

# TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE BRITT

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## HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE  
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY  
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY  
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 5, 1971

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



*released 9 Aug*

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON : 1971

62-432

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RESOLUTION

*Resolved*, by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, that the testimony of Lawrence Britt taken in executive session on May 5, 1971, be released from the injunction of secrecy, be printed and made public.

JAMES O. EASTLAND, *Chairman*.

Approved: July 12, 1971.

(11)

## TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE BRITT

WEDNESDAY, MAY 5, 1971

U.S. SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE  
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT  
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS  
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room 155, Old Senate Office Building, Senator Edward J. Gurney, presiding.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Samuel Scott, associate counsel; Alfonso L. Tarabochia, chief investigator; and David Martin, investigation analyst.

Senator GURNEY. The subcommittee will come to order.

Will you raise your right hand, Mr. Britt?

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BRITT. I do.

Senator GURNEY. Proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I should like to make a brief preliminary statement.

Mr. Britt has testified under his real name, and is so testifying, but he is a refugee and because of that, and facts that would develop through his testimony, he has been helped to create a new identity. The committee is aware of the new identity, but with the Chair's permission, we will not refer to it at this time so our record will try to protect that identity.

Senator GURNEY. I understand.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sir, what is your nationality?

Mr. BRITT. My nationality is Czechoslovak.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where were you born?

Mr. BRITT. I was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was your education?

Mr. BRITT. I got my education at Charles University in Prague in the Department for International Relations, and I graduated in 1954. Later in 1964 I enrolled in the Charles University again, studied at the Department for Journalism and graduated in 1967.

Mr. SOURWINE. What has been your employment since you got out of there?

Mr. BRITT. Several weeks before my graduation in 1954, I was invited by the Center Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and I was recruited as an intelligence officer for Czechoslovak Intelligence Service. I served in this capacity until September

1968 when I defected and a short time later I asked the American authorities for political asylum.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will say, Mr. Chairman, that the committee is aware of how Mr. Britt got to the United States and where he entered, but again if the Chair will permit, we will not go into that on the record.

Mr. Britt, what rank did you achieve in the Czechoslovak service?

Mr. BRITT. I was a major.

Mr. SOURWINE. How high do the ranks run in that service?

Mr. BRITT. The highest rank in the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service was the rank of colonel, so it was a high rank.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many majors were there approximately at the time you were in it?

Mr. BRITT. I would say about, between 70 and 100.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you any idea how many men altogether were in that service?

Mr. BRITT. There were about 1,500 people in the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am talking about officers in the Intelligence Service.

Mr. BRITT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the nature of your assignment? And if it changed, tell us about that.

Mr. BRITT. At the beginning I got an intelligence schooling. I went through a 6-month intelligence school in Prague and then at the beginning of 1955, I was appointed a research officer in the Department for Research and Analysis. I worked there until 1958, when I was appointed operational officer, an officer of the operational department for intelligence activities against Germany.

In 1961, I was sent to Berlin as a member of the so-called *residencia* there, covered as a cultural attaché of the Czechoslovak Embassy in East Berlin. I stayed there until January 1963 when I returned to Prague to the headquarters of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service and shortly after that, in February of 1964, I was appointed deputy chief of the new Department for Disinformation. Actually in the parlance of the Soviet-bloc intelligence services, it was called the Department for Active Measures. I served as deputy chief of this department for 2 years, until 1966, when I was appointed an officer of the Czechoslovak intelligence station in Vienna.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was your chief in the Department of Disinformation when you were deputy?

Mr. BRITT. My chief was Maj. Tíří Stejskal.

Senator GURNEY. What does this Department of Disinformation mean; that is, the word "disinformation"?

Mr. BRITT. Yes, actually it prepares and carries out disinformation, black propaganda and so-called influence operations. These operations, first of all, aim at influencing the sphere of public opinion of the non-Communist world, trying to deceive the world public opinion, to undermine the American positions all over the world.

The second direction of these activities is deceiving decisionmakers of the non-Communist countries, and to bring them to false decisions.

In the parlance of the intelligence services it means to "feed" them with false information and expect that they will then use it as a basis for wrong conclusions and measures.

Senator GURNEY. I understand. I suppose false information would be a good description of the word "disinformation."

Mr. BRITT. Yes, sir; but, it is used in the intelligence services, it is a common term.

Mr. SOURWINE. To expand on that a little, with the Chair's permission—is it true that the disinformation operation includes a number of specialized techniques? For instance, the Chair spoke of the actual dissemination of false information.

Mr. BRITT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And there is the discrediting of factual information?

Mr. BRITT. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And of true information.

Mr. BRITT. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then there is the slanting with respect to public information, with a view, as you said, to bring about bad judgments and false decisions?

Mr. BRITT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, are there other specialized techniques which you recognize and can tell us about at this time?

Mr. BRITT. Well, I think there are basically three types of operations: disinformation, which means to feed an enemy, it can be the United States, Germany, Britain, any non-Communist country, with false information so that the counterpart, the enemy, takes wrong decisions.

Second type are propaganda operations. It may seem strange that Soviet-bloc intelligence spends so much time and effort on propaganda when every Communist-bloc country has a large official apparatus for the same purpose. It is true that Soviet-bloc intelligence takes over the role of a propagandist abroad whenever for ideological, moral, or tactical reasons the official propaganda institution can't do that. So for example, Eastern European intelligence services do not hesitate to do propaganda of fascist character in the name of some nonexistent Fascist organization if it serves the purpose. It is actually black propaganda as the real source is covered and the world public opinion doesn't know that it was initiated in Eastern Europe.

Then, there is the third type called influence operations which are the most demanding and very rare.

These operations are based on the activities of so-called influence agents, Communist agents working in non-Communist countries, who have important positions in the government, political parties or in Parliament. They can get instructions from East European Communist intelligence services, for instance, how they should react in Parliament, in a parliamentary discussion or if they occupy an important position in an enemy's intelligence service, what to do, in order to make it less efficient.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are there persons of that nature in the United States, to your knowledge?

Mr. BRITT. I have no knowledge of this kind of person in the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not mean, sir, individuals whom you know personally or know to be, but do you have reason to believe there are such individuals in the United States?

Mr. BRITT. Yes, I suppose so, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't have any examples?

Mr. BRITT. No, because the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service maybe was not as well established in the United States as, for instance, the Russian Intelligence Service could. As far as the operations carried out directly on the American territory are concerned, during the period between 1964 and 1966 when I was a deputy chief of that department, this was very, very rare. Actually, I remember only one operation which was carried out anonymously in the United States in 1964 during the presidential campaign. It was a propaganda operation against the presidential candidate, Mr. Goldwater, but it was not too successful because it was only a drop in the ocean of really existing anti-Goldwater opinions and propaganda.

Senator GURNEY. You are saying we are doing a pretty good job ourselves without the help of the Czechs?

Mr. BRITT. Yes, that is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you give us an example of an operation of this type in any country with which you are familiar?

Mr. BRITT. First of all, I would like to underline that most of these operations are parasites on the existing anti-American movements all over the world. It is very easy for the Communist intelligence service to start an anti-American operation in Africa, Asia, or Latin America because of anti-American movements and opinions which objectively exist there. Disinformation operations of the Communist intelligence services parasitize on these existing anti-American streams.

I can give you an example of an operation which was carried out in 1964 and 1965, aiming at undermining American positions in Africa.

Three forgeries of American documents were produced in Prague.

The purpose was to reveal the United States as the major conspirator and enemy of the left-oriented African regimes. The first one was a forgery of a letter by American Ambassador in Leopoldville to the Congolese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I think. Together with the other two written in similar spirit, these forgeries were to prove American conspiracy against the leftist Tanzanian Government. They were leaked to Tanzanian governmental officials but unfortunately I can't say who was used as a channel because the Disinformation Department was not informed about the names of agents. We were responsible for preparation of these operations without being allowed to know the identity of people involved.

Senator GURNEY. Who would know these, within your intelligence system?

Mr. BRITT. The so-called operational departments who are responsible to carry it out with the help of their agents. The Disinformation Department didn't have any agents, it prepared these operations, but didn't direct any agents. That was the responsibility of the so-called operational departments.

Senator GURNEY. I take it your operation was somewhat compartmentalized so one part would not know another part, where it was operating or what the names of the people were in another department?

Mr. BRITT. Yes, in order to protect agents. Well, in this case, in this operation Oscar Kambond, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tanzania, presented the forgeries to the public as a proof of the American conspiracy.

And that was the start of a big anti-American campaign, not only in Tanzania but I would say all over the African continent. Tanzanian

President Nyerere hesitated to believe in these forgeries, he asked the American authorities for proof and shortly after that the American authorities presented the facts proving that all these documents were forgeries. President Nyerere accepted that, but the campaign continued, because actually the press did not want to believe that they were forgeries.

The second stage of the operation took place several months later when the Congolese rebellion forces were supplied with another forgery, confirming, or trying to confirm, the American antileftist activities in Africa.

The forgery was published when Thomas Kanza, the Congolese rebel foreign minister, gave an interview to the East African Standard. Mr. Kanza said that the Congolese revolutionaries had documents proving that the United States, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia had prepared the return of Moise Tshombe to the Congo and presented as a proof that forgery. And shortly after that Mr. Bouteflika, the Algerian Foreign Minister, made a similar attack at the meeting of African politicians in Nairobi, in March 1965. Many African news media published these pseudo-facts about the American conspiracy and the campaign continued for another few weeks or months.

I think one of the reasons why this campaign, this operation was successful was that most of the African leftist leaders, politicians or journalists wanted to believe in that disinformation message. They were not careful enough to find out whether the documents were forged or not. They wanted to believe in them because they confirmed their opinion. I suppose that was one of the reasons why this operation, and many other operations, were successful.

Senator GURNEY. Are we through with Tanzania?

Mr. BRITT. Yes.

Senator GURNEY. Let us go back to this United States political campaign of 1964.

Can you describe the efforts and the techniques used by the Czechs in the political campaign?

Mr. BRITT. As far as the technique is concerned, it was very primitive because the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service produced several forged documents and they were very cheaply forged. I can explain why. For instance the letter written by the American, supposedly written by the American Ambassador to Mr. Tshombe—

Senator GURNEY. I'm talking about the 1964 political campaign here.

Mr. BRITT (continuing). You mean the presidential campaign?

Senator GURNEY. That is right; not the Tanzanian matter.

Mr. BRITT. I think that it was a leaflet of several pages attacking Mr. Goldwater as a racist. Some facts in this leaflet about Mr. Goldwater were picked up from American books and newspapers and they were mixed with sensational ingredients attacking Mr. Goldwater as a racist.

Senator GURNEY. How were these distributed?

Mr. BRITT. They were distributed anonymously. I think that these letters were sent to the United States in diplomatic bags and mailed by the members of the Czechoslovakian intelligence station in the United States.

Senator GURNEY. In other words, mailed here.

Mr. BRITT. Yes.

Senator GURNEY. Do you know to whom they were mailed?

Mr. BRITT. The names were usually selected from various address books, "Who's Who," and similar publications.

Senator GURNEY. In other words, there was a mailing list of various sorts.

Mr. BRITT. Yes.

Senator GURNEY. How many were there, do you know?

Mr. BRITT. I would say there were several thousand copies of this leaflet mailed.

Senator GURNEY. Was there any other effort in that political campaign?

Mr. BRITT. No, no other effort. That was the only operation which the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service carried out in the United States of America in 1964.

Senator GURNEY. Now, how about 1968?

Mr. BRITT. I can't say because at that time I was not in the Disinformation Department any more.

Senator GURNEY. Do you know whether any other Communist country in Europe, either Russia or Iron Curtain countries, do this as a routine thing in political campaigns?

Mr. BRITT. The intelligence services have a green light to do it. There are no restrictions; but, they are careful, very careful, because it is dangerous from the operational point of view and from the political point of view as well. It is dangerous to be directly involved, to have direct connections with dissidents, with the ultraleftists in the United States or in other non-Communist countries. It represents an excessive risk because if the Soviet-bloc perpetrator is disclosed by a counter intelligence service, it would cause serious political harm to the Soviet Union and her prestige.

A safer way how to misuse the ultraleft of the non-Communist world is ideological influencing, leaving the initiative for individual violent or nonviolent actions in the hands of its leaders and that is not the job of Soviet-bloc intelligence but supreme Communist party bodies. It is true that many Communist intelligence disinformation and propaganda operations are accompanied by outbursts, but they erupt spontaneously, inspired by disinformational messages rather than on direct initiative of the Soviet-bloc intelligence.

The only case of direct involvement of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service in organizing demonstrations and riots I know, happened in Panama in 1965.

The Czechoslovak Intelligence Service didn't have any agents in Panama but had a lot of them in Mexico. Some of them were, I suppose, students, and again I don't know neither the identity nor the number of them because I was not allowed to. With their help the operation was carried out in Panama in 1965, a year after the clashes between American military forces and the students in Panama during which several people were killed. The Czechoslovak Intelligence Service decided to use the incident as a motive and base for an anti-American operation there and develop a tradition of anti-American struggle, a day of fight against American imperialism.

Every anniversary of the death of these Panamanian students was supposed to be commemorated by demonstrations and riots. The Czechoslovak Intelligence Service succeeded in instigating these riots



in 1965 with the help of the Mexican agents but a year later it didn't work any more and that was the end of the operation. This operation was the only one I know about when students were directly used or misused.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire?

Senator GURNEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Two different facets of that, one, leaving for a moment the activities in Latin America which we will come back to, I wanted to go back and lay a little foundation and ask a few questions. The foundation lies in your use of the phrase "the United States, the enemy."

It could have been any free country, I take it, that means that the intelligence service of Czechoslovakia, and I presume of other Iron Curtain countries, regards every free country in the world as an enemy, is that correct?

Mr. BRITT. The reason why I used the term is that United States is characterized in the long-range plans of the Soviet-bloc intelligence as enemy No. 1. There are certain priorities.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why?

Mr. BRITT. Because the United States is the most important rival of the Soviet Union, so not only the Soviet Intelligence Service but all satellite intelligence services as well consider the United States the enemy No. 1.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, I want to get to the question, with that background: Why was the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service interested in the Barry Goldwater campaign? What was the objective, what did they expect to gain, why were they attempting to discredit Mr. Goldwater as, as you say, a racist?

Mr. BRITT. The reason why, I think was that Mr. Goldwater was considered a dangerous rival.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you did this because he was an anti-Communist?

Mr. BRITT. Yes, strongly anti-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Opposed to the U.S.S.R.?

Mr. BRITT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he opposed to Czechoslovakia?

Mr. BRITT. No, not at all; the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service was only an instrument of the Soviet Intelligence Service.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that true in general?

Mr. BRITT. Yes, it is. It sounds unbelievable or ridiculous that Czechoslovakia, a small country in middle Europe with the help of her Intelligence Service is involved in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and so forth. Doing things which don't correspond with real interests of Czechoslovakia at all. This is not typical for Czechoslovakia only, all satellite intelligence services are primarily Soviet foreign policy instruments.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you operated in Panama, your objective was a certain impact on the United States, isn't that correct?

Mr. BRITT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. But when you operated with regard to Barry Goldwater, your objective was, as I understand your testimony, only to hurt an individual who, as an individual, was an enemy of the Soviet Union?

Mr. BRITT. That was one reason. Another reason was to show an

American presidential candidate as a racist and to influence the black part of the American population against him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you then making international propaganda against the United States by this charge of racism against Goldwater?

Mr. BRITT. Yes; thousands of these anti-Goldwater pamphlets printed in English, French and maybe in Spanish too were distributed throughout the Third World pointing the United States as the enemy of nonwhite nations, but the effect was very limited.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, I wanted to ask a few questions about the area of operations in Latin America that you opened up. You spoke of Panama. Do you have any knowledge of operations of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service in Cuba?

Mr. BRITT. I know that Czechoslovak Intelligence Service had a large intelligence station in Cuba, in Havana.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was this put in?

Mr. BRITT. I'm not quite sure, but I think it was established in 1960 or maybe 1961.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this residentura operating against Cubans or was it using Havana as a base?

Mr. BRITT. This residentura had to help the Cubans to learn the espionage business. At that time I think the Czechs were more acceptable than the Russians.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you were training Cubans in the intelligence business?

Mr. BRITT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. To operate where?

Mr. BRITT. Especially in Latin America.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you train Cubans in the intelligence business to operate as agents in the United States?

Mr. BRITT. That is only my supposition. I think yes. I wasn't involved in operation activities against the United States, but according to my knowledge, I would say "yes."

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you aware of the operations of the International Union of Students in Prague in training Puerto Ricans to operate as agents in the United States?

Mr. BRITT. I know that in Prague there was a large Cuban intelligence station which operated with the help of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service.

Mr. SOURWINE. Cubans were sent to Prague for training in large numbers?

Mr. BRITT. Yes, many people from Latin American countries who were supposed to be trained came to Prague. Maybe I don't know how, whether they came over Canada or through other countries, but they came to Prague and they were trained there. How far Czechoslovak Intelligence Service instructed them there, I don't know, but certainly there was cooperation between the Czechoslovak and the Cuban Intelligence Services in Prague. The Cubans had a large villa there and a permanent Czech liaison officer was in daily contact with them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge of cooperation between the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service or its residentura in Havana and guerrilla operations run by Cubans elsewhere in this hemisphere, the Guevara type of operations?

Mr. BRITT. I don't have any knowledge about it, but I can say my opinion on it. I would say that Cuba represents an important base for the penetration of the United States, certainly there are many refugees in the United States who could have been recruited not only by Cuban Intelligence Service but Czechoslovak Intelligence Service or Russian Intelligence Service as well.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is a speculation based on your background knowledge, it is not an indication or statement that you know of this?

Mr. BRITT. This is my speculation.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I say something off the record?

Senator GURNEY. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SOURWINE. May we go back on the record?

Senator GURNEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any information about the use of Cuban exiles in connection with guerrilla operations elsewhere in Latin America, either for or against such operations?

Mr. BRITT. No, not at all. During the period between 1964 and 1966, the Department for Active Measures was not involved in influencing or directing guerrilla acts in Latin American or Asian countries, not at all.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. May I inquire?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Tarabochia is our chief investigator and has special knowledge. May he ask any questions that occur to him?

Senator GURNEY. Yes, at any time.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. You mentioned about the falsification of documents, an accusation of the United States, an anti-Communist element in the Congo.

Are you aware that Che Guevara fought in the Congo against the government forces?

Mr. BRITT. No, I didn't know about that.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. Did the misinformation or Disinformation Department of the Czechoslovak Intelligence ever mention the use of anti-Castro Cuban exiles fighting in the Congo?

Mr. BRITT. No, never.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. Going back to Panama, the riots January 9, 1964, were the direct result of agitation by student leaders who were members of the International Union of Students. Are you aware that the International Union of Students is based, the secretariat is based in Prague?

Mr. BRITT. I would like to say that the riots in 1964 were the inspiration for the later operation, but the Czechoslovak Disinformation Department was not involved in these riots in 1964, only later. I know about the fact that the International Union of Students has its headquarters in Prague. I was personally in contact with the chairman of this organization who was my university colleague, Mr. Vokrouhlicky, but during the period 1964-66 there was no direct influence of the Czechoslovak Disinformation Department on the International Union of Students.

It is true that the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service planned to misuse the World Congress of that organization which was supposed to be held in Algeria for anti-American propaganda. However, President Ben Bella was arrested and the congress didn't take place

there. A year later, I think it was in 1965, the congress was to be held in Ghana and the same thing happened there. President N'krumah was overthrown and the congress had to be postponed until 1968 when it took place in Bulgaria, and I doubt whether the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service was involved there.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. Did the name of Floyd Britton surface during the operation in Panama? Does the name of or are you familiar with Floyd Britton?

Mr. BRITT. No.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. He was the leader of the students during the demonstrations which were supposed to take place in 1965.

Mr. BRITT. The problem is, following—I think you were not here when I spoke about the position of the Disinformation Department—the Disinformation Department was responsible for the preparation of all these operations but not for the execution of them because we were not informed about the channels, the names of the agents which was supposed to carry out those operations, for security reasons.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. That is all.

Senator GURNEY. Mr. Britt, let's go back to your statement that the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service was really an extension of Soviet foreign policy; and as I also understood, you stated that is true of the Iron Curtain countries.

Could you give us more detail on how this is done, for example does the head of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service report directly to Moscow? Do you go there for training? Do Russians come to Prague and tell them what to do? Give us some of the techniques involved here.

Mr. BRITT. The Czechoslovak Intelligence Service after 1948 was built up according to the Soviet pattern. Starting with 1949-50, many Soviet advisors came to Prague to direct the activities of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service. They stayed formally as advisors until 1963 when the official title changed to liaison officers. Anyhow, that was only a formal change. They still had the same power as before.

The mechanism of the Soviet influence is very powerful.

The system of advisors is one way how the Soviets direct satellite intelligence services. Until 1963, every operation, even the most unimportant one, had to be approved by an advisor first. When a Czechoslovak intelligence officer wrote an operation proposal he had to visit his advisor, discuss it with him, rewrite it according to the advisor's critical review and only after that he submitted it to his Czechoslovak chief. The system of advisors is hierarchically structured. There are advisors who direct activities at the department level, advisors who check everything at the level of the chief of the intelligence service, and finally there is a chief advisor for the Ministry of Interior who serves as the personal advisor for the minister. Understandably the advisors at the higher level have the right to veto all decisions of the subordinate advisors.

Then there are, of course, other ways of the Soviet influence. If the Soviets need something from the Czechoslovak, East German, Hungarian or Polish Intelligence Service they approach directly the chief of such service who gives the orders to the departments. Thus, people involved in such operation very often don't know that they are doing something for the Russians because they got instructions from the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service chief.

Then there are many people in the satellite intelligence services who have been professionally educated in the Soviet Union in the Intelligence School there. Until 1964 the intelligence school for Czechoslovak officers took 2 years. After that, it was changed to 1 year only. Anyhow there was an order in 1964 that every chief starting with the position of a deputy chief of a department was supposed to be professionally educated in Moscow. Many of the officers who went to Moscow and came back were critical of the Moscow intelligence school standards. The Russians didn't give them too much of their own experience and newest techniques.

The intelligence school in Moscow is another form of Soviet influence. It gives the Russians a chance to get acquainted with the Czechoslovak officers, to study their character, their strength and weaknesses, level of the ideological indoctrination and devotion to communism. This kind of information is very valuable. For example in Czechoslovakia in 1968 they knew very well who their people were, whom they could rely on.

The influence of the Russian Intelligence Service on the Czechoslovak or other satellite intelligence services is intensive, actually, the Russians can do with the satellite intelligence services what they want.

Senator GURNEY. The school in Moscow, as I understood your testimony, is more to determine if students from Czechoslovakia are reliable and ideologically safe for Russia, rather than teach them intelligence techniques?

Mr. BRITT. Right.

Senator GURNEY. I think your testimony is, if I understand you correctly, that the school did not really give the Czechoslovak too much information on how the Russian Intelligence Service worked?

Mr. BRITT. Right.

Senator GURNEY. This method of direction by the Russians of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service, and supervisions that you have described, was that still going on when you defected from Czechoslovakia?

Mr. BRITT. Yes.

Senator GURNEY. So far as you know, that is still true today?

Mr. BRITT. Yes.

Senator GURNEY. So far as you know it is really a Russian Intelligence Service?

Mr. BRITT. Yes; they get every piece of information, every memorandum they are interested in. They know the identity of all Czechoslovak agents abroad, everything about the Czechoslovakian codes, the system of communications. Really, they have the whole Czechoslovak intelligence net completely under their control and the same applies to other satellite services.

Senator GURNEY. Do you know if the Russians divide areas of the world into assignments say to Czechoslovakia and Hungary and some of the others in order to make the intelligence coverage as wide as possible?

Mr. BRITT. Again, I have not read any document which I could reproduce, but I can tell you my own judgment, my own opinion about it.

Until 1968, the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service was after the Soviet Intelligence Service the most efficient one of all the satellites. The situation has changed after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia because several Czechoslovak intelligence officers defected which

represented a considerable loss for the Soviets. Many Czechoslovak agent nets were destroyed or made inactive.

The Czechoslovak Intelligence Service before 1968 used the broad scope of Czechoslovak diplomatic relations for its activities. As far as America is concerned it operated in Canada, the United States, Mexico, Cuba, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile. In Europe it was Great Britain, France, West Germany, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Scandinavian countries, Italy, Switzerland, Turkey, and Greece. In the Middle East and Africa the following countries belonged to the primary targets or operational bases: Lebanon, Syria, United Arab Republic, Iraq, Iran, Algeria, Morocco, Guinea, Ghana, Congo, Tanzania, and Kenya. Southern Asia and the Far East was covered by the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service in India, Indonesia, Japan, and maybe Ceylon.

Speaking about Japan, only the Department for Scientific-Technical Intelligence operated there, not the departments for political intelligence as Japan was considered the domain of the Russian Intelligence Service.

Senator GURNEY. You mentioned Poland, East Germany, and Hungary.

Mr. BRITT. Yes.

Senator GURNEY. I haven't noticed that you mentioned Rumania or Yugoslavia. Is there any intelligence service under Soviet control there, as far as you know?

Mr. BRITT. As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, there was no cooperation or connection between the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Intelligence Services and I am sure that the same applies to the relations between Yugoslav and other Soviet-bloc services, the Soviet Service included.

As far as the Rumanian Intelligence Service was concerned, starting with 1962 the relations deteriorated and Rumania, even if it was still a member of the Soviet-bloc intelligence community, it was not trusted any more as a reliable partner. There were still connections at the highest official level between the chiefs, but I would say that those were really only official formal connections, not efficient and productive ones.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I don't mean to digress, but may I go off the record a moment?

Senator GURNEY. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator GURNEY. Back on the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Britt has written a book on the subject of "disinformation" growing out of his own experiences and knowledge. I understand the book is going to be published and I do not want to try to beat him to the punch with his own book, so to speak, but there are a number of technical questions I should like to ask while Mr. Britt is here, if I may ask those at this time.

Senator GURNEY. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Britt, will you tell us as much as you can of the organization of the disinformation department of which you were an assistant director?

Mr. BRITT. Well, the organizational structure of the Czechoslovak Disinformation Department changed in details several times during

the time I worked there as its deputy chief, but the basic scheme remained unchanged.

The Department was headed by a chief and one deputy chief. Four territorial sections formed a backbone of the Department. It was German-Austrian section, European section, covering the rest of the non-Communist Europe excluding Germany and Austria, American section and the section covering the developing countries of the Middle East, Africa, Southern Asia, and the Far East.

Then there were three specialized sections, the first for disinformation activities against foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services, the second for coordination of military disinformations and the third for economic disinformation.

All of these sections were responsible for developing new ideas and plans which were then carried out with the help of the operational territorial departments of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service.

Finally there was a section for analysis and documentation and an archive collecting signatures, letterheads and all kinds of model letters and documents which could be used as patterns for forgeries.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Britt, give us the names and positions and duties of top officers of that department as best you remember them?

Mr. BRITT. There were about 20 people working in the disinformation department. According to security rules they were supposed to address each other only under cover names. That's why I don't remember all real names of my subordinates even though I was entitled to know them.

The department was headed by Maj. Tiří Stejskal who until 1963 was the chief of the Latin American Operational Department. In the mid-fifties he served in Austria and was expelled from there as persona non grata. As his deputy I was responsible mainly for the mentioned territorial sections. In 1966 I was succeeded by Liev. Col. Karel Fremund who for a long time had been the director of the Ministry of Interior Press Department.

The people working in the department were mostly experienced intelligence officers who had spent several years abroad and had the necessary knowledge of the problems and mentality of countries they covered. Thus, for example Maj. Ludvík Neckár who was responsible for operations on the American continent had spent 4 years in Brazil, Maj. Václav Louda a specialist for developing countries had worked for several years as the chief of the North American Territorial Operational Department and had spent some time in Canada and Great Britain. Maj. Jaroslav Němec was specialized in operations against foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services. His name became famous in 1959 when he had to leave Austria in a hurry. He was a member of the Czechoslovak intelligence station in Salzburg at that time and was instructed to deliver laxative powder into Radio Free Europe—RFE—dining room saltshakers in Munich through one of his agents. The operation didn't succeed as the agent was in fact an American double agent, Němec was exposed and immediately for security reasons had to leave Austria. Maj. Jaroslav Kazbal covering Europe had spent several years in Great Britain, I think, and in Turkey or Greece. This very short and basic characteristics give you at least a very brief idea what quality of officers worked in the department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Britt, tell us what were the major and minor objectives of your department and how they were related to each other?

Mr. BRITT. The major objectives of the Disinformation Department were summed up in a long-term plan of disinformation operations covering the period of 5 to 7 years.

The Czechoslovak plan which was worked out in 1965 under the Soviet supervision characterized the United States as the enemy No. 1. The primary goal was to isolate the United States in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa morally and politically and to promote the withdrawal of American military from Europe.

As far as priorities are concerned the NATO was the second most important target. The Czechoslovak Intelligence Service together with other Soviet-bloc intelligence services was supposed to work for disintegrating of the NATO countries partnership to the extent that the Atlantic Alliance wouldn't be renewed in 1969. As you know this didn't happen.

German Federal Republic followed as the third most important target. According to the long-term plan disinformation operations were to aim at weakening the alliance between West Germany and its Western partners presenting West Germany as a Nazi seedbed.

The territory of developing countries represented the main battlefield in anti-American activities as the majority of operations was carried out there and it was the territory where the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service registered greatest successes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Please go into detail with regard to the types of operations that were carried out, using as many examples of actual operations as you think would be necessary to make it a clear and comprehensive exposition of what was done.

Mr. BRITT. Operation called Research, conducted in the mid-fifties' was directed against North American influence in Latin America. The Czechoslovak Intelligence Service noted the unsuccessful American efforts to survey public opinion in Latin America which became famous as the Project Camelot, and decided to continue in the name of the United States. In forged questionnaires, the respondents were asked to answer a battery of very personal and sensitive questions concerning themselves, and they have been even asked to characterize political orientation of their friends which reeked of denunciation. The whole survey could be construed as American interference in the internal affairs of the countries involved. The completed questionnaires were to be sent to American Embassies. Among the addresses were a significant number of people known to Czechoslovak Intelligence Service for their anti-American opinions, who could be relied upon to arouse scandal and agitation over the brutal methods of American inquiry. The calculation was correct. The Americans became once more target No. 1.

As an example of an operation directed against an individual can serve a Russian operation scandalizing Mr. Anthony Courtney, Conservative member of the British Parliament. On one visit to the Soviet Union, Courtney invited a woman employee of the Soviet State Tourist Office to his hotel room. The result was a series of intimate photographs taken and published by the Soviets in the form of a pamphlet and sent to prominent British citizens and newspapers. There was a difference of 4 years between the hotel adventure and the distribution



of the pamphlet. In all probability, the Soviet Intelligence Service hoped to use the compromising photographs for recruitment. When it realized that it was not possible, it decided to use the material for a subversive public relations campaign against Courtney. The leaflet provided impetus to jokes circulating among the British political aristocracy. It is difficult to estimate what degree British public opinion was influenced. The fact remains, however, that Anthony Courtney was not reelected as a member of the Parliament in the next parliamentary elections.

Mr. SOURWINE. Please discuss specifically the exertion of influence with special reference to the influential individual that you mentioned earlier in your testimony.

Mr. BRITT. Your question, as I understand it, relates to the category of the so-called influence operations or influence agents. As I have already mentioned, the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service certainly didn't have as many influential agents as the Russian service had or has, nevertheless, there were several developing countries where the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service operated successfully with the help of these agents. It was, for example, the United Arab Republic. The Czechoslovak Intelligence Service had several agents there, in the state hierarchy, who served as disinformation channels for material produced in Prague and Moscow. Their prominent positions offered Moscow a chance to leak disinformational material directed mainly against the United States of America and to a lesser degree against the German Federal Republic and Great Britain. This material consisted of forged data on various anti-Arab plans and subversive activities by the United States.

In this connection I would like to mention one thing. It would be a big mistake to make a conclusion that Communist agents have successfully penetrated all the non-Communist world and that they are responsible for all its trouble and problems. This espionage paranoia typical for the 1950's can actually only innerly weaken the democratic world. In the present competition between the Communist and the non-Communist world, Soviet-bloc intelligence is only one of many foreign policy instruments, and certainly not the most important one. Communist disinformation, propaganda and influence operation can't win that competition. The new Communist espionage paranoia would be a tragic mistake for many reasons, and I would like to mention at least one. It creates dirty waters in which especially the Communist intelligence knows how to fish and thus it would be completely counterproductive. It was not a good fortune that the Communist intelligence services registered their greatest successes in the 1950's. The atmosphere of those years was a fertile soil for their activities.

Mr. SOURWINE. Finally, please tell us as much as you can from your own knowledge about the operations of all disinformation agencies of Iron Curtain countries, or perhaps you should tell us what you know of any other Iron Curtain countries' operations.

Mr. BRITT. The Soviet Disinformation Department which represented a center for disinformation activities of the Soviet bloc was established in 1959, and headed by General Agayants, an Armenian with intelligence experience going back several decades.

The Czechoslovak Disinformation Department between 1965-66 maintained direct contact not only with the Soviets but the Hungarian and East German counterparts as well. According to the Soviet

idea this was supposed to be a way to make the disinformation apparatus more productive and efficient. The East German department was headed at that time by Liev. Col. Wagenbrett and the Hungarian department by Maj. Janos Furjes. While the East German department scored most successes in West Germany the Hungarian Department spent most of its energy fighting against the Hungarian desk of the Radio Free Europe.

There were several more or less ineffective operations which the Czechoslovak Disinformation Department carried out together with these satellite copartners, mainly against West Germany and Austria. The situation radically changed in 1968. Czechoslovakia, once a partner and very productive source of disinformation and propaganda operations against the non-Communist world became herself a target and victim. The Soviets with the help of satellite intelligence services and Stalinists from the Czechoslovak state security organs launched a series of operations of this kind against the democratization movement and its representatives using forgeries, anonymous threatening letters, a special newspaper, radio broadcasting, leaflets, books, and many other forms of persuasion. They even hid weapons on the Czechoslovak territory and anonymously informed the Czechoslovak police about the hiding place, trying to create an impression that the weapons belonged to the counterrevolutionary underground and had been delivered by Western intelligence services. Despite this extensive effort, disinformation, propaganda, and influence operations against Czechoslovakia totally failed. It was the Soviet Army which defeated the new Czechoslovak regime, not the Soviet Intelligence Service.

For me personally this was a period of reevaluation of my life. I identified myself openly with the new regime in Czechoslovakia and after the invasion refused to follow orders from the occupied Prague headquarters. The only solution left for me was a life of a political exile. Maybe I am too personal in this part of my testimony, but I think it belongs to the "corn" of the problem we are speaking about. In 1968 looking back into my own past I realized that the psychological warfare operations I participated in during my appointment in the Disinformation Department was a bad service especially for my own country. It was one of the reasons why I defected.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask if anybody here has further inquiry or anything he would like to have opened up on the record again?

Mr. MARTIN. I have one question. I wonder if the witness would have any information on contacts between disinformation apparatus and elements in the American media, that is, with or without the knowledge of these elements in the American media. When they were in contact with members of the disinformation apparatus, did you consistently try to use contacts in the American media for spreading disinformation in this country?

Mr. BRITT. I understand. There were several levels of disinformation influence on the mass media. There were newspapers which were owned by Czechoslovak Intelligence Service. Then there were newspapers where one member of the editorial staff was recruited as an agent.

Mr. SOURWINE. Talking about newspapers in the United States?

Mr. BRITT. All over the world. I will specify it later, as far as the United States is concerned.

The third and most of often way of influencing mass media was called "anonymous way." Letters have been produced in name of various individuals which pretended that the letter writer for patriotic or nationalist reasons, hatred toward Americans or for other reasons decided to publicize a sensational document—mostly a forgery—which was enclosed.

Until 1964 the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service owned a newspaper in Brazil. After the coup d'etat there the publication of the newspaper was ceased by the new government and the Czechoslovak service lost that propaganda channel.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where in Brazil that paper was published?

Mr. BRITT. It was in Rio. Later the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service changed this practice and didn't buy newspapers abroad anymore as it was disadvantageous both from the operational and the financial point of view. After the coup in Brazil, the newspaper was stopped and the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service lost not only the channel but the money it put into this project as well. That's why the Czechoslovak service later relied more on recruiting individuals in editorial staffs.

According to my experience, most of them were in second- or third-rank newspapers. I have no knowledge about any agent who would be established in the most important newspapers of the world like, for instance, the New York Times, the British Times, Le Monde, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and so forth, because these editorial staffs, these newspapers are financially strong and the correspondents are mostly experienced people who are aware of the danger of Communist intelligence services.

On the other hand, it was easy to recruit second- and third-class journalists in small newspapers, mostly in developing countries, which were permanently in financial trouble.

As far as the United States is concerned I don't know about any journalists recruited for the Czechoslovak or any other Soviet-bloc intelligence service and I don't know any newspaper under direct influence of Communist intelligence either.

Mostly what happened was that a newspaper was supplied with documents or forgeries through the mail, and it depended on the newspaper whether it believed in it and accepted it or not.

Mr. MARTIN. It would also depend on the quality of the forgery or disinformation that had the quality of apparent authenticity, even an intelligent man might be disposed to accept it?

Mr. BRITT. Yes; I might say not all the operations were based on forgeries. There were even operations which used genuine American documents.

For instance, in 1969, at the time I was already in the United States, reading foreign newspapers I discovered a new disinformation and propaganda operation against the United States which I think, is of Russian origin. Several editorial staffs in Europe, in West Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain received a letter with top secret American military documents. The documents were mailed from Rome and accompanied by an anonymous letter explaining that the letterwriter was a friend of General Wendland, who as a deputy chief of the West German Intelligence committed suicide in 1968. According to the letterwriter General Wendland was disturbed by the content

of the American documents because Europe including the territory of West Germany was supposed to become a major battlefield and target for American atomic, bacteriological, and chemical weapons in case of a war between the Soviet Union and the United States. Several newspapers and magazines devoted a lot of space to these documents, some of them even mentioned the Soviet Disinformation Service as a possible initiator but the edge of critique aimed at the United States. The campaign continued for several months. Anyhow, it was clear that the documents were not valid anymore otherwise the Soviets would not use them for propaganda purposes. The Russians got the documents from an American sergeant who was arrested in the United States in 1964.

Senator GURNEY. Does anyone have any more questions?

Mr. MARTIN. I just wanted to ask whether you have named two different ways in which the disinformation apparatus worked through the free world, three ways actually—first, by recruiting agents; second, by feeding documents which are in fact forgeries but which appear authentic to innocent members of the press or innocent editors; and, third, by feeding to the press documents which are genuine but whose publication serves the interest of the Soviet Union.

Are there any other ways, to your knowledge, which the disinformation apparatus works through the free world media?

Mr. BRITT. Well, certainly there are other ways. Once the Czechoslovak Disinformation Department had a professional schooling, an educational session on professional disinformation techniques and various new methods were discussed. Czechoslovak officers were impressed by the propaganda success of an operation which might have been initiated by the East German Intelligence Service. Two television journalists got an interview from a man who had spent several years in Congo as a mercenary and was known in Germany as Congo-Müller. He thought that he was giving the interview for a West German television station. Under the influence of alcohol he lost all moral inhibitions and started to boast of his military career in Congo. Several weeks later the interview was broadcast to his large surprise by the East German television. In 1968 the East Germans registered a similar success with Dr. Walter Becher, spokesman of the rightist Sudeten German movement in West Germany. I can't and I don't intend to implicate the two journalists as East German intelligence agents as I don't know anything about them, but propaganda success of their operation was remarkable.

The is another thing that I should mention. When the Disinformation Department wanted to carry out a big campaign in one country, it used to surface the disinformation message in another country in order to protect the people who were directly involved. For instance, I remember that an anti-American black propaganda campaign in Indonesia in 1964-65, initiated by Prague, started with an article published in a Ceylonese newspaper. Only after that first publication it was transplanted on the Indonesian press. At the beginning of my testimony I mentioned the three basic types of operations disinformation, black propaganda and influence operations. You can hardly find pure types as mostly every operation involves elements of all types, but the majority of these operations can be characterized as black propaganda operations. They are the easiest for an intelligence service can execute them even without help of agents. The operational depart-

ments of the Intelligence Service, and I believe the reaction is the same in the Russian Intelligence Service as well as in the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service, do not like operations involving their agents. The operational departments don't like to risk their agents because their primary task is to gather information with the help of these agents. When the agents are involved in disinformation or propaganda operations, it is risky, and all operational departments try to avoid that risk. That's why the disinformation message is most often delivered anonymously.

Senator GURNEY. Does anyone have any further questions?

Mr. SOURWINE. If we close the record here, we will not be foreclosing the witness from providing any additional information that may occur to him, because he will have an opportunity to correct the record after it is filed.

I am sure the committee is appreciative of your helpfulness in coming down, Mr. Britt. We will get this transcript to you as soon as possible.

Senator GURNEY Thank you again, Mr. Britt, for your helpful testimony.

The committee will now adjourn, subject to call.

(Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the hearing this day was concluded.)

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