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THE WORLD HEROIN PROBLEM

REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY MISSION

COMPOSED OF

MORGAN F. MURPHY, Illinois, *Chairman*

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PURSUANT TO

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AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS TO CONDUCT THOROUGH STUDIES AND INVES-
TIGATIONS OF ALL MATTERS COMING WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE



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FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., May 27, 1971.

This report has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs by a special study mission conducted between April 3 and 23, 1971.

The findings in this report are those of the special study mission and do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the full Committee on Foreign Affairs.

THOMAS E. MORGAN, *Chairman.*

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., May 27, 1971.

HON. THOMAS E. MORGAN,
*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: There is transmitted herewith a report of a special study mission conducted between April 3 and April 23, 1971, by the undersigned, both members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. We were accompanied by Dr. John J. Brady, Jr., staff consultant, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Mr. Fred Flott, Department of State, acted as escort officer.

The purpose of the study mission was to gather information pertaining to the illegal international traffic in heroin.

During the course of the trip, which took us around the world, we met with United States diplomatic and military officials, parliamentarians, foreign law enforcement officials responsible for narcotics control and other foreign governmental leaders responsible for narcotics matters in Switzerland, France, Italy, Turkey, Iran, Thailand, South Vietnam, Hong Kong, and Japan. Prior to our departure we met with officials from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Treasury, concerning various aspects of this problem.

We would like to express our thanks and appreciation for the assistance, cooperation and hospitality extended to the members of the study mission by Departments of State and Defense personnel in the countries visited.

In particular, we would like to thank the agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, U.S. Department of Justice, with whom we met in the several countries. It was largely through their efforts that we were able to learn as much as we did concerning the illegal production of, and traffic in, heroin around the world.

It is hoped that the information contained in this report will be helpful to the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Congress in their deliberations on the legislation pending on this subject.

MORGAN F. MURPHY, *Chairman,*
ROBERT H. STEELE,
*Special Study Mission on
the World Heroin Problem.*

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THE WORLD HEROIN PROBLEM

INTRODUCTION

Drug abuse around the world is increasing. Of particular concern is the alarming rise in the use of opium-based drugs, particularly heroin, in the United States, and the rapid increase in heroin addiction within the United States military forces in South Vietnam, where the best estimates are that as many as 10 to 15 percent of our servicemen are addicted to heroin in one form or another.

To combat this growing menace around the world and at home the United States must use every resource available. It must work through international organizations; it must exert pressure on its friends and allies to convince them of the need to take strong action either to control or eliminate the growing of opium poppies or to increase their efforts to stop the illegal traffic in narcotics. Our Nation must provide the leadership to make international cooperation to control the illegal traffic in narcotics and other dangerous drugs more effective.

The battle to stem the alarming increase in heroin addiction will not be easy, nor will victory come quickly. But the war against heroin must be sharply accelerated—now. Given the increasing use of heroin among our youth, immediate action is crucial. Unfortunately, time is not on our side, and as this report is being written more young Americans are becoming addicted to heroin.

Equally distressing is the fact that the United States alone cannot bring an end to the waste and devastation that drug abuse, particularly the use of opium and its derivatives, is causing among the youth of the Nation. We must have the cooperation of the entire world.

For example, only a small percentage of the illegal heroin that reaches the United States is confiscated by the authorities. There are simply too many ways of hiding heroin, from small containers secreted in various body orifices to hollow ski poles and food containers. There are literally thousands of places to hide illegal heroin on board ships entering U.S. ports. International air travel has complicated the problem even further for it enables the courier or trafficker to move quickly from continent to continent, arranging pickups and payoffs personally, in addition to providing places to secrete illegal shipments.

Once the poppy pod is cut and the opium gum extracted and sold on the illegal market, the battle to prevent the end product, heroin, from reaching the addict is lost. The problem must be attacked at the source—in the poppy fields of the Near and Far East, principally in Turkey, Thailand, Burma, and Laos.

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We must be willing to devote more resources, human and material, to fight the illegal international traffic in heroin, including the exercise of economic and political pressures where necessary. If that means the imposition of economic sanctions or the exercise of political initiatives, we must be willing to follow that course of action. We are fighting to save generations of young Americans from the scourge of heroin. As in any war, we must bring all of the weapons available to the point of decision.

THE HEROIN PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES

The problem of heroin addiction in the United States

The National Institute of Mental Health estimates that there are 250,000 heroin addicts in the United States. One-half of these are located in the New York City area.

In 1970, 1,154 persons died as a result of drug addiction in the Nation's largest city. One half of these deaths occurred among young people 23 years of age, or less.

In a 1970 survey in the District of Columbia, heroin addiction was estimated at 10,400 persons. In 1971, this estimate had risen to 16,880, an increase of more than 60 percent.

There are approximately 9,000 heroin addicts in Chicago, according to the Narcotics Squad of that city.

Heroin addiction among U.S. military forces has reached alarming proportions. Reliable authorities estimate that as many as 10 to 15 percent of the troops in Vietnam are using heroin in one form or another. Some smoke it, some sniff or "snort," and approximately 5 to 10 percent inject.

Five years ago the heroin problem was restricted to the ghetto areas of our major cities. Now it is spreading to the suburbs and is found among the children of the wealthy and well-to-do as well as among the poor.

The heroin problem is also affecting U.S. industry. The Wall Street Journal, quoting from a study conducted by the New York Chamber of Commerce, reported last summer that "drug abuse in business—a problem which was rare, indeed, two years ago has overnight become—in qualitative terms—almost as serious as that of alcoholism."

"The increase in drug abuse on company premises stems partly from the spread of illegal drugs through high schools and college campuses and U.S. troops in Vietnam," the report concluded.

And the number of addicts is increasing rapidly. In a statement to the United Nations Commission on Narcotics at Geneva in September 1970, John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) said that "the list of addicts is growing by several thousand each year and, in 1969, the number of new addicts doubled from the preceding year. Every time one addict is cured, more take his place because of the ever-increasing amounts of heroin available. Among the other debilitating consequences of the addiction problem is that in New York City alone, persons are dying of drug related causes at the rate of three per day."

Even these statistics, alarming as they are, may not tell the whole story. Unfortunately, the extent of the addiction problem is difficult to measure. There is no central agency in the United States which collects all of the intelligence on the number of drug users and the figures

provided by BNDD are minimal estimates since they are based only on reporting from law enforcement agencies.

The statistics that are available, therefore, are only educated guesses and the number of addicts may be greatly in excess of the estimated 250,000.

Consumption of heroin in the United States

Based on the estimates that there are at least 250,000 heroin addicts in the United States, it would take between 4 and 5 tons of heroin to support the addict population.

Estimates of the cost of the heroin that the average addict requires daily varies, however, from \$30 to \$100 per day.

Heroin addiction and crime in the United States

The habit of the narcotics addict is not only a danger to himself, but to society as a whole. Narcotics have been cited as a primary cause of the enormous increase in crimes committed over the past few years.

Whatever the price, the cost in property stolen by the addict to support the habit is tremendous.

The estimated amount of money spent by heroin addicts in the United States is \$7.5 million per day. This figure is based on the fact that there are 250,000 addicts, with an average habit (minimum) of \$30 daily. For this year, the estimated figure would be approximately \$2,737,500, 000.

To support the habit, reliable authorities estimate that the addict would have to steal goods worth at least 4 or 5 times the cost of his habit per year.

If 75 percent of those addicted resorted to crime, using the above figures, then, the cost in crime committed to sustain the habit would be in excess of \$8 billion per year at a minimum.

The source of illicit heroin

Most world poppy cultivation takes place within a zone extending from the Plains of Anatolia in Turkey to Yunnan Province in China. The international illegal traffic in opium has two major production areas. The first area of importance for the United States is in the Near East where opium produced in Turkey for legitimate medical requirements is diverted to illegal channels. The opium is smuggled to Syria and Lebanon where it is processed into morphine base. (A certain amount of morphine base and heroin is also produced in Turkey.) The morphine base is then smuggled to the Marseilles area of France where it is refined into heroin in clandestine laboratories. The bulk of the heroin entering the United States is grown in Turkey and processed in Marseilles.

The second important area is in the Far East, particularly in Laos, Burma, and Thailand, and to a lesser degree, Yunnan Province in China.

At least 1,000 tons of raw opium are produced in the Shan states of Burma, the border area of Yunnan Province in China, northern Thailand, and northwestern Laos. This production is illicit and is grown in areas where there is little or no governmental control by either Burma, Laos, or Thailand.

The central collecting point for the majority of this opium is at a point where the borders of Thailand, Laos, and Burma meet. A large proportion of the opium is designated for Southeast Asian opium addicts. The remainder is either exported outside of Southeast Asia or is refined into morphine base, the basic ingredient of heroin, or heroin itself in laboratories located in the Burmese-Laotian-Thailand border area, in Vientiane, Laos, in Bangkok, Thailand, and at other points along the Mekong. The heroin labs manufacture both No. 3 purple smoking heroin, which is used by Asian addicts, and No. 4 white heroin, which is produced primarily for the U.S. market and for U.S. troops in South Vietnam.

The main flow of No. 4 heroin to U.S. troops in South Vietnam is through Laos and Thailand. In addition, large quantities of opium and morphine base are smuggled into Hong Kong, where it is both consumed locally and refined into No. 4 heroin for the U.S. market.¹ U.S. narcotics experts regard Hong Kong of increasing importance as a source of the heroin being smuggled to the United States from the Far East. Current estimates are that at least 10 percent of the heroin entering the United States comes from the Far East and that the percentage is growing. There is also evidence that some of the No. 4 heroin appearing in Saigon also has its source in Hong Kong.

A Chinese traveler from Hong Kong was arrested at Ton Son Nhut in April carrying 3.5 kilos of heroin. This could be the beginning of a trend. When the heroin dealers in Hong Kong realize that a lucrative market exists among the Americans in South Vietnam, they will undoubtedly attempt to get into the market.

There has recently been an increase in the amount of No. 4 heroin smuggled directly from Thailand to the United States. Narcotics experts attribute the increase primarily to the expanding activity of a number of ex-servicemen and U.S. nationals who have served in Southeast Asia and have set up smuggling operations in Thailand.

A certain amount of heroin is also produced from opium poppies grown in Mexico. It is estimated that Mexico accounts for about 15 percent of the heroin which is smuggled into the United States. There is no evidence available to suggest that the Chinese Communists are actively engaged in the illegal international traffic in opium or its derivatives.

The major sources and flow of illicit opium is shown in figure 1.

Profits from the production, processing, and sale of illegal opium

One of the fundamental facts mitigating against solution of the heroin problem in both the United States and abroad is the tremendous profit involved. From the prices paid to the poppy grower to the

¹ Opium and morphine base are smuggled into Hong Kong primarily in Thai fishing boats. It is processed into heroin in four or five clandestine laboratories. The authorities in Hong Kong have a difficult time intercepting shipments from Thailand. The Thai fishing boats dump the opium into Chinese Communist waters where it is picked up by one of the 11,000 junks that ply the waters around Hong Kong. The job of policing and seizing is almost impossible. As in the case of Turkey, once the poppy is cut and the opium introduced into illegal channels, the battle to prevent the end product from falling into the hands of the addict is lost.

retail price for pure heroin sold in New York, there is a \$219,975 dollar mark-up as shown in the following table:

DEVELOPMENT OF RETAIL PRICE OF HEROIN IN THE UNITED STATES, 1969


United States	U.S. dollars per kilogram	U.S. dollars per kilogram of raw opium equivalent
Price to farmer for opium (in Turkey).....	\$25	
Wholesale price for heroin ¹ (Marseilles).....	5,000	\$500
Border price for heroin (New York).....	10,000	1,000
Wholesale price for heroin (New York).....	22,000	2,200
Retail price for heroin (New York).....	220,000	22,000

¹ When raw opium is converted to morphine and heroin the volume is reduced by a ratio of 10 to 1.

Because of the tremendous profits that are realized as a result of the illegal traffic in narcotics, there is always the possibility that governmental authorities and police at all levels "can be bought." Above all, some way must be found to take the profit out of heroin smuggling.

Fig 10

WORLD: Major Illicit Opium Sources and Flow



BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHENTICATIVE

THE SITUATION IN FRANCE AND ITALY

FRANCE

Heroin production in France

Heroin is produced in illegal laboratories primarily in the Marseilles area although some may also be produced in Paris and Le Havre. The principal area is Marseilles because of the port facilities and the large criminal element located there. Marseilles is also closer to the source of supply, Turkey, than either Paris or Le Havre, although there is evidence that increasing amounts of morphine base are being smuggled into West Germany by Turkish nationals employed in that country. If this trend continues, other areas of Europe could be used to produce heroin. This will be particularly true if current efforts to close down the illicit laboratories in Marseilles prove successful.

It has been estimated that 80 percent of the heroin entering the United States originates in Turkish poppy fields and is processed in France. French authorities question this estimate. From the discussion which the study group has had with authorities in France, Turkey and the United States, this estimate is undoubtedly high. It is fair to say, however, that the bulk of the heroin entering the United States does originate in Turkish poppy fields and is processed in France. According to the experts, French heroin is among the best grade made due to the expertise of the French chemists who process the morphine into heroin. By the time it reaches the addict in the United States, it has been reduced to 4 to 6 percent purity.

The Marseilles heroin operation

Most of the illegal heroin producing laboratories are located on the southern coast of France, between Nice and Marseilles, and possibly in Corsica.

These laboratories are not large and a number are believed to be mobile. They do not operate continuously as it does not take long to process a shipment of morphine base into heroin. According to the best estimates, there are probably only 5 to 10 laboratories operating at one time.

The poppy is grown in Turkey and the opium smuggled to Marseilles by sea, air, and overland. Once it arrives in Marseilles it is picked up by the purchaser and turned over to a chemist for processing.

The chemist usually operates his own laboratory, frequently on a free-lance basis. There is no one central organization commanding the entire operation although cooperation among groups is not unusual. If a shipment to one group is seized by the police, another group will help by loaning it some morphine base to tide the losing group over until it can arrange for another shipment from Turkey.

It is estimated that there are five, and possibly ten, groups operating at any one time with up to 100 individuals employed. Each group appears to have its own courier and trafficking and purchasing operations. Over the past 10 years every narcotics case in Marseilles has involved one or more of four Corsican families: the Venturi brothers (Jean and Dominic), Marcel Francisci, Antoine Guerini and Joseph Orsini. (Orsini himself served a prison term in the United States and was deported in 1958.) There are offshoots of these four families and ad hoc groups may appear from time to time, but these four families are the heart of illegal heroin production in Marseilles. The problem is that in France, as well as in the United States, the police must have evidence upon which to base a case. The police cannot put the finger on the families or people involved. French authorities are hampered by the secret Swiss bank accounts as much as are U.S. authorities.

French mechanism for control

Though France does not suffer to the same extent from heroin abuse as the United States, there is a problem developing in that country. This has been a major factor in prompting French authorities to increase their efforts to combat the availability of heroin in France. An indispensable element in this endeavor has been a growing willingness to cooperate with the United States in its efforts to fight heroin abuse.

A French-American agreement setting up close cooperation between the agencies specializing in the fight against the illegal traffic in drugs in France and the United States was signed on February 26, 1971, by Raymond Marcellin, French Minister of the Interior, and U.S. Attorney General John M. Mitchell. Under the terms of the agreement both governments have agreed to exchange narcotics agents in order to facilitate cooperation. Very considerable credit belongs to Mr. Marcellin for assigning high priority to the anti-heroin effort.

The fight against drug abuse in France is centralized in the Office of the Chief of National Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Bureau.

There are three groups which deal with narcotics matters: the Central Office, the Marseilles Service, and the Narcotics Service in Paris.

In 1969 there were 40 agents assigned to narcotics duties; today there are 120 with the probability that this number will be increased shortly.

In addition, between 6,000 and 7,000 police and gendarmerie and others have been given training in narcotics control practices.

It was pointed out that under the centralized French system, numbers were not as important as emphasis.

If any information becomes available to any French authority, it will be transmitted to the Central Office, although at the present time French authorities are working largely from information provided by the United States.

The French authorities believe that the effort against drug traffickers must be secret. In their opinion the nature of the problem is such that the less known about police methods and tactics, the better the chances are for successful results. As a result, police throughout the country sometimes work on narcotics cases without being completely

aware of all the facts surrounding the case. This approach also serves to prevent police corruption.

French police do very little undercover work. Under French law even police officials are not permitted to get involved in narcotics traffic. If they do, they are liable to criminal prosecution. In addition, if it could be shown that the evidence was provoked by police activity the case would be thrown out of court. As a consequence, the French police depend upon U.S. personnel for their information.

Difficulties in controlling illegal heroin production in France

The French police have been able to locate and close only 13 laboratories over the past 20 years. Two were closed in 1969; one in 1964. One of those closed in 1969 was located in a villa approximately 25 kilometers outside of Marseilles. Finding this one was a result of fine police work by both the French police and United States BNDD agents working closely with the police. A man suspected of being implicated in the narcotics racket was released from arrest. He went directly to the villa and was followed by the authorities. When the police raided the villa, the laboratory was in full operation.

The study mission inspected another building in the suburbs of Marseilles which had housed the illicit laboratory that was closed in 1964. It was an innocent looking building, and if the authorities had not been told by an informer that a laboratory was located in that particular building it would not have been discovered.

As a result of visiting these two locations, it became evident to us that looking for an illegal heroin-producing laboratory is like looking for a needle in a haystack. They can be set up anywhere in a short period of time and they can be moved just as quickly.

At present, the only practical method by which they can be located is through the use of informers. This takes time and money. Money must also be available to pay the informer as well as for making a purchase of the heroin from illegal sources in order to develop leads.

Both French and American authorities voiced confidence that their efforts were progressing satisfactorily and that the Marseilles Service and the Central Office were developing a force capable of effective action in discovering and closing the illegal laboratories. There is a steadily increasing spirit of aggressiveness on the part of the French authorities in their efforts to stop the illegal production of heroin in France.

The French authorities were also hopeful that scientific and technological developments would greatly assist them in their investigations. For example, now in the process of development is a sensory device which, when perfected, will "smell" illegal laboratories in operation. These devices will be mounted in helicopters which will be used by the police to patrol the area. Unfortunately, the device must be in an area when a laboratory is in operation if it is to be useful to the police.

Helicopter-borne patrols are of considerable assistance to the police and should be used. If nothing else, they can increase the sense of police pressure that the narcotics manufacturer is beginning to feel in France. The authorities were emphatic in their belief that, because of French narcotics laws and police pressure, the laboratory oper-

ators are beginning to "panic." Police pressure should, therefore, be increased.

Consideration should be given to making helicopters and trained pilots available to the French until they develop their own capabilities. If arrangements can be made with French governmental officials it might be possible to place U.S. helicopter units assigned to U.S. Forces in Europe on temporary duty in the Marseilles area. While this would be only an interim solution to the problem, it would be useful and it would enable the authorities to utilize one more weapon in the struggle to stamp out illicit heroin production during the period when the French are developing their own airborne patrol capability.

ITALY

Italy is a transshipment point. It is estimated that 30 to 40 percent of the raw material used to produce heroin either passes through Italy or is hidden in vessels destined for France which stop at Italian ports.

There is also the probability that some of the heroin produced in France and elsewhere returns to Italy where it is then smuggled to the United States. There are no firm estimates on the amount involved, but it is considered to be substantial by knowledgeable experts. The number of known heroin traffickers seen in Italy, plus the deep involvement of a number of known Mafiosa in the United States form the basis for this judgment.

There is also the possibility that heroin is being produced in Sicily and Sardinia.

Italian efforts to control the illegal traffic in narcotics

Efforts by the Italian Government to control the illegal traffic in narcotics have not been successful. For example, it is estimated that the Italian authorities seize only about one-tenth of 1 percent of the narcotics which reach that country.

There appear to be a number of reasons for this.

First, the Italian police agencies are fragmented and cooperation depends upon personalities rather than institutional procedures. There are three distinct national police agencies: The Finance Police, the Public Security Forces, and the Carabinieri. Each is jealous of its prerogatives.

In addition, a Central Narcotics Office (CNO) has been set up in the Ministry of the Interior. Charged with the responsibility for coordinating efforts to control narcotics traffic, the CNO does not always get the cooperation of the police agencies or high-ranking government officials.

Second, the Mafia is deeply involved in the narcotics traffic, and high-ranking Italian Government officials aid that organization throughout Europe. A commission has been appointed to determine the extent of Mafia infiltration of the Italian Government. It will take some time, however, before the results of this study are known.

Third, the Italians do not recognize the seriousness of this problem. According to police authorities throughout Italy, there is no Italian heroin problem. Consequently, there is no feeling of urgency to take

immediate and effective action to coordinate their efforts to combat this problem.

Fourth, the Italians will not take action to improve international cooperation to stop the illegal traffic of heroin. They do not coordinate their activities with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) in spite of the fact that that organization maintains complete files on all known international criminals. Nor will they pass information to Interpol. They have also refused to put any pressure on Turkey to do anything about this problem. Another indication of Italian attitudes is their refusal to participate in the Special Drug Abuse Control Fund established by the United Nations until at least three-fourths of the members have contributed.

Italian cooperation with the United States

There are BNDD agents in Italy working with the Italian authorities in an effort to interdict morphine passing through Italy and to stop heroin from returning. These efforts are hampered by the need to coordinate activities within the several Italian police agencies. Nevertheless, BNDD is helping and encouraging the Italians to improve their capability to halt the drug traffic while waiting for the Italian Government to centralize its operations in this area. Right now, there is little or no cooperation between the Central Narcotics Office and the several police agencies, including the local police. As a matter of fact, the only successful seizures and arrests made in Italy since 1962 have been made with BNDD assistance.

Ambassador Graham Martin has met with Italian Government officials on at least three occasions requesting more cooperation from the Italian Government, to no avail.

These efforts must be intensified. The United States must keep the pressure on the Government of Italy to take effective action and should be prepared, if necessary, to supply aircraft, helicopters, vehicles, communication and other equipment to help increase Italian capabilities to deal effectively with the illegal traffic in narcotics.

If there were no opium production in Turkey, however, the illegal laboratories in Marseilles could not exist. Nor could the illegal trafficker profit in Italy. Solution to the problem has to be found in Turkey. If efforts to close the illegal laboratories in Marseilles, or to stop the Italian trafficker are successful, the operation will move some place else. Without morphine base it is impossible to produce heroin. The Middle East-European aspect of the illegal international traffic in narcotics can only be stopped at the source—in the poppy fields of Turkey.

THE ROLE OF TURKEY

Background

Poppy cultivation is a tradition in the Anatolian region of Turkey dating back to about 1900 B.C. During the 19th century, as world trade greatly expanded, the demand for opium increased and between 1850 and 1900 cultivation spread and expanded throughout the entire country as a cash crop and an important export. In addition to opium gum, other important by-products include seeds for flavoring and oil, both of which have become a standard part of the Turkish farmer's diet.

Although by 1900 the addiction and abuse of opium and its derivatives had become a serious world health problem and the need for controls was recognized, the political, cultural, social and economic differences between nations made achievement possible only through a progression of treaties, culminating finally in their codification in a Single Convention in 1961. The Single Narcotics Convention which came into force in 1964 was ratified by Turkey in December 1966 and by the United States in 1967. Under this agreement Turkey is recognized as an opium exporter to the legal market.

Attempts to control opium production

Since 1967 Turkey has reduced the number of provinces legally permitted to cultivate poppies from 21 to 7 for the 1971 harvest. It has announced a further reduction to four provinces for 1972. During this same period the legal production of opium gum has been reduced from 368 tons to an estimated 100 tons in 1970. It is estimated by reliable authorities, however, that illegal production could be at least as much and possibly twice that amount—more than enough to satisfy the 4 to 5 tons of heroin required by the addict population in the United States.

Turkey has also tightened procedures for surveillance of poppy fields, purchase from farmers, and curbing of illegal traffic, and instituted efforts to encourage crop substitutions.

Under current practice, worldwide opium trade requirements are determined by the United Nations Control Board. Based upon this, the Turkish Government estimates how much opium Turkey should produce in the following year. The Ministry of Agriculture then determines how much acreage should be planted and in which provinces. The Cabinet then passes an approving decree. The Ministry does not tell the farmer how much land he can plant. Instead, the farmer declares to the village headman how much he intends to farm and the expected yield. These estimates are then passed to the Ministry of Agriculture. The farmer is expected to abide by his declaration, but under present law he is not required to obtain a license.

Control teams will be organized in each of the four provinces to monitor the growing of poppies. These teams will inspect the fields continually from the time of planting through the harvest. The con-

control team will also be responsible for inspecting those areas where poppy cultivation is not permitted. To insure that the provincial control teams are managing the program properly other inspection teams will be periodically sent from Ankara. To facilitate the inspection process the United States will probably loan an airplane to the Turkish Marketing Organization (TMO) to help in the surveillance. The control teams will also educate the farmer on the reasons for and the need to eradicate poppy growing in Turkey.

The Government of Turkey has also increased its efforts to purchase the total opium crop being produced this year. Special instructions have been given to the TMO which is the agency responsible for all purchases and sales of opium. In addition, the governors of the provinces currently harvesting opium have been instructed to assure the closest cooperation between TMO, Ministry of Agriculture, and law enforcement agencies in their provinces.

The basic problem in any collection system is to get an accurate measure of how much is actually planted and how much opium gum is produced. If the above system is effective, the illegal production of opium should be reduced. These procedures are not, however, a substitute for a licensing law. Under this procedure the only penalty is to deny the farmer the authorization to grow poppies. These steps, however, do represent an effort to bring poppy cultivation under control.

Hopefully, once poppy cultivation is brought under control, the next step should be a decision to stop growing poppies entirely. To do this, the farmer must be taught to grow other crops. This should not be an insurmountable problem. Poppy cultivation represents only a minor portion of the crop land. The poppy grower seldom devotes more than one hectare to poppies. The poppy takes so much out of the soil that there is a need to rotate crops. If modern farming methods could be introduced and crops that are easier on the soil developed, the incentive to grow poppies might be removed.

To encourage crop substitution, the Ministry of Agriculture has appointed at least one extension agent to each county in the poppy cultivation area. Depending upon soil and climatic conditions, farmers are being encouraged and assisted to switch to other cash crops, including fruits and vegetables, safflower, sunflower, alfalfa, vetch and wheat. A new high yielding winter wheat seed has been introduced on the Anatolia Plateau which includes some of the poppy growing provinces.

The matter of crop substitution is a long-term problem. The Government of Turkey has yet to develop any particular crop that would pay the farmer the same amount of income as that derived from the legal and illegal production of opium. While there are crops that would pay the farmer the same amount of money that he now derives from the legal cultivation of poppies, there is no other crop which would equal the total income from both legal and illegal production.

In an effort to induce the Turkish farmer to grow other crops, consideration should be given to discontinuing poppies as a cash crop. It is one of two crops grown in Turkey for which payment by the Government is immediate. The other is sugar beets.

If the Government were to increase the payments for sugar beets and encourage the substitution of wheat or some other crop for the poppy as a cash crop, the results might be encouraging. If necessary, the United States should help in this effort by vigorously pressing the Turkish Government to consider this alternative and by furnishing financial and technical assistance to implement such a program.

Consideration should also be given to the feasibility of increasing the price that the Government pays the farmer for opium gum. This action, combined with a strict licensing laws and other measures which would make possession of, and trafficking in, illegal opium or its derivatives a crime punishable by death, as in Iran, could produce positive results.

Economic factors involved in Turkish poppy growing

If Turkey stopped growing poppies completely there would be slight impact upon the Turkish economy. According to official Turkish Government statistics, Turkey's total export earnings in 1969 were 4.8 billion Turkish lira (TL) or approximately \$534 million, at the rate of 9 lira to the dollar. Legal exports of opium products—opium gum and poppy straw—in that year were valued at only TL 23.6 million or \$2,622,196.

Illegal sales of opium do not show up in these figures. If illegal opium sales netted the Turkish farmer even three times that amount or \$7,866,588 this is an insignificant item in a total export earning of approximately \$534 million.

There are now approximately 80,000 farmers engaged in growing poppies for opium production. In the late 1960's the average annual earnings per farm was between \$700 and \$800. Ten percent of this was derived from the sale, legal and illegal, of opium gum. This represents approximately one-half of the total annual cash income of the Turkish farmer. The Government pays between \$10 and \$15 per kilogram for legal opium. On the other hand, the farmer can sell opium on the illegal market for at least \$25 per kilogram. Thus, the incentive is to sell to the illegal purchaser.

There is another problem. At present the farmer takes the opium gum to the Government collector in his area who is supposed to weigh the gum and pay the farmer on the spot.

In practice, the farmer is very often cheated. The TMO representative responsible for the purchase of the opium gum from the farmer frequently waits 6 weeks before he weighs the opium gum. During this time moisture in the gum has evaporated and the weight reduced. As a consequence, the farmer gets less money and he feels cheated. Under the circumstances it is no wonder that the farmer is more interested in selling on the black market.

What Turkey has not done

In 1966 Turkey ratified the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.¹ Article 23 of the Convention requires that all parties enact licensing laws to control the growing of poppies. To date, Turkey has not passed a licensing law.

The principal reasons given are that domestic political realities (approximately 80,000 farmers grow poppies) do not permit passage, and that passage as a result of U.S. pressure would give the impression that the Government of Turkey is a "puppet of the United States."

¹ This is the basic document controlling the legal production of opium around the world.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs has been studying this problem since July 1970. At that time passage of the licensing laws was thought imminent, before the Turkish Parliament adjourned during the first week in August. No action was taken.

At the Geneva meeting of the United Nations Commission on Narcotics in September 1970 the Turkish representatives pledged passage of a licensing law shortly after Parliament convened early in November.

It is now May 1971 and no positive action has yet been taken by the Turkish Parliament. In response to questions by members of the study mission, a high-ranking Turkish official expressed strong belief that a licensing law would be passed this year.

The Demirel Cabinet fell in March 1971 and a new Cabinet has been installed under the leadership of Prime Minister Nihat Erim. This government is a non-Party government and is more broadly based than was the Demirel government. If it had the will to do so it could pass quickly a law licensing the growing of poppies.

And while there are indications that the Prime Minister intends to take action to control the growing of poppies, the study mission is of the opinion that there is no sense of immediacy on the part of the Turkish Government.

An extract from the Erim government's program fully illustrates this. "Our Government is of the opinion that opium smuggling, which has become a destructive disaster of the youth of the world, is hurting above all our humane feelings; therefore, due importance shall be attached to this problem. Opium producers shall be provided with a better field of occupation in farming."

Certain Turkish legislators questioned the inclusion in the program of remarks on opium. The full response of Prime Minister Erim is not available; however, observers present report that he took a strong position in favor of opium production controls and then explained that opium production would not be discontinued completely until the farmers engaged in poppy farming and opium production were provided with means of attaining a higher level of subsistence.

While it is reassuring to learn that the Government of Turkey is aware of the problem, it is well to remember that actions speak louder than words.

If the United States is to solve the problem of heroin addiction at home, it must have the active and effective cooperation of the Turkish Government, for only the Turks have the power and the authority to control the growing of poppies. And while the United States can't tell the Turks what to do in this matter, it must employ every available leverage to persuade the Turkish Government to take whatever steps are necessary to control and eventually discontinue the growing of poppies.

As a measure of Turkish sincerity in acting on this problem, it is essential that legislation controlling the growing of poppies be enacted as a meaningful first step. While passage of a licensing law will not solve the problem, it is required if the Government of Turkey is to inhibit the flow of opium to the illegal market. Passage of this legislation would also demonstrate Turkey's desire to fulfill her treaty commitments under the provisions of the Single Convention—commitments that were made in December 1966.

United States-Turkish cooperation

In September 1966 the United States began discussions with the Government of Turkey to find ways to better control the production of opium in Turkey. At that time poppy cultivation was permitted in 21 provinces. Although production was prohibited throughout the rest of Turkey, enforcement agencies were poorly equipped and relatively untrained for this type of control, resulting in an estimated 200 tons available for the illegal market.

By 1967, as a result of U.S. efforts and decreasing world opium requirements, the Government of Turkey concluded that opium production would not be an economic crop in the future and that steps should be taken to reduce production. At the same time, the Government decided that it needed to upgrade its enforcement capabilities as well as to provide assistance to farmers to switch to other crops.

To assist in this effort, in 1968 the United States made \$3 million available from AID funds. Approximately \$1.5 million of the loan is being used to finance vehicles and equipment for enforcement agencies and the remainder to finance research to develop alternative crops and vehicles and equipment required by the Ministry of Agriculture to assist the farmer in switching to other crops.

All of the commodities programed under this loan have not been received in Turkey. Bureaucracy and redtape have held up the clearing of the commodities through Turkish customs, with the result that much of the equipment sits around on the dock for substantial periods of time. Steps are now being taken to insure that equipment and commodities shipped for the use of the National Police and gendarmerie will not be subjected to customs clearance.

In connection with this loan, the Government of Turkey has reorganized the Turkish National Police and the gendarmerie in order to develop a 750-man narcotic law enforcement group. The headquarters of this group is located in Ankara and when fully developed, it is expected that there will be 51 regional offices. At the present time it is estimated that half of the 750-man group has been trained and deployed in the field.

Cooperation between the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and Turkish enforcement agencies has been excellent. BNDD agents are now in Turkey working with their counterparts on narcotics control. U.S. agents have reported little evidence of illicit production in provinces where poppy cultivation has been prohibited, and such crops, when found, have been immediately destroyed.

There have been suggestions that the United States make money available to Turkey to buy up the entire poppy crop. They have been rejected on the grounds that it would result in every farmer increasing the land that he devotes to poppy cultivation.

The suggestion has also been rejected by the Turkish Government on the grounds that the domestic political situation in Turkey made it impossible. If this obstacle could be overcome, it is estimated that it would cost about \$5 million to buy up the entire crop.

Another proposal worthy of consideration has been made that the U.S. attempt to purchase the entire illegal crop through the use of undercover agents. This would have the effect of drying up the source of morphine for the laboratories in Marseilles and if entirely success-

ful would dry up the heroin supply to the U.S. market, at least temporarily. Consideration might be given to this expedient as a stop gap measure while other programs, such as crop substitution, are being developed.

It was also suggested to the study mission by a leading Turkish parliamentarian that a parliamentary group be established between the Congress of the United States and the Turkish Parliament for the purpose of discussing mutual problems in the field of narcotics control. In the opinion of the study mission such a group would be beneficial and would provide a useful forum for a meaningful exchange of views on the subject. It should not, however, become merely a discussion panel.

It has been argued that if the supply of opium from Turkey is shut off completely, those engaged in the illegal production of heroin would transfer their operations someplace else, possibly to Afghanistan, India, Iran, Thailand, etc.

There are valid arguments against this line of reasoning. In the first place, the heroin obtained from poppies grown in Afghanistan is low quality and cannot be produced in the quantities needed by the international heroin dealer. Secondly, most of the opium grown in Afghanistan is consumed either in Afghanistan or in Iran.

Iran has strict licensing laws and efficient collection procedures, and most of what she produces is also consumed domestically.

India also has strict licensing laws and efficient collection procedures. There is little evidence of a leakage of opium gum to the illicit market from India.

Thailand, Burma, and Laos do present a problem. But it is a problem that will have to be faced under any circumstances, regardless of whether Turkey produces opium gum or not. If the source of illegal opium can be compressed, more resources can be applied to a smaller area. This would enable the United States and the international community to concentrate its effort in Southeast Asia.

THE PROBLEM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Heroin addiction in the military services in South Vietnam

Heroin addiction in the military forces of the United States is increasing rapidly, particularly in South Vietnam where the best estimates available are that 10 to 15 percent of all U.S. troops currently in South Vietnam are addicted to heroin in one form or another. It is estimated that in some units heroin addiction might be as high as 25 percent. Some smoke it; some sniff or "snort." From 5 to 10 percent of these inject. In the eloquent words of one concerned young American currently serving in Vietnam: "It is ironic indeed that in the last two years of the war our biggest casualty figures will come from heroin addiction, not from combat."

Contributing to this epidemic use of heroin is its ready availability, the frustrations and boredom growing out of the war, and the fact that the drug culture in the Armed Forces reflects American society as a whole. It is realistic to assume that many young Americans have used heroin prior to induction into the military services.

However, most of the addicts in South Vietnam become addicted in that country—usually within the first 30 days after entry.

Because of the quality of the heroin available in South Vietnam, it is possible to become addicted through smoking or sniffing. The "high" does not develop as quickly as when injected, but smoking or sniffing does develop a physical need for heroin. Unfortunately, most of those who smoke or sniff are under the dangerous illusion that heroin taken in this manner is not addictive. Nothing could be further from the truth.

There is also a widespread belief among many American servicemen in Vietnam that this heroin is actually cocaine, a non-addictive drug. This, again, is not true.

Of the heroin users among the U.S. military in South Vietnam, it is estimated that 40 to 45 percent sniff, 50 percent smoke, and between 5 and 10 percent inject. Because of the purity of the heroin all are addictive, although according to medical authorities those who inject become physically dependent sooner than do those who sniff or smoke.

Those who have become addicted to the high quality heroin available in South Vietnam will have no choice but to inject the much more diluted heroin that is available in the United States. The military services should, therefore, make every effort to detect and rehabilitate addicts before returning them to civilian society.

U.S. deaths from heroin abuse

The rate of deaths resulting from drug abuse in South Vietnam is increasing. Between August and December 1970, there were 90 deaths which were suspected to have been drug related. Autopsy confirmed that 59 of these had died from an overdose of heroin.

In January 1971 there were 17 deaths which were suspected to have been drug related. In February there were 19 such deaths. Figures for March and April are not yet available, but if this trend continues over 200 young Americans will die of heroin addiction in 1971.

Ready availability of heroin in South Vietnam

Heroin is readily available to American servicemen in South Vietnam, particularly in Saigon. And it is cheap.

One quarter gram sells for as little as \$2.50 and as much as \$10, while an eighth of a gram will sell for as little as \$1.50 and as much as \$5. Most is purchased, but a large amount is obtained by military personnel who barter cigarettes and other post exchange items for the drugs.

Contributing to the availability of heroin in Saigon is the large number of U.S. military deserters who are engaged in every form of criminal activity, including the selling of heroin.

According to figures provided by United States Army Vietnam (USARV) there are 875 such deserters, although the figure varies.

Between 400 and 500 of these live in an area of Saigon which is called Soul Alley. This area is "off limits" to U.S. personnel and one enters at his own risk. Military police and others who have entered the area have been assaulted, robbed, stripped of their clothing and weapons and otherwise mistreated.

United States military efforts to conduct raids into Soul Alley have failed.

The intelligence gathering capability of the inhabitants of Soul Alley is excellent, and they are usually "tipped off" when a raid is being planned.

Nevertheless, U.S. authorities in South Vietnam should surround and raid Soul Alley and apprehend all U.S. deserters. While this would not solve the heroin problem in Vietnam, certainly it would help.

Heroin production in Southeast Asia

Virtually all of the heroin being used by United States military personnel in South Vietnam, and an increasing amount of the heroin entering the United States, is produced from poppies grown in the remote mountain areas of Burma, Laos, Thailand, and parts of Yunnan Province in Communist China.

Unfortunately, no government exercises effective administrative or political control over these areas.

Poppies are grown in areas occupied by hill tribesmen who have been growing poppies for centuries. Some of the areas of Laos and Thailand are infested with Communist guerrillas, if not actually controlled by them, while rebel bands and remnants of the Koumintang inhabit the poppy-producing areas in Burma and Thailand.

Burma, Laos, and Thailand produce an estimated 1,000 tons of raw opium, or more than one-half of the world illicit output. Most of this is consumed in the Far East and Southeast Asia. Practically all observers are agreed that the largest group of users and addicts consists of overseas Chinese. Burma, Laos, and Thailand may together account for three-quarters of a million users and addicts, with Burma having the largest share. Hong Kong may account for another 150,000.

Two different types of heroin are produced from the poppies grown in this area—white and purple. There is little or no indigenous requirement for white heroin in Southeast Asia—purple heroin is smoked there.

The production of white heroin in quantity is a comparatively recent development. There are no reliable statistics available to indicate what proportion of opium production is processed into heroin, but it

must be concluded that production is increasing in direct proportion to the growing demand among Americans in South Vietnam.

The major flow of illegal traffic

The major flow of the traffic from the producing areas of Burma, Laos, and Thailand is directed through the Mekong River Valley in the latter two countries. Major cities in these two countries, such as Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Bangkok, serve as final markets, heroin processing centers, and transshipment points, principally to South Vietnam and Hong Kong.

The first major collections of the raw opium in Burma are made by Koumintang irregulars and guerrilla armies of the Shan tribal insurgents who themselves convoy the product southward for delivery to wholesale operators in the cities. The latter arrange for conversion to heroin and for the domestic and export distribution of both opium and heroin. Often these wholesalers are prominent local businessmen.

In Laos, Government armed forces are major wholesalers of opium and heroin and have been directly involved in large-scale smuggling activities.

The major conduit, however, is Thailand.

From the American viewpoint, Thailand is as important to the control of the illegal international traffic in narcotics as Turkey. While all of the opium produced in Southeast Asia is not grown in Thailand, most of it is smuggled through that country. Some of this is processed into heroin which is smuggled to the United States by couriers on commercial or military aircraft. Some is mailed to the United States by U.S. military personnel using both commercial and military postal services. Most, however, is smuggled into South Vietnam through both Laos and Thailand.

Recently American citizens, mostly ex-military, have moved to Thailand and have entered the business of smuggling heroin to the United States.

According to U.S. narcotics agents, the Bangkok operation is led by an ex-U.S. serviceman, William Henry Jackson. Jackson operates a place called the Five Star Bar in Bangkok, which is patronized chiefly by black U.S. servicemen. According to the narcotics agents, Jackson is assisted by other ex-military men, some of whom have moved from Europe to Bangkok. According to the agents, the Jackson group recruits patrons of the Five Star Bar as heroin couriers to the United States and utilizes other active duty military personnel to ship heroin to the United States through the Army and Air Force Postal System.¹

Jackson is now wanted in the United States in connection with a heroin seizure case, and American authorities are working with the Thai Government to have him deported.

BNDD agents in Bangkok are of the opinion that Jackson is probably paying a Thai legislator for protection.

Bangkok is also the source of heroin for another major system engaged in smuggling heroin into the United States—the Okinawa sys-

¹ The Bureau of Customs announced on May 6, that it made 248 seizures of narcotics through Army and Air Force post offices from the beginning of March through April 24, 1971. It also announced that it had seized 17 pounds of heroin in a piece of military mail from Bangkok, Thailand, on April 5. The package, seized at Fort Monmouth, N.J., contained heroin valued at an estimated \$1.75 million on the street.

tem. This system is composed of U.S. military and ex-military personnel allied with a few Okinawans. Efforts to contain this system are hampered by the inability of authorities on Okinawa to initiate adequate customs procedures at the civilian airports. Most U.S. authorities are convinced that this will change once Okinawa reverts to Japan and Japanese law enforcement officials assume customs responsibility for Okinawa.

These Americans who are engaged in this most despicable crime of modern times carry U.S. passports with all of the privileges attendant. They are enemies of the American people who do not deserve the rights accorded to law-abiding citizens, and serious consideration should be given to withdrawing the passports of these international criminals.

Above all, the United States Government should inform the Thai Government that a refusal to deport known U.S. heroin traffickers could prejudice Thai-American relations.

Smuggling into South Vietnam

Heroin is smuggled into South Vietnam in a variety of ways. Some is carried in commercial aircraft, some is air landed or air dropped. Some is probably carried overland by North Vietnamese or Vietcong using trail areas used for transporting supplies, and some is carried in South Vietnamese vehicles and aircraft.

It is believed that the Laotian and South Vietnamese Air Forces are deeply involved in this activity. Heroin has also been smuggled in Air America aircraft although there is no evidence that any official of a U.S. agency has ever been involved in the smuggling of heroin into South Vietnam.


It is also possible to rent private aircraft in Southeast Asia and the use of private aircraft for smuggling purposes is increasing.

It is assumed by the U.S. military that this activity reaches high levels of command, to include the politicians, both in Laos and in South Vietnam. We were told that there is information available that high-ranking Vietnamese officials, including military, are mixed up in drug operations.

Heroin is smuggled into South Vietnam from Bangkok by Thai soldiers either returning from leave or those beginning a tour of duty in South Vietnam. Many of these soldiers travel in U.S. military aircraft. Unfortunately, there are no adequate customs procedures in effect and the Thai soldier enters South Vietnam unchecked. Some is also carried in Thai aircraft, both military and commercial, and some is thought to be mailed by Thai military personnel through the postal system which the United States operates for the Thai military serving in Vietnam. As one American official told us, "This is an ideal situation for shipping heroin to Vietnam." Finally, some heroin is thought to be carried in by American military personnel returning from R. and R. Recent evidence indicates that Hong Kong may be a limited source of the heroin reaching U.S. troops in South Vietnam.

Once the heroin reaches South Vietnam from these various sources, it becomes readily available in the streets of Saigon. The street peddler who sells heroin is the low man on the totem pole. The structure of

the illegal heroin market can be illustrated as a pyramid consisting of four tiers:



If the financiers and backers who finance the narcotics business can be uncovered and prosecuted, severe damage could be inflicted on the entire operation, especially if strong measures are taken to deal with the bottom three tiers of the pyramid simultaneously.

The problem of corruption

Official corruption plays an important part in the worldwide traffic in heroin. The extent of corruption in Southeast Asia is difficult to assess. Reliable sources report that at least two high-ranking Laotian officials, military and governmental, including the chief of the Laotian general staff, are deeply involved in the heroin business.

In Thailand, a former diplomat and member of one of the most respected Thai families is reputed to be one of the key figures in the opium, morphine base, and heroin operations in that country and throughout Southeast Asia.

Recently, a member of the South Vietnamese legislature, and friend of high-ranking governmental officials, was arrested smuggling heroin into Vietnam. The U.S. Military Command has supplied Ambassador Bunker with the names of high-ranking Vietnamese officials it suspects of involvement in the heroin trade, and believes that the corruption has reached the point where only forceful intervention by President Thieu can succeed in checking the traffic.

There have also been reports that Vice President Ky is implicated in the current heroin traffic. The study mission was unable to find any evidence to support this allegation.

In general the wholesale organizations trading in opium and opiates seek to involve government officials in their activities by corruption. Essentially, the wholesalers want both legal protection for themselves and insurance for the dependability of their business operations. In order to provide deliveries of contraband in large volumes and with regularity, the wholesalers seek to corrupt officialdom at fairly high levels if possible. At the same time, officialdom itself may be vulnerable to corruption because of the relatively large compensation it can get for collaborating with the major traders. For this reason, some officials are undoubtedly involved in illegal narcotics traffic.

The involvement in the traffic of individual officials and military officers in some other countries has also been reliably reported, as has the use of diplomatic pouches for smuggling opium and heroin. In no country, however, is there likely to be a flourishing illicit trade in opium or heroin without the complicity of at least a few key civil servants or police officers.

What the governments of Southeast Asia are doing

SOUTH VIETNAM

Most of the heroin in Southeast Asia is produced for Americans. Until recently this led many governments to look upon heroin usage as strictly an American problem and little was done to help stop the illegal traffic. Addiction, however, is being discovered among the indigenous population, and the various governments are responding to U.S. initiatives in order to begin to get some control over this problem.

This is particularly true in the South Vietnamese military forces. We were told that during the South Vietnamese invasion of Laos, that some South Vietnamese troops who had been transferred from other areas of Vietnam on short notice had to be treated for withdrawal symptoms. Some U.S. personnel supporting the operation were also treated for withdrawal pains. The theory is that these troops were moved so rapidly and on such short notice that it was not possible to obtain sufficient heroin to satisfy their needs. As a result, one high-ranking South Vietnamese official told the study mission that whereas he had formerly looked upon the drug problem as an American problem, he now realized that it was becoming a Vietnamese problem.

Proper enforcement of South Vietnamese law would put a stop to a large part of the illegal traffic in heroin in that country. Particular emphasis must be placed on ending corruption in the customs service, which has been responsible for large quantities of heroin entering South Vietnam.

The possession of and the sale of heroin in South Vietnam is illegal. Yet sales on the streets of Saigon are so blatant that several attempts were made to sell heroin to members of the study mission as they walked the streets of Saigon, accompanied by a uniformed member of the United States Army.

As a result of American pressure the national police are becoming more aware of the need to do something about this problem. The national police commander has promised to take action.

In this context, combined narcotics suppression committees have been established in each military region. The membership consists of two U.S. officers and two inspectors from the national police. The committee collects and evaluates information on narcotics smuggling and informs the national police agencies of the need to take action to arrest and prosecute offenders.

It is too early to measure the effectiveness of these committees. In spite of the fact that heroin addiction has been a growing problem for over a year, the committees were not established until February 1971.

The study mission was assured by U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker that both President Thieu and Vice President Ky were con-

cerned with the problem and are interested in stopping the illegal traffic in heroin.

Promises and interest are not enough, however. Strong action must be taken to stop the heroin traffic in South Vietnam. We are not optimistic that the Government is either willing or able to take such action.

One of the major reasons for pessimism is the internal political situation in South Vietnam, where differences between President Thieu and Vice President Ky inhibits effective action being taken.

Vice President Ky was especially critical of the efforts being taken by the Government of South Vietnam to solve the problem of heroin, and stated that if he were given the responsibility of cleaning up "the drug mess" in South Vietnam, he would produce concrete results within 2 or 3 months.

The implication of this statement is that the Government is not doing all that it can, or should. Some way must be found to convince the South Vietnamese of the urgency of this problem and the absolute necessity to solve it.

In the final analysis, neither South Vietnam nor the United States can solve this problem alone. Both need the cooperation of the producing countries: Burma, Laos, and Thailand. Of the three, Thailand is the most important, and the most able to take action.

THAILAND

According to United States officials in Bangkok, the Thai Government is taking some action to stem illicit heroin production.

Since producing opium is illegal in Thailand, there are projects aimed at encouraging the hill tribesmen to grow other crops. These programs consist of education and training in new farming techniques and improved enforcement of Thai law.

The study mission visited a tribal research center which is situated on the grounds of Chiang Mai University in Northern Thailand. The research center is the research branch of the Hill Tribe Division, Department of Public Welfare, Ministry of the Interior. One of the problems which led to the creation of the research center was the illegal cultivation of poppies in Northern Thailand. The Government was desirous of eliminating the growing of poppies, yet the economy of some of the hill societies is based upon the income derived from opium sales. Prohibition, without the promotion of alternative cash crops would have caused considerable hardships. In addition, the inability of the Government to exert effective administrative control over these areas would have doomed the project to failure.

In 1967 and again in 1970, the Thai Government requested the United Nations to help by conducting a study on the economic and social needs of the opium producing areas in Thailand.

There have also been efforts to resettle the hill tribes to other areas, but this program has not been overly successful.

The Thai Government has initiated efforts to destroy the poppy crops, but without great success. The areas are too remote and enforcement almost impossible because of the Communist inspired insurgency in the area.

In 1962, the Thai invited U.S. BNDD agents into Thailand to assist them in their efforts. Relations between BNDD agents and the Thai police are improving. The Thai now permit BNDD agents to operate undercover and to appear in court in narcotics cases.

BNDD efforts, at least until 1969, were hampered because funds needed to do an effective job were not available. This situation has also changed and sufficient funds are now being made available.

Much more cooperation on the part of the Thai government is required, however. The Thai must devote more resources to improvement of their capability to intercept illegal shipments of opium, morphine, and heroin.

The Thai Government must also institute adequate and effective customs inspection, especially in the case of Thai troops and aircraft going to and from South Vietnam.

The study mission was also of the opinion that the United States Mission in Thailand should be more forceful in convincing the Thai Government that the United States not only needs, but expects, rapidly increasing action to stop the illegal traffic in opium and its derivatives.

Strong and effective measures by the Thai Government, however, would not completely solve the problem. Poppies are also grown in Burma and Laos.

BURMA

Poppies are grown in Burma under uncontrolled conditions. Due to economic, social, and political factors, the Government is not able to apply control measures required to implement their policies or intentions of prohibiting, or to supervise and control the growing of poppies and the production of opium. While much of the opium produced in Burma is consumed locally, a considerable amount appears in the illicit traffic. It is bartered for goods or sold for cash. Opium is very often the principal cash crop.

Burma has few economic, political, or cultural contacts with the outside world as a result of the Government's acute sensitivity to foreign influence. Because of this, U.S. relations with Burma are not close, although they are "correct and friendly."

Any reduction in the amount of opium produced in Burma will take time. The Government must be strengthened and some way found to convince the opium producers to grow other crops.

There is little that the United States can do unilaterally to bring this about. It can, and must, however, urge the United Nations to help.

LAOS

The Laotians are deeply involved in the growing of poppies and in the production of heroin. Opium is the principal source of income of the ethnic minorities in Laos.

The possession of opium in Laos is not illegal at the present time. There is a law being considered which would make such possession illegal. Even if the law passes, enforcement will be next to impossible because of the inability of the Laotian Government to exercise effective political control over most of Laos. A copy of the proposed legislation, including the note of presentation, is included in the

appendix. This proposal, which was first drafted in 1963, will be presented to the National Assembly, hopefully in May 1971.

There are other steps that the Laotians can take to assert some control over the illegal traffic in opium and its derivatives. From the evidence available, there is no doubt that the Laotian military is deeply involved in the international traffic in heroin. Heroin is processed in laboratories located in Laos, and what is not smuggled through Thailand is smuggled through Laos, primarily by air in Laotian Air Force planes. While there is little likelihood that the Laotian Government will gain control over its territory in the near future, it can, and must, take action to reform its air force and eliminate the corruption which permits the drug traffic to flourish.

It should also be pointed out that tribesmen who grow poppies in the non-Communist part of Laos are some of the most effective resistance fighters against the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao. They depend for their livelihood upon opium production. The United States should consider the feasibility of buying up the opium crop each year, while encouraging and assisting the tribesmen to grow other crops. Such a program would probably cost at the most \$10 million annually. In 5 years, however, it would not equal the amount of military assistance that the United States gives to Laos annually to enable it to remain non-Communist. If it is in the national security interests of the United States to save 3 million Laotians from communism, it certainly is in the national security interest of the United States to spend whatever is necessary to save generations of young Americans from heroin addiction.

In summary, the heroin problem in Southeast Asia is a regional problem. It transcends national boundaries and the operations in one country are dependent upon the operations in the other. Efforts to combat it must, therefore, be regional in scope. And the United States must push the fight against heroin as vigorously as it has conducted the fight against Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

For years the United States has been encouraging regional economic development in Southeast Asia. It is discouraging that the most successful regional commercial development has been the illicit production and sale of heroin.

What the United States is doing to attack the heroin problem in South Vietnam

Steps are being taken by the United States Government in South Vietnam at both the diplomatic level and the military level to combat the growing heroin problem.

The study mission learned that the United States has made a strong appeal to the Government of South Vietnam to take action in this area. In a strongly worded memorandum, the U.S. Ambassador pointed out that "continuation of illegal traffic in drugs, particularly heroin, will have a serious impact on American support of the national effort."

Because there has been criticism of U.S. diplomats for not pressing the narcotics issue forcefully enough with host governments, it is only fair to say that the study mission wholeheartedly supports the efforts of the Embassy in South Vietnam. Following is an extract from the paper:

DRUG ABUSE

GOALS

Accordingly it is suggested that the following goals be established:

1. Recognition by all Vietnamese officials and citizens of the magnitude of the drug problem and the serious impact that a continuation of illicit traffic in drugs, particularly heroin, will have on the American support of the national effort.
2. Development of a national will to eradicate trafficking in drugs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To achieve these goals it is specifically recommended that the President of Vietnam:

1. Issue a circular in the immediate future, through both civilian and military components of the government, indicating your concern over the accelerating drug problem and the apparent involvement of large numbers of Vietnamese in drug trafficking. This circular should specifically mention the trafficking of heroin and the danger this highly addictive narcotic currently poses to the physical well-being of Americans as well as the future danger it poses to Vietnamese citizens. This circular should be followed by a decree which specifically legislates against trafficking in heroin and which imposes severe penalties for doing so.

2. Appoint a Presidential Task Force of highly qualified, dedicated and honest investigators to ferret out, investigate and prosecute the financiers and backers who comprise the powers behind drug trafficking. These men are responsible for manipulating, fostering, protecting and promoting the illicit traffic in drugs. They include influential political figures, government officials and moneyed ethnic Chinese members of the criminal syndicate now flourishing in the Cholon sector of Saigon.

3. Initiate action to establish a comprehensive drug training program for all law enforcement elements within the Republic of Vietnam, to include prosecutors. Such training would be directed primarily at heroin, its characteristics and the danger it poses to the physical well being of users.

4. Initiate immediate action to arrest all importers, distributors and street peddlers involved in the distribution and sale of drugs, especially heroin. Further, that stringent penalties be levied against these people to preclude their return to these activities.

5. Initiate action to form a specialized narcotics section within the Customs Fraud Repression Service. Such a section would devote its energy to combat the smuggling of drugs, especially heroin.

6. Take immediate action to have existing customs regulations enforced. Specific actions that must be taken are:

- (a) Unauthorized personnel must not be allowed to handle any items of cargo or baggage until such items have been properly cleared by customs officials.

- (b) Existing customs regulations pertaining to the actual processing and searching of individuals and all classes of cargo/personnel must be adhered to rigidly.

7. Initiate action to enforce existing health and welfare laws as they pertain to the sale of pharmaceutical products (dangerous drugs) throughout Vietnam. No such products should be sold to American servicemen without the required prescription.

U.S. military authorities in South Vietnam are also aware that the problem of heroin addiction has reached epidemic proportions and must be solved. To do this, a four-point program has been developed, consisting of education, amnesty, rehabilitation, and suppression.

Education programs have been expanded at all levels of command where the consequences of drug abuse are stressed. There are also programs aimed at educating noncommissioned and commissioned officers in the detection and control of drug abuse in their units.

An education program to be effective must stress the dangers inherent in the illegal use of drugs and the dangers it poses to the health and future of the user. It must be current, accurate, and hardhitting.

There has been criticism that material provided for use in Vietnam does not fit these requirements. According to one recognized authority, more use should be made of films which "tell it like it is." These films should be kept up to date and they should focus on the problem in South Vietnam.

Amnesty programs have been instituted. Basically, amnesty is a promise of freedom from punishment in exchange for accepting medical treatment and rehabilitation. Under this program when an addict requests rehabilitation treatment and medical assistance, he is admitted to a rehabilitation center where he undergoes treatment for his addiction. To prevent the amnesty program from being used as a vehicle to escape from combat and to discourage resumption of the habit, an individual is permitted to request amnesty only one time.

While there has been no success in curing those who inject, there have been some successes in curing those who sniff or smoke. There are very few statistics available concerning rehabilitation programs. They must, therefore, be used with caution.

For example, during the first quarter of 1971, 3,458 heroin users participated in the rehabilitation program. Of this number, there were at least 703 known unsuccessful participants. There are no figures available which estimate the rate of cure of those participating. From statistics that are available, the rate of cure is not encouraging. For instance, of 532 addicts treated at Pioneer House, an amnesty and rehabilitation center located in Long Binh, between October 1970 and March 1971, there were reported 149 successful cures, 94 failures, and 249 in the unsure category.

An important part of the rehabilitation program is the counseling received during the treatment period. Even here, the program is vulnerable. For instance, the week before the study mission visited Long Binh, two counsellors at Pioneer House were arrested, one for using LSD; the other for using heroin.

Another problem emanates from the requirement that the amnesty and rehabilitation program is entirely voluntary. The individual is free to leave the center at any time. In the past, people have walked out of the rehabilitation center before they were cured. They will probably do the same in the future.

But perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the drug rehabilitation program is that there is not a coordinated Vietnam-wide effort to establish rehabilitation centers. Responsibility is delegated to major commanders. Some commands support the effort fully. Some distrust the concept and take little or no interest in the program.

Several steps have also been taken to suppress the use of drugs, particularly heroin, in South Vietnam. Drug-abuse councils have been formed in every unit down to battalion/squadron level to provide analysis, evaluation, and monitoring of all aspects of narcotics and drug suppression. A combined antinarcotics enforcement committee, composed of Vietnamese and American forces, has also been established in each military region to eliminate the illicit traffic in narcotics within the civilian community of the Republic of Vietnam.

In addition, a Joint United States/Republic of Vietnam Narcotics Investigative Detachment will concentrate its efforts on the illegal

drug supply and trafficking problem to interdict and eradicate drug sources before the heroin reaches military personnel. This detachment is made up of representatives from the several U.S. military investigative organizations, the Vietnamese Military Police, and the Vietnamese National Police.

Simultaneously, a Joint U.S. Customs Group has been established to assume responsibility for all military customs operations in Vietnam to include postal, household goods, unaccompanied baggage, and the processing of accompanied baggage and personnel arriving or departing South Vietnam. This unit is responsible for all customs enforcement, including narcotics.

Hopefully, these steps will help reduce the availability and use of heroin by U.S. personnel in South Vietnam.

There is one other aspect of the problem which is of concern to military authorities in South Vietnam—they have no adequate and reliable procedures for detecting the heroin addict. As part of the drug-suppression program, new and more complete surveying techniques are to be employed and statistical data will be collected and compiled on a commandwide basis.

Measures must be taken to improve the reliability of addict detection procedures. If possible, the development of a simplified urinalysis test should become a matter of first priority for medical authorities. If this is not feasible, adequate laboratory facilities should be furnished down to battalion and squadron level. Every soldier should be required to undergo periodic urinalysis, especially before his return to the United States and absolutely before his separation from the military service. If the serviceman who has become addicted using 94- to 97-percent pure heroin in South Vietnam enters the drug scene in the United States where the heroin available is 4 to 6 percent pure, the ominous implications are obvious for himself, his family, and for American society. In the absence of the heroin available in South Vietnam, the only alternative for one who has become addicted through sniffing and snorting will be to inject.

Implementation of the above program must receive the highest priority at every level of command, and it must be pushed with a greater sense of urgency than has been the case. In spite of the fact that drug abuse has been a growing problem in South Vietnam for over 1 year, the directive setting out the program to combat it was not issued until December 1970.

While U.S. military and diplomatic personnel in Southeast Asia are concerned about the problem, the study mission is of the opinion that a greater sense of urgency is needed.

For example, when we arrived in Bangkok, we were told that there was a regional conference being held to discuss the problem of drug addiction among U.S. military personnel in Southeast Asia. All U.S. agencies responsible for the drug problem were represented at the meeting. This included military, Bureau of Customs, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and U.S. diplomatic personnel.

While it was encouraging to note that this conference was finally held, such action should have been taken much sooner to mobilize the resources available to take strong coordinated action to stop the illegal traffic in heroin.

IRAN AND JAPAN

The study mission also traveled to Iran and Japan in an effort to determine what impact, if any, those countries had upon the heroin problem in the United States. We are happy to report that there is no evidence to suggest that either contributes in any way to the illegal production and smuggling of heroin into the United States.

What was of particular interest to us was the approach that the two countries have taken, and are taking, to control heroin addiction.

In both, these procedures are aimed at suppression of the illegal traffic, rehabilitation of the addicts when found, and strict justice for those convicted for illegal possession of, or trafficking in, heroin.

IRAN

Iran has one of the largest heroin using populations in the world—approximately 50,000. Unlike the United States, 90 percent of the heroin used in Iran is produced illegally in that country. The remaining 10 percent required by the Iranian heroin addict population originates in the poppy fields of Turkey.

In 1955, because opium addiction was undermining the health of the nation, Iran banned the growing of poppies.

By 1969, discouraged by the lack of movement on the part of Turkey and Afghanistan, and alarmed by the gold drain which covered the cost of illicitly imported opium, Iran authorized limited poppy cultivation under strictly controlled conditions.

Iran has strict opium collection procedures and the poppy crop is closely monitored from planting until the harvest of the opium gum. And whereas the Government of Turkey pays the farmer \$10 to \$15 for opium gum, the Government of Iran pays \$90. This, of course, explains in part why there is little or no leakage of opium gum from the licit to the illicit market in Iran.

There are other reasons. If the farmer in Iran violates the law, he forfeits his license to grow poppies. And if an individual in Iran is convicted of possession or trafficking in heroin, he is executed. (Since 1969, 86 people have been shot for offenses involving heroin.)

In the past, Turkish smugglers moved raw opium into Iran. As a result of strict enforcement of Iranian narcotics legislation and efforts by both Turkish and Iranian Governments to combat smuggling, the amount of opium introduced from Turkey has been reduced dramatically. Now, however, instead of smuggling raw opium, the Turks are smuggling morphine base and heroin. This is a new development.

It is easier to deal in morphine gum or heroin which has one-tenth the bulk of opium gum. In addition, opium gum has a distinctive odor and in hot weather is extremely difficult to conceal while morphine base or heroin is almost odorless.

This poses a potential problem of severe dimensions for the entire international effort to control the illegal traffic in narcotics.

The evidence suggests that the drug traffickers in the Marseilles area of France are becoming concerned at the increasing pressure being applied by the French authorities in cooperation with U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drug agents. It is thought that they may be looking for other areas in which to operate their illicit laboratories. If heroin is produced in Turkey, at the source of the opium gum, it will remove the necessity to smuggle opium gum or morphine base to France. The long, circuitous route from Turkey to Marseilles provides an opportunity for law enforcement agencies to intercept the shipment at any step along the way and particularly in Marseilles where it is halted long enough to be turned into heroin. If, on the other hand, heroin production takes place in Turkey on a scale large enough to provide the illegal heroin formerly produced in Marseilles, interception will become much more difficult.

It is obvious that Turkey must introduce effective opium production controls and work toward a complete abolition of opium production. The heroin problem in Iran and the United States is fueled by the opium that originates in Turkey, and it is that country that can do the most toward helping to solve the heroin addiction problem.

JAPAN

The Japanese have been able to control heroin addiction. Since 1964 they have succeeded in reducing their heroin addict population from approximately 50,000 to only several thousand.

The success of Japanese efforts to control addiction is due to effective Japanese police work and to strict penalties dealing with the narcotics pusher.

The maximum penalty is 10 years in prison for smuggling or selling heroin.

If a man is arrested for heroin pushing, there is no bail permitted. He must be charged within 48 hours, however. The police can hold the suspect for 10 days during which preindictment investigations are conducted. At the end of 10 days, he is turned over to the prosecutor who has an additional 10 days to bring the accused to trial. If necessary, the prosecutor can request an additional 10 days before commencing trial. Therefore, an individual arrested for possession of heroin can be held for 30 days without bail.

It is the opinion of the study mission that law enforcement officials and legislators in the United States should study the methods used by Japan to deal with this problem.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO CONTROL ILLEGAL HEROIN TRAFFIC

It is obvious that if the illegal traffic in heroin is to be brought under control international cooperation is needed. The most immediate problem is to control the cultivation of poppies and the production of opium.

The production of legal opium is regulated by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) through the provisions of the Single Convention of 1961 which became internationally effective December 13, 1964.

The Board is entrusted with enforcing the provisions of the Single Convention. The Board asks both parties and non-parties to the Convention for estimates of drug requirements and existing stocks and statistics of production, consumption and seizures each year, and by article 12(3), if estimates are not forthcoming, the Board can fix them. Among the weapons which the Board has are requests for information and explanations, public declarations that a country has violated its obligations, and under article 14(2), a recommendation to parties that they impose embargoes on imports and exports against an offending country.

Member states are also required to license the growing of poppies and to control trade by granting export licenses only when the importer produces an import certificate from the importing country. A third country is not to allow drugs to pass through its territory without a copy of the export authorization.

The provisions of the Single Convention, however, apply only to the control of legal production of opium. They provide essentially voluntary restraints on parties with respect to cultivation of the opium poppy, production of opium, manufacture of opium-derived drugs and import and export of these substances. The United States has proposed amendments which, if adopted, would provide the INCB with authority to control production and illegal traffic in narcotic drugs.

It is hoped that a conference to consider the proposed amendments would meet early in 1972.

While the study mission fully supports U.S. efforts to strengthen the ability of the international community to restrict narcotics activity to legitimate medical and scientific purposes, it is of the opinion that such a conference should be convened as soon as possible and not wait until early in 1972. Time is essential and the United States should impress this fact on the international community at every opportunity.

The problem, however, is not the control of legal production, but to find ways to stop leakage of opium to the illegal market. Some countries such as India, Iran, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia have been relatively successful in accomplishing this. Others such as Turkey have not.

Complicating the problem are those areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma, Laos, and Thailand where opium poppies are grown illegally and under uncontrolled conditions.

Because of the amount and quality of heroin produced from the poppies grown in Burma, Laos, Thailand, and Turkey, international efforts to control the illegal traffic in heroin must be concentrated on those four countries.

Experience has demonstrated that the only way to control this problem is to control it at the source—in the poppy fields.

The United States can, and should, exercise what bilateral diplomatic and economic pressures it can to encourage its friends and allies to take action to stop opium production. It is also necessary to obtain the cooperation of the United Nations.

Acting upon the initiative of the United States the United Nations did agree to establish a Special Fund for Drug Abuse Controls, to be made up of voluntary contributions and used to develop short-term and long-term plans and programs to bring the problem of drug addiction under control.

The United States pledged \$2 million and on April 1, 1971, the Permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations made the first \$1 million payment. Unfortunately, the United States is the only country to have pledged any money, although one other, West Germany, has announced unofficially that it will pay approximately \$350,000 into the fund.

This is disappointing. With addiction increasing around the world, particularly in the United States, there is an immediate need for effective action and cooperation.

According to the Secretary General, the purpose of the drug abuse fund will be to develop short-term and long-term plans and programs and to provide assistance in the execution of those plans and programs. During the initial stages of the Fund, pending the completion and submission of a proposed long-term policy and plan of action which would deal with all aspects of the problems related to drug abuse control, the voluntary contributions to the Fund will be used for specific projects to be included in a short-term program without prejudice to on-going projects. The short-term program will consist of projects to expand the research and information facilities of United Nations drug control bodies; to plan and implement programs of technical assistance in pilot projects for crop substitution purposes, the establishment and improvement of national drug control administrations and enforcement machinery, and training of personnel, and in setting up or expanding research and training centers which could serve national or regional needs; to enlarge the capabilities and extend the operations of United Nations drug control bodies and their secretariats; to promote facilities for the treatment, rehabilitation and social reintegration of drug addicts; and to develop educational material and programs suitable for use on high-risk populations.

While this is a commendable program and should be encouraged it does not go to the heart of the problem—how to stop the illegal traffic in heroin now or how to get Turkey to honor her international treaty obligations by passing a law licensing the growing of poppies; or what is to be done to control the growing of poppies and the production and smuggling of heroin in the Far East.

These are the basic problems and, if necessary, the United States should be willing to make funds available to the United Nations, or to the individual countries, so that they might begin to deal with them.

The United States also must convince the world community of the urgency of this problem.

International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)

Essentially, the purpose of Interpol is to enable police forces in the different countries to coordinate their work effectively in the double aim of law enforcement and crime prevention.

Interpol is not an enforcement body, nor is it an investigating body. It collects, collates, stores and disseminates information on known international criminals.

It has a staff of 107, of which 12 devote full time to narcotics matters.

Interpol is hampered in its efforts to assist in the control of narcotics by—

(1) Bad communications between police units in the member countries;

(2) Corruption in the police units or on a higher national level; and

(3) Poor administrative and police control over large parts of the country such as in Thailand, Laos and Burma.

Another problem is that Interpol does not receive a great amount of intelligence from member countries concerning the smuggling of narcotics. If a foreign national is arrested for a narcotics offense, the national police are required to provide Interpol with all of the information surrounding the case. This is not always done. Until January 1971 one of the greatest offenders was the United States.

The United States is also currently behind in its dues to Interpol. The dues were increased in 1969 from \$28,500 per year to \$48,780. The United States needed legislative authority to pay the difference—authority which has not yet been granted.

There have been a number of suggestions made that Interpol could increase its effectiveness by improving its communications facilities and by computerizing its operations. The Study mission discussed this with Interpol officials at some length. Although it was the considered opinion of those experts that such improvements would make Interpol operations more efficient, they pointed out that there were no funds available for this: Interpol operates on an annual budget of less than \$1 million and any additional equipment would require an increase in the annual dues.

It has been suggested that the United States should make money available to Interpol to introduce these modernization programs. This could be done but it should be done with caution and in such a way as to preclude the assumption that the United States is trying to "take over" Interpol.

The United States should consider ways to improve the communications capabilities of Interpol and the member countries, either on a bilateral basis or through the Interpol apparatus.

Other international organizations

In addition to action in the United Nations and increased cooperation with Interpol, the United States should also consider putting pressure on our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Both are mutual security treaties and both pledge action against a common foe. Heroin addiction is an enemy of mankind and all the world's resources should be mobilized against it.

The United States furnishes approximately \$100 million military assistance to Turkey annually to enable that country to fulfill her commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO was organized to protect the security of the North Atlantic area, including the United States. During the 22 years that NATO has been in existence, the United States has contributed well over \$20 billion to insure its survival. Money is no object when it comes to the defense of the free world. The U.S. defense budget in 1971 will be approximately \$79 billion, plus another \$2 billion for military assistance.

But how well will we have defended America, if we lose a generation of young Americans to heroin addiction in the process?

Europe depends upon the United States for its security. It should be willing to do what is necessary to help solve this problem, including putting pressure on Turkey to take effective action to first control and then to stop the growing of poppies.

The same situation applies in Southeast Asia. Thailand is a SEATO partner and Laos and South Vietnam fall under the U.S. security blanket. They must all be persuaded to join in the battle against heroin now.

CONCLUSIONS

1. As of May, 1971, there are an estimated 250,000 heroin addicts in the United States and an additional 30,000-40,000 addicts among U.S. troops in Southeast Asia.
2. The problem is how to stop heroin from reaching American addicts in the United States and in Southeast Asia. Once the poppy is cut and introduced into illegal channels, the battle to prevent the end product, heroin, from reaching the addict is virtually lost.
3. Heroin addiction is essentially an American problem and most countries view it as such. As a result, there is a great deal of talk about cooperation with the United States but there is very little action.
4. There is no sense of urgency on the part of most governments that action must be taken immediately to stop the illegal production of, and traffic in, heroin. U.S. diplomatic personnel must assign top priority to gaining the full cooperation of host governments in attempting to solve the heroin problem.
5. Turkey must stop growing opium poppies if this problem is to be brought under control. Most of the heroin entering the United States originates in the poppy fields of Turkey.
6. Prospects for stopping poppy cultivation and the production of heroin in Southeast Asia in the near future are dim. Efforts must be directed toward stopping the illegal flow of heroin into South Vietnam. If these efforts fail, the only solution is to withdraw American servicemen from Southeast Asia. Above all the U.S. diplomatic community in the several countries must be aware that their job is to represent United States interests rather than to appease the host government.
7. The United States can and should exert pressures on the Governments in Southeast Asia in order to gain their cooperation in the fight against heroin. The survival of Laos and South Vietnam depend upon continued military and economic assistance from the United States and the ability of Thailand to defend itself would be seriously weakened if the United States were to discontinue military assistance to that country. While the effectiveness of threats to cut off military and economic assistance are debatable, there can be no disagreement that because of this assistance the United States has a right to expect full cooperation from these countries in efforts to stop illegal traffic in heroin.
8. Corruption plays an important role in the illegal heroin traffic, particularly in Southeast Asia. Governmental and military officials at all levels are implicated. If graft and corruption are to be eliminated, some way must be found to take the profit out of the production and sale of heroin.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the President take personal command of the struggle to eliminate the illegal international traffic in narcotics, particularly heroin, and commit the full resources of the country to that battle.

2. That every U.S. department and agency engaged in the conduct of foreign policy be instructed to participate in a broad-based diplomatic offensive to gain the full cooperation of foreign governments in eliminating the illegal traffic in opium and its derivatives. These instructions should require each U.S. country team to draw up a comprehensive and specific plan for gaining greater cooperation from the host government. Such plans should entail the escalating use of all available political and economic leverages and each foreign government should be put on notice that failure to cooperate would prejudice bilateral relations. To buttress the efforts made abroad, the Department of State should undertake a concerted campaign to impress on foreign ambassadors in Washington and at the United Nations the seriousness of the U.S. Government's concern.

3. That the U.S. Government immediately and forcefully exercise the special leverages it has with the South Vietnamese and Royal Laotian Governments by virtue of our enormous military, economic, and political support of those governments to gain their cooperation in cracking down on the illegal heroin trade in their countries and the official corruption that contributes to it.

4. That the U.S. Government underwrite an accelerated research program to find a nonaddictive substitute for opium, which continues to have important medicinal applications.

5. That the United States negotiate with other countries to better control and, where feasible, stop the cultivation of opium poppies. To help accomplish this, the United States must be prepared to undertake a multimillion-dollar bilateral program to assist those countries to develop substitute economic activities for their opium farmers.

6. That the permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations continue his initiatives to gain greater U.N. participation in the fight against illicit narcotics and dangerous drugs, emphasizing efforts to:

(a) gain the strong support of the Secretary General in this struggle;

(b) push vigorously to insure adoption of amendments to the Single Convention which have been proposed by the United States;

(c) gain participation by all nations in the U.N. Special Fund for Drug Abuse Control; and

(d) initiate proposals designed to upgrade the capabilities of the United Nations Division on Narcotic Drugs and the International Narcotics Control Board in terms of personnel and funding. Special emphasis should be placed on the development of programs by the U.N. Division on Narcotic Drugs to provide alternate economic activities for opium farmers.

7. That U.S. military authorities in Southeast Asia undertake all appropriate policing measures to reduce the flow of heroin to U.S. troops in South Vietnam, including increasing the surveillance of mail entering South Vietnam through APO channels. Customs procedures must also be expanded to include inspection of Thai soldiers entering South Vietnam aboard U.S. military aircraft.

8. That the Department of Defense improve its capability to identify military heroin addicts by instituting an extensive program of urinalysis; that it provide acute care and detoxification for all military addicts; and that it provide basic rehabilitation services for those addicts. That in cases where military rehabilitation efforts prove unsuccessful, the unrehabilitated addict's commanding officer should be permitted and required, prior to the addict's discharge from the military, to civilly commit the addict to the Administrator of the Veterans' Administration for a period of 3 years for treatment and rehabilitation. That the Veterans' Administration in turn contract with civilian multimodality treatment centers at the community level with the purposes of utilizing the centers' expertise within the VA hospitals and ultimately turning the patient over to such centers for reintegration into society.

9. That the United States substantially speed up the withdrawal of military draftees from South Vietnam. The draftees have proven far more susceptible to heroin addiction than nondraftees and are estimated to have an addiction rate of over 15 percent.

10. That the Congress consider legislation which would provide for preventive detention, in the form of a nonbailable offense, for those arrested for the illegal possession of, or trafficking in, heroin, who are not addicted themselves. This legislation should also consist of a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 20 years upon conviction with no possibility of parole.

11. That the Congress consider legislation which would ban the manufacture, distribution, sale, or possession with intent to use, drug materials for illegal purposes.

12. That the United States consider canceling the passport of any American known to be engaged in the illegal traffic in heroin.

13. That U.S. customs authorities increase the surveillance of mail entering the United States through APO channels.

14. That the United States utilize its worldwide intelligence collection apparatus, including the use of satellite photography, to

gather information on all aspects of the illegal production of and traffic in heroin.

15. That substantial new funds be made available to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for discretionary expenditure.

16. That the United States consider making additional funds available to Interpol to improve its operations.

17. That the United States seek greater cooperation from the Government of Switzerland to identify individuals who utilize secret Swiss bank accounts to finance the traffic in heroin.

18. That Congress extend an invitation to the Parliament of Turkey to join in the creation of an interparliamentary group to consider ways and means of attacking the illegal production and sale of opium and its derivatives.

19. That the Committee on Foreign Affairs conduct an in-depth series of hearings to consider the several legislative proposals that have been made to deal with the illegal international traffic in narcotics.

JOURNAL

SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS, INTERVIEWS AND DISCUSSIONS

Washington, D.C.—March 30 and 31:

Mr. Frank A. Bartimo, Assistant General Counsel Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Health and Environment, Department of Defense.

Mr. Kenneth Giannoules, Interpol Bureau, Department of the Treasury.

Mr. Fred T. Dick, Chief, Saigon Office, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

Mr. Andrew C. Tartaglino, Assistant Director for Enforcement, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

Geneva, Switzerland—April 4-5:

United Nations:

Dr. Dale C. Cameron, Chief, Drug Dependence Unit, World Health Organization.¹

Mr. S. P. Sotiroff, Officer in Charge, U.N. Division of Narcotic Drugs.

Mr. Leon Steinig, U.S. Member, International Narcotics Control Board.

Mr. S. Stepczynski, Deputy Secretary, International Narcotics Control Board.

Dr. Braenden, Director of U.N. Narcotics Laboratory.

Dr. J. M. Chilov, Chemist from U.S.S.R., U.N. Narcotics Laboratory.

Dr. Carl Blood, World Health Organization.

U.S. Mission to the European Office of the United Nations:

Hon. Idar Rimestad (AEP), U.S. Representative.

Mr. Edward J. Gaumond, Counselor for Administration.

Mr. Edward G. Misey, Legal Officer, Control Officer.

Paris, France—April 6:

Mr. Jean Nepote, General Secretary, International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and staff.

Hon. Arthur K. Watson, U.S. Ambassador to France.

Hon. David K. E. Bruce, (AEP), U.S. Representative, Paris Peace Talks.

Mr. John Cusack, Chief, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Europe, and staff.

Mr. Marcell Carrere, Chief, French National Narcotics Squad, and staff.

Mr. Louis F. Janowski, Control Officer, Consular Officer, U.S. Embassy.

Marseilles, France—April 7-9:

Mr. Philip H. Chadbourn, Jr., Consul General.

Mr. Albert Habib, Chief, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Marseilles.

¹ Congressman Steele only.

Mr. Anthony J. Morelli, Special Agent, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

Mr. Stephen M. Swanson, Special Agent, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

Mr. Robert Mattei, Chief, Narcotics Division, Marseilles.

Mr. Francois Goujon; Asst. Chief, Commission Principal.

Mr. Antoine Comiti, Chief of Narcotics, Marseilles Regional Services.

M. Henri Arnaud, Member, French Chamber of Deputies.

M. Hubert Louis, Commission Division, Ministry of the Interior.

Mr. Herbert Moza, Dir. of American Studies, University of Aix, Aix, France, and selected students.

M. Jean Laporte, Regional Super. Prefect, Marseilles.

Rome, Italy—April 9-10:

Mr. Michael A. Antonelli, Chief, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Italy.

Mr. Wells Stabler, Deputy Chief of Mission,¹ U.S. Embassy.

Col. David Brown, Defense Attache Office, Control Officer, U.S. Embassy.

Bishop Paul C. Marcinkus, Vatican Diplomatic Corps.²

Mr. Mario Cozzi, U.S. Customs Liaison Representative, Rome.

Ankara, Turkey—April 10-12:

Hon. William J. Handley, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey.

Mr. Henry P. Schardt, Political Officers, U.S. Embassy.

Mr. Joseph S. Toner, Dir., U.S. Agency for International Development, Turkey.

Dr. Harry R. Varney, Agricultural Attache (visit to poppyfield in Afyon).

Mr. Morris Draper, Political Officer, Control Officer.

Mr. Leonard H. Otto, Agricultural Adviser, U.S. AID Mission.

Mr. James W. Spain, Principal Officer, Istanbul.

Mr. John Warner, Special Assistant to the Director, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

Mr. Bernard J. Rotklein, Mutual Security Affairs Officer, Control Officer.

Maj. General Dudley Faver, USAF, Commander, Turkish-U.S. Logistics Command (TUSLOG).

Mr. Robert A. Lincoln, Public Affairs Officer, USIA.

Hon. Kasim Gulek, Presidential Quota Senator.

Hon. Mahmut Vural, Justice Party Senator from Ankara.

Hon. Mustafa Ustundag, Republican Peoples Party Deputy from Konya.

Hon. Mukadder Oztekin, Republican Peoples Party Deputy from Adana.

Hon. Ali Ihsan Balim, Justice Party Deputy from Isparta.

Hon. Osman Meric, Under Secretary, Ministry of Interior.

Hon. Oral Karaosmanoglu, Justice Party Senator from Manisa.

¹ Congressman Steele only.

² Congressman Murphy only.

Mr. Altemur Kilic, Press and Publications Director General, Prime Ministry.

Mr. Ekren Gunay, Assistant General Director, Ministry of Agriculture.

Mr. Orhan Eralp, Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry.

Tehran, Iran—April 12-13:

Hon. Douglas MacArthur, U.S. Ambassador to Iran.

Mr. Douglas L. Heck, Dep. Chief of Mission.

Mr. Donald R. Toussaint, Political Officer.

Col. Warren Bovee, Chief of Mission to the Iranian Gendarmerie.

Mr. Arnold L. Raphael, Political Officer (Narcotics Reporting Officer), Control Officer.

CWO Danny Boyd, Genmish Narcotics Adviser.

Mr. James P. Cavanaugh, Regular Administration Specialist, Security Officer, U.S. Embassy.

Major James J. McGowan, Jr., U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Office.

General Roohollah Amini, Chief, Narcotics Division, Iranian Gendarmerie.

Dr. Amini-Rad, Director General, Narcotics Control Administration.

Col. Naser Gholi Shirani, Chief, Narcotics Division, National Police.

Dr. Jahanshah Saleh, Iranian Senate.

Mr. Mohammad Saidi, Iranian Senate.

Mr. Hill, Community School, Tehran.

Mrs. Ertehfat, International School, Tehran.

Dr. Morrone, Tehran, American School.

Thailand—April 14-17:

Hon. Leonard Unger, U.S. Ambassador.

Mr. George S. Newman, Deputy Chief of Mission.

Mr. Rey M. Hill, Director, United States Operations Mission, Agency for International Development.

Mr. William Wanzeck, Chief of Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

Mr. Keith S. Shostrom, Chief, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Hong Kong.

Maj. Gen. Louis T. Seith, USAF, Commander, Military Assistance Command.

Mr. Joseph Jenkins, Agent in Charge, United States Customs Bureau, Southeast Asia.

Mr. Laurence G. Pickering, Political Officer.

Mr. Michael A. Burns, Political Officer, Control Officer.

Brig Gen. John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, Commanding General, Support Command, Thailand.

Mr. Louis J. Lapham, Political Counselor.

Wever Gim, Consul General, Chiang Mai.

Mr. James Pettit, Bur. of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Chiang Mai.

Hon. Rajawongse Thongthang Thongtaem, Director General, Customs Department.

H. S. H. Prince Bhisatej Rajani, His Majesty's Hilltribe Project.

Mr. Chit Posayanonda, former Director General, now Counselor, to the Bureau of Narcotics.

Police Maj. Gen. Surapol Chulabrahm, Police Department (Border Patrol Police).

Police Maj. Gen. (M. R.) Nilya Bhanumas, Secretary General, Thailand Central Bureau of Narcotics.

Mr. M. R. Chiravadee Kasemsri, Chief, U.N. Division, Department Technical and Economic Cooperation (participated in U.N. Narcotics Survey).

Mr. Sayom Ratanawichit, Chief, Social Studies & Planning Division, Dept. of Public Welfare.

Mr. Nikom Khamnuanmasok, Social Development Branch, Chief, Social Projects Div., National Economic Development Board.

Visit to Hilltribe Research Center, Chiang Mai University.

Visit to Border Patrol Police Hilltribe Handicraft Center.

Flyover Mae Kong Soon poppy-growing area.

Also participated in a Staff Conference on Control of Drug Abuse and Traffic with representatives from U.S. Mission in Southeast Asia.

Saigon—April 17-19:

Hon. Ellsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador, South Vietnam.

Mr. Samuel D. Berger, Deputy Ambassador.

Mr. John E. McGowan, Special Assistant.

Mr. Terrence G. Grant, Political/Military Affairs Officer, Control Officer.

Mr. Stephen Winship, Political/Military Affairs Officer.

Lt. Gen. William J. McCaffrey, Dep. Commanding General, U.S. Army, Vietnam.

Lt. Gen. Michael Davison, Commanding General, II Field Forces, Vietnam (II FFV).

Col. George Webb, Deputy Chief of Staff II FFV.

Col. James H. Hyndman, Provost Marshal General II FFV.

Lt. Col. Frank H. Chamberlin, Surgeon General, II FFV.

Specialist John Backoven, Coordinator, Pioneer House.

Sgt. Tim Jaqua, Coordinator, Pioneer House.

Lt. Col. Alfred R. Jefferson, Deputy Provost Marshal, MACV.

Lt. Col. James M. Parrack, Commanding Officer, Joint Narcotics Investigation Detachment, 8th MP Group (CI), 18th MP Brigade.

Maj. James J. Reilly, Control Officer, Drug Abuse Suppression Division, Provost Marshal Office, MACV.

Maj. Robert Schwartz, Joint Customs Section, Security and Investigations Division, Provost Marshal Office, MACV.

Hong Kong—April 19-20:

Mr. David L. Osborn, principal officer, U.S. consulate.

Mr. David Dean, International Relations Officer General.

Mr. J. Donald Blevins, Consular Officer, Control Officer.

Mr. Keith S. Shostrom, Chief, Bur. of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Hong Kong.

Cdr. R. L. Vomies, Liaison Officer, 7th Fleet, Hong Kong.

Cdr. R. L. Stanford, Officer in Charge, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Phil. Det. Hong Kong.

Mr. Wayne Crawford, Resident Agent, Naval Investigative Services.

Mr. Vincent E. Durant, U.S. Customs, Foreign Liaison Officer,
Hong Kong (TDY).

Tokyo—April 21-22:

Hon. Armin H. Meyer, U.S. Ambassador, Japan.

Mr. Lester E. Edmond, Economic/Commercial Officer.

Mr. Ronald A. Gaiduk, Consular Officer, Control Officer.

Mr. Rustam Aruslan, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs,
Tokyo.

Mr. William J. Cunningham, Political Officer.

Mr. Thomas C. Stave, Economic/Commercial Officer.

Mr. Segoro Usukura, Police Superintendent and Chief of Second
Vice Section,¹ Tokyo Metropolitan Police Dept.

Mr. Hiromasa Sato, Chief of Narcotics, Second Section, Ministry of
Health¹ and Welfare; Briefing by Office of Special Investigations,
US¹ Air Force, Naval Investigation Service Office, and Criminal In-
vestigation Detachment, US Army, Japan.

¹ Congressman Steele only.

A P P E N D I X

NOTE OF PRESENTATION (TRANSMITTAL SHEET TO LAO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY) CONCERNING THE DRAFT LAW ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE GROWING OF THE POPPY, OF THE MANUFACTURE, CONSUMPTION, SALE, PURCHASE, AND POSSESSION OF OPIUM

Importance of the opium problem is manifest equally from the domestic and the international point of view. On the domestic side, the economic aspect of the problem is tied to its political aspect by the fact that the culture of the opium poppy constitutes the principle source of revenue of our ethnic minorities.

However, it would be useless in the present state of affairs to think that we would be able to avoid international control of drugs. The idea of considering opium as an important source of revenue is best rejected.

Traffic in drugs in Laos was formerly an administrative offense governed by the Decree of Haussaire [High Commissioner] No. 247/3101 of 3 September 1948 which is no longer in effect.

The Royal Government, by letter No. 2595/PC/AG of December 10, 1958 addressed to the Ministry of Finance gave its agreement to the principle of the complete revision of their legislation concerning drugs to replace the Decree of 3 September 1948 of the High Commissioner of France in Indochina, regarding the establishment of the opium regulation.

Such is the draft text prepared by our experts and followed by an explanation of the rationale attached to this note.

In view of the events which continuously preoccupy us it would be appropriate to develop a clear policy concerning the campaign against illicit traffic in drugs. It is recalled that in 1963 the Royal Government decided to withdraw the membership of Laos in the Single Convention of 1961 regarding drugs.

DRAFT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION CONCERNING THE PROHIBITION OF THE CULTIVATION OF THE POPPY, OF THE MANUFACTURE AND CONSUMPTION, SALE AND PURCHASE OF OPIUM

Article 1.—For a period of five years following the publication of this law the mountain dwelling population who traditionally devote themselves to the cultivation of the opium poppy may only continue to consume the opium which they produce.

Authorization to grow and consume may be granted by provincial governors only to men over thirty years of age.

The area of land to be cultivated will be determined in relation to the needs of the person requesting it by a provincial consultative commission chaired by the provincial governor and including a representative of the Ministry of National Education. This area will be reduced each year so that at the expiration of the five year period indicated above no authorization to cultivate the poppy and to consume the opium which may be drawn from it will be granted.

Article 2.—With the exception of the specific cases covered by the preceding Article, the culture of the opium poppy, the manufacture, possession, consumption and the vending of opium are forbidden throughout the territory of the Kingdom.

The sale and purchase of opium are forbidden to all persons including those exceptionally authorized to cultivate the opium poppy and who may consume only the product of their cultivation.

Article 3.—With the exception of medicinal products containing opium or such products intended for the manufacture of medicines which remain subject to regulations regarding the sale, conditions and use of poisonous substances, importation, even with the intention of reexportation, transit, storage and transshipment of opium are prohibited.

Article 4.—Any person who shall cultivate the poppy or shall consume opium without the authorization specified in Article 1 or who shall not respect the limits of such authorization as he shall have received, shall be punished by a fine from 5,000 to 200,000 kip and by imprisonment of three months to three years, or by one of these two penalties only.

In case of repetition of the offense, the maximum fine shall be applied.

Article 5.—Any person will be punished by a fine from 5,000 to 10,000 kip and by imprisonment from six months to five years or one of these two penalties only, who shall have:

1. Manufactured opium outside of the special cases covered in Article 1;
2. Transported or possessed or given opium either freely or for payment, or who will have bought or received free;
3. Forged, false authorization to cultivate or to consume or who will have falsified authorization granted by provincial governors by the substitution of names, of photographs, or by false notification or false declarations of civil status;
4. Participate in the preparation and the introduction into circulation of false authorization or falsified authorization;
5. Sale of an authorization or who will have given such authorization free;
6. Bought an authorization or will have received it free;
7. Who will have obtained or tried to obtain more than one authorization;
8. Who will have imported opium, stocked it, had it transshipped, or had it transited in Laos territory.

Further in the cases covered by sections 5, 6 and 7, the authorization will be withdrawn.

In case of repetition of the offense, the maximum fine will be applied.

Article 6.—Any keeper of an opium smoking den will be punished by a fine from 10,000 to 1 million kip and be imprisoned from six months to five years or by one of these two penalties only.

In case of repetition of the offense the maximum fine will be applied.

Article 7.—Infractions covered by this law will be prosecuted by the Department of the Public Prosecutor.

In every case opium seized will be confiscated and destroyed. Means of transportation will be seized and sold on behalf of the state if it is established that their owners are the perpetrators of the infraction, prosecutors or accomplices of such perpetrators.

Materiels, furniture and special objects such as beds, sofas, lamps, pipes, etc. . . . found in the possession of keepers of opium dens will be seized, confiscated and destroyed.

Opium found abandoned in Lao territory will be seized and destroyed on demand of the Public Prosecutor.

Article 8.—All previous dispositions contrary to the present law are annulled.

Certified that the present text is adopted by the National Assembly at its meeting of -----

THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

