winding down this war when, since the administration has taken office, it has sustained one-third of all the casualties in this war—one-third.

That is winding down the war?

I can only think of the statement made—and I salute my colleague from Vermont for underscoring the crassness of it—that if the President does end the war he has still promised to pull the rug out from under the doves after July 1, because that will be a political ploy associated with his reelection.

How terrible to make a statement—if Members want to defend this person making the statement, they can—but how terrible it must be to realize the full import of a statement that says, in April 1971, "I will pull the rug out, some time in 1972, from under the doves."

What happens is that, in the meantime, we are maiming and crippling so many human beings, until it is convenient or advantageous to pull out that rug.

To my mind, that is the greatest immorality that can be perpetrated. I think we would have greater honesty and greater justice if, as the Senator from South Carolina alluded, we took an H-bomb—one could not do it because we have already dropped more bombs on Southeast Asia than three, four, or five H-bombs—but if we took an H-bomb and laid Indochina waste completely, then we are sure that we would win, sure that we would be giving those people freedom and democracy although there would not be anyone there to enjoy it. That is, of course, exactly what we are doing now.

The reason why we cannot use H-bombs to annihilate these people is that it would be morally incomprehensible to us. It would find no moral approbation anywhere in the world. In fact, it would place upon us a blot of unbelievable proportions.

So what do we do? We do not use H-bombs, because that would be doing it too quickly, too efficiently, and too intelligently. So over a period of time we drop conventional bombs—bombs of a sort that when we realize the quantity of them, we can appreciate it.

During the Second World War we dropped over 2 million tons of bombs. During the Korean war, 600,000 tons. We have already amply surpassed that in Indochina. We have amply surpassed our bombing record of World War II and the Korean war.

Upon this little country we have dropped several equivalent hydrogen bombs in terms of destructive energy. Yet no one stands up and rails about it. Why? Because the bombing of Laos was concealed from the American people; 350,000 sorties were concealed from the American people and basically from Congress until March of 1970. In the past 12 years we have doubled our efforts at bombing Laos.

People have the gall to stand on the floor and say that we are winding down the war. The only reason we do not use our intelligence to do this efficiently is because we cannot find the moral approbation. I submit that moral approbation is not there either when we do it on a piecemeal, surgical basis. That moral approbation will not be there, 5, 10, 50 or 1,000 years from now, because this part of American history will stand out as our darkest hour.

Mr. President, I yield the floor and yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered?

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I request the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUGHES). Is there a sufficient second? There is not a sufficient second.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has been yielded back. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second. The yeas and nays are ordered.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment (No. 433) of the Senator from Alaska. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I announce that the Senator from Virginia (Mr. BYRD), the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS), the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA), and the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS) would vote "yea."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON), the Senator from Delaware (Mr. BOGGS), the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.

The Senator from Maryland (Mr. BEALL) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) are detained on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Maryland (Mr. BEALL), the Senator from Delaware (Mr. BOGGS), the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) would each vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 19, nays 64, as follows:

[No. 250 Leg.]

YEAS—19

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Bayh | Hatfield | Moss |
| Brooke | Hughes | Nelson |
| Cranston | Inouye | Pell |
| Eagleton | Kennedy | Proxmire |
| Fulbright | Mansfield | Schweiker |
| Gravel | Mathias | |
| Hartke | Metcalf | |

NAYS—64

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Aiken | Ervin | Percy |
| Allen | Fong | Randolph |
| Allott | Gambrell | Roth |
| Anderson | Griffin | Saxbe |
| Baker | Gurney | Scott |
| Bennett | Hansen | Smith |
| Bentsen | Hart | Sparkman |
| Bible | Hruska | Spong |
| Brock | Humphrey | Stafford |
| Buckley | Jackson | Stennis |
| Burdick | Javits | Stevens |
| Byrd, W. Va. | Jordan, N.C. | Stevenson |
| Case | Jordan, Idaho | Symington |
| Chiles | Magnuson | Taft |
| Church | McClellan | Talmadge |
| Cook | McGee | Thurmond |
| Cooper | Miller | Tunney |
| Cotton | Mondale | Weicker |
| Dole | Muskie | Young |
| Dominick | Packwood | |
| Eastland | Pastore | |
| Ellender | Pearson | |

NOT VOTING—17

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Beall | Fannin | McIntyre |
| Bellmon | Goldwater | Montoya |
| Boggs | Harris | Mundt |
| Byrd, Va. | Hollings | Tower |
| Cannon | Long | Williams |
| Curtis | McGovern | |

So Mr. GRAVEL's amendment (No. 433) was rejected.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote whereby the amendment was not agreed to.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

## REFERRAL OF A BILL TO COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a bill introduced today by the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH) permitting commercial banks to underwrite water and sewer revenue bonds be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. I think I have cleared this matter all around, and I make that request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUGHES). Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

## MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 8687) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1972 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. According to the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to consider amendments Nos. 447, 448, and 449 by the Senator from New York (Mr. BUCKLEY).

What is the pleasure of the Senator from New York?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Montana.

AMENDMENT NO. 447

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the amendment.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we

| Program | Fiscal 1972 spending (billions) | Cut below level (percent) | Hold at level (percent) | Increase level (percent) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. National defense | 76.0 | 57.0 | 36.0 | 7.0 |
| 2. Foreign aid | 4.1 | 81.6 | 16.4 | 2.0 |
| 3. Space | 3.3 | 57.4 | 34.6 | 8.0 |
| 4. Farm | 9.6 | 39.0 | 47.8 | 13.2 |
| 5. Public works | 2.3 | 14.2 | 54.7 | 31.1 |
| 6. Housing and urban development | 3.7 | 16.7 | 38.1 | 45.2 |
| 7. Education | 5.2 | 13.2 | 46.4 | 40.4 |
| 8. Health | 3.1 | 5.0 | 40.1 | 54.9 |
| 9. Social security | 4.3 | 5.0 | 43.0 | 52.0 |
| 10. Welfare | 11.4 | 48.4 | 35.2 | 16.4 |
| 11. Veterans | 10.7 | 9.0 | 59.4 | 31.6 |

## CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time fixed for the transaction of routine morning business has expired.

## MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 10880) to amend title 38 of the United States Code to provide improved medical care to veterans; to provide hospital and medical care to certain dependents and survivors of veterans; to improve recruitment and retention of career personnel in the Department of Medicine and Surgery, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

## MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which the clerk will state.

The second assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 8687) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1972 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

AMENDMENT NO. 433

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The pending question is on the amendment of the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL). There is a time limitation of 2 hours on the amendment.

Without objection, the text of the pending amendment will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendment (No. 433) is as follows:

TITLE VI—CESSATION OF BOMBING IN INDOCHINA

SEC. 601. (a) No funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other law may be expended after the date of enactment of this Act to bomb, rocket, napalm, or otherwise attack by air, any target whatsoever within the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Kingdom of Laos.

(b) No funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other law may be expended after the date of enactment of this Act to bomb, rocket, napalm, or otherwise attack by air, any target whatsoever within the Republic of Vietnam unless the President determines any such air operation to be necessary to provide for the safety of United States Armed Forces during their withdrawal from Indochina.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. I ask unanimous consent that the time be equally charged against both sides.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Who yields time?

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Alaska.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, while we deliberate today in this Chamber American planes will ease into the sky over Southeast Asia. They will drop tons of explosives, guided to the flesh of human beings by the most elaborate and impersonal technology.

Hovering over Laotian rice fields, the A–119 Stinger gunship can put a piece of shrapnel into every square foot of an area the size of a football field.

On the ground are 3 million Laotians, the heaviest bombed people in the history of warfare. They will huddle in their caves and field trenches, and some will die. Many will not see the sun for months, fear keeping them in their covered bunkers during daylight hours.

In the name of America the planes come.

Over the past 10 years 700,000 Laotians have been made refugees, tens of thousands have been killed or wounded, and hundreds of thousands forced to live much of the time in caves and trenches.

The bombing raids also come in the name of the U.S. Senate, until we legislate otherwise.

The war is not winding down for the peoples of Indochina. Since the much heralded bombing halt over North Vietnam, the planes have not come home. They have simply shifted their targets into Laos and Cambodia.

The bombing has continued at 100 tons an hour, 2,400 tons a day. The rate of civilian casualties and refugee generation, indicative of the overall level of violence, has if anything increased during the last 2 years.

Recent hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees reveal that since the invasion of Cambodia nearly one quarter of that country's population—1,500,000 people—have become refugees. In the last few months in South Vietnam more refugees have been created than at any time since the 1968 Tet offensive.

The bombing of North Vietnam has been resumed. As recently as September 21 an armada of 250 U.S. planes attacked targets in the North, and this raid was followed on successive days by two more so-called protective reaction strikes. At present the bombing of North Vietnam has reached an average rate of once every 4 days, and according to North Vietnamese reports 106 villages in addition to missile sites have been struck. The Meatgrinder in Vietnam, which has taken 325,000 civilian lives and wounded more than a million since 1965, is still whirling. As the South Vietnamese Minister of Information commented in 1968, South Vietnam has been devastated by an alien air force that seems at war with the very land of Vietnam.

The amendment I offer is quite straightforward. Let us stop the bombing, not just partially over North Vietnam but in all Indochina—except for those strikes inside South Vietnam demonstrably related to the security of our withdrawing troops. Is it really the desire of the Senate to continue to send out those planes?

An Orwellian transformation is taking place in our military policy in Indochina. Due to public pressure American boys are slowly coming home but they are leaving an automated war behind. There is every danger, as Noam Chomsky has warned, that we intend to turn the land of Vietnam into an automated murder machine. Computer technology and a small number of troops manning aircraft and artillery are creating a U.S. destructive presence that may literally hover over Southeast Asia for years to come. In the midst of this the public is confused, pacified by the diminishing troop levels, yet vaguely troubled by continuing reports of devastation.

Eluding recognition, hidden in the techno-euphemisms of military speech, is the reality of our policy. "Selective ordnance"—a rather dull and technical sounding term until one realizes it masks the use of napalm against human beings. "Harrassment and interdiction"—a rather light-hearted term until one understands that it represents the random hurling of destruction into jungle areas.

These antiseptic words obfuscate horror-filled realities, and thereby circumvent public judgment. "Surgical air strike"—one pictures a diseased cancer benevolently removed from the countryside. But the cancer is the peasantry. In World War II the cancer was the Jews, and the operation was the "final solution." In the name of America, how many executions are taking place from the air in Indochina.

It is the enormity of our mistake that clouds it. If we were wrong, how wrong we were. Nothing will bring back those who have died, or the lost arms and legs, eyes and ears. But let us commit ourselves at least to stop the bombing of those who remain.

How the people of this country, a good people, industrious people and generous people, could have come to visit such destruction on another nation is difficult to comprehend. Orwell in his masterpiece "1984" depicts such carnage as the result of technology gone mad, removed from common experience, giving reality to surrealistic nightmares. We may have intervened in Indochina on commendable reasons—even that is questionable—but at some time the machine got out of control and we could not turn it off.

winding down this war when, since the administration has taken office, it has sustained one-third of all the casualties in this war—one-third.

That is winding down the war?

I can only think of the statement made—and I salute my colleague from Vermont for underscoring the crassness of it—that if the President does end the war he has still promised to pull the rug out from under the doves after July 1, because that will be a political ploy associated with his reelection.

How terrible to make a statement—if Members want to defend this person making the statement, they can—but how terrible it must be to realize the full import of a statement that says, in April 1971, "I will pull the rug out, some time in 1972, from under the doves."

What happens is that, in the meantime, we are maiming and crippling so many human beings, until it is convenient or advantageous to pull out that rug.

To my mind, that is the greatest immorality that can be perpetrated. I think we would have greater honesty and greater justice if, as the Senator from South Carolina alluded, we took an H-bomb—one could not do it because we have already dropped more bombs on Southeast Asia than three, four, or five H-bombs—but if we took an H-bomb and laid Indochina waste completely, then we are sure that we would win, sure that we would be giving those people freedom and democracy although there would not be anyone there to enjoy it. That is, of course, exactly what we are doing now.

The reason why we cannot use H-bombs to annihilate these people is that it would be morally incomprehensible to us. It would find no moral approbation anywhere in the world. In fact, it would place upon us a blot of unbelievable proportions.

So what do we do? We do not use H-bombs, because that would be doing it too quickly, too efficiently, and too intelligently. So over a period of time we drop conventional bombs—bombs of a sort that when we realize the quantity of them, we can appreciate it.

During the Second World War we dropped over 2 million tons of bombs. During the Korean war, 600,000 tons. We have already amply surpassed that in Indochina. We have amply surpassed our bombing record of World War II and the Korean war.

Upon this little country we have dropped several equivalent hydrogen bombs in terms of destructive energy. Yet no one stands up and rails about it. Why? Because the bombing of Laos was concealed from the American people; 350,000 sorties were concealed from the American people and basically from Congress until March of 1970. In the past 12 years we have doubled our efforts at bombing Laos.

People have the gall to stand on the floor and say that we are winding down the war. The only reason we do not use our intelligence to do this efficiently is because we cannot find the moral approbation. I submit that moral approbation is not there either when we do it on a piecemeal, surgical basis. That moral approbation will not be there, 5, 10, 50 or 1,000 years from now, because this part of American history will stand out as our darkest hour.

Mr. President, I yield the floor and yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered?

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I request the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUGHES). Is there a sufficient second? There is not a sufficient second.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has been yielded back. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second. The yeas and nays are ordered.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment (No. 433) of the Senator from Alaska. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I announce that the Senator from Virginia (Mr. BYRD), the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS), the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. McINTYRE), the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA), and the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS) would vote "yea."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON), the Senator from Delaware (Mr. BOGGS), the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) are necessarily absent.

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The result was announced—yeas 19, nays 64, as follows:

[No. 250 Leg.]

YEAS—19

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Bayh | Hatfield | Moss |
| Brooke | Hughes | Nelson |
| Cranston | Inouye | Pell |
| Eagleton | Kennedy | Proxmire |
| Fulbright | Mansfield | Schweiker |
| Gravel | Mathias | |
| Hartke | Metcalf | |

NAYS—64

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Aiken | Ervin | Percy |
| Allen | Fong | Randolph |
| Allott | Gambrell | Ribicoff |
| Anderson | Griffin | Roth |
| Baker | Gurney | Saxbe |
| Bennett | Hansen | Scott |
| Bentsen | Hart | Smith |
| Bible | Hruska | Sparkman |
| Brock | Humphrey | Spong |
| Buckley | Jackson | Stafford |
| Burdick | Javits | Stennis |
| Byrd, W. Va. | Jordan, N.C. | Stevens |
| Case | Jordan, Idaho | Stevenson |
| Chiles | Magnuson | Symington |
| Church | McClellan | Taft |
| Cook | McGee | Talmadge |
| Cooper | Miller | Thurmond |
| Cotton | Mondale | Tunney |
| Dole | Muskie | Weicker |
| Dominick | Packwood | Young |
| Eastland | Pastore | |
| Ellender | Pearson | |

NOT VOTING—17

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Beall | Fannin | McIntyre |
| Bellmon | Goldwater | Montoya |
| Boggs | Harris | Mundt |
| Byrd, Va. | Hollings | Tower |
| Cannon | Long | Williams |
| Curtis | McGovern | |

So Mr. GRAVEL's amendment (No. 433) was rejected.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote whereby the amendment was not agreed to.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

## REFERRAL OF A BILL TO COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a bill introduced today by the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH) permitting commercial banks to underwrite water and sewer revenue bonds be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. I think I have cleared this matter all around, and I make that request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUGHES). Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

## MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION, 1972

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 8687) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1972 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. According to the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to consider amendments Nos. 447, 448, and 449 by the Senator from New York (Mr. BUCKLEY).

What is the pleasure of the Senator from New York?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Montana.

AMENDMENT NO. 447

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the amendment.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we

Aachen destroyed 85 percent. Dresden, Germany, was destroyed 98 percent with air power. The German people were warned ahead of time and innocent citizens left these cities prior to the saturation bombing. I know what air power can do. We could have laid North Vietnam bare, if necessary. Instead of that, we have been fighting with one hand behind our back while American soldiers are being killed. 45,000 ground troops have been killed.

Mr. GRAVEL. We have dropped more bombs in Indochina than we dropped in the Second World War. The Senator is right—in destroying Aachen, they destroyed the factories that made the guns. If we want to destroy the factories, we have to go to the Soviet Union and China. That is where they are being made.

Mr. THURMOND. We could have stopped those guns from coming in by bombing the ports or by placing an embargo there, or we could have stopped those guns by controlling the importation from the Soviet Union. We did not have to go to the Soviet Union.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. THURMOND. Furthermore, many of the bombs dropped in Vietnam were dropped in forests and on other insignificant targets.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

GRAVEL AMENDMENT

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I wish to state my position on the amendment proposed by the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL). I have decided to vote against the amendment, because, on balance, I think it would be a mistake to single out this one aspect of U.S. military activity in Indochina. For some years now I have been working as hard as I can to bring an end to all U.S. combat involvement in Indochina. So far, those of us of this persuasion have not been able to make our view prevail in law, or in the councils of the executive branch. Until we can succeed in stopping this whole war—this tragic, misconceived, wasting war which is eating at the vitals of our Nation—I cannot in good conscience tell the President and our military commanders that one particular aspect of the war is what is bothering us and must cease first. I think this bombing program probably falls in the category of the kind of military decision which the Commander in Chief and his professional commanders have a claim to deciding from their own perspective. It is their responsibility to make the tactical and strategic decision about the actual fighting of the war. It is the Congress' duty and prerogative to make the broader, overriding policy decision of whether or not to authorize war.

For this reason, Mr. President, I want to make it clear that my decision to vote against the Gravel amendment in no way lessens my deep, anguished concern over the continuing ravage being rained on civilians throughout Indochina through the massive U.S. bombing program. I want this war to end right now. I want the bombing to end with it because the toll of human suffering, which is an inevitable byproduct of any bombing program of this scale, is very great indeed.

Moreover, I want to make it very clear that my vote against the Gravel amendment should in no way be interpreted to mean that I will support a continuation of a U.S. bombing program once U.S. ground forces have been withdrawn, as I hope they will be entirely out by mid-1972. I will not support a continuing role for the U.S. Air Force in support of President Thieu's forces after U.S. ground forces have left. There have been suggestions that just such a situation is being contemplated; that the U.S. should continue to help the ARVN fight the war through continued use of U.S. air power for several more years. I am against this and believe that the Senate will be against it.

Mr. STENNIS. Is the Senator from Alaska ready to yield back the remainder of his time?

Mr. GRAVEL. I should like to make a closing statement.

Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Seventeen minutes.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, we are prepared to vote on this issue. I do not think the issue will prevail. I think that is a shame on the Senate; not something of which I am proud. It is a matter of great frustration.

The Senator from South Carolina made the point that we have to have confidence in the President. I have no confidence in the President of the United States on this issue. I think what is being done here is immoral to a magnitude not yet approached in the history of man. It will go down in history as an act comparable to the "final solution" in Germany. I think this is something that we will hang our heads in shame about for a long time.

I could understand the false patriotism associated with ground troops, or patriotism associated with the immediacy of our boys' lives. But when we talk about a war, a surgical kind of war at a distance, where we can hold ourselves not responsible for the annihilation and eradication of human beings and the destruction of great countries, then I think we have fallen to a low ebb.

I have no confidence in the President because he comes forward with the fallacious and weak argument that they need it militarily, when any literate person who reads the facts in the Pentagon papers, the facts in the studies, knows that there is no logical, intelligent base for military action of this sort. It has no military benefit. So, if it has no military benefit, one should at least have the brains not to do it—at least save the money.

The cost of destroying a truck on the Ho Chi Minh Trail is $100,000. That is the cost of destroying a single vehicle that probably, in reality, cost only $3,000. I submit that is a "great" situation to be in, to let the enemy produce a truck which costs $3,000 and then we place a burden on our gross national product to the tune of $100,000 matched against it.

Any fool can see that over a period of time we would lose that war.

We talk about bombing being needed to crush the enemy. How ridiculous. Interviews, not by myself, but interviews by the military on the scene, demonstrate that prior to the bombing of Laos, voluntarism there was 30 percent, but after the bombing, voluntarism was 100 percent. Obviously, any fool can realize that if he is going to get killed sitting at home, or is going to get killed fighting the enemy, he might as well fight the enemy.

Why sit there and let yourself get shot. So, of course they all volunteer. That is something which has been conclusively proved in the Pentagon Papers; that is, the more we escalate the bombing, the more we develop the resolve of these people to fight on against us. That is not something psychologically unusual. It was made abundantly clear to us in the Second World War when the British, at the time of the Battle of Britain were being annihilated by the Nazis. Did the British capitulate? Of course not. The bombing of England brought the British people to their finest hour. It is doing the same thing to the people in Indochina today, and history will record this as their finest hour. It will also record this as our bleakest hour.

Then we find ourselves in Nuremburg where we pontificated and said that civilian destruction with very little military value was immoral and wrong and should be condemned.

But that is exactly what we are doing today in Laos. The words of Telford Taylor, the American chief prosecutor in Nuremburg, are long ago and far away. It is not convenient morally to apply the same standard we did to Herman Goering, Albert Speer, and Rudolf Hess. That was the standard for them, but we have a different standard for ourselves.

That, I submit, is human—part of human nature.

How interesting, how ridiculous, how stupid to think that the $162 million asked for in this budget to be appropriated to bomb Laos is greater than the gross national product of the country of Laos.

That tells the story about the size of this Nation of ours, the power of this Nation with respect to a small nation, that we can, out of hand, without even thinking about it, appropriate enough money for bombs greater than the total productive capacity of all the human beings in Laos.

Now, Mr. President, let me address myself to one area in which many Members in this Chamber take shelter: Supporting the President because it is patriotic and we have to do it to end the war, because the war is being wound down.

He is not doing that one bit. What he is doing is changing the character of the war. What he is doing is changing it from a ground war, where we are involved with our bloody hands, and taking it and making it an air war where we do not see the blood, where we can pontificate about our ideology. Of course, it does not strike anyone as intelligent or proper—what is the difference in fighting communism in Southeast Asia or fighting it in Moscow or fighting it in Chile or in Cuba? We are caught in our our dichotomous idiocy. Containing communism today is bankrupt. We have no choice but to coexist. To think that intelligent people really believe that we are

Ho Chi Minh Trail, is not susceptible to quantifiable subdivision between that which is necessary to the safety of US troops (withdrawing or not) and that which might serve some other immediate purpose. The enemy supplies and men moving southward on the Ho Chi Minh Trail are all threats to the safety of US troops in South Vietnam. Hence, it is unreasonable to authorize bombing for the protection of US forces in South Vietnam but not elsewhere.

US air operations in Cambodia are intended primarily to interdict the flow of supplies to be used against US and allied troops in South Vietnam. These operations are strongly encouraged by the Cambodian government which receives a secondary benefit from the air strikes. Since the closure of Sihanoukville, the North Vietnamese have been forced to rely on the supply routes in Northeastern Cambodia to support their aggression in southern South Vietnam and Cambodia. While these routes are not directly threatened by allied ground forces, they are open to air attacks which significantly impede the flow of munitions and weapons. If this proposed amendment were to become law, the South Vietnamese and our withdrawing forces would again be affectively faced with a large communist sanctuary in Cambodia.

The proposed amendment would intrude into matters properly within the constitutional authority of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to direct US military operations in Southeast Asia. Certainly the coordinated use of our forces is a well established principle of the Commander-in-Chief powers. The proposal to proscribe one arm of the military from functioning, leaving the others to operate as cripples, is a direct attack on the President's authority.

This proposed legislation would severely limit our ability to implement effectively the Nixon Doctrine that calls for sufficient flexibility to meet changes in the local military situation with an adequate response. As he indicated about Indochina in his 25 February 1971 foreign policy report: "A negotiated settlement for all Indochina remains our highest priority. But if the other sides leaves us no choice, we will follow the alternative route to peace—phasing out our involvement while giving the region's friendly countries the time and means to defend themselves."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I am pleased to yield.

Mr. GRAVEL. May I ask the Senator where the President gets the authority to bomb, as Chief Executive, if he chooses to bomb?

Mr. THURMOND. I cannot hear the distinguished Senator.

Mr. GRAVEL. Where does the President of the United States get the power to go bomb? We had no troops in Laos, and all of a sudden he decided to go bomb. Where does the President of the United States get that kind of power?

Mr. THURMOND. The Communists were in Laos, in Cambodia, and in Thailand. They carried the war to these countries. As has been stated, this is not a war just confined to South Vietnam and North Vietnam.

The Communists took this war to Vietnam. The Communists took this war to Laos. The Communists have been penetrating Thailand. Therefore, when they see fit to carry this war to other countries, we have to go where the fighting is, in order to protect our own men and to protect our national interest.

Mr. GRAVEL. By that logic, would it not be logical that we at least bomb the areas where the factories are that produce the guns that are used to kill American boys? Should we not do that?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, it is my judgment that this war could have been brought to an end long, long ago. I think we should have bombed the factories in North Vietnam that are producing arms to kill American men. I think we should have closed the sanctuaries long, long ago. I think we should have closed the ports long, long ago. I think we should have closed the Ho Chi Minh Trail long, long ago.

I will say now that I have not approved the manner in which this war has been fought. I have not approved of fighting with one hand tied behind our backs. I have been one who takes the position that America should not go into a war until we have to; but once America gets into a war, we should have the backing of every patriotic American. Furthermore, we should use our full force—Army, Navy, Air Force; all the power we have—to win the war quickly, to crush the enemy, and bring the American boys home.

I realize that this has not been done. I realize that is the reason why many young people have become disheartened about this war and have turned their backs, so to speak, on this war. I think the way this war has been fought has been a great mistake. But Mr. Nixon inherited this war. When did the war start? It started back under President Kennedy. It was carried on under President Johnson, who at one time had between 500,000 and 600,000 fighting men over there.

President Nixon has been trying to bring the war to a close. I am not trying to defend him. I would condemn him just as much as anyone else if I felt it were justified, because our country must come first, regardless of party and partisan reasons. It is my firm belief that this war should have been ended years and years ago, and we would not have lost all these lives over there. We have lost more than 45,000 men in ground fighting. We have lost approximately 1,400 in the Navy. We have lost approximately 1,000 in the Air Force. If this war had been fought the way we fought World War II, there is no question in my mind that most of these lives could have been saved.

I repeat: we should not go into a war until we go into it to win and to put into it the power we have, and we have not done that in Vietnam. Mr. Nixon is trying to wind it down. He is winding it down. He has brought more than 300,000 fighting men home, and he is bringing them home on schedule.

But why would the Senator from Alaska handicap him, if the President feels the need and Mr. Laird feels the need and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps feel the need to bomb in a certain place to save American lives? Why would the Senator want a law passed by Congress saying that he cannot do it? He is the commander in chief, and he must be given the flexibility.

In the first place, I do not think you have the constitutional authority to do it. Second, if you did have the constitutional authority, I do not think you ought to handicap the President, the Commander in Chief, and handicap the military men in taking the steps necessary to protect our men as we are withdrawing from South Vietnam.

Mr. GRAVEL. I should like to pursue the logic of the Senator with respect to the constitutional power and authority to bomb. I could buy that logic, that we have to protect our boys and therefore we have to bomb. The Senator went on to say that we should just as well bomb the factories. The arms for the Pathet Lao and for the North Vietnamese do not come from Cambodia or Laos or, for that matter, from North Vietnam. They come from the Soviet Union and China.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from South Carolina has expired.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield 2 additional minutes to the Senator.

Mr. GRAVEL. So if the President has the power to go into a neutral country such as Laos and bomb in the interest of saving the lives of our boys, why can he not bomb the Soviet Union because they are manufacturing the guns that are killing our boys? Why can he not do that, or should he do it?

Mr. THURMOND. That is an entirely different question. The Senator from Alaska knows that is an entirely different matter. Here is a war in Indochina. It is not just confined to Vietnam. The Communists themselves have gone into Cambodia and Laos with this war. We did not do it. They did it. They had sanctuaries there, and they would fight and run back and hide behind the sanctuaries. They had guerrilla troops.

If the governments of those countries are going to permit the Communists to corral their forces there and allow them to attack our forces in South Vietnam, then we have the right to protect our troops and to take such steps as necessary. If the government of Laos and the government of Cambodia had the power to protect themselves against the Communist troops coming in, they probably would have done that. But they evidently did not do it. If they did it, they would open themselves to the responsibility of allowing this fighting to go on there. The Communist troops in those countries, who are stationed there and are fighting our men and doing all they can to kill our soldiers, have no right to protection and no right to claim they are in a neutral country. They went there as trespassers. They went there, I am sure, against the will of those countries. If they had the permission of the countries, that makes it even worse.

With respect to bombing the factories, there are gun factories and war plants in North Vietnam, and they should have been bombed. I agree with the Senator on that, if he favors that position. They should have been bombed long ago. The concrete plants and the powerplants should have been bombed continuously. The gun plants should have been bombed continuously. Every warmaking industry in North Vietnam should have been destroyed.

I was in World War II, and I saw

because he says he needs it. We just go along on that basis.

I do not understand what insanity besets this body if we can do that so readily, because this body is made up of good people, kind people, generous people, great Americans; but, by some quirk of fate, because of some psychological aberration, we sit here party to a bombing process that is annihilating thousands and thousands upon thousands, even millions of Asians far away from our shores. I do not understand this. I think we can only leave it to the study of sociologists in future decades to elicit what happened to our moral sensibilities, what happened to our humaneness, what happened to our ability to even see and discern right from wrong—something that apparently this body is unable to do.

Mr. President. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum on my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the pending amendment, No. 433, offered by the distinguished Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), would deny funding under the pending bill or any other law to conduct aerial warfare in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, North or South Vietnam, except in South Vietnam to insure the safe withdrawal of American troops.

This amendment, if passed, would seriously damage U.S. efforts to impede communism in Indochina until our allies there are able to handle the job alone.

At present military forces of North Vietnam have invaded and are trying to overthrow the governments of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Local forces in each of those countries are trying to defeat the North Vietnamese.

U.S. air operations are essential in Laos if the flow of Communist soldiers down the Ho Chi Minh Trail is to be held in check. U.S. air operations are essential in Cambodia if the Cambodians are to be given sufficient time to build up military forces to repel the North Vietnamese invaders. U.S. air operations are essential along the borders of North Vietnam if intelligence indicates military moves are developing which would endanger the safe withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Mr. President, besides these obvious military reasons for defeating this amendment, there is the constitutional question. Does the Congress have the right to tie the hands of the Commander in Chief so that one arm of our military forces, the ground element, is denied the aid of another arm, the air element? I think not.

This amendment should be soundly defeated, so that the coordinated use of our forces may be applied in a zone where American soldiers are still deployed.

The Senate should also consider that with the present U.S. withdrawal of U.S. forces nearly two-thirds complete the advantage in Indochina is shifting toward the aggressor.

As this Nation continues to bring U.S. troops down to minimum levels in 1972, the dangers to our remaining forces increase. Even with a planned timetable of withdrawal, the President is assuming greater risks each day. He, therefore, needs the maximum flexibility in transferring the entire combat responsibility to our allies in Indochina.

Mr. President, this amendment could insure the eventual victory of North Vietnam over South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. I urge every Senator to weigh carefully the effects of the amendment. In my judgment, it is one of the most dangerous amendments yet offered in the Senate concerning the war in Indochina.

As we step out of the war in Indochina we must not turn our backs on our own men or the soldiers of our allies. I urge the Senate to reject this amendment.

There is no question but that the Defense Department strongly opposes this amendment. I ask unanimous consent that the DOD position on the Gravel amendment be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I just want to say in closing that I cannot understand why anyone, any Member of this body, would offer this type of amendment. If we have any confidence at all in President Nixon, if we have confidence in his sincerity, his patriotism, and his judgment, which is based on the advice of military experts; if we have confidence in Mr. Laird and the Secretaries of the services; why would anyone offer this type of amendment to say "You cannot bomb," if President Nixon, Mr. Laird, and the Chiefs of Staff of the armed services say "we need to bomb at this time and at this place to save American lives?"

To me, the amendment is ridiculous. I hope the Senate will kill it promptly.

EXHIBIT 1

(Adding Section 601 to HR 8687, an Act to authorize appropriations during FY 72 for procurement, etc., for the Armed Forces.

EFFECT OF THE AMENDMENT

The proposed amendment would deny funding "under this or any other law" to conduct aerial warfare in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Vietnam, or the Republic of Vietnam except that such warfare may continue in RVN if the President determines it necessary to safe withdrawal of U.S. troops from Indochina.

DOD POSITION

DOD strongly opposes the amendment, the objective of which is to legislate the end of U.S. participation in the resistance of North Vietnamese aggression in Indochina by the elimination of crucial air support for U.S. and friendly forces there.

U.S. support for the legitimate governments of Laos, Cambodia and the Republic of Vietnam has been expressed in part by the provision of operational military support in order to counter the aggression from North Vietnam. The direct military support has been accompanied by public pronouncements of our objective of frustraing the takeover of its neighbors by North Vietnam. Precipitate termination of our air efforts would raise doubts about our adherence not only to this objective but to others which might test our determination, even touching our more formal commitments as well.

An action by the Senate such as this would impact severely on the governments concerned. While the Government of Thailand would not be endangered, nor for that matter are we bombing there, it would be compelled to consider a new and less friendly diplomatic alighment. The will of the Royal Lao Government to defend itself, already undermined by years of strife against the more numerous and well-equipped North Vietnamese invaders, would be gravely affected. Cambodia's brave and determined resistance to this same North Vietnamese invader would be less effective with the weakened and uncertain U.S. support implied in this amendment. Finally in South Vietnam, where the President has long since made clear the *essential* U.S. objective in South Vietnamese people to determine their own political future without outside interference," the ability to achieve our objective would be damaged. The objective has been incorporated in various policy statements directed toward achieving a peaceful solution in Vietnam and Indochina, a peace in which the peoples of the region can devote themselves to development of their own societies. While the proposed amendment does not attack this objective, rather simply imposing obstacles to its achievement, one result of the amendment would surely be to weaken Vietnamese determination.

We must consider then the outcome, surely adverse, for our Southeast Asian friends and allies. Our long sought objective of restoring the arrangements envisioned in the 1962 Geneva Agreements for Laos would not be attainable if we were abruptly to cease aerial warfare. North Vietnam would have a greatly reduced incentive to settle along these lines and the Royal Lao Government would be without leverage. The meager Lao forces cannot alone defend against the North Vietnamese invasion, and must depend on the U.S. for the direct effects of the assistance and the diplomatic advantage as well.

The proscription against US bombing support for the Cambodians exposes the developing Cambodian Army to a risk of major losses by opposing superior forces without adequate supporting weapons. The Cambodians have no heavy bombing capability of their own—only 16 T–28 aircraft used for close air support, and a limited number of artillery pieces. Our military support is essential to the GKR's resistance of the North Vietnamese and the preservation of their neutrality. In Vietnam it is the Defense view that Vietnamization is progressing satisfactorily. It should be noted that the RVNAF has made great strides in assuming increasing responsibility for conducting combat operations even while the US has deployed approximately one-third million (332,800) military personnel. As the RVNAF steadily achieve a greater capability and self-reliance, it is considered extremely disadvantageous to submit the Administration's Vietnamization programs to an arbitrary curtailment of air support. In the wider context, disengagement of US forces together with the winding down of war-related violence in South Vietnam is being steadily achieved. The furtherance of these objectives is dependent on a rational policy which places US national interests involving realistic solutions ahead of chimerical panaceas. Vietnamization is a rational policy leading to the successful achievement of essential US objectives.

The overwhelming proportion of US bombing and certainly all directed against the

judgment. Let us make clear we are not dealing with nuclear weapons. We are dealing with conventional weapons.

Mr. GRAVEL. What is the difference in these millions of tons of bombs and using a few hydrogen bombs?

Mr. STENNIS. I think the Senator has a military question there. We are in this war, and we are trying to get out. If we withdraw our weapons they can continue with their actions unless we are going to have an abject surrender and desert these people over there that we have been helping. With great deference to the Senator, that is the best answer I can give.

Would the Senator yield to me for a minute?

Mr. GRAVEL. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. I am compelled to leave the Chamber briefly. I ask unanimous consent that when the Senator concludes I may yield to the Senator from Illinois, or yield to him now, who will speak in opposition to the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I have listened with great interest to the debate this morning. I intend to vote against the amendment of my distinguished colleague from Alaska. I would not presume to be a military expert in this war. I did serve as a gunnery officer in the Naval Air Corps in World War II. I have been in Vietnam several times and in Vientiane.

I have accepted highly classified briefings on this war, and none of those briefings has convinced me at all that we should ever have gone into this war in the first place. I think it is a tragic mistake that we did so. But we are there and this is what this administration faced. They could not reverse the decision which involved over a half million of our men being there when the President took office.

The President is Commander in Chief of our Army, Navy, and Air Force. He announced his avowed policy to remove our forces, and he is staying exactly on schedule. Every single commitment the President made to withdraw our forces he has kept or exceeded. It is my sincere hope and my prayer that when the President announces late in October or November the next schedule of withdrawal, we can step up the rate considerably. But as long as we have American forces in Vietnam, and we have over 200,000 men there, I would not want to tie the hands of the Commander in Chief and I would not want to tie the hands of the man who has the avowed policy of taking our men out of Vietnam at the soonest possible time consistent with their safety.

I feel that the bombing provides an element of safety to those men and continues to insure the highest rate of withdrawal. Without it I do not see how we could stem the flow of forces coming in from the North, and I do not see how we could stem the flow of their supplies. I do not see how we could keep the initiative and not relinquish the initiative to them.

Therefore, despite the fact that I dislike this war as intensely as any Member of the Senate and have consistently opposed any escalation of the war, and have supported every possible deescalation, I back and support the President's overall program of getting out. I commend him for what he has done. I am not going to tie his hands in any way and take away any support he can provide for the safety of those forces as they withdraw because I want to give him the possibility of withdrawing at a faster rate than we are.

For those reasons I intend to vote against the amendment of my colleague from Alaska.

I yield the floor.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLEN). The Senator has 26 minutes remaining.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I yield myself as much time as I may require.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska is recognized.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I can only disagree with the Senator. First, I do not think the President is doing the best he can. Second, I think our presence there continues to be immoral. If it takes 3 years or 4 years to wind down this war I just cannot buy it. I cannot abdicate my responsibility as a human being and wash my hands of it like Pilate, and say the President is leading us and I have to agree with him. I do not agree with him.

Since the President took office and initiated his plan of winding down the war we have suffered one-third of our casualties. So I cannot quite buy that theory that we are doing the best possible.

I do not see how stopping the bombing will increase the flow of troops. In fact, the truth, as evidenced by the Pentagon papers and independent studies, shows that the more bombing of the people, the more increase there is in troops that they send down to fight us. Why would it not be more intelligent for them to volunteer in Laos to fight Americans rather than to stay where they are, to be bombed. If we want to stop the flow of troops, the best way would be to stop the bombing. They do not want to get their heads shot off.

Why should they get pressed into service if they could live in safety in Laos and Vietnam? So the theory that this will decrease the flow of troops is bankrupt, it always has been bankrupt, and always will be bankrupt, as was proven in the Battle of Britain. The more the people are bombed, the more they are forced to fight. This is a wrong course of action, but we should realize also when we do it that we condemn millions of people, millions of innocent peasants, who offer no threat to us, either as a nation because of their large numbers, or as a fighting force.

The tools of war do not come from Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam; they come from China and the Soviet Union. So if we really wanted to follow an intelligent approach to fighting this war, we should at least save the money and attack the source. But that is not the case. This is an intricately woven situation in which we find ourselves. First, we find umbrage for our immorality in the intricacies of the situation.

I say immorality, because there is not a person on this floor who can give me proof, who can give me an argument, why we should bomb these people. If it is to protect our troops, the amendment provides the ability to protect our troops. The President can bomb if our troops are immediately involved in Southeast Asia. Since we have no American troops in Cambodia and Laos, obviously there are no American troops to protect. But if we are involved in the task of loading our troops on planes and ships to get them out, obviously we do not have to bomb these other places.

Obviously we do not have to go for 3 or 4 years bombing these other places. But that is not what is going on in Vietnam today. Eventually the American people will appreciate what is going on. We take some troops out so we can minimize the casualties of American boys and so we can escalate the amount of casualties of Asians. That is what has happened in the bombing of Laos in the last 2 years by the 100-percent increase in bombing activity.

I cannot find any reason, any rationale, why anybody in this body would abdicate his moral responsibility to somebody else when it comes to life, and that is what we are talking about in Southeast Asia and Indochina today. The military experts, the Secretary of Defense, the chief of the Marine Corps, psychological studies of the people who have been bombed, prove, by all possible indications, that bombing is ineffective as a military tool, totally ineffective as a military tool, and that it really does nothing but annihilate the broad civilian population. That this would be the case, and that in the face of this logic we would put aside this proof and put aside this logical argumentation and say, "Well, the Chief Executive of this country feels that he needs the bombing and that this is a good policy. And he stated publicly that, regardless of what the troop levels are going to be, he has the right to bomb," is difficult to understand, and yet we go along with that.

It is interesting that on inquiry by the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) and his subcommittee we have an American Ambassador, Mr. Sullivan, who, when asked under what circumstances the United States could bomb these countries, answered that it was under the President's authority to make foreign policy. What an interesting reflection upon a democracy—a democracy in which the President or the Chief Executive, on a whim, can order the killing of thousands and thousands of people. And the Congress can condone it by saying, "He is the Chief Executive, and this is a part of his way to conduct that foreign policy."

What a total cop-out. What a total moral cop-out on the part of this body and on the part of the Congress to sit back and find umbrage under the simple fact that he can do it. In ordering the bombing we rub salve over our minds and say, "Well, he says he needs it for military reasons." But, of course, we have proof readily available to us that it has no military purpose. We go along simply

solution." I see no difference in the type of bombing we have going on today. That this Senate could stand here and call for the water to wash our hands, means in this very instance that we are party to the killing of human beings. I just cannot buy that argument, because if we have a criminal who is President of the United States, we should at least have the moral quality to recognize it, point to it, and ask for its correction.

Perhaps the Senator from Mississippi could give me some other technical reason why we are doing this. However, I cannot see it at this point in time. The Senator has no argument for the bombing other than that they want to bomb. That is not moral when human life is at stake.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, we start with the fact that we are at war and have been at war there for years. We are now in the process of withdrawing as rapidly as we can within reason and commonsense.

I am assuming that will continue. It has been successful so far. There are many problems that go with it. That is obvious. Right on top of that policy, if this amendment is agreed to, we would be saying in the hard, cold letter of the law that no funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other law may be expended after the date of enactment of this act to bomb, rocket, napalm, or otherwise attack by air, any target whatsoever within the Republic of Vietnam unless the President determines any such air operation to be necessary to provide for the safety of U.S. Armed Forces during their withdrawal from Indochina.

That would be an abandonment of our policy of trying to hold down the transportation of supplies over the Ho Chi Minh Trail. It would be an abandonment of all of these policies that go to protect our forces.

With all due deference to the Senator, I think it would be contradictory. If we are going to do this, I would then say that we should throw in the towel and get out before nightfall if possible.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, we are not supposed to have any troops in Cambodia. We are not supposed to have any troops in Laos. We are not supposed to have any troops in North Vietnam. The only place we are supposed to have troops is in South Vietnam. And that is the place where I make the provision that if the President thinks it is necessary he can bomb.

Would the Senator tell me why we are bombing these poor people in Laos and Cambodia off the face of the earth? What reason do we have for doing it?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I was alluding in my remarks to South Vietnam, of course. I have already pointed out the reasons that it is done in these other areas. It is because of supplies. I think that perhaps they have an occasional raid in North Vietnam. As long as we are over there, already engaged in battle, it is pretty obvious that it is likely to happen. We have told them all the time that we were not promising not to bomb under any circumstances. There was a question about the understanding of our right of surveillance, and so forth, going back to 1966.

It is corect, I think, that there were those conditions. There was an understanding that we would have the right of surveillance.

I would not want the Chief Executive to say that as long as we are engaged over there we will never bomb North Vietnam under any circumstances. Certainly we ought not to tie his hand.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I hope that the Senator from Mississippi does not mean to leave the impression that we are only bombing there slightly.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator means North Vietnam?

Mr. GRAVEL. Yes. I think the record shows that every 4 days we have been striking North Vietnam. And the record shows that under this administration we have doubled the amount of bombing in the little country of Laos. As we are withdrawing troops, we are turning up the rheostat of this immoral bombing.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I do not apologize for any new raids. There are facts that they are based upon. However, if the Senator will get the North Vietnamese troops out of there and no longer let them be a menace to our boys and our departure, if he can get them out of there in some way, I would be willing to join him in his amendment.

However, they are there, and they are going to stay there. I do not remember whether it is classified as to how many are there. Two divisions are there as a minimum. That much is not classified.

Mr. GRAVEL. Does the Senator mean two American divisions?

Mr. STENNIS. No. I mean two North Vietnamese divisions. What are we going to do, just pat them on the heads and say it is all right? We have to do something to keep them on the defensive as much as we can. We are paying the bill to keep them on the defensive, to keep them tied up. And they are keeping our allies tied up. That is why we have to have the potential there that I have been referring to.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, perhaps if the Senator from Mississippi will not join me on the basis of moral commitment, he might join me on the basis of logic and intelligent action. We have been bombing in Laos for 7 years. The greater part of Laos is now controlled by the Pathet Lao. The more we bomb them, the less successful we are. Perhaps we should change our tactics. Perhaps if we change our tactics, we might be more successful.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Senator is proposing that we get out and stop all activity there. I think they would double their forces there within a few weeks if we just stated, "We will leave you alone."

That is the situation. If we stop fighting them, they will be heading for Thailand and all of that area within 15 minutes after the Senator's amendment becomes law.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I think the Senator from Mississippi is in disagreement with the CIA findings in 1964. Under President Johnson the CIA studied the domino theory and came forward with the statement that they doubted that the remainder of Southeast Asia would go Communist.

The Senator now has changed that theory and says that we have to bomb them. With that kind of logic, why do we not bomb Chile? Why do we not bomb Cuba?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Senator does not put me in a position of believing in the domino theory. I have not only not believed in it, but I have also said that I would not subscribe to it. If that theory were correct, we would all be lost and not know it.

I think our situation over there now is that with all of these North Vietnamese troops in there, if we withdraw the only effective way of opposing them, they would double up their forces and they would get all of the key areas of Laos. They are already there. They already have part of it. Part of Laos is already in their hands.

We would not have to have any domino theory for them to get the rest of Laos. I think it is rather obvious that the pattern is to get Thailand, too.

That is just the situation that exists. I am not saying that we should augment the forces there and protect Thailand and every other country. I understand the Senator's amendment here increases in a lot of ways the things that our boys would have to do if we were to stop all the bombing.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I would like to find out what the increase would be. The only task that I know that our boys have is to wind down and get out. Under the present administration, it has taken 3 years so far. Perhaps the Senator from Mississippi could elaborate on what increased tasks the American boys would have if we were to stop the bombing of Laos and Cambodia. I do not see where there would be an increase in the tasks.

I would like to also put forth a question, and the logic is very simple. My friend, the Senator from Mississippi, says that troops are stationed in Laos. Our studies indicate that for every military casualty we get, we cause 50 civilian casualties. If we pursue the same logic which was followed at the Nuremberg trial by our chief prosecutor, any act that has extreme civilian consequences, regardless of the amount of military benefit, is reprehensible. This is something that we fly directly in the face of.

I would like to address another point to the Senator from Mississippi, and that is, very simply, that any analysis of the bombing, the effectiveness of the bombing, is tied to the destruction of the productive capacity of a country to wage war; otherwise, bombing as we are prosecuting it in Southeast Asia is a policy to annihilate the entire population. It could be done in this way with a hydrogen bomb. The President may yet advocate that. But if we want to go to the source of the productive capacity, the fighting strength these people have with guns and arms, we would have to bomb China and the Soviet Union because that is where their supplies come from. Why waste all the money there, at a cost of $33 billion thus far, when we are doing something very ineffective militarily?

I pose that as a question to my colleague.

Mr. STENNIS. That is a question of

so-called gook rule which haunted the Calley trial has far more profound implications for the air war.

On the afternoon that the U.S. helicopters and attack planes accompanied the South Vietnamese into Laos, the President issued a statement on our environmental crisis. Within it, he quoted from T. S. Eliot's "Murder in the Cathedral":

Clean the air, clean the sky, wash the wind . . .

It would have been revealing for the President to have quoted further:

The land is foul, the water is foul, our beasts and ourselves are defiled with blood.

A rain of blood has blinded my eyes . . . Can I look again at the day and its common things and see them all smeared with blood, through a curtain of falling blood? We did not wish anything to happen.

Let us stop the bombing, withdraw our troops and begin to "take stone from stone and wash them."

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Who yields time?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, what is the pending order of business before the Senate?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment of the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL).

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, how much time do I have in opposition to the amendment?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Fifty-seven minutes.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield myself 10 minutes.

Mr. President, I have read with the utmost interest and concern the amendment offered by the Senator from Alaska. I admire his fine interest in the subject and his compassion. It is consistent with his desire to end this war. However, I think that the immediate realities of the situation would compel Senators, however much they might be in sympathy with these objectives, to reject the amendment.

An analysis of this amendment shows that the military aid we supply to the small nations mentioned in the amendment would be cut off. We could not supply them with money or military aid if any of it was going to be used in this bombing. In other words, Cambodia would be affected to some degree in using our military aid in doing some bombing. They would be cut off from doing any bombing in defense of their own country, so far as our military aid was concerned.

The same is true with respect to Laos. We are giving them military aid, and have been, and they, too, have some capacity in the air. So under this amendment, that would be precluded.

The amendment reads:

SEC. 601. (a) No funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other law may be expended after the date of enactment of this Act to bomb, rocket, napalm, or otherwise attack by air, any target whatsoever within the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Kingdom of Laos.

So, whether intended or not, it gets right into the heart of their military programs which, under the conditions, need to be augmented and thus relieve us.

Another point is that the very atmosphere of this amendment runs contrary to what we did here yesterday.

We had a very good debate of 5 hours and most of that time was used discussing aid to Laos. the activities there, the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and bombing in North Vietnam. After the debate, all that money provided for the purpose of the bombing was excluded from the operation of the amendment. The original form of the amendment excluded bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but the last version adopted expressly excluded from its limitations the bombing in North Vietnam. We do not like to have to do those things but the situation over there demands it or they will march right on through Laos and absorb those people there.

By the way, in debate yesterday, I meant to point out that the Kingdom of Laos is over 1,000 miles from its northern to its southern borders. That is just about the distance from Chicago to New Orleans—1,000 miles long. The population of Laos is only 2.8 million. Yet they have all that borderline, all that terrain, all that area to be protected. Of course, they cannot protect themselves.

But anyway, back to the subject here, we had this whole matter of the bombing generally by our own forces under review yesterday, and then mlitary aid to the Laotian Government, and all of that was approved by an overwhelming vote here yesterday afternoon, the full budget amount requested for all those activities and our military aid in that whole nation of Laos, and also no limit of any kind to be put upon the amount that could be spent of our money on bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and also in northern Laos.

So I think, Mr. President, that that is the deciding factor, that if we come along now and put on this limitation through this amendment, it would be totally inconsistent with what we did yesterday. We would have two programs going, one for bombing and one for not bombing. We will be cutting off the one here that is entirely in control of these people that live in these countries and one that they are carrying out with their manpower. In other words, we would be cutting off those who are doing something for themselves and putting the burden, so far as the bombing is concerned, on the shoulders of our own pilots. I do not believe the Senate wants to do that.

Let me conclude my remarks by saying that I note here the Senator's amendment was prepared prior to September 23, 1971, and it was introduced on that day. Not knowing when it would come up, or when the other amendments would come up, the Senator did not have the picture before him that we are faced with today. So, very respectfully, I urge the Senate not to adopt on 2 successive days two contradictory programs and expect the conferees to be able to bring back both of those from the conference.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may need. I do not believe we will use all the time.

I should like to ask a simple, fundamental question: Why do we have to bomb at all?

Mr. STENNIS. It is part of the war, Senator. It was brought out in debate yesterday that most of the fighting in northern Laos is what we call bombing. A great deal of it in northern Laos is air cover for the men fighting on the ground. It is really not bombing in the ordinary sense.

Mr. GRAVEL. Let me say that my amendment would permit that.

Mr. STENNIS. It is straffing. Some is bombing. It is mixed in together. The bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail—it is obvious what that is for. Then we have the soldiers trying to hold that trail within its limits. North Vietnam wants another trail further to the west, one they can travel on better; so that they are trying to push us back toward the borders of Thailand. Thus, we have to go in there with our bombs, not only to destroy the trail but also to protect our fighting men there.

Mr. GRAVEL. If I could clarify my amendment, it is made abundantly clear that if it is to protect the fighting men, we would permit the bombing. I make that exclusion. But I do not understand it, in the face of statements by General Shoup, Mr. McNamara, and the intelligence accounts reported in the Pentagon papers, that the bombing is totally ineffective militarily and has no effect at all. If we are really trying to get out of this war, as the President tells us and the Senator from Mississippi indicates to this body, why do we have to bomb a thousand miles away from where our troops are? I just do not understand that. I do not understand why we want to bomb over over there if we are really getting out.

Mr. STENNIS. The best answer, I think, is that this is part of the war, even though it is in the process of being wound down. If we withdraw the bombing from all of this area now—we have mentioned the Ho Chi Minh Trail—and just say that we are not going to bomb, but will stop it by law, then North Vietnam—with all our men still there in South Vietnam—would be able to make our cause much worse. It could be devastating, if we are going to say that we are going to withdraw our punches now, and say "Now you can hit us but we are not going to hit back anymore in this way." I think that would be partial surrender. I want us to get out of there the best way we can, but we have to protect our rear while we are leaving.

Mr. GRAVEL. If I could restate it again. I have a provision in my amendment to protect our rear as we leave and to protect our troops. That is the qualification—the only exception in that amendment. But the only message I can get from the Senator from Mississippi is simply that because the President of the United States has a policy to bomb, we must go ahead and bomb. We in the Senate must have no independent judgment or no independent morality. I say this in the form of a question to the Senator from Mississippi. I liken this situation to that which existed in Nazi Germany where they had the chancellor who came into power through the election process, as our President did, but the chancellor went on to commit the most heinous crimes in history, including the "final

Picture the battlefield in Laos. Light spotter planes at 2,000 feet; A–1E, A–26 and T–28 prop bombers, AC–47 and AC–130 gunships, flare ships and rescue helicopters at 5,000 feet, F–4, F–105 and B–57 jet fighters and jet reconnaissance aircraft at 10,000 feet; KG–135 supertankers at 20,000 feet; C–130's filled with electronic gear designed to coordinate the bombing at 25,000 feet; B–52 bombers at 30,000 feet; C–130's of Hillsboro control overseeing the entire operation at 35,000 feet and SR–71 reconnaissance aircraft at 70,000 feet.

And on the ground is the Laotian peasantry. Listen to their reactions and thoughts as recorded in refugee interviews.

The planes came like birds and the bombs fell like rain.

Another—

There wasn't any night when we thought we'd live until morning . . . never a morning we thought we'd survive until night.

And another—

I just stayed in my cave. I didn't see the sunlight for two years. What did I think about? Oh, I used to repeat, please don't let the planes come, please don't let the planes come, please . . .

And another—

Before the village was beautiful and filled with happiness and there was a large field of fruit trees. But when I left my village all I saw were the holes of the bombs and the burning houses and the people who had died so pitifully.

And another—

Our lives became like one of the animals who search to escape the butcher.

And this continues every hour—200,000 pounds of bombs, every 9 days the equivalent of one Hiroshima. From 1965 to 1969, 70 tons of bombs for every square mile of North and South Vietnam were dropped, 500 pounds for every man, woman and child. In just the first 5 months of 1971 there were 780 million pounds of bombs dropped over Southeast Asia.

PART II

The airwar is not even militarily effective. Secretary of Defense McNamara revealed in 1968 that it could at best reduce the flow of supplies along the Ho Chi Minh trail by only 10 percent to 15 percent. At a cost of over $100,000 per truck destroyed. Former Under Secretary of Defense Townsend Hoopes has pointed out that in the history of bombing campaigns, only when the sources of production are attacked can the logistical flow of supplies be effectively impaired. In this case that would involve strikes against China and the Soviet Union. A study of the hamlet evaluation reports reveals that the number of villages under government control in South Vietnam varied independently of the level of the air campaign over the North.

On the ground the bombing raises enemy morale and alienates civilians. Pathet Lao defectors indicate that before the heavy bombing in Laos they managed only a 30-percent rate of voluntarism among their forces. However, after the massive attacks of late 1968 the figure jumped to almost 100 percent. "Better to die fighting than in a trench" was the feeling of one Pathet Lao recruit.

As I have indicated, the air war is not isolated in any one country in Indochina. The Vietnam war has indeed become the Indochina war. But information concerning the extent of U.S. bombing in Laos has been limited and concealed by the executive branch, so I would like to discuss in more detail the situation in those skies.

Since 1964 the United States has been engaged in an aerial campaign over Laos. The bombing was seriously escalated in late 1968 and early 1969 when restrictions against civilian targeting were significantly relaxed. The air war has involved in Laos alone an estimated cost of $5 to $7 billion, innumerable Laotian casualties, and over 400 pilots either dead, missing in action, or captured.

Even traces of these facts were officially kept from the public until March 1970. The same pattern of duplicity and deception which the Pentagon papers have shown to characterize our entry into Vietnam has been repeated in Laos.

Currently a strict grayout is imposed on U.S. operations there, with little information besides official reports available to the press. Reporters are not permitted to accompany attack and spotter planes on their missions as they are in Vietnam. Most pilots are apparently under instructions not to talk with newsmen. The air attaché in Vientienne is similarly inaccessible. Recent requests by Congressman McCLOSKEY for photographs of previously existing Lao villages to confirm their continued well-being have gone unmet by the Pentagon. Military officials have failed as well to provide Congressman McCLOSKEY with a listing of all bombed civilian targets in Laos.

But there are some unofficial sources of information. These nearly unanimously tell one story—that of massive bombardment of civilians under Pathet Lao control. Congressmen McCLOSKEY and WALDIE found, in a U.S. information survey initially concealed from them by the Embassy, that 75 percent of the 190 respondants from 96 villages had had their homes bombed. In addition 97 percent had seen a bombing attack and 61 percent had seen a person killed. Congressmen McCLOSKEY and WALDIE also conducted their own interviews, and all 16 refugees queried, from seven different villages, testified to the aerial destruction of every single dwelling in their hamlets.

A report by U.N. expert Georges Chapelier in December 1970 stated that in the Plaine des Jarres—

By 1969 the intensity of the bombings was such that no organized life was possible in the villages. . . . Jet planes came daily and destroyed all stationary structures. Nothing was left standing. The villagers lived in trenches and holes or in caves. The only farmed at night. All of the interlocutors without exception had their villages completely destroyed. In the last phase, bombings were aimed at the systematic destruction of the materials bases of the civilian society.

At one time there were more than 50,000 people living in the Plaine des Jarres. There is virtually no life there now.

One village chief indicated that in 21 hamlets not one home was left standing. In his own village, 45 percent of the 2,600 inhabitants never left their trenches.

A sample of 25 villages from the Plaine des Jarres revealed casualty rates of 5 to 10 percent from the bombing. It is estimated that 50 civilians are killed for every Pathet-Lao casualty.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. GRAVEL. I yield myself 3 additional minutes.

In 1968, Jacques Decornoy, the Southeast Asian desk editor for Le Monde, traveled through Pathet Lao controlled areas. According to his interviews, 65 villages in the Sam Neua district alone had been destroyed by U.S. air power. Traveling through the devastated areas, he depicts it as "a world without noise for the surrounding villages have disappeared. The inhabitants themselves living in the mountains."

Such testimony is, of course, contrary to our Government's official position that "never before has such care been taken to spare civilians in bombing raids."

The picture burnt into one's imagination is that of hundreds of thousands of Laotians desperately huddling in caves and trenches as U.S. planes roar overhead. Again, it is the enormity of the suffering endured by these poor people which blinds us to our own policy. I will rerun the picture, because we must break through the psychic numbness we have developed.

There are hundreds of thousands of poor peasants, noncombatants, living underground in fear of U.S. air power in Asia. There are entire areas of former civilization reduced to near caveman standards by the most advanced Nation in the history of the earth. For what? No matter for what; it is indefensible.

At Nuremberg, Teleford Taylor, chief U.S. prosecutor, argued that where the military profits of any policy are dwarfed by the civilian casualties, such a policy is indefensible. The massive air war by the United States against the peoples of Indochina is indefensible. Every B–52 raid, every A–119 K stinger drop, is criminal.

The situation in Laos is not appreciably different from what is currently occurring in Cambodia. As the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees noted, the same pattern of destruction is being repeated relentlessly throughout Indochina. It is up to Congress to terminate it. The President has made it clear that he intends to continue the bombing, stating in February this year, "I will not place any limitations on the use of air power."

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. GRAVEL. I yield myself 2 additional minutes.

Secretary of Defense Laird has indicated that we intend to maintain a naval and air presence in Southeast Asia indefinitely after the last ground troops are withdrawn. The Pentagon, which seems to have statistics available for all categories and contingencies, lacks even an estimate of the likely civilian casualties this presence will cause. Such considerations do not seem to have a high priority in current American decisionmaking. The

| Program | Fiscal 1972 spending (billions) | Cut below level (percent) | Hold at level (percent) | Increase level (percent) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. National defense | 76.0 | 57.0 | 36.0 | 7.0 |
| 2. Foreign aid | 4.1 | 81.6 | 16.4 | 2.0 |
| 3. Space | 3.3 | 57.4 | 34.6 | 8.0 |
| 4. Farm | 9.6 | 39.0 | 47.8 | 13.2 |
| 5. Public works | 2.3 | 14.2 | 54.7 | 31.1 |
| 6. Housing and urban development | 3.7 | 16.7 | 38.1 | 45.2 |
| 7. Education | 5.2 | 13.2 | 46.4 | 40.4 |
| 8. Health | 3.1 | 5.0 | 40.1 | 54.9 |
| 9. Social security | 4.3 | 5.0 | 43.0 | 52.0 |
| 10. Welfare | 11.4 | 48.4 | 35.2 | 16.4 |
| 11. Veterans | 10.7 | 9.0 | 59.4 | 31.6 |

## CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time fixed for the transaction of routine morning business has expired.

## MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 10880) to amend title 38 of the United States Code to provide improved medical care to veterans; to provide hospital and medical care to certain dependents and survivors of veterans; to improve recruitment and retention of career personnel in the Department of Medicine and Surgery, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

## MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which the clerk will state.

The second assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 8687) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1972 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

AMENDMENT NO. 433

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The pending question is on the amendment of the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL). There is a time limitation of 2 hours on the amendment.

Without objection, the text of the pending amendment will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendment (No. 433) is as follows:

TITLE VI—CESSATION OF BOMBING IN INDOCHINA

SEC. 601. (a) No funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other law may be expended after the date of enactment of this Act to bomb, rocket, napalm, or otherwise attack by air, any target whatsoever within the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Kingdom of Laos.

(b) No funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other law may be expended after the date of enactment of this Act to bomb, rocket, napalm, or otherwise attack by air, any target whatsoever within the Republic of Vietnam unless the President determines any such air operation to be necessary to provide for the safety of United States Armed Forces during their withdrawal from Indochina.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. I ask unanimous consent that the time be equally charged against both sides.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Who yields time?

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Alaska.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, while we deliberate today in this Chamber American planes will ease into the sky over Southeast Asia. They will drop tons of explosives, guided to the flesh of human beings by the most elaborate and impersonal technology.

Hovering over Laotian rice fields, the A-119 Stinger gunship can put a piece of shrapnel into every square foot of an area the size of a football field.

On the ground are 3 million Laotians, the heaviest bombed people in the history of warfare. They will huddle in their caves and field trenches, and some will die. Many will not see the sun for months, fear keeping them in their covered bunkers during daylight hours.

In the name of America the planes come.

Over the past 10 years 700,000 Laotians have been made refugees, tens of thousands have been killed or wounded, and hundreds of thousands forced to live much of the time in caves and trenches.

The bombing raids also come in the name of the U.S. Senate, until we legislate otherwise.

The war is not winding down for the peoples of Indochina. Since the much heralded bombing halt over North Vietnam, the planes have not come home. They have simply shifted their targets into Laos and Cambodia.

The bombing has continued at 100 tons an hour, 2,400 tons a day. The rate of civilian casualties and refugee generation, indicative of the overall level of violence, has if anything increased during the last 2 years.

Recent hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees reveal that since the invasion of Cambodia nearly one quarter of that country's population—1,500,000 people—have become refugees. In the last few months in South Vietnam more refugees have been created than at any time since the 1968 Tet offensive.

The bombing of North Vietnam has been resumed. As recently as September 21 an armada of 250 U.S. planes attacked targets in the North, and this raid was followed on successive days by two more so-called protective reaction strikes. At present the bombing of North Vietnam has reached an average rate of once every 4 days, and according to North Vietnamese reports 106 villages in addition to missile sites have been struck. The Meatgrinder in Vietnam, which has taken 325,000 civilian lives and wounded more than a million since 1965, is still whirling. As the South Vietnamese Minister of Information commented in 1968, South Vietnam has been devastated by an alien air force that seems at war with the very land of Vietnam.

The amendment I offer is quite straightforward. Let us stop the bombing, not just partially over North Vietnam but in all Indochina—except for those strikes inside South Vietnam demonstrably related to the security of our withdrawing troops. Is it really the desire of the Senate to continue to send out those planes?

An Orwellian transformation is taking place in our military policy in Indochina. Due to public pressure American boys are slowly coming home, but they are leaving an automated war behind. There is every danger, as Noam Chomsky has warned, that we intend to turn the land of Vietnam into an automated murder machine. Computer technology and a small number of troop manning aircraft and artillery are creating a U.S. destructive presence that may literally hover over Southeast Asia for years to come. In the midst of this the public is confused, pacified by the diminishing troop levels, yet vaguely troubled by continuing reports of devastation.

Eluding recognition, hidden in the techno-euphemisms of military speech, is the reality of our policy. "Selective ordnance"—a rather dull and technical sounding term until one realizes it masks the use of napalm against human beings. "Harrassment and interdiction"—a rather light-hearted term until one understands that it represents the random hurling of destruction into jungle areas.

These antiseptic words obfuscate horror-filled realities, and thereby circumvent public judgment. "Surgical air strike"—one pictures a diseased cancer benevolently removed from the countryside. But the cancer is the peasantry. In World War II the cancer was the Jews, and the operation was the "final solution." In the name of America, how many executions are taking place from the air in Indochina.

It is the enormity of our mistake that clouds it. If we were wrong, how wrong we were. Nothing will bring back those who have died, or the loss of arms and legs, eyes and ears. But let us commit ourselves at least to stop the bombing of those who remain.

How the people of this country, a good people, industrious people and generous people, could have come to visit such destruction on another nation is difficult to comprehend. Orwell in his masterpiece "1984" depicts such carnage as the result of technology gone mad, removed from common experience giving reality to surrealistic nightmares. We may have intervened in Indochina for commendable reasons—even that is questionable—but at some time the machine got out of control and we could not turn it off.

cattle feeding operations as we do it in the high plains areas.

And most of all, they need a transportation system. They need—and must have—a much improved farm to market road system to transport tractor fuel and fertilizer to their farms—and grain and livestock and poultry products to their population centers.

It might be well to invite not only Matskevitch, Minister of Agriculture, but invite the man who heads up their Highway Department.

Matskevitch is an extremely competent individual. He would be an influential person in the cabinet of any country.

I enclose a picture taken in March of 1959 with identification of the individuals on the back because I thought you might like a picture of him.

Very respectfully yours,

ROSWELL GARST.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
*Washington, D.C., August 11, 1971.*

DEAR MR. GARST: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of July 27, 1971, in which you propose that an invitation be issued by the Secretary of Agriculture to Minister Matskevich to visit the United States.

We appreciated receiving your suggestion and have discussed it with the Department of Agriculture. We understand that Matskevich has already been invited to make a private trip to the United States this month. In the event that he comes, the possibility remains open, of course, that he might meet with Secretary Hardin while here.

Sincerely.

R. T. DAVIES,
*Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.*

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AUGUST 13, 1971.

Mr. R. T. DAVIES,
*Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. DAVIES: Thanks for your letter saying that you understood Minister of Agriculture Matskevich has been invited to make a private trip to the United States this month.

I know about that invitation—but I doubt seriously if he will come without an official invitation from Secretary Hardin, in spite of the fact that he has been invited to speak before a group of economists.

And from the State Department's own interest, it seems to me an invitation to Matskevich to come would be highly desirable. Hardly anything could be more innocent than inviting him back for another look at American agriculture after 15 years.

In 1950, we were eating 64.4 pounds of beef per person. By 1960, it was up to 85.1 pounds per person. By 1970, it was up to 113.8 pounds per person. In 1950, we had about 150 million people—in 1970, above 200 million.

It seems highly probable that the U.S.S.R. has failed to keep pace—and is anxious to learn how we have done so well.

So I urge you to reconsider your decision and invite him.

Sincerely yours,

ROSWELL GARST.

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## SENATOR PROXMIRE'S POLL OF WISCONSIN RESIDENTS

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, a poll I have taken of Wisconsin residents shows an overwhelming support for the President's wage-price freeze and with even more support expressed for continuation of some wage-price controls after the freeze is ended.

Among the other interesting results of the poll, which was answered by some 18,000 Wisconsin residents, was the continuing desire of the voters to reduce Federal spending in the area of defense, foreign aid, and space.

The questions and the results are detailed in my October newsletter to my constituents. I asked unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the newsletter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, follows:

WHAT YOU THINK ABOUT INFLATION, SCHOOL BUSING, RED CHINA, AND FEDERAL SPENDING

Wisconsin voters continue a remarkably consistent and emphatic opposition to increased federal spending!

You call for cuts in spending for defense, foreign aid, and space.

Most of you support admission of Mainland China to the United Nations.

You overwhelmingly oppose busing to desegregated schools.

The Administration's new wage-price control program has your support . . . so far.

BUDGET CUTTING ALMOST AS POPULAR AS LAST YEAR

How do your preferences compare with your attitude last year?

In August of 1970, in response to a similar questionnaire, more of you favored budget cuts but a majority continue to support a reduction in defense, foreign aid and space expenditures. In fact, there is more support for reduced foreign aid than there was last year—a whopping 81.6 percent of you favor such a reduction.

The welfare program is also less popular. Almost 50 percent of you favor a cutback in welfare spending.

On the other hand, a majority of you favor an increase in spending for health as well as a boost in social security benefits. Last year there was no majority support for spending increases of any kind.

OUR CHINA POLICY

Where do you stand on China?

More than four out of every five of you support admitting Mainland China to the United Nations but not at the cost of expelling Nationalist China.

Only 20 percent of you would admit Red China if it meant barring Nationalist China from U.N. membership.

You also overwhelmingly support the President's proposed trip to Peking as well as more trade with Communist China.

THE WAGE-PRICE FREEZE

And the freeze in your wages and prices?

More than four out of every five of you support the 90-day freeze on wages and prices. You are willing, by and large, to pass up a wage increase as long as prices and rents remain stable and you want some continued controls after the freeze expires. A great many of you (85.9 percent) feel the price freeze should be extended to cover interest charges. However, few of you are buying more goods because of the freeze.

SCHOOL BUSING

Segregation and school busing?

Although almost all of you are against busing to end segregation no matter where it exists, one out of every four who answered the questionnaire would approve of busing to end school segregation created by acts of a state government.

It is very clear, however, that most of you strongly oppose busing under any circumstances.

Here's how you and your fellow Wisconsin citizens answered my September questionnaire:

INFLATION

Do you support the current 90-day freeze on wages, prices, rents?

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| Yes | 84.7 |
| No | 15.3 |

Are you willing to forego an increase in your wages as long as prices and rents are held down also?

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| Yes | 86.2 |
| No | 13.8 |

Do you expect to buy more clothing, furniture, appliances, or other products now that prices are frozen?

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| Yes | 22.4 |
| No | 77.6 |

Should the freeze be extended to cover interest charges?

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| Yes | 85.9 |
| No | 14.1 |

Should some kind of wage-price controls be continued after November 12, 1971?

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| Yes | 89.2 |
| No | 10.8 |

Do you favor the President's plan to postpone the Family Assistance Plan (welfare reform)?

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| Yes | 51.7 |
| No | 48.3 |

Do you favor postponement of revenue sharing with state and local governments?

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| Yes | 27.2 |
| No | 72.8 |

CHINA

Do you support the President's decision to go to Peking before next May?

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| Yes | 71.5 |
| No | 28.5 |

Would you favor opening up trade with Mainland China provided strategic goods were not traded?

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| Yes | 75.9 |
| No | 24.1 |

Would you favor admitting Mainland China to the United Nations:

If Nationalist China also kept its membership?

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| Yes | 83.8 |
| No | 16.2 |

If Mainland China admission is conditioned on expelling Nationalist China?

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| Yes | 20 |
| No | 80 |

BUSING

Do you think busing should be used to desegregate schools that were segregated by actions of a state government?

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| Yes | 24.6 |
| No | 75.4 |

Do you think busing should be used to eliminate segregation wherever it exists and whatever its causes?

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| Yes | 12.9 |
| No | 87.1 |

SPENDING: INCREASE OR CUT?

The President's budget called for $249 billion for the current fiscal year. How, as a U.S. Senator, would you vote on the following proposed (or already approved) major spending levels?

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| Yes | 51.7 |
| No | 48.3 |