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**RAYA KISELNIKOVA**

## Defector Tells Of Spying in Latin America

**MEXICO CITY (UPI) —** A Russian Embassy employee who defected last month said Soviet spying in this capital is aimed at "total domination" of Latin America.

A dual role is played by Soviet Embassy staff members in Mexico, Raya Kiselnikova told a news conference.

She cited the example of four consular workers who she said spend eight hours a week learning visas and the rest of their time on "clandestine operations."

The few Russians in Mexico City who are interested in strengthening trade and diplomatic relations "are subverted for a more sinister purpose, the total domination of this hemisphere," she said.

The Soviets are keenly interested in information on Mexico's political situation, student movements and military matters, she said.

Miss Kiselnikova, 30, said she quit her job in the embassy commercial section because she feared reassignment to Russia and a possible "purge." She asked for asylum in Mexico.

# Secret Documents Yield Insights on Mao

By FOX BUTTERFIELD

An extensive series of recently disclosed confidential documents is providing China specialists with a rare insight into the inner workings of the Chinese Communist party.

The documents — speeches, directives, and letters of Chairman Mao Tse-tung originally intended for distribution only within the highest levels of the party — were acquired by the United States Government and private scholars after they had

Excerpts from Mao documents will be found on Page 26.

been printed in Red Guard pamphlets.

In the view of specialists who have been enthusiastically examining them, these are some of the most important revelations:

Chairman Mao, an earthy, shrewd political operator, had difficulty getting information from subordinates and has faced strong opposition from

high-ranking party members. At one point he complained that the General Secretary of the party, Teng Hsiao-ping, had consulted him in seven years.

Chairman Mao's greatest source of power was his ability to dominate party conferences, where he applied "guerilla" tactics to expose his critics.

Chairman Mao asserted that his conflict with the Soviet Union began as early as 1945 when Stalin tried to prevent the Chinese Communists from continuing their war against the Nationalists, led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The Chairman felt that Stalin accepted him as a real Communist only after China entered the Korean war in 1950.

The Cultural Revolution grew logically out of Chairman Mao's basic political ideas. From the documents, it appears that it was not a power struggle, but rather a test designed by Chairman Mao to find men worthy of succeeding him as true revolutionaries.

The specialists believe that the documents represent a major breakthrough for understanding China.

"With these papers we can no longer say that China is a great unknown, a great enigma," one Government intelligence analyst has concluded. "Now we know a great deal about how the system really works."

According to Prof. Michael Greenberg of Columbia University's East Asian Institute, one of the most valuable features of the documents is that they provide insights into the policy-making process in China and into Chairman Mao's methods

# Secret Documents Yield Insights on Mao Tse-tung

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of operating as a political leader.

It is apparent, for example, that Chairman Mao eschewed a large staff, feeling that reliance on secretaries would lead to bureaucracy and is "a manifestation of degeneration in revolutionary will."

It is also clear that Chairman Mao had difficulty obtaining information. "During the last decade," he wrote at the time of the failure of the Great Leap Forward, a crash program for economic development in 1958-59, "there was not a single comrade who suggested or dared to expose defects in our plans."

Instead Chairman Mao got his information by being an avid reader. The documents are filled with his comments after reading reports on such varied subjects as the establishment of a work-study program in a provincial university or ways to improve local newspapers.

During the Cultural Revolution, after reading a report on obstruction of the students' movement, Chairman Mao wrote angrily to Defense Minister Lin Biao, the party's deputy chairman, and Premier Chou En-lai: "I have gone through this case. Things cannot go on this way. Let the Central Committee issue an instruction against this. Next, write an editorial."

## Red Guards Got Papers

The documents had been made available to the Red Guards when the Maoist leadership decided, as part of its general effort to revitalize the party during the Cultural Revolution, to relax controls over the circulation of classified documents.

Several of the pamphlets, whose title pages bear the warning, "Internal party document: take security precautions," have been published in recent months by the United States Government. They deal with the period from the late nineteen-fifties to the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966.

Two more pamphlets, which cover the period from 1965 to 1967, have been made available by the State Department to The New York Times. In one of these new documents Chairman Mao asserted in 1965 that after 15 years in power there were

still many people that his regime did not control.

"Right now one-third of the nation's power is controlled by the enemy or enemy sympathizers," he said to his chief ideological adviser, Chen Po-ta. "After 15 years, we now control the other two-thirds."

Because of the nature of the Mao papers and their slightly mysterious origin, at first some doubts were raised about their authenticity. But after examination, both academic and Government specialists now feel certain that the documents are genuine.

One Government analyst who has spent years studying Chairman Mao said, "Whenever you get documents of this length, with exact date and place given, it is pretty hard to forge them. We would catch most fabrications."

Chairman Mao's greatest power, Professor Oksenberg believes, derived from his ability to dominate party conferences. He prevented the formation of an opposition bloc by continually changing the size and composition of the members who attended, Professor Oksenberg said.

One of the most important documents is Mr. Mao's previously unpublished speech at the 1959 conference called at Lushan, a mountain resort in central China, to discuss the failure of the Great Leap in agriculture and industry. The speech discloses the Chairman's forceful personality and his use of guerrilla tactics to overcome his powerful critics.

After keeping silent for two weeks to let the opposition show itself, Chairman Mao finally counterattacked. "You have spoken so much," he said bitingly. "Permit me to talk some now, won't you?"

His language is often blunt and earthy, filled with vivid metaphors. Referring to a third century general, Chairman Mao said: "I am like Chang Fei, who although crude, was careful at times."

"Comrades, you should analyze your own responsibility and your stomachs will feel much more comfortable if you move your bowels and break wind."

At the same time, Chairman Mao's speeches often seem vague and rambling, jumping from subject to subject. Professor Oksenberg thinks the Chairman may be intentionally

vague, never committing himself so that he can always blame his subordinates if a policy proves a failure.

Another valuable feature of the documents, a Government specialist points out, is that "you can almost see here the Cultural Revolution taking shape in Mao's mind, growing out of his vision of the ideal society and China's failure to achieve it."

He notes two key themes in Chairman Mao's thoughts that culminated in the Cultural Revolution: his strong egalitarian bent, with his belief in the necessity of keeping close to the masses; and a feeling that conflict is inherently beneficial.

"I have spent much time in the rural areas with the peasants and was deeply moved by the many things they knew," Chairman Mao said in a 1966 speech. "Their knowledge was rich. I was no match for them."

But the documents also show that Mr. Mao became increasingly worried during the nineteen-sixties that the party was becoming elitist and bureaucratic and was no longer keeping itself pure by contact with the masses.

"At present some comrades fear mass discussion very much," he warned in 1962. "They fear that the masses may put forward views different from the leaders. This attitude is extremely bad. Comrades, we are revolutionaries."

In a directive on public health work just before the Cultural Revolution began, Chairman Mao displayed hostility to intellectuals who he felt were divorced from the masses and consequently useless to society. Asserting that the Ministry of Public Health had not done enough for the

peasants, he suggested that it be renamed the "Lords' Ministry."

"The more books a person reads," he observed, "the more stupid he becomes."

In Professor Oksenberg's interpretation, the documents show that the Cultural Revolution was not a power struggle, but rather a test designed and initiated by Chairman Mao to find men in the party who were true revolutionaries and therefore worthy of succeeding him.

"The final test of whether or not socialism will make it," Chairman Mao said to the Central Committee in 1966, "will be decided by your putting politics in command and your going among the masses where together with them you will carry out the great Cultural Revolution."

At another meeting in 1966 he said: "I will feel sorry if you do not pass the test. I share your anxieties."

The specialists have also been fascinated by Chairman Mao's change in attitude toward the violence and disorder of the Cultural Revolution. At first he clearly held to the view that conflict is valuable exposing the enemy and resolving underlying problems.

In a speech discussing the Cultural Revolution in August 1966, Chairman Mao stated "I firmly believe that a few months of disturbances will be mostly for the good."

But as the extent of trouble caused by the Red Guards began to become apparent, Chairman Mao moderated his view. "I did not expect that one [wall] poster and the Red Guards would cause so much trouble," he admitted in October, 1966.

# Excerpts From Confidential Speeches, Directives and Letters of Mao Tse-tung

Following are excerpts from confidential speeches, directives and letters of Mao Tse-tung that have recently become public and that shed new light on the Chinese Communist party:

## Chinese-Soviet Dispute

The roots for [the conflict] were laid earlier. The episode occurred a long time ago. They did not allow China to make revolution. This was in 1945, when Stalin tried to prevent the Chinese revolution by saying that there should not be any civil war and that we must collaborate with Chiang Kai-shek. At that time we did not carry this into effect, and the revolution was victorious. After the victory, they again suspected that China would be like Yugoslavia and I would become a Tito.

Later on, I went to Moscow to conclude the Chinese-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance (Feb. 14, 1950), which also involved a struggle. He [Stalin] did not want to sign it, but finally agreed after two months of negotiations. When did Stalin begin to have confidence in us? It began in the winter of 1950, during the Resist-America Aid-Korea campaign [the Korean war]. Stalin then believed that we were not Yugoslavians and not Titoists.

—Speech to the 10th Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, Sept. 24, 1962.

## Great Leap Forward

Talking about it now, our country is so populous; it has such vast territory and abundant resources. A country of more than 4,000 years, and culture. What a boast, though, it is not even as good as Belgium. Our steel production is so low, so few people are literate. We are inferior when these things are compared, but we have zeal and must catch up with Britain within 15 years.

There are two methods of leadership, one is a little better than the other. For instance, on the question of cooperativization, some advocated quick action, others slower action. I consider the former better. Strike the iron when it is hot. Better to get it done in one stroke than drag on.

—Speech at Supreme State Conference, Jan. 28, 1958, just before the Great Leap Forward.

I was not in a hurry to speak, and have ended it by stiffening my scalp. For 20 days I have shown my forbearance, and now the conference will soon be adjourned.

Being an unpolished man, I am not too cultured. Nobody can be without shortcomings; even Confucius had his mistakes. I have seen Lenin's own drafts that had been corrected pell-mell. If there were no errors, why should he correct them? It is basically impossible to anticipate some things. Coal and iron could not walk



GREETED RED GUARDS: Chairman Mao Tse-tung shakes hands with girl wearing Red Guard armband in Peking in 1966. Documents, found in pamphlets used by the youth organization, provided specialists with insight into inner workings of Chinese Communists.

by themselves, and had to be transported by rolling stock. I did not anticipate this point.

It was possible that I did not know about it. This is because I was not the director of the Planning Commission. Before August of last year, I devoted my main energy to revolution. Being basically not versed in construction, I knew nothing about industrial planning.

However, comrades, in 1958 and 1959 the main responsibility has fallen on me and you should take me to task. Was it Ko Ching-shih [head of the party's Shanghai bureau] or I who invented the massive smelting of iron and steel? I say it was I. This created a great disaster when 90 million people went ahead to smelt steel.

You have said what you wanted to say, and the minutes attest to that. If you have caught me in the wrong, you can punish me. Next was the people's commune. I did not claim the right of inventing people's communes, but I had the right to suggest. In Shanghai a reporter asked me: "Is the commune good?" I said, "Good," and he immediately published it in the newspaper. Hereafter, newspaper reporters should leave me alone.

Have we failed now? All comrades who have come

to this conference have gained something. We have not failed completely. We have paid a price, blown some Communist wind, and enabled the entire nation to learn a lesson.

Comrades, you should analyze your responsibility and your stomachs will feel much more comfortable if you move your bowels and break wind.

—Speech on the failure of the Great Leap Forward, July 23, 1958.

## Mao at Work

During the last decade there was not a single comrade who suggested and dared to expose analytically and systematically to the Central Committee the defects in our plans. I have never known such a man. I know there are such people, but they dared not appeal to the top echelon directly by bypassing the proper echelons.

—Comments by Mao after reading a letter from Li Chung-shan, a vice director of the State Planning Commission, July 26, 1959.

There were many things about which they did not consult with me. These things should have been discussed by the Central Committee and decisions taken on them. Teng Hsiao-ping never consulted with me. He has never consulted with me about anything since 1959.

—Speech at a meeting, Oct. 24, 1966.

You should not rely on

your secretaries to do everything. You should mainly do things yourselves. Reliance on your secretaries for everything is a manifestation of your degeneration in revolutionary will.

—A directive entitled "Sixty Work Methods," Feb. 19, 1958.

At the present we are still without an atomic bomb. But we also had no airplanes and big guns in the past. We depended on millet plus rifles to defeat the Japanese aggressors and Chiang Kai-shek. We have become fairly strong and we will be even stronger. The most reliable way is to keep military and government expenditures in proper proportion and to reduce military spending to 30 per cent of the state budget so that the expenditure for economic construction can be increased.

Do you genuinely want atomic bombs? Or do you want to lower the proportion of military expenditure and carry out more economic construction? Which is after all the better course? All of you are requested to study the issue. This is a question of strategic policy.

—From a circular entitled "On 10 Major Relationships," April 1956.

Dear Comrades:

I have received your kind letter some time ago and am sorry to be so late in replying. As you wished, I have copied out on separate sheets all my classical poems that I can remember and I

enclose them. Please let me have your comments and criticism.

—Instruction on Health Work, June 26, 1965.

## Mao's Ideal Society

Comrade Lin Piao:

I acknowledge the receipt of the report from the General Logistics Department which you forwarded on May 6. I think this plan is quite good.

So long as there is no world war, the armed forces should be a great school. In this great school, our army men should learn politics, military affairs, and agriculture. They can also engage in agriculture, run some medium and small factories, and manufacture a number of products to meet their own needs. They should also do mass work and participate in the Cultural Revolution.

While the main task of the workers is in industry, they should also study military affairs, politics, and culture. Where conditions permit, they should also engage in agricultural production.

While the main task of the peasants is agriculture, they should also at the same time study military affairs, politics, and culture. Where conditions permit, they should collectively run small plants.

This holds good for students too. While their main task is to study, they should in addition learn other things, that is, industrial work, farming, and military affairs.

Let us create new ideas and new academic schools of thought have always been young people without much learning.

—Talk with Mao Yuan-hsin, February, 1966.

At present some comrades fear mass discussion very much. They fear that the masses may put forward views different from the leading organs and leaders. When problems are discussed, they suppress the enthusiasm of the masses and forbid them to speak out. This attitude is extremely bad. Comrades, we are revolutionaries. If we have truly committed mistakes, we should solicit the views of the masses of the people and other comrades, and make self-examination ourselves.

—Talk on the Question of Democratic Centralism, Jan. 30, 1962.

Tell the Ministry of Public Health that the Ministry works only for 50 per cent of the nation's population, and that of this 50 per cent mainly the lords are served. The broad masses of peasants do not get medical treatment. The Ministry of Public Health is not that of the people, and it is better to rename it as the Ministry of Urban Health or the Lords' Ministry, or the Health Ministry of the Urban Lords.

Medical education must be reformed. Basically there is no need to read so many books. How many years were spent by Hua To or Li Shih-chien of the Ming dynasty in school? The important thing is to improve themselves through study in practice. The more books a person reads, the more stupid he becomes.

A vast amount of manpower and material has been diverted from mass work for carrying out the revolution. Diseases which are not easy to understand and difficult to cure—so-called principles of medicine. But no attention is paid to the masses.

—Instruction, Sept. 7, 1966.

## Attitude Toward the Masses

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## On Education

Since ancient times, those who create new ideas and new academic schools of thought have always been young people without much learning.

It is reported that penicillin was invented by a laundress in a dyer's shop. Benjamin Franklin of America discovered electricity. Beginning as a newspaper-boy, he subsequently became a biographer, politician and scientist.

Naturally one can learn something in school, and I do not mean to close down the schools. What I mean is that it is not absolutely necessary to go to school.

—Speech at Chengtu Conference, March 22, 1958.

The existing system of education won't do. The period of schooling should be shortened. There are too many courses of study at present. They are harmful to people and cause the students to lead a strained life every day. Myopia has been on the increase.

Examinations at present are like tackling enemies. They are surprise attacks, full of catch questions and obscure questions. They are nothing but a method of testing official stereotyped writing. I disapprove of them and advocate wholesale transformation.

The final test of whether or not socialism will be achieved by the masses

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improved treatment of common diseases.

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—Instruction, Sept. 7, 1966.

## On Bureaucracy

At the highest level there is very little knowledge. They do not understand the opinion of the masses. They are very busy from morning until evening, but they do not examine people and they do not investigate matters.

Their bureaucratic manner is immense. They beat their gongs to blaze the way. They cause people to become afraid just by looking at them.

They are eight-sided and slippery as eels.

Government offices grow bigger and bigger. There are more people than there are jobs. Documents are numerous. There is red tape; instructions proliferate.

—Twenty Manifestations of Bureaucracy, undated but probably from 1966.

## On the Cultural Revolution

They really created disturbance on the streets of Nanking. The more I saw, the happier I felt.

Do not be afraid to make trouble. The more trouble you make and the longer you make it last the better. Confusion and trouble are always noteworthy. It can clear things up. The more you are afraid of ghosts the more you will encounter them. However, do not fire your guns. It is never good to open fire.

—Instruction, July 13, 1966.

After returning to Peking I was most distressed. Some schools have quietly closed their doors; some have even suppressed the student movement. Who wants to suppress student movements? Only the old warlords.

Some fear revolution. They want to fight things up and put the lid on. This is not permissible.

We should trust the masses and become students of the masses, then we can become teachers of the masses. The current Great Cultural Revolution is a formidable situation. Can we or do we dare undergo the test of socialism?

The final test of whether or not socialism will be achieved by the masses

For example, if 20 ques-

ing politics in command and your going among the masses where together with them you will carry out the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

—From a Talk to Central Committee leaders, believed to be in the summer of 1966.

The revolution has been imposed on you people because you did not carry out the revolution yourselves.

During the session those comrades who have come to attend the conference should go to Peking University and the Broadcasting College to read the big-character posters. You cannot go today because there are documents to deal with. When you read the posters, tell them that you have come to learn from them and help them make revolution.

When you go there you should be surrounded by students. More than 100 people have been assaulted at the Broadcasting College. In this era of ours, it is a good thing to have the leftists assaulted by the rightists because the leftists are tempered in this way.

—Address to Regional Secretaries and Members of the Cultural Revolution Group, July 22, 1966.

The principal question is what policies we should adopt regarding the problem of disturbances in various areas. My views are as follows. I firmly believe that a few months of disturbances will be mostly for the good and that little bad will result from these disturbances.

If the students want to be on the streets, let them. What is wrong with their putting up big-character posters in the streets? Let the foreigners take pictures, they just want to show our backwardness.

—Talk Before the Central Committee Work Conference, Aug. 23, 1966.

This meeting is more successful. At the last meeting we failed to penetrate things due to lack of experience. Nobody had thought, not even I, that a single big-character poster, the Red Guards, and the large-scale exchange of revolutionary experiences would lead to the demise of the various provincial and municipal committees.

—Speech at a Report Meeting, Oct. 24, 1966.

Comrade Chou En-lai: Recently many revolutionary teachers and students and revolutionary masses have written to me asking whether it is considered armed struggle to make those in authority taking the capitalist road and freaks and monsters wear dunce caps, to paint their faces and to parade them in the street. I think it is a form of armed struggle.

These methods cannot achieve our goal of educating the people. I want to stress here that, when engaging in struggle, we definitely must hold to struggle by reason.

—Letter to Chou En-lai, Feb. 1, 1967.

## Soviets Are Increasing Their 'Eyes in the Sky'

By George C. Wilson  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Soviet Union in 1969 launched a record number of observation satellites which look down on the United States and China from space.

And the Soviets appear to be switching to a satellite which stays up about 12 days instead of eight.

While both the United States and the Soviet Union keep much of their military space program secret, they do make public under a United Nations agreement the general characteristics of their launches.

An analysis of these space logs for 1969 shows the upsurge in reconnaissance satellites and a decrease in such other Soviet military activities as the orbital space bomb and maneuvering satellites.

Both the United States and Russia use their space satellites to count missiles and bombers on the ground and submarines and surface ships being built in yards. Their cameras would help police any arms control agreement reached at the SALT talks.

While the United States is considered ahead in reconnaissance satellites, the space log indicates steady Soviet progress.

In the eight years from calendar 1962 through 1969, the Soviet annual rate of launches of observation satellites rose from five to 32. The 1969 high of 32 launches compares with 29 in 1968 and 22 in 1967.

See SPY, A10, Col. 4

### SPY, From A1

The longer a satellite stays up, the fewer are needed through the year to provide frequent looks at what other nations are doing.

Five of the Soviet reconnaissance satellites were of the longer duration variety.

The last one — Cosmos 313 — was launched from the military space center at Plesetsk. The previous ones were all from the experimental space center at Tyuratam.

### Through Experimenting

This switch to Plesetsk indicates to some Soviet space specialists that the Soviet Union is through experimenting with the 12-day satellite and considers it operational.

FOBS—fractional orbital bombardment system—is a flat trajectory missile which can go around the world the long way to the United States, eluding the American warning radars in Greenland.

John S. Foster Jr., Pentagon research chief, told the Senate Appropriations Committee this year that the SS-9 ICBM is used to launch FOBS. He said the FOBS flight tests may be directed toward perfecting be stored on the ground.

One interpretation of the space log figures is that the Soviets have finished their FOBS tests and are ready to deploy the weapon. David Packard, deputy secretary of

defense, cited the FOBS threat in arguing for Senate approval of the Safeguard ABM defense.

### Launchings Dwindled

Starting on Sept. 17, 1966, the Soviets conducted a fast paced FOBS flight test program, firing 11 of the vehicles by the end of 1967. But the launchings dwindled to two in 1968 and only one in 1969.

Possibly, technical problems with FOBS have prompted the Soviet rocket forces to scrap the program. But it would appear late in the day to do this.

Similarly, the mysterious series of maneuvering Soviet rocket tests decreased from five in 1968 to one in 1969. Just what the Soviets were up to is still being argued by American weapons specialists.

One theory is that the Soviets were practicing with satellite killers, sending up a target satellite and then exploding another near it. Evidence behind this theory includes pieces of space vehicles detected by radar, indicating an explosion of some kind had taken place.