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White House Took Steps to Stop Leaks Months Before Anderson Disclosures

By ROBERT M. SMITH
 Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 8—The communist Jack Anderson, has been able to disclose secret memoranda concerning National Security Council meetings recently despite White House steps months ago to prevent leaks to reporters and to insure the secrecy of council proceedings.

According to reliable sources, the White House quietly ordered David R. Young of Henry A. Kissinger's national security staff and Egil Krogh Jr. of John D. Ehrlichman's domestic advisory staff to investigate the leaks and to stop them. The action was prompted, according to Government sources, after an article in The New York Times July 23 that dealt with the talks on limitation of strategic arms and caused concern in the White House.

It is not known specifically what Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young have done in the five months since the security assignment was added to their duties. They are reported to have reviewed the procedures used by the council and to have inquired into the methods used by council members, such as Secretary of State William P. Rogers, to prepare for meetings and to handle the council's papers.

F.B.I. Called In

Presumably, Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young have had their task made more difficult by the disclosures by Mr. Anderson. The Justice Department has confirmed that the Administration has called on the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate the leaks.

According to one source, Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young are authorized to call on the F.B.I. but hold the principal responsibility because "it is a White House problem" and because "it would be inappropriate to send some F.B.I. man around to talk with people like the Secretary of State." It is not known whether Mr. Rogers himself was interviewed.

The article that prompted the move was written by the Pentagon correspondent of The Times, William Beecher. The article reported that American negotiators had proposed to the Soviet Union an arms-control agreement that would halt construction of both land-based missiles and missile submarines. Mr. Beecher also reported that a companion proposal would allow as many as 300 defensive missiles in both the United States and the Soviet Union to protect offensive missiles.

The article said that the

American proposals had been made orally at negotiations in Helsinki but that specific draft agreements were still being written in Washington.

According to one Government official, the disclosure came "during a very critical stage of the negotiations" and the proposals involved "were not even in any written memo." He said the Administration's feeling was that the information had to come from someone present at the discussions of the National Security Council.

Officials at council meetings include representatives of the Defense and State Departments, the intelligence community and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The F.B.I. has conducted an extensive investigation over more than four months in an effort to uncover Mr. Beecher's sources. The inquiry has been conducted here, elsewhere in the United States and abroad, and was still going on last week.

Secret Paper Says Press 'Slanted' War

By Laurence Stern
and Sanford J. Ungar
Washington Post Staff Writers

During the secret deliberations of the top Nixon administration policy makers on the Indo-Pakistani crisis last month, an assistant secretary of defense accused the press of "slanting" its war coverage against Pakistan.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs G. Warren Nutter made the charge in an exchange with President Nixon's national security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, during the White House session on December 4.

"It goes without saying," Nutter commented, "that the entire press is slanting this war to place the entire blame on the Pakistanis and to show that they attacked India."

Kissinger then said, "This has been a well-done political campaign for which we will pay."

The exchange was recorded in a "memorandum for record" prepared by James H. Noyes, a deputy to Nutter.

The memorandum, which purportedly quotes the participants directly, is one of several documents that have been in the possession of The Washington Post, which obtained them from columnist Jack Anderson.

It covers the same meeting as another memorandum published in Wednesday's editions of The Washington Post. The other memorandum, drafted by Navy Capt. Howard N. Kay for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported the secret session in paraphrase form.

See DOCUMENTS, A7, Col. 1

The Noyes memorandum also recorded Kissinger's assertion that President Nixon was angry with the version of events that was being put out in State Department press back-grounders.

This issue came up during discussion of American strategy in the United Nations debate over the war.

"Both Yahya (West Pakistan President Yahya Khan) and Mrs. Gandhi are making bellicose statements. If we refer to Mrs. Gandhi's in our statement, do we not also have to refer to Yahya's?" asked Assistant Secretary of State Samuel dePalma.

Kissinger is reported as replying:

"The President says either the bureaucracy should put out the right statement on this, or the White House will do it. Can the UN object to Yahya's statements about defending his country?"

DePalma answered: "We will have difficulty in the UN because most of the countries who might go with us do not want to tilt toward Pakistan to the extent we do."

"Whoever is doing the back-grounding at State," Kissinger is then quoted as saying, "is invoking the President's wrath. Please try to follow the President's wishes."

At another point, Kissinger is quoted as expressing, in bitter terms, his pessimism about the eventual outcome of the U.N. Security Council meeting.

"Nothing will happen at the Security Council because of Soviet vetoes. The whole thing is a farce."

As events developed, the Soviet Union did veto the resolution sponsored by the United States and other countries calling for a mutual pulling back of troops and an immediate cease fire.

Kissinger is also recorded as having said: "We have told the Paks we would make our statement. Let's go ahead and put in our own statement anyway regardless of what other countries want to do."

"We need now to make our stand clear even though it has taken us two weeks of fiddling. We need our resolution tabled. We want to insist on a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces before the details of a political settlement are considered."

India opposed the pull-back resolution on grounds that its troops would have to withdraw to bases more than 400 miles from the border while the Pakistani bases were only a few miles from the front.

The discussion by the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group, the nation's top international crisis directorate, was opened by Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard M. Helms.

Helms alluded to Soviet support for India in the emerging conflict. In an aside to his colleagues the CIA director advised:

"You should all read our new study 'Moscow and India-Pakistan Crisis.'"

Anderson's disclosures of secret U.S. policy discussions about the Indo-Pakistani crisis brought an announcement yesterday from a second congressional committee that hearings will be held on the government's security classification system.

Rep. William Moorhead (D-Pa.) said his House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information will open extensive hearings in March.

They will cover the first five years of operations of the Freedom of Information Act, as well as "the whole problem of classification," including the Anderson documents.

Moorhead conceded there may be "overlap" with an investigation announced Wednesday by the House Armed Services Committee.

An FBI investigation into Anderson's sources for the Indo-Pakistani documents continued yesterday. Justice Department sources said, however, that it was not of the scale of an earlier probe concerning disclosures of the Pentagon Papers on the war in Vietnam.

U.S. ENVOY IN INDIA DISPUTED POLICIES BACKING PAKISTAN

Keating Said Explanation of
Nixon's Stand Was Hurting
Americans' Credibility

FACTS ALSO QUESTIONED

Ambassador's Cable Bared
by Columnist, Who Also
Replies to Kissinger

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 5—Kenneth B. Keating, United States Ambassador to India, complained in a secret cablegram to Washington during the Indian-Pakistani war that the Nixon Administration's justification for its pro-Pakistan policy detracted from American credibility and was inconsistent with his knowledge of events.

The secret message to the State Department was made available to The New York Times at its request by the syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, who says he has received from unidentified United States Government informants "scores" of highly classified documents relating to the conflict last month.

Today Mr. Anderson—asserting that he was irked by a comment from Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on national security disputing the accuracy of some of his recent columns—released the Defense Department's record of three top-level White House strategy sessions held at the start of the two-week war.

'Secret Sensitive' Reports

The reports of the meetings of Dec. 3, 4 and 6, were classified "secret sensitive." A low-key investigation is underway to ascertain who leaked the documents to Mr. Anderson. He said today that he was ready, if necessary, for a battle with the Government. [Details on Page 17.]

The documents provide an unusual look into the thinking and actions of Mr. Nixon and his advisers on national security affairs at the start of the crisis, which eventually led to the Indian capture of East Pakistan and the establishment of a breakaway state there under the name Bangladesh.

Because the White House Security Action Group, known here as WSAG, did not have a formal structure, the language of Mr. Kissinger and the other participants was often looser, more piquant and franker than that in public statements by Mr. Kissinger and other Administration spokesmen at the time.

On Dec. 3, the day that full-scale fighting broke out, Mr. Kissinger told the White House strategy session, according to one document:

"I am getting hell every half-hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise."

The group included John N. Irwin, under secretary of state; Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The next day, Dec. 4, the United States called for a meeting of the United Nations Security Council to discuss the war and to press India for a withdrawal. Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, told newsmen that the United States believed that India bore "the major responsibility" for the fighting.

The decision by the Administration to attach blame to India came as something of a surprise in Washington since most diplomats and officials had expected a more neutral stance.

Disagreed With 'Tilt'

Critics of the Administration such as Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, had been complaining about Mr. Nixon's failure to criticize Pakistan for her bloody repression of the East Pakistani autonomy movement and the arrest of its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

Mr. Anderson has indicated that the documents in his possession were leaked by officials who disagreed with the Administration's "tilt" toward

Pakistan. Ambassador Keating is also understood to have argued since March, when the repression began, for a statement against Pakistan.

Mr. Keating's cable, dated Dec. 8, was in response to the United States Information Agency's account of a briefing given by Mr. Kissinger at the White House on Dec. 7, setting forth the Administration's justification for its policy.

That briefing also became a source of contention between Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Anderson. In it Mr. Kissinger said that the United States was not "anti-Indian" but was opposed to India's recent actions. Mr. Anderson, seizing on the denial, sought to prove that the Administration was "anti-Indian," and therefore lying.

Dispute Over Relief

In his briefing Mr. Kissinger said, among other things, that the United States had allocated \$155-million to avert famine in East Pakistan at India's "specific request."

Mr. Keating said that his recollection from a conversation with Foreign Minister Swarn Singh was that India "was reluctant to see a relief program started in East Pakistan prior to a political settlement on grounds such an effort might serve to bail out" Gen. Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, then President of Pakistan, who was displaced after the loss of East Pakistan.

The Ambassador noted that the briefing said that the Indian Ambassador in Washington, L. K. Jha, was informed on Nov. 19 that the United States and Pakistan were prepared to discuss a precise schedule for political autonomy in East Pakistan but that India had sabotaged the efforts by starting the war.

"The only message I have on record of this conversation makes no reference to this critical fact," Mr. Keating said.

Mr. Kissinger said at the briefing, that when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was in Washington in early November, "we had no reason to believe that military action was that imminent and that we did not have time to begin to work on a peaceful resolution."

"With vast and voluminous efforts of intelligence community, reporting from both Delhi and Islamabad, and my own decisions in Washington, I do not understand statement that Washington was not given the slightest inkling that any military operation was in any way imminent," Mr. Keating responded. He said that on Nov. 12 he sent a cable "stating specifically that war is quite imminent."

The record of the White House strategy sessions indi-

cated that intelligence information on the situation in South Asia was quite thin, at least in the early stages.

Mr. Helms and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—while agreeing that India would win in East Pakistan—disagreed on the time it would take. Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, came close by saying it would take one to two weeks, but there is no sign yet that he was correct in predicting that the Russians would push for permanent use of a base at Visag, on India's east coast.

Often Mr. Helms simply read rival claims by Pakistan and India, without making any judgment on their accuracy—indicating that the United States had no independent information.

Fears for West Pakistan

By Dec. 6, when it was clear that the Indians would win in East Pakistan, Mr. Sisco said that "from a political point of view our efforts would have to be directed at keeping the Indians from extinguishing West Pakistan."

After the war was over Mr. Nixon said in an interview in Time magazine that the American intelligence community had reason to believe that there were forces in India pushing for total victory but that under pressure from the United States the Soviet Union convinced India to order a cease-fire once East Pakistan surrendered.

This version of events has been officially denied by New Delhi, which said it had no plans to invade West Pakistan.

But in the period covered by the documents made public by Mr. Anderson there seemed considerable confusion in the Administration. At one point Mr. Kissinger said that Mr. Nixon might want to honor any requests from Pakistan for American arms—despite an American embargo on arms to India or Pakistan.

It was decided at the Dec. 6 session to look into the possibility of shipping arms quietly to Pakistan. But the State Department said today that no action was taken.

Carrier Sent to Rejoin

"It is quite obvious that the President is not inclined to let the Paks be defeated," Mr. Kissinger said, apparently referring to the possibility of the loss of West Pakistan.

Later on in the crisis the United States sent the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise into the Indian Ocean, apparently as a show of force to deter any attack on West Pakistan, sources said at the time.

continued

Mr. Kissinger asked at the Dec. 3 meeting for clarification of a "secret special interpretation" of a March, 1959, United States-Pakistani accord by which the United States would come to Pakistan's aid in case of attack. Later, Administration officials said that the United States was bound only to come to Pakistan's aid in case of attack by a Communist country.

Much of the discussion revolved around tactics in the United Nations. Mr. Kissinger indicated some frustration with the powerlessness of the world body to take action because of the Soviet veto.

"If the United Nations can't operate in this kind of situation effectively, its utility has come to an end and it is useless to think of United Nations guarantees in the Middle East," he said on Dec. 3. Today the State Department, asked about that gloomy prediction, sought to diminish its importance by saying that the United Nations could be effective in specific situations.

Many ideas were raised only to be dropped. Despite strong talk about cutting off aid to India, she only lost military aid and development loans; food products and so-called "irrevocable loans" were not stopped.

Mr. Kissinger, reflecting the President's anger, said that "henceforth we show a certain coolness to the Indians; the Indian Ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level." An Indian spokesman said today that Mr. Jha had not sought or been invited to an interview with a high official since the crisis.

Officialdom in Action

Anderson's Revelations Provide Glimpse Of How Leaders React Under Stress

By MAX FRANKEL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 5—The country has now caught up with the movies and received some real-life Anderson tapes, or at least minutes, and they offer a fascinating glimpse of government—a faithful account of how high-ranking officials talk to one another under stress. But to be read fairly and profitably, these revelations also need more explanation and information, only some of which is available so far.

These are not the equivalent of the massive Pentagon papers on Vietnam. In one sense, they are even more vivid: they record the crisis managers in action, barely one month after the fact, in the early days of the India-Pakistan war. In every other sense, however, they are only fragmentary: they deal with tactical discussions during a few days, without relation to the larger calculations of American interests, in South Asia and elsewhere.

The Anderson minutes do not offer conclusive proof of any major deception. The Nixon Administration's sympathy for Pakistan and anger over what it called Indian "aggression" were obvious at the time. But they do reveal that the White House secretly toyed with the idea of giving more positive military help to Pakistan than it acknowledged.

Interpretation Questioned

And the further disclosure today of Ambassador Kenneth B. Keating's complaint about the Administration's public statements suggests that the judgments of the White House may have rested on a debatable reading of prewar diplomatic events.

Indeed, the new disclosures once again point up the failure of the Administration to reveal all the reasons for the President's anger at the Indians, for his willingness at every turn to give the Pakistanis the benefit of every doubt and for his readiness to side conspicuously with Pakistan and China, thus enhancing the Soviet Union's position in India and the Indian Ocean.

The papers also suggest a remarkable degree of frustration and anger by the President and his principal security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, over the presumed unwillingness of the bureaucracy to follow their instructions and adopt their view of the war. And they demonstrate some of the methods — from threats to jokes — that Mr. Kissinger uses to enforce the Presidential will.

The leak of these papers to Jack Anderson, particularly so soon after the Pentagon papers, obviously troubles the White House and many other high Government officials. The hunt for the culprit is less energetic than might be imagined, apparently because the consequences are thought to be more of an embarrassment than a compromise of diplomatic or military secrets.

But a breach of confidence about discussions at such a high level may result in serious side effects. It could encourage an already secretive President to cut off even more officials from policy deliberations, thus denying them both influence and understanding. It could also further inhibit the candor of official discussions and record-keeping.

It is widely believed here, even by many reporters who delight in printing secrets, that orderly administration and fair dealings with the public as well as with other nations require a certain amount of confidentiality in Government offices. This view reflects the conviction that sound decisions depend upon energetic and free debate and often upon brutal judgments about the motives, strengths and weaknesses of individuals, groups and governments.

But secrecy is also widely employed here to mislead the public, to hide errors of judgment or calculations of personal or political profit. It has therefore become customary for reporters to try to penetrate official confidences and to receive and print as much information as they can get, from sources both sympathetic and disgruntled.

Often the reporters do not

learn enough to explain events fully. Sometimes they learn more than the Government deems to be in the national interest. The Government's most effective defense against leaks from inside is an information policy of candor that satisfies public curiosity about an event and leaves officials immune to charges of duplicity or deception.

Unusually Large Audience

The audience for Mr. Anderson's disclosures was unusually large here today, clearly because the Nixon Administration's policies and conduct in South Asia over the last 10 months are not yet widely understood.

The White House minutes confirm there was a general fear that India might seek to dismember West Pakistan after she severed East Pakistan from the West. The basis for that fear has not been publicly demonstrated, and it was not discussed at the compromised meetings.

The minutes portray an unseen President driving his assistants into words and deeds that would punish India. But they reveal nothing about Mr. Nixon's apparent personal affinity for the Pakistani leaders and dislike of high Indian officials. Nor do they shed any light on the intensity of the effort the White House says it made to find a peaceful solution.

One of Mr. Anderson's recent columns about the war—but not the documents he has released—portrayed the President as confident that the Indians would not allow themselves to become wholly dependent on the Russians and that the risks of offending them were therefore less than critics believed.

But there has been no official explanation to this effect, nor any accounting of why the United States was willing to diminish its own influence in India and in the new state proclaimed by the Bengali secessionists because of its pro-Pakistani exertions and assertions that could not alter the course of the war.

If these issues were debated among high officials, the record remains secret. The tone of the meetings now divulged suggests that Mr. Kissinger, as so often before, may simply have been enunciating policy as privately determined by the President, with no back-talk wanted, and hardly any offered.

Kissinger Parley Excerpts

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 5 — Following are excerpts from a background briefing for news correspondents given on Dec. 7 by Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on national security. Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona obtained the transcript from the White House and inserted it in The Congressional Record on Dec. 9. It constitutes a Nixon Administration summary of American policy at the time of the meetings discussed in the documents made public today by the columnist Jack Anderson.

OPENING STATEMENT

There have been some comments that the Administration is anti-Indian. This is totally inaccurate. India is a great country. It is the most populous free country. It is governed by democratic procedures.

Americans through all administrations in the postwar period have felt a commitment to the progress and development of India, and the American people have contributed to this to the extent of \$10-billion.

Therefore, when we have differed with India, as we have in recent weeks, we do so with great sadness and with great disappointment.

Now let me describe the situation as we saw it, going back to March 25. March 25 is, of course, the day when the central Government of Pakistan decided to establish military rule in East Bengal and started the process which has led to the present situation.

The United States has never supported the particular action that led to this tragic series of events, and the United States has always recognized that this action had consequences which had a considerable impact on India. We have always recognized that the influx of refugees into India produced the danger of communal strife in a country always precariously poised on the edge of communal strife. We have known that it is a strain on the already scarce economic resources of a country in the process of development.

The United States position has been to attempt two efforts simultaneously: one, to ease the human suffering and to bring about the return of

the refugees; and secondly, we have attempted to bring about a political resolution of the conflict which generated the refugees in the first place.

Now the United States did not condone what happened in March, 1971; on the contrary, the United States has made no new development loans to Pakistan since March, 1971.

Secondly, there has been a great deal of talk about military supplies to Pakistan. The fact of the matter is that immediately after the actions in East Pakistan at the end of March of this past year, the United States suspended any new licenses. It stopped the shipment of all military supplies out of American depots or that were under American Governmental control. The only arms that were continued to be shipped to Pakistan were arms on old licenses in commercial channels, and these were spare parts. There were no lethal and end-items involved.

To give you a sense of the magnitude, the United States cut off \$35-million worth of arms at the end of March of this year, or early April of this year, immediately after the actions in East Bengal, and continued to ship something less than \$5-million worth; whereupon, all the remainder of the pipeline was cut off.

It is true the United States did not make any public declarations on its views of the evolution, because the United States wanted to use its influence with both Delhi and Islamabad to bring about a political settlement that would enable the refugees to return.

We attempted to promote a political settlement, and if I can sum up the difference that may have existed between us and the Government of India, it was this:

We told the Government of India on many occasions — the Secretary of State saw the Indian Ambassador 18 times; I saw him seven times since the end of August on behalf of the President. We all said that political autonomy for East Bengal was the inevitable outcome of political evolution and that we favored it. The difference may have been that the Government of India wanted things so rapidly that it was no

longer talking about political evolution, but about political collapse.

We told the Indian Prime Minister when she was here of the Pakistan offer to withdraw their troops unilaterally from the border. There was no response.

We told the Indian Prime Minister when she was here that we would try to arrange negotiations between the Pakistanis and members of the Awami League, specifically approved by Mujibur, who is in prison. We told the Indian Ambassador shortly before his return to India that we were prepared even to discuss with them a political timetable, a precise timetable for the establishment of political autonomy in East Bengal.

When we say that there was no need for military action, we do not say that India did not suffer. We do not say that we are unsympathetic to India's problems or that we do not value India.

This country, which in many respects has had a love affair with India, can only, with enormous pain, accept the fact that military action was taken in our view without adequate cause, and if we express this opinion in the United Nations, we do not do so because we want to support one particular point of view on the subcontinent, or because we want to forego our friendship with what will always be one of the great countries in the world; but because we believe that if, as some of the phrases go, the right of military attack is determined by arithmetic, if political wisdom consists of saying the attacker has 500 million and the defender has 100 million, and, therefore, the United States must always be on the side of the numerically stronger, then we are creating a situation where, in the foreseeable we will have international anarchy, and where the period of peace, which is the greatest desire for the President to establish, will be jeopardized; not at first for Americans, necessarily, but for peoples all over the world.

Questions and Answers

Q. Why was the first semi-public explanation of the American position one of condemning India, and why this belated explanation that

you are now giving? The perception of the world is that the United States regards India as an aggressor; that it is anti-India, and you make a fairly persuasive case here that that is not the case. So why this late date?

Mr. Kissinger. We were reluctant to believe for a long time that the matter had come down to a naked recourse to force, and we were attempting for the first two weeks of the military operations to see what could be done to quiet it through personal diplomacy conducted by the Department of State.

We made two appeals to the Indian Prime Minister. We appealed also to the Pakistan President, and we appealed also to the Soviet Union.

Now, then, on Friday the situation burst into full-blown war and it was decided to put the facts before the public. Now, I cannot, of course, accept the characterization that you made of the way these facts were put forward; that they were put forward as anti-Indian.

Q. I said the perception of the world public was that the United States was anti-Indian because of the nature of that first background briefing at the State Department on Friday.

A. We are opposed to the use of military force in this crisis, and we do not believe that it was necessary to engage in military action. We believe that what started as a tragedy in East Bengal is now becoming an attempt to dismember a sovereign state and a member of the United Nations.

So the view that was expressed on Saturday is not inconsistent with the view that is expressed today. What was done today is an explanation of the background that led to the statement on Saturday, and it might have been better if we had put the whole case forward.

Texts of Secret Documents

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 5—Following are the texts of three secret documents made public today by the columnist Jack Anderson describing meetings of the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group on the crisis between India and Pakistan:

Memo on Dec. 3 Meeting

Secret Sensitive

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Refer to: 1-29643/71

International Security Affairs
 Memorandum for Record

SUBJECT

WSAG meeting on India/Pakistan participants.

Assistant to the President for national security affairs—Henry A. Kissinger
 Under Secretary of State—John N. Irwin

Deputy Secretary of Defense—David Packard

Director, Central Intelligence Agency—Richard M. Helms

Deputy Administrator (A.I.D.)—Maurice J. Williams

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff—Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

Assistant Secretary of State (N.E.E.A.R.)—Joseph J. Sisco

Assistant Secretary of Defense (I.S.A.)—G. Warren Nutter

Assistant Secretary of State (I.O.)—Samuel De Palma

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (I.S.A.)—Armistead I. Selden Jr.

Assistant Administrator (A.I.D./N.E.S.A.)—Donald G. MacDonald

TIME AND PLACE

3 December 1971, 1100 hours, Situation Room, White House.

SUMMARY

Reviewed conflicting reports about major actions in the west wing. C.I.A. agreed to produce map showing areas of East Pakistan occupied by India. The President orders hold on issuance of additional irrevocable letters of credit involving \$99-million, and a hold on further action implementing the \$7-million P.L. 480 credit. Convening of Security Council meeting planned contingent on discussion with Pak Ambassador this afternoon plus further clarification of actual situation in West Pakistan. Kissinger asked for clarification of secret special interpretation of March, 1959, bilateral U. S. agreement with Pakistan.

KISSINGER: I am getting hell every half-hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to see everything we do comes out otherwise.

HELMS: Concerning the reported action in the west wing, there are conflicting reports from both sides and the only common ground is the Pak attacks on the Amritsar, Pathankot and Srinagar airports. The Paks say the Indians are attacking all along the border; but the Indian officials say this is a lie. In the east wing the action is becoming larger and the Paks claim there are now seven separate fronts involved.

KISSINGER: Are the Indians seizing territory?

HELMS: Yes; small bits of territory, definitely.

SISCO: It would help if you could provide a map with a shading of the areas occupied by India. What is happening in the West—is a full-scale attack likely?

MOORER: The present pattern is puzzling in that the Paks have only struck at three small airfields which do not house significant numbers of Indian combat aircraft.

HELMS: Mrs. Gandhi's speech at 1:30 may well announce recognition of Bangladesh.

MOORER: The Pak attack is not credible. It has been made during late afternoon, which doesn't make sense. We do not seem to have sufficient facts on this yet.

KISSINGER: Is it possible that the Indians attacked first and the Paks simply did what they could before dark in response?

MOORER: This is certainly possible.

KISSINGER: The President wants no more irrevocable letters of credit issued under the \$99-million credit. He wants the \$72-million P.L. 480 credit also held.

WILLIAMS: Word will soon get around when we do this. Does the President understand that?

KISSINGER: That is his order, but I will check with the President again. If asked, we can say we are reviewing our whole economic program and that the granting of fresh aid is being suspended in view of conditions on the subcontinent. The next issue is the U.N.

IRWIN: The Secretary is calling in the Pak Ambassador this afternoon, and the Secretary leans toward making a U.S. move in the U.N. soon.

KISSINGER: The President is in favor of this as soon as we have some confirmation of this large-scale new action. If the U.N. can't operate in this kind of situation effectively, its utility has come to an end and it is useless to think of U.N. guarantees in the Middle East.

SISCO: We will have a recommendation for you this afternoon, after the meeting with the Ambassador. In order to give the Ambassador time to wire home, we could tentatively plan to convene the Security Council tomorrow.

KISSINGER: We have to take action. The President is blaming me, but you people are in the clear.

SISCO: That's ideal!

KISSINGER: The earlier draft for Bush is too even-handed.

SISCO: To recapitulate, after we have seen the Pak Ambassador, the Secretary will report to you. We will update the draft speech for Bush.

KISSINGER: We can say we favor political accommodation but the real job of the Security Council is to prevent military action.

SISCO: We have never had a reply either from Kosygin or Mrs. Gandhi.

WILLIAMS: Are we to take economic steps with Pakistan also?

KISSINGER: Wait until I talk with the President. He hasn't addressed this problem in connection with Pakistan yet.

SISCO: If we act on the Indian side, we can say we are keeping the Pakistan situation "under review."

KISSINGER: It's hard to tilt toward Pakistan if we have to match every Indian step with a Pakistan step. If you wait until Monday, I can get a Presidential decision.

PACKARD: It should be easy for us to inform the banks involved to defer action inasmuch as we are so near the weekend.

KISSINGER: We need a WSAG in the morning. We need to think about our treaty obligations. I remember a letter or memo interpreting our existing treaty with a special India tilt. When I visited Pakistan in January, 1962, I was briefed on a secret document or oral understanding about contingencies arising in other than the SEATO context. Perhaps it was a Presidential letter. This was a special interpretation of the March, 1959, bilateral agreement.

Prepared by:

/S/ initials

JAMES M. NOYES

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs

Approved:

(illegible signature)

For G. Warren Nutter Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

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DATE 6 Jan 72

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Account of Dec. 4 Meeting

Covering Memorandum

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Secret-Sensitive

Memorandum for: Chief of Staff, U.S.

Army

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

Chief of Naval Operations

Commandant of the Marine Corps

SUBJECT

Washington Special Action Group meeting on Indo/Pakistan hostilities; 4 December 1971

1. Attached for your information is a memorandum for record concerning subject meeting.

2. In view of the sensitivity of information in the N.S.C. system and the detailed nature of this memorandum, it is requested that access to it be limited to a strict need-to-know basis.

For the chairman, J.C.S.:

A. K. KNOIZEN

Captain, U.S. Navy

Executive assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff

Report on the Meeting

Secret Sensitive

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

5 DECEMBER 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT

Washington Special Action Group meeting on Indo-Pakistan hostilities; 4 December 1971.

1. The N.S.C. Washington Special Action Group met in the Situation Room, the White House, at 1100, Saturday, 4 December, to consider the Indo-Pakistan situation. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Kissinger.

2. Attendees

A. Principals:

Dr. Henry Kissinger

Dr. John Hannah, A.I.D.

Mr. Richard Helms, C.I.A.

Dr. G. Warren Nutter, Defense

Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, J.C.S.

Mr. Christopher Van Hollen, State

B. Others:

Mr. James Noyes, Defense

Mr. Armistead Selden, Defense

Rear Adm. Robert Welander, O.J.C.S.

Capt. Howard Kay, O.J.C.S.

Mr. Harold Saunders, N.S.C.

Col. Richard Kennedy, N.S.C.

Mr. Samuel Hoskanson, N.S.C.

Mr. Donald MacDonald, A.I.D.

Mr. Maurice Williams, A.I.D.

Mr. John Waller, C.I.A.

Mr. Samuel De Palma, State

Mr. Bruce Laingen, State

Mr. David Schneider, State

3. Summary. It was decided that the U.S. would request an immediate meeting of the Security Council. The U. S. resolution would be introduced in a speech by Ambassador Bush as soon as possible. The U.S.G.-U.N. approach would be tilted toward the Paks. Economic aid for Pakistan currently in effect will not be terminated. No requirements were levied on the J. C. S.


4. Mr. Helms opened the meeting by indicating that the Indians were currently engaged in a no holds barred attack of East Pakistan and that they had crossed the border on all sides this morning. While India had attacked eight Pak airfields there were still no indications of any ground attacks in the West. Although not decreeing a formal declaration of war, President Yahya has stated that "the final war with India is upon us," to which Mrs. Gandhi had responded that the Pak announcement of war constituted the ultimate folly. The Indians, however, had made it a point not to declare war. The Indian attacks have hit a major P.O.L. area in Karachi resulting in a major fire which will likely be blazing for a considerable length of time, thus providing a fine target for the India air force. Mr. Helms indicated that the Soviet assessment is that there is not much chance of a great power confrontation in the current crisis.

5. Dr. Kissinger remarked that if the Indians have announced a full scale invasion, this fact must be reflected in our U.N. statement.

6. Mr. Helms indicated that we do not know who started the current action, nor do we know why the Paks hit the four small airfields yesterday.

7. Dr. Kissinger requested that by Monday the C.I.A. prepare an account of who did what to whom and when.

8. Mr. De Palma suggested that if we



SECRET INDIA-PAKISTAN PAPERS, which Jack Anderson, the columnist, distributed in Washington yesterday. They are classified Secret-Sensitive.

refer to the India declaration in our discussion in the U.N., that we almost certainly will have to refer to remarks by Yahya.

9. Dr. Kissinger replied that he was under specific instructions from the President, and either someone in the bureaucracy would have to prepare this statement along the lines indicated or that it would be done in the White House.

10. Mr. Helms referred to the "no holds barred" remark in the official India statement and similar remarks that were being made from the Pak side.

11. Dr. Kissinger asked whether the Indians have stated anything to the effect that they were in an all-out war.

12. Mr. Helms said that the terminology was "no holds barred."

13. Dr. Kissinger asked what the Paks have said. Mr. Helms said the terminology was "final war with India." Dr. Kissinger suggested this was not an objectionable term. It did not seem outrageous to say that they (the Paks) were trying to defend themselves.

14. Dr. Kissinger then asked what was happening in the U.N., to which Mr. De Palma responded that the U.K., Belgium, Japan and possibly France were joining for a call for a Security Council meeting. The Japanese had detected some slight tilt in our letter requesting the meeting. The Japanese preferred a blander formulation. We have not, however, reacted to the Japanese.

15. Dr. Kissinger asked to see the letter and requested that it be promulgated in announcing our move in the U.N., to which Mr. De Palma responded affirmatively.

16. Dr. Kissinger stated that while he had no strong view on the letter, our position must be clearly stated in the announcement.

17. Dr. Kissinger stated he did not care how third parties might react, so long as Ambassador Bush understands what he should say.

18. Dr. Kissinger said that whoever was putting out background information relative to the current situation is provoking Presidential wrath. The President is under the "illusion" that he is giving instructions; not that he is merely being kept apprised of affairs as they progress. Dr. Kissinger said that this should be kept in mind.

19. Mr. De Palma indicated that he did not yet know whether the Security Council would be convened in the afternoon or evening (this date). However, the first statements at the meeting would likely be those by the Indians and Paks. He suggested that Ambassador Bush should be one of the first speakers immediately following the presentation by the two contesting nations. He felt that the impact of our statement would be clearer if it were made early. Dr. Kissinger voiced no objections.

20. Mr. De Palma asked whether we wanted to get others lined up with our resolution before we introduced it. This, however, would take time. Dr. Kissinger suggested rather than follow this course, we had better submit the resolution as quickly as possible, alone if necessary. According to Dr. Kissinger the only move left for us at the present time is to make clear our position relative to our greater strategy. Everyone knows how all this will come out and everyone knows that India will ultimately occupy East Pakistan. We must,

therefore, make clear our position, table our resolution. We want a resolution which will be introduced with a speech by Ambassador Bush. If others desire to come along with us, fine; but in any event we will table the resolution with a speech by Ambassador Bush.

21. Dr. Kissinger continued that it was important that we register our position. The exercise in the U.N. is likely to be an exercise in futility, inasmuch as the Soviets can be expected to veto. The U.N., itself, will in all probability do little to terminate the war. He summarized the foregoing by saying that he assumed that our resolution in the U.N. will be introduced by a speech and there will be no delay. We will go along in general terms with reference to political accommodation in East Pakistan but we will certainly not imply or suggest any specifics, such as the release of Mujib.

22. Dr. Kissinger asked how long the Indians could delay action in the Council. Mr. De Palma said they could make long speeches or question our purpose. Mr. Van Hollen said that they would draw out as long as possible which would allow them to concentrate on the situation in East Pakistan. Mr. De Palma said that they could shilly-shally for three or four days which, Mr. Helms stated would be long enough for them to occupy East Pakistan. Mr. De Palma stated that we could always try to force a vote. Dr. Kissinger reiterated that there was no chance in getting anything useful in the U.N.

23. Mr. De Palma suggested that in all likelihood one side or the other will veto.

24. Concerning the matter of economic aid, Dr. Kissinger stated that the President had directed that cutoff was to be directed at India only. He indicated, however, that he wanted to read the announcement to the President so that the latter would know exactly what he might be getting into. At this point Mr. Williams asked whether some mention should be made in the statement explaining why aid for Pakistan is not being cut off. Dr. Kissinger said that information would be kept for background only.

25. Mr. Williams said that the Department of Agriculture indicated that the price of vegetable oil was weakening in the United States; thus cutting off this P.L.-480 commodity to India could have repercussions on the domestic market. He asked, therefore, whether oil could be shipped in place of wheat. Dr. Kissinger said that he will have the answer to that by the opening of business Monday.

26. Dr. Kissinger then asked for a brief rundown on the military situation. Admiral Zumwalt responded that he thought the Paks could hold the line in East Pakistan for approximately one or two weeks before the logistics problems became overriding. He expected the Soviets to cement their position in India and to push for permanent usage of the naval base at Visag. He anticipated that the Soviet's immediate short range objective would be to gain military advantages through their current relationship with India.

27. Dr. Kissinger indicated that the next meeting will convene Monday morning (Dec. 6).

/S/ H. N. Kay
H. N. KAY

Colonel, U.S.N.

South Asia/M.A.P. Branch, J5
Extension 72400

Memo on Dec. 6 Meeting

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
6 December 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT

Washington Special Action Group,
meeting on Indo-Pakistan hostilities; 6
December 1971.

1. The N.S.C. Washington Special
Action Group met in the Situation
Room, the White House, at 1100, Mon-
day, 6 December, to consider the Indo-
Pakistan situation. The meeting was
chaired by Dr. Kissinger.

2. Attendees

A. Principals:

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Mr. David Packard, Defense
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, State
Gen. William Westmoreland, J.C.S.
Mr. Richard Helms, C.I.A.
Mr. Donald MacDonald, A.I.D.

B. Others:

Mr. Christopher Van Hollen, State
Mr. Samuel De Palma, State
Mr. Bruce Lanigen, State
Mr. Joseph Sisco, State
Mr. Armistead Selden, Defense
Mr. James Noyes, Defense
Mr. John Waller, C.I.A.
Mr. Samuel Hoskanson, N.S.C.
Col. Richard Kennedy, N.S.C.
Mr. Harold Saunders, N.S.C.
Rear Adm. Robert Welander, O.J.C.S.
Capt. Howard Kay, O.J.C.S.
Mr. Maurice Williams, A.I.D.

3. Summary. Discussion was devoted
to the massive problems facing Bangla-
desh as a nation. Dr. Kissinger indicat-
ed that the problem should be studied
now. The subject of possible military

aid to Pakistan is also to be examined,
but on a very close hold basis. The
matter of Indian redeployment from
East to West was considered as was
the legality of the current sea "block-
ade" by India.

4. Mr. Helms opened the meeting by
briefing the current situation. He stated
that the Indians had recognized Bangla-
desh and the Paks had broken diplo-
matic ties with India. Major fighting
continued in the East but India is en-
gaged in a holding action in the West.
Mr. Helms felt that the Indians will
attempt to force a decision in the East
within the next 10 days. The Indians
have almost total air superiority now
in the East where they can employ ap-
proximately a hundred of their aircraft
against Pak ground forces and logistic
areas. The Indians, however, have not
yet broken through on the ground in
East Pakistan. Major thrust of the Indian
effort in East Pakistan is in the north-
west corner of the province. The air-
field at Dacca is all but closed. The
Indians are registering only minor gains
in the Jessore area, but they claim to
have taken Kamalpur. In the West,
Indian activity is essentially limited to
air attacks. The Paks appear to be on
the offensive on the ground and have
launched air strikes in Punjab. Overall,
the Paks claim 61 Indian aircraft
destroyed; the Indians claim 47 Pak
planes. In naval action one Pak destroy-
er has been sunk by the Indians and
another claimed sunk [sic]. The In-
dians also claim the sinking of one Pak
submarine in eastern waters. Moscow
is increasingly vocal in its support of

Terms Used in Texts

A.I.D.—Agency for International De-
velopment
A.S.D. (I.S.A.)—Assistant Secretary of De-
fense, International Security Affairs.
C.I.A.—Central Intelligence Agency
C.I.C.S.—Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
D.A.S.D.: N.E.A.S.A. & P.P.N.S.C.A.—Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense, near
Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs;
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Policy Plans and National Security Coun-
cil Affairs.
Dep. Dir.: N.S.C.C. & P.P.N.S.C.A.—Deputy
Director, Policy Plans and National Secu-
rity Council Affairs.
I.S.A.—International Security Affairs
of Defense Department
J.C.S.—Joint Chiefs of Staff

L.O.C.—Line(s) of communication
N.E.A.—Near Eastern Affairs, Section
of State Department
N.E.S.A.—Near Eastern and South
Asian
N.S.C.—National Security Council
O.J.C.S.—Office of Joint Chiefs of
O.S.D. Files—Office of Secretary of Defense
Files
Paks—Pakistanis
P.D.A.S.D. (I.S.A.)—Principal Deputy As-
sistant Secretary of Defense, International
Security Affairs.
P.O.L.—petroleum, oil and lubricants
R & C Files—Records and Control Files.
P.L.—public law
Secdef—Secretary of Defense
U.S.G.—United States Government
W.S.A.G.—Washington Special Action
Group, arm of National Security
Council,
Staff

India and is not supporting any U.N. moves to halt the fighting. The Chinese press made this statement at a press conference in Peking on India this morning.

5. Dr. Kissinger then asked for a military assessment, questioning how long the Paks might be able to hold out in the East. General Westmoreland responded that it might be as much as three weeks.

6. Dr. Kissinger asked what is to be done with Bangladesh. Mr. Helms stated that for all practical purposes it is now an independent country, recognized by India.

7. Ambassador Johnson suggested that the Pak armed forces now in East Pakistan could be held hostage. General Westmoreland re-enforced this by noting there was no means of evacuating West Pak forces from the east wing, particularly in view of Indian naval superiority.

8. Dr. Kissinger stated that the next state of play will involve determining our attitude toward the state of Bangladesh.

9. Mr. Williams referred to the one and a half million urdu speaking (Bihari) people in East Pakistan who could also be held hostage.

10. Dr. Kissinger asked if there had already been some massacre of these people. Mr. Williams said that he certainly thinks there will be. Dr. Kissinger asked if we could do anything, to which Mr. Williams stated that perhaps an international humanitarian effort could be launched on their behalf. Dr. Kissinger asked whether we should be calling attention to the plight of these people now. Mr. Williams said that most of these people were, in fact, centered around the rail centers; that they are urban dwellers and that some efforts on their behalf might well be started through the U.N. Dr. Kissinger suggested that this be done quickly in order to prevent a bloodbath. Mr. Sisco stated that while the U.N. cannot do anything on the ground at this time, public attention could be focused on this situation through the General Assembly.

11. Mr. Williams referred to the 300,000 Bengalis in West Pakistan, and that they too were in some jeopardy. Mr. Sisco said that this humanitarian issue could be a very attractive one for the General Assembly and that we would begin to focus on Assembly action. Mr. MacDonald cited as a possible precedent the mass movement of population from North Vietnam in 1954.

12. Returning to the military picture, Mr. Williams stated that he felt that the primary thrust of the Indian Army would be to interdict Chittagong and cut off any supply capability still existing for the Paks in the East. He said that he felt that the major thrust of the Indian Army in the East would be to destroy the Pak regular forces. He felt that a major job would be to restore order within the East inasmuch as it will be faced with a massacre as great as any we have faced in the 20th century.

13. General Westmoreland suggested that the Indians would probably need three or four divisions to continue to work with the Mukti Bahini. The remainder could be pulled out to assist the Indian forces in the West.

14. Mr. Sisco opined that the Indians would pull out most of their troops once the Pak forces are disarmed, inasmuch as they have a very friendly population; thus, they will turn the military efforts over to the Mukti Bahini as quickly as possible. He felt that the extent and timing of Indian withdrawal from East Pakistan would depend to a large degree on developments in the West.

15. In response to a question, General Westmoreland stated that Indian transportation capabilities were limited from West to East, and that it would probably take at least a week to move one infantry division. It might take as much as a month to move all or most of the Indian forces from the East to the West.

16. Mr. Sisco said that the long term presence of Indian forces in Bangladesh would have to be addressed. Mr. Van Hollen remarked that should the Indian Army remain more than two or three weeks after the situation in East Pakistan is wrapped up they would, in fact, become a Hindu army of occupation in the eyes of the Bengalis.

17. Mr. Van Hollen raised the problem of the return of the refugees from India. Inasmuch as Bangladesh is predominantly Moslem, the return of 10 million refugees, most of whom are Hindu, would present another critical problem.

18. General Westmoreland suggested that the Indian position in the West was not unadvantageous. He briefly discussed the order of battle in West Pakistan and suggested that the Indians were in relatively good shape. He said that he expected the major Pak effort to be toward Kashmir and the Punjab. The Indians, he felt, will be striking toward Hyderabad so as to cut the main L.O.C. to Karachi. He did not think that the Indians necessarily plan to drive all the way to Karachi. He also suggested that the current Indian move in that direction could very well be diversionary in order to force the Paks to pull reserves back from the Kashmir area.

19. Mr. Packard asked about the P.O.L. supply situation for Pakistan. Mr. Helms said that at the present time it looked very bad. The overland L.O.C.'s from Iran, for example, were very tenuous.

20. Mr. Williams suggested that the reason for the Indian thrust to the south was essentially political. Inasmuch as the Indians do not want to fight on the border they will have to give ground in Kashmir. In order to ward off parliamentary criticism, Mrs. Gandhi may be going for some Pak real estate in the south.

21. Dr. Kissinger then asked about U.N. initiatives. Mr. Sisco said that we are now reviewing the situation with Ambassador Bush. Two Security Council resolutions have been vetoed by the Soviets. However, there is a groundswell building in New York for an emergency session by the General Assembly to be convened under the provisions of the "threat to peace" mechanism. The crisis could be moved into the Assembly through a simple majority vote.

22. Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Sisco agreed that any resolution introduced into the General Assembly must retain two key elements: Cease fire and withdrawal of

military forces. Dr. Kissinger agreed that our U.N. delegation has handled the situation extremely well to date. Mr. DePalma said he was not likely that the crisis will be introduced in the General Assembly, we must remember that there are 136 countries represented therein and we can expect all sorts of pressure to be generated. Mr. DePalma suggested that when the resolution is introduced in the Assembly there will be a new twist, i.e.: the Indians will be no longer terribly interested in political accommodation. By that time that issue will have ceased to be a problem.

23. Mr. DePalma said that a Council meeting was scheduled for 3:30 today and at that time we could try to get the Council to let go of the issue in order to transfer it to the Assembly, it being quite obvious that we are not going to get a cease-fire through the Security Council.

24. Dr. Kissinger asked if we could expect the General Assembly to get the issue by the end of the day, to which Mr. DePalma replied that hopefully this will be the case.

25. Dr. Kissinger said that we will go with essentially the same speech in the General Assembly as was made in the Security Council, but he would like something put in about refugees and the text of our resolution.

26. Dr. Kissinger also directed that henceforth we show a certain coolness to the Indians; the Indian Ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level.

27. Dr. Kissinger then asked about a legal position concerning the current Indian naval "blockade." Mr. Sisco stated that we have protested both incidents in which American ships have been involved. However, no formal proclamation apparently has been made in terms of a declaration of a war, that it is essentially still an undeclared war, with the Indians claiming power to exercise their rights of belligerency. State would however, prepare a paper on the legal aspects of the issue. Ambassador Johnson said that so far as he was concerned the Indians had no legal position to assert a blockade.

28. Dr. Kissinger asked that a draft protest be drawn up. If we considered it illegal, we will make a formal diplomatic protest. Mr. Sisco said that he would prepare such a protest.

29. Dr. Kissinger then asked whether we have the right to authorize Jordan or Saudi Arabia to transfer military equipment to Pakistan. Mr. Van Hollen stated the United States cannot permit a third country to transfer arms which we have provided them when we, ourselves, do not authorize sale direct to the ultimate recipient, such as Pakistan. As of last January we made a legislative decision not to sell to Pakistan. Mr. Sisco said that the Jordanians would be weakening their own position by such a transfer and would probably be grateful if we could get them off the hook. Mr. Sisco went on to say that as the Paks increasingly feel the heat we will be getting emergency requests from them.

30. Dr. Kissinger said that the President may want to honor those requests. The matter has not been brought to Presidential attention but it is quite

declined to let the Paks be defeated. Mr. Packard then said that we should look at what could be done. Mr. Sisco agreed that it should be done very quietly. Dr. Kissinger indicated he would like a paper by tomorrow (7 Dec.).

31. Mr. Sisco suggested that what we are really interested in are what supplies and equipment could be made available, and the modes of delivery of this equipment. He stated that from a political point of view our efforts would have to be directed at keeping the Indians from "extinguishing" West Pakistan.

32. Dr. Kissinger turned to the matter of aid and requested that henceforth letters of credit not be made irrevocable. Mr. Williams stated that we have suspended general economic aid, not formally committed, to India which reduces the level to \$10-million. He suggested that what we have done for Pakistan in the same category does not become contentious inasmuch as the Indians are now mobilizing all development aid for use in the war effort, whereas remaining aid for East Pakistan is essentially earmarked for fertilizer and humanitarian relief. A case can be made technically, politically and legally that there is a difference between the aid given India and that given to Pakistan.

33. Dr. Kissinger said to make sure that when talking about cutoff of aid for India to emphasize what is cut off and not on what is being continued.

34. Dr. Kissinger then asked about evacuation. Mr. Sisco said that the Dacca evacuation had been aborted.

35. Dr. Kissinger inquired about a possible famine in East Pakistan. Mr. Williams said that we will not have a massive problem at this time, but by next spring this will quite likely be the case. Dr. Kissinger asked whether we will be appealed to bail out Bangladesh. Mr. Williams said that the problem would not be terribly great if we could continue to funnel 140 tons of food a month through Chittagong, but at this time nothing is moving. He further suggested that Bangladesh will need all kinds of help in the future, to which Ambassador Johnson added that Bangladesh will be an "international basket case." Dr. Kissinger said, however, it will not necessarily be our basket case." Mr. Williams said there is going to be need of massive assistance and resettling of refugees, transfers of population and feeding the population. Dr. Kissinger suggested that we ought to start studying this problem right now.

36. Mr. Williams suggested that the Indians had consistently requested refugee aid in cash. The Indians in turn will provide the food and support for the refugees. This has provided India with a reservoir of foreign currency. Dr. Kissinger also asked that this problem be looked at by tomorrow to determine whether we could provide commodities in lieu of cash. We do not want to cut off humanitarian aid. We would like to provide material rather than cash.

37. The meeting was then adjourned.
/S/ H. N. KAY

H. N. KAY
CAPTAIN, U.S.N.
South Asia/M.A.P. Branch, J5
Extension 72400.

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House Committee Will Probe Classification of Documents

By Sanford J. Ungar
Washington Post Staff Writer
Rep. F. Edward Hebert (D-La.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, yesterday announced "a major inquiry into the problem of proper classification and handling of government information involving the national security."

He said it was "a coincidence" that the investigation would come on the heels of the release by syndicated columnist Jack Anderson of secret government documents concerning American policy in the Indo-Pakistani war.

Nonetheless, the disclosure of the top-secret Pentagon papers on the history of Vietnam war last summer, and now Anderson's release of current documents, appeared to have focused new concern throughout the government over the troubled security classification system.

Hebert assigned the new probe, which will begin shortly after Congress reconvenes Jan. 18, to a subcommittee headed by Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), a critic of the Pentagon and of administration policy in Vietnam.

In a telephone interview last night, Nedzi said that "it is not my intent to investigate the leak" of documents to Anderson.

"What we want to go into are the general problems of classification and security, how much is required and how it is handled and what kind of new legislation may be necessary," Nedzi said.

He acknowledged, however, that the Anderson documents, three of which appeared in full in The Washington Post yesterday, would "almost necessarily" come up during the probe.

Meanwhile, government investigators pressed their efforts to locate the source of Anderson's documents.

A report circulated yesterday among high-level administration sources that the investigation had already pinpointed offices in the Pentagon as the probable source of memoranda describing meetings of the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group.

Those sources stressed that the memoranda, prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and for G. Warren Nutter, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, had been circulated only within the Pentagon.

They said they were especially surprised by the leak of the memoranda, because it would be relatively easy to trace their limited distribution.

Other government officials, however, pointed their fingers elsewhere.

One White House official said he suspected that the State Department was the source of the security breach. "You know that place leaks like a sieve," he said, especially in instances that might make Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, look bad.

At the Pentagon, on the other hand, attention was diverted to the National Security Council.

The Justice Department continued to decline comment on the continuing FBI investigation.

Anderson continues his battle against government secrecy today, switching from the Indo-Pakistani war to secret White House documents used by President Nixon in preparation for meetings at San Clemente with Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato.

In a column distributed to 700 newspapers, including The Washington Post, Anderson discloses the contents of briefing papers prepared for the President.

Those papers, Anderson says, indicate that Sato has been dismayed with American policy in the Far East and is considering an independent Japanese approach to China.

Anderson quotes a cable from Armin Meyer, U. S. Ambassador to Japan, which said that "whereas heretofore anti-Americanism was pretty much special vehicle for opposition parties and Japan's tendentious press, developments of past few months have fostered seeds of doubt within normally American-oriented community."

Meyer also told Washington that the Japanese have the impression that the U. S. is being asked to maintain cold-war confrontation posture

while President's mission to Peking gives (the U.S. government) advantage of appearing to be more progressive and peace-minded."

In San Clemente, one Japanese diplomat in the Sato party told Washington Post reporter Stanley Karnow that it was "alarming" to learn the content of the secret American papers.

"I must pay my compliments to the White House," he added, however. "They understand Japanese attitudes very well." The diplomat said he was especially concerned by references in today's Anderson column to growing interest in Japan in a revision of the American-Japanese security treaty.

Assistant White House press secretary Gerald Warren continued to refuse comment on any of the disclosures in the Anderson columns, and Kissinger, who is in San Clemente with the President, refused to discuss them.

In response to a question about Kissinger's earlier comment to reporters that Anderson had taken comments about India and Pakistan "out of context," Warren said, "I am sure Dr. Kissinger stands by what he said. . . . The President is aware of the matter."

Anderson said Tuesday that he was releasing the full texts of the three documents to refute Kissinger's claim.

There was a run on Anderson's Washington office yesterday for copies of the secret documents which had appeared in The Washington Post.

By day's end, a member of his staff said, 18 news organizations had picked up copies of the three memoranda and another nine had asked that they be sent in the mail.

The New York Post, The Chicago Sun-Times, The San Francisco Chronicle and The Boston Globe all published the texts of the memoranda in yesterday's editions after they received them from the Los Angeles Times-Washington Post News Service.

The widespread appearance of the documents in newspapers throughout the country appeared to obviate the possibility of any action in court by the Justice Department, as in the case of the Pentagon papers.

The New York Times said it would publish the documents in today's editions.

Responding to Anderson's suggestion Tuesday that the secret documents and others in his possession could be made available to Congress as a basis for a debate of American policy toward India and Pakistan, a high-

ranking aide for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said, "I think that's fine."

Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman of the committee, was in the Caribbean on vacation and could not be reached for comment.

Fulbright staff aides directed attention, however, to a report issued by the Foreign Relations Committee on Dec. 16, which said, "The problem for Congress in the foreign affairs field . . . goes beyond reducing unnecessary classification."

The report added, "It involves finding a way for Congress to make certain that it receives the full information necessary for exercising its war and foreign policy powers, including information which most people would agree should be kept secret from potential enemies."

"It may also involve finding a way for Congress to share in determining what information is classified and thus kept secret from the American people."

That appeared to be the focus of the upcoming investigation by the House Armed Services Subcommittee. Nedzi said that it might not be "appropriate" to look into Kissinger's activities, but said the probe would focus on the way information is handled within the government.

"I don't know how any official has the right to deceive the public," Nedzi said. "He has the privilege to say 'no comment,' or that the subject is classified, but to misrepresent is wrong."

Hebert, announcing the investigation in New Orleans, said it appeared to be "open season" on all classified information in government.

He acknowledged that there is substantial overclassification, but expressed anger over what he called the "callous disregard" of security regulations by those with access to sensitive material.

Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska), who released much of the content of the Pentagon papers during a midnight, one-man subcommittee hearing June 29, praised Anderson for his columns on the Indo-Pakistani war.

"Again American citizens have been dependent on secret documents for knowledge of the true plans and actions of their government," Gravel said.

Sen. George S. McGovern (D-S.D.), a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination, said the Anderson documents "set forth a record of seeking by whatever subterfuge American economic and political aid to Pakistan, while blandly assuring the public of our neutrality."

Accurate Intelligence Reports Ignored In Pakistan War, Secret Notes Reveal

By SAUL FRIEDMAN
Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — As in the Vietnam war, American intelligence information before and during the India-Pakistan conflict generally was accurate, but apparently was ignored by White House policymakers.

This became evident in interviews with American officials, on the scene in India and Bangladesh, who referred to their secret messages to Washington.

The conclusion is supported by the minutes of secret strategy sessions here, which have been released in full by columnist Jack Anderson.

FURTHERMORE, Michigan Congressman Lucien Nedzi, Democratic chairman of an armed services subcommittee on intelligence, said: "My reviews so far suggest to me the biggest problem is the use, or the lack of use, the executive makes of intelligence."

In the Indo-Pakistan war, as on other occasions, Nedzi said, "One gets the impression that policy is made in the President's bedroom."

Nedzi explained that he meant that President Nixon is engaging in "one-man" policy-making, which does not take into account the opinions of the intelligence community and the state department.

American officials here and in India complained that during the Indo-Pakistan war, intelligence experts and experienced State Department personnel were removed from policy making. Among those excluded were consuls and even Kenneth Keating, the ambassador to India, they said.

AS A RESULT of the gap

between intelligence information and policy-making, the White House insisted on an anti-India, pro-Pakistan policy and ended up on the losing side, U.S. officials in Washington and overseas said.

The Pentagon study of the Vietnam war disclosed that the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence gatherers correctly assessed the strength of the Communists, the relative ineffectiveness of American bombing, and the weaknesses in the "domino theory" — the belief that if South Vietnam fell to the Communists, the rest of Southeast Asia would follow.

Similarly, American officials stationed as political observers and intelligence gatherers in India and East Pakistan are bitter that their information was ignored by the White House.

Consequently, they say, the White House underestimated:

- The effects of the Pakistani reign of terror in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) that resulted in a guerrilla war for independence and the Indian invasion.

- The determination of Indian prime Minister Indira Gandhi to aid Bangladesh and return to the new country the 10 million refugees who fled to India from the Pakistani terror.

- The improvement of the Indian armed forces since 1965, when they suffered defeat at the hands of American-equipped Pakistanis.

The officials maintain that the White House, paying closer attention to reports of the ambassador to Pakistan, misunderstood the role of the East Pakistan Awami

League. They say the White House failed to realize that the league, which bore the brunt of the terror campaign (its leader, Sheik Mujibur Rahman, was jailed) represented the moderate left, in opposition to Maoist Communists.

India, criticized by mainland China, primarily went to the aid of the Awami League, which meant that the U.S. inadvertently supported the more radical leftists in Bangladesh.

THE MINUTES of the Special Action Group meetings that were obtained by Anderson show that even in the early days of the 14-day war, the CIA and the Pentagon correctly predicted that the Indians would capture East Pakistan and recognize the Bangladesh government, but fight only a holding action on the borders of West Pakistan.

Nevertheless, national security adviser Henry Kissinger indicated that the President personally was making policy. The policy was apparently at odds with the intelligence.

State Department sources, apparently at the President's behest, continually voiced concern to reporters that India was bent on carrying the war into West Pakistan, when the intelligence officials were saying that front was "a holding action."

Kissinger told one meeting of the group:

"I am getting hell every half-hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise."