laos and Cambodia by free world forces to actions required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

Amendment No. 53: Section 842. Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion which will restrict the period of availability of balances in Procurement and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation appropriations, as proposed by the House, and provide for the merger of the old balances with appropriations in this bill; and will repeal Section 642 of the Defense Appropriation Act of 1970, which was to have accom-

plished the purposes of this section but which proved to be ineffective, as proposed by the Senate.

Amendments Nos. 54 and 55: Section 843. The Conferees agree to the deletion of "Cambodia" from this section. The House language prohibited the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand. The Senate proposed the addition of Cambodia to the section.

Amendment No. 56: Section 884. Updates citation as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 57: Section 845. Deletes prohibition inserted by the Senate on the use of funds for research not directly related to a specific military function or operation.

Amendment No. 58: Section 846. Changes section number and inserts language proposed by the Senate limiting the number of military and civilian personnel in intelligence operations in the Department of Defense to 138,000.

Conference total—with comparisons

The total new budget (obligational) authority for the fiscal year 1971 recommended by the Committee of Conference, with comparisons to the fiscal year 1970 total, the 1971 budget estimate total, and the House and Senate bills follows:

New budget (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1970—	\$72,667,032,144
Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1971—	68,457,666,000
House bill, fiscal year 1971—	66,806,561,000
Senate bill, fiscal year 1971—	66,417,077,000
Conference agreement ———	66,595,937,000
Conference agreement compared with:	
New budget (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1970 —————	- 6,071,095,144
Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1971 ———	- 2,149,729,000
House bill, fiscal year 1971 —————	- 210,624,000
Senate bill, fiscal year 1971 —————	+ 178,860,000

GEORGE MAHON,
ROBERT L. F. SIKES,
JAMIE L. WHITTEN,
GEORGE W. ANDREWS,
DANIEL J. FLOOD,
JOHN M. SLACK,
JOSEPH P. ADDABBO,
JOHN J. RHODES,
GLENN R. DAVIS,
LOUIS C. WYMAN,
E. A. CEDERBERG,
FRANK T. BOW,

Managers on the Part of the House.

Mr. MAHON, Mr. Speaker, I call up the conference report on the bill (H.R. 19590) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, and for other purposes, and ask unanimous consent that the statement of the managers on the part of the House be read in lieu of the report.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the statement.

(For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House for today.)

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. MAHON) is recognized.

Mr. MAHON, Mr. Speaker, we have before us the second conference report on the Department of Defense appropriation bill for fiscal year 1971. The House passed the first conference report on De-

ember 16. It went over to the other body and, after midnight last night, the conference report was tabled by a voice vote.

The first conference report had been signed by all of the Senate conferees except one and had been signed by all of the House conferees. But the bill was tabled last night by a voice vote in the Senate. So we went back into conference with the Senate today.

There were two items that Members will be especially interested in and I think I should make a few remarks in order to make the legislative history of what we are doing reasonably clear.

One of the items related to the use of American ground combat troops in Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, and the other issue related to our support of South Vietnamese and other free world forces in Cambodia or Laos.

SECTION 838

On October 7 of 1970, the defense procurement authorization bill became law—Public Law 91-441. In that bill, language with respect to the use of defense funds to support South Vietnamese and other free world forces in Cambodia or Laos was carried as follows:

Nothing in Clause A of the first sentence of this paragraph shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos.

This provision appeared to be a direct denial of any right on the part of the President to use funds in the Defense appropriation bill for the support of the South Vietnamese or other free world forces in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover in Cambodia or Laos. From the standpoint of the House conferees on the Defense appropriation bill this language, which had been enacted into law, was intolerable at this particular point in time.

Almost identical language was incorporated in the Senate version of the Defense appropriation bill. The House conferees refused to adopt the language tie the President's hands, and make it impossible for him to use funds in the bill to support South Vietnamese and other free world forces in their effort to prevent a Communist takeover in Cambodia or Laos.

So, in the first conference we had with the other body, we left this language which became known as the "Fulbright amendment," in the bill, but we modified the amendment by attaching the following proviso:

Provided further, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support of free world or local forces in actions designed to promote the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

That language gave the President considerable latitude in the use of Defense funds to support the Vietnamese and other free world forces in their effort to make Vietnamization operative, their efforts to make the disengagement of U.S. troops possible, and in their effort to prevent a very drastic deterioration of their military situation by a comple-

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Communist takeover in Cambodia or Laos.

So, in the conference today with the other body we agreed to include the objectionable language, which I have quoted, but we insisted upon a proviso which in substance is approximately the same proviso as was contained in the original conference agreement. This relates to section 838 of the Defense appropriation bill. The new proviso is as follows:

Provided further. That nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support of actions required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia, or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

We thought that this sufficiently modified the provision in the bill which relates to the same subject and which was very restrictive upon the President.

The fact is that the language in the Defense Procurement Authorization Act—Public Law 91-441—raised grave doubt in my mind as to whether or not that language actually would control the Defense appropriation bill carrying the money, but since this language had been almost identically repeated in the Defense appropriation bill in the Senate, it was thought we should take some action to modify what we consider to be the very damaging language to which I made reference.

So it seems to me the House of Representatives has performed a good function in making it possible for the President to have the latitude which is required to exercise his judgment, to meet the situation in Southeast Asia from the standpoint of the use of South Vietnamese and other free world forces.

SECTION 843

Now I would like to turn to another provision in the bill that relates to the use of American ground combat troops in Cambodia. The language which we sent to the Senate, the language which passed the House, provided:

In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by this section shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand.

To that the Senate added "or Cambodia." In the conference today, the words "or Cambodia" were stricken out.

In the original conference report, which was adopted by the House and tabled by the Senate, we had a proviso which expanded the President's authority as follows:

Provided. That nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit the President from taking action in said areas designed to promote the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

In the conference with the Senate today, when we considered the use of American ground combat troops in Cambodia, the House was compelled, in order to get a conference agreement, to strike out this proviso which the House supported originally, and which the House conferees would have continued to sup-

port. We yielded in order that a conference report might be placed before the House today for reconsideration.

One of the controlling factors in our decision to agree to the elimination of this proviso is the fact that the President has stated repeatedly that he has no intention of using U.S. ground combat troops in Cambodia. In a press conference on December 10, the President stated the following. The question to the President was:

Mr. President, Secretary of State William P. Rogers assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today that there is no present intention of ever using American ground forces in Cambodia. Can you foresee any circumstances whatever under which we would use ground forces in Cambodia?

The response of the President was:
None whatever.

In view of the fact that the President said he could not foresee the use of American ground combat troops in Cambodia, the House felt that it could safely yield in that respect.

There is another piece of legislation which refers to this proposal on the use of American ground combat troops in Cambodia.

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield at that point?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Speaker, I should clarify a point: in section 843 as passed by the Senate, the prohibition against use of U.S. ground combat troops was extended from Laos and Thailand, which was in the House bill, to include Cambodia, and in the latest conference between the two bodies, the words "or Cambodia" were stricken.

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman is correct.

This language which was contained in the House bill was inserted in the Defense bill last year, by the other body, and it became part of the law. There was no serious objection to it, although the members of the House Committee on Appropriations were never impressed with this language, but under the circumstances, we hardly had any alternative.

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Arkansas.

Mr. RHODES. The legislative history stated by the gentleman from Texas is absolutely correct. The language was in the appropriation bill last year, and it means exactly the same thing, as far as we are concerned, this year as it did last year. There has been no change in the legislative history as far as that is concerned, except the fact that the other body put the words "or Cambodia" in, and that was stricken in conference today.

Mr. MAHON. I know of no one, Mr. Speaker, who advocates that we use U.S. ground combat troops in Cambodia at this time, but no one can foresee just what the future developments may be.

The House conferees were anxious to do what we could in order to give the President as much flexibility as possible

to meet unforeseen situations. We in no way advocate the use of U.S. ground combat troops in Cambodia, but we did not want to deny the President that option if unforeseen developments should make this appear to be desirable.

Nevertheless, under all the circumstances we felt that we could safely yield to the Senate position in that regard, and the Senate agreed to eliminate "or Cambodia" from the bill.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. If I understand the gentleman correctly, the contention, if there is further contention, would be over the language dealing with the assistance to third countries, or what the gentleman describes as free world forces.

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman has put his finger on the key point.

Mr. GROSS. And the contention is not among the conferees of the House and the Senate. The contention would be, if the conference report were not adopted, in the same place as it was before, on the part of other Members of the other body who are not members of the conference; is that correct?

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman is correct. One member of the conference did not sign, but I believe his reason in not signing did not relate to this point. The other conferees on both sides signed the conference report.

Mr. GROSS. A majority of the conferees on both sides, the House and the Senate, did agree?

Mr. MAHON. Overwhelmingly.

Mr. GROSS. And they have agreed to the language which the gentleman read to us this evening with respect to assistance to third country forces?

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. GROSS. One final question, if the gentleman will indulge me. There has been no change in the money figure of the bill as a result of the last conference?

Mr. MAHON. There has been no change in the money figure. It is \$66.6 billion. All dollar actions agreed to in the first conference report are agreed to in the second conference report.

In my judgment, I might say the total is a lower figure than we will be confronted with next year, in view of the urgent need to modernize our forces in order to deter war and promote peace.

Mr. GROSS. Would there be any point in the House voting on this, as support for the House conferees? I assume that nothing would be gained by that?

Mr. MAHON. I doubt it. I believe it is well understood that a majority of the Congress approves aid to South Vietnamese and other free world forces.

Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, if I might proceed for a moment, I should like to make further reference to the section dealing with the introduction of U.S. ground combat troops into Cambodia. I should like to call particular attention to the supplemental foreign aid authorization bill (H.R. 19911), which relates also to Cambodia. It was a supplemental

authorization bill that provided funds for Israel, but it also related to military aid to Cambodia.

The supplemental foreign aid authorization conference report was approved by the House and Senate on December 22, 1970. The language in this bill also relates to the use of U.S. ground combat troops in Cambodia, and states the following:

Section 6. (a) In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act may be used to finance the introduction of United States ground combat troops into Cambodia, or to provide United States advisers to or for Cambodian military forces in Cambodia.

So that language, having been approved in the supplemental foreign aid authorization bill on December 22 by both bodies, was another reason why the House receded in part from its position with respect to the use of U.S. troops in Cambodia.

Now, the language in the foreign aid supplemental authorization bill continues as follows:

(b) Military and economic assistance provided by the United States to Cambodia and authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act shall not be construed as a commitment by the United States to Cambodia for its defense.

There is nothing in this Defense appropriation conference report that would commit the United States to the defense of the Government of Cambodia other than for the protection of the U.S. forces in South Vietnam and the maintenance of our forces as we undertake to withdraw and disengage and settle the war which is in progress there.

In support of the language that appeared in the supplemental foreign aid authorization bill, a letter was written by the Secretary of State to Senator CRUICK before the action was taken to prohibit the use of U.S. ground combat troops in Cambodia.

The Secretary stated:

Confirming Assistant Secretary Abshire's conversation with you, I should like to reaffirm that the Administration's programs, policies and intentions in Cambodia in no way conflict with section 6—

That was the section I just read to you.

in the finally agreed upon conference report that would preclude action on the part of the American military or friendly allies in relieving the nonhumanely kept prisoners of war in any areas of the aggressor nation?

Mr. MAHON. No. The answer to the question is "No." There is a proviso in the Defense appropriation bill relating to South Vietnamese and other free world forces, section 838, which is as follows:

Provided further, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support of actions required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of United States Forces from Southeast Asia, or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

There is no prohibition in any legislation of which I know that would prevent incursions by the United States into North Vietnam for the purpose of rescuing Americans held as prisoners of war, and that is where our prisoners are, with the exception of about three, as I understand the situation.

Mr. HALL. I can appreciate the gentleman's statement. I think this is very important, because we must not tie the hands of the military, acting under ultimate civilian authorization, to make such forays in any effort to bring about the release of our non-humanely kept prisoners of war, or if necessary for the early conclusion of the war with honor and protection of our men while they are withdrawing under the Vietnamization plan. Is that correct?

Mr. MAHON. I thank the gentleman. I would say that this language with respect to Americans held as prisoners of war, in the judgment of the House conferees, should have been applied to the language relating also to the use of our own U.S. troops in Cambodia. However, we were not able to preserve the language as fully as we would have liked. The language relating to prisoners of war was not in the House or Senate versions of the original bill, but was written in the conference upon the insistence of the Members of the House.

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman from Texas yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Speaker, I just want to nail down the point which the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HALL) made. As far as I know, speaking as one conferee, there is nothing in this bill that prohibits the President from taking any action which he deems to be appropriate to release any Americans held as prisoners of war, using whatever forces the United States has available, and there is no prohibition against financing the use of South Vietnamese and other free world forces, for that purpose, either. And that is the intent of the conferees, and I am sure that is the import of the bill.

Mr. MAHON. I thank the gentleman for his contribution.

I should like to say, as a part of this record, that in my opinion as far as the majority of the House conferees are concerned, and certainly for my own part, I do not think we can write anything into the law to abridge the Constitution of the United States or to deny the President

in his capacity as Commander in Chief the right to take such actions that may be required for the defense of our U.S. fighting forces. So it may be that, fundamentally, much of the language about which we have had so much controversy is relatively unimportant, because I do believe that the President of the United States, under the Constitution and as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, does have wide latitude in regard to the use of the Armed Forces. This is a question that has been debated at great length, and I will not try to extend my discussion on that.

Mr. DAVIS of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. DAVIS of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I want to clarify one matter which I think is important in connection with the colloquy between the chairman and the gentleman from Iowa relating to the necessity for a record vote here.

Is it the intention of the chairman to obtain a rollcall vote on this conference report?

Mr. MAHON. I have not crossed that bridge. I do not believe there is any problem involved, but, of course, a rollcall vote will be easy to secure at this time. I am certainly not opposed to it, and would probably prefer to have one except for the lateness of the day, and the fact that we do have another conference report coming up on the heels of this one.

Mr. DAVIS of Wisconsin. I just wanted to express my own strong feelings that the House should—and I hope overwhelmingly will—put itself on record in support of the House position here in connection with this language. Actually, the language was the only part that was in controversy, and the only part in consideration here, because we have already expressed ourselves on the conference report as a whole when it came before us previously.

But that is the only matter that is really now before us, a matter that was treated in what might be termed a cavalier fashion late last evening, and certainly in a manner that gave us the impression that we were jousting in shadowland. We did not have any disagreement with the men with whom we sat in the conference room, but they feared that their agreements on these provisions, no matter how well founded, could not receive approval at that or any other hour of the night. And I have a strong feeling that it is in order that we make it clear to everyone concerned, whether it be the executive department, the Congress, or others who are looking at us from other parts of the world, that we do not propose to have the President's hands tied as they would have been, not only because of the language which appeared in the defense appropriation bill, but the language which appears in other legislative acts which have already cleared the Congress. I think the situation is one that does require a resounding rollcall vote in order to clearly substantiate the position that we have taken with respect to this language.

Mr. MAHON. I thank the gentleman.

I felt that although it may be a little tedious, this ought to be spelled out in the Record at this time in order that all might understand the interpretation which the House conferees and, I hope, the House places upon the actions which have been taken.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the distinguished chairman yielding, and I have appreciated his statement.

I simply want to ask one question. In view of all the give-and-take that has been necessary in order to bring this report here for what we all know is approaching final action, is there anything

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the conference report.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the conference report.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Doorkeeper will close the doors, the Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members, and the Clerk will call the roll. The question was taken; and there were—yeas 234, nays 18, not voting 180, as follows:

[Roll No. 452]

YEAS—234

Abernethy	Flynt	Mink
Adams	Foley	Mizell
Addabbo	Ford, Gerald R.	Mollohan
Albert	Foreman	Monagan
Alexander	Forsythe	Montgomery
Anderson, Ill.	Fountain	Morgan
Anderson, Tenn.	Frelinghuysen	Morse
Annunzio	Frey	Natcher
Arends	Friedel	Nelsen
Ashbrook	Fulton, Pa.	Nichols
Ashley	Fuqua	Nix
Earling	Gallifanakis	Obey
Barrett	Gallagher	O'Hara
Beall, Md.	Garmatz	Olsen
Bell, Calif.	Gaydos	Passman
Bennett	Gonzalez	Fatten
Bennett	Goodling	Pelly
Betts	Green, Oreg.	Perkins
Bevill	Griffin	Pettis
Bieber	Gross	Philbin
Blanton	Hall	Pickle
Blatnik	Halpern	Pike
Boggs	Hamilton	Podell
Boland	Hammer-	Poff
Bolling	schmidt	Preyer, N.C.
Bow	Hanley	Price, Ill.
Brademas	Hansen, Idaho	Pryor, Ark.
Bray	Hansen, Wash.	Pucinski
Brinkley	Harsha	Quie
Brooks	Harvey	Quillen
Brotzman	Hastings	Rarick
Brown, Mich.	Hathaway	Reid, N.Y.
Brown, Ohio	Hays	Rhodes
Broyhill, Va.	Hogan	Robison
Burke, Fla.	Horton	Rodino
Burke, Mass.	Hosmer	Roe
Burleson, Tex.	Hunt	Rogers, Fla.
Byrne, Pa.	Hutchinson	Ruth
Byrnes, Wis.	Ichord	St Germain
Camp	Jacobs	Schadeberg
Carey	Johnson, Calif.	Schmitz
Carter	Jonas	Schneebeli
Cederberg	Jones, Ala.	Schwengel
Chamberlain	Jones, N.C.	Scott
Chappell	Kazen	Shriver
Clancy	Kee	Sikes
Collins, Tex.	Keith	Sisk
Conable	King	Skubitz
Conte	Kluczynski	Slack
Corman	Kyl	Smith, Iowa
Coughlin	Kyros	Smith, N.Y.
Crane	Landgrebe	Springer
Culver	Latta	Stafford
Daniel, Va.	Leggett	Stanton
Daniels, N.J.	Long, Md.	Steed
Davis, Wis.	Lukens	Steele
Jellenback	McCloskey	Steiger, Wis.
Jennis	McClure	Stephens
Jent	McDade	Stratton
Jerwinski	McFall	Stubblefield
McKinson	Macdonald,	Stuckey
Mgall	Mass.	Symington
Monohue	MacGregor	Taft
Morn	Madden	Taylor
Mowning	Mahon	Teague, Calif.
Mulski	Mailliard	Teague, Tex.
Muncan	Marsh	Thomson, Wis.
Mshleman	Matsunaga	Therman
Neighan	Mayne	Tunney
Indley	Meeds	Udall
Isher	Melcher	Van Deertin
Wood	Miller, Ohio	Vander Jagt
Towers	Mills	Vigorito
	Minish	Wampler

Ware
White
Whitehurst
Whitten
Widnall
Wiggins

Williams
Wilson, Bob
Wilson,
Charles H.
Wright
Wylie

Wyman
Young
Zablocki
Zwach

NAYS—18

Conyers
Harrington
Hawkins
Hechler, W. Va.
Helstoski
Kastenmeler

Koch
Mikva
Nedzi
Rees
Roybal
Ryan

Scheuer
Thompson, N.J.
Vanik
Waldie
Wolff
Yates

NOT VOTING—180

Abbutt
Adair
Anderson, Calif.
Andrews, Ala.
Andrews, N. Dak.
Aspinall
Ayres
Belcher
Berry
Biaggi
Bingham
Blackburn
Brasco
Brock
Broomfield
Brown, Calif.
Broyhill, N.C.
Buchanan
Burlison, Mo.
Burton, Calif.
Burton, Utah
Bush
Button
Cabell
Caffery
Casey
Celler
Chisholm
Clark
Clausen,
Don H.
Clawson, Del
Clay
Cleveland
Cohelan
Collier
Collins, Ill.
Colmer
Corbett
Cowger
Cramer
Cunningham
Daddario
Davis, Ga.
de la Garza
Delaney
Denney
Devine
Diggs
Dowdy
Dwyer
Eckhardt
Edmondson
Edwards, Ala.
Edwards, Calif.
Edwards, La.
Eilberg
Erlenborn
Esch
Evans, Colo.

Evins, Tenn.
Fallon
Farbstein
Fascell
Fish
Ford,
William D.
Fraser
Fulton, Tenn.
Gettys
Giaino
Gibbons
Gilbert
Goldwater
Green, Pa.
Griffiths
Grover
Gubser
Gude
Hagan
Haley
Hanna
Hébert
Heckler, Mass.
Henderson
Hicks
Hollifield
Howard
Hull
Hungate
Jarman
Johnson, Pa.
Jones, Tenn.
Karth
Kleppe
Kuykendall
Landrum
Langen
Lennon
Lloyd
Long, La.
Lowenstein
Lujan
McCarthy
McClary
McCulloch
McDonald,
Mich.
McEwen
McKneally
McMillan
Mann
Martin
Mathias
May
Meskill
Michel
Miller, Calif.
Minshall
Mize
Moorhead

Morton
Mosher
Moss
Murphy, Ill.
Murphy, N.Y.
Myers
O'Konski
O'Neal, Ga.
O'Neill, Mass.
Ottinger
Patman
Pepper
Pirnie
Poage
Pollock
Powell
Price, Tex.
Purcell
Railsback
Randall
Reid, Ill.
Reifel
Reuss
Riegler
Roberts
Rogers, Colo.
Rooney, N.Y.
Rooney, Pa.
Rosenthal
Rostenkowski
Roth
Roudebush
Roussetot
Ruppe
Sandman
Satterfield
Saylor
Scherle
Sebelius
Shibley
Smith, Calif.
Snyder
Stagers
Steiger, Ariz.
Stokes
Sullivan
Talcott
Thompson, Ga.
Ullman
Waggonner
Watson
Watts
Weicker
Whalen
Whalley
Winn
Wold
Wyatt
Wydler
Yatron
Zion

Mr. Brasco with Mr. Grover.
Mr. Hicks with Mr. Whalley.
Mr. Jarman with Mr. Gude.
Mr. Yatron with Mr. Collier.
Mr. Andrews of Alabama with Mr. Denney.
Mr. Caffery with Mr. Cleveland.
Mr. Edwards of California with Mr. Goldwater.
Mr. Moorhead with Mr. Broomfield.
Mr. Miller of California with Mr. McClure.
Mr. Davis of Georgia with Mr. Belcher.
Mr. Celler with Mr. McEwen.
Mr. Fulton of Tennessee with Mr. Don H. Clausen.
Mr. Gettys with Mr. Langen.
Mr. Gray with Mr. Lujan.
Mr. Stagers with Mr. Broyhill of North Carolina.
Mr. Rooney of Pennsylvania with Mr. Buchanan.
Mr. Randall with Mr. Blackburn.
Mr. Mann with Mr. Fish.
Mr. Karth with Mr. Michel.
Mr. Hull with Mr. Mathias.
Mrs. Sullivan with Mrs. Dwyer.
Mr. Henderson with Mr. Watson.
Mr. Lennon with Mr. Sebelius.
Mr. Abbutt with Mr. Roth.
Mr. Delaney with Mr. Sandman.
Mr. Fascell with Mr. Mize.
Mrs. Griffiths with Mr. Adair.
Mr. Green of Pennsylvania with Mr. Kleppe.
Mr. Gibbons with Mr. O'Konski.
Mr. Patman with Mr. Myers.
Mr. Purcell with Mr. Erlenborn.
Mr. Watts with Mr. Gubser.
Mr. Hollifield with Mr. Del Clawson.
Mr. Ullman with Mr. Esch.
Mr. Howard with Mr. Steiger of Arizona.
Mr. Anderson of California with Mr. Thompson of Georgia.
Mr. Aspinall with Mr. Wold.
Mr. Bingham with Mr. Clay.
Mr. Reuss with Mrs. Chisholm.
Mr. Diggs with Mr. McCarthy.
Mr. Stokes with Mr. Lowenstein.
Mr. Colmer with Mr. Winn.
Mr. Cohelan with Mr. Collins of Illinois.
Mr. Casey with Mr. Snyder.
Mr. Burlison of Missouri with Mr. Scherle.
Mr. Hungate with Mr. Lloyd.
Mr. Jones of Tennessee with Mr. Ayres.
Mr. Hagan with Mr. Minshall.
Mr. Haley with Mr. Kuykendall.
Mr. Hanna with Mr. Saylor.
Mr. Roberts with Mrs. Reid of Illinois.
Mr. Rogers of Colorado with Mr. Railsback.
Mr. Rosenthal with Mr. Talcott.
Mr. Satterfield with Mr. Ruppe.
Mr. O'Neal of Georgia with Mr. Weicker.
Mr. Brown of California with Mr. Powell.
Mr. Farbstein with Mr. Wyatt.
Mr. William D. Ford with Mr. Reifel.
Mr. Giaino with Mr. Roussetot.
Mr. Fraser with Mr. Cowger.
Mr. Moss with Mr. Morton.
Mr. Daddario with Mr. Meskill.
Mr. Edmondson with Mr. Berry.
Mr. Eilberg with Mr. McCulloch.
Mr. Fallon with Mr. Brock.
Mr. Evans of Colorado with Mrs. May.
Mr. Landrum with Mr. Bush.
Mr. McMillan with Mr. Cramer.
Mr. Pepper with Mr. Riegler.
Mr. Gilbert with Mr. Burton of Utah.
Mr. Eckhardt with Mr. Roudebush.
Mr. Dowdy with Mr. McDonald of Michigan.
Mr. de la Garza with Mr. Button.
Mr. Cabell with Mr. Cunningham.
Mr. Murphy of Illinois with Mr. Pollock.
Mr. Mosher with Mr. McKneally.
Mr. Clark with Mr. Whalen.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The doors were opened.
AMENDMENTS IN DISAGREEMENT
The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the first amendment in disagreement.

So the conference report was agreed to.
The Clerk announced the following pairs:
Mr. O'Neill of Massachusetts with Mr. Smith of California.
Mr. Hébert with Mr. Andrews of North Dakota.
Mr. Waggonner with Mr. Martin.
Mr. Burton of California with Mrs. Heckler of Massachusetts.
Mr. Biaggi with Mr. Corbett.
Mr. Rooney of New York with Mr. Pirnie.
Mr. Rostenkowski with Mr. Price of Texas.
Mr. Shipley with Mr. Devine.
Mr. Evins of Tennessee with Mr. Johnson of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Long of Louisiana with Mr. Zion.
Mr. Edwards of Louisiana with Mr. Edwards of Alabama.
Mr. Murphy of New York with Mr. Wydler.

The Clerk read as follows:

Senate amendment No. 14, Page 15, line 4, strike out "\$2,933,100,000" and insert \$2,930,000,000".

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. MAHON

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. MAHON moves that the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 14 and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed, insert the following: "\$2,908,500,000".

The motion was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the next amendment in disagreement.

The Clerk read as follows:

Senate amendment No. 26, Page 18, line 13, strike out "\$3,203,000,000" and insert "\$3,201,300,000".

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. MAHON

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. MAHON moves that the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 26 and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed, insert the following: "\$3,219,800,000".

The motion was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the next amendment in disagreement.

The Clerk read as follows:

Senate amendment No. 31, Page 20, line 7, strike out "\$1,381,200,000" and insert "\$1,345,100,000".

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. MAHON

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. MAHON moves that the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 31 and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed, insert the following: "\$1,338,700,000".

The motion was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the next amendment in disagreement.

The Clerk read as follows:

Senate amendment No. 49, Page 43, strike out:

"Sec. 836. During the current fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense may, if he deems it vital to the security of the United States and in the national interest to further improve the readiness of the Armed Forces, including the reserve components, transfer under the authority and terms of the Emergency Fund an additional \$300,000,000: *Provided*, That the transfer authority made available under the terms of the Emergency Fund appropriation contained in this Act is hereby broadened to meet the requirements of this section: *Provided further*, That the Secretary of Defense shall notify Congress promptly of all transfers made pursuant to this authority."

And insert:

"Sec. 836. Upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is necessary in the national interest, he may, with the approval of the Office of Management and Budget, transfer not to exceed \$700,000,000 of the appropriations contained in this Act between such appropriations: *Provided*, That the Secretary of Defense shall notify the Congress promptly of all transfers made pursuant to this authority."

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. MAHON

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. MAHON moves that the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 49 and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted, insert the following:

"Sec. 836. Upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is necessary in the national interest, he may, with the approval of the Office of Management and Budget, transfer not to exceed \$600,000,000 of the appropriations contained in this Act between such appropriations, to be merged with and to be available for the same purposes, and for the same time period, as the appropriation to which transferred: *Provided*, That the Secretary of Defense shall notify the Congress promptly of all transfers made pursuant to this authority."

The motion was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the next amendment in disagreement.

The Clerk read as follows:

Senate amendment No. 53, Page 46, strike out:

"Sec. 842. Appropriations heretofore made available for Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army; Procurement of Aircraft and Missiles, Navy; Other Procurement, Navy; Procurement, Marine Corps; Aircraft Procurement, Air Force; Missile Procurement, Air Force; Other Procurement, Air Force; Procurement, Defense Agencies; and Special Foreign Currency Program shall not be available for obligation after June 30, 1973. Appropriations heretofore made available for Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, shall not be available for obligation after June 30, 1975. Appropriations heretofore made available under the headings Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army; Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy; Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Air Force; and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense Agencies shall not be available for obligation after June 30, 1972."

And insert:

"Sec. 842. (a) Amounts, as determined by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the Office of Management and Budget, of any appropriations of the Department of Defense available for procurement (except Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy) which (1) will remain unobligated as of the close of any fiscal year for which estimates are submitted and (2) which have been available for obligation for three or more fiscal years, shall be withdrawn and shall revert to the general fund of Treasury.

(b) Amounts, as determined by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the Office of Management and Budget, of any appropriations of the Department of Defense available for Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy which (1) will remain unobligated as of the close of any fiscal year for which estimates are submitted and (2) which have been available for obligation for five or more fiscal years, shall be withdrawn and shall revert to the general fund of the Treasury.

(c) Amounts, as determined by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the Office of Management and Budget, of any appropriations of the Department of Defense available for research, development, test and evaluation (except Emergency Fund, Defense) which (1) will remain unobligated as of the close of any fiscal year for which estimates are submitted and (2) which have been available for obligation for two or more fiscal years, shall be withdrawn and shall revert to the general fund of the Treasury.

(d) The Comptroller General of the United States shall examine the internal

system upon which the determinations required by this section are based and shall submit to the Congress prior to April 1, 1971, a report as to the adequacy of such internal system.

"(e) Section 642 of the Department of Defense Appropriation, 1970 (Public Law 91-171, approved December 29, 1969), is hereby repealed."

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. MAHON

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. MAHON moves that the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 53 and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted, insert the following:

"Sec. 842. (a) Appropriations heretofore made available for Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army; Procurement of Aircraft and Missiles, Navy; Other Procurement, Navy; Procurement, Marine Corps; Aircraft Procurement, Air Force; Missile Procurement, Air Force; Other Procurement, Air Force; Procurement, Defense Agencies; and Special Foreign Currency Program shall not be available for obligation after June 30, 1973. Appropriations heretofore made available for Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, shall not be available for obligation after June 30, 1975. Appropriations heretofore made available under the headings Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army; Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy; Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Air Force; and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense Agencies shall not be available for obligation after June 30, 1972. Each such appropriation shall be merged with and shall be available for the same time period as appropriations made in this Act under the same head.

(b) Section 642 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1970 (Public Law 91-171, approved December 29, 1969), is hereby repealed."

The motion was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider the votes by which action was taken on the conference report and on the several motions was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the conference report on the bill H.R. 19590, and to include extraneous material.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

(Mr. ALBERT asked and was given permission to address the House for minute.)

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I take this time for the purpose of discussing the program. I observe that the distinguished minority leader, the gentleman from Michigan, is present.

Tonight we have one other conference report, the conference report on the foreign aid appropriation bill, and on disposition of that, we will finish the legislative business for today, as far as know.

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29 Day
off

June FY 71 Defense
Appropriation, perhaps
there will be record vote
today following new
action by conference -

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absolutely the Senator's assurance; nonetheless, I believe that we should ask any question that should be in anyone's mind.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Of course, I may say for the record that the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) has been kept fully apprised of developments in connection with this conference report, and he is fully agreeable with the results.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I move adoption of the conference report.

The motion was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendments in disagreement will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:
Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 8 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment, insert "\$155,000,000".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 11 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment as follows:

"CONTINGENCY FUND

"For the additional amount for 'Contingency funds', \$7,500,000: Provided, That this appropriation shall be available only upon enactment into law of authorizing legislation."

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 16 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment, insert "\$8,000,000".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 22 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

"FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO THE PRESIDENT

"APPALACHIAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

"For an additional amount for 'Appalachian Regional Development Program', \$8,500,000, to remain available until expended."

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 29 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the amount stricken and inserted by said amendment, insert "\$2,135,000".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 44 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted by the Senate amendment, insert the following:

"VIII "LEGISLATIVE BRANCH "HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

"The provisions relating to the Speaker of the House of Representatives carried in House Resolution 1238, Ninety-first Congress, shall be the permanent law with respect thereto."

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 53 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment, insert "\$1,000,000".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Sen-

ate numbered 58 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment, insert "\$1,610,000".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 62 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment, insert: "\$700,000".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 71 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment, insert: "\$3,000,000".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 84 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted by said amendment, insert: "including the purchase of one hundred and fifty passenger motor vehicles for police-type use, in addition to these heretofore authorized, without regard to the general purchase price limitation for the current fiscal year, \$5,025,000."

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendments of the House to the amendments of the Senate numbered 8, 11, 16, 22, 29, 44, 53, 58, 62, 71, and 84.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from West Virginia.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I move that the Senate recede from its amendment No. 15.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from West Virginia.

The motion was agreed to.

PROVIDING FOR THE DISPOSITION OF FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO PAY JUDGMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE MISSISSIPPI SIOUX INDIANS

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, in accordance with rule XIII of the Senate, I enter a motion that the Senate reconsider the vote on December 22 by which it receded from its amendment to H.R. 14948, to provide for the disposition of funds appropriated to pay judgments in favor of the Mississippi Sioux Indians in Indian Claims Commission dockets numbered 142, and 359-363, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from South Dakota.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina. May I ask what this is?

Mr. McGOVERN. It is a judgment claim with reference to the Sioux Indians in South Dakota, North Dakota, and Montana. There was a difference between the House and Senate versions of the bill. I moved on last Tuesday that the Senate recede from its position and now, in consultation with other Senators who are interested in the bill, I am asking that we go back to the original position and request that the bill be returned from the House.

This has been discussed with the leadership on both sides. I checked with Senators SCOTT, ALLOTT, and FANNIN, and with Senators on the majority side.

Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina. I shall not object.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I move further that the Senate request return of the bill from the House of Representatives.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from South Dakota.

The motion was agreed to.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION BILL, 1971—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 19590) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, and for other purposes.

I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRANSTON). Is there objection to the present consideration of the report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report.

(For conference report, see House proceedings of December 15, 1970, pages H11762-H11763, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.)

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, the proposal I am about to make has been discussed by me with the majority and minority leaders. The bill continues two sections, with language that is now in the law, but in conference the House insisted that that language be modified and its modification is not acceptable to quite a few Senators on the floor. So what I propose to do is to ask that the conference report be tabled and that we appoint conferees so as to go back into conference and see if we cannot iron out our differences and have the bill enacted, instead of having a continuing resolution.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Louisiana yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. SCOTT. The Senator has discussed this with me and on our side here we would normally prefer a record vote on this. I understand what the situation is now. I have been under considerable pressure to insist on a record vote but I think it would be probably unfair to the Senate that this take place at this late hour.

Therefore, I will not press the point, but it is with considerable reluctance because I am told that the Members of the House would have preferred that the Senate have a record vote. I thought I had better make it a matter of record here.

Has the distinguished Senator from Louisiana discussed this question of a record vote with the House conferees?

Mr. ELLENDER. The Senator is correct. I have. I am very hopeful that we will get some conclusion of the matter early tomorrow.

Mr. SCOTT. On which we might have to have a record vote.

Mr. ELLENDER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. President, I move that the conference report be tabled.

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The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Louisiana.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I move that the Senate insist on its amendments and ask a further conference with the House and that the Chair be authorized to appoint conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Senators ELLENDER, RUSSELL, McCLELLAN, STENNIS, SYMINGTON, YOUNG of North Dakota, SMITH, and ALLOTT conferees on the part of the Senate.

RECESS UNTIL 9 A.M.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move that the Senate stand in recess, in accordance with the previous order.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 12 o'clock and 10 minutes a.m. today, Tuesday, December 29, 1970), the Senate recessed until 9 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate December 28, 1970:

IN THE DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Kenneth Franzheim II, of Texas, now Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to New Zealand, to serve concurrently and without additional compensation as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Western Samoa.

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

John H. Reed, of Maine, to be a member of the National Transportation Safety Board for the term expiring December 31, 1975 (reappointment).

U.S. PATENT OFFICE

Rene Desloge Tegtmeyer, of Virginia, to be an Assistant Commissioner of Patents, vice John Henry Schneider.

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H 11761

for not working instead of providing the incentives for self-supporting and independence, that drives families apart instead of holding them together, that brings welfare snoopers into their homes, that robs them of pride and destroys dignity.

Mr. Speaker, so that this magnificent address may be in the permanent RECORD, and so that all who read the RECORD may have the benefit of it, I have asked for this permission to put it in the RECORD as it was given at the meeting last night:

TEXT OF AN ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. Secretary, Mr. Mayor, Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I share with six of my predecessors, beginning with Theodore Roosevelt and most recently Dwight D. Eisenhower, the honor of having convened a White House Conference on Children, and I take special pleasure in welcoming you here this evening.

Our concern at this Conference is with the well-being of 55 million individual human beings who happen to be children under the age of 14—and who represent one-fourth of our Country's total population.

When I refer to them as 55 million individual human beings, I mean to put the emphasis precisely on that; On the fact that nothing is so intensely personal as the private world of a child, and nothing so removed from the statistical abstractions of a chart or a computer. In talking about our children, we are talking about our world—about its future—but in the most special, the most human, the most individual sense of anything we do or consider.

The refreshing little flower emblem that has been used as the symbol of this Conference is a reminder to us of one very simple and very basic truth: that the world of the child is different, and very special, and full of promise—and very much alive.

It also reminds us that whether we speak of a community of 200 people or of 200 million, the important thing to remember is that no two are alike. Because of this, what is right for one child may be all wrong for another.

Here in Washington, in government, we have a tendency to think about things in the mass—about cities of more than a million, or people over 65 or under 21, or about whole school systems or health delivery systems. Just yesterday I spent most of the day working on next year's budget—on the billions for this and the billions for that, and how perhaps a hundred million could be saved here in order to be used there, trying to balance the needs and hopes of dozens of government departments and agencies that operate thousands of programs involving millions of people.

Sometimes, after doing that, I find myself reflecting on both the necessity and the impersonality of it all. Budgets have to be made and they have to be followed because this is the way the real world operates, and governments have to deal with great masses of people because this is the way governments operate. But how far removed this can get us from the perspective of the individual person! How great a tendency there is, in government, to lose track of people as people—to get so wrapped up in charts and projections and columns of numbers that we lose sight of what ultimately it is all about!

If there is one thought more than any other that I would like to leave with you tonight, it is this: to remember that what matters is one person, one child, unlike any other, with his own hopes and his own dreams and his own fears, who lives at the center of his own separate and very personal world.

I am sure that each one of you is here, taking part in this great Conference, because you do care not only about children, but about the child. I hope you will help us keep the focus on that one child.

One of the special glories of America is that we are a nation of individuals, and individualists. We produce people, not automations. We recognize diversity not as an evil, but as a virtue. We turn not to one institution alone, but to many, to perform the great tasks of achieving a better life for all. We recognize a role for government, for the church, the home, the school, for those voluntary agencies that are so distinctive a feature of American life—and we know that this is a case in which additional cooks enrich the broth.

There is, of course, a large and vital role government does play, and must play, in ensuring the best possible opportunity for the child.

I would like to speak briefly tonight of one government program presently being considered by the Senate—which I believe particularly deserves your support.

The great issue concerning family and child welfare in the United States is the issue of family income. For generations social thinkers have argued that there is such a thing as a minimum necessary family income, and that no family should be required to subsist on less. It is a simple idea, but profound in its consequences.

On August 11, 1969, I proposed that for the first time in America's history we establish a floor under the income of every American family with children.

We called it the Family Assistance Plan. It has in turn been called the most important piece of domestic legislation to be introduced in Congress in two generations.

In terms of its consequences for children I think it can fairly be said to be the most important piece of social legislation in our nation's history.

You know the story of this legislation. In April it passed the House of Representatives by a margin of almost two to one. Then it became mired down in the Senate.

It is still stuck, but it is not lost. There is still an opportunity for the 91st Congress to change the world of American children by enacting Family Assistance.

In these closing days of that Congress, I want to emphasize once again, unequivocally, my support for welfare reform *this year*.

In the last ten years alone the number of children on welfare has nearly tripled, to more than 6 million. Six million children. Six million children caught up in an unfair and tragic system that rewards people for not working instead of providing the incentives for self-support and independence, that drives families apart instead of holding them together, that brings welfare snoopers into their homes, that robs them of pride and destroys dignity.

I want to change all that.

The welfare system has become a consuming, monstrous, inhuman outrage against the community, against the family, against the individual—and most of all against the very children whom it was meant to help.

We have taken long strides toward ending racial segregation, but welfare segregation can be almost as insidious.

Think what it can mean to a sensitive child. To take only one example—the free lunch program—my daughter Tricia does tutoring at an inner-city school, and she tells me of her deep concern each day to see the welfare children herded into an auditorium for their free lunch, while the others bring their lunches and eat in the classroom. We have got to find ways of ending this sort of separation. The point is not the quality of the lunch—in fact, the free lunch is probably nutritionally better than those the others bring. The point is the stigmatizing by separation of the welfare children, as welfare children.

I remember back in the depression years of the nineteen thirties, how deeply I felt about the plight of those people my own age who used to come into my father's store when they couldn't pay the bill because their fathers were out of work, and how this seemed to separate them from the others in the school. None of us had any money in those days, but those in families where there were no jobs, where there was nothing but the little that relief then offered, suffered from more than simply going without. They suffered a hurt to their pride that many carried with them for the rest of their lives.

I also remember that my older brother had tuberculosis for five years. The hospital and doctor bills were more than we could afford. In the five years before he died, my mother never bought a new dress. We were poor by today's standards. I suppose we were poor even by Depression standards. But the wonder of it was that we did not know we were poor. Somehow my mother and father with their love, with their pride, their courage and their self-sacrifice were able to create a spirit of self respect in our family so that we had no sense of being inferior to others who had more than we had.

Today's welfare child is not so fortunate. His family may have enough to get by on. They may even have more, in a material sense, than many of us did in those Depression years. But no matter how much pride and courage his parents have, he knows they are poor—and he can feel that soul-stifling, patronizing attitude that follows the dole.

Perhaps he watches while a caseworker—himself trapped in a system that wastes, on policing, talents that could be used for helping—while this caseworker is forced by the system to poke around the child's apartment, checking on how the money is spent or whether his mother might be hiding his father in the closet. This sort of indignity is hard enough on the mother—enough of a blow to her pride and self-respect—but think what it must mean to a sensitive child.

We have a chance now to give that child a chance—a chance to grow up without having his schoolmates throw in his face the fact that he is on welfare, and without making him feel that he is therefore something less than the other children.

Our task is not only to lift people out of poverty, but from the standpoint of the child to erase the stigma of welfare and illegitimacy and apartness—to restore pride and dignity and self-respect.

I do not contend that our Family Assistance Plan is perfect. In this confused and complex and intensely human area, no perfect program is possible—and certainly none is possible that will please everybody. But it is a good program, and a program immensely better than what we have now, and vastly important to the future of this country and especially to the neediest of our children. For the Senate to adjourn without enacting this measure would be a tragedy of missed opportunity for America and particularly for the children of America.

I have dwelt at some length on Family Assistance because of its vital and even historic importance, and because now is the time of Senate decision.

This represents one of the things the Federal Government can do to give children a better opportunity. With our stress on the Right to Read, on the first five years of life through the new Office of Child Development, on education reform, on food and nutrition, and in many other areas we are trying to meet what I believe is a great responsibility that rests upon us. I know that in the Conference you will have many new ideas for things we might do.

We shall do our best to meet our responsibility in those areas where the Federal Government can best do what needs to be done.

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H 11762

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But I would also stress that equally and often more important is what States and communities do, and the school and the church and the family, the mass media, voluntary organizations, and each of us as individuals. For the child is not raised by government. The child is raised by his family. His character is shaped by those people he encounters in his daily life.

I think especially of the millions of Americans who give their time and their energy and their heart to volunteer activities working with children. Before becoming President I served as national chairman of the Boys Clubs of America, and I saw from the inside the wonderful work such organizations and others do, and also the spirit, the dedication, of the people who make them possible. The churches, the service organizations, hundreds, thousands of organizations all across America have helped and they can help more. Most important, they can do what government cannot do. They can give heart and inspire hope, and they can address themselves not simply to children but to that one special, precious child.

Before closing, I would like to leave with you a few very personal reflections from the perspective of this office.

A President always thinks about the legacy that he would like to leave the country from his years in office. I think often about that in terms of what I can leave for America's children. And I know that the first thing I would like to do for them, is to bring peace.

I speak not just of ending the war, but of ending it in a way that will contribute to a lasting peace—so that theirs at last can be what we have not yet had in this century, a generation of peace. And I speak not only of the absence of war, but also of a peace in which we can have an open world—in which all the peoples of the world will have a chance to know one another, to communicate with one another, to respect one another.

The second thing that, as President, I would like to leave for America's children is a strong, productive, creative economy—one that can provide every family with children a floor under its income higher than what now is the ceiling for most of the world's peoples. I want to leave them an economy that provides jobs for all with equal and full opportunity, producing not for war but for peace.

Beyond this, I want America's children in the last generation of this century to have the best education, the best health, the best housing that any children have ever had anywhere, any time.

I want them to enjoy clean air and clean water and open spaces, and to restore the heritage of nature that is rightfully theirs.

Although we will always have differences here in America, I hope the government can help achieve a better understanding among the generations, the races, the religions—and among those with different values and different life-styles.

I would like to do all this, and to do it in a climate of freedom.

Edmund Burke once pointed out that for us to love our country, our country must be lovely. Patriotism literally means love of country, and I want this generation of children to develop a new sense of patriotism. We do love our country, most of us, but we know it has many unlovely features. I want these young Americans to learn to love America not because it is the richest country or the strongest, or merely because they were born here, but because America is truly a good country and becoming better—because it is a truly lovely country.

I am convinced that in my term as President so far, we have made some progress toward those goals. I think that by the end we will have made more progress.

But even if all these goals could be fully achieved, it still would not meet our duty to our children.

No matter what government does for people—no matter what we provide in the way of income or housing or food, we still will not have reached the essential element as far as a full and meaningful life is concerned.

What is most important is that every person in this country must be able to feel that he counts.

We have got to let 55 million young Americans—as well as those a little older—know what they do matters, that their ideas do count, that the country needs their thoughts, their creativity, their contribution.

I recall Walter Judd once said that he loved his daughter very much, and when she asked him to help with her arithmetic the easiest thing would have been to do it for her. But because he loved her, he did not do it for her but helped her learn to do it for herself.

While this Conference will and should make recommendations as to what government can do for children—about how we can make life better for them—let us remember that what is most important is to provide the opportunity for each of them to participate. For each child, it is not just a matter of what more government is going to do for him, but how his own life is going to be enriched so he can do something for his fellow man.

A sense of identity, of pride, of self-respect—these no government can provide. Government can help to create better conditions. It can help remove obstacles to the child's development. It can mobilize research, and provide resources, and offer advice and guidance. But all these only help make success possible. The love, the understanding, the compassion, the human concern that touch the child and make him what he can become—these are provided by people.

In the way we shape the character of the next generation, we test our own character as a people. In the rigor and the realism with which we approach the needs of the next generation—of each and every child in that generation—we test our devotion to humanity and our belief in ourselves.

I am confident we will meet those tests, and I am grateful to all of you here for the concern you have shown, the dedication you have demonstrated, in helping us do so. Your recommendations will receive the most careful consideration, not only because we in this Administration respect your view but also because we share your concern that the nation's children—our children—should receive the best the nation can give them.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. MAHON submitted the following conference report and statement on the bill (H.R. 19590) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, and for other purposes:

CONFERENCE REPORT (H. REPT. No. 91-1759)

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 19590) "making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, and for other purposes," having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its amendments numbered 13, 16, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 38, 40, 41, 46, and 57.

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate numbered 7, 10, 12, 22, 24, 43, 44, 45, 47, 50, 51, 54, and 56 and agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 1: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 1, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment insert "\$7,841,450,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 2: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 2, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$4,368,800,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 3: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 3, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$1,426,700,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 4: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 4, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$5,988,350,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 5: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 5, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$85,200,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 6: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 6, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$107,500,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 8: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 8, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$6,268,687,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 9: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 9, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$4,729,410,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 11: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 11, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendments insert "\$6,157,136,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 17: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 17, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$3,017,900,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 20: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 20, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$2,465,400,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 28: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 28, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$1,377,200,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 35: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 35, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$1,600,200,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

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Amendment numbered 37: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 37, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$2,137,900,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 39: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 39, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$2,744,100,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 42: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 42, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$443,600,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 52: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 52, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment insert: "Provided further, That nothing in clause (1) of the first sentence of this subsection shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos: *Provided further*, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support of free world or local forces in actions designed to promote the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. Forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 55: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 55, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment insert: "or Cambodia: *Provided*, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit the President from taking action in said areas designed to promote the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. Forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 58: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 58, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment insert:

SEC. 845. After June 15, 1971, no part of the funds in this Act shall be available to support in excess of 138,000 personnel of the Department of Defense (military and civilian) assigned to activities managed under the Intelligence and Security Program of the Department of Defense."

And the Senate agree to the same.

The committee of conference report in disagreement amendments numbered 14, 15, 18, 26, 29, 31, 48, 49, and 53.

GEORGE MAHON,
ROBERT L. F. SIKES
(except as to amendment No. 20),
JAMIE L. WHITTEN,

GEORGE W. ANDREWS
(except as to amendment No. 20),
DANIEL J. FLOOD,

JOHN M. SLACK,
JOSEPH P. ADDABO,
WILLIAM E. MINSHALL,
JOHN J. RHODES,
GLENN R. DAVIS,
LOUIS C. WYMAN
(except as to amendment No. 20),

FRANK T. BOW,
Managers on the Part of the House.

ALLEN J. ELLENDER,
RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN,
JOHN STENNIS,
MILTON R. YOUNG,
MARGARET CHASE SMITH,
GORDON ALLOTT,

Managers on the Part of the Senate.

STATEMENT

The managers on the part of the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 19590) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, and for other purposes, submit the following statement in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon and recommended in the accompanying conference report as to each of such amendments, namely:

TITLE I—MILITARY PERSONNEL

Military personnel, Army

Amendment No. 1: Appropriates \$7,842,450,000 instead of \$7,822,450,000 as proposed by the House, and \$7,861,750,000 as proposed by the Senate. The sum available for Permanent Change of Station Travel is \$505,391,000 instead of \$485,391,000 as proposed by the House, and \$524,691,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Military personnel, Navy

Amendment No. 2: Appropriates \$4,368,600,000 instead of \$4,360,100,000 as proposed by the House, and \$4,377,100,000 as proposed by the Senate. The sum available for Permanent Change of Station Travel is \$221,465,000 instead of \$212,965,000 as proposed by the House, and \$229,965,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Military personnel, Marine Corps

Amendment No. 3: Appropriates \$1,426,700,000 instead of \$1,422,700,000 as proposed by the House, and \$1,430,600,000 as proposed by the Senate. The sum available for Permanent Change of Station Travel is \$101,225,000 instead of \$97,225,000 as proposed by the House, and \$105,125,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Military personnel, Air Force

Amendment No. 4: Appropriates \$5,988,360,000 instead of \$5,973,350,000 as proposed by the House, and \$6,002,425,000 as proposed by the Senate. The sum available for Permanent Change of Station Travel is \$398,760,000 instead of \$383,760,000 as proposed by the House, and \$412,835,000 as proposed by the Senate. The conferees are in agreement that a reduction of \$16,075,000 shall apply proportionately to Communications and Intelligence as proposed by the House.

Reserve personnel, Air Force

Amendment No. 5: Appropriate \$85,200,000 instead of \$86,200,000 as proposed by the House, and \$84,200,000 as proposed by the Senate.

National Guard personnel, Air Force

Amendment No. 6: Appropriates \$107,500,000 instead of \$108,500,000 as proposed by the House, and \$106,500,000 as proposed by the Senate.

TITLE III—OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

Operation and maintenance, Army

Amendment No. 7: Provides \$3,634,000 for emergencies and extraordinary expenses as proposed by the Senate instead of \$4,000,000 as proposed by the House. This action is associated with amendment number 48.

Amendment No. 8: Appropriates \$6,268,687,000 instead of \$6,269,011,000 as proposed by the House, and \$6,228,687,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The House agrees to the Senate increase of \$1,700,000 for civilian personnel and the increase of \$8,000,000 for Automatic Data Processing operations. The conferees agree to an amount of \$40,000,000 for unforeseen opera-

tional costs instead of the \$50,000,000 included by the House and deleted by the Senate.

Operation and maintenance, Navy

Amendment No. 9: Appropriates \$4,729,410,000 instead of \$4,731,910,000 as proposed by the House, and \$4,685,410,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The House agrees to the Senate increases for civilian personnel and headquarters operations of \$500,000 and \$7,000,000 respectively. The Senate recedes from its decrease of \$4,000,000 for the Antarctic Operation. The conferees agreed to an amount of \$40,000,000 for unforeseen operational costs instead of the \$50,000,000 included by House and deleted by the Senate.

Operation and maintenance, Marine Corps

Amendment No. 10: Appropriates \$402,743,000 as proposed by the Senate instead of \$399,943,000 as proposed by the House.

The House agreed to the Senate increase of \$1,500,000 for civilian personnel and \$1,300,000 for Marine Corps headquarters operations.

Operation and maintenance, Air Force

Amendment No. 11: Appropriates \$6,157,136,000 instead of \$6,167,136,000 as proposed by the House and \$6,093,236,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The conferees agreed to the House allowance of \$23,900,000 for the retention of five Air Force reserve units and the conferees agree to an amount of \$40,000,000 for unforeseen operational costs instead of the \$50,000,000 included by the House and deleted by the Senate.

Operation and maintenance, Air National Guard

Amendment No. 12: Appropriates \$343,600,000 as proposed by the Senate instead of \$337,600,000 as proposed by the House. The House agreed to the Senate increase of \$6,000,000 for aircraft fuel and oil and other operational costs.

National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice, Army

Amendment No. 13: Appropriates \$100,000 as proposed by the House instead of \$65,000 as proposed by the Senate.

TITLE IV—PROCUREMENT

Procurement of equipment and missiles, Army

Amendment No. 14: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to appropriate \$2,908,500,000 instead of \$2,933,100,000 as proposed by the House, and \$2,930,000,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Under Aircraft, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$62,000,000 for LOH helicopters as proposed by the Senate instead of \$64,200,000 as proposed by the House; the amount of \$2,100,000 for OV-1 aircraft modification as proposed by the Senate instead of \$3,500,000 as proposed by the House; and the amount of \$8,000,000 for avionics/armament spares as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$10,300,000 as proposed by the House.

Under Missiles, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$51,900,000 for the XMIM-72A Chaparral Missile as proposed by the Senate instead of \$76,400,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees agreed to provide a total of \$58,200,000 for the XMIM-23B Improved Hawk missile, instead of \$43,200,000 as proposed by the House and \$81,400,000 as proposed by the Senate, with the understanding that no fiscal year 1971 production would be contracted for, with the added funds used to stretch out the production already under contract. This action will provide sufficient time for necessary tests of this missile scheduled during fiscal year 1971.

The conferees agreed to the amount of \$8,800,000 for Nike-Hercules modifications

as proposed by the Senate instead of the \$3,000,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees agreed to the amount of \$34,900,000 for the initial production of the XMGM-52A Lance missile as proposed by the Senate. The House had provided no funds for this purpose.

The conferees agreed to the amount of \$5,300,000 for XMGM 31A Pershing missile modifications as proposed by the Senate instead of the \$10,300,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees agreed to the amount of \$15,000,000 for the Land Combat Support System (LCSS) and \$5,000,000 for LCSS spares as proposed by the Senate. The House had provided no funds for this purpose. The conferees also agreed to provide \$1,700,000 for LCSS modifications as proposed by the House. The Senate had deleted the funds requested for such modifications.

Under Weapons and Combat Vehicles, the amount of \$12,000,000 for the M577A1 Tracked Command Post Carriers as proposed by the Senate was agreed to by the conferees instead of \$2,800,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees agreed to delete the amount of \$6,400,000 for the Chaparral missile carrier, and the amount of \$1,300,000 for the Vulcan Gun Shop Test, as proposed by the Senate, instead of funding these items in those amounts as proposed by the House. The conferees also agreed to provide \$23,900,000 for M16A1 rifles as proposed by the Senate instead of \$27,100,000 as proposed by the House.

Under Tactical and Support Vehicles, the conferees agreed to provide the amount of \$28,800,000 for the XM705 1 1/4 ton truck and \$1,100,000 for XM705 truck initial spares. The House had not allowed these funds. None of the funds made available for the XM705 1 1/4 ton truck are to be obligated for that purpose until after the evaluation of the modified M715 truck is completed and a determination made that the latter vehicle will not essentially meet Army requirements. If it is determined that the modified M715 truck will essentially meet those requirements, the funds provided for the XM705 truck may be used for termination of the existing XM705 production contract, and funding of the initial procurement of the modified M715 truck.

Under Communications and Electronics Equipment, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$9,300,000 for STARCUM Communications (Other) as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$10,800,000 as proposed by the House; and the amount of \$53,000,000 for Defense Communications Planning Group projects as proposed by the Senate instead of \$78,000,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees agreed to delete the amount of \$600,000 for the RC-292 Antenna Group and \$1,100,000 for the SB-22 Switchboard as proposed by the Senate. The House had funded these items in those amounts.

The conferees agreed to restore the \$4,000,000 House reduction for the RATAF Field Artillery Radar Sets as proposed by the Senate with the understanding that any future procurement of this equipment shall be from a domestic producer.

The conferees also agreed to the amount of \$11,400,000 for miscellaneous items under \$500,000 as proposed by the Senate instead of \$14,400,000 as proposed by the House.

Under Other Support Equipment, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$800,000 for the LCM landing craft and \$4,400,000 for the LCU landing craft as proposed by the Senate. The House had not provided funds for those purposes.

The conferees also agreed to the deletion of \$16,500,000 for a classified project as proposed by the Senate. The House had allowed those funds.

Under Production Base Support, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$182,500,000 for provision of industrial facilities as proposed by the Senate instead of the \$187,100,000 as proposed by the House.

Amendment No. 15: Reported in technical disagreement. It is the intention of the managers on the part of the House to offer a motion to recede and concur in the Senate amendment to authorize the transfer to this appropriation of \$50,000,000 from the Army stock fund.

Amendment No. 16: Makes funds available for obligation until June 30, 1973, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended" as proposed by the Senate. *Procurement of aircraft and missiles, Navy*

Amendment No. 17: Appropriates \$3,017,900,000 instead of \$3,005,800,000 as proposed by the House and \$3,127,900,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Under Aircraft, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$112,500,000 for twelve A-6E Intruder Attack Aircraft and \$11,400,000 for A-6E aircraft initial spares as proposed by the Senate, instead of the \$72,500,000 for six A-6E aircraft as proposed by the House. The House had provided \$5,700,000 for A-6E aircraft initial spares to support only six aircraft.

The conferees agreed to the amount of \$64,000,000 for the AV-8A Harrier (V/STOL) attack aircraft as proposed by the House, instead of the \$96,200,000 as proposed by the Senate. The agreement of the Committee of Conference is based on the procurement of these eighteen aircraft in the United Kingdom.

The conferees agreed to the amount of \$23,000,000 for the E-2C Hawkeye Early Warning Aircraft, in addition to the \$20,000,000 in advance procurement funds provided in the bill for fiscal year 1971, instead of the \$92,300,000 as proposed by the Senate. The House had deleted the latter amount. The \$43,000,000 total thus provided for long lead-time items is in full accord with the current Department of Defense plan to award a production contract for eleven such aircraft in fiscal year 1972. The action of the conferees should in no way be construed as an effort to delay this important program.

The conferees also agreed to the amount of \$72,000,000 for Variable Avionics Shop Test (VAST) equipment as proposed by the Senate, instead of the \$28,600,000 as proposed by the House.

Amendment No. 18: Reported in technical disagreement. It is the intention of the managers on the part of the House to offer a motion to recede and concur in the Senate amendment to authorize the transfer to this appropriation of \$100,000,000 from the Defense Stock Fund.

Amendment No. 19: Makes funds available for obligation until June 30, 1973, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended", as proposed by the Senate.

Shipbuilding and conversion, Navy

Amendment No. 20: Appropriates \$2,465,400,000 instead of \$2,694,400,000 as proposed by the House, and \$2,276,900,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The conferees agreed to the amount of \$166,000,000 for an additional SSN-688 class nuclear attack submarine above the President's budget, and \$22,500,000 in advance procurement funds above the President's budget for another SSN-688 class submarine to be funded in fiscal year 1972, as proposed by the House. The conferees also agreed not to provide other funds above the President's budget in the following amounts and for the listed purposes:

AS submarine tender.....	\$102,000,000
AD destroyer tender.....	103,000,000
Service craft.....	24,000,000

The Senate had not allowed any of the funds provided by the House for Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, above the President's budget.

Amendment No. 21: Makes funds available for obligation until June 30, 1975, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended", as proposed by the Senate.

Other procurement, Navy

Amendment No. 22: Appropriates \$1,487,300,000 as proposed by the Senate instead of \$1,448,400,000 as proposed by the House.

Under Ship Support Equipment, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$900,000 for Submarine batteries as proposed by the Senate instead of \$4,200,000 as proposed by the House; the amount of \$4,900,000 for SHORTSTOP electronic warfare system ship alterations as proposed by the Senate, instead of no funds as allowed by the House for that purpose; and the amount of \$500,000 for small boats as proposed by the Senate instead of \$1,800,000 as proposed by the House.

Under Communications and Electronics Equipment, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$2,400,000 for the AN/SPS-40 radar set as proposed by the Senate, instead of no funds as allowed by the House for that purpose. The conferees agreed to delete the \$4,000,000 allowed by the House for miscellaneous items, as proposed by the Senate.

Under Aviation Support Equipment, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$4,000,000 for the CBU-55/B (Fuel Air Explosive) cluster bombs. The House had allowed no funds for that purpose.

Under Ordnance Support Equipment, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$14,500,000 for the MK-46 torpedo as proposed by the Senate, instead of no funds allowed for that purpose as proposed by the House; the amount of \$110,600,000 for the MK-48 torpedo as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$80,600,000 as proposed by the House; and the amount of \$30,800,000 for Ordnance Replenishment spares as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$34,100,000 as proposed by the House.

Amendment No. 23: Makes funds available for obligation until June 30, 1973 as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended", as proposed by the Senate.

Procurement, Marine Corps

Amendment No. 24: Appropriates \$175,900,000 as proposed by the Senate instead of \$171,700,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees agreed to the amount of \$4,200,000 for the XM705 1 1/4 ton truck as proposed by the Senate. The House allowed no funds for that purpose. The same understanding with respect to this truck set forth under Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army, will prevail under this appropriation.

Amendment No. 25: Makes funds available for obligation until June 30, 1973 as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended", as proposed by the Senate.

Aircraft procurement, Air Force

Amendment No. 26: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to appropriate \$3,219,300,000 instead of \$3,208,000,000 as proposed by the House, and \$3,201,300,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Under Aircraft the conferees agreed to the amount of \$9,200,000 for F/RP-5A/B aircraft as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$10,300,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees agreed to provide the amount of \$18,000,000 for the International Fighter Aircraft, instead of the \$30,000,000 provided by the House. The Senate had allowed no funds for that purpose. The action of the conferees does not constitute a full production decision on this aircraft.

Under Modification of Inservice Aircraft, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$99,000,000 for modification of B-52/FB-111 aircraft to accommodate the Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM), as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$71,300,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees also agreed to the amount of \$14,000,000 for Additional SEA Requirements as proposed by the Senate, instead of

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\$17,000,000 as proposed by the House.

Under Aircraft Spares and Repair Parts, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$31,000,000 for F-111 aircraft initial spares as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$19,800,000 as proposed by the House. In addition, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$399,400,000 for replenishment spares as proposed by the Senate, instead of the \$405,900,000 as proposed by the House.

Amendment No. 27: Makes funds available for obligation until June 30, 1973, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended", as proposed by the Senate.

Missile procurement, Air Force

Amendment No. 28: Appropriates \$1,377,200,000 instead of \$1,372,300,000 as proposed by the House and \$1,380,400,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Under Ballistic Missiles, the conferees deleted the amount of \$3,200,000 for LGM-30F/G Minuteman II/III Operational Base Launch Program as proposed by the House instead of allowing that amount for that purpose as proposed by the Senate.

Under Other Missiles, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$99,500,000 for the AGM-69A Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM) as proposed by the Senate, instead of the \$50,000,000 as proposed by the House. The conferees also agreed to the amount of \$10,800,000 for SRAM initial spares as proposed by the Senate, instead of the \$5,400,000 as proposed by the House.

Amendment No. 29: Reported in technical disagreement. It is the intention of the managers on the part of the House to offer a motion to recede and concur in the Senate amendment to authorize the transfer to this appropriation of \$50,000,000 from the Defense Stock Fund.

Amendment No. 30: Makes funds available for obligation until June 30, 1973, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended", as proposed by the Senate.

Other procurement, Air Force

Amendment No. 31: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to appropriate \$1,338,700,000 instead of \$1,381,200,000 as proposed by the House and \$1,345,100,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Under Munitions and Associated Equipment, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$731,000,000 as proposed by the Senate, instead of the \$752,900,000 as proposed by the House.

Under Electronic and Telecommunications Equipment, the conferees agreed to the amount of \$5,000,000 for cryptographic equipment as proposed by the Senate, instead of the \$9,000,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees agreed to delete the \$6,400,000 for the Minuteman Operational Base Launch Program as proposed by the House instead of allowing such amount for that purpose as proposed by the Senate.

The conferees agreed to delete the amount of \$800,000 for Elimination of Compromising Emanations as proposed by the Senate instead of allowing such amount for that purpose as proposed by the House.

The conferees also agreed to the amount of \$5,000,000 for Training Equipment as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$5,800,000 as proposed by the House; the amount of \$41,000,000 for spares and repair parts as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$44,200,000 as proposed by the House; and the amount of \$11,400,000 for Class V Modifications as proposed by the Senate, instead of the \$13,200,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees further agreed to a general unspecified reduction of \$10,000,000 as proposed by the Senate. This reduction was based on the fact that there are prior year balances available in that amount which can be used to fund fiscal year 1971 programs.

Amendment No. 32: Makes funds available for obligation until June 30, 1973, as pro-

posed by the House, instead of "available until expended", as proposed by the Senate.

Procurement, Defense Agencies

Amendment No. 33: Appropriates \$38,910,000 as proposed by the House instead of \$45,310,000 as proposed by the Senate. The conferees agreed that the funding of \$6,400,000 for the procurement of automatic data processing equipment for the World-Wide Military Command and Control System would be deferred until the General Accounting Office has reported on the feasibility and cost of the system.

Amendment No. 34: Makes the sum appropriated for Procurement, Defense Agencies available for obligation until June 30, 1973, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended" as proposed by the Senate.

TITLE V—RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

Research, development, test, and evaluation, Army

Amendment No. 35: Appropriates \$1,600,200,000 instead of \$1,608,500,000 as proposed by the House and \$1,589,700,000 as proposed by the Senate. The Conference agreement includes \$15,800,000 for the Pershing Missile System as proposed by the Senate instead of \$11,500,000 as proposed by the House. A total of \$6,000,000 is provided for Electrical Power Sources as proposed by the Senate instead of \$4,000,000 as proposed by the House.

The conference agreement provides for a general reduction of \$14,100,000 instead of specific reductions in low priority programs totaling \$24,600,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 36: Makes the sum appropriated for R.D.T.&E., Army available for obligation until June 30, 1972, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended" as proposed by the Senate.

Research, development, test, and evaluation, Navy

Amendment No. 37: Appropriates \$2,137,900,000 instead of \$2,156,200,000 as proposed by the House and \$2,130,500,000 as proposed by the Senate. The Conference agreement provides \$3,500,000 for the LAMPS Destroyer Helicopter System as proposed by the House instead of \$10,500,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The conferees are in agreement on a general reduction of \$18,300,000 instead of specific reductions in low priority programs totaling \$32,700,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 38: Makes the sum appropriated for R.D.T.&E., Navy available until June 30, 1972, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended" as proposed by the Senate.

Research, development, test, and evaluation, Air Force

Amendment No. 39: Appropriates \$2,744,100,000 instead of \$2,701,100,000 as proposed by the House and \$2,744,800,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The Conference agreement includes:

(1) No funds for the Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy program, as proposed by the House, instead of \$10,000,000 as proposed by the Senate.

(2) \$61,000,000 for Minuteman Rebasings as proposed by the Senate instead of \$27,000,000 as proposed by the House. The sum provided deletes the amounts requested for the Mobile Minuteman and Hard-Point Defense concepts, as stated in the Senate Report.

(3) \$87,000,000 for the Airborne Warning and Control System as proposed by the Senate instead of \$83,500,000 as proposed by the House.

(4) \$10,500,000 for the Minuteman Operational Base Launch program instead of no funds as proposed by the House and \$19,800,000 as proposed by the Senate. The sum

provided is only for equipment at Vandenberg Air Force Base and the Western Test Range needed for range improvement and not related only to the Minuteman Operational Base Launch program.

In deleting funds requested for the Minuteman Operational Base Launch Program, the conferees are in agreement that if a firm decision is made that such firings are required and will be conducted, consideration will be given to a budget request in a future fiscal year.

(5) A general reduction of \$25,000,000 instead of specific reductions in low priority programs totaling \$43,600,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 40: Makes the sum appropriated for R.D.T.&E., Air Force available until June 30, 1972, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended" as proposed by the Senate.

Research, development, test, and evaluation, Defense agencies

Amendment No. 41: Makes sum appropriated for R.D.T.&E., Defense Agencies, available until June 30, 1972, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended" as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 42: Appropriates \$443,600,000 instead of \$438,900,000 as proposed by the House and \$445,100,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The amount of \$3,500,000 is approved for Climate Modification Research (Nile Blue) as proposed by the Senate.

The conferees restored the \$1,500,000 reduction in the laser program which was proposed by the Senate.

The conferees agreed to a \$3,000,000 general reduction for the Defense Atomic Support Agency.

Emergency fund, defense

Amendment No. 43: Deletes specific transfer authority as provided by the House which is now covered in Section 836.

TITLE VI—COMBAT READINESS, SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES, DEFENSE

Amendment No. 44: Appropriates \$300,000,000 as proposed by the Senate instead of \$358,500,000 as proposed by the House.

The conferees strongly favor the Vietnamization program of the Department of Defense but believe that the \$600,000,000 in transfer authority provided under Section 836 of the bill could be used to provide for any additional requirements for this program. If additional funds are required above that which would be obtained under the transfer authority, the President can submit a supplemental request to the Congress.

Amendment No. 45: Deletes transfer authority of \$150,000,000 which was proposed by the House. All transfer authority is included under Section 836 as general authority.

TITLE VII—SPECIAL FOREIGN CURRENCY PROGRAM

Amendment No. 46: Makes the appropriation for the Special Foreign Currency Program available for obligation until June 30, 1973, as proposed by the House, instead of "available until expended" as proposed by the Senate.

TITLE VIII—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Amendment No. 47: Section 807. Imposes a ceiling of \$136,700,000 as proposed by the Senate instead of \$134,400,000 as proposed by the House on funds available for the schooling of minor dependents of military and civilian personnel stationed in foreign countries.

Amendment No. 48: Section 807. Reported in technical disagreement. The Managers on the Part of the House will offer a motion to concur in the Senate language authorizing rest and recuperation trips for dependents of senior advisers in Vietnam who voluntarily extend their tour of duty.

Amendment No. 49: Section 836. Reported

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in technical disagreement. The Managers on the Part of the House will offer a motion which will provide general transfer authority between appropriations totaling \$600,000,000 instead of specific transfer authority of \$600,000,000 as proposed by the House and general transfer authority of \$700,000,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The Committee of Conference is in agreement that all transfers made under this authority shall be considered to be matters of special interest to the Committees on Appropriations under the reprogramming procedures.

Amendments Nos. 50, 51, and 52: Section 838. (1) Imposes a limitation of \$2,500,000,000 on funds available to support Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces and local forces in Laos and Thailand. (2) Limits payments to members of free world forces to the amounts which can be paid for equivalent services to members of the Armed Forces of the United States. (3) Limits U.S. financed military support of Governments of Laos and Cambodia by free world forces to actions designed to promote the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

Amendment No. 53: Section 842. Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion which will restrict the period of availability of balances in Procurement and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation appropriations, as proposed by the House, and provide for the merger of the old balances with appropriations in this bill; and will repeal Section 642 of the Defense Appropriation Act of 1970, which was to have accomplished the purposes of this section but which proved to be ineffective, as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment Nos. 54 and 55: Section 843. Provides that none of the funds appropriated in this bill shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos, Thailand, or Cambodia except in actions designed to promote the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. Forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

Amendment No. 56: Section 844. Updates citation as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 57: Section 845. Deletes prohibition inserted by the Senate on the use of funds for research not directly related to a specific military function or operation.

Amendment No. 58: Section 846. Changes section number and inserts language proposed by the Senate limiting the number of military and civilian personnel in intelligence operations in the Department of Defense to 138,000.

CONFERENCE TOTAL—WITH COMPARISONS

The total new budget (obligational) authority for the fiscal year 1971 recommended by the Committee of Conference, with comparisons to the fiscal year 1970 total, the 1971 budget estimate total, and the House and Senate bills follows:

New budget (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1970	
Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1971	68,745,686,000
House bill, fiscal year 1971	66,808,561,000
Senate bill, fiscal year 1971	66,417,077,000
Conference agreement	66,595,937,000
Conference agreement compared with:	
New budget (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1970	-6,071,095,144
Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1971	-2,149,729,000

House 1971	bill, fiscal year	
Senate 1971 <td>bill, fiscal year</td> <td>- \$210,624,000</td>	bill, fiscal year	- \$210,624,000
		+ 178,860,000

GEORGE MAHON,
ROBERT L. F. SIKES
(except as to amendment No. 20),
JAMIE I. WHITTEN,
GEORGE W. ANDREWS
(except as to amendment No. 20),
DANIEL J. FLOOD,
JOHN M. SLACK,
JOSEPH P. ADDABBO,
WILLIAM E. MINSHALL,
JOHN J. RHODES,
GLENN R. DAVIS,
LOUIS C. WYMAN
(except as to amendment No. 20),
FRANK T. BOW,

Managers on the Part of the House.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to: Mr. BURKE of Florida (at the request of Mr. GERALD R. FORD), on account of illness.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

Mr. FEIGHAN (at the request of Mr. FLOWERS), for 30 minutes, on December 16, and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

Mr. STEELE (at the request of Mr. KYL), for 5 minutes, today and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

Mr. ABBITT, tomorrow, for 30 minutes, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN (at the request of Mr. FLOWERS), for 60 minutes, on December 16, and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. KYL) and to include extraneous material:)

Mr. GROSS.
Mr. HALL.
Mr. WYMAN in two instances.
Mr. REID of New York.
Mr. PETTIS.
Mr. TALCOTT in three instances.
Mr. McDONALD of Michigan in two instances.
Mr. MCDADE.
Mr. MCCLOSKEY.
Mr. ESCH.
Mr. BUSH.
Mr. SCHMITZ in two instances.
Mr. BROOMFIELD.
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN.
Mr. BELCHER.
Mr. ZWACH in two instances.
Mr. WYATT.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. FLOWERS) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. DENT in two instances.

Mr. JACOBS.
Mr. RARICK in three instances.
Mr. DIGGS.
Mr. MELCHER.
Mr. MARSH in two instances.
Mr. EDWARDS of California.
Mr. KLUCZYNSKI in two instances.
Mr. FOUNTAIN in two instances.
Mr. DINGELL.
Mr. RODINO in two instances.
Mr. HAGAN in two instances.
Mr. KYROS in two instances.
Mr. EILBERG in three instances.
Mr. DULSKI in six instances.
Mr. FLOWERS in three instances.
Mr. YATRON.

BILLS PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT

Mr. FRIEDEL, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee did, on December 14, 1970, present to the President, for his approval, bills of the House of the following titles:

H.R. 2669. An act to amend section 213(a) of the War Claims Act of 1948 with respect to claims of certain nonprofit organizations and certain claims of individuals;

H.R. 8663. An act to amend the Act of September 20, 1968 (Public Law 90-502), to provide relief to certain former officers of the Supply Corps and Civil Engineers Corps of the Navy;

H.R. 14421. An act to provide for the conveyance of certain property of the United States located in Lawrence County, S. Dak., to John and Ruth Rachetto;

H.R. 15805. An act for the relief of Warren Bearcloud, Perry Pretty Paint, Agatha Horse Chief House, Marie Pretty Paint Wallace, Nancy Paint Littlelight, Pera Pretty Paint Not Afraid.

H.R. 18012. An act to amend the Foreign Service Buildings Act, 1926, to authorize additional appropriations; and

H.R. 19846. An act to amend the Act of August 24, 1966, relating to the care of certain animals used for purposes of research, experimentation, exhibition, or held for sale as pets.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. FLOWERS. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 6 o'clock and 46 minutes p.m.) the House adjourned until tomorrow, Wednesday, December 16, 1970, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

2617. Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, a letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), transmitting the annual report of the Department of Defense on its disposition of foreign excess personnel property for fiscal year 1970, pursuant to section 404(d) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended; to the Committee on Government Operations.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

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This has been done with the President's expressed goals for environmental improvement and the problems of agricultural pollution in mind. We are hopeful that this effort to redirect ACP will result in a much higher priority for this program.

The comments in your letter to the President concerning probable future legislation dealing with agricultural sources of pollution are especially noteworthy and timely. This Department is vitally concerned with environmental problems associated with agriculture and is actively working toward solutions in several fields. It would certainly seem appropriate to consider the adaptation of accepted and workable programs such as ACP to assist with the overall Department effort in helping to solve environmental problems in the rural areas.

Your views on this matter are very much appreciated as well as your support for the ACP.

Sincerely,

CLIFFORD M. HARDIN,
Secretary.

OCTOBER 21, 1970.

Hon. CLIFFORD M. HARDIN,
Secretary of Agriculture,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have noted with great concern that this year the Bureau of the Budget recommended elimination of the Agricultural Conservation Program for fiscal year 1971. I believe I understand the ACP program, not only from my observation of it in my own State of Kentucky, but through my years of services as a member of the Senate Committee on Agriculture. It has been a good program—for individual farmers and for the country. I believe it can meet new challenges and will be needed in the years ahead.

While I know you are familiar with the strong support for the ACP in the Congress and in the country, I would like to direct my comments to two or three points which I believe ought to be considered at this time:

I recall that opposition to the ACP developed in the Bureau of the Budget years ago, where it was argued that the conservation practices increased soil fertility and eventually production. Of course, such assumptions could also be used to argue against the work of the County Agent and the Grant College systems. I think it should be more widely recognized that since that time the ACP has been directed to long-range conservation measures, including dozens of conservation practices serving specific needs, and can now be adopted to meet more recently recognized problems. For example, you are to be commended for developing the new practices encouraging the abatement of agricultural-source pollution.

I now serve as the ranking Republican member of the Senate Public Works Committee, which has legislative jurisdiction over water and air pollution control, and solid waste disposal. I am sure that agricultural sources of pollution will require increasing attention next year and in the years to follow. With the ACP, a program is already at hand which can be of great value. If it is ended or sharply curtailed, some new and untried program to deal with farm sources of pollution will have to be developed—and there is often much waste of time and funds in establishing new programs.

Second, for years there has been a growing concern about farm programs which result in large payments to a small number of large farm operations. Now we are moving to place a limit on crop payments. But beneficiaries of the ACP have always been widely spread, the ACP has had a limit of \$2500 per farm, and the average payment is about \$200—\$173 in Kentucky. With the possible exception of the County Agent system, I know of no program which better lends itself to support for

the family farm and smaller operations, and which in fact has provided such broadly distributed benefits. Further, there is a clear national benefit in saving the hillsides, in renewing our soil and, as we are especially aware today, in protecting clean water from the beginning—where the raindrop falls.

Finally, it seems to me that the technical assistance offered by Soil Conservation Service would be less effective—especially on small family farms—without the possibility of cost sharing for specific practices.

I should think it an anomaly indeed, when there is so much talk and concern about ecology and the environment, if an established program which not only has helped farmers but which has resulted in restoring natural beauty and enhancing the environment, should be abandoned or reduced.

I hope very much that funds may soon be released so that the 1971 ACP programs can be promptly announced, and farmers may enter their requests for participation.

With kind regards, I am

Yours sincerely,

JOHN SHERMAN COOPER.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DEANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
APPROPRIATION BILL, 1971

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BYRD of Virginia). The hour of 12 o'clock having arrived, the Chair now lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which the clerk will state.

The legislative clerk read as follows: H.R. 19590, making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, and for other purposes.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, it is again my privilege to present to the Senate the Department of Defense appropriation bill at the request of the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations and the Department of Defense Subcommittee, the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL).

The committee considered budget requests totaling \$68,745,666,000 for the various programs of the Department of Defense, excluding military construction, family housing, civil defense, and regular military assistance. This amount is approximately 46 percent of the total fiscal year 1971 budget requests of \$148.1 billion that have to be considered by Congress.

The committee recommends appropriations totaling \$66,417,077,000 which

are—under the budget estimates by \$2,328,589,000—under the House bill by \$389,484,000—and under fiscal year 1970 appropriations by \$6,249,955,144.

However, I want to call attention to the fact that additional funds in the amount of approximately \$1.6 billion will be required during this fiscal year for pay increases for civilian and military personnel that are already in effect. These additional funds will be included in the second supplemental appropriation bill for fiscal year 1971 that will be considered early in the next session. When this additional requirement of \$1.6 billion is considered, a more valid comparison with the fiscal year 1970 appropriation is a reduction of approximately \$4.6 billion.

I am quite sure that many Members of the Senate are surprised that the most recent 6-percent general pay increase will require an additional \$1.6 billion for the military and civilian personnel of the Department of Defense. It will be recalled that when this matter was considered by the Senate in connection with the increase for postal employees, I tried to make clear what the total cost would be. If the Congress really wants to help the President in his fight against inflation, we have to stop granting these large pay increases for military and civilian personnel as well as employees on the legislative branch of our Government. How can we expect labor and industry to respond to pleas to hold costs down while we go on granting these annual increases?

For the period from fiscal year 1964 to the present, Congress granted increases of 65.3 percent for basic military pay and 43.6 percent for classified employees. During this same period, the Department of Commerce's noncompensation component of its index of Federal purchase of goods and services increased only 20.6 percent. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point two tabulations prepared at my request by the Department of Defense entitled "Pay and Price Increases Since Fiscal Year 1964" and "Military and Classified Civilian Pay Raises Since Fiscal Year 1964."

There being no objection, the tabulations were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PAY AND PRICE INCREASES SINCE FISCAL YEAR 1964

Fiscal year	Purchased goods and services ¹	Military basic pay ²	Classified civilian salaries ²
1964.....	100.0	100.0	100.0
1965.....	101.8	105.2	106.3
1966.....	103.7	114.7	109.2
1967.....	106.2	120.3	113.3
1968.....	109.1	125.3	117.1
1969.....	113.3	135.8	124.2
1970 (in January 1970 budget et.....)	117.6	152.9	135.5
1971 estimates, as submitted.....	120.6	152.9	135.5
1970 (reflecting Jan. 1, 1970, pay increase— not in 1971 budget estimates).....	117.6	159.1	139.6
	120.6	165.3	143.6

¹ Source: Noncompensation component of index of Federal purchase of goods and services, Department of Commerce, for calendar year 1963 through calendar year 1969. Further price increases were estimated at 3 percent for calendar 1970 and 2 percent for calendar 1971. The calendar year data were then converted to fiscal years as follows: Fiscal year 1969 index = (calendar year 1969 index + calendar year 1968 index) ÷ 2.

² Source: Specific pay increases enacted by Congress. Details as to effective dates and percentages are in the following table.

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MILITARY AND CLASSIFIED CIVILIAN PAY RAISES SINCE FISCAL YEAR 1964

	[in percent]	
	Military basic pay	Classified civilian salaries
Oct 1, 1963	14.2	
Jan 5, 1964		4.1
July 1, 1964		4.2
Sept. 1, 1964	2.3	
Sept. 1, 1965	10.4	
Oct. 1, 1965		3.6
July 1, 1966	3.2	2.9
Oct. 1, 1967	5.6	4.5
July 1, 1968	6.9	4.9
July 1, 1969	12.6	9.1
July 1, 1970	8.1	6.0
Base prior to fiscal year 1964 raises	190.0	160.0
Effective rate in fiscal year 1964	110.65	102.05
Cumulative effect of above raises from base 100	182.00	146.58
Ratio of current rate to average amount paid fiscal year 1964 (line 3 + line 2)	165.3	143.6

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, as the bill passed the other body, it included appropriations totalling \$66,806,561,000. This total included \$653,935,000 for items not included in the President's budget. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point a tabulation marked exhibit A listing each of the non-budgeted items included in this total.

There being no objection, the tabulation was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

EXHIBIT A

Items in House bill, totaling \$653,935,000 for which there is no budget estimate

Operation and Maintenance, Army: Floor amendment to cover unfunded requirements	\$50,000,000
Operation and Maintenance, Navy:	
Floor amendment to cover unfunded requirements	50,000,000
Project DEEPFREEZE	4,000,000
Operation and Maintenance, Air Force:	
Floor amendment to cover unfunded requirements	50,000,000
Retention of 5 Air Reserve units	23,900,000
National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice: General increase (understatement of estimate)	35,000
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy:	
Nuclear submarine (SSN) - Advance procurement for submarines 1972	166,000,000
Submarine tender (AS)	22,500,000
Destroyer tender (AD)	102,000,000
Service craft	103,000,000
24,000,000	
Combat Readiness, South Vietnam Forces, Defense: Revision (September 9, 1970) of original budget request	58,500,000
Total, nonbudget items added by House	653,935,000

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff appeared before the Department of Defense Subcommittee on November 20 and requested that the House bill be increased by \$1,368,116,000, of which \$1,008,534,000 was for budgeted items disallowed by the House and \$354,599,000 was for additional nonbudgeted items—many of which require annual authorization but which were not considered in the Department of Defense Procurement and Research and Development Authorization Act, 1971—Public Law 91-441. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point a tabulation marked exhibit B listing each of the items included in this total of \$354,599,000 and indicating those items that require annual authorization.

There being no objection, the tabulation was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Non-budget items in DoD reclama

AUTHORIZED	
Military personnel, Army:	
Civil disturbance training	\$1,262,000
Military personnel, Air Force:	
Servicemen's group life insurance	9,300,000
Medical continuation pay	1,500,000
Airlift service rate increase	4,300,000
Basic allowance for subsistence	10,400,000
Oahu cost-of-living allowance	2,100,000
National Guard personnel, Army:	
Additional drills for civil disturbance training	16,976,000
Operation and maintenance, Army:	
Second destination transportation	32,634,000
Change in RVN deployments	40,800,000
Operation and maintenance, Air Force:	
P.L. 91-258 Airway and Airway Development Act	5,300,000
Stock fund surcharge increase	3,100,000
MAC passenger rate increase	3,000,000
MAC cargo and special assignment rate increase	20,000,000
M3C rate increase	3,500,000
Conversion to new type foam for aircraft fires	10,000,000
Operation and maintenance, Defense Agencies:	
Computer services, Sec/Def activities, Computer Access to Public Statements (CAPS)	300,000
Operation and maintenance, Army National Guard:	
Protective equipment for civil disturbances	4,777,000
Operation and maintenance, Air National Guard:	
Force change to more modern weapons systems	2,500,000
Classification of air technicians	1,400,000

Other procurement, Air Force:	
Additional war readiness munitions (WRM)	\$168,400,000
Total	241,549,000

NOT AUTHORIZED

Procurement of aircraft and missiles, Navy:	
RH-53D mine countermeasure helicopter	39,100,000
Airborne electronic countermeasures	49,800,000
Research, development, test, and evaluation, Army:	
Heavy lift helicopter	10,000,000
Research, development, test, and evaluation, Navy:	
Airborne electronic warfare equipment	9,700,000
Submarine sonar development	2,900,000
Research, development, test and evaluation, Air Force:	
Armament/Ordnance equipment	500,000
Research, development, test, and evaluation, Defense Agencies:	
ARPA—Strategic technology	1,050,000
Total	113,050,000
Grand total	354,599,000

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, the committee's recommendations for reductions totaling \$389,484,000 are the net of increases totaling \$766,151,000 for budgeted items disallowed by the House and recommended additional reductions of \$1,155,635,000. These reductions include:

Nonbudgeted items included in the House bill, \$653,935,000: reduction based on the use of funds transferred to appropriations in this bill from stock funds, \$200,000,000; reductions based on recent review of budgeted programs \$301,700,000.

I stated earlier that the Secretary of Defense requested the committee to restore House reductions in budgeted items totaling \$1,013,517,000. The committee's recommendations include \$733,951,000 for these items. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point a tabulation marked exhibit C listing each of these budgeted items included in the Secretary's request and the committee's recommendation with respect to each.

There being no objection, the tabulation was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

LIST OF RESTORATIONS REQUESTED BY DOD AND COMMITTEE ACTION ON THESE

Item	Restoration requested by DOD	Restoration recommended by Senate committee	Item	Restoration requested by DOD	Restoration recommended by Senate committee
Military personnel, Army:			Military personnel, Navy:		
Automatic data processing	\$5,000,000		Public affairs	\$1,100,000	
Communications and intelligence	3,100,000		Headquarters staff	11,000,000	
Public affairs	1,451,000		Permanent change of station travel	17,000,000	\$17,000,000
Permanent change of station travel	39,300,000	\$39,300,000			

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Item	Restoration requested by DOD	Restoration recommended by Senate committee	Item	Restoration requested by DOD	Restoration recommended by Senate committee
Military personnel, Marine Corps:			Aircraft spares and repair parts:		
Shortfall in total strength.....	\$24,600,000		A-6E.....	\$5,700,000	\$5,700,000
Public affairs.....	700,000		E-2C.....	8,500,000	8,500,000
Communications and intelligence.....	1,100,000		Common ground equipment:		
Permanent change of station travel.....	7,900,000	\$7,900,000	S-3A (versatile avionics shop test equipment).....	34,400,000	34,400,000
Automatic data processing.....	500,000		E-2C (VAST equipment).....	9,000,000	9,000,000
Military personnel, Air Force:			Sparrow missile, AIM-7E/F.....	16,000,000	
Automatic data processing.....	3,300,000		Technica. engineering support.....	11,800,000	
Communications and intelligence.....	7,616,000		Other procurement, Navy:		
Headquarters staff.....	7,000,000		Ship alterations (Shortstop electronic warfare system).....	4,900,000	4,900,000
Permanent change of station travel.....	29,075,000	29,075,000	AN/SPS-40 radar sets.....	2,400,000	2,400,000
Reserve personnel, Army: Overstated drill strength projection	1,750,000		Cluster bombs, CBU-55/B.....	11,500,000	
Operation and maintenance, Army:			Walleye.....	3,500,000	
Civilian personnel.....	3,133,000	1,676,000	MK-46 torpedo.....	14,500,000	14,500,000
Safeguard contract support.....	3,100,000		MK-48 torpedo.....	30,000,000	30,000,000
Automatic data processing.....	8,000,000	8,000,000	Procurement, Marine Corps: Trucks, 1 1/4 ton, XM 705.....	4,200,000	4,200,000
Field exercises.....	3,696,000		Aircraft procurement, Air Force:		
Communications.....	2,926,000		B-52/FB-111 aircraft:		
Public information.....	900,000		Modifications for AN/ALR-37 (RASTAS).....	8,000,000	
Professional training: Long term courses.....	600,000		Modifications for SRAM.....	27,700,000	27,700,000
Conversion of heating plants in Europe.....	8,000,000		F-111 spares and repair parts.....	11,200,000	11,200,000
Operation and maintenance, Navy:			Missile procurement, Air Force:		
Civilian personnel.....	500,000	500,000	Operational base launch program (Minuteman).....	3,200,000	3,200,000
Intelligence.....	1,500,000		SRAM missile, AGM-69A.....	49,500,000	49,500,000
Communications.....	2,012,000		SRAM missile spares, AGM 69A.....	5,400,000	5,400,000
Headquarters operation and maintenance.....	7,000,000	7,000,000	Other procurement, Air Force: Operational base launch program (Minuteman).....	6,400,000	6,400,000
Operation and maintenance, Marine Corps:					
Civilian personnel.....	1,500,000	1,500,000			
Headquarters operation and maintenance.....	1,300,000	1,300,000			
Operation and maintenance, Air Force: Automatic data processing.....	3,000,000				
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, DEFENSE AGENCIES			PROCUREMENT, DEFENSE AGENCIES		
Armed Forces information and education:			Defense Communications Agency: Automatic data processing equipment (WWMCCS).....	6,400,000	6,400,000
Contract services.....	213,000		Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army:		
Supplies.....	275,000		Aircraft: Advanced helicopter development.....	1,100,000	
Other services.....	100,000		Exploratory development.....	5,400,000	
Defense Supply Agency:			Federal Contract Research Centers.....	300,000	
Automatic data processing (SAMMS).....	5,500,000		Pershing missile system.....	3,800,000	3,800,000
Other purchased services.....	1,100,000		Sea-to-land logistics system.....	500,000	
Supplies and materials.....	2,075,000		Defense Communications Planning Group.....	4,000,000	4,000,000
Defense Communications Agency:			Development of electric power sources.....	2,000,000	2,000,000
Civilian personnel.....	1,000,000		Research, development, test, and evaluation, Navy:		
Travel costs.....	205,000		Basic research.....	5,000,000	
Supplies and Materials.....	241,000		Exploratory development.....	3,000,000	
National Military Command System.....	2,000,000		Military sciences: Studies and analyses.....	200,000	
National Security Agency.....	1,200,000		Center for Naval Analyses (FCRC).....	1,000,000	
Defense Intelligence Agency.....	1,300,000		Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins Univ. (FCRC).....	3,000,000	
Defense Atomic Support Agency.....	2,000,000		Aircraft: Destroyer helicopter system (LAMPS).....	7,000,000	7,000,000
Operation and maintenance, Air National Guard:			Avionics development, F-14C aircraft.....	5,200,000	
Flying hour program.....	5,000,000	5,000,000	Surface effects ships.....	10,000,000	
General reduction.....	1,000,000	1,000,000	Facilities and installation support.....	1,100,000	
Contingencies, Defense.....	5,000,000		Additional recruitments.....	10,000,000	
Procurement of equipment and missiles, Army:			S-3A antisubmarine aircraft (transfer from PAMN).....	-58,000,000	
Improved HAWK surface-to-air missile.....	38,200,000	38,200,000	Research development, test, and evaluation, Air Force:		
Nike-Hercules modifications.....	5,800,000	5,800,000	Aerospace biotechnology.....	2,000,000	
LANCE surface-to-surface missile.....	30,800,000	30,800,000	Subsonic cruise armed decoy.....	10,000,000	10,000,000
Lance modifications.....	3,000,000	3,000,000	Minuteman rebasing.....	50,000,000	34,000,000
Land combat support system.....	21,600,000	15,000,000	Airborne warning and control system (AWACS).....	23,500,000	23,500,000
Lance spares.....	1,100,000	1,100,000	Operational base launch support (Minuteman).....	19,800,000	19,800,000
Land combat support system spares.....	9,700,000	5,000,000			
Tracked command post carriers, M577A1.....	9,200,000	9,200,000	RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, DEFENSE AGENCIES		
Trucks, 1 1/4 ton, XM-705.....	28,800,000	28,800,000	Defense Communications Agency.....	2,400,000	
Truck spares, 1 1/4 ton, XM-705.....	1,100,000	1,100,000	Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA):		
RATAC field artillery radar sets.....	4,000,000	4,000,000	Technical studies.....	500,000	
Landing craft (LCU, LCM).....	9,600,000	5,200,000	Climate modification research (NILE BLUE).....	1,000,000	1,000,000
Procurement of aircraft and missiles, Navy:			Defense Communications Agency.....	600,000	
A-6E intruder attack aircraft.....	40,000,000	40,000,000	Defense Supply Agency.....	250,000	
S-3A antisubmarine aircraft.....	79,000,000		Studies and analyses.....	1,400,000	
E-2C Hawkeye early warning aircraft.....	92,300,000	92,300,000	Defense Atomic Support Agency.....	6,700,000	6,700,000
A-6 aircraft modification (for Condor missile).....	5,500,000		Total.....	1,013,517,000	733,951,000

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I do not intend to take time to explain the recommendations of the committee with respect to each appropriation in the bill. These recommendations are explained in detail in the committee's report.

I do want to call attention to the five volumes of hearings on the budget requests that total over 4,500 pages. Each of the programs and items included in the budget request are discussed in detail in these hearings.

Of the total amount recommended by the committee, approximately 60 percent—\$39,990,246,000—is for the "Military Personnel" and "Operation and Maintenance" titles of the bill. These funds are required for the support of the active duty and reserve military forces, and for the most part, the level of these appropriations is determined by the strength of the active duty forces. The

committee's recommendations are based on the fiscal year 1971 budgeted active duty military end-strength of \$2,908,100 which includes:

Army.....	\$1,239,600
Navy.....	643,800
Marine Corps.....	241,200
Air Force.....	783,500

Title III of the bill includes the budget request of \$3,194,000,000 for "Military Retired Pay." The number of individuals on the retired rolls and the amount they receive is determined by law, and Congress must provide the funds. I call attention to the rate of increase in this appropriation. For fiscal year 1965, \$1,339,000,000 was required, and, as I have stated, the requirement for fiscal year 1971 is \$3,194,000,000. The projection for fiscal year 1975 based on the current rates for retired pay of \$4.1 billion, and

the projection for fiscal year 1980 is \$4.9 billion.

The committee's recommendations include appropriations totaling \$15,970,110,000 for the various procurement appropriations included in title IV of the bill. The committee's recommendation for each of these appropriations is explained in detail in the report.

For the research, development, test, and evaluation title, the recommendations of the committee total \$6,960,100,000, and these recommendations are also explained in detail in the report.

Rather than go into the details of the committee's recommendations for the various procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation appropriations, I intend to comment on several of the major programs for which funds are recommended.

The total recommended for the various research, development, test, and evaluation appropriations is below the budget requests by \$385,500,000; below the fiscal year 1970 appropriations by \$446,648,694; and over the House allowances by \$5,400,000.

The increase of \$5,400,000 over the House allowance is the net of recommended increases in budget programs disallowed by the other body totaling \$107,800,000 and recommended additional reductions in budgeted programs totaling \$102,400,000, which are based on a recent review of requirements and involve reductions in more than 100 projects. I ask unanimous consent to have included in the Record at this point a tabulation listing each of the projects involved in the increases and decreases recommended by the committee.

There being no objection, the tabulation was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

R.D.T. & E. PROJECTS INCREASED OR DECREASED
Research, development, test, and evaluation, Army

(Dollars in thousands)

Project and recommended change	
Committee increases:	
Pershing missile system	3,800
Development of electric power sources	2,000
Total increases	5,800
Committee reductions:	
Aircraft and Related Equipment:	
Aircraft Weapons	1,500
Aeronautical Evaluation	400
Aerial STANO (Advance Development)	1,100
Air Mobility Support Equipment	600
Aerial STANO Systems (Engineering Development)	300
Missiles and Related Equipment:	
Surface-to-surface Missile Rocket System	1,200
Forward Area Air Defense	400
Missile Effectiveness Evaluation	900
Kwajalein Missile Range	2,000
White Sands Missile Range	2,000
Chaparral/Vulcan System	200
Military Astronautics and Related Equipment: Tactical Satellite Communications	
	1,000
Ordnance, Combat Vehicles and Related Equipment:	
Army Small Arms Program (Advance Development)	1,000
Infantry Support Weapons	600
Field Artillery Weapons and Munitions	500
Wheeled Vehicles	300
Fortifications, Mines, and Obstacles	600
TOW Anti-Tank Weapon	500
Other Equipment:	
Therapeutic Development	800
STANO Program (Advance Development)	1,000
Tactical Communications	1,200
Supporting Development for Communications	400
STANO Systems (Engineering Development)	300
Biological Defense Materials	600
Chemical Defense Materials	2,000
Testing	1,400
Desert Test Center	600
STANO Operational Development (General Purpose Forces)	700
Counter Intelligence Activities	500
Total reduction	24,600

Research, development, test, and evaluation, Navy

(Dollars in thousands)

Project and recommendation change	
Committee increases:	
Destroyer Helicopter system (LAMPS)	\$7,000
Committee reductions:	
Aircraft and related equipment:	
Early Warning Aircraft	700
Airborne ASW Detection System	800
Advance Airborne Reconnaissance	900
Airborne Life Support System	100
Avionics	300
V/STOL Developments	300
Missiles and related equipment:	
F5M Systems	5,500
ABM Support	500
Standard ABM	500
Advance ARM System Technology	500
A/L S/L Anti-ship Missile Harpoon	2,500
Advance A/L ASM System	500
Submarine Tactical Weapon System (STAM)	300
Military Astronautics and Related Equipment: Satellite Communications	
	800
Ships and Small Craft:	
Submarine Silencing	200
NMSC System Wide Support	200
Aircraft Launching and Retrieving	300
Advance Submarine Surveillance Equipment Program	900
Advance Ship/Submarine Sonar Developments	500
EW/CW Countermeasures	100
New Ship Design	1,500
Advance Surface Craft	500
Advance Air Control	200
Advance Communications	300
EY-130 Steel	500
Fiver and Shallow Water Warfare	1,000
Ship Contract Definition	1,000
Electronic Warfare Systems	800
Submarine Surveillance Equipment Program	500
Ordnance, Combat Vehicles and Related Equipment:	
ASW Torpedo Counter Measures Resistance	300
Advance Conventional Ordnance	600
Unguided Conventional Aircraft Weapons	1,000
Marine Corps Ordnance/Combat Vehicles	500
HI Energy Laser	2,000
Conventional Ordnance Equipment	1,800
Other equipment:	
Marine Corps Operational Electronic Developments	100
Undersea Surveillance	700
Advance Undersea Surveillance	1,000
Training Development Technology	300
Advance Marine Biology	500
Programwide Management and Support:	
ASW Support	500
Strategic Support	500
Atlantic Underwater Test and Evaluation Center	500
Total reductions	32,700
<i>Research, development, test, and evaluation, Air Force</i>	
(Dollars in thousands)	
Project and recommended change	
Committee increases:	
Subsonic cruise armed decoy	\$10,000
Minuteman rebasing	34,000
Airborne warning and control system (AWACS)	23,500
Operational base launch support (Minuteman)	19,800
Total increase	87,300

Committee reductions:

Military Sciences:	
Environment	\$1,300
RAND	1,000
Aircraft and Related Equipment:	
F-4 Avionics	5,000
Advance Aircraft Navigation	200
Advance Fire Control and Missile Technology	1,200
Advance Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition Capabilities	1,000
VTOL Engine Development	800
Aerial Targets	500
Missiles and Related Equipment:	
Rocket Propulsion	3,000
Air-launched Missile Propulsion	1,000
Advance ASM Guidance Technology	300
Military Astronautics and Related Equipment:	
TITAN III	6,900
Missile and Space Defense	3,200
Advance Space Power Supply Technology	300
Space Experiment Support	300
Advance Liquid Rocket	500
Space Craft Technology and Advance Re-entry Tests	400
Ordnance, Combat Vehicles and Related Equipment:	
Chemical and Biological Defense Equipment	300
Armament/Ordnance Development	500
Improved Aircraft Gun System	600
Truck Interdiction	2,500
Other Equipment:	
Common Mobility Support	2,600
Light Weight Precision Bombing	3,000
Tactical Electronic Operational Support System	1,000
Satellite Communications Terminal-Tactical	500
Airborne Satellite Communication Terminals-Strategic	900
Aeronautical Chart and Information Center	300
Helicopter-borne Radar	200
Advance Detection System Development	800
Tactical Information Processing and Interpretation	500
Tactical Jamming	200
Electronic Warfare Systems	500
Life Support System	300
Cobra Mist (Classified Project)	500
Information Analysis Center	200
Tactical Air Control System	300
100th Strategic Air Wing	500
Air Force Communications	500
Total reductions	43,600

Research, development, test, and evaluation, Defense Agencies

(Dollars in thousands)

Project and recommended change	
Committee increases:	
Climate modification research (NILE BLUE)	1,000
Defense Atomic Support Agency	6,700
Total increase	7,700
Committee reductions:	
Advanced Research Projects Agency, laser program	1,500

SAFEGUARD ABM SYSTEM

Mr. ELLENDER. The recommendations of the committee include \$1,079,900,000 for the continuation of the development and deployment of the Safeguard ABM system. The recommendations of the committee are based on the modified phase II deployment approved in the authorization act, which provides for the continuation of deployment at the Grand Forks, N. Dak., and Malmstrom, Mont., sites, the initiation of full deployment at the Whiteman, Mo., site,

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and advance preparation at the Warren Air Force Base, Wyo., site. The committee's recommendation for this system is discussed in detail on pages 23 to 25 of the report, and I ask unanimous consent to have these pages included in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SAFEGUARD ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

The recommendations of the committee include \$1,079.9 million for the continued development and deployment of the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile defense system, which amount is a reduction of \$13.1 million in the budget requests considered by the committee. In addition to these funds, the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 1971, includes \$365.8 million for the Safeguard system. The amount included in the

request for each appropriation and the amount recommended is set out in the following tabulation:

[In millions of dollars]

Appropriation	Budget request	Committee recommendation
Military personnel, Army.....	14.0	14.0
Operation and maintenance, Army.....	53.0	49.9
Procurement of equipment and missiles, Army.....	661.0	651.0
Research, development, test and evaluation, Army.....	365.0	365.0
Total.....	1,093.0	1,079.9

¹ Discussed in detail on page 105 of this report.

The program requested in the budget and the program on which the committee's recommendations are based are set out in the following tabulation:

[In millions of dollars]

	Budget program	Recommended program
a) Continuation of development (R.D.T. & E.).....	365.0	365.0
b) Continuation of deployment at phase 1 sites (Grand Forks, N. Dak., and Malmstrom, Mont.).....	512.0	508.9
c) Initiation of deployment at the Whiteman, Mo., site.....	178.0	178.0
(d) Advance preparation at the following sites: Northeast, Northwest, National Command Authority, Michigan/Ohio, and Warren Air Force Base, Wyo.....	25.0	0
(e) Advance preparation at the Warren Air Force Base, Wyo., site.....	0	15.0
(f) Total modified phase 2 costs.....	13.0	13.0
Total.....	1,093.0	1,079.9

Attention is called to the fact that, while the committee's recommendations do not include any funds for the installation of additional Sprint missiles at the phase 1 sites (Grand Forks, N.D., and Malmstrom, Mont.), funds for this purpose are included in the Military Construction Appropriation Act, 1971. In its overall action on the Safeguard system, the committee has approved the installation of the additional Sprint missiles at these sites.

The committee's recommendation for the Safeguard system is in accord with the previous action of the Senate in acting on the Department of Defense Procurement and Research Authorization Act, 1971 (Public Law 91-441) which was based on the following recommendation of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate:

"The committee has decided to confine the authorization for the continuation of the Safeguard program to those sites devoted to the defense of the deterrent. Thus the committee has approved continuation of the phase 1 sites at Malmstrom and Grand Forks, as well as full deployment at Whiteman and advance preparation at Warren Air Force Base.

"In taking this action, the committee wishes to establish the primacy of active defense to increase the survivability of the land-based deterrent. By striking from the authorization the House approved administration request to proceed now to advance preparation for four area defense sites, the committee affirms its conviction that there is no compelling need to move now to the deployment of an area defense of our population against Chinese Communist ICBM attack. (S. Rept. 91-1016, p. 19.)"

This recommendation of the Senate Armed Services Committee is implemented in Section 402 of the Department of Defense Procurement and Research and Development Authorization Act, 1971 (Public Law 91-441), and the funds recommended to the committee are subject to the restrictions imposed therein. This section reads as follows:

"Sec. 402. None of the funds authorized by this or any other Act may be obligated or

expended for the purpose of initiating deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system at any site other than Whiteman Air Force Base, Knobnoster, Missouri; except that funds may be obligated or expended for the purpose of initiating advanced preparation (site selection, land acquisition, site survey, and the procurement of long lead-time items) for an anti-ballistic missile system site at Francis E. Warren Air Force Base, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as a limitation on the obligation or expenditure of funds in connection with the deployment of an antiballistic missile system at Grand Forks Air Force Base, Grand Forks, North Dakota, or Malmstrom Air Force Base, Great Falls, Montana."

As indicated above, the committee's recommendations for appropriations in this bill directly related to the development and deployment of the Safeguard system total \$1,079.9 million, and the Military Construction Appropriation Act, 1971, includes \$365.8 million for this purpose for a total of \$1,445.7 million.

In addition to these funds, the recommendations of the committee include \$228.1 million for indirect support of the Safeguard system and other antiballistic missile efforts. The general purpose of these funds and the appropriation in which they are included are set out in the following tabulation:

Appropriation and purpose

	Amount (in millions)
Army:	
Research, development, test, and evaluation:	
Advanced ballistic missile defense.....	\$138.0
Range support (Kwajalein and White Sands Missile Range)....	35.0
Navy:	
Research, development, test, and evaluation:	
Sea-based missile defense.....	2.0
ABM support (Polaris targets for Safeguard test program).....	6.5

Air Force:

Research, development, test, and evaluation:	
Nike targets for Safeguard tests.....	\$8.0
Missile and space defense (ABM portion).....	1.0
Advanced sensor technology.....	7.6
Defense agencies:	
Research, development, test, and evaluation:	
Advanced research projects agency, ABM activities.....	30.0
Total.....	228.1

NAVY'S F-14A FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President \$932 million is included in the committee's recommendations for the continuation of development and initial production of the Navy's F-14 fighter aircraft. This program is discussed on pages 29-30 of the report, and I ask unanimous consent to have these pages included in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the pages were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

F-14A AND F-14B FIGHTER AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS

The recommendations of the committee include \$932 million for the continuation of development and production of the Navy's F-14A fighter aircraft. The funds are for the following purposes: procurement of 26 aircraft, \$517 million, which does not include \$8.5 million for advance procurement; procurement of initial spares and repair parts, \$80.9 million; advance procurement to support the planned fiscal year 1972 procurement program, \$60.1 million; and continuation of the development, test and evaluation program, \$274 million.

F-14A will be the Navy's primary air superiority fighter aircraft in the future. In addition to providing fleet air defense, this aircraft will have an air-to-ground attack capability. The F-14A configuration will incorporate a modified version of the existing Phoenix AWG-9 fire control system and TF-30 engines. It will have an all-weather capability for delivery of Phoenix and Sparrow missiles and will also employ a 20-millimeter gun and Sidewinder missiles for close in, air-to-air combat. The F-14A is manufactured by the Grumman Aircraft Corp., Bethpage, Long Island, N.Y., and is powered by two TF-30-P412 engines manufactured by the Pratt & Whitney Division of the United Aircraft Corp., East Hartford, Conn.

The \$517 million recommended for procurement of aircraft and \$8.5 million in advance procurement will provide a total of \$525.5 million for the procurement of 26 F-14A aircraft. The 26 aircraft, referred to as lot III, are required to continue an orderly, least cost and earliest initial operation capability for the introduction of this new aircraft. The first eight of these 26 aircraft will supplement the 12 (lots I and II) research and development aircraft to enable the Navy to complete technical evaluation, conduct board of inspection and surveys trials and provide aircraft for fleet test and evaluation. The remaining 18 aircraft in lot III will provide the fleet training squadron aircraft to commence training for initial operational capability in April of 1973.

This \$274 million is recommended for the continuation of the development and testing program with the first flight scheduled for January 1971, and Navy preliminary evaluation scheduled for April 1971.

The F-14A is discussed on pages 576-580 and 935-936 of part 3 of the committee hearings on the Department of Defense appropriation bill, 1971.

In addition to the \$932 million recommended for the F-14A program, the committee's recommendation for the appropriation

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entitled "Research, development, test, and evaluation, Navy" includes \$45 million for the F-14B aircraft program. The F-14B is the basic F-14A airframe powered by the advance technology engine being developed jointly by the Navy and the Air Force. This program is discussed on pages 966-967 of part 3 of the committee hearings on the Department of Defense appropriation bill, 1971.

POLARIS-TO-POSEIDON CONVERSION PROGRAM

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, the recommendations of the committee include \$921.6 million for the continuation of the program to convert 31 of the existing 41 Polaris submarines to Poseidon-carrying submarines.

I wish to state in passing that early next year two of these conversions will be completed, and moneys have been provided to fund six more.

I wish to state further that when selections of the submarines are made, they are usually programed when it is time to change the nuclear core. By coinciding these two actions, the costs of the program are diminished.

This program is discussed on page 32 of the report, and I ask unanimous consent to have the committee's comments on this program included in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the page was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

POLARIS-TO-POSEIDON CONVERSION PROGRAM

The recommendations of the committee include \$921.6 million for the continuation of the conversion of Polaris submarines to carry the new Poseidon missile. These funds are for the following purposes:

	Millions
Conversion of 6 submarines (total estimated cost, \$436,000,000, less advance procurement of \$143,600,000)	\$292.4
Advance procurement to support the fiscal year 1972 conversion program	54.3
Advance procurement to support the fiscal year 1973 conversion program	24.5
Procurement of Poseidon missiles	540.5
Procurement of Poseidon missile spares and repair parts	9.9
Total	921.6

The current program calls for the conversion of 31 of the existing 41 Polaris submarines to carry the new Poseidon missiles, which will be equipped with a multiple independently aimed reentry vehicle (MIRV).

Through fiscal year 1970, eight of these conversions have been funded, and the first Poseidon submarine (funded in fiscal year 1968) is scheduled to be deployed early in 1971. The recently successful submerged test launches of the Poseidon missile indicate that this deployment schedule will be met.

The recommended conversion program for fiscal year 1971 is based on the conversion of six Polaris submarines that would otherwise have to go into the shipyard for a scheduled overhaul, including a replacement of the nuclear propulsion cores.

In addition to the funds referred to above, the committee's recommendation for the appropriation entitled, "Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy," includes substantial funds for the continuation of the development and testing of the fleet ballistic missile system, the fleet ballistic missile defense, the fleet ballistic missile command and control.

The Polaris-to-Poseidon conversion program is discussed on pages 615-619, 700-705, and 972-973 of part 3 of the committee hearings on the Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1971.

DD-963 DESTROYER PROGRAM

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, \$459.5 million is recommended for the continuation of construction of the Navy's new destroyers, referred to as the DD-963 class. The funds recommended, along with advance procurement funds provided in fiscal year 1971, will provide for the construction of six of these new ships. This program is discussed on pages 35 and 36 of the committee's report, and I ask unanimous consent to have the committee's comments included in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the comments were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DD-963 DESTROYER PROGRAM

The recommendations of the committee include \$459.5 million for the Navy's new destroyer construction program. This new class of destroyers has been designated the DD-963 class. The sum recommended and \$47.3 million for advance procurement made available in prior fiscal years will provide a total of \$506.8 million for the construction of six of these ships.

On June 23, 1970, the Secretary of the Navy announced the award of a contract for the construction of 30 of these new class destroyers to Litton Systems, Inc. This contract provides for funding these ships in five consecutive procurement increments, each subject to congressional approval, from fiscal years 1970 through 1974. The first increment for three ships was funded in fiscal year 1970, and the program recommended by the committee for fiscal year 1971 provides for the second increment of six ships. The total estimated cost to the Government of the 30 ships under the contract, including the cost of Government-furnished radars and weaponry, is estimated to be \$2,550 million. The delivery of the first ship of the new class is expected in the fall of 1974.

These new ships will have a displacement of 7,000 tons, and will be approximately 560 feet long, with a beam of 54 feet. They will be equipped with a gas turbine propulsion system and will have a speed of over 30 knots. Armament will consist of two 5-inch guns, Sparrow missiles configured for air defense, standard and rocket assisted projectiles, antisubmarine torpedoes, antisubmarine rockets, and an on-board helicopter. These new destroyers will have an electronic warfare capability and be equipped with air search radar, surface search radar, fire control radar, and long-range sonar. The crew will consist of about 270 officers and men.

This program is discussed on pages 672-674 and 737-741 of part 3 of the committee hearings on the Department of Defense appropriation bill, 1971.

MARK-48 TORPEDO PROGRAM

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, the committee's recommendations include \$146.9 million for the continuation of development and testing and limited procurement of the Navy's Mark-48 torpedo. The tremendous increase in the cost of development of this family of torpedoes and the delay in developing an operational weapon is a matter of great concern to this committee. However, when the fact that this torpedo will make the new nuclear attack submarines fully effective is considered, you can reach only one decision, which is to continue the program at the most economic rate; the recommendation of the committee is based on this conclusion. This program is discussed on pages 36 and 37 of the committee's report, and I ask unanimous consent that these comments be included in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the comments were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MARK 48 TORPEDO PROGRAM

The recommendations of the committee include \$146.9 million for the Navy's Mark 48 torpedo program. The basic Mark 48 torpedo is a 3,600 pound, 21-inch diameter torpedo capable of being launched from torpedo tubes on both submarines and surface ships. The Mark 48 will have greatly improved capabilities over the Mark 37, which it will replace, in such areas as maximum speed, attack depth, acoustic acquisition range, and operating range. This torpedo will provide the Navy with an advanced wire guided torpedo capable of coping with today's high speed, deep diving nuclear submarine threat.

The program includes three versions of the basic torpedo. They are:

Mark 48, Mod 0 Torpedo.—This version is a high speed, long range, deep diving anti-submarine torpedo capable of operating with or without wire command guidance, using acoustic homing and conventional warhead. It has a secondary capability against surface ASW escort type ships. The propulsion system consists of a turbine engine and a pump jet propulsor. This version is ready for limited production.

Mark 48, Mod 1 Torpedo.—This version is a dual purpose antisubmarine/antiship, high speed, long-range, deep diving torpedo capable of operating with or without wire command guidance and using acoustic homing. Its propulsion system consists of a piston type swash plate engine powered by hot gas and a pump jet propulsor. This version is expected to be ready in the very near future for limited production.

Mark 48, Mod 2 Torpedo.—This version is also a dual purpose antisubmarine/antiship torpedo. It is a conversion of the basic Mark 48, Mod 0 torpedo, with an improved warhead and which makes it more effective against surface ships. This version is not ready for production.

Upon completion of the technical and operational evaluation in fiscal year 1971, either the Mark 48, Mod 1, or the Mark 48, Mod 2, will be selected for quantity procurement to meet fleet requirements.

The development of the Mark 48, Mod 0 is behind schedule by approximately 18 months and the estimated cost of development of the Mark 48 series of torpedoes has increased from \$75.1 million to \$484.1 million. However, attention is called to the fact that the original estimate was for the development of only one type of torpedo and the current estimate is based on the development of three different versions of the torpedo. This tremendous increase in cost is the result of two factors; namely, (a) a stretch-out of the program caused by technical difficulties, and (b) the requirement for the development of a dual purpose antisubmarine/antiship capability, replacing a separate antiship torpedo development.

Of the total recommended, \$110.6 million is for the procurement of torpedoes and \$36.3 million is for the continuation of development and testing. These programs are discussed in the following paragraphs:

Procurement.—The committee's recommendation for the appropriation entitled "Other procurement, Navy" includes \$110.6 million for the procurement of a limited number of Mark 48, Mod 0, and Mark 48, Mod 1, operational torpedoes, and for the conversion of a smaller number of existing Mark 48, Mod 0, torpedoes to the Mark 48, Mod 2, configuration for operational evaluation.

Development and testing.—The committee's recommendation for the appropriation entitled "Research, development, test, and evaluation, Navy" includes \$36.3 million for the continuation of the Mark 48 development and testing programs. Of this total, \$25.3 million is to continue development

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through the completion of the technical and operational evaluation of the Mark 48, Mod 0 and Mod 2 versions of the torpedo. The balance of \$11 million is to continue development through the completion of the technical and operational evaluation of the Mod 1 version. A determination will be made as to which version of the dual purpose torpedoes should be procured in quantity to meet inventory objectives.

It is the position of the committee that a dual purpose Mark 48 torpedo is an essential requirement for the fleet, and its recommendations are based on this position.

The Mark 48 torpedo program is discussed on pages 417-426, 860, 1083-1086, and 1183-1185 of Part 3 of the Committee hearings on the Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1971.

AIR FORCE'S F-111F TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, the recommendations of the committee include \$52.7 million for the Air Force F-111F tactical aircraft procurement program. The funds recommended provide for the completion of currently approved Department of Defense procurement plans for this aircraft. This program is discussed on pages 39-41 of the committee's report, and I ask unanimous consent that these comments be included in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the comments were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

AIR FORCE PROGRAMS

F-111D/F TACTICAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

The recommendations of the committee include \$562.7 million for the F-111D/F tactical fighter aircraft program. The F-111F is the latest model in a series of swing-wing F-111 tactical fighters. Like its F-111D predecessor, it will have the capability to operate from bases at extended range from its targets, to penetrate sophisticated defenses and to carry out attacks at night in all weather. The F model differs from the F-111D only in its engine and its avionics system. It is equipped with the new P-100 engine, which provides a 25-percent increase in thrust over the older model. Its avionics package is expected to be less costly than the Mark II system planned for the D model but will retain similar navigation capabilities and enable comparable air-to-ground attack performance against fixed targets.

In discussing the planned fiscal year 1971 procurement of the F-111 tactical aircraft, the Secretary of Defense stated:

"I am sure that the committee shares my long-standing concern over the F-111 program, particularly in light of the difficulties that have been encountered. For the time being, we have retained in the budget request the planned funding for the F-111's noted above. However, I have asked the Secretary of the Air Force, in connection with an investigation of recent structural and operational difficulties, to examine in detail the alternatives to procuring F-111's in fiscal year 1971. I have postponed a final decision on this matter until this action is completed by the Air Force."

On September 17, 1970, the Deputy Secretary of Defense advised the Congress:

"The Air Force has now progressed sufficiently through the test program to permit me to conclude from the results obtained that the F-111 fleet will be structurally sound, and that it will indeed perform its intended missions. * * * Accordingly, I have approved the program for the procurement of remaining F-111's in fiscal year 1971."

F/FB-111 Recovery Program.—A major accident on December 22, 1969, resulted in the grounding of all F-111 series aircraft. Following a comprehensive review of the F-111 primary structure by an Air Force/industry team and a special ad hoc committee of the

Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, the "F-111/FB-111 recovery program" was formulated. Phase I of the recovery program was started in April of 1970 and includes the following sequential phases:

Nondestruct inspection.—Provides for the nondestructive inspection of 11 of the 15 primary forgings and the incorporation of several engineering changes."

Cold proof test.—Each aircraft is subjected to a series of positive and negative gravity loads up to and including design limits at -40°. This test is designed to stress all primary forgings to 100 percent to assure that the four forgings not covered by the non-destruct inspection are structurally sound.

Field operations and functional check flight.—Includes final reassembly, extensive systems checkout, functional check flight and preparation for delivery to the Air Force.

Acceptance.—Includes final Air Force acceptance inspection and flight check prior to delivery to the using command.

A total of 344 aircraft (inventory and production) are scheduled to be processed through the recovery program. As of November 19, 1970, 228 aircraft have been processed successfully through the cold proof test, and there has been one failure. 148 aircraft have been returned to the users. According to the current schedule, the cold proof test phase of the Recovery Program will be completed in early April 1971.

Phase II of the program is now being defined and will include refined nondestructive inspection techniques and establishment of final inspection intervals.

It is estimated that the recovery program will cost approximately \$35 million.

Section 503, Public Law 91-441.—Section 503 of the Department of Defense Procurement and Research and Development Authorization Act, 1971 (Public Law 91-441) provides that no funds shall be obligated for the procurement of F-111 aircraft unless the Secretary of Defense has determined that the aircraft has been subjected to and successfully completed a comprehensive structural integrity test program, and approved a program for the procurement of such aircraft. This provision reads as follows:

"Sec. 503. Of the total amount authorized to be appropriated by this Act for the procurement of the F-111 aircraft, \$283,000,000 of such amount may not be obligated or expended for the procurement of such aircraft until and unless the Secretary of Defense has (1) determined that the F-111 aircraft has been subjected to and successfully completed a comprehensive structural integrity test program, (2) approved a program for the procurement of such aircraft, and (3) certified in a written report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives that he has made such a determination and approved such a program, and has included in such written report the basis for making such determination and approving such program."

On September 17, 1970, the Deputy Secretary of Defense advised the Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate—

"a. 'The Air Force has now progressed sufficiently through the test program to permit me to conclude from the results obtained that the F-111 fleet will be structurally sound, and that it will indeed perform its intended mission.' and

"b. 'Accordingly, I have approved the program for the procurement for the remaining F-111's in FY 1971.'"

The total recommended includes funds for the following purposes: Procurement of aircraft, \$283 million; prior year overtarget costs, \$200.5 million; procurement of aircraft spares and repair parts, \$31.6 million; and research and development, \$48.2 million. Each of these is discussed below.

Procurement of aircraft.—\$283 million is recommended for the procurement of F-111F

aircraft and the recovery program. The sum recommended and the \$60.9 million for advanced procurement provided in fiscal year 1970, will provide a total of \$343.9 million. As presented in the budget request, the total of \$343.9 million was to cover the cost of the F-111 recovery program and the procurement of up to 40 F-111F aircraft. However, the committee's recommendation is based on the use of approximately \$35 million for the F-111 recovery program and the procurement of 24 F-111F aircraft. It is anticipated that the funds recommended will provide an adequate number of aircraft to equip the planned fourth wing, which will complete the planned F-111 production program. These funds are included in the committee's recommendation for the appropriation entitled, "Procurement of aircraft, Air Force."

Prior year overtarget costs.—\$200.5 million is recommended to cover overtarget costs for F-111 aircraft funded in fiscal year 1969 and prior years. These aircraft were funded based on target costs, and the additional funds are required to cover the Government's obligation in additional costs up to contract ceiling costs. These funds are included in the committee's recommendation for the appropriation entitled "Procurement of aircraft, Air Force."

Procurement of aircraft spares and repair parts.—\$31 million is recommended for the procurement of initial aircraft spares and repair parts to support F-111F aircraft. These funds are included in the committee's recommendation for the appropriation entitled "Procurement of Aircraft, Air Force."

Research and development.—The committee's recommendation for the appropriation entitled "Research, development, test, and evaluation, Air Force," includes \$48.2 million for the continuation of the development and testing program for the F-111 aircraft.

The F-111 program is discussed on pages 263-290, 338-339, 414-420, 589-590, and 726-728 of part 4 of the committee's hearings on the Department of Defense appropriations bill, 1971.

C-5A STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, \$622.2 million is included in the committee's recommendations for the C-5A strategic airlift aircraft, including \$200 million for program contingencies. The committee's recommendations are in accord with and subject to the provisions of the Department of Defense Procurement and Research and Development Authorization Act. This program is discussed on pages 41-44 of the committee's report, and I ask unanimous consent that these comments be included in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the comments were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

C-5A STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT

The recommendations of the committee include \$622.2 million for the C-5A strategic airlift aircraft program. The C-5A is the largest aircraft ever built and has a basic mission payload of 100,000 pounds for a 5,560 nautical mile mission, a maximum speed of 470 knots, a ceiling of 43,500 feet and a ferry range of 7,200 miles.

The C-5A aircraft was designed for the specific role of carrying outsized (very large) equipment of the Army's combat divisions that no other aircraft can transport, such as tanks, self-propelled guns, and other equipment of mechanized and armored divisions. It is this capability used, along with other airlift aircraft (C-130's and C-141's) that will enable the United States to meet its military commitments through the rapid deployment of forces from a strong strategic reserve stationed in the United States. In commenting on the military requirement for

the unique capability of the C-5A aircraft, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, in a statement to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, said on May 27, 1970:

"As I have stated before, this airplane is critical to augment our airlift capability. We must have a rapid response posture to deploy Army units and their equipment to many areas of the world. Only with this capability can we successfully withdraw a significant portion of our overseas committed forces and at the same time give positive assurance to our free world allies that we could rapidly redeploy our forces in time of tension. Though the airplane is in its early stages of system test and qualifications, it clearly will have the capability to do the job it was intended to do." (Italics added.) (Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, hearings on Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Fiscal Year 1971, and Reserve Strength, pt. 3, 2411.)

The recommendations of the committee are based on a C-5A buy of 81 aircraft (four squadrons) rather than the originally planned force of 120 aircraft (six squadrons). This force of 81 aircraft includes five research and development aircraft and 76 production aircraft.

The funds recommended are for the following purposes: funding for prior year deficiencies, \$344.4 million; contingencies, \$200 million; procurement of aircraft spares and repair parts, \$66.2 million; and research and development, \$11.6 million. Each of these is discussed below.

Funding for prior year deficiencies.—\$344.4 million is recommended to cover funding deficiencies for the 76 aircraft funded in prior fiscal years. Under the Air Force's interpretation of the contracts, it is estimated that the production cost of these 76 aircraft will total approximately \$2,460 million. Through fiscal year 1970, approximately \$2,033 million has been made available to cover these costs, leaving a balance of \$427 million. The committee recommends the allowance of \$344.4 million to cover the major part of this deficiency and calls attention to the fact that the balance of approximately \$32 million will have to be funded in fiscal year 1972. The funds for fiscal year 1971 are included in the committee's recommendation for the appropriation entitled, "Procurement of aircraft, Air Force."

Contingencies.—\$200 million is recommended for "Contingencies" to assure the continuation of production of the C-5A aircraft. Of the \$344.4 million recommended to cover prior year deficiencies (discussed in the paragraph above), approximately \$286 million is for the Lockheed Aircraft Corp. It is estimated that this amount would be adequate to assure the production of C-5A aircraft through December of this calendar year, at which time about 30 aircraft will have been delivered to the Air Force. The financial position of the Lockheed Co. is such that the Air Force must provide additional funds to assure the continued production of C-5A's.

It is the view of the committee that it is imperative to continue the production of these aircraft. This position is supported by the fact that if production is allowed to stop with the production of only 30 aircraft, the cost per aircraft will be approximately \$125 million, whereas if production is continued through fiscal year 1971, 42 aircraft will be produced at a cost of \$94 million per aircraft, and if the planned 81 aircraft are produced the cost per aircraft will be approximately \$56 million.

The committee desires to call attention to the fact that there are a number of disputes between the contractor and the Air Force with respect to the Air Force's total liability for the planned 81 aircraft. These differences total some \$400 to \$500 million, and the matter is now pending before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. Of

course, the recommended \$200 million for contingencies will be an offset against any determination of the Board of Contract Appeals that is favorable to the Lockheed Corp.

The committee's recommendation is in accord with the provisions of the Department of Defense Procurement and Research Authorization Act, 1971 (Public Law 91-441), and the \$200 million recommended for "Contingencies" is subject to the limitations imposed in section 504 of that act, which reads as follows:

SEC. 504. (a) Of the total amount authorized to be appropriated by this act for the procurement of the C-5A aircraft, \$200,000,000 of such amount may not be obligated or expended until after the expiration of 30 days from the date upon which the Secretary of Defense submits to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a plan for the expenditure of such \$200,000,000. In no event may all or any part of such \$200,000,000 be obligated or expended except in accordance with such plan.

(b) The \$200,000,000 referred to in subsection (a) of this section, following the submission of a plan pursuant to such subsection, may be expended only for the reasonable and allocable direct and indirect costs incurred by the prime contractor under a contract entered into with the United States to carry out the C-5A aircraft program. No part of such amount may be used for—

(1) direct cost of any other contract or activity of the prime contractor;

(2) profit on any materials, supplies, or services which are sold or transferred between any division, subsidiary, or affiliate of the prime contractor under the common control or the prime contractor and such division, subsidiary, or affiliate;

(3) bid and proposal costs, independent research and development costs, and the cost of other similar unsponsored technical effort; or

(4) depreciation and amortization costs on property, plant, or equipment.

Any of the costs referred to in the preceding sentence which would otherwise be allocable to any work funded by such \$200,000,000 may not be allocated to other portions of the C-5A aircraft contract or to any other contract with the United States, but payments to C-5A aircraft subcontractors shall not be subject to the restrictions referred to in such sentence.

(c) Any payment from such \$200,000,000 shall be made to the prime contractor through a special bank account from which such contractor may withdraw funds only after a request containing a detailed justification of the amount requested has been submitted to and approved by the contracting officer for the United States. All payments made from such special bank account shall be audited by the Defense Contract Audit Agency of the Department of Defense and, on a quarterly basis, by the General Accounting Office. The Comptroller General shall submit to the Congress not more than thirty days after the close of each quarter a report on the audit for such quarter performed by the General Accounting Office pursuant to this subsection.

(d) The restrictions and controls provided for in this section with respect to the \$200,000,000 referred to in subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be in addition to such other restrictions and controls as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the Air Force.

These funds are included in the committee's recommendation for the appropriation entitled, "Procurement of Aircraft, Air Force."

Procurement of aircraft spares and repair parts.—\$66.2 million is recommended for the procurement of aircraft spares and repair parts for the support of the C-5A force. These funds are included in the committee's rec-

ommendation for the appropriation entitled, "Procurement of Aircraft, Air Force."

Research and development.—The committee's recommendation for the appropriation entitled, "Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Air Force," includes \$11.6 million for the continuation of the C-5A testing programs.

The C-5A aircraft program is discussed on pages 291-294, 342-343, 424-432, 601-602, and 730-733 of part 4 of the committee's hearings on the Department of Defense appropriations bill, 1971.

MINUTEMAN MISSILE PROGRAM

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, the committee's recommendations include \$898.5 million for the continuation of the development and deployment of the Minuteman II and III systems, including \$29.4 million for the operational base launch program. The Minuteman program is discussed on pages 46-48 of the committee's report, and I ask unanimous consent that these remarks be included in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the pages were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MINUTEMAN MISSILE PROGRAM

The recommendations of the committee include \$898.5 million for the Minuteman II and III missile programs. The planned force of 1,000 Minuteman missiles was attained in April of 1967, with the deployment of 800 Minuteman I's and 200 Minuteman II's, and the current plan calls for the replacement of Minuteman I's with Minuteman II's and III's. The current operation force includes approximately 500 Minuteman I's, 500 Minuteman II's, and a limited number of Minuteman III's, which were initially deployed in June of 1970. The long-range plan calls for a force of 500 Minuteman II's and 500 Minuteman III's.

The Minuteman III provides a major improvement in capability over the Minuteman I and II. It has an improved guidance and control system, and its improved third stage provides additional throw weight to carry the MK-12 reentry system. The MK-12 system with its multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) and penetration aid capability will greatly enhance the Minuteman III's effectiveness against ABM defenses, and the number of warheads is increased without increasing the number of missiles in the force.

Included in the total recommended for the Minuteman program is approximately \$29.4 million for the support of the planned operational base launch program. The objectives of this effort is to flight test the Minuteman system from an operational silo in order to obtain as realistic a configuration and environment as possible. The first such test calls for the firing of a Minuteman II missile from an operational silo in the Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont., Minuteman complex into the Pacific. The planned line of flight would be across the Northwestern portion of the United States into the Pacific Ocean area some 200 miles south of San Francisco over a corridor encompassing the least population density possible. It is the view of the committee that these flight tests should be conducted in order to demonstrate the reliability of the Minuteman system. In recommending funds for this program, the committee calls attention to the fact that three efforts to launch a modified Minuteman II from an operational silo all resulted in failures.

The funds recommended are for the following purposes:

Procurement of missiles.—\$447.2 million is recommended for the procurement of Minuteman missiles and associated ground equipment. The sum recommended and \$34.9

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million advance procurement will provide a total of \$482.1 million for this purpose. This recommendation is based on a 15-month production leadtime and support of the planned deployment rate during the fiscal year 1971 funding period. Funds are also included for the procurement of missiles to support the operation test program and to provide spare missiles for logistic support of the deployed forces. The total recommended includes \$3.2 million for the procurement of range safety destruct equipment, operational qualification testing, and contractor support for the operational base launch program. These funds are included in the appropriation entitled, "Missile procurement, Air Force."

Advance procurement.—\$28.5 million is recommended for the advance procurement of long leadtime components to support the planned fiscal year 1972 Minuteman missile procurement program. These funds are included in the appropriation entitled, "Missile procurement, Air Force."

Missile spares and repair parts.—\$26.2 million is recommended for the procurement of initial missile spares and repair parts required for the support of the missiles and associated equipment in the fiscal year 1971 procurement program. These funds are included in the appropriation entitled, "Missile procurement, Air Force."

Force modifications.—\$166 million is recommended for modifications of existing Minuteman missiles and associated equipment. Of the total, \$69.7 million is for the modification of existing launch and launch control facilities from a Minuteman I to a Minuteman II and III capability. The balance of \$96.3 million is for the update program that provides for correction of known deficiencies during testing or inservice use. These funds are included in the appropriation entitled, "Missile procurement, Air Force."

Other procurement.—The committee's recommendation for the appropriation entitled, "Other procurement, Air Force" includes \$6.4 million for the procurement of telecommunications and electronic equipment for the support of the operational base launch program.

Research and development.—The committee's recommendation for the appropriation entitled, "Research, development, test, and evaluation, Air Force," includes \$224.2 million for the continuation of the Minuteman development and testing program. Of the total recommended, \$185.4 million is for such efforts as systems integration and testing, guidance and control support, postboost propulsion system testing and implace and in-flight hardness testing of the Minuteman III. The balance of \$38.8 million is for general support and further implace and in-flight hardness testing of the Minuteman II. Within the total recommended, \$19.8 million is for the support of the operational base launch program which will provide for the development of range safety destruct ordnance, missile integration, flight demonstration support, contractor support, and development of airborne equipment.

In addition to the above referred to funds the committee's recommendation for the appropriation entitled, "Research, development, test, and evaluation, Air Force" includes funds for the following efforts associated with the Minuteman system: Minuteman rebasing, \$61 million, and command data buffer (ground base computer system), \$10 million. The Minuteman program is discussed on pages 270-276, 364-365, 459-462, 577, and 795-797 of part 4 of the committee's hearings on the Department of Defense appropriation bill, 1971.

SUPPORT OF FREE WORLD FORCES

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, section 838 of the bill as it passed the other body authorizes the use of appropria-

tions available to the Department of Defense during the current fiscal year for the support of free world forces participating in the war in Southeast Asia without limitation. The use of funds for this purpose was authorized in section 502 of the Department of Defense Procurement and Research and Development Authorization Act, 1971 (Public Law 91-441). However, the Authorization Act provides for a limitation of \$2.8 billion on the total that may be used for the support of these forces. The President's budget was based on the use of approximately \$2.2 billion for this purpose. The committee recommends that section 383 be amended to impose a limitation of \$2.5 billion.

The committee also recommends that section 838 be amended to include the restrictive language included in section 502 of the Authorization Act with respect to the support of free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Governments of Cambodia and Laos, and the use of funds for the payment of allowances to free world forces personnel in excess of such payments to U.S. military personnel.

These recommendations of the committee are discussed on pages 7 and 8 of the committee report. I ask unanimous consent to have these comments included at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the comments are ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SUPPORT OF FREE WORLD FORCES—SECTION 838

Section 838 of the bill authorizes the use of appropriations available to the Department of Defense to support Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of the Vietnamese forces and for the support of local forces in Laos and Thailand and for related costs. The recommendations of the committee include \$2,165,300,000 for these purposes. These funds are included in the following titles of the bill:

	Millions
Military personnel-----	\$145.0
Operation and maintenance-----	780.1
Procurement-----	940.2
Combat readiness, South Vietnamese forces-----	300.0
Total-----	2,165.3

¹ In addition, the appropriation entitled "Military Construction, Army" in the Military Construction Appropriation Act, 1971 includes \$12 million for the support of free world forces.

Of the \$2,165.3 million recommended, \$1,749.2 million is for the South Vietnamese Forces (including \$285.7 million for the modernizing program), and the balance is for the support of other free world forces in South Vietnam and for local forces in Laos and Thailand.

As the bill passed the House, funds would be available for the support of free world forces without limitation as to the amount. The committee recommends that Section 838 be amended so as to impose a limitation of \$2,500,000,000 on the total that can be used for support of free world forces during fiscal year 1971. It is the view of the Committee that this limitation will give the Secretary of Defense adequate flexibility to meet any unforeseen costs of the Vietnamization program. The Committee also recommends that Section 838 be amended to include the restrictive language included in Section 502 of the Authorization Act with respect to the support of free world forces in actions de-

signed to provide military support and assistance to the governments of Cambodia and Laos, and the use of funds for the payment of allowances to free world forces personnel in excess of such payments to United States personnel.

The funds recommended for these purposes are provided pursuant to and in accord with section 502 of the Department of Defense Procurement and Research Authorization Act, 1971 (Public Law 91-441), which read as follows:

"Sec. 502. Subsection (a) of section 401 of Public Law 89-367, approved March 15, 1966 (80 Stat. 37), as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"(a) (1) Not to exceed \$2,800,000,000 of the funds authorized for appropriation for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes to support: (A) Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces, (B) local forces in Laos and Thailand; and for related costs, during the fiscal year 1971 on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine. None of the funds appropriated to or for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States may be used for the purpose of paying any overseas allowance, per diem allowance, or any other addition to the regular base pay of any person serving with the free world forces in South Vietnam if the amount of such payment would be greater than the amount of special pay authorized to be paid, for an equivalent period of service, to members of the Armed Forces of the United States (under section 310 of title 37, United States Code) serving in Vietnam or in any other hostile fire area, except for continuation of payments of such additions to regular base pay provided in agreements executed prior to July 1, 1970. Nothing in clause (A) of the first sentence of this paragraph shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos."

INTRODUCTION OF AMERICAN COMBAT GROUND FORCES INTO LAOS, THAILAND, AND CAMBODIA

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, as the bill passed the other body, it includes section 843 as proposed in the President's budget which prohibits the use of funds provided in the bill for the financing of the introduction of American ground forces into Laos or Thailand, and the committee recommends that this provision be amended to include Cambodia. The committee's recommendation is based on the fact that earlier in this session the Senate adopted a somewhat similar amendment on a rollcall vote of 58 yeas to 37 nays. This recommendation is discussed on pages 10 and 11 of the report, and I ask unanimous consent to have these comments included at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the comments are ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PROHIBITION AGAINST THE USE OF FUNDS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF AMERICAN GROUND FORCES INTO LAOS, THAILAND, AND CAMBODIA

Section 843 of the bill as it passed the House provides that none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand. The committee recommends that this provision be amended to include Cambodia, so as to read as follows:

"Sec. 843. In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by this Act

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shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos, Thailand, or Cambodia."

This matter was debated at length by the Senate earlier in this Session in connection with an amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Bill (H.R. 15828), and the Senate adopted, on a roll call vote of 53 yeas to 37 nays, an amendment which reads as follows:

"Sec. 7. The Foreign Military Sales Act is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"Sec. 47. Limitations on United States Involvement in Cambodia.—In concert with the declared objectives of the President of the United States to avoid the involvement of the United States in Cambodia after July 1, 1970, and to expedite the withdrawal of American forces from Cambodia, it is hereby provided that unless specifically authorized by law hereafter enacted, no funds authorized or appropriated pursuant to this Act or any other law may be expended after July 1, 1970, for the purposes of—

"(1) retaining United States forces in Cambodia;

"(2) paying the compensation or allowances of, or otherwise supporting, directly or indirectly, any United States personnel in Cambodia who furnished military instruction to Cambodian forces or engage in any combat activity in support of Cambodian forces;

"(3) entering into or carrying out any contract or agreement to provide military instruction in Cambodia, or to provide persons to engage in any combat activity in support of Cambodian forces; or

"(4) conducting any combat activity in the air above Cambodia in direct support of Cambodian forces."

Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to impugn the constitutional power of the President as Commander-in-Chief, including the exercise of that constitutional power which may be necessary to protect the lives of United States Armed Forces wherever deployed. Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to impugn the constitutional powers of the Congress including the power to declare war and to make rules for the Government and regulation of the Armed Forces of the United States."

The committee's recommendation for the inclusion of Cambodia in this provision is based on this earlier action of the Senate.

ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, press reports in the past week indicate that 10 European nations of the North Atlantic Alliance have agreed on a defense improvement program in which, over a 5-year period, they will provide close to \$1 billion to improve military installations and increase existing forces. According to the report, funds will be used for an integrated communications system and a new shelter program to provide a better aircraft survival system.

Some Members of the Senate will welcome this news as the initiation of a long overdue process aimed at equalizing, to a degree at least, the NATO burden that for so long has fallen disproportionately on the shoulders of the United States. Speaking for myself, I am not all satisfied with the proposal made. It is entirely too small.

For almost two decades I have urged every Secretary of Defense since Louis Johnson to secure from our NATO allies greater cooperation in the form of increased combat forces, installations, and improved equipment and materiel. During those years, I repeatedly stated that such an equalization of the burden was

dictated by economic necessity as much as by fairness. To a large extent my pleas fell on deaf ears. Today, this is no longer solely my point of view. It is no longer an opinion; it is a fact. History has caught up with us. Our continued deficits, our annual gold drain, the inflationary spiral, and our pressing needs in other areas of the Government make it imperative that we—and our allies—realistically face this fact. To do otherwise would be foolhardy. Early this year and again last month, I queried the Secretary of Defense about the matter. He promised to do something about it. It seems that my urging, and that of others, has finally borne some fruit. However, I must confess that this is but a very small beginning, that in the future even greater contributions must be forthcoming by our allies. I would also hope that all of the countries involved will cooperate in this common endeavor, that they will search their souls as well as their exchequers and assume their proper responsibilities.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the complete statement be included at this point in the Record.

My enthusiasm for this gesture of our allies was further limited by the statement made by the Secretary of State on behalf of the President to the NATO Foreign Ministers at Brussels recently. In this statement he said:

We have agreed that NATO's conventional forces must not only be maintained, but in certain key areas, strengthened. Given a similar approach by our allies, the United States will maintain and improve its own forces in Europe and will not reduce them unless there is reciprocal action by our adversaries . . .

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT DELIVERED BY SECRETARY ROGERS TO THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

The meeting of the North Atlantic Alliance will be one of the most important conferences in the history of the alliance. This past year has witnessed the completion of a comprehensive review of alliance defense that can serve as the basis for a common effort throughout this decade. This review testifies to the continuing value of candid consultations based on mutual respect and to the common recognition that the prospects for peace rest primarily on our ability and willingness to maintain an alliance sufficiently strong to deter those who might threaten war.

After the most searching consultations, together we have arrived at several fundamental conclusions which will help us maintain NATO's strength while the alliance seeks to translate the promise of detente into the reality of a just and lasting peace.

We have reaffirmed flexibility of response as the proper strategy for a defensive alliance confronted by a formidable mix of a potentially hostile force, which is constantly improving.

We have agreed that NATO's conventional forces must not only be maintained, but in certain key areas, strengthened. Given a similar approach by our Allies, the United States will maintain and improve its own forces in Europe and will not reduce them unless there is reciprocal action from our adversaries. We will continue to talk with our NATO Allies with regard to how we can meet our responsibilities together.

The allies have agreed to move to trans-

form the recommendations of the study into fact. This should provide NATO with an enhanced capability sufficient to make the strategy of flexible response a more credible factor in the equation of deterrence.

In the process of this review we were heartened by the efforts of several of the alliance's members to create a new and more equitable sharing of the burdens of the alliance through a greater effort by our allies to meet the challenges of NATO defense in the decade of the seventies. This European initiative gives concrete testimony to the vitality and spirit of the European allies. NATO has strong support among the American people. Successful efforts to improve European forces and absorb a greater share of the burden will insure continued support.

I welcome the achievements of the alliance. I am certain we can move from agreed goals to practical action with the same seriousness of purpose.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, again speaking personally, although I know I voice the views of many of my colleagues, I regret this stated commitment. Certainly I would welcome with all my heart some signal of reciprocity on the part of Russia and its own allies. They should recognize that a mutually beneficial lessening of tensions can only be achieved through reduced force levels, as the Secretary of State indicated—"in reciprocal action."

But this reciprocal action is equally applicable to our own allies. If it is the considered judgment of the NATO leaders that ground forces of the present size are needed, then it is incumbent upon our allies to increase their commitment to permit the withdrawal of sizable numbers of American troops from Europe. For this fiscal year, there will be appropriated approximately \$14 billion representing the costs of supporting U.S. general purpose forces in Europe and similar forces maintained in this country as a European contingency.

I recently made a trip to visit most of the NATO countries, just as I did 10 years ago. To be frank and candid, I found very little difference in military preparations between 10 years ago and now, except as to Germany. We are continuing to bear a disproportionate share of the burden. In addition to our Armed Forces in Europe, we have a very large number of civilians, many of them are dependents. To maintain them is very costly to us.

Our 6th Fleet is in the Mediterranean. In addition, we have a large contingent in the Atlantic, the cost of which is being paid by Uncle Sam without any assistance from any of our Western allies in Europe. It is time for them to wake up.

On my recent trip, I found that a change of attitude has come about only in the last couple of years, since the Russians entered the Mediterranean. That seems to have awakened our allies a little. With all that is going on in Western Europe now, it strikes me that it is only a question of time before we should halt all of the aid we are giving to the countries in Western Europe that are well able to take care of themselves. Therefore, I think it is unnecessary for us to be carrying almost the entire load.

This \$14 billion is what the American taxpayer provides annually for such military support. It is my considered opinion

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that we cannot continue this vast outlay indefinitely. I would look to our allies to recognize this and take immediate steps to relieve us of this onerous burden.

It is up to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Chief Executive to impress upon these governments who for years have accepted our largesse and protection that the time has come for them to fully equalize the burden. They are hard realists. They know when we mean what we say. If the administration is unwilling or unable to convince the NATO countries of the urgency of our reducing American forces in Europe, then it is incumbent upon the Congress to make these decisions. This is a matter that the next session of the Congress must deal with. It is imperative that we do so. The welfare of our country demands it. As a member of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and its Department of Defense Subcommittee, I will do all that I can to present facts that will warrant our withdrawal of troops from Western Europe at a much earlier date.

I talked with a number of European NATO organization personnel, and in my judgment, there is little effort being made to assist us. When I talked about monetary contributions, they said, "We cannot afford that. We might be able to increase our troops."

I said, "If you do, we will withdraw ours."

They said, "No, you must not withdraw yours."

I asked, "How long do you think we ought to stay here?"

"Ten years at least," was the reply.

Mr. President, as I told those people, we cannot do that. We cannot possibly afford to maintain a military umbrella of protection over Western Europe any longer. It is up to our allies in Western Europe to participate more fully in their own protection. I think Congress should be addressing itself to this subject when it meets next year.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish to say that I am in full accord with what the distinguished acting chairman for the bill now under consideration has said about NATO and our position there.

It appears that we have, once again, been taken. I recognize the fact that at one time there were as many as 385,000 U.S. military personnel in Western Europe, and that that number has declined to a little under 300,000 at the present time, so that, overall, we have there about 525,000 military personnel and dependents—a quarter of a century after the end of the Second World War.

It is true that the direct costs to us are about \$3 billion a year, which we can ill afford to lose—to squander, in my opinion—and that out of the defense budget, as the distinguished Senator from Louisiana has stated, it takes about \$14 billion a year to maintain those elements which we have there.

The recent meeting, just a week or so ago, was to me a deep disappointment because of the firm pledge which the ex-

ecutive branch made as to what we would do in keeping our forces at their present level. There was a lot of talk and a lot of coverup, but in reality what it amounted to was only a delay in facing up to the problems which confront the NATO Alliance.

Our NATO partners are getting off very cheaply at a proposed figure of \$195 million a year over the next 5 years. As far as contributing manpower, the United States is in just as bad a position as ever and our European Allies are in just as good a position, to wit, no change at all.

The compromise reached between the administration and our NATO Allies is only a coverup for a situation which calls for drastic attention. What the United States supposedly got was a NATO capability for fighting a 90-day holding or conventional war. What the United States got, in effect, was nothing because there will be no such happening as a "90-day conventional war on the ground." The end result will be, in my opinion, a Western European Continent weaker than ever and a delay in the time when the issue will have to be faced.

Now it looks as if we are waiting for a quid pro quo to reduce our costly contest. Well, if that is the case, if we are waiting for the Soviet Union to get its troops out of Eastern Europe, I think we are going to wait a very long time and we had better become accustomed to a permanent American presence in Western Europe.

With them it is a matter of geography. As far as we are concerned, it is a matter of having a sizable contingent—say at most two divisions and our nuclear capability. That would bring about a reduction of two and one half divisions from the present four and one half or five as well as a large reduction in expenditures.

I had hoped that this administration, by applying the termination date of June 30, 1971, would after that time begin to bring about a substantial reduction in American troops and dependents in Western Europe.

I would like to find out just how many headquarters we have in Western Europe, just how many generals we have in Western Europe, just how many colonels we have in Western Europe, and the answers to a lot of other questions, because I must say that while economics influences my thinking, literally it is of secondary significance. The important thing is the principle.

A quarter of a century after the end of the war, with all these countries fully rehabilitated, as the distinguished Senator has indicated, and fully able to take care of their own needs, maintaining direct contacts with the countries of Eastern Europe, maintaining a trade contact with the Soviet Union, entering into consortiums to establish trade contacts such as the steel rolling mill with Communist China—all of indicates a change which I think calls for a change in an outdated policy which has now, once again, been not inaugurated but maintained.

As I understood the Nixon doctrine, it was to maintain a low profile all over the world. It was to bring about a gradual

withdrawal of American troops and gradually more dependence on the people in the regions concerned.

The low profile may be taking effect in Southeast Asia and in Asia generally, but it seems to be taking the opposite stance as far as Western Europe is concerned.

I assure the distinguished Senator from Louisiana that as far as I am concerned, I intend to do all that I possibly can—and not only through sense of the Senate resolutions—to try to bring about a rectification of this policy, to bring about a substantial reduction of American troops and dependents. It should be done over not too long a period of time, but still, on a gradual basis. I think the time is long overdue to face up to this matter. I think the American people want this done. I am certain that a majority of the Senate wants it done. Unless it comes about this spirit of permanency will continue to permeate our policies. Unless something is done in the Senate, apparently, we can look forward to a permanent stationing in Europe of U.S. military personnel and dependents, not for years but for decades.

The cost is too great and the principle of necessary change is too sound to let go of at this time.

I reiterate that it is the principle which counts, and it is long past time when a substantial part of the American military personnel and their dependents in Europe should have been brought home.

It is with a sense of gratification that I commend the distinguished Senator from Louisiana. He has been very consistent in his attitude toward this particular problem, and I wish to assure him once again of my wholehearted support of any initiative which he undertakes, both in committee and on the floor.

Mr. ELLENDER. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the committee amendments be agreed to en bloc, and that the bill as thus amended be considered as original text for the purposes of further amendment, provided that no points of order be considered as waived thereby.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Louisiana? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The amendments agreed to en bloc are as follows:

On page 2, line 10, after the word "elsewhere", strike out "\$7,822,450,000" and insert "\$7,861,750,000".

On page 2, line 18, after the word "cadets", strike out "\$4,360,100,000" and insert "\$4,377,100,000".

On page 3, line 2, after the word "elsewhere", strike out "\$1,422,700,000" and insert "\$1,430,600,000".

On page 3, line 10, after the word "cadets", strike out "\$5,973,350,000" and insert "\$6,002,425,000".

On page 4, line 19, after the word "law", strike out "\$86,200,000" and insert "\$84,200,000".

On page 5, line 12, after the word "law", strike out "\$108,500,000" and insert "\$106,500,000".

On page 6, line 19, after the word "exceed", strike out "\$4,000,000" and insert "\$3,634,000"; and, in line 25, after the word "Government", strike out "\$8,269,011,000" and insert "\$6,228,687,000".

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On page 8, at the beginning of line 7, strike out "\$4,731,910,000" and insert "\$4,685,410,000".

On page 9, line 1, after the word "salaries", strike out "\$399,943,000" and insert "\$402,743,000".

On page 10, line 5, after the word "Government", strike out "\$6,167,136,000" and insert "\$6,093,236,000".

On page 12, line 22, after the word "Bureau", strike out "\$337,600,000" and insert "\$343,600,000".

On page 13, line 11, after the word "Board", strike out "\$100,000" and insert "\$65,000".

On page 15, line 2, after the word "authorized", strike out "\$2,933,100,000" and insert "\$2,930,000,000", and in addition \$50,000,000 shall be derived by transfer from the Army stock fund; and, in line 4, after the word "available", strike out "for obligation until June 30, 1973" and insert "until expended".

On page 15, line 21, after the word "plants", strike out "\$3,005,800,000" and insert "\$3,127,900,000", and in addition, \$100,000,000 shall be derived by transfer from the Defense stock fund; and, in line 24, after the word "available", strike out "for obligation until June 30, 1973" and insert "until expended".

On page 16, line 13, after the word "amended", strike out "\$2,694,400,000" and insert "\$2,276,900,000"; and, in line 14, after the word "available", strike out "for obligation until June 30, 1975" and insert "until expended".

On page 17, line 12, after the word "plants", strike out "\$1,443,400,000" and insert "\$1,487,300,000"; and, in line 13, after the word "available", strike out "for obligation until June 30, 1973" and insert "until expended".

On page 17, line 23, after the word "only", strike out "\$171,700,000" and insert "\$175,900,000"; and, at the beginning of line 24, strike out "for obligation until June 30, 1973" and insert "until expended".

On page 18, line 16, after the word "things", strike out "\$3,203,000,000" and insert "\$3,201,300,000"; and, in line 17, after the word "available", strike out "for obligation until June 30, 1973" and insert "until expended".

On page 19, line 6, after the word "things", strike out "\$1,372,300,000" and insert "\$1,380,400,000", and in addition, \$50,000,000 shall be derived by transfer from the Defense stock fund; and, in line 8, after the word "available", strike out "for obligation until June 30, 1973" and insert "until expended".

On page 19, line 24, after the word "amended", strike out "\$1,381,200,000" and insert "\$1,345,100,000"; and, in line 25, after the word "avoidable", strike out "for obligation until June 30, 1973" and insert "until expended".

On page 20, line 14, after the word "amended", strike out "\$38,910,000" and insert "\$45,310,000"; and, in line 15, after the word "available", strike out "for obligation until June 30, 1973" and insert "until expended".

On page 20, line 24, after the word "law", strike out "1,608,500,000" and insert "\$1,589,700,000"; and, in line 25, after the word "available", strike out "for obligation until June 30, 1972" and insert "until expended".

On page 21, line 6, after the word "law", strike out "\$2,156,200,000" and insert "\$2,150,500,000"; and, in line 7, after the word "available", strike out "for obligation until June 30, 1972" and insert "until expended".

On page 21, line 14, after the word "law", strike out "\$2,701,100,000" and insert "\$2,744,800,000"; and, in line 15, after the word "available", strike out "for obligation until June 30, 1972" and insert "until expended".

On page 21, line 28, after the word "available", strike out "for obligation until June 30, 1972" and insert "until expended"; and, on page 22, line 1, after the amendment just above stated, strike out "\$438,900,000" and insert "\$445,100,000".

On page 22, line 23, after "\$50,000,000", strike out the comma and "and, in addition, not to exceed \$150,000,000, to be used upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such funds can be wisely, profitably, and practically used in the interest of national defense and to be derived by transfer from such appropriations available to the Department of Defense for obligation during the current fiscal year as the Secretary of Defense may designate: *Provided*, That any appropriations transferred shall not exceed 7 per centum of the appropriations from which transferred".

On page 23, line 16, after the word "transferred", strike out "\$358,500,000" and insert "\$300,000,000"; and, in line 17, after the amendment just above stated, strike out the comma and "to remain available for the period of availability of the appropriation to which transferred, and in addition \$150,000,000 to be derived by transfer from such appropriations available to the Department of Defense for obligation in the current fiscal year as the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President, may designate: *Provided*, That the Secretary of Defense shall notify the Congress promptly of all transfers made pursuant to this authority".

On page 24, line 7, after the word "available", strike out "for obligation until June 30, 1973" and insert "until expended".

On page 26, line 20, after the word "exceeding", strike out "\$134,400,000" and insert "\$136,700,000"; and, on page 28, line 11, after the word "amended", insert a semicolon and "(1) under regulations approved by the Secretary of Defense, for transportation from their homes to rest and recuperation centers in the Pacific area and return, plus per diem payments of not to exceed \$30 per day for each dependent for periods not over two weeks, for dependents of military personnel assigned as province or district; senior advisers in Vietnam on voluntarily extended tours of duty totaling not less than 18 months, during periods when such military personnel are granted special incentive leaves at such rest and recuperation centers."

On page 42, after line 24, strike out: "Sec. 836. During the current fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense may, if he deems it vital to the security of the United States and in the national interest to further improve the readiness of the Armed Forces, including the reserve components, transfer under the authority and terms of the Emergency Fund an additional \$300,000,000: *Provided*, That the transfer authority made available under the terms of the Emergency Fund appropriation contained in this Act is hereby broadened to meet the requirements of this section: *Provided further*, That the Secretary of Defense shall notify Congress promptly of all transfers made pursuant to this authority."

And, in lieu thereof, insert:

"Sec. 836. Upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is necessary in the national interest, he may, with the approval of the Office of Management and Budget, transfer not to exceed \$700,000,000 of the appropriations contained in this Act between such appropriations: *Provided*, That the Secretary of Defense shall notify the Congress promptly of all transfers made pursuant to this authority."

On page 44, line 3, after "(a)", strike out "Appropriations" and insert "Not to exceed \$2,500,000,000 of the appropriations"; and, in line 10, after the word "determine", insert a colon and "Provided, That none of the funds appropriated by this Act may be used for the purpose of paying any overseas allowance, per diem allowance, or any other addition to the regular base pay of any person serving with the free world forces in South Vietnam if the amount of such pay-

ment would be greater than the amount of special pay authorized to be paid, for an equivalent period of service, to members of the Armed Forces of the United States (under section 310 of title 37, United States Code) serving in Vietnam or in any other hostile fire area, except for continuation of payments of such additions to regular base pay provided in agreements executed prior to July 1, 1970: *Provided further*, That nothing in clause (1) of the first sentence of this subsection shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos."

On page 46, after line 8, strike out: "Sec. 842. Appropriations heretofore made available for Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army; Procurement of Aircraft and Missiles, Navy; Other Procurement, Navy; Procurement, Marine Corps; Aircraft Procurement, Air Force; Missile Procurement, Air Force; Other Procurement, Air Force; Procurement, Defense Agencies; and Special Foreign Currency Program shall not be available for obligation after June 30, 1973. Appropriation heretofore made available for Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, shall not be available for obligation after June 30, 1975. Appropriations heretofore made available under the headings Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army; Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy; Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Air Force; and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense Agencies shall not be available for obligation after June 30, 1972.

And, in lieu thereof, insert:

"Sec. 842. (a) Amounts, as determined by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the Office of Management and Budget, of any appropriations of the Department of Defense available for procurement (except Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy) which (1) will remain unobligated as of the close of any fiscal year for which estimates are submitted and (2) which have been available for obligation for three or more fiscal years, shall be withdrawn and shall revert to the general fund of Treasury.

"(b) Amounts, as determined by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the Office of Management and Budget, of any appropriations of the Department of Defense available for Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy which (1) will remain unobligated as of the close of any fiscal year for which estimates are submitted and (2) which have been available for obligation for five or more fiscal years, shall be withdrawn and shall revert to the general fund of the Treasury.

"(c) Amounts, as determined by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the Office of Management and Budget, of any appropriations of the Department of Defense available for research, development, test and evaluation (except Emergency Fund, Defense) which (1) will remain unobligated as of the close of any fiscal year for which estimates are submitted and (2) which have been available for obligation for two or more fiscal years, shall be withdrawn and shall revert to the general fund of Treasury.

"(d) The Comptroller General of the United States shall examine the internal system upon which the determinations required by this section are based and shall submit to the Congress, prior to April 1, 1971, a report as to the adequacy of such internal system.

"(e) Section 642 of the Department of Defense Appropriation, 1970 (Public Law 91-171, approved December 29, 1969), is hereby repealed."

On page 48, line 14, after "Laos", strike out "or" and insert a comma; and, in the same line, after "Thailand", insert "or Cambodia".

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On page 48, line 17, after the word "purposes", strike out "which would be authorized by section 610 of the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1971, as passed by the Senate" and insert "authorized by section 610, Public Law 91-511, approved October 26, 1970".

On page 48, after line 20, insert a new section, as follows:

SEC. 845. No part of the funds appropriated in this Act may be used to carry out any research project or study unless such project or study has a direct and apparent relationship to a specific military function or operation.

At the top of page 49, insert a new section, as follows:

SEC. 846. After June 15, 1971, no part of the funds in this Act shall be available to support in excess of 138,000 personnel of the Department of Defense (military and civilian) assigned to activities managed under the Intelligence and Security Program of the Department of Defense.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, before I yield the floor, I wish to take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to the distinguished Senator from North Dakota (Mr. Young) who has contributed so much to the formulation of the bill before the Senate. His pertinent questions at the daily hearings that he regularly attended, his breadth of knowledge of the issues involved, and his wise and impartial counsel in the determination of the proper course of action have been of inestimable aid to the committee and to Congress.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, I deeply appreciate the very kind comments of my friend, the distinguished Senator from Louisiana, the acting chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.

The bill does represent a great amount of hard work for almost an entire year by the chairman of this committee. This is also true of the entire Senate Appropriations Committee and the very able staff members, William W. Woodruff, Edmund L. Hartung, Fran Hewitt and Guy McConnell. The bill probably does not represent as much money as many would like. Certainly, the military would like to have more money, and certainly could justify more. But, on the whole, I believe it represents the most reasonable budget with which we could come up with at this time.

Mr. President, the Defense Appropriations bill which we are now considering providing \$66,417,077,000 does represent a very sizable budget.

It also represents a considerable reduction over the budget of 2 years ago. It is \$389,484,000 below the amount approved by the House and \$2,328,389,000 below the 1971 budget estimates. That is a sizable reduction. Further, Mr. President, it is \$6,249,955,144 below the 1970 appropriation.

In the past 2 years there has been a reduction of approximately \$12 billion in the amount requested by the Bureau of the Budget. During this period we have experienced severe inflation, so the purchasing power of the budget we are providing today would be approximately \$17 billion below the purchasing power of the money appropriated 2 years ago.

I realize there are some who very sincerely believe this is still too big a budget and that it should be cut further. It certainly can be argued that there is some waste in a Federal budget this size, whether it be for the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Government. The same arguments would be appropriate even if it involves a budget of \$5 or \$10 billion.

Great progress has been made in the last few years, however, toward eliminating wasteful and unnecessary expenditures. I will have more to say on this later.

Mr. President, few realize that nearly \$40 billion of the \$66.4 billion contained in this bill goes to pay for costs of personnel of the Department of Defense, both military and civilian. Great strides have been made toward reducing the number of personnel in the Defense Department in the past 2 years. If we are to further reduce the defense budget, it is absolutely necessary that further deep cuts be made in personnel in the Department of Defense if we are to provide anywhere near the amount of money necessary for the modernization of our Armed Forces. Military and civilian personnel have been reduced from 4,735,000 on July 1, 1969, to an estimated low of 4,053,000 on July 1, 1971, or a reduction of 682,000. The Secretary of Defense has announced that still more cuts are scheduled.

In the last 2 years, 32 major military bases around the world and in the United States have been closed and still other bases are expected to be closed. Seventy-one military bases have been closed during the same period. Two hundred sixty-six ships have been retired from the Navy. These are important steps, too, toward reducing the appropriations for the Department of Defense and making possible more and much needed additional funds for the modernization of our Armed Forces.

Mr. President, as I mentioned previously, great progress has been made toward eliminating wasteful and unnecessary expenditures. Some old contract procedures which resulted in huge overruns in cost have been eliminated. A new so-called fly before you buy procedure of the Defense Department with respect to planes and even missiles has resulted in great savings to the Government and in better military equipment.

I share the views of a great many people that this budget is not adequate to carry on the war in Vietnam and all of our other worldwide commitments and still maintain a strong national defense. Under all the circumstances, however, I believe it is a reasonable budget and one with which the Department of Defense can live.

Ever since the advent of World War I, in which we became involved at a time when we had an obsolete and inadequate national defense, I have been deeply concerned about the need for the United States to have the most modern and best military equipment of any other nation in the world.

With the new foreign policy announced by President Nixon, we are reducing our worldwide commitments. This new policy is long overdue. This will

mean far less manpower in the Department of Defense, which, in turn, would result in further savings. This will go a long way toward making possible a program of increased modernization in our armed services.

With the many costly domestic and foreign programs along with the war in Vietnam, our overall budget has become so huge that we have been cutting back too severely on the modernization of our armed services—and this at a time when Russia has been increasing their budget year after year to provide the most modern of all kinds of military hardware, such as missiles, planes and tanks.

Unless this trend is reversed, we will soon be a second rate military power to Russia. We are already second rate in certain areas of military hardware.

Mr. President, whether it is popular or unpopular to maintain an adequate national security, I shall continue to do whatever I can toward providing the necessary funds to make sure that we are not a second rate power and thus subjected to all of the blackmail that be sure to result.

While the Navy has retired 266 ships in the past 2 years, Russia has been making great strides forward in building a bigger and more modern Navy. If we want to even keep abreast of Russia, we must provide more new and modern ships, such as nuclear submarines. In order to effect a savings and make some reduction in this Defense budget, a start on a nuclear submarine was delted from the House-passed bill. This is a cut that is going to hurt and the kind that we cannot continue indefinitely in the future.

Russia is building new nuclear submarines at a rate approximately eight times that of the United States, and in the matter of a short while could well surpass us in this very important area of national defense.

Because of some serious problems we have experienced in the acquisition of new and more modern fighter planes, we are slipping behind Russia in this important phase of military defense. Their newest fighter planes are equal or superior to anything we have in our inventory today.

We have two new fighter planes which we believe will be superior to anything Russia has—the F-14 and the F-15. The F-14 will not be operational, however, until the spring of 1973; and the F-15 will be operational in mid-1975. Even this schedule would be delayed if we fail to provide the necessary funds for the research and development of these new and absolutely necessary planes. Fortunately, there are funds in this bill to continue with the research and development of these planes.

The Soviet Government has been working feverishly to surpass us in both the number and effectiveness of intercontinental missiles. Their SS-9 carries a far bigger megatonnage than any of our intercontinental missiles. We believe, however, that our Minuteman, which we think has a more modern and sophisticated warhead, is still superior for the time being. The Russians have announced just recently their first long-

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range test firing of an improved SS-13 intercontinental missile into the Pacific. While the Russians are about equal to us in the number of intercontinental missiles, we still believe that we have a narrow margin of superiority in this area. This superiority could easily be overcome if we failed to continue the modernization of our missiles.

With the winding down of the war in Vietnam, hopefully our military budget can be lower in future years and still provide the money so badly needed for the modernization of our Armed Forces.

Cutbacks in defense spending do have some adverse effects on our national economy. The 683,000 civilian and military personnel that have been retired from the military services have added substantially to our unemployment problem. Cutbacks in defense-related industries have meant a further reduction in the same period of approximately 1,200,000 defense-related jobs.

Mr. President, in this connection, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks a column by James McCartney entitled "Defense Trims Wipe Out Jobs Across Nation" which was published in the Miami Herald on Sunday, November 29. This article gives a vivid and, I believe, quite accurate analysis of the new unemployment problem we face.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STEVENSON). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, I do not mean to imply that we must maintain a huge defense establishment just to provide jobs. But I do want to point out that the cutback in defense spending has and will continue to affect employment in industry in this country. I am hopeful that increased public works and other means will be found to offset this drop in employment opportunities.

Mr. President, I am hopeful that the Senate will approve this defense budget bill the same, or substantially the same, as it came from the Senate Appropriations Committee where it received long and most diligent consideration.

EXHIBIT 1

DEFENSE TRIMS WIPE OUT JOBS ACROSS NATION
(By James McCartney)

WASHINGTON.—President Nixon's slashing attack on the nation's semi-sacred defense budget is cutting deep into the economy.

Literally hundreds of thousands of men have been thrown out of work as a direct result.

Hundreds of communities across the land—from tiny places like Valley Forge, Pa., to cities such as Seattle—have been hit hard. Southern California's aero-space industry is reeling from the shock.

Even though the defense budget is about to rise once again, the effects of cuts over the last two years continue to hit home.

Nixon's program which has been masterminded by Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, is sweeping in scope.

Yet, because it evolved bit by bit over a two-year period, its full dimensions have not been widely understood.

Here is the way it adds up now:

More than 1.2 million defense contract workers have been dropped. Many were scientists and engineers.

Military manpower has been cut by 639,000.

Civilian employes of the military are down about 142,000.

This, however, is only one way to look at the cutbacks.

The number of ships in the Navy, for example, has been cut by 150—from a high in the early days of the Nixon Administration of 858.

The number of divisions in the Army has been cut. It was up to 19 and two-thirds divisions. The new figure is 13 and one-third divisions.

That is the lowest strength for Army divisions in a decade.

The number of planes in the Air Force is down by about 10 per cent. That's a slash of about 5,000 aircraft.

All this has touched raw nerves across the land.

Top administration officials candidly acknowledge that the defense cuts are the greatest single contributing factor to the current unemployment problem.

"MOST SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTOR"

That problem is now considerable.

As of the end of September, there were about 4.7 million unemployed.

This represents an increase of 1.9 million during the Nixon Administration.

As computed by Defense Department Comptroller Robert C. Moot, defense cuts have fed about 1.2 million men into the labor force during this period.

"We have let that many men go, you could say," says Moot. "You can't say that every man we've released has become unemployed. It's not that simple. It's not a one-for-one thing.

"But we are the most significant contributor to the unemployment problem."

By far the hardest-hit region has been the West Coast—all the way from the southern California aerospace complex to the state of Washington.

This area has absorbed about 32 per cent of the impact.

The north central region of the country—Ohio, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri and Kansas—ranks second, with 17 per cent.

Percentages in other regions are: south central (including Louisiana and Texas) 16.7; New England (including Massachusetts and Connecticut) 12; South Atlantic (including Georgia and Florida) 9; middle Atlantic (including Pennsylvania) 9; mountain, 4.

In some industries the impact has simply knocked business for a loop.

Defense cutbacks, for example, have slashed demand for aircraft and aircraft parts by 44 per cent.

The slash in demand for electronic equipment amounts to 23 per cent.

In some towns and cities across the land this has meant something like localized depression.

SEATTLE HIT HARDEST OF ALL

Probably the worst-hit city in the country is Seattle, which depends on Boeing Aircraft for its economic survival.

Seattle is a wasteland.

But many a smaller place has suffered quietly.

Valley Forge, Pa., a suburb of Philadelphia, was one of the first to be hit in the early days of the Nixon Administration. The administration canceled the "Manned Orbital Laboratory" program.

A major contractor was General Electric, with a plant in the Valley Forge area.

Raymond Bell Posey, executive vice president of the Valley Forge Chamber of Commerce, estimates that retail sales in the area have dropped about five or six per cent since the contract was canceled.

He says about 4,500 men lost jobs, many of them white-collar professionals. "But this

is such a diversified area," he says, "that the impact has not been severe."

He points out that many of the employes of the General Electric plant commuted from Philadelphia, or Pottstown, or even from New Jersey—often traveling as far as 20 miles to get to work.

Thus, the Philadelphia area has absorbed the loss, and many who lost work have found other jobs, he believes.

This kind of pattern is repeated elsewhere. The one-industry town is no longer common in the United States, and most cities can absorb defense contract losses without disaster.

In terms of dollars, the Nixon Administration actually sought to slash the defense budget by about \$8 billion—but has not succeeded in getting all requested cuts through Congress.

Administration officials, particularly Laird, have been plain-spoken in saying that they did not think the economy ought to depend on artificial stimulus from defense spending.

The President has made his attitudes clear on this subject privately. In other words, the administration does not wish to support a kind of "military-industrial complex" to keep employment high, according to officials.

This could be a courageous political point of view on the part of the administration for which it has gotten little public credit.

The defense cutback program, however, has clearly ended.

Last year's final administration proposal was for \$71.8 billion. A rise of at least several billion is now in prospect—probably to about \$74 or \$75 billion.

It could go much higher if strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union fail.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MAJOR MILITARY SPENDING CUT BY SENATE COMMITTEE

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I rise today to congratulate the chairman and members of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and especially its Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations for the major cuts they have made again this year in the military spending bill. Once again, they and their House counterparts, have achieved a signal success.

The Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER) and the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. YOUNG) did an excellent job on this measure. It is a very difficult one to deal with because it is so complicated, and because it involves the security of our country in which we are all deeply interested. They handled it with excellent judgment and achieved a great deal.

The President asked for \$68.7 billion. The Senate committee proposes \$66.4 billion. That is a whopping cut of \$2.3 billion below the President's requests.

They did this in the face of one of the heaviest propaganda barrages by the Department of Defense and its allies to restore the cuts that we have seen.

The Secretary of Defense insisted that the \$68.7 billion was a "rock bottom" budget. When the House cut \$1.9 billion from his requests, he came back to the

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Senate to plead for restoration of \$1.3 billion. Furthermore, included in the \$1.3 billion was \$355 million for items which were not even in the President's budget.

I am happy to observe that not only did the Senate committee turn down the Secretary's request, but they went even further than the House. They not only refused to restore the \$1.3 billion, they not only kept intact the House cut of \$1.9 billion, but the Senate committee cut an additional \$389 million below the House cuts.

That is some cut. Because of it, I intend to support the committee's actions.

SENATE EFFORTS VINDICATED

One further point should be made about the committee's action. In the passage in the Senate of the military authorization bill, the Senate accomplished a number of important goals. It cut over 7 percent from the budget request. In addition, it cut a number of weapons systems which the House had proposed but which either had not been requested or for which no "fly before you buy" or "build a prototype first" policy was in effect. The committee cut back on these items, and cut back very firmly.

In the conference, however, the House was adamant about a number of them. The Senate had to give in on some system which should not be built.

But I am very pleased to note that both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees have refused to fund these items in most cases. The work of the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) and his colleagues which appeared to be lost during the conference on the military authorization bill, has now been won. It has been won in the same sense that much of the effort the critics of military spending made and lost on the Senate floor has now also been won in the Appropriations Committee due to the \$2.5 billion cut in funds.

PRIORITIES FIGHT BEGINNING TO PAY OFF

The Appropriations Committee staff now tell me that the \$2.4 billion cut in the Defense bill will more than offset any increases which the Congress has made for health, education, housing, and the environment. They tell me that their best estimates are that when action on the budget requests are completed we will have cut the President's overall budget requests by more than \$1 billion. That is for the entire sweep of Federal spending and will be \$1 billion below President Nixon's request. We have therefore cut back on some wasteful spending. We have increased funds for needed programs. And, in addition, we have given the taxpayer a \$1 billion plus overall cut. The long fight over priorities and spending is beginning to pay off. But it is only a beginning.

FIGHT NOW UP TO THE PRESIDENT

Congress has done its job. But the President and the administration have not cut military spending in any comparable degree to the cuts in appropriations by the Congress. Let me be specific.

In fiscal year 1969, Congress cut the President's requests for the Department of Defense and military construction by \$5.5 billion.

In fiscal year 1970, or last year, Congress cut the President's requests for the Department of Defense and military construction by \$6 billion.

The year, fiscal 1971, Congress will cut the President's requests by somewhere between \$1.9 and \$2.4 billion. We can be reasonably certain that the figure will be \$2 billion or more. Those are total cuts from the President's budget requests for those 3 fiscal years of \$13.5 billion.

PRESIDENT'S SPENDING TOO HIGH

But what about defense spending or the "outlays." These are the funds the President controls.

In fiscal year 1969, actual defense spending was \$81.2 billion. In fiscal 1970, the first budget over which Mr. Nixon had real control, the military outlays dropped to \$79.4 billion, or by only \$1.8 billion. This year thus far, outlays are at an annual rate of \$77.6 billion. This figure is for the first 3 months. The pace may quicken later. But thus far we have seen a cut in outlays or actual military spending of only \$4.6 billion—which of course Congress provided for in the appropriations.

Congress had done its job. It has cut appropriations by over \$13.5 billion, and by over \$11 billion before this year. But the President and his administration have cut only \$4.6 billion from actual spending.

It is time for the President and the Office of Management and Budget to do their job.

A \$30 BILLION BACKLOG

One of the reasons for this difference is the huge backlog of obligated balances which the Department of Defense has squirreled away. According to Special Analysis G in this year's budget statement of the Department of Defense had on hand on June 30, 1970, obligated balances of \$30.4 billion. They expect to have \$30.9 billion on hand on June 30, 1971. The procurement backlog alone is over \$19.5 billion. These are funds which have been obligated but not yet actually spent. It is from these huge balances that the President and the Pentagon keep spending even while Congress cuts their budget. Congress has done its job. It is time for the President, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Pentagon to do their job. Unless they act, the military budget will continue to be out of control.

I welcome the attempt of both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees to come to grips with this problem. Unless this problem can be cured, we will have lost permanent control over military spending. I welcome the committee's language—in section 842—ordering the withdrawal of overage balances from the Pentagon and for the Comptroller General to determine the amounts to be withdrawn. That will help.

DANGER OF INCREASED BUDGET

But the danger is that the Pentagon will step up spending. We have already been told by Secretary Laird that he expects to ask for \$1 billion more for military spending next year than this year. That is bad news for the country and bad news for the taxpayers, especially when

we are engaged in winding down the Vietnam war, which should enable us to save \$8 billion to \$10 billion.

Instead, there should be a decisive cut in military expenditures by the President. And there should not only be a cut in his budget requests but in the actual spending or "outlays" over which he and the executive branch have control.

This is necessary both to carry out the mandate of Congress and to keep his overall budget within reasonable grounds.

We are told that the President is aiming for expenditures consistent with a full employment budget. This means that spending next year would be about \$228 billion. There is no way this goal can be met short of a decisive cut in military spending without, of course, a deep and punishing reduction in spending in the human program areas. With the increases in the noncontrollable items brought about by the increases in the interest on the national debt, social security, welfare, medicare, and veterans costs, to name only a few, the overall budget can only be kept under control if there is a substantial decrease in Pentagon outlays.

Congress has given the President the blueprint. We have cut \$13.5 billion from military appropriations. It is now up to the President and the Pentagon to carry out the plan. That can be done by slashing Pentagon outlays over which the President has control. They must cut more than the \$4.6 billion reduction to date.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, as a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, I highly compliment our distinguished colleagues, the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER), and the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. YOUNG), upon the excellent job which they and their fellow members of the subcommittee have done on the defense appropriations bill.

I am also pleased that the pertinent appropriations recommended, although independently arrived at, are substantially in agreement with the Military Procurement Authorization Act. There are, of course, some significant differences with respect to particular items.

Mr. President, we do not have a clear-cut historical legislative system for comparing procurement items all the way through in this legislative process. I think it will be helpful to bring forward at this time the figures as agreed to by the authorizing committee and as agreed to by the Appropriations Committee. Without this comparison being brought together in one treatment, anyone that is really trying to make a study of the military budget for this year and what was done about it by Congress, by both Houses, would find the record to be incomplete. So, I make these comparisons here primarily for the purpose of bringing out the complete legislative history. The Defense appropriations bill, as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee, totaled \$66.4 billion, which is \$400 million, or less than 1 percent below the \$66.8 billion passed by the House.

In terms of the procurement authorization legislation, the appropriations recommended by the committee provided \$18.535 billion, or \$374.2 million, which is 2 percent less than the Senate authorization bill, which amounted to \$18.9 billion, or \$222.2 million, which is 1.8 percent below the amount provided in the House appropriations bill.

The following table compares the procurement Authorization Legislation with the House and Senate appropriation actions:

	(Dollars in billions)
Authorization request.....	19,937
Authorization act.....	19,595
Authorization, (Senate version)....	18,909
Appropriation, (House version)....	18,757
Appropriation, (reported to the Senate).....	13,535
Program, (reported to the Senate)....	13,745

Mr. President, with reference to procurement, the Senate authorized \$11.9 billion for the procurement of military hardware for fiscal year 1971. This is relevant here because it was the military procurement bill that we had under debate for so long. This compared with the defense request of \$12.5 billion. The Appropriations Committee now recommends funding in the amount of \$11.6 billion, or \$317 million less than the Senate authorization.

I would like to emphasize that there are only a few major differences between the Senate authorization and the program now under consideration.

I think the striking similarity in these matters represents the understanding and the consideration of the Members of the Senate who have worked on these programs for years and are getting familiar with them one way or the other, either on the Armed Services Committee or on the Appropriations Committee. We have a good number of Senators in common to those two committees.

For purposes of the history of procurement items for fiscal year 1971, I note the following:

ARMY PROGRAMS

1. IMPROVED HAWK GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILE

This missile was authorized by the Senate at \$53.3 million, a reduction of

\$37 million in the request. As a result of conference action the final authorization was \$81.4 million. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommends full funding of \$81.4 million authorized, or \$23.3 million above the Senate authorization.

2. ARMY TANK PROGRAM

As with the Improved Hawk, the Army tank program was reduced by the Armed Services Committee; however the reduction was restored by conference action. The recommended funding is the same as the amounts finally authorized.

NAVY PROGRAMS

The only significant difference concerns the Sparrow-F air-to-air missile. The Armed Services Committee reduced the number of missiles because of concurrency. This bill recommends no procurement this year to permit another year of development before starting production.

I have previously pointed out the transitional nature of the fiscal year 1971 budget. As ultimate force size and composition change, so do the requirements change. Battle losses, changes in usage factors—all have an effect on requirements for military equipment and material. Some 4½ months have passed since the Armed Services Committee completed their review of the fiscal year 1971 program.

Mr. President, one of the most difficult matters to deal with in the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and on the floor of the Senate, is the authorization and appropriation for research, development, testing, and engineering.

The Committee on Appropriations recommends \$6,960,100,000, which is 1 percent below the \$7,016,500,000 that was originally authorized by the Senate. It is \$5.4 million more than the sum in the appropriation bill as passed by the House. It is \$141 million below the final authorization.

A comparison of the Senate Appropriations Committee report with the original budget request, the Senate authorization, and the House appropriations bill follows—in millions:

	Request	Senate authorized	Appropriation			
			House	Senate	Change from	
					Senate authority	House appropriation
Army.....	1,735.9	1,609.2	1,608.5	1,589.7	-19.5	-18.8
Navy.....	2,212.3	2,134.3	2,156.2	2,139.5	-63.8	-25.7
Air Force.....	2,977.7	2,718.0	2,701.1	2,744.8	+26.8	+43.7
Defense agencies.....	475.7	445.0	438.9	445.1	+1	+6.2
Emergency fund.....	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0		
Total.....	7,401.5	7,016.5	6,954.7	6,960.1	-56.4	+5.4

Compared with the Senate authorization, the major changes made by the Senate Appropriations Committee are as follows:

ITEMS ABOVE SENATE AUTHORIZATION

Cheyenne—Senate authorization, 0; appropriation, \$17.6 million.

The \$17.6 million deleted in the Senate, but restored in the final authorization, is recommended for appropriation by the Senate committee. However, that

does not constitute a commitment to production.

SAM-D—(Senate authorization, \$74.3 million; appropriation, \$83.1 million.

The difference of \$8.8 million was restored in the final authorization and is provided both in the House and Senate actions on the appropriation to support continued development. The Army has appointed a board to reassess the threat, review system tradeoffs, and make

recommendations during the consideration of the fiscal 1972 authorization.

Destroyer helicopter—LAMPS—(Senate authorization, \$5.5 million; appropriation, \$10.5 million.

The Senate authorization of \$5.5 million was reduced to \$3.5 in the House appropriations bill but restored to the final authorization of \$10.5 million in the Senate committee appropriation report. The increase will permit initiation of contract definition, test bad aircraft and sensor work, and studies of ship-related requirements.

Air launch/surface launched antiship missile—Harpoon—Senate authorization, \$7 million; appropriation, \$18.5 million.

The \$7 million in the Senate authorization was increased in the House appropriations bill to \$21.0 million which is the same amount in the final authorization. The Senate Appropriations Committee deducted \$2.5 million from this as being excess funding.

Point defense system—Senate authorization, \$11 million; appropriation, \$14.8 million.

The Senate Appropriations Committee agreed with the House and recommends the \$14.8 million, the same amount as finally authorized, but \$3.8 million higher than the Senate authorization.

B-1—Senate authorization \$50 million—appropriation \$75 million.

Both the House bill and the Senate Appropriations Committee provided \$75 million, the amount contained in the final authorization. The progress of this development program will be watched closely and the requirements presented in the fiscal 1972 budget will be reviewed in detail.

Minuteman rebasing—Senate authorization \$50 million—appropriation \$61 million.

The Senate Appropriations Committee recommendation of \$61 million is \$11 million higher than the Senate authorization, but \$34 million above the House appropriations bill. None of these funds will be used for mobile minute-man or land point defense.

Subsonic cruise armed decoy (SCAD)—Senate authorization, 0—appropriation \$10 million.

The Senate committee restored \$11 million as provided in the final authorization act, but which the House had not provided in the appropriation. While the Senate Armed Services Committee supported this program, funds requested for fiscal year 1971 were deleted because of delay in approval by the Secretary of Defense and the availability of prior year SCAD funding.

Items below Senate authorization:
S-3A—Senate authorization \$287 million, appropriation \$266 million.

The Senate committee recommends \$266 million which is the same as the final authorization and the House appropriations bill. Since the research and development program is incrementally financed, the difference of \$21 million from the Senate authorization is not required.

Ship contract definition—Senate authorization \$10 million—appropriation \$1 million.

The \$1 million appropriation recommended compares with the \$2 million in

the House bill but is \$9 million below the authorization approved by both Houses. This is attributed to a delay in the DXG program which permits a reduction in funds required in fiscal 1971.

Titan III—Senate authorization \$35.4 million—appropriation \$28.5 million.

The House appropriations bill provided \$35.4 million which is the amount requested and authorized by both Houses. The Senate Appropriations Committee reduced this by \$6.9 million based on a review of lower priority requirements.

Mr. President, that completes the figure history of this matter. Again I highly compliment the two ranking members of our subcommittee that handled this bill. It is amazing to me the fine knowledge they have of all these intricate and complicated matters, with the switching back and forth of progress in the programs and the changing of figures from year to year. They certainly render great service to the Senate. I am pleased to see that their work is being accepted so well by the Senate.

I hope this bill will be agreed to by the Senate with a tremendous vote, without any alteration of any substance.

I refer again to the figures which I have given as partly in response to a promise I made in debate on the procurement bill when the question was raised about line items for this huge bill. I said then we would do everything we could to complete the record all the way through and next year we propose to do the same thing for the information of all Senators and interested parties. It is virtually impossible, however, in these huge bills to have what we ordinarily call line items to carry all the way through. I yield the floor.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States, submitting nominations were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Leonard, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, the Presiding Officer (Mr. STEVENSON) laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committee.

(For nominations received today, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 380) to repeal section 7 of the act of August 9, 1946 (60 Stat. 968); asked a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. HALEY, Mr. EDMONDSON, and Mr. SAYLOR were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message also announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 17867)

making appropriations for foreign assistance and related programs for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, and for other purposes; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. PASSMAN, Mr. ROONEY of New York, Mrs. HANSEN of Washington, Mr. COHELAN, Mr. LONG of Maryland, Mr. MCFALL, Mr. MAHON, Mr. SHRIVER, Mr. CONTE, Mrs. REID of Illinois, Mr. RIEGLE, and Mr. Bow were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message further announced that the House had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 17923) making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture and related agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, and for other purposes; that the House receded from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 3 to the bill and concurred therein, with an amendment, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

The message also announced that the House had disagreed to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 19504) to authorize appropriations for the construction of certain highways in accordance with title 23 of the United States Code, and for other purposes; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. FALLON, Mr. KLU-CZYNSKI, Mr. WRIGHT, Mr. EDMONDSON, Mr. CRAMER, Mr. HARSHA, and Mr. CLEVELAND were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message further announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 17436) to amend the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, to provide for a national environmental data system, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

The message also announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills and joint resolution, and they were signed by the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. ALLEN):

S. 336. An act to amend section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 to permit the exemption of security loans, not exceeding \$500,000 in aggregate amount, from the provisions of such act;

S. 4187. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Army to convey certain lands at Fort Ruger Military Reservation, Hawaii, to the State of Hawaii in exchange for, certain other lands; and

S.J. Res. 230. Joint resolution extending the duration of copyright protection in certain cases.

HOUSE BILL REFERRED

The bill (H.R. 17436) to amend the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, to provide for a national environmental data system, was read twice by its title and referred to the Committee on Commerce.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS, 1971

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 19590) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, and for other purposes.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment and ask to have it stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be read.

The assistant legislative clerk read the amendment, as follows:

On page 49, between lines 5 and 6, insert a new section as follows:

"Sec. 847. None of the funds appropriated by this Act in excess of \$20,000,000 may be expended for the purpose of public information, public affairs, and public relation activities, including personnel costs connected with such activities."

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, on November 6 President Nixon sent a memorandum to the heads of all departments and agencies of Government concerning Government public relations activities. I wish to read that memorandum for the benefit of the Senate. It is not very long and it is an excellent statement. I read:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, November 6, 1970.

Memorandum to the heads of executive departments and agencies.

Subject: Public relations activities.

During the past 18 months, I have seen a number of agency publications, exhibits, films and related public relations efforts which in my judgment represent a questionable use of the taxpayers' money for the purpose of promoting and soliciting support for various agency activities. While I believe in and fully support an open Administration that legitimately informs the public, I want to put an end to inappropriate promotional activities by executive branch agencies.

Therefore, I direct you to curtail sharply your agency's FY 1971 plans for promoting the agency's programs and attempting to obtain support of special interest groups.

To bring about a curtailment of self-serving and wasteful public relations activities, I have instructed the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to reduce the funds available to your agency in FY 1971 for broadcasting, advertising, exhibits, films, publications, and similar public relations efforts. The Director will inform you of the specific dollar reduction I have ordered for your agency. I have directed that amounts which would have been used for this purpose be reduced and placed in reserve.

I want to make it clear that this is not an attempt to single out those who serve the Government well by informing the public and preserving the principle of freedom of information. Rather, it is directed at those who are, quite understandably, program advocates, and who, perhaps unknowingly, affront many of our citizens with public relations promotions, fancy publications and

exhibits aimed at a limited audience, and similar extravagances that are not in keeping with this Administration's often stated policy of frugal management of the public's resources.

Please take personal action to ensure that your subordinates carry out the intent of this directive and that they do not attempt to circumvent it through changes in position titles or a reallocation of resources intended for other purposes.

RICHARD NIXON.

I cannot think of a more appropriate or better statement concerning the purpose of my amendment. It is designed to implement the memorandum of the President of the United States, and, I may say, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces—the directive to cut down on promotional public relations activities. I could not have stated it nearly as well if I tried.

All of us receive these extravagant publications, paid for by the public relations office of the Department of Defense. By coincidence, on yesterday I happened to receive a most elaborate publication. It was a book at least 18 inches in one direction and about 14 inches in the other. It was sent to me by the Vice President of South Vietnam. It had elaborately illustrated pictures, and I would estimate it would cost somewhere around \$20 or \$25 on the open market. It was promoting, of course, the activities of our armed services and the Vietnamese armed services in Vietnam. I have no doubt, of course, that the ultimate payment for it would come out of our aid to Vietnam. It would not be allocated directly to the funds involved here. All of us get these enormous volumes of promotional literature, and we see television programs, and so on.

The President, as I said, has gone to the heart of the matter, directing the agencies to confine their activities to distributing legitimate information.

The President is to be commended for this step to limit the use of tax moneys to lobby taxpayers. By imposing a \$20,000,000 ceiling on the public relations and public information activities of the Pentagon, my amendment will give the Senate an opportunity to support and endorse the President's efforts. The Senate Appropriations Committee has recommended as I understand, a nonstatutory spending limit of \$23,000,000, on an annual basis. But it actually allowed a total of \$30,400,000 for fiscal year 1971 on the grounds we are already well into the fiscal year and spending has been going on at a higher rate. This is not good enough, I think, particularly in view of the fact that we face, perhaps, a \$15 billion deficit, and a mounting backlog of social needs. The Senate should do more than give the Pentagon's propaganda program a gentle tap on the wrist. It should impose a strict, statutory limit on spending for these purposes.

Eleven years ago, for fiscal year 1959, the Congress for the last time placed a limitation on the amount which the Department of Defense could spend on public relations and public information. The limit was set at \$2,755,000—a substantial sum to promote what was then a \$43 billion defense establishment. The Office of the Secretary of Defense alone—just that office—now spends more than that

on public relations. From fiscal 1959 to fiscal 1970, the overall defense budget almost doubled. But during that same period, the Defense Department admitted spending for public relations activities, lacking any effective legislative restraint, soared to \$40 million—a fifteenfold increase since 1959.

In other words, the overall expenditures for defense about doubled during that period, and its promotion and public relations costs had a fifteenfold increase.

I might point out, however, that I was advised by Defense officials last year that public relations and related spending for the entire Defense Department came to only \$27,953,000 in fiscal 1969. But now, in anticipation of the imposition of a legislative ceiling, they admit that the public relations bill for 1969 was actually \$44,062,000.

This is one of the recurring phenomena with the Defense Department, and other departments as well. When the matter first came up, they said \$27 million. Now they have put it at \$44 million, and so this permits the Department to come before the committee and say, "Look, we are taking a big cut, cutting it from \$44 million to \$30 million," when actually, if we accept their first figure of \$27 million, we would be giving them a substantial increase, at \$30 million, over their actual estimate.

The House Appropriations Committee was deceived on a more grand scale. The committee's report on the pending bill states:

In 1968, the Committee was advised that \$9,108,000 was included in the fiscal year 1969 Defense budget for Public Affairs, Public Information, and Public Relations activities. This year, the Committee was advised that the Department's best estimate of actual obligations for fiscal year 1969 was \$44,062,000, an increase of \$34,954,000 over the estimate.

The C-5A syndrome seems to have infected the public relations apparatus. But that is not all. The report of the House committee goes on to say:

For fiscal year 1970, the budget estimate included \$34,164,000 for these activities. Based on this estimate, the Committee applied a reduction of \$4,955,000. The Committee was informed this year, however, that the Department estimated it would obligate \$40,447,000 for this activity during fiscal year 1970, or \$11,283,000 more than the amount allowed by the Committee.

The committee was not only deceived; the Defense Department thumbed its nose at the committee's attempt to make a modest cut in the program.

Yet the House committee, in spite of saying it was "determined to establish a fixed limitation" on these activities, was apparently so inured to deception on such a scale from the Pentagon that it cut the fiscal year 1971 budget request by only \$7 million. This still left public relations spending at 11 times the 1959 limit.

In response to my inquiries last year, I was also told by the Department of Defense and the various services that the total number of personnel, military and civilian, who worked in public affairs programs came to some 2,800. I now find, again, that the figures provided grossly understated the actual situation. Now that the Department is concerned that

Congress may reimpose a spending ceiling on this activity, they have recomputed the personnel involved and for fiscal 1970 the total comes to 4,430—nearly a 60-percent increase over the figure supplied to me. I ask unanimous consent that a table containing budget and personnel data, taken from the Senate Appropriations Committee hearings, and a table showing the effect of my amendment be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the tables were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SUMMARY OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS COSTS

(In thousands of dollars)

	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal year 1970	Fiscal year 1971
Army.....	13,929	12,253	12,253
Military personnel, Army.....	7,683	7,100	7,100
Operation and maintenance, Army.....	5,323	4,300	4,300
Army National Guard.....	300	300	300
Procurement of equipment and missiles.....	16	10	10
Other.....	607	543	543
Navy/Marine Corps.....	14,340	14,001	12,186
Military personnel, Navy.....	6,982	6,488	5,692
Operation and maintenance, Navy.....	3,641	3,543	2,869
Military personnel, Marine Corps.....	3,543	3,786	3,441
Operation and maintenance, Marine Corps.....	174	184	184
Air Force.....	12,390	10,080	9,650
Military personnel, Air Force.....	8,559	6,734	6,537
Operation and maintenance, Air Force.....	3,831	3,346	3,113
Office, Secretary of Defense.....	3,403	3,354	3,527
Military personnel (various).....	1,806	1,706	1,706
Operation and maintenance, Defense agencies.....	1,597	1,648	1,821
Total.....	44,062	39,683	37,616

Note: The above figures differ from those previously furnished to the HAC staff on public affairs in connection with the fiscal year 1970 budget review (1) because of the method by which derived, (2) because of reductions based on specific congressional action and fiscal constraints, (3) because of fiscal year 1970 pay raises, and (4) because of expanded coverage. For instance:

1. Based on 1-time reports costs at lower levels of command have been ideal and which are not available through routine accounting reports.
2. For comparability among services certain costs have been added (such as the Air Force's Home Town News Center and orientation group) or deleted (such as security review functions except in the OASD(PA), which are included).
3. Certain OSD costs incurred in central services category assigned to public affairs.
4. All identifiable costs of the A.F. & E. program and similar terminal information programs have been excluded.

The above figures also represent a substantially broader definition than applied from 1952 through 1959 under Public Law 179 82d Cong., particularly with respect to community relations programs and answering public inquiries.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL BY DEPARTMENT¹

	1969	1970	1971
Army:			
Military.....	1,138	1,058	1,058
Civilian.....	438	387	387
Navy/Marine Corps:			
Military.....	1,464	1,400	1,257
Civilian.....	336	312	267
Air Force:			
Military.....	982	814	781
Civilian.....	323	272	272
OASD (PA):			
Military.....	123	101	101
Civilian.....	95	86	86

¹ All figures are year-end strength except Army, which are available in man-years only.

Source: Hearings of the Senate Appropriations Committee on the Defense Appropriation bill, p. 920.

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COMPARATIVE DATA ON PUBLIC RELATIONS BUDGETS AND ALLOWANCES

	Budget	House allowance	Senate committee	Fulbright amendment (approximate)
Army.....	\$12,312,000	\$10,444,000	\$10,300,000	\$6,750,000
Navy and Marine Corps.....	12,186,000	10,485,000	10,400,000	6,820,000
Air Force.....	9,650,000	8,190,000	8,100,000	5,360,000
Office of the Secretary of Defense.....	3,527,000	1,471,000	1,200,000	800,000
Defense Agencies and JCS.....	623,000		400,000	270,000
Total.....	38,298,000	30,590,000	30,400,000	20,000,000

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In the last fiscal year the admitted spending on public relations and public information was \$12,253,000 by the Army alone; \$14,001,000 by the Navy; \$10,080,000 by the Air Force; and \$3,354,000 by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. But this is really only the beginning.

For example, the Army takes much pride in what it calls Operation Understanding, a 4-day tour of Army Air Defense Command activities for a "cross section of interests and occupations in the civilian communities" during which the guests are exposed to the virtues of the ABM and other weapons systems. Apparently, the women's liberation movement has had a significant impact on the Army: they have frequent ladies' days in Operation Understanding. Three of the most recent lists furnished me were comprised entirely of women. One list was made up entirely of members of Texas Federation of Women's Clubs, one of members of Altrusa Clubs, and another of Colorado ladies, with no apparent club affiliation, who ranged from wife of physician to wife of district manager of the local telephone company.

Although the Army runs 36 of these tours a year, bringing in local leaders from all over the country to visit installations in Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, and elsewhere, it says that the "program is operated on the basis of no additional expense to the Government." Apparently, not one cent of the Army's \$13 million public affairs budget last year was charged off to Operation Understanding."

The admitted totals for military spending on public relations activities is but the very small tip of a very large iceberg. It does not include, for example, the costs of maintaining aircraft for flying local dignitaries to Florida, Las Vegas, or Colorado Springs for "orientation" purposes; the travel expenses of the thousands of officers and civilians who ply the banquet circuit selling their service's particular brand of national defense; and the thousand-and-one activities at the local base level, labeled "community relations," which all add up to trying to win friends and influence people to support military spending programs.

One of the biggest hidden subsidies for public relations is from the millions of dollars spent in the name of internal information programs for members of the Armed Forces. In fiscal year 1970 the Army spent, by its own admission, \$13,200,000 on internal information programs. But this money financed items such as the "Big Picture" television series on which \$727,000 was spent for production of 25 new films that year,

which were seen by millions of Americans on their local television stations. Other services have similar programs, all ostensibly for internal use. A total of \$35,103,790 was spent on internal information programs in fiscal year 1970. And a significant part of this amount should, in fact, be charged to public relations.

I emphasize that these figures are not within the figure which is called public relations, yet they obviously are in fact public relations.

Each service has its own devices, but the objective is the same: public support which will be reflected in practical terms—congressional appropriations. A Navy Journalist wrote me last summer as follows:

I wholeheartedly support your fight against huge expenditures by the military in the area of public affairs. As a Navy Journalist, I am well aware of the fact that the public affairs programs of the military are more geared to convincing the public than to informing it.

If our job in public affairs is to create a good image of the armed forces, whether it is deserved or not, all public affairs programs should be abolished. I suggest instead that the task be placed in the hands of J. Walter Thompson Company or another agency more experienced and more capable in the field of public relations and advertising. I'm sure they could do a much better job of convincing the American public at less cost to the American public.

An information officer in the Air Force wrote in a similar vein. He said:

My own experience after four years in the field leads me to agree with you that a great deal of money is wasted on public relations activities which serve no purpose other than to further inflate the egos of high-ranking military officers . . .

I also wonder about the propriety of spending the public's money to improve that same public's image of the military; although from the military's point of view, I can see the necessity for such an expenditure in light of the growing anti-military sentiment among the American people.

One of the most blatant—and I think inexcusable—propaganda programs has been one where five military camera crews have been used to turn out so-called news films on Vietnam and Southeast Asia for use by the commercial television networks.

I might say that these films are offered to the commercial television networks free, gratis. Several months ago it was disclosed, by personnel involved in this program, that some Department of Defense TV films presented to American television audiences as authentic events were in fact faked or staged. The Defense Department has not only propagandized the American people to support the current Vietnam policy, but also it has

palmed off fiction as fact. The commercial television networks are perfectly capable of presenting the facts about what is going on in Vietnam. The American people deserve better, both from their Government and the TV networks, than to have staged propaganda films, paid with their tax money, passed off as straight and genuine TV news.

It is one thing for the Defense Department to have employees available to provide—quickly and responsively—factual information both to the public and the press upon request. It is quite another when the Department and the individual military services use taxpayers' money to generate and promote public support for military weapons, military programs, or a President's foreign policy. The existence of this public relations apparatus, which vigorously promotes the special interests of the Military Establishment, and the current foreign policy of the executive branch, should concern all those interested in preserving our democratic system and the traditions of the free press.

Only Congress can bring the Defense Department's public relations program under control. As a first step, a fixed statutory limit on spending for public relations should be imposed. My amendment would do just that.

It might be argued that a reduction to \$20,000,000 is too severe, that the program should be cut back more gradually. In the last 11 years, since a congressional ceiling was abandoned, the size of the Armed Forces has increased about 35 percent, the cost of living about 30 percent, military pay about 69 percent, and civilian salaries about 56 percent. The inflation in this program has been of bureaucratic—not economic—origin. The limitation I propose would still allow a 740 percent increase above the 1959 legislative ceiling, which it seems to me is a very generous increase indeed.

Although the restriction I propose would meet, temporarily, a number of the problems involved in the operation of public relations programs by each of the components of our Armed Services, it does not get at the more fundamental problems of coordination and control within the Defense Department. What is needed is centralized control within the Pentagon for all public relations and continued congressional review to assure that whoever is placed in control recognizes the limitation on his role. To guarantee that control, I hope that in the future Congress will consider appropriating all funds for public information to one specific office—say, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. This would take away the power of the individual services to fund unlimited public relations programs through a variety of operating budgets.

In 1947 Congress, in passing the National Security Act, voted to end the rampant rivalry between the military services and to require each to subordinate its parochial interests to those of the Military Establishment as a whole. The purpose, the Senate committee report stated, was to provide "unity of military concept" and "unity of purpose and effort" for our military forces. But 23 years later the Army, Navy, and Air Force

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each spend millions of tax dollars annually in an effort to persuade the public that its own brand of weaponry is the finger in the dike holding back the enemy hordes.

The Department of Defense, the purpose of the National Security Act notwithstanding, does not speak to the public with one voice but with at least four; one seeking a larger share of the taxpayers' money collected by the Federal Government and the other three competing for a larger share of the Department of Defense allocation—all of them urgently demanding more money for war and related purposes.

In recent years, the public's confidence in their Government and its leaders has been badly strained, much of the distrust having been created by the misuse of the Government's propaganda resources. Congress has failed the people in failing to control the propaganda apparatus of the Military Establishment.

There is something basically unwise and undemocratic about a system which taxes the public to finance a propaganda campaign aimed at persuading the same taxpayers that they must spend more tax dollars to subvert their independent judgment. President Nixon recognized that fact in his recent memorandums, which I have read, calling for a cutback in public relations programs. But only Congress can give the public a fair chance by cutting inlets on the barrage of propaganda employed to persuade the man in the street that more military spending is good for him.

I urge the Senate to reassert congressional control over the public relations apparatus of the Department of Defense by adopting my amendment.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD certain information provided by the Department of Defense and the military services concerning various aspects of their public relations and information activities.

There being on objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., April 16, 1970.

Hon. J. W. Fulbright,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your letter of March 31, 1970 requesting information concerning the activities of this office, the data requested is provided in the enclosures attached. I want to thank you for your comments about the previous cooperation which has been provided to you. I also want to express my regret that there was some delay in my response because of a death in my family.

You will note that the paragraphs in the enclosures follow the sequence of the questions asked in your letter of July 21, 1969.

I trust that this information will be helpful to you.

Sincerely,

DANIEL Z. HENKIN.

RESPONSIBILITIES

Although there have been some significant changes in the organization of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), primarily through elimination of some activities and consolidation of others, there has been no basic change in the responsibility to provide the American people with maximum information about the De-

partment of Defense consistent with national security. Other aspects of the responsibilities of this office have remained the same as previously reported. These include:

(a) Responsibility involving the inter-relationship of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Military Departments, the Joint Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, and the close coordination essential with the White House and the State Department in national security public affairs matters. This office continues to emphasize that our objective is to insure that public information efforts are responsive to requests for information to the maximum extent possible, without duplication.

(b) Responsibility to provide public affairs policy guidance to the Unified and Specified Commands, to conduct seat-of-government coordination, and to perform public affairs functions for the JCS.

Also, as previously reported, this office continues to review functions and organizational structure with the dual goals of improving operational efficiency and achieving economies. Last September, a reduction of about 7% in OASD(PA)'s authorized personnel strength was reported. There will be further reductions of more than 6% by June 30, 1970, a cut of more than 13% in less than a year. Among other actions, OASD(PA) field offices established previously in New York City, Los Angeles and Chicago have been closed; further reductions are anticipated.

COSTS

The approximate over-all cost that can be specifically identified with OASD(PA) activities for FY 1971, as provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), which is responsible for these budget matters, is as follows: You will note the increased costs resulting from pay and per diem increases.

	Fiscal year--	
	1970 (budget)	1971 (estimate)
(a) Civilian personnel.....	\$1,426,000	\$1,436,000
(b) Military personnel.....	1,706,000	1,706,000
(c) Travel.....	100,000	142,000
(d) Central services costs.....	122,000	243,000
Total.....	3,354,000	3,527,000

Despite the 13-percent reduction in personnel, the cost of personnel pay and related benefits will increase \$10,000. Savings resulting from decreased employment will be offset by increases for within-grade salary increases and annualization of the congressionally-approved pay raise which became effective in July 1969.

The \$42,000 increase in travel is entirely attributable to the increased per diem rates approved by the Congress during fiscal year 1970.

Controlled by ASD (administration), not included in OASD(PA) budget. Fiscal year 1971 estimate includes (a) DOD annual film report (\$100,000); and (b) Armed Forces Day posters (\$21,000), which were originally included for fiscal year 1970, but subsequently were deleted. This estimate is subject to downward revision, particularly since the ASD(PA) has asked for a review of sound-on-film news activity.

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL

	Fiscal year		
	1969	1970	1971
(a) Civilian.....	95	86	86
(b) Military.....	119	101	101
Total.....	214	187	187

DETAILED FUNCTIONAL INFORMATION

Enclosure 4 tabs include detailed information in response to your request for an updating of the data provided to you last year regarding the functions and activities of the various elements of this office.

SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA

As a result of a study which has been under way for several months, the ASD(PA)

intends to designate the incumbent Special Assistant for Southeast Asia to succeed the retiring Director for the Directorate for Defense Information. He plans, on an orderly basis, to disestablish the Southeast Asia Office and reassign its functions, probably by the end of the current fiscal year.

MEDIA ACCREDITATION AND TOURS STAFF

As previously reported this staff has been disbanded as a separate entity. The following is the disposition of the functions previously conducted by this staff:

Function abolished: Conduct, in coordination with the White House, State Department and USIA, tours to the United States for members of foreign news media.

Functions and projects transferred to the Directorate of Community Relations:
Biennial Tour of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Parliamentarians, Visits and Briefings for Official Foreign Visitors to the Pentagon and Defense Installations.

The Military Art Program.
The Joint Civilian Orientation Conference.
Implementation of Policies Outlined in DoD Directive 5435.2 "Delegation of Authority to Approve Travel in and Use of Military Carriers for DA Purposes."

Functions transferred to the Directorate of Defense Information:

Assistance to individual representatives of news media, foreign and domestic, in accomplishing sponsored or unsponsored travel to U.S. military installations or facilities worldwide.

Approval of travel in military carriers of news media representatives.

SPECIAL PROJECT OFFICERS

Although some reductions in staff is anticipated before the end of this fiscal year, as of this date there has been no change in the functions, organization or personnel requirements for the Special Projects Office except that one of the three Special Assistants who compose the Special Projects Office has assumed the additional responsibility for the administration of OASD(PA).

DIRECTORATE FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION

As of April 1, 1970, there were 54 military and civilian professional and clerical personnel assigned to the Directorate for Defense Information, OASD(PA). Included in this figure are three civilian information officers and one civilian information assistant assigned to the Defense News Branch and seven military information officers and one civilian information assistants assigned to the Armed Forces News Branch.

As of April 1, 1970, the Press Division had issued 823 news releases pertaining to the Military Departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Answers to formal and informal queries remained about the same as reported for FY 1969, about 10,000 formal queries on a 12-months basis, and approximately 25,000 information queries from news media representatives and from members of the Congress.

In addition to the above, the Press Division handles about 50 interviews per month (an annual rate of 600), distributes a considerable volume of testimony by Defense witnesses before the Congress after release by the cognizant committee.

The Directorate also coordinates on public affairs plans and releases involving major events and/or major exercises, such as NATO operations, movements of major units, etc.

MEDIA TRAVEL

During this fiscal year OASD(PA) has approved requests from the Military Services and the Unified and Specified Commands for travel on military carriers for 209 individual news media representatives. We support such travel, within reasonable limits, when it helps to enhance the flow of information to the American public. Travel is accomplished on a strict space-available

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basis, not to interfere with the mission of the carrier, and the travel itself must be an essential ingredient of the story. No actual funds were expended by this office.

MAGAZINE AND BOOK BRANCH

The functional responsibilities and activities of the Magazine and Book Branch remain as stated in our last report.

Attached is a list of the authors we assisted during the last year, indicating the author and name of the book.

Author and book

Robert Liston, *The Draft*.
 LCDR John J. Boyd, *Canal Zone*.
 Charles A. Well, *Curtains Over Vietnam*.
 Mrs. Graham Lester, *Letters from Home*.
 Liz Carpenter, *Ruffles and Flourishes*.
 William H. Boyer, *ROTC*.
 Trevor Armbrister, *Pueblo*.
 Norman Folmar, *Jane's Fighting ships*.
 Rene J. Francillon, *Pictorial Aircraft*.
 Burton Shapiro, *Lands and Peoples*.
 Dr. Jeremy J. Stone, *Cost of the Arms Race*.
 Researchers, *Whitaker's Almanack* (sic).
 Researchers, *Standard Reference Encyclopedia*.
 Researchers, *Ohio Almanac*.
 Researchers, *New York Times Almanac*.
 Orrin E. Dunlap, Jr., *Communications in Space*.
 Hank Searls, *CBW*.
 Howard S. Rowland, *Federal Aid to Towns and Cities*.
 David Seligman, *Pacifism*.
 James E. Mrazek, *The Art of Winning Wars*.
 George B. Macgillivray, *The Macgillivray Clan*.
 Irving S. Cohen, *The American Negro*.
 Lucian J. Ciletti, *200th Anniversary of America*.
 Bruce Nelson, *DoD Research by Universities and Private Institutions*.
 Denise Dooling, *Black Power*.
 Researcher, *The Bulletin Almanac*.
 Researchers, *Collins Encyclopedia*.
 Researcher, *The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography*.
 Elden Aldridge, *Medal of Honor Winners*.
 Richard Austin Smith, *Submarine Procurement and Operations*.
 Leonard Moseley, *American Impact on London—WWII*.
 Researchers, *Information Please Almanac*.
 Virginia Myers, *Careers for Women in Uniform*.
 Edgar J. Schoen, *Our Mythical Rule of Law*.
 Mr. Goldenberg, *Vietnam*.
 Prof. William B. Kintner, *Safeguard: Why The ABM Makes Sense*.
 Researchers, *World Directory of Aviation and Astronautics*.
 Researchers, *Standard Reference Library, Inc.*
 Neal Ashby, *Human Errors*.
 William J. Breslow, *Naval History*.
 Edward Wakin, *Negro Participation in American History*.
 Seymour Hersh, *Domestic Action Programs*.
 Joseph Roson, *Civic Action Programs*.
 Russell Brines, *Far East*.
 Dr. Charles Squire, *Waves in Classical and Quantum Mechanical Systems*.
 Seymour Hersh, *My Lai*.
 Al Hoehling, *Pearl Harbor Story*.
 Gerald Ellis, *Weapons Used in Southeast Asia*.
 George Laros, *Presidential Aircraft*.
 Marty Gerson, *My Lai*.
 Edwin Corley, *Presidential Aircraft*.
 Edward Jablonski, *Air War*.
 Irwin R. Abraham, *Medal of Honor Winners*.
 Researchers, *Funk and Wagnall's Standard Reference Encyclopedia*.
 Ward Just, *U.S. Army*.
 R. E. Crickmer, *High School Geography*.

E. N. Huggins, *Novel on Korea*.
 Researchers, *World Book Encyclopedia*.
 Researchers, *Encyclopedia Britannica*.
 Aldus Books Limited, *Oceanology*.
 Al Schollin, Lt. Gen. Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. (biography).
 Researchers, *World Aviation Directory*.
 Clay Blair, Jr., *Novel with a Pentagon setting*.
 Lee R. Buschoff, Jr., *Space Available Travel*.
 Paul J. Gillette, *Medal of Honor Winners*.
 Giuseppe D'Avanzo, *Supersonic Aircraft*.
 Edwin Lee White, *10,000 Tons by Christmas*.
 Paul Dickson, *American Research Institutions*.

AUDIO VISUAL DIVISION

The functional responsibilities and activities of the Audio Visual Division and the Technical Services staff remain generally as established in 1966 and as reported in our September 3, 1969 letter.

Updated information concerning the Audio-Visual News Branch, Motion Picture Production Branch, and the Radio-Television Production Branch are contained in Tab F¹.

Next, TAB F² lists those funds required for operation wherein services, equipment or expendable supplies are required.

TAB³ lists completed films, newsfilms, video tapes and still photos, either released to the public or cleared for public release.

AUDIO-VISUAL NEWS BRANCH

In performing the function of the Audio-Visual News Branch 590 assignments were accomplished from 1 July 1969 to 31 March 1970. These assignments produced 28,500 photo prints for distribution to various media.

MOTION PICTURE PRODUCTION BRANCH

The Motion Picture Production Branch participates in two main activities: approval of assistance on the production of commercially produced motion pictures and the approval of release to the public of those films and video tapes produced by the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps and other components of the Department of Defense.

The Branch also has the responsibility for the production of films for the Office of Public Affairs. During the period July 1969 to date no productions were undertaken, and none are anticipated through July 1970.

The List of Selected Films referred to in our last report was published in January 1970 as planned. The cost of printing 5,000 copies of this catalogue was \$484.35 and was funded by the general DoD printing budget. Copies of this catalogue are made available at OASD (PA) Directorate for Community Relations and Information Offices of the Military Services. Approximately 20 requests for information concerning DoD films are replied to weekly by this branch.

It is anticipated that for the remainder of the fiscal year 1970 the following additional work will be accomplished:

Assistance: Five (5) theatrical projects (based on telephone conversations with producers and previous general inquiries).

Release of Service Productions: Ten (10) video tapes, and Thirty (30) Service films.

RADIO-TELEVISION PRODUCTION BRANCH

Activities of the Radio Television Production Branch are basically confined to assistance to the commercial media in the production of documentary and entertainment programs, with a heavy preponderance on documentaries. Assistance involves authorization of and arrangements for (1) access to military facilities and personnel for research, photography or interviews, and (2) access to military film depositories for the selection and purchase of stock footage. All photography is accomplished by commercial film crews at the company's expense, and stock footage is purchased by the company in ac-

cordance with the provisions established by DOD Instruction 7230.7 User Charges.

The single exception to the above paragraph involves one disc recording containing several spot announcements, and one film clip, produced in cooperation with all the Services as a salute to Armed Forces Day, at an estimated total cost of \$2,000. These costs have been absorbed by the military departments and are not charged to OASD (PA).

MAIL EARLY OVERSEAS 1969 PROJECT

This project produced a professional package of spot announcements, film clips and slides which were provided to over 750 television stations. A spot announcement package was also sent to over 5,000 stations. These public service materials urged the public to mail Christmas packages to servicemen overseas in time for delivery by Christmas. The project was coordinated with Postal authorities. Contract cost: \$9,268.90. These funds did not come out of the OASD (PA) budget. They were part of the general printing fund maintained by OSD.

AUDIO VISUAL EXPENDITURES¹

	July 1, 1969 to Mar. 31, 1970	Apr. 1, 1970 to June 30, 1970 (estimate)
Photographic supplies and equipment:		
Still photo:		
Expendables (chemicals, film, photographic papers, etc.)	\$5,078.98	\$1,200.00
Equipment	788.81	0
Total	5,867.79	1,200.00
Motion picture:		
Expendables (film stock, film cans, tape, movie leaders, filters)	2,864.48	1,500.00
Equipment	1,086.40	200.00
Total	4,950.88	1,700.00
Technical services: Expendables (parts, tubes, wire, tape, etc.)		
	881.39	368.61
Travel	3,121.06	2,665.00

¹ These are estimates obtained from staff personnel. Accounting and other official records are not structured to record actual costs for these types of services.

MISCELLANEOUS CONTRACTS

1. Department of Defense Newsfilm Contract (V-Series)

A contract to process, screen, edit and distribute to national TV-newsfilm media military sound-on-film stories occurring in Southeast Asia.

Production costs cover only the Stateside expenditures necessary for transport of film, film processing, editing, release printing, and necessary management details to accomplish the foregoing.

The input of sync-sound newsfilm is generated by five Service-supported camera teams in Vietnam. These teams are under the direct supervision of MACV and indirectly of OASD (PA). These teams were approved by Deputy Secretary Vance on November 12, 1965, and established by April-June 1966. The purpose of these teams is to document for release to the public, via national network television, the feature aspects of the military participation in Southeast Asia. The teams are not in competition with the civilian media. The high usage by network syndication of the material produced by these teams is indicative of the effectiveness of their efforts. A study is now under way with a view to inactivation of all or most of these five teams by the end of FY 1970. Such action appears feasible and desirable in view of the reduction of U.S. military strength in Vietnam and the need to achieve economies wherever possible.

2. Motion picture film processing

Motion picture newsfilm exposed by DoD cameramen requiring urgent handling is

processed under a contract arrangement with the Department of Agriculture.

3. Army Photographic Agency

This Agency provided multiple services which include tape coverage of network newscasts from which Defense Department excerpts can be extracted, reproduced and shown to interested Defense agencies.

4. Defense Film Report

Funds (\$100,000) for the production of a Defense Film Report were deleted from our budget as of 2 January 1970. (FY 1970 budget).

5. Costs

FY 1970 costs involved in 1, 2 and 3 above, funded from the OASD (Administrational) budget (Central Services costs referred to in Encl 2), are estimated at \$122,000. Estimated costs for FY 1971 are the same except for the addition of \$100,000 for the DoD annual film report.

RELEASED MATERIAL

	Number of different photos	
	July 1, 1969, to Mar. 31, 1970	Apr. 1, 1970, to June 30, 1970 (estimated)
STILL PHOTOS (BASIC INPUT FROM THE SERVICES)		
Subject:		
Vietnam (combat operations, civic action, etc.)	133	61
Ceremonies and special events	54	36
U.S. troop training and exercises	107	43
New equipment and research	46	23
Miscellaneous	66	32
Total	467	195
Still photo assignments	590	185
Total prints produced	28,500	6,000

	Number of different photos	
	July 1, 1969, to Mar. 31, 1970	Apr. 1, 1970, to June 30, 1970 (estimated)
STILL PHOTOS (BASIC INPUT FROM THE SERVICES)		
Subject:		
Vietnam (combat operations, civic action, etc.)	133	61
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U.S. troop training and exercises	107	43
New equipment and research	46	23
Miscellaneous	66	32
Total	467	195
Still photo assignments	590	185
Total prints produced	28,500	6,000

	Number of different photos	
	July 1, 1969, to Mar. 31, 1970	Apr. 1, 1970, to June 30, 1970 (estimated)
OFFICIAL FILM PRODUCED BY THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS¹		
News film:		
Footage released	16,724	8,873
Number of releases	145	89
V-series:		
Footage released	6,037	2,259
Number of releases	121	32
SPOTMASTER RELEASES		
DOD radio news releases (Spotmaster)	156	52
National media responses	4,500	1,700
Audio technical assistance requests	3,700	1,200
Telephonic inquiries	975	300

¹ Releases from this film are a bonus derived by screening official documentation film taken by the military departments or record and historical purposes.

DIRECTORATE FOR COMMUNITY RELATIONS		
<i>Assigned personnel</i>		
Officers	-----	15
Enlisted	-----	2
Civilians	-----	14
Total	-----	31

During FY 1970 the Directorate for Community Relations will complete an estimated 15,000 actions. These actions range from the Senate Youth Program which requires extensive planning to a simple action such as providing a color guard for a school function.

The expenditure for DCR for FY 1970 is estimated at \$244,000. This figure includes civilian personnel salaries, overtime, cost of personnel benefits and travel. The increase in costs is due to per diem and salary increases

even though there has been a decrease in the total number of personnel assigned to the Directorate since the last report. Salaries for military personnel projected through FY 1970 are estimated at \$305,000.

Events division

a. *Aerial Events.* The Events Division schedules and coordinates the appearances by the USAF Thunderbirds, US Navy Blue Angels, US Army Golden Knights, US Navy Reserve Air Barons, and the US Navy Parachut Team. During the first half of FY 1970, the teams participated in 449 demonstrations, including those at military installations. The Events Division provided static display aircraft for 98 civilian and military shows. There were 132 flyovers authorized, including missing-ship formations for military funerals. These are authorized as part of training missions including Air National Guard and Reserve units of all services. During the second half of FY 1970, the teams are scheduled for 128 demonstrations, including those at military installations. It is estimated that there will be static display aircraft at 56 events. For flyovers, it is estimated that 100 demonstrations, including those for military funerals, will be given during the last half of FY 1970.

b. *Surface Events.* Military participation (musical, color guard, troops) for more than 4,500 events in the Washington metropolitan area and about 1,500 national events elsewhere will be authorized by this Division in FY 1970. A list of typical events supported is attached, showing military participation authorized. (TAB G²)

Defense Industry Bulletin: This publication, which was mentioned in previous correspondence to your office, was transferred to the Defense Supply Agency on October 1, 1969. (See TAB G²)

Place	Event	Sponsor	Military participation
Washington, D.C.	Awards ceremony, handicapped Federal employee of the year.	U.S. Civil Service Commission	Joint color guard and Marine Band.
Do.	Washington's Birthday.	Department of the Interior	Joint color guard, joint cordon, Navy Band.
Do.	Annual dinner, White House News Photographers Association.	WHNPA	Navy Band.
Arlington National Cemetery	Veterans Day ceremonies.	Veterans' Administration; veterans organizations	Navy Band and Sea Chanters.
Do.	Memorial Day observances.	G.A.R. Memorial Day Corp.	Air Force Band and Singing Sergeants.
Wapakoneta, Ohio	Homecoming of Neil Armstrong	City	661st Air Force Band, 338th Army Band, U.S. Air Force flyover.
Rockville, Md.	High school assembly	High school principal	Air Force band.
Chicago, Ill.	All-star football game	Chicago Tribune	National anthem by Bluejacket Choir, 100 American flags carried by men of all services.

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Washington, D.C., September 8, 1969.

Memorandum for: Secretaries of the Military Departments; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director of Defense Research and Engineering; Assistant Secretaries of Defense; Assistants to the Secretary of Defense; Director, Defense Supply Agency. Subject: Transfer of Function.

Reference: (a) My memorandum, subject: "Review of OSD Functions," dated March 8, 1969.

In accordance with reference (a), the Director, Defense Supply Agency will assume responsibility for the publication of the Defense Industry Bulletin effective October 1, 1969, vice the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). The three (3) personnel space authorizations (2 military and 1 civilian) and the personnel currently occupying these spaces will be transferred from the Office, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) to the Defense Supply Agency effective with the close of business on 1 October 1969. FY 1970 funds budgeted in support of the foregoing function when appropriated by the Congress will be transferred to the Defense Supply Agency from OSD. The Defense Supply Agency will budget for the publication of the Defense Industry Bulletin for FY 1971 and thereafter. Necessary arrangements for the orderly transfer of this activity

will be worked out between the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) and the Director, Defense Supply Agency.

DAVID PACKARD.

PROJECTS DIVISION

An internal reorganization of the Directorate in October 1969 resulted in the establishment of the Programs Branch under the Projects Division. This branch has an authorized strength of two officers, and has an assigned strength of one officer who develops the long-range planning for Department of Defense Community Relations programs. Specifically, this branch develops programs to support the community relations objectives with regard to educational groups, youth groups, academic groups, and professional groups. The programs developed by the Programs Branch are executed by the appropriate Division or Divisions of DCR. Additionally, the branch monitors community relations problems around the country with a view to helping to solve or easing the problems. For example, this branch monitors military base closures, reductions in force of civilian employees, pollution of defense installations and other such problems. The Chief, Programs Branch, also acts as the Public Affairs working representative on the DoD Domestic Action Council. Duties include the coordination of news releases

about Domestic Action programs and furnishing the public with Domestic Action information upon request.

a. *The Office of Media Accreditation and Tours* has been abolished, as was previously stated. A Far East and Pacific Journalists tour was accomplished in November after the Department of Defense withdrew from this White House, State and Defense Department jointly sponsored program. The Department of Defense participated in this tour since planning and commitments had been made prior to the Defense withdrawal from the program. The cost to the Department of Defense was \$15,593.56. A list of participants is attached. (Tab H)

b. *Joint Civilian Orientation Conference.* JCOC-40 will be conducted on April 19, 1970 for 10 days. There will be 71 participants who will pay all their own expenses, including food and lodging, which totals to approximately \$24,000. Military aircraft transportation costs for last year's JCOC (39) were funded by the Air Force. For the present JCOC-40, Military Airlift Command aircraft will be utilized and funded by Department of Defense. ASD(PA) costs will be about \$6,000.

c. *Speakers Bureau.* For FY 1970, DCR anticipates a total of 900-950 speaker requests from all parts of the nation. As of April 10, 1970, 427 speakers have been provided. There

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has been an increase in requests for speakers during the present fiscal year in comparison with FY 1969.

**EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC JOURNALISTS TOUR,
NOVEMBER 3-DECEMBER 2, 1969**

MEMBERS OF THE TOUR—REVISED SEPTEMBER 30

Robert Baudino, Australia, Chief Correspondent, Parliamentary Press Gallery, Canberra, Sydney Daily Telegraph, Canberra, Australia.

John David Little, Australia, News Reporter and Producer, Channel 9 TV, Sydney, Australia.

Leng Jo-Shui, China, Diplomatic Reporter, Central News Agency, Taipei, China.

Matt Wilson, Fiji, Chief Reporter, Fiji Times, Suva, Fiji.

P. M. Woo, Hong Kong, Editor, Ming Pao Monthly, Hong Kong, B.C.C.

Anwar Effendi, Indonesia, Editor, Mimbar Umum, Medan, Indonesia.

Mohammad Nurdin Supomo, Indonesia, Director, Radio Republic Indonesia, Palembang, Palembang, Indonesia.

Yutaka Ichiki, Japan, Assistant Political Editor, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Tokyo, Japan.

Shin Kawai, Japan, Senior Foreign News Reporter, Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo, Japan.

Lew Hyuck In, Korea, Political Editor, Dong-A Ilbo, Seoul, Korea.

Ri Dong Yohp, Korea, Editorial Writer, Chonpuk Ilbo, Chonju, Korea.

Somvall Vilayleck, Laos, Press Director (Propaganda and Tourism), Lao Ministry of Information, Vientiane, Laos.

S. H. Tan, Malaysia, Editor, The Malay Mail, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

K. I. Gibson, New Zealand, Bulletin Editor, NZBC, News Service, Wellington, New Zealand.

Neal H. Cruz, Philippines, Editor-in-Chief, Daily News International, Manila, Philippines.

Eduardo R. Ranosa, Philippines, Senior News Editor, Tri-Media News (Philippines Herald DZHP TV-13), Manila, Philippines.

Colonel Karoon Kengradomying, Thailand, Director, Army Signal AM-FM Radio, Bangkok, Thailand.

Sutichal Yoon, Thailand, City Editor, The Bangkok Post, Bangkok, Thailand.

Phan Lac Phuc, Viet-Nam, Editor, Tien Tuyen, Saigon, Viet-Nam.

ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

The activity in the Organization Division will be approximately the same for FY 1970 as it was for FY 1969. The Division will handle somewhat over 6,000 items of routine correspondence and respond to more than 300 written inquiries from the White House and Members of Congress. The Organizations Division continues to mail materials of interest to almost 300 civilian organizations which have indicated a desire to receive such items. Some of the significant forms of co-operation being extended to organizations during FY 1970 include:

a. Support provided to the Senate Youth Program, which is jointly sponsored by the United States Senate and the William Randolph Hearst Foundation. Secretary Laird addressed the group during the visit to the Pentagon this year.

b. Two seminars for nongovernmental organizations. Leaders of the organizations are invited to the Pentagon for a one-day seminar. Unclassified briefings are given by Department of Defense officials. Each will be attended by more than 200 participants.

c. Ten Pentagon military briefings for groups of business executives attending seminars sponsored by the Brookings Institute on Federal Government operations.

d. Providing support similar to that of FY 1969 for national conventions of major veterans organizations.

e. Arrangements for 50 leaders of civilian organizations to attend Brass Strike Exercise in October 1969, and similar participation for the exercise in May 1970.

Both the Projects and Organization Divisions, during this fiscal year, have responded to an increasing number of requests for briefings and information on Defense policies and programs from high-school and college student groups throughout the nation. These have included specific requests for in-house briefings of student groups visiting the Pentagon during trips to the Washington area sponsored by veteran, civic and religious organizations; requests for speakers to participate in seminar activities during seasonal conferences of student organizations; and requests for brochure material of Defense publications, including fact sheets, Commanders Digest, and the Defense Industry Bulletin.

The Projects Division provides the actual briefings and tours of the Pentagon. It is estimated that over 6,000 students will have attended briefings or heard Defense speakers during FY 1970. Groups included Senate Youth Forum, Presidential Classroom, Washington Study Group, etc.

DIRECTORATE FOR PLANS AND PROGRAMS

The activities of the Directorate for Plans and Programs in FY 1970 remain essentially the same as they were described for FY 1969.

As previously stated, the planning function in this Directorate is not normally accomplished by the preparation of formal plans. It is more a matter of developing, in conjunction with other DoD elements and other agencies of the government, public affairs courses of action in connection with situations—actual or potential—that may be of public interest and therefore may require some action to be taken. Hence there have been no actual public affairs plans produced in the past year.

During this period, the personnel authorization of this Directorate was reduced by one (1) military space.

**DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, D.C., August 17, 1970.**

Honorable J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in further reference to your letter of 31 March 1970 requesting certain information concerning the Navy's public affairs program. Our final report was delayed because of the necessity of including afloat commands in order to be completely responsive to your inquiry.

Paragraph one of your letter requested an update of information on the same subject last year. Paragraph two raised certain questions concerning Navy internal information programs requiring a more complex response and is presented separately with pertinent annexes. The complete report comprises enclosure (1) to this letter and is keyed, paragraph by paragraph, to your letter of 31 March.

The figure of \$8.801 millions for 1970 includes military and civilian pay raises effective this fiscal year. Despite increased salary costs, the figure is lower than our estimate for FY '70, made last year, but is considered more accurate. The reductions reflect manpower losses and reduced public affairs activities Navywide. Also included are administrative costs, some of which can be charged to internal information, although those costs are not easily separated.

It is hoped these data assist you in your consideration of defense appropriations bills which will come before you in the Senate this session of Congress.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN H. CHAFEE,
Secretary of the Navy.

**PUBLIC AFFAIRS COSTS—U.S. NAVY,
FISCAL YEARS 1970-71**

1. (a). The overall estimated cost for FY 1970 of all Navy public affairs* activities, including the pay and allowances of all military personnel is \$3,801,466; for FY 1971, \$7,645,175.

1. (b). The number of civilian and military personnel working in public affairs, internal information and related administrative and clerical duties in FY 1970 totals 1,465. Of these, 441 work full-time in public information and community relations; 143 work full-time in internal information and 125 work full-time in administrative and clerical duties. The remainder devote part of their time to two or more of the activities we list above. In FY 1971, we estimate 296 persons, civilian and military, will be assigned full-time in public affairs; 117 full-time in internal information; 113 full-time in administration, and the remainder will work part-time in two or more of these areas. Total personnel assigned in public affairs, internal relations and related administration in FY 1971 is estimated to be 1,314 civilian and military.

1. (c). Accurate data (or even an accurate estimate) of the numbers of personnel who work part-time in connection with public affairs are virtually impossible to gather without inaugurating complex and costly Navy-wide accounting and time allocation procedures of doubtful value in cost and manpower management. Many Navy ships and shore activities assign one person collateral duty in public affairs. This person normally spends anywhere from no time to several hours a week on this assignment.

1. (d). The following information is provided as the Marine Corps input to the Department of the Navy response to your letter of 31 March.

Estimated pay and allowances costs for Marine public affairs personnel for FY 1970 and FY 1971 are \$3,920,000 and \$3,625,000 respectively. The figures do not include the pay increase provided for in Public Law 91-231.

The number of civilian and military personnel presently engaged in full-time public affairs work is 701. The estimated figure for FY 1971 is 631.

There are no Marine Corps personnel engaged in public affairs activities on a part-time basis.

1. (e). Data presented are actual through April 1, 1970. Except as noted, activities were expected to continue at the same rate through the remainder of the fiscal year.

MEDIA RELATIONS DIVISION

The Media Relations Division continues, in coordination with OASD(PA), to be responsible for all liaison with news media on information of national interest about the Navy and for preparation of informational films and printed matter with carry-over value to the Navy's internal information program.

Since the last report one branch of the Division has been disestablished: Special Projects and Research. A Special Assistant for Contract Motion Picture Production was designated in January 1970 to permit close supervision and control over commercial film producers performing work under contract for the Office of Information, and to seek new cost-saving measures.

News Branch: During the period 1 July 1969 to 1 April 1970, this branch answered an average of 500 queries per month originating from the Pentagon press corps and other newsmen from throughout the nation and the world.

A total of 881 news releases was prepared

*Public affairs includes public information and community relations.

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by the News Branch during the same period. (Also, approximately 792 routine contract award announcements were made and, in addition, about 100 releases of internal Navy interest were prepared and disseminated to service-oriented publications.)

In response to requests from news men, the News Branch also arranged over 500 interviews with key Navy officials during this period and coordinated the embarkation of approximately 200 newsmen in naval aircraft and ships. The majority of these newsmen were embarked in groups.

Audio-Visual Branch: During the period 1 July 1969 to 1 April 1970 this branch has responded to approximately 215 requests for assistance from U.S. and foreign broadcast networks. A sample of the types of requests received and the assistance provided is as follows:

Challenge, CBS Television: Arranged for interview and filming of deep diving experiment by Navy petty officer at New London, Connecticut.

Today Show, NBC Television: Salute to the Navy on Navy Day was coordinated with their writer.

Truth or Consequences, Metromedia Television: Coordinated guest appearances of Navy personnel at request of producer.

Metromedia Radio News: One-half hour documentary on the battleship USS New Jersey, provided technical assistance.

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation: Provided assistance for a documentary on the military as a profession.

Radio Luxembourg/Operation Deep Freeze: Coordinated the taping of communication aspects for the filming of a news feature report by telephone from McMurdo Sound, Antarctica, to Luxembourg.

WRC-NBC Television, Washington, D.C.: Provided interviewees and arranged for filming in connection with story on pollution and Navy plans to fight it.

NHK, Japan Broadcasting Corporation: "Big Sciences of the World". Coordinated research visits to Navy installations throughout the country.

The Audio-Visual Branch also originated, for release by DOD, Navy newsfilm stories of national interest. Since 1 July 1969, this branch has provided Navy footage used in 89 DOD releases such as the following samples:

SAC Bombers on Naval Air Station.

Navy Christmas Around the World.

Women Take Survival Training in Antarctica.

APOLLO XII Recovery Training.

Swiftboat Turnover in South Vietnam.

The Branch also releases one-minute, silent 16mm film clips (called news featurettes) produced by the film library of the Naval Photographic Center, Washington, D.C. Forty-seven featurettes have been released during the period. A sample list of subjects includes:

Navy Aid to Tunisian Flood Victims.

Seabee Hurricane Relief.

Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle.

175th Anniversary of the Navy Supply Corps.

Shark Attack.

Inner Space Vehicle.

Test Pilot Glider Training.

Science Students Visit Naval Installations.

Camp Concern.

The Audio-Visual Branch coordinated Navy cooperation on two commercially produced feature films and three defense industry produced films in Fiscal Year 1970. This cooperation includes script review and approval, arrangements for filming on naval facilities and ships and the sale of stock footage to the film producer by the Naval Photographic Center. There was no cost to the Navy in this cooperation. The films are:

Feature Films: Too Late the Hero (Robert Aldrich).

Which Way to the Front (Jerry Lewis/Warner Brothers).

INDUSTRY FILMS:

Hook, Line and Helo (Sikorsky)

Saga of the Skyraider (Douglas)

The Ballad of John Green (Ling Tempeo Vought)

The Branch also produced a 28 minute film for internal distribution. The film "Navy Screen Highlights", produced with existing stock footage, summarized the most significant events occurring within the Navy during the year.

FILM PRODUCTION BRANCH:

This branch produces historical and informational films for internal and public audiences. During the past nine months it has completed five films for release. Sample titles are: "Destroyerman", "Home from the Sea", and "The Great Flight". Four other films, made by commercial producers under contract to the Navy, were completed during the period: "Law of the Sea", "The Navy Sings It Like It Is", "Port of Call" and "Rise of the Soviet Navy".

NEWS PHOTO BRANCH:

The News Photo Branch continues as the primary Navy agency for the clearance and release, through DOD, of still photographs to U.S. news media. It also serves as the focal point for requests by Navy units for transparencies and prints needed for internal publications and other internal information programs. Since the beginning of the current fiscal year, this branch has distributed 21,695 transparencies and prints.

AMERICAN FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION BRANCH:

This branch provides policy guidance and administrative assistance to 22 Navy-operated AFRT radio outlets and six television stations ashore, plus closed circuit television systems in 12 major ships when deployed. An average of 55 radio outlets in ships of both the Atlantic and Pacific areas had AFRT radio programming during this reporting period.

MAGAZINE AND BOOK BRANCH:

Between 1 July 1969 and 1 April 1970, this branch has answered approximately 1,000 requests for information from magazine and book publishers, editors, authors, staff writers and freelancers. In addition, extended assistance was provided to more than 50 persons developing magazine articles. Examples of this assistance are:

Arranged interviews and visit to USS John Adams for Parade Magazine.

Arranged interviews and provided information and photos to *Undersea Technology Magazine* for a special anti-submarine warfare issue.

ASSISTANCE TO 175 BOOK PUBLISHERS AND AUTHORS INCLUDED

Cooperation with David Westheimer (author of *Von Ryan's Express*) for a book titled *Downfall*.

Providing information for the up-dating of encyclopedias, almanacs, textbooks, science works and naval publications such as *Jane's Fighting Ships*.

Media relations projects to be pursued during the period 1 April-30 June 1970: During the remainder of fiscal year 1970, it is expected that five to eight more half-hour motion picture films, primarily useful in the internal information program, will be completed. Other work of the Division is expected to continue at approximately the same pace as described earlier. However, the workload of this Division basically depends on current events—providing media representatives with information on topics of current news interest. Since these events are unpredictable, no definite scope of future activities can be forecast.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS DIVISION

This Division is the principal point of contact between the American citizen, individ-

ually or as an organization member, who wants information about the Navy, or who wants to arrange either to visit a Navy unit or to have a Navy unit or exhibit visit his town. Thus, orientation visits/cruises, exhibits/displays, performances by the Navy's Blue Angels flight demonstration team or the Navy Band Sea Chanters and every imaginable kind of question about the Navy are the province of the Community Relations Division.

ORIENTATION AND SHIP VISIT BRANCH

The FY 1970 activities from 1 July 1969 to 1 April 1970 have included responding to requests, including those from Members of Congress, for:

U.S. Navy ship visits to various U.S. ports; Reservations on U. S. Navy operated boat tour of Pearl Harbor and the Arizona Memorial;

Youth group orientation visits and cruises;

Surplus equipment including uniforms, boats and nautical material items; and use of facilities of naval bases for berthing and messing including outdoor encampments (Boy Scouts of America);

Support of the OSD-sponsored Joint Civilian Orientation Conference;

Activities have also included administering the SECNAV Guest Cruise Program and coordination of Fleet and Naval District actions in connection with commandant level orientation cruises.

SPECIAL EVENTS BRANCH

Following are illustrations of special events conducted during the 1 July 1969-1 April 1970 period (all special events participation is provided at no additional cost to the government):

Blue Angels were scheduled for 46 performances nationwide;

U.S. Navy Band—One hundred and twenty-five performances were scheduled in the Washington, D.C. area directly through the office at no additional cost to the government;

U.S. Navy Band Annual Spring Tour—Approximately sixty-three performances are scheduled in various U.S. cities during this annual tour. The performances are booked through a civilian tour director and all expenses are borne by the sponsors;

Navy Unit Band performances in the fifteen naval districts—Three hundred and seventy-five requests were processed and assigned by this branch to the proper naval districts for action by 1 April 1970. Another 100 requests are expected from 1 April to 1 July 1970. The bands perform at no expense to the government;

U.S. Navy Band Sea Chanters—Seventy-five performances were scheduled and coordinated through this branch at no additional cost to the government;

Foreign VIP Visits—Visits to the U.S. by heads of state of twenty countries. This branch coordinated security and baggage handling arrangements with the State Department, DOD, and appropriate naval district commandants;

Fort McHenry Flag Day Observance—Annual observance featuring a different service each year. Navy participation this year will include the Naval Air Training Command flag pageant and band, Navy ceremonial guard, ship visit and flyover.

LIAISON BRANCH

The Liaison Branch (more accurately referred to as the "Public Inquiries Branch") researches and prepares replies to correspondence and phone inquiries on Navy policies and programs received from members of Congress, private citizens, government agencies, industry, national organizations, foreign nationals, and daily newspaper "Action Line" type columns. Nearly 7,000 (6,786) such inquiries were handled in the period 1 July 1969-1 April 1970.

INTERNAL RELATIONS DIVISION

Editorial Services Branch:

Selected Navy entries for the Armed Forces' Thomas Jefferson Awards program. Assisted in budgeting request and extension of programs for High School News Service Report, a DOD publication for which the Navy is executive agent. Produced various graphic designs for pamphlets including a domestic action pamphlet on "Camp Concern".

NAVAL RESERVE AND TRAINING BRANCH:

Continued to administer all active duty for training of naval reservists of the Office of Information; conducted orientation course for Public affairs specialist direct commission officers; published the monthly newsletter Items of Interest; supervised evaluation of projects performed by Naval Reserve Public Affairs Companies (NRFACs) and designated nine top performing units for FY 69.

BIOGRAPHIES BRANCH

Prepared 53 new biographies; revised 378 old biographies; filled requests for 6, 730 biographies; furnished information on 502 officers via telephone; furnished information other than biographies on 1,579 officers; supplied briefing material for 30 VIP trips; mailed more than 22, 604 biographies under routine distribution; and supplied 2,814 photographs. A one-third increase in the above figures is anticipated for the fourth quarter due to the annual selection of flag officers during that time.

PLANS DIVISION:

Specific activities during FY 70 included: Preparation of Policy Guidance concerning:

- Seal Beach Pollution
- Environmental Control
- LFS Program
- Civil Disturbance
- OMEGA Navigation System
- UNITAS XI
- Black Sea Transit Operations
- Preparation of responses to substantive Congressional queries, including this report;
- Provided project officer to DOD Prisoner of War Sub-Committee on Public Affairs;
- Provided public affairs escort for return of Navy POWs from North Vietnam;
- Coordinated Navy public affairs planning for return of chemical munitions from Okinawa;
- Developed and revised Navy Public Affairs Regulations;
- Coordinated public affairs aspects of reduction in force actions at naval shore installations in connection with Project 703.

NAVY DEPARTMENT SPEECH BUREAU

Speech Evaluation Branch: Provides small rehearsal facility equipped with basic video tape recording equipment for use of Navy speakers as a means of improving oral delivery.

Speaking Engagements and Planning Branch: Coordinated public appearances by enlisted men and junior officers in the United States on leave or under change-of-duty orders from Vietnam, who have volunteered to speak in their home areas about the work of the Riverine Forces ("Brown Water Navy") in Vietnam. About 100 appearances by 35 officers and men have been arranged under this program. Responding to requests from various sponsoring organizations, 68 speaking appearances by Rear Admirals/Assistant Secretaries and above have been arranged during the period 1 July 1969 to 30 April 1970.

PROGRAM SUPPORT BRANCH

Planned, coordinated and conducted two 14-day speech seminars primarily for qualified naval reserve and navy officers who have expressed desires for training so that they could help fill requests for Navy speakers in their local areas.

Eight hundred and eighty-eight requests for speech material and speech background material were handled in the first nine months of fiscal 1970, nearly half of which required considerable basic research.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS MANPOWER MANAGEMENT DIVISION

Advises the Chief of Information on the procurement, assignments and training of public affairs officer specialists and sub-specialists; coordinated with the Chief of Naval Personnel on the procurement, training and assignment of Navy Journalists; prepares public affairs personnel plans. The Division is concerned with approximately 170 public affairs specialist officers and 800 enlisted journalist personnel. The principal effort during the period of this report has been related to the involuntary separation of personnel under Project 703 and the severe turbulence which results from such drastic actions within a small community.

2. (a). (b). (c). As was indicated in our answer to question number one of your previous inquiry, "Internal information programs . . . are so integrated with normal command and administrative functions that they are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to separate." In an effort to be both responsive and accurate, however, we have surveyed major commands to identify persons whose primary duties are in the information field and who spend all or a part of their time working at internal information tasks. The effort devoted in a formal sense to internal information has been reduced to man years. Information requested in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), and (c), paragraph 2 of your 31 March letter is contained in tabular form in Annex A, Tab 1. Data are provided by fiscal years. Seldom is money requested specifically for internal information programs and no such request was made for FY 1971.

2. (d). The manner in which internal information duties are performed varies from command to command and station to station in the Navy, depending on missions or specialties. It is difficult to describe in detail, therefore, how personnel on board each station or command perform duties in the conduct of such programs. However, their activities are guided by provisions of Navy Public Affairs Regulations and are described in Tab 2, Annex A; costs are included in Tab 1.

2. (e). No catalogs of internal information materials other than films are published by the Navy. A U.S. Navy Film Catalog, NAVAIR 10-1-777, a comprehensive listing of all Navy films for training, internal information and for public consumption, was sent to you last year.

2. (f). Copies of typical internally-distributed materials in the categories enumerated above are furnished as Tab 4.

2. (g). Films produced in FY 1970 are included in Tab 1, Annex A. It is possible to determine organizations requesting Navy films listed in Tab 1 but virtually impossible to determine numbers of persons before whom they have been shown. Persons borrowing films are not required to report audience size or composition. Although these films have been cleared for public showing, it neither means they have been shown nor even requested outside the Navy.

2. (h). Non-appropriated funds generally are not used in Navy internal information programs with the exception of base newspapers, many of which are published with use of welfare and recreation funds.

2. (i). A list of Navy periodicals published primarily for internal information use, and their costs are included in Tab 1, Annex A.

2. (j). The Navy maintains no facilities of its own for training information personnel. Instead, it annually enrolls students at non-Navy activities, including the Defense Information School (DINFOS), an activity of the Department of Defense sponsored jointly by the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs, and for Manpower and

Reserve Affairs. Navy students (officers and enlisted) scheduled for training in FY 1970 are as follows: at DINFOS, 202; postgraduate course in the University of Wisconsin, eight; and the photojournalism short course at Syracuse University, 13.

2. (k). The Navy Publications and Printing Service is the Department of the Navy's central publications service, conducting the Navy program coordinating the development of information to be printed or duplicated in conventional or micro-format, and controlling the procurement production, and physical distribution thereof, in accordance with 44 U.S.C., Public Printing and Documents, and regulations of the Congressional Joint Committee on Printing.

The total Navy program encompasses the publications and printing requirements of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Chief of Naval Material and the Systems Commands, the Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Secretariat. (Each component—command, bureau, or office—is responsible for the technical and editorial content of whatever publications may be required for the fulfillment of their assigned missions and for determining to whom such publications shall be distributed.)

The elements of the Service organization are a Headquarters Staff, 37 Navywide Publications and Printing Service Office and Branch Offices, and the Defense Printing Service, Washington, D.C. and Branches thereof.

The Service functions as a self-supporting organization, chartered by the Department of Defense to operate under the Navy Industrial Fund in accordance with Title IV of the National Security Act of 1947 as amended, and charged with the responsibility to provide and perform printing and related services or products and other functions necessarily incident thereto, for the Department of Defense, and for other agencies of government as directed or authorized by law or competent authority.

Production Record—FY 1969

Within the production reporting context of an industrially funded organization, the Navy Publications and Printing Service (NPPS) produced, within NPPS facilities, short-run, high-priority, and classified products and services valued at \$22.6 million dollars in Fiscal Year 1969, and procured other categories of products and services valued at \$26.0 million dollars.

Of the \$48.6 million dollar total, NPPS procured or produced, by customer:

Army	-----	\$2.0
Air Force	-----	1.8
Navy	-----	39.0
SecDef	-----	3.5
Other government agencies	-----	2.3
Total	-----	\$48.6

CROSS-SERVICING BY NPPS

The Service operates a nationwide program designed to accelerate the procurement and distribution of technical manuals under contracts established by the Public Printer and developed in cooperation with the Naval Material Command, the Systems Commands, the Joint Committee on Printing, and the U.S. Government Printing Office. This program takes into consideration existing Army, Air Force and Marine Corps, as well as Navy, military equipment production contracts and schedules, and promotes the effective use of local commercial printing resources by all the services.

NPPS manages a central repository and referral service for engineering plans and drawings and technical information, and furnishes such information to naval activities, other Government agencies and contractors. A complete microform facility has been established to support this function.

As advertised in the Commerce Business Daily and in other governmental and commercial periodicals, the NPPS Office in Philadelphia furnishes a subscription sales service to the public on all military specifications and standards and on certain DOD directives. It is currently providing specifications and standards to 3,468 industry subscribers, and directives to over 400 subscribers.

The Navy Publications and Printing Service is providing direct support to Southeast Asia through the NPPSO, Pearl Harbor, and its branch Offices at Subic Bay, Guam, and Okinawa. Production in WESTPAC meets requirements of CINCPACFLT, PACAF, MACV, FMFPAC, and the 7th and 13th Air Forces. At the request of MACV, NPPS also provides a "Printing Liaison Officer", on the MACV staff, who services that and other Commands and provides direction to the operation of the MACV printing production facility.

It is worth noting that official publications of Navy, whether for internal or external use, are not promotional and are continually reviewed for security, propriety and "good taste" in accordance with SECNAV Instruction 5600.12 of 17 February 1960, and OPNAV Instruction 5600.16 of 25 January 1970. Tab 3, Annex A contains copies of those instructions.

2. (1). Approximately 150 newspapers are published periodically throughout the Navy, 50 of which are published with appropriated funds, 100 with nonappropriated funds, chiefly those accumulated for recreation and welfare purposes. Approximately 100 magazines are published periodically by Navy units at the local level. Typical samples are included in Tab 5, Annex A. Costs for internal information publications also are included in Tab 1, Annex A.

COSTS RELATED TO NAVY INTERNAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS

2. (a). Item, sub-total, total fiscal year 1970 (estimate).

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONNECTED WITH INTERNAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS

2. (b). Full time personnel, Washington level 61; Outside of Washington 82.

2. (c). Part time personnel 325.63 (man years)¹

2. (d). Cost data for each office having share of responsibility for internal information program, not available—included in "Other" below.

2. (g). Cost of movies produced by the Navy for internal information.

"Year Ender 1969".....	\$42,750
"Navy Christmas".....	84,944
"Navy Songs".....	49,657
"Law of the Sea".....	138,818
"Bomb Squad".....	69,179
"Cleared for Take Off".....	21,866
"The Navy Man".....	65,008
"Sea Power on the Move".....	53,653
"Navy's Operational Test and Evaluation".....	46,940
"Skills for the Sea".....	55,420
"175 Years of NavSup".....	34,520
"President's Visit".....	22,500

Movie costs—total..... 685,255

2. (1). Annual cost of periodicals published for use in internal information.

Bupers Register And Personnel Newsletter.....	\$4,713
Officer Personnel:	
Newsletter.....	\$9,749
Career Information Newsletter.....	7,216
Navy Recruiter Magazine.....	18,348
Naval Training Bulletin.....	20,598
BUPERS Mess Newsletter.....	733
Naval Aviation News.....	136,000
All Hands/Naval Reservist.....	446,168
Retired Naval Personnel, Newsletter.....	11,712

Navy Chaplain's Bulletin.....	9,045
Wifeline.....	14,000
Direction.....	32,000
NAVNEWS.....	21,000
JO Journal.....	1,150
Sealift.....	38,038

Periodical costs—total..... 770,470

2. (2). Cost of newspapers and magazines published at the local level by Navy

Appropriated funds.....	\$1,990,485
Non-Appropriated funds.....	283,830

Newspapers magazines local—total..... 2,274,315

Other Costs—Not specifically identified..... 2,111,670

Total cost of Navy internal information program fiscal year 1970..... 5,841,710 (Estimate)

Total cost of Navy Internal information program fiscal year 1971..... \$3,320,280 (Estimate)

¹Represents amount of time personnel, filling full-time public affairs billets, devote to internal information activities.

²Naval Aviation News is the oldest of the Navy's publications of this type and is a product of the Naval Aviation History Branch. Its mission is "to provide information and data on aircraft training and operations, space technology, missiles, rockets and other ordnance, safety, aircraft design, power plants, technical maintenance and overhaul procedures." Thus, it is primarily a technical publication, but is listed here because, collaterally, it performs an internal information function.

³Does not include film budget. Schedule for films for internal information purposes to be made during FY 71 has not been established.

CHAPTER ONE: INTERNAL INFORMATION

E-1001 GENERAL

1. *Internal Relations* covers the activities and associations of people working in the same organization.

2. *Internal Information*, a tool of internal relations, defines the communications methods and media used to acquaint personnel in the Navy and their dependents and the civilian employees of the Navy with news and other material that can help them in understanding the Navy and their jobs or personal affairs.

3. The Navy's internal publics include active-duty personnel, retired personnel, civilian employees, dependents and Naval Reservists.

4. The internal information program uses ship and station newspapers, Servicewide publications, educational programs, retention and leadership programs and personal communication between officers in command and their men.

5. The essential purposes of the internal relations program are to inform and to create an understanding of the Navy's role, policies and missions and (to the extent possible) this country's democratic way of life.

6. As appropriate, the internal information program may include recognition of the achievements of members of minority groups and stress their opportunity for advancement in the Navy and for assignment to the type of service in which they are interested and for which they are qualified, on a par with other Navy personnel.

7. Basic authority for internal relations activity is article 0709.1 of *Navy Regulations*, which states that the commanding officer will "use all proper means to promote the morale, and to preserve the moral and spiritual well-being of the personnel under his command." An imaginative and positive internal information program provides a prime means of carrying out this requirement.

E-1002 RESPONSIBILITY

1. The Chief of Information is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy and to the Chief of Naval Operations for informing naval personnel of the plans and policies of the Navy Department. He is responsible for supplying certain material for the support of the internal information program.

2. The Chief of Naval Personnel coordinates support of the General Military Training program of the Navy. This program was conceived to simplify administration of in-service training and the internal information flow that supports broad national and naval policy.

3. Director of Civilian Manpower Management has primary cognizance of information programs directed to civilian employees of the Navy.

4. Officers in command are responsible for fulfilling the objectives of the internal information program by supervising and actively participating in the program of their commands. Officers in command are supported by trained public affairs personnel, but the responsibility for informing their men—like the responsibility for the welfare of their subordinates—is primarily that of the officers in command.

5. The public affairs officer is important to the internal relations program. He supervises, coordinates and organizes the program's activities in accordance with these *Regulations*. He should:

a. Act in an advisory capacity to the officer in command on all matters pertaining to the conduct of the program.

b. Maintain close coordination with officers in command at all levels, staff officers and organizations associated with the morale and welfare of personnel. (He should be alert to detect any areas of current or potential misunderstandings or discontent, and should be able to offer suggestions to remedy the problem areas.)

c. Keep a close watch on policies and directives that affect personnel and disseminate pertinent information for fullest understanding and compliance.

d. Supervise the base, station or ship newspaper, magazines and radio and/or TV station.

E-1003 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

The policy of unrestricted flow of unclassified information described in F-2005.1 applies to internal information as well as public information. Navy personnel are entitled to the same access to news as are all other citizens. Calculated withholding of unfavorable news stories from internal information publications is therefore prohibited.

E-1004 OBJECTIVE AND PURPOSES

1. The objective of the internal information program is to ensure that each individual in the Navy, his dependents and civilian employees are fully and continually informed about the Navy, its purpose and future, with emphasis on their individual importance. This program should provide personnel with background material to:

a. Motivate the individual Navy man and his dependents toward a career in the Navy.

b. Provide them with information about the Navy and their country so that they can intelligently discuss these matters with military or civilian acquaintances.

2. The information objectives of the Navy as described in A-1004 and A-1005 should be used as guidelines for development of pertinent phases of the internal information program. Guidance concerning internal information programs may be obtained from the Internal Relations Division (OI-410), Office of Information, or the Public Affairs Offices of Fleet and Type Commanders or District Commandants.

E-1005 METHODS AND MEDIA

1. *Information periods*. The need for personal contact between the officer in command and his men has been apparent

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throughout military and naval history. This need has not been changed with the advent of missile ordnance and atomic power in the Navy.

a. General Military Training (GMT) periods coordinated by the Planning Board for Training should provide for internal dissemination of information.

b. Officers in command periodically should be the principal participant and on other occasions lend support by introduction of the subject and person covering the subject. At scheduled presentations or discussions, the officer in command can present his policies and expectations concerning the subject covered and its relationship to his command.

c. At special periods applicable to dependents, their attendance should be encouraged.

d. When appropriate, the officer in command should participate in civilian-employee indoctrination training periods. Note. See OPNAVINST 1500 (series) and the U.S. Navy Manual for Leadership Support (NAVPER 15934), Appendices B, C and D, for further information.

2. *Visiting Policy Spokesmen.* Senior Navy Department officials and flag officers visiting the command should be invited to speak to personnel of the command on Navy policy and other appropriate subjects.

3. Ship and station newspapers.

a. A ship or station newspaper is a publication prepared and distributed by and for Naval personnel and their dependents. An activity's newspaper can be an effective medium in the internal information program. To be as effective as possible, the publication should be closely supervised, encouraged and supported by the officer in command. He must ensure that the publication is in good taste and conforms to the policies established by the Department of the Navy.

b. The best qualified personnel should be assigned to prepare the material used in the internal information periodicals.

c. Sources of material for such publications are: Navy internal news releases, Service-wide periodicals, exchange newspapers from other commands, the American Forces Press Service, NAVNEWS and locally-developed channels. Special columns can include messages from the officer in command and the chaplain, letters to the editor, open forums, schedules of events, local news and sports and recreation.

d. Under certain conditions, command newspapers may be produced by a commercial publisher at no cost to the command. Such newspapers are known as Civilian Enterprise publications and are normally funded through advertising revenue obtained by the publisher. Officers in command are encouraged to investigate the possibilities of establishing a Civilian Enterprise newspaper in lieu of a command funded paper, whenever practicable. Information on establishing Civilian Enterprise papers is available from the Office of Information (OI-410). Basic guidelines will be found in NAVEXOS P-35 (see E-1008.1).

4. Familygrams (letters to parents, wives and families).

a. As a means of keeping dependents informed, officers in command are encouraged to write personal letters to parents and families of personnel attached to their commands on appropriate occasions. Such letters, when published by a ship, squadron or advance base, are especially effective in bridging the separation of personnel from their families. The Familygram should include news of the activities of the unit, the people and the role of the unit in its sphere of operation.

b. A critique of a unit's Familygram, or examples of other units' letters, may be obtained by writing to Family Editor (OI-410), Internal Relations Division, Office of Information.

E-1000 MATERIALS AVAILABLE

1. Materials listed below are a source of background and current information for use

in the internal information program. They may be reproduced and used in any way required to supplement local information.

2. *Bureau and Systems Command publications.* Such publications provide information supporting the internal information program. Extracts and reprints from them should be used as appropriate.

3. OPNAVINST 1500 (series), General Military Training, enclosure (1), Command Planning Guide for General Military Training, provides direction and coordinated reference materials currently available to all commands in support of various previously independent programs.

4. *DIRECTION Magazine* is issued monthly by the Chief of Information to provide guidelines in public affairs for officers in command and public affairs officers.

5. NAVNEWS is a twice-a-month news service distributed to ship and station editors, containing information about the Navy and its personnel. The news service also contains Family Editor information, which provides material of interest to wives. The service is available on request from the Office of Information (OI-410).

6. *JO Journal*, issued with NAVNEWS for all ship and station editors, also goes to all Journalists, broadcasters and photojournalists. The *JO Journal* covers a broad field of topics: techniques, tools, information on contests, and news of where Journalists are serving and in what positions.

7. *Department of Defense material.* The Office of Information for the Armed Forces (OASD-M&RA) publishes material that is distributed to officers in command. This material, distributed through the Bureau of Naval Personnel, includes such items as *Fact Sheet* (background information on international and national events and policy statements), the pocket guides (to various countries, such as Japan, Spain, Okinawa, etc.) and other pamphlets on matters of interest for military personnel.

a. Public affairs officers and editors should ensure that this material is routed to them for use as source information in their internal information programs.

b. The Armed Forces Press Service provides a weekly clip-sheet (Armed Forces Press File), covering current events of interest to all the Services.

(1) The Galley Guide is periodically included with the Armed Forces Press File. It includes helpful hints for editors.

(2) Those on the Press File mailing list also receive the weekly *Commanders Digest*, which contains official information, editorials, news and policy from Washington authorized sources.

(3) Requests for the clip-sheet service and *Commanders Digest* should be sent to Armed Forces Press Service, Pomponio Bldg. 1117 North 19th St., Arlington, Virginia 22209.

E-1007 IMPLEMENTATION

1. An internal information plan will be drafted by each command in order to ensure the continuance of an internal information program which will coordinate all desired and necessary components.

2. The recommended approach for planning the internal information program is as follows:

a. Officers in command should direct an officer of the command to:

(1) Coordinate the components of the General Military Training program, as delineated in E-1005.1.

(2) Provide for publication of timely and interesting information in ship and station newspaper that support the information objectives of the Navy.

(3) Advise the officer in command on the use of a "CO's column" in ship or station newspapers.

(4) Obtain, evaluate and distribute information materials within the command.

b. When the public affairs officer of a command is not the officer responsible for the

internal information program, he should act as an advisor to the latter. The public affairs officer should also be alert for public information possibilities in the internal information program.

3. To be effective, the internal information program must support, complement and supplement the command's long-range training program. Flexibility must be maintained, however, to meet the changing requirements of a command's information needs.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5600.16.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Distribution List.

Subject: Provision of Technical Instructions on the Operation and Maintenance of new equipment; policy for

1. *Purpose.* To promulgate the policy for provision of technical instructions on the operation and maintenance of new equipment and systems delivered to the fleet.

2. *Background.* There is concern over the non-concurrent delivery of instruction manuals and maintenance manuals when new and complex equipment is delivered to the fleet. This is particularly apparent where urgency of development, delivery and installation precludes concurrent delivery of technical data in a completed form.

3. *Policy.* The following policy is promulgated to ensure that every ship receiving new equipment also receives sufficient operational and maintenance instructions to permit the attainment of a satisfactory state of readiness with the equipment:

a. The technical bureaus have the responsibility to provide operating and maintenance instructions for each new equipment installation.

b. In special cases where time to prepare the technical manuals may be expected to exceed that time required to produce the equipment, the technical bureau may authorize interim manuals or instructions to be supplied with the equipment. The interim manuals may be as simple as an approved, typewritten sheet or as complete as the final manual, but in no case will the fleet be supplied technical equipment without approved technical instructions on the operation and maintenance of the equipment.

J. W. CRUMPACKER.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, D.C.

SECNAV Instruction 5600.12.

From: Secretary of the Navy.

To: All Ships and Stations.

Subject: "Promotional-type" publications.

Re (a) Government Printing and Binding Regulations (current edition) published by the Joint Committee on Printing, Congress of the United States.

1. *Purpose.* This instruction emphasizes legal prohibitions against the printing or duplicating by or for any component of the Department of the Navy of "promotional-type" publications as defined herein, regardless of security classification, distribution, source of funds used in production and distribution, method of printing or duplicating used, format, or nomenclature applied to the publications, such as book, pamphlet, report, manual, directive, periodical, poster, etc.

2. *Definition.* Promotional-type publications are defined as printed or duplicated material which—

a. Is not required by law or regulations or competent authority; and/or

b. Is distributed to individuals or organizations having no functional, management, or command responsibility with respect to the issuing activity or subject matter contained therein; and/or

c. The content of which—

(1) Is directed to the invitation for or acquisition of work, responsibilities, or resources;

(2) Is actually or can be construed as an attempt to influence appropriation matters or legislation affecting weapons systems, defense concepts, or functional assignments; or

(3) Could be construed as an instrument of intradepartmental or interdepartmental rivalries.

3. **Background.** Under the provisions of reference (a), the Congress of the United States holds the Secretary of the Navy responsible for insuring that the subject matter of all Department of the Navy printed or duplicated material, including illustrations, is certified as necessary for the public service; is authorized by law; is devoted to the work which the branch or officer of the Government issuing the same is required by law to undertake; and does not contain matter which is unnecessary in the transaction of the public business or matter relating to work which any other branch of the Government services is authorized to perform. Further, all illustrations and the use of more than one color must be certified as functional and as relating entirely to the transaction of public business. This is a clear recital of Congressional intent that nothing be printed or published by a Government agency which is not strictly required for the conduct of its public functions. While there may or may not have been violations of or confusion as to this intent, it is emphasized herein to insure that all activities are aware of it.

4. **Prohibition.** The production and issuance of promotional-type publications, as defined herein, by any activity of the Department of the Navy or the use of appropriated or nonappropriated Department of the Navy funds in the commercial production and issuance of such publications is considered to be in violation of reference (a), and is prohibited. Requests for interpretation of this Instruction with regard to specific proposed publications, complete with a rough layout of each proposed publication, shall be forwarded via appropriate channels to the Chairman, Navy Publications and Printing Control Committee, for decision.

F. A. BANTZ,
Under Secretary of the Navy.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
Washington, June 18, 1970.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in further response to your letter of March 31, 1970, requesting information concerning the Air Force external and internal information programs. Our delay in replying was caused by the necessity of going to individual units in the field to obtain some of the specific data you requested. Attached is an answer to each of the questions raised in your letter, together with a notebook of supporting materials and examples.

I hope you will find this data responsive to your request, and we will be happy to furnish any further information you may require.

Sincerely,
WILLIAM B. ARNOLD,
Chief, Congressional Investigations Div.,
Office of Legislative Liaison.

INFORMATION CONCERNING AIR FORCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND INTERNAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS FOR U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

PREFACE

The mission of the Air Force Information Program is to develop and maintain a degree of knowledge and understanding of the Air Force which will assist us in meeting our responsibilities to both our own members and the general public. The Information

mission is based on the policy guidance of the Secretary of Defense that the full record of the Air Force should be available to the American people, subject only to our first concern for the security of the United States and the safety of the Armed Forces. The Secretary's guidance derives in turn from the Freedom of Information Act which provides that maximum information concerning Department of Defense operations and activities must be made available to the public. In addition, we understand and abide by Section 601 of the DOD Appropriations Act of 1970 (PL 91-171), which prohibits the use of funds for publicity or propaganda purposes not authorized by the Congress.

Question:

1. With regard to the Public Affairs Program:

(a) The estimated total cost for all Air Force Public Affairs activities in FY 1970 and FY 1971, including the pay and allowances of all military personnel.

Answer:

The estimated total cost for all Air Force Public Affairs activities in FY 1970 and FY 1971, including pay and allowances of all military personnel, are:

Costs	Fiscal year--	
	1970	1971
Military pay.....	\$6,734,000	\$6,537,000
O. & M. (includes civilian pay).....	3,346,000	3,113,000
Total.....	10,080,000	9,650,000

Question:

1. With regard to the Public Affairs program:

(b) The number of civilian and military personnel now working full time in the Public Affairs Program and the number estimated for FY 1971.

Answer:

The number of civilian and military personnel now working full time in the Public Affairs Program and the number estimated for FY 1971 are:

Full-time	Fiscal year--	
	1970	1971
Military.....	660	627
Civilian.....	219	219
Total.....	879	846

Question:

1. With regard to the Public Affairs Program:

(c) An estimate of the number of personnel who now work part-time in connection with Public Affairs activities and the expected number in FY 1971.

Answer:

Part-time is defined as those full-time Air Force personnel working in the Information career field who divide their time among Public Information, Community Relations and Internal Information activities. These part-time figures are a proportionate share, based on workload, and expressed in man-years of those personnel working in all functions of the Information Program, as shown below:

Estimated part-time	Fiscal year--	
	1970	1971
Military.....	142	142
Civilian.....	60	60
Total.....	202	202

Question:

1. With regard to the Public Affairs program:

(d) A detailed description of the activities in the last year of the various offices involved in Public Affairs programs, including information on the output of each office (i.e., number of photographs or press releases issued, speeches made, etc.)

Answer:

Public Affairs activities in the Air Force are conducted by the Public Information Division and the Community Relations Division. Detailed descriptions of these two divisions and information on their output are as follows:

PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION

The Public Information Division prepares, coordinates, and releases USAF information to national news media. It supervises/directs Information activities originating in major commands when the resultant stories are of national interest. This division monitors the USAF-wide press tour program; provides guidance on pictorial policies and operations; initiates, formulates, and supervises policies and procedures for the release of Air Force information to radio, television, and printed media (newspapers, books, and magazines); and plans and programs public information projects and activities. It has operational control for the three SAFOI field offices (New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles) and the Home Town News Center. There are five Branches within the Public Information Division: Operational Forces, Support Forces, Information Development, Pictorial, and Magazine and Books.

Branch personnel develop and write original information materials, including pictorial features, concerning subject matter of current public interest. They review and coordinate with Air Staff and/or Office, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), as appropriate, information actions concerning major commands and Air Force commands which are incorporated into unified or specified commands, such as Strike Command and MACV. They review television and motion picture scripts and proposed releases from major command or contractor sources and coordinate them with Air Staff authorities to ascertain accuracy and security compliance prior to determining appropriate distribution or other suitable action. They also coordinate with, prepare drafts, or complete appropriate release actions regarding Congressional notifications or inquiries processed by the Office, Secretary of the Air Force, Legislative Liaison. On request they attend interviews given news media representatives by Secretariat or Air Staff officials.

OPERATIONAL FORCES BRANCH (PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION)

The Operational Forces Branch acquires, develops, prepares, staffs, and disseminates public information news materials of all kinds that pertain to those operational Air Force commands and Air Force components of Unified/Specified Commands, whose principal mission is to conduct or to be prepared to conduct offensive and/or defensive air operations. Specific commands include: Tactical Air Command, Aerospace Defense Command, Strategic Air Command, United States Air Forces in Europe, Pacific Air Forces, Alaskan Air Command, United States Air Force Southern Command, and Air National Guard units assigned to listed operational commands.

SUPPORT FORCES BRANCH (PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION)

The Support Forces Branch acquires, develops, prepares, staffs, and disseminates public information news materials that pertain to Weapon and Support Systems Acquisition, Aeronautical Research, Basic and Applied Research, Personnel, Legal, Budget, Strategic and Logistic Airlift, Logistics, Com-

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munications, Accident and Incident Investigations, Training in other than the combat commands, and NASA-Air Force relations. Specific commands include: Air Force Systems Command, Air Force Logistics Command, Air Force Communications Service, Air Training Command, Air University, Headquarters Command, USAF Security Service, USAF Academy, Office of Aerospace Research, Aeronautical Chart and Information Center, Air Force Accounting and Finance Center, Air Force Data Systems Design Center, and Air Force Reserve Personnel Center.

INFORMATION DEVELOPMENT BRANCH (PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION)

The Information Development Branch develops formal and informal staff recommendations for Air Force Information actions. It reviews and evaluates news and feature materials published in newspapers, magazines, and Government publications to identify and monitor current and potential public information problems and to recommend suitable Air Force Information actions. It monitors the security review processing of Secretariat and Air Staff speeches and evaluates their significance and news potential for public information handling. The Branch prepares plans and programs for Information actions to inform the public and internal Air Force military and civilian personnel of the mission, performance, capabilities, and requirements of the USAF. Information plans and programs are coordinated with Office, Secretary of Defense, the Air Staff, and other appropriate Government agencies. The Branch evaluates the effectiveness of Information activities in terms of the Secretary of Defense's principles of public information and the Freedom of Information Act.

PICTORIAL BRANCH (PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION)

The Pictorial Branch provides required audio-visual support for Public Information activities, including that needed for special news events. It coordinates with Office, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) and appropriate Air Staff offices concerning Air Force cooperation with national television, radio, and motion picture industries. It provides pictorial information materials and policy guidance to the SAFOI field offices. The Branch coordinates and clears Air Force films and scripts recommended for non-profit public exhibition.

MAGAZINE AND BOOKS BRANCH (PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION)

The Magazine and Books Branch maintains liaison with magazine and book publishers, editors, and writers, keeping them informed of Air Force activities of significance to their interests. The Branch assists magazine and books media representatives in gathering information and illustrative materials, arranging interviews, briefings, orientation visits, and other similar support, as related to the Air Force. It assists authors and publishers to develop their story ideas on Air Force themes.

PUBLIC INFORMATION OUTPUT

News release originated; distribution by:

OASD/PA ¹	77
AF commands	92
Direct to media	23
Total	192

News photos, distribution by:

OASD (PA)	429
Direct to media	766
Total	1,195

News Inquiry answers, distribution by:

OASD (PA)	537
Direct to media	1,695
Total	2,232

¹ Office, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

USAF HOME TOWN NEWS CENTER

The USAF Home Town News Center, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, receives, evaluates, and edits home town news and feature stories, photographs, and tape recorded or filmed interviews forwarded to it by Air Force units. It provides its services to media that have asked for them. The centralized HTNC operation relieves the maximum workload from each Air Force unit or base and standardizes the material distributed by the USAF.

HOME TOWN NEWS CENTER OUTPUT

Output distributed to print media:

Individual news stories	321,109
Individual news photos	107,980
Individual inquiry answers	675

Output distributed to broadcast media:

Individual radio news interview tapes	6,112
Individual television news film clips	3,657
Individual TV news slides	80

Individual Inquiry answers:

Radio stations	2,855
TV stations	64
Total inquiry answers	2,919

USAF OFFICE OF INFORMATION FIELD OFFICES

The USAF Office of Information field offices in New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago (Chicago will close June 30, 1970), are collocated with those of the other military services in these cities. They assist radio-television, magazines, newspapers, wire services, book publishers, and motion and still picture company representatives to obtain facts, figures, photographs, recordings, film transcripts, and related materials concerning Air Force activities. The offices provide briefings to media, propose magazine article ideas, assist in news coverage of events, and review materials for accuracy upon request. In addition, they provide assistance in obtaining transportation of accredited media representatives to the locale of story material, and arrange interviews and/or appearances of Air Force personnel with media representatives.

FIELD OFFICE OUTPUT

Sajoi-New York/Mid-West/Los Angeles

News Inquiry answers:

Direct to media	635
Speeches made	31

The Community Relations Division is described as follows:

COMMUNITY RELATIONS DIVISION

The Community Relations Division develops, plans, and implements Air Force-wide community relations programs designed to foster mutual understanding and cooperation between the Air Force and civilian communities. Also, when authorized by OASD(PA), plans, guides, and directs Air Force relations with national civic groups and organizations to bring about mutual understanding. It participates in and supports exhibits, demonstrations, open houses, significant national and international civic and military events, and other community relations functions. The USAF Air Demonstration Squadron, the Air Force Orientation Group, and the United States Air Force Band, which are scheduled by this Division, support these activities as does the USAF Documentary Art Program, another division responsibility. The Speakers Branch schedules and monitors speeches and public appearances by senior Air Force officials. The Community Relations Division has Air Staff responsibility for the worldwide Air Force band and museum programs and operational control of the Air Force Museum. The Division's overall mission is accomplished through specific actions of the five branches reported below.

SPECIAL EVENTS BRANCH (COMMUNITY RELATIONS DIVISION)

The Special Events Branch develops, coordinates, and implements programs that respond to requests from the public to view Air Force equipment and capabilities. These programs, which are conducted under Department of Defense public affairs and security directives and politics, are made up of demonstrations, exhibits, open houses and participation in civic and military events. The branch monitors and assists Air Force major commands in their special events programs and works with the other Services on joint programs. It controls scheduling of the Air Force Orientation Group and the USAF Air Demonstration Squadron.

Branch personnel attend an annual December scheduling meeting with OSD and representatives from the other Services. The Thunderbird schedule for the coming year is worked out, during this meeting along with the schedule for demonstration teams from the other services in order to respond to requests and avoid duplication. The Special Events Branch closely monitors this schedule throughout the year and coordinates changes as appropriate. During FY 70, the Thunderbirds flew for 120 performances. These included a South American trip in the fall to Colombia and Guatemala. The South American tour was requested by the countries visited and approved by the Department of State.

The Special Events Branch also exercises operational control over the Air Force Orientation Group at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The Orientation Group constructs exhibits and adapts Air Force equipment for public display. The group was responsible for 285 exhibitions during FY 70. Exhibition sites included conventions, fairs, air shows, and similar public events.

ART AND MUSEUM BRANCH (COMMUNITY RELATIONS DIVISION)

The Art and Museum Branch develops, coordinates, and implements programs that give the Air Force and public an opportunity to view the Air Force visual history. These programs are implemented through direct contact with artists and museums. Dissemination is by means of exhibits at requesting Air Force installations, civic centers, and museums. The Branch has operational control of the Air Force Museum, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Activities include:

The Air Force Art collection, which presently numbers in excess of 3,000 paintings. These paintings are screened to provide suitable selections for display at the 33 exhibits that were arranged by the Art Branch during FY 70. The Branch arranged 47 artist tours during the year to cover Air Force activities.

CIVIL BRANCH (COMMUNITY RELATIONS DIVISION)

The Civil Branch replies to inquiries received from the general public that are referred to this Headquarters. The inquiries may be directed to this office or be addressed to the Secretary, Chief of Staff or other Air Force officials. Some come through Congressional channels. During Fiscal Year 70, the Branch responded to more than 5,000 inquiries. Most responses involve providing fact sheets or photographs, although some responses require individual research. For example, inquiries regarding specific instances of sonic booms are researched and determination made of possible Air Force involvement. During FY 70, Civil Branch provided 31 sonic boom responses. This Branch is also responsible for approving non-local airlift for community leader orientation concerning such matters as base closures, mission changes or to demonstrate other aspects of the Air Force mission. The Branch approved 42 point-to-point flights during the year and 5 orientation flights.

Another project conducted by the Branch

was the Air Force Wife of the Year Program. This involved mailing 325 entry forms to Air Force bases worldwide. The entries were screened by Major Commands and 20 were submitted to the Air Force judges. One of the criteria for selection was community service.

SPEAKERS BRANCH (COMMUNITY RELATIONS DIVISION)

The Speakers Branch evaluates and acts on requests from civil and military sources nationwide that ask for Air Force speakers and appearances by senior Air Force officials. These include the Air Force Secretary, Under Secretary, Assistant Secretaries, Chief of Staff, Vice Chief of Staff, Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, and individuals from other Air Force activities. A quantitative evaluation of the Speakers Program follows.

The Speakers Branch processed 444 requests for Air Force speakers. Most of these requests were for speeches or appearances by the Secretary of the Air Force or the Chief of Staff. The Branch makes recommendations to the Secretary and the Chief of Staff as to the appropriateness of their acceptance. In some cases, the Branch arranges for a substitute speaker or a representative. During FY 70, Headquarters USAF officials made a total of 156 speeches and appearances.

BANDS BRANCH (COMMUNITY RELATIONS DIVISION)

The Bands Branch develops, plans, and coordinates the Air Force-wide Band program that supports the Air Force Community Relations Program, takes part in military formations and other appropriate ceremonies and enhances the recreation and entertainment programs at Air Force installations by providing concert music, dance orchestras, glee clubs, instrumental combinations, and individual musicians. The Branch monitors all aspects of the Air Force Band Program—including bands assigned to the Air National Guard—through technical assistance visits, reports, and other means. It schedules performances of the USAF Band and its components and processes and obtains needed clearances for engagements of all Air Force Bands when DoD and Headquarters USAF authorization is required. Although the Band Program is separate from the Information Program, scheduling is accomplished by this office to insure that band performances in the public domain comply with DoD directives and guidance. All Air Force bands are assigned to Air Force Major Commands.

During FY 70, the Air Force Band and its components conducted 318 performances before a total estimated audience of 654,150. In addition to scheduling the USAF Band, the Branch responds to public inquiries regarding the Air Force Band Program. The recent elimination of the Air Force Bagpipe Band as part of the overall Band reduction program, resulted in the Branch responding to 226 inquiries relating to the deactivation of the Bagpipe Band.

Question:

1. With regard to the public affairs program:

(e) Please list the films produced within the last year that were made available to the public, and the cost of each film.

Answer:

The following list is films produced or scheduled for production during FY 1970, by the Aerospace Audio-Visual Service (AAVS) of the Military Airlift Command. With exception of Items 1 and 13, these film products were prepared by AAVS, MAC, to meet requirements established by the various commands and units, other than the Office of Information, for films to assist in training, indoctrination, mission orientation, etc. All these films are unclassified and have been made available on request for public non-profit, public service theatrical, pub-

lic service television and general sale purposes.

1. "The Air Force Now" and "Air Force News Review"—11 films. Monthly internal information series presenting unclassified information on recent Air Force developments and current events, with emphasis on people. (Note: Also reported in answer to question 2f.) This film is produced for the Commander's Cell Program in the Internal Information Program.

Cost (Average): \$39,174

2. SFP 1468, "Wings Over the Americas (U.S. Air Force Southern Command)." Shows the civic actions, mobile training teams (medical and technical), rescue training, special air operations and advisory activities which are the responsibilities of the U.S. Air Force Southern Command. 23½ min., color, 1969.

Cost \$37,835

3. SFP 1663, "Air Force Reserve—Ready Now" Shows the mission of the Air Force Reserve (AFRES) made up of some 400,000 reservists. Covers activities of Air Force Reserve: flying, medical, air terminal, navigation specialty training and logistics units. Also pictures the humanitarian role of the Reserves in such disasters as hurricanes, tornadoes, blizzards, earthquakes and forest fires. 22 min, color, 1969.

Cost \$36,095

4. SFP 1677, "Operational Readiness—Mission of Air Force Logistics Command." An account of the logistic results of a Vietnam air battle: The ordering of a new engine for one aircraft, parts for the repair of another, and other requirements filled by the Air Force Logistics Command through its various activities, its methods of speedily supplying U. S. forces, and its plans for the future when computers will direct a fully-mechanized warehouse to supply a specific item to a specific location. 19 min. color, 1968.

Cost: \$40,401

5. SFP 1687, "Wings of Freedom—The Vietnamese Air Force." Depicts the growth of the South Vietnamese Air Force to the present, 1969. The film shows the various phases of training and study in preparation to becoming a flying officer. Included is actual footage of the TET Offensive. 29 min, color, 1968.

Cost: \$51,565

6. SFP 1704, "The Air Force Chaplaincy—Where the Men Are." Portrays how chaplains serve the spiritual needs of the men and women of the Air Force and their dependents. Pictures their service on flight lines, in work areas, in casualty wards, during emergency situations, and parish programs on large installations and in isolated areas. 18 min, color, 1969.

Cost: \$25,903

7. SFP 1725, "The Air Guard in GEEIA." Story of the Air Guard volunteers and the Ground Electronics Engineering Installation Agency (GEEIA) performing installation and maintenance service. Depicted are several notable projects including Project "FAST RACE" requiring expeditious removal of communications-electronics installations from French soil. 16 min, color, 1969.

Cost: \$25,964

8. SFP 1737, "School of the Sky—Parachuting at the USAF Academy." Shows basic parachute training program for all the Services and continuation of training by volunteer cadets in advanced programs at the Academy. Pictures cadets making first airborne jump and competing in tournaments. 13 min, color, 1969.

Cost \$19,348

9. SFP 1797, "The Indispensables—KC-135 Air Refueling." This film tells the story of the "Tankers," the KC-135 aircraft used worldwide to refuel aircraft of the Air Force and Navy. Combat stories of refueling over Vietnam are related on camera by fighter pilots, bomber pilots and general officers. 28 min, color, 1969.

Cost \$44,351

10. SFP 1875, "Friends, Neighbors and People We Know." A comprehensive overview of the Air National Guard in the Vietnam war: Their response to the call to active duty, deployment to Southeast Asia, and the mission accomplishment. 27½ min, color, 1970.

Cost \$44,754

11. SFP 2003, "Tomorrow Will Not Wait—Air, Water and Land Conservation." Shows attempts by the Air Force to stop pollution where possible, and to conserve the land we live in. 13 min, color, 1970.

Cost \$21,251

12. TF 6374, "The Greater Adventure." Shows right and wrong driving techniques. 30 min, color, 1969.

Cost \$42,329

13. Television film clips. Series of weekly news clips depicting worldwide Air Force activities, with emphasis on people.

Cost (average) \$4,363

14. SFP 2039, "NORAD Tracks Santa" (TV Clip). This is a short Christmas film clip showing weapons controllers picking up a blip that turns out to be Santa Claus. 1 min, color, 1969.

Cost \$2,879

Question:

2. With regard to the Internal Information Program, please provide:

(a) Information as to the total cost of all aspects of the Internal Information Program (including military pay and allowances) in FY 1970 and proposed for FY 1971.

Answer:

The total cost of all aspects of the Internal Information Program (including military pay and allowances) in FY 1970 and proposed for FY 1971 is:

Costs	
Military pay and allowances:	
Fiscal year 1970.....	\$6,025,054
Fiscal year 1971.....	6,025,054
O&M (includes civilian pay):	
Fiscal year 1970.....	3,503,026
Fiscal year 1971.....	3,485,297
Total fiscal year 1970.....	9,528,080
Total fiscal year 1971.....	9,510,351

Question:

2. With regard to the Internal Information Program, please provide:

(b) Details on the number of personnel (military and civilian) involved in Internal Information activities in Washington and outside of Washington on a full-time basis—also the number involved on a part-time basis.

Answer:

The number of personnel (military and civilian) in Internal Information activities in Washington and outside of Washington on a full-time basis (including the number involved on a part-time basis) is:

	Fiscal year—	
	1970	1971
In Washington area:		
Full time:		
Military.....	43	43
Civilian.....	44	44
Part time.....	None	None
Total.....	87	87

	Fiscal year—	
	1970	1971
Outside Washington area:		
Full time:		
Military.....	549	549
Civilian.....	108	108
Total.....	657	657
Part time:		
Military.....	115	115
Civilian.....	50	50
Total.....	165	165

* Part time is defined as those full-time Air Force personnel working in the information career field who divide their time among public information, community relations, and internal security.

Information activities. These part-time figures are a proportionate share, based on workload, and expressed in man-years, of those personnel working in all functions of the Information Program.

In addition, at unit level in the field, a modest number of personnel perform an additional duty in the Internal Information function. For example, an aircrew member might also act as Squadron Information contact to assist in identifying to the Information specialists certain activities worthy of note in base newspapers, etc. Such additional duty assignments and activities are normally a result of personal interest and are additive to the additional duties already assigned the individual. The numbers of individuals are relatively small and difficult to quantify because the designation is usually informal and always secondary to primary duties. These personnel are not considered "part-time" as defined above in support of the Internal Information Program.

Question:

2. With regard to the Internal Information Program, please provide:

(c) A detailed description of the activities of all offices which have a share in the responsibility for the conduct of the Internal Information Program, including those of the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard.

Answer:

The office which has responsibility for the conduct of the Internal Information Program (including those of the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard) is described as follows:

INTERNAL INFORMATION DIVISION

The Internal Information Division of the Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Information, plans, directs and supervises the USAF Internal Information Program for all Air Force members, including both Air Force civilian and active duty military personnel as well as members of the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Air Force Reserve Officers Training Corps (AFROTC). The division establishes program objectives to assist commanders throughout the Air Force in communicating effectively with their personnel on matters relating to information needs, orientation, motivation and retention. It is responsible for planning, developing, producing, distributing, controlling and evaluating print and audio-visual products in support of these objectives. It monitors professional education and training for the information career field and serves as point of contact for liaison with the Office of Information for the Armed Forces (OASD/M&RA).

Working under the supervision of the Chief of the division are:

Assistant for Policy and Programs (Internal Information Division)

Advises division chief on policies regarding information, new military concepts, ideologies in conflict, and techniques of communications. Assists in prepublication guidance, coordination, and final review of all Command Services Unit articles and *Airman*

Magazine articles. Selects or composes articles for *Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders*, for publication twice monthly, and for monthly *Supplement to Policy Letter*. Prepares monthly and annual Consolidated Index to all Internal Information materials and annual booklet, *Questions and Answers About the United States Air Force*.

Internal Projects Branch (Internal Information Division)

The Internal Projects Branch monitors and supervises professional education of Information personnel; represents the Air Force as required in matters affecting Defense Information School; undertakes special projects as directed; supervises Freedoms Foundation program as it relates to the internal Air Force audience; supervises Air Force participation in the Thomas Jefferson Awards Program. Prepares congratulatory messages for the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff; and evaluates surveys.

Internal Media Branch (Internal Information Division)

The Internal Media Branch supports the Air Force Internal Information Program with visual and written media and policy guidance. Produces the weekly *Air Force News Service* for approximately 250 base newspapers; critiques all base newspapers and monitors expenditure of appropriated and non-appropriated funds for official newspapers; conducts annual Newspaper Awards Contest; monitors the Commander's Call program; directs production of the monthly *Air Force Now* film series and selects or directs the production of feature films for Commander's Call use. Conducts the Outstanding *Airman* Program; coordinates the USAF Orientation Program; produces, or directs the production of, posters, pamphlets, and fact sheets as required. Point of contact for all coordination with the Office of Information for the Armed Forces (OASD/M&RA).

Armed Forces Radio-Television Branch (Internal Information Division)

The Armed Forces Radio and Television Branch exercises staff supervision and policy control over all Air Force-operated Armed Forces Radio and Television stations. Develops, coordinates, and disseminates Air Staff policy on the operation of the stations. Maintains liaison with Office of the Secretary of Defense, Departments of Army and Navy, major air commands, other governmental agencies, and commercial radio and television industries in matters pertaining to Armed Forces Radio and Television.

Command Services Unit (Internal Information Division)

The Command Services Unit, a function of the Internal Information Division, is responsible for planning, preparing, coordinating and distributing editorial, audio-visual and other printed materials designed for use at all levels of command.

Products that are prepared and distributed by the Command Services Unit include *Airman*, the official monthly magazine of the Air Force; fact sheets and background information sheets; the Aerospace Speech Series; slide presentations; original photography; graphic illustrations; booklets; posters.

Commanders at every echelon, including the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, are responsible for implementing the Internal Information Program in accordance with Air Force Regulations 190-6, 190-7, 190-18 and Air Force Manual 109-4, copies of which are included with this report at Tab A through Tab D.

Question:

2. With regard to the Internal Information Program, please provide:

(d) A catalog or other publication listing all films, books, leaflets, posters, etc., currently available for use in the program.

Answer:

The following index was produced for this report and includes all films, books, leaflets, posters, etc., currently available for use in the program.

- Tab E, *Airman*, Magazine, Monthly.
- Tab F, *The Air Reservist*, Magazine, 10 times a year.
- Tab G, *Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders (AFRP 190-1)*, Pamphlet, Semi-monthly.
- Tab H, *Supplement to AF Policy Letter (AFRP 190-2)*, Pamphlet, Monthly.
- Tab I, *Information Program Bulletin*, Pamphlet, Semi-monthly.
- Tab J, *Aerospace Speechmaking Guide (AFP 190-41)*, Pamphlet, As required.
- Tab L, *Of Flight and Bold Men*, Pamphlet, Reprint.
- Tab M, *Air Force News Service*, Releases, Weekly.
- Tab N, *Broadcast Briefs*, Releases, Weekly.
- Tab O, *General Officer Biographies*, Resumes, As required.
- Tab P, *Consolidated Index to Air Force Information Materials*, pamphlet, monthly & yearly.
- Tab Q, *The Air Force Now*, films monthly; *Air Force News Review*, films discontinued.
- Tab R, *Commander's Call "Talk Arounds"*, talking papers, 8 times a year.
- Tab S, *USAF Lithograph series (5 sets)*, pictures, as required.
- Tab T, *Bulletin board*, graphic news posters, weekly.
- Tab U, *AFacts*, graphic posters, discontinued.
- Tab V, *Photo pack (1 set) aircraft photos*, as required.
- Tab W, *Fact sheets, pamphlets*, as required:
 - 69-1 Air Force Reserve.
 - 69-2 Air Force One.
 - 69-3 Unified Commands.
 - 68-22-5a *Tactical Air Command (Revision)*.
 - 70-1 *Thunderbirds*.
 - 70-2 *B-1*.
 - 70-3 *F-15*.
 - 70-4 *Bare Base Concept*.
 - 70-5 *Air-to-Surface Missiles*.
 - 70-6 *Transition Program*.
 - 70-7 *C-5 **.
 - 70-8 *Aerial Postal and Courier Service **.
 - 70-9 *Security Police **.
 - Tab X, *background information, pamphlets*, as required:
 - 69-1 *USAF Education Services Program*.
 - 69-2 *USAF Highlights of 1968*.
 - 69-3 *Facts About Air Force People*.
 - 69-4 *Conservation of Natural Resources*.
 - 69-5 *Key Events in USAF History*.
 - 69-6 *Aerospace Defense*.
 - 69-7 *Organization of the USAF*.
 - 69-8 *Air Force Base Guide*.
 - 69-9 *"For Extraordinary Heroism"—Presidential Unit Citation*.
 - 69-10 *U.S. Air Force Scientific Spinoff*.
 - 70-1 *Strategic Forces*.
 - 70-2 *Air Force Cross (Revision)*.
 - 70-3 *Air Force Aces*.
 - 70-4 *Tactical Airpower*.
 - 70-5 *USAF in Southeast Asia*.
 - 70-6 *U.S. Air Force Band*.
 - 70-7 *Air Force Historical Aircraft **.
 - 70-8 *Military Airlift **.
 - 70-9 *Highlights for 1969 **.
 - 70-10 *Civil Air Patrol **.
- Tab Y, *aerospace speeches, pamphlets*, as required:
 - 54 *Veterans Day—1969*.
 - 55 *NCO Leadership in Today's Air Force*.
 - 56 *Wide New Yonder*.
 - 57 *Air Superlarity: Key to Airpower*.
 - 58 *Forces for Freedom (Armed Forces Day—1970)*.
 - 59 *Memorial Day—1970*.
 - 60 *Independence Day—1970 **.
 - 61 *Air Force Heritage **.

* Projected for completion in FY 1970.

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62 Air Force People—Our Most Important Asset.*

Tab Z, Air Force newspapers, newspapers, weekly, semi-monthly, monthly.

Question:

2. With regard to the Internal Information Program, please provide:

(e) A copy of each of the materials published by the Air Force last year for use in the program.

Answer:

A copy of each of the Internal Information materials published during FY 1970 is attached (Tabs E through Z).

Question:

2. With regard to the Internal Information Program, please provide:

(f) A list of the movies produced by the Air Force last year for the program, the cost of each, and an estimate of the number of civilians who have seen each.

Answer:

Twelve films were produced by the Air Force in FY 1970. Eleven are for The Air Force Now/Air Force News Review series, each produced at an average cost of \$39,174, including personnel costs. It is estimated that each of these films was seen by an average of 30,000 Air Force civilian employees.

The annual Air Force Christmas Television Program was produced at an estimated total cost of \$38,756, and was seen by approximately 15,000 U.S. civilian employees of the Air Force in overseas areas on the Armed Forces Radio and Television Network, and made available as a public service to television stations in the United States with recruiting commercials. Two-hundred and sixty-seven stations requested use of the videotape; no estimate of civilian viewers is available.

Question:

2. With regard to the Internal Information Program, please provide:

(g) A list of all Air Force periodicals used in the program and the annual cost of each.

Answer:

Periodicals published for use in the Internal Information Program during FY 1970 and the costs for each are:

Airman magazine.....	\$340,000
Air Force policy letter for commanders.....	9,600
Supplement to the policy letter.....	15,000
Information program bulletin.....	1,037
The Air Reservist.....	120,000

Question:

2. With regard to the Internal Information Program, please provide:

(h) A detailed explanation concerning use of nonappropriated funds, if any, in the Air Force Internal Information Program.

Answer:

The only use made of nonappropriated funds in the Air Force Internal Information Program is in the production of 18 Air Force newspapers, as explained in paragraph 2j, and as defined in AFR 190-7, Tab B.

Question:

2. With regard to the Internal Information Program,

(i) Information concerning Air Force training schools for Information personnel, the estimated costs for operation in FY 1970, and the number of officers and men scheduled to be trained.

Answer:

Four-hundred and thirty-one Air Force officers and airmen are scheduled to receive Information training during FY 1970 through Department of Defense and Air Force training programs. The programs, with personnel attendance figures in parentheses, are: Short Course in Public Communication, Boston University (44); Foreign Service Institute Area Country Studies Program (7); Air Force Institute of Technology (AFTT) (21); and the Defense Information School (DINFOS) (359). Tuition costs for the Short Course in Public Communication and

* Projected for completion in FY 1970.

DINFOS are borne by the Department of the Army as executive agent for non-degree DoD Information training. Costs borne by the Air Force in support of Information training are estimated at \$24,750, of which \$23,750 is for tuition.

Question:

2. With regard to the Internal Information Program, please provide:

(j) Information concerning the number of newspapers and magazines published by Air Force units at the local level, the total cost estimate for each publication, and the source of funding. Please provide appropriate samples of these publications.

Answer:

As of May 4, 1970, there were 251 Air Force newspapers being published, including 60 by Air National Guard and 21 by Air Force Reserves units. Of these, 150 are official newspapers, financed by appropriated or nonappropriated funds, and 101 are unofficial, produced by civilian commercial enterprises at no cost to the U.S. Government. The estimated total cost of official newspapers is \$587,303, of which \$414,538 is from appropriated funds and \$172,965 from nonappropriated funds. Attached as Tab Z are sample newspapers.

SUMMARY

The preceding pages respond to questions concerning the resources and activities of the Public Affairs (Public Information and Community Relations) and Internal Information Programs of the United States Air Force. In a vertical alignment, such as exists in the Air Force Information program, job specialization within the functional areas of public, community or internal information diminishes at each successive lower level of organization. At the lower levels, in other words, the Information Specialist performs overlapping duties in all three functional areas, while also meeting the normal management overhead responsibilities.

The answers to the questions contained in this report concerning manpower and funding are as precise as possible; however, some statistical interpolation was necessary because of the nature of the aforementioned overlapping duties and functions at the lower levels of the Information structure. Consequently, in addressing the overall Information Program, we identified an overhead management segment—primarily engaged in administering and supporting the overall Information effort—which does not clearly translate into any one of the three pure functions of Public, Community and Internal. While computations are in some instances based on estimates, the management overhead represents approximately 20% over and above the functional area costs of the Public, Community and Internal Program as described in this response.

The Air Force is already in a reduction-in-force, and we anticipate the above-mentioned management overhead to decrease at a rate at least equal to that of the reduction of the Public, Community and Internal programs. Additional major reductions in the Information Program are in planning stages for FY 71.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, OFFICE
OF THE CHIEF OF PUBLIC INFORMATION,
Washington, D.C., June 15, 1970.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The following data is provided in further response to your letter of 31 March 1970, concerning the external and internal information programs of the Army.

The succeeding paragraphs correspond to the numbered paragraphs of your letters. Where the data or material furnished is voluminous, it is cited in the pertinent paragraph and attached as an inclosure.

1. With reference to the external information program of the Army which includes Public Information and Community Relations programs:

a. The estimated overall cost of the external information program for FY 1970, including military personnel costs, is \$12,253,000. Cost estimates for FY 1971 are at the same level as for FY 1970. Costs reported herein are computed on a different basis from those reported last year. Those in the previous report were limited to the major command headquarters and their major subordinate command headquarters level. Costs reported above include those down through installation level.

b. Personnel who have information assignments do not perform duties exclusively in the external information program but also perform duties in internal and administrative activities. Therefore, all personnel are accounted for in man-years, under part-time in paragraph 1c, below.

c. The number of personnel in man-years of effort, in connection with external information activities, for FY 1970 is 1,058 military and 387 civilian. It is estimated that these numbers will be about the same for FY 1971.

d. Costs for Army activities outside the Office of the Chief of Information (OCINFO), which are described in AR 860-5 (Incl 1), that have external information programs are: Major Commands, \$10,797,000 (\$6,294,000 MPA, \$3,650,000 OMA, and \$853,000 other); and Unified Commands for which the Army component is the executive agency, \$131,000 (\$84,000 MPA and \$47,000 OMA). These costs are included in the totals listed in paragraph 1a, above. Personnel costs account for all of MPA funds and about 50 percent of OMA funds. Thus, approximately 80 percent of the overall costs are attributable to personnel pay costs which are necessary to accomplish the external information mission.

e. (1) *Community Relations Division (CRD)*: The division responded to over 2000 pieces of correspondence requesting Army participation in activities in the civilian domain during the period July 1, 1969 through March 31, 1970. This does not include countless telephonic requests for assistance from the general public handled in the course of daily business.

(a) *Divisional Organizations*. CRD supported and provided assistance to 67 organizations such as the Society of the First Division and World Wars Tank Corps. For this year's annual Tank Corps reunion, CRD arranged for the appearance of a speaker, color guard, and an equipment display.

(b) *Veterans Organizations*. A large portion of the support provided to 29 different veteran groups during FY 1970 consisted of coordinating answers to requests for assistance in such personnel matters as hardship cases, compassionate reassignment, location of Army personnel, and requests from families pertaining to the health and welfare of sons and daughters.

(c) *Boy Scout and Youth Groups*. An average of six requests per month was received from Congressional offices seeking accommodations at Army installations for Boy Scouts and other youth groups visiting the Washington, D.C. area. One such request was to provide facilities for 120 boys and girls to a junior symphony orchestra which visited the area during the period 29-30 March 1970.

(d) *Service-oriented Organizations*. CRD provided support to 146 service-oriented organizations during the past year. An example of such support was the provision of a speaker and displays to the annual reunion of the Congressional Medal of Honor Society in Houston.

(e) *Military Wife of the Year*. This program honors the soldier's wife for bettering human relationships in both military and civilian communities, at home and abroad.

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CRD serves as the coordinator for Army participation in this program.

(f) Speaker Requests. Over 800 requests for Army speakers were processed from civic clubs, church groups, veteran organizations, professional clubs, etc., on a variety of subjects.

(g) Bands. Army bands and musical units are in great demand as evidenced by the approximately 675 processed requests received by this office during the first nine months of FY 1970. Typical of these actions was a request from the Chairman of the Philadelphia Pulaski Day Parade through a Congressional office for Army participation in the October 5th Pulaski Day Parade in Philadelphia. The 173rd US Army Band from Fort Dix, New Jersey, fulfilled that request. In addition CRD coordinated and scheduled the United States Army Field Band and Chorus for 250 performances before an estimated 600,000 persons during FY 1970.

(h) US Army Parachute Team. During the first nine months of FY 1970, 109 parachute demonstrations were coordinated and arranged for the Golden Knights parachute team. Demonstrations were performed at Bradenton, Florida at the request of Florida State authorities in connection with "De Soto Week" (approximately 3500 spectators viewed the demonstration) and Charleston, South Carolina, at the request of the Charleston Tricentennial Commission and the South Carolina State Tricentennial Commission (approximately 30,000 spectators, including the Mayor of Charleston, viewed the demonstration).

(i) Army participation in Public Events. CRD responded to approximately 1000 requests for participation by Army personnel and equipment in civic-sponsored public events. Such a request was received in October 1969, for the participation of an Army color guard and firing squad for a Laconia, New Hampshire, Veterans' Day flagpole dedication ceremony. Arrangements were made to provide the requested support from Company B, 368th Engineer Battalion, of the United States Army Reserve stationed in Laconia.

(j) Veterans' Recognition. The American people have a continuing interest in the welfare and morale of American servicemen and initiate many projects to show their concern as evidenced by 150 requests received by CRD. One such project was initiated by a citizens' group in Gallup, New Mexico to honor a returning serviceman, a representative of all servicemen from the area, during the Christmas season. CRD assisted in locating a serviceman from the Gallup area who met the requirements of the project and coordinated this information through the interested Congressional office.

(k) US Army Exhibit Unit. At the request of civilian organizations and military recruiting offices, 11 exhibits were shown in 228 cities before a total audience of 12 million persons. Eighty percent of the exhibits were in support of the Army recruiting program. (See schedule at Incl 2).

(l) In addition to the above, CRD serves as point of contact between the Army elements and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) in matters relating to Army participation in activities such as those described above. CRD also monitors Army Regulations dealing with community relations.

(m) As the Army point of contact, CRD forwards input provided by the Army staff and the major commands to the Defense Industry Bulletin which is published by the Defense Supply Agency, a Department of Defense agency.

(2) *Command Information Division.* Activities of the Command Information Division deal solely with internal information and are discussed in paragraph 2, below.

(3) *Policy, Plans and Programs Division.* Policy, Plans and Programs Division's activities complemented those of community rela-

tions, public information, and command information. As the major planning and policy office for OCINFO, activities of the division involved developing, coordinating, and administering plans and policies with other OCINFO divisions, and agencies of the Departments of the Army and Defense. Actions actually dealing with the external information program are normally accomplished by the Community Relations Division and the Public Information Division as described in paragraphs 1e(1), above and 1e(4), below.

(4) *Public Information Division.* The following are examples of Public Information Division activities during FY 1970:

(a) Public Information Division responded to approximately 13,450 media queries during the period 1 July 1969 through 15 April 1970. Additionally, some 14,000 other queries were answered from private citizens and organizations, including coordination of responses to Members of the Congress. These queries ranged from very simple matters about the Army, providing biographies, fact sheets regarding equipment, etc., to complex questions requiring extensive research and staff coordination involving such matters as the alleged My Lai incident, the Green Berets incident, and the NCO Clubs investigation. Among the public inquiries, many were requests from high school and college students seeking material and assistance in preparation of term papers, theses and other reference material. Under the Freedom of Information Act, the Army has a mandate to be responsive in making full disclosure with minimum delay, consistent with national security, to requests for information from the media and the public.

During this period, coordination was effected on 48 Medal of Honor presentations, etc., for press kits, and for response to the media.

(b) Approximately 147 public releases were cleared for issue by subordinate commands. See sample at Inclosure 3. Some 150 other releases were prepared and forwarded to the Department of Defense for national release. See sample at Inclosure 4. National announcements of approximately 660 contract awards involving amounts of more than one million dollars were made through the Department of Defense. Arrangements were made for approximately 185 interviews by media representatives with members of the Department of the Army staff, as well as tours to subordinate installations by press representatives.

Fifty newspapers from all parts of the United States are screened on a daily basis for analysis of information of special Army interest.

f. No motion pictures are produced for the external public. Motion pictures produced in support of the internal information program that are available to the public, upon request, are discussed in paragraph 2g, below.

g. "The Army Hour" is a twenty-five minute radio program of soldier interviews and music. Last year, 52 programs were released to approximately 1,232 commercial and educational radio stations in the United States and 285 American Forces radio stations overseas. "Worldwide" is a five-minute radio program of soldier interviews. Last year, 104 programs were released to approximately 1,058 commercial and educational radio stations in the United States and 285 American Forces radio stations overseas. During FY 1970, through 31 March, the Army Hometown News Center released 378,592 audiotapes, 1,353 television film clips, and 1,658,000 printed releases. This material, consisting of news of local soldiers for use by their hometown media, was furnished to 2,474 radio stations and 546 television stations.

h. Copies of major commands' monthly reports for non-local travel for external information purposes, as required by paragraphs 27 and 28, AR 360-5, for the FY 1970 are at

Inclosure 5. As examples, one staff officer was sent to Fort Bragg, North Carolina and to Korea on Operation Pocus Retina. One staff officer went to Miami, Florida, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on the IX Conference of American Armies. Two staff officers traveled to Fort Benning, Georgia, and Fort Hood, Texas, for liaison visits in connection with press arrangements for the My Lai incident courts-martial.

i. No "Speechmaker" publications were produced in FY 1970.

j. The quarterly Command Information reports which relate solely to the internal information program are provided at Inclosure 6.

k. During FY 1970, about 350 senior speakers (Lieutenant General and higher and Assistant Service Secretary and higher) were provided in response to requests from civic, service, veterans, and professional organizations.

2. With reference to the internal information program of the Army:

a. The FY 1970 cost for operation of the internal information program, including military personnel costs, is estimated at \$13,200,000. Costs estimated for FY 1971 are at the same level as for FY 1970.

b. Because of the many duties performed in addition to internal information, personnel accounting is in man-years of effort. It is estimated that 1,141 military and 246 civilian man-years were used in FY 1970, on internal information activities.

c. The purpose of the Army Pictorial Center, located in Long Island City, New York, is to provide pictorial and audiovisual services for the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Materiel Command, Continental Army Command, government agencies, and other authorized activities; and to maintain and operate the Army Motion Picture Depository and Army Motion Picture Record Center. The operating cost for FY 1970, is estimated at \$10 million. There are 750 persons assigned to the center, and the workload is 250 motion picture projects. Only a small portion of its activity is directly in support of the Army internal information program. Specifically, \$727,000 was budgeted for production of twenty-five Big Picture films in FY 1970. (Latest figures available indicate these films had 118,779 showings to internal audiences and 44,762 showings to external audiences). For reasons of economy, the Army Pictorial Center is scheduled to be closed on 30 June 1970, and the responsibility for the various audiovisual activities will be assigned to other facilities of the Army Materiel Command.

d. Army Regulation 360-81 (Inclosure 7) describes the operation of all offices, including the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard, which have a share of the responsibility for conduct of the internal information program. Costs are included in paragraph 2a, above.

e. Catalogs and listings of materials used in the internal information program are at Inclosure 8.

f. A copy of each of the internal information materials published during FY 1970, are at Inclosure 9, 10, 11, and 12.

g. The detailed data requested is shown in Inclosure 13.

h. Periodicals published for use in the internal information program during FY 1970 and the costs for each are:

Army Reserve.....	\$250,000
Commanders Call Support Material.....	47,600
Army Digest.....	426,000
Army news/photo features.....	43,000

i. As of 30 May 1970, there were 140 authorized Army newspapers and 22 magazines being published throughout the Army. The estimated total cost is \$1,412,537, of which \$385,964 was from appropriated funds and \$1,026,673 from non-appropriated funds. At-

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tached at Inclosure 14 are three sample newspapers and two magazines.

j. Information concerning the training schools for information personnel is contained in DA Circular Number 350-74 (Incl 15), DA Circular Number 350-76 (Incl 16) and Defense Information School Brochure (Incl 17), attached. Thirteen officers and thirteen civilians attended the Advanced Public Relations Course, University of Wisconsin, during FY 1970. Six officers participated in the OCINPO Senior Officer Civil Schooling Program at the University of North Carolina, the University of Wisconsin, the University of Colorado, and the Ohio State University during FY 1970. Army personnel consisting of 138 officers, 439 enlisted men and 21 civilians attended courses of instruction at the Defense Information School during FY 1970.

Sincerely,

WINANT SIDLE,

Brigadier General GS, Chief of Public Information.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, with respect to the comments on Guard and Reserve forces included in the committee report on the defense appropriation bill for 1971, I agree wholeheartedly with the requirement for belt tightening in both the National Guard and Reserves of all the services. Such belt tightening through improved management is being forced upon the services through rising personnel costs, the prices of fuel and other expendable supplies, and the like.

Before we punch another hole in the belt, however, we should recognize that the Guard and Reserves have been living under austere budgets since the political decision in 1965 that they would not be mobilized to duty in Southeast Asia. For example, Army Reserve construction has been stopped for 6 of the 7 years from 1964 to 1970. Normal equipment retirement and withdrawals of equipment for use in combat from the Army Guard and Army Reserve exceeded equipment issues from 1964 to 1969.

Thus, for many years, Guard and Reserve manning, equipping, and training have been given low funding priority.

Now, as the Committee on Appropriations has pointed out, national policy has placed on the Department of Defense a requirement for development of genuine combat capability in the National Guard and Reserve. Secretary Laird has expressed publicly and officially his policy that Guard and Reserve units must be prepared to be the primary and initial source of augmentation for the active services and that the services must provide support to effect this preparedness. The services have developed their Guard and Reserve budgets to meet the minimum requirements of this policy, the ob-

jective of which is the development of mobilization equipping, manning, and training levels to meet JCS stated requirements for force deployability.

The reductions which have been made in Guard and Reserve appropriations do not appear to be consistent with this objective. The House of Representatives has told the Air Force to retain units previously programmed for inactivation and has provided the necessary funds to support this retention. If the committee report is approved, we in the Senate will signify our willingness to have these units retained without the necessary support funds, thereby forcing degradation of support and a consequent lessening of readiness for deployment.

There is another point which we should consider before we determine that there is oversupport for the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. The technician manning and flying hour program represented by the operations and maintenance funds are key elements which have made these components ready—so ready that when units of the Air Guard and Air Reserve were mobilized in 1968, they were ready for deployment within 72 hours and were able to fly combat missions within a few days after their arrival in Vietnam.

At a time when the Secretary of Defense and the military services are trying to carry out the repeatedly expressed intent of Congress that the Guard and Reserve be made ready so that they can be used upon mobilization and would, therefore, be more likely to be mobilized should the need arise—at a time when we are encouraging the improvement of readiness in all the Guard and Reserve components, it would be inconsistent for us to jeopardize proven readiness in the two components where the greatest improvement has been made.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MURPHY). The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATION BILL, 1971—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 17923) making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture and related agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, and for other purposes.

I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.

MURPHY). Is there objection to the present consideration of the report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report.

(For conference report, see House proceedings of December 7, 1970, pp. H11294-H11295, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.)

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, may I ask that the secretaries on both sides of the aisle notify Senators who may be concerned with this matter that the Senate will take up this conference report immediately. I have heretofore endeavored to notify all the Senators that I thought were interested one way or the other in this report. I hope that they may be present on the floor momentarily.

Mr. President, I shall not report on all the details of the conference agreement, since the full text of the conference report and the statement of the managers on the part of the House have been printed as House Report No. 91-1680, and appears in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of December 7, yesterday, beginning on page H11294.

Mr. President, the Senate passed the agricultural appropriation bill on July 9. The bill as passed by the Senate contained 62 different numbered amendments, comprised of 106 individual differences. The House appointed its conferees on November 20, and the conference committee met on December 2, and again on December 3, when it reached final agreement.

Mr. President, I should say in justice to the House that the conferees of the House were not appointed until that late date because of the pendency of the farm bill which had not become law until about the time of the appointment of the House conferees.

Mr. President, in recognizing the need to economize in Federal expenditures, plus the fact that almost one-half of the current year will have elapsed by the time the President approves the appropriation bill, many of the items in conference were reduced below the amounts proposed by the Senate.

The conference agreement on the appropriation bill totals \$8,090,856,550. This is \$7,260,400 over the 1970 appropriations, \$342,502,050 over the 1971 budget estimates, and \$385,078,550 under the bill as passed by the Senate on July 9.

FOOD STAMP PROGRAM

Mr. President, the principal decrease under the Senate version of the bill pertains to the funding for the food stamp program.

The budget estimate and the House bill provided \$1,250 million and the Senate provided \$1,750 million. The conferees agreed to \$1,420 million. This is \$330 million under the Senate bill, but is \$170 million over the estimate and an increase of \$823,037,000 over the obligations for fiscal 1970.

The entire appropriation of \$1,420 million is available only within the limits of amounts authorized by law for fiscal 1971.

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COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF CONFERS RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEW BUDGET (OBLIGATIONAL) AUTHORITY FOR 1970, BUDGET ESTIMATES AND AMOUNTS RECOMMENDED IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE BILLS FOR 1971—Continued

[Note—All amounts are in the form of "appropriations" unless otherwise indicated]

[Amounts in dollars]

Agency and title (1)	New budget (obligational) authority enacted to date, fiscal 1970 ¹ (2)	Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1971 (3)	New budget (obligational) authority recommended in House bill (4)	New budget (obligational) authority recommended in Senate bill (5)	New budget (obligational) authority recommended by conferees (6)	Increase (+) or decrease (–) Conferee recommendations compared with—				
						1970 (7)	1971 budget (8)	1973 House bill (9)	1971 Senate bill (10)	
RECAPITULATION										
Title I: General activities.....	2,308,982,150	2,866,476,500	2,954,986,150	3,701,300,100	3,342,754,550	+1,033,772,400	+476,278,050	+387,768,400	–358,545,550	
Title II: Credit agencies.....	633,127,000	574,198,000	667,522,000	696,955,000	670,422,000	+37,295,000	+96,224,000	+2,900,000	–26,533,000	
Title III: Corporations.....	5,141,487,000	4,307,680,000	3,827,680,000	4,077,680,000	4,077,680,000	–1,063,807,000	–230,000,000	+250,000,000	0	
Title IV: Related agencies.....	(3,839,000)	(4,226,100)	(4,054,000)	(4,226,000)	(4,204,000)	(+365,000)	(–22,000)	(+150,000)	(–22,000)	
Total, New budget (obligational) authority.....	8,083,596,150	7,748,354,500	7,450,188,150	8,475,935,100	8,090,856,550	+7,260,400	+342,502,050	+640,668,400	–385,078,550	
Consisting of—										
1. Appropriations.....	7,422,796,150	7,302,554,500	6,788,888,150	7,795,135,100	7,429,556,550	+6,760,400	+127,002,050	+640,668,400	–365,578,550	
2. Reappropriations.....	2,000,000	0	0	0	0	–2,000,000	0	0	0	
3. Contract authorizations.....	195,500,000	0	195,500,000	190,000,000	195,500,000	0	+195,500,000	0	–15,500,000	
4. Authorizations to spend from debt receipts.....	463,300,000	445,800,000	465,800,000	490,800,000	465,800,000	+2,500,000	+20,000,000	0	–25,000,000	
Memoranda:										
1. Appropriations to liquidate contract authorizations.....	1,213,197,000	185,000,000	185,000,000	185,000,000	185,000,000	–1,028,197,000	0	0	0	
2. Appropriations, including appropriations to liquidate contract authority.....	8,635,993,150	7,487,554,500	6,973,888,150	7,980,135,100	7,614,556,550	–1,021,436,600	+127,002,050	+640,668,400	–365,578,550	
3. Transfers from sec. 32.....	212,383,000	256,475,000	256,475,000	256,475,000	256,475,000	+44,092,000	0	0	0	
4. Transfer from CCC.....	63,782,000	68,779,000	68,779,000	68,779,000	68,779,000	+4,997,000	0	0	0	
Total, new budget (obligational) authority.....	8,083,596,150	7,748,354,500	7,450,188,150	8,475,935,100	8,090,856,550	+7,260,400	+342,502,050	+640,668,400	–385,078,550	
Less: Loan repayments, Rural Electrification Administration¹.....	156,600,000	167,300,000	167,300,000	167,300,000	167,300,000	+10,700,000	0	0	0	
Net total, new budget (obligational) authority.....	7,926,996,150	7,581,054,500	7,282,888,150	8,308,635,100	7,923,556,550	–3,439,600	+342,502,050	+640,668,400	–385,078,550	

¹ Includes adjustments for transfers authorized in the indefinite portion of the 2d Supplemental Appropriation Act for financing increased pay costs under Public Law 91-231.
² An additional \$100,000,000 was provided in the 1970 Appropriation Act from sec. 32, permanent appropriation, which included \$20,000,000 for special milk.
³ An additional \$30,000,000 was provided by Public Law 91-207, approved Mar. 12, 1970, from sec. 32, permanent appropriation.
⁴ A budget amendment for an additional \$216,579,000 was submitted directly to the Senate.
⁵ In addition, \$3,434,000 is available by transfer from food stamp appropriation.
⁶ In addition, there is permanent indefinite contract authority (budget authority established

under basic law) of \$440,756,000 in the 1971 budget and Senate bill, and \$690,756,000 in the House bill. For fiscal year 1970 none is required.
⁷ Note—Does not include interest receipts under the Rural Electrification Administration estimated at \$116,100,000 in 1970 and \$119,300,000 in 1971 that are covered into miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury.
⁸ Deducting REA loan repayments from these totals has the effect of converting these figures to a basis comparable with the treatment of all other major loan programs in the Federal budget. Other loan programs operated through revolving funds net loan repayments against budget outlays, whereas REA loan repayments are covered into miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.
 The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.
 Mr. HOLLAND. Has full action now been completed upon the conference report, and all of the amendments reported in disagreement?
 The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
 Mr. HOLLAND. I move that the Senate reconsider the action by which it has agreed to the conference report and concurred in the amendment in disagreement.
 Mr. FULBRIGHT. I move to lay that motion on the table.
 The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS, 1971

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 19590) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, and for other purposes.
 The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GOLDWATER). The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from

Arkansas to the bill (H.R. 19590) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, and for other purposes.
 Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, may we have order?
 The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will be in order.
 Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.
 The yeas and nays were ordered.
 Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, before we proceed to further consideration of the substance of the amendment, I want to say a few words in commendation of the distinguished acting chairman of the Armed Services Committee.
 It is my understanding that the language in this bill prohibiting the use of Defense Department funds to pay for Vietnamese or Thai operations in support of the Cambodian or Laotian Government. It is my understanding that this provision was not in the House bill, but it is in the Senate bill; is that correct?
 Mr. ELLENDER. That is correct.
 Mr. FULBRIGHT. I congratulate the Senator. I am very pleased indeed that the committee has put that provision in the bill, and I hope very much that in

conference the Senator will be able to retain it, because it is my understanding, judging from the attitude of Members of the House of Representatives, that they are not very sympathetic to it.
 Again, the Cooper-Church amendment of last year prohibiting the sending of ground troops into Laos and Thailand has been expanded to include Cambodia, if I understand the bill correctly; is that not correct?
 Mr. ELLENDER. That is correct.
 Mr. FULBRIGHT. Again, I think the Senator and the committee ought to be commended for following the clear and express intent of the Senate in this respect.
 I believe the committee also eliminated the \$30-million item in the House bill for the International Fighter, another matter which has been debated at considerable length in the Senate; is that not correct?
 Mr. ELLENDER. That is correct.
 Mr. FULBRIGHT. And the committee retained the Mansfield amendment of last year, the language requiring Department of Defense research to be relevant to a military function?
 Mr. FULBRIGHT. This was restored in the bill?

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Mr. ELLENDER. It is in the bill.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, these are all actions for which I think the Senator from Louisiana deserves great credit and the commendation of the Senate, because he has done a very good job in all these instances in retaining what I believe to be the majority opinion of the Senate itself.

Mr. President, reverting now to the substance of my own amendment to illustrate one of the points I made earlier—I regret that on this bill, which involves more than \$66 billion, when the distinguished chairman presented it and when I offered an amendment, I counted the Senators present, and there were five.

It seems that whenever we have a bill involving as much as \$66 billion, we can usually expect to have about five Senators listening to the presentation of the chairman. If it is a bill involving only a little item like \$290 million for the SST, I think on that we had 70 Senators present, all intensely interested, as though it involved the whole Treasury of the United States. But the bigger the bill, the less attention is given to it. That has been a standing tradition in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. I remember in the House once we passed what was in those days the largest bill ever passed, which was, back in the 1940's, in the amount of \$30 billion; and I believe it passed in approximately 20 minutes, as I recall, without debate. So this is nothing new, in either the House or the Senate, and it is certainly no reflection upon the chairman of the committee. He presented a very good statement and, as I have said, I approve of most of the things he has done with this measure, with this one exception as to public relations.

Mr. President, I have here an illustration of just how far the Defense Department goes in brainwashing the American people in the guise of an information program.

This is a film catalog of the Army's "Big Picture" series, issued in the fall of 1969. The catalog is 32-plus pages long. Judging from the numbers, I estimate there are some 400 films or television programs listed. These do not even show up in the regular public relations budget for which the committee is allowing \$30 million. These are the types of things that are made for what they call "internal information," and are allocated and paid for from funds for internal information programs. Yet, on the very first page it is quite clear that these are made not only for that but also for public distribution. I will read one paragraph contained in "General Information":

Routine distribution of "The Big Picture" is divided into two main phases—primary showings and secondary showings.

Primary showings are made to members of the Army through the Command Information Program at each installation—

They are a captive audience. They have to look at the films—

At the same time, primary showings are seen over television stations throughout the U.S. and Armed Forces television outlets overseas. These stations present the series as a public service offering each week for the

Armed Forces and the American public. To provide adequate distribution, films are rotated among the stations using the series.

Following these primary showings, secondary showings are then available. Included in secondary showings are additional Army unit desiring films for use in Command Information Programs, civilian schools, public groups and professional and civic organizations.

In other words, here is a vast education program—paid for by the funds in this bill for internal information programs—designed to persuade the people of the United States to certain points of view, especially about foreign policy questions.

I submit, as I have said many times in the past, that it is not the responsibility of the military to educate the citizens of this country about highly controversial political matters. Yet, this is done. No other facility in the United States is comparable in extent and cost to this.

I read just a few of the types of films they have in this one series. These are very short synopses prepared by the Army about their own films. This is one:

TV 736: Vietnam Crucible. "Vietnam Crucible" is a report to the American soldier of Army activities in Vietnam. This Big Picture presentation portrays the civilian as well as the military situation in the Republic of Vietnam.

Many of the films are devoted to Vietnam, but some do not seem to be about anything that has any direct relation to the military.

Here are some others:

TV 705: The Army's First Infantry Division routs the terror and suffering imposed by the Viet Cong on the citizens of a Vietnamese village.

TV 695: A nation builds. Introduced by Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey and narrated by film star John Wayne, this film traces the dramatic efforts of the people of Vietnam who are struggling to build a nation under the fire of Communism.

Here is a report of the U.S. Army in South America helping the people of Bolivia and Peru. In view of what has happened in Peru, I wonder whether these films are having the desired effect in Peru.

A report of the United States Army in South America, helping the people of Bolivia and Peru map the peaks at the roof of the world and training their special forces units in guerrilla warfare.

And more:

TV 681: The Army in Taiwan. The advice, assistance and training given the armed forces of Taiwan by the United States Army is reported in graphic detail.

TV 680: The Unique War. The story of the American soldier's struggle to build a nation at the grass roots level—the two faces of the war in Vietnam, narrated by Glenn Ford.

Apparently, many use Hollywood talent to present a case which in many instances should be, I think, entirely outside the jurisdiction and responsibility of the military.

The committee has included in the bill the provision that research projects must be relevant to a military purpose, and I congratulate them for doing that. I submit that many of these information or

public relations affairs have no direct relation to the military, except the function of obtaining more money from Congress for the purpose of financing whatever program they are interested in.

TV 676: The New First Team. This film dramatically portrays the long and proud battle record of a unit which has made the transition from horse cavalry to sky cavalry.

That is a most important project. Here it is 1969, and a TV film shows the transition from horse cavalry to sky cavalry. I wonder what military purpose that serves.

These are available not just for the military but also to any civic club or any high school. The catalog tells you how to telephone the local office, and you can get any of these films free of charge.

Here is another one, TV 675, entitled "Your Military Neighbor." This is their description:

TV 675: Your Military Neighbor. The Army is often called upon to assist the civilian community during times of emergency. "Your Military Neighbor" is the story of this assistance and the soldier who is active in the affairs of the community.

TV 674: Vietnam Report. This film explains why Americans are in Vietnam and how the American fighting man is dedicated to helping the free people of Vietnam to protect their freedom.

Mr. President, this reminds me of a film which has been much discussed in recent years, entitled "Why Vietnam?", a different film from any of those I mentioned. This description reads:

Outlines U.S. policy with respect to Vietnam as stated to the Nation.

I mention this film because it completely distorts the facts as to how we got into this war. I want to call attention to it now because, apparently, we are about to become involved in Cambodia in much the same way as we became involved in Vietnam.

The point is that the films are all made with Government money, paid for by the taxpayers, for the purpose of what they call informing, but I would call it the brainwashing of the American people about many of our Government's policies.

The USIA is specifically forbidden to brainwash the American people. The USIA makes films of many things but they are restricted for use only in foreign countries. I am not sure that I approve of a lot the USIA does, but as long as they are only misleading foreign people about our policies, that is one thing, but for us to finance our own departments to mislead the American people, I believe is the height of idiocy. I do not think we should allow them to do.

These films are made in the Pentagon and distributed throughout the United States free of charge—that is, free to the recipient, but not free to the taxpayers. They disguise this operation by calling it "troop information." Well if it is troop information, why does the pamphlet say these are all available to civic clubs and high schools or to anyone else who wants them, and free of charge?

Also, they urge television stations to use them and many of the smaller ones like to use them as fillers. What they

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need is the advertising of this kind of matter. With people like John Wayne, these stations say they like to use him on their stations, as well as Glenn Ford and many others who have well-known names or have famous names. What if anything, they pay John Wayne and others to do this, I do not know. Of course they did make available to him for his movie use of certain Department of Defense facilities. The U.S. Government can supply the equipment, the background, the troops, and everything else for a private movie like the Green Berets.

Recently I saw a part of the movie "Tora, Tora, Tora." It cost millions of dollars, with the greatest part of it using American facilities such as ships, aircraft carriers, military personnel, and so forth. I think that one of the ways they recompense some of the movie actors is to allow them the use of our facilities. I really cannot tell the Senate whether we pay the actors directly or not. But they are used, at least.

Paul Newman narrated one movie. I shall put the list in the Record, if the Senate is interested. But a lot of this has really very little to do with informing the troops and could not be justified as a legitimate expense of the Department of Defense.

Here is another which just caught my eye, "The history of the cavalry, from dashing horses to modern armor," released for the 1964-65 season. That is an old one.

Here is another one, entitled "The Finest Tradition, a spectacular summation of the Army's readiness for any mission—brushfire or global conflict."

The idea of global conflict apparently recurs in many of these films. I suppose that is to condition us to the possibility if not the probability of having a global conflict so that we will not be afraid of it or will accept it without protest.

Here is one of "Thailand—a look at the Kingdom of Thailand and the assistance offered this stanch ally by members of the United States Army."

Here is another, "The AEF in Siberia—the little-known story of the expeditionary force which journeyed into Russia following World War I. Shows their mission and activities while in the U.S.S.R."

Really, Mr. President, what does that have to do with our military activities today? What relevance does that have? That was, I guess, in 1918 or 1919. I submit it has nothing to do with the present responsibilities of the Department of Defense.

Here is another one entitled "Soldiers in Grease Paint"—hosted by Hollywood star, Celeste Holm. This is the story of entertainers who traveled wherever the military were in World War II to bring them a laugh and a reminder of home. Celeste Holm, I assume, would attract a great many people.

Here is another one entitled "Shape of the Nation"—Bob Hope, Alan Shepard, Bud Wilkinson, Bob Richards, Jerry Colonna and Robert Preston participate in this film report on the President's physical fitness program. Mr. Hope serves as host-narrator.

Mr. President, this obviously would be very attractive to any school or television station if they could get it free, but they have to pay for most of Bob Hope's films, I would imagine.

Then there is a film entitled "Hidden War in Vietnam"—James Arness host-narrates this half hour report on American assistance to the Vietnamese.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arkansas yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BELLMON). Does the Senator from Arkansas yield to the Senator from California?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. As one who has had some experience and background in these matters on the Hollywood scene, I can assure the distinguished Senator from Arkansas that to my knowledge actors do not get paid nor do they get any credit for the use of U.S. Government materiel or personnel from the military in the making of any motion picture.

It has been longstanding practice that the Department of Defense makes arrangements whereby, as was the case in the movie "Tora, Tora, Tora," certain payments were decided upon by the Department of Defense covering all the expenses incurred by the Government for the use of its weaponry, ships, and all the rest, and those bills are submitted to the producing companies or the producing studios and they are paid by those companies or studios.

With regard to one of the films that the Senator mentioned, "Soldiers in Grease Paint," I had some interest in that one. That was made during World War II. I am very proud to say that Hollywood sent 85,000 free volunteers from the motion picture industry to travel many places around the world to entertain our military forces, which they did without pay, and on their own time. I do not think there was a more important or worthwhile contribution to the war effort than that.

I would also say that in the beginning, in the making of these films, there was a statement made by Gen. "Hap" Arnold that the use of films made by my colleagues in Hollywood, as well as the volunteer services that were rendered by the motion picture industry, had a great influence on the outcome of World War II, caused by the use of film techniques, and actors and actresses—particularly by my good friend Frank Capra, who, I understand, is presently in town.

We trained our civilian Army in one-third the time the German high command thought was possible and thereby threw the German war program out of gear. This one feature had more to do with the successful outcome of World War II, probably, than any other one thing that could be named.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator misunderstands my point. I do not suggest that the use of any of these films was solely for the military. These films are being made available for public distribution, to television stations, civic clubs, and high schools all over the country,

yet they are being made under the guise of being solely for troop information.

I do not object to use of films for troop information purposes. They are all of entertainment value, but some of them go far beyond that when they undertake to discuss purely the political aspects of some of these situations. But that is not what I am objecting to, or even commenting on.

My point is that these films are being used to indoctrinate the public to take a particular view of grave issues, like the war in Vietnam, through the showing of the films on television and their distribution to schools and civic clubs.

No one has given the Defense Department the responsibility to educate the children or the people of this country, especially in political affairs. That is my point. In any case, there is no criticism because they used movie actors. They used them to make the product attractive for distribution. It is no criticism intended of the movie actors who cooperated with the Pentagon in making these. I have no criticism to offer on that score.

It is a fact, since the Senator mentioned it, that in the making of some films for private distribution and profit, which have used military facilities, the GAO found that the charges made for the utilization of military equipment was nominal compared to the actual cost. If they had charged the reasonable cost for an aircraft carrier, for example, it would have run into tens of thousands of dollars, whereas the actual charge was something like \$15,000. It was a nominal charge.

It is very difficult to say how much it is worth to use an aircraft carrier. The cost of a carrier runs into the hundreds of millions of dollars. Even the interest on such a sum for several days would run into a lot of money.

Does the Senator believe the Military Establishment is the agency of the Government dedicated to educating the civilian public about the political problems involved in Vietnam?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I did not raise that question. The Senator seemed uncertain as to whether John Wayne had been paid and whether Celeste Holm was paid. I merely rose to make the record clear. That was the only purpose of my explanation.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I appreciate the Senator's statement. I did not know whether actors are paid directly or not.

I have received a report on the cooperation given in some commercial films. I think one of them was "The Green Berets." It was made at Fort Bragg, I believe, or much of it was. They even brought in special troops. They brought them there to play a part.

I will put this entire list in the Record because I think it is interesting. The Senate ought to know what is happening. I cannot imagine why we want to throw money away on this. It is a program that has mounted in cost and effects on our system. Never a day passes that some general, a member of the high echelon of the Pentagon, does not make a speech

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to someone's constituency to tell them about the great benefits of this or that weapons system and to tell them how wonderful the war is on behalf of our people.

This goes on all the time, beginning with General Westmoreland down. I think that General Westmoreland made 59 speeches in the first 18 months after he came back from Vietnam. That is not to mention the speeches he made when he was in Vietnam. President Johnson brought him back to address a joint session. Why does the Senator suppose that was done? Was it to inform us on the war or to influence our votes? It is one of the first times that a President sought to inject the military into the political life of our system.

This one says, "Patterns of History." This is for public distribution. "The Pattern of Communist Aggression From Early Post-World War II Days in Greece, Through Korea, Southeast Asia and Cuba."

That is an interesting subject. We ought to all be informed. My point is that I do not think we ought to be given only the military view of the significance of this kind of activity. This is what makes the subject the distorted picture that many of our constituents get.

Here is one called, Challenge of Ideas. It reads:

Discussion of the conflict between democratic and Communist philosophies.

Now, who is well qualified to tell us the difference between democratic and communistic philosophies?

The speakers include John Wayne, Helen Hayes, Edward R. Murrow, Lowell Thomas, and others.

It never occurred to me that John Wayne was a specialist or qualified particularly in informing the American public about the characteristics of the communistic philosophy and the democratic philosophy.

I would have thought that someone especially versed in history, especially in the history of the United States and the democratic system would have been used.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record this entire film repertory.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THE BIG PICTURE
GENERAL INFORMATION

This catalog supersedes all previous Big Picture catalogues and contains a list of films that are currently available in the Big Picture series.

The Big Picture is the official television report by the U.S. Army to its members and to the American people. Subject matter for episodes ranges from historic moments in the Army's proud history to up-to-the-moment coverage of current actions and accomplishments.

How to obtain individual films

To obtain the Big Picture, military users should use DA Form 11-44 and forward their request to the nearest Audio-Visual Support Center (AVSC). TV stations and other civilian users should make their request by contacting the nearest Army installation, Attention: Information Officer

Distribution for the weekly series

Routine distribution of the Big Picture is divided into two main phases—primary showings and secondary showings.

Primary showings are made to members of the Army through the Command Information Program at each installation. At the same time, primary showings are seen over television stations throughout the U.S., and Armed Forces television outlets overseas. These stations present the series as a public service offering each week for the Armed Forces and the American public. To provide adequate distribution, films are rotated among the stations using the series.

Following these primary showings, secondary showings are then available. Included in secondary showings are additional Army Units desiring films for use in Command Information Programs, civilian schools, public groups and professional and civic organizations.

In cooperation with his area TV stations, and the Audio Visual Support Center, (AVSCO), the Army Information Officer prepares a schedule for the appearance of each film. The AVSC packages and delivers the film to the TV station as scheduled by the IO. When the run has been completed, the film is returned to the AVSC and is then delivered to the next TV station on the showing schedule.

How to use this catalog

All Big Picture films are listed numerically (TV number) and include the following information:

- a. Title
- b. Synopsis
- c. Release year
- d. Film color
- e. Restrictions, if any

For further information

For specific questions regarding the Big Picture series or further information, write to: Commanding Officer, United States Army Command Information Unit, Attention: Broadcast/Pictorial Branch, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20315.

Big Picture films are also listed in Department of the Army Pamphlet 108-1.

TV 763: NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Big Picture examines the history and organization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: NATO. This timely film provides a close scrutiny of the major force which deters aggression in Europe. Color-Released 68-69 Season

TV 762: D-Day Anniversary. A 25th anniversary look at the sights and sounds of the famous beaches of Normandy. This Big Picture replays the drama and battle action of the period leading up to the historic landings and the fierce combat to overcome the wall of "Fortress Europe" in June of 1944. Black and White-Released 68-69 Season

TV 761: U.S. Army Europe. Following World War II, U.S. Army Europe was given the mission of helping to protect the borders of the West against possible aggression. Despite tensions and conflicts elsewhere in the world, Europe remains a critical area and a constant challenge to peace. In this issue of the Big Picture, you will see some of the ways in which the men of U.S. Army Europe perform their mission as an important element of the NATO forces guarding the peace. Color-Released 68-69 Season

TV 760: Your Army Reports #16. The Big Picture cameras travel to Fort Hood, Texas to attend a double anniversary celebration for the First and Second Armored Divisions, and to the 1968 conference of the Association of the United States Army. Color-Released 68-69 Season

TV 759: Call Me Mister. The highly qualified men and women of the U.S. Army who wear the insignia of the Warrant Officer perform a vital role. These officers with a war-

rant provide special talent in such fields as photo-mapping, automotive maintenance, flying Army aircraft, nuclear power plant operations and many others. Big Picture cameras look at some of these activities and some of the training provided by the Army in the Warrant Officer program. Color-Released 68-69 Season

TV 758: Ranger. The small unit leader of the modern U.S. Army must be a highly resourceful individual capable of directing operations under many types of geographical and climatic conditions. The Big Picture visits Fort Benning, Georgia, where selected officers and non-commissioned officers are trained to develop their leadership skills to the ultimate degree and earn the coveted "Ranger" shoulder tab. Color-Released 68-69 Season

TV 757: Korea Revisited. In the summer of 1950 the forces of communism unleashed an attack upon the Republic of Korea causing death and destruction. The United Nations answered the attack with a multi-nation fighting force which drove out the enemy and set up a shield behind which the people could rebuild. The Big Picture presents a look at the Republic of Korea today to show the progress and development of the nation and its people. Color-Released 68-69 Season

TV 756: The Silver Rifles. Many symbols recognize excellence and valor in the nation's armed forces. Among the most prized is the Combat Infantryman's Badge. The meaning and traditions behind the award of these Silver Rifles is the subject of this "Big Picture" episode. Narrated by Fess Parker. Color-Released 68-69 Season

TV 755: The Voice of Command. The U.S. Army is on duty in every corner of the globe. To function effectively, it must have a highly developed communications system, a vital network that can unite these widely dispersed army elements into a single cohesive force, instantly responsive to our nation's needs. The Big Picture tells the story of the globe-spanning communications chain which carries to the ends of the earth, "The Voice of Command." Color-Released 68-69 Season

TV 754: The Soldier's Heritage. Through all of this nation's wars, the American soldier has distinguished himself by bravery and determination. He has established a heritage of which all Americans can be proud. To preserve and portray this enduring record, The Big Picture presents the historical summary of these accomplishments from the Revolutionary War to the present in "The Soldier's Heritage." Color-Released 68-69 Season

TV 753: Seek and Strike. The modern armor soldier moves to battle on mounts of increasing mobility and firepower to seek and strike the enemy. The Big Picture takes you to the U.S. Army Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky for a look at the historical development of mobile armor and examines the training of the tankner as he learns to move, shoot and communicate from aboard the latest combat vehicles. Color-Released 68-69 Season

TV-752: The Army Air Mobility Team. Modern combat operations demand an immediately responsive fighting force. Previously, armies have been bound to earth in transporting men and supplies to and from battle. Today our highly mobile U.S. Army soldiers have the most modern vertical and short take-off aircraft to support them in combat operations. The Big Picture, "The Army Air Mobility Team" examines how men and Army aviation function in the difficult terrain in Southeast Asia. Color-Released 68-69 Season

TV 751: Equal to the Environment. Wars must often be won by conquering a hostile environment as well as an enemy Army. The United States Army has often been forced to conduct operations in steaming tropical

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jungles, on sub-arctic coasts, towering mountains, in sub-zero cold and bleak deserts. The Big Picture "Equal to the Environment" tells how lessons learned, and history, are used as a basis for training our fighting men in ways and means of combating the dangers and problems of climate and terrain. Color-Released 68-69 Season.

TV 750: West Point—the Army Challenge. Duty, Honor, Country—the West Point motto, which motivates the lives of all who join the long gray line. The big picture documents the story of a young man who enters the U.S. Military Academy and completes the four years of study to qualify for a commission as a Second Lieutenant, United States Army. Color-Released 68-69 Season.

TV 749: Logistics in Vietnam. No soldier has been as well supplied as the U.S. soldier on duty in Vietnam. For a look at the magnitude of the support and supply activities, U.S. Army camera crews covered the action for this episode of the big picture. "Logistics in Vietnam" documents the activities and facilities which provide medical, transportation, engineer, supply and other services to the American fighting men. Color-Released 68-69 Season.

TV 748: 1st Air Cavalry Division. The famous "First Team" became airborne in July 1965. Shortly afterward, its new power was trained on the aggressive forces in Vietnam. This is the story of how that new power, air-mobility, is helping the 1st Cavalry win the battle for freedom in Southeast Asia. Color-Released 68-69 Season.

TV 747: The Big Green Lab. In the tropics jungle heat and humidity can destroy man and deteriorate his weapons. And so in the forests of Panama the "Big Green Lab" of the Army Materiel Command's Test and Evaluation Command wage a constant battle against the ravages of environment. Color-Released 68-69 Season.

TV 746: 9th Division. In North Africa, in France and Germany, the 9th Division was unbeatable. Today, "The Old Reliabilities" meet a new challenge in Vietnam and add new victories to their battle record. Color-Released 68-69 Season.

TV 745: Soldier's Christmas. No matter where the soldier is stationed, in a remote Arctic outpost or the steaming jungles of Vietnam, the spirit of Christmas finds its way to our servicemen. Color-Released 68-69 Season.

TV 744: To Serve a Soldier. The soldier with a high morale is a tough man to beat. Special Services has the responsibility of providing morale support activities and activities and services to the soldier, wherever he may be stationed in the world. The Big Picture presentation "To Serve a Soldier" documents the important mission of Special Services. Color-Released 68-69 Season.

TV 743: Your Army Reports No. 15. Presents brief features of Army activities worldwide. In this issue: The "Missile Mentor" that helps protect our country from surprise attack; the U.S. Army Orthopedic Clinic in Boston; the Demilitarized Zone in Korea. Color-Released 68-69 Season.

TV 742: Meeting the Need. To assure that our soldiers will be the best equipped, fed and clothed fighting men in the world, the U.S. Army Natick Laboratories provide research, development and testing of foods, clothing and equipment. The Big Picture "Meeting the Need" takes a comprehensive look at the scientists and facilities of the Natick Labs. Color-Released 68-69 Season.

TV 741: Men With a Mission. The Big Picture traces the history of the U.S. Army Reserve and its present mission of providing the backup force to the active Army in times of emergency. Narrated by Efrem Zimablist Jr., this film shows the men of the Army Reserve training to maintain their high state of readiness. Color-Released 68-69 Season.

TV 740: Policing the Front. The role of the Military Policeman has always been important but never so vital as in the present war in Vietnam. The men who wear the MP armband are shown in a variety of activities as they handle the complex problems of law enforcement and security against the background of a war with no conventional frontlines. Narrated by Jack Webb. Color-Released 68-69 Season.

TV 739: Soldiers-at-law. The responsibility for U.S. Army judicial and legal activities lies with the Judge Advocate General. The BIG PICTURE "Soldier-At-Law" shows the training which qualifies the civilian attorney as a judge advocate or military lawyer. The film emphasizes how individual rights, which are protected by the civilian judicial system, are also guarded by the military judicial system. Color-Released 68-69 Season.

TV 738: USARPAC. One of the U.S. Army's largest areas of activity is spread the length and breadth of the blue Pacific. This command, known as U.S. Army Pacific or USARPAC, includes responsibility for men and missions in Vietnam, Korea, Okinawa, Japan, Thailand, Taiwan and Hawaii. The BIG PICTURE, "USARPAC", takes a look at missions of our soldiers in the Far East. Color-Released 68-69 Season.

TV 737: The Bridge. The soldier and his family can always count on the spiritual services of the Chaplain. For a look at the U.S. Chaplain Corps through history and the dedication of these clergymen in uniform, John Daly hosts a visit to the Chaplain's School at Fort Hamilton, New York and some of the duty stations where Chaplains serve. Color-Released 68-69 Season.

TV 736: Vietnam Crucible. "Vietnam Crucible" is a report to the American soldier of Army activities in Vietnam. This Big Picture presentation portrays the civilian as well as the military situation in the Republic of Vietnam. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 735: The Fight for Life. The war in Vietnam is fought in a hostile environment against an elusive enemy. As in any war, the sick and wounded require immediate medical assistance. The Big Picture documents the work being done by the men and women of the U.S. Army Medical Services as they help the soldier win, "The Fight for Life." Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 734: YAR #14. The men of the United States Army Reserve have an important mission to fulfill in defense of America. To meet this mission they must be well trained in the latest techniques of modern warfare. "Your Army Reports, #14" features the training activities of the 205th Infantry Brigade (Separate) of the U.S. Army Reserve as it prepares to meet its mission in defense of America. Color-Released 67-68 Season. Withdrawn from TV.

TV 733: Platoon Leader. It takes men of leadership to lead a platoon of men in battle, men who can quickly assess the situation and make the right decision at the right time. The story of these men and the training they receive in the Army is depicted in this Big Picture presentation. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 732: They Clear the Way. Part of the job of the U.S. Army Engineers is to build the bridges, airfields and roads which bring mobility to the combat forces. The Big Picture presentation, "They Clear the Way," depicts the story of these difficult and challenging missions in Vietnam. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 731: The Senior Soldier. In today's modern and complex Army the role of the non-commissioned officer has greatly expanded. He has become part of a highly technical, creative, and resourceful middle management team. "The Senior Soldier" is the story of this team and the men who provide the face to face leadership which gets the job done. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 729: YAR No. 13. The Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson, decorates Warrant Officer Jerome R. Daley for gallantry in action in this edition of "Your Army Reports." Army combat photographers move forward with the 1st Cavalry Division and Vietnamese troops during an amphibious landing and search for the Viet Cong. And finally, "Your Army Reports No. 13" depicts the important mission of harbor pilots in the busy Port of Qui Nhon. Color-Released 67-68 Season. Withdrawn from TV.

TV 728: The Army Triangle. Three things dear to the heart of the soldier are food, mail and pay. The story of how these important items are processed and delivered to the soldier is detailed in this Big Picture documentary film. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 727: CONARC, HQ of the U.S. Soldier. The weapons of warfare are not enough to defend America in today's complex international community. It takes organization and men of vision; men capable of seeing the Big Picture. "Continental Army Command-Headquarters of the U.S. Soldier" is the Soldier" is the story of these men and how they are organized and trained to defend America. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 726: The Army's Civilians. The Army civilian plays an important role in the defense of America. Highly skilled, and completely dedicated to his country, he serves America well at home and abroad; in peace and in war. The Big Picture presentation, "The Army's Civilians," depicts the story of these men and women and their service to our country. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 725: Song of the Soldier. Throughout history soldiers have gone to war with a song. Their songs express pride in country, belief in cause, and determination to win the battle and return home. You are invited to join the United States Army band and chorus in the Big Picture presentation, "The Song of the Soldier," as they sing the songs of the American soldier, from the Revolutionary War to Vietnam. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 724: Ready To Strike. The "Tropic Lightning" 25th Infantry Division has a distinguished history beginning in World War II. The exploits of this division in Vietnam as a combat unit and a nation building force are portrayed in the Big Picture "Ready to Strike." Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 723: When the Chips Are Down. A major portion of the nation's strength in reserve lies in the National Guard. Bob Hope uses his light touch to narrate this Big Picture presentation which shows the training and readiness of the citizen soldiers. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 722: YAR No. 12. The Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson, speaks at the Annual Convention of the Association of the United States Army in this edition of "Your Army Reports." Then it's off to Vietnam to visit with Vietnamese civilians working with the United States Army, and a special feature on the Army Combat Photographer. Color-Released 67-68 Season. Withdrawn from TV.

TV 721: Physical Fitness. The future of America's fighting force is invested in the Physically Fit; the men and Women with the strength and courage to protect her interests. Therefore, the Army places a great deal of emphasis on physical training in developing the soldier. This training is the theme of the Big Picture, "Physical Fitness." Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 720: The Sky Soldiers. Since its arrival in Vietnam in 1965 the 173rd Airborne Brigade has played an important role in war and in peace . . . the 173rd landed at Vung Tau to secure and defend the airfield; . . . the 173rd mounted a large scale attack against the enemy in the heavily fortified Bien Hoa area and the 173rd undertook the mission of

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protecting the rice harvest for a hungry people under operation "New Life." The Big Picture presentation "The Sky Soldiers" shows the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Vietnam in a role of courage and sacrifice. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 719: Army Transportation—Key to Mobility. Transportation has always played an important role in deciding the victory in warfare. The Spanish Armada of 1588, for instance, never accomplished its mission, and the Spanish Army never reached the battlefield. In the American Army today, delivering men and equipment to the battlefield is the job of the Army Transportation Corps. This challenging job is handled by highly trained professionals. "Army Transportation—Key to Mobility" is the story of these professionals and their training in the Army Transportation Corps. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 718: Your Army Reports #11. The helicopter pilot has a big job in the Army, and this job gets even bigger when he arrives in Vietnam. For the helicopter lends mobility in difficult terrain, as it transports men and equipment to the battlefield. "Your Army Reports #11" spends a day with a helicopter pilot, and then joins a Chaplain who uses the helicopter to bring religious services to men of the Special Forces in Vietnam. Finally, this edition of "Your Army Reports" travels to Europe for firepower demonstrations at the Seventh Army Senior Commander's Orientation. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 717: Ready 'Round the World. In the cold realism of war you are either ready or you're dead. There is no second chance. This is true of nations as well as individual soldiers. A nation must be ready to meet any action another nation may initiate. Its strength and ability must discourage nations of hostile intent. "Ready Round the World" is a film which depicts America's strength in the complex international world of the sixties. It is a film which speaks of men on guard around the world protecting the American way of life. Color-Released 67-68.

TV 716: The Big Red One in Vietnam. In World War II the First Infantry Division landed on Omaha Beach. After securing the beach they drove inland toward Hitler's Germany, and became a legend in their own time. Twenty-one years later a new threat to free men arose, and "The Big Red One" returned to the battlefield in Vietnam. The Big Red One in Vietnam is the story of this battlefield and one of America's most colorful units. The story of men bringing hope and security to people who have known only disillusionment and fear. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 715: The O.C.S. Story. Thomas Jefferson expressed a basic attitude of the American people, when he said: "I have sworn upon the altar of God eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of men." This fundamental belief in the individual has met the test of the 20th century, as the American Army has met the challenge of Fascism, Nazism, and Communism. The Army is welded together by leadership; by men who inspire young American men and the special training they receive in the United States Army to become Second Lieutenants. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 714: Screaming Eagles in Vietnam. The 101st Airborne Division earned a place in history with its gallant fight during the battle of the bulge. General McAuliffe's reply to the German surrender ultimatum was "Nuts" and this aggressive spirit made the division an incomparable fighting team. Twenty years later, a new generation of soldiers, with the same esprit-de-corps, took the battlefield in southeast Asia. Their dynamic exploits are recorded in "The Screaming Eagles in Vietnam." Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 713: Your Army Reports No. 10. This issue of "Your Army Reports" travels to Virginia and the Institute of Heraldry, where a group of specialists design and develop a variety of heraldic insignia for agencies of the Federal Government. Then a story from Thailand where United States Army Engineers assist the government in constructing houses, bridges and roads. And finally "Your Army Reports" goes to Vietnam where infantrymen search Viet Cong tunnels for arms and information. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 712: The Pershing—Seventh Army Blackjack. In 1958 it became evident that a smaller, lighter and more mobile solid propellant ballistic missile was needed to replace the Redstone. An Army rocket team was assembled to work with Martin Aircraft Company on the project. This combined team developed the Pershing Missile; a supersonic, surface-to-surface missile with a four hundred mile range. The film "The Pershing—Seventh Army Blackjack" tells the story of this mission. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 711: The "I" in Infantry. A young man entering the Army is trained to be an Infantry Soldier. It doesn't happen overnight. It takes time. He has to learn how to control his fear, to handle his weapons, and more important he must find himself. He must learn where he fits into his infantry unit. And he must learn that his unit, and his comrades are depending on him—the individual. The "I in Infantry" is the personal story of a young man's development as an Infantryman. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 710: Shotgun Rider. The Shotgun Rider, protecting the stagecoach, blasted a colorful trail through the pages of American history. Today he still plays a colorful role, for the war in Vietnam has put the shotgun rider back in business. Not aboard a stagecoach, but in a helicopter. His weapon is no longer a shotgun, but a machine gun. His mission, however, is the same; to protect the interest of a free people as he stretches from his helicopter firing at enemy targets. The film "Shotgun Rider" is the story of these men, and their important mission in Vietnam. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 709: It's Up to You—Basic Combat Training. A military unit needs well-led, intelligent, rugged and skilled soldiers. This is the function of Army training; to shape the men who are the Army. The eight weeks of basic combat training are shown in this film as a new trainee learns the skills from seasoned veterans and progresses from civilian to soldier. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 708: Stay Alert Stay Alive. To stay alive, the soldier must stay alert. Training in the United States readies him for his job but new lessons are learned every day. To pass this information on to newly arriving soldiers at the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division in Vietnam, an intense, rugged school is conducted by men who have stayed alert and stayed alive. This film shows how this training program operates on the scene in Vietnam. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 707: Your Army Reports #9. In this edition of "Your Army Reports" we visit Vietnam, Taiwan and Germany. Patrol Air Cushion Vehicles, developed specifically for the war in Vietnam, are featured in this film. These heavily armed PACV's travel on a cushion of air, at speeds up to 50 knots. In Taiwan the Army is shown giving assistance at a Nationalist Chinese Cadre School, while paratroopers in Germany train to drop behind enemy lines. "Your Army Reports #9" is another report to the American soldier on Army activities throughout the world. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 706: The Inner Ring. History's alternative to the wall of the early warning siren is silence. Silence of the dead, of a civilization destroyed. It would speak mutely of an apathetic people who refused to face reality and

lacked the strength and wisdom to survive. "The Inner Ring," narrated by Darren McGavin, dramatically illustrates how the U.S. Army Air Defense Command safeguards America against sudden air attack and assures us that silence will not be our epitaph. Color-Released 67-68 Season.

TV 705: Village Reborn, Vietnam. The Army's First Infantry Division routs the terror and suffering imposed by the Viet Cong on the citizens of a Vietnamese village. Color-Released 66-67 Season.

TV 704: The Army and Vietnam. This film tells the story of how the American Army is meeting the challenge of Vietnam with well trained soldiers and new methods of logistical support. Color-Released 66-67 Season.

TV 703: Probe and Pursue. This is a graphic portrayal of the hazards faced by American soldiers as they engage in search and clear missions. Color-Released 66-67 Season.

TV 702: To Answer the Call. The men of the National Guard are charged with the responsibility of answering calls from the federal and state governments in time of emergency. This is the story of how the Army and Air National Guard cooperate in combat and in times of national catastrophe. Color-Released 66-67 Season.

TV 701: The Test of Battle. This film depicts the role of the United States Army Combat Development Command in providing new means of fighting and existing in a combat zone. Color-Released 66-67 Season.

TV 700: Your Army Reports #8. A roundup of action in Vietnam, shot by American cameramen on the scene, is depicted in this issue of Your Army Reports. The men and women of the United States Army are shown performing the tasks of defending our nation from the forces of aggression. Color-Released 66-67 Season.

TV 699: The Army's Floating Workshop. The USS Corpus Christi has been renovated and equipped with the finest material for performing the job of repair and maintenance of the Army's aircraft in Vietnam. The history of this vessel and its utility in combat support are documented in this film. Color-Released 66-67 Season.

TV 698: Alaskan Centennial. This film depicts the history of Alaska; first as a possession, then as the 49th State. It describes the role of Alaska in assisting the United States in defense, resources, and manpower for peace. Color-Released 66-67 Season.

TV 697: U.S.O.—Wherever They Go. The story of the U.S.O., depicting its history and service to the Armed Forces, is told in this star packed film, which is introduced by Bob Hope and narrated by John Daly. Color-Released 66-67 Season.

TV 696: Your Army Reports #7. This issue of Your Army Reports takes you to Taiwan, Korea, Germany and Vietnam, where U.S. soldiers are helping to defend freedom. Color-Released 66-67 Season.

TV 695: A Nation Builds. Introduced by Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey and narrated by film star John Wayne, this film traces the dramatic efforts of the people of Vietnam who are struggling to build a nation under the fire of Communism. Color-Released 66-67 Season. Withdrawn from TV.

TV 694: Chopper Pilot. A portrayal of the rigorous training that Army Aviators receive in preparation for their role in moving men, equipment and wounded in Vietnam. Color-Released 66-67 Season.

TV 693: The Red Diamond. This film report of the Red Devils of the Fifth Infantry Division (Mechanized), tells the story of one division which has seen service in twenty countries in nine campaigns. Color-Released 66-67 Season.

TV 692: Your Army Reports No. 6. This episode of the Big Picture presents some of the highlights of 1966—Remembrance Day in Luxembourg honoring General Patton, the selection of the Sergeant Major of

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- the U.S. Army, President Johnson's visit to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and from Vietnam, Combat Operations Hawthorne and Paul Revere. Color-Released 66-67 Season. Withdrawn from TV.
- TV 691: Claws for the Eagle. A report on the modern weaponry used by the fighting men of the U.S. Army in many different situations. Color-Released 66-67 Season.
- TV 690: Soldiers and Altars. The extensive religious activities and facilities that the Army provides for servicemen and their families—in peace and in combat. Color-Released 66-67 Season.
- TV 689: Your Army Reports, No. 5. In Vietnam, in Thailand, in Germany, in Korea, in the United States, the Army is undertaking responsible missions. What, where and why is the subject of this report. Color-Released 66-67 Season.
- TV 688: Something To Build On. What opportunities are available for the young man who makes a career of the United States Army? The many advantages are objectively considered in this report. Color-Released 66-67 Season.
- TV 687: Firepower for Freedom. A vivid portrayal of this history of munitions and the work presently in progress in research and development of modern firepower. Color-Released 66-67 Season.
- TV 686: U.S. Army in the Andes. A report of the United States Army in South America, helping the people of Bolivia and Peru map the peaks at the roof of the world and training their special forces units in guerrilla warfare. Color-Released 66-67 Season.
- TV 685: Your Army Reports, No. 4. Probe and Pursue missions in Vietnam, assistance to the Montagnards in the Central Highlands, and a patrol of the 101st Airborne Division sweeps the "Iron Triangle" in this issue of Your Army Reports. Color-Released 66-67 Season.
- TV 684: Our Heritage. Dr. Frank C. Baxter traces the chain of events surrounding the Declaration of Independence. These events and the documents are tied to the present day situation. Color-Released 66-67 Season.
- TV 683: Lifeline. The difficult task of AMC—The Army Materiel Command—supplying our forces at home and abroad with the necessities of life and defense. Color-Released 66-67 Season.
- TV 681: The Army in Taiwan. The advice, assistance and training given the armed forces of Taiwan by the United States Army is reported in graphic detail. Color-Released 66-67 Season.
- TV 680: The Unique War. The story of the American soldier's struggle to build a nation at the grass roots level—the two faces of the war in Vietnam, narrated by Glenn Ford. Color-Released 66-67 Season.
- TV 679: Missions Unlimited. This is a report on the Army's many missions and how the U.S. soldier is ready to respond in all areas of possible conflict. Color-Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 678: Your Army Report #3. Featured in this issue of Your Army Reports are: the merging of First and Second United States Armies, under a single headquarters located at Fort Meade, Maryland; a visit to a 1st Cavalry Airmobile Division Base in Vietnam; and Reserve Officers training in Kentucky. Color-Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 677: Your Army Reports #2. Army cameramen travel to Vietnam, Korea and White Sands Proving Grounds for this issue of Your Army Reports. Color-Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 676: The New First Team. This film dramatically portrays the long and proud battle record of a unit which has made the transition from horse cavalry to sky cavalry. . . . The First Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Color-Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 675: Your Military Neighbor. The Army is often called upon to assist the civilian community during times of emergency. "Your Military Neighbor" is the story of this assistance and the soldier who is active in the affairs of the community. Black and White-Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 674: Vietnam Report. This film explains "why" Americans are in Vietnam and how the American fighting man is dedicated to helping the free people of Vietnam to protect their freedom. Black and White-Released 65-66 Season. Withdrawn from TV.
- TV 673: M-60, King of Armor. This film presents the concepts, prototype, exhaustive tests, production and field use of the world's newest battle tank, M-60, King of Armor. Black and White-Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 672: Your Army Reports #1. Pictorial reports on the U.S. Army which includes . . . The chinook helicopter, the experimental Jungle Canopy Platform System, the Aerial Gunners, the 35th Engineer Group building logistic and air support bases at Cam Rahn Bay in Vietnam, the 809th Engineer building a road in Thailand, the First Cavalry Division on patrol in Vietnam, and a report on the Army's new Drill Sergeants. Color-Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 671: Army Medical Research. This film tells the story of Army Medical Research. How this research is conducted and the latest advances in preventive medicine. Color-Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 670: Alaskan Earthquake. This is the story of how the United States Army, along with both state and federal agencies, responded to the Alaskan earthquake. Black and White-Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 669: Strike Command. This film shows graphically the fighting potential of the quick-response, diverse and versatile team called the United States Strike Command. A joint command which includes fighting men of the Army, Air Force and Navy. Color-Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 668: Science Moves the Army. This is the story of the Army Tank Automotive Center where Scientists are developing vehicles for a modern Army. Color-Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 667: The Army Nurse—Soldier of Mercy. This film traces the history of military nursing—as old as our country—to current action with our soldiers in Vietnam. Black and White—Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 666: E.O.D. (Explosive Ordnance Disposal). The story of military men who risk their lives to make safe or destroy undetonated explosives. Color—Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 665: Assignment Taiwan. Filmed in Taiwan, this is the story of the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group in the Republic of China. Black and White—Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 664: Ice Cap. The frozen North reveals its mysteries to the relentless probing of Army Engineers. The research, experimentation and daring of Army and civilian scientists at the North Pole have yielded information that will benefit all mankind for years to come. Black and White—Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 663: Berlin Duty. This is the story of American soldiers serving in the shadow of the Iron Curtain and how their presence is symbolic of the West's refusal to abandon a beleaguered people to Communism. Black and White—Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 662: Drill Sergeant. A portrayal of the role of the Army's Drill Sergeant as a leader, instructor, counselor, and friend to the recruits who will be tomorrow's combat-ready soldiers. Color-Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 661: Desert Strike. The story of a mock war waged in the mountains and deserts of our Southwest by the United States Strike Command. Many weapons in our defense arsenal are put to use by opposing forces in Exercise Desert Strike, as a rehearsal of STRICOM'S ability to deal with specific emergencies the world over. Black and White-Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 659 part 1, TV 660 part 2: Tigers on the Loose. Former members of the 101st Armored Division, including General Anthony MacAuliffe—German Generals Hasse Von Mantuffel and Siegfried Westphal—and German author Manfred Gregor, recall the fierce combat in which the division participated during World War II. Black and White-Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 657 part 1, TV 658 part 2: The Bridge at Remagen. On March 7th, 1945, a bridge at Remagen was captured intact, providing the first American bridgehead on the Rhine. The story of this bridge—and the men who fought to take it—is the subject of this two part film. Black and White-Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 656: Operation Scoreboard. Focuses attention on the Army Sports program and opportunities available to the young soldier of today for participation in team athletics. Black and White-Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 655: Assignment Iran. This film following a young Army officer through his preparation and assignment in Iran. He is trained in guerrilla warfare, in the native language, history and culture of Iran. Black and White—Released 65-66 Season.
- TV 654: Action Vietnam. The stories of two American heroes in Vietnam. The late Captain James Spruill and Captain Roger Donlon, Medal of Honor recipient. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.
- TV 653: A Soldier's Warranty. Vic Morrow introduces this salute to TECOM—the Army's Test and Evaluation Command. TECOM makes sure that the American soldier receives only the best equipment. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season. Withdrawn from TV.
- TV 652: Prologue to Leadership. A pictorial report of the summer training of ROTC cadets at Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, Pennsylvania. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.
- TV 650/651: Tried by Fire. Paul Newman narrates the two part story of the 84th Infantry Division during the final months of the war in Europe. Vivid eyewitness accounts of the 84th in action from the Siegfried Line to the Elba River are given. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.
- TV 648/649: The Battle of St. Vith. Narrated by Robert Taylor, this two-part episode recalls the key engagement that disrupted the overall German plan for the Battle of the Bulge. German and American participants in the battle reflect on their particular roles during those days of crisis. Black and White-released 64-65 Season.
- TV 647: History of the Cavalry. The history of the U.S. Cavalry from dashing horses to modern armor. Black and White-Released 64-65 Season.
- TV 646: The Finest Tradition. A spectacular summation of the Army's readiness for any mission—brush fire or global conflict. Black and White-Released 64-65 Season.
- TV 645: Years of Menace. The Berlin Wall . . . Lebanon . . . Laos . . . South Vietnam . . . Cuba. President Kennedy's ultimatum to Khrushchev. Black and White-Released 64-65 Season.
- TV 644: The Cold War. The world in tension, South Vietnam struggles against the communists. Black and White-Released 64-65 Season.
- TV 643: The Cobra Strikes. The invasion of South Korea. The bitter panorama of the Korean War. Black and White-Released 64-65 Season.
- TV 642: The Years Between. Uneasy peace. The Berlin Blockade and Chinese Communists present a new menace to world peace. Black and White-Released 64-65 Season.
- TV 641: The Victory. Highlights of the victory in Europe and in the Pacific. Soviet

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Russia's occupation of territory presents a new threat. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 640: The Tide Turns. The invasion of France and the drive inland that led to victory. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 639: Global War. Pre-D-Day build-up of forces and the progress of the war on all fronts. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 638: The Slumbering Giant Awakens. The combined efforts of the military, industry, and labor to make possible a giant war machine. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 637: The Spreading Holocaust. The U.S. girds to meet the challenge of the world's mightiest crusade for freedom. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 636: Flames on the Horizon. The Nazis and Fascists overrun Europe. Pearl Harbor! Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 635: The Three Faces of Evil. The build-up of Fascism, Nazism, and Japanese Militarism. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 634: The Winds of Change. The events leading to the American participation in World War I. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 633: America on the Move. A documentary described the spirit and motivation of our country as it meets the challenge of today. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 631: Exercise Delaware. Film coverage of a joint U.S.-Iranian Exercise. STRAC troops from Fort Campbell are airlifted to Iran to participate. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 630: Wherever Brave Men Fight. Vic Morrow, star of TV's COMBAT, narrates the story of the Infantryman. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 629: Wings at the Treetops. The story of Army Aviation which has given the American soldier a dimension of mobility undreamed of twenty years ago. Color—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 628: Background to Berlin. From the rubble of World War II, a dynamic, prosperous city, West Berlin, has risen. An outpost of freedom in the jungle of Communist slavery. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 627: Soldier's Heritage. An intimate look at the American soldier—his fears—his courage—his convictions; his role in shaping the history of our nation. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 626: Meeting the Challenge. The citizen—soldiers, the National Guard—have helped write American military history; this is their story. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 625: Old Glory. A documentary tribute to the American flag. Even more colorful in its heritage than in its stars and stripes. Color—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 624: Thayer of West Point. Lowell Thomas narrates the story of the father of West Point and his unique influence upon our nation's destiny. A dramatized documentary featuring stage and screen star, Shepherd Strudwick, as Sylvanus Thayer. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 623: How Sleep the Brave. A poetic memorial to those generations of Americans who lived and struggled for American ideas and now rest in Arlington National Cemetery. Color—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 622: Medal of Honor. Depicts the gallantry of the men who have been decorated with the nation's highest award from Gettysburg to Korea. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 621: Salute to the Coast Guard. The U.S. Army's tribute to a sister service which has logged a long and distinguished record in war and peace. Black and white—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 620: Traditions and Achievements. The heritage of the American Army from the days of the Revolution through the Korean War. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season.

TV 619: One Week in October. How U.S. diplomacy, determination and readiness in October, 1962 caused the removal of Soviet Ballistic Missiles from Cuba. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season. Withdrawn from TV.

TV 618: Third Army (The Big A). Story of the modern Third Army, covering seven southern states and including the Infantry, Signal & Military Police Schools, plus the special units assigned at various posts. Black and White—Released 64-65 Season. Withdrawn from TV.

TV 616: Thailand. A look at the kingdom of Thailand and the assistance offered this staunch ally by members of the U.S. Army. Color—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 614: Battalion Commander. A pictorial report of a day in the life of a Battalion Commander on duty in Europe. Shows his many functions as "the old man" with his unit and its troops. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 613: Pershing Joins the Ranks. The field testing by the U.S. Army of the Pershing missile with actual firings shown at White Sands Missile Range. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season. Withdrawn from TV.

TV 612: AEF in Siberia. The little-known story of the Expeditionary Force which journeyed into Russia following World War One. Shows their mission and activities while in the U.S.S.R. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 611: Soldiers in Grease Paint. Hosted by Hollywood star Celeste Holm, this is the story of entertainers who traveled wherever the military were in WWII to bring them a laugh and a reminder of home. Features many stars on tour as shown by Signal Corps cameramen during the war. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 610: An Army Moves. The saga of early trans-continental motor convoy by Army trucks in the first days of combustion engines. Follows the convoy from the East Coast to the Pacific as it winds over rugged trails, sustaining itself along the way. Ends with a look at modern mobility of the Army. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 609: R.O.T.C. a Pattern for Progress. Traces the story of an R.O.T.C. officer from his college days through his first few years of Army duty, showing the increased responsibilities challenges and privileges as he advances. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 608: Point of the Spear. A pictorial summary of the tremendous air-lift operation of October 1963, dubbed "Big Lift." The cameras follow the 2nd Armored Division from Fort Hood, Texas, to Germany and then into maneuvers in West Germany. Color—Released 63-64 Season. Withdrawn from TV.

TV 607: Operation Montagnard. The story of how the rugged mountain tribes in Vietnam were trained to become defenders of their areas against the wily Viet Cong. Demonstrates the methods used by U.S. Army Special Forces to help win over these tribes to the cause of South Vietnam. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 605: U.S. Army Advisor in Vietnam. The story of the Army advisor's tour in Vietnam and how he works closely with a Vietnamese unit, advising on defense, offense, training and tactics. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 604: Mapping Adventure. Army engineers work hand-in-hand with Latin American neighbors on the difficult project of mapping South American jungles, mountains and swamps. Color—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 602: Paris '44. The recapture of Paris in

1944, and how the Allies saved it from mass destruction by the occupation forces of the Nazi regime. Scenes of General DeGaulle in Paris during the first few days of liberation. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 600: Climb to Glory (part two). The final breakthrough by the 10th Mountain Division in its relentless push toward final victory in Italy in WWII. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 599: Climb to Glory (part one). The 10th Mountain Division in Italy and how the unit succeeded in breaking the Gothic Line, highly touted as invincible by the Nazi leaders. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 598: Operation Amigo. Civil action at work in Latin and South America with assistance offered by members of the U.S. Army. Road-building, medical help and education for the masses are demonstrated as they happened. Color—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 597: Prelude to Taps. The famed 3rd Infantry, "The Old Guard," in the Nation's capital, offers a colorful, marching salute to all members of the Army team. Shown is a retreat review, a salute of flags and country, rifle drill and the marching precision of the Honor Guard drill team. Color—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 596: Famous Generals Series—Stilwell. The military career of "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell in the Far East during WWII. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 595: Famous Generals Series—Arnold. General "Hap" Arnold's career during WWII, which is also the story of the growth of the present-day Air Force. Depicts much of the aviation activity in this era. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 594: Famous Generals Series—Patton. The military career of forceful, colorful, George S. Patton, with emphasis on his WWII action in Africa and Europe, narrated by Ronald Reagan. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 593: A Nation Sings. A musical remembrance of Civil War tunes and songs, featuring Ray Morgan as host-narrator with Bill Hayes and Gloria Lambert as vocalists. Backed up by the U.S. Army Band and Chorus. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 592: Famous Generals Series—Marshall. An encompassing chronology of the career of General George C. Marshall, including his post-military assignment as Secretary of State. A capsule look at the Army prior to WWII and the events leading up to that war. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 591: Famous Generals Series—Bradley. The story of the quiet General Omar Bradley and his rise to top rank in WWII. Traces his early days and schooling as well as his military career. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 590: Famous Generals Series—Eisenhower. General Eisenhower's career with the military is traced from West Point through WWII. Does not cover his service as President of the U.S. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 589: Famous Generals Series—MacArthur. The career of General MacArthur with emphasis on WWII action in the Pacific and during the post-war era in Japan, plus early days of fighting in Korea. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 588: Famous Generals Series—Pershing. The military highlights of "Blackjack" Pershing's career, from prior to the turn of the century through WWII to include his retirement days. Emphasis on WWII activity. Black and White—Released 63-64 Season.

TV 587: Fortress in the Sea. The recapture of Corregidor in WWII by General MacArthur's forces. Includes recollections of an Army nurse, a commander of paratroopers and an Army sergeant who saw action on the

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- island. Black and White—Released 62-63 Season.
- TV 568B-Salute to the Air Force. Host-narrated by Eli Wallach, the film features a review of aviation history from World War I to present age of space flights. Black and White—Released 62-63 Season.
- TV 584: Alaskan Scout. Features the activity of Eskimo scouts in the Alaska National Guard as they operate from fishing village of Shishmaref, near Arctic Circle. Black and White—Released 62-63 Season.
- TV 583: AFN-The American Forces Network. A report on the largest military radio broadcasting network in Europe. Features operations in Frankfurt, Berlin, Munich. Black and White—Released 62-63 Season.
- TV 582: Shape of the Nation. Bob Hope, Alan Shepard, Bud Wilkinson, Bob Richards, Jerry Colonna and Robert Preston participate in this film report on the President's Physical Fitness program. Mr. Hope serves as host-narrator. Black and White—Released 62-63 Season. Withdrawn from TV.
- TV 581: Salute to MATS. Film features four giant airlifts conducted simultaneously. Famous airlifts of the past are shown. Black and White—Released 62-63 Season.
- TV 579: Beachhead: Anzio. World War II—the establishment of a beachhead at Anzio. Features footage not previously released. Black and White—Released 62-63 Season.
- TV 578: The Third Challenge: Unconventional Warfare. Film portrays Communist techniques used in situations to take over political parties, countries, create discord, sabotage. Color—Released 62-63 Season.
- TV 576: Beyond the Call (part two). Alexander Scourby narrates the concluding episode of this two-part tribute to America's heroes who have earned the Medal of Honor. Black and White—Released 62-63 Season.
- TV 575: Beyond the Call (part one). Alexander Scourby narrates the first episode of a two-part series paying tribute to the heroic soldiers and gallant men of all services who have earned the Medal of Honor. Black and White—Released 62-63 Season.
- TV 572: Command Decision: The Invasion of Southern France. Operation "Dragon" is revealed in this historical motion picture which features Roosevelt, Churchill, Chiang Kai-Shek and Stalin. Black and White—Released 62-63 Season.
- TV 569: Salute to the Navy. A film tribute to the Navy featuring a pictorial review of the Navy's history, its achievements and future role in the military establishment. Black and White—Released 62-63 Season.
- TV 568: The Army's All Americans. Noted sports commentator, Chris Schenkel, host-narrates this story of Army sports. Famous athletes are featured. Black and White—Released 62-63 Season.
- TV 567: The Soldier Is Tops. A report on the impact of technological, physical and special requirements of today's fighting man, his selection and training. Black and White—Released 62-63 Season.
- TV 566: Dragon's Teeth. General J. Lawton Collins tells of the fight to take the Siegfried Line in World War II, and of the campaign to cross onto the soil of Germany. Black and White—Released 62-63 Season.
- TV 562: Hidden War in Vietnam. James Arness host-narrates this half-hour report on American assistance to the Vietnamese. Color—Released 62-63 Season.
- TV 561: Guerrilla, U.S.A. The 101st Airborne Division and Special Forces Troops engage in maneuvers in mountains of West Virginia under realistic conditions. Film involves local townspeople. Black and White—Released 62-63 Season.
- TV 560: Road to the Wall. Documentation of the rise of Communism from St. Petersburg, Russia, in early days of Lenin and Trotsky to Berlin and Cuba under the influence of Krushchev. Black and White—Released 62-63 Season. Withdrawn from TV.
- TV 555. The Aggressor. Features role of Aggressor soldiers. Emphasize means they employ the testing defenses, security measures and plans of operation of the Army. Black and White—Released 62-63 Season. Withdrawn from TV.
- TV 554: Sky Divers. Features U.S. Army parachute teams in two-mile high maneuvers. Black and White—Released 62-63 Season.
- TV 552: Soldier Statesman. President Kennedy addresses the 1962 graduating class at West Point and emphasizes the dual role they must perform as officers and statesmen representing America abroad. Black and White—Released 62-63 Season. Withdrawn from TV.
- TV 550: Patterns of History. The pattern of Communist aggression from early post WWII days in Greece, through Korea, Southeast Asia and Cuba. Black and White—Released 61-62 Season. Withdrawn from TV.
- TV 548: Military Assistance Program (part two). Parallels MAP-Part One (TV 529) and features the Military Assistance Program in the Far East, and how it is essential to our allies. Black and White—Released 61-62 Season.
- TV 547: Special Forces. Documents the training of the Special Forces soldier at Fort Bragg, N.C., and moves to the Alps in Southern Bavaria where a training mission is covered. Black and White—Released 61-62 Season.
- TV 546. The Famous Fourth. Traces history of Fourth Division in World War I, WWII, and concludes with airlift of unit across North Pole to assignment in West Germany. Black and White—Released 61-62 Season.
- TV 544. Solid Punch. Documents the history of U.S. Army missiles and shows examples of types, uses and versatility of Army missile power. Black and White—Released 61-62 Season. Withdrawn from TV.
- TV 543: Top of the World. An examination of the defense posture and strategic importance of Alaska, the Northwest Territory, Canada and Greenland. Features DEW Line and electronic sentinels on guard there. Black and White—Released 61-62 Season.
- TV 539: This is the Infantry. Centered on activity at the Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga., the film presents the story of how the infantryman is trained to be resourceful, aggressive and self-reliant. Black and White—Released 61-62 Season.
- TV 538: The Army Chaplain—Yesterday and Today. A pictorial essay on the Army Chaplain. Film spans all American wars from the Revolutionary to the Korean War, and emphasizes the Chaplain's role as a spiritual leader. Black and White—Released 61-62 Season.
- TV 536. The U.S. Army in Berlin: Checkpoint Charlie (part two). Picks up the report on Berlin, the divided city, in the critical summer of 1961. Companion film to TV 530. Black and White—Released 61-62 Season.
- TV 532: The Chaplain and the Commander. A pictorial essay on the Army Chaplain, his religious services, pastoral activities and duties as a staff officer. Black and White—Released 61-62 Season.
- TV 530: The U.S. Army in Berlin: Time-table for Crisis (part one). A review of the troubled times of Berlin from VE Day to the critical summer of 1961. Companion film to TV 536. Black and White—Released 61-62 Season.
- TV 529: Military Assistance Program (part one). Shows how the U.S. Military Assistance Program functions as a vital part of U.S. foreign policy in furnishing training, equipment and advice to allies. Reports on NATO success. Companion to TV 548. Black and White—Released 61-62 Season.
- TV 528: Caribbean Command. A report on Latin America and the importance of our neighbors to the south in the maintenance of our freedom. Black and White—Released 61-62 Season. Withdrawn from TV.
- TV 527: Patrolling. An Army lieutenant leads a combat night patrol into enemy territory and returns after establishing contact with the enemy. Black and White—Released 61-62 Season.
- TV 523: The Army's Music Men. The U.S. Army Band, Fort Myer, Va., is featured in this unique presentation which brings musical selections from World War I to contemporary tunes. Alexander Scourby narrates. Black and White—Released 61-62 Season.
- TV 520: U.S. Army and the Boy Scouts. John Daly host-narrates this program which shows the many ways in which the Army and the Boy Scouts have shared experiences. Black and White—Released 61-62 Season.
- TV 518: Silent Warriors. A Special Forces unit's training in Utah armed with deadly bows and arrows. Black and White—Released 60-61 Season.
- TV 517: MP Story. Review of Military Police History and the MP's training at Fort Gordon, Ga., covering laboratory work to physical training. Black and White—Released 60-61 Season.
- TV 515: West Point—Education for Leadership. Shot on location at the United States Military Academy, the camera records the unrehearsed action and responses of cadets in classrooms, laboratories and on the playing fields. Black and White—Released 60-61 Season.
- TV 514: City Under Ice. The Army in action on the polar frontier. Shown is the story of Camp Century, a research and development project in Greenland. Black and White—Withdrawn from TV.
- TV 512: Challenge of Ideas. Discussion of the conflict between democratic and communist philosophies. Speakers include John Wayne, Helen Hayes, Edward R. Murrow, Lowell Thomas and others. Black and White—Released 60-61 Season. Withdrawn from TV.
- TV 509: Role of Armor. Authentic combat footage from WWII and Korea is used to depict the growth and development of Armor from its earliest beginnings to its all-important role in today's Army. Black and White—Released 60-61 Season. Withdrawn from TV.
- TV 506: Breakout and Pursuit. The story of "Operation Cobra," one of the most daring war plans of WWII, directed by General Omar Bradley. American forces breakout from Normandy and begin their dash across France. Black and White—Released 60-61 Season.
- TV 505: Partners in Progress. How the Army's Corps of Engineers worked with American industry to keep America strong and free. A historical sequence demonstrates the Corps' work from the early days of Western Frontiers, through war and peace. Black and White—Released 60-61 Season.
- TV 504: History of Aviation (part three). The final episode in this trilogy depicting military aircraft in the present-day concept of mobility and dispersion. Shows many unconventional transport devices including one-man flying platforms and "air cars." Companion film to TV 503 and TV 502. Black and White—Released 60-61 Season.
- TV 503: History of Aviation (part two). Covers the period from the Billy Mitchell era to the present-day jet age. On-camera appearances of many air age "greats" heighten the film. Companion film to TV 504 and TV 502. Black and White—Released 60-61 Season.
- TV 502: History of Aviation (part one). First in a trilogy showing the development of aircraft from the crude beginning to the present day. Covers period of early pioneer efforts to the pre-Billy Mitchell Era. Companion film to TV 503 and TV 504. Black and White—Released 60-61 Season.

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TV 495: Mouth-to-Mouth Resuscitation. An excellent film on this newest of artificial respiration methods. Black and White—Released 60-61 Season.

TV 493: Dateline: West Berlin. How an Army newspaper in Berlin mirrors the daily life of hundreds of military men on guard in the divided city. Black and White—Released 60-61 Season.

TV 489: Eighth Army—Shield of the Free World. Traces the history of the Eighth Army in WWII, the Japanese Occupation, and its role in Korea. Black and White—Released 60-61 Season.

TV 486: They Were There. The Army's role in civil disaster. Film reviews the Johnstown Flood, San Francisco Earthquake and more recent holocausts: the Chilean Earthquake and the tidal wave damage inflicted on Hawaii. Black and White—Released 60-61 Season.

TV 485: Battle of North Africa (part two). A review of the military campaigns in North Africa during WWII. Covers the destruction of the fleet at Oran in June, 1940, and concludes with Field Marshal Montgomery's bitter battle for El Alamein. Companion film to TV 484. Black and White—Released 60-61 Season.

TV 484: Battle of North Africa (part one). A two-part presentation of the military campaigns in North Africa during World War II. Companion film to TV 485. Black and White—Released 60-61 Season.

TV 482: The Story of Stars and Stripes. Herbert Mitgang of the *New York Times* and famed commentator Baukhage tell the story of this world famous Army newspaper. Alexander Scourby and Sheppard Strudwick narrate the absorbing film. Black and White.

TV 481: Payoff in the Pacific (part two). The war in the Pacific. Covers the island-hopping victories of the Allies to the Japanese surrender aboard the Battleship Missouri. Companion film to TV 480. Black and White—Released 60-61 Season.

TV 480: Payoff in the Pacific (part one). World War II from Pearl Harbor and the loss of the Philippines to the early victories in the South Pacific and to the B-29 bases constructed on Saipan. Companion film to TV 481. Black and White—Released 60-61 Season.

TV 477: Operation Cartwheel. An outstanding historical report on a World War II Pacific Theater operation. Demonstrates the Allies' success in bypassing and isolating enemy strong points. Black and White—Released 60-61 Season.

TV 459: The Joe Mann Story. A highly sensitive memorial to a soldier killed in World War II. Expertly photographed with unusual backgrounds in Holland. Black and White—Released 59-60 Season.

TV 447: War's End. Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall presents some penetrating thoughts about the Korean War and the effect it has had upon training in today's Army. Black and White—Released 59-60 Season.

TV 446: Winter War. William H. Lawrence, *New York Times* correspondent, narrates this second Big Picture episode covering Korea War History. Companion film to TV 445. Black and White—Released 59-60 Season.

TV 445: Summer Storm. Korean War Military history. Jim Lucas, Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance, is interviewed at the program close. Black and White—Released 59-60 Season.

TV 444: The Pershing Story. A film biography of General John J. Pershing. Covers period from 1860 through 1948, the year of his death. Black and White—Released 59-60 Season.

TV 443: West Point Summer Training. A typical summer training program at Camp Buckner where West Point cadets gain valuable field experience. Black and White—Released 59-60 Season.

TV 441: Battle for New Guinea. The bitter fight through unending mud to take New Guinea. Broadens the viewer's perspective of the role of the infantryman. Black and White—Released 58-59 Season.

TV 431: Battle of San Pietro. John Huston narrates this film about one of the most dramatic battles of WWII, Italy. Black and White—Released 59-60 Season.

TV 429: Character Guidance. The Army's Character Guidance program is explored in this documentary presentation. Black and White—Released 58-59 Season.

TV 428: The Code of the Fighting Man. A study of the Soldier's Code of Conduct—an outline of the U.S. Army Soldier's moral obligation to his country. Black and White—Released 58-59 Season.

TV 417: Battle of Manila. Invasion of the Philippines. Covers the landings through the final liberation of the City of Manila. Black and White—Released 58-59 Season.

TV 413: Battle of the Bulge. The story of America's "winter soldier" through the years from Valley Forge to the Battle of the Bulge. Black and White—Released 58-59 Season.

TV 408: Battle of Salerno. A fast-moving dramatic film covering the fighting by Fifth Army Forces of Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, in Italy. Black and White—Released 58-59 Season.

TV 373: Preamble to Peace. An examination of the meaning of the U.S. Constitution and its preamble. Black and White—Released 57-58 Season.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, this is not the first time I have raised questions about the Pentagon's public relations program. I realize that the acting chairman of the committee has gone along with a small cut in the direct appropriation. This is an appropriation for direct public relations. All of this television and film material that I have been reading about is not included in the direct appropriations for public relations. This is in a different area, for internal information. That program amounts to a great deal more money.

I am not trying to cut that with this amendment. All I am doing is criticizing what they are doing with it.

No one can say that the Military Establishment is not entitled to have a public relations program, I agree that it is. But the present program goes much too far and is too costly. They use this material to distribute all over the United States.

I do hope that the Senate will accept this very minor cut. I would not exaggerate its importance. It is only to cut it back to \$20 million.

This is still over seven times what Congress allowed them for direct propaganda only 11 years ago when the Congress took off the ceiling. It used to be \$2,720,000.

I am asking that a ceiling of \$20 million be put on this activity.

PEANUT ACREAGE ALLOTMENTS

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on H.R. 17582.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BELLMON) laid before the Senate H.R. 17582, to amend the peanut marketing quota provisions to make permanent certain provisions thereunder.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, this bill was passed by the Senate yesterday

on the Consent Calendar. It was likewise passed yesterday by the House of Representatives.

This proposed action has been cleared by the majority leader, the acting majority leader, the chairman of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, the ranking minority member of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, the distinguished Senator from Vermont.

It merely made permanent the law relating to the leasing of peanut acreage that has been on the statute books for about 3 years.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be considered as having been read twice and that the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I shall not object, the Senator says it is to make permanent the peanut acreage. Does that mean that there can be no change in the future?

Mr. TALMADGE. No; this is a leasing provision where small peanut growers may lease land from their neighbors only within the neighborhood where peanuts are grown.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I thought the Senator said it was to make permanent the peanut acreage.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I did not mean to say that. The bill has been acted upon unanimously by the Agriculture Committee of the House, the Agriculture Committee of the Senate, and unanimously by the Senate as a whole.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do not object. I just wanted to know what it was.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. And the Senate will proceed with the consideration of the bill.

The question is on the third reading of the bill.

The bill (H.R. 17582) was ordered to a third reading, was read the third time, and passed.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
APPROPRIATIONS, 1971

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 19590) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, and for other purposes.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I shall not detain the Senate very long, and I do not expect to answer all the arguments made by my good friend from Arkansas (Mr. Fulbright). I realize there are some abuses in the public affairs functions of the Department of Defense, but I consider those necessary evils.

Mr. President, in 1969 the amount appropriated for public affairs functions was \$44.1 million. In 1970 it was \$39.7 million. In the present bill the Budget Bureau provided for \$38.298 million. The House has cut the program limitation back to \$30.4 million. That is the amount that is now in the bill.

Since July 1, these activities have been funded under the authority of the continuing resolution at a monthly rate of at least \$2.5 million. This means that

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at the end of this month approximately \$15 million will have been obligated, and under the proposed amendment, only \$5 million would be available for the last half of the fiscal year.

As a matter of fact, we have already given notice to the Department of Defense that they can expect a limitation of \$28 million for the public affairs functions of the Department of Defense for next fiscal year.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. How much?

Mr. ELLENDER. It is \$28 million.

I do hope that the Senate will reject the amendment.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD two inserts, one a comment from the committee report and the other additional material descriptive of the public affairs function.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PUBLIC AFFAIRS FUNCTIONS

The fiscal year 1971 requests for public affairs functions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Army, the Navy and Marine Corps, the Air Force, the Defense Agencies and Joint Chiefs of Staff, where such functions constitute the primary mission of an organizational element, total \$38,298,000 which includes \$633,000 for Security Review Activities. For fiscal year 1970 approximately \$39,700,000 was provided for these activities, and for fiscal year 1969 approximately \$44,100,000 was provided.

Of the total requested for fiscal 1971, \$12,312,000 is for the Army, \$12,186,000 is for the Navy and Marine Corps, \$9,650,000 for the Air Force, \$3,527,000 for the Secretary of Defense, and \$623,000 for the various Defense Agencies and Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The committee recognizes the requirement for an adequate public affairs program within the Department of Defense and the Army, the Navy and Marine Corps, and the Air Force in order that the public may be provided with accurate, timely information on Department of Defense programs and activities. This matter was discussed in a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the secretaries of the military departments and other Department of Defense officials, dated March 4, 1969. In this memorandum, the Secretary of Defense stated:

"Our obligation to provide the public with accurate, timely information on major Department of Defense programs will require, in some instances, detailed public information planning and coordination within the Department and with other government agencies. However, I want to emphasize that the sole purpose of such planning and coordination will be to expedite the flow of information to the public. Propaganda has no place in Department of Defense public information programs."

While the Committee recognizes the requirement for these activities, it is the view of the Committee that the total requested can and should be substantially reduced. Therefore, the Committee has recommended concurrence in the specific reductions made by the House in the request for funds for these activities. The committee also recommended concurrence in the specific reductions made by the House in the request for funds for these activities. The committee also recommends concurrence in the House action imposing specific limitations on the funds available for public information affairs, which is based on a total limitation of \$28,000,000 annually. However, due to the lateness in the fiscal year the specific limitations recommended for fiscal year 1971 total \$30,400,000. The recommended limitations,

which are not applicable to Security Review Activities, are:

Army	\$10,300,000
Navy/Marine Corps	10,400,000
Air Force	8,100,000
Office of Secretary of Defense	1,200,000
Defense Agencies and Joint Chiefs of Staff	1,400,000
Total	30,400,000

Applicable to "Operation and Maintenance" only. Military personnel assigned to these activities are subject to the limitation imposed on each of the services.

The Public Affairs function provides for the following activities:

It provides a daily news briefing, necessary in-country transportation, accreditation, and other logistic support to more than 400 newsmen in South Vietnam and responds to their inquiries concerning military operations in that nation.

It conducts a daily regularly-scheduled on-the-record briefing for newsmen covering the Department of Defense, at which there is an extended exchange of questions and answers concerning a wide variety of subjects related to the Department's activities.

It arranges and conducts special news briefings and conferences at which the Secretary of Defense and other knowledgeable officials are available to answer newsmen's questions concerning subjects of interest. In addition to the daily briefings, 60 other additional news briefings were arranged for newsmen at the Pentagon in 1969.

It arranges interviews for newsmen and authors with key officials of the Department at the behest of these newsmen and authors. For example, in 1969 more than 450 interviews requested by newsmen were arranged by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). In that same year, that office was responsible for arranging for Secretary Laird meeting with newsmen on 60 occasions.

It provides the 35-50 newsmen covering the Pentagon daily and others in Washington and throughout the nation, with a 24-hour-2-day, seven-day-a-week, availability to respond to inquiries. In 1969, more than 35,000 news inquiries were handled by the office providing this service.

It schedules knowledgeable speakers from the Department to meet, insofar as possible, requests received from the public and from organizations.

Coordinates and arranges news coverage of major news events to insure equitable treatment for all news media, efficient and prompt handling of news copy, film, and sound recording; as well as access to news sources. For example, coverage of the movements of the Sixth Fleet during the Jordanian crisis was arranged and coordinated by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

In response to requests from community, civic, and other organizations; it coordinates and schedules the appearance of demonstration teams, such as the Blue Angels, Thunderbirds and Golden Knights throughout the nation.

It monitors military operations and programs to insure that accurate information on these activities is publicly released on a timely basis and is consistent with the requirements of national security.

It reviews, for security and policy, Defense information that is proposed for release by the Government to the public, in addition to reviewing for security thousands of pages a year of Congressional testimony by Defense witnesses in order to permit open publication of the hearings.

It assists the Secretary of Defense and other key officials of the Department in responding to voluminous correspondence addressed to them or referred to them as a result of public or Congressional inquiries.

It provides technical assistance to radio, television and broadcasting representatives covering news events associated with Department of Defense operations.

It exerts continuous effort throughout the Department of Defense to insure promptness, accuracy, and completeness in the release of information concerning the Department's activities in consonance with the Freedom of Information Act and the Principles of Public Information enunciated by the Secretary of Defense.

In conjunction with the Department of State and in support of our Paris peace negotiators, it makes available to the American and world public, information concerning the plight of American Prisoners of War and Missing in Action. Cooperates with a great variety of organizations in focusing world attention on the problem. The program is carried out under the supervision of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Operations).

It arranges and provides briefings at the request of student groups and thus affords an opportunity for exchanging ideas and information during question and answer periods. For example, since January 1, 1970, approximately 125 student and youth groups composed of 3,792 members attended Defense briefings at the Pentagon or locations in the Washington area, and engaged in discussions at their request.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, movies and slides are used more and more each year, especially in our school systems. It is one of the best ways of teaching young people. I have seen some of these films. They are very good. I think we will need more and more of them in the military system, particularly if we are to sell a voluntary military system to our people. The Department of Defense will have to produce films showing how good life is in the military if we are to have a completely voluntary military force by the date we have set, which is about a year from now.

We always have a problem of public relations wherever the military is involved, especially in Southeast Asia. Even in my State we have the Minuteman missiles scattered over one-third of our State, and we have two large Air Force bases, and now a large ABM system which involves 12 or 15 towns and cities. They have many problems as the result of this huge program.

Both the Army and the Air Force have an obligation to the people of North Dakota to explain what they are doing there. If a chamber of commerce wants a speaker to explain what they are doing, they should be able to get a speaker to tell them what they are doing. If they want General Westmoreland to speak, and I was able to get him, he would serve a good purpose.

I do not see how it is possible to cut out something that is so vital in the Department of Defense. As the chairman of the committee has pointed out, there would be little funds left for the remainder of the year if this motion were agreed to.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I think the purpose of the amendment is misunderstood. General Westmoreland is not paid out of the funds of public relations. He is on the regular payroll. My proposal would not affect his speech-making activities. The Senator has distorted the purpose of the amendment. My proposal relates to the use of the vast

resources of the military to influence the attitudes and political judgments of Americans in general.

But these are vast programs. There are over 400 films in one catalog. It is a process, I think, of brainwashing the American people. There is no competing agency. I wonder what the attitude of the Senator from North Dakota would be if the State Department undertook to sell the American people on one of its policies and we appropriated \$100 million for them to make films to distribute all over the country to propagandize the current President's views on foreign policy. As has been said before, and I joined in, we forbid USIA to distribute any of its material in the United States.

The Senator asked how we are going to sell a voluntary army. I do not think it is a function of the military to sell a voluntary army. At present I am opposed to the idea of a volunteer army. I do not think it is consistent with the preservation of a democratic system to establish a voluntary army which is disassociated from the people. I might change my mind, but as of the moment I am opposed to it. That is a matter that all of us in public life will have to thrash out sooner or later.

My amendment is addressed to the program of public relations. This program does not finance General Westmoreland's travels.

The Senator mentioned the ABM. I think it is not proper, if we are going to preserve the independence of judgment in the Senate, to use the full impact of the Military Establishment to go out and sell the ABM. That is one of the most controversial political issues we have ever had come before us.

Last year the first matter was decided on a 50-50 vote. Now, you throw into the breach all the pressure of the military to make people think it is a good thing and that it would be a strong step. I think that is not in keeping with our democratic system.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Apparently the Senator was not listening to my remarks.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was listening very carefully.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. We have an ABM in North Dakota. It involves 12 to 15 towns and cities. They are all being affected one way or another. It is up to the military to go to these towns and cities and tell them how they are being affected. We have another situation with the Air Force.

Two years ago we had a terrific storm and the Air Force came to help the Indian people—giving them clothes and other help.

I do not say these funds should have to be used to sell the ABM but to tell the local communities how they will be affected.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator remembers that last year we had the famous Starbird memorandum. General Starbird was in charge of selling the ABM. He put out a memorandum which was secret to begin with, but an enterprising reporter discovered it, and the Washington Post published it. He set forth how to go about selling the pro-

gram. It would have organized the manufacturers and the industrial companies who were involved in the project and their people would be used to go to each community, inform the leading citizens there, and get them to speak up for ABM. He had in the memorandum every possible approach of the Pentagon and its related allies, especially contractors to sell the ABM to the American people.

I thought that is what the Senator from North Dakota had reference to. I assume they told the people in North Dakota that, having the missiles in their midst, the ABM would be the salvation of the world and make them feel that they are a great part of a mission which contributes to peace and safety. I do not know what else they would say to the people there. They would not say, "Look, there is a great difference of opinion on this ABM. Half of the Senate voted for it and half against it."

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. The people of North Dakota need no selling at all. They think it is a patriotic thing to do. They accepted the ABM and the Minuteman and two Air Force bases.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from North Dakota is the one who sold them. What the Senator from North Dakota is for, the people there are for. I myself do not see why they had to send the military there, because the Senator from North Dakota can do better than the military. That is his function. I think it is his function, as a Senator and a political officer. I think the Senator would be derelict if he did not explain his views and interpretation of the ABM. He supported it. That is his right and duty, if he believes in it.

I do not think we ought to turn the primary education of the American people on military matters over to the military—that is, if we want to preserve the American system. They simply have too much muscle, money, and personnel. They have all of their people at their beck and call to sell their views. If we think the military can do it better than the Congress, then all right. But as long as I am a Senator, sworn to uphold the Constitution, I feel it is my duty to uphold the integrity of the Senate and its function. If it does not perform properly, the people can change things.

I must say one wonders about it on some subjects, but I still have confidence in the political system we have. I think the education of the people on military matters should be done by Senators, Representatives, and the press—the civilian part of our Government and country. We are not a militaristic society—at least we are not in the past. But I must say we do not give as much emphasis to that aspect as we did in the past. Consider the bill we are going to vote on in a few minutes—\$66 billion. That is more than the money provided for all of the rest of the agencies combined, if we leave out the trust funds, for which we do not appropriate.

This one agency can call on any of its 4 million people, and send them anywhere it wants to, to tell its story. The

Pentagon has sent veterans all over the country. They have been down in my State. General Walt has been down there several times. They send in sergeants to say what a great job we are doing in Vietnam and how we are teaching the people hygiene and what a great job we are doing there. They send them into my State, obviously to offset my criticism. I think I am within my province in saying what I do. My constituents can retire me if they want to, but they cannot do anything about military officers who come there.

I say the system is getting out of bounds when there is such a huge organization educating the American people on military projects.

A short while ago I read the memorandum of the President of the United States, issued on November 6th, directing agencies to cut back on their propaganda activities, in very specific terms. I shall not read it again; I read it a moment ago.

My amendment is in direct support of the announced policy of the President of the United States. Therefore I think the Senate should support the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT). On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. DODD), the Senator from Maryland (Mr. TYDINGS), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL), are necessarily absent.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOK), the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK), the Senator from New York (Mr. GOODELL), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. MILLER), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) is absent on official business.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.

If present and voting, the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from New York (Mr. GOODELL) is paired with the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK). If present and voting, the Senator from New York would vote "yea" and the Senator from Colorado would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) is paired with the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER). If present and voting, the Senator from Oregon would vote "yea" and the Senator from Texas would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 44, nays 46, as follows:

[No. 416 Leg.]

YEAS—44

Bayh	Gravel	Mansfield
Burdick	Harris	Mathias
Byrd, W. Va.	Hart	McCarthy
Case	Hartke	McGovern
Church	Hollings	Metcalf
Cooper	Hughes	Mondale
Cranston	Inouye	Montoya
Eagleton	Javits	Moss
Fulbright	Kennedy	Muskie
Gore	Long	Nelson

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Pearson
Pell
Percy
Proxmire
Randolph

Ribicoff
Saxbe
Schweiker
Spong
Stevenson

Williams, N.J.
Williams, Del.
Yarborough
Young, Ohio

NAYS—46

Aiken
Allen
Allott
Anderson
Baker
Bellmon
Bennett
Bible
Boggs
Brooke
Byrd, Va.
Cannon
Cotton
Curtis
Dole
Eastland

Ellender
Ervin
Fannin
Fong
Goldwater
Griffin
Gurney
Hansen
Holland
Hruska
Jackson
Jordan, N.C.
Jordan, Idaho
Magnuson
McClellan
McGee

McIntyre
Murphy
Packwood
Pastore
Prouty
Scott
Smith
Sparkman
Stennis
Stevens
Symington
Talmadge
Thurmond
Young, N. Dak.

NOT VOTING—10

Cook
Dodd
Dominick
Goodell

Hatfield
Miller
Mundt
Russell

Tower
Tydings

So Mr. FULBRIGHT'S amendment was rejected.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment. If there be no further amendment to be proposed, the question is on the engrossment of the amendments and the third reading of the bill.

The amendments were ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill was read the third time.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I was greatly encouraged this past week to learn that the Appropriations Committee, under the dedicated leadership of the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Louisiana, had decided to report the Department of Defense appropriations bill to the Senate with a decrease of \$389 million below the amount recommended by the House. When one considers that the House version was itself about \$1.9 billion below the original estimate, it is possible to hope that at least in this area, Christmas may arrive a few weeks early to the American taxpayer.

The Appropriations Committee, by declining to include in this bill funds which were not in the President's budget and which have not received the required annual authorization, has demonstrated the proper emphasis on orderly procedure which is essential for efficient, economical government.

Several months ago, when the Senate was debating the military authorization bill, I spoke on the twin bulwarks for a strong, secure America in the future. They were education and science. Without a renewed commitment to these areas, which have not been accorded the support they require, all of our sophisticated new hardware could conceivably incase our society in a suit of inflexible, inanimate steel. I believe we have become aware of this danger and are determined to prevent it.

Today, however, I would like to mention very briefly a different type of strength that is needed for a strong America. This strength resides in the spirit and soul of the American people. It is a deep desire for peace: of necessity peace with security, but peace that provides hope and confidence for the future of America and all mankind. A society that continues, year after year, to concentrate a large bulk of its resources on the machinery of war and destruction runs the risk of debilitating its innermost morality and inherent humanity. For the best part of three decades we have run this risk. Now perhaps there is a chance for change. As we vigilantly maintain our national security, by prudent and judicious defense expenditure, as we disengage from war in Asia, and as we closely watch negotiations in Paris and Helsinki, we may be able to divert a greater proportion of our resources to peaceful needs at home.

I view this current appropriations bill as a step toward this end. While I had hoped it might be possible to effect an even greater reduction in the amount recommended, I am satisfied that it is an excellent beginning. I commend the members of the committee for their action.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President (Mr. Spong), I do not intend to repeat the arguments made many times in the early part in the Cooper-Church-Mansfield-Aiken amendment. It was said at the time that the amendment we offered was an unusual amendment and without precedent. In my statement I have noted the many reasons, on which this question has been raised and considered by the Senate in previous years.

In 1954, the debates show, on the question of the Korean security treaty, a colloquy between the distinguished Senator from Mississippi and then chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr. Wiley, and myself, in which the Senator from Mississippi raised this question of the "constitutional process" provided in that treaty, as necessary to implement the treaty—to provide for the argument of the United States in war.

Since that time, the Senate has looked into the question and the Foreign Relations Committee, under Senator FULBRIGHT, examined them rigorously. The subcommittee under the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON), reviewing U.S. commitments, in action last year taken on the national commitments resolution, approved by the Senate, the approval of an amendment which I offered to the defense authorization bill, which was stricken in conference; later, the amendment which Senator MANSFIELD and I offered to the defense appropriation bill, which was modified by the effective work of Senator Church—and that is the beginning of our work together on later amendments—and the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN), and others, a limitation upon the use of troops in Laos and Thailand was accepted by Congress and by the administration.

The action which has been taken by the Committee on Appropriations follows a long line of precedents.

I appreciate very much, and I know my colleagues do, the action of the Appropriations Committee.

Mr. President, over the past 2 years the Senate has rigorously examined the constitutional framework of policymaking for foreign affairs and national security matters. A very important application of the responsibilities of the Senate in these areas was the debate over Cambodia. A decisive statement of the majority view of the Senate is found in the pending bill, the Department of Defense appropriations bill, 1971. Section 843 provides:

Sec. 843. In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos, Thailand, or Cambodia.

The committee report states that the committee's recommendation for the inclusion of Cambodia in section 843 of the bill is based upon the earlier action of the Senate with respect to the defense authorization bill on December 15, 1969, and the Cooper-Church amendment to the foreign military sales bill, H.R. 15628, was adopted by the Senate, 58 to 37.

This clear affirmative action by the Appropriations Committee marks another important step in the effort by the Senate to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities in the joint making of foreign policy, particularly with respect to engagement in war over a period of years—certainly since 1954.

The primary purpose of the Cooper-Church amendment was to assert the view of the Senate that the United States should not become involved in a new war in Cambodia, a country to which it has no commitments, without the expressed approval of the Congress. Underlying their purpose is an attempt to resolve the continuing and contentious problem of whether a decision to enter into a war should be made by the President alone or by the President and the Congress, and whether the involvement of the United States in a war is necessary for the security of the United States and its people. These are issues which have troubled the Congress and the people during the life of the Republic, but more particularly since World War II.

The Constitution provides that the Congress has the authority to declare war, to make rules and regulations for the Armed Forces and to raise and support armies and a Navy, to suppress insurrection and repel invasion. The Constitution provides that the President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy of the United States and the militia when called into service of the United States. While the notes of members of the Constitutional Convention distinguished the power of the President from that of the King of England who had the power to declare war and to raise armies and to make war, the exact and distinctive war powers of the President and the Congress have never been determined.

There has never been any doubt, nor

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is there now, in the event of sudden attack upon the territory of the United States or upon U.S. forces, the President has the authority and duty to repel attack. But since World War II, the way in which the Government of the United States—the Congress and the Executive—decide upon whether war is necessary for our security, has been continually at issue.

On January 26 of 1954 in the debate on the Korean security treaty, the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Mr. STENNIS, and I, engaged in a colloquy with the then chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Wiley of Wisconsin. The issue was over the meaning of "constitutional processes" and I am going to place in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks the full colloquy—a colloquy which I believe throws much light on the issue that has been so heatedly debated over the past 2 years. At this point I would like to quote the following portion. Senator STENNIS is questioning Senator Wiley then chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee about the meaning of "constitutional processes":

Senator STENNIS. If the language does not mean the President can act without the action of the Congress, then what does it mean and why include such language?

Mr. WILEY. To put it in a little different way, let me say the language simply means that if there is an overt attack by an aggressor upon one of our allies, the United States will simply take whatever action is determined by the President and the Congress to be advisable under the circumstances, having in mind the obligations of this Treaty, if it is ratified.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator says 'the President and the Congress.' He means, does he not, that the language did require affirmative action by Congress before the United States could enter into armed conflict or into a war?

A few moments later in the debate, Senator STENNIS, seeking further clarification of the war-making powers of the President and the Congress, said as follows:

Mr. STENNIS. Of course, we protect our troops wherever they may be. However, apart from that, does the Senator from Wisconsin agree that before we would be called on to act under this Treaty, affirmative action by the Congress as well as the President would be required? Does the Senator agree to that?

Mr. Wiley replied:

Very well. I think that if the circumstances were such as I have suggested, namely, if there had been an overt act of aggression but our troops were not involved or if there had not been an attack of our own troops but simply an attack of our allies, it would necessarily follow under Article III [of the UN Charter], that we would act to meet the common danger; and our action at that time would be in accordance with Constitutional processes. If it did not mean consultation, or something similar, with respect to which the Executive has the power, and if it meant utilization of the armed forces, I believe that Congress would and should have to decide.

Mr. WILEY. I agree. . . .

Mr. COOPER. The Senator from Mississippi has raised the most searching question that can be addressed to this treaty. As the Senator from Wisconsin has said, it is the age-old constitutional question, "Under what circumstances can the President of the United

States take action which, as a practical matter, may have the effect of committing this Nation to war without a congressional declaration of war?"

The phrase, "constitutional processes" must imply the powers of both President and Congress. Under the Constitution the President of the United States can assert under certain circumstances—such as our troops being attacked or our physical area being invaded—his constitutional power as Commander in Chief to take action for the security of the country. Such action could, of course, lead to war.

The important language in this article, it seems to me, in addition to the phrase "constitutional processes," which is difficult of interpretation, is the language defining the area, and conditions in which the United States would be morally committed to take some action under its constitutional processes.

I believe the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin has said that he did not intend to make a statement which would interpret in any way the words "constitutional processes" to exclude the constitutional power of the President of the United States as Commander in Chief to act, under certain circumstances which he might think proper, to protect the security of the United States. Is that correct?

Mr. WILEY. Yes, of course. Again we get into a field which has been the subject of discussion for some 165 years, as I have said. However, I believe that with the understanding which has been appended as a result of the suggestion of the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE] there can be no question as to what the meaning of the treaty is. As I have stated, there is nothing in the treaty which would delimit the constitutional power of either Congress or the President.

Mr. COOPER. We seem simply to speak in a circle and come back to where we started. What does "constitutional processes" mean?

Mr. WILEY. It is not a Bricker amendment, if that is what the Senator has in mind.

Mr. COOPER. We come back to the question: What are the constitutional powers of the President and Congress with respect to taking steps toward war? I believe that the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin has said that, in the absence of such circumstances as demanded the protection of the security of the United States, we would certainly expect that Congress would determine whether the United States should go to war.

The debate I have quoted from 1954 concerned Korea. However, the problem of national commitments was very much the principle at issue then as it is now.

The history of the past 25 years provides many significant examples of the processes of progressive involvement to war without any express prior commitment by our Government. It could, occur again and in situations where our national security and interests are not actually threatened.

The collapse of Nazi Germany brought the Soviet armies into Eastern Europe where they still remain. The fall of Nationalist China, the attack upon South Korea, and the possibility of a takeover of Southeast Asia by Communist China, caused the United States to construct a wide ranging series of bilateral and multilateral mutual defense agreements designed primarily to contain the Soviet Union and Communist China. They are eight in number and include 43 nations. Among them are NATO, SEATO, and ANZUS and American multilateral treaties with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Nationalist China.

While these treaties differ in certain

respects, particularly NATO, which states that an attack upon any part of a large area designated by the treaty, shall be considered as an attack upon all the parties—they are similar in substance. In essence, the treaties affirm that armed attack against any party to the treaty would endanger the safety of all and that each party would act to meet the danger "in accordance with its constitutional processes." The term, "constitutional processes," is not defined or spelled out in the treaties. Does "constitutional processes" mean that the President acting as Commander in Chief could commit the forces of the United States to the military assistance of another treaty country? Or does it mean that the President shall consult with the Congress to determine whether the use of American forces is essential to the security of the United States as well as the other country and that he will not commit forces until the Congress has given its approval, either by a declaration of war or by a joint resolution of the Congress?

In fact, as the situation exists today, with the presence of our Armed Forces in a number of other countries, there is obviously a great danger that we could become engaged in a war without "constitutional processes" ever being exercised by joint action by the President and the Congress. For in addition to Vietnam, American troops are stationed in large numbers in Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Nationalist China, and Western Europe.

Senator SYMINGTON's subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has made a very thorough examination of our forces commitments around the world and has asked many basic questions about the necessity for their continued presence. The administration is making a similar examination. Both branches are seriously examining the possibility of the withdrawal of our forces from other countries consistent with our security.

This is a worthwhile and necessary inquiry, for it is evident that the mere presence of sizable forces in other countries is a significant factor that could lead to war without "Constitutional processes." Our involvement in war in Vietnam began with a limited military training program to the Government of South Vietnam. In 1962, the United States expanded its forces in South Vietnam as the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese enlarged the war against the Government of South Vietnam. Gradually, our forces grew from 650 in 1962 to about 17,000 in 1963, to a peak of 535,000 in 1969. When our forces were fired upon, our involvement in a major war was irretrievably determined. This involvement was approved by the Congress in August of 1964 with the Tonkin Bay Resolution, but the many small but increasingly binding decisions had been made over a period of at least 10 years.

I do not believe that any of the Presidents who have been involved with Vietnam, Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, or President Nixon, foresaw or desired that the United States would become involved in a large scale

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war in Asia. But the fact remains that a steady progression of small decisions and actions over a period of 20 years had forestalled a clear-cut decision by the President or by the President and Congress—decision as to whether the defense of South Vietnam and involvement in a great war were necessary to the security and best interest of the United States. In the light of the experience in Vietnam, a basic change in attitude has taken place. In constitutional terms, the recognition that "Constitutional processes" become difficult if not irrelevant once engaged in a war, has underlined the urgency of the debate of the past few years over Cambodia.

Of course, economic difficulties and severe social problems at home, the desire to change our priorities, are factors in congressional concern, but most important, I submit, is a growing awareness on the part of the Congress that it must carry out its constitutional responsibilities to share the burden of decision-making and judgment on vital issues of policy and national security.

On June 25, 1969, by a vote of 70 to 16, after several years of thought and consideration, the Senate approved the national commitments resolution. In brief, the resolution states that the use of Armed Forces of the United States or the promise of their use to another country upon the territory of another country, shall not be deemed a national commitment of the United States unless explicitly agreed to by the President and the Congress by a treaty, statute or resolution.

Building upon this principle, I introduced an amendment on August 12, 1969, to the defense authorization bill denying funds for the use of American forces in support of Laos or Thailand. This amendment was approved 86 to 0 on September 17, 1969, but was deleted in conference with the House. Later, on December 15, Senator MANSFIELD and I introduced an amendment for the same purpose to the defense appropriations bill. It was modified by Senator CHURCH and thus marked the beginning of our association on Cooper-Church—and supported by Senators JAVITS, ALLOTT, and GRIFFIN, among others, denying the use of funds for American ground forces in Laos. It was passed by the Congress and approved by the President and remains the law of the land. The intended effect of these amendments was to insure that before American forces could be committed to the defense of these countries in war, the President must secure the approval of the Congress.

The Cooper-Church amendment to the military sales bill which passed the Senate by a vote of 58 to 37 on June 30, 1970, had a similar purpose: That is, to require that before any future commitment to a country with which we have no obligation that any new commitments must be the result of a joint decision on the part of the Executive and the Legislature.

I am very pleased that the Senate Appropriations Committee has accepted the basic principles of the Cooper-Church amendment and incorporated it as a part of the bill. Senator CHURCH and

I are extremely grateful to Senator RUSSELL, Senator ELLENDER, and Senator STENNIS and others for their careful consideration of our written request to the Appropriations Committee that Cambodia be a part of the prohibition for U.S. ground combat troops along with Laos and Thailand.

The action of the Appropriations Committee is an affirmation of the constitutional principle that the President cannot commit troops to war in support of another country without the approval of the Congress.

The debate of the past several years and this most recent action by the Senate Appropriations Committee is in no sense a derogation of the President on the constitutional authority of the President. On the contrary, it is a clear expression of the reestablishment of the proper relationship between the Congress and the President with respect to the war-making powers.

This effort to reestablish a proper constitutional relationship has in no way restricted the President's powers to protect our forces—to respond to an attack upon U.S. forces or upon the United States itself. In these actions, the President does not require the approval of Congress but he cannot take the United States into war unless the threat to our security is immediate, without the consent of the Congress. And in the event of an action to meet some immediate threat the Congress has the right to cut off funds for such actions if the Congress after due deliberation decides that continued action is not essential to U.S. security.

There has been suggested by some commentators that the process of the past several years to reestablish the congressional role in the making of foreign policy, and security affairs is a part of a movement toward neoisolationism. Comparisons have been made with the battle over the Bricker amendment in the early 1950's. This is a false analogy. The Bricker amendment largely concerned the issue of the overriding of domestic law by treaties and conventions. It would have provided that domestic law could not be superseded except by a statute approved by the Congress. The Bricker amendment was part of a larger conflict between those who advocated a major international role for the United States and the isolationists.

There are very few Members of Congress who desire a return to fortress America kind of isolationism. What is at issue is not whether we should be involved in the world but rather, how our power should be used to best further our interests. It is my belief that the debate of the past few years in the Senate and the Congress over Indochina and the review of our other commitments has strengthened the ability of the legislature to make the joint decisions called for by the Constitution. The action of the Appropriations Committee on section 843 is an important declaration of this new institutional strength.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert into the RECORD at this point the debate that took place January 26, 1954, in the Senate.

There being no objection, the debate was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH KOREA

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed consideration of the treaty, Executive A (83d Cong., 2d sess.), a Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, signed at Washington on October 1, 1953.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield?

Mr. WILEY. I yield to the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I preface my question by saying if anyone who is interested in knowing why the Bricker amendment was presented, will take the trouble to read the debate in the Senate in 1945, when the Senate, unanimously, with the exception of only one Member, voted to ratify the charter of the United Nations, he will find that the people of the Nation, and almost every Senator, were so imbued with the thought that the charter of the United Nations would be the instrumentality of preventing another world war that the hope was expressed by many, including Members of the Senate who discussed the charter, that posterity would look upon that action as it did upon the work of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, when the Nation was formed.

Some very eloquent and wonderful speeches were made on the floor of the Senate at that time, but only one minor part of the charter was discussed, and that was done by the distinguished Senator from Michigan (Mr. FERGUSON), who raised the question as to what kind of agreement would be involved if the Security Council called on the President of the United States to send troops abroad in the event of another war, or to stop an aggression which might lead to a major conflict. The Senator from Michigan hazarded a guess that in such a case a treaty would have to be submitted to the Senate. That viewpoint was challenged, primarily on the ground that the Security Council was only a part of the United Nations, that the United Nations was not a super sovereign government, and that never in the past had we negotiated a treaty except with a sovereign nation.

At the time of the debate there was no discussion of the fact that an international FEPC was involved in the United Nations Charter, and also the question of human rights, which some persons claim can, if acted on in a certain way change our Bill of Rights. So, as I say, without any mature consideration of what the Charter meant, but in an impulsive way, all but one Member of the Senate voted for its ratification.

In 1948 we find the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare considering an FEPC bill. That committee reported a bill, with a substantial number of Senators signing their names to the report, stating that, regardless of whether such a bill could be authorized by our Constitution, it was authorized by the Charter of the United Nations.

Again, when a President of the United States seized the steel companies without any apparent authority, so far as the average lawyer or Member of Congress knew, the Chief Justice of the United States and two other judges who agreed with him held that, even if the President did not have the power he claimed under the Constitution, he had it under the Charter of the United Nations. Consequently, many of us felt that it would be quite appropriate to insert in the Constitution, a clear definition of what all good constitutional lawyers said had been the law all the time—and I agree with that viewpoint—that no treaty which violates the Constitution of the United States can be valid and effective.

Another treaty is now brought before the

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Senate, a treaty with Korea. I find in the report of the committee that the heart of the treaty is article III, which recites:

"ARTICLE III

"Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

The question I desire to ask my friend, the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, which reported the treaty, is this: Will he be good enough to make it crystal clear to us in his explanation of the treaty to what extent under this treaty we are being committed to a future war on the mainland of Asia? The article of the treaty to which I have just referred provides that our aid will be rendered in accordance with constitutional processes.

Mr. WILEY. That is correct.

Mr. ROBERTSON. So that, certainly, would clear up the question raised by the Senator from Michigan (Mr. Ferguson) with reference to constitutional processes in connection with the United Nations.

We all know that when the United Nations voted to enter the Korean war to try to stem the communistic aggression of North Korea, the President of the United States furnished troops, and Congress, to this day, has never been asked to vote or given the privilege of voting on the question whether the Congress should carry out the provision of the Constitution that the Nation cannot make war except by an act of Congress.

I wish the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee would discuss this particular aspect of the treaty. Will we be committed to war if, at the end of the stalled negotiations in the Far East, the President of Korea decides he has had enough of such tactics, that North Koreans are in the territory of South Korea, as indeed they are, and that situation justifies South Korea to make war. In that event will we also be at war, under this provision? If that is what we are being committed to, certainly we should not go to war until Congress so votes.

Mr. President, I hope the distinguished chairman of the committee will not leave in doubt any provision of the treaty. Most of us have had little opportunity to consider it. We are all busy with other committees. I had four committee meetings today, and could not attend them all, and from now on there will be constant meetings of the Committee on Banking and Currency. I am on five subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee, and they will be in constant session. Of necessity I must rely upon the members of the Foreign Relations Committee, when that committee reports a treaty, to explain it fully in order that I may vote intelligently. I frankly admit that I am not one who wants to confess to the Nation that the Senate is incapable of analyzing treaties which it is called upon to ratify. If I thought that such was the case I would say, Change the Constitution and let the House of Representatives approve treaties.

I have pointed out that we ratified the most far-reaching treaty in the form of a charter in our history. We did not know what was in it. We do not yet know everything that is in it in its full application. That is the reason why a change in the Constitution is now being proposed. If something comes out of that treaty which is clearly in violation of our Constitution, I want to be sure that it is not going to be the overriding law of this land.

So I call on my distinguished colleague with reference to this and all other treaties that may come before the Senate for ap-

proval to make sure that we are fully advised of what we are doing.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield for a brief question?

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I yielded for a brief question a quarter of an hour ago, and my Jeffersonian friend from Virginia delivered quite a speech which was very challenging. I would prefer to carry on with my statement, and I am sure the answer to the question which was finally propounded by the distinguished Senator from Virginia will be as complete as the English language can make it.

Mr. STENNIS. If the Senator would rather proceed with his speech I shall withhold my question.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, in order that it may appear in the Record more clearly, I ask unanimous consent at this time that the very brief Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea be printed at this point in my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PAYNE in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

The treaty is as follows:

"MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

"The parties to this treaty,

"Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area,

"Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area.

"Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area,

"Have agreed as follows:

"ARTICLE I

"The parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any party toward the United Nations.

"ARTICLE II

"The parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self-help and mutual aid, the parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this treaty and to further its purposes.

"ARTICLE III

"Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

"ARTICLE IV

"The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose of United States land, air, and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.

"ARTICLE V

"This treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of Korea in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

"ARTICLE VI

"This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either party may terminate it 1 year after notice has been given to the other party.

"In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty.

"Done in duplicate at Washington, in the English and Korean languages, this 1st day of October 1953.

"For the United States of America:

"JOHN FOSTER DULLES

"For the Republic of Korea:

"Y. T. PYUN."

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, on Thursday, January 21, the Committee on Foreign Relations reported the Mutual Defense Treaty With Korea—Executive A, 83d Congress, 2d session—signed at Washington on October 1, 1953, unanimously recommending that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification at an early date.

When this body gave its approval to the security pact between the United States and Japan in 1951, one of the primary elements which motivated our decision was the conviction that while such a pact was essential to preserving the safety of this country in the Far East, it was also a prerequisite to the restoration of Japan as a free nation in a divided world community. For we knew, and we know now, that if the Soviet Union and a Sovietized China could encompass Japan within their sprawling, expanding orbit, then the power of world communism in the Pacific, buttressed by Japan's great industrial potential, would directly and gravely menace the security of the United States in the westward approaches to this continent.

Parenthetically, Mr. President, I might say that most of us realize that we are no longer living in yesteryear. This little world has changed considerably, even since the beginning of the Second World War, and has become very small, indeed. We have airplanes that can travel a thousand miles an hour. We now have the A-bomb and the H-bomb. We are now able to cross our own continent in a matter of 4 hours, and we cross the Atlantic in 4 hours, if it is necessary. The result is that every nation is in every other nation's backyard, speaking figuratively and realistically.

I was speaking a moment ago about Japan. Virtually the same considerations are valid with respect to the Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea which the Senate now has before it. If we learned in the Second World War that the Pacific Ocean was a pathway for Japan to attack our westernmost possessions, we have learned, and we should now realize, that the security of Japan depends upon our preserving a free and independent Korea in the territory across the Sea of Japan—territory which points as a bayonet at the heart of the Island empire.

The security of Korea is therefore a matter of the most vital concern to the United States, the United Nations, and the free world. One treacherous attempt has already been made to lay hands upon this bastion of freedom, which came perilously close to succeeding. Have we forgotten the ordeal of Pusan? Have we forgotten what the position of Japan and of our forces stationed there would have been had the Communists from North Korea driven the defenders of the republic into the sea?

Many who are experienced in world affairs are convinced that this aggressive attack against Korea, conceived, prepared, and armed by an outside power, might never

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have been unleashed had the enemy been advised in advance—and this is important—that it could expect the United States to react with immediate and vigorous means in aid to the victims. One of Secretary of State Dulles' principal preoccupations has been to avoid this repetition of past error, that we do not again permit a would-be violator of free territory to miscalculate the intentions of the United States. In the words of Mr. Dulles:

"I believe, as one looks back at the wars of this century, that it can be said with a high degree of probability that if the aggressors had known in advance what we would do, that probably they would have not committed the acts of aggression.

"I think it is absolutely clear as to what we would do, if Korea were again invaded from the north. We would do what we did before.

"The important thing is to let that be clearly known. Then, I think it is not likely to happen, but if there is doubt about that, then it is likely to happen."

In short, the primary value of this treaty consists in giving the Communists notice, beyond any possibility of misinterpretation, that if they embark upon another aggression in Korea, the United States will not sit idly by, but that we can be expected to take prompt and adequate measures to meet it. At the same time, the treaty constitutes an additional link in the system of mutual security thus far developed in the Pacific. It fills a gap in the fabric of treaties which have already been concluded between the United States, on the one hand, and the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, and Japan. Like the other security treaties with these countries, the Korean Treaty provides for consultation and, when necessary, appropriate action. And it reaffirms the belief of the United States that the greatest measure of security is to be found in collective measures.

The provisions of this treaty evidence our desire for peace. It is not a threat to any nation, but rather further proof of our will to live in peace, and to work toward that end through collective action for the protection of the free nations in the Pacific. This is clearly recognized in the preamble, which proclaims the determination of the parties to defend themselves against external armed attack, and to strengthen their efforts for collective defense pending the development of a more effective system of regional security in that area. It is also confirmed in article I, under which the parties undertake to settle by peaceful means any international dispute in which they may be involved, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any party toward the United Nations.

Whenever either party is of the opinion that the political independence or security of either is threatened by external armed attack, the parties are required, under article II, to consult together. This article, which, as will be noted, incorporates the principle of the Vandenberg resolution—Senate Resolution 239, 80th Congress—obliges the parties, separately and jointly, to undertake, through self-help and mutual aid, to maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and to implement the treaty.

The heart of the treaty, as was said by the distinguished Senator from Virginia [Mr. ROBERTSON], who recently asked me a question, is contained in article III, which received a most careful examination in the committee. It is worded as follows:

"Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on each of the parties, in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of

the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

The unusual phraseology of this article relative to territory under the administrative control of one of the parties, was drafted to take cognizance of the fact that at present the Republic of Korea has effective control only over a part of the peninsula, and to anticipate the day when a settlement unifying the country would be reached through processes recognized as lawful by the United States.

It should be emphasized that the treaty does not become operative unless one of the parties is the victim of an external armed attack. It does not extend to the case of large-scale domestic riots or disturbances instigated by an outside power, nor does it apply to the violent overthrow of the Government or to a coup d'etat. An armed attack initiated by one of the parties to the treaty falls outside its scope. The instrument, in other words, is not an offensive alliance.

More significant, it does not apply to territories not now under the administrative control of either party, nor to territory which is not at some future time recognized by the United States as having been lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other party. In order to eliminate all possible doubts on this score, it was suggested by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE] that there be included in the Senate resolution giving its advice and consent to ratification an interpretative clause worded as follows:

"It is the understanding of the United States that neither party is obligated, under article III of the above treaty, to come to the aid of the other except in case of an external armed attack against each party; nor shall anything in the present treaty be construed as requiring the United States to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea."

The suggestion was adopted in the committee. Such an understanding is altogether consistent with the intention of the parties at the time the agreement was being negotiated; for Secretary Dulles indicated to the committee at the hearings that this very point was emphasized to the representatives of the Republic when article III was drafted. The United States, under the treaty, reserves for itself the right to determine whether territory not now under the administrative control of Korea has lawfully been brought under such control.

There can be no question, therefore, of the United States becoming involved under this treaty in hostilities resulting from a unilateral attempt to the Government of Korea to unify the country by forceful means or by any other means not regarded as lawful by the United States. Whatever the practical consequences of such action by the other party would be, we are not warranted in assuming that the Republic of Korea will do other than to abide by the terms of the armistice agreement to which they and we have solemnly subscribed.

Mr. President, I believe it is important to call attention to one other element in the formula of article III, which recognizes that the armed attack referred to would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the parties. Any action we take pursuant thereto would then, under this article, be determined in accordance with our constitutional process.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield for a question at that point?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PAYNE in the chair). Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from Mississippi?

Mr. WILEY. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator from Wisconsin has quoted from article III the phrase "in accordance with its constitutional processes."

Will the Senator explain fully, exactly what is meant by the phrase "in accordance with its constitutional processes," and also give his opinion as to whether or not constitutional processes were met at the time the United States went to war in Korea?

I ask the question in all good faith, and not in criticism of anyone. I was a Member of the Senate at the time the United States went to war in Korea. I did not raise any objection at the time we sent our troops there. However, I believe we have learned something in a practical way about what the clause can mean, and what it did mean, because it is to be found in article 43 of the United Nations Charter, which is on the subject of the use of troops and force.

So I shall appreciate the opinion, conclusion, and assurance of the Senator from Wisconsin as to what is meant by the phrase "in accordance with its constitutional processes," as used in article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea.

Mr. WILEY. My reply to that question would be that any action we take under the terms of article III would then be determined in accordance with our constitutional process. This approach follows the principle of the Monroe Doctrine, rather than the "attack upon one is an attack upon all" principle of the North Atlantic Treaty. I think it will be agreed that the Korean treaty approach, which was previously formulated by Mr. Dulles in the Philippine and Australia-New Zealand pacts, has some advantages over the North Atlantic Treaty formula; and it avoids the constitutional question marks which seem to have been suggested by the latter.

The proposed treaty does not change in any way the constitutional relationship between the President and the Congress with respect to the use of the Armed Forces of the United States. What we do will be in accordance with the constitutional processes.

If the Senator will refer to page 5 of the report he will find this language under the headline "Monroe Doctrine' Formula," paragraph 6:

"The second element to be noted in the formula of article III is its replacement of the specific commitment language used in the North Atlantic Treaty—

Which I have just read—

by what Secretary Dulles has called the "Monroe Doctrine" principle. Thus, each party, in article III, recognizes that the armed attack referred to therein would be dangerous to its own peace and safety. The action to be taken would then be determined in accordance with its constitutional process. By contrast, the North Atlantic Treaty formula makes an attack upon one tantamount to an attack upon all, so that such an attack, which might not take place against the United States itself, is nevertheless so regarded."

That is, in the North Atlantic Treaty.

"Because of the constitutional issues which the approach suggests, for example, whether an attack upon another gives the President the same inherent right to act as an attack upon United States territory, the language of President Monroe was regarded by Secretary Dulles as preferable when he negotiated the Philippine and Australia-New Zealand Pacts, and is reproduced in the Korean Treaty.

"In short, the phraseology of article III of the Korean Pact permits the United States to take any action we deem appropriate by our constitutional processes, and gives adequate assurance of support to the other country which may be the victim of an attack. It has the additional advantage of never having been challenged throughout

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our history, from the constitutional standpoint, as altering the balance of power between the President and Congress."

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield for another question?

Mr. WILEY. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. Specifically the clause we are discussing means that before the United States can resort to force or use troops, before it can go to war, it will be necessary that the matter be brought before the Congress. Is that correct?

Mr. WILEY. I think the constitutional process in the case referred to by the Senator from Mississippi would call for a declaration of war by the Congress. I am not so naive as to say, however, that something might not happen which would be in the nature of an attack upon our forces or upon a part of our territory. In such a case we would not wait for a declaration of war; we would go into battle. Constitutional process might also include, withdrawing our ambassador, by the President, issuing of an Executive warning, cutting off aid, and so forth.

Mr. STENNIS. If the Senator will yield further, regardless of what particular circumstances might exist at the time the question may arise, are we committing ourselves now, in agreeing to this treaty, to go to war if Korea is attacked, without any declaration by the Congress?

Mr. WILEY. In my opinion, very definitely the answer is no, but we enter into an undertaking that if there is an overt act by an aggressor upon our ally, then we will do that which we think is advisable and in accordance with our constitutional processes.

Mr. STENNIS. Who is "we"? Is that the Congress, or is it the President?

Mr. WILEY. It is the Congress and the President who have to determine that question.

Mr. STENNIS. Under that interpretation, then, an act of Congress would be required before American forces could be used, or the United States could go to war under the treaty, as the Senator has explained it. Is that correct?

Mr. WILEY. As I understand the question, I agree that if an overt act is committed by an aggressor upon an ally, it then rests with the constituted authority, to wit, the Congress, to decide whether or not we shall regard such aggression as a basis for going to war.

Mr. STENNIS. That is the interpretation the Senator from Wisconsin places upon the pact the Senate is considering today; is it?

Mr. WILEY. That is correct.

Mr. STENNIS. And on article III?

Mr. WILEY. Yes.

Mr. STENNIS. Will the Senator say that, in his opinion, that was the opinion of the committee which has reported the treaty, and which he represents on the floor today, the Committee on Foreign Relations?

Mr. WILEY. Supplementing what I have said, I would state that of course the President, as Commander-in-Chief, would undoubtedly come to the Congress, he would undoubtedly submit to the Congress a statement of the facts, and Congress would make the decision as to whether it would make a declaration of war.

Mr. STENNIS. It is the opinion of the Senator that that is as far as the treaty or pact goes, and that it does not authorize an attack by us or obligate us to make an attack unless the Congress so declares?

Mr. THYE. Will the Senator yield for a question at that point?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin has the floor. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield?

Mr. WILEY. I desire to have the Senator from Mississippi to restate the question, because I wish to be very clear about the facts stated in the question. I might say that we

always have to be very sure of our facts. As I have said many times, until one obtains the facts, one had better not apply a principle; otherwise one may apply the principle to the wrong set of facts.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I am very glad to try to restate my question, because I think it is a very vital question before the Senate. I am referring to article III. The last clause therein reads: "In accordance with its constitutional processes."

Applying that to the United States, and assuming that an attack might be made on Korea, my question is, Would the consent of the Senate to the ratification of the pact, or treaty, authorize the President of the United States to act without action by Congress, and to respond to an attack on Korea by force and send Korea aid, by the use of the Army, the Navy, or airpower, or to go to war?

Mr. WILEY. My answer is that there is nothing in the treaty which would change, delimit, or add to the powers of the President of the United States.

Mr. STENNIS. I know the Senator does not mean to be evasive. However, I am asking the Senator to go as far as he can in stating what he thinks the treaty means. The Senator is presenting the treaty to the Senate and asking for its ratification. In my opinion, merely to say that the treaty does not change the authority of the President of the United States does not go far enough to answer the question fully and directly.

Is the treaty a committal by the United States to go to war even though Congress does not so declare?

Mr. WILEY. I think I think I have answered the question. There is a certain angle to the question of the Senator which has been debated for almost 165 years. The President, as the Executive and as the Commander in Chief, under certain circumstances, in a number of instances, in our relations with countries in South America, has assumed the right and has exercised the power when there was a question of American rights being invaded.

Let me try to be so clear in this matter that there shall not be any suggestion whatsoever that I am trying to evade the issue. I have said that the treaty does not in the slightest add to or attempt to control or delimit the right of the constitutional power of the President of the United States. In substance, it becomes an agreement with an ally that if and when an aggressor attacks that ally, we will go to the aid of the ally only if and when constitutional processes are followed.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the Senator from Wisconsin will yield further—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield further to the Senator from Mississippi?

Mr. WILEY. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. Then, Mr. President, let us suppose that such a condition arose that the President honestly felt justified and required the United States to go to war, but that Congress thought to the contrary, or perhaps was not in session. Then we would be directly confronted with the question, What is the President's authority?

I should like to raise a further point for the consideration of the Senator from Wisconsin. This exact language is in article 43 of the United Nations Charter. This language leads most interested citizens to believe that it means the question would have to come before Congress, and that Congress would have to vote a declaration of war, before the United States could go to war. That would be my interpretation of the language, but there is a precedent to the contrary.

Now it is proposed that we reenact the same language. I think we are entitled to know the bottom rock opinion of every member of the Foreign Relations Committee

in regard to exactly how far we are committed, before we vote on the treaty. That is why I am pressing for an answer to this question.

I fully appreciate the very fine sentiments of the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and I know he is sincere in what he says.

Mr. WILEY. Of course, the courts have held that the United Nations Charter is not self-executing; and, of course, in the case of any obligation which we have undertaken under the United Nations, the meaning is simply that we are obligated to handle it under our own constitutional processes. This, to me, at least, is very clear. I believe it means—as I have said several times—that we have entered into an arrangement with an ally to protect that ally if she is attacked. Otherwise, there is no obligation whatever. But if our ally is attacked, still it will be up to our appropriate constitutional authorities to-wit, the Congress and the President, to determine how the United States will live up to the agreement. If a resort to war is indicated, then clearly Congress will have to take action.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield to me at this point?

Mr. WILEY. I yield.

Mr. THYE. The question which has been raised is that before the United Nations can commit us to use our troops, the United States Congress have a right to act upon a resolution which might be before the Security Council, and we have a right to exercise a veto in the event such a resolution is adopted by the Security Council, and therefore we have that safety insofar as the United Nations is concerned. In the case of the treaty now before the Senate, of course we have a right to examine the various questions.

The only part of the Korean Treaty which seems to me to be dangerous is the part which might affect the troops we now have in Korea. Of course we expect to have them there for some months to come. In the event a conflict between the South Koreans and the North Koreans should arise, our troops would be in the center of the conflict. Then the President would have to have the right and the courage to proceed to protect our troops at the very moment when shellfire broke out. But I believe that within the United Nations we do have the security of having a resolution considered by the Security Council; and we have the right to veto that resolution if we must.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the Senator from Wisconsin will yield further to me, I should like to boil down the question, repeating only a part of it: So far as language is concerned, virtually the same language is in the United Nations Charter; and a precedent was established under that language at the beginning of the Korean war.

It seems to me to be good logic and commonsense that if now we reenact virtually the same language, we reinforce the precedent which already has been established, we approve it, and we read into this language the meaning which has been given it. That is very clear; it is both law, logic, and precedent. Therefore, I am raising that particular point. I am not referring to all the conditions now existing in Korea.

As the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. THYE) has said, we already are at war in Korea. It is true there is a truce there now, but it is merely a temporary truce; and if a treaty of peace is not concluded, of course it is possible that our troops will have to resume the fighting. I am not trying to cover that point at all. Certainly our men will be protected.

But now the Congress is asked to legislate for the future, hoping at the same time that the present situation and condition will clear up. We are proposing to legislate for the long-time future, and it is proposed that we establish a precedent in the case of the con-

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continent of Asia. All the other agreements or arrangements were in relation to various islands in the Pacific, which at least can be surrounded by our aircraft carriers, submarines, and airpower.

But now we are proposing to deal with the continent of Asia and with a pact which will operate for an indefinite time in the future, unless terminated under its terms.

Therefore, I think this is the very heart of the question. If the language does not mean that the President can act without action by Congress, then what does it mean, and why include such language?

Mr. WILEY. To put it in a little different way, let me say the language simply means that if there is an overt attack by an aggressor upon one of our allies, the United States will simply take whatever action is determined by the President and Congress to be advisable under the circumstances, having in mind the obligations under this treaty, if it is ratified.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator says "the President and the Congress." He means, does he not, that the language would require affirmative action by Congress before the United States could enter into armed conflict or into a war?

Mr. WILEY. I think it means before we could get into a full-scale war; I am sure of that.

But I agree fully with the statement of the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, namely, that, regardless of wherever our troops may be, if they are attacked, they will not await action by the President in calling Congress into session; or if an attack were made on any of our territory, the President would be obligated, as Commander in Chief, immediately to take the steps which would be advisable under the circumstances.

In that connection, I think the declaration of the 16 nations relating to the armistice is very significant, and I now ask unanimous consent to have it printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the declaration was ordered to be printed in the Record as follows:

"DECLARATION OF THE 16 NATIONS RELATING TO THE ARMISTICE, JULY 27, 1953"

"We, the United Nations members whose military forces are participating in the Korean action, support the decision of the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command to conclude an armistice agreement. We hereby affirm our determination fully and faithfully to carry out the terms of that armistice. We expect that the other parties to the agreement will likewise scrupulously observe its terms.

"The task ahead is not an easy one. We will support the efforts of the United Nations to bring about an equitable settlement in Korea based on the principles which have long been established by the United Nations, and which call for a united, independent, and democratic Korea. We will support the United Nations in its efforts to assist the people of Korea in repairing the ravages of war.

"We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the United Nations, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Korea, and our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Korean problem. We affirm, in the interests of world peace, that if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.

1 U. N. Document S/3079, August 7, 1953, made public August 7, 1953.

"Finally, we are of the opinion that the armistice must not result in jeopardizing the restoration or the safeguarding of peace in any other part of Asia."

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I shall read a part of the declaration of the 16 nations. It relates to the United Nations members whose military forces are participating. I read the following:

"We affirm in the interest of world peace that if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that in all probability it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.

"Finally, we are of the opinion that the armistice must not result in jeopardizing the restoration or the safeguarding of peace in any part of Asia."

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield at this point for a brief question?

Mr. WILEY. Yes; I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. Of course, we protect our troops wherever they may be. However, apart from that, does the Senator from Wisconsin agree that before we would be called on to act under this treaty, affirmative action by the Congress, as well as by the President, would be required? Does the Senator agree to that?

Mr. WILEY. The Senator from Mississippi now speaks, does he, about the use of force?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes; the use of force.

Mr. WILEY. Very well. I think that if the circumstances were such as I have suggested, namely, if there had been an overt act of aggression, but our troops were not involved, or if there had not been an attack upon our own troops, but simply an attack upon the troops of our allies, it would necessarily follow, under article III, that we would act to meet the common danger; and our action at that time would be in accordance with constitutional processes. If it did not mean consultation, or something similar, with respect to which the Executive has the power, and if it meant utilization of the Armed Forces, I believe that Congress should and would have to decide.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator very much.

Mr. COOPER and Mr. HUMPHREY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield, and if so, to whom?

Mr. WILEY. I have only a little left of my statement, and then I shall be glad to open myself to general questions, if that is agreeable.

Article IV of the Treaty grants to the United States the right to dispose United States land, air, and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea, as determined by future mutual agreement. By contrast with the corresponding provision of the Japanese Mutual Security Treaty, the United States is under no obligation under the Korean Treaty to participate in the internal security of the Korean Republic, or, as I have already noted, to take any military measures as a result of a revolution within Korea. We can, in fact, pull out all our Armed Forces from that area any time we desire to do so; not that there is any such intention. The existing military situation in Korea makes it more than likely that the stationing of United States forces there will be in our national interest for some time. As a consequence, a supplementary agreement to implement the terms of article IV will be needed to regulate the presence of our Armed Forces on Korean soil. Our committee has been assured that we will be consulted by the Department of State concerning the terms of the anticipated agreement.

The treaty is to remain in force indefinitely, although either party may terminate

it 1 year from the date that it gives notice thereof to the other party.

Now, Mr. President, let me say just a few words about the United Nations. In our treaties with the Philippines, and with Australia and New Zealand, the parties agree to report to the Security Council any action taken to repel an armed attack. This language has been omitted from the Korean Treaty. Does this mean that the United States is disregarding its obligations under the U.N. Charter?

I want to dispel any doubts Senators may have on this point. The facts of the matter are these. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which restates the fundamental right of states to defend themselves against attack, specifically refers to members of the U.N. Since South Korea is not a member of the United Nations, it was deemed desirable, during the negotiations, to omit any reference to the Security Council in this treaty. This is in no way reflects any change in the warm support of the present administration for the United Nations.

Mr. President, this is not a one-sided treaty. It is not a gesture of altruistic deference to the Korean people; but it is an instrument which is eminently in the best interests of both the United States and Korea. The Korean Army has been tested and tempered in the crucible of battle. It has proven itself to be a valiant, fearless, and able ally. In testimony before our committee, Gen. Matthew Ridgway referred to instances in the history of our operations which demonstrated that Korean troops, under Korean leadership, fought with much the same effectiveness as our own. According to General Ridgway the Korean soldier, if provided with proper training; equipment, and leadership, will fight with very great gallantry and very great efficiency. This military reservoir, which is not negligible, complements the deterrent effect which is the primary purpose of the treaty—to put the world on notice that we intend to defend the peace in Korea.

Prompt ratification of the treaty will prevent doubts from arising in the minds of those who covet the soil of Korea as to just what our intentions are. The treaty itself will be a stabilizing factor in an area which has known little stability for so many years.

Mr. President, the Korean Mutual Defense Treaty is a testimonial to a gallant people, a long-suffering people who bear the scars of a terrible scourging endured through 3 years of misery, 3 years of indescribable devastation, and its accompanying sorrow of hunger, disease, and death. Victims of a cruel and premeditated aggression carefully prepared by the Communist enemies of civilization, they fought a desperate struggle, at first inadequately armed and inadequately supplied but richly endowed with a spiritual resource that enabled Korea to bear up proudly under any adversity which would have humbled others in more fortunate circumstances and blessed with greater advantages.

We have been proud to call the Koreans our ally; and we are proud to have fought and worked with them. And we should be proud to join with them in this instrument of mutual faith and confidence, which will serve the cause of peace and freedom, and strengthen our Pacific defenses.

I strongly urge the Members of the Senate to accept the recommendations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and to give their advice and consent to the ratification of this treaty, subject to the understanding which has been described.

In our discussion in the committee there followed, as a result of the contribution made by the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GEORGE), the understanding, which is made a part of the resolution of ratification. The understanding reads as follows:

"It is the understanding of the United States that neither party is obligated, under article III of the above treaty, to come to the

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aid of the other except in case of an external armed attack against such party; nor shall anything in the present treaty be construed as requiring the United States to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea."

I now yield to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. I thank the Senator from Wisconsin for yielding.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Senator from Wisconsin yielding the floor, or yielding for a question?

Mr. WILEY. I yield for a question.

Mr. COOPER. I have been very much interested in the searching questions asked by the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS). I should like to say, first, that I do not believe that the wording of the United Nations Charter has relevancy in this situation.

I ask the Senator from Wisconsin if it is not true that the United Nations, contrary to popular belief held by some, has no power whatsoever to commit this Nation to war.

Mr. WILEY. That is correct.

Mr. COOPER. There is only one situation in which the United Nations might have any power to commit our troops. If under the Charter nations have made available to the Security Council of the United Nations fixed and permanent military forces, consenting in advance for their use to maintain peace, there would be authority to commit the forces. As this has not been done by the United States or any other nation, I say and I am sure the Senator from Wisconsin will agree—that there is absolutely no power in the United Nations, to commit this Nation to war.

Mr. WILEY. I agree.

Mr. COOPER. The Senator from Mississippi has raised the most searching question that can be addressed to this treaty. As the Senator from Wisconsin has said, it is the age-old constitutional question, "Under what circumstances can the President of the United States take action which, as a practical matter, may have the effect of committing this Nation to war without a congressional declaration of war?"

The phrase, "constitutional processes" must imply the powers of both President and Congress. Under the Constitution the President of the United States can assert under certain circumstances—such as our troops being attacked or our physical area being invaded—his constitutional power as Commander in Chief to take action for the security of the country. Such action could, of course, lead to war.

The important language in this article, it seems to me, in addition to the phrase "constitutional processes," which is difficult of interpretation, is the language defining the area, and conditions in which the United States would be morally committed to take some action under its constitutional processes.

I believe the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin has said that he did not intend to make a statement which would interpret in any way the words "constitutional processes" to exclude the constitutional power of the President of the United States as Commander in Chief to act, under certain circumstances which he might think proper, to protect the security of the United States. Is that correct?

Mr. WILEY. Yes, of course. Again we get into a field which has been the subject of discussion for some 165 years, as I have said. However, I believe that with the understanding which has been appended as a result of the suggestion of the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE] there can be no question as to what the meaning of the treaty is. As I have stated, there is nothing in the treaty

which would delimit the constitutional power of either Congress or the President.

Mr. COOPER. We seem simply to speak in a circle and come back to where we started. What does "constitutional processes" mean?

Mr. WILEY. If it is not a Bricker amendment, if that is what the Senator has in mind.

Mr. COOPER. We come back to the question: What are the constitutional powers of the President and Congress with respect to taking steps toward war? I believe that the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin has said that, in the absence of such circumstances as demanded the protection of the security of the United States, we would certainly expect that Congress would determine whether the United States should go to war.

Mr. WILEY. I believe that expresses very forcefully the position I take as to what the language means. However, I cannot help but say that, as we discuss the treaty, which relates to a small country, a mere dot on the perimeter of the earth, so to speak, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that in the day in which we are living—and I say this very thoughtfully—I am sure if we could foresee any danger of a third world conflict which would make it advisable for the President not to convene Congress in Washington, where we could be immediately blown out of existence by a bomb, but himself to take the steps which were necessary under the circumstances, Congress should provide the machinery to make it possible to vote, if necessary, by television or in any other way, so that that which happened to Hiroshima could not happen to Washington.

The story has been told that the Commander in Chief was consulted on the wisdom of dropping the A-bomb on Tokyo, and he said, "If we do so, we will kill the Emperor, and kill all the high government officials in Japan. We cannot do that to Japan, because we need the Emperor, around whom the people can gather when we take over."

There will be nothing like that in a third world war. The object will be to paralyze at one time the entire Government—Congress, the Executive, and the courts. Consequently, there should be adequate machinery available whereby Congress could vote by long distance on the subject.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILEY. I yield further to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. I thank the Senator from Wisconsin. I know I share the hope of every Senator that there will be no resumption of the Korean war, but if there should be, there will be opportunity for Congress to take proper constitutional action.

But we cannot take away from the President his constitutional powers to protect our security, and I do not believe we ought to give to this treaty any interpretation which would permit any assumption that he would not act to protect our forces or to meet further aggression in Korea.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILEY. I yield to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I feel that the questions which the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] has asked and the probing he has done are of such significance that those of us who served on the Committee on Foreign Relations at the time of the discussion of the treaty should make our own positions quite clear.

First of all, I concur in the general analysis and interpretation of the treaty as given by the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER]. When we mention the phrase "constitutional processes" we must remember that in article III of the Korean treaty, which is now under

discussion, the phrase is preceded by the language: "would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

The Government of the United States would determine the action in the area which would be dangerous to its own peace and security.

The truth of the matter is that "constitutional processes" relate to two sections of our Constitution. The phrase relates to article I, dealing with the legislative authority of Congress to declare war. It also relates to article II, the Executive authority, in which article the President is made the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States. He takes an oath of office to defend the Republic and uphold the Constitution.

It seems to me that to argue the question of constitutional processes is beyond the point. The fact is that the courts have interpreted, and the President, by effective Executive action, has made it clear and unmistakable, that the Executive, the President of the United States, under the Constitution, within the constitutional processes, can take the action he deems to be necessary in order to protect the peace and safety and security of the Nation.

The only reason we are entering the treaty at all is because we feel it is in the interest of the security of the United States to do so.

I asked the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Stevens, and General Ridgway whether it was their feeling that the defense of Korea was important to our national security. The answer is to be found in the hearings. General Ridgway answered unmistakably, as did the Secretary of the Army, that the defense of South Korea against armed attack was absolutely essential to the safety and jurisdictional integrity of the United States.

I want my friend, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) to know that I do not interpret the term "constitutional processes" to mean necessarily that there would be an open declaration of war by Congress.

I would hope that the preceding section of article II, which refers to consultation by the parties in case of an impending attack, would give the President time to come before Congress. However, it is entirely possible, as we sit here today, now at this very minute, that an attack could be launched against American installations in Okinawa or in the Philippines or in Korea. Surely under such circumstances we would expect the President to take effective action, as the Commander in Chief, to protect our forces and our interests. I want that point to be absolutely clear in light of the important questions which the Senator from Mississippi has asked.

It is important to bear in mind that we have a flexible defense structure, under which, as the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense stated, in answer to questions by Senators, it is the policy of the United States not necessarily to restrict action, in case of aggression in Korea or in other areas, to the immediate geographical area where the combat is occurring, but to pick and choose as we please.

I asked questions along that line of the Secretary of Defense and of General Ridgway, when they appeared before the committee. I asked General Ridgway the question: "Would we be limited under the treaty to confine our military action to South Korea?" His answer was that we would not be so limited, but that we would be able to pick and choose. He did not say where we would pick and choose, but he said that we would use our forces where we saw fit to use them.

I think we all ought to understand that fact that when we vote on the treaty, as we should understand what we are voting for I shall vote for the ratification of the treaty

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Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield?

Mr. WILEY. I was about to yield to the Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS]. I am perfectly willing to sit down and permit the Senator from New Jersey to speak on the treaty.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILEY. I yield.

Mr. WATKINS. I did want to ask a question of the Senator from Wisconsin, but inasmuch as the Senator from Minnesota has made his statement, I believe it is only fair to give the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] an opportunity to make a statement.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] referred to the Senator from Mississippi, and I should like to have the opportunity of replying on the time of the Senator from Wisconsin, if he does not object.

Of course, if our troops were attacked in Korea or in Okinawa, or anywhere else, the President of the United States could immediately act to defend them. That, however, is entirely apart from the argument today. The question before the Senate today goes far beyond the sphere of activity of the United States Government in protecting American troops. It goes to the question of saying to a foreign nation: "If you are attacked, under any circumstances, we will come right into the fray."

That is the question before us. I ask now: By constitutional processes is it meant that Congress will be ignored? The Senator from Wisconsin has been very honest and has stated how Congress would enter the picture. Others may be just as honest and yet disagree. However, let us keep our eye on the ball. The question is whether, in certain circumstances, we will commit ourselves unconditionally to go into a foreign country.

It is a new policy. The question is, What does "constitutional process" mean? If it does not mean that Congress is involved, why have that clause in the treaty? If it does not mean that Congress is to declare war, then I believe it is included argumentatively, and I say let us strike it out so that it may be clearly defined and a two-thirds majority of the Senate may give an interpretation. I think we should include the action of the Congress. We are treading on dangerous ground when we commit ourselves to take action thousands of miles from home without giving Congress an opportunity to participate in the decision.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield for a moment?

Mr. WILEY. I will yield shortly. I do not think there is a great amount of difference between the two Senators who have spoken on the other side of the aisle. The treaty contemplates that an overt act of aggression being committed on South Korea—that is the single fact we will take into consideration—and that event there is no question in my mind that the phrase "constitutional processes" means action by the Congress. I have said so 3 or 4 times in different ways, but I again refer to the understanding which is made a part of the treaty:

"It is the understanding of the United States that neither party is obligated, under article III of the above treaty, to come to the aid of the other except in case of an external armed attack against such party; nor shall anything in the present treaty be construed as requiring the United States to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea."

That expresses what we think the treaty means in relation to an overt attack by any nation upon South Korea.

Let us assume, as has been suggested, an attack upon Okinawa or upon our Armed Forces in Hawaii, and it comes to the knowledge of the President. He cannot permit our forces to be sitting ducks. His duty is to be alert and to be ready for any emergency, and the forces under him must be ready.

I do not think I can say anything more than I have said, that the treaty does not delimit the power of the Executive or the power of the Congress. Everything remains as is provided for in the Constitution. We are saying to an ally, "You remain at home. If an aggressor attacks you, then, pursuant to congressional authority or constitutional process, we will decide what we are going to do."

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield at that point?

Mr. WILEY. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator's comments about the interpretative clause I think should be clearly understood to involve two things: First, to define the scope of the treaty, as the Senator has pointed out; second, if the Government of South Korea should start a unilateral action and try to defend Korea by military means, which was the subject of interrogation of witnesses, under this treaty, because of such unilateral action within the peninsula of Korea, started let us assume, by our partner to the treaty, we would be under no obligation to furnish military defense. This does not rule out the possibility that, as a result, it may be necessary for us to take action within the area to defend our own installations, our own interests, but it makes it clear that this treaty can be interpreted in no way as binding the United States to aid in some expedition on the part of Dr. Rhee.

I should like to make it clear, Mr. President, because we are at a point in foreign affairs where we must be mature and, I should say, somewhat bold and frank, that this treaty does not make mandatory a declaration of war on the part of the Congress of the United States. It does, however, require that the President of the United States, following constitutional processes in article I and article II, defend the security, the peace, and the interests of the United States.

Mr. President, I should like to quote what General Ridgway had to say. I said to General Ridgway in questioning him:

"Senator HUMPHREY. Do we consider the southern half of Korea as essentially necessary, or essential to our defense in the Pacific—to the defense of our own security and territorial responsibilities that we have in the Pacific?"

"General RIDGWAY. Positively; yes, sir."

That is a clear-cut answer.

So, finally, it seems to me that the chairman of the committee has given, the only answer that can be given; namely, it bears upon the situation, and the President can surely come to the Congress if it is humanly possible, particularly if the hostilities are of great dimension; but no Congress would want to tie the President's hands in doing what is necessary for the fundamental interests and security of the Nation.

Mr. WILEY. We will determine the action for consultation, well and good. But if we should find ourselves in a situation similar to that at Pearl Harbor, where our country took action before it declared war, and the President asked later for a declaration of war under this treaty or any other treaty, we would not expect the President of the United States to stand idly by and see the security of our own country threatened and not take positive action.

I desire to make clear that the military authorities have said they believe the defense of South Korea is essential to our own security.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I said I would yield to the Senator from Utah.

Mr. WATKINS. Suppose a situation exists in

which the war which has been raging in Korea is settled, and a peace treaty is entered into. This treaty, I understand, extends beyond such a period.

Mr. WILEY. That is correct.

Mr. WATKINS. It goes on indefinitely.

Mr. WILEY. That is correct.

Mr. WATKINS. Suppose Korea were again threatened. Am I to understand that Congress would be required to act before the President could send forces to defend against another attack?

I notice the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] is shaking his head. I totally disagree with his interpretation of the powers of the President.

Mr. WILEY. If I understand the Senator's statement as referring to a threatened attack. Does he mean there has actually been an overt attack?

Mr. WATKINS. Suppose another nation should attack Korea and the situation which we now have did not exist—

Mr. WILEY. I read, and I thought the Senator from Minnesota also referred to this language:

"Nor shall anything in the present treaty be construed as requiring the United States to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea."

I think that if an armed attack occurred, it would be up to the President of the United States to submit the matter to Congress.

Mr. WATKINS. That is my understanding.

Mr. WILEY. I have said that 50 times.

Mr. WATKINS. I wanted to be certain. I desired to ascertain what would happen if we were enabled to get out of the present condition, which has never been legally declared to be war, but actually is war. When that situation has passed and there is peace again in the world, then, in the event of another attack upon Korea, or upon South Korea—let me put it that way—under this treaty, what would be the constitutional processes the United States would go through to become a party to that conflict or to decide not to become a party to the conflict?

Mr. WILEY. It would be necessary to follow the constitutional processes. The President would undoubtedly report the situation to Congress; and in such a case, if the attack was simply an isolated attack upon South Korea by an aggressor, I think the language of the treaty is very plain.

Mr. WATKINS. That Congress would have to make the decision whether the United States would go to war or would not go to war?

Mr. WILEY. The Senator is correct.

Mr. WATKINS. That is what I wanted to have made clear.

Mr. BUTLER of Maryland. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILEY. I yield.

Mr. BUTLER of Maryland. I am sorry I have not had an opportunity to follow the debate as closely as I should have. My question may already have been answered.

I wish to ask the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin if it is the desire of the contracting parties to leave the matter to their own individual constitutional processes within their own countries, why does the treaty provide that we shall perform acts to meet dangers, instead of following the formula as laid down by the Atlantic Pact, which makes it optional as to whether we shall?

Mr. WILEY. I do not have any question in my mind that it is made optional, entirely depending on the act of Congress. Article II provides:

"ARTICLE II

"The parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the parties is threatened by external

armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this treaty and to further its purposes."

Then article III sets forth:

"ARTICLE III

"Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

In order to make it absolutely clear—and I have read this three times previously—the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE] submitted an understanding to be appended to the treaty, and all members of the Committee on Foreign Relations agreed that it should be appended. It reads as follows:

"It is the understanding of the United States that neither party is obligated under article III of the above treaty, to come to the aid of the other except in case of an external armed attack against such party; nor shall anything in the present treaty be construed as requiring the United States to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea."

As we said by the distinguished Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], the committee debated very clearly the issue: Suppose Syngman Rhee started the battle. Would there be any obligation on the part of the United States? The answer was, "No, there would be no obligation whatsoever."

Does that answer the question of the Senator from Maryland?

Mr. BUTLER of Maryland. I think the Senator has answered my question.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILEY. I yield.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I wish to clear up a point in my own mind. I am in accord with what the United States has done in the case of South Korea. But I see Korea divided into South Korea and North Korea. Suppose Syngman Rhee, possibly feeling as did Abraham Lincoln about our own country, that it should not be divided into South United States and North United States, decided to go to war about the division of Korea? What would be the obligation of the United States under the treaty?

Mr. WILEY. There would be no obligation. Mr. CHAVEZ. The Senator will remember that once upon a time Lincoln took the United States to war on the question of a divided country, and many men from Wisconsin and every other State of the Union north of the Mason and Dixon's line fought in battle against those who lived south of the Mason and Dixon's line, who felt the other way about the question. If Lincoln was right, would Syngman Rhee, likewise, be right, if he declared a war to unite Korea?

I think I am asking a fair question. Should there be a South Korea and a North Korea?

Mr. WILEY. I shall be very happy to try to answer the Senator's question. First, if Syngman Rhee should precipitate a war, there would be no obligation upon the United States under this treaty.

Mr. CHAVEZ. That is the point.

Mr. WILEY. There would be no obligation whatsoever upon our Government. Second, when Lincoln said there should be one nation, indivisible, he recognized that if the South should win, it would have been

the beginning of "dividitis," and the United States would have been merely another country of the Balkan type.

Mr. CHAVEZ. What about Korea?

Mr. WILEY. So Abraham Lincoln was right.

Third, so far as Syngman Rhee is concerned, so far as the United Nations is concerned, and so far as the United States is concerned, we have said that we will take steps, and we are trying to take steps, to bring about a unification of Korea, but we will not go to war for that purpose. I think that policy is definite and certain. I think all of us sympathize with Syngman Rhee and with Korea. All of us hope that if and when the world conflagration simmers down, Korea can again be united and be one people. But that is some distance in the future.

The philosophy of this treaty was stated better than I myself could state it by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Dulles, who is now Secretary of State. The purpose is to serve notice upon those who caused the devastation in Korea that if they attempt to take South Korea, then we will take such steps, pursuant to our congressional processes, as we deem advisable.

Furthermore, as I have said, the United Nations has said substantially the same thing. Sixteen of the United Nations have declared that to be their policy.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I wish to thank the Senator from Wisconsin for his indulgence. The only point I wished to make, and I think the Senator from Wisconsin has answered my question correctly, is that by our preachments we try to sell our ideas of government to other countries. But once in a while I become very much confused. I see South Korea, and I see North Korea. Yet we have the example of Lincoln, who was a peaceful man, permitting Americans to be killed in order to hold the United States together. I do not know for certain, but it seems to me that once in a while we are willing to have people of the same type and kind divided.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILEY. I yield.

Mr. WATKINS. I wish to ask the Senator from Wisconsin why a treaty is needed when we already have the United Nations operating. The United Nations is supposed to protect the interests of all the small nations of the world, and that covenant has still a long time to run.

Will the Senator explain why this treaty is needed, even though the United Nations has been and is supposed to be continuing to fight to defend the integrity of South Korea?

Mr. WILEY. I believe I answered the inquiry of the Senator in my opening remarks. I showed quite clearly that the reasons for the treaty was given by Secretary Dulles, and by the other witnesses who testified at the hearings. If the Senator will read the hearings, I think he will find the answer to his question.

My own conclusion is that, among other things, we have been precipitated into leadership in the world, and that we ought to enter into the treaty. I felt that in view of the treaties into which this country had entered with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, it was necessary to serve notice upon the Kremlin that we would do what is set forth in the pending treaty. After all, the Kremlin is pulling the strings. The Kremlin pulled the strings when we were involved in hostilities with North Korea. After we defeated the North Koreans, the Kremlin induced General Mao and the Chinese Communists to enter the conflict. We fought the Chinese Communists and succeeded in halting them. About 2 million lives were lost in the conflict. We are stating to the Kremlin now, "If you start again, what follows may not necessarily have to be a limited war"—and it may not be a limited war.

In the opinion of that branch of Government which spearheads foreign policy, it was thought that to enter into the pending treaty would be in the interest of peace and security.

In the course of my remarks I called attention to the fact that if South Korea were defeated by the Communists, that country would become a spearhead right into the very heart of Japan. If the Kremlin could gain control of Japan, with its great industrial capacity, it would mean that all of Asia would be lost to the Communists, including the southeast. That area would include Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and the rest of that vital area of the world.

I think it is the judgment of the best military brains—and I do not claim to be one of them—that it is necessary to enter into this treaty with Korea in the interest of America. I think that underlying that foreign policy is the basic principle of self-preservation, the preservation of the Nation itself. When steps are taken such as will be taken in consenting to the treaty, I think it will be the judgment of those who claim to know, who claim to have facts of which we have only a part, that the treaty is vital to the security of this country.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. WILEY. I yield.

Mr. WATKINS. Is not the making of this treaty another confession that the United Nations does not have adequate power to do what it was created to do, and that the United Nations has substantially failed to protect all the smaller countries, and that that failure has required the United States to enter into a series of treaties in the Pacific, as well as to enter into the North Atlantic Pact?

Mr. WILEY. I do not think that the United Nations had, from the nations which constituted that organization, the authority to undertake the job. The United Nations is but an adventure in seeking to create some kind of unity at a crossroads of the world, where the black, white, red, and yellow men can meet and exchange ideas. However, there is no real power in the United Nations as yet. Perhaps when nations begin thinking alike, and dreaming a little more about fundamental spiritual factors, the United Nations may become a truly international force.

I might add the treaty is made pursuant to article 51 of the United Nations Charter, relating to the right of states to defend themselves. In the case of NATO in Europe, an organization of nations was built up for that very purpose. As a matter of fact, the United Nations Charter contemplates just such an organization.

Mr. COOPER. Will the Senator from Wisconsin yield for a question?

Mr. WILEY. I yield to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. While we have an interest in the defense of smaller states against aggression, is it not true that one of the reasons behind the making of the treaty is as stated in article 3, a concern for the peace and safety of this country?

Mr. WILEY. Korea is not a member of the United Nations.

Mr. COOPER. Is it not true that we consider it important to the security of our own country?

Mr. WILEY. The Senator is correct.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I remember that a year or two ago there were those who stated that the failure of the Government to announce that Korea was of interest to the United States and important to the peace and security of the United States was an invitation to invasion by the Communists and, in fact, helped precipitate the Korean war. Today we are considering a treaty which takes the opposite course, and which gives effective

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notice to the Communist aggressors that Korea is important to our peace and security. Unfortunately, some of those who complained a short while ago that the United States had not given notice of its intentions now find fault with this treaty which makes it clear.

Mr. WILEY. I thank the Senator. The Senator is stating what I believe is one true reason for the negotiation of the treaty.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield?

Mr. WILEY. I yield to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. As the Senator from Mississippi has indicated to the Senator from Wisconsin, I have a few more questions to ask. Some might be involved so far as the time taken to propound them is concerned, and if the Senator will be on the floor of the Senate at some later date in the debate, I should be glad to defer to him now for his lunch hour, and we can take these questions up later.

Mr. WILEY. If the Senator has something to ask, he had better ask it now.

Mr. STENNIS. Very well. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILEY. I am happy to yield.

Mr. STENNIS. I wish to preface my questions by saying that since early childhood I have had a very high respect for the Korean people. I know a little about some of the Christian missionaries who have gone among those people. I have had a most profound respect for the present Ambassador from Korea, and have found him to be a very intelligent and patriotic gentleman. Therefore my remarks will not reflect anything but praise and admiration for the Korean people.

As I understand, it is frequently said in a segment of the press that a promise was made to Syngman Rhee that the pending pact or treaty, or one similar, would be entered into, and that that promise was made to him before he would ever agree to the cease-fire. I was very much disturbed when Syngman Rhee released certain prisoners, and, as I understand, that delayed the cease-fire several weeks, during which time lives were lost.

As I have understood, through segments of the press and otherwise, before the cease-fire was finally obtained, a promise was made that the pending treaty would be consummated. Does the Senator know anything about that, and will he tell the Senate the facts on that point?

Mr. WILEY. The only information I have on the subject is that when Secretary Dulles went to Korea he entered into this agreement, but he said he would have to submit it to the Senate, and that it would then be up to the Senate. He did comply with that promise, and submitted the treaty to the Senate, and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings.

As to the other matters referred to in the Senator's question, about what he has read in the press, I have consulted with Dr. Wilcox, of our committee, and we have no distinct recollection about those facts.

There appears in the hearings a letter from President Eisenhower to President Syngman Rhee, in response to a letter from President Rhee. President Eisenhower's letter is dated May 30, 1953, and is found on page 53 of the hearings. In that letter President Eisenhower said:

"You speak of a mutual-defense pact. I am prepared promptly, after the conclusion and acceptance of an armistice, to negotiate with you a mutual-defense treaty along the lines of the treaties heretofore made between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, and the United States and Australia and New Zealand. You may recall that both of these treaties speak of 'the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area.'

A security pact between the United States and the Republic of Korea would be a further step in that direction. It would cover the territory now or hereafter brought peacefully under the administration of the ROK. Of course, you realize that under our constitutional system any such treaty would be made only with the advice and consent of the Senate. However, the action which the United States has heretofore taken, and the great investment of blood and treasure which has already been made for the independence of Korea, are certainly clear indications of American temper and intentions not to tolerate a repetition of unprovoked aggression."

That confirms everything we have said before.

Mr. STENNIS. What the Senator from Wisconsin has said confirms, then, the article in the New York Times, dated January 22, in which the flat statement is made that—"The mutual defense treaty with Korea was signed by the two Governments on October 1, 1953, and transmitted to the Senate for approval 11 days ago.

"The treaty was one of the conditions demanded by President Syngman Rhee, of South Korea, for his agreement to the Korean armistice. That demand, said the committee report, reflected the legitimate concern on the part of South Korea for its security in the postarmistice period."

Mr. WILEY. I cannot agree that that can be read into the President's letter. I think there were negotiations; and I can imagine that Syngman Rhee, under the conditions confronting him, should have had assurances. The President said in his letter:

"However, the action which the United States has heretofore taken, and the great investment of blood and treasure which has already been made for the independence of Korea, are certainly clear indications of American temper and intentions not to tolerate a repetition of unprovoked aggression."

Now let us back up the President and ratify the treaty.

Mr. STENNIS. But these representations were made, at least partly, in order to obtain a "cease fire." My point is that if the "cease fire" was obtained in that way, in a measure the Senate was largely committed to ratify this treaty.

My question is, Should not there have been some consultation? Of course, there might have been. I shall ask the question whether there was any consultation before this treaty was agreed upon, in substance. Was there any prior consultation with the Senator from Wisconsin or with any other member of his committee, so far as he knows?

Mr. WILEY. Yes; and in that connection I read from page 2 of the committee report:

"3. COMMITTEE ACTION

"Assistant Secretary Robertson, on his return from the preliminary negotiations with President Rhee, appeared before the committee on July 16, 1953, and gave a full report on the course of the negotiations, on the problems encountered, and on proposed future negotiations. This was supplemented by several consultations between the Secretary of State and the members of the Far Eastern Subcommittee during the negotiations."

The Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH] was the chairman of that subcommittee.

I read further from our report, on page 2:

"In the light of these consultations, and the fact that the treaty was made public almost 2 months before it was signed and 5 months before it was transmitted to the Senate, the committee felt that adequate opportunity for a full consideration of all the issues involved had been offered. Consequently, the committee proceeded to consider the treaty soon after its reference to the Senate.

"On January 13, 1954, public hearings began with testimony by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who discussed in detail the foreign-policy aspects of the treaty. The hearings concluded the following day with testimony by Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens and the Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. Matthew V. Ridgway, who addressed themselves to the military aspects of the treaty. The committee considered the treaty in executive session on January 19, 1954, and voted without objection to report the treaty to the Senate with an understanding, which is discussed below.

"The committee wishes to commend the executive branch for its attempts to keep the committee informed during the course of the negotiations. Such consultations, properly timed as they were, can do much to build a spirit of cooperation between the two branches of the Government."

Mr. STENNIS. I have no particular complaint about that. My point is this: In order to obtain the cease-fire, in order that American boys might be spared the hardships of further military action, we had to make a promise for a mutual security pact of some kind, substantially like this one. Is that a fair statement of the situation?

Mr. WILEY. I do not think it is fair, because the President stated in his letter that he would enter into the treaty; and in the letter he also said:

"Of course, you realize that under our constitutional system any such treaty would be made only with the advice and consent of the Senate."

Mr. STENNIS. Yes; I am sure that point was made clear.

My question is this: Was not the agreement originally made—I refer to the agreement to negotiate this treaty through constitutional processes—under duress or semi-duress, in order to obtain a cease-fire, after we had been on the verge of a cease-fire a few weeks previously, but suddenly that possibility seemed to be blown up, so to speak, by the release of the prisoners?

Mr. WILEY. I have no information by which I can affirm or disaffirm that statement. But by consulting with the State Department, I imagine the Senator from Mississippi can obtain a very definite answer on that subject. I will say that no such statement was made before the committee.

Mr. STENNIS. Of course, in large part the Senator from Wisconsin is my consultant with the State Department, because I know he keeps up with these matters, and I know he will give us an honest report.

Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield for another question?

Mr. WILEY. Certainly.

Mr. STENNIS. The committee report mentions a regional security pact in the Pacific area. It mentions it as a possibility and as something which the committee thinks is perhaps a desirable step. Does the committee have in mind, for the regional pact, a specific pact to which the United States would be a party?

Mr. WILEY. I remember distinctly asking the question whether there was under contemplation a NATO for the Pacific; and I remember distinctly, also, that the Secretary of State spoke on that subject. We include the following in our report:

"The committee, therefore, raised the question of a Pacific pact or Pacific NATO with the Secretary of State. Although he felt that such a development would have certain advantages, the Secretary pointed out that the Pacific countries have cultural and political differences in addition to physical separation, which distinguished that area from Europe.

"I think it would be very fortunate if a Pacific security system could be developed and it certainly is a possibility which we have very much in mind, but it does not

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seem as though that could be achieved at any early predictable date."

"The committee, while concurring in the Secretary's evaluation of the prospects for a Pacific pact, wishes nonetheless to express its belief that such a pact is a desirable ultimate objective of United States policy in the Pacific and hopes that the Department of State will continue to encourage such a development. The security of the Pacific area would be measurably enhanced if the nations of that region would join and work together for their regional and collective self-defense."

Of course, he went into detail, and, of course, what he said was correct. Those nations are somewhat in the same position as the one France and Germany have been in. Their approach to any degree of unity can be brought about, I believe, only by means of the very thing which we hope will bring about unity in Europe, namely, the tremendous pressure of the Communists, which would require those nations to unite in order to save their own skins.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the Senator from Wisconsin will yield further, let me say that brings us to another question: Instead of calling on the United States of America alone to enter into a pact with Korea to guarantee Korea against attack, why not make a real effort to obtain adherence to such a pact by some of the other Pacific nations that are close by Korea and certainly are as much bound up with Korea's future as are countries many thousand miles away? Why not make an earnest effort to have such nations join in a pact of that sort—if not in a Pacific pact, then at least in a group in which we would have some helpful standbys.

Mr. WILEY. I have no question that that group has been canvassed. The Secretary of State has said that such a pact does not seem possible in the predictable future. However, I do not think that prevents a future administration or the present administration from trying to bring about an agreement on the part of states which could constitute a real barrier to Communist advance in Asia.

But, again, dealing with that problem is like dealing with the problem now existing between France and Germany, and the Kremlin.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Wisconsin for his answers. I shall not detain him further.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I thank all the Senators who have asked questions. I am sure their questions have been directly to the point, and I am sure they have brought into the picture considerable light which I failed to bring in during the course of my discussion.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, I have just had a brief discussion with the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS]. I told him there were a few matters which I wished to bring to his attention in reply to his questions. He would like an opportunity to go to lunch. I have a prepared speech on the Korean Treaty. I shall deliver that first and, if he will return to the Chamber after lunch, I shall be glad to discuss further with him the question which he has raised. In the meantime I shall deliver my prepared speech, which takes up some of the points. Later I shall be glad to discuss further the questions raised by the Senator from Mississippi. I shall try to make proper reply to them.

Mr. President, I rise to second and support the convincing argument made by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the able Senator from Wisconsin, in favor of the Korean Mutual Defense Treaty.

The future security of the Republic of Korea is a matter of definite concern, and immediately related to the security of the United States. The Secretary of State, when he appeared before our committee testified that our security interests extended to the Pacific island chain of Japan, the Ryukyus,

Okinawa, Formosa, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, a chain anchored by two land bases: Korea and Indochina. He pointed out that we have a security tie with all of these areas.

I may say parenthetically that I have just been to that area, as chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations. At a later date I shall make a report to the Senate on that trip.

The Republic of Korea has demonstrated by its valiant and stouthearted stand against the Communists that it is a firm and dependable link. The magnificent fight put up by the South Korean troops against the northern invaders will not be forgotten by the free world. South Korea's anticommunism is tested and unquestionable. This brave country is a valuable ally for the United States and for the free nations.

So far I have spoken of what the United States will gain from this alliance. Let me say now, that the Republic of Korea will gain a much needed and well-deserved sense of security from the treaty. Concerned and appalled as we have been casualties among American forces in Korea, our losses do not compare with the suffering during the past 3 years of the people of South Korea. Their land has been ravished, their homes destroyed, their sons and husbands killed, their families scattered. South Korea has paid a heavy price for its resistance to Communist aggression. And although the fighting has ceased, under an uneasy armistice, the Republic of Korea has no assurance that it will not be asked to pay the same price again next month or next year.

This brings me to the main point that I wish to stress about this treaty, its deterrent effect upon potential aggression in Korea. I believe that few Senators will quarrel with me if I say that had the Communists known in advance in 1950 that the United States and the United Nations would take firm action to oppose their attacks, they would never have crossed the 38th parallel. A recurrence of this sort of aggression is exactly what this treaty is designed to prevent by giving the Communists a clear warning about United States reaction to such a venture.

I may say that this is one of a number of treaties which we have made with countries in that area to emphasize this warning. We have a treaty of mutual defense with Japan. We have such a treaty with the Philippines, with Australia, and with New Zealand, and now we have before us a treaty with Korea. It is part of a pattern which we are developing in order to give warning to the Kremlin that something will happen if there are any further aggressions in this area. The Communists will be in no doubt about our retaliatory action. The treaty says:

"Each party recognizes that an armed attack * * * either of the parties * * * would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

We have been discussing that provision for some time.

Article III was prepared with the greatest care. After considering a similar provision in the security alliances which we developed in West Europe under the NATO plan, we decided that, because under the NATO plan the treaty said an attack on one would be considered an attack on all, a difficulty was created, which occasioned a great debate when that instrument was before the Senate for consideration.

The question was whether, if there should be an attack, the President could act without constitutional processes, so we decided upon a different provision. I was in consultation with Secretary Dulles when the treaties with Australia and other countries were being negotiated. It was decided not to adopt the NATO pattern, namely, that an

attack on one would be considered an attack on all, but the pattern of the Monroe Doctrine. So if we are now asked the question as to what would happen if one of those treaties were violated by an attack, we can well ask anyone who raises the question, "What would we do if there were an attack in some area of South America protected by the Monroe Doctrine? What are the constitutional processes which apply to such a situation?"

The same principle applies in connection with the treaty now before us. We have simply said, by this treaty and similar treaties with other countries, that we are giving a warning that we look upon the Pacific area as an area of danger to us—not to anyone else—comparable to the danger we saw when the Monroe Doctrine was first enunciated. Let me make that point clear.

Besides our unilateral guaranty to act to meet the common danger, Secretary Dulles pointed out that the Republic of Korea has also the guaranty of 16 United Nations members having troops in Korea that a violation of the armistice agreement will be met with countermeasures not necessarily confined to Korea.

It has been brought out very properly today that, of course, the present situation, with danger of a possible violation of the truce, is an immediate problem, and that we have very little doubt as to what we would do under those conditions. The United Nations is also committed as to what it would do.

The Korean Treaty looks beyond that, years ahead, and assumes that the Korean situation is to be cleared up. In this treaty we have the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, that we would view with alarm a threat to our peace and security if there were any attack in the far eastern area.

Secretary Dulles said:

"What we mean by this is, we would no longer feel limited by the boundaries of North Korea and the Yalu River, no longer would there be a privileged sanctuary, as General MacArthur called it, north of which attacks against our forces could be mounted. We would feel free to extend hostilities to areas beyond Korea, if those areas were in fact being used as a base for attack against our forces in Korea."

In other words, we are serving a warning that something definite will happen in case there is a breach of the present truce.

A precise definition of our future action, such as that given by the Secretary of State, should be the greatest possible deterrent to anyone plotting further aggression in that area.

Between these two guaranties Korea can rest secure in the knowledge that it will not face renewed aggression alone.

One guaranty is the United Nations guaranty, with respect to which I have just quoted the Secretary. The other is the mutual-defense arrangement which we are setting up in the treaty with Korea. Korea can rest secure in the knowledge that it will not face renewed aggression alone.

When I was in Korea 2 months ago I observed that the conclusion of an armistice there and the 16-nation declaration had given South Korea a measure of relief and stability. The pledge contained in the mutual-defense treaty will increase this measure and, in my opinion, give Korea a sufficient sense of security to enable it to go forward with the enormous task of reconstruction without the enervating fear of an attack from the north.

This has not been possible yet.

Korea needs a breathing spell desperately to put its homeland in order again.

It is my belief that the Communists will probably not renew their aggression in Korea in the near future. The signs show that they are digging in for a prolonged armistice—an uneasy truce—and not preparing for a renewal of the fighting. In spite of these signs,

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of course, we must remain on our guard in Korea. I may say that we are remaining on our guard in Korea.

I should like to devote a few minutes of my time now to stress the things that the treaty does not do.

The treaty does not compel the United States to come to the aid of President Rhee should he attempt to reunite Korea by force.

My distinguished colleague, the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. WILEY), read the interpretation which was added to the treaty in the Committee on Foreign Relations, on the motion of the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GEORGE), in order to protect us by reassurance against any suggestion that we might be called upon to act in case South Korea attempted to move unilaterally to bring about unification of Korea by force.

Much as we can sympathize with President Rhee's desire to see his country united, we cannot allow ourselves to become a party to an unlawful act, such as unification by military might. As a nation, we stand on record as striving wholeheartedly for the peaceful unification of Korea, and we will continue to bend our every effort toward that goal, remote as it may seem to some people at the moment. A violent unification, however, is against the principles and purposes of the United Nations of which we are a member, and against the truce terms. In the event that President Rhee should try such an action, the treaty will not come into play. Article III, which I have already quoted, limits action to an armed attack on either of the parties "in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other." I have emphasized the word "lawfully" in order to focus the attention of the Senate to this limitation.

In other words, if Korea is united by lawful means—by agreement or treaty or by other means—then the whole of Korea becomes subject to the treaty, and we would be prepared to help defend the whole of Korea. However, we would take no part in uniting it by forceful means.

During the hearings held by our committee, I asked the Secretary of State specifically whether the wording of article III would deter President Rhee from unilateral action to reunite Korea. He answered me, stating that it makes clear to President Rhee that "if he does that, he would then be alone." So we are repeating again and again exactly the limitations of the treaty.

I might add at this point, that when I was in Korea I had a long talk with President Rhee. I feel that it has been made entirely clear that the United States must oppose any attempt on his part to go it alone. For myself, I believe that he will not violate the truce.

I may say parenthetically that I am one of those who are very sympathetic with President Rhee's position, and very sympathetic with his situation, and on the floor of the Senate I have stated that he has dedicated himself to see his country reunited.

One can understand how he felt, in a state of turmoil, when he thought we were going to settle on the 38th parallel or some other place, and leave Korea divided. We are sympathetic, Mr. President, but we are trying to persuade him not to act with force, and we are trying to persuade him that his best chance of uniting Korea is to work with his friends and with his allies, especially the United States, to bring about the unification of Korea by peaceful means.

The second thing this treaty does not do is to run counter to our obligations under the U.N. Charter. The treaty was negotiated under article 51 of the Charter, which preserves for each nation the right of individual and collective self-defense against an armed attack. The only obligation imposed by that article in connection with an armed

attack upon members, is that the measures taken to repel such an attack shall be reported to the Security Council. If we do take measures, we must report them to the Security Council, but we definitely do not have to ask the Security Council whether we can take the measures.

We are, therefore, not dependent upon a green light from the United Nations before we can come to the Republic of Korea's assistance in case she is attacked again. This means that a Soviet veto in the Security Council cannot stall prompt action on our part. We are free to do what we think is right and necessary under the circumstances. In the event of another attack, I am sure that our Government would work with the U.N. and report to the Security Council on any action taken.

Finally, the treaty does not go beyond the general type of commitment which we have made in our other Pacific-area security treaties. To those treaties I have already referred.

In providing, as it does, that an armed attack on either party would be regarded by the other as dangerous to its own peace and safety and would be met, by each party, in accordance with its constitutional processes, the treaty remains squarely within the four corners of the Constitution, and is on all fours with the Monroe Doctrine, which has been in effect for a long time and which deals with any possible encroachment by European nations on South America.

So I suggest to my friends who are troubled that they ask themselves: What would be the constitutional process in case there was a threatened attack on South America by a European or other country? That is exactly the same question we have before us.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? I should like to ask him to outline what those processes are.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KUCHEL in the chair). Does the Senator from New Jersey yield to the Senator from Utah?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I would prefer to wait until I have concluded my remarks. Then I shall be very happy to yield.

Secretary of State Dulles, who devised this formula when he negotiated the Japanese, Philippine, and Australia-New Zealand treaties, has characterized it as the Monroe Doctrine approach. It uses the exact words of President Monroe in his historical warning to European nations that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. The Monroe Doctrine has stood unchallenged on constitutional grounds throughout our history.

Before I close, I would like to refer briefly to the debate in the Senate last Friday during which a number of my distinguished colleagues on the other side of the aisle took issue with the administration's military strategy. Let me say to them that this question was also raised during the Foreign Relations Committee's consideration of the Korean Mutual Defense Treaty. The committee, in deciding to report the treaty, carefully explored with administration witnesses the defensive capacity of the United States in order to determine whether we have the military strength to shoulder this additional commitment. We, too, had read of the announced withdrawal of two American Army divisions from Korea, of military reductions, and of contract cancellations. I want to pass on to the Senate the assurances we received on that score. General Ridgway told us that the withdrawal of the two divisions would not weaken our position over there. "In fact," he said, "I think it would add to our flexibility."

I would also like to quote Secretary Dulles on this point:

"If we had to try to maintain ground forces, let us say, in Asia, to meet an attack by ground forces at any place where the

enemy chooses to attack, then I believe that we are virtually subservient to the enemy.

"What we must do is to make clear that if there is such an attack, which involves our vital interests, our reaction will be, as I said last night, at places and by means of our own choosing. We will not necessarily allow the enemy to pick the rules of battle and the place of battle and the conditions of battle which best suit his purposes.

"By making that clear, as has been done in relation to Korea, in relation to Indochina, in relation to our vital interests in the Pacific, it is possible for us to protect our vital interests without an overextension."

That is the end of the quotation from Mr. Dulles in explaining the withdrawal of troops and the principle of flexibility and retaliation.

Speaking for myself, I believe that the President's program ensures us sufficient military strength to meet our commitments as well as the new one in Korea that we are considering today. As for the so-called "new" strategy, it is tailored, in my opinion, to meet the world situation confronting us, in which we need the utmost flexibility within our economic and military means, to react to any new threat of aggression.

In conclusion, I would like to express some thoughts on the Pacific area in general. Over the past years, I have become familiar with that region through periodic visits there—I made three visits there on three different occasions—and as chairman and formerly as ranking minority member, of the Far Eastern Consultative Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee. Over those years, I have noted an improvement in the situation there from the dark days of 1949 when China fell to the Communists. I believe that the nations of that area are becoming more alert to the threat of communism and that our military, economic, and technical assistance has given them a helpful start toward being able to meet that threat effectively. But I also believe that more can be done to encourage the idea of collective security in the Far East.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, will the Senator from New Jersey yield?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I would prefer to wait until I have finished with my remarks. Then I shall be happy to yield.

I hope the free nations of the Pacific will soon forget their differences and make common cause in a regional security arrangement, which in my judgment should be similar to the so-called American Monroe Doctrine and which would recognize that an attack anywhere in the Far East would affect the safety and security of all of us.

In making this statement I am not unaware of the great cultural, racial, and political differences which exist between the various nations in the Pacific, and I should state that we found that there would be difficulties in bringing about a regional pact among those nations at this time. However, we are still working on it. I am hopeful that their mutual aspirations and interests will override those differences.

Until the time that such a regional agreement is possible, the web of mutual defense and security treaties that we have negotiated with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, Japan, and now the Republic of Korea, offers the best insurance against future aggression in that area so important to us. I therefore strongly urge the Senate to give its overwhelming advice and consent to this treaty and put the Communists on notice.

I shall be glad now to yield for questions. Mr. Watkins rose.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KUCHEL in the chair). Does the Senator from New Jersey yield to the Senator from Utah?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I yield.

Mr. WATKINS. While the Senator was delivering his address I asked him if he would

outline the various steps in the constitutional process.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. We all agree that so far as a declaration of war is concerned, that is a congressional function, but we have two different situations existing. One is the present truce which is a precarious truce, with our men on the line in jeopardy in case of attack. We emphasized previously that in case of attack by the South Koreans, without any action by us, we would have nothing to do with it.

Mr. WATKINS. What would we do if South Korea provoked an attack?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I discussed that with General Taylor at great length. He will have to be governed by the circumstances of the situation. It is very difficult to know just what to do. Before I discuss an attack under those circumstances, I want to consider an attack the other way. The question is, What are our constitutional processes?

Mr. WATKINS. Yes. What steps are we to take?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. With our troops in jeopardy I have no doubt that the President of the United States could move immediately. The Senator would agree with that, I am sure.

Mr. WATKINS. I should think so, because of the previous conflict which had been going on, and the temporary truce being only a breathing spell in it.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. If it precipitated a war, I would myself urge that the matter be immediately brought to the Congress, as I urged President Truman to do when the first attack was made. He should have done that. But the President may be on the spot. Confronted with a sudden danger to our peace and safety that he cannot now foresee, I would say that if the Monroe Doctrine principle came into effect, he would have to act immediately and rely on the Congress to back him up by a declaration of war.

Mr. WATKINS. Suppose there is peace in that area; suppose the armistice results in a peace treaty. This treaty will run on indefinitely. Suppose, then, an attack were made upon South Korea. What, then, would be the situation? Would the President have the power to order our troops into action there before coming to the Congress, or would he make the decision as to whether we should go to war?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. We have a great many troops in the area. The Senator is not speaking about the troops being in jeopardy, is he?

Mr. WATKINS. Where the troops have been withdrawn, as they would be if a peace treaty were made.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. What does the Senator conceive to be the duty of the President in case of a violation of the Monroe Doctrine in South America? What has the President done in the past? He has certainly issued stern warnings. He would have to be prepared to move in, and there would be a declaration of war if the situation should reach such a serious stage. President Cleveland issued a stern warning that we were going to stand by the Monroe Doctrine. Great Britain at that time was the one causing the trouble, if I correctly remember my history. The circumstances would be about the same in this case. The President should be prepared to issue a stern warning and have Congress back of him and ask for the support of Congress. I think President Truman should have done that on the occasion when South Korea was invaded by North Korea.

Mr. WATKINS. I agree with the Senator. I think it is an important right for the man who are going to do the fighting and the dying to have a voice in the matter.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Through the Congress?

Mr. WATKINS. Yes; through their representatives.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I agree.

Mr. WATKINS. No President would have the right, unless we were attacked, to order our forces into action.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I agree with the Senator, and I cannot see why the situation cannot be handled in that way. Under our constitutional processes we would handle it in that way. When we debated the NATO pact the question very properly came up as to whether it covered an attack on Paris, for instance, and whether the President, acting alone, could move to defend Paris. We said, "The language is too broad; it is too uncertain. Let us use the words 'constitutional processes' so that everyone will know that there will be at least that approach to the question."

That is my position.

Mr. WATKINS. The Senator asked me what I would say the process should be in the event some nation threatened to attack a South American nation. I would say that the issuance of a warning by the President would be one of the first steps, but before he ordered out the Armed Forces I would say that the President, by all means, should come to the Congress to get the power to take that action.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I could not agree more thoroughly with the Senator. I agree absolutely with all the Senator has said. I cannot conceive of a situation where it would not be possible to do that.

Mr. WATKINS. In the case of the NATO agreement it was stated that there was an attempt to increase the war-making powers of the President. What I objected to was that by agreement we were attempting to increase his war-making powers of the President to order our forces into action. In the debate we finally got the legislative history of what occurred when the North Atlantic Pact was drafted. As I remember, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], who was present a few moments ago, said that article 11 was drafted in the committee itself, and that he was responsible for article 11 which provided, in effect, that the treaty would be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties according to constitutional processes. That is, in substance, what was provided. That meant, it was said, that all steps in implementing the treaty should be by the Congress, and particularly the decision as to a declaration of war should be made by the Congress, as should the decision with reference to sending troops outside United States territory in time of peace.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I agree with the Senator. I have been advised by the chief of our Foreign Relations Committee staff that in the report on the NATO Treaty we made it clear that it was not intended in any way to enlarge the President's powers in the matter of declaring war. That was in the report which was made at the time.

Mr. WATKINS. Many persons have taken the position, and apparently the Truman administration took the position, that we sought in the NATO Treaty, to give additional power to the President, so that he could order out the troops without the approval of the Congress. In fact, there never has been approval by the Congress to sending troops to Europe under the NATO Treaty. The Senate alone passed an advisory resolution that the President should consult the Congress first.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I wish to read to the distinguished Senator from Utah a quotation from the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, when the NATO Treaty was presented to the Senate. I read from a volume entitled "A Decade of American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1941-49, 81st Congress, 1st Session, Published by the Committee on Foreign Relations":

"The committee does not believe it appropriate in this report to undertake to define the authority of the President to use

the Armed Forces. Nothing in the treaty, however, including the provision that an attack against one shall be considered an attack against all, increases or decreases the constitutional powers of either the President or the Congress or changes the relationship between them."

That was in the report when the NATO Treaty was submitted to the Senate for action.

Mr. WATKINS. When I offered my reservation which required the adoption of a resolution by Congress to put us into a war in the event that any of the nations included in the treaty were attacked, or to send our forces abroad, the reservation was rejected. It was said by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations at that time that to accept the reservation would be to cut the heart out of the treaty. But all it attempted to do was to say, in specific terms, that before such actions were taken, Congress should have the right to make the decision. Of course, I became suspicious of the whole proposal, and my suspicions were justified when the President did attempt to send troops abroad under the treaty without any authorization from Congress.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. That gave rise to the troops-to-Europe issue and to the long debate on the subject. That was the reason for the specific approach to this treaty, which we hoped would provide a sense of collective security in other dangerous areas. We did not use the NATO formula, but we used the Monroe Doctrine formula, which throughout the years we felt had proved to be constitutional and safe.

Mr. WATKINS. I might observe, in connection with this subject, that that presents a far different picture than we had in connection with the NATO Treaty.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I hope the distinguished Senator from Utah feels that we have leaned over backward to try to provide the protections which he was anxious to have, and which all of us are anxious to have, namely, constitutional processes in our difficult, serious international relations.

Mr. WATKINS. I am happy to hear the Senator make that statement. I am glad we finally stopped the trend of attempting to increase the war-making power of the Executive by way of treaty. I may say that that was one of the things that gave rise to the proposed Bricker amendment.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. All of us are aware of that. We may have more debate on that subject before we finish with the general discussion on this subject.

Mr. WATKINS. I thank the Senator from New Jersey for his courtesy.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, I observe that the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] is on the floor. I promised him that at the end of my address, I would be glad to answer any questions he might wish to ask. I yield to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. I appreciate the Senator from New Jersey yielding. I did not have the advantage of being here during all the time he was making his remarks. At the expense of repetition, may I ask him what is his answer to the question I propounded to the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY] with reference to the interpretation of the phrase, "in accordance with its constitutional processes," as contained in article III.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I may say to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi that I have discussed that question at some length with the Senator from Utah. I should be glad to refer the distinguished Senator to the Record, or I shall be glad to restate my position.

Mr. STENNIS. Does the Senator from New Jersey agree with the Senator from Wisconsin that it would require, as the Senator from Wisconsin repeatedly said, an affirmative act

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of Congress for the United States to use force?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I called attention to the fact that there were two situations. One was the uneasy truce which now exists. If there were a violation of the truce, I believe the President would be justified in acting to protect our troops and, as a part of our obligation in the United Nations, to protect the troops of the United Nations. I assume the distinguished Senator will agree with that statement.

Mr. STENNIS. I do agree with that statement.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Assuming that we pass the Korean truce stage, and that there is a new attack in the future, what I then called attention to was the fact that under this treaty we are virtually, by article III, putting our position in the Far East in the same situation as in the Western Hemisphere under the Monroe Doctrine. We say in article III:

"ARTICLE III

"Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

As we include the same clause in all our treaties, we are practically saying we are approaching the far-eastern situation in the same spirit as did President Monroe, when he warned the other countries of the world that aggression against the Western Hemisphere would be a matter of concern to the United States. As we know, down through our own history, the Monroe Doctrine has helped to prevent an outbreak of wars in this hemisphere.

We are seeking here the same approach as the Monroe Doctrine approach. Whatever constitutional processes would be required in the case of a violation of the Monroe Doctrine on this continent, I would say the same processes would be followed under this treaty, namely, the requirement of a declaration of war by Congress, except in some emergency in which the President had to act quickly in order to protect the safety of some of our citizens.

Mr. STENNIS. I appreciate the answer of the Senator from New Jersey on that point. Then, unless it were necessary to protect some of our own citizens, including the protection of our own soldiers or servicemen who would be in the theater of danger, the Senator is not committing himself in this treaty to any obligation except through the process of a declaration of war by Congress?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. The Senator is correct.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is not going any further than that?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. No.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator does not think the United States is committed to go any further than that, does he?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Not as I see it.

Mr. STENNIS. Does the Senator from New Jersey agree with the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] in his point?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I was not sure I thoroughly understood what was the real difference.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I yield.

Mr. THYE. I wanted to be certain that the reference by the Senator from Mississippi to the Senator from Minnesota was not a reference to me.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I understood the Senator from Mississippi to be referring to the junior Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY].

Mr. STENNIS. The junior Senator from Minnesota is a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I was not entirely certain what the difference was between the junior Senator from Minnesota and our distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, but my position in the matter is very clear.

I thought probably the Senator from Minnesota had reference to something that might happen unexpectedly, as to which we could not be too critical of the President if he used his discretion. That may be true. But fundamental constitutional processes mean that we follow the Constitution; and under the Constitution, Congress must declare war, if war is to be declared.

Mr. STENNIS. Did the Senator from New Jersey in his address cover the idea of a regional security agreement in the Pacific area, an agreement that might be called a Pacific NATO? Did the Senator speak on that point in his main address?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I discussed the approach of NATO, and the Monroe Doctrine approach, quite extensively. I pointed out that in the negotiation of this treaty I had the privilege of cooperating with Mr. Dulles and with our Far-Eastern Subcommittee in the discussion of these approaches. We considered that we could not adopt the NATO formula, because to do so would cause difficulty on the floor of the Senate, with respect to understanding what was meant by the statement that an attack on one meant an attack on all. In other words, under the NATO formula, would an attack on Paris mean an attack on New York, and could the President act in such a situation? We leaned over backward to use the language of the Monroe Doctrine in formulating the far-eastern treaties, with the result that it is necessary for us to observe our constitutional processes.

Mr. STENNIS. I wish to ask 1 or 2 further questions. Did the Senator consider asking some of the other Asiatic nations to come forward and pledge themselves to the security of Korea? Was that considered by the Senator?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I shall be glad to answer that question, because I have taken part in the discussions of that question, too. I have been to the Far East with Secretary Dulles and his associates. I have discussed the question at length with him and with Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. I think there is not one of us who would not favor a collective security pact among all the Asiatic nations, but we have discovered there are differences between those countries. There are difficulties today that cannot be surmounted all at once. Some steps will have to be taken toward security before we can get the whole group into a mutual security pact. There is still very serious friction between the Philippines and Japan and serious friction between Japan and Korea. It will be found that there are some strained feelings between some of the countries which I have visited, as, for instance, between Indochina and Burma. We cannot accomplish our purpose all at once, but we are working sincerely to the end of bringing about a security setup among those nations themselves, which will bear upon that area in the sense that the Monroe Doctrine bears upon the areas of this hemisphere.

Mr. STENNIS. Does the Senator from New Jersey contemplate that the United States would become a member of a so-called Pacific NATO?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I have urged that the initiative should come from those countries themselves. They should set up such a mutual security organization among themselves. If the United States can be of help to them, well and good. But I do not believe we should take the initiative by trying to tell

them what to do for their own defense. We can advise them, but we should not try to lead them into a pact by insisting that they join in it.

Mr. STENNIS. Does the Senator suggest or think that the United States of America should become a party to it?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I think that the treaties which we have entered into were definitely wise, because the treaties reflect our sense of fear and apprehension about the Far Eastern area. I do not think we can avoid our share of the responsibility or avoid going at least as far as the statement in article III, which states that each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area would be dangerous to its own peace and safety.

In other words, if there were to be an armed attack in the Pacific area, this country would be alerted and alarmed, and would have to do something about it, and do it quickly. If there were an attack on Indochina by the Chinese Communists, as Secretary Dulles has given the warning, we will be right there, and the consequences which follow will have to be borne. We have warned aggressors that we are going to be alert to any aggression anywhere in that area, which means so much to our own peace and security.

Mr. STENNIS. Lest the Senator be misunderstood, is it correct that the Secretary favors a Pacific NATO in which we would be a party?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I am opposed to a Pacific NATO. I am opposed to anything further than saying that an attack on a nation in that Pacific area would be dangerous to our own peace and safety. I am in favor of saying that we would be glad to consult with a nation which is so attacked, and to take such action as is provided under our constitutional processes and to do what we can to meet the aggression.

This is the Monroe Doctrine approach. At Rio we enlarged the conception of a unilateral Monroe Doctrine into a multilateral Monroe Doctrine. In the Far East we should be thinking of a multilateral Monroe Doctrine.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator would extend to all other nations of Asia the pact we are now entering into with Korea, would he?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I would not even say that. With regard to some, I would, and with regard to others, I would not. We would have to explore the situation which obtained as to each one of the nations. We began with our natural allies, Australia and New Zealand. The Philippines were, in a sense, a ward of ours. The Japanese are, in a similar sense, a ward of ours. Korea, which has become an essential ward of ours, is the last one. As to whether we enter into such a pact with other nations would have to be determined on the merits of each individual case.

Mr. STENNIS. There are at least a few nations of Asia to which the Senator would extend the same pact which we now propose to extend to Korea?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. No; I would not without investigating each one on its own merits. I would not want to be committed to that policy, because I do not know what the effects would be. I do say that we should be convinced that an attack on any country in Asia would be a danger to our own peace and security. We have given a warning ahead of time, and we would be alerted to it. Anyone starting hostilities would have to take the consequences.

Mr. STENNIS. If I may ask the Senator one more question, referring to the discussion with Syngman Rhee, it was stated in the papers that some promises were made with reference to a pact, subject to ratification by Congress, of course. Does the Senator know whether or not the proposal was made that the United Nations or some other nations should give this guaranty, either without the

United States or including the United States, and that it was stated that Syngman Rhee refused to agree, and stated that it would be with the United States or no one?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I cannot answer that at all, but I can refer the distinguished Senator to the Senate document in which appears the message of President Eisenhower on the Korean Treaty. On page 5 of the message of the President of the United States, there is a joint statement by Secretary of State Dulles and President Syngman Rhee. It is erroneously dated October 3, 1953, in the print. Actually, it was released August 7, 1953. I shall read only the beginning of it. If the Senator wishes, I suggest that he read all of it.

I also suggest that the Senator read the statement on page 7 of the message from the President of the United States, which was issued by the Secretary of State after the original initialing of the treaty by Secretary Dulles and President Rhee, on October 3, 1953.

I am now reading in part from what is called the joint statement by Secretary of State Dulles and President Syngman Rhee. The correct date on which it was released is August 7, 1953:

"Following is the text of a joint statement by President Syngman Rhee and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles following the conclusion of their talks at Seoul, Korea."

The distinguished Senator from Mississippi will remember that just as the Congress was adjourning last summer there was a plan to have some of the Members of the Senate go to Korea. The Senator from California (Mr. Knowland) and I were to go as Members on the Republican side, and two of our colleagues were to go from the Democratic side. We were to go to Korea to discuss the matter with President Rhee. We could not go because of the pending business in the Senate, and because of the lamentable death of our colleague, Senator Taft. However, Secretary Dulles, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Assistant Secretary Walter Roberts, and a number of others did go. They discussed the matter with President Syngman Rhee, following which the statement I am about to read was issued. I quote the beginning:

"Our friendly and understanding consultations demonstrate clearly the determination of the United States and the Republic of Korea to stand together in cordial cooperation to achieve our common objectives, including the reunification of Korea."

Of course, what was troubling Dr. Rhee was the question of the reunification of Korea. President Rhee felt that if Korea were divided at the 38th parallel, or any other parallel, it would be permanently divided. He was greatly disturbed that we were not going to carry on until a unification was brought about. In view of those facts our representatives went to Korea to discuss that matter.

The joint statement continues:

"We have today initiated a draft of a mutual defense treaty. That treaty is designed to unite our nations in common action to meet danger and it will cement the ties which have brought us together to combat in Korea the menace of Communist aggression."

"Our two Governments will actively proceed with the constitutional processes necessary to bring this treaty into full force and effect. These constitutional processes, in the case of the United States, require that the United States Senate consent to the ratification. The United States Senate, having adjourned this week, will not again be in regular session until next January. However, United States Senate leaders have been kept fully informed of the exchange of views which have led to the action we have taken today and it is our sincere hope that this will

lead to prompt and favorable United States Senate action."

Mr. President, I shall not read further, but if the distinguished Senator will read the remainder of the statement, he will see what has been accomplished.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator from Mississippi was confused as to the date of the report. Which is the correct date?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. The correct date is August 7, 1953. The date in the document is a misprint.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I have had called to my attention by Dr. Wilcox the discussion contained in the printed hearings. In appendix II there is contained an exchange of letters between President Rhee and President Eisenhower. The first is a letter from President Rhee to President Eisenhower, dated May 30, 1953, the next is a letter from President Eisenhower to President Rhee, dated June 6, 1953. The next is a letter from President Rhee to President Eisenhower, dated June 19, 1953.

I have not read the letters recently, but, as I recall, they did not involve any commitment or coercion; President Rhee wanted assurance that he would not be left alone with a divided Korea.

Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I thank the Senator from North Dakota for yielding until I could finish the colloquy.

BARRING AMERICAN FORCES IN CAMBODIA

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I rise to commend the distinguished Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER), floor manager of this defense appropriations bill, and the members of the Senate Appropriations Committee, for the amendment the committee adopted to section 843 of the measure.

This is a very important action, consistent with the declared objective of the present administration to disengage American combat troops from Southeast Asia. It is an action, moreover, which implicitly recognizes that spending money for military purposes in a foreign land readily leads to the involvement of American personnel and then to the commitment of American troops.

To avoid just such a sequence of events in Laos and Thailand, the Senate adopted last December an amendment in the nature of a substitute, which I offered to an original amendment proposed by the distinguished Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER). This amendment, adopted by a vote of 73 to 17 on December 15, 1969, prohibited the use of any funds in last year's defense appropriation bill to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into either Laos or Thailand.

The following morning, at a Cabinet meeting, President Nixon indicated his willingness to accept the amendment, acknowledging it to be in accordance with his announced intentions. White House spokesmen indicated, at the time, that the restriction was consistent with the President's own objective of keeping the United States out of a wider war on an expanding front in Indochina.

But the amendment, as adopted, represented something more than an affirmation of Presidential policy. It was also, in a very real sense, a reassertion of congressional control over the spending of public money in countries neighboring on the war front in South Vietnam. It was more than the expression of

the sense of Congress that the United States should not become involved in a spreading war in Southeast Asia; it was an exercise of congressional power denying funds for such a purpose, insofar as the use of American ground combat troops were concerned.

On October 14, 1970, Senator COOPER and I addressed a letter to the distinguished chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee (Mr. RUSSELL) asking that the committee give consideration to extending the prohibition in the law to include Cambodia, along with Laos and Thailand.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the letter be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OCTOBER 14, 1970.

HON. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As you well know, we submitted an amendment to the Defense Appropriations bill last year, which was modified on the Senate floor on December 15th, barring the use of U.S. funds to introduce American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand. We are happy to note that this same language is included in this year's bill, H.R. 19590.

Because of the recent debate over American operations in Cambodia, we are requesting that Section 843 be amended in Committee by adding "or Cambodia" to the present wording. Hence, the Section would read:

Sec. 843. In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos, Thailand or Cambodia.

Thank you for your consideration of this matter, and we look forward to hearing from you in the near future.

Sincerely,

JOHN SHERMAN COOPER,
FRANK CHURCH.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, it is most gratifying that the committee has responded affirmatively to this request. In doing so, the committee has taken cognizance of the majority decision of the Senate on a subsequent Cooper-Church amendment, approved by this body on June 30 of this year by a vote of 58 to 37. Had that amendment become law, more extensive restrictions would have applied to military spending in Cambodia than a simple prohibition against introducing American ground combat troops.

So the action the committee has taken with respect to the pending bill is altogether in line with the previous judgment of the Senate.

In amending section 843, the committee has used the language of last year, which the President approved, adding only the words, "or Cambodia." Once more, this goes hand in hand with the President's declared objective that, in the future, Asian governments must rely on their own armed forces—rather than ours—for their self-defense.

The section, as amended, now reads:

Section 843. In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the in-

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roduction of American ground combat troops into Laos, Thailand, or Cambodia.

I trust that the Senate will uphold the committee's decision; and I hope that, once passed by the Senate, the amendment will be retained in conference, and signed into law by President Nixon.

As part of the law, the amendment would help enforce the President's own declared resolve to prevent the United States from being drawn into a larger war, a goal that has the overwhelming support of all the American people.

Moreover, as part of the law, the amendment would constitute a further expression of the right of Congress to determine where and how public money is spent. Should the time come in the year ahead when the President decides we should send American combat troops into Laos, Thailand, or Cambodia, he would be obliged to come to Congress first for its consent. This is what the Constitution intended.

For all these reasons, Mr. President, I commend the Senate Committee on Appropriations for the statesmanlike action it has taken.

I ask unanimous consent that pages 10 and 11 of the Committee on Appropriations report—No. 91-1392—to the Department of Defense appropriations bill, 1971, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PROHIBITION AGAINST THE USE OF FUNDS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF AMERICAN GROUND FORCES INTO LAOS, THAILAND AND CAMBODIA

Section 843 of the bill as it passed the House provides that none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand. The committee recommends that this provision be amended to include Cambodia, so as to read as follows:

"Sec. 843. In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos, Thailand, or Cambodia."

This matter was debated at length by the Senate earlier in this Session in connection with an amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Bill (H.R. 15628), and the Senate adopted, on a roll call vote of 58 yeas to 37 nays, an amendment which reads as follows:

"Sec. 7. The Foreign Military Sales Act is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"Sec. 47. Limitations on United States Involvement in Cambodia.—In concert with the declared objectives of the President of the United States to avoid the involvement of the United States in Cambodia after July 1, 1970, and to expedite the withdrawal of American forces from Cambodia, it is hereby provided that unless specifically authorized by law hereafter enacted, no funds authorized or appropriated pursuant to this Act or any other law may be expended after July 1, 1970, for the purposes of—

"(1) retaining United States forces in Cambodia;

"(2) paying the compensation or allowances of, or otherwise supporting, directly or indirectly, any United States personnel in Cambodia who furnished military instruction to Cambodian forces or engage in any combat activity in support of Cambodian forces;

"(3) entering into or carrying out any contract or agreement to provide military instruction in Cambodia, or to provide persons

to engage in any combat activity in support of Cambodian forces; or

"(4) conducting any combat activity in the air above Cambodia in direct support of Cambodian forces."

Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to impugn the constitutional power of the President as Commander-in-Chief, including the exercise of that constitutional power which may be necessary to protect the lives of United States Armed Forces wherever deployed. Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to impugn the constitutional powers of the Congress including the power to declare war and to make rules for the Government and regulation of the Armed Forces of the United States."

The committee's recommendation for the inclusion of Cambodia in this provision is based on this earlier action of the Senate.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I, too, would like to commend the committee for its exercise of statesmanship in regard to this matter. I also commend the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) and the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) for their fine work which laid the basis for this action.

Mr. President, I rise only to call the attention of the Senate to the fact that we are still, as it were, chasing after a runaway trolley with respect to the war-making powers of the President. The best we can do is to anticipate it in an appropriation bill, where the money is immediately to be expended. The worst we can do is to chase the trolley, after the event has happened, the troops are already there, and the United States is committed, and then try to stop it with sense resolutions or a denial of money like the effort made with regard to the McGovern-Hatfield resolution.

The basic problem is that the constitutional responsibility for making war has gotten out of hand and is now essentially in the hands of a succession of Presidents who have been bold enough to seize the nettle, because they are all undeclared wars, which will probably be true of the future.

I hope very much, therefore, that the Senate will give most serious attention next year, when the Committee on Foreign Relations holds its hearings on my bill and, I hope, on other bills relating to the question of the war-making powers of the President and the war declaring powers of Congress, and that we may, by sophistication in our legislation, come abreast of this new problem.

That is the real solution.

I hope very much that members of the Appropriations Committee, who have shown such a statesmanlike attitude, will now take an interest in this legislation as being very much along the lines of trying constructively and in a big way to deal with this problem.

Mr. President, I wish to join my colleagues in paying tribute to the chairman and members of the Appropriations Committee for the sense of fair-mindedness and respect for the will of the Senate which is reflected in the defense appropriations bill they have brought to the floor. In particular, the action of the Senate Appropriations Committee, as embodied in section 843 and section 838, taken in conjunction with the historic debates earlier in this

session, is a great significance. The great underlying issue of all these measures, of course, is the question of the division of the Nation's war powers between the Congress and the President.

The bill before us does much to restore the position of the Senate which, despite the clear provisions of the Constitution, has been eroded with respect to its proper role in the exercise of the Nation's war powers.

Mr. President, while the Senate has much to be gratified about in this bill, I think it also underscores the basic problem. There is, in my view, a grave danger that—by concentrating only upon its general power over appropriations—the Senate may unwittingly be contributing to the further erosion of its other, more specific war powers specified in article I, section 9 of the Constitution. If the Senate is forced to rely solely on its power over appropriations to effect its check-and-balance role with respect of warmaking, then the Senate will be contending itself with an after-the-fact role. Our recent experiences have shown how difficult it is to play our proper role when we are reduced only to ex post facto appropriations cuts and prohibitions.

In my judgment, the Senate will not live up to its full constitutional responsibilities until it finds an effective way to reassert its other war powers, as envisaged and specified in the Constitution. I hope very much that the Senate will give proper attention to this aspect of the problem early in the next session. The Foreign Relations Committee plans to hold hearings on this broad issue. I hope that the distinguished members of the Appropriations Committee and of the Armed Services Committee will take an active and sympathetic interest in those hearings.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I wish to ask a question of the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee, the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER), with reference to section 843, as to his interpretation of the definition of the word "introduction."

Section 843 reads:

In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos, Thailand, or Cambodia.

The Senator from Kansas is puzzled with reference to the definition in section 843 of the word "introduction."

Mr. ELLENDER. In recommending that section 843 be amended to include Cambodia, along with Laos and Thailand, it was the intent of the committee to apply to Cambodia those same restrictions and criteria that were applied to Laos and Thailand pursuant to this provision as it appeared in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1970, and proposed in the President's budget for fiscal year 1971.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask a question as one who supported the Church-Cooper resolution—I do not wish to become involved in extended debate concerning it, but would this language prohibit any President from taking appropriate measures to protect American

forces even if that meant going into Cambodia?

Is that a correct interpretation, I again ask the Senator from Louisiana?

Mr. ELLENDER. As I said, what the committee did was to use the exact language the President proposed in his budget for Laos and Thailand which the House had recommended, and then we added Cambodia. Of course, the Congress cannot by statute limit in any way the powers given to President by the Constitution.

Mr. DOLE. That is the point the Senator from Kansas would make for the record, that the President is the Commander in Chief. By statute we can limit the expenditure of funds as a proper role of Congress, but we cannot derogate the rights and powers of the President, which he possesses by virtue of the Constitution, by enactment of any statute.

To complete the record as to what the President's intentions may be, he stated them forthrightly on June 30, in his report on Cambodia. He gave a number of guidelines for U.S. policy in Cambodia, and among these were the following which relate to U.S. personnel:

There will be no U.S. ground personnel in Cambodia except for the regular staff of our Embassy in Phnom Penh.

There will be no U.S. advisers with Cambodian units.

We will conduct—with the approval of the Cambodian Government—air interdiction missions against the enemy efforts to move supplies and personnel through Cambodia toward South Vietnam and to reestablish base areas relevant to the war in Vietnam. We do this to protect our forces in South Vietnam.

The President further commented publicly on this aspect of U.S. policy the following evening. He was asked whether he could give categorical assurances now that we will not send ground troops back into Cambodia no matter what. He answered:

I indicated when this operation was begun two months ago . . . that once we had completed our task successfully of cleaning out the sanctuaries that then it would not be necessary and I would not consider it advisable to send American ground forces back into Cambodia.

I can say now that we have no plans to send American ground forces into Cambodia. We have no plans to send any advisers into Cambodia. We have plans only to maintain the rather limited diplomatic establishment that we have in Phnom Penh and I see nothing that will change that at this time.

The interviewer then indicated that the Senate seemed to want the President to foreswear this in a final way and the President responded:

I think that anybody hearing the answer that I have just given would certainly get the impression and would incidentally be justified in having the impression that the President of the United States has no intention to send ground forces back into Cambodia, and I do not believe that there will be any necessity to do so.

When you say, can I be pinned down to say that under no circumstances would the United States ever do anything, I would not say that, but I will say that our plans do not countenance it, we do not plan on it, and under the circumstances, I believe that the success of the operation which we have undertaken, as well as what the South

Vietnamese will be able to do, will make it unnecessary.

In reading these statements made by the President on July 1 of this year, one can easily see that the President indicated his present intention not to introduce American ground combat troops into Cambodia. This amendment, however, goes a step further, a step which the President refused to go, and purports to impose a judgment, regardless of the circumstances. The President has indicated that he will meet his responsibility as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces and take the action he considers necessary to protect American forces.

It should be clear in the Record and I make the point that because of the importance of the President's responsibility, whoever he may be, that it is a continuing responsibility, obligation and duty—to protect American forces.

I would assume, based on the response from the Senator from Louisiana, that there is no effort to impinge upon the President's constitutional rights, powers, and duties.

Mr. ELLENDER. None whatever.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, that satisfies the Senator from Kansas. The Senator from Louisiana recalls that we had a very extensive debate on the Cooper-Church amendment and that section 843 is far different.

The Cooper-Church amendment was broader in some respects. It referred to the retention of ground forces in Cambodia. It covered the carrying out of contracts with any government that might supply forces in Cambodia and the conducting of air activity over Cambodia.

At the same time, the language of the Cooper-Church resolution made clear that it was not an effort by Congress in any way to impugn the constitutional rights and duties and obligations of the President. Therefore, I appreciate the response of the Senator from Louisiana.

I trust the record is clear that nothing contained in the defense appropriations bill or in the language of section 843 would tie the hands of any President if he found it necessary to act in the exercise of his powers under the Constitution to protect American forces.

IMPROVED INTERNAL SECURITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM DEFENSE BUDGET NEARS PEACETIME LEVEL WHILE WAR CONTINUES

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, the fiscal year 1971 defense budget is close to the prewar, peacetime levels—much closer than many people appear to realize. Military manpower, for example, is forecast at 2,908,000 for June 30, 1971. That is an 8-percent increase above the level of 2,685,000 at June 30, 1964. And it is less than 4 percent above the 2,808,000 we had on June 30, 1962—another peacetime year.

In constant dollars—factoring outpay and price increases—defense spending under this bill will be about \$4 billion higher in wartime 1971 than it was in peacetime 1964. The added costs of the war are more than \$10 billion, so there have had to be short cuts elsewhere.

Let us look at what has happened. Consider procurement. In peacetime fiscal year 1964, we provided budget authority of \$15,645 million. This bill provides

\$15,970 million—an increase of \$325 million, 2 percent above the prewar level. But there have been sharp price increases since fiscal year 1964. That \$15,645 million we provided in fiscal year 1964 would be equivalent to \$19.3 billion at today's prices. So, in dollars of constant buying power, this bill is 18 percent below the peacetime level—and this bill has to cover the cost of the war.

Consider R.D.T. & E. In peacetime fiscal year 1964, we provided budget authority of \$6,984 million. This bill actually provides less—\$6,960 million. And that 1964 amount would be equivalent to \$8.7 billion today. Once again, we find that the budget has been cut in real terms, this time by 20 percent, below the peacetime level. And, once again, this bill has to cover the cost of the war.

The consequences of trying to fight a war within a peacetime budget level are plain. It has been necessary to make cuts elsewhere—and very deep cuts. From 1968 to 1970, the number of ships in the active fleet has been reduced by 189. And consider this: In the last decade, while the average age of our fleet has actually increased, the Soviets have built a formidable navy. Forty-seven percent of our ships are 20 years old or more, but less than 1 percent of the Soviet Navy's ships are that old. Their submarine force, on which they have concentrated, is six times as large as Hitler's was at the beginning of World War II.

As to aircraft, the Air Force is buying less aircraft in 1971 than in any year since 1935, and over half of the 1971 buy is designated for other nations of the free world. The Navy is buying less aircraft in 1971 than in any year since 1946.

Deployments have been cut. The number of military personnel in Europe is one-third less than prewar, and cutbacks will be necessary in Korea and elsewhere.

Setting aside special war costs in the 1971 budget for defense, we find that the baseline force provided is much lower than for any year since before the Korean war.

IMPROVED INTERNAL SECURITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The pace and intensity of the war in Vietnam has changed considerably since the advent of President Nixon's policy of Vietnamization. Not only has the U.S. troops strength in Vietnam declined substantially, but the entire complexion of the war has shifted from the frequent clash of main force units, to an intensified pacification campaign to bring security to the countryside. Increasingly, the forces of the Republic of Vietnam are assuming responsibility for military operations against the enemy main force units, driving them out of South Vietnam and their long protected sanctuaries across the border in Cambodia. As a result, overall security in South Vietnam is improved, enemy main forces have been denied the initiative, and territorial forces are providing increased security to the villages and hamlets. The President's policies have been successful thus far in winding down the war, reducing the level of violence

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and the number of casualties, turning more of the security responsibility over to the South Vietnamese, and providing increased security, prosperity, and self-government for the South Vietnamese people.

Two aspects of the Vietnamization program which reflect improved internal security in South Vietnam are the improvement and modernization of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces—RVNAF—and increased territorial security. Indicators of progress and success achieved in each of these aspects of Vietnamization have been encouraging during the past year: and, as President, Nixon stated on April 20, 1970, progress in Vietnamization was the sole criterion on which he was able to base his decision to withdraw 150,000 more U.S. troops during the next year.

IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION OF RVNAF

The RVNAF I. & M. program covers every aspect of development of the regular forces—ARVIN, VNN, VNMCC, VNAF—and territorial forces—RF, PF—for the purpose of enabling the RVNAF to take over the maximum share of the war.

The strength of the RVNAF now stands at over 1,000,000 men, which represents over a 90-percent increase during the past 5 years and approximately 15 percent during the past year.

Equipment deliveries to the RVNAF include over 880,000 small arms and crew-served weapons, 1,100 artillery pieces, 38,000 radios, 51,000 wheeled vehicles, 2,000 tracked vehicles, 200 helicopters and other aircraft, and 550 naval craft. The delivery of equipment is proceeding generally on schedule or ahead of schedule.

Additional equipment is being turned over to the RVNAF by U.S. units redeploying from Vietnam. About 20 different types of ARVN units have been equipped in this manner. The large turnover of riverine combatant craft to the VNN has made it the ninth largest navy in the world. Unit turnovers to the VNAF have equipped one special air mission, one fighter/attack—A-37—one forward air control—(O-1)—one airlift—CH-47—and two assault attack—UH-1—squadrons.

Military training within the RVNAF is a continuing effort for each man and each unit. Training centers and service schools incountry have an annual student training load of over 600,000, up 27 percent from 1969 and up over 50 percent from 1968. Offshore training—that is, in the United States—for RVNAF personnel has increased from about 1,500 in fiscal year 1967, to 2,400 in fiscal year 1969, to 7,600 in fiscal year 1970. Newly activated units undergo a unit training cycle; refresher training is given to units withdrawn from operations for refitting; and unit operational training is conducted by units in place.

The gradual yet highly visible improvements in the RVNAF are reflected in the Cambodian operations which provide further evidence of the military's confidence and ability to perform as a credible fighting force.

The United States has turned over to

RVNAF more than 50 facilities to include the 9th Infantry Division base at Dong Tam, the U.S. Navy base at My Tho, the 3d Marine Division base at Dong Ha, Nha Trang Air Base, and the 4th Infantry Division base at Camp Enari. Additional facilities are programmed for turnover in the near future.

By October 15, 1970, the actual U.S. troop strength in Vietnam had been reduced below the 384,000 directed by the President. The authorized U.S. troop strength had been reduced 29 percent and U.S. infantry-type battalions had been reduced 34 percent.

The number of U.S. combat deaths during the first 6 months of 1970 was 55 percent less than the same period in 1969. Similarly, the number wounded in action was 55 percent less. The weekly rate of U.S. combat deaths since July 1, 1970 is about 40 percent below the weekly rate for the first 6 months of 1970.

As a result of increased overall security, starting at the border areas, the number of ground contacts has decreased considerably, with the weekly average of days of contact reduced over 50 percent from 1969 levels.

INCREASED TERRITORIAL SECURITY

Today the territorial security forces number over 500,000. Giving protection to the Vietnamese people is the primary mission of these forces whose improved weapons, training, and leadership have produced a fighting force of significant capability.

Over 350,000 armed citizens are among the more than 3,500,000 members of the Peoples' Self-Defense Force, which is designed to provide additional security for the nation's more than 17 million citizens.

The National Police, which now number over 88,000, are better trained and better equipped to perform a public safety function, particularly protecting the people who live in the countryside.

Significant progress is evident through the GVN control of rural areas, with over 93 percent of the population now residing in relatively secure areas.

A special pacification and development campaign is now in full swing, the purpose of which is to accelerate, improve and consolidate GVN program gains countrywide.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I have listened with interest to the colloquy and the statements of the Senator from Kansas and the Senator from Louisiana. This increases my desire to have the Members of the Senate acquainted with the report of the staff members of the Foreign Relations Committee. That report is classified. I would urge that it be declassified so that the Senate will know what is going on in Cambodia.

I can fully sympathize with the feelings of the Senator from Kansas with respect to the rights and privileges and duties of the President of the United States when it comes to getting involved in a war. However, I have great interest in the rights and responsibilities of the Congress of the United States when it comes to fighting in other countries. Therefore, I hope that the facts incident

to Cambodia, developed by the gentleman who went out on the ground, are made known to the Senate at the earliest opportunity.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am intrigued with the comment the Senator from Missouri made twice here today.

As one who is not privy to that report, I inquire whether it is possible that we might have a meeting similar to the one we had on the ABM if it is not possible to declassify the report. I wonder if we could not meet in a secret session so that the Senator from Missouri could brief us on what is contained in the report.

Mr. SYMINGTON. If the Senator from Alaska would like to look at the report, I am confident that the report would be made available to the Senator to be read in the Foreign Relations Committee offices. I do not think a secret session should be required for I believe that it would be better for the report itself to be declassified.

Those who are going to vote on the money to cover what is planned in Cambodia should know what is going on in Cambodia.

I would like to see all the Members of the Senate have the information that in major part could be declassified in this report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read a third time, the question is shall the bill pass? On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. DOB), the Senator from Maryland (Mr. TYDINGS), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. MCCARTHY), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL): are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL) would vote "yea."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOK), the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK), the Senator from New York (Mr. GOODELL), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. MILLER) and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) is absent on official business.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.

If present and voting, the Senator from Iowa (Mr. MILLER), and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) would each vote "yea."

On this vote, the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK) is paired with the Senator from New York (Mr. GOODELL). If present and voting, the Senator from Colorado would vote "yea" and the Senator from New York would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) is paired with the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD). If present and voting, the Senator from Texas would vote "yea" and the Senator from Oregon would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 89, nays 0, as follows:

[No. 417 Leg.]

YEAS—89

Aiken	Gore	Murphy
Allen	Cravrel	Muskie
Allott	Criffin	Nelson
Anderson	Curney	Packwood
Baker	Hansgen	Pastore
Bayh	Harris	Pearson
Bellmon	Hart	Pell
Bennett	Hartke	Percy
Bible	Holland	Prouty
Boggs	Hollings	Proxmire
Brooke	Hruska	Randolph
Burdick	Hughes	Ribicoff
Byrd, Va.	Isaacs	Saxbe
Byrd, W. Va.	Jackson	Schweiker
Cannon	Javits	Scott
Casse	Jordan, N.C.	Smith
Church	Jordan, Idaho	Sparkman
Cooper	Kennedy	Spong
Cotton	Long	Stennis
Cranston	Magnuson	Stevens
Curtis	Mansfield	Stevenson
Dole	Mathias	Symington
Eagleton	McClellan	Talmadge
Eastland	McGee	Thurmond
Ellender	McGovern	Williams, N.J.
Ervin	McIntyre	Williams, Del.
Fannin	Metcalf	Yarborough
Fong	Mondale	Young, N. Dak.
Fulbright	Montoya	Young, Ohio
Goldwater	Moss	

NAYS—0

NOT VOTING—11

Cook	Hatfield	Russell
Dodd	McCarthy	Tower
Dominick	Miller	Tydings
Goodell	Mundt	

So the bill (H.R. 19590) was passed.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I move that the Senate insist on its amendments and request a conference with the House on the disagreeing votes thereon, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. ELLENDER, Mr. RUSSELL, Mr. McCLELLAN, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota, Mrs. SMITH, and Mr. ALLOTT conferees on the part of the Senate.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER) for the leadership he has shown in shepherding this bill through the committee and the Senate today. It is the first Defense bill in recent years that has received such widespread acceptance by the Senate. It reflects the growing mood in the Senate to reduce the enormous expenditures and allocation of resources in this area by reducing what the Defense Department stated was a bare-bones, rock bottom budget, by \$2.3 billion. No Member of the Senate is better prepared and more thorough in his scrutiny than the senior Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER). This bill demonstrates the highest degree of diligence, and the greatest sensitivity to the desires of the Senate collectively and it reflects a great service to the Nation as a whole. In addition, this bill contains some very important policy statements, ranging from prohibition of expenditures for waging war in Cambodia to a most justified restriction on the expenditures of Defense money for research unrelated to Defense activities.

With equal force, I wish to commend the senior Senator from North Dakota

(Mr. YOUNG) the ranking Republican Member. He demonstrates the same devotion and diligence manifested by Senator ELLENDER. The high standing both have in the Senate is reflected in the swiftness with which the Senate has accepted the recommendations brought forth by the full Committee on Appropriations under their leadership. To them, the full Committee on Appropriations, Senator FULBRIGHT who forcefully and succinctly presented his view on a very important aspect of proposed expenditures of these moneys, the leadership wishes to express its sincere thanks.

NATIONAL GROWTH POLICY

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I ask that the Chair lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on H.R. 19436.

The Chair laid before the Senate H.R. 19436, to provide for the establishment of a national urban growth policy, to encourage and support the proper growth and development of our States, metropolitan areas, cities, counties, and towns with emphasis upon new community and inner-city development, to extend and amend laws relating to housing and urban development, and for other purposes, which was read twice by title.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to immediate consideration of the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BELLMON). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I move that all after the enacting clause be stricken and that the text of the Senate-passed bill, S. 3468, be substituted therefor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Alabama.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment to the substitute amendment and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The legislative clerk proceeded to read the amendment.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered; and, without objection, the amendment will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendment is as follows:

On page 135, after line 16, add the following:

ELIGIBILITY OF AMERICAN SAMOA BANKS FOR FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE

SEC. 1010. (a) Subsection (a) of section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended (12 U.S.C. 1813(a)), is further amended by inserting the words "American Samoa," after the word "Guam," each place it appears therein.

(b) Subsection (d) of section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended (12 U.S.C. 1813(d)), is further amended by inserting the words "American Samoa," after the word "Guam,"

(c) Subsection (e) of section 3 of the

Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended (12 U.S.C. 1813(e)), is further amended by inserting the words "American Samoa," after the word "Guam,"

(d) Paragraph (5) of subsection (1) of section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended (12 U.S.C. 1813(1)(5)), is further amended by inserting the words "American Samoa," after the word "Guam,"

(e) Subsection (m) of section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended (12 U.S.C. 1813(m)), is further amended by inserting the words "of American Samoa," after the word "Guam,"

(f) Subsection (o) of section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended (12 U.S.C. 1813(o)), is further amended by inserting the words "American Samoa," after the word "Guam,"

(g) Paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of section 7 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended (12 U.S.C. 1817(a)(4)), is further amended by inserting the words "American Samoa," after the word "Guam,"

(h) Subparagraph (B) of paragraph (5) of subsection (b) of section 7 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended (12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(5)(B)), is further amended by inserting the words "American Samoa," after the word "Guam,"

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I have discussed this amendment with the chairman of our committee and he has no objection to the amendment.

My amendment would simply allow banks in American Samoa to be eligible for Federal Deposit Insurance under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, if those banks can, in fact, meet the eligibility criteria for Federal Deposit Insurance.

This proposal was considered and passed by the Senate on July 1 of this year, and it has been pending before the House Banking and Currency Committee since that time. I am informed by members of the House committee that it is impossible for that committee to consider this matter and bring it to the floor of the House in this session of Congress. I am further informed that that committee has no objection to this legislation and even suggested we handle the matter in this manner.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the substitute amendment, as amended.

The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment of the amendment and third reading of the bill.

The amendment was ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read the third time.

The bill (H.R. 19436) was read the third time and passed.

PROGRAM—PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS IN SENATE PROCEDURE

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is the intention of the leadership to lay before the Senate tomorrow a clean bill, an original bill, from the Committee on Public Works, the rivers and harbors bill. That will be followed, I will say to my distinguished colleague, the minority leader, by going back once again to Cal-