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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 24, 1972

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MEMORANDUM

TO:

H - Mr. Abshire

FROM: PM - Joseph J. Wolf

SUBJECT:

Symington Subcommittee:

Lowenstein-Moose Report on Trip to Southeast Asia

Lowenstein says that the report is now being put in final form and Symington has decided that it will go as a report of the Subcommittee to the full Foreign Relations Committee, being covered by a letter from Symington to Fulbright, which will be unchasified. Symington is working on this letter now, which will set forth the Senator's well-known personal views about escalation of the war in Southeast Asia, while we pull out of Vietnam, cost, duplication of effort, etc. It will not reflect the views of the Subcommittee, but only those of its Chairman.

Lowenstein hopes that we can start the declassification process on the report about Tuesday or Wednesday of next week, following the same pattern we used on the Laos report. I asked if we could see the Symington letter to make sure that it would contain only truly unclassified material. Lowenstein in effect denied this. He did say that he would personally review that text, and if he had any doubt on any point, he would be in touch. I said he certainly should be, since the finger would point directly at Symington if there was the slightest indication of a security leak, and I knew he wanted to avoid this as much as we did.

Lowenstein said the report is organized into a general discussion of the way things are going in Southeast Asia, followed by country chapters on Laos, Thailand and Cambodia, then followed by a discussion of the issues between the Executive and Legislative Branches (access to the CFS in

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Cambodia, access to the intelligence stations, etc.) and concluding with a philosophic section which will talk about where we are going in Southeast Asia.

Lowenstein asked me if we had come to any conclusion on his request to let them clear memoranda of conversation. I said I looked into it and obviously it was a non-starter as he must have recognized. We then discussed the problem of correct reporting and he seemed to back away from his request. I think that one is over with.

As to the CFS issue, he told me that he thought we were making a major mistake since documents like the CFS and Five-Year MAP plans were necessary to go into a study in depth of the MAP program. I stressed to him that we would give the factors involved in appropriate form but would protect the field submissions. He said that a good investigator would get far more from a field submission or a telegram as to the thinking behind the program than by a Washington presentation. I said that the history of the way the SFRC and staff had approached the foreign assistance program with only three days of hearings, did not seem to me to be thrusting in the direction of the thorough investigation by either the members or the staff that he was talking about. He sadly admitted that he was not speaking for the Committee or the full staff in this desire of his to search more thoroughly into the major programs. concluded by repeating the fact that if the members wanted to get the factors involved or to talk formally or informally, they only had to ask.

He said he would be in touch early next week.

PM:JJWolf:bmh

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CC: PM - Mr. Spiers, Mr. Chapman
H - Mr. Symmes
EA - Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Dexter, Mr. Corcoran, Mr. Hummel
L - Mr. Brower
U/SA - Mr. Newman
AID - Mr. O'Connor
CIA - Mr. Maury,
DOD - Mr. French, Mr. Monaghan
NSA
White House - Mr. Lehman

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