

*Cal. Grogan* 17 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR ~~THE DIRECTOR~~

1. This memorandum is for information only.

2. Hanson W. Baldwin's recent book, THE GREAT ARMS RACE (Praeger, 116 pp.) was written in May 1958 and based on nine articles appearing in the NEW YORK TIMES during February and March. It is a summary of Mr. Baldwin's views on the balance sheet of American military assets and liabilities in comparison with those of the Soviet Union. While he holds that the preponderance of military power rests at present with the American, not the Soviet side, he warns this is no cause for complacency. He describes on p. 51 the balance as follows: "The Soviet long-range air armies and the missile commands would have to plan and carry out almost simultaneous surprise attacks against all of these dispersed (Western) bases in order to reduce our nuclear offensive power so that the losses we could inflict upon Russia in retaliation would be small-- or acceptable -- to Moscow . . . This would represent a split-second miracle of timing."

3. Mr. Baldwin contends that to hold or improve our position in a rapidly changing world of technology, it is necessary to spend much more money on offensive missiles, anti-missile missiles, missile-firing submarines, lighter missile-firing aircraft, anti-submarine devices, ground equipment for limited warfare, and man power development. He holds that man is probably the weakest element in the American formula for security and he urges a better quality of education, longer enlistments, more stability, and the elimination of the short-term officer.

4. He refutes the contention that inter-service rivalries are the cause of most of our military deficiencies and places the blame on the reluctance of civilian officials to make difficult decisions, the unwieldy civilian bureaucracy in the Pentagon, and the placing of fiscal considerations above military requirements.

5. Baldwin makes one specific reference to CIA. On pages 109-110, he says: "To insure swift and realistic impact upon our policies of (sic) Soviet technological or military progress, it has been suggested that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency be included in a policy coordinating group. This suggestion has some organizational merit, but it also bodes some political danger, for it is unwritten law that no head of a secret intelligence agency should ever be put in the position of framinger of executing broad national policies! The streamlining of existing agencies and the selection of better executives should expedite implementation of decisions already made."

[Redacted Signature]

Acting Assistant to the Director

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cc: DDCI (w/o attach.)