

29 December 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Support Services Staff

SUBJECT : ADP Contingency Backup for CIA

REFERENCE : Memo from Mr. [REDACTED] to Chairman IPB, dated
. 8 December 1970, same subject.

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1. Two Computer Centers are using the Vital Records Program to protect tapes:

(a) RID/DDP -- At present RID has 63 tapes in the Vital Records collection at the Agency Archives Records Center. In the RID "Vital Records Schedule," Items #21a thru #21p and Item #25 are specifically related to the protection of their vital magnetic tapes. This schedule was written and approved in 1960 and the first deposit received in 1961. From 1965 thru 1967 tapes regularly moved in and out between RID and the Records Center. In 1967 we received 172 different deposits of from 1 to 20 Tapes. In 1967 the RID established a tape storage facility at Headquarters "remote" from their tape library. From that time on their deposit activity declined: 1968 -- 7 deposits; 1969 -- 14 deposits; and 1970 -- one deposit.

(b) OCS/DDS&T -- At present the Office of Computer Services has three reels of magnetic tape in the Vital Records depository. These were received on 11 March 1965. In September 1968 the OCS asked for temporary Vital Records storage for 1,640 reels of old RCA tapes. (These were removed and destroyed in April 1970).

(c) NPIC and CRS/DDI -- These two components have never sent any tapes to the Center for storage. CRS has sent several million punch cards for storage as vital ADP records. Recently, these cards were returned to CRS and converted to tapes, but neither card nor tapes have been redeposited. CRS has, in the past few weeks, inquired about depositing some AEGIS tapes. We are assisting in developing a schedule for that material.

(d) OS/DDS -- The Office of Security is the only other office that has a few vital records on duplicate tapes in our storage.

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2. The above indicates that there will be some Computer Centers that will challenge the major contention of the referenced paper with regard to tape protection contingency plans. But, I do not agree with the Computer Center practice of storing backup tapes in headquarters because I feel the secondary tape libraries are not sufficiently "remote" and are as vulnerable as the main library. Also, the tapes can be retrieved from the [redacted] Vital Records Collection in an emergency one hour or routine half a day. I feel a routine procedure can channel a duplicate tape to storage and the same courier can return with the preceding tape which was just obsoleted by the new deposit. The use of scarce headquarters space for backup storage should be critically re-examined by an objective third party. I cannot accept the paper's recommendation 2b on page 9 for each center to maintain an alternate backup storage site.

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3. Further, I believe that the referenced paper has not sufficiently identified the scope of the tape problem for IPC to take adequate action. Our inventory of July 1970 (attached) shows 27,385 tapes on hand in 15 components. The subject paper mentioned 4 centers (OCS, CRS, RID, and NPIC) which have a total of 19,881 tapes. They also mention OEL and Office of Communications which have 5,320 more. However they omit nine other offices that have 2,184 tapes, (OCI, OER, OBG, OSR, FMSAC, ORD, OSI, OSP, and O/LOG). The two special computers as well as the nine unmentioned components have vital tapes just as the four main centers do. Size alone is not a measure of critical and continuing need. Unfortunately, the Operating Officials are not sufficiently conversant with the importance of software and data base tapes to initiate adequate protective steps and the computer officials continue to insist that the offices not the analysts are responsible to identify and protect the important tapes.

4. The subject paper does not estimate the size of the Vital Tape backup problem which they are asking IPC to consider. I have used the rule of thumb the Federal Government uses. National Archives and Records Consultants find that less than 2% of Office records are "Vital" for continuing operations. (The Agency has 200,000 cu. ft. of active records in the offices with another 60,000 cu. ft. as inactive records. We have 5,146 cu. ft. in Vital Records as of October 1970). We can use a similar yardstick on the total of 27,385 tapes which are equal to 3,912 cubic feet (at 7 tapes per foot). At a generous 5%, some 1,369 tapes or 196 cu. ft. probably could be identified as deserving preservation as Vital Records. The Agency would consider the 5% volume of 196 cu. ft. to be a very small deposit. (If we used the 2% rule this drops to 78 cu. ft. for 547 tapes). The routine twice a day courier system could probably satisfy the normal traffic for that amount.

The possibility deserves study before more Headquarters space and a second vital records program is established for duplicate tapes storage.

5. It seems to me that the problem posed in the referent paper is not one of tapes and equipment, but rather one of emergency planning. Such planning should include paper records, microfilms, maps, photos, and all other agency required information facilities, and personnel. The problem of backup equipment deserves more attention than the reference gave it. The planning should be graduated to cope with catastrophies of graduated magnitudes of seriousness and disruption. Our concept should be based on relative rather than absolute security. But, exploiting the convenience of an extra adjacent room for tape storage can not be considered thorough or adequate emergency planning.

6. As the CIA Records Officer I feel our Program Position should continue to be as follows:

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(a) The Agency has an established Program in [REDACTED] for the routine identification and safe storage of all its Vital Records regardless of the media on which the information is inscribed. That program is being used by some for tape backup and should be used more fully.

(b) The Operating Offices, Systems Analysts, and Computer Centers have an official requirement in [REDACTED] to protect vital information and be prepared for "all" types of emergencies.

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(c) Like Government and Industry the Agency Records Program considers tapes to be records and plans for and handles them accordingly. This includes disposal schedules and official authority for final disposal when approved by the CIA Records Officer in accordance with U. S. Archivist rules.

(d) The problem of emergency backup computer tape storage is and should continue to be an intrinsic part of the Agency Emergency Planning and Vital Records Preservation Program. The Agencywide Program covers all types of emergencies (from nuclear and home-made bombs down to fires, floods, and riots) to whatever degree the Agency policy, funds, and facilities may authorize.

7. I believe the IPC should urge the Centers and Offices to identify, schedule, and protect its vital tapes thru the existing Vital Records Program and facilities. The IPC should not create a new procedure, program, and facility to store Vital tapes in Headquarters.

[REDACTED]
CIA Records Administration Officer

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Attachment:
1970 Tape Inventory

TOTAL TAPES IN HEADQUARTERS

1 July 1970

	<u>Number of Computer Tapes</u>	<u>Directorate Total Tapes</u>
DDS - O/Commo	1,400	
O/Logistics	<u>19</u>	1,419
DDI - Central Reference Service	2,117	
Office of Current Intelligence	458	
Office of Economic Research	300	
NPIC	2,501	
OBGI	110	
OSR	<u>230</u>	5,716
DDS&T - FMSAC	100	
O/Computer Services	11,013	
O/ELINT	3,920	
O/Research & Development	889	
O/SI	52	
O/SP	<u>26</u>	16,000
DCI	<u>0</u>	0
DDP	<u>4,250</u>	<u>4,250</u>
TOTAL		27,385

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