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DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

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DRAFTED BY:ARA:RAHURWITCH
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R 162248Z SEP 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL AMERICAN REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS
CINCSO POLAD

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SUBJECT: HURWITCH TESTIMONY ON CUBA POLICY BEFORE FULBRIGHT
COMMITTEE

1. TRANSMITTED FOR BACKGROUND AND POSSIBLE USE OF POSTS IS PUBLIC STATEMENT OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY HURWITCH BEFORE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, SEPTEMBER 16, 1971. PURPOSE OF HEARINGS WAS TO OBTAIN DEPARTMENT'S POSITION ON DRAFT SENATE RESOLUTION 146 CALLING FOR REPEAL OF PUBLIC LAW 87-733 OF OCTOBER 3, 1962 AND ON DRAFT SENATE RESOLUTION 160 WHICH: (1) ASKED PRESIDENT TO TAKE STEPS TO REVIEW U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA WITH OBJECTIVE OF BEGINNING PROCESS LEADING TO RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND CUBA; AND (2) EXPRESSED SENSE OF SENATE THAT U.S. SHOULD SUPPORT OAS RE-EXAMINATION OF THOSE RESOLUTIONS RELEVANT TO CUBA.

2. TEXT FOLLOWS: QUOTE MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE: I AM VERY PLEASED TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 146, A JOINT RESOLUTION TO REPEAL PUBLIC LAW 87-733, AND UPON SENATE RESOLUTION 160, EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE U.S. SENATE WITH RESPECT TO U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA.

WITH REGARD TO SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 146, AS THE DEPARTMENT

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HAS STATED BEFORE--IN LETTERS OF MARCH 12 AND JUNE 3, 1970--
IT NEITHER ADVOCATES NOR OPPOSES REPEAL OF PUBLIC LAW 87-733
SINCE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH DOES NOT DEPEND ON IT AS LEGAL OR
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR OUR POLICY TOWARD CUBA. HOWEVER,
THE DEPARTMENT WOULD NOT WISH THIS POSITION TO BE MISINTERPRETED.
THE JOINT RESOLUTION WAS EXPRESSIVE OF A COMMON UNDERSTANDING
OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES AT THAT TIME OF THE
THREAT TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
NATIONS POSED BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF INTERFERENCE
IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THESE NATIONS THROUGH SUPPORT
OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AND BY ITS MILITARY TIES WITH THE SOVIET
UNION. THE HISTORY OF THE ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES IN RESPONSE TO THIS THREAT IS WELL KNOWN
TO THE COMMITTEE.

IN THE DEPARTMENT'S VIEW, THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE
IN THE BASIC CONDITIONS UPON WHICH U.S. CUBAN POLICY HAS BEEN
BASED IN THE YEARS SINCE 1962 THAT WOULD WARRANT A CHANGE IN
U.S. POLICY. THEREFORE, THE CUBAN RESOLUTION OF 1962 STILL
REFLECTS U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA.

THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF OUR POLICY TOWARD CUBA WERE DES-
CRIBED AS FOLLOWS BY PRESIDENT NIXON IN HIS REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS OF FEBRUARY 25, 1971:

"CUBA CONTINUES TO EXCLUDE ITSELF FROM THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM BY ITS ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT OF REVOLUTION
AND ITS MILITARY TIES TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE LATTER MEANWHILE
ATTEMPTED TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE AND ITS MILITARY PRESENCE.

"WE DO NOT SEEK CONFRONTATIONS WITH ANY GOVERNMENT. BUT THOSE
WHICH DISPLAY UNREMITTING HOSTILITY CANNOT EXPECT OUR ASSISTANCE.
AND THOSE WHICH VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM, BY INTERVENING IN THE AFFAIRS OF THEIR NEIGHBORS OR
BY FACILITATING THE INTERVENTION OF NON-HEMISPHERIC POWERS,
CANNOT EXPECT TO SHARE THE BENEFITS OF INTER-AMERICAN COOPERATION.
WE WILL WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY TO REDUCE THE DISRUPTIVE EFFECT
OF SUCH ACTION."

UNITED STATES POLICY, THEREFORE, DERIVES FROM THESE PRINCIPAL
CONSIDERATIONS: OUR NATIONAL INTEREST; OUR OBLIGATIONS AS A
MEMBER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES; OUR CONCERN OVER

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CUBA'S EXPORT OF ITS REVOLUTION; AND CUBA'S MILITARY TIES TO THE SOVIET UNION.

WITH REGARD TO THE LAST, THE CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1962 AS WELL AS THE MORE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS LAST YEAR AT CIENFUEGOS ARE ILLUSTRATIVE OF OUR CONCERN ABOUT CUBA'S PRESENT MILITARY TIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION. YOU WILL RECALL MR. CHAIRMAN THAT AT CIENFUEGOS, CUBA PERMITTED THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE NEW STEPS WHICH COULD HAVE AFFORDED THE SOVIETS THE ABILITY TO AGAIN OPERATE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS FROM THIS HEMISPHERE. PRESIDENT NIXON STATED ON FEBRUARY 25, 1971, THAT THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN CONTRARY TO THE EARLIER UNDERTAKING BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES FOLLOWING THE MISSILE CRISIS. ONLY AFTER A PERIOD OF DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIET UNION DID WE REAFFIRM OUR UNDERSTANDING AND AMPLIFY IT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE AGREEMENT INCLUDED ACTIVITIES RELATED TO SEA-BASED SYSTEMS.

CUBA'S OPEN PURSUIT OF A POLICY OF ATTEMPTING TO SUBVERT EXISTING GOVERNMENTS IN THE HEMISPHERE AS WELL AS ITS COOPERATION WITH SOVIET MILITARY PURPOSES CONTINUE TO CONSTITUTE, IN OUR VIEW, A THREAT TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THIS HEMISPHERE. I WISH TO INVITE THE COMMITTEE'S ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT, CONSISTENT WITH THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED POLICY STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, OUR CONCERN IS BASED UPON EXTERNAL, NOT INTERNAL, POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT.

BY REFRAINING FROM STEPS THAT MIGHT ASSIST CUBA AND BY STRONGLY SUPPORTING THE MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE OAS, THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT SOUGHT THE OVERTHROW OF THE PRESENT CUBAN REGIME BUT RATHER SOUGHT THE REDUCTION OF CUBA'S CAPABILITY TO EXPORT ARMED REVOLUTION AND THE DISCOURAGEMENT OF SOVIET ADVENTURES IN THIS HEMISPHERE. AS A RESULT, CUBA HAS BEEN DEPRIVED OF SUBSTANTIAL SUMS OF HARD CURRENCY WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE BE AVAILABLE TO PROMOTE CUBAN GOALS IN LATIN AMERICAN AND SOME OF THE ENERGY, MONEY AND MANPOWER NOW REQUIRED TO KEEP THE CUBAN ECONOMY FUNCTIONING WOULD OTHERWISE BE AVAILABLE FOR SUPPORT OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. CUBA TODAY, (DUE ALSO IN PART TO PRIME MINISTER CASTRO'S MISMANAGEMENT) IS NOT AN ATTRACTIVE MODEL LIKELY TO STIMULATE EMULATION ELSEWHERE IN THE HEMISPHERE. MOREOVER, CUBA IS A FINANCIAL BURDEN FOR THE SOVIET UNION, COST I

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THE DEPARTMENT WISHES TO ASSURE THE COMMITTEE, HOWEVER, THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA IS UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW TO DETERMINE WHETHER SUCH POLICY TOWARD CUBA CONTINUES TO SERVE THE COMPLEX OF U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS INVOLVED, OR WHETHER SOME OTHER POLICIES MIGHT NOT SERVE BETTER. ANY SUCH REVIEW WOULD, OF COURSE, TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OUR COMMITMENTS IN THE OAS.

WE RECOGNIZE, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT THERE IS GREAT FERMENT IN LATIN AMERICA. WE KNOW THAT MODERNIZATION BRINGS EXTENSIVE AND FREQUENTLY UNSETTLING CHANGE. WE ARE NOT OPPOSED TO CHANGE.

I WOULD RECALL THAT PRESIDENT NIXON IN HIS TOAST AT A DINNER HONORING PRESIDENT CALDERA OF VENEZUELA ON JUNE 2, 1970, SAID, "...ALL OF US COME FROM AND WERE BORN TO THIS WORLD, OUR NATIONS, THROUGH VIOLENT REVOLUTION. NOW OUR CHARGE AND OUR TASK IS TO PROVIDE THE MEANS AND THE METHOD THROUGH WHICH THOSE GREAT CHANGES THAT NEED TO BE MADE IN THE WORLD, IN OUR OWN COUNTRIES AND IN THE WORLD, CAN BE MADE THROUGH PEACEFUL CHANGE."

NOR ARE WE BENT UPON A POLICY THAT INSISTS THAT OTHERS FOREGO THEIR HISTORIES AND TRADITIONS AND ARRANGE THEIR SOCIETIES TO CONFORM TO OURS. WE FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT OUR NATION WHICH VALUES A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY AT HOME SHOULD IN EQUAL MEASURE RESPECT DIVERSITY ABROAD.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD ALSO RECALL THAT PRESIDENT NIXON HAS STATED THAT WHILE WE HOPE THAT GOVERNMENTS WILL EVOLVE TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES, WE DEAL WITH GOVERNMENTS AS THEY ARE. OUR RELATIONS DEPEND NOT ON THEIR INTERNAL STRUCTURES OR SOCIAL SYSTEMS, BUT ON ACTIONS WHICH AFFECT US AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM.

THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA ADVOCATES CHANGE, HOWEVER, THROUGH VIOLENT MEANS. CUBA'S POLICIES ENCOURAGE POLARIZATION WITHIN THE MANY FRAGILE SOCIETIES OF LATIN AMERICA AND TEND TO LEAD TO REPRESSIVE REGIMES OF THE RIGHT OR DICTATORSHIPS OF THE LEFT WHEN SUCCESSFUL. CUBA'S POLICIES HAVE ALSO FORCED OTHER NATIONS OF THE HEMISPHERE TO DIVERT A PORTION OF THE SCARCE RESOURCES TO THE PURCHASE OF WEAPONS AND TO THE WEAKENING OF THEIR INTERNAL SECURITY CAPABILITY, INCLUDING THE PURCHASE OF ARMS,

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IN ORDER TO COUNTER CUBAN INFLUENCE. ILLUSTRATIVELY, THE THEN PRESIDENT OF COLOMBIA, DR. CARLOS LLERAS RESTREPO, A WELL-KNOWN LIBERAL STATESMAN, REPLIED TO A REPORTER'S QUESTION IN FEBRUARY 1970 AS TO WHETHER HE THOUGHT HIS COUNTRY SHOULD FOLLOW CHILE'S EXAMPLE IN SEEKING A NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH CUBA:

"CHILE IS IN THE SOUTH AND WE ARE IN THE CARIBBEAN. COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA ARE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE BEEN LASHED BY GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS, BY URBAN INTERVENTIONS IN OUR DOMESTIC MATTERS. THAT IS THE SOURCE OF CUBA'S SANCTION. I DO NOT BELIEVE CHILE'S POSITION IS THE POSITION OF THE CONTINENT AND I CONSIDER IT IS CUBA THAT MUST CHANGE TOWARD US AND NOT THE REVERSE. WE HAVE HAD TO INVEST MAJOR SUMS TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC ORDER BECAUSE OF THE CUBANS."

MR. CHAIRMAN, OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR LATIN AMERICAN NEIGHBORS IN THE HEMISPHERE SUGGEST THAT THE VIEW OF FORMER PRESIDENT LLERAS REFLECTS PREVAILING SENTIMENT.

IN ITS CONTINUING REVIEW OF POLICY TOWARD CUBA, THE DEPARTMENT SEES NO EVIDENCE OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS THAT MATERIALLY AFFECT THE TWIN FOUNDATIONS OF U.S. POLICY. ON THE CONTRARY, THE MOST RECENT EVIDENCE CONFIRMS THE VALIDITY OF CONTINUING THIS POLICY. CUBA CONTINUES TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER HEMISPHERIC NATIONS BY PROVIDING TRAINING IN CUBA FOR URBAN AND RURAL TERRORISTS--BY PROVIDING MONETARY AND OTHER MATERIAL SUPPORT TO SUBVERSIVE GROUPS--AND OCCASIONAL DIRECT PARTICIPATION BY CUBANS IN INSURGENCIES. ON JULY 26 PRIME MINISTER CASTRO OPENLY TOOK SIDES IN THE PENDING URUGUAYAN ELECTIONS AND DREW A STIFF REJOINDER FROM THE URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT. HIS PUBLICLY EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE TURN OF EVENTS IN BOLIVIA DREW THE REMINDER FROM THE BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT THAT CUBANS IN 1967 AND AGAIN IN 1970 HAD BLATANTLY INTERFERED IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF BOLIVIA, A NATION THAT HAD EXPERIENCED ONE OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC EVOLUTIONS IN THE HEMISPHERE IN 1952, SEVEN YEARS BEFORE HE CAME TO POWER. LAST MONTH, ON AUGUST 27, PRIME MINISTER CASTRO VIGOROUSLY RE-AFFIRMED THAT HE WOULD NOT ABANDON HIS SUPPORT FOR VIOLENT CHANGE IN OTHER NATIONS OF THE HEMISPHERE AND SPOKE OF CUBAN SUPPORT FOR VIOLENT CHANGE IN OTHER NATIONS OF THE HEMISPHERE AND SPOKE OF GUERRILLAS.

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DESPITE PRIME MINISTER CASTRO'S RENEWED EFFORT TO PROJECT HIMSELF AS A LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY LEADER, IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT IN THE PERIOD 1968-1971 THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SOME FALLING OFF IN THE MATERIAL SUPPORT WHICH CUBA PROVIDED TO SUBVERSIVE MOVEMENTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. AS HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE, CUBAN SUPPORT HAS BECOME MORE SELECTIVE AND THERE HAS BEEN A SHIFT FROM RURAL GUERRILLA WARFARE TO URBAN TERRORISM. CUBAN ADOPTION OF NEW TACTICS ON SUBVERSION, HOWEVER, DOES NOT MEAN THAT IT HAS RENOUNCED SUPPORT OF VIOLENT REVOLUTION; NEITHER DOES IT REPRESENT AN ABANDONMENT OF OTHER FORMS OF SUBVERSION; WHICH WE BELIEVE CUBA CONTINUES TO REGARD AS USEFUL POLITICAL TOOLS.

AN IMPORTANT FACTOR ACCOUNTING FOR SOME REDUCTION IN CUBAN SUPPORT IS THE FACT THAT THE MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE OAS TO COUNTER CUBAN INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE SUCCEEDED IN WEAKENING CUBA'S CAPABILITY TO COMMIT SUCH INTERFERENCE. CUBA'S LONG SERIES OF DISASTROUS FOREIGN ADVENTURES, CULMINATING IN THE CHE GUEVARA 1967 FIASCO IN BOLIVIA, HAD ITS EFFECT AS WELL. FINALLY, ECONOMIC MISMANAGEMENT AT HOME MATCHED THE FAILURE ABROAD. PRIME MINISTER CASTRO SAID IN AUGUST 1970 THAT IF CUBA HAD NOT GIVEN FULL SUPPORT TO REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA, IT WAS IN PART BECAUSE "WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO." TO ABANDON NOW THESE POLICIES WHICH HINDER THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT'S CAPABILITY TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES WOULD THEREFORE BE NEITHER PRUDENT NOR JUSTIFIED.

WITH REGARD TO SENATE RESOLUTION 160, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE NOTES THAT THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION IS IN TWO SECTIONS. I SHALL ADDRESS COMMENTS TO EACH.

THE FIRST SECTION PROPOSES THAT IT BE THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT THE PRESIDENT TAKE STEPS TO REVIEW U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF BEGINNING A PROCESS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE REESTABLISHMENT OF NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CUBA. IT APPEARS TO ASSUME THAT A PROCESS LEADING TO THE REESTABLISHMENT OF NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CUBA WOULD SERVE U.S. INTERESTS AND THAT SUCH A PROCESS WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO BOTH COUNTRIES. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THIS TO BE TRUE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE RESOLUTION MIGHT BE MISINTERPRETED

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TO IMPLY THAT WE ARE NO LONGER CONCERNED OVER PRIME MINISTER CASTRO'S POLICIES OF DEMONSTRATING HOSTILITY TOWARD THE U.S., OF EXPORTING HIS REVOLUTION, AND OF SEEKING EVER CLOSER MILITARY TIES WITH THE USSR. IT COULD WELL ENHANCE HIS PRESTIGE AND LEND HIM THE STATURE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE HE SEEKS BUT DOES NOT ENJOY. I BELIEVE IT WOULD ALSO GIVE AN AURA OF LEGITIMACY TO THE EXTREMIST MOVEMENTS SUPPORTED BY CUBA THAT SEEK VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF GOVERNMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA. THESE ARE SOME OF THE PERTINENT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

FROM THE ECONOMIC STANDPOINT, THE U.S. HAS LITTLE, IF ANYTHING, TO GAIN. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH A NUMBER OF FRIENDLY NATIONS TO ASSURE A RELIABLE SUPPLY OF SUGAR FOR THE U.S. DOMESTIC MARKET; THEREFORE CUBAN SUGAR IS NOT ESSENTIAL AS LONG AS THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT REMAINS IN POWER. THE ABSENCE OF CUBAN TOBACCO OR THE FEW OTHER CUBAN EXPORT PRODUCTS HAS ALSO NOT HAD SIGNIFICANT EFFECT UPON OUR ECONOMY.

THUS, FROM THE STANDPOINT OF U.S. INTERESTS, UNLESS THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT WERE TO ABANDON ITS POLICIES AND ACTIONS WHICH CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE HEMISPHERE, THE BENEFITS TO BE DERIVED FROM NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH CUBA ARE NOT READILY APPARENT, WHEREAS THE COSTS ARE CLEAR.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA IS NOT, AS I HAVE STATED AT THE OUTSET, INFLEXIBLE. SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA ABANDON THE POLICIES BY WHICH IT EXCLUDED ITSELF FROM THE FAMILY OF AMERICAN NATIONS, THE UNITED STATES WOULD, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS, REVIEW EXISTING POLICIES IN THE LIGHT OF SUCH NEW CIRCUMSTANCES. THE PRESIDENT SAID AS MUCH PUBLICLY ON APRIL 16 OF THIS YEAR; ON APRIL 19, FIDEL CASTRO IN DIRECT REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, DECLARED THAT HE SCORNEDED NORMALIZED RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. SEVERAL DAYS LATER, (ON APRIL 21) THE NEW YORK TIMES EDITORIALIZED:

"HIS (CASTRO'S) STANCE IMPLIES THAT CONTINUED HOSTILITY IS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE.

"CASTRO'S VERBAL SUPERMILITANCY CAN ONLY BE INTERPRETED AS A PUBLIC ATTACK UPON AND REPUDIATION OF THE MORE CONCILIATORY LINES NOW BEING FOLLOWED IN MOSCOW AND PEKING. HIS WORDS GUARANTEE UNFORGETTABLELY THAT THE CUBAN AMERICAN HATEFULNESS WILL CONTINUE.

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BUT HE HIMSELF MUST NOW BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY."

WE KNOW OF NO BASIS FOR BELIEVING THAT CUBA, WHICH FORCED THE
BREAK IN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, WOULD NOW WELCOME
THEIR REESTABLISHMENT.

WITH REGARD TO THE SECOND SECTION OF THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION,
HEMISPHERIC POLICY TOWARD CUBA INCLUDING THAT OF THE U.S.
DERIVES FROM A SERIES OF RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES AT MEETINGS CONVOKED AT LATIN AMERICAN IN-
ITIATIVE. THESE RESOLUTIONS EXCLUDED THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF
CUBA FROM PARTICIPATION IN THE OAS. THEY CONDEMNED CUBA FOR
ACTS OF INTERVENTION AND AGGRESSION AGAINST VARIOUS COUNTRIES OF
THE HEMISPHERE AND IMPOSED SANCTIONS SUSPENDING ALL TRADE AND
SHIPPING AS WELL AS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER COUN-
TRIES AND CUBA UNTIL TH OAS DECIDED BY A TWO-THIRDS VOTE THAT
CUBA HAS CEASED TO BE A THREAT TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY
OF THE HEMISPHERE.

THE DEPARTMENT NOTES THAT THE PROPOSED SENATE RESOLUTION EN-
VISAGES A REEXAMINATION BY THE OAS OF ITS CUBAN POLICY AND
CONCURS, THAT SHOULD CIRCUMSTANCES SO WARRANT, REVIEW OF POLICY
TOWARD CUBA SHOULD PROPERLY TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE OAS BUT ONLY
WHEN A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTS SUCH A REVIEW. UNILATERAL
CHANGE OF POLICY TOWARD CUBA BY ANY OF THE OAS MEMBER NATIONS,
VIOLATES BINDING OBLIGATIONS TAKEN UNDER THE TERMS OF THE RIO
TREATY, DEROGATES FROM THE PRESTIGE AND AUTHORITY OF THE OAS
AND CONSEQUENTLY WEAKENS THE TIES THAT BIND THE NATIONS OF THE
AMERICAS. FOR THIS REASON, IT IS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE UNITED
STATES TO TAKE UNILATERAL STEPS, MUCH LESS WITHOUT PRIOR CON-
SULTATION WITH THE OTHER OAS MEMBERS, THAT WOULD LEAD TOWARD
NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH CUBA. FOR THIS REASON WE HAVE DEPLORED
CHILE'S ACTION.

ALTHOUGH THE U.S. IS, OF COURSE, PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE
IN THE DISCUSSION OF ITEMS PLACED UPON THE OAS AGENDA, THE
DEPARTMENT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH LED
TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE OAS RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING CUBA HAS
CHANGED IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY; THEREFORE, NO CHANGE IN THESE
RESOLUTIONS WOULD BE Warranted. THE DEPARTMENT URGES THAT
THE OAS, WHICH PRIME MINISTER CASTRO AS RECENTLY AS A FEW

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WEEKS AGO CHARACTERIZED AS "THAT CESSPOOL, THAT FILTH, THAT
CADAVER," SHOULD DIGNIFY CUBA BY ALLOCATING ANY OF ITS VALUABLE
TIME TO TAKING NOTE OF IT.

FOR THESE MULTIPLE REASONS, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WOULD OPPOSE THE ADOPTION ON RESOLUTION 160 BY THE UNITED

STATES SENATE. UNQUOTE
IRWIN

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