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[redacted]

2. (Confidential - JMM) Informed Ed Braswell, Chief Counsel, Senate Armed Services Committee, of the above, explaining that we were following well-established ground rules under which we would be of course prepared to brief Senator Symington himself, as a member of our oversight Committee, on the matters in question but could not discuss them with staff investigators of the Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Braswell said he thought our position was reasonable and clear and saw no need to alert Senator Stennis.

3. (Unclassified - JMM) On the Director's instructions, I met with Senator John Sherman Cooper, just returned from travel in the Middle East and Europe (Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Cairo, Athens, Vienna), and said we would like to have him visit the Agency for a lunch or breakfast and share his obversations with some of our specialists. He said he had little new to
25X6 contribute [redacted] but had several interesting conversations in Cairo and Athens and found grounds for cautious optimism regarding the SALT talks in Vienna. He accepted our invitation and said he would call me next week to arrange a breakfast visit.

Salt



with tallow. She glided to anchorage some 100 yards away. Volunteers on board fired 16 rounds in salute; they were answered by artillery in the Navy Yard. The spectators around the ship yard and on boats dotting the harbor erupted in loud cheering.

After the rejoicing of that early morning crowd in 1797, the *Constellation* had a long and noble career. She fought and defeated British and French men o' war, was instrumental in crushing the Barbary Pirates, and, in the 1840's, helped open China to Western trade. During the Civil War she protected Union interests by blockading against Confederate raiders. Then, even after the golden age of sailing ships had dimmed, she continued to serve her country in a high capacity when, on President Roosevelt's orders, she became the flagship of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet in World War II.

The *Constellation* was towed home to Baltimore in 1955, and this month she will be feted in honor of her one hundred and seventy-fifth year. These celebrations could not be possible were it not for the Constellation Restoration Committee. In fact, there would be no *Constellation* at all if the committee had not fought to save her—from the Navy itself.

In her last years with the Navy, the frigate decayed badly, and in 1953 Naval officials announced their intentions to scuttle her. Concerned Baltimore businessmen, who now make up the committee, initiated political action to save the *Constellation;* they brought her to Baltimore.

The committee, a private, nonprofit body, has labored throughout the ensuing 17 years to raise enough money to restore the ship. Close to $1.4 million has been gathered, but an additional $500,000 is needed to complete restoration—and further sums will be required for maintenance thereafter.

Earle Burger, an assistant director of the project, says that although no federal grants have been forthcoming, the committee receives matching grants from the city and the state. *Constellation* commemoration medals, struck about ten years ago from copper bolts withdrawn from the hull during early restoration, sell "very, very well" at $2 each. Requests for them are received from all over the world. But most of the funds come from visitors to the ship, who pay an admission charge of $1. Mr. Burger says that at one time a peak of 60,000 people a year paid to see the man-of-war, but because the temporary berth at Pier Two was a poor location, receipts dropped badly. He looks to an upswing in people visiting the frigate when she moves to her new home at Constellation Pier.

The 18th century ship which visitors see today is largely the result of restoration by Baltimore naval architect Leon D. Polland. Mr. Polland, who has been chief of construction and repair since work began in 1958, said recently, "The ship, when we got her, was what everyone calls a hulk, and I must admit they were close to the truth."

Mr. Polland, an average-sized man with short, gray hair and steel-rimmed glasses, stood on the top deck of the *Constellation.* "Nothing you see here—the spar deck, the bulwarks, the masts—existed as you see it when we received the ship. In addition to recent decay, naval modifications in 1853 had modernized her into a fast corvette. We are in the process of rebuilding her into a frigate."

A frigate, Mr. Polland explained, has two complete decks of guns. A corvette has only one. In the 1853 refitting, *Constellation* was "razeed," or cut down, and newer, heavier, guns were installed on the remaining deck. "During our restoration," he said, "we rebuilt the spar deck, which includes a forecastle and a quarter deck aft. Thus she again became a frigate."

Mr. Polland is guided in his work by David Steel's Dimensions, an extensive list drawn up in England in 1790. The original ship was almost certainly built to similar specifications.

"These figures are based on centuries of experience. You need dependable references and sources—no one can just build a frigate," he smiled. Other sources include drawings of sister ships such as *The Congress.* But great care must be taken to make every detail the right size. "The masts and spars, for instance, are all in a certain proportion to one another. Aside from the purely functional purpose, a shipbuilder invariably attempts to create something proportionally perfect for others to admire. He looks upon a well-proportioned ship as something akin to a beautiful woman."

The "beautiful woman" now berthed on Pratt Street has been the center of a raging controversy. Even though copper pins bearing the date 1797 and the name of the shipbuilder, David Stodder, have been discovered, some people have refused to believe that the *Constellation* is an 18th century ship.

"We guess around 25 per cent of the ship is original," stated Earle Burge in the frigate's defense. "That's quite a lot in a ship of *Constellation's* age. With wooden ships in salt water, the rate of replacement is quite high. Timber might be replaced every ten or 12 years—though wood in the lower decks and lower hull might last much longer."

Other details believed to have been on the ship since 1797 include the carved gangboards on the top deck, the hawser clamp for the old hemp anchor rope, iron hooks to hold the crew's hammocks, many of the "knees," or naturally curved beams connecting the sides of the ship to the decks, and the bilge pump. (There is a similar one on the *Constitution,* the only other U. S. ship of 1797 in existence.)

The bases of the *Constellation's* masts are girdled with iron hoops or bands of mid-19th century vintage.

"The wooldings—the word simply means *windings*—were originally rope," he explains. "Iron fastenings had not been invented when *Constellation* was built, and all rigging fittings consisted of rope instead of iron. Iron fittings were invented in the 1840's and forged in the shipyards. But the iron bands are so much stronger and so much more permanent than rope that I would hesitate to take them off." Precisely the same decision, he added, was reached by the caretakers of Boston's *Constitution* and the *H.M.S. Victory* in Portsmouth, England.

The iron hoops are the only iron to remain, however; the remaining fittings of the rest of the masts and of the spars have been recreated in the original rope. The latter iron fittings will be displayed below decks to show the development of naval architecture.

The topmasts and topgallants are the latest parts to be reconstructed. Mr. Polland's team of 12 craftsmen ("They do the work of 30 men—if we had sufficient money the job could have been completed in 12 months") should finish the renovation of *Constellation* by the end of this year.

Most of the carpentry has been carried out here, but materials have often come from far away. The upper sections of the masts came from Portland, Oregon; the ropes were made in New Bedford, Connecticut; and deadeyes, round wooden blocks used to tighten the shrouds, were carved in Portsmouth, England. Wherever possible, Mr. Polland prefers to "buy American" and to use products made in Baltimore. The cannons for the gun deck, for instance, are being cast in fiberglas by McClean Brothers of Baltimore. Mr. Polland explained that iron guns would be too costly to handle because of their great weight. (An 18-pounder cannon weighs 5,200 pounds.) McClean's cannons will look "just like the real thing," he says.

If people express disappointment that parts of the *Constellation* are "modern," it can be answered that Williamsburg is even less genuine. *Constellation* should be considered an authentic 18th century man-of-war, and repairs and replacements have been made only where necessary.

When *Constellation* has taken her place as one of the great tourist attractions of Baltimore's new Inner Harbor, she will look much as she did shortly after that September morning 175 years ago when the citizens of Baltimore came to cheer her at the start of her long career.

## THE SALT TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, last week the President signed the SALT Treaty and the interim agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the limitation of strategic arms. This vital step, approved by the Senate, was an important move toward the vital goal of reducing the risks of global conflict and destruction. The interim agreement lays the groundwork for what we all hope will be fruitful negotiations in the second round of the SALT talks directed toward a permanent treaty to end the deadly spiral of the arms race. For too long both of the great superpowers have devoted themselves to increasing their armaments and increasing the stakes in a worldwide balance of terror. Now we can begin to halt this perilous and wasteful process, and get on with the business of making our world safer, not more dangerous.

I believe that this interim agreement represents an important measure of progress toward the goal of a safer world. For the first time, both of the great nuclear powers have agreed to place some limits upon the scope of their awesome weaponry. Hopefully, the next round of negotiations will make some progress toward reducing the amount of destructive force that each nation has at its command. Arms reduction should be our ultimate goal; I am hopeful that this arms limitation agreement will be but the first step toward that vital end.

The President is to be commended for obtaining this agreement. The SALT negotiators worked long and hard to preserve U.S. security, and at the same time to provide significant and lasting limitations on strategic weapons. I believe that they drove an acceptable bargain in this round of talks. Had this interim agreement not adequately reflected the genuine security needs of the United States, I am confident that the President would never have approved it, and if I did not feel that way, I would not have voted to approve it. I believe that this interim agreement provides the United States with a subtantial margin of security, and that it can point the way for meaningful and fruitful negotiations in the next round of SALT talks.

I say this despite the long debate, and eventual approval of the Jackson amendment to the joint resolution approving the interim agreement. I do not believe that the United States got the worst part of the bargain at the SALT I talks. Nor

Mr. President, it is clear that FRED HARRIS has committed himself to bringing about needed change in many areas of our national life. He has served with distinction in this body, and I regret very much that he will not be once again taking his seat here when the 93d Congress convenes in January. However, I know that FRED and his wonderful wife LaDonna intend to remain in Washington, each continuing the fine work they have been involved in, and I think all Senators would agree with me when I say I am very glad that they will.

## RETIREMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES RAPER JONAS

Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina. Mr. President, this week House colleagues from both sides of the aisle and from States scattered throughout the Nation paid well-deserved tribute to an outstanding North Carolinian, Representative CHARLES RAPER JONAS, who is retiring after an illustrious 20-year career.

I am proud today to join in that salute and to bring to the attention of the Senate some of the reasons for that general acclaim.

One of the explanations, surely, is the fact that from the very start of his Capitol Hill career he established a reputation as a highly knowledgeable Member with a tremendous capacity for hard work and attention to detail.

He also demonstrated a strong sense of responsibility and integrity in both fiscal matters and questions of legislative principle.

Although he was just the second Republican Member of Congress to represent a North Carolina district in this century when elected in 1952, he has shown throughout his career a capacity for putting the needs of the State and country above purely partisan considerations.

Those qualities have earned him the respect and admiration of all who have known him and had the opportunity of either serving with him or observing the results of his work in the House.

The same attributes account for his assignment to the Appropriations Committee, a highly coveted position, early in his career and for the widening scope of his influence on the committee and in the House as a whole in the ensuing years.

The hallmark of his career and the trait for which he is best and most widely known has been his continuing battle against carelessness and waste in Government spending.

A colleague from another State said of him the other day that his contribution to the cause of good government is virtually immeasurable. If the taxpayers of the Nation knew how many millions of dollars CHARLIE's prudence had saved them, they would rise up to thank him with one resounding voice.

To that, those of us who have served with him in North Carolina's delegation for so long can say a fervent "amen" as well as "Godspeed."

## RETIREMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE ALTON A. LENNON

Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina. Mr. President, as the second session of the 92d Congress draws to a close, I think it appropriate to bring to the Senate's attention the fact that it marks the end of the congressional career of a distinguished North Carolinian whom some Senators will recall as a colleague in this body.

I speak in that regard of Hon. ALTON A. LENNON who is retiring after eight terms in the House as Representative from North Carolina's Seventh District.

He was elected to that seat after serving as a Member of this body by gubernatorial appointment in the early 1950's upon the death of Senator Willis Smith.

His work has been of a distinguished caliber reflecting great credit to himself and to his State during both phases of his Capitol Hill career.

While serving with distinction as a member of the House Armed Services Committee and the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, his most noteworthy House accomplishments have been in the area of marine resources research and development in his capacity as chairman of the Subcommittee on Oceanography.

He was signally honored recently by the National Oceanographic Association which presented him with its first Man of the Year award for the marine resources programs developed under his direction.

That was but one of the honors he has been accorded at various times during his career in which he has attained the respect not only of his own delegation but of the House as a whole for his legislative knowledge, for his close attention to issues affecting the interests of his State, and for his dedication to duty, and unflagging integrity.

North Carolina and the Nation have benefited greatly from his service and, as one privileged to work with him as a friend and colleague during most of his years in Washington, I am proud to bring his accomplishments to the attention of the Senate.

## THE 175TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE U.S. FRIGATE "CONSTELLATION"

Mr. BEALL. Mr. President, it is with great personal satisfaction that I report to you today on the success of the recent celebration in connection with the 175th anniversary of the launching of the U.S. frigate *Constellation*. This vessel is now permanently docked at Pier 1, in her home port of Baltimore.

Congress recently passed and President Nixon signed into law S. 2499. This legislation, which I sponsored, authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to strike up to 100,000 commemorative medals marking this anniversary. The design and specifications for these medals will soon be determined by the *Constellation* Committee and the Treasury Department. I believe that these medals will be an enduring and fitting tribute to this historic ship, the first ship of the U.S. Navy. The funds raised by the sale of these medals will substantially aid the untiring efforts of the *Constellation* Restoration Committee to return this 18th-century ship to its original condition, minus the structural changes necessitated by long years of service. Already, my office has received numerous inquiries regarding the purchase of these commemorative medals.

I wish to thank all Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives who supported this legislation, and to let them know that, by so doing, they shared in and contributed to the week-long dockside activities in honor of this vessel.

These festivities culminated Thursday, September 7, 1972. At this time I had the privilege of participating in a ceremony which served to remind all of us standing on the new *Constellation* Pier in Baltimore of our Nation's early struggles for freedom and liberty. We were pleased to have present the Soviet square rigger *Tovarish*, under the command of Captain Candenko, and a complement of Soviet cadets who were visiting Baltimore to honor the *Constellation*. We were especially pleased to have as our guest of honor Mrs. David Eisenhower. Mrs. Eisenhower graced not only these ceremonies, but the city of Baltimore and the State of Maryland as well, and I am happy to say that she was welcomed with warmth and enthusiasm. Both Senator MATHIAS and I were proud and honored to welcome these distinguished guests as they joined Baltimore in paying tribute to the *Constellation*.

During these ceremonies it was my pleasure to present to the *Constellation* Committee a framed copy of Senate bill 2499, a copy of the public law bearing the President's signature, and the pen used by the Chief Executive to sign this legislation into law.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article entitled "The *Constellation* at 175," published in the September issue of Baltimore magazine be printed in the RECORD. The article summarizes the current activities of the *Constellation* Committee and indicates future plans for this noble and aged vessel.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE "CONSTELLATION" AT 175

(By Christopher T. George)

One hundred and seventy-five years ago this month a large crowd gathered at a Fell's Point shipyard. They had come to see the 9 a.m. launch of the frigate *Constellation*, the second ship to be launched by the fledgling U.S. Navy and the first to put to sea. (The frigate *United States* had been launched several weeks before.)

To a succession of drum rolls, men removed wedges that held the ship above the dark waters of the Patapsco. The *Constellation* then slid slowly downward on ways greased

do I wish to commit our negotiators at the SALT II talks to any hard and fast formula for the next agreement, even before negotiations have begun. Nor do I wish to commit the Senate—which is constitutionally required to advise and consent to any treaty that may arise out of SALT II—to some formulation of policy which may not even be applicable for years to come. Yet that is one way in which the Jackson amendment might be construed.

Senator JACKSON'S amendment urges the President not to agree to any further agreement with the Soviets which "limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union," and specifically sets forth as the standard by which "inferiority" is to be judged, the numerical equality expressed in the recently ratified ABM treaty. The Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) stated repeatedly on the Senate floor that he did not believe that any agreement which did not provide for "equality" between the United States and the Soviet Union would be acceptable to him. Let me state, Mr. President, that I would heartily agree with Senator JACKSON on the point. We live in an extremely dangerous world, unfortunately, neither side of the global conflict has ever been able to bring itself to rely on the other side's professed good intentions. And so we have both built up these huge arsenals with which to deter the other side from launching any suicidal assault against the other. I believe that at a minimum, our deterrent capability should and does rest upon equality of forces with the Soviet Union. I believe that this has been—and should continue to be—the basis of our defense posture. I can see no greater risk in these times of high peril and uncertainty than creating or presenting a condition of strategic inequality; a condition which might prove a deadly temptation to the other side to attempt to gain some advantage from its own superiority.

So I believe in strategic equality. Without it I do not believe that we can maintain our own security; nor could we play our role in the maintenance of the security of our friends and allies in other parts of the world. And it is precisely because I believe in strategic equality that I opposed the Jackson amendment. Senator JACKSON suggests that the only equality that counted was the strict numerical parity of intercontinental land and undersea-based missiles, and strict parity of throweight on a megatonnage basis. This narrow definition of equality of strategic forces would actually make more difficult the negotiation of a further arms limitation and reduction agreement.

This narrow definition of "equality" simply makes no sense in terms of present-day defense realities. The United States presently enjoys greater than a 2-to-1 advantage over the Soviet Union in the number of targetable, deliverable nuclear warheads. In 5 years, we hold the same advantage, some 10,000 warheads to the Soviets' approximately 4,000 warheads. How can it be said then, that an agreement which does not exact as one of its terms strict numerical equality of missiles—of missiles, not targetable warheads—provides for strategic inferiority? Yet this is precisely how Senator JACKSON interprets his own amendment—that no matter how great our advantage in warheads, we must have numerical parity in intercontinental missiles, or we will be in an "inferior" position.

I cannot agree with this analysis, for our strategic strength is based upon our entire array of weapons systems deployed around the globe. Our national security is adequately protected not only by our intercontinental missiles, but by our sea-based Polaris force, and by our strategic bombing capability. In fact, any of these three forces is sufficient in and of itself to deliver the kind of destructive blow to any enemy that should deter that enemy from launching a first strike at the United States. Even under the most desperate type of circumstances, where a successful first strike could manage to destroy every last one of our land-based missiles, the nuclear destruction capable of being unleashed by our submarine-launched missiles and by our bombers would be sufficient to destroy any enemy many times over. And our submarine-based missile deterrent is as close to invulnerable as is possible. Our strategic bombers are in the air around the clock. Our security, in short, depends on no single element of our strategic forces. And thus, the level of strategic force which is necessary for us to deter any aggression against us need not be hinged upon any single element of weaponry.

Our superior technology has enabled us to develop weapons far more sophisticated than our adversaries. We do not need the same numbers of missiles to accomplish the same destructive results. Our MIRV warheads make possible the utilization of a single missile to produce far more destruction than our adversaries can produce with larger numbers of missiles. And our more compact warheads are equal in deadly force to the larger, heavier warheads of the Soviets.

Since we are some 2 years further advanced in the technology warhead delivery than are the Soviets, we have been able to amass an intercontinental strategic force which is far superior to the Soviets, and will continue to remain so.

Under these circumstances, there was no need for the Senate to pass the Jackson amendment. Indeed the language of the Jackson amendment might be termed meaningless—that is, in terms of strategic realities. However, it could have a most unfortunate effect. Through its insistence that we attain numerical parity with the Soviets in missiles, in addition to our overwhelming superiority in warhead technology, the Jackson amendment may have the effect of convincing the Soviets that we were not sincere in reaching an agreement to limit strategic arms. Indeed, given our great advantage in warhead technology, strict adherence to numerical equality in missiles—that is, delivery vehicles—might mislead the Soviet Union into fearing that we were preparing for a preemptive first strike capability. If this were to develop, I fear that the real incentive for the Soviets would be to step up development of their own MIRV technology, and to accelerate the momentum of their already burgeoning nuclear submarine fleet.

I am sure this was not the result intended by Senator JACKSON. But I fear that this might follow from such a construction of the Jackson amendment. Indeed, although spokesmen for the administration declared that the administration supported the Jackson amendment and the concept of "intercontinental strategic equality," the administration also made it clear that they did not support Senator JACKSON'S interpretations of his amendment. This rather confusing distinction, I must confess, made it more difficult to gather exactly what was the position of the administration. But the crucial factor is that it will be the Executive who will be negotiating the next round of strategic arms agreements, and not the Senate. We will have our chance to advise and consent to agreements presented to us. It seems to me that that is the time for debate and decision as to the proper shape of these agreements—not before they are signed, much less negotiated.

Mr. President, recognizing the need to move forward to SALT II, I voted to approve this interim agreement despite the unfortunate and, I believe, unwise tacking on of the Jackson amendment. I am prepared to exercise my judgment upon any finished agreement when the proper time comes. I shall do this with an eye on protecting the security of the United States. That cannot be negotiated away. I hope that my reservations about the deleterious effect of the Jackson amendment are unfounded, and that the Governments of the United States and of the Soviet Union can move on now toward concrete agreements which will serve the cause of peace, in our time, and for all the generations to come.

## ENCOURAGEMENT FOR BUSINESS ENTERPRISE

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, America must have a strong economy if we are to remain a strong Nation and if we are to solve the multitude of social problems today. The only way we will have a strong economy is to have a healthy climate for business and industry.

Yet today we find business under strong attack. We find a frightening lack of knowledge and understanding as to how our business enterprise system works, and how it must work to support the society we all want.

People who want a better life for everyone should seek to encourage business enterprise, not tear it down.

Mr. President, an excellent speech on this subject was delivered on August 3, 1972, by William P. Reilly, a civic leader and the chief executive officer of Arizona Public Service Co. The Arizona Legislative Review recently printed this speech which was delivered before the Business Political Committee of Arizona. I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ENCOURAGEMENT FOR BUSINESS ENTERPRISE

Fellow members of productive America:

You are highly complimented by being so addressed—all of us here represent the Productive America sector of our economy. And, we are bi-partisan which means active in both parties. This is a far cry from being non-partisan which means inactive in both parties.

Productive America carries the burden of responsibility for providing the means for successfully meeting the total needs of the people of America—and large portions of the world.

There is a difference between those who produce and consume—and those who consume without producing.

You are producers.

Let's look at where we are—

209 million people

70 million under 18—not in work force

22 million over 64—not in work force

7 million—sick, lame and lazy

So, half of our people are not part of our productive work force.

How about the other half—

First, let's divide them—men and women, about 52 million each.

When you deduct people in schools and colleges, members of the armed services, in prisons, the young anti-establishment people who roam the country—the noble women who stay home to take care of their families—we get down to a labor force of about 85 million, of which about 30 million are women—thus you have 85 million men and women taking care of the 209 million.

But, within the 85 million labor force are those who provide services financed by the gross national product of America's productive system.

These people include those who run our federal institutions, our state, county, municipal governments, our schools, etc., etc.—who are entirely dependent for their livelihoods on the fruits of the productive sector.

Then there are those who depend on the voluntary contributions supported by businesses taking care of local unmet needs—and the foundations financed by the wealth of the nation to study and condemn our systems—

And, there are the unemployed who, through no fault of their own, are between jobs.

There is talk about a 4-day work week, more recreation, more leisure time activities—and at the same time a need for 35 million more jobs by 1980.

The reality to be faced is—all but those 17 and under can vote—producer or non-producer, and the non producers outnumber the producers.

Productive America provides the means—and is virtually non-existent in policy roles—taxation without representation was never greater.

Did you see one business executive at the last convention—one representing a large taxpayer—or a larger employer? (Editor's Note: Reference is to the Democratic National Convention. Mr. Reilly's address was delivered prior to the Republican convention.)

Did we see one on the list of Arizona delegates?

Did you read the platform adopted?

Did it sicken you as a productive American?

Are we not somewhat responsible for this?

Does it not bother you that we are left out of decisions? That we are led instead of leading?

During the next few months we will be under a barrage of criticisms—

And when it comes will we run and hide—or will we redouble our efforts to educate people—our employees, our customers—

Will we work harder to support candidates who know and understand the benefits of a productive America—and vote to preserve its benefits?

Recently I heard the statement made in an address that "The Business of America is Business."

The theme of this talk attacked the system that has made this country what it is today.

The business and industrial sector of America was castigated—portraying them as elements that are out to reap the highest profit possible, with little or no regard for the consequences of their actions.

In so doing, the speaker joined the ranks of an ever-increasing chorus of people who have launched an assault on the reputation of America.

These people question many of our national institutions, including our economic system. They crusade for radical changes in our system of corporate ownership, changes so drastic that they would all but destroy free enterprise as we know it. Their beliefs, their purposes, their actions run contrary to the principles of the majority of our people. Deliberately or not, they are also weakening our free competitive system.

And they are having an impact that is frightening to behold.

In one survey conducted recently, students on campuses from coast to coast were asked whether they agreed with this proposition: "Business is overly concerned with profits and not with public responsibility."

Sixty-one per cent of all students said they agreed strongly and another 34 per cent agreed partially. Only five per cent disagreed.

It's pretty obvious that the image of business in the eyes of college students isn't what it ought to be.

If you were so inclined you could write that off on the basis that college students are a relatively small portion of the total population.

But, let's look at another survey—which asked a representative sample of the American public: "Just as a rough guess, what per cent profit on each dollar of sales do you think the average manufacturer makes, after taxes?"

The median public estimate of a manufacturer's after-tax profits was 28 per cent.

But the correct answer for that particular poll was 4 per cent—and that figure has not been as high as 6 per cent since 1950.

It's a little disconcerting to know that at a time when profit margins for American industry are close to the lowest in a quarter of a century, the American public's estimate of profit is at its highest.

And this fallacy about profit is not limited to one segment of our population. The misconception exists among every group surveyed: men and women, young and old, whites and blacks, manual workers and farmers, Republicans and Democrats, Americans with high incomes and low incomes, those with some college education and those with none, those who own stock and those who don't. All guessed wrong, and all by a very wide margin.

Disturbing? It is to me. And I'm sure it is to you.

Surprising? Not a bit. Especially when you consider that few, if any, teachers in our high schools and universities have ever had basic courses in economics—and few, if any, have been exposed to the working world as employees of Productive America.

I'm sure all of you in recent months have seen results of surveys that paint an equally bleak picture.

They paint a picture of more than 200 million people supported and sustained by a system that is an integral facet of their daily lives—but about which they know or understand very little.

From the halls of Congress to the campus lecture circuit and the TV talk-show, every type of platform is being used to convince the American public that private business is a sinister influence on our society. The words and the bias may differ from person to person, but the basic contentions are always the same—our products are shoddy . . . our advertising is deceptive . . . our prices are rigged . . . our profits are excessive . . . our plants are the major sources of pollution . . . and our economic and political power is enormous.

That's the picture some people would like to paint of America, and its business system.

But that's not my picture, and I'm sure it's not yours.

My picture of America, though, contains exactly the same words I referred to at the outset.

But when you put them in their proper position in a sentence structure, you get a much more accurate and positive view of this country and its business enterprises.

That's why I think: "The Business of Business is America."

That statement gives me a picture of a life support system for this country.

There are nine million or so individually owned businesses of every conceivable type that provide jobs and goods and services for all the people of America.

Corporations alone, which seem to be the form of business that is the favorite target, number more than one and a half million.

In addition to the direct payroll that these businesses and corporations provide, they are also the major source of revenue for taxation at nearly every level of government.

They, therefore, provide the foundation for additional millions of jobs at the federal, state and local level.

In addition to that, they provide much of the dollar support for ours schools, police and fire protection, construction of public facilities, roads, buildings and the sundry other governmental services.

And by far not the least, they provide much of the support for the defense of our country.

The reason that business is able to play such a major role in the support of life in this country today is because business is designed to operate at a profit—and share its profits with its owners, its shareholders, its employees, the various governmental taxing agencies, the volunteer service organizations and the preservation and defense of the nation. The sharing of its profits through dividends paid to investors underlie the integrity of our insurance policies life, health and liability, which give us such peace of mind. This is just one example of benefit to the American system of sharing in the country's productivity.

Let me give you an example of revenue sharing—by our company in one year—1971—

$37 million collected from our customers went into coffers of taxing agencies—

½ of our profits went to Uncle Sam—and he does not have one penny invested in our company but shares equally in our profits through his income tax portion—

When we needed a rate increase of $10 million—we had to ask for $20 million—½ to the company and ½ to Uncle Sam. This is inflation producing!

Each one of you is in the same boat—it will get worse instead of better—

Our first job, of course, is in Arizona—let's get with it.

What will you do about assuring that the Business of Business is Arizona and America.

## NEED FOR FEDERAL WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STANDARDS

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, when a worker is injured on the job today, his or her economic outlook is bleak. Dis-

quake, fire, wind and flood problems that lead to disasters, and will examine and develop means for preventing or controlling disasters. Particular attention will be given to disasters that may result from combined actions, such as, earthquake and fire, fire and wind, earthquake and tsunami flooding.

An important component of the program is the formation of a disaster information center which will serve as a library of pertinent publications on natural disasters, as a storage of general information, and as a data bank. This will serve as the main unifying element of the program. The disaster information service will also be a source of data and informtaion for others concerned with natural disasters. It should be especially helpful to government agencies, private organizations, and practicing engineers who are involved with problems of natural disasters.

Another important element of the program involves short-term interdisciplinary studies, of two to six weeks duration, during which a particular problem or event will be studied by a group of faculty, research fellows, students, and a much larger number of active participants who can contribute special knowledge, and who have special need to solve problems posed by natural disasters.

The basic objectives of the program are to determine why natural events lead to disasters and by what efficient means they can be controlled or prevented.

## CORRECTIONS OF THE RECORD

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I find, to my great dismay, that on yesterday, when I had spoken devoted and affectionate words in respect of my colleague, Senator COOPER, the RECORD, through a printing error, failed to show that I had spoken them, and by implication attributed them to another Senator.

I ask unanimous consent that the RECORD be corrected at the top of the third column on page S17408 by inserting my name before the words "This is a very personal matter to me."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The correction will be made.

## EDITORIAL COMMENTS ON SALT INTERIM AGREEMENT

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, since the passage of my amendment to the SALT interim agreement resolution, considerable editorial comment has come to my attention, some of it published during the Senate debate on the amendment. I am encouraged to note how much of the comment supports our effort to secure passage of the amendment and recognizes that our demand for equality in intercontinental strategic forces in any future strategic arms limitation agreement is in the best interests of a sound and prudent national security posture for the United States.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a representative selection of the editorial comment be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Columbus (Ga.) Ledger, Aug. 23, 1972]

SENATOR JACKSON IS RIGHT—EQUALITY IN MISSILE STRENGTH

There can be no sound argument advanced against the position Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) has taken on the October renewal of Strategic Arms Limitations Talks with the Soviet Union.

Sen. Jackson has offered a new preamble to the interim agreement ratified by the Senate as a result of the first round of SALT. Essentially, it urges the United States to seek equality with the Soviets in levels of intercontinental strategic forces during the October phase of negotiations.

Senators backing the Jackson guidelines are remarkable for their political diversity. Senators Barry Goldwater, Strom Thurmond and Gale McGee of strong views on defense have joined such senators as Robert Packwood, Lawton Chiles and David Gambrell, none of whom are particularly known as hard liners on defense matters. Sen. Jackson has, by what amounts to an individual crusade, found 30 co-sponsors for his resolution, a tribute to his ability to educate his fellow senators and draw support.

The Jackson measure says that we can't rely on the negotiators of the first round of SALT to produce a satisfactory deal on offensive weapons, an equal number of missiles, for each side, unless there is strong congressional opinion forcing them to do it. The deal which allows Russia numerical superiority in misslies and submarines is his target. Equality in numerical strength is his goal.

Welcome as the news of successful negotiations with Russia on this complex subject was to all Americans, there is rational opposition to the particular quotas of weaponry which are involved in possible agreements on offensive missiles and submarines. We believe Sen. Jackson is correct.

We believe equality is the minimum requirement for American security in any deal with Russia or any other major potential enemy. We prefer superiority but if equality is accompanied by improved and beneficial relations with potential enemies which makes them become potential friends, we support that much of a gamble because we believe the future of mankind and the world demands it.

We can't support agreements which would make us subject to potential blackmail if we allow ourselves to assume an inferior position to Russia or anyone else, however. Sen. Jackson has done well and he is correct. We believe he must achieve support of enough people to influence enough more of his fellow senators to get his guidelines made official.

[From the Greensburg (Pa.) Tribune-Review, Aug. 25, 1972]

ARMS INFERIORITY—SALT STACKED DECK AGAINST U.S. SECURITY

(By W. J. Griffith III)

For a man who prides himself on being an excellent poker player, President Nixon has managed to stack the deck against himself—and the security of the United States.

That's the basic assessment of Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., regarding the anti-ballistic missile treaty and the five-year nuclear weapons "moratorium" agreement which evolved from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Noting that the U.S. SALT negotiators themselves admitted the "moratorium" is unsatisfactory as a premanent solution, Jackson has proposed a resolution which would put the Senate on record opposing any more SALT agreements locking the United States into arms inferiority.

Jackson charges that the "moratorium" is onesided, limiting the United States to the present 42 nuclear submarines and 1,054 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles while permitting the Soviets to continue construction of both weapons systems until they have 62 nuclear subs and 1,618 land-based ICBMs stationed in permanent silos. The Washington senator adds that while Washing unilaterally renounced construction of mobile ICBMs, Moscow is free to build as many as it wants without violating the agreement, as Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird acknowledged.

Further, Dr. John S. Foster Jr., Pentagon chief of research and engineering, warned: "Although the United States has a lead in deployed technology that now offsets this imbalance, (in numbers), Soviet exploitation of their numbers and throw-weight capability could adversely effect the strategic balance."

Nevertheless, Laird contends that both sides gave up something in the disarmament negotiations. Laird says that "we are stopping our momentum in the ABM field. They are stopping their momentum in the offensive weapons area." Foster offered a different analysis in June-July hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Sen. Howard W. Cannon, D-Neb., asked Foster: "Is it not true that the Soviets will not have to exercise restraint in their momentum, that is, they will not have to curtail their current building rate of submarines for at least three years and perhaps more?" Foster: "Yes, sir; that is correct."

Cannon: "On the other hand, the United States has agreed to give up something this year, and that is work on three ABM sites at the Minuteman missile installations. In fact, we will actually be dismantling work already started at Malmstrom Air Force Base . . ." Foster's reply: "Yes, that is correct."

In the hearings, Jackson asked Gerard Smith, chief U.S. SALT negotiator, how much Soviet momentum in offensive nuclear weapons had been slowed by the "moratorium." Smith answered: "I do not think you can answer that . . . I do not think you can get a specific answer to that question."

Smith couldn't answer a number of other questions, as well, about what the United States agreed to in SALT. Jackson asked Smith what "under construction" meant in regard to submarine production. Smith's answer: "We do not have an agreed definition."

Further, the chief negotiator admitted that "we were not able to negotiate a definition of what constitutes a heavy missile." Yet the USSR is allowed 313 heavy missiles while the U.S. is permitted none.

The "moratorium" is vague on other matters, too. For example, Jackson asked: "Did you try to negotiate a throw-weight freeze?" (Throw-weight is the payload a missile can throw or carry.) Smith answered: "No, sir."

Jackson asked why there was no limit on diesel subs which carry nuclear missiles. Smith replied: "I don't consider a 700- or 400-mile SLBM (submarine launched ballistic missile) a modern missile."

Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, chief of Naval operations, stated, however, that "a 700-mile range missile could do catastrophic damage to a substantial portion of our people and cities whereas it could do very little damage to theirs."

When Jackson tried to find out what, exactly, the United States bargained away during the negotiations, Smith refused to answer, stating that "I would not like to identify publicly what our position was."

Jackson presented figures he said represented the American position on Aug. 4, 1970: The United States demanded parity on all long-range missiles but eventually settled for 1,710 while giving the Soviets 2,358. Originally the Nixon administration proposed 250 heavy missiles for both sides but finally agreed to build none while Moscow was granted 313.

U.S. SALT negotiators two years ago demanded a ban on all mobile land-based ICBMs. Washington announced in May it would build none but the Soviets can construct as many as they want.

Dr. William Van Cleve, a SALT adviser for the U.S. from 1969 to 1971, agrees with Jackson's assessment of what the Nixon ad-

ministration gave up. Van Cleve was the only person outside the government who was called upon to testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee in the June-July hearings.

"Those agreements," Van Cleve noted, "do not resemble those deemed acceptable in 1969 or 1970," which was nuclear equality. In fact they don't resemble what Laird thought was acceptable four months before they were signed. Last February, Laird warned that "if we were placed in an inferior position where the Soviet Union would have substantially more ballistic missile submarines than the United States had . . . this could have a tremendous effect upon the future course of the United States."

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[From the Greenburg (Pa.) Tribune-Review, Sept. 6, 1972]

ONLY ONE WINNER

Sen. Henry Jackson, D-Wash., has received a powerful assist from organized labor in their battle to prevent any more White House agreements, accepting American military inferiority.

The AFL-CIO executive council states: "American labor is firmly opposed to a treaty on offensive weapons that would limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union."

The Washington Democrat has jointly sponsored a bi-partisan Senate amendment to the five-year "moratorium" on offensive weapons which grew out of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. This agreement lays the groundwork for a treaty which would permanently freeze levels of nuclear arms.

Jackson has pointed out that the "moratorium" is basically unilateral. The Soviet Union is free to go on building up a tremendous edge in both nuclear missile submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles while the United States has agreed to maintain its present levels. Even if the Kremlin should honor the "moratorium," at the end of five years it would have three ICBMs and nuclear missile subs for every two of ours. The AFL-CIO warns: "If these disparities were made the basis for a follow-on treaty in this period of rapidly changing technology, the United States would be placed in a position of strategic inferiority."

Organized labor, in fact, is understating the danger. As Dr. John S. Foster Jr., director of Pentagon research, acknowledges, Soviet weapons technology could surpass that of the United States before the five-year period has expired, which would further endanger American security.

Up until recent years, the United States had always maintained nuclear superiority—a strategy that has prevented a major war between the free world and the Communist bloc. It is a policy that should not be abandoned, even for a short span.

In the arms race there is only one winner; the rest are losers.

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[From the New York Post, Sept. 12, 1972]

A CRITICAL HOUR

(By William F. Buckley, Jr.)

When on accepting the renomination of his party at Miami Beach a few weeks ago Richard Nixon said that he would never negotiate an arms limitation agreement from a position of inferiority, he ran a terrible risk. The risk was that someone would read out to him from the transcript of the various press conferences in Moscow in which Henry Kissinger gave out the details of the SALT Treaty.

I counted *seven* times that Mr. Kissinger defended relegation of the U.S. to inferiority on the grounds that after all we were talking not about an ideal situation but about the current situation. Mr. Kissinger's point was that the Soviet Union has been going hellbent for strategic armament for three years while we have been coasting, and that we are better off more or less freezing the situation than waking up a year or two from now to find the Soviet lead drastically lengthened.

In other words, we negotiated from inferiority.

The scandal of creeping American arms inferiority is easily the best kept secret in the world, notwithstanding that the facts are widely available and have been remarked by the Chiefs of Staff and by the Reader's Digest, who between them cover just about everybody. Fortunately, the facts are well known to a group of senators who are right this minute engaged in one of the toughest and most important parliamentary maneuvers of the decade.

They are fighting for what we call the Jackson-Scott-Allott amendment to the Interim Agreement. Now that amendment does several things. But mostly what it does is to address the President of the U.S. thusly:

Friend, when you come back to us in a couple of years with SALT II—the treaty that is supposed to incorporate a permanent lessening of the strategic potential of the Soviet Union and the United States—do not present this chamber with a document that grants the Soviet Union superiority.

As things now stand under SALT I, the Soviet Union has a 50 per cent advantage in launching sites and a 400 per cent advantage in payload, once they are done Mirving. Meanwhile, between now and the time you come back to us with the treaty, we in the Senate will from time to time question the Executive on what strides are being made to narrow the gap between the Soviet Union and the United States, within the terms of the current agreement. What kind of research are you doing, for instance? And when we say equality with the Soviet Union, we mean equality of the kind spelled out for instance in the ABM Treaty, not the fancy-talk equality by which such as Sen. Fulbright transmogrify a 4 to 1 disadvantage into equality, on the nice metaphysical principle that every Russian can only die once.

The doves, sensing a great danger to their vision of a disarmed America, are horrified to note that Sen. Jackson's got himself 44 cosponsors for his amendment. With 44 cosponsors, one can assume a great many others will vote with the 44 easily enough for a swollen majority. What will be left over is a highly visible minority who actually are voting against American equality in strategic arms, not the most attractive record to offer their constituents in an elction year.

The doves then fought back with a Mansfield amendment about playing fair under the rules of SALT I, but the Jackson people completely outwitted them by going for it 100 per cent (the vote was 85 to 1) on the grounds that the language of the proferred amendment was totally harmonious with that of the Jackson amendmnt—thus stripping it of any real meaning. The doves talk now about throwing out the Jackson amendment at a conference with the House (which did not come through with a complementary measure), but the Senate strategists don't particularly care. SALT II is projected as a treaty, and is subject therefore to ratification by the Senate. By two-thirds of the Senate.

Richard Nixon is actually encouraging the Senate realists. He desires them to tie down his hands, and why should he not? Richard Nixon is not the only American who knows what the Russians have been secretly up to in recent weeks and months in the field of arms research and development. Hubert Humphrey also knows about it. It is only the American people who don't know about it but, inevitably, will know about it soon. They can reasonably demand to know how their Senators voted on the Jackson amendment at that critical hour.

[From the Kansas City Times, Sept. 14, 1972]

AFOUL OF MISTRUST ON ARMS PACT

The Soviets are on weak grounds in objecting to the views of the Pentagon and of Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D–Wash.) on the arms control agreement signed in Moscow last May. A statement by Izvestia, the government newspaper, charges the U.S. secretary of defense, Melvin R. Laird, with violating the spirit of the Soviet-American pacts limiting strategic arsenals and thus jeopardizing the effectiveness of the agreements. Izvestia specifically accuses Laird of pressing for the development of U.S. offensive systems.

Laird is indeed working for that purpose. He is asking Congress for funds to finance accelerated development of the new, longer-range Trident underwater missile and the B–1 strategic bomber. The terms of the Moscow treaty on offensive weapons do not forbid such programs. In fact the pact asserts the right of both the U.S. and Russia to pursue weapons development during a 5-year interim period before a full-fledged agreement is reached.

Why, then, are the Russians complaining? It is a fair question, particularly since the 5-year freeze applies to *numbers* of offensive nuclear weapons. But it does not prevent the Russians from proceeding with their as yet untested version of the SS9 multiwarhead missile, believed capable of carrying three warheads, each with a punch of 5 million tons of TNT. The U.S. has no comparable weapon.

What the Soviets apparently want is for the U.S. to deny itself more advanced weapons, as permitted in the temporary treaty, while they move ahead to establish an advantage. In seeking an advantage they strengthen the skepticism of those Americans who are wary of accepting any arms control understanding with the Soviet Union.

Senator Jackson has warned that the interim agreement is subject to unilateral interpretations. The Soviet protest tends to bear out Jackson's point. He is therefore trying to attach a rider that would require future agreements to be based on the principle of equality of forces. His proposal would not alter the treaty in its present form. And it might facilitate Senate approval of the treaty—something that needs to be done promptly so that the two governments can proceed next month with further arms control negotiations. It is in this round of talks that any objections by Moscow can be properly dealt with.

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[From the Oregonian, Sept. 15, 1972]

TESTING THE RUSSIANS

The Senate's adoption of Sen. Henry M. Jackson's amendment requiring the United States to seek in a permanent treaty with the Soviet Union equality in "intercontinental strategic forces" is a proper action after a month-long debate which has produced a new awareness in Congress and the nation.

Once that hurdle was passed, after rejection of substitute amendments by Sen. J. W. Fulbright and other Foreign Relations Committee doves that would have weakened the directive to "over-all equality, parity and sufficiency," approval of the five-year interim agreement signed by President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev in Moscow May 26 was a foregone conclusion.

We see no danger and some benefit in the Jackson amendment holding the Russians' feet to the fire as a test of their sincerity in Phase II of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. If the Russians really want a stand-off permitting reduction in the insane arms race, rather than a threatening dominance in offensive power, this is the time to find out.

The principle of equality in defensive weapons was recognized in the treaty limiting deployment in both the United States and the Soviet Union of anti-ballistic mis-

siles, already ratified by the Senate. All that Sen. Jackson asked was that the U.S. negotiators be instructed to insist on equality in offensive weapons.

There are differences of opinion and in statistical reports on the relative missile power of the two nations at present, and the potential for each under the five-year interim agreement. Sen. Jackson has demonstrated, however, that the Soviet Union could build 62 nuclear submarines of the Polaris type under the interim agreement while the United States would be limited to 44. He has shown that the Russians could replace their obsolete SS–7 and SS–8 ICBMs with new submarine-launched missiles on a one-for-one basis, but the United States, which has already retired its Atlas and Titan I missiles, has no such trade-in privilege. He has said the Russians are developing new ICBMs which would increase their "throw weight" advantage without going beyond the 1,618 ICBMs permitted under the interim agreement.

Sen. Jackson may be overly impressed with the statistics of overkill, but his opponents were even less realistic in favoring what amounts to a U.S. policy of unilateral arms limitation based on faith in the Russians. The American negotiators of the next step in SALT are certainly aware of the statistics of offensive capabilities, of first-strike dangers and of second-strike limitations. It should strengthen the hands of the diplomats, however, that Congress has added its voice to that of the Nixon Administration in demanding treaty equality in offensive weapons. No less will be accepted by the American people.

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[From the New York Daily News, Sept. 16, 1972]

SALT MAKES THE GRADE

The five-year interim agreemnet between the U.S. and the USSR on limitation of strategic weaponry was approved Thursday by the Senate, but only after adoption of a common sense amendment put forward by Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.).

This proviso urges President Richard M. Nixon, in the next phase of SALT negotiations, not to settle for less than numerical equality in major arms with the Soviets.

American bargainers settled for less than parity in the present pact, conceding Moscow sizeable margins in land-based and undersea missile strength. Superior U.S. technology, particularly in multiple warheads, is supposed to make good the deficit in numbers.

But this nation would assume a foolish risk if it depended, as Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) contends it should, on maintaining its scientific edge indefinitely. Fulbright apparently has learned nothing from the quick Russian catch-ups in development of A-bombs, H-bombs and long-range missiles.

DEFENSE BUDGET

We're happy the Senate heeded the far more hardheaded and realistic Jackson in this case, and we hope the rider will survive the coming Senate-House conference on the SALT resolution. Favorable House action on the Defense budget indicates the lower chamber may be more than willing to go along. In okaying the $74.5 appropriation bill on Thursday, the House gave Mr. Nixon just about every cent he requested for development of the Trident submarine missile system and the new B–1 manned bomber.

Lack of those advanced weapons, as the President has stressed repeatedly, would greatly handicap our negotiators in trying to obtain a long-range treaty on arms ceilings.

The notion that new defense programs will offend the Communist enemy is absurd. Time and time again. the Kremlin has shown that it respects strength and determination, just as it despises and exploits weakness.

[From the Ogden, Utah, Standard-Examiner, Sept. 16, 1972]

SENATE OK'S SALT

The U.S.-Soviet agreement on strategic arms limitations (SALT) is a more realistic document as it leaves the Senate than it was when originally drafted at the Kremlin.

The agreement, as approved late Thursday by an 88–2 vote in the Senate, includes Sen. Henry M. Jackson's amendment requiring numerical equality in intercontinental weapons that carry nuclear warheads.

This, if accepted by the U.S. House of Representatives and authorities in the U.S.S.R., would modify the original pact that had taken into consideration the American superiority in multiple warheads.

Sen. Jackson argued, and we agree, that this U.S. advantage could easily be wiped out by Russian advances during these next five critical years.

The goal of SALT from the start has been to curtail the arms race in nuclear weapons—including both land and sea missiles and aircraft.

This objective can better be achieved under the Jackson amendment than in the treaty as signed in Moscow during President Nixon's historic visit to the Soviet Union. Once in force, SALT's agreement will be in the best interests of world peace.

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[From the Birmingham News, Sept. 16, 1972]

JACKSON'S FIRM STAND

A healthy skepticism regarding Soviet military intentions and determination on the part of Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Washington) has resulted in a sounder Soviet-American approach to slow the arms race.

The Senate approved the five-year pact which President Nixon brought home from the Moscow summit, but served notice that the temporary agreements, specifically regarding numbers of nuclear warheads, would not be acceptable to serve as a basis for a permanent treaty.

Approved overwhelmingly by a vote of 87 to two, the agreement for the first time set limits on the number of offensive missiles deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union at least for the next five years.

Sen. Jackson, from the beginning of the debates, worked long and hard for the amendment which demanded strict, numerical equality in missiles for the two countries.

Jackson's logic for numerical equality is sound. "The present U.S. advantage in strategic weapons technology, which now offsets Soviet numerical superiority," Jackson argued on the floor of the Senate, "cannot be assured in a long-term treaty. What would be a tolerable basis for an interim agreement, therefore, would be intolerable as the basis for (permanent) treaty."

Jackson also asked the Senate to join with him in calling upon the Soviet Union to "reverse its weapons build-up and content itself with equality with the United States in strategic offensive weapons."

The senators who opposed Jackson's amendment did so out of fear that instead of the Russians reducing number of nuclear submarines and missiles to the U.S. levels, the U.S. would accelerate its nuclear program to reach the same numbers the Russians project, and that this see-sawing back and forth would result in another uncontrollable arms race.

The doves also have bought the "doctrine of strategic sufficiency"; that is, the U.S. needs only sufficient missiles to assure the destruction of the Soviets in case of nuclear attack. Anything more, they argue, is foolishness and waste.

The problem with the "doctrine of sufficiency" is that more and more sophisticated defense technology can radically alter what is sufficient to knock out a potential enemy.

Jackson argued that Russia's numerical superiority in numbers of weapons would, in only a matter of time, be supported by a technology equal or even more advanced than that of the United States.

The amendment Jackson pushed and which was backed by the White House should present no insoluable problem for the Soviets, if their real intention is peace.

If their real intention is not peace, and they are simply seeking time to achieve an insurmountable superiority, it is best we discover it now.

Sen. Jackson has served his nation well in doggedly insisting that the administration, the Congress and the Soviets confront what could be a key issue in the pursuit of a new era of peace.

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[From the Daily Oklahoman, Sept. 17, 1972]

ARMS EQUALITY WITH RUSSIA

Sen. Henry Jackson's misgivings about Russian intentions in the strategic arms race are widely shared and altogether justified by the record.

While the Russians were spinning out the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) at Helsinki and Vienna, they were continuing to deploy land-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles until they had acquired their present advantage which is frozen into the interim agreement the United States Senate approved the other day.

But the persistent Jackson was successful in attaching to the agreement an administration-backed amendment which calls on President Nixon to seek equality in "levels of intercontinental strategic forces" in negotiations for a permanent treaty.

Jackson had observed that the interim treaty gave the Soviets "more of everything; more light ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), more heavy ICBMs, more submarine-launched missiles, more submarines, more payload, even more ABM (anti-ballistic missile) radars." He had said the Soviet advantage in offensive weapons covered by the interim agreement was "on the order of 50 per cent."

Opponents of his amendment—notably Chairman J. W. Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. Jacob K. Javits, R-N.Y., and Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo.—argued that this country's forward bases in Europe and its superiority in missile accuracy and multiple warhead technology gave it an overall adavntage.

It's true that the Russians haven't yet developed a MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle) capability. But they're working on it, and Sen. Jackson correctly points out that the U.S. advantage in this respect is temporary.

He has said that if the Russians "were to aggressively pursue a silo-killing MIRV program for their force of SS–9 type heavy missiles, they could, within the lifetime of the interim agreement, develop the capability to destroy virtually all of our land-based missile forces."

The interim agreement has a five-year life. Senate foes of the Jackson amendment argue that insistence on numerical equality with the Soviet Union would jeopardize the prospects for a permanent treaty on strategic arms limitation.

But to permit the Russians to widen their superiority would lessen their need for any kind of understanding. Worse still, it would lay this country open to nuclear blackmail five years from now.

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[From the Dallas Times-Herald, Sept. 17, 1972]

A VOTE FOR SECURITY

One rejoices that the Senate backed Henry Jackson in his call for U.S.-Soviet equality in number of missiles. Not that we are out of the woods, of course, in our effort to negotiate a satisfactory arms control treaty with the Russians.

But passage of the so-called Jackson Amendment was absolutely vital to U.S. security. Under the SALT agreement (which is not a treaty in final form), the United States over the next five years is permitted 1,054 land-based ICBM missiles and 710 underwater launchers; the Russians can have 1,618 ICBMs and 950 underwater launchers.

This is scarcely the kind of military inferiority which most Americans would like to see written into treaty form. Therefore, Jackson urged the Senate to demand in advance a treaty that provides numerical equality in intercontinental weaponry.

With the President's backing, Jackson last Thursday shepherded the amendment through the Senate. A conference committee could scrap the amendment. But Jackson says this doesn't matter. It is the Senate whose opinion counts, inasmuch as any future treaty will be submitted only to the Senate, not the House.

Predictably, Sen. Fulbright, the Ozark oracle, protested against the Jackson Amendment, basically because we have more nuclear warheads than the Russians, even if we have fewer missiles. Yet Donald G. Brennan of the Hudson Institute estimates that the Soviets have the capability of deploying "ten thousand or more MIRV (Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle) warheads on their allowed booster force within the lifetime of this agreement"—enough to "wipe out virtually all of our Minuteman force . . ."

Moreover, Jackson notes how "People and nations attach meaning to the relative strategic position of the two superpowers." It is not necessarily how strong we *are* that matters; it is how strong we *look*. That is what weighs with our allies no less than our enemies.

A good arms limitation treaty—one that does not create too many advantages for the Soviet Union—is going to be hard to negotiate. It will be immensely harder if the Soviets think us inclined to accept nuclear inferiority. They may think this of us anyway, but they are much less likely to now that the U.S. Senate has upheld Henry Jackson.

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[From the Augusta, (Ga.), Chronicle-Herald, Sept. 17, 1972]

WILL TO SURVIVE

The U.S. Senate's vote, 56 to 35, calling for quantitative equality for the United States in any future arms agreements with the Soviet Union, was a victory for practical men who desire intensely the survival of the United States in an age of flagrant Communist aggression.

The overall interim agreement on arms, approved 87–2, is not affected by the controversial amendment. The effect of approval is to ratify the freeze President Nixon negotiated a few months ago in Moscow. This interim agreement, to last only five years, permits a marked lead for Russia in the number of missiles and submarines, by approving the number now completed or under construction.

The disparity in numbers that will result lies in the phrase, "or under construction." It means that the United States stands still, while Russia goes ahead with what are being built, the final approved figures being 1,618 intercontinental missiles for Russia as contrasted to only 1,054 for the U.S.; and with 62 Russian nuclear submarines, equipped with 950 missile launchers, in contrast to the United States' 44 submarines and 710 launchers.

The numerical-equality amendment which has just won 56–35 Senate approval was opposed by Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) and others who have objected to stronger U.S. defenses. Their claim was that since we have superior technology, the capabilities of our missiles and submarines are equal to the far greater numbers which the interim agreement authorizes for the Communists.

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), whose support for the numerical-equality amendment won White House support, replies that the U.S. technological advantage is temporary. In five years' time, he points out, a continuation of the numerical advantage for Russia can mean an advantage in first-strike effectiveness which would threaten the security—indeed the very existence—of America. Thus, he argues, the only safe policy is to set up now a policy of future parity in numbers of strategic weapons.

With all due acknowledgement of the idealistic dedication to absolute equality by Senator Fulbright and others who follow his lead, we must conclude that Senator Jackson's concern seems more than justified. The security of the United States is too urgent an issue for our government to indulge in armament guessing games that might prove to be wrong. We must remember that Russia has not agreed to any inspection system, nor does it show any indication of doing so. And we may doubt the permanence of satellite reconnaissance ability to keep tabs.

Agreements on arms limitations with Communist powers committed to our destruction are a hazardous matter at best. The least we can do is what a substantial majority of the Senate vote demanded—give away nothing to aggressor states in the way of military advantage.

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[From the Pittsburgh (Pa.) Press, Sept. 17, 1972]

SENATE SERVES NOTICE

After more than a month of heavy debate, the U.S. Senate has approved a five-year missile-limitation agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States—with the Jackson "rider" included.

The Jackson rider was what the long debate was all about.

In the end, Sen. Henry M. Jackson of Washington succeeded in persuading the Senate to his resolution. It merely says it is the opinion of the Senate that in future arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, the United States should not consent to any arrangement which leaves this country with inferior numbers of offensive strategic weapons.

The five-year, or interim, agreement was reached by President Nixon and Soviet leaders on Mr. Nixon's trip to Moscow last May. Its chief purpose, apparently, is to hold the line on weapons developments until a new round on negotiations on arms limitations can get under way.

Both Senate and House now have approved this five-year agreement, but the House resolution does not include the Jackson rider. In the compromise between the two houses the rider may get dumped.

But, as Sen. Jackson says, no matter.

It is the Senate which acts on treaties, and the 56–35 vote by which the Senate adopted the Jackson rider serves notice on both Soviet and U.S. negotiators that the Senate is not apt to okay a treaty which could leave the United States in an inferior position.

In short, the Senate announces that the seeming advantages which Mr. Nixon granted the Soviet Union in an effort to get more arms-control negotiations under way is not to be taken as a precedent on which to base future treaties. And that is a useful service.

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[From the Tucson (Ariz.) Daily Citizen, Sept. 18, 1972]

NUCLEAR TREATIES OPEN NEW ERA

Following more than a month's debate, the U.S. Senate has ratified the second of two arms control treaties signed by President Nixon during his visit to the Soviet Union. This one places limitations on each country's offensive strategic weapons.

More than a month ago, the Senate gave approval to the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. This pact—of unlimited duration—restricts each nation to two defensive ABM systems, one "centered in the party's national capital," and the other elsewhere.

Verification of each party's compliance will be "through national technical means," that is, spy satellites.

Senate ratification of the second treaty, an interim agreement on offensive weapons, was delayed as a result of a proposal by Sen. Henry M. Jackson, which was finally adopted.

Sen. Jackson wanted the Senate to go on record as reserving to the United States the right to scrap the agreement if future Soviet actions threaten to wipe out a major part of our deterrent force.

According to Sen. Jackson, a sound critic of strategic arms limitation accords, the interim agreement gives the Soviets an advantage in offensive weapons "on the order of 50 per cent," based on the highly complex rules of nuclear arithmetic.

Under the interim accord, which is to last five years, the Soviets are allowed a numerical superiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles and missile-launching sites.

Although many military experts regard the United States as having a big lead in what is described as multiple-warhead technology, Sen. Jackson does not want any treaty which "would limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union."

The House of Representatives earlier had approved the second treaty, without provisions contained in the Jackson amendment. Now it goes to a House-Senate conference.

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[From the Denver Post, Sept. 18, 1972]

A STEP TOWARD DISARMAMENT

The Senate's approval of a five-year U.S.-Soviet interim agreement setting limits on offensive nuclear weapons is an overdue, but welcome, action.

It now remains for a Senate-House conference committee to work out the differences which include a Senate amendment calling for parity on strategic arms.

The White House had expressed concern that further delays in approving the interim agreement—carefully worked out earlier this year by President Nixon and Soviet leaders in historic strategic arms limitation talks (SALT)—could impede other U.S.-Soviet accords.

The Senate gave overwhelming support to the first part of the SALT agreements by ratifying on Aug. 3 a treaty setting limits on defensive missile units. Since then the Senate had been debating the arms parity amendment principally by Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash.

The Nixon administration would have preferred no amendments, but went along with a revised version of the Jackson amendment deemed more conciliatory to the Russians.

Under the circumstances, this was a sound move for the administration to make. The Jackson amendment should help calm fears that the Soviet Union will gain a strategic advantage through the SALT accords.

It remains to be seen whether the amendment approved by the Senate will survive the conference committee deliberations.

But it is really an academic question because the interim agreement on offensive nuclear arms, which requires approval by both houses of Congress, is intended to be succeeded by a treaty which only the Senate can ratify. The potential treaty, therefore, will not be a matter for House action, and the administration and the Senate have now made clear where they stand on the issue.

Only experience gained during the next five years can determine what shape such a treaty will take—or even if there will be a treaty.

More permanent limitations on strategic arms will be considered during the SALT 2

discussions, which are expected to get under way in Geneva during the fall.

Final approval of the interim agreement by both houses of Congress ought to help launch SALT 2 in the right channel.

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[From the Detroit News, Sept. 18, 1972]

IN NUCLEAR ARMS PACT—PARITY IS U.S. GOAL

Senate approval of the U.S.-USSR agreement to limit offensive nuclear weapons assures congressional adoption of the five-year pact. But it does not halt the arms race or the Soviet Union's efforts to achieve superiority over this country.

In fact, the interim agreement assures the Soviet Union a lead in some weapons. It freezes intercontinental ballistics missiles to those deployed or under construction, an estimated 1,618 for the USSR and 1,054 for the United States; limits the Soviet submarine force to 62 with 950 missile launchers, and restricts the U.S. underwater fleet to 44 submarines and 710 launchers.

Most of the debate in the Senate came over an amendment by Senator Henry Jackson, Washington Democrat, which finally was adopted. It calls upon the President to seek a future treaty on offensive nuclear weapons that "would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union."

In negotiating the agreement, U.S. officials had accepted the higher figures for the Soviet Union on the grounds that the United States is ahead in multiple warheads (MIRV's) for each missile, U.S. submarines have forward bases which improve their relative efficiency and the United States has a numerical superiority in bombers, carriers and fighter-bombers based in Europe and the Far East and not subject to the new treaty.

However, Robert W. Bowie, director of the Harvard Center for International Affairs, has pointed out that while the agreement achieves a rough parity between the USSR and the United States at present, that status is "not likely to endure." He said that within three to five years, the Soviets can be expected to perfect their own MIRV's and then could take advantage of their much larger and more numerous launchers. In addition, new Soviet subs with longer radius would reduce the advantage of U.S. bases.

"In short, the existing parity is likely to be eroded as the Soviets catch up in technology in view of their 50 percent or greater edge in launchers," he wrote recently. "For the interim needed to negotiate a permanent treaty these are satisfactory risks but this would not be a satisfactory basis for a permanent treaty."

Even if the present U.S. deterrents were sufficient to avoid war with the USSR, nobody knows what kind of political leverage and blackmail the USSR might impose on other nations if it achieved superiority over the United States. So what Jackson really was asking for, and the Senate adopted, was a statement of warning to the then president to maintain parity when the permanent U.S.-USSR pact comes up for negotiation and adoption.

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[From the McKeesport (Pa.) News, Sept. 18, 1972]

EXPECTED ACTION

Senate approval of the U.S.-Soviet interim agreement on offensive arms limitations was a foregone conclusion following earlier approval of a defensive missiles pact.

It is elementary that one treaty alone is worthless, for to curb defensive weapons solely without a similar limitation on offensive missiles would set off a staggering arms race and invite a first strike.

Approval of the five-year offensive agreement freezes ICBMs to those deployed or under construction, an estimated 1,618 for the Soviet Union and 1,054 for the United States. The pact also limits Russia to 62 submarines and 950 submarine missile launchers, and the United States to 44 submarines and 710 launchers.

It was the numerical edge given the Soviets that caused a delay in approval by the Senate by a 88-2 vote. The House had approved the agreement earlier. The Senate dispute was resolved by adopting an amendment calling for equality in long-range weapons in any future agreement.

The treaty had been viewed with some apprehension by some lawmakers, notably Sen. Henry Jackson who is noted for his deep concern over U.S. defenses. This group read into the terms a decided advantage for Russia. Such an interpretation understandably breeds misgivings. Other lawmakers saw the U.S. with a decided superiority in missile accuracy and multiple warhead technology.

Apparently the White House has no serious objections to the amendment since a spokesman says that President Nixon "obviously was very pleased" with approval of the agreement.

Jackson, author of the amendment, voiced unconcern whether or not the "equality" amendment would survive a Senate-House conference since what is involved is a future treaty upon which the Senate alone will act.

There is reason to regard Jackson's reservations about the interim pact as a contribution to a rational defense posture. And his amendment puts the Soviets on notice that when the next round of strategic arms negotiations gets under way that American Senators, who have the final say, will be keeping a close eye on developments.

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[From the Kansas City Star, Sept. 20, 1972]

POSTSCRIPT TO THE MOSCOW PACT

Superiority or inferiority, no. Equality, yes. That, greatly simplified, was the majority position of the U.S. Senate when it came to approving the offensive arms agreement signed by President Nixon in Moscow last May 26.

The handling of this pact in Congress was unusual for two reasons. First, President Nixon is not required by law or the Constitution to obtain the sanction of Congress for an executive agreement such as the one covering offensive weapons. Second, the controversial amendment by Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) calling for equal strategic strength has no direct bearing on the 5-year accord with Russia. Instead it is intended as a guide to the kind of permanent arms control understanding that the U.S. will work for in the coming SALT II negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The Senate line-up for and against Jackson's proposal in general followed the pattern of voting on Senator McGovern's recent attempt to cut the military spending bill by $4 billion. The Democratic nominee lost that one by a margin of 59 to 33. The vote on Jackson's amendment was 56 to 35. Whereupon the Senate approved by 87 to 2 the actual 5-year arms agreement whose terms were not changed by the Jackson amendment.

Thus the group of liberal Democratic senators who embrace what has been called "the Proxmire philosophy" on defense spending continues to be thwarted. There are enough Republicans and Southern Democrats in Congress to knock down any move that smacks of 1-way disarmament. The majority, by approving funds for the advanced Trident submarine and the B-1 bomber to replace the overage B-52, has said that the improvement of weapons systems, as permitted by the temporary Moscow pact, is still necessary.

That position was the essence of the Jackson amendment in so far as any early meaning it may have. By not forfeiting strategic strength now, the U.S. will have much greater bargaining power at the next round of SALT. But the results of SALT I are now certain of final ratification by both houses of Congress. Thus a limited measure of progress on international arms control has been chalked up with the way open to further and more comprehensive agreement.

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## HEARINGS ON LIFE-THREATENING MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I am pleased to read on page S17281 of the RECORD of October 10 that the chairman of the Health Subcommittee, the senior Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), expects to hold hearings early next year on the subject of life-threatening medical experiments. I have urged such hearings for almost 2 years, in part because of totally unsubstantiated statements and charges made by Senate staff members and the press relating to a total body radiation project carried on at the University of Cincinnati Medical College. These statements have been damaging to professional men of the highest caliber, to a fine institution, and possibly to some of the patients involved. My prior statements on this question are set out on pages S21665–S21668, December 15, 1971; S40–S46, January 19, 1972; S12381–S12384, August 1, 1972; S16561–S16562, October 2, 1972, of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

It is therefore more in sorrow than in anger that I note another totally erroneous statement of the Senator from Massachusetts reported on page S17281 to the effect that the Cincinnati project made patient care secondary to experimentation. The project was thoroughly reviewed and given a complete vindication against such charges by a comprehensive peer review of the American College of Radiology, a report of which is set out on page S40 of the RECORD of January 19, 1972.

In view of this, I believe that the hearing planned should now also undertake an investigation of irresponsible, inaccurate, and preconceived staff actions and statements of Senate committee and staff employees.

## BOMBING OF HANOI

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, news reports over the past 24 hours strongly suggest that American bombs are responsible for the damage to the French and Algerian legations in Hanoi, and the personal injury and the loss of life that has apparently occurred.

Just 2 weeks ago, on September 28, the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, which I serve as chairman, held a hearing on the impact on civilians of the air war over North Vietnam. In both open and closed sessions, administration witneses assured us again and again—but without much proof—that what officials call "collateral damage" was minimal and that every precaution is taken to avoid air strikes over civilian and nonmilitary areas. In this connection, Hanoi and other cities in North Vietnam were singled out by the witnesses. Maj. Gen. John W. Pauly, Vice Director for Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had this to say about Hanoi in the closed session:

Hanoi city area has been relatively untargeted. The only things that have been

targeted at all are those that are in the fringe at 4 or 5 miles out from town that I have mentioned. These are the war-making facilities.

The only exception to this are the two bridges I mentioned that were taken out with LGB's. We have verified that there was no collateral damage. When we have a sensitive siuation, we will be looking specifically for collateral damage. Those were taken out clean and the downtown Hanoi area, as we will mention later, has relatively no damage. The only collateral damage that we have been able to identify in the specifics that have been provided (by the subcommittee) have been tied in the immediate vicinity of a strike against nearby military targets in which a stray bomb had gone off or where the strike force had, in fact, for various reasons, missed their target.

And so, Mr. President, there is "collateral damage" in Hanoi—and, based on testimony before the subcommittee, a great deal more, including several disastrous mistakes, in Haiphong, and Nam Dinh, and other cities and towns in North Vietnam.

In this connection, let me say that the much emphasized smart bombs are hardly used. The Defense Department informed me yesterday, in response to questions raised in the hearing, that:

The percentage of smart bombs dropped in North Vietnam since the current campaign began in May is 1.77 percent.

The growing collateral damage in North Vietnam raises troubling questions about the purposes of the President's air war over North Vietnam, and about the rules of engagement covering the bombing and shelling over all of Indochina.

Our country is apparently responsible for another disastrous mistake. For most Americans today the whole war is a mistake—and each day that this carnage is allowed to go on simply compounds that mistake.

## DEATH OF FORMER SENATOR BUSH

Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, upon the death of former Senator Prescott S. Bush, many newspapers throughout the State of Connecticut expressed the deep respect which all of us in the State have long felt for this fine man. I ask unanimous consent that nine of the editorials which have appeared over the last several days be included in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Greenwich (Conn.) Time]

EDITORIAL

Prescott S. Bush died Sunday at the age of 77. Thus ended a life remarkable for its many contributions to society and mankind.

Mr. Bush epitomized the characteristics associated with the idealized version of the public official candor, integrity, consistency, dedication. And another, which perhaps many of his constituents weren't as aware of—deep, human compassion and an unshakable sense of justice. In the rough and tumble arena of politics, the humanitarian persuasions of Pres Bush weren't as widely known. A deeply religious man, it could be said of him he was one of the rare ones who tried to carry through the precepts of his religion into his everyday life.

To list the accomplishments of this neighbor of ours can be done if you have sufficient space to catalogue a staggering array of achievements in many, many diverse fields. To him, the pinnacle of his career was the U.S. Senate, which he loved and served so well. In Greenwich, we also insist on placing high on the record the 15 years that Pres Bush served as Moderator of the Representative Town Meeting, a towering presence of firmness and fairness as he presided over the sometimes turbulent sessions. His dignity, authority, grace and—praise be, a good sense of humor—had a lot to do with the shaping of this community during those important years.

Pres Bush, as everyone knows, got his political indoctrination by heading Republican fund-raising efforts in the state. When he was persuaded to try for state office he was still not very well known.

He made his first run in 1950 but was defeated by Bill Benton by a slim majority of 1,000 votes. He liked his first taste of big league politics, good naturedly listened to the advice and ribbing of friends who felt they had to guide him into the "realities" of politics and bridge the gap between "the people" and the patrician world in which Bush moved. These friends quickly found out that Pres Bush was inately a good "people" man because he too began to enjoy his expanded association with various types and groups he probably never would have been exposed to had he not plunged into the political picture.

He once told a friend visiting him in his Senate office: "I've been very fortunate in my life and I've enjoyed it. But I love this United States Senate job more than anything I've done. It gives me a chance to try to be of real service to the people of the state and my country. But most of all, it's taken me out of the routine so familiar to all of us in Greenwich and I have been enriched by meeting and getting to know some wonderful people all over this state—ethnic groups, upstate farmers, Portuguese fishermen—you name it, we've got it in Connecticut.

This was a dimension of Pres Bush that not everyone got to know, for his general demeanor was dignified and restrained. Some, in the way folks tend to stereotype people in the public eye, even though he was stand-offish and aloof. No point to quarrel now—how could they know, as did those close to him, what a warm and vivacious man he could be. A fine singer (former Whiffenpoof) witty parodist, quick to appreciate a good line or anecdote, a man with a twinkle in his eye.

Friend and golfing associate of the late President Eisenhower, Pres Bush moved in the top echelons of power politically, socially and in the business world. His manner and attitude were the same in any milieu. He operated with the graceful ease of a man whose upbringing and career were almost of story-book nature: Yale, baseball at Yale, Whiffenpoofs, national senior golf champion in 1951, tennis player, swimmer, World War I captain, partner in Brown Brothers Harriman & Co., prominent civil leader, club man, successful party fund-raiser, head of a fine family. If such a shiny life should tempt a man to self-complacency, it didn't have that effect on Pres Bush. He plunged into the political arena with gusto. He took his first defeat, bounced off the floor and waded right in again. Next time he ran for the Senate he won, handing Abe Ribicoff one of the few defeats that worthy has ever sustained.

Pres Bush was an excellent Senator. He was reelected to a full term in 1956 and probably would have been reelected in 1962 had he not decided to eschew the run because of health problems.

Frankly, it is extremely difficult for us to contemplate a Greenwich minus Prescott Bush. Reality says we must. The great contributions he made to our town and state are part of our very fiber. But we'll miss more than that—we'll miss a great human being, a friend, a wise counselor, a man who cared a great deal, a man of probity and honor, a man of character.

We take some solace in seeing several sons in the political vineyard, so the name and the high purposes of Senator Bush will be carried on. To them, to the wonderful widow, Dottie, to all who have lost a fine friend and respected fellow townsman, our condolences. We are all truly the poorer today for his loss.

[From the New Haven (Conn.) Register, Oct. 10, 1972]

EDITORIAL

During his years in the U.S. Senate, Prescott S. Bush had performed to the fullest measure of his abilities, as any good man in office does, but with many essential differences that set him apart from many of the household names of his day:

His achievements were without fanfare or self-glorification.

Mr. Bush, a tall, regal looking man with an aura of ivy league about him, with fashionable Greenwich as his home and a Wall Street career as an investment banker, was as unlikely a politician as one would expect to find in ethnic-conscious industrial Connecticut.

He was a relative political amateur when he first bobbed to attention in a 1950 race for the Senate, but he made it close enough to gain a second chance two years later, when he went on to victory.

Mr. Bush was more than a man for his time. Hard working and vigorous, a man of deeply felt convictions, the Senator was not one to seize upon issues of the moment, but to perceive and put his energies behind issues that were of moment.

He recognized fully the urban blight that beset the cities and rallied early to their cause, playing a major hand in the shaping of the father of all redevelopment legislation, the Housing Act of 1954. He championed urban renewal at every turn. Beyond promoting and supporting legislation in Washington, Mr. Bush took the lead in bringing the message of urban renewal home to Connecticut's cities and towns, and played a vital role in New Haven's urban renewal fortunes.

The former Senator was among the first to recognize the danger of Joe McCarthyism, and his mark was that he could oppose the latter, but in never but a gentlemanly fashion. The other tactics were alien to Mr. Bush's character.

Mr. Bush's deep interest in urban renewal was matched by his equal deep concern for civil rights, better education, a strong U.S. military posture and fiscal responsibility in federal government, including the control of inflation. He predated much of the later day civil rights struggle with his battles against racial discrimination in FHA Housing and in employment, the latter among both management and unions. His humaneness showed in his persistant efforts on behalf of flood and storm victims. He was an advance man for ecology interests with his involvement in flood control and beach erosion problems.

Mr. Bush, a Yale graduate who had served 12 years as a member of the Yale Corp., was in retirement when he passed away Sunday at the age of 77. He will be remembered as a man of compassion and integrity whose distinguished service for his state and country will offer challenge to others to emulate.

[From the Waterbury (Conn.) Republican]

EDITORIAL

Prescott S. Bush was a distinguished gentleman who looked and acted like a U.S. Senator. He was a great credit to the State

SALT



NEW YORK TIMES DATE 15 Sep 72 PAGE 1

# SENATE APPROVES PACT WITH SOVIET ON STRATEGIC ARMS

## But It First Accepts Jackson Amendment on Numerical Equality in New Accords

## CLOSURE BID SUCCEEDS

## House Conference Is Next—$74.5-Billion Defense Budget Advances

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 14 — After more than a month of debate, the Senate approved today the United States-Soviet agreement to freeze a major part of their offensive nuclear arsenals for five years. However, it stipulated that there should be equality in the number of weapons in any future treaty governing strategic intercontinental arms.

The agreement, which would limit the number of offensive land-based and submarine-borne missiles possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union, was approved by a vote of 88 to 2, with only Senator James B. Allen of Alabama and Senator Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina, both Democrats voting against it.

**Jackson Amendment Vote**

Earlier, the Senate had voted 56 to 35, in favor of the controversial amendment sponsored by Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington that caused the delay in approving the arms-limitation accord. The amendment, which was initially endorsed by the Nixon Administration, calls upon the President to seek a future treaty on offensive nuclear weapons that "would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union."

The Senate rejected repeated attempts to eliminate or modify the Jackson amendment, which was attached to a resolution approving the interim accord on arms signed by President Nixon and Soviet leaders in Moscow in May.

Since the House of Representatives adopted a simple resolution of approval in mid-August, the matter now goes to a Senate-House conference.

**Permanent Limitation Sought**

The interim accord, which aims at limiting the arms race while the two sides attempt to negotiate a permanent treaty on offensive weapons, was one of two agreements concluded by Mr. Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader. The other was a treaty limiting antiballistic, or defensive, missiles.

The Senate gave its approval to the defensive-weapons treaty —the only act of Congress actually required by law—in August, but Mr. Nixon has withheld ratification of the treaty pending approval of the interim agreement on offensive weapons by the House and the Senate.

After today's votes, Administration officials privately expressed the hope that the Jackson amendment would be dropped in the Senate-House conference. The Administration hope, it appeared, may be realized since the Senate will be represented in the committee by members of the Foreign Relations Committee, who felt that the amendment's insistence on numerical equality would undermine chances for permanent agreement on offensive weapons.

The White House endorsed the amendment in what some Administration officials privately described as a political favor to a Senator who had consistently supported the Administration on national security policy. The Administration also took the position that the Jackson amendment represented merely an expression of Senate opinion that was not binding upon the Administration.

Continued on Page 11, Column 1

In other Congressional action on defense today, the House passed and sent to the Senate a $74.5-billion deefnse appropriations bill that contained virtually all the funds required to start a multibillion-dollar program of improving the nation's nuclear arsenal. It had been requested by the Administration in the wake of the agreements on arms with the Soviet Union.

Included in the bill—which provides $4.3-billion less than the Administration's military request in the current fiscal year—were almost $1-billion to start construction ofthe Trident missile-launching submarine and $445-million to continue development of the B-1 supersonic strategic bomber. About the only major strategic program left out of the bill was a Safeguard antiballistic missile site around Washington, as permitted under the defensive-weapons treaty.

**End-War Proviso Beaten**

The House again refused to attach an end-the-war amendment to the defense bill. After less than 15 minutes of debate, the House, by a vote of 208 to 160 rejected an amendment by Representative Joseph P. Addabbo, Democrat of Queens, that would have required the withdrawal of all American forces from Indochina in four months, subject to the concurrent release of prisoners of war.

There never had been any doubt that the Senate would approve the interim agreement, but in the protracted debate stirred up by the Jackson amendment, it finally took a closure vote. After discussing it since Aug. 2, the Senate approved today by vote of 76 to 15 a motion to limit debate and force a vote on the Jackson amendment and the offensive-weapons agreement.

In some ways, the debate turned into a personality contest and a clash between Senator Jackson, a senior member of the Armed Services Committee with close ties to the military, and Senator J. W. Fulbright, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

**A Matter of Judgment**

For many Senators, their votes turned not so much on the strategic issues of the debate as on whether they respected the judgment of Senator Fulbright or Senator Jackson more. As he has in all defense debates in recent years, Senator Jackson prevailed.

In some ways, the Jackson amendment was a direct outgrowth and reaction to the interim agreement, which grants the Soviet Union a numerical advantage in land-based and submarine-launched missiles. In defending the agreement, the Administration has argued that this Soviet advantage would be offset by American technological and numerical superiority in bombers, carriers and fighter-bombers based in Europe and the Far East.

All of this action took place subsequent to attacks by the President against the 92d Congress for delaying and a response to that charge delivered by Senator MANSFIELD on September 8.

Mr. President, I also stated on Monday that the work of the subcommittee on surface mining legislation could not have been accomplished without "the great and full support of the minority members of the subcommittee." The Senator from Idaho (Mr. JORDAN), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN), and the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON) were prime supporters of the subcommittee and worked tirelessly. I lauded their efforts during those sessions as chairman of the subcommittee, and I laud their efforts now.

It was because of their great and faithful dedication to the task of drafting the surface mining legislation that I was doubly shocked to find not one of them at the executive session and therefore expressed my dismay that their failure to attend might have political overtones.

Perhaps my frustration under extreme pressure and urgency induced me to speak more bitingly than I should have done. So if my criticism on Monday was unwarranted, I apologize.

I am most pleased that a full quorum was in attendance at the Interior Committee's executive session today and that we did, indeed, report a bill to regulate surface mining, subject to amendments to be proposed on the floor of the Senate.

## SALT NEGOTIATORS THEMSELVES SEE PROBLEMS IN THE ACCORDS

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I wish to invite the attention of the Senate to a detailed and thoughtful analysis of the SALT accords that appears in the September 1972 issue of Fortune. Its author, Mr. Charles Murphy, has delved into the problems of strategic arms limitation with energy and thoroughness, producing one of the most comprehensive and balanced press interpretations of SALT to date.

Mr. Murphy's article reinforces the testimony already on the record, that officials who played key roles in concluding the interim agreement—notably the chief negotiator, Ambassador Gerard Smith—consider that the present interim agreement is not acceptable as a permanent agreement.

In short, Mr. President, it is clear that the interim agreement does not provide the kind of strategic equality necessary for a stable, long-term, arms control agreement. This is the serious concern of the sponsors and supporters of the Jackson-Scott amendment. I commend Mr. Murphy's article to the Senate.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article entitled "The SALT Negotiators Themselves Are Troubled By What We Gave Away in the Moscow Arms Agreements" be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Fortune magazine, September 1972]

THE SALT NEGOTIATORS THEMSELVES ARE TROUBLED BY WHAT WE GAVE AWAY IN THE MOSCOW ARMS AGREEMENTS

(By Charles J. V. Murphy)

The agreements reached in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have had a rather remarkable record in the U.S. Senate. The first of the two major agreements, the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, sailed through last month by a vote of 88 to 2. The ABM treaty binds us and the Russians to confine the defenses against each other's missiles to two fixed sites, at least 800 miles apart, each to have no more than 100 interceptor rockets—a token number. The other major SALT agreement, which put limits on offensive missiles, managed to generate a certain amount of controversy about the conditions that should be attached to it; but there was never the slightest possibility that the Senate would reject it. This "interim agreement" fixes future ceilings for the two nations on the number of strategic nuclear submarines each may have during the next five years, the total number of missiles these vessels may carry, and the number of land-based strategic missiles each nation may separately deploy.

What is remarkable about the Senate record is that virtually none of those who are responsible for the agreements are happy with them. Not President Nixon. Not Henry Kissinger, who with the President took part in the final horse trading in Moscow and composed a dazzling if not wholly convincing political rationale for the trade. Not Secretary of Defense Laird. Not the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Not even the principal negotiators. One adviser to our negotiating team, William R. Van Cleave, observed sadly in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee that the agreements were "a light-year removed from the outcomes contemplated in the studies and planning for SALT . . . There has since the start of SALT been a constant erosion of U.S. SALT positions and expectations."

The private unhappiness with the agreements is focused on several problems. First, the interim agreement leaves the Soviet Union with a three-to-two lead over us in the number of land-based strategic-missile launchers—now the central element of military striking power; concedes them at the end of the five-year life of the agreement an equal superiority in strategic missile submarines, where we now have a three-to-two lead over them; and gives them a three-to-one advantage in the weight of the nuclear warheads that the ICBM's can deliver. Second, the agreement leaves the Russians in a position to make far more technological improvements in their strategic weapons than we can hope to make. The U.S. has frozen itself, says Dr. Edward Teller, the distinguished physicist and weapon expert, "in a position that is difficult and dangerous."

A SINGULAR OPPORTUNITY FOR THE RUSSIANS

If this is the practical outcome, what was Nixon after in the SALT exercise to begin with? The short answer is that he was trying to prevent an even worse outcome for the U.S. As Kissinger put the Nixon choice in Moscow, the value of the interim agreement is to be judged not by assessing "whether the freeze perpetuates a Soviet numerical superiority" but by what "this margin [would] have been without the freeze." The primary American objective was to brake the spectacular momentum the Soviet Union has lately acquired in the deployment of strategic ICBM's inside the Soviet Union and missile-launching submarines in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. By Kissinger's figures, the Russians have been adding to their strategic strike forces at a rate of some 100 sea-launched and 200 land-launched missiles a year. The U.S. last added launchers to its strategic inventory in 1967.

The decision to hold down our numbers was reached back in the early 1960's by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara. The growth of the Minuteman force was to be halted when it reached 1,000 launchers, the Polaris force was to hold at its present level of forty-one hulls, and an advanced bomber proposed by the Air Force was rejected. In the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, it appears, the Kennedy men were determined to reduce the risk of another nuclear confrontation; they hoped that if we did not add to our nuclear advantage and let the Russians rise to parity, the arms race would slow down and the risk would in fact be reduced.

On the evidence, the Russians certainly made the most of this singular opportunity. As Kissinger pointed out in Moscow, the situation in which the U.S. found itself nine years later, particularly with regard to submarines, was hardly "the most brilliant bargaining position" for our negotiators. President Nixon has suggested that if the U.S. were to set out now to redress the balance, immediate additional investments in strategic systems on the order of $15 billion a year would be necessary. And Congress, given its present massive mistrust of just about any military investment, would certainly never yield up such funds. It has persistently skimped on the strategic programs and the R. and D. account through the past four years.

Thus our bargaining position in the SALT talks was a steadily weakening one. We had no ongoing weapon systems in development and deployment, while the Russians had at least three: a class of heavy multimegaton ICBM's, which we call the SS-9's; a class of light ICBM's called the SS-11's; and a class of strategic-range missile submarines called Y, for Yankee. In bargaining for a future ceiling on the Soviet strategic offensive force, we really had only one thing to put up for bid: the Safeguard ABM, a more promising property than is commonly appreciated. "On the offense side," says Dr. John S. Foster Jr., director of defense research and engineering, "our margin of advantage was melting fast. The Russians knew this and why. They were hardly likely to yield to the President what Congress would not give."

To the degree that the agreements brake somewhat the accumulation of city-destroying weapons, they are certainly all to the good. The destructive power of the weapons already piled up passes all rationality. And their costs now border on the lunatic. We have at least begun the effort to construct a system in which these costs will be less necessary; we have again demonstrated a willingness before the world to do what we can to stop the arms competition.

In other respects, though, the SALT agreements are undesirable. It is one thing, serious enough in itself, to slide into a situation in which the Russians gain an advantage in numbers of strategic weapons; it is quite another matter to regularize this advantage in a formal agreement. Furthermore, the agreement enables the Russians to raise the power of their strategic forces still further by technological improvement, and so make their advantage more threatening. In May, toward the climax of the negotiations, the U.S. delegation warned that if the next round of SALT talks failed to impose a real check on strategic power, "U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized." The most serious defect of all is that the agreements on defensive and offensive weapons do not complement one another; indeed, they are inherently incompatible. Van Cleave complained: "We are comparing levels of ABM

with levels of ABM and offensive levels with offensive levels, which is politically important and which *may* be strategically important, but which blurs the really significant offensive-defensive relationship and the need to match defense to offense and vice versa. If ABM is to be limited as stipulated by the treaty, the offensive capability permitted the Soviet Union is intolerable. If such offensive capability is to be permitted, higher levels of ABM are necessary . . ." On these same grounds, Dr. Donald G. Brennan of the Hudson Institute, another defense analyst of high repute, deplores the treaty. 'The ABM treaty," he argued recently, "does the wrong thing well, and the interim agreement on strategic weapons does the right thing badly."

ABANDONING THE SHELTER

There is no question that the ABM treaty has transformed our defense posture. Our Safeguard system was earlier supposed to consist of twelve antiballistic missile complexes across the land. Their function was to provide defense for our cities against a light attack—e.g., of the kind the Chinese might launch—and, more important, to ensure that even a massive attack on our land-based missiles and strategic bombers would not destroy all of them. Additionally, Safeguard was to shelter what the prevaling jargon describes as the National Command Authority (NCA)—meaning particularly the President and his staff, the high military command, and the members of Congress.

Now, under the ABM treaty, the concept of a country-wide ABM defense for the Minuteman and bomber forces, let alone for the cities, has been abandoned. We and the Russians have restricted ourselves to token deployments consisting of two antiballistic elements—a limited force in defense of a single ICBM complex in the field, and another limited force in defense of our respective capitals—the NCA role, that is. This was the outcome most ardently desired by the Kremlin. The Russians were not seriously interested in limiting strategic weapons. What they were adamant about, through the critical exploratory phases of SALT negotiations, was finishing off Safeguard. The Kremlin began the horse trading on offensive strategic weapons only after the ABM issue was settled pretty much to its satisfaction.

For many Americans, this Soviet attitude was entirely welcome They interpret the Soviet abandonment of antiballistic defenses as a tardy conversion to the "mutual assured destruction" theory of strategy promulgated by McNamara and the school of defense scientists and analysts to whom he looked for counsel. That proposition holds that where both sides are entirely vulnerable to nuclear attacks, neither side will dare to launch one—that nuclear war becomes possible only when there are defenses against the attacks. It was on this line of reasoning that so many in Congress and the academic community fiercely opposed the Safeguard system when Nixon announced it three and a half years ago.

THE TROUBLE WITH GALOSH

It is possible that the Soviet leaders now agree with these critics about the benefits of mutual assured destruction. But it seems more likely that the Russians, who are by tradition defense-minded, believe in ABM's—and that they opted for the ABM treaty only because their own defensive system was so far behind ours. As early as the mid-1960's they had begun to raise around Moscow an elaborate ballistic defense, which the West named Galosh. From satellite photographs and study of energy emissions, U.S. intelligence judged the system a mediorcre one. It depended upon clumsy mechanical scanning radars for aiming the interceptor missiles. These radars could track but a single missile at a time, or a cluster. The interceptor rockets were huge, and interception could take place only in outer space. Four years ago the Russians, realizing that they were on an unpromising path, tore down much of what they had built and started all over again, this time putting up two huge phased-array radars, each as long as two football fields, the costliest structures of their kind in the world. The radars are first class, but the revamped system still appears to be faltering because of the well-known Soviet lag in computers and other data-handling gear. The Russians may well have decided that a defense against the thousands of American warheads is at present beyond them.

Meanwhile, they might well have been alarmed by the superior showing of Safeguard. The Army over the past several years has put our ABM system through rigorous tests on the Pacific missile range, which extends from California to Kwajalein Atoll in the mid-Pacific, 4,200 miles away. Out of twenty-nine attempted interceptions, twenty-five were successful. These trials were all, to be sure, carefully orchestrated; none of the experts, not even Safeguard's stoutest champions, claim that the system can be made to provide anything approaching a leakproof defense against a severe nuclear attack. Nevertheless, the development of high-capacity computers (Sperry Rand), memory storage banks (Lockheed), and programming techniques (I.B.M.), in combination with phased-array radars (Raytheon and Bell Telephone Laboratories) and an integrated command system (Western Electric), has finally created the means for mastering the stupefying volume of data upon which the tracking-aiming-firing-intercepting sequence ultimately depends. "The theory," says Dr. Foster, "now rests on demonstrated principles. A workable ABM system can be put together."

M'NAMARA'S UNEASY SURMISE

It is now plain that the numerous skeptics about Safeguard were grossly wrong. Paul Nitze, when he was Deputy Secretary of Defense under Lyndon Johnson, made himself a lay expert of sorts in this strange new military science. In the SALT talks he was the advocate of the American position where technical points in the ABM matter were concerned. "As a defense for hardened silos," Nitze has concluded, "Safeguard can be made effective. It's expensive, but it's going to be more expensive to deploy an offensive missile capable of defeating it."

And so the Russians may have concluded that they faced the prospect of our having an effective ABM technology and their being without one. A U.S. defense analyst who had numerous conversations with his Soviet counterparts says, "Though they never came right out and said so, I got the feeling that they were afraid we Americans would be tempted to move on to still better radars, more interceptors; that we would go from a thin to a thick ABM cover, while having the advantage of the MIRV technology. They may have realized that the combination of the two would swing the strategic ascendancy back to us."

It should be noted that there is a much more pessimistic view of their reasons for wanting the ABM treaty. Teller, for one, believes that the Russians know more about the effects of high-yield nuclear explosions on warheads, structures, and command-and-control systems than we do. They are also said to know more than we do about the electromagnetic effects produced by nuclear explosions outside the earth's atmosphere. During the extensive nuclear tests that the Russians ran in 1961, American surveillance systems verified the stunning revelation, which the Kennedy Administration suppressed, that the Russians had staged several interceptions of missile warheads by exploding nuclear devices outside the atmosphere.

While the intelligence community is divided on the point, a strong body of opinion is increasingly suspicious that the Galosh complex may be only the tip of the real Soviet ABM iceberg. During the past fifteen years the Russians have assembled over their immense geography a surface-to-air missile defense, originally called the Tallinn system, which has no counterpart anywhere else. It includes at least 10,000 interceptor missiles and hundreds of radars. The system undoubtedly has an antibomber function. But Dr. Foster has steadily argued that with the inclusion of the huge surveillance radars that dot the Soviet landscape, the whole apparatus could be tied together fairly rapidly into a vast ABM system. This is only a surmise. The treaty itself explicitly prohibits any move toward a country-wide system. Nevertheless, there remains a brooding suspicion in our defense community that those radars may signify a Soviet intention to cheat. Years ago McNamara remarked to Foster, "They never would deploy so many missiles simply for an air defense, considering the thousands of winged interceptors they have. They must intend to make the system over into an ABM system."

A NEW SET OF PROBLEMS

In any case, and whatever their reasons, the Russians have most certainly induced Nixon to administer the coup de grace to Safeguard, his single contribution to U.S. strategic assets. The program now is a shambles. So far, $5 billion has been obligated for Safeguard, most of it for R. and D. If the Washington complex goes forward, the final cost of the two sites would be an estimated $8.5 billion. When the agreement came, a grudging Congress had authorized Defense Department construction of but four sites, and active construction was under way on only two.

At Nekoma, North Dakota, close to the Manitoba line, on the northernmost edge of the ninety-mile-long Minuteman field that starts at Grand Forks, the earth moving and structures are about 90 percent completed; however, it will take another two years before the radars, computers, power generators, and command-and-control mechanisms are installed and made operational. At Malmstrom Air Force Base in western Montana, 600 miles away, construction was about 10 percent advanced, work having been delayed by a long strike. At the two remaining complexes—one at Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming and the other at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri—the ground had not even been broken for the construction. Now the Grand Forks complex is to be finished, but Malmstrom is being dismantled, and work at the other sites has ceased.

Meanwhile, there is a large question about the NCA complex permitted for Washington. The defense authorization request for fiscal 1973 asks for $28 million with which to start work, and the Army hopes to shift there the radars and computers on order for Malmstrom and Whiteman. But Congress is now stone cold on the ABM proposition, and we may not even elect to build the NCA complex we are allowed under the treaty.

And so the ABM treaty leaves us with a good many problems. In February, 1970, in a message to Congress, Nixon deliberately raised the question whether it is a good thing for a President to be left with the single option, in a nuclear attack, of ordering a strike back at the adversary's cities, knowing that this would bring a mass slaughter of Americans. "Should the concept of assured destruction be [so] narrowly defined and should it be the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we face?" Obviously, the President's answer then, in Washington, was no; but the treaty he signed in Moscow constitutes a yes answer. In the immediate future, cities and people will remain defenseless. As Brennan has observed,

"We and the Russians have agreed not to defend ourselves, not only against each other, but, interestingly, against anybody else." Mutual assured destruction, he argues, is not so much a theory as "a fashion"—a nightmarish notion that "nuclear stability resides in high hostage levels."

Now the question arises: just how mutual is the mutuality of destruction likely to be? On this point, the arithmetic suggests that we shall end up a good deal less mutual than they.

COUNTING UP THE LAUNCHERS

U.S. satellite photography shows that the Soviet Union has deployed precisely 1,527 ICBM's of various character. Silos for ninety-one more, not yet emplaced, have been marked. The agreement on offensive weapons permits unfinished work to be carried forward to deployment, and no doubt these empty holes will be loaded, giving the Russians a total of 1,618 ICBM launchers. Inasmuch as the U.S. has no unfinished ICBM systems in the works, our inventory of launchers must remain at the level of the past five years. It consists of 1,000 Minutemen deployed in six fields and fifty-four Titan missiles.

Furthermore, the lead that the U.S. still retains in submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) will soon be erased and here, too, we shall slide into an inferior numerical position. By our count, at the time the interim agreement was signed, the Russians had twenty-six to twenty-eight Yankee-class missile submarines at sea, and fifteen more building. These are nuclear-powered, and those at sea, each have tubes for sixteen ballistic missiles with a range of 2,000 miles. A new class has lately appeared, having only twelve tubes; these are being armed with a 3,000-mile missile. U.S. intelligence had credited the total Soviet submarine force, in being and in assembly, with an aggregate inventory of 710 SLBM's. The Russian negotiators startled our delegation with the disclosure that the true number was forty-eight submarines and 768 missiles.

The agreement allows both sides to enlarge and modernize their SLBM forces in exchange for cutbacks of older missiles. Here again the Russians, who had more obsolescent missiles and fewer modern submarines, will benefit most. They are permitted to move on to a fleet of sixty-two submarines having a total of 950 missiles in their tubes. To reach that level they are bound to retire 210 of their pre-1964 land-based ICBM's (liquid-fueled rockets in the SS–7 and SS–8 classes) as well as thirty fairly short-range ballistic missiles deployed at present on ten older nuclear H class submarines, also verging on obsolescence. The U.S., for its part, is allowed to add three submarines to its present fleet of forty-one sixteen-tube Polaris/Poseidons, and to raise its present inventory of 656 SLBM's to an eventual aggregate of 710. This gain in sea-based launchers would be at the expense of the fifty-four land-based Titans, the oldest and heaviest ICBM's in the U.S. strategic forces. At the end of the period covered by the Moscow agreement, then, the Russians could have 1,408 land-based launchers to our 1,054; and, since the three additional submarines allowed us are hardly likely to be built in the next five years, they could have 950 launchers at sea to our 656.

Considering the advantages that the Russians already had on the ICBM side of the strategic equation, the stubbornness with which they held out for a roughly equivalent advantage in numbers of SLBM's was disturbing to the American negotiators. "The submarine ratio," one of Kissinger's lieutenants says, "was the knottiest issue of all. There was no give on the other side." The ratio was finally settled directly between Nixon and Brezhnev in the Kremlin at high noon on the day of the signing, while the Soviet and U.S. negotiating teams were still deadlocked over numbers in Helsinki, 550 miles away, in an atmosphere that one observer has described as "frantic."

One justification advanced for this really extraordinary concession on our part is that the Russians, lacking forward bases similar to those the Polaris/Poseidon force uses at Holy Loch in Scotland, Rota in Spain, and in the Pacific, are able to keep their submarines on station only half as long as we are, and accordingly need a larger force in order to have an equal number of SLBM's in position at any given time. This argument is not altogether persuasive, however; some defense analysts have suggested that there are ways for the Russians to operate their submarines more efficiently. In any case, the 3,000-mile SLBM's with which the new Y class submarines are being armed should minimize their problems.

THE MEANING OF MIRV

Calculating the military value of the opposing missiles is trickier than just adding up launchers. The "throw-weight" of the missiles, i.e., the military payload carried, varies considerably from one launcher to another. The number of warheads and their accuracy, range, and explosive yields also bear on the potential value of the payload. Henry Kissinger has said that the U.S. has a two-to-one lead in numbers of warheads. Furthermore, Soviet warheads are not now as accurate as ours—on the average, their missiles will hit about three-tenths of a mile farther from target than the Minuteman will—but their greater yields offset their inaccuracy. The Soviet SS–9 missile, for example, weighs about 500,000 pounds. It lifts a 12,000- to 14,000-pound warhead having a twenty-five megaton yield. Other land-based Soviet missiles are smaller; still, aggregate throw-weight of all classes of Soviet ICBM's is estimated to be around three times the Minuteman's 2,400,000 pounds. (The Minuteman's gross weight is about 70,000 pounds. It can throw a single warhead with a yield of 1.5 megatons or three warheads with a total yield of 600 kilotons.)

Is our disadvantage in throw-weight a crucial one? Defenders of the SALT agreement think not. They argue that bombers must be counted in the balance and that our Strategic Air Command is clearly superior to the Soviet bombers. More important, our development of MIRV (for multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles, i.e., warheads) enables us to put more warheads on our launchers than the Russians have been able to fit on theirs—three on the Minuteman, as many as fourteen on the Poseidon. A number of targets, tens, even hundreds, of miles apart, can be attacked with extraordinary accuracy from a single launch.

But this technology, which is now an American monopoly, is almost certainly within the Russians' grasp. Defense Secretary Laird recently informed Congress that the first Soviet MIRV is expected to be tested this winter. If the test is successful, a thorough refitting of the Soviet missile forces is expected to be under way within two or three years.

A STRANGE PAUSE IN DEPLOYMENT

Once they have mastered the MIRV technique, it should not be excessively difficult for the Russians to fit a huge SS–9 warhead with from six to twenty separately steered warheads, all more powerful than those lifted by either the Minuteman or the Poseidon. The strange pause that settled over the vast SS–9 deployment program during the winter of 1970–71, after 288 missiles had been deployed and with some twenty-five silos still empty, is now believed to reflect a decision to replace the entire SS–9 force with a new generation of MIRV warheads. There are also signs that the SS–11 force is to be replaced methodically with a new MIRV'd class of relatively "light" ICBM's, and that some two score other silos in SS–11 fields, as yet unfilled, will get MIRV'd weapons too.

Finally, the Russians have about a dozen new silos that are even wider than those in which the first-generation SS–9's are emplaced; and a huge new missile has been spotted on a Soviet test launcher. Its payload is estimated at between 24,000 and 28,000 pounds—it is at least double the size of the SS–9—and Senator Henry M. Jackson has said the missile may be armed with a fifty-megaton warhead.

What kind of threat does this emerging Soviet capability represent to the U.S.? No one can speak definitely to this question, but there are some fairly pessimistic answers around. Teller, for example, believes that a combination of improved SLBM's and improved SS–9's might conceivably give the Soviet Union a capability over the next several years to wipe out the U.S. Minuteman and strategic bomber forces on the ground. Actually, to destroy ICBM's in their silos, warheads are not needed in fantastic numbers. In the absence of ABM, it is easy enough, given data on accuracy and yield, to calculate the number of missiles needed to destroy just about all of an enemy's silos. If the Russians should finally begin to approach U.S. standards of accuracy, they should soon have enough SS–9's and SLBM's to annihilate our land-based strategic forces. They could use those two strike elements alone, holding the SS–11's in reserve to retaliate against our cities in the event that our sea-based forces struck at theirs.

There are all sorts of reasons for doubting that the Russians actually intend to launch any such first strike. Nevertheless, the fact that they had a first-strike *capability* would cast a long shadow over world events. And the fact—if it ever came to pass——could not be hidden. In an age of satellite cameras and computers, the adding up of opposing strengths can be done swiftly and accurately. Long before any crisis came to a boil, the behavior of our political leaders, and theirs, would be influenced heavily by that arithmetic. Confidence in Minuteman is a political factor of prime importance, for us and for our friends and foes.

During the five-year life of the interium agreement, it seems clear, the Russian strategic forces will benefit more than ours will from technological improvements. This is all the more reason, many of our defense analysts believe, for the U.S. to be investing heavily in the kinds of advanced technology that we *are* allowed under the agreement and that might make a difference toward the end of the decade, if the present agreement is not meanwhile replaced by one more favorable to us. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, a sailor of vast experience and uncommon sense, says, "The side which masters the technological openings should prevail. The chiefs and I understand this. We insisted, on that account, that the agreements shelter three rights: the right to modernize, the right to keep R. and D. alive, and to look and see."

Few question the need for surveillance—i.e., looking and seeing. But there is an extremely serious division in Congress and the scientific community over the Defense Department's desire to proceed forthwith with the development of a new strategic bomber (which we are free to develop anytime), and a new strategic submarine (which would not be operational for more than five years). Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin has served notice that the procurement programs are in for a hard time. Proxmire has been supported extensively by a broad coalition of antimilitary lobbies and "think tanks" that have become a powerful influence in shaping the behavior of Congress on defense spending. In the coalition are such bodies as the Federation of American Scientists, the Council for a Livable World, SANE, the Coalition on National Priorities and Military Spending, the Arms Control Association, and the Institute for Policy Studies.

These groups and their allies in Congress

would hold investment in the strategic area to a level that would keep R. and D. barely alive. And they are strongly against any move into production—to the creation of new forces in being.

A CASE FOR THE TRIDENT

Both of the two new strategic systems that the Defense Department wants to develop have been before the country, in one form or another, for quite a few years. One, the Trident system, seeks to replace the Polaris/Poseidon submarine missile force in the 1980's with a more advanced combination of hull and missile. The other, the B–1, involves the large-scale production of a supersonic, swing-wing intercontinental bomber, to be ready for initial deployment in the late 1970's. At this point, the funding required to take the two systems further along in the R. and D. and prototype cycle comes to only about $1.3 billion in the current budget. In the production and deployment phases, the aggregate costs would of course be $25 billion at the least, and might even be twice that.

As a matter of fact, the Trident is in the process of being invented. All that is certain about it now is that the hull will have about twice the displacement of the Polaris submarines; the Trident will carry twenty-four missiles, versus sixteen, will be faster, quieter, and much more versatile, will ttake five years to build, and will cost at least $1.3 billion for each vessel (the figure includes R. and D. and missile costs). In simplest terms the Trident is being invented for the purpose of exploiting one available new technology, and to anticipate and evade another that is pregnant with menace, but which has not yet materialized.

The menace lies in the knowledge that if the Russians, with their fast and growing flotillas of attack submarines, should develop a means of detecting and tracking the Polaris force—and we and they both know the theortical solutions to the problem—the elusiveness that has been the singular merit of the system would be lost. As Teller recently observed, "a single big discovery in oceanography—the detection of submarines—could wipe out our last deterrent." The available new technology would bring within the Navy's reach a 6,000-mile missile—Trident II—that can (like the Poseidon missile) be launched from a submerged vessel. The Poseidon missile now has a maximum range of about 3,000 miles. This means that when the vessel is on station it must linger fairly close to the Eurasian land mass if the missile is to reach worthwhile targets, and that requirement considerably narrows the ocean areas where the adversary has to look for it. A 4,000-mile missile, Trident I, is in development now and could presently replace some of the Poseidons. With the full-range missile, the Trident will have just about the whole expanse of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans in which to maneuver.

SECOND THOUGHTS IN CONGRESS

Unfortunately, the Trident costs a mint. The Navy contemplates an initial buy of ten vessels, as replacements for the first ten Polaris vessels (which will be twenty years old early in the next decade). That means a capital outlay of between $13 billion and $15 billion, as a starter. A total of $164 million has already been committed to R. and D. In fiscal 1973 the Defense Department has asked for a total of $977 million. Of this sum, $555 million is to extend the research looking to the eventual design of the hull, further improvement in the missile, and superior communications. Another $361 million is mostly for developing the reactor, a five-year task, and buying some hardware.

Until a year or so ago, even the leading congressional and other skeptics on defense favored moving on to an improved submarine missile force. A sea-based deterrent has long been attractive to many of these skeptics, because it promises to draw fire away from the homeland (and also because it requires no ABM to protect it). But the looming cost of the system, together with the now-familiar argument that another U.S. SLBM would only provoke the Soviet Union into developing another of its own, has brought a change of heart. A parade of defense analysts before the various congressional military committees has recommended that we stand pat with the Polaris/Poseidon force. In June the Trident seemed to be in big trouble in Congress; the Navy's request for immediate production money came within one vote of failing to win approval of the Seante Armed Services Committee.

In July, however, the mood of the Senate seemed to undergo a change. An amendment to restrict Trident funding to R. and D. was defeated, forty-seven to thirty-nine. Six days later, the Navy's entire request passed the Senate, as part of the $20.5-billion military-authorization bill.

A VERY EXPENSIVE BOMBER

The B–1 is the intercontinental bomber that the Strategic Air Command has longed to suit up for ever since McNamara virtually scrubbed the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) about ten years ago. The airframe for the first of three prototypes is to start through North American Rockwell's jigs in October. General Electric is running tests at its Evendale, Ohio, plant on the 30,000-pound-thrust engines. (They are designed to deliver twice the thrust of the engines used in the F–4.) In April, Boeing was awarded a contract for integrating the avionics system. By and large, the program is on schedule. The first test flight is scheduled for April, 1974, only a year and a half away.

If the machine eventually makes it through Congress, it should cut quite a figure in the air. Its gross weight of about 360,000 pounds will be about three-quarters that of the B–52, but will include a bomb load that will be twice as large. Furthermore, its top dash speed is better than mach 2—i.e., more than twice the speed of sound—but the real difficulty for an enemy will be the B–1's ability to maintain almost supersonic speeds over hundreds of miles at earth-hugging, rooftop level on the way to the target. The B–1, using the terrain-following radar successfully developed for the otherwise ill-starred F–111, will be able to arrow over hostile lands at speeds never before attained by machines moving so close to the earth.

The problem about the B–1, as about the Trident, is its staggering cost. So far, close to $700 million has been spent on development, and the Air Force asked for $445 million more this year. Carrying the program through the prototype will cost an estimated $2.6 billion. The Air Force is counting on a total buy of 241 machines, with spares. That would put the total cost of the program at about $11.1 billion, an average of $45,500,000 per plane. (The avionics alone will cost $5 million per plane). Given such costs, and the likelihood that they will soar further in the production and deployment phases, it is unlikely that Congress will give the Air Force anything like the numbers it wants. The penalty for excessive costs, in bombers as in submarines, is likely to be a loss in effective numbers—ever fewer machines for the mission. For the moment, however, the Air Force's progress to the prototype has been virtually assured by the Senate's all but unanimous approval of the entire B–1 package.

A year and a half ago, the Defense Department's Dr. Foster made public certain calculations regarding Soviet investment in the military technologies. The burden of his findings was that Soviet spending on R. and D. alone was exceeding U.S. spending by a margin of $3 billion to $4 billion a year. U.S. outlays for all military R. and D. was running around $7 billion to $8 billion a year the Soviets rate had risen to $10 billion to $11 billion. These estimates were based upon a close scrutiny by the various intelligence agencies of some five score Soviet military programs. Foster acknowledged that his estimates might be off by as much as 20 percent on the high side, but they could also err on the low side. His point was that an investment program like that on the Soviet scale, which appears to have acquired its present momentum in the 1968–69 period, is bound to produce technological surprises. "The development cycle," Foster noted, "runs from four to seven yeare. The satellite cameras can't see through a roof. But whatever has been in preparation in the plants should begin to come out into the open before long."

It is a mistake to believe that satellite reconnaissance, technically brilliant as it is, can keep us apprised of all the important military work that may be going on in the Soviet Union. A camera cannot see through a layer of cloud, and sizeable stretches of the Soviet Union are hidden by cloud 80 percent of the time. We were a year or more discovering an ICBM field in a locality previously judged to have no military facilities. The Chinese Communists actually finished a whole new gaseous-diffusion plant under the all but everlasting Himalayan cloud cover before a clear, bright day exposed it to a camera in space.

We Americans have lived on the high side of the strategic equation for a quarter of a century. Living on the low side is certain to be a lot more dangerous. We might well have ended up on the low side in the years ahead even if there had been no SALT talks at all; but the outcome of the talks, by formalizing our inferior status, and limiting our options for changing it, have made our situation still more precarious.

The numerical inferiority we accepted in 1972 will become tolerable only if the Soviet Union is prepared to restore a more satisfactory balance in SALT II, which may begin soon. It would seem to be mandatory that, despite the considerable costs entailed, we exercise the options we have and look toward a time when we may end our strategic inferiority.

## THE JAWS OF THE WHALE

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, at its annual meeting, recently held in London, the International Whaling Commission failed to adopt a recommendation by the United Nations Conference on the Environment at Stockholm for a moratorium on the killing of whales. The rejection of this proposal was a severe blow to conservationists and other concerned individuals all over the world who have long maintained that a moratorium on whaling is imperative in order to save many species, whose future survival is already in question.

Although, unfortunately, the moratorium was not adopted by the Commission, several important actions, including the setting of quotas for all major exploited species, were taken. While not all that we had hoped for, these efforts are nevertheless a step in the right direction.

Mr. Scott McVay, a member of the U.S. delegation to the International Whaling Commission and Chairman of the Committee on Whales, Environmental Defense Fund, whose efforts to save whales and other sea mammals are well known, has written an interesting and informative article outlining the actions of the Commission which appeared in the New York Times on Sunday, September 3, 1972. In his article entitled "The Jaws of the Whale," Mr. McVay notes that the

Commission asked the United States to halt the killing of porpoises during commercial fishing operations. This serious problem is of great concern to conservationists and others who fear that the continued loss of 200,000 to 400,000 of their numbers each year is severely depleting the populations of this species of whale.

I was most gratified when the Senate adopted an amendment that I cosponsored to S. 2871, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, which establishes the goal of reducing the number of porpoises and dolphins killed during fishing operations to levels approaching a zero mortality and serious injury rate. I am hopeful that our actions in behalf of marine mammals during this session of Congress will serve as an example to other nations of our concern for these creatures of the sea and our commitment to their preservation, thus helping to bring about an agreement to halt the killing of whales at the next meeting of the International Whaling Commission.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE JAWS OF THE WHALE

(By Scott McWay)

PRINCETON, N.J.—Advocates of a moratorium to stop killing whales—which was urged by the United Nations' Conference on the Environment at Stockholm—were disappointed by results of the recent International Whaling Commission meeting at London. But the moral imperative of the Stockholm decision, persistently voiced by Russell E. Train, leader of the U.S. delegation, did contribute to a number of positive actions.

Intensive efforts the previous year had already achieved regional observer plans in the North Pacific (Japan, U.S. and U.S.S.R.), North Atlantic (Canada, Iceland and Norway), and South Atlantic (Australia and South Africa). The observer agreement for the Antarctic, involving Japan, Norway, and the U.S.S.R., was finally signed in London. The exchange of observers is a major, far-reaching accomplishment.

There were other affirmative notes.

The "blue whale unit" (one whale equalled two Fin or six Sei whales) was finally eliminated, and for the first time quotas were set for every major exploited species, including the Minke whale.

The Fin whale quota was reduced by about one-third in the North Pacific and Antarctic. (Even when a moratorium is achieved, however, the Fin will need 30 to 40 years to recover to a level of "maximum productivity.")

Quotas were set for the Sei whale at levels believed to be at "maximum sustainable yield" but they do not provide an adequate margin for safety if the estimates are wrong.

Quotas for male and female Sperm whales were set separately, as recommended (but, unfortunately, at levels higher than would have been the case with the combined quota).

The Commission asked the United States to halt, as the Norwegian commissioner put it, "the strangulation and drowning of porpoises in tuna nets" by which some 250,000 porpoises perish annually.

An Argentine resolution was approved asking the Secretary General of the United Nations to urge nations which are whaling outside the Whaling Convention to join the International Whaling Commission and abide by its rules.

The Mexican commissioner questioned the prevailing assumption that to know more about whales we must continue to kill them in vast numbers. She was appalled to learn "that to have a meaningful voice in the proceedings we have to kill what are probably the most amazing of nature's creatures, and to kill them for profit." Such an encrusted pattern of thinking contrasts sharply with President Luis Echeverria Alvarez's recent action to establish a haven for whales in the peninsula of Lower California.

A permanent secretariat of the commission will be established and its convention brought up to date. An international decade of cetacean research was declared, giving impetus to studies of the living whale.

Used whaling equipment will not be sold to nonmember nations.

The moratorium idea, which has taken hold in the West in the past two years, caught the Soviets by surprise. Not the Japanese. They were at Stockholm. They feel world opinion more strongly and may have to harken to it, especially when threatened by a boycott of Japanese cameras, cars and radios. Also, the Japanese people, including many gifted writers and scientists, are sick of whaling and no longer find whale meat very palatable. The problem is profit. While only 17 per cent of the fishing effort of one Japanese company is directed at whales, more than 50 per cent of its profits are from butchered whales.

In the Soviet Union, environmental concern has not yet gotten into public consciousness nor pricked the public conscience. The whale has not yet become the symbol of a world habitat ravaged by man—as seems to have happened at Stockholm. Yet those who celebrate the whale should remember that the Soviet Minister of Fisheries, Aleksandr Ishkov, who banned the killing of porpoises as "cousins to men" in 1966, displayed considerable faith in the whale family again in 1967 in Vancouver, British Columbia, when he put his head into the open jaws of a killer whale. One day we may earn the reciprocal faith of the whale.

## THE ADMINISTRATION ACTS TO AID PENNSYLVANIA'S FLOOD VICTIMS

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, an article published in the September 9 Philadelphia Inquirer points out the extensive Federal effort being waged to aid Pennsylvania's hard-hit flood victims. As I believe the facts noted in the article speak for themselves, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a report of the Honorable Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the remarks of the President at Wilkes College, and a fact sheet on the extent of the tropical storm Agnes recovery effort.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

UNITED STATES OUTSPENDING STATE 10 TO 1 IN FLOOD RELIEF

HARRISBURG.—Both the Federal and state governments, after checking to see who's paying what for flood relief in Pennsylvania, have found the figure comes to $403 million, most of it coming from the Federal Treasury.

Put another way, the state has spent about a dime for every Federal dollar.

Gov. Milton Shapp, in a running feud with the Nixon administration about who should pay for what, has said on numerous occasions Washington isn't meeting its obligations to Pennsylvania, which tropical storm Agnes hit harder than any other state in late June. Damage in Pennsylvania was estimated at more than $2.5 billion.

Shapp blames flood-relief delays on a slow moving national bureaucracy that almost couldn't get started administering aid and he says it is still not moving fast enough.

Some of Shapp's cabinet members have caustically remarked that Pennsylvania would have fared better in getting relief if it had been the Saigon government.

"We are the U.S. government," one said, "yet we might have gotten quicker help if we could have gone to the United Nations."

Federal relief officials admitted to bureaucratic snags in the beginning. But Washington has been following a line of silence toward Shapp now—except for an occasional countercharge alleging political motivation on the part of Pennsylvania's governor. It seems to prefer to let the facts speak for themselves.

Here are figures, as of the end of August, supplied by the Federal and state governments.

The Federal government has spent or has under contract about $365 million for statewide flood relief. State government has spent $38.9 million. About 70 percent of the money has gone to the hard-hit Wyoming Valley in the northeastern part of the state.

The Federal government predicts spending another $1.2 billion in the future. State government has appropriated $150 million from its budget for flood relief but most of it is sitting idle in the various departments.

Another $1.75 million in state money, drawn from the general fund right after Agnes hit, went for flood relief. Shapp appropriated that $1.75 million under emergency powers granted the governor by the state Constitution.

All the $150 million in state money hasn't even been earmarked by departments. About $23.5 million is being held without designation in the general fund.

Additionally, a $100 million bond issue for flood relief that Shapp proposed is still hanging in the legislature. And there's been talk from his office of additional bond issues and the possibility of raising the state gasoline tax by 2 cents a gallon.

Morever, much of the money the state might spend will be reimbursed. Charles McIntosh, the state budget secretary, figures at least $50 million might be reimbursed—if certain funds are ever expended. He referred to a $50 million, short-term loan fund for businesses set up in the Commerce Department.

Only two loans totaling $6.5 million—$4 million to the Piper airplane firm at Lock Haven and $2.5 million to a Wilkes-Barre heating company—have been made from that fund. Commerce Secretary Walter Arader figures he might loan another $10 million by December.

The Commerce Department received $51.8 mililon of the $150 million state appropriation.

REPORT ON AGNES RECOVERY EFFORTS IN WYOMING VALLEY

(Memorandum for the President from Hon. Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget)

During our meeting before you sent me on August 12 to the flooded areas of Pennsylvania as your personal representative, you spelled out definitive instructions in four areas.

1. Work closely with the flood victims themselves. Meet with them. Visit their homes and businesses. Listen. Seek their ideas and criticisms as my guide to actions.

2. Combine all available talent, not only in Pennsylvania but in the entire Federal Government, into one effective, well-coordinated team geared to meet the immediate and long-term needs of the people.

3. Within the law, change or discard any rule if it will help even one family.

Consider this one: "I have a secret plan to end the war."

Who said it? Why, Richard Nixon of course. When? On March 5, 1968, in Nashua, N.H.. Or did he?

Everybody says he did, carefully using quotation marks to show the "secret plan" was right out of the 1968 candidate's mouth.

As George McGovern put it in 1971: "Three years ago, Richard Nixon campaigned on the pledge that he had a 'secret plan to end the war.' . . ." McGovern returned to the theme in his acceptance speech: "I have no 'secret plan.' . . ."

John Lofton, editor of the Republican National Committee's weekly publication, "Monday," has made a hobby of writing a polite query to everybody who quotes Richard Nixon directly as having used the words "secret plan." Once in a while he gets a reply.

The most forthright of these came from Anthony Lewis of The New York Times, who wrote in October 1969: "I think you have caught me in a mistake. The truth is I wrote that out of the same general impression that so many people seem to have. But I have now checked back through our files and agree with you that I cannot find the precise phrase 'a plan' in what Mr. Nixon said during 1968."

What Mr. Lewis did find, and what is most often cited as the basis for "secret plan," was this remark of Mr. Nixon's on March 5, 1968, in Nashua, N.H.: "And I pledge to you the new leadership will end the war and win the peace in the Pacific. . . ."

In late 1970, John B. Oakes, editor of the eitorial page of The New York Times, responded to a new query on another use of the "plan" by citing the same quotation and asking: "How could he make such a pledge if he didn't have a plan?" The Times editor argued: "It seems obvious that Mr. Nixon implied that he had a plan when he gave his pledge. But, as I say, it was doubtless an error to put the words in quotes and if that is what you want me to admit, I am glad to do so, and to state that it won't appear that way in this context again." Nor did it—in The Times.

Not everyone was willing to stop using the phrase when its unrealibility was pointed out. N.B.C.'s Edwin Newman replied: "When I spoke of a secret plan, I did not mean it as a quotation. It was shorthand, which is sometimes unavoidable, *for a plan that the President said he had* and the particulars of which he said he could not divulge without impairing the plan's chance of success." (Italics mine.)

Did Mr. Nixon ever say he had a "plan," secert or otherwise? He did not; nobody who has been challenged on the use of a direct quotation on this has ever come up with the citation of time or place. Mr. Nixon never said it; the use of quotation marks is inaccurate, unfair and misleading. But it continues, error feeding on error, as a myth becomes accepted as truth.

The question then becomes—if he did not actually say it, did he imply that he had a secret plan? His remarks on March 5, 1968, in Nashua, N.H., were a pledge "to end the war and win the peace." He continued he had no "push-button technique" in mind, but would "mobilize our economic and diplomatic and political leadership."

Not surprisingly, both press and political opponents came back with the question "How?" Newsmen pressed for details, and when no plan was set forth, its absence was noted. The first use of the word "plan" that I could find was in the March 11, 1968, New York Times subhead: "Nixon Withholds His Peace Ideas/Says to Tell Details of Plan Would Sap His Bargaining Strength If He's Elected." The Associated Press lead three days later added to the idea of a specific plan, necessarily cloaked in secrecy: "Richard M. Nixon says the reason he is not ready to spell out the details of his plan to end the war in Vietnam is because he is reserving his 'big guns' for use against President Johnson if he wins the Republican Presidential nomination."

In that A.P. story, Mr. Nixon stressed that he had "no magic formula, no gimmick. If I had a gimmick I would tell Lyndon Johnson." The furtherest he would be drawn into a discussion of a "plan" was this: "But I do have some specific ideas on how to end the war. They are primarily in the diplomatic area."

That's as much as the clips I have seen show about the "plan." Would a fairminded person say they constitute the basis for an inference that the candidate possessed a detailed, and necessarily secret, panacea for the conflict? I think not—no more than one would infer that Senator McGovern has a "secret plan" to fulfill his pledge to bring back the prisoners in ninety days.

Throughout the campaign and on into the years ahead, we can expect to hear some orators and commentators use a little inflection around "secret plan" that makes it sound like a quotation. The quotation thereof is no dark media conspiracy, just an example of how some writers and cartoonists, too lazy to check source materials, casually pick up and perpetuate an error. A small but hardy band of newsmen, with no constituency but objectivity, will wince when they see the non-quote quoted.

## CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there any further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

## INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business (S.J. Res. 241), which the clerk will report.

The second assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Calendar 929 (S.J. Res. 241) authorizing the President to approve an interim agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. What is the will of the Senate?

CALL OF THE ROLL

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Arkansas not lose his right to the floor.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk called the roll and the following Senators answered to their names:

[No. 420 Leg.]

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Allen | Byrd, Robert C. | Jackson |
| Buckley | Fulbright | Mansfield |
| Byrd, Harry F., Jr. | Hughes | |

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. A quorum is not present.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I move that the Sergeant at Arms be instructed to request the attendance of absent Senators.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from West Virginia.

The motion was agreed to.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Sergeant at Arms will execute the order of the Senate.

After some delay, the following Senators entered the Chamber and answered to their names:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Aiken | Fong | Nelson |
| Anderson | Gambrell | Packwood |
| Bayh | Goldwater | Pastore |
| Beall | Gravel | Pearson |
| Bellmon | Griffin | Pell |
| Bennett | Gurney | Percy |
| Bentsen | Hansen | Proxmire |
| Bible | Harris | Randolph |
| Boggs | Hart | Ribicoff |
| Brock | Hartke | Roth |
| Brooke | Hatfield | Saxbe |
| Burdick | Hollings | Schweiker |
| Cannon | Hruska | Scott |
| Case | Humphrey | Smith |
| Chiles | Inouye | Spong |
| Church | Javits | Stafford |
| Cook | Jordan, N.C. | Stennis |
| Cooper | Jordan, Idaho | Stevens |
| Cotton | Long | Stevenson |
| Cranston | Magnuson | Symington |
| Curtis | Mathias | Taft |
| Dole | McClellan | Talmadge |
| Dominick | Metcalf | Thurmond |
| Eagleton | Mondale | Tower |
| Eastland | Montoya | Welcker |
| Ervin | Moss | Williams |
| Fannin | Muskie | Young |

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Louisiana (Mrs. EDWARDS), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN), and the Senator from California (Mr. TUNNEY) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE) is absent on official business.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT), the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), and the Senator from Iowa (Mr. MILLER) are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GAMBRELL). A quorum is present.

The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, with respect to the cloture vote which will occur on tomorrow, I ask unanimous consent that all amendments at the desk at the time of the vote be considered as having been read in order to meet the reading requirement under rule XXII.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President——

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, as we resume the discussion of the interim agreement, I wish to say that I am indeed very sorry that the leadership felt compelled to file a cloture motion.

For the record, I would like to state

that, from the beginning, my position and the position, I believe, of those associated with me in the effort to approve, without qualification, the interim agreement that the Senate should proceed under the rules of the Senate in the regular manner and that any amendments to the resolution of approval should be presented and be subject to debate and amendment.

The sponsor of the proposed amendment which gives rise to this situation, the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON), has taken the position that he is unwilling to submit his amendment to the resolution in the absence of what is called a package agreement, that is, an overall agreement to limit time on all amendments to his amendment and provide for a specific time for final action on amendments and the resolution itself. That has been the reason why we have not been able to proceed in the usual manner for the discussion of and action upon amendments to the Interim Agreement.

As I said before, I consider the Interim Agreement a most important measure. It, together with the ABM Treaty, is, I believe, a most significant step if we can succeed in carrying through with it and proceedings to phase II negotiations. This is the most significant step since World War II toward some kind of reconciliation between the Communist nations and the non-Communist countries of the world. If we take this first step we might look toward a period of détente and possibly even a period in which the United Nations might be infused with new strength and hope.

I would remind the Senate that this agreement was negotiated over a 3-year period between our officials and the Russians at both Helsinki and Vienna. Those negotiations led to agreement at a meetings. We approved it unanimously and President Nixon in Moscow.

The Committee on Foreign Relations approved this agreement after full hearings. We approved it unanimously and with no amendments. We specifically discussed the possibility of various amendments and decided that amendments of any kind would be inappropriate. Since the committee reported the resolution, of course, amendments have been offered specifically the Jackson amendment, compelling us to review this position, and I have done so with other Members. Therefore, we will offer amendments to the Jackson amendment; if the Jackson amendment, in any form is adopted, other amendments will be offered, which are at the desk.

The President and his spokesman stated categorically at the time we reported this matter that the interim agreement adequately provides for our security. Numerous quotations from the President's statement in Moscow and in Washington, and also his spokesman, Mr. Kissinger, support this position. The President stated that at a minimum the United States has overall equality in strategic weapons. In some categories, of course, we are fairly superior; that is, in such things as nuclear warheads, for example, we have more than the Russians. We have superiority as a result of MIRV and also as a result of the stationing of our nuclear weapons in Europe. We have some 14 operational aircraft carriers and two under construction, I believe, and we will thus have about 16 very large, very expensive, very powerful aircraft carriers which can, as we know, be maneuvered close to the Soviet Union or any place else. In heavy bombers we also have about an advantage of three or four to one, with over 500 heavy bombers, whereas the Russians have about 150. These are approximate numbers. We have bases overseas for our submarines, and we have been told by experts that because of this geographic advantage for the U.S. it is necessary for the Soviets to have about three submarines for every two of the United States to keep the same number on station. In other words, the overseas bases we have in Spain, Scotland, and the Pacific enable our submarines to stay on station without going back and forth across the ocean for refueling, supplies, and so on.

So overall I think it is clear we have at least equality in some cases superiority. The only area in which the Russians have numerically more weapons is in the intercontental ballistic missiles, which are roughly in the position of 1,618 to 1,054.

Here again there is some slight difference in those categories as to size and throw weight, but difference is of very minimal significance because from testimony we had both recently and at the time of the ABM debate, it was quite clear that each side has far more destructive capacity in these missiles than is necessary to inflict what is called unacceptable damage to the other.

Mr. President, you will recall at the time of the ABM debate Secretary of Defense McNamara and others were talking about the mutual capacity to kill 100 million Americans and 100 million Russians and destroy 75 percent of all industrial capacity in either country, and so forth. These figures were bandied about in those hearings, but the significance is that we both have what is generally considered to be overkill capacity; that is, both sides have the capacity in the absence of an effective defense to destroy effectively the industrial capacity and an enormous number of the inhabitants of each side. The ABM treaty, of course, recognized that neither side has an effective defense against a nuclear attack. If it could be assumed the ABM was an effective defense to the missiles then there would be a more complex situation, but now we have had almost unanimous approval of the ABM agreement. The effect is that both sides give up the idea of trying to create an effective ABM defense weapons system, effective against the intercontinental ballistic missile. That is a very significant agreement.

I am very glad the ABM Treaty has been approved. But accepting that at its true value, and I have no reason to believe either side does not intend to abide by it, then the question is how much overkill, how much surplusage of destructive power is needed when we both can inflict unacceptable damage on the other.

That gives us a very different picture. The argument about superiority of numbers on the one side as opposed to the other has become almost irrelevant. However, that the core of the argument now being used is that we still must have superiority.

Mr. President, much has been written to the effect that the President has lent the prestige of his office to support the amendment by the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON), the amendment to the resolution authorizing the President to accept the Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons, the agreement the President signed in Moscow, subject to congressional approval.

I am struck by the irony of the situation. The most prominent, vocal critic of the Moscow agreements, the Senator from Washington, has enlisted the support of the President in opposition to the principal agreement the President brought back from Moscow, an agreement the President himself hailed as tangible evidence that mankind need not live forever in the dark shadow of nuclear war.

An agreement which, said the President, will provide renewed hope that men and nations working together can succeed in building a lasting peace.

The President is supporting the principal critic of these agreements—the Senator who has characterized the Interim Agreement negotiated by the President as one which puts the United States in a position of subparity.

Here are the words on August 7 of the Senator from Washington, Mr. JACKSON:

> We have, in the few brief years since the Kennedy Administration, gone from strategic superiority to parity to sufficiency—whatever that means—to *interim* subparity.

Who got the United States into a position of interim subparity?

None other than the President of the United States, says Mr. JACKSON. The President signed the agreement which Mr. JACKSON describes as putting the United States in a position of interim subparity. Lest there be doubt, the Senator from Washington removes it in these words: "in the interim agreement before the Senate we have subparity."

The Senator from Washington was referring to the interim agreement signed by President Nixon in Moscow in late May—let me make that crystal clear.

I happen to agree with the Nixon who in late spring described the agreements to Members of the Congress and the American people as agreements in which "neither side won and neither side lost—if we were to look at it very, very fairly, both sides won, and the whole world won."

They were the words of President Nixon.

I find myself in agreement with the position which the President took in late May—but opposed to his position in midsummer.

The careful examination which members of the Committee on Foreign Relations gave the interim agreement supports the proposition that the interim agreement is a good and significant first step.

But a first step must be followed by a

second, and a third, so that finally we may begin to move toward some control of man's ingenuity to destroy himself.

Now it appears that the President himself is beginning to have doubt about the wisdom of the first step he took in late May.

The officials who negotiated the agreement, Ambassador Gerard Smith and others, have been left dangling, not knowing what is going on. At a time when the White House needed people who could read the fine print in amendments such as that proposed by the Senator from Washington, the expertise was lacking.

What I find most disturbing about the waffling of the administration on the language of the Jackson amendment is that it does not seem to realize that this amendment not only condemns the agreement which this administration negotiated, but that it ties the hands of our negotiators when the next round of negotiations come up.

It was the President who announced many months ago that our nuclear arsenal should be determined by the concept of sufficiency. But the sponsor of the proposed amendment which he asks we adopt, refers to sufficiency as something he does not understand; sufficiency, whatever that is, said the Senator from Washington.

Sufficiency, to me, and I believe to the men who negotiated the accords, means that there is a limit to the need to have capacity to kill.

The chairman of the Armed Services Committee told us a few days ago that one U.S. nuclear submarine could destroy 25 percent of Soviet cities which have a significant industrial potential. Surely 20 or 30 times that amount is sufficiency.

But the thrust of the Jackson amendment—the thrust which the administration does not seem to comprehend, is that sufficiency is no longer to be the undergirding of our negotiating posture. The new word is superiority.

If we are to base our negotiations on the concept of superiority, we might as well save the time and effort of our negotiators because the other side will believe Mr. JACKSON, not the President, and will see us moving once again toward the concept of a first strike.

If the administration has not seen the writing on the wall, as it is revealed most skillfully in the Jackson amendment, surely they must see it in the rash of news stories in recent days which show our Military Establishment moving toward cruise missiles, not covered by the accords, and toward hardened war heads capable of a first strike designed to destroy retaliatory weapons in the hands of the Soviet Union.

The Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE) has properly asked the President to tell the Senate what is up. I think he deserves an answer.

For months now we have been told how inferior the United States is in weapons of all kinds.

This is part of the annual rite by which the Department of Defense gets appropriations. We shoud be smart enough to realize that now.

We should also be wary that by approval of the language of the Jackson amendment we are not endorsing a Gulf of Tonkin resolution for renewal of the arms race.

I anticipate that if this amendment is approved, in the years to come we will be confronted, each year, with the statement, "Well, you already approved it." It will be argued that we will need more and more intercontinental ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, and every other imaginable kind of weapons systems in order to comply with the interpretation of the language of the Jackson amendment.

I think the amendment of the Senator from Washington should be examined very carefully as to what it really means. I personally have no intention of voting for it, nor shall I vote for the resolution if it contains the Jackson amendment, even as amended—in other words, if it is not changed to become meaningless during this debate.

I think the administration should be absolutely clear on the meaning of every word. The President has himself, so far as I know, never given a definitive statement on his position on the Jackson amendment.

It was suggested by some committee members that it would help if the minority leader would get a letter signed by the President making his position quite clear. This was not done, and we were told it could not be done.

It is not enough to issue vague statements through a press secretary, as was done recently.

Are Members of this body to accept a statement from Mr. Ziegler that "We"—and I do not know who "we" is, "We endorse the Jackson amendment but we do not endorse the separate elaboration of the amendment."

This, I think is, at best, a very ambiguous or ambivalent statement.

WAFFLING ON THE JACKSON AMENDMENT

First. In early August, a version of the Jackson amendment was circulated and sponsors were invited to join it on the ground that it was endorsed by the White House. That was the amendment which stated that Congress would consider action on deployment by the Soviet Union, having the effect of endangering the survivability of the strategic deterrent forces of the United States, whether or not such action or deployment was undertaken within the terms of the interim agreement referred to in section 2, to be contrary to the supreme national interests of the United States. This was an invitation to the Soviet Union to denounce the agreement.

Second. When the White House read this fine print, and received word that a number of Senators were appalled by this language, the White House found it necessary on August 7 to abandon this language and to approve some substitute language. On that date the White House stated in a press conference that "the Jackson amendment is consistent with the undertakings in Moscow."

Third. Two days later, on August 9, the White House found it necessary once again to clarify its attitude toward the Jackson amendment and Mr. Ziegler said:

> We endorse the Jackson amendment and feel that that is consistent with our position but we do not endorse separate elaborations of that amendment. We feel the amendment, as offered, speaks for itself.

Mr. President, I once again emphasize these are the words of Mr. Ziegler. The words which I have quoted in other parts of my statement indicating support for the agreement as negotiated were, in many instances, the words of the President of the United States. He stated directly that this was a good agreement, and that it was in our interest and that it was quite adequate for our safety. Also Dr. Kissinger at the White House in the presence of about 100 Members of Congress was introduced by the President who said, after he had made a statement of his own:

> I authorize Mr. Kissinger to speak on my behalf about this.

The President said:

> I have another engagement, but Mr. Kissinger will speak for me.

I consider these statements to be more significant than those made at a press conference by Mr. Zeigler.

In any case, in view of this controversy, I find it strange that the President has not seen fit to issue directly, over his own signature or in person, a definitive statement about the situation in the Senate with respect to this agreement.

Fourth. One must ask, "What goes on?".

Who interprets Mr. JACKSON'S language—Mr. JACKSON, or the White House?

Confusion has been so rampant that it has been necessary for the Soviet Union to issue a clarifying statement.

Confusion about the meaning of the Jackson amendment led to stories in the press suggesting that the amendment by Mr. JACKSON had either been submitted to, or cleared by, the Russian Embassy. But the Soviet Embassy, in order to clarify the situation—this is rather unusual, I may say—issued the following statement, and circulated it to a number of Senators, I being one of them, although I know that others have received it as well.

It was a simple statement, on one page, which read as follows:

> In connection with the reports published in the American press to the effect that Soviet diplomats were consulted on Senator Jackson's resolution and allegedly gave "their acquiesence" to it the Embassy of the Soviet Union would like to state that there is no truth in these reports.

That is a rather unusual statement to be issued by any foreign embassy that I know of. I do not recall any precedent quite like it from the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, there have been some very good discussions about the significance of overkill, the significance of the development of the enormous capacity for destruction that exists in nuclear weapons, and the distinction which should be drawn between ordinary conventional weapons which we are accustomed to fighting with, such weapons

as we had in World War II, for example, and nuclear weapons. So I shall address myself for a few minutes to this subject.

WHAT IS AT ISSUE

Over the weeks since Mr. Nixon visited Moscow to sign the strategic arms limitation agreements, the Senate has gone to great lengths to learn as much as possible about these agreements and their implications. Now the Senate must decide whether to support those agreements or not—and, if it chooses to support them—what the nature of that support will be. Will the Senate express unequivocal support for a limitation of the arms race Or will the Senate qualify its support by appending an ambiguous statement of philosophy heavy with suspicion and distrust? The Jackson amendment is an amendment with serious implications and it deserves therefore the serious consideration of every Senator. With the knowledge, born of experience, that such resolutions may well acquire even greater importance as time passes, the Senate should not now give voice to a statement of philosophy without first judging carefully its full implications.

The Jackson amendment hinges upon its contention that a stable strategic balance is difficult to preserve. The amendment implies that we must be ever vigilant, else the other side suddenly emerge one day with a power that renders us "inferior." Is this a possibility? If it is not, then the Jackson amendment should be rejected: for the assumption that we are threatened by inferiority leads inevitably to far-reaching conclusions. We are quickly led to believe that we must be satisfied in future arms agreements only with some kind of measurable equality. And we are quickly convinced that, in the meantime, we must continue to purchase every available weapons system not specifically limited by agreement. Those are weighty and expensive conclusions. If the assumption from which they are drawn is faulty or misconceived, then we will have erred seriously. So that assumption must be carefully examined: Could we become "inferior?"

BACKGROUND

Beginning back in the mid-1950's, after the Soviet Union had acquired a nuclear delivery capability, we began to realize that our ability to deter an attack upon us rested in our ability to convey to any opponent an absolute certainty that any attack, however massive, would be answered by an unacceptably devastating reprisal. We began to appreciate that if a combined bomber and missile strike against us could succeed in decimating our nuclear forces to the point of virtual uselessness, we would in fact have no deterrent. That realization had a revolutionary impact on the pattern of our strategic thinking. We began to reassess some of the assumptions underlying our defense posture and we decided that the American deterrent was in need of some drastic revisions. The ultimate outcome of this reassessment was the far-reaching decision to expand, disperse, and protect the American retaliatory force, a decision made during the latter years of the Eisenhower era and carried through under the aegis of the Kennedy administration.

By the midpoint of the 1960's, the attainment of an invulnerable deterrent posture by the Soviet Union had changed things a great deal. Despite the repeated political crises and conflicts which beset it, the Soviet-American relationship had come to assume a remarkable degree of stability at the strategic level. The mainspring of that stability was, and still is, the mechanism of mutual deterrence, created and maintained by the existence of credible second-strike nuclear forces in the strategic arsenals of each side. These forces, in the form of hardened land-based ICBM's and submarine-deployed medium-range missiles, gave both countries the assured ability to ride out a premeditated nuclear first strike with enough residual arms to guarantee a crippling reprisal against the attacker. The paradoxical result was that each country, though totally vulnerable as never before, now assumed an unprecedented degree of security from its opponent's certitude that starting a general nuclear war would be suicidal. As a consequence, nuclear weapons had become both self-negating and substantially devoid of political exploitability.

The recent advent of ABM and MIRV technology and the continued expansion of the Soviet ICBM force throughout the past half decade, however, have aroused widespread fears among some Americans that the Soviet Union is now somehow set on a course of acquiring something called strategic "superiority." In its more alarmist variations, this argument maintains that the Soviet Union is moving dangerously close to achieving a nuclear first-strike capability against the United States, that Moscow's apparently conciliatory conduct in the SALT talks has been only a ruse to lull us into a false sense of security, and that we are now in jeopardy of having our deterrent capacity compromised.

THE DURABILITY OF MUTUAL DETERRENCE

All of these apprehensions are built upon the assumption that there are certain inherent qualities in such weapons as MIRV's and ABM's which make them fundamentally different from existing weapons systems. The idea has emerged that, because MIRV's provide their possessors with at least a fourfold increase in deliverable warheads, either side might be able to almost completely disarm its opponent's land-based missile force by attacking it with a skillfully planned MIRV barrage. If the attacker also had an effective ABM system, according to this conception, it could blunt any small retaliatory strike that the attacked country might still be capable of. Thus the advent of ABM's and MIRV's have revived the specter of a first-strike possibility. If both sides, by deploying an appropriate ABM–MIRV combination, developed such a first-strike capability, then we would be returned to the "delicate balance of terror" which existed in the 1950's.

But the ABM–MIRV first-strike threat is deceptive. For the U.S. retaliatory capability consists of a good deal more than just land-based missiles. It includes also a sizable number of manned bombers on continuous, quick-reaction alert status and a fleet of 41 nuclear submarines, each of which carries 16 medium-range Polaris missiles over half of which remain constantly on operational patrol. Each of these additional force categories would complicate the Soviet Union's war-planning effort enormously. The B–52 bomber contingent has the capability of being launched on sufficiently short warning to stand a good chance of evading destruction on the ground by any incoming missile attack, and these aircraft still possess a respectable capability for penetrating Soviet air defenses and geting through to their assigned targets. The Polaris fleet, for its part, is virtually invulnerabel to attack and will remain so until the Soviets can acquire an antisubmarine capability, a development which, according to all testimony, lies far beyond any foreseeable technological horizon. Thus the Soviet Union's defense would have to depend solely upon ABM's to sustain the brunt of retaliation. And so the fear that either side might, through an ABM–MIRV combination, suddenly emerge wtih a first-strike capability is still ill-founded. Even if either side undertook to acquire that vastly expensive combination, it would still be vulnerable. It is ironic that the Senate has, by approving the ABM treaty, now removed even the assumptions behind this illusory ABM–MIRV first-strike possibility; but we are still left with the climate of fear engendered by the advent of MIRV and ABM technology.

Eventually, what all Americans must be brought by their leaders to recognize is that the United States and the Soviet Union have long since reached a plateau in their strategic relationsip. The terms "mutual deterrence" and "nuclear stalemate" both describe it appropriately. From a strategic nuclear perspective, both sides are now inexorably equal, regardless of the further numerical additions or qualitative improvements in either side's arsenal. This is a fundamental and critically important point: we are equal not because we have numerically equivalent arsenals; our equality arises from the fact that we are alike in being deterred. This equality is not subject to sudden change or gradual erosion in the foreseeable future. It cannot be altered by the deployment of additional weapons today, nor is there foreseeable technology that could alter it.

THE "SUPERIORITY" FALLACY

Somehow, the notion that the United States should maintain strategic "superiority" over the Soviet Union, or that we should live in anxiety about the possibility that they will attain "superiority," has for years enjoyed an almost mystical fixation in our thinking. Perhaps this fixation can be partly explained by the natural psychological and chauvinistic satisfaction that Americans traditionally have drawn from being "stronger than," "better than," or "ahead of" their Communist adversary. For the most part, however, it seems to have arisen from a genuine belief that "superiority" somehow would give us advantages—either political or military or of some other sort.

Indeed, even some strategic analysts have been quick to assume that U.S. "superiority" has been the determining factor in various American foreign policy successes against the Soviet Union. Such an assumption demands closer examination.

It is widely agreed, of course, that nuclear weapons perform a deterrence function: They deter a premeditated attack directly upon one's homeland. This is a rather undemanding function; the weapons do not have to do anything but merely exist—in sufficient quantity to guarantee that we can retaliate against anyone else's first strike upon us. For this function, as has been discussed, relative numbers in the respective strategic arsenals are, by and large, unimportant. All one needs for deterrence is "enough" strength, even if that strength is less, in quantative terms, than that of the adversary.

But some people have adopted the belief that nuclear weapons can perform a second function: That, even without a first-strike capability, they can provide a sort of lever as we act in pursuit of our foreign policy objectives: In this view, we can get some extra utility out of our nuclear weapons, over and above their primary role of deterring an attack on our homeland, by making our adversaries fearful that, if they interfere with our global activities, they will subject themselves to the possibility of suffering incredible losses, either because we retaliate massively against their interference or because the confrontation could escalate out of control. Now, it is possible that this kind of function could have been performed by nuclear weapons during that period when the United States was the only nation to possess them. It was probably believable to other nations in the immediate postwar years—after we had shown ourselves willing to drop two atomic bombs on the cities of Japan—that we might use such weapons against those who confronted us around the world. But today is far different. Now that other nations possess these weapons, any threat—implied or otherwise—that we would resort to their use to support our objectives would certainly be met with incredulity, with utter disbelief. We have, to be sure, shown ourselves willing to wreak massive destruction upon a country which cannot strike back—as in Vietnam—but it is unlikely that anyone in the world believes we would do such things—in Vietnam or anywhere else—if there were any possibility at all that we would be attacked, even a small attack, with nuclear weapons.

Now, to be sure, there have been many occasions when the Soviet Union has backed away from crises when confronted with American diplomatic and military pressure. The question, however, is whether it was some kind of strategic "superiority" or really other factors which were the deciding elements in our favor. The Cuban missile crisis is the classic example often cited. In his famous nationwide television address, President Kennedy did indeed state that it would be our policy to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in this hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response against the Soviet Union. Kennedy did not, however, promise or threaten the Soviets with a nuclear retaliation if they failed to remove their missiles from Cuba. On the contrary, he only threatened such retaliation in the event that the missiles were actually fired. His threat may or may not have been believable—perhaps it was. But the main point is that his threat concerning our retaliating was not directed toward the objective of getting the Soviet missiles physically removed from Cuba. If he had threatened a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union if they did not remove their missiles, they surely would not have believed him. However greater our nuclear forces may have been in terms of numerical quantity, they were not enough to perform a successful first strike. The Soviet Union even with far less numerical strength, still possessed a second strike capability, and everyone on both sides knew it.

Of course, it can be asked: why, then, did Khrushchev back down? And for the explanation, we must look to other factors—apart from so-called American nuclear superiority. First of all, the crisis took place virtually within an arm's reach of our own borders; we had a preponderance of conventional power in this area. From the Soviet point of view, once they saw that we were concerned about the missiles, there was no guarantee that we would not use this conventional capability to remove the missiles from Cuba forcibly. That would have been a serious humiliation to the Soviet Union, much worse than that which occurred when they removed the missiles on their own decision under the terms of an understanding.

A second factor was that we had the force of resolve on our side. The Soviet Union had created the problem by altering the status quo; we had responded by making it clear that we found that the presence of Soviet weaponry in the Western Hemisphere posed a direct threat to our interest. The burden of responsibility for ending this tension was thus placed upon the Soviet Union. And third, when we placed a naval quarantine around Cuba and threatened to launch an air strike against the missiles already there, we placed the onus of decision directly upon the Soviets: any Soviet ship attempting to run the blockade would have to face the possibility of being sunk by our naval forces. While Khrushchev may have wanted the missiles in Cuba to start with, he was certainly under no obligation to risk armed conflict of any kind to keep them there.

So it is in these more conventional, less apocalyptic factors that the explanation of that classic and often cited episode must be found. It was a case not where nuclear "superiority" triumphed, but where the United States was able, by threatening the Soviet Union with the prospect of conventional war, to make the Soviet Union change its plans. The whole episode would very probably have occurred in the same way even if nuclear weapons did not exist. Afterward, although there was a good deal of self-congratulation about how our nuclear superiority had scared the Soviets off, President Kennedy was more realistic about the outcome. He said that the Soviets had backed down, in the final analysis, simply because they were wrong and that, at some future time, if they thought they were in the right and had vital interests to protect, they might very well not back down. In other words, they might choose to fight, even with a so-called nuclear inferiority, if the circumstances were different. Kennedy, much to his credit, realized that we had been lucky in the Cuban crisis. Under other circumstances, he realized, with mutual deterrence preventing either side from employing nuclear weapons, the Soviets might have felt that they had conventional superiority and that the battle was worth fighting. I would say that that is probably true with respect to their exploits in Eastern Europe.

To underscore this point, we need only recall the success of the Soviet Union in occupying Hungary in 1956 and in building the Berlin Wall in 1961. In both cases, the United States had a so-called "superiority" in nuclear power, and it did not change a thing. The Soviets had the force of resolve and conventional superiority on their side, and we were unwilling to risk war in order to avert their plans. In none of these crises—Hungary, Berlin, Cuba, or, I might add, Czechoslovakia—did the strategic nuclear equation really play any significant role in shaping the outcome of events. Indeed, it is one of the greatest ironies of the nuclear age that while enthusiasts in both Washington and Moscow have often lauded "superiority" as a goal, neither side has ever behaved internationally as though it mattered. The meaning of this is profoundly important: unless a nation uniquely possesses a first-strike capability—something no longer a possibility—then nuclear weapons give no advantage. Our nuclear weapons serve only one real function—to deter any potential enemy from using his.

THE REAL REASONS FOR ARMS CONTROL

Now the question might be asked: If mutual deterrence is so durable and mere numerical superiority gives no advantage, then why have SALT agreements at all? That is a question worth considering carefully. The administration, of course, has to its credit the achievement of having negotiated these agreements. Regrettably, however, they have given a sort of distorted justification for having done so. According to the administration, we needed these agreements to keep the Soviet Union from rushing ahead and gaining "superiority"—as if that were something they could actually do. By giving credence to the idea that there is such a thing as "superiority," the administration has, indirectly, given support to those in our country who are unhappy about the agreements and suspicious of the Soviet Union. For now that the notions of superiority and inferiority are abroad in the land, many people are doing a lot of mathematics and coming to alarming conclusions. They are saying that, in negotiating these agreements, we lost. We are in danger, they say, because even with the agreements, the Soviet Union may be able to acquire "superiority." Of course, the administra-

tion has its reasons for wanting to keep the specter of superiority alive. In this way, they can frighten the Congress and the people into paying billions more for new weapons systems—the Trident, the B–1, and so on—as the only way, even with the agreements, of preventing the Soviet Union from acquiring "superiority."

So it is worthwhile to look carefully at the reasons for having and supporting a limitation on offensive weapons. This agreement should be supported not because it offers a technique of keeping the Soviet Union from acquiring a nuclear "superiority;" the possibility of "superiority" is an illusion. There are other reasons far more sound for supporting such agreements:

First. Rationality and economy. First, there is the very rational justification that the agreement provides each side with a systematic, fear-reducing method of cutting back its vast expenditures on new weapons. As it is, each time either side spends billions of dollars on a new weapons system, that expenditure proves to have no significance other than waste. We are on a treadmill. Each side has already gained from its nuclear weapons as much security as life in this age will allow. Thus the new weapons which each side continues to acquire, each in emulation of the other, provide no gain. Like Alice in Wonderland, it takes all the running we can do just to keep in the same place. If we stood still, we would get just so far. And if these new strategic weapons have nothing to offer, then it it patently wasteful to expend the gargantuan amounts of our national resources which are necessary to produce and maintain them. As everyone now knows, modern weapons systems are enormously costly to create, develop, and deploy. If we spend our moneys and our energy on them, then we cannot do other things. President Eisenhower understood this perfectly:

> Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. The cost of one modern bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities. It is two electric powerplants, each serving a town of 60,000 population. It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. . . . We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people.

These astounding sacrifices of needed food, housing, and social services are now being made on both sides, so much so that there are probably no two countries in the world in greater need of a radical shift in economic priorities than the United States and the Soviet Union. A truly rational decision by either side would be to step off the nuclear arms treadmill unilaterally, for each side already has enough. But that kind of supreme rationality on either side is unlikely in the real world. This is why the SALT agreements are so valuable and so deserving of our unequivocal support: they offer both sides a calm, calculated method of stepping off the treadmill together.

Second. Nuclear proliferation. The second reason for supporting the offensive-weapons limitation has to do with the rest of the world. Today, as both the United States and the Soviet Union have apparently recognized, we live in a world that is not very easy to control. People everywhere are nationalistic; they care more about themselves and their own countries than about the ideologies of the two so-called powers. They are, as they should be, intractable—going their own way in the world. But it is a world in which nuclear weapons technology has become virtually a free-market commodity. And many of the countries on the threshold of acquiring a nuclear capability have made it abundantly clear that a precondition of their acceptance of nonproliferation must be a demonstrated willingness on the part of the superpowers to modulate their own nuclear arms race. When the United States and the Soviet Union signed the nonproliferation treaty, they acknowledged that precondition. Now we are obliged to follow through with substantive action. To do otherwise—preaching the virtues of nonproliferation while at the same time continuing on as we have—would be seen, and rightly, as a kind of double dealing. It could only serve to aggravate the probability that those nations with the scientific ability to develop nuclear weapons will do so.

Third. The value of dialog. A third cogent reason for supporting the SALT limitations is that these continuing negotiations, and the contact they provide, afford us an opportunity to get to know the Soviet Union better. And likewise for them to know us better. Not nearly enough attention has been paid, either by scholars or government officials, to the persistent mutual misperceptions and misunderstandings which have continually plagued Soviet-American relations. More often than not, these misperceptions and misunderstandings have been substantially due to distorted images generated by insufficient information. Much of this groping in the dark can be significantly reduced in the course of the continuing dialog we have now begun. While the subject matter will often be weapons interactions and strategy trade-offs, which are technical matters, we eventually in such discussions begin to learn a great deal about the fears, calculations, and motivations which move the two sides. These continuing talks give us the opportunity to learn from experience, in a way that no preaching or theorizing can teach us, what the other side is really like.

Fourth. Tension reduction. Finally, we should support the SALT agreements because our own country, and surely the Soviet Union as well, needs some psychic relief from the breathtaking pace and continuing tension of the nuclear arms race. Whether or not we have in recent years been secure in any objective sense, we have certainly not behaved like a nation which felt secure. Perceptions of security are, at bottom, rooted in obscure processes of the mind; surely they do not come from the logical deductive schemes of the strategic theoretician. The arms race, as it continues, may not alter the security of either side at all—objectively, it almost surely would not—but the race does tend to maximize each side's inner feeling of insecurity and to heighten the compulsions which we feel: to be "vigilant" and ever watchful of new danger, unseen but just around the corner. Arms control, as we begin slowly to perform it with these first agreements, can help us to begin to eliminate the sources of these perceived insecurities. And by doing that, arms control can reduce the tension, both within each of the two superpowers and between them.

CONCLUSION

Twice in the past 20 years, we have had to accommodate, in our thinking and planning, qualitative changes in our strategic nuclear position. The first came in the early 1950's, when the Soviet Union initially acquired an air-deliverable nuclear capability, and we were confronted for the first time with the realization that an unrestricted war could now mean unimaginable destruction to both sides. We had lost our nuclear monopoly.

The second change, described earlier, came in the later 1950's, as the Soviet Union attained a large enough strategic capability to place our vulnerable retaliatory forces in possible danger of being destroyed by a surprise first strike. We realized that such situation was unstable, and we moved to harden and disperse our strategic arsenal so as to provide a guaranteed nuclear second-strike capability. The Soviet Union followed suit shortly thereafter with a similar hardening and dispersal program of its own, and the nuclear era evolved from its second phase—a delicate balance of terror—into its third and present phase of stable mutual deterrence.

Somehow the heightened activity of recent American and Soviet weapons-development programs has led many Americans to fear that the East-West nuclear equation is once again on the verge of a qualitative shift. But, particularly in light of the open abandonment by each side of the attempt to shield itself with antiballistic missiles, there is simply no reasoned basis for this fear. The Soviet-American strategic relationship has become firmly immobilized—at least for any foreseeable future—by the durability of mutual deterrence; and while new weapons deployments by either or both superpowers may induce numerical fluctuations in the strategic balance, neither the stability of that balance nor the security it provides will be significantly affected in the process.

Viewed with this perspective, it becomes clear that the current Senatorial debate over the Jackson amendment represents a very fundamental choice. The argument is not between those who advocate American strength and those who think we can get by with weakness. The argument is not between those who trust the Soviets and those who do not. The argument is between those who still believe that security in the nuclear age depends upon the numerical measurement of destructive power and those who

realize that we have entered an era in which such measurements no longer have any meaning. In sum, we can choose now between continuing to deploy newer and ever newer weaponry in a perpetual yet illusory pursuit of additional security and additional advantage or we can render firm and unequivocal support to a meaningful and productive arms-limitation dialog with the Soviets.

Much of the importance of the SALT agreements arises from their symbolism. They represent the realization by both sides that arms spending is inherently wasteful and that neither side, with all its astronomical spending, is achieving anything by it. The creation of that symbolism is actually the most important aspect of what has thus far been accomplished; for neither side has yet agreed to give up a great deal in substance. We have, however, made a beginning—which symbolizes a new way of thinking about weapons and represents an important first step in bringing them under control. But that symbolism is delicate. It could still be destroyed, and with it the spirit of trustful negotiation for mutual benefit which has now been born. Were the Senate to approve the Jackson amendment, it would not only jeopardize that spirit, it would compound our mistake by giving voice to outmoded notions of nuclear superiority that can only lead to the further purposeless waste of our resources, energy, and national spirit.

Mr. President, in connection with my earlier comments on the mutual sufficiency we and the Russians have to destroy each other, on September 7, there was an interesting report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. I wish to read an article entitled "Nuclear Aggressor Doomed, Study Finds," published in the Washington Post on September 8, 1972. It reads as follows:

NUCLEAR AGGRESSOR DOOMED, STUDY FINDS

LONDON, September 7.—The International Institute for Strategic Studies said today that nuclear parity has made it impossible for the United States or the Soviet Union to launch a nuclear war without incurring "obliteration."

Neither superpower can disarm the other by a "first strike" and each has enough delivery vehicles and weapons "to destroy any conceivable combination in a second-strike targets within the other's territory," the institute said in a survey report entitled "The Military Balance 1972–73."

"Whatever detailed calculations may be constructed, neither superpower can consider itself to have any significant advantage over the other in terms of freedom to engage in nuclear war without incurring obliteration," it concluded.

The Institute said 1972 could be viewed as a "turning point" because of the SALT agreements between the United States and Russia.

The Institute, founded in 1958 as a research center on problems of defense, security and arms control, describes itself as independent of governments. It has an international council and staff.

Mr. President, I might add that that institution over the years has had a reputation for being extremely conservative in these matters. This report conforms with my earlier remarks about our nuclear deterrent.

Mr. President, there is another item that I wish to draw to the attention of the Senate.

The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association has passed a resolution firmly supporting the interim agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

The association urges that the Congress authorize approval by the President of the agreement and the associated protocol. The association also asks that—

The Government of the United States . . . seek promptly to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on further measures limiting and reducing strategic offensive arms, and on general and complete disarmament, in accordance with the provisions of the preamble and Article XI of said treaty and of Article VII of said interim agreement.

I ask unanimous consent that the telegram from the Secretary of the American Bar Association be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the telegram was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
*August 17, 1972.*

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
*Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, New Senate Building, Capitol Hill, D.C.:*

On Wednesday afternoon, August 16, 1972, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted the following resolutions:

Whereas, the United States has undertaken by the terms of article VI of the nonproliferation treaty of 1968, to which it is a party, to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control", and expressed a similar intention in the preamble of the limited test ban treaty of 1963; and

Whereas, it has for some years been a major objective of the United States to reduce the risk of military confrontation with the Soviet Union, particularly if involving the use of strategic or nuclear weapons; and

Whereas, it has also been a major objective of the United States to slow down and arrest the escalation of armaments, in particular in the field of strategic weapons; and

Whereas, the needs of the people, in the United States and elsewhere, require the allocation of greater financial and other resources, some of which might not be available if increased military expenditures occur; and

Whereas, the United Nations and various of its committees have for many years urged strategic nuclear arms control and disarmament measures; and

Whereas, the United States and the Soviet Union have sought since 1967 to begin negotiations on agreements to limit strategic weapons, and began such negotiations in November 1969, and have reached certain agreements expressed in a proposed treaty and interim agreement, both signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972, by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev; and

Whereas, the Senate, on August 3, 1972, advised and consented to the ratification of the said treaty; and

Whereas, negotiations on further agreements will be facilitated by approval by the Congress of the said interim agreement as well; and

Therefore, be it resolved, That the American Bar Association urges the Senate and House of Representatives to authorize approval by the President of the United States of the interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, and the associated protocol, all of which were signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972 by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev; and

Be it further resolved, That the President or his designee be authorized to appear before the appropriate committees of the Congress in support of such action; and

Be it further resolved, That the American Bar Association urges the Government of the United States to seek promptly to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on further measures limiting and reducing strategic offensive arms, and on general and complete disarmament, in accordance with the provisions of the preamble and article XI of said treaty and of article VII of said interim agreement.

KENNETH J. BURNS, Jr.,
*Secretary of the American Bar Association.*

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I have, of course, submitted an amendmen to the Jackson amendment on behalf of myself and, I believe, nine other cosponsors. As I said at the beginning of my remarks, the Foreign Relations Committee has long felt that this resolution approving the Interim Agreement should not have any amendments whatever to detract from its significance.

The House of Representatives, I understand, has passed a resolution in that form. I offer my amendment to the Jackson amendment regretfully because I would not have offered a clarifying amendment of any kind except for the doubts the Jackson amendment has created as to the serious intent of the President to negotiate further nuclear weapons limitations. I want to make that very clear.

If my amendment is agreed to, its effect would be to clarify the significance of the whole question. I believe that the Jackson amendment is ambiguous. It has been packaged and sold so that many people understand that its purpose is to provide guidelines for future negotiations requiring our negotiators to seek equality of strategic nuclear forces with the Soviet Union. This seems reasonable. Who could be against equality?

However, the implication is quite clear from the way it was phrased that the Interim Agreement is not based upon a one for one equality of strategic forces. The real meaning of the Jackson amendment calling for equality is not that there be overall strategic equality of nuclear force, but numerical equality and, one could say megatonnage equality, if he wishes. However, if there is required to be one for one specific numerical equality with respect to ICBM's, submarines, and other items which are covered in the language of the Jackson amendment's reference to "intercontinental strategic forces," then there is inequality or superiority on our part, because we are far ahead of the Russians when one takes into account MIRV weapons, geographical factors, war heads, et cetera.

But in any case I believe it is the overall equality in strategic nuclear weapons that the President had in mind as a basis for the agreement. In fact, I am convinced of that. The agreement was nego-

tiated on that basis. It did not include such items as aircraft carriers and forward based nuclear attack weapons and bombers. At this stage, those factors were too difficult to reconcile. But this agreement is a first step, achieved with great difficulty.

It has been suggested by some of those supporting the Jackson amendment—suggested privately; I am not sure I heard it publicly—that after this long period of nearly 3 years of negotiations with no agreement having been achieved, the President, for his own purposes, this being an election year, was determined to get an agreement. It has been suggested by some in my presence that the President went to Moscow and accepted an improper, improvident, and unwise agreement, because of his anxiety to obtain an agreement now, so that it could become a foreign policy asset in his election this year. I have heard this suggested in the last 2 days.

This is the kind of statement or suggestion that I guess is intended to appeal to Democrats and persuade them to support the Jackson amendment. I reject that. Obviously I am not a greater supporter or confidant, politically speaking, of the President. I do not believe he went to Moscow, not having achieved an agreement in Helsinki or Vienna, and insisted on an agreement against the interests of the United States. After long and thorough study of the agreement I do not believe it is against the interest of the United States, and I do not think there is any real substance to the argument that we have an inferior position.

It is incredible to me that there are people in this body who on one occasion brag about the technical superiority of the United States, about the efficiency of our private enterprise system—people who state we are the most advanced country in the world in the field of industrialization, that we have done the most in the highly sophisticated realm of computers and guidance systems, and so forth, and they brag on it; and then, when we come to an argument like this, suddenly we become inferior, and suddenly, although we have spent far more money on weapons than the Russians, we become inferior. They cannot have it both ways.

Mr. President, one cannot in 1 day engage in self-adulation and brag about our superiority—as a matter of fact I subscribe to our superiority. If we had not wasted our resources on the war in Vietnam we would have outdistanced all countries. We still are the most industrialized Nation. But you cannot, on the one hand, say we are far ahead in our technological capacity to produce and then turn around and say that we are inferior by 3 to 2. We cannot say we have a far more sophisticated populous, people trained in the sciences and mathematics, and so forth, and far superior to the Russians, and then say we do not get our money's worth when we buy weapons.

Mr. President, these arguments do not pan out. We are either efficient or we are not. I believe we are. We have more and better weapons than any nation in the world, including Russia. I do not mean by that they do not have the capacity to build weapons; of course, they do. But we are told the implication of the Jackson amendment is that we are inferior and rapidly deteriorating.

We made deliberate choices in past years and I think they were correct. We made these choices when there was not an ulterior motive. We were told that a choice between the Minuteman and the Titan was a good choice; that it was efficient to make smaller weapons rather than larger weapons. Even small and large are not good descriptions because a small nuclear weapon is so large it can wreak havoc on any city in the world, and destroy tens of thousands of people if dropped in the middle of New York or Moscow. But we were told we made a deliberate choice to have small weapons. So far as I can see it is a good choice. Data supplied to the committee still substantiates that.

But what of the future? What is the motive for continuing the arms race? What could be the possible objective of sabotaging our effort to approve the first phase of the SALT talks? What can possibly be accomplished by raising doubt that the first agreement made in this area by the President of the United States is a dubious agreement and that it does not provide for the security of this country, and that in the future we have to resume the concept of superiority, phrased in the terminology of equality in certain areas? It can mean nothing else but that we are not content with overall equality, or parity, or sufficiency, such as the President stated, but that we are to return to negotiations based on the concept of superiority. We already have superiority. As I said, with respect to aircraft carriers and bombers, there is no prospect whatever that the Russians plan to build aircraft carriers, because they are very vulnerable. No other country in the world in recent years has built them. The British have stopped it.

But in any case this interim agreement is one of the most important matters we have to deal with this year. If we cannot make any progress in this area, I see no end to the arms race. This would be a most serious setback if at this late date, after all the attention given to this matter we should be qualified in our approval of this agreement.

As I said in my prepared remarks about symbolism, there are many implications. Many things indicate the reaction of the Russians. If we adopt the Jackson amendment, unamended, the Russians will take it to mean we are not serious about further negotiations on arms control. They would take it to mean that Congress is still determined to go forward to acquire new superiority or possibly even resumption of the concept of trying to acquire a first-strike capability. That concern is strengthened by both the Jackson amendment and the recent discussion of further steps to create weapons to destroy hard-site missiles. However, the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE) has an amendment dealing with this subject.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point an article from the New York Times of September 5, 1972, entitled "Soviet Says Pentagon Violates Arms Spirit."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SOVIET SAYS THE PENTAGON VIOLATES ARMS-PACT SPIRIT

Moscow, September 4.—The Soviet Union accused the Pentagon today of violating the spirit of Soviet-American agreements limiting their strategic arsenals and jeopardizing their effectiveness by pressing for accelerated development of new American offensive military systems.

Izvestia, the Government newspaper, pointed to the next round of negotiations this fall and said that possibilities for broadening the agreements "will be determined, in many respects, by the degree to which the sides observe not only the letter but also the spirit of the understanding reached."

Its primary criticism was directed at the position of Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird that the Pentagon could not support the agreements signed in Moscow last May unless funds were voted by Congress for accelerated development of the new longer-range Trident underwater missile and the B–1 strategic bomber.

FIRST ATTACK ON POSITION

Although the commentary did not mention Mr. Laird by name, this was the first time that his position had been so forthrightly attacked in the Soviet press since President Nixon's visit here in May.

The lengthy Izvestia commentary also renewed earlier Soviet objections to Senator Henry M. Jackson's effort to attach conditions to a Congressional resolution approving the interim agreement to limit offensive nuclear arsenals.

It was seen as an effort by Moscow to discourage support for the Washington Democrat's maneuver when the resolution comes up for a vote in the Senate. The House has already overwhelmingly approved the resolution.

Senator Jackson is trying to attach a rider that would require future agreeemnts to be based on the principle of equality of forces because of his objections to certain numerical advantages granted to Moscow under the current formula.

Today's commentary was directed not only against such a move, which it dismissed as an unwarranted re-interpretation of the agreement, but also against the longer-term programs of the Pentagon although they do not abrogate any specific terms of the accords.

"Opposition to the Soviet-American agreements, mostly coming from the Pentagon and industrialists linked with it, stands in the way of limiting the arms race and general prospects for disarmament," Izvestia said.

The commentary told Soviet readers that expenditures sought by the Pentagon for the new bomber and the underwater missile were being justified not so much because of their desirability but on the contention that they were necessary "to force the U.S.S.R. to take further steps" to curb the arms race.

"It is evident," Izvestia asserted, "that without apparently formally violating the letter of the Moscow agreements, one can still fundamentally violate the general spirit of the agreement by unilateral acts, thus jeopardizing the effectiveness of the agreement itself."

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, this is simply an indication of the first reaction, to my knowledge, on the part of the Soviets to both the enormous increase which we have just authorized in our new weapons systems, specifically the Trident and the B–1, and the Jackson amendment.

I wish to make this record as complete as I can, because I anticipate this will be the last primary discussion of this matter, and I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article by Chalmers Roberts in the Washington Post on the 16th of August, entitled "Promise of SALT: What's Happening?" which I think is an interesting observation.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BACKWARD OR FORWARD?—PROMISE OF SALT: WHAT'S HAPPENING?

(By Chalmers M. Roberts)

Less than three months ago Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed their names to "basic principles of relations" between the two superpowers, a sort of codification of the President's pledge that the United States would move from "an era of confrontation" to an "era of negotiation." The Nixon-Brezhnev "principles" included a statement that "differences in ideology and in the social systems" are not a bar to normal relationships, that both nations "will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations" and that both recognize they should eschew "efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly."

Three days earlier the two leaders had signed the strategic arms limitation (SALT) agreements. In assessing the Soviet-American atmosphere at the end of the Moscow summitry Henry Kissinger remarked that "I think trust has developed but not the point that it could survive a major challenge that one side would put to the other that affects its own estimate of its vital interests."

It is against this background, it seems to me, that one should assess the Jackson amendment to one of the two SALT pacts, that limiting offensive weapons. The fate of the amendment is far less important that what the discussion of it disclosed about the post-summit attitudes in Washington. The same is true of the related new, more accurate and more powerful American missile warheads that the administration has requested. Like a summer lightning storm the discussion suddenly illuminated the landscape in this capital, both in the Senate and in the White House and elsewhere in the executive branch.

"Confrontation" and "negotiation" are not, of course, mutually exclusive and that is just as true in Moscow as in Washington. Mr. Nixon last July 27 said that "the decision with regard to the SALT agreements involved a fight between the hawks and doves" in his own administration. On July 15 Kissinger remarked at a congressional briefing that during the SALT negotiations "we were acutely conscious of the contradictory tendencies at work in Soviet policy"—in other words, the hawk-dove problem in the Kremlin.

In asking both for congressional approval of the two SALT pacts and for money for the Trident submarine and B–1 bomber programs the President said Brezhnev and his colleagues "made it absolutely clear that they are going forward with defense programs in the offensive area which are not limited by these agreements." Soviet sources in a position to know about those conversations, however, contend that Mr. Nixon's version stretched Brezhnev's remarks for his own purposes. But American sources, equally in the know, contend Brezhnev left no doubt about what Mr. Nixon said he said. Jackson commented that he was "disturbed by the report of the President" on Brezhnev's remarks.

What the Jackson amendment affair plus the revelation of the new missile warhead program demonstrates is the limited meaning being applied by the Nixon Administration to the Moscow "basic principles of revelations" and that we can expect to see a lot more "confrontation" along with future "negotiation." Indeed, the "trust" about which Kissinger spoke seems close to non-existent.

Jackson made his own motivation clear enough. He considered the offensive weapons agreement put the United States at a disadvantage and he used the amendment device to lock the administration into a SALT II posture of accepting nothing less than what he termed "a restoration of parity." The gloss he supplied on what constitutes "parity" made it clear he meant what those Americans who negotiated the agreements and many others consider old fashioned "superiority." What Jackson could not do by direction—defeat the agreement in the Senate—he sought to do by indirection—tie the administration's hands in the negotiations ahead that are designed to turn the five year agreement into a permanent treaty.

The Kremlin reaction to all this is unclear but not difficult to imagine. Quite probably the Moscow hawks have gained a point in their continuing suspicion of arms agreements with the United States. Whatever chance there was for both Washington and Moscow to exercise mutual restraint by not doing what they legally could do within terms of the SALT pacts has been diminished.

The history of the action-reaction phenonemon in the Soviet-American arms race clearly indicates that the dominant pressure in both capitals is to build those arms not forbidden by agreement out of fear that the other side will do so to its own advantage.

The tragedy is that the long history of the Cold War, of Soviet-American ideological differences on top of clashes of national interest, makes mutual restraint exceedingly difficult to achieve. As Jerome H. Kahan of the Brookings Institution put it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 28: "In theory, both nations ought to exercise unilateral restraint and pursue purely stabilizing strategic policies. But experience shows that neither nation has taken such initiatives."

The promise of SALT was more than just the important limitations for the first time on both offensive and defensive strategic weapons. The hope of Mr. Nixon's Moscow visit, in Kissinger's words, was that it would "mark the transformation from a period of rather rigid hostility to one in which, without any illusions about the differences in social systems, we would try to behave with restraint and with a maximum of creativity in bringing about a greater degree of stability and peace." Hence the language of the "basic principles" signed in Moscow. Hence Mr. Nixon's remark in his address to Congress that his Moscow and Peking trips had done away with "the kind of bondage" of which George Washington had said: "The nation which indulges toward another in habitual hatred is a slave to its own animosity."

In this larger context both the Jackson amendment and the new missile warhead program represent backward, not forward, steps.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I also noticed in this morning's newspaper a significant article, which does not bear directly upon this agreement, but which revives memories of the period of Khrushchev. When Khrushchev visited the United States, he visited the Committee on Foreign Relations. The reason why he visited the Committee on Foreign Relations was that the House of Representatives had an antagonistic attitude toward him, and the Speaker of the House refused to have a joint session for the leader of one of the most powerful nations in the world, with whom our relations are so important. So as a result, as a sop to him, the Foreign Relations Committee was asked to receive Mr. Khrushchev. He went about this country, visited Iowa, and was shown the corn-growing operations there, and so on.

As I look back on that period—not only I, but many people, astute observers, in my opinion—feel the United States missed an opportunity at that time to take steps toward the improvement of our relations with the Soviet Union which could lead to a limitation of arms, to an increase in trade, and so forth. I believed—others shared that view; I have read that—that Khrushchev was making gestures, within the climate in his own country that would allow him to do so, suggesting better relations with us, and during his trip he made many statements which the record in our committee indicated were designed, in many cases, to show that he wanted to imitate the economic accomplishments of the United States.

On the whole, we rejected any such overtures. Our reaction and particularly the Cuban affair led to the removal of Khrushchev. His polities of rapprochement with the United States had proved to the Russians that he was ineffective and futile, and he was removed. I believe that was one of the principal reasons why he was removed.

This morning in the Washington Post there is an article by Mr. Victor Zorza, who, I believe, is admitted as being an expert on the Soviet Union, entitled "Storm Brewing for Brezhnev." His article is related to the point I have discussed.

I ask unanimous consent that that entire article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STORM BREWING FOR BREZHNEV

(By Victor Zorza)

The storm clouds gathering over the Kremlin could be the first intimation of a new conflict in the Soviet leadership.

This year's disastrous harvest is being blamed on the weather, while the expulsion of the Russians from Egypt is blamed on the undependable Arabs, but a good management team in Moscow might have averted both mishaps.

This at any rate, is what would be said by those who have been kept off the team by Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist Party's general secretary, and who believe that they could have done better, as unsuccessful aspirants to high office everywhere believe.

In the West, they would have an opportunity to trumpet their claims from the election hustings every four years or so. In the Soviet Union, they have usually had to wait for an accumulation of bad luck and political errors on the part of an incumbent leader to trip him up.

The first indications of leadership trouble are usually provided by the Moscow rumor mill, and by indications between the lines of the Soviet press that not all is well.

The U.S. embassy in Moscow has now picked up enough of the background noise to send Washington a dispatch detailing the reasons Brezhnev's position might be regarded as somewhat shaky. Both the harvest and the Middle East fiasco loom large in its assessment.

The United States has made use of Brezhnev's political need for foreign grain and

other goods to force him into concessions. The bombing and mining of North Vietnam just before the May summit was the stick, and the possibility of large and prompt grain supplies to avert a domestic crisis was an important part of the carrot.

Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz was sent to Moscow to explore the possibilities just before the summit. On his return, he said that the Russians "understand the language of naked power—the kind of language President Nixon is now speaking."

The Soviets virtually abandoned Hanoi, and pressed it so hard to make a deal with the United States as to cause the North Vietnamese press to hint at betrayal by Moscow. Soon after that American grain began to flow to the Soviet Union.

But this was before the full extent of the harvest failure became evident even to the Russians. Further indications of future food shortages have become available since then, and present sabotages are already being reported from such sensitive areas as the highly industrialized Gorky Province.

Brezhnev's need for foreign grain is likely to become greater, not less, and so is his vulnerability both to pressure from abroad, and to criticism at home.

The critics could blame him first for failing to put agriculture on its feet, which he promised to do when he overthrew Khrushchev, and then for making concessions to the United States in exchange for the grain he has failed to produce himself.

Khrushchev's own position was weakened considerably by his agricultural failures and his decision to pour Moscow's precious hoard of gold into capitalist coffers in exchange for grain.

Brezhnev's failure in Egypt is also linked with his dealings with the White House. Cairo claims that it ordered the expulsion of the Russians only after Brezhnev had committed himself at the Moscow summit to withhold the arms Egypt wanted. Brezhnev's domestic critics could thus argue that his concessions have greatly weakened the Soviet Union's position in the world.

Certainly just before the summit there were those in the Soviet leadership who were unalterably opposed to Brezhnev's intended concessions. But Ukrainian party chief Pyotr Shelest, who was dismissed on the very eve of Mr. Nixon's arrival in Moscow for precisely such opposition, is still a full voting member of the Kremlin Politburo.

The flurry of Soviet press articles after the summit to defend the Moscow accords against unidentified Communist critics made it clear that Shelest and his friends had not surrendered.

Even the agreements on strategic arms limitation are giving rise, between the lines, to a leadership debate which shows that Brezhnev's wisdom is being questioned.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The article reads in part:

The storm clouds gathering over the Kremlin could be the first intimation of a new conflict in the Soviet leadership.

This year's disastrous harvest is being blamed on the weather, while the expulsion of the Russians from Egypt is blamed on the undependable Arabs, but a good management team in Moscow might have averted both mishaps.

Then it discusses various other matters, and the last paragraph reads:

The flurry of Soviet press articles after the summit to defend the Moscow accords against unidentified Communist critics made it clear that Shelest and his friends had not surrendered.

Even the agreements on strategic arms limitation are giving rise, between the lines, to a leadership debate which shows that Brezhnev's wisdom is being questioned.

So we have a picture in Moscow, in the Kremlin, in the Politoburo, in which Mr. Shelest, who is the Ukrainian party chief and one of the leading members, is playing a role which appears to be similar to that of the junior Senator from Washington. He is raising questions about Mr. Brezhnev and making the assertion that Brezhnev has made an agreement which is unsatisfactory to the Soviet Union. So we have a tit-for-tat operation. Obviously in a country like the Soviet Union, which is a big country, just as ours is, there are going to be differences in the Politburo and the Central Committee, which corresponds, in a vague sort of way, as nearly as it can, to the differences going on in the Congress and the Executive in this country.

What is so unfortunate and tragic is that these gentlemen on both sides of the world and in both nations do not believe in rapproachment; they believe in force; they have no confidence whatever in diplomacy or negotiation between great countries; they believe the only way they can preserve their safety is through more and more military power. This type of suspicious personality is coming to the fore in both countries. They are criticizing the men who reached this agreement. In the case of the United States, the proposal is before the Senate to qualify the agreement made by President Nixon. It is alleged that the agreement fixes an inferior status for us. In Moscow it is Mr. Shelest and his friends who are saying Mr. Brezhnev did not look out for the security of Moscow.

So we have a repetition of our inability to reach agreement with Russia years ago, and, in my opinion, it will be a great tragedy if, 10 years from now, we look back, after we have spent perhaps $500 billion on more sophisticated weapons, and then try again to reach some accommodation.

I think it is significant that they are now questioning Mr. Brezhnev, and I assume and I suspect, on much the same grounds that the Senator from Washington is questioning the agreement made by Mr. Nixon.

Of course, I hasten to add the Senator from Washington is not making a personal attack on the President, because he is on very good relations, so far as I know, with the President; but the effect of it is to question the President's handiwork, in much the same way as questions are being raised about Mr. Brezhnev.

Mr. President, I do have a related matter. It is not directly on this, but it is material which should be made available because it is an aspect of the cost of the war, because the arms race is a major part of the contributing causes of inflation and the distortion and disruption of our own economy.

It should be perfectly evident, I think, to anyone that the exorbitant amount of money, which is now in the neighborhood of $1,000 or $300 or $400 billion on military operations, hardware, and related costs since World War II, has undermined our economy and has created inflation which has made us noncompetitive in international trade. That is one aspect of the arms race.

I have prepared, also, some material more directly on the cost of the war in Vietnam, which I think fortifies the conclusion that we simply can no longer afford to carry on the policies we have of relying so exclusively on military force and on the exertion of our power abroad, as in Vietnam, and the preparation for military activities in the future, and the maintenance of bases abroad. I wish to put those into the RECORD.

TIME FOR AN ACCOUNTING—THE COST OF NIXON'S WAR

Mr. President, four and a half years ago Richard Nixon, launching his campaign for President, said:

If in November this war is not over after all of this power has been at their disposal, then I say that the American people will be justified to elect new leadership and I pledge to you the new leadership will end the war and win the peace in the Pacific and that is what America wants.

Mr. President, I wish to reiterate that this is, to the best of my knowledge, an accurate quotation. I say that because in the New York Times, there were two articles questioning whether the President had campaigned on the basis of a secret plan for ending the war.

I have not, and no one that I know of has, seen a secret plan, but this is a major quotation which certainly indicates President Nixon's committment at that time to end the war, and on other occasions as well he pledged himself to end the war.

Mr. Nixon has had 3½ years to end the war. Yet the killing continues unabated, his pledge to end the war unfilled. In 1964 the voters of America elected a President who said he would keep them out of war. In 1968 they elected a man who said he would get them out of the war they did not want to get into. The voters were duped both times. And they will be deceived again unless they hold the President accountable for his failure.

Is there any wonder that the public is disillusioned with their political leaders, that they despair at their Government's failure to respond on so basic an issue as ending a senseless war? A recent Harris poll reported that 79 percent of the American people want "to bring all U.S. ground, naval, and air forces home from Vietnam." Yet, at the same time, 88 percent expected U.S. involvement to continue. In other words, they had given up hope that their Government would do what they wanted it to do. For Washington, as a commentator in the New Yorker magazine observed recently—

. . . the war has become part of America's business as usual.

We are now in the 12th year of this unconstitutional, undeclared war, the longest war in our history, with the prospects for ending it more dim than on January 20, 1969. As of August 5, since Mr. Nixon became President, 19,898 Americans, 88,949 South Vietnamese, and 441,955 enemy soldiers have died in the conflict—more dead than the population of five of our States. And since his inauguration, 107,695 more American servicemen and 423,920 South Vietnamese soldiers have been wounded. Thus, American dead and wounded have added 127,-

593 names to the casualty lists under the Nixon war policy.

Administration officials have repeatedly paid lip service to the plight of American prisoners of war and those missing in action. But the rolls of the POW's and the MIA's lengthen each day American involvement continues. Seventy-six more Americans have been taken prisoner and 466 more are missing since this administration took office. According to press reports, 84 Americans have been lost over North Vietnam since last March; in all 175 fliers are missing, 72 have been killed, and 55 wounded. The President cannot bomb the North Vietnamese into releasing the prisoners and accounting for the missing; they will do this only if he carries out his tattered and faded pledge to end the war. To try to make the American people believe that somehow the prisoners may be released before the fighting stops is sheer demagoguery. Until the President carries out his 1968 pledge, the POW and MIA lists will continue to lengthen.

The toll of the suffering of the unfortunate people of Southeast Asia is incalculable. The few estimates available of civilian casualties, refugees created and homes destroyed do not begin to convey the horror that has been inflicted upon innocent civilians trapped in the middle. The bits and pieces we do know are horrible enough, but how does one measure in mathematical terms the destruction of a social structure or the delicate balance in the ecology of an entire region. The Senate Subcommittee on Refugees estimates that in South Vietnam alone the cumulative total of refugees is now about 8,000,000, nearly half of the country's population—more than four times the population of my State.

The Library of Congress reports that before 1969 an estimated 3 to 3½ million refugees, excluding Laos, had been generated by the war. In comparison, as many as 4½ million have been generated in the Nixon years. Before Nixon Cambodia was relatively free of the ravages of war. Now, as a consequence of the President's initiative, it, too, has become a battleground. In the last 2 years as much as 30 percent of Cambodia's population has fallen victim to the conflict he thrust upon them.

It is estimated that since 1965 there have been nearly 1,300,000 civilian war casualties in South Vietnam—including some 400,000 dead. An estimated 537,-153 civilians have been killed or wounded in the Nixon war years. The bloodbath the President so readily conjures up is not some dim future possibility, it is happening every day to thousands of innocent people throughout Southeast Asia.

On August 29 the President announced that U.S. troop strength in Vietnam would be reduced to 27,000 by December 1, the smallest reduction rate announced to date. What the President did not say was that there are now 45,000 Americans in Thailand compared with 32,000 5 months ago; that the naval forces off Indochina have grown from 15,000 to 39,000; and that many thousands more American servicemen are engaged in the war from bases on Guam and other parts of the Pacific.

The President would like the American people to believe that only the 37,000 Americans in Vietnam are involved in the war. But in truth there are some 150,-000 in the Far East involved, either directly or in support operations. According to the Defense Department, 148,200 members of the Armed Forces received hostile fire pay—combat pay—in June 1972. Although a small number may be on the list because of service on the DMZ in Korea, the total involved in direct action in Southeast Asia is far higher than the President wants the American people to know.

According to recent news reports, air units, which were moved earlier from Vietnam to Thailand to meet withdrawal targets, are actually operating out of the Danang, South Vietnam, air base on a commuter basis. For everything except official counting purposes they are still stationed in Vietnam. The deception typified by "protective reaction," "mobile maneuvering," and other artful Pentagonese continues to be the hallmark of the President's Vietnam policy.

Instead of keeping his commitment to end American involvement in the war, Mr. Nixon has only shifted the principal means of killing from the ground to the air. During the Nixon years 3,632,734 tons of air munitions—bombs, rockets, and bullets—have been used to devastate the people and landscape of Indochina, far more than was used in World War II and the Korean war combined; 767,826 tons above the total for the Johnson war years; and more than 180 pounds of destruction for every man, woman, and child of North and South Vietnam.

The stepup in the air war is also reflected in the number of sorties flown. As of June, 30 percent more fixed wing and helicopter sorties had been flown in South Vietnam during the Nixon war years than were flown in the Johnson years; 21,400,507 compared with 16,654,-842. Air raids over North Vietnam are now being carried out at a level of intensity unequalled during the pre-Nixon period. A few months ago the captain of the aircraft carrier *Coral Sea* operating in the Tonkin Gulf, was quoted as saying:

> This time we're not pulling our punches. We've told the world we're going to be the winner. . . . We've never done anything before on this scale in Asia."

It has been reported that 4,000 tons of bombs a day are being dropped over North Vietnam. If all were 500-pound laser-guided bombs, at an estimated cost of $3,324 each, the daily bomb load alone would cost the taxpayers $53,184,-000, enough to build and equip three 300-bed hospitals. It would take the entire annual income of 5,318 average American families to pay the cost of a day's bombing with laser bombs. For each of the 3,000 pound television-guided bombs being dropped over North Vietnam, a low-cost, two-bedroom housing unit could be built.

During the Nixon years a total of 3,529 aircraft—fixed wing and helicopter—have been lost in Southeast Asia. Eighty-four aircraft have been lost over North Vietnam since the resumption of the bombing in April. And the cost of each F-4 shot down over North Vietnam would pay for an annual salary of $9,000 to 30 school teachers. Ten B-52 sorties would provide $2,000 scholarships to 210 needy students or build a 22-bed nursing home.

By the end of this fiscal year, using the executive branch's conservative criteria of "incremental" costs, the American taxpayers will have funneled more than $112 billion down the Indochina rathole, $147 billion if the full costs, the more realistic figure, is used. Using incremental costs, by the end of the current fiscal year the Nixon administration will have spent more than $54.5 billion on the war, only slightly less than the amount spent in the Johnson war years, or $260 for every man, woman, and child in the United States.

What would the $54.5 billion do here at home? It would:

Bring all of America's 25.5 million poor above the poverty line, $11.4 billion;

Eliminate hunger in the United States, $4 to $5 billion a year;

Pay for the construction of the Washington Metro subway system, $3 billion;

Construct 36,000 low-cost houses, $1 billion;

Finance all unfunded applications for HUD water and sewer grants, $4 billion;

Construct 500 high schools, $8 billion;

Meet the hospital needs of urban areas, $18 billion; and,

Expedite rebuilding of blighted urban areas. $3 billion.

This is only scratching the surface of needs here at home. Instead of using our resources to build a better society here, the Nixon administration has squandered the taxpayers' money on bombs and bullets to tear down ancient, established societies in primitive countries halfway around the world. Under the Nixon administration's concept of priorities billions of dollars more for a stepped-up bombing campaign in Indochina is sound and prudent spending. But it sees Congress action to expand education, health, and manpower training programs by $1.8 billion this year as reckless spending, justifying a Presidential veto of the appropriation bill.

President Eisenhower once said—

> Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.

Every day this war continues, more than $16 million is being taken from the wallets and pocketbooks of Americans.

To add to the tragedy, much of the cost of the Nixon war will be paid for by the children and grandchildren of current taxpayers in the form of interest on the debt, veterans' benefits, and social consequences such as the drug addiction of veterans. There have been authoritative estimates that the overall costs will ultimately reach $350 billion or more. The Library of Congress calculates the budget deficit in the Nixon years due directly to the war at $36 billion and, when the current year is added, it will top $42 billion.

But probably the most devastating im-

pact on the lives of everyday Americans has been from the inflation created and nurtured by the war. From January 1969 to June 1972 the Consumer Price Index rose 17.2 percent. Every housewife knows what has happened to the price of a pound of hamburger even though she may not point the finger of guilt where it belongs, at the war.

The pockets of all Americans have been picked by President Nixon's failure to keep his campaign pledge. When he came to office, the average American worker was earning $118.13 per week, measured in 1967 dollars. By June 1972 the Nixon war and economic policies had reduced workers' real weekly earnings to $108.31. The Nixon war policy has taken a $10 bill out of every worker's pay envelope.

In announcing the invasion of Cambodia 2 years ago, and expansion of the tragedy to yet another country, President Nixon said:

During my campaign for the Presidency, I pledged to bring Americans home from Vietnam. They are coming home. I promised to end this war. I shall keep this promise. I promised to win a just peace. I shall keep that promise."

None of those promises have been kept. There are 150,000 American servicemen in Southeast Asia engaged in the war, although only 37,000 are officially listed in Vietnam. The announced policy is to keep a residual force in Vietnam indefinitely. Far from ending, the war has entered a new and bloodier phase. More Vietnamese, North and South, Cambodians, and Laotians have been killed during the Nixon years than were killed in the Johnson years. Where is the "just peace" he promised? Peace is more distant today than when Mr. Nixon took office.

The President is running on his record. This is as it should be. He was elected to end this war. He has not done so. On October 9, 1968, in bidding for election to the Presidency, he said:

Those who have had a chance for four years and could not produce peace should not be given another chance.

I could not agree more. The American people should hold him to that standard.

I ask unanimous consent that certain accompanying data which I have accumulated be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the data were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE—CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM, 1961-72

| | Jan. 1, 1961–Jan. 18, 1969 | Jan. 18, 1969–Aug. 5, 1972 |
|---|---|---|
| A. U.S. military personnel: | | |
| Combat deaths[1] | 30,991 | 14,852 |
| Noncombat deaths[2] | 5,200 | 5,046 |
| Wounded in action[3] | 195,601 | 107,695 |
| | 1964–68 | 1969–Aug. 5, 1972 |
| Missing[4] | 779 | 466 |
| PPWs | 448 | 76 |
| | 1961–68 | 1969–Aug. 5, 1972 |
| B. South Vietnamese military personnel: | | |
| Combat deaths | 85,410 | 88,949 |
| Wounded in action[5] | 185,386 | [6] 423,920 |
| | 1966–68 | 1969–June 1972 |
| Missing | 8,083 | 16,367 |
| | 1964–68 | 1969–Aug. 5, 1972 |
| C. Other allied forces (South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Nationalist China, Spain, and Thailand): | | |
| Combat deaths | 2,682 | 2,452 |
| Wounded in action | 6,045 | [7] 5,624 |
| | 1966–68 | 1969–June 1972 |
| Missing | 27 | 27 |
| | 1961–68 | 1969–Aug. 5, 1972 |
| D. Enemy forces (North Vietnamese and Vietcong): | | |
| Combat deaths | 430,864 | 441,955 |
| Wounded in action | ([8]) | ([8]) |
| Missing | ([8]) | ([8]) |

[1] Killed in action, died of wounds in combat, and died while missing in action or captured.
[2] Died of illness, homicide, accident, aircraft accident, and other noncombat causes.
[3] Both hospitalized and nonhospitalized cases. Somewhat fewer than half of those wounded in action required hospitalization.
[4] Both "missing in action" and "missing not as a result of hostile action." Of the 1,245 listed as missing as of Aug. 5, 1972, 124 were in the latter category.
[5] Only those seriously wounded and hospitalized.
[6] Through May 1972.
[7] Through May 1972.
[8] No reliable estimates.

Source: DOD Public Affairs Office.

U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION/PRISONERS OF WAR

| | Missing[1] | POW's |
|---|---|---|
| 1964 | 4 | 3 |
| 1965 | 54 | 74 |
| 1966 | 201 | 97 |
| 1967 | 226 | 179 |
| 1968 | 294 | 95 |
| 1969 | 176 | 13 |
| 1970 | 86 | 12 |
| 1971 | 79 | 11 |
| 1972[2] | 125 | 40 |

[1] Both "missing in action" and "missing not as a result of hostile action."
[2] Through Aug. 5, 1972.

Source: DOD Public Affairs Office.

*U.S. troop strengths in Southeast Asia*

[Estimates as of Aug. 15, 1972]

| | |
|---|---|
| South Vietnam | 42,000 |
| Offshore/Vietnam | 39,000 |
| Thailand | 45,000 |
| Laos (Jan. 1972) | 1,200–1,300 |
| Cambodia (Jan. 1972) U.S. Govt. personnel | less than 100 |
| Okinawa | 40,000 |
| Guam | 10,000 |
| Taiwan | 9,000 |
| Philippines | 18,000 |

For troop strengths at various times during the 1961–68 and 1969–71 periods, the most reliable and complete source is Charles H. Murphy. U.S. Military Personnel Strengths by Country of Location Since World War II, 1948–71. (CRS Multilith No. 72–59F) Washington, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Feb. 29, 1972.

Total U.S. military personnel serving in Vietnam since December 1965: Approximately 2.5 million. (These figures are not available by specific time periods.)

Source: DOD Public Affairs Office.

*Estimated number of refugees generated by the war*

Prior to January 1969:
Vietnam: 3–3½ million.
Cambodia: Few, if any.
Since January 1969:
Vietnam: 2–2½ million.[1]
Cambodia 1–2 million.[2]
Laos: 700,000–800,000 (cannot be broken down into time periods.[3]

[1] Information obtained by phone from Dr. J. U. Hoeber, Agency for International Development.

[2] There is no reliable information on Cambodian refugees. A report by the General Accounting Office in early 1972 indicated that more than two million people in Cambodia had been displaced by the war, but that figure is considered by many to be high. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees. War Victims in Indochina. 92d Cong. 2d sess., 1972: 84.

[3] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Impact of the Vietnam War. 92d Cong., 1st sess. Committee print, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1971. 36 p.

AIR-DELIVERED MUNITIONS IN INDOCHINA[1]

| Year | Tons | Year | Tons |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1966 | 496,319 | 1969 | 1,387,259 |
| 1967 | 932,119 | 1970 | 977,436 |
| 1968 | 1,437,370 | 1971 | 763,160 |
| | | 1972[2] | 504,879 |
| Total | 2,865,808 | Total | 3,632,734 |
| Total for 1966 72 (January–June) | | | 6,498,542 |

[1] Data are not broken out separately for South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
[2] January through June 1972.

Source: DOD Public Affairs Office.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

| | Prior to January 1969 | Since January 1969 |
|---|---|---|
| South Vietnam | 725,000 | [1] 525,000 |
| Cambodia | Few | [2] 1,500 |
| Laos | 8,158 | [3] 10,653 |

[1] Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, as reported in The Washington Post, June 16, 1972. State Department figures confirm only 133,226 civilian casualties hospitalized in South Vietnam in 1967–68, and 187,583 in 1969–72.
[2] 1,500 casualties were reported by the Washington Star on May 26, 1971. Other reports only indicate that casualties have been in the thousands. The State Department can provide no official figures.
[3] Information obtained by phone from Office of Laos and Thailand Affairs, Agency for International Development.

SORTIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

| | Fixed Wing | Helicopters |
|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 7,258 | 37,651 |
| 1966 | 170,780 | 2,994,537 |
| 1967 | 226,156 | 5,517,625 |
| 1968 | 281,686 | 7,419,149 |
| Total—16,654,842 | 685,880 | 15,968,962 |
| 1969 | 257,209 | 8,441,509 |
| 1970 | 131,464 | 7,563,826 |
| 1971 | 39,457 | 4,213,835 |
| 1972[1] | 54,787 | 698,420 |
| Total—21,400,507 | 482,917 | 20,917,590 |

[1] January through June 1972.

Note: Sorties in North Vietnam are available on a daily basis but are not tabulated on a monthly and yearly basis. A compilation would require a time-consuming study.

Source: DOD, OASD (Comptroller), Directorate for Information Operations, Statistics on Southeast Asia, table 6, 1966–72.

FINANCIAL COST OF THE WAR

(All figures are in millions of dollars, except interest rate; by fiscal year)

| | Total involvement costs [1] | Federal funds deficit [2] | Estimated deficit attributable to involvement in Vietnam [3] | Average annual interest rate on public debt (percent) | Estimated interest on debt attributable to involvement in Vietnam |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 615 | 3,864 | 615 | 0.03678 | 23 |
| 1966 | 6,631 | 5,085 | 5,085 | .03988 | 204 |
| 1967 | 18,968 | 14,944 | 14,944 | .04039 | 611 |
| 1968 | 20,537 | 28,379 | 20,537 | .04499 | 951 |
| 1969 | 21,917 | 5,490 | 5,490 | .04891 | 315 |
| 1970 | 17,877 | 13,143 | 13,143 | 0.05557 | 748 |
| 1971 | 12,076 | 29,866 | 12,076 | .05141 | 659 |
| 1972 | [4] 7,805 | 28,933 | [4] 7,805 | [5] .05093 | 431 |
| Total | 106,423 | 119,704 | 79,695 | | 3,942 |

[1] Includes funds for Economic Development, Food for Peace, Military Assistance and Incremental War Costs.

[2] The change in the national debt is closely associated with the surplus or deficit in the Federal funds budget which excludes trust funds.

[3] For years when involvement costs were less than the Federal funds deficit; the estimated deficit attributable to involvement in Vietnam equals involvement costs. For years when involvement costs exceeded Federal funds deficit; the estimated deficit attributable to involvement costs would be the same as the Federal funds deficit.

[4] Estimate.

[5] Figure is for June 1972; annual average not available at this time.

Sources: DOD, OASD (comptroller), July 18, 1971, Budget of the United States, various years U.S. Department of Treasury, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, fiscal year 1971 and the Treasury Bulletin, June 1972.

FUNDING OF U.S. PROGRAMS IN SUPPORT OF SOUTH VIETNAM, FISCAL YEAR 1953-72

| Fiscal year | Economic assistance | Food for peace | Military assistance | Incremental war costs | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1953-61 | $1,469,900,000 | $78,300,000 | $508,800,000 | | $2,057,000,000 |
| 1962 | 124,100,000 | 31,900,000 | 204,200,000 | | 360,200,000 |
| 1963 | 143,300,000 | 52,600,000 | 258,400,000 | | 454,300,000 |
| 1964 | 165,700,000 | 56,700,000 | 181,800,000 | | 404,200,000 |
| 1965 | 225,000,000 | 51,700,000 | 234,900,000 | $103,000,000 | 614,600,000 |
| 1966 | 593,500,000 | 143,000,000 | 94,300,000 | 5,800,000,000 | 6,630,800,000 |
| 1967 | 494,400,000 | 73,700,000 | | 18,400,000,000 | 18,968,100,000 |
| 1968 | 398,200,000 | 138,500,000 | | 20,000,000,000 | 20,536,700,000 |
| 1969 | $314,200,000 | $99,300,000 | | $21,500,000,000 | $21,913,500,000 |
| 1970 | 365,900,000 | 110,800,000 | | 17,400,000,000 | 17,876,700,000 |
| 1971 | 387,700,000 | 188,000,000 | | 11,500,000,000 | 12,075,700,000 |
| 1972 [1] estimate | 385,000,000 | 120,420,000 | | 7,300,000,000 | 7,805,420,000 |
| Total | 5,066,900,000 | 1,144,920,000 | $1,482,400,000 | 102,003,000,000 | 109,697,220,000 |

[1] Estimate.

IMPACT OF INFLATION SINCE 1969 *

Since January, 1969 (to June, 1972) the consumer price index has risen 17.2 percent. (Bureau of Labor Statistics)

DECREASE IN REAL WAGES SINCE 1969 *

Average gross weekly earnings in 1967 dollars for January, 1969 were $118.13. For June, 1972 (preliminary figure), average gross weekly earnings in 1967 dollars were $108.31, a decrease of $9.82 (Bureau of Labor Statistics.) **

UNIT COSTS OF MAJOR WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS

B-52D—$6.5 million.

F-105D—$2.1 million.

F-4E—$2.8 million.

A-7—$3.48 million.

UH-1H medium helicopter—$315,000.

Artillery rounds (point detonating fuse):

105 mm howitzer—$25.79.

155 mm howitzer—$54.67 (white bag, charges 5-7).

8-inch howitzer—$94.54 (white bag, charges 5-7).

Anti-tank mine, M-15 (heavy)—$19.00 (estimated). Last buy 1953.

2.75-inch rocket, heavy warhead—$45.34 (FY 70 money).

NOTE.—All figures in FY 72 dollars except as noted.

SOURCE.—DOD Public Affairs for aircraft figures, Office of the Chief of Staff Army for the remainder.

ESTIMATED DAILY COST OF THE WAR

A frequent inquiry from Members of Congress concerning Vietnam involves the daily cost of the war. A rough estimation of the average daily cost of the Vietnam War can be made by dividing the incremental war costs for the fiscal year by the 365 days in the calendar year. Applying this formula to the estimated incremental war costs of $7.3 billion for fiscal year 1972 indicates a daily incremental cost of $20 million. Applying the same formula to the $21.5 billion spent in incremental war costs during fiscal year 1969 reveals that the war was then costing almost $59 million a day. During FY 1970 the daily cost was about $47 million and during FY 1971 about $31 million. In June 1972, the Defense Department estimated that the Defense budget for FY 1973 would have to be increased by $3.3 billion if the North Vietnamese offensive continued at its then current level through September 1972 and by an extra $5 billion if such conditions continued until the end of the year. These estimates reflected the costs of increased bombing and artillery support of the South Vietnamese forces, increased logistical operations, and replacement of military equipment.[1] Based on the Defense Department's July 18, 1972, estimate of incremental war costs for fiscal year 1973 as $5.8 billion, the daily cost during FY 1973 would be just under $16 million, a figure equal to the daily war cost in FY 1966. This estimate allows for measures being taken to counter the invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnamese forces, which began in April of this year.

COST PER B-52 AND FIGHTER-BOMBER MISSION

On the basis of curently available information, it is not possible to determine the cost of the air war in Vietnam during the present offensive. With regard to the earlier air operations over North Vietnam in the 1965-1968 period, however, there are official data on the average costs per sorties by B-52s and fighter-bombers engaged in Indochina. According to testimony before the Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations in 1969, the cost of an average B-52 sortie was then more than $41,000, of which $22,500 was the cost of the average munitions drop of 27 tons. In other official sources the cost of an average fighter-bomber sortie in the 1965-1968 period was given as more than $8,000.

Most of the cost estimates which have appeared in the press in recent months are based on these official figures as reported in "The Air War in Indochina," a widely-circulated report compiled by the Air War Study Group at Cornell University last year and reprinted in a revised edition by Beacon Press in March 1972. Although these estimates may be valid for the air operations of the 1965-68 period, they are not entirely appropriate to the current phase of the air way. Since the numbers and types of aircraft and munitions being currently employed over North Vietnam are significantly different, the costs of the present campaign cannot be accurately calculated by extrapolating from figures pertaining to the earlier period. For example, there are indications that the present campaign against North Vietnam is characterized by a much greater reliance on fighter-bomber aircraft than on B-52s. Moreover, to the extent that the more accurate "smart" bombs are being used today, fewer planes and munitions are required, although the bombs themselves are much more expensive.

With regard to the current phase of the air war, only fragmentary cost data have been made public by the Defense Department. The Pentagon's Public Affairs Office has disclosed (1) that the average hourly operating cost of a B-52 is $1,300 while the average operating cost of an F-4 fighter-bomber is $800 per hour, and (2) that a sortie flown to Vietnam from Guam averages 13 hours, a sortie from Thailand takes about 4 hours, and missions out of Danang and from offshore carriers take an hour or less.

According to authoritative sources, the costs of the various types of "smart" bombs being used in Vietnam at present are as follows: (1) $3,324 for a laser-guided 500-lb bomb, (2) $4,900 for a laser-guided 3,000-lb bomb; and (3) $16,800 for a television-guided 3,000-lb bomb.[2] However, since the numbers

*The trends reflected in figures above are due in part to the Vietnam War. The precise percentage is problematical.

**Bureau of Labor Statistics now uses 1967 dollars in all computations requiring constant dollars.

[1] Washington Post June 6, 1972. pp. A1, A10.

[2] Aviation Week and Space Technology. May 22, 1972, pp. 16-17.

and types of aircraft operating out of various bases have not been disclosed and there is no detailed information on the types and quantities of munitions delivered, it is not possible to derive cost estimates from these data comparable to those available for the earlier period.[*]

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COST OF REHABILITATING DRUG ADDICTS FROM THE VIETNAM WAR

1. General. Hard facts on this subject are scarce. A cohesive cost estimate therefore is not feasible. The following data may be of use.

2. Number of users. a. The Assistant Secretary of Defense advises that urinalysis tests are available only from mid-November 1971 through July 31, 1972. 436,540 tests were administered to men coming home from Vietnam, going on R & R or leave, being transferred, being treated under exemption programs and so on. The number of drug users (not necessarily addicts) identified was 14,283, or 3.3 percent. How many were returned to duty as "cured" and how many were discharged with varying degrees of dependency on drugs is not known.

b. Dr. Marc J. Musser, Chief Medical Director for the Veterans' Administration, estimates that some 50,000 to 75,000 veterans are drug addicted. This includes all veterans, not only Vietnam veterans.

c. According to Senator Alan Cranston (California), Chairman of the Senate Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee on Health and Hospitals, there are currently 100,000 or more addicted Vietnam veterans. Senator Cranston reported that only 5,600 of these veterans are currently undergoing treatment by the Veterans' Administration. (*Washington Post*, June 17, 1972)

3. Cost of treatment.

a. The cost of treating these addicted veterans depends, of course, on the kind of treatment program and the amount of time needed to achieve rehabilitation for each addict. In a report to the Ford Foundation, "Dealing With Drug Abuse," released this year, the following estimates are given for the cost of various types of treatment programs:

(1) Civil commitment programs—cost estimates are $10,000 to $12,000 per year per addict while the addict is in the institution.

(2) Therapeutic communities—costs range anywhere from $3,000 to $10,000 per year per resident.

(3) Methadone maintenance—the cost of the program is roughly between $500 and $2,500 per patient per year, dependent on a number of factors. Methadone itself can be procured for about $.05 per day per addict, but there are a great many variations which account for the wide cost estimate. At present, $500 per addict per year is about the minimum for a program that uses standardized dosages, out-patient induction, fairly cheap urinalysis, and no services except those supplied by the addicts themselves. A reasonable estimate for a program with individual doses, some inpatient ancillary services (such as group and individual therapy, job training and placement, family counseling, medical care and education) is $2,000. The cost for each patient who has finished the induction stage and is stabilized in the program is about $1,000 per year.

(4) a. Antagonists—the two basic antagonists currently in use for treatment of heroin addicts are cyclazocine and naloxone. So far, the costs have been high—$3,000 to $5,000 per addict per year—partly because of the need for inpatient care common to experimental programs and partly because of the scarcity and high prices of the drugs.

b. The Veterans' Administration fiscal 1972 budget for drug programs was $17.5 million. Since January of 1971, it has opened 32 clinics to treat drug addicted veterans. Another twelve clinics, costing an additional $10 million, are scheduled to open during this fiscal year.

c. During consideration of H.R. 12846, a bill to authorize treatment programs for drug-dependent servicemen, the House Armed Services Committee estimated that the costs for the drug programs would be about $67.4 million in fiscal 1972 and $90.5 million in fiscal 1973, with costs after that leveling off.

d. Two private laboratories have been awarded contracts worth more than $1 million for screening out GI drug users through urinalysis testing. These firms have already been paid over $1.6 million since the screening program began. (Washington Post, June 26, 1972)

4. Cost of crime. According to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, heroin users in Vietnam can support their habits for as little as $2 to $6 per day. Here in the United States, drugs are harder to get, considerably less potent, and far more expensive. BNDD estimates that the average heroin habit costs $30 per day in the United States. Few addicts, including veterans, have the means to pay for such an expensive habit, and many, therefore, stand a good chance of turning to crime, thus adding to the ever-rising crime rate here at home. According to a report of the House Select Committee on Crime, "Heroin and Heroin Paraphernalia," addicts who turn to crime must steal either cash or goods, and when they steal goods, they must steal goods worth five times the cost of their habit. According to the report of a special study mission of the House Foreign Affairs Committee ("The World Heroin Problem"), the current cost of crime committed by addicts to sustain their habits could be in excess of $8 billion per year. Some experts calculate that the actual social costs of addiction—the costs of crime and punishment and attempted rehabilitation—already surpass $25 billion a year.

5. Spread of addiction.

1. Director John Ingersoll of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has stated that the problems of heroin addiction are being spread to small cities and towns throughout the United States by returning Vietnam servicemen. (Washington Star, April 5, 1971)

2. Dr. Judianne Densen-Gerber, Executive Director of Odyssey House in New York City, has called heroin addiction a "communicable disease," which, she says, through a "natural ripple effect" will cause 75,000 new addicts from Vietnam to produce an additional 250,000 to 750,000 new addicts in the United States within a year. (New York Times, June 27, 1971)

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PROJECTED COSTS OF VETERANS' BENEFITS FOR VIETNAM ERA

1. The Veterans' Administration has no estimate of projected costs for benefits authorized military personnel who served in the United States armed forces between 1961 and 19671, nor are its analysts willing to undertake any such project.

2. There are two reasons, primarily:

a. Costs constantly fluctuate.

b. There is no way to anticipate accurately how many Vietnam veterans will elect to take advantage of authorized benefits. Experience factors from earlier wars are unapplicable.

3. The following data may be of some use, but great care should be taken in applying these costs against raw strength figures reflecting total numbers of military personnel who served during the Vietnam Era.

a. Medical care: The average monthly cost of care in a VA hospital is $1323.70. A Vietnam Era veteran has an average hospital stay of 13.5 days.

b. Educational assistance: 5.885 million veterans of the Vietnam Era are eligible for educational assistance as of April 1972. Forty percent have already entered draining at a cost of $15.3 billion. The average yearly cost per trainee (as of April 1972) is $1,015. The average length of training is 6 months. The Senate passed educational amendments to the GI Bill, which would have a five year cost of $3.812 billion in direct benefits, not counting administration.

c. Compensation: The average monthly compensation payment to each Vietnam veteran is $122.50. As of June 1971, 244,567 veterans of the Vietnam Era were receiving compensation. Compensation was also being paid to 39,972 survivors of Vietnam veterans. The average payment monthly for survivors is $191.06.

d. Pension: Only 2,298 veterans of the Vietnam Era currently are collecting pension benefits. The average monthly payment is $128.28. However, 5,556 survivors also collect pensions with a monthly payment of $70.16.

NOTE.—Those who served after 1964 receive greater benefits than those served earlier; that fact further complicates estimation problems.

SOURCE.—Veterans' Administration.

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[*] Acoording to a committee print issued on June 29, 1972, by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a total of 7,662 B–52 sorties had been flown in 1972 through May 27—4,833 in South Vietnam, 2,047 in Laos, 649 in Cambodia, and 83 in North Vietnam (all during April 1972). U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Vietnam: May 1972; A Staff Report Prepared for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, June 29, 1972. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972, p. 12.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I am ready to yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington is recognized.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, first, I ask unanimous consent that the following staff members be permitted to be present on the Senate floor during the consideration of the interim agreement and during votes relating thereto: Richard Perle, Dorothy Fesdich, and William Van Ness.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHILES). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I would just like to make some very brief remarks at this time. I shall speak later, in more detail.

First, let me say that from the beginning I have urged early and expeditious action on both the ABM treaty and the interim agreement. I suggested the unanimous-consent agreement on the ABM treaty which was agreed to. I suggested a unanimous-consent agreement—in fact several of them, a long list—in connection with the pending interim agreement, and the various suggestions were not agreed to. Without going into all the details, let me simply say for the record that yesterday I did agree on three different occasions to a unanimous-consent agreement that would be limited only to my amendment and amendments thereto, but that was objected to.

From the outset, I made it clear that I would support cloture and that I would sign a motion for cloture in order to expedite the action of the Senate. I will say that I have signed the cloture motion, and I strongly support it, so that the Senate can work its will. I commend the

distinguished majority leader and the distinguished minority leader for taking this action in the form of a cloture motion—an action of last resort—in order to dispose of the very important matter pending before the Senate.

Mr. President, I want to get at the heart of the amendment that I have offered. I think we all understand what we mean by equality of intercontinental strategic forces. I am referring, of course, to landbased ICBM's, seabased ballistic missiles, and intercontinental bombers.

Some are attempting to argue that I am advocating an expedition of the arms race. I would point out that under my amendment, with its 44 cosponsors, the Soviets could stop building modern nuclear submarines. The Soviets could halt their program at 41 boats, which would be a number equal to ours. They could dismantle a portion of their ICBM's, which now number 1,618 to our 1,054. We are in the process of dismantling our ABM site in Montana.

Our amendment offers a golden opportunity, Mr. President, for a U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement by which we can reduce forces. This is what we mean by emphasizing equality in intercontinental strategic forces.

The interim agreement is not at issue in these discussions. The issue, Mr. President, is what our future policy will be, and what advice the Senate of the United States will give to the President and the executive branch of the Government in connection with the SALT II talks regarding the limitation of strategic arms.

I say that this amendment does give us an opportunity, a golden opportunity, to begin a process of reduction in strategic arms. This is the way we could save money on both sides.

We are talking about entirely different things when we talk about my amendment and when we talk about the interim agreement. The interim agreement is an effort to freeze both sides where they happened to be—or might be expected to be—at a given moment in time.

I know of no spokesman for the administration who has responsibility in this area of strategic arms, and who will be involved one way or another in the follow-on SALT talks, who is supporting the view that the disparities in numbers agreed to in the interim agreement are acceptable as a basis for a final treaty.

When one talks about the great expenditures, which I want to see cut back, one should also talk about the enormous expenditures of the Soviet Union which are involved in an unbelievable buildup of intercontinental strategic forces—far in excess, Mr. President, of anything that we have attempted. In fact, the United States has not moved on adding numbers of land-based missiles or submarines to our forces since 1965. So I want to zero in on the heart of the issue, which is the issue of equality in intercontinental strategic forces which all Americans understand.

The AFL-CIO Executive Council met in Chicago on August 28 of this year, and adopted a statement in support of the Jackson-Scott amendment, which speaks for itself. Let me just quote a part of it:

The Moscow agreements limit defensive weapons by a permanent treaty and offensive strategic weapons by a five-year interim agreement. But while the treaty on defensive weapons is based on the principle of U.S.-Soviet equality (with each country having the same number of weapons and equal size limitations), the interim agreement on offensive weapons departs from this principle. We are concerned that the significant Soviet advantage—in numbers of strategic offensive launchers and their size—granted in the interim agreement for five years not become the basis for a follow-on treaty.

Under the terms of the interim agreement the Soviet Union is permitted 1,618 land-based ICBM's to 1,054 for the United States. At sea, the Soviets are permitted to build up to 62 modern nuclear submarines while the United States is frozen at 44. Moreover, the combined payload capability of the Soviet strategic offensive missile forces is four times that of the U.S. force. If these disparities were made the basis for a follow-on treaty in this period of rapidly developing technology, the United States would be placed in a position of strategic inferiority.

American labor is firmly opposed to a treaty on offensive weapons that would limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union.

That is the nub of the AFL-CIO statement endorsing the Jackson-Scott amendment. I ask unanimous consent that the entire statement be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY THE AFL-CIO EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ON JACKSON-SCOTT AMENDMENT TO SALT AGREEMENT

The AFL-CIO Executive Council meeting in May called for a strategic arms agreement that would ". . . place simultaneously inviolable limits on the number, size and variety of both offensive and defensive strategic weapons."

The Moscow agreements limit defensive weapons by a permanent treaty and offensive strategic weapons by a five-year interim agreement. But while the treaty on defensive weapons is based on the principle of U.S.-Soviet equality (with each country having the same number of weapons and equal size limitations), the interim agreement on offensive weapons departs from this principle. We are concerned that the significant Soviet advantage—in numbers of strategic offensive launchers and their size—granted in the interim agreement for five years not become the basis for a follow-on treaty.

Under the terms of the interim agreement the Soviet Union is permitted 1,618 land-based ICBM's to 1,054 for the United States. At sea, the Soviets are permitted to build up to 62 modern nuclear submarines while the United States is frozen at 44. Moreover, the combined payload capability of the Soviet strategic offensive missile forces is four times that of the U.S. force. If these disparities were made the basis for a follow-on treaty in this period of rapidly developing technology, the United States would be placed in a position of strategic inferiority.

American labor is firmly opposed to a treaty on offensive weapons that would limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union.

The AFL-CIO supports the amendment offered, on a bipartisan basis, by Senators Jackson and Scott, to the resolution approving the interim agreement. The Jackson-Scott amendment serves notice that if the threat to the survivability of U.S. strategic forces is not limited by a follow-on agreement within five years, U.S. supreme national interests could be jeopardized.

The amendment calls upon the President to seek numerical equality in intercontinental weapons, in such a future treaty. We would hope the Soviets could be persuaded to reduce their forces to U.S. levels. The Jackson-Scott amendment also calls for vigorous research, development and force modernization.

By calling for an equal balance in intercontinental weapons the Jackson-Scott amendment seeks to protect those U.S. weapons based in Europe and dedicated to the defense of our democratic NATO allies from being compromised in the continuing SALT II negotiations. Soviet insistence on "compensation" in intercontinental strategic weapons for U.S. tactical forces in Europe under our alliance obligations is a device to divide and weaken the NATO alliance.

We must not submit to this Soviet demand. We believe that negotiations to achieve a European nuclear balance must take place in a manner that permits the full participation of our allies. These negotiations should deal with Soviet as well as comparable allied weapons.

We make these proposals in the interest of the security of our country. As we declared at our Ninth Constitutional Convention:

". . . our existence in freedom and as a free trade union movement depends on the strength and the determination of the American people to safeguard their national survival, protect their free way of life, and assure the maintenance of world peace. These vital aims and interests of our country's foreign policy are beyond bargaining or compromise."

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, there has been a lot of editorial comment relating to the SALT accords. It is rather interesting that the Russians, through their literary spokesmen, have made all sorts of comments against my amendment. It is rather unusual, is it not, that we are getting advice from the Soviet Union on amendments pending before the Senate? In fact, Soviet journalists and representatives have been rather active in this community, indicating their views of Senate amendments, which is a rather unusual precedent, I must say, for a country that does not permit, any opportunity at all for our journalists or our representatives to visit the Supreme Soviet or meet with the Presidium or the Politburo.

Mr. President, I want to refer to and ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD a number of editorials that I think are representative of views around this country.

One is an editorial published in the Wall Street Journal of August 7, entitled "A Grain of SALT"; another is an editorial published in the Jacksonville, Fla., Times-Union of August 9, 1972, entitled "SALT: The Letter and the Spirit"; one is a commentary published in the Atlanta Journal of August 9, 1972, entitled "Limiting Missiles"; another is an editorial in the St. Louis Globe-Democrat of August 9, 1972, entitled "Intelligently Peppering SALT"; another is an editorial in the Seattle, Wash., Times of August 9,

1972, entitled "Arms-Pact Safeguard"; and so forth.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A GRAIN OF SALT

Thanks to the flare-up over the Strategic Arms agreement in the Senate last week, we apparently will after all have a debate commensurate with the seriousness of the steps being taken. In the end the agreements will be approved, but by then both the Senate and the nation ought to have a better understanding of what they are doing.

Just when the agreements appeared to be headed for rubber-stamp approval, Senator Jackson and Senator Scott proposed to attach a statement of congressional intent setting forth certain limiting principles. The Senate approved the treaty part of the agreements limiting antiballistic missile systems, but postponed action on the separate "interim agreement" on offensive weapons pending further consideration of the Jackson-Scott resolution.

The Jackson-Scott proposals would not be reservations changing the text of the treaty or agreements, but would put Congress on record on three points: That the United States is committed to the principle of numerical equality in the follow-on treaties the U.S. and Soviets have pledged to negotiate. That a strong research and development program is needed to strengthen the American position in these negotiations. And that if the Soviets deploy weapons that threaten to wipe out a major part of our deterrent forces, it would jeopardize our "supreme national interests" and, presumably, be grounds for abrogating the agreements.

These points neatly stress the seriousness of the potential strategic and political problems with the interim agreements. The United States has agreed to give the Soviets a 3-2 superiority in missile numbers, and their missiles are also much larger. For the moment we can more than offset these Soviet advantages because our lead in multiple warhead technology gives us more deliverable warheads. But the agreements preclude our matching the Soviet advantages in numbers or size. The agreements do not preclude the Soviets' matching or overtaking our lead in multiple warheads.

Deeply serious strategic problems could arise if the Soviets deployed multiple warheads large enough and accurate enough to attack our Minuteman missiles. For with their advantages in launcher numbers and size they could theoretically develop the capacity to destroy nearly all our landbased missiles, most of our bomebrs and at least a few of our missile submarines, all the while retaining enough missiles to wipe out American cities if we dared to retaliate with our remaining forces. One does not have to think the Russians are madmen lusting to push the button to see that this would be a portentous change in the nuclear balance.

Even if this worst possibility does not develop, there are serious political problems in an agreement giving the Soviets a numercial lead. It is one thing to argue, as the administration has, that we have no programs that could prevent them from gaining a lead in this particular time period. It is quite another thing to formalize this inequality and seem to give it a stamp of approval. If the world gets the idea that the United States is willing to accept an inferior position, political balances will tip in favor of the Soviet Union in any world trouble-spot.

Thus the agreements carry decided risks for the United States unless a satisfactory follow-on agreement is reached in SALT II. The administration recognized these risks when it declared during the negotiations that failure to reach further limitations would jeopardize supreme national interests and provide grounds for abrogating the otherwise permanent treaty when the interim agreements expire. Thus it is not surprising, except apparently to Senator Fulbright and other Senate doves, that the administration does not oppose the Jackson-Scott initiatives.

The risks will have been more than worth taking if SALT II does produce a comprehensive agreement reducing the level of strategic arms and, even more importantly, laying the basis for Soviet-American political understandings that would enhance the security of both sides. But while taking a calculated gamble on that outcome, we ought to remember that history warns that such hopes prove illusory more often than not.

Frankly, we doubt that the odds in this gamble justify as high a level of risk as the American negotiators have been willing to accept in these agreements. But at this point we cannot start over to seek a better agreement; it is too late in the game to turn back on the gamble. But at least the Senate can make it clear that it understands the risks, that while it is willing to take these agreements it takes them with a grain of salt.

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SALT: THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT

It is difficult to see why the so-called "Jackson reservations" on the SALT pact—as the modified version now stands after conference with the White House—could arouse the opposition even of highly arousable J. W. Fulbright and his Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

For all the Jackson wording specifies, in effect, is simply that the spirit of the agreement, as well as the letter, is to be honored by the Soviet Union, as well as the U.S., during the five years of the interim agreement on offensive weapons.

In fact, according to United Press International reports from Washington, no serious objections have been raised by Soviet representatives when the matter was discussed with them by U.S. officials.

The exact wording of the (revised) Jackson amendment should be examined. The key phrase is "were the survivability of the strategic deterrent forces of the United States to be threatened . . . . this could jeopardize the supreme national interests of the United States" and hence would be cause for voiding the agreement.

This only means that if the Soviet Union were to uphold the letter of the agreement, yet work within this limitation to reach a "first strike" capacity, in utter contrast to the "balance" which is the key to the spirit of the treaty, then the U.S. would no longer be bound.

As a point of fact, there already is a similar "escape clause" in the agreement as originally drawn; the agreement could be abrogated at any time that new Soviet developments actually endanger U.S. security.

The only difference in the Jackson reservation and what's already "on paper" is that Sen. Jackson spells it out unmistakably, brings it into the open. The U.S.S.R. is simply told in no uncertain terms: This is an agreement for balance, not to be a "cover" for any Soviet effort to honor the letter, but not the spirit, of the treaty.

Such a reservation makes no change in the basic agreement. The White House deputy press secretary, Gerald Warren, stated in no uncertain terms that the spelled-out notice was entirely "consistent with our understanding in Moscow."

But, while such a reservation does not change, but only makes more specific the "parity" concept of the agreement, there is a very pragmatic reason for its point of emphasis.

The "balance" of the interim SALT agreement, which covers the next five years until a more permanent pact can be worked out, basically leaves the Soviet Union more missiles in almost every category, while the U.S. has more warheads due to its technological capability (which the Russians don't yet have) of clustering several independently targetable warheads in a single nose cone.

Doubtlessly, during the covered period, the U.S.S.R. will develop its own version of multiple warheads. No harm, as such. But if it were to employ this on all its missiles, it would have a sweeping superiority which was never intended by either the good faith agreement or spelled-out terms of the SALT pact.

Since "balance" is based on one side having more missiles and the other side having more warheads, any basic change in this condition—such as the mass use of multiple warheads on Soviet missiles—would obviously upset the balance.

What objection can be raised simply to stating, in plainer English, that the spirit as well as the letter of the treaty is to be observed?

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LIMITING MISSILES

(By John Crown)

No rational person wants to see the United States and the Soviet Union embroiled in a military conflagration and no rational person wants a never-ending arms race between the two nations.

Thus it was that President Nixon's summit agreements in Moscow drew a sigh of relief from a great many people. And thus it was that Senate ratification last week of the limitation on defensive missiles brought on another sigh of relief.

But those sighs of relief have been far from unanimous. There is a sizable segment of the citizenry who view with grave doubts the agreements on arms limitations.

A realistic view of Russia's record of adhering (or of not adhering) to past treaties has been one cause for concern.

But the principal fear is that we have been outmaneuvered within the treaty provisions. This has been the one voiced the most often.

And it was to redress this to some degree that Sen. Henry M. "Scoop" Jackson, D-Wash., has initiated an additional provision in a treaty resolution, one that is expected to lead to heated controversy on the Senate floor.

How anyone could in good conscience take exception to Sen. Jackson's prudent provision defies all reason. And underscoring the noncontroversial aspect of the provision is that President Nixon, the man who came up with the original resolution, has endorsed the inclusion of Sen. Jackson's provision.

What we had last week was Senate ratification of a treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union limiting defensive missiles. This is well and good.

But limiting only defensive missiles without similar limitations on offensive missiles is ludicrous. To only limit defensive missiles and to permit the unrestricted and unrestrained development and deployment of offensive missiles serves no useful purpose at all.

The other way around would make more sense—limiting offensive missiles and placing no restrictions on defensive missiles.

So all we have done thus far is agree to limit defensive missiles.

In order to balance the thing out, before the Congress is a resolution dealing with limitations on offensive missiles. There is nothing permanent about this. It is of temporary nature only.

President Nixon worked out with the Russian leaders a temporary agreement which would limit offensive missiles while the two superpowers seek to arrive at a permanent arrangement. The temporary agreement is for a maximum of five years.

This is where Sen. Jackson's prudent provision enters the picture.

He proposes that should the temporary agreement run its course without the two

nations establishing a permanent limitation on offensive missiles, that this would be grounds for abrogating the limitations on defensive missiles.

This is rational and logical and pragmatic.

It would be the height of folly for us—or them—to be bound by defensive missile limitations when there is no prospect of similar limitations on offensive missiles. The two go together, which is why President Nixon successfully sought the temporary agreement to accompany the permanent agreement on defensive missiles.

To limit defensive missiles and leave offensive missiles to chance is to invite a first strike.

But there are members of the Senate who fear that adding the provision would endanger the agreement. They fear Soviet capriciousness, that the Russians would seize on this as grounds for spurning what has been accomplished.

The Senate has more than its share of the fainthearted who think the way to deal with Communists is to crawl and beg.

Disregard the fact that the Russians have been sounded out and have no objection to Sen. Jackson's addition—which is the case.

Even if this were not true, Sen. Jackson's proposal makes sense. It is the prudent course for us to follow.

The key is a limitation on offensive missiles—or on none.

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INTELLIGENTLY PEPPERING SALT

Now that the euphoria over the United States-Soviet nuclear arms limitation agreements has subsided, it is time to take a careful second look at the proposed "interim agreement" on offensive weapons.

There was virtual unanimity on the first pact limiting defensive missile systems (antiballistic missiles). Only two opposition votes were cast.

But the interim agreement is a decidedly different matter. As proposed, it will give the Soviet Union a 3–2 superiority over the United States in offensive nuclear missiles during the time both sides try to negotiate limitations on these weapons during the next five years.

Sen. Henry M. Jackson of Washington now is wisely acting to amend the interim agreement so that it will include adequate safeguards against any Russian attempt to use the negotiating period to put the United States at a further disadvantage.

Senator Jackson points out that under the interim agreement the United States would not be adequately protected if the Russians chose to test and deploy MIRVs (multiple independently targeted warheads) on their very large 313 ICMs.

If they chose to press this advantage, our less numerous and less powerful land-based ICBM force could be threatened with total annihilation.

There is the distinct possibility that the Russians could develop a "first strike" capability that could knock out nearly all of our land-based ICBMs, virtually all of our strategic bombers and perhaps most of our submarines—and still have enough missiles to destroy our cities if the United States does not take the necessary precautions to protect itself against this potential threat.

Jackson and other Senators thus have concluded that the Senate must insist on an amendment that will do two things:

Warn the Russians that the United States will not allow the Soviets to take actions that threaten the "survivability of the United States deterrent" or jeopardize our national interest while the negotiations are in progress.

Put the Congress on record as opposing any eventual SALT treaty "in which the United States is limited to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the level accorded the Soviet Union."

When one considers the inherent dangers of any interim agreement that failed to incorporate these two points, it becomes obvious that they must be included to protect the national security.

This country simply cannot rely exclusively on the word of Russian leaders that they will negotiate at SALT II in good faith.

There must be an iron-clad, fully spelled-out escape clause that will allow the United States to end the agreement at any time it finds the Russians have used the negotiating period to put this country at a serious disadvantage in strategic nuclear weapons.

Anything less would be foolish. Without this protection, the Russians could, if they chose, greatly accelerate their missile development and the United States, under the present wording of the treaty, could not abrogate the pact until five years had gone by.

The Russians also should be put on notice that any final arms limitation agreement on offensive weapons will not be acceptable unless it provides equal strength to both sides.

This is just good common sense. It would be extremely dangerous to this country and for world peace to agree to an arrangement that gave the Russians a permanent superiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The Senate should ratify the interim agreement promptly, but only after it has added the indispensable amendment proposed by Senator Jackson.

This is the only way to fully protect the nation's security while the new offensive arms limitations talks are in progress.

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[From the Seattle (Wash.) Times, Aug. 9, 1972]

THE TIMES' OPINION AND COMMENT: ARMS-PACT SAFEGUARD

The administration now has reached a meeting of the minds with Senator Jackson, who had assumed the difficult and potentially Arms Limitation Agreement between the unrewarding role of raising sticky questions about the widely hailed Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.

With the Nixon administration and Jackson on the same track, the way ought to be clear for prompt congressional approval of the agreement setting ceilings on the number of offensive strategic weapons each nation may have.

The interim pact is widely and properly hailed as the capstone of past efforts and the cornerstone of future progress toward ending the superpower arms race.

In the euphoria induced by President Nixons' trip to Moscow, the public has been little inclined to listen to reservations such as that expressed by Jackson that:

"Simply put, the agreement gives the Soviets more of everything; more light intercontinental ballistic missiles, more heavy missiles, more submarine-launched missiles, more submarines, more payload, even more missile-defense radars. In no area covered by the agreement is the United States permitted to maintain parity with the Soviet Union."

Of course, the reason the administration felt safe in agreeing to allow the Russians "more of everything" is existing United States technical superiority in strategic weapons. Put crudely, the Russians have more weapons; we have better ones.

"But I am persuaded after careful review of this argument," Jackson said, "that we are moving into a period of rapidly changing technology in which the advantage we enjoy by virtue of our greater technical sophistication will be narrowed . . ."

Jackson noted that the treaty covering anti-ballistic-missile defense clearly established the principle of equal limits on both countries. His revised amendment calls for this principle of equality to be applied to offensive missiles, as well, in the next round of the arms-limitation talks.

This the administration has agreed to in return for Jackson's dropping a toughly worded provision that would have called for abrogation of the Moscow pact under certain circumstances.

Thus, the stage is set, not only for full congressional approval of the existing limitations on armaments, but for further progress on a basis less likely to permit either superpower undue advantage.

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[From the Chicago Tribune, Aug. 9, 1972]

COMPROMISE ON ARMS LIMITATION

The White House has agreed to a modified compromise proposed by Sen. Henry M. Jackson of Washington attaching congressional understandings to the interim arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union. The agreement, reached by President Nixon and Soviet leaders in Moscow last May, freezes the number of offensive nuclear missiles at present levels for five years.

It is to be followed, in theory, by a treaty. The Nixon administration assented to Sen. Jackson's view that any such treaty be based on the principle of equality of nuclear forces. The senator has been worried because, he says, the interim agreement has placed us in a position of sub-parity.

In response to White House endorsement of his principle, Sen Jackson dropped a provision in his earlier resolution which would have called for abrogation of the five-year interim agreement at any time evidence supported the belief that the Soviet Union was taking steps to jeopardize United States deterrent missile forces.

Sen. Jackson and the administration agreed that if no treaty limiting offensive weapons was achieved by 1977 this would justify abrogation of the complementary treaty signed in Moscow restricting defensive antiballistic missiles to 200. Half of these could be emplaced around the national capitals of the two countries and half around offensive missile launching sites.

The Jackson compromise has been cleared with Soviet officials in Washington, who expressed no objection to it. The White House interpretation is that it does not legally affect the interim agreement on offensive weapons because it adds no reservations requiring Soviet acceptance.

Sen. John Stennis, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and Sen. George D. Aiken, ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, welcomed the understanding reached between Sen. Jackson and the White House. Sen. Stennis said the resolution made it clear that the United States was accepting "a position of sub-parity now in order to get a position of parity in any future agreement."

The Jackson resolution requires approval of both Senate and House and probably will encounter opposition from some of the more fervent antiwar members. Nevertheless, the accord between the senator and the administration sets prudent sights for future negotiations on arms control and helps clear the air pending final action on the Moscow agreement. The treaty limiting defensive missiles has already been approved 88 to 2.

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[From the Sarasota (Fla.) Herald Tribune, Aug. 9, 1972]

USEFUL JACKSON RESOLUTION

It is difficult to understand why there should be the expectation of a floor fight both in the Senate and the House over the Jackson resolution concerning the SALT "interim agreement" which accompanies the Soviet-American treaty to restrict missile defenses over the next five years.

The treaty, which already has Senate approval (all it needs except the President's

signature) accepts a position of mutual nuclear deterrence. Those striving for nuclear peace in a dangerous world regard it as the most significant arms control measure yet.

The interim agreement, which needs both Senate and House approval, limits the number of offensive missiles each nation can deploy during the life of the treaty.

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) and others have been worried that this limitation was unfair to the United States and that the Soviet Union might take advantage of it.

His original resolution included a warning to the Soviets not to take actions (such as improving the quality or accuracy of weapons) prejudicial to American interests.

The revised Jackson resolution deletes the warning, which Sen. George D. Aiken (R-Vt.), for one, considered insulting to the Soviets, and states only that if no further treaty limiting offensive weapons (SALT II) has been reached by 1977, the expiration date of the agreement, then the agreement may be abrogated by this country. In the meanwhile, our negotiators should seek full strategic equality.

This version now has won the blessing of the Nixon administration. It will not have the effect of a legalistic restriction on either the treaty or the interim agreement but will convey congressional caution in the entire realm of nuclear accords, specifically focused on the ones now being considered.

It has taken years (since 1963) to reach the point the United States and the Soviet Union now occupy. The world still is gravely threatened by nuclear war. Each of the big powers has the capacity to wipe out the other several times over. Every step back to sanity and stability must be cherished and encouraged.

Which is why threats of floor fights on Senator Jackson's resolution or the interim agreement itself are so hard to comprehend.

But Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.), one potential opponent, thinks that appending any clarifying language at all to the agreement is to imply that the United States has made a bad bargain and apparently believes no further "tag ends" should be put in the same barrel—certainly none that imply the United States really should maintain nuclear superiority rather than parity, for then, he says, "there will be no end to the arms race."

Senator Cooper, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, is unquestionably one of the Senate's brighter luminaries, but this time we must beg to disagree with him. As it stands now, the Jackson resolution implies a certain unease in the presence of a momentous accord—and it is an unease not restricted to Capitol Hill but widely shared throughout the country.

If putting it in words helps in any way to get the substantive agreement through, it is probably a wise move.

We don't think it will perversely spur the arms race, particularly since the Soviets themselves have been consulted on the revised Jackson language and have no objections.

The point of President Nixon's mission to Moscow and all the subsequent effort to get the treaty and the interim agreement OK'd has been to move "with all deliberate speed" away from global incineration before it is too late. Quibbling over side-effects at this point is not moving in the right direction.

If Congress acts promptly, and minimizes irrelevant floor fights, the SALT II preparations can start in October. Most Americans, we believe, hope that they will.

This has become a scruffy old world, full of ills and aches, and perhaps not the prize planet in the universe we once thought it to be. But it is the only one we have.

[From the Denver, (Colo.) Post, Aug. 15, 1972]

SETTING SALT FOR PHASE II ADDS TO ARMS CONTROL HOPE

Agreement by the United States and the Soviet Union to undertake the second round of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in Geneva this fall provides encouragement for future disarmament progress by the two super powers.

The SALT 2 discussions will center on more permanent limitations on missiles than those developed in the SALT 1 accords, and will also consider limitations on bombers and forward base systems.

The historic first-phase agreements, worked out by President Nixon and Soviet leaders earlier this year, provided a foundation for still more comprehensive disarmament pacts.

The solidity of that foundation, however, depends in large measure on Congress.

The Senate has given solid support to the first part of the SALT 1 accords—a treaty establishing limits on defensive missile units.

It now remains for both the House and the Senate to approve an interim agreement setting restrictions on offensive nuclear arsenals.

Debate on the interim agreement has centered on an amendment offered by Sen. Henry M. Jackson of Washington, and supported by Colorado's Sen. Gordon Allott.

The proposed amendment would seek assurance at SALT 2 that the United States would be guaranteed parity with the Soviet Union on strategic weaponry.

Specifically, Jackson is concerned that U.S. superiority in multiple warhead systems may be wiped out by Soviet gains in this area which, coupled with Soviet advantages in other aspects of nuclear weaponry, might give them the capacity for a decisive first strike.

The Nixon administration has given its backing to the proposed Jackson amendment—at least in a version calling for general U.S.-Soviet parity on strategic arms.

The administration would prefer approval of the interim agreement without any amendments, but has accepted the amendment to calm fears about the Russians gaining a strategic advantage.

Passage of the Jackson amendment could conceivably be beneficial to SALT 2 if it leads to strong approval of the interim agreement in both houses of Congress.

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[From the Savannah (Ga.) Evening Press, Aug. 17, 1972]

NUCLEAR EQUALITY

For trying to compromise with reasonable critics of its Moscow arms agreement, the Nixon Administration has been severely attacked by Sen. Frank Church and Sen. J. William Fulbright. The position taken by the two Senators is difficult to understand.

Last week the focus of the Church and Fulbright attacks was an amendment Sen. Henry Jackson offered in an effort to assure that the Moscow pact would not jeopardize U.S. security.

Sen. Jackson has maintained that treaty should contain language calling for equality in nuclear arms when the United States and Russia negotiate a permanent deal to succeed this temporary agreement.

The Washington senator, an expert on defense, believes the five-year temporary pact, which gives Russia a sizable advantage in numbers of missile launchers, could be risky if the Soviets use the five years to develop new technology in the MRV (multiple reentry vehicle) field.

Should this happen, says Sen. Jackson, Russia could end up with a 50 per cent advantage in numbers of missiles and a 40 per cent advantage in the permissible size of their warheads—as well as a superiority in numbers of warheads.

In a compromise with Sen. Jackson and other critics, the White House agreed to accept an amendment and even helped Sen. Jackson rewrite the amendment in order to satisfy him and at the same time express his goal in terms compatible with Administration goals.

Sen. Church and Sen. Fulbright leaped into the fray declaring they wouldn't accept any amendments of this type. "I for one do not want to be party to another Tonkin Gulf resolution," said Sen. Fulbright in a comparison that boggles the mind. The amendment had about as much to do with Tonkin Gulf type resolutions as National Cucumber Week has to do with welfare reform.

Sen. Church's criticism was even more interesting, if that's the word. "I suggest that this administration . . . is beginning the slow process of scuttling its own nuclear agreements with Moscow." Let's be reasonable. If the Administration didn't want the agreement, it didn't have to reach it in the first place. If it was so devious it wanted to pretend to reach the agreement, then have Congress defeat it, the Administration didn't have to do anything except not battle for the pact. And if it wanted to scuttle the agreement, it would have done a better job by accepting the first Jackson amendment instead of getting the Senator to rewrite it.

What was really being argued, and pursued, by Sen. Church and Sen. Fulbright was a theory that often draws the label of new isolationism. It is advocacy of nuclear inferiority. Their objection to the Jackson amendment was that it called for nuclear equality. It is a view that is quite dangerous.

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[From the New York Daily News, Aug. 17, 1972]

SALT WILL PASS WITH A CAUTION ON PHASE II

(By Jerry Greene)

WASHINGTON, Aug. 16.—The fiddle-faddle in the United States Senate over approval of the interim agreement with Russia on limitation of strategic offensive weapons stems from a deep belief by some members that the Soviets suckered the Americans during the SALT talks.

What the opposing senators want in the campaign led by Sen. Henry (Scoop) Jackson (D Wash.) is a little written warning, or assurance, that more of the same won't happen in SALT Phase 2, slated to begin this fall.

Jackson and most of his colleagues favor the SALT agreements—the interim offensive weapons five-year pact as well as the ABM treaty, already okayed, and there is no question the pending measure will be approved.

But Russia ran way out ahead of the U.S. in the number of key items during the three years SALT was under negotiation, producing more missiles while talking limitations, and it is this situation that senators would like to prevent next time, as if a few phrases would do it.

The senators heard some powerful supporting testimony during the SALT hearings. Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Navy chief of staff, assured them that 'the objectives of SALT are inseparable from and fully consistent with, national security requirements. I believe that the deterrent capability of our strategic forces wil lnot be impaired by the agreement so long as vigorously press forward with necessary programs which are permitted under its terms."

But there was one witness who opposed the whole thing, whose views attracted scant attention. His testimony was worth noting, for he was an adviser to the U.S. SALT negotiating delegation. He was William R. Van

Cleave, associate professor at the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Southern California.

Van Cleave thinks we got jobbed during the negotiations, largely because our delegation proceeded on the assumption that the Russians operate on the same concepts and have the same objectives of a peaceful world as we.

His thoughts as expressed before the senators are worth consideration just in case the hopes and the prospects don't work out quite the way they should if there is to be any real success in restricting and perhaps eventually banishing weapons that could destroy the earth.

Van Cleave told the senators that the agreements, the ABM treaty and the interim offensive pact, "are in fact a light-year removed from the outcomes contemplated in the studies and planning for SALT in 1969. . . . These agreements do not resemble those deemed acceptable in 1969 or 1970."

The negotiators kept trying to get better agreements, the witness said, and the Soviets kept saying "nyet."

The Van Cleave contention was that the offensive weapons accord allows the Russians a distinct and dangerous superiority over the U.S.

His testimony, like Senate debate on the subject, was filled with numbers and sizes, yards and yards of statistics and comparative data with which almost anything can be proved.

A REMINDER ON PREDICTIONS

The witness had an unhappy reminder for his audience: "Our projections of Soviet objectives and future capabilities have been seriously in error many times, a fact that should make us a bit humble about current projections and expectations.

"In 1965, even after the Soviet ICBM build-up had begun, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara publicly stated that the Soviets clearly had no intention of trying to close the gap in strategic forces or to compete quantitatively with the U.S."

He recalled that as late as 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird acknowledged that we had not responded to the Russian growth in intercontinental missiles because we believed all the Soviets had in mind was to achieve numerical parity with the U.S. Well, they got the numerical parity they wanted, and kept right on building. At last account—we promise these will be the only statistics we use—the U.S. had 1,054 ICBMs deployed, while Russia's land-based total was 1,550.

Van Cleave had a thought or two about reading the Russian mind.

"UNCERTAINTY REMAINS GREATER"

"Our uncertainty concerning Soviet strategic concepts remains greater than our knowledge, yet we continue to assume in our strategic and SALT planning that Soviet concepts and objectives are similar to our own. The weight of available evidence, I believe, strongly suggests the opposite.

"For some time in the U.S. it has been commonly believed that there are certain truths about strategic stability and the optimum strategic relationship which only need to be learned to be accepted. We have tried to read our truths into Soviet activities. Where they did not fit, it was a matter of Soviet error or misunderstanding, rather than a deliberate, considered or even final rejection of these truths."

What the witness, what Jackson and the questioning senators have been saying is that in their opinion, perhaps in haste to get some sort of an arms treaty on the books this election year, the U.S. has succeeded in outtrading itself. An extension of this situation for another five years—the life of the interim offensive limitation agreement—might well prove fatal.

[From the Tacoma (Wash.) News-Tribune, Aug. 21, 1972]

WATCHING THAT PACT

We thank the United States Senate and especially Sen. Henry M. Jackson for amendment to the strategic arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union.

Apparently the Congress shares with many Americans some qualms about the treaty, and even President Nixon is said to have approved the Jackson amendment.

Apart from all the complexities and defense algebra of the treaty itself, with its limitations on missiles, there is in the minds of Americans a question as to whether we can trust the Soviet Union, which is known to pursue its self interest vigorously.

The answer of the Senate in the Jackson amendment is that we cannot; that we must be vigilant and continue to match Soviet development.

The Jackson amendment says in diplomatic language that if the Soviets take advantage of the arms agreement to seek overwhelming nuclear superiority, all bets are off.

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[From the Winston-Salem (N.C.) Journal and Sentinel, Sept. 10, 1972]

THE RIGHT PRIORITY

There is a contradiction in the defense policy of the United States—an ominous contradiction—that sooner or later we must resolve.

On the one hand the nation continues to fight a war in Southeast Asia as if our national existence depended on the outcome.

On the other hand the agreements that President Nixon signed in Moscow concede to the Soviet Union a 50 per cent superiority over the United States in numbers of strategic nuclear weapons, which could put an end to our national existence.

Does this make sense? Is it reasonable to go on fighting year after year, to pour vast resources of air and sea power and money into a struggle against a feeble little Communist country which can do us no harm while giving a decisive advantage to a powerful Communist country that can indeed do us mortal harm?

Under the patient coaching of Sen. Henry M. Jackson, the U.S. Senate is gradually becoming aware of what President Nixon gave away in Moscow. The facts are clear.

Under the interim agreement on offensive weapons . . .

The U.S. may have 1,054 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Soviet Union 1,618.

The U.S. may have 710 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the Soviets 950.

The U.S. may have 44 missile firing submarines, the Soviets 84.

The U.S. may have no heavy intercontinental missiles of 25-50 megatons or more, the Soviet Union 313.

We say, "The facts are clear," but that may be a misstatement. For these figures represent only what the U.S. government *understands* to be the agreement. What the Soviet Union understands may be a different matter.

For example, the agreement as our government understands it provides that the U.S. may have 1,054 land-based intercontinental missiles and the Soviets 1,618. That figure of 1,054 is an official U.S. government figure. But the figure of 1,618 for the Soviets is only a U.S. intelligence estimate of what the Soviets had last July 1. The Soviet government has never officially acknowledged it. Consequently, the Soviets are free to say in a year or two that they actually had 1,800 or 2,000 land-based missiles on July 1 and are therefore free to maintain that number.

Rather slipshod, isn't it?

But to go back to the contradiction in our defense policy. As we have argued for at least four years, we believe that the U.S. must reorder its priorities. It makes absolutely no sense to go on squandering our resources on a war in Vietnam that, no matter how it comes out, can have no effect on the strategic balance in the world.

What does make sense is to concentrate our resources where they *can* affect that strategic balance. In particular we must be sure that the Soviet Union does not surpass us in strategic weaponry.

We say this not because we are militarists or chauvinists or because we believe that the U.S. has always used its power wisely. We say it because we believe that some kind of external check must be maintained on the Soviet leaders, for they are subject to no internal checks of any kind.

We say it too because under the American nuclear umbrella most of the peoples of the world have made considerable progress during the past 25 years—progress in nationhood, progress in individual liberty, progress toward economic self-sufficiency. And we would hope that given the same kind of protection they might continue that progress for the rest of this century.

For these reasons we support Sen. Jackson's amendment to the interim agreement saying that the U.S. will not accept on a permanent basis the inferiority in numbers and weight of nuclear weapons that Mr. Nixon conceded in Moscow.

As Sen. Jackson has argued, the purpose of the amendment is not to give the U.S. an excuse to build up to the Soviet level but to give the Soviets a good reason to cut down to ours.

In that way, the amendment may help do what the Moscow agreement was actually supposed to do—put a brake on the arms race without endangering our national security.

Mr. JACKSON. On March 18, 1970 the Subcommittee on SALT of the Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing at which the noted historian Richard Pipes gave important testimony on salient themes of Russian history that bear on her foreign and defense policy. Dr. Pipes is professor of history and director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University.

Professor Pipes' testimony deals with issues bearing on past and future SALT negotiations. I believe the insights of this distinguished historian will be of great interest to Members of the Senate, in connection with our current discussions.

I ask unanimous consent that Professor Pipes' statement of March 18, 1970, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD PIPES, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, DIRECTOR, RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 18, 1970

(U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of the Committee on Armed Services)

The desire to seek explanation of a country's conduct in its history is a natural and justifiable one, since clearly every nation's outlook and behavior are in some measure influenced by its past experience. But the procedure is always fraught with danger. It is all too easy to fashion an image of another people's national character, to assume that it is eternal and immutable, and from this assumption to draw completely false deductions. In reality, "national character" is an elusive and transient thing. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for example, the French were generally regarded as the most aggressive nation on the European continent, whereas the Germans were viewed as

impractical dreamers, sovereigns of the "realm of clouds," as Voltaire called them. Then, in the second half of the nineteenth century the roles were neatly reversed, and the Germans, descending from their clouds, turned into a nation of Huns. The Japanese who were once thought to have inherited from their samurai ancestors an unquenchable thirst for blood, have recently become a nation of frenetic businessmen, at the same time that the Jews, whose unfitness for warfare had been proverbial, created in Israel a military machine of unsurpassed efficiency. Such examples could be multiplied many times over.

As every historian knows, that which is loosely called "national character" represents the spirit not of an entire nation, but only of that social group which at a given time happens to control the instruments of power and the organs of opinion, and manifests itself only as long as that group enjoys this control. The problem, therefore, is one of identifying the elite and ascertaining its particular experiences, interests, and expectations. Such knowledge is particularly useful in dealing with countries that have authoritative forms of government because there the ruling elite is relatively immune to public pressures.

In considering the elite which rules today's Russia and its possessions, four facts relevant to its conduct of foreign policy demand emphasis: its cultural background, the nature of its claim to authority, its class interests, and its colonial experience. Only when all four of these factors have been taken into account is it possible to understand something of that peculiar mixture of aggressiveness and caution which has distinguished Soviet foreign policy since 1917.

1. THE CULTURAL BACKGROUND OF THE SOVIET ELITE

The Soviet elite is not, the same one that had ruled Russia in the imperial period, that is, from the accession of Peter the Great in 1689 to the Revolution. The imperial elite, composed largely of landed and service gentry, was thoroughly Westernized; it considered itself part of Europe and in its majority emulated European models. This class was overthrown in 1917, and replaced by a new elite formed of elements that had never been much exposed to Westernization: the lower bureaucracy, small tradesmen, provincial intelligentsia, clergy, skilled labor, and peasantry. The cultural roots of these groups lay not in the Westernized Russia of Peter and his successors, but in the pre-Petrine culture of old Moscow, and even beyond it, in Byzantium and the Turkic tribes of the Steppe.

In imperial Russia, the ancestors of the Soviet elite had been kept out of the chambers of power. They always viewed the Western culture of the St. Petersburg court and of its gentry with distaste and suspicion. Though not averse to borrowing Western technology, especially of a military nature, they rejected the spiritual foundations on which this technology had grown. Their whole attitude toward the external world was decisively influenced by the teachings of the Orthodox Church which more than any other Christian establishment resisted innovation and persecuted heresy. The xenophobia which this Orthodox Church inculcated in its flock impressed itself very deeply on the mind of the Russian lower classes; and so did the belief that the Orthodox alone are pure and fit for salvation. This faith, in a secularized form, has remained very much part of the outlook of the Soviet elite; for although this elite professes militant atheism it has no other culture to fall back on than the xenophobic, anti-Western culture of old Moscow.

The practical consequences of this fact are considerable. The group ruling the Soviet Union is not predisposed by its cultural background to regard itself as part of a broader international community; nor does it tend to think in terms of a stable world order which accords every nation a rightful place. Such an outlook is widespread in communities with a Protestant and a commercial culture, but it is rather rare elsewhere. The Soviet elite tends to think in terms of a perpetual conflict pitting right against wrong, from which only one side can emerge victorious. Needless to elaborate, Communist ideology with its stress on class warfare culminating in a vast revolutionary catacylsm neatly reinforces this inherited religiously-inspired outlook.

2. *The Question of Legitimacy*

The elite which rules Soviet Russia lacks a legitimate claim to authority and this fact has critical bearing on its conduct of both domestic and foreign policy. Lenin, Trotsky, and their associates seized power by force, overthrowing an ineffective but democratic government. The government they founded derives from a violent act perpetrated by a tiny minority. Furthermore, this power seizure was carried out under false pretenses. The *coup d'etat* of October 1917 was accomplished not on behalf of the Bolshevik party but on behalf of the Soviets—a fact which survives today mainly in the name "Soviet Union." The Soviets were representative bodies of soldiers, workers, and peasants which, for all their structural looseness and lack of regular procedure, did in a fashion express the will of the people. But although the Bolsheviks claimed to overthrow the Provisional Government in order to transfer power to these Soviets, in reality they used them from the begininng as a facade behind which to consolidate their own authority, and the transfer was never accomplished. And, finally, the Soviet government has never dared to seek a mandate from its population. The one and only post-1917 election in which the Bolsheviks ran in competition with other parties—the election for the Constituent Assembly held in the winter of 1917–1918—gave them a quarter of the national vote, whereupon they ordered the assembly dissolved. No elections giving the voter a choice even from among Communist candidates have been held since that disagreeable experience.

Now it is sometimes said by friends of the Soviet Union abroad that one must not apply to its government standards of democracy derived from the West. And, indeed, it is perfectly possible to exercise authority without recourse to the Western idea of popular sovereignty or by twisting it out of all semblance as Hitler had done when he claimed that the will of eighty million Germans fused and became one with his own. But as a matter of record, the Soviet government makes no such claim on its own behalf: its constitution and legal system claim to rest on democratic principles indistinguishable from our own, and hence it cannot escape being judged by them. A government which came to power by force in the name of slogans which it did not and had no intention of honoring, and which has never dared to seek popular sanction, such a government cannot be said to be democratic no matter how broadly the term is defined. And herein lies its tragedy and insoluble inner contradiction. The yawning gap between constitutional promise and political reality stares in the eye of all but the most obtuse or cynical of Soviet citizens.

Legitimacy of some kind is essential to every political authority to justify the right of some men to order others about. The Soviet government is no exception. Unable to obtain a popular mandate, it seeks to obtain it in a variety of other ways, of which nationalism is the handiest. By appearing as the protector of Russian national interests from internal and external enemies, the regime can identify itself with the people. But to be able to do so, it must have enemies; and it conjures them up as the need arises. The atmosphere of a crisis is essential to the Soviet elite and can be counted on to remain an instrument of Soviet policy as long as the present elite remains in power. In the 1930's and 1940's it was often said that Soviet behavior is motivated by fear. This is correct as far as it goes: only the fear is not of other peoples but of its own, and for that reason it is incapable of being allayed by concessions. Fear breeds insecurity which in turn expresses itself, in nations as in individuals, in aggressive behavior.

(And it may be noted parenthetically that the one time the Soviet Union confronted a genuine menace rather than one of its own making, namely Nazi Germany, it reacted by appeasing; its most determined reactions have always been reserved for imaginary enemies.

3. CLASS INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET ELITE

All elites have vested interests, or they would not be elites. But as a rule, the disparity between the interests of the elite and of the rest of the citizenry is wider in poor countries than in rich ones, and the dread of losing status is proportionately more acute. And Russia is still a desperately poor country, with a standard of living below that of some countries in the preindustrial stage of development. The bulk of the wealth created by Soviet industry since the inauguration of the first Five-Year-Plan in 1928 has gone into armaments and those branches of the economy of greatest direct benefit to the military. Agriculture has been ruined to pay for this most up-to-date military machine; and consumer industry has been forced to operate on a shoestring. This situation has not significantly changed since the death of Stalin, periodic promises of a vast outpouring of consumer goods notwithstanding—(for example, Khrushchev's confident boast that by 1970 the Soviet Union would exceed the United States in the production of meat and milk). The Soviet citizen today is poor not only in comparison with his counterpart in other European countries, but also in comparison with his own grandfather. In terms of essentials—food, clothing, and housing—the Soviet population as a whole is worse off than it was before the Revolution and in the 1920's. If one considers such intangibles as access to information and the right to travel as elements of the standard of living—as they should be—then, the Soviet citizenry is positively destitute.

This cannot be said of the Soviet elite which enjoys a fairly decent standard of life. The closer a member of this group stands to the inner sancta of the bureaucratic-military-police establishment, the readier his access to the country's very limited store of goods and services, to the sources of objective information, to a passport authorizing travel abroad. No wonder therefore that the Soviet elite vigorously protects its privileged position and the political system which makes it possible; that it dreads democracy which would inevitably sweep away its status and force it to share the indescribably drab life of the ordinary Soviet citizenry; that it supports the regime in its nationalism and crisis-mongering.

4. THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE

The Moscow state, that is, the ancestor of the Imperial and Soviet states, emerged on the fringe of Asia. In order to create a national state, its founders had not only to impose their authority on rival Russian principalities, but also to repel, subdue, and integrate the Turco-Mongol and Finnic populations with which they were surrounded. As a consequence, in Russia, the process of nation-building took place concurrently with that of empire-building, rather than before. The two processes, so distinct in the history of western states, in the case of Russia, cannot be readily separated either chronologically or geographically. In

the second half of the 16th century Moscow already administered a sizable colonial population of Tatars and Finns. To these were added in the 17th century the natives of Siberia and the Cossacks, in the 18th the nomads of Central Asia, the Crimean Tatars, the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Poles, Jews, and Baltic peoples, and in the 19th, the Caucasians and Muslims of Turkestan.

As a result of these acquisitions, the Moscow government acquired early a great deal of expertise in handling foreigners; but this expertise it gained from administering subject peoples, western and Oriental, not from dealing on equal terms with other sovereign states. The Office of Ambassadors in Moscow knew less, comparatively speaking, about foreigners than did the various administrative offices charged with responsibility for administering immense territories inhabited by peoples of different races and religions. In some measure this also held true of the Imperial government and of the Soviet government; for techniques of administration tend to survive change of elites.

The implications are not far to seek. A country whose governing apparatus has learned how to deal wtih foreign peoples from what are essentially colonial practices is not predisposed to think in terms of a stable international community or of balance of power. Its natural instincts are to exert the maximum use of forces, and to regard absorption as the only dependable way of settling relations with other states, especially those located along its own borders. There is little need here for theory, because the options are narrow, and concern tactics rather than objectives or strategy.

To anyone acquainted with the rich literature on the international relations of the Western powers it must come as a surprise to learn that there is no definitive or even comprehensive history of Russian foreign relations. The literature on the theory of Russian foreign policy is so meager that it may be said not to exist. That Russians have felt no need to compile the record of their external relations or to investigate its principles is in itself a significant fact, illustrative of their general attitude toward the outside world.

These four factors impel the elite which rules Soviet Russia to conduct a dynamic and inherently aggressive foreign policy, very different from that pursued by such predominantly commercial countries as the United States, whose principal aim is international stability. If the Soviet elite were not inhibited by other factors, which it is helpless to change, the Soviet Union very likely would conduct a policy of reckless external expansion such as Germany and Japan had pursued in the 1930's. But fortunately, such inhibiting factors do exist, and these must be taken into account to provide a rounded picture of Soviet foreign policy.

The most important of these is the spirit and mood of the ordinary people: not only the people of Great Russian stock but also those belonging to the numerous ethnic minorities inhabiting the Soviet Union.

The Russian people have no tradition of glorifying war, perhaps because they never had a feudal culture in the proper sense of the word. Its great medieval epic celebrates not the victory of Russian arms but their defeat. Neither in the folklore nor in the proverbs of Russia is there much trace of militarism. The common people have always viewed war as a desperate act to defend one's home; and Russian troops, so effective on their home soil, have never shown much skill on foreign campaigns. This general attitude deserves comment even in the case of a country which allows its citizenry no say in governmental affairs, because in the long run the quality of the human material has considerable bearing on a government's freedom of action.

Even more significant, however, is the fact that the people of the Soviet Union are utterly exhausted. The country had been mobilized in 1914 and except for brief respites has not been allowed since then to return to normal life. Having dropped out of the international war in 1917, Russia suffered for the next three years an even more devastating civil war followed by several years of epidemic and famine. It barely recovered from these disasters during the New Economic Policy era, when in 1928 it was reharnessed into state service to carry out the most ambitious program of industrialization ever attempted by the nation.

To make this program economically feasible, a whole counter-revolution was inaugurated in the countryside, in the course of which the government confiscated, in the face of the peasantry's desperate resistance, its land, livestock and implements. This tragedy was not even over when the regime launched a political massacre of actual, potential, or imaginary opponents of nightmarish dimensions. And then came World War II. The losses in human lives which the population of the Soviet Union has suffered between 1914–1945 exceed those of any other people in modern times except European Jewry. They can be estimated at two million casualties in World War I, 14 million during the Civil War and the famine, ten million during collectivization, 10 million during the purges and 20 million during World War II, for a total of 56 million human lives lost. The demographic pyramid of the Soviet population bears a visible scar from these stupendous losses showing a deep indentation in the age group between 35 and 70, especially on the male side.

After such exertions and bloodletting the inhabitants of the Soviet Union are simply incapable of being mobilized once again for any sustained national effort. Their fatigue is so profound that neither exhortations nor alarms can shake them from it. They require three things of which they have been deprived for the past half a century: peace, privacy, and prosperity, probably in this order. With a population in this state it is just not possible to launch ambitious drives of external expansion.

Consideration must also be given to the fact that approximately one-half of the population of the Soviet Union consists of peoples who are not of Russian nationality. This colonial population brought under Russian sovereignty by imperial and Soviet conquest, not only shares the exhaustion of the Russians proper, but experiences a sense of national frustration as well. Neither blandishments nor persecution have had much effect on the patriotic spirit among the ethnic minorities. They constitute a volatile and unreliable element.

Thus a kind of dilemma arises before the Soviet elite: one of the principal factors inducing it to maintain an aggressive posture, namely lack of confidence in its popular support and the need for crisis, also forces it to act cautiously. The Soviet government cannot risk a protracted war because such a war always makes the government dependent on its population. All the important concessions which the Imperial government had made before the revolution were the consequence of long wars: the Crimean War, which compelled it to free the serfs and institute local self-government; the Japanese War, which forced it to grant a constitution; and World War I, which caused it to abdicate. These historic lessons have not been lost on the Soviet government and in large measure account for the prudence which it has always shown in the face of firm resistance by other powers.

The same factor explains the haste with which the Soviet elite exploits any opportunity abroad where serious opposition seems unlikely. Guided more by the prospect of success than by any consideration of "national interest," Russian expansion follows no discernible pattern. The whole concept of "national interest" in the sense in which the term is used in the West, is altogether alien to the Russian mind. Most writings on the subject come from the pens of foreigners who seek to locate behind Russian foreign policy patterns of a kind they are familiar with in their own countries. In Russian literature, prerevolutionary and Soviet, hardly anything is said on the matter. As for Communist theory, it too provides no guidelines for the conduct of a rational foreign policy insofar as the whole assumption of Communism is that the forces of "progress" and of "reaction" are split along class lines, not national ones.

By and large, Russian expansion tends to focus on targets of opportunity. Historians have long noted what may be called the "pendulum" effect in nineteenth century Russian expansion, meaning rapid shifts from one area to another in response to encountered resistance. Thus, frustrated by its defeat in the Crimean War from subjugating the Ottoman Empire, the Imperial government promptly sent its forces into Central Asia which it conquered in a series of rapid expeditions. But as soon as the British, alarmed for the security of India, threatened to stop Russian advances in that region, St. Petersburg shifted its attention to the Far East. Defeated in Korea and Manchuria by Japan, it returned to the Balkans.

Such pendular swings can also be detected in Soviet foreign policy: For instance, the shift in 1948 from expansion in Europe where it was halted by determined U.S. resistance, to East Asia. This evidence suggests that Russian expansion is motivated less by needs than by opportunities, less by what its elite wants than by what it can get. For this reason it is impossible to determine control over which areas would satisfy the Soviet government and induce it to assume a cooperative international stance. Russia has all the territory and all the resources it needs; its external security is assured by its military power and by vast buffer zones separating it from potential enemies. If it nevertheless keeps on expanding it is precisely because its expansion is in large measure determined by internal rather than external factors, above all, by the tragic relationship of the government to its people.

Developments which have occurred in military technology since the end of World War II, and particularly the emergence of a strategy based on rocketry and nuclear weapons, have significantly affected the situation.

In some respects, the changes in warfare have had a positive effect on world peace. Scientific and technological warfare requires a large scientific and technical intelligentsia, whose outlook is bound to be very different from that of the traditional class of field or staff officers. That which has been learned of this intelligentsia through personal contacts during the past 15 years suggests that it differs indeed from the rest of the Soviet elite of which it is a member by virtue of its privileged status. Soviet scientists and technicians think of themselves not only as Russians but also as citizens of the world, for they are better aware than administrators of common human problems. They are more objective and less emotional. Their whole temper is more liberal than that of the rest of the Soviet elite. Their emergence is undoubtedly a healthy phenomenon, good for Russia and the rest of the world.

In other respects, the development of highly technical warfare has had a very deleterious effect on the prospects of peace. If it is true, as argued above, that the principal deterrent to a recklessly aggressive Soviet foreign policy is the unreliability of the Soviet population, then clearly any development which frees the regime from dependence on its population reduces the effectiveness of that deterrent. The more mechanized

warfare becomes, the briefer and more devastating war tends to become, the less the Soviet elite needs to make allowances for the spirit of its population, the less it is afraid of war. The scientific-technical intelligentsia, of course, gains in status under these conditions; but its actual influence on government policy in Russia, as elsewhere, is questionable. It is a curious fact that the most liberal among American scientists, who have been so frustrated in their attempt to influence their own government on such issues as ABM, are most sanguine about the power of their Soviet counterparts. But if they tried and failed to exert political power in a country where it is possible to appeal over the head of the administration to the mass of citizens, how can the Soviet scientific elite succeed in a country where no such opportunities exist?

On balance, the development of modern military technology will probably intensify the expansionist tendencies of the Soviet elite. It is likely to increase its self-confidence and encourage it to pursue targets of opportunity wherever they present themselves with greater boldness than before.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I hope that cloture will be voted tomorrow so that the Senate can move to final consideration of the proposed amendments and final action on the Interim Agreement.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do not wish to speak any further about the merits of the agreement. I did not say anything about cloture. My position is that I shall vote against cloture. I still think that the proper procedure in a matter of this importance is to follow the regular procedure that we normally follow in the Senate, and that is that the resolution is open for amendment.

I had hoped that the Senator from Washington would offer his amendment and that we could debate it on the merits. I would hope that some Members of the Senate might be present and that it could be developed in the regular order.

Whatever happens to his amendment would be handled without a strict limitation of time, because I think it is a matter of sufficient importance to warrant thorough consideration.

I will not reiterate what I have said already about equality, other than the fact that I believe there is a misunderstanding on the part of many people in and out of the Senate as to what equality consists of. The amendment which is at the desk, offered by myself and some nine other cosponsors, simply undertakes to make clear what equality we are in favor of. The word "equality" is a word with many possible interpretations. I do not know of anybody who is not in favor of equality of strategic nuclear weapons as between the United States and the Soviet Union. The question in issue, of course, is the nature of that equality.

If I understand him correctly—and I believe I do—the amendment of the Senator from Washington restricts that to equality of intercontinental nuclear forces, and this is the crux of the matter; whereas, we believe—and I believe—that overall equality in all nuclear weapons is what is desirable and what the President's agreement intended to deal with, and not a specific kind of weapons system.

The matter as to what this amendment means is the very crux of the matter, and I hope it can be developed in a free and open debate in the Senate, without the restriction either of cloture or a unanimous-consent agreement. I hope that the Senate will not impose cloture on a matter of this kind.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHILES). The bill is open to further amendment.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in view of the fact that there seems to be no desire on the part of any other Senator to speak on the pending business, I ask unanimous consent that it be laid aside temporarily so that the Senate may proceed to the consideration of other business on the calendar.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## U.S. SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, LAND ACQUISITION, AND PARKING FACILITIES PLANNING ACT OF 1972

Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 997, S. 3917.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

S. 3917, to authorize the construction of the completion of the New Senate Office Building on the east half of square 725 in the District of Columbia, to authorize the acquisition of certain real property in square 724 in the District of Columbia, to authorize the Architect of the Capitol to initiate and conduct a study of alternate designs for a vehicle parking garage with limited commercial facilities to be constructed on square 724 and an architectural design competition to be conducted in connection therewith, and to authorize the acquisition of all publicly or privately owned property contained in square 764 in the District of Columbia as an addition to the United States Capitol Grounds, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, with reference to S. 3917, that there be a time limitation thereon of 30 minutes, to be equally divided between the distinguished Senator from West Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH) and the distinguished Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER); that time on the amendment to be offered by the distinguished Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) be limited to 30 minutes, to be equally divided between the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) and the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH); that time on any other amendment be limited to 20 minutes, to be equally divided between the mover of such and the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH); and that time on any debatable motion or appeal be limited to 10 minutes, to be equally divided between the mover of such and the distinguished manager of the bill.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, what bill is that?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. The bill now before the Senate, S. 3917, to authorize the construction of the completion of the new Senate Office Building on the east half of square 725 in the District of Columbia.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator very much.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from West Virginia? The Chair hears none and it is so ordered.

## QUORUM CALL

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask unanimous consent that the time not be charged against either side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHURCH). Without objection, it is so ordered and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

The Senate continued with the consideration of the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 241) authorizing the President to approve an interim agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

## CLOTURE MOTION

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, at this time I send to the desk a cloture motion and ask that it be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under rule XXII, the Chair, without objection, directs the clerk to read the motion.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

earlier statement and from your testimony that you were not aware of any unusual risk involved in this test?

Captain BROU. That is correct, Mr. Mann. As I recall, on my visit to Dr. Kempe, he stated to me that Walter Reed did 6,000 such diagnostic studies a year. There was a risk, but no more risk than a normal tonsillectomy or appendectomy. We all know that people undergo tons of appendectomies and tonsillectomies every day with little or no consequences. That is the only risk.

Mr. MANN. At the same time, there was some indication that you, in consultation with your medical friend, had some reluctance to engaging in further tests?

Captain BROU. I had reluctance because of my experience the first time in the hospital, getting in the hospital and not being able to get out, and having two tests instead of one test—which I submitted to, of course. But being in the military, you can't really say no sometimes in the medical field when you are in the hospital.

I had already signed one release stating that I would submit to this diagnostic study. Then they impressed upon me the fact that it was a most unusual case and they wanted the facts of this to be written up, to be photographed, and so forth. I said, "Sure. If it will help somebody else, go ahead."

With the third test, which was the bad test, I was apprehensive and I was scared. The tests are painful, as I said before, but certainly nothing that I would shy away from if it meant the difference between life and death. But it was never put to me that it was imperative to my living a normal life.

Mr. MANN. Weren't you made aware of the possibility of blindness as a result of your condition?

Captain BROU. No. No, sir, I was not.

Mr. MANN. Thank you.

Mr. WALDIE. Are there any questions?

Mr. SMITH. Captain, were you made aware of the possibility of blindness—a possibility, if you didn't do anything about your eye?

Captain BROU. No, sir.

Mr. PHILOS. Mr. Chairman, I believe this statement about the tonsillectomy is correct, but it should be placed in the proper context. I ask your permission to have Colonel Kempe cover that in just one or two statements, if he may.

Mr. WALDIE. Fine, Colonel. Please come back.

Dr. KEMPE. As I mentioned before in regard to complications, if these tests are made, the patient is informed that there are complications. We don't say, "Forget about it, it is without any danger." We see catastrophes. We see deaths from these incidents, but they are very small.

Certainly, as Captain Brou said, people under appendectomies all the time. But how many deaths do you have from appendectomies? It's not without risk. Even undergoing anesthesia alone causes a risk.

One of the risks in these studies, for instance, is to develop or have a sensitivity to the injection material. We knew from the one shot that we had given her that she did not have this hypersensitivity to it. So there was a little less risk on that side.

But we never intended that this procedure carries a risk and carries even death or paralysis. We inform the patient of that fact. There is no doubt about it. I informed the Captain about it. I informed her doctor friend about it.

Mr. WALDIE. Is your testimony, Colonel, that you informed the Captain that it could even involve death?

Dr. KEMPE. I don't think I told her it might be death. What I usually say it, "Anything, really, could happen."

Mr. WALDIE. Did you tell her it could involve paralysis?

Dr. KEMPE. Yes, I did that.

Mr. WALDIE. Did you tell her?

Dr. KEMPE. Yes, I did. And especially her doctor friend.

Mr. WALDIE. I have no further questions.

Mr. FLOWERS. No questions.

Mr. WALDIE. The Committee is in adjournment.

Thank you very much, Captain and gentlemen.

Captain BROU. Thank you.

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President I am happy to support passage of H.R. 6503, which I believe is a just resolution of the case of Capt. Claire E. Brou. I hope this unusual case will not be considered a precedent. Ordinarily the disability retirement system for military personnel provides a sufficient resolution for claims of this nature. It is my hope that in the future by and large most cases of injuries arising in the course of military service can be handled within the administrative structure without the necessity of recourse to legislative relief by private bill.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, may I say furthermore that, on the basis of the Senate's consideration of—and I assume assent to—this bill, this particular measure is not to be considered as a precedent for future disposal and decision.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to amendment.

If there be no amendment to be proposed, the question is on third reading.

The bill was ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

## INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

AMENDMENTS NOS. 1516, 1517, AND 1518

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment which I intend to propose to Senate Joint Resolution 241 and ask that the amendment be printed, for the convenience of Senators.

This amendment is substantially the same as Amendment No. 1406, which I sent to the desk on August 7, 1972. My purpose in having this amendment printed for a second time is to reflect some technical changes which are required as a result of the Senate's adoption of the Mansfield amendment last Thursday. These changes relate to the placement of language in my amendment to Senate Joint Resolution 241 and the designation of a section number. Having the amendment printed a second time will also permit the names of new cosponsors to be listed.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as having been read, in accordance with the requirements of rule XXII.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be printed at this point in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received and printed and will lie on the table; and, without objection, the amendment will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendment reads as follows:

At the end of S.J. Res. 241 insert a new section as follows:

"SEC. —. The Government and the people of the United States ardently desire a stable international strategic balance that maintains peace and deters aggression. The Congress supports the stated policy of the United States that, were a more complete strategic offensive arms agreement not achieved within the five years of the interim agreement, and were the survivability of the strategic deterrent forces of the United States to be threatened as a result of such failure, this could jeopardize the supreme national interests of the United States; the Congress recognizes the difficulty of maintaining a stable strategic balance in a period of rapidly developing technology; the Congress recognizes the principle of United States-Soviet Union equality reflected in the antiballistic missile treaty, and urges and requests the President to seek a future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union; and the Congress considers that the success of these agreements and the attainment of more permanent and comprehensive agreements are dependent upon the maintenance of a vigorous research and development and modernization program leading to a prudent strategic posture.".

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I am aware that the distinguished majority whip has already made a unanimous-consent request which has been approved, but I did want to make the record clear on this point.

Mr. President, in anticipation of tomorrow's vote, and for the purpose of preserving my parliamentary position, I also send to the desk two other amendments which are substantially the same as the amendment I have just sent to the desk.

The first amendment is in the form of an amendment in the nature of a substitute to the amendment to be offered by the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT). The second is in the form of an amendment in the nature of a substitute to any pending amendment which meets the requirements of rule XXII.

I ask unanimous consent that the two amendments be considered as having been read in accordance with the requirement of rule XXII.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendments be printed at this point in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendments will be received and printed and will lie on the table; and, without objection, the amendments will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendments are as follows:

In lieu of the language proposed to be inserted, insert the following language:

"SEC. —. The Government and the people of the United States ardently desire a stable international strategic balance that maintains peace and deters aggression. The Congress supports the stated policy of the United States that, were a more complete strategic offensive arms agreement not achieved within the five years of the interim agreement, and were the survivability of the strategic deterrent forces of the United States to be threatened as a result of such failure, this could jeopardize the supreme national interests of the United States; the Congress recognizes the difficulty of maintaining a stable strategic balance in a period of rapidly developing technology; the Congress recognizes the principle of United

Mr. WALDIE. We will go into that in a moment. Under that hypothetical question would you consider that doctor to be a highly skilled man in administering this test?

Colonel KEMPE. Even so it is not completely applicable to this case. You mean as a general question. If this would be the first catheter study he had done I do not think that would be enough.

Mr. WALDIE. Let me read what Dr. Guiterrez says his experience has been.

"During that admission the patient underwent a right inferior petrosal sinogram performed by Dr. Harrell, the staff physician in charge of such procedures. During this procedure I acted as first assistant to Dr. Harrell. The patient suffered no complication. Some weeks later I performed an identical procedure on another patient, whose name I recall as McCarthy, for an identical condition posterior to the left eye. I performed this procedure without Dr. Harrell's presence, with the normal attendance of a resident, and the appropriate technicians."

Then in the summary of the affidavits by the Judge Advocate General's Office he states on page 2, sub-paragraph (b) "It was not the first procedure of this kind undertaken by Dr. Guiterrez. He participated in the first procedure performed on the claimant in December of 1967 which resulted in no complications whatever and performed at least one other identical procedure on another patient prior to the second test run on the claimant in April of 1968."

I assume from this that that is the experience of Dr. Guiterrez prior to administering the tests upon Captain Brou. I assume from what you have reponded to the hypothetical question that that is not sufficient experience for you to assume that, Doctor.

Colonel KEMPE. We will have to leave this to the chief who runs this section.

What is actually the technical——

Mr. WALDIE. I understand that. All I asked was your personal experience, Colonel, as a skilled man in this field. I gathered you said that if that is the extent of his experience.

Dr. KEMPE. This is not my field to begin with—the catheter studies. These skills are learned in a different department. That is why when we give it to these patients they are done in the department that teaches this and they do these tests.

Mr. WALDIE. Doctor, while this fluid is being injected, countered to the flow of the blood, if the patient experiences immediately a sensation and numbness and communicates that sensation, is that an indication to the doctor who is administering this fluid that something may be amiss?

Dr. KEMPE. No. In 90 percent, or even 99 percent of these injection studies if the patient experiences sensory phenomena, he has to because these tests always irritate the nerves.

Mr. WALDIE. Do they experience numbness 90 percent of the time?

Dr. KEMPE. Numbness lasting for about a couple of seconds. Numbness of the face or other areas, depending on which area you inject, numbness of pain.

Mr. WALDIE. If a thrombosis was the causative factor, would numbness be an immediate reaction of the patient?

Dr. KEMPE. Numbness too, yes.

Mr. WALDIE. Would that be the first indication to the patient that something is going wrong?

Dr. KEMPE. Many symptoms can happen, but numbness is a very dominant one not only in a successful study but also with a study that leads furthermore to thrombosis. The main symptoms are paralysis.

Mr. WALDIE. With the history of a fractured skull, which you emphasize, do you emphasize that—because in that patient's case, with the fractured skull on the side, this test was being administered—certain cautions are necessary, or certain difficulties in her reaction might otherwise occur than had she not had the fractured skull?

Dr. KEMPE. A fractured skull brings forth one thing, that we may have an impairment of the flow of the circulation on the healthy side, on the side where she does not have the bad eye. We still especially have to do the test on this side.

Mr. WALDIE. With the history of a fractured skull, with the knowledge that the test is dangerous, with the knowledge that numbness is an indication of a thrombosis, when the patient complains of a numbness, do you immediately stop injecting fluid at that point?

Dr. KEMPE. Correct.

Mr. WALDIE. Or do you continue on the basis that all patients complain of numbness?

Dr. KEMPE. It usually is right after the injection. It doesn't occur during the injection.

Mr. WALDIE. When it's occurring during the injection, it's unique, then?

Dr. KEMPE. No, I can't even say that it's unique.

Mr. WALDIE. If you were administering this test and the patient complained of numbness during the administration of the test, would you stop injecting?

Dr. KEMPE. No. You tell the patient before injecting, "You will feel a numbness and a numbness over your face, so do not move", for instance. We even tell the patient while he is laying on this table, "Don't move. You will feel a numbness. You will feel a flash or burning sensation." They tell the patient this because the patient, during this time the x-ray is taken, is not supposed to move so as to get a picture. So you check that.

Mr. WALDIE. But this is a patient who has had this test and has experienced all the phenomena that is usual. This is the second time the test is being given and the patient sees fit to complain on the basis that the phenomena she is now experiencing is different from that which she experienced in the first instance.

Dr. KEMPE. So he stopped.

Mr. WALDIE. Would that dictate that you would stop?

Dr. KEMPE. He did stop.

Mr. WALDIE. Upon her first complaint?

Dr. KEMPE. So far as I know, yes.

Mr. WALDIE. I have no further questions.

Mr. Mann?

Mr. MANN. No questions.

Mr. SMITH. No questions.

Mr. COUGHLIN. I have one question I want to clarify again. As I understand it, this goes back to Mr. Waldie's earlier question, that this particular procedure, if improperly performed, could have affected that portion of the brain which would cause the patient's present condition.

Dr. KEMPE. It can happen without being improperly done. It can happen if it's improperly done, but we have no evidence that it was improperly done.

Mr. COUGHLIN. But ti could happen, if improperly done?

Dr. KEMPE. Yes. Many things could happen if improperly done.

Mr. COUGHLIN. I have no further questions.

Mr. WALDIE. Any further questions of any witness?

Mr. MANN. I have this question: Dr. Kempe, did you and Dr. Harrall testify before the Senate Committee?

Dr. KEMPE. Who?

Mr. SMITH. Did you appear before the Senate Committee and testify?

Dr. KEMPE. Never, no.

Mr. WALDIE. Any further questions of any witness or any member of the Committee?

May I call Captain Brou for another question or two?

Gentlemen, thank you very much.

Dr. KEMPE. Thank you very much.

Mr. PHILOS. These are the original affidavits which I will leave with the court reporter.

Mr. WALDIE. Captain, I want to get one point a little clearer in my mind. There seems to be some misunderstanding as to when you first registered a complaint to Dr. Gutierrez that you were having a reaction that you had not experienced in the previous test and whether at that point he stopped injecting fluid. Would you address yourself to that?

Captain BROU. Mr. Chairman, as I said before, I did not complain of numbness at the time his injection was made. I complained that this hand (indicating the right hand) was drawing up into this position (indicating).

I had already experienced a sensation in my head which Dr. Kempe explained to you as being a burning sensation, as a sensation of pressure. It's as if some vise or something is clamping your head. That is the sensation that I think is normally experienced by other people. I experienced it twice before. I experienced it on this third test. But I also experienced this clenching of my right hand, of my fist.

Mr. WALDIE. Was that a unique experience?

Captain BROU. Very unique. I had never experienced that before.

Mr. WALDIE. Did the doctor cease injecting fluid at that point upon that complaint?

Captain BROU. I cannot say whether he did or he did not because I feel he injected it all at one time and then that is what happened. But I have no way of knowing that, because you can't really see everything that is going on. You can see the catather going into your head, and so forth, and the injection of dye on a television screen because they have you in such a position that your head is turned back. From watching the screen on the previous tests, I watched it again.

I saw the catheter finally get in place. I saw the dye when it spread out, as if one would drop a drop of ink into a glass of clear water, and then my hand drew up. I experienced a pain in my head and then my hand drew up in a clenched position.

Mr. COUGHLIN. I have one question, Captain. The report that we have from the Senate indicates that the amount provided in this bill would be in full settlement of all your claims against the United States. Does that mean it would be in lieu of the roughly $600 a month that you are now receiving in benefits?

Captain BROU. No, sir, it does not. It means it would be in addition to, as is stated in some report or some writeup of this case.

Mr. COUGHLIN. No further questions.

Mr. WALDIE. Are there any other questions?

Mr. Flowers?

Mr. FLOWERS. No, sir.

Mr. WALDIE. Thank you, Captain.

Captain BROU. If I may, Mr. Waldie, I would like to make one further statement that was not heretofore brought out due to the fact that five years hence I would have retired from the military on twenty years active service. At that time my retirement pay would have been more than my physical disability retirement pay and possibly I would have been promoted once or twice during that five years. At that time I could have drawn on my twenty years Naval and military experience, and I could have drawn on both my Bachelors and Masters Degrees to get a civilian job. It would in no way have affected my retirement pay from the military, which would have been considerably more even though it was subject to Federal income tax.

I could have gotten the same medical benefits being retired from the military, and I would have been entitled to all other benefits that I am presently entitled to now. The one big difference is that I would have had my health and I could have gone on and gotten another job, which I cannot do now.

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Mann has a question.

Mr. MANN. Did I understand from your

States-Soviet Union equality reflected in the anti-ballistic missile treaty, and urges and requests the President to seek a future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union; and the Congress considers that the success of these agreements and the attainment of more permanent and comprehensive agreements are dependent upon the maintenance of a vigorous research and development and modernization program leading to a prudent strategic posture.".

In lieu of the language proposed to be inserted, insert the following language:

"SEC. —. The Government and the people of the United States ardently desire a stable international strategic balance that maintains peace and deters aggression. The Congress supports the stated policy of the United States that, were a more complete strategic offensive arms agreement not achieved within the five years of the interim agreement, and were the survivability of the strategic deterrent forces of the United States to be threatened as a result of such failure, this could jeopardize the supreme national interests of the United States; the Congress recognizes the difficulty of maintaining a stable strategic balance in a period of rapidly developing technology; the Congress recognizes the principle of United States-Soviet Union equality reflected in the antiballistic missile treaty, and urges and requests the President to seek a future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union; and the Congress considers that the success of these agreements and the attainment of more permanent and comprehensive agreements are dependent upon the maintenance of a vigorous research and development and modernization program leading to a prudent strategic posture.".

## FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY ACT OF 1972

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now turn to the consideration of Calendar No. 1046, S. 3939, that it be laid before the Senate and made the pending business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The legislative clerk read the bill by title, as follows:

A bill (S. 3939) to authorize appropriations for the construction of certain highways in accordance with title 23 of the United States Code, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, with an amendment on page 76, after line 21, insert a new title, as follows:

TITLE III

URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1964

SEC. 301. (a) The Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 is amended—

(1) by striking out "two-thirds" in the fifth sentence of section 4(a) and inserting in lieu thereof "90 per centum";

(2) by striking out "one-sixth" in the proviso to the second sentence of section 5 and inserting in lieu thereof "40 per centum"; and

(3) by striking out "two-thirds" in the last sentence of section 9 and inserting in lieu thereof "90 per centum".

(b)(1) Section 3 of such Act is amended—

(A) by striking out "No" in the fifth sentence of subsection (a) and inserting in lieu thereof "Except as provided in subsection (f), no"; and

(B) by adding at the end thereof of a new subsection as follows:

"(f) The Secretary is also authorized, on such terms and conditions as he may prescribe, to make grants or loans to any State or local public body to enable it to assist any mass transportation system which maintains mass transportation service in an urban area to pay operating expenses incurred as a result of providing such service. No financial assistance shall be provided under this subsection unless (1) the Secretary determines that the mass transportation services provided by the system involved are needed to carry out a program referred to in section 4(a), and (2) the applicant State or public body has submitted to the Secretary a comprehensive mass transportation service improvement plan which is approved by him and which sets forth a program, meeting criteria established by the Secretary, for capital or service improvements to be undertaken for the purpose of providing more efficient, economical, and convenient mass transportation service in an urban area, and for placing the mass transportation operations of such system on a sound financial basis. The amount of any grant under this subsection to a State or local public body to enable it to assist any mass transportation system to pay operating expenses shall not exceed twice the amount of financial assistance provided from State or local sources for that purpose. The Secretary shall issue such regulations as he deems necessary to administer this subsection in an equitable manner. Such regulations shall include appropriate definitions of (A) operating expenses, and (B) the sources or types of State or local financial assistance which may be considered in computing the maximum allowable Federal grant."

(2) The fourth sentence of section 4(a) of such Act is amended by striking out "section 3" and inserting in lieu thereof "section 3 (other than subsection (f))".

(3) Section 12(c) is amended—

(A) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (4);

(B) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (5) and inserting in lieu thereof "; and";

(C) by adding after paragraph (5) a new paragraph as follows:

"(6) the term 'mass transportation system' means any private company or public authority or agency providing mass transportation service."

(c) Section 4(c) of such Act is amended—

(1) by inserting "(1)" after "(c)";

(2) by striking out "sections 3, 7(b), and 9" and inserting in lieu thereof "section 3 (except subsection (f)), and section 7(b) and 9";

(3) by striking out "this subsection" wherever it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "this paragraph"; and

(4) by adding at the end thereof a new paragraph as follows:

"(2) To finance grants and loans under section 3(f) of this Act, the Secretary is authorized to incur obligations on behalf of the United States in the form of grant agreements or otherwise in amounts aggregating not to exceed $800,000,000. This amount shall become available for obligation upon the date of enactment of this paragraph and shall remain available until obligated. There are authorized to be appropriated for liquidation of the obligations incurred under this paragraph not to exceed $400,000,000 prior to July 1, 1973, which amount may be increased to not to exceed an aggregate of $800,000,000 prior to July 1, 1974. Sums so appropriated shall remain available until expended."

(d) Section 4(c) of such Act is amended by striking out "$3,100,000,000" in the first and third sentences and inserting in lieu thereof "$6,100,000,000".

So as to make the bill read:

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That

TITLE I

SHORT TITLE

SEC. 101. This title may be cited as the "Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972".

REVISION OF AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR INTERSTATE SYSTEM

SEC. 102. Subsection (b) of section 108 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, as amended, is amended by striking out "the additional sum of $4,000,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, the additional sum of $4,000,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, and the additional sum of $4,000,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976." And inserting in lieu thereof the following: "the additional sum of $3,250,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, the additional sum of $3,250,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, the additional sum of $3,250,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, the additional sum of $3,250,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1977, the additional sum of $3,250,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1978, the additional sum of $3,250,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1979, and the additional sum of $257,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1980."

AUTHORIZATION OF USE OF COST ESTIMATE FOR APPORTIONMENT OF INTERSTATE FUNDS

SEC. 103. The Secretary of Transportation is authorized to make the apportionment for fiscal years 1974 and 1975 of the sums authorized to be appropriated for such years for expenditure on the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, using the apportionment factors contained in table 5, House Committee Print Numbered 92–29.

EXTENSION OF TIME FOR COMPLETION OF SYSTEM

SEC. 104. (a) The second paragraph of section 101(b) of title 23, United States Code, is amended by striking out "twenty years" and inserting in lieu thereof "twenty-four years" and by striking out "June 30, 1976" and inserting in lieu thereof "June 30, 1980".

(b)(1) The introductory phrase and the second and third sentences of section 104(b)(5) of title 23, United States Code, are amended by striking out "1976" each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof at each such place "1980".

(2) Section 104(b)(5) is further amended by striking out the sentence preceding the last sentence and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "Upon the approval by the Congress, the Secretary shall use the Federal share of such approved estimate in making apportionments for fiscal years 1976 and 1977. The Secretary shall make a revised estimate of the cost of completing the then designated Interstate System after taking into account all previous apportionments made under this section, in the same manner as stated above, and transmit the same to the Senate and the House of Representatives within ten days subsequent to January 2, 1976. Upon the approval by the Congress the Secretary shall use the Federal share of such approved estimate in making apportionments for fiscal years 1978 and 1979. The Secretary shall make a final revised estimate of the cost of completing the then designated Interstate System after taking into account all previous apportionments made under this section, in the same manner as stated above, and transmit the same to the Senate and the House of Representatives within ten days subsequent to January 2, 1978. Upon the approval by the Congress, the Secretary shall use the Federal share of such approved esti-

mate in making apportionments for fiscal year 1980."

AUTHORIZATIONS

SEC. 105. (a) For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of title 23, United States Code, the following sums are hereby authorized to be appropriated:

(1) For the Federal-aid primary system including urban extensions out of the Highway Trust Fund, $950,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and $950,000,000 for the fiscal year, ending June 30, 1975: *Provided*, That at least $300 million of such funds for each of the fiscal years ending June 30, 1974 and June 30, 1975 shall be expended for carrying out the provisions of section 148 of title 23, United States Code, relating to the elimination of roadway dangers with emphasis on the elimination of railroad-highway grade crossings.

(2) For the Federal-aid secondary system including urban extensions out of the Highway Trust Fund, $500,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and $500,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, of which at least $50,000,000 for each of the fiscal years ending June 30, 1974, and June 30, 1975, shall be expended exclusively for carrying out provisions of section 142, title 23, United States Code, relating to highway public transportation in rural areas.

(3) For the Federal-aid urban system, out of the Highway Trust Fund, $800,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and $800,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975: *Provided*, That at least $300,000,000 of such funds for each of the fiscal years ending June 30, 1974 and June 30, 1975, shall be expended exclusively for carrying out provisions of section 142, title 23, United States Code, relating to highway public transportation in urbanized areas.

(4) For the Federal-aid small urban system, out of the Highway Trust Fund, $50,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and $100,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975.

(5) For forest highways, out of the Highway Trust Fund, $50,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and $50,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975.

(6) For public lands highways, out of the Highway Trust Fund, $25,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and $25,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975.

(7) For forest development roads and trails, $170,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and $170,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975.

(8) For public lands development roads and trails, $20,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and $20,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975.

(9) For park roads and trails, $50,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and $50,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975.

(10) For parkways, out of the Highway Trust Fund, $75,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and $100,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975.

(11) For Indian reservation roads and bridges, $75,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and $75,000,000 out of the General Fund of the Treasury and $25,000,000 out of the Highway Trust Fund for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975.

(12) For carrying out section 319(b) of title 23, United States Code (relating to landscaping and scenic enhancement), out of the Highway Trust Fund, $15,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and $15,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975.

(13) For necessary administrative expenses in carrying out section 131, section 136 and section 319(b) of title 23, United States Code, $1,500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and $1,500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975.

(14) For carrying out section 215(a) of title 23, United States Code (relating to territorial highway development program), out of the sums in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated:

(A) for the Virgin Islands not to exceed $2,500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and not to exceed $2,500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975;

(B) for Guam not to exceed $2,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and not to exceed $2,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975; and

(C) for American Samoa not to exceed $500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and not to exceed $500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975.

(b) For each of the fiscal years 1974 and 1975, no State shall receive less than one-half of 1 per centum of the total apportionment for the Interstate System under paragraph (5) of subsection (b) of section 104 of title 23, United States Code. Whenever such amounts made available for the Interstate System in any State exceed the cost of completing that State's portion of the Interstate System, the excess amount shall be transferred to and added to the amounts apportioned to such State under paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (6), and (7) of subsection (b) of section 104 of title 23, United States Code in the ratio which these respective amounts bear to each other in that State.

(c) For each of the fiscal years 1974 and 1975, no State shall receive less than one-half of 1 per centum of the total apportionment for the Federal-aid urban system and for the Federal-aid small urban system, under paragraphs (6) and (7), respectively, of subsection (b) of section 104 of title 23, United States Code.

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 106. (a) The definition of "construction" in subsection (a) of section 101 of title 23, United States Code, is amended to read:

"The term 'construction' means the supervising, inspecting, actual building, and all expenses incidental to the construction or reconstruction of a highway, including locating, surveying, and mapping (including the establishment of temporary and permanent geodetic markers in accordance with specifications of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in the Department of Commerce), acquisition of rights-of-way, relocation assistance, elimination of hazards of railway grade crossings, acquisition of replacement housing sites, acquisition and rehabilitaiton, relocation, and construction of replacement housing, and improvements which directly facilitate and control traffic flow, such as grade separation of intersections, widening of lanes, channelization of traffic, traffic control systems, and passenger loading and unloading areas."

(b) The definition of "Indian reservation roads and bridges" in subsection (a) of section 101 of title 23, United States Code, is amended to read:

"The term 'Indian reservation roads and bridges' means roads and bridges that are located within or provide access to an Indian reservation or Indian trust land or restricted Indian land which is not subject to fee title alienation without the approval of the Federal Government on which Indians reside or Indian and Alaska native villages, groups or communities in which Indians and Alaskan natives reside, whom the Secretary of the Interior has determined are eligible for services generally available to Indians under Federal laws specifically applicable to Indians."

(c) The definition of "urbanized area" in subsection (a) of section 101 of title 23, United States Code, is amended to read:

"The term 'urbanized area' means an area so designated by the Bureau of the Census, within boundaries to be fixed by the Secretary in cooperation with responsible State and local officials."

FEDERAL-AID SMALL URBAN SYSTEM

SEC. 107. (a) Subsection (a) of section 101 of title 23, United States Code, is amended as follows:

(1) After the definition of the term "Federal-aid urban system" add the following new paragraph:

"The term 'Federal-aid small urban system' means the Federal-aid highway system described in subsection (h) of section 103 of this title."

(2) After the definition of the term "urban area" and the following new paragraph:

"The term 'small urban area' means an area including and adjacent to a municipality or other urban place having a population of five thousand to fifty thousand, not within urbanized areas, as determined by the latest available Federal census, within boundaries to be fixed by the State after consultation with local officials and subject to the approval of the Secretary."

(b) Section 103 of title 23, United States Code, is amended by adding immediately after subsection (g) a new subsection (h):

"(h) The Federal-aid small urban system may be established in each urban area of five thousand to fifty thousand population at the request of local officials. The system shall consist of arterial and collector routes, exclusive of urban extensions of the Federal-aid primary and secondary systems, selected by responsible local officials in cooperation with the State highway department based upon anticipated functional usage for the year 1980. Each route of the system shall connect with another route on a Federal-aid system. At his discretion, the Secretary may delegate to any State highway department the authority to approve designation of the Federal-aid small urban system. The provisions of chapters 1, 3, and 5 of this title applicable to Federal-aid primary highways shall apply to the Federal-aid small urban system except as determined by the Secretary to be inconsistent with this subsection.

(c) Subsection (b) of section 104 of title 23, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(7) For the Federal-aid small urban system:

"In the ratio which the population in small urban areas, or parts thereof, in each State bears to the total population in such small urban areas, or parts thereof, in all the States as shown by the latest available Federal census."

(d) Subsection (a) of section 120 of title 23, United States Code, is amended by striking out "the Federal-aid secondary system, and the Federal-aid urban system," and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "the Federal-aid secondary system, the Federal-aid urban system, and the Federal-aid small urban system."

DECLARATION OF POLICY

SEC. 108. Subsection (b) of section 101 of title 23, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paargraph:

"It is further declared to be in the national interest and to be the intent of Congress that in the administration of the Federal-aid highway program the Secretary shall carry out the program in such a manner as to give the highest priority in all instances, to highway safety and the saving of human lives."

FEDERAL-AID SYSTEM REALINEMENT

SEC. 109. (a) Section 103(b) of title 23, United States Code, is renumbered as section 103(b)(1) and a new section 103(b)(2) is added to read as follows:

"(b)(2) After June 30, 1975, the Federal-aid primary system shall provide an adequate system of connected main roads important to interstate, statewide, and regional

preaching today strive to ensure that they will fulfill this responsibility as effectively as possible? Certainly the very Word of God is at the source of effective preaching. That is why preaching must be the proclamation of this Word and therefore centered upon Sacred Scripture, which is "the Word of God . . . consigned to writing under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit" (Dei Verbum, 93). What this means, of course, is that preaching thereby becomes centered on Christ himself, for as Saint Augustine has said, "In the Scriptures every verse sings of Christ" (In Epistulam Ioannis Tractatus, 2, 1).

The man who preaches must therefore be familiar with the Scriptures, not simply as one who reads them, but as one who, in imitation of the Mother of the Lord (cf. Lk 2: 19), ponders the mysteries contained therein and contemplates their depths. He must moreover be familiar also with sacred Tradition, which with Scripture forms "one sacred deposit of the Word of God, which has been committed to the Church" (Dei Verbum, 10). Consequently, he must be thoroughly acquainted with the teaching of the Magisterium, which serves this Word and explains it faithfully (cf. ibid.); and he must engage in continuing study of the Fathers, exegesis and theology in order to understand more profoundly the Word of God as its meaning has been unfolded through the centuries. Finally, as far as possible, he ought to know well those who listen to him, so that he will be able to address himself to their anxieties, their doubts, their questions, their needs.

In short, preaching must proceed from deep conviction, serious learning and loving compassion (cf. Mk 6: 34). If these conditions are fulfilled, it will be not only intelligent and knowledgeable but also capable of strengthening faith, raising hearts to the Lord and imparting the principles upon which the People of God can build their lives in today's world. May every bishop, every priest, every deacon who preaches be able to say joyfully: "This is what we proclaim to you: what was from the beginning, what we have heard . . . we speak of the word of life" (1 Jn 1: 1).

It is my honor to convey to all taking part in the National Congress this message on behalf of the Holy Father. Praying that the Word of God may be proclaimed ever more effectively and imploring the Holy Spirit to grant wisdom, understanding and courage to those who strive to realize this goal, His Holiness cordially imparts to all participating in the National Congress his special Apostolic Blessing.

I am happy to express my own prayerful best wishes for the success of this important work.

Sincerely yours in Christ,

J. CARD. VILLOT,
*Secretary of State.*

## CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

## INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. At this time, in accordance with the previous order, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, Senate Joint Resolution 241, which the clerk will please state by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read the joint resolution by title, as follows: A joint resolution (S.J. Res. 241) authorizing the President to approve an interim agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The pending business is the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), Amendment 1434. The vote on the amendment will take place not later than 12 o'clock.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Montana.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that time on the amendment by Mr. MANSFIELD be equally divided between and controlled by the distinguished author of the amendment (Mr. MANSFIELD) and the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations (Mr. FULBRIGHT).

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. I ask unanimous consent that the time be equally charged.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will please call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## RECESS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in recess until the hour of 11:30 a.m. today.

The motion was agreed to; and at 10:40 a.m. the Senate took a recess until the hour of 11:30 a.m., whereupon the Senate was called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. GAMBRELL).

## INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

The Senate continued with the consideration of the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 241) authorizing the President to approve an interim agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, with the proviso that I retain my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) and 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator——

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has only 10 minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield the time from the other side, 5 minutes from the time of the Senator from Washington.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I urge the Senate to support the Mansfield amendment to be voted on shortly. I regret that it has been necessary to attach any amendment to the interim agreement on offensive nuclear weapons. It is my view that the amendment of the Senator from Washington has raised doubts about the agreement itself and doubts about the future course of negotiations leading to further agreements on the limitation of nuclear weapons.

I am informed that the Mansfield amendment is supported by the administration. I must say that this information has come to me from one of the liaison officers of the administration, Mr. Korologos.

It endorses the relevant sections of the Declaration of Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. These principles were signed by President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev in Moscow on May 29.

The Mansfield amendment is the correct interpretation of the purposes and intentions contained in the interim agreement. The Jackson amendment as it now stands is in direct contradiction to this spirit and according to the statements made by the President, Dr. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, and other high officials of this Government.

We are all for equality or parity or sufficiency, and for the maintenance of the deterrent, but it is a fact known by Members of the Senate that the nuclear systems of the United States and the Soviet Union are asymetrical and that an agreement for numerical equality in intercontinental launchers or throw weight is at present and will be in the foreseeable future all but impossible to achieve.

If the arguments of the distinguished Senator from Washington could be carried into effect, it would mean that the United States and the Soviet Union would have to have identical nuclear systems. Of course, that is impossible.

The President and his chief spokesmen have stated repeatedly that, in arriving at the present interim agreement and the ABM Treaty, and in future SALT negotiations and under any future agreement or treaties resulting from future negotiations overall equality or parity based on qualitative as well as quantitative factors will be an overriding criterion.

Senator MANSFIELD'S amendment, of which I am a cosponsor, endorses this concept of overall parity; Senator JACKSON'S amendment, unless it is amended to include specific reference to overall parity or equality for all strategy nuclear systems, would, in fact, prescribe a course of action which in practical terms is impossible to attain, and would severely restrict the possibility for further limitations on nuclear weapons. The administration has said that it does not

accept Senator JACKSON's interpretation of his own amendment. Further, the administration has repeatedly stressed that all factors—quality, megatonnage, numbers of deliverable warheads, reliability, accuracy, forward basing, time on station, and so on—must all be taken into account in any agreement or treaty. This position of the administration is in contradiction to Senator JACKSON'S limited interpretation of equality.

For these reasons, I hope that the Senate will overwhelmingly approve the Mansfield amendment and quickly move to pass the interim agreement so that the Congress can affirm its support of the President's efforts and all of our efforts to bring the dangerous nuclear arms race to a halt.

Mr. President, I want to read this provision of the Mansfield amendment which is found on page 2, beginning with line 13, and through line 21:

" 'Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives,' and

" 'The prerequisites for maintaining and strengthening peaceful relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are the recognition of the security interests of the parties based on the principle of equality and the renunciation of the use or threat of force.'."

This is what the President of the United States said in his agreement with Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union:

Security interests of the parties based on the principles of equality.

So if my good friend the Senator from Washington, a distinguished Member of this body and one who has spent many years in this field, argues that only his amendment can secure equality, I will argue that that is not true, but that if this amendment of the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD) is passed, calling for equality on both sides, it will as effectively, without any doubt and without obfuscation, prescribe equality.

Furthermore, we will remove any doubt, not only as to this interim agreement which we are now called upon to and should approve at an early date, but as to the purpose of our country to achieve a treaty on the limitation of offensive nuclear systems. Our country, under President Nixon, for 3½ years has sought to attain this first step toward the limitation of offensive nuclear systems. Before that, it was urged by President Johnson, and plans were made during the administration of President Kennedy. We have come to this point, and now, for a month, we have been delayed in the approval of this important resolution.

I hope that the adoption of the Mansfield amendment will move this body off of the impasse that we have been in, and that we will move forward to achieve, in the next phase of our negotiations, a true limitation on offensive nuclear weapons.

I thank the Senator from Montana.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, the virtue, rare in the Senate these days, of procedural complications that have tied up the SALT resolution there is, so far as I know, little if any opposition to the amendment offered by the distinguished majority leader. As has been previously indicated by the able Senator from Kentucky, as I understand, the administration has announced its support of the amendment.

All the amendment does is to single out for special congressional approval language previously agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union. Such special approval can serve a useful purpose. In the present case it serves the purpose of enabling those of us who support the principle of equality in intercontinental strategic forces to also go on record in support of the exercise of mutual restraint, reciprocity, and mutual accommodation in United States-Soviet relations. Indeed, what could be more in the spirit of reciprocity than a future SALT treaty that leads to equality in the numbers of intercontinental strategic launchers as between the United States and the Soviet Union?

It is because I find the Mansfield amendment a useful opportunity to join in expressing hope for a more stable strategic relationship that I shall vote for it.

I want to be clear, Mr. President, on the relationship between the pending amendment offered by the distinguished majority leader and the amendment that I intend to offer at a later time along with the many cosponsors. I might say that there are now more than 40 cosponsors of my amendment.

The Mansfield and Jackson amendments are complimentary. Indeed, they rather reinforce each other: the Mansfield amendment restates the hopes for accommodation and restraint and the Jackson amendment proposes one specific basis upon which such accommodation and restraint might be built. That basis, as I have so often argued, must be equality in intercontinental strategic forces between the United States and the Soviet Union.

I cannot conclude, Mr. President, without urging those Senators who may disagree with my amendment to join with me in an effort to let the Senate work its will on the substance of our disagreement. I hope that the readiness of the proponents of my amendment to join with the majority and minority leaders in agreeing on a time certain for a vote on this amendment will mean that we can proceed without delay to an agreement establishing a time certain for a vote on my amendment and on amendments to it. The Senate has urgent business before it and the cooperation of all of us will be necessary to the timely conclusion of our work.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.

I support the amendment proposed by the Senator from Montana, the majority leader. I think it properly states the purpose and the intent of the United States and Russia in concluding the interim agreement. I regret that I am unable to agree with the Senator from Washington on several points.

The first is that I think it ought to be very clear that those of us who support the interim agreement as presented by the administration are not those responsible for the delay in the Senate's action upon that agreement. We take the position that the Senate ought to proceed under its rules to deal with all amendments, and then vote on the resolution itself. The Senator from Washington, if I understand him correctly, takes the position that he will not call up his own amendment and will not allow us to act upon it unless we agree to his specific requirements that all action upon all amendments to his amendment be controlled by unanimous-consent agreement. This I reject as an improper procedure. I do not agree with it. I want to make it clear that it is the Senator from Washington who is standing in the way of proceeding under the rules of the Senate to deal with the amendments in the order they may be presented. To say that we are objecting to the Senate working its will is, in my view, a distortion of the facts as they now exist.

I also disagree with the Senator's use of the word "equality." He is not asking for equality between the United States and Russia; he means equality in specific weapons systems that is, in effect, the ICBM, or what he calls in his amendment intercontinental strategic forces.

This, I believe, is a misconcepton of the whole effort that has been brought to bear by both countries to bring about a degree of parity, or equality, if you like, in their overall strategic weapons systems, including not only the ICBM's, but aircraft, other forward-based nuclear weapons, and—although they are not involved directly—the nuclear submarines of our allies. All those systems were in the back of their minds and were considered by the two parties in reaching this agreement.

The administration, both the President and Dr. Kissinger, speaking for the President, have made it quite clear that in their view there is at least parity or equality, if you like, as between the nuclear weapons of the United States and of Russia.

I think that to continue to state that all the Senator from Washington is asking is equality between the United States and Russia in strategic weapons is a gross distortion of the facts. It is a gross distorttion of what his amendment in fact means. This is indicated by his refusal to delete the word "intercontinental" from his amendment. He is also unwilling to substitute the word "sustaining" instead of "leading to," in connection with reference to our strategic posture. These proposals that have been made in our negotiations would make his resolution much more in accord with the concept of equality.

But the Senator from Washington refuses to do that. He very clearly is saying that in intercontinental missiles there must be the same numerical equality; otherwise, he does not approve of the agreement. What that would mean is not equality. In view of our superiority in these other areas, numerical equality in ICBM's, would clearly result in superiority overall for the United States. That is the reason, of course, why the administration accepted this disparity in the number of ICBM's. It is quite clear.

I think that if we are going to vote on this amendment, it ought to be under-

stood what is involved. It does not call for overall equality, as between the two defense systems of the two countries. I very much regret that the Senator from Washington continues to say that all he is asking is equality, period. If he would add each time, "I am asking for equality in ICBM's——"

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. How much time do I have remaining, Mr. President?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 5 minutes remaining.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield myself 2 additional minutes.

I do think that, in the interest of public understanding, this point should be made very clear. My own view is similar to that of the Senator from Kentucky, who just spoke on this matter, that the effect of the Senator from Washington's amendment, seeking, as it does, overall superiority and numerical equality in ICBM's, is to undermine the spirit of the agreement made between President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev.

This was reported in the New York Times on yesterday, in commenting upon an article in Investia. The Russians interpret this amendment, together with the statements and the actions with regard to the Trident, the B–1, and other weapons systems, as indicating that we are not really sincere in seeking a limitation of nuclear weapons, that we have used and are proceeding to use this agreement as an excuse for a vast increase in our weapons systems.

We have already approved in this body—I did not vote for it—the Trident system, a vast, expensive system, for which the present cost estimate is $13 billion—no doubt it will be far more than that—for 10 submarines, unusually large submarines, twice as large, I believe, as anything now in being. So that this is interpreted as an effort to increase the superiority of the United States in this area.

The basic concept of the administration, as repeated time and again, is that we can get an agreement with the Russians provided there is an overall equality. I believe that "parity" is the word often used.

President Nixon, himself, some years ago used the word "sufficiency" to describe the needs of balance as between our system of defense and that of the Russian Government. I subscribe to that. I think that is a proper way to look at it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield myself 1 additional minute.

In fact, I think that the only way we can get any agreement in the future is on the basis of approximate overall equality. I do not believe the Russians will proceed with phase II if they believe we are not willing to accept overall equality. I think the future negotiations will come to naught unless we are prepared to accept that concept.

I think the great harm of the Jackson amendment is that it rejects that concept and requires—if it is followed—that our negotiators insist upon numerical equality in ICBM's and, of course, that we also retain our superiority in all other weapons systems.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 2 minutes?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I rise as a cosponsor of the Mansfield amendment because I think one thing, in fairness, should be made clear; and that is that in my view the reason for adopting the Mansfield amendment as an amendment to this resolution is the fact that it answers the question of the Jackson amendment. I believe that it therefore makes completely unnecessary the Jackson amendment. In my view, the Jackson amendment, considering the controversy which surrounds it, represents a commitment by those who vote for it as to what they are going to do in all the 5 years from now. It has no effect upon the agreement, but it has a vital and material effect upon the future policy of the United States as we vote here.

The words of Senator MANSFIELD's amendment, repeated from the communique, are "will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war." That will be my standard of judgment in voting for weapons systems, and I do not wish to be tied down to numerical equivalency in any particular kind of weapons systems.

Therefore, I feel justified—unless it is amended so that it does the same thing—to vote against the Jackson amendment, precisely because we have adopted the Mansfield amendment. So this is not just a meaningless gesture to please MIKE MANSFIELD. It is a material, critical, substantive element of what we are adopting here. I think it ought to be made clear, in all fairness, as we are having a rollcall vote, that this represents one Senator's concept, my concept, of what we ought to say in this regard. If we say it in the resolution, that seems to me to end any question about how Senators will vote on the future of the weapons systems.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does not the Senator agree that the words he mentioned are inherently inconsistent with the thrust of the Jackson amendment?

Mr. JAVITS. That seems to me crystal clear.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. They are not complementary. They are inconsistent.

Mr. JAVITS. Exactly. As it stands. So I do not want to fool around about the idea that I am voting for some pious statement in the Mansfield amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 1 minute?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, obviously, the Mansfield amendment is not a substitute for the Jackson amendment. It is complementary, as I have indicated.

I would be a bit foolish if I did not understand what is going on here. Here we have more than 40 cosponsors of my amendment, and we cannot get an agreement to vote on that amendment. We worked out an agreement yesterday to vote on the Mansfield amendment, and I think we have established a precedent here of some cooperation; and I hope that the Senator from Arkansas will cooperate in an effort to limit debate in the closing hours of this session so that the Senate can vote on an amendment that has more than 40 cosponsors.

That is exactly where we stand. It is a pretty sorry day if the Senator from Arkansas will not cooperate when we are called upon to vote on an important interim agreement, which is not a treaty and which is not the basis for the final negotiations.

The Senate certainly should be in a position to give advice and not just consent in connection with the follow-on SALT negotiations. I want to try to help implement the Fulbright doctrine, which stipulates, as he has announced it here over and over again, that the Senate should have something to say about policy——

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GAMBRELL). The time of the Senator from Washington has expired.

Mr. JACKSON (continuing). And give its advice and not just its consent on foreign policy matters.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If the Senator from Montana will yield me a few seconds, I only want to say that the Senator from Washington has not offered his amendment. When he offers his amendment, we can talk about some kind of agreement for voting on it.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in the time left to me I want to call upon the Senate to support the words of the President of the United States promulgated at Moscow on May 29, 1972, because this amendment is nothing but what President Nixon has said and agreed to in his meeting with Chairman Brezhnev.

I think that support of this amendment is support of the President of the United States.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GAMBRELL). Under the previous order, the hour of 12 noon having arrived, the question is on agreeing to the amendment (No. 1434) of the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD).

On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS), and the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS), are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES) is absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON), and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) would vote "yea."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON), the Senator from New Jersey (Mr.

CASE), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. FONG), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT), and the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.

If present and voting, the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), and the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND) would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 84, nays 1, as follows:

[No. 400 Leg.]

YEAS—84

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Aiken | Ervin | Moss |
| Allen | Fannin | Muskie |
| Allott | Fulbright | Nelson |
| Anderson | Gambrell | Packwood |
| Bayh | Gravel | Pastore |
| Beall | Griffin | Pearson |
| Bennett | Gurney | Pell |
| Bentsen | Hansen | Proxmire |
| Bible | Hart | Randolph |
| Boggs | Hartke | Ribicoff |
| Brock | Hollings | Roth |
| Brooke | Hruska | Saxbe |
| Buckley | Humphrey | Schweiker |
| Burdick | Inouye | Scott |
| Byrd, Harry F., Jr. | Jackson | Smith |
| Byrd, Robert C. | Javits | Sparkman |
| Chiles | Jordan, N.C. | Spong |
| Church | Jordan, Idaho | Stafford |
| Cook | Long | Stennis |
| Cooper | Magnuson | Stevens |
| Cotton | Mansfield | Stevenson |
| Cranston | Mathias | Symington |
| Curtis | McClellan | Talmadge |
| Dole | McGee | Tower |
| Dominick | McIntyre | Tunney |
| Eagleton | Metcalf | Weicker |
| Eastland | Miller | Young |
| Edwards | Mondale | |
| | Montoya | |

NAYS—1

Goldwater

NOT VOTING—15

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Baker | Harris | Mundt |
| Bellmon | Hatfield | Percy |
| Cannon | Hughes | Taft |
| Case | Kennedy | Thurmond |
| Fong | McGovern | Williams |

So Mr. MANSFIELD'S amendment (No. 1434) was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment.

## PRINTING OF COMPILATION ENTITLED "FEDERAL AND STATE STUDENT AID PROGRAMS, 1971" AS A SENATE DOCUMENT

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on Senate Congressional Resolution 31.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. EDWARDS) laid before the Senate the amendment of the House of Representatives to the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 31) authorizing the printing of the compilation entitled "Federal and State Student Aid Programs, 1971" as a Senate document which was, on page 1, lines 7 and 8, strike out "forty-three thousand nine hundred" and insert "forty-four thousand".

Mr. PELL. Madam President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendment of the House with an amendment, which I send to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. EDWARDS). The clerk will report the amendment.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 1, line 3, strike "1971" and insert in lieu thereof "1972".

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Rhode Island.

The motion was agreed to.

## MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED BILL AND JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bill and joint resolution:

S. 3323. An act to amend the Public Health Service Act to enlarge the authority of the National Heart and Lung Institute in order to advance the national attack against diseases of the heart and blood vessels, the lungs, and blood, and for other purposes; and

H.J. Res. 55. A joint resolution proposing the erection of a memorial on public grounds in the District of Columbia, or its environs, in honor and commemoration of the Seabees of the United States Navy.

The enrolled bill and joint resolution were subsequently signed by the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. ALLEN).

## QUORUM CALL

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CRANSTON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## REVENUE SHARING ACT OF 1972—PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. McCLELLAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. James Calloway of the staff of the Committee on Government Operations be permitted to be present during consideration of the amendment which I shall call up on the revenue sharing bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. EDWARDS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

## INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

The Senate continued with the consideration of the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 241) authorizing the President to approve an interim agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Madam President, what is the pending business before the Senate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business at the moment is Senate Joint Resolution 241.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Madam President, Senate Joint Resolution 241, I believe, is the so-called interim agreement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is the so-called interim agreement on the control of nuclear weapons.

I wish to reiterate for the information of Senators what I think the situation is.

We have just approved the Mansfield amendment. The joint resolution is now open for amendment. If the Senator from Washington will lay before the Senate his amendment then I certainly will be willing to discuss the matter with him and certain other Members who have pending amendments, specifically the Senator from Missouri and possibly the Senator from California, but one at a time, if he wishes to have an agreement on a time certain to vote on one of those amendments.

The Senator from Washington stated a moment ago that he had over 40 cosponsors. I think he raises a question that is very important. It is my belief that some of those cosponsors do not understand the way the Senator from Washington uses the word "equality." In his statement here a moment ago to the Senate, and as he made it before, he used the word "equality" without qualification. He said all his amendment seeks to do in the future is to lay down guidelines that our negotiators should seek equality.

I think I would understand and I think many members in the public would understand that to mean overall equality, and that is overall equality of nuclear weapons, equality of capacity to develop new ones, either offensive or defensive weapons. That is what I take the statement to mean.

I do not believe it is understood that what the Senator from Washington is really saying is that regardless of the degree of superiority we may have in the field of airplanes and the capacity to deliver nuclear weapons by airplanes or from forward bases, or our superiority in other areas these are excluded from his concept of equality and that all that the Senator is contemplating when he uses the word "equality" is in numbers of intercontinental missiles.

I believe in view of that circumstance, and aside from others, that a thorough discussion of the significance of the Senator from Washington's amendment is necessary if the Senate is to vote intelligently and with understanding on what is involved in this agreement.

Within the last few days there have been indications that this is the way at least the Russians understand the agreement. The article I referred to earlier in Isvestia makes clear the Russians believe this amendment is an effort to undermine the interim agreement, it is an indication of lack of desire on our part to proceed with significant restrictions on nuclear arsenals.

So I submit, in view of this circum-

stance, in addition to others, that a quick disposal of the Jackson amendment would be very much against the interest of this country. I believe that everything has indicated in recent days that the country as a whole is interested in stopping the arms race. I believe the condition of our budget, with the very large deficit projected this year of some $27 billion already, and others are saying it will go as high as $35 billion, indicates the necessity for restriction on the exorbitant demands of the strategic weapons system. So in view of that I cannot believe that 40 Senators understand the significance of the amendment to be offered, I assume, by the Senator from Washington.

I think if they understood that this would inhibit, if not prevent, further progress in the control and limitation of nuclear weapons, that they would not support it. It is very easy to misunderstand what the amendment does when it is presented in this fashion.

In the negotiations about this amendment prior to the recess it was suggested that certain amendments to the proposed Jackson amendment be considered, such as insertion of the word "overall" or removal of the word "intercontinental," leaving the meaning to be overall equality as the goal. The Senator from Washington, of course, rejected such suggestions, which leads only to the conclusion that he is not interested in overall equality; he is interested only in the numerical equality of ICBM's. I think that is the significance of it.

Madam President, I will not detain the Senate much longer.

I do believe adequate debate on the Jackson amendment is, of course, important. We have clear proof of the situation with regard to the equality or sufficiency of our own weapons system which will be presented when the Jackson amendment is before us. That will be the time to clarify the significance of the Jackson amendment. So I suggest again it is quite a distortion of the truth and facts to state that those who are opposed to the Jackson amendment are preventing its consideration by the Senate, or, as the Senator said, that we are preventing the Senate from working its will. The rules of this body are clear. Rule XXII provides against the limitation of debate except by unanimous consent, and unanimous consent is not the usual procedure to be followed in important issues. It is not unusual, of course, on routine issues. Neither I nor anyone else has objected to these overall unanimous-consent agreements on what I call relatively routine matters, things that come year after year.

I emphasize that this interim agreement is not a routine matter in my opinion. It could be the most significant move by this Congress in many years, if it is properly implemented and if we accept it in the spirit in which it was intended at the time of the summit meeting. If, along with the ABM agreement, could be a landmark action by Congress and the country if it is carried through properly, and by that I mean if we accept genuine parity or sufficiency, to use the word of the President, in this area rather than trying to manipulate this whole matter to the point that we have superiority and continuing superiority.

We had superiority for a long time. But the clear fact is that if we insist upon superiority, there will be no further progress in the control of armaments. On the contrary, it would result in a vast increase, in the acceleration of the arms race, in my opinion, because the reaction against the failure of phase II in the SALT agreements would be an increase in the arms race because of the disappointment, as well as because of suspicion that would arise then, on the part of both sides, that the other side was going for that myth of first strike capability. I do not believe first strike capability is a possibility under present conditions, or the foreseeable conditions, but it is a concept which has been sold and much talked about and could be easily distorted into a justification for an unlimited arms race.

Mr. JACKSON. Madam President, I just have a few brief remarks. I think the RECORD discloses that from the very outset the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has not been of a mind to move this measure along. I would point out that when word was out that I was going to offer an amendment calling for equality in intercontinental strategic forces the matter went over for a whole week. The interim agreement was already the pending business. The Foreign Relations Committee went into a series of sessions to discuss my amendment. On the very day that we started to discuss the interim agreement, I offered, as I did on the ABM treaty, to agree to a unanimous-consent proposal so that we could get an early vote, and the Senator from Arkansas objected.

So I think the record is very clear, and to say that we do not use the unanimous-consent device as a means to get action on important bills is rather absurd. We have the revenue sharing vote today, and we have a very important amendment we are going to vote on, by unanimous consent, by 5 o'clock. This goes on day after day. I have always opposed filibusters——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Madam President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have said I would not object to doing it on an individual basis. On the revenue sharing bill, there is no overall package deal to dispose of it at one time, and the Senator from Louisiana will not make such an agreement.

Mr. JACKSON. Well, is the Senator from Arkansas willing to enter into a unanimous-consent agreement to cover my amendment and all amendments thereto?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is not what the Senator from Louisiana has done. I am willing to agree to a unanimous-consent agreement, as far as I am concerned—of course, with the agreement of the Senator from Missouri—on his amendment. I have said that all along.

Mr. JACKSON. But we have to get an agreement on all amendments to the amendment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is not the procedure being followed on the revenue-sharing bill.

Mr. JACKSON. When a matter is made the pending business of the Senate and then it is delayed for over a week, day after day, before it is even brought up for debate or discussion, I think it is a clear indication that the chairman of the committee recognizes that we have a majority of Senators in support of our amendment and he does not want a vote on it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator yield——

Mr. JACKSON. May I just finish? May I say I think it is amazing for the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee to tell over 40 Members of the Senate that they do not know what the Jackson amendment is about, that they do not know what equality in intercontinental strategic forces is about. I think the American people and my colleagues know what my amendment is about, and that is why they are supporting it. I think it is most unusual for one Senator to say to over 40 other Senators that they really do not know what "equality" means or what they are doing in cosponsoring my amendment. Let the Senators have an opportunity to vote and then we will find out their views. I think that is what should be done here.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Madam President, I do not know why the Senator keeps talking about equality. He never finishes that expression. Equality in intercontinental ballistic missiles. He says equality. Equality is a term, I admit——

Mr. JACKSON. Madam President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes, I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. My amendment does not say intercontinental strategic missiles; it says intercontinental strategic forces. Read the amendment. That includes bombers. That includes missiles fired from land bases. It includes missiles fired from submarines.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If that is true, why does the Senator object to the word overall strategic?

Mr. JACKSON. For the obvious reason.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What is the reason?

Mr. JACKSON. For the obvious reason that the addition of the term overall would of necessity mean more than my amendment intends. I have said repeatedly that the intercontinental strategic forces to be balanced on the basis of equality are ICBM's, SLBM's and intercontinental range bomber forces. I am not inculding, for example, tactical weapons. Addition of the word "overall" could prejudice the position of our NATO partners and other allies who are not participating directly in the SALT negotiations.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Of course, we are getting into the type of debate which is appropriate to the Senator's amendment. I think that is quite proper. The only thing is, I think it would be more appropriate to make these arguments—and we shall make them—when and if the Senator's amendment is offered. They are legitimate questions of our differences of view. But I do not think it is clear at all from the Senator's

amendment and what has been said in the press that he is talking about overall nuclear equality in strategic weapons. It is not only weapons in Europe that we have, but we have weapons all around the periphery of the Soviet Union. We have them in Turkey. We have control of when they are used. We have them in the Far East. We have them on aircraft carriers. We have 14 of them commissioned now, and we soon will have 16, and the Russians have none. Are these intercontinental or not? If they fly off an aircraft carrier in the North Sea, I admit they are not from our continent, but they are the same kind of destructive weapon.

This argument is on the merits. I was talking about the procedure primarily. I reiterate that when the Senator presents his proposal that all he asks is equality—equality of intercontinental strategic forces—I say that the average person would be impressed. Certainly I would be included in the definition of an average person. If he came to me, I would say, "Sure, I am for equality." Everybody is for equality. The interim agreement is for equality. The President says it gives equality—at least equality.

The argument can be made that the Russians have inferiority at the moment, and that is why the permission was given in the interim agreement to increase their numbers of submarines.

Mr. CRANSTON. Madam President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. CRANSTON. Is there a pending amendment?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No.

Mr. CRANSTON. Can the Senator say why we cannot proceed to vote on the interim agreement?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Because the Senator from Washington will not allow us to vote on the interim agreement. That is the reason why we have not been able to vote on the agreement. The Senator said it was held up 1 week. I did not hold it up a week. I was perfectly willing to vote on it. It was the leadership, anticipating it was very controversial—so it is and was—for its own convenience, in order for the leadership to proceed with important and critical measures, that laid it aside.

The Senator says he has a majority. He said 40. That is not a majority.

Mr. JACKSON. I said we have over 40 cosponsors. I said a majority of Senators support my amendment. The Senator knows it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I know no such thing. I am not a prophet. I do not know how the elections are going to come out. The polls may show it, but I do not know it, and the Senator's poll may show it. I have been subjected to this many times. It depends on the way one presents his oral description of what an amendment means. I suspect a number of Senators think the Senator means overall equality, that he takes all the weapons systems, offensive, defensive, puts them up against the Russians, and that there is approximate equality. That is what the interim agreement actually provides for, but the Senator is offering an amendment which does not say that at all, and it is clear that is not proposed. His amendment calls for numerical equality in intercontinental ballistic missile forces, and he ignores all the other areas of nuclear weaponry where we have advantages or superiority, including the weapons that we already have in place around the periphery of the Soviet Union, on our aircraft carriers, and in Europe.

The other members of the Armed Services Committee—he does not have to take my word about it; the Senator from Missouri has had considerable experience, and is a former Secretary of the Air Force; he has said and will say that these weapons in Europe can be put on a fighter-bomber and, with one refueling, delivered to Moscow. The weapon does not come from the United States, but a 2- or 3-kiloton weapon delivered on Moscow, coming from Germany, is just as destructive as one coming out of a submarine.

All of these factors were taken into consideration by the President. Dr. Kissinger, at the White House, described this, and answered all of the questions as to whether there was parity as well as sufficiency, and he said there was. He said in no uncertain terms that this was not an imprudent agreement which leaves the United States in an inferior position.

Inferiority is clearly the implication in the Senator's amendment. It is very cleverly written. He says, "Strategic forces inferior to the limit provided for the Soviet Union." The implication is clear that we are inferior in our strategic forces.

Well, what does he mean by our strategic forces? Again he comes back; the only thing he can mean is ICBM's.

Nobody denies that there is a numerical inferiority. However, our country, years ago, deliberately rejected the idea of weapons such as the SS–9's and the Titans, big multimegaton weapons. We deliberately chose the smaller, 1-megaton Minuteman, because it is a more efficient way to use our capacity for destruction.

Mr. JACKSON. Madam President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. Is that not so?

Mr. JACKSON. Or would the Senator say that an SS–9 might be designed for a first-strike capability, in order to knock out a hardened site? Otherwise, why would they want to have a 25-megaton warhead capability?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We started out——

Mr. JACKSON. The forces we sought were totally different. We never sought a first-strike capability to knock out hardened sites. That is the difference, and that is what is disturbing about the huge Soviet missiles and the still larger missiles they are now developing.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator assumes all of this. I do not think he has any basis for that at all. He is trying to read the minds of the Russians.

The first effort we made was to develop a big one, bigger than we now have. We were far ahead in technology, and so on, and our own military people, looking at it, decided that it was less efficient to put 10 or 20 or 25 megatons in one missile, less efficient than to put the same or less megatonnage in four or five missiles, for various reasons. First, there is flexibility; you can fire at more targets more easily. It is more accurate; and 4 megatons, in the calculations I have, which come from expert sources, 4 megatons properly delivered in a Minuteman will cause the equivalency, they call it, in destruction, of 16 megatons, or about 4 to 1. If you concentrate it all in one, it is not efficient.

We started out that way, and simply as a matter of sophistication and knowledge, we decided it was more efficient to go to the Minuteman.

I think that is true. Everything we have been doing is to that effect, that that is correct. We are not about to go back to the big one.

When you MIRV a weapon, you have fewer megatons, but they divided it up. Why did they divide it up? Because it is more efficient to put mirved missiles in submarines. They are still so destructive no one can withstand it.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for clarification at that point?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield for that purpose.

Mr. JACKSON. Did the Senator want to leave the record as I understood he left it, that we had the choice of several warheads for Minuteman, and could deliver up to a total of 4 megatons? Is that what the Senator said?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No; 4 separate megatons, I mean four missiles, 1 megaton per missile, is a more efficient way to use it than one big missile. We decided that years ago, more efficient than one missile with 10 or 15 megatons in it. We made the decision that it was more efficient and more effective.

Mr. JACKSON. It is not a matter, I would say, of efficiency. I think it is a matter of strategic policy.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I mean efficiency in destructive power, the deliverability of destructive power. These are details that I have very good information on, and at the proper time—it is premature now, I guess, since the Senator's amendment is not even up; but whenever he offers it, the details of this will be properly developed, not only by me but by members of the Armed Services Committee who take this view and who have the information, and others with sources that I think are unanswerable.

Mr. CRANSTON. Madam President, will the Senator yield to me briefly, so that I may put a question to the Senator from Washington?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield for that purpose.

Mr. CRANSTON. The Senator from Washington, in colloquy with the Senator from Arkansas, stated that the trouble with the word "overall" was that nuclear tactical weapons would then be included.

Would the Senator accept the word "overall" if it was followed by the words "exclusive of nuclear tactical weapons?"

Mr. JACKSON. What would it mean then? Can the Senator explain what it would mean?

Mr. CRANSTON. It would mean that all relevant factors in measuring suf-

ficiency of force would be considered, but nuclear tactical weapons would not be considered.

Mr. JACKSON. What relevant factors?

Mr. CRANSTON. There are many factors that we have gone over in this debate. The great ring of forward position forces that are used on sea, in the air, and from the ground. You would consider more than simply the number of missiles and throw weight.

Mr. JACKSON. Well, I would just point out that obviously you have to consider the relative posture, as we are talking about it, first in intercontinental strategic terms, to determine whether or not you are going to have any basis of equality or parity.

When the Soviets get 1,618 land-based missiles, and we have our thousand, when the Soviets get 950 launching tubes for 62 Y-class submarines, and we have 44 ballistic missile submarines with a total of 710 tubes, I think it is apparent to the people of this country and to Members of the Senate that this is not equality; and when you add on top of that that they have a 4-to-1 advantage in throw-weight, that is, in the capacity of these items that we are talking about, it is clear that we have not achieved parity.

I remember in the arguments over the ABM that the contention against the ABM was that when the Soviet Union got around our number of land-based missiles, they would stop deployment of ICBM's at around a thousand. Here they are at 1,618 already.

You know, you have to ask, Why was not some determination made by those who constantly worry about U.S. forces to get the Russians to cut back and reduce theirs? There is a golden opportunity for the Russians to agree to a thousand land-based missiles and to the 42 Y-class submarines they now have, or to 44. There is a golden opportunity, Madam President, to have a real arms limitation agreement that will save money and resources on both sides.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Madam President, this comes back, I submit to the Senator from Washington, to the same argument as before. One reason the Russians thought they should have more ICBM's was that they had no capacity to put weapons around our borders, as we have around theirs in such places as Turkey, Korea, and elsewhere as well as in aircraft carriers. They do not have a single aircraft carrier.

This is a matter of each country's decision as to how it looks after its defense. Not having the capacity to do what we have done, to have in being 7,000 warheads in Europe and other large numbers on aircraft carriers, and so on, scattered around the world, how do they offset that to reach even a degree of equality? They cannot do that under the situation in which they operate.

The Senator is taking one area—ICBM's. He talks about the submarines. We believe, and we have been told, that we have superior submarines. We already have superior submarines. They are beginning to develop a missile that can travel a couple of hundred miles more than ours, but we have underway the Trident submarine, and so forth. There is the ever-increasing sophistication.

I think that the way the Senator presents his case is very deceptive. I would have thought the same thing. If I had no background on it and the Senator approached me cold and said, "Aren't you for equality with the Russians on strategic missiles?" I would say, "Sure, I am."

He would say, "Would you cosponsor my bill?"

I would say, "Sure. I'm for equality."

But it never would have occurred to me that the kind of equality he is talking about is superiority—equality in one area, and we are clearly superior in the others.

It can mean nothing, in truth, but superiority if we accept the Senator's idea that we must have 1,618 ICBM's and 740 submarine tubes, just what the Russians could have, and they all, of course, would have to be exactly of the same explosive power and length. The whole idea that this one category should be balanced off nicely so that each side has the same amount is absolutely irrelevant and is a wrong way to look at it.

When you consider the power of destruction of one-fourth of all these weapons on the other country, in view of the fact that we have already agreed to the ABM treaty, in which each country has said it is not going to proceed to develop a defense against these weapons, then we do not need 1,600.

Then comes into play what the President has called sufficiency. I submit that 400 on each side is sufficient, because the other side has said, "We do not propose to develop and we do not have a defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles or against submarine missiles." The only kind of defense either would have at the present time, I suppose, is some kind of defense against those missiles delivered by airplanes, because we both have antiaircraft defenses of some kind, but we have nothing that could deal with a submarine launched missile or an intercontinental ballistic missile. So when you get above 400, which often has been used as a figure adequate to destroy three-fourths of each other's industrial capacity and kill 300 million people—that is enough to completely demoralize and destroy the other country's society.

So in talking about this, the Senator is confusing the issue by equating nuclear weapons with conventional weapons. It is true that there is considerable merit in saying, with respect to conventional weapons, that we ought to have so many .45's against their .45's, so many different guns. There is some relevance in that argument. But with nuclear weapons, if there is no defense against it, I submit that the Senator is playing around with the numbers game of a thousand or 1,600 or 2,000, and it is utterly meaningless. It has no significance. The concept of equality under those circumstances is meaningless.

The idea of first-strike capability seems to me also to be meaningless, because there is literally no possibility of a straight first-strike capability on either side with weapons of this kind and deployed as they are, including submarine weapons. Assume, for example—and I do not think they could—that the Russians could destroy 1,000 Minutemen, which is a fantastic and ridiculous assumption, what are they going to do about the submarines?

A first-strike capability means that the country attacked could not effectively retaliate. With 700 or 500 or even 400, they could render unacceptable damage to the other.

So I think the whole idea of equality, as submitted by the Senator, is simply not a meaningful term under the circumstances, because it is not understood that way, and I would not have understood it that way.

Mr. JACKSON. Madam President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator has dwelt at great length on the subject of the 7,000 warheads in Europe. Would the Senator give the Senate the benefit of his views as to the number of bombs or warheads we could put on Soviet soil in connection with a move on our part and, second, how many we could put on Soviet soil in the event of a Soviet first strike against our forces in Europe?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This has been discussed, as I have said, at considerable length. The Senator from Missouri discussed it the other day. He stated time and again that with one refueling, the fighter bombers, of which we have several hundred, could take a nuclear weapon of about 200 kilotons, I think he said ——

Mr. JACKSON. How many weapons?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. To Moscow.

If the Senator is asking how many they could shoot down, nobody knows how efficient they are, but if you send enough of them over, you can. We will discuss all those matters in the debate.

Mr. JACKSON. I would like to get this one point clarified.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We will get it clarified in the debate.

Mr. JACKSON. I also asked the Senator for his view of the number of weapons we would have after a Soviet first strike on our forces in Europe. As I pointed out——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We have plenty of weapons.

I want to ask the Senator this question, for my own information and that of the Senate: There is no pending amendment. Is the Senator going to continue to filibuster this resolution, or is he going to offer his amendment, and why can he not offer his amendment and let us have the debate relative to his amendment?

Mr. JACKSON. I have never filibustered at any time. I point out that the Senator from Washington has a long record in favor of modifying rule XXII, and he has supported moves to limit debate, which the Senator from Arkansas has not done. I believe very strongly and feel very deeply that we ought to reach an early agreement here to get a vote as soon as possible.

I am prepared and ready to enter into a unanimous-consent agreement, Madam President, to bring about a time limitation on the Jackson amendment and amendments thereto. We agreed on a time certain for the Mansfield amend-

ment, and the Senator from Arkansas certainly should be willing to agree to a unanimous-consent agreement, so that Senators will know when the various amendments to the amendment and the final action on the amendment can be voted upon.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We have gone over this again. I do not want to deceive anybody. Under the rules of the Senate, the pending business is the resolution as presented by the administration, as reported unanimously by the Committee on Foreign Relations. It is ready for action. If the Senator is not willing to allow us to act on that, it seems to me that under the rules he has no alternative, unless he wants to filibuster, to offering his amendment.

With respect to the idea of unanimous consent, he is absolutely wrong in saying that that is essential. I am not going to make any such agreement. I made that very clear yesterday and on other occasions. I am not going to make the kind of agreement the Senator wants, and that is all there is to it. If he offers his amendment, I am perfectly willing to make an agreement, so far as I am concerned, on the amendments to his amendment as they come up. That is the only procedure I can follow. I do not understand the words like "equality," and, as the Senator says, "filibustering." If he has not filibustered, I do not know what the word means. I am not against filibustering under proper circumstances but I think the Senator should take the consequences of it and accept it.

Mr. JACKSON. Madam President, my record in the Senate on the subject of filibustering is an open book. The voting records are clear. I will put my record alongside the record of the Senator from Arkansas any day on the subject of filibustering.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not deny that I have filibustered. The only difference here is that the Senator from Washington denies it. It is a proper thing to do under the proper circumstances.

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator from Arkansas favors the doctrine of filibustering. He has never voted to limit debate in this body. To say that the Senator from Washington is filibustering is nonsense.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Madam President, will the Senator from Washington yield to me without losing his right to the floor?

Mr. JACKSON. I have no further comment. I yield.

## REVENUE SHARING ACT OF 1972

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Madam President, under the order previously entered, I ask that the Chair now lay aside Senate Joint Resolution 241 and that the Senate proceed to the consideration of H.R. 14370.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate H.R. 14370 which the clerk will state.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

H.R. 14370, to provide payments to localities for high-priority expenditures, to encourage the States to supplement their revenue sources, and to authorize Federal collection of State individual income taxes.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Madam President, on behalf of the distinguished Senator from Arkansas (Mr. MCCLELLAN), I yield 1 minute to the distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON).

Mr. JACKSON. Madam President, I have several unanimous-consent requests here.

## DISPOSITION OF JUDGMENTS IN FAVOR OF CERTAIN INDIANS

Mr. JACKSON. Madam President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on H.R. 6797.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. EDWARDS) laid before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives announcing its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 6797) to provide for the disposition of funds appropriated to pay judgments in favor of the Kickapoo Indians of Kansas and Oklahoma in Indian Claims Commission dockets numbered 316, 316–A, 317, 145, 193, and 318, and requesting a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon.

Mr. JACKSON. I move that the Senate insist upon its amendment and agree to the request of the House for a conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. JACKSON, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. METCALF, Mr. FANNIN, and Mr. BELLMON conferees on the part of the Senate.

## DISPOSITION OF FUNDS TO PAY A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CERTAIN INDIANS

Mr. JACKSON. Madam President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on H.R. 7742.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. EDWARDS) laid before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives announcing its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 7742) to provide for the disposition of funds to pay a judgment in favor of the Yankton Sioux Tribe in Indian Claims Commission docket numbered 332–A, and for other purposes, and requesting a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon.

Mr. JACKSON. I move that the Senate insist upon its amendment and agree to the request of the House for a conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. JACKSON, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. METCALF, Mr. FANNIN, and Mr. BELLMON conferees on the part of the Senate.

## DISPOSITION OF FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO PAY A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CERTAIN INDIANS

Mr. JACKSON. Madam President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on H.R. 10858.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. EDWARDS) laid before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives announcing its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 10858) to provide for the disposition of funds appropriated to pay a judgment in favor of the Pueblo de Acoma in Indian Claims Commission docket numbered 266, and for other purposes, and requesting a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon.

Mr. JACKSON. I move that the Senate insist upon its amendments and agree to the request of the House for a conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. JACKSON, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. METCALF, Mr. FANNIN, and Mr. BELLMON conferees on the part of the Senate.

## ACQUISITION OF A VILLAGE SITE FOR CERTAIN INDIANS

Mr. JACKSON. Madam President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on H.R. 3337.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. EDWARDS) laid before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives announcing its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 3337) to authorize the acquisition of a village site for the Payson Bank of Yavapai-Apache Indians, and for other purposes, and requesting a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon.

Mr. JACKSON. I move that the Senate insist upon its amendment and agree to the request of the House for a conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. JACKSON, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. METCALF, Mr. FANNIN, and Mr. BELLMON conferees on the part of the Senate.

## DISPOSITION OF FUNDS TO PAY A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CERTAIN INDIANS

Mr. JACKSON. Madam President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on H.R. 8694.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. EDWARDS) laid before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives announcing its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R.

that are equally enticing to those used by the military.

H.R. 2 also establishes a uniformed services university of the health sciences. The intent is to enhance medical careers in the military service by creating teaching posts in this institution, as well as to attract young students to obligate themselves to a period of military service in exchange for a medical education. Given the current national shortage of medical school capacity, the availability of 100 or more additional places should certainly serve as an effective recruitment device. Every year, thousands of qualified students are turned away from medical and other health professional schools in this country simply because there is not room. Many of these students will undoubtedly be attracted to exchange military service for medical education. In addition, of course, a quality institution will be able to attract students who are inclined to a military way of life.

However, a military medical school raises a number of important questions. First, it raises the possibility of a special and separate health educational system being established in the country which is not compatible with institutions in the civilian sector.

Second, it assumes a Federal responsibility for the direct training of future Federal/military personnel which is without precedent.

I have long been convinced that the health educational institutions in our Nation must be reformed in order to respond to the challenges that face us in our country. I have also been convinced that these institutions are capable of producing the personnel we need, given adequate Federal support, and incentives and opportunities for change. Because of these misgivings, I am pleased that the Senate insisted on establishing an annual line item authorization for this new university. This will allow a close annual review by both the authorizing and appropriation committees of the progress in planning and implementing the university.

Overall, I believe H.R. 2 offers some important mechanisms for the training and recruitment of physicians, and I congratulate the committees on their work. The Health Subcommittee will watch progress on both these programs very closely for their applicability in other areas.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, I move the adoption of the conference report.

The motion was agreed to.

## QUORUM CALL

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.

## INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

The Senate continued with the consideration of the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 241) authorizing the President to approve an interim agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, what is the question before the Senate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the amendment of the Senator from Montana, No. 1434, to Senate Joint Resolution 241.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I rise to speak in support of the amendment to Senate Joint Resolution 241 which has been offered by the Senator from Washington. This amendment simply expresses the reasonable understanding of the Congress about the future relationship on strategic matters between the United States and the Soviet Union. This is an entirely appropriate moment for the Congress to share the responsibility with the President for the making of an important component of our foreign policy.

As I understand it, the Jackson amendment would simply state three understandings of what U.S. policy should be with respect to the forthcoming second round of negotiations with regard to strategic arms limitation.

First, the amendment provides that the failure of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to achieve a permanent treaty on offensive arms which would have the effect of limiting the threat to the ability of our land-based strategic deterrent forces to survive a Soviet first strike would jeopardize our "supreme national interests."

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Certainly.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was under the impression that we were going to vote on the pending amendment. The amendment the Senator is addressing his remarks to has not been offered, is that correct? Is it correct that the Jackson amendment has not been offered?

Mr. BUCKLEY. It certainly has been the subject of widespread speculation and discussion.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I mean it has not been called up. It is not before the Senate; is that correct?

Mr. BUCKLEY. It has not been offered; no.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would like to try to clarify the situation before us, if I could. The Senator from Montana has offered his amendment as the pending business. Is it the purpose of the Senator from New York not to allow a vote on the Mansfield amendment today?

Mr. BUCKLEY. No. I believe, with all due respect to the distinguished chairman, that in considering the Mansfield amendment one must also keep in mind the alternative, which we all know will be offered in due course, namely, the Jackson amendment. Therefore, by speaking in favor of the Jackson amendment, I impliedly am speaking against the Mansfield amendment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not want to be misunderstood. The Senator has a perfect right to speak about it. I am trying to understand what the parliamentary situation is.

The request has been made for a package unanimous-consent agreement on all amendments. I and some other Senators interested in this matter have declined to make that agreement. However, we are—I am, and I think all of those interested in my point of view are—perfectly willing to proceed to vote on all of these amendments as they arise. That is, we are not disposed to delay consideration of the resolution or any amendments thereto, and I have thought we would be able to proceed to consideration of all amendments, and disposition of this matter today or possibly tomorrow.

What I am trying to understand is whether or not it is the position of Senators who support the position of Senator Jackson that they will not allow a vote on any amendments unless they get an overall agereement on all amendments. I am only inquiring what the situation is; that is all.

Mr. BUCKLEY. I regret that I am not in a position to speak for the Senator from Washington. I am sure he could clarify his position.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would like, if the Senator will allow me, to make my position very clear that I am prepared to proceed to a vote on the pending amendment and all subsequent amendments in order, and without any undue delay whatever. There is no disposition on my part or that of anyone associated with me and interested in this matter to delay any vote at all. We can dispose of this amendment today if the Senate will permit, or certainly tomorrow, because I think it requires a matter of only a few minutes. According to Senator MANSFIELD's statement that he made yesterday, he will use only a few minutes. I certainly would not take more than 5 minutes on it. But we do object to tying down all amendments and all freedom of debate in the Senate.

As the Senator knows, the rules of the Senate, absent unanimous consent, provide for debate. Rule XXII was a matter of debate here in the Senate for many years, and many of us fought very hard and long to prevent its emasculation. I object to, by unanimous consent, emasculating freedom of debate.

I am opposed to delay. I am more than willing, as a matter of fact anxious, to dispose of this matter. I want to make my position clear that I am not anxious to delay any vote at all. I am prepared to move rapidly to dispose of all amendments and the resolution itself.

I think it would be very useful if those supporting the Jackson amendment would make their position clear on the parliamentary matters. I am not arguing about the substance of it at this time.

Mr. BUCKLEY. I thank the Senator from Arkansas for his observations, but as I say, I do believe that we have before us one of the very critical matters involving not only foreign relations but the future security of the United States. I believe it is of such critical importance that it is necessary that we fully understand the implications of each amendment that comes before us.

As I say, I personally feel that the way to analyze the merits of the Mansfield amendment is really to talk about the Jackson amendment. It is for that reason that I would like to proceed with my remarks about the Jackson amendment, in the hope that those who might be inclined to vote in favor of the Mansfield amendment would reserve judgment until they consider the alternatives which will be presented to them.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Certainly.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Just as a matter of information, could the Senate have the benefit of knowing how long the Senator intends to address it?

Mr. BUCKLEY. About 15 or 20 minutes.

Mr. President, as I understand it, the Jackson amendment would simply state three understandings of what U.S. policy should be with respect to the forthcoming second round of negotiations with regard to strategic arms limitation.

As I mentioned earlier, the first of these understandings would provide that the failure of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to achieve a permanent treaty on offensive arms which have the effect of limiting the threat to the ability of our land-based strategic deterrent forces to survive a Soviet first strike would jeopardize our "supreme national interests."

This aspect no more than restates the obvious. It is well understood that the terms of the interim agreement provide for a significant quantitative advantage in favor of the Soviet Union in both intercontinental and submarine launched ballistic missiles. Moreover, because of the very large size of some Soviet missiles, the interim agreement provides a 4- or 5-to-1 advantage for the Soviet Union in terms of the most important long-term measure of the capacity of a ballistic missile force, namely its payload capacity or "throw weight."

It is important to appreciate that if the Soviet Union were to achieve the same level of warhead design sophistication which the United States now enjoys on a production line basis, they could deploy up to five times as many independently targeted warheads on their ballistic missiles as could the United States.

The United States will be able to accept the quantitative inferiority embodied in the interim agreement only if the agreement is truly "interim." At the present time, the United States enjoys a 2-to-1 margin in the number of deployed warheads over the Soviet Union. This advantage is one which is certain to disappear over the next few years as the Soviet Union deploys its own multiple warheads.

It has been argued that the Soviet Union would require 5 or more years to deploy multiple warheads, and thus there is ground for complacency for the duration of the interim agreement. The record on the subject suggests that there is no such ground.

It took the United States 7 years to go from fission bomb development to thermonuclear bomb development—from 1945 when the first A-bomb was detonated to 1952 when the first H-bomb was detonated. The Soviet Union detonated their first A-bomb in 1949, but detonated their first H-bomb only 5 years later. They developed the technique for artificial earth satellites—Sputnik—ahead of the United States, and have shown a willingness to expend resources for strategic nuclear forces far beyond the require- United States only 3 years to develop the hardware for its own multiple warheads. It would be highly imprudent for the Congress to assume that the Soviet Union would be so technologically retarded that it would be incapable of developing and deploying multiple warheads within a 5-year period.

It seems to me most likely that if we allow the imbalance in the interim agreement to remain beyond the 5-year term of the agreement, the threat to our land-based deterrent would become stark.

Mr. President, it is important that we understand that the language of the Jackson amendment is not substantially different from language used by administration witnesses in hearings on the interim agreement before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services. These witnesses made it clear that the development by the Soviets of the ability to threaten the survivability of our land-based deterrent forces would in fact prove an unacceptable threat to our national security. While they did not necessarily agree as to precisely when the Soviet Union would be able to threaten the survival of our deterrent forces, none doubted that the Soviet Union had the basic elements with which to do so if the life to the agreement were extended beyond its 5-year-term.

By accepting the amendment under consideration, Congress simply reinforces the idea that it correctly understands the interim agreement to be in fact "interim" in effect and in no way a permanent solution to the problem of appropriate strategic nuclear force levels with respect to either ICBM's or SLBM's.

The second element of the Jackson amendment represents nothing more than commonsense. No negotiated agreement can be considered "stable" if it fails to insure that there will be no disadvantage for either side. All the amendment does is to apply to a permanent agreement limiting offensive strategic weapons the logic of the ABM treaty which places equal limits on each side with respect to the number of ABM interceptors which can be deployed by either side. If an ABM treaty were offered which provided the Soviet Union with a permanent 4- or 5-to-1 advantage in the critical parameter of ABM capacity, such a treaty would undoubtedly be overwhelmingly rejected by Congress as well as by the American people, and with good reason.

The Jackson amendment would apply the commonsense principle of "no disadvantage" by requesting that any future treaty "not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union."

It is difficult to see how any exception can be taken to such a proposition. As mentioned earlier, the United States can "live with" temporary inequality, but permanent inequality can only be a source of conflict.

The third element of the Jackson amendment places the Congress squarely on record as supporting those research and development and procurement efforts which will assure the maintenance of a strategic force which will leave no doubt as to the United States intent to preserve a position of nuclear parity. The Senate has wisely approved the funding for the current effort for the B-1 bomber and the Trident submarine and missile program. The Jackson amendment would emphasize the fact that Congress will not permit the deterrent capacity of any element of our strategic forces to degrade over time.

There is no more important effort Congress can make than to assure a continuing high level of research and development for it is our only reliable hedge against technological surprise, and our only insurance policy against Soviet evasion. Research must be pressed far more vigorously than it has in the past because of the risks inherent in any arms limitation agreement—more so because the pending agreement is merely "interim" in nature.

Finally—and this is another area in which I believe that the Mansfield amendment is defective, because the Jackson amendment describes the fundamental understandings of the Senate which are in accord with those who negotiated the SALT accords—this statement of the Senate's position will provide the President with the maximum in bargaining strength in the second round of SALT, while placing Congress squarely on record as supporting a sensible permanent agreement limiting offensive weapons on a basis which will yield neither nation any long-term advantage.

Mr. President, it is for these reasons that I urge that the Mansfield amendment not be adopted and that, instead, the Senate regard favorably the proposals which are incorporated in the amendments which will be submitted by the Senator from Washington.

## NATIONAL HEART, BLOOD VESSEL, LUNG, AND BLOOD ACT OF 1972—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), I submit a report of the committee of conference on S. 3323, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STEVENSON). The report will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The comimttee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the House to the bill (S. 3323) to amend the Public Health Service Act to enlarge the authority of the National Heart and Lung Institute in order to advance the national attack against diseases of the heart and blood vessels, the lungs, and blood, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses this report, signed by a majority of the conferees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the consideration of the conference report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report.

(The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of August 16, 1972, at pp. H7685–H7687.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I understand that this has been cleared on all sides.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am honored to have been referred to as the "father" of the National Heart Institute—having introduced on June 9, 1947, H.R. 3762, joined by then Senator, now Representative, PEPPER, of Florida, which provided for the establishment of the Heart Institute within NIH—I am particularly pleased to endorse strongly and to encourage my colleagues to support the conference report on the National Heart, Blood Vessel, Lung, and Blood Act of 1972 (S. 3323), which I cosponsored with the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY).

This legislation would establish a national commitment to combat heart disease—the Nation's No. 1 killer, killing more than 1 million persons annually, and leading health problem—and other major causes of death and disability.

This legislation will permit us to launch a more effective effort against heart, blood vessel, lung, and blood diseases in accordance with the President's commitment to give, and I quote from his state of the Union address:

increased attention to the fight against diseases of the heart, blood vessels and lungs, which presently account for more than half of all the deaths in this country.

The major differences between the Senate- and House-passed bills were that the Senate bill contained provisions relating to emergency medical services; established prevention programs—in accordance with a most worthwhile amendment offered by the ranking minority member of the Health Subcommittee, the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER); and authorized $1.470 billion over a 3-year period, while the bill passed by the House authorized appropriations of $1.290 billion. In essence, the conference agreement retained the emergency medical service and prevention programs provisions and split the money figures, authorizing $1.380 billion.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, all of the differences between the respective versions of the bill have been resolved, and this resulting bill contains all of the essential elements of an effective program to combat these major diseases. The essence of the Senate-passed bill is contained in the conference report.

Last year, Mr. President, the Congress enacted sweeping legislation in respect to the conquest of cancer. Heart disease claims twice as many victims as does cancer. And the bill the Senate has before it now is designed to do all that is necessary in order to advance the attack against these diseases.

The bill calls for the Director of the National Heart and Lung Institute of the NIH to carry out a comprehensive program for, first, research into the cause and the prevention of all forms of heart, lung, and blood diseases; and second, research into basic biological processes in respect to the heart and lung; third, research into techniques, drugs, and devices used in the diagnosis and treatment of persons suffering from these diseases; fourth, establishment of programs for field studies and large-scale testing and demonstration of preventive therapeutic and rehabilitative approaches, including emergency medical services for persons suffering from heart and lung diseases; fifth, public and professional education relating to all aspects of these diseases.

The bill, Mr. President, also includes special prevention and control programs for these diseases. These prevention and control programs have been modeled after similar programs which were included in last year's cancer legislation. For this special program, the bill authorizes a total of $105 million for 3 years.

The bill also authorizes the Director of the Heart and Lung Institute to provide for the development of 15 new centers for basic and clinical research into the diseases of the heart, blood vessels, and blood. In addition, the bill authorizes the development of 15 additional new centers for basic and clinical research into lung diseases, including bronchitis, emphysema, asthma, cystic fibrosis, and other lung diseases of children.

As a result of the conference, Mr. President, the bill now requires that the 15 centers in respect to heart and blood diseases shall also be utilized for prevention programs, including programs to develop improved methods of detecting individuals with a high risk of developing heart disease, programs to develop improved methods to eliminate those factors which cause those individuals to be vulnerable to heart diseases, and programs to develop more skilled health professional manpower in the area of prevention.

In addition to the funds which are authorized for the special prevention and control program, the bill authorizes a total of $1.275 billion over the next 3 years. This fund level is a compromise between the Senate and House bills.

Mr. President, the Senate Health Subcommittee has worked very hard on this legislation, and I believe that the conference report we bring to the Senate is an excellent one. Without question, the Heart and Lung Institute at the NIH along with the other research institutes at the NIH need to get on with the effort envisioned by the legislation. I am convinced that with a sustained effort on their part, we will increase the likelihood of making significant advances against these diseases which claim such a heavy toll in death and disability.

I urge the adoption of the conference report.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I move the adoption of the conference report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Montana.

The motion was agreed to.

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## INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

The Senate continued with the consideration of the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 241) authorizing the President to approve an interim agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have listened with interest to the remarks of the distinguished Senator from New York (Mr. BUCKLEY) in his opposition to the so-called Mansfield amendment to the interim aid agreement on offensive weapons, which is now the pending business.

It distresses me to find that he takes issue with the remarks of the President of the United States as contained in the declaration of principles issued by the President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

For example, let me point out that the second declaration of the declaration of principles signed by Richard Nixon, President of the United States of America, at Moscow, on May 29, 1972, is the exact equivalent of the amendment offered by the Senator from Montana, now speaking—an amendment, incidentally, cosponsored by the distinguished ranking Member of this body, the Senator from Vermont (Mr. AIKEN), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), and the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH).

It is difficult for me to understand how anyone can be for what the President of the United States has agreed to in Moscow and to stand up on the floor of the Senate and argue against the proposal which is now before the Senate.

Mr. President, the stabilization that is sought under phase I of SALT means that each side will be assured of the total validity of the other's deterrent capacity. The importance of such assurance is not diminished, I think, by the approval of new weapons development such as those contained in the military procurement authorization bill. But the im-

portance of SALT would, indeed, be diminished, if not obliterated, if it were suggested that the agreement, rather than stemming the tide of arms development, should be construed as a signal to increase this Nation's might unilaterally to a point beyond that of sufficiency or that of providing sufficient retaliation as a deterrent.

The issue before the Senate, therefore, is whether this Nation is prepared to take a first step toward some limitation or whether it will, instead, continue the saber-rattling so long a part of the arms race in which we have now been engaged for nearly three decades. Either we begin now to end the arms race or we do not. Either we take this step—and do so in good faith—or we do not.

The SALT Treaty ratified so overwhelmingly on August 3 set out the framework for this important initiative. It is within that framework—limiting defensive weapons—that the idea of strategic weapons is made valid and totally creditable. This is the great breakthrough occasioned by phase I of SALT. With it, this Nation need not continue in the arms race and its lack of participation need not impair its security in the least. With it this nation can determine the sufficiency of its deterrence on its own and without comparison to the offensive deterrence of the Soviet Union. Phase I, in effect, codifies the concept of sufficiency; a doctrine that permits an independent and autonomous judgment as to how much of a deterrent force is enough. If what we have is sufficient, we need no more. That we can eliminate an enemy 10 times over with existing force is enough; it is all we need. That another party's force can eliminate us 20 times over is of no concern. Redundance is not and should not be a part of our national policy.

In that light, I might ask, what does the pending amendment do to enhance the resolution before the Senate?

It makes it clear beyond question, I believe, that we endorse expressly the declaration signed by the President which is designed to ease and avoid military confrontations to the greatest extent possible. Most important, I think, is that part of the declaration which would deny advantage to one side or the other. As it is stated: "both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent."

They are inconsistent. That is what the President signed. And it is to affirm that endorsement that this amendment is proposed.

With it, and with the underlying SALT agreement, this Nation is not denied its obligation to remain strong and to maintain a sufficient deterrent force. That national goal remains totally secure.

What we do say, however, is that this small step away from arms escalation should not be twisted into an augmentation of the arms buildup. Let us use SALT as a signal for further and more comprehensive agreements, and not as a signal to obtain a new defense posture, one which is unilateral and could only add to the danger of military confrontation.

Mr. President, I am prepared to vote on this. I am prepared to enter into a reasonable agreement on this amendment and I do so because of the fact that, on yesterday, it was made crystal clear—if I may use a well known phrase—that there would be no unanimous consent agreements entered into for a package for any bill which may come before the Senate.

So, Mr. President, if there is no chance of getting a reasonable agreement, it is my intention to move to table the pending amendment. I shall vote against the tabling motion but I think we should have a little movement.

Therefore, Mr. President, I move to table my own amendment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for just a moment? Will he withhold his request?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BENTSEN). The motion is not debatable.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thought the Senator from Montana said if he could get a reasonable amendment?

Mr. MANSFIELD. A reasonable amount of time.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I suggested yesterday that he would take 20 minutes. Has the Senator reason to believe that we cannot get an agreement to vote in 20 minutes?

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct.

Mr. President, I move to table the pending amendment and suggest the absence of a quorum so that I may ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BENTSEN). The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Montana to table his amendment No. 1434.

On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON), the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. ERVIN), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS), the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), the Senator from Montana (Mr. METCALF), and the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES) is absent on official business.

Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. FONG), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN), and the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS) is absent to attend the funeral of a friend.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.

The Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOK) is detained on official business.

On this vote the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOK) is paired with the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD). If present and voting, the Senator from Kentucky would vote "yea" and the Senator from Oregon would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 31, nays 52, as follows:

[No. 393 Leg.]

YEAS—31

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Allen | Dole | Roth |
| Allott | Dominick | Saxbe |
| Baker | Fannin | Scott |
| Beall | Gurney | Smith |
| Bellmon | Hansen | Sparkman |
| Bennett | Hollings | Taft |
| Boggs | Hruska | Thurmond |
| Brock | Jordan, N.C. | Tower |
| Buckley | Jordan, Idaho | Weicker |
| Cotton | Miller | |
| Curtis | Packwood | |

NAYS—52

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Aiken | Fulbright | Pastore |
| Anderson | Gambrell | Pearson |
| Bayh | Gravel | Percy |
| Bentsen | Hart | Proxmire |
| Bible | Hartke | Randolph |
| Brooke | Humphrey | Ribicoff |
| Burdick | Inouye | Schweiker |
| Byrd, Harry F., Jr. | Jackson | Spong |
| Byrd, Robert C. | Javits | Stafford |
| Case | Kennedy | Stennis |
| Chiles | Long | Stevens |
| Church | Mansfield | Stevenson |
| Cooper | McClellan | Symington |
| Cranston | Mondale | Talmadge |
| Eagleton | Montoya | Tunney |
| Eastland | Moss | Williams |
| Edwards | Muskie | Young |
| | Nelson | |

NOT VOTING—17

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Cannon | Harris | McGovern |
| Cook | Hatfield | McIntyre |
| Ervin | Hughes | Metcalf |
| Fong | Magnuson | Mundt |
| Goldwater | Mathias | Pell |
| Griffin | McGee | |

So the motion to lay the Mansfield amendment on the table was rejected.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, once again I will make an effort——

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, may we have order in the Senate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order. The Senate will not proceed with its business until there is order. Those Senators who are conversing will please take their seats.

The Senator from Montana may proceed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wonder if it would be possible to reach a time limitation just on the pending amendment. Efforts have been made but so far they have been unsuccessful. I would point out to the membership on the basis of statements made yesterday that the Senate has been told that agreements covering a package would be objected to. That is every Senator's right, just as it is to object to a unanimous-consent agreement on a pending amendment. But I would point out that not later than the hour of 2 p.m. the Senate on the second track turns to the revenue-sharing bill. I would point out this is a most important Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons which the President of the United States consummated.

I would point out that the language of the pending amendment quotes in toto the second declaration of the declaration of principles issued in Moscow and signed by President Richard Nixon and the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev.

So, in an attempt to achieve a little movement, I made a motion to table, which I voted against as I stated I would. Now, in an attempt to get something beyond motion—a little action—I would like to request of the distinguished Senator from Washington if he would consider the possibility of a brief limitation on the pending amendment so that we could at least get that far along the road to consideration.

; Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator yield to me first, very briefly?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. SCOTT. I would just like to underscore the request of the distinguished majority leader. The calendar is running against us, and we are all much aware of the passage of time and of the overhanging burden of legislation. I hope we can come to some agreement.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I appreciate the comments of the distinguished Republican leader.

I yield to the distinguished Senator from Washington.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, as the Senate knows, I have made very clear my willingness to reach a unanimous-consent agreement affecting all the amendments. Realistically, the amendment that the Senate must face up to is the amendment that I cosponsored with 30 colleagues, and it is in this area where the problem of consent has been encountered. I think if we are going to be realistic, we must face up to that issue, and I am ready and willing, as I have been from the very first day, to enter into a unanimous-consent agreement on all the amendments and final action on the pending resolution, but I cannot turn around and approve a hit and miss approach. If we do that, then we run into the problem of motions to table, among other things, on which no notice need be given. Given that approach, Senators, of course, will not have an opportunity to be advised in advance when the vote is going to take place. But I am ready and willing, as I have been from the very beginning, the very first day, to reach a unanimous-consent agreement on all amendments and on final action on the resolution.

Mr. MANSFIELD. What the Senator from Washington has said is correct, but the leadership, apart from the amendment of the Senator from Montana which is now pending, is faced with a dilemma. We were told by two Senators on yesterday that they would object to any package unanimous-consent agreements. Now we are told by the distinguished Senator from Washington—and he has been most consistent—that he will agree to nothing but a package unanimous-consent agreement. If we continue to operate on that basis, the Senate will face an impasse which it will not be able to by pass unless the preference of individual Senators will give way to the desires of the Senate as a whole.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield briefly on that point?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, on yesterday I was one of the two Senators who indicated that he would object to any unanimous-consent request that included a prohibition against nongermane amendments. I did not mean to say on that occasion, and I thought I did not say, that I would object to all unanimous-consent agreements otherwise employed.

As far as I am concerned, a package is fine as long as it does not include a prohibition against nongermane amendments or unless there is first an opportunity for me to examine such a unanimous-consent agreement.

In this particular case I have no objection to a provision in the proposed unanimous-consent agreement against nongermane amendments. I believe I have never so objected, but I want to preserve my right to object to any such proposal for the remainder of this term. In this case I have no such objection. I certainly do not want to stand in the way of an agreement that will expedite action.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I appreciate that statement. The Senator was aware that the leadership was trying to protect his right on the basis of statements made not only on yesterday but on previous times.

What is the attitude of the distinguished Senator from New York, who indicated he might have some reservations to unanimous-consent agreements under certain circumstances?

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, the Senator from New York wished to provide against unanimous consents which allowed nongermane amendments. If, as the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER) says, he is not going to raise that objection with respect to this matter, I certainly do not, because it does exactly what I want, to wit, permits only amendments that are germane.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Then, Mr. President, it appears the two objections which I had assumed would come from the other side have now been laid aside temporarily.

I would like at this time to ask the distinguished chairman of the committee if he would give consideration, along with his interested colleagues—and he has to talk with them—to a package agreement for a time limitation on each amendment, a time limitation on the measure itself, and perhaps a time certain on which a final vote could be taken.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, we did discuss this question. I have discussed it with a number of my colleagues, some of whom have amendments at the desk. We were reminded that the Senate used to pride itself on freedom of debate. This is a proposed limitation on all aspects of the measure, including all amendments, even those which have not yet developed and which could develop. This kind of limitation is unusual and inappropriate for important measures. We are quite willing to agree to a time limitation on the Senator's amendment and on every amendment as it comes up, reserving the right, on new amendments that may come up, to have additional time.

There is no disposition on my part, or on the part of any of those associated with me in this matter, to delay action. I personally believe we could dispose of the matter today—not, of course, by 2 o'clock, but in the course of a few hours—if we could proceed under the traditional rules of the Senate, and not by unanimous consent.

All of those who have amendments say they will not agree to the requirement of the Senator from Washington that there be a limitation on every amendment and that that must be agreed to—in other words, the package.

It is true that the Senator has taken this position from the beginning. I only point out that it is not the traditional way for the Senate. It operates under rule XXII, among others, which used to be considered important in the Senate, and I still consider it important. I would personally not be disposed to agree to the Senator from Washington's proposal lest we put ourselves in a straitjacket on all amendments and the final disposition of the bill.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. I would point out to the Senator that, in connection with the treaty that was submitted to this body by the President covering agreement with the Soviet Union on antiballistic missiles, we entered into a unanimous-consent agreement, and I agreed to that at the outset, and made clear then that I would do the same on the interim agreement. So, speaking of precedent, there have been many, and there is the one just before this one in which we agreed to a stipulated time of debate and vote by unanimous consent. That is not unusual in this body.

Certainly, with a number of Senators being away, I cannot agree to a situation in which, if I bring my amendment up, a motion to table can be offered at any time. I want to cooperate, and I have from the very beginning, as the Senate knows, because I made it clear, when both of these Moscow accords were submitted by the President, that I would agree to a unanimous consent. That worked out well on the ABM debate, and I do not see why we cannot apply that same principle to the interim agreement.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, indeed.

Mr. PASTORE. It strikes the Senator from Rhode Island that the crucial amendment which we have to face up to is the so-called Jackson amendment, of which I am a cosponsor.

I was wondering if we could not consider, as a minipackage, not only that the Mansfield amendment be voted on at a time certain, but that it be followed by the so-called Jackson amendment, to be voted on at a time certain, without a motion to lay the amendment on the table.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That would be agreeable to me, if it could be done.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. May I inquire of the Senator, what about amendments to the Jackson amendment? Would they be subject to motions to table?

Mr. PASTORE. Well, the agreement would have to cover the amendments to the Jackson amendment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would be perfectly willing to vote on this amendment. As I understand, the Jackson amendment has not been offered yet.

Mr. PASTORE. That is true, but everybody knows he is going to offer it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. When he offers the Jackson amendment, I think we could get agreements on each one as they are offered, but there may be some additional ones. We do not know what is going to happen either on the Mansfield amendment or on amendments to the Jackson amendment.

Mr. PASTORE. Well, if amendments and bids for agreement are to multiply, it strikes the Senator from Rhode Island we are going to be here until Christmas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does not the Senator from Rhode Island agree that the Senate rules provide for freedom of debate, and that this business of unanimous consent has grown up largely on routine legislation?

Mr. PASTORE. I know, but that is for freedom of debate, not frustration; and it is not limitless. I mean there comes a point where the will of the Senate has to be expressed. I do not know how the Jackson amendment is going to fare, but I do know it is a crucial amendment, and if it is defeated, that is the end.

On the other hand, if it is to prevail, I do not think any attempt to dilute it would carry. If it is the will of the Senate to accept the Jackson amendment in an unadulterated form, I do not think any attempts to weaken it will succeed, and the need here is to bring about a decisive test. The Senator from Montana moved to lay his own amendment on the table in order to exercise some kind of a test. The will of the Senate has been expressed, and we have refused to lay it on the table. Therefore, it is the active, pending business. All I am suggesting is that we vote on the Mansfield amendment, and I shall vote for it, and then, if the Jackson amendment comes up, I shall vote for it, too.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with the Senator. I am willing to vote on the Mansfield amendment immediately, and then consider the Jackson amendment.

Mr. PASTORE. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Why does not the Senate do that? Why does the Senator say now we have got to agree to a limitation on all possible amendments to the Jackson amendment?

Mr. PASTORE. Because I have a pretty good idea just what they are, and the Senator from Arkansas knows what they are.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not see why we do not proceed to vote on them.

Mr. PASTORE. The point is, we keep talking and do not vote on anything.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I will stop talking. Let us vote.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there is a lot of sparring going on on this bill. It has been going on for some time. I would hope that a time would come when Senators would subordinate their personal feelings and personal desires and consider the position in which the Senate finds itself during these particular days covering the beginning of a political campaign and covering the matters which confront us in these weeks and maybe months ahead, keeping in mind the fact that this is a presidential proposal which was consummated at great length by men in whom we all have confidence—I refer to Ambassador Smith and his colleagues, and I certainly refer to the President of the United States, who signed this in behalf of all of us.

To go on like this, I do not know where it is going to end, but I would hope, in view of the fact that there is no possibility at this moment of achieving an agreement, that the Chair would put the pending amendment to the Senate for a vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BENTSEN). The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Montana.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I just want to say to the Senator from Montana that I am willing to sit down again and see if we can find some area of agreement here much along the lines suggested by the Senator from Rhode Island, and that is to get an agreement for a time certain to vote on the Mansfield amendment and my amendment, together with the amendments thereto. I am willing, certainly, to make another try at it. But I believe that we are not going down the right road here to bring this to an early and final solution unless we face up to the main controversy, which is the amendment that I along with some 30 Senators have cosponsored. I think the sooner we face up to that, the sooner we can bring this to a final conclusion. I am willing to explore, this afternoon, other alternatives to those we have discussed as a possible means of trying to resolve it. But I want to again emphasize that the unanimous-consent approach has just been applied to a treaty, which is a permanent obligation unless terminated by either party, and when we apply unanimous-consent procedures in that kind of situation, it seems to me that we ought to at least be willing to treat the pending matter, which is not a treaty, on the basis of some reality, and that is that we can dispose of this matter very rapidly if we reach a unanimous agreement.

The facts are, I think, that we have the votes to carry my amendment. That is the reason for the delay. If the parties agree that they are willing to have a vote, why can we not agree to it under proper stipulation, so that Senators, many of whom, on both sides of the aisle, are in and out, will know when that vote is going to occur? That is all.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. Without an unanimous-consent agreement, you cannot do it. I am not going to fall into the trap of having someone make a motion to table without warning, and without being able to advise other Senators who want to be heard and to vote.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, going back to the SALT Treaty, there were no reservations or understandings offerred. It came in clean, and it was disposed of clean. Therefore, there was no need, really, for a unanimous-consent agreement in the sense that one would be desirable for the present legislation.

The Senator is against a piecemeal time limitation on amendments. He has a point of view, but would he be against a vote on the pending amendment at this time, without any time limitation being tied to it?

Mr. JACKSON. I do not want to agree at this time——

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am not asking for a time limitation now. This is just a vote.

Mr. JACKSON. No; as I say, I do not want to agree on this one amendment at this time.

Mr. MANSFIELD. No; I am not asking for an agreement. Is the Senator prepared to vote on this amendment at this time without any agreement?

Mr. JACKSON. No. No; not at this time. I want to see if we can make another try, to see if we can reach an agreement, because we need to know what amendments are going to be offered. I have an idea as to some, and I think we ought to be able to be in a position to have an understanding about when these amendments are going to be offered and when we are going to get some votes. Otherwise, there will be no order. If a Senator does not want to bring up an amendment at a given time and there is no unanimous-consent agreement, he can go on talking indefinitely.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes; but——

Mr. JACKSON. And I understand the problem. It is my amendment that the time is being consumed on. I have been ready from the very first day, and I made it clear over and over again——

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the Senator's amendment has not been offered. It has just been talked about. All we are doing—and this includes all of us—is tilting at windmills. We are getting nowhere. We might be satisfying our own ego, our own sense of well-being, but as far as the Senate is concerned, we are not subordinating our personal desires to what the institution itself should be doing, and we are all going to pay for the machinations which are going on, and nobody is going to benefit—nobody—but all of us will lose because of it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. JACKSON. I will just make one final statement on this.

If the vote on the Mansfield amendment would solve the problem, I would agree, but it would not solve the problem. Why delude the Senate? Whom are we kidding?

For some reason, the moment my amendment was offered, it caused the pending business to be set aside for a whole week. Since when do we get into a

situation in this body that, when a Senator offers an amendment, the pending business is set aside for a whole week? These are the facts. And a special meeting of the Committee on Foreign Relations was held to discuss my amendment. Does not a Senator have a right to offer amendments to a pending bill? What is unusual about it? Who delayed? Not the Senator from Washington. I made it clear right from the beginning, and I have tried my very best to work with the leadership on both sides to reach a unanimous agreement to vote. In fairness, I think these facts ought to be pointed out.

If the vote on the Mansfield amendment would solve the problem right now, I would agree immediately. But I am not going to indulge in fictions and try to delude the people of this country that by agreeing to vote on the Mansfield amendment, we have agreed to go right ahead and act on this whole matter. I think we have to face up to the real issue, and the real issue is our simple amendment that stipulates, in effect, that in any follow-on agreement on strategic arms limitation with the Soviet Union, it should be the policy of the United States to achieve equality. That is the issue before the Senate, and I believe that the sooner we face up to that issue, the sooner we will be able to get a final vote.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the issue is not equality. Everybody believes in equality.

The suggestion was made to the distinguished Senator from Washington that the word "overall" be inserted for "equality." That was turned down. It is equality in specific fields.

I do not know what we are trying to seek when we have enough TNT in this country and in the world to account for 15 tons applicable to every man, woman, and child on the face of the globe.

I would hope that we would get away from this sparring and this moving for advantage and get down to the business which confronts the Senate and this country, which is far more important than the business of any individual Senator. The sooner we can reach an accommodation of our divergent views, the better off the Senate is going to be.

So far as I am concerned, I am willing to agree to any kind of time limitation to bring this matter to a head and to trust the judgment of the Senate as a whole.

I certainly am disappointed, when the Mansfield amendment, so-called, is given the prestige and the credibility it has received this afternoon; because it is not that important—it is just an affirmation, word for word, of the second declaration in the declaration of principles issued by the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, a declaration to which they affixed their signatures. It is a simple statement of what they stand for. Either they believed in what they did or they did not.

Unfortunately, the administration is against its own language. It is hard to understand. It is simple language to which the President affixed his signature. What are they for? What they did? Or are they for an amendment which they say is fine, but they do not believe in its interpretation? The administration is trying to have it both ways. If they have ever got themselves in a box—and it is their own fault—they got themselves in a box on the Jackson amendment. They are for it, but they are not for its interpretation. What are they for? We would like to know.

Mr. SYMINGTON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri is recognized.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, in support of the position just taken by the majority leader, on the first of June, at the joint session, the President of the United States stated:

> I ask from this Congress and I ask from the Nation the fullest scrutiny of these accords. I am confident such examination will underscore the truth of what I told the Soviet people on television just a few nights ago, that this is an agreement in the interest of both nations.

What the majority leader has said about the position of the administration in this matter is of special interest. It has been my understanding they are for this amendment. It has also been my understanding that they are against it in any case an interpretation of it.

I would present to the Senate that this extended discussion and delay is putting us all in an increasingly difficult position if we are sincere in wanting to work out a meaningful arms control agreement; because pretty soon the leaders of the Soviet hardliners in that nation, comparable to the hardliners in this Nation, are going to be able to go to the Soviet people, under their controlled system, and say, "The President of the United States now admits that when he spoke to you about the fairness of this agreement, he was not telling you the facts."

To me, it is regrettable indeed that we are placing ourselves in such a position.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in order at least to clarify the air, I had said in prior debates that I would move to table Senator JACKSON'S amendment. I have no desire to table it if we can get to a vote on the merits and the opportunity to amend it. I can say without any reservation that I would not move to table it—certainly not without prior notice and without an agreement. At the same time, I would make no agreement and I would not make a motion to table it without agreement with the Senator.

I have said that more or less in the same spirit in which the Senator from Montana has moved simply to get some action, to get some kind of test on it. But I would not make a motion to table the Jackson amendment without prior notice.

Next, I wanted to clarify the fact that there is no need for further negotiations about a package agreement. If no one else wishes to object, I shall object to a package agreement; but in that connection, I would take very limited time on any amendment, including the pending business or the Jackson amendment.

The point is that the practice of the Senate always has been, prior to recent times, to proceed under the rules of the Senate, without unanimous consent. To do otherwise was quite unusual. I do not object to the unanimous consent procedure on routine matters or on matters of lesser importance than this. I consider this an extremely important matter. The Committee on Foreign Relations voted unanimously to approve it. The President and his spokesmen submitted it to the country, both in the joint session and at the White House, without any reservations. The House has approved it without any reservations, with an overwhelming vote—I think there were only seven votes against it in the House of Representatives—328 in favor of it, without any amendments.

As a Member of the Senate and as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I am not going to agree to put the Senate in a straitjacket on these votes. I am perfectly prepared to vote now, immediately, on this matter, and within a very brief time on any amendments to the Jackson amendment; but I insist upon abiding by the rules as I think the traditions of the Senate have interpreted them.

I submit that the Senator from Washington is endangering the entire measure. His action raises very serious questions as to whether his purpose is to kill the agreement itself because in his view it does not provide for equality. Of course, I join the views of the Senator from Montana completely, that the agreement does provide equality, overall equality. That was the thrust of the President's view as he made his views known at the joint session and through Dr. Kissinger and others. So I would regret very much if this agreement is killed but, at the same time, I am not going to agree to a package deal. It is up to the Senator from Washington. He must take the responsibility of holding this up, as he has held it up now, as he says, because he wants a package deal. There will be no package deal as long as I am able to stand on the floor of the Senate. I am not going to agree to a package deal. I want to make that clear so that we do not delay it any longer. It is entirely up to the Senator from Washington whether we vote now on this amendment and on succeeding ones.

For my part, I am unable to see why, if he has the votes as he says he has—and I do not disagree, because I do not know—but if he has them, the Mansfield amendment can be disposed of before 2 o'clock, so far as I am concerned, if he wants us to go ahead and allow us to vote on it. But I am not going to agree at this time to a unanimous-consent agreement.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, the way to bring debate of this kind to a conclusion, of course, as the Senator from Arkansas well knows, is to enter into a unanimous-consent agreement. I must say that the business of the Senate would come to a complete halt if we did not have unanimous-consent agreements at each session of Congress. We have a long series of them. I see no reason in the world why, if they want to vote on it, we cannot agree to vote at a specific time.

I point out in this whole business—I cannot find out how many amendments

to my amendment there really are—that any reasonable person would want to enter into an agreement and understand when those amendments will take place so that Senators can be here at that time.

I am amazed it would be said that the unanimous-consent process has not been used in connection with important legislation. We do it at every session of Congress. I am ready and willing to cooperate with the leadership in expediting this matter, as I have from the outset when we brought up the ABM treaty.

One other word, Mr. President, and I am not going to get into the substance of this debate at this moment—I will have some remarks to make in just a moment—but there seems to be the impression going around that we are trying to modify or change what was agreed to in Moscow. That is not what is before the Senate. What is before the Senate is an effort on the part of the junior Senator from Washington to implement the Fulbright doctrine. Senators will recall that the Fulbright doctrine suggested that the Senate give its advice—and not just its consent—on these matters, and that not all policy be made downtown. The Senator from Washington is trying to implement the Fulbright doctrine.

All we are doing here, Mr. President, is offering an amendment that suggests certain policy guidelines that represent the views of the body that will have to pass on the follow-on treaty.

What is wrong with that?

The objective is to achieve strategic parity or equality in the follow-on treaty. That is the thrust of our amendment. We are not trying to modify the interim agreement. Our amendment is not a modification of the interim agreement. Some people have sown confusion on this point. The administration itself has made it clear they would never have agreed to the interim agreement as a final treaty because it provides for a substantial disparity of forces vis-a-vis ours and the Soviet Union's.

The whole objective of our amendment is to provide for advice by the Senate relating to negotiations of the follow-on treaty on strategic offensive forces. I shall speak in a moment on that in some detail.

I would point out further, Mr. President, that there is a great opportunity here for the Soviets to roll back their strategic forces. We hear so much talk about how to save money. Of course we all want to do that in defense. But, would it not be wonderful and sensible if the Soviet Union would announce that it will cut back its forces, its ICBM forces from 1,618 land-based to 1,000, and that they will hold their submarine building program to 42, where it is right now, one ahead of ours?

We cut back our ABM missile sites from four to two, and our negotiators knew full well that it would end up being just one—and the conferees in connection with the military procurement bill have already set that at one.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield for one or two questions?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. May I ask the distinguished Senator from Washington whether he is opposed to the position of the President in regard to the interim agreement as stated on June 15 of this year?

Mr. JACKSON. Well——

Mr. AIKEN. Is he opposed to the position of the President?

Mr. JACKSON. On June 15 the President spoke at some length about the Moscow accords. Nothing he said then detracts from the need for my amendment, which, I might add, the White House supports.

Mr. AIKEN. Then he opposes the position taken by the President on June 15 of this year——

Mr. JACKSON. That is not what I said.

Mr. AIKEN (continuing). And which would be approved on the part of the Senate by the Mansfield amendment.

Mr. JACKSON. As the Senator knows, I voted for the ABM treaty. I did not concur and I do not concur in this interim agreement without some understanding as to what the policy of the government will be in connection with the negotiations for a follow-on treaty that is to take place pursuant to this interim agreement.

Mr. AIKEN. Then the Senator from Washington is opposed to the position taken by the President on June 15?

Mr. JACKSON. I hope to be able to support the interim agreement, with the Jackson amendment. I think there are many other Senators who feel the same way.

Mr. AIKEN. Would approval of the Mansfield amendment nullify the Jackson amendment if that were also approved later? Would that not solve the problem so far as the Senator from Washington is concerned?

Mr. JACKSON. The Mansfield amendment is not related at all to my amendment.

Mr. AIKEN. But the Senator's amendment is not before the Senate.

Mr. JACKSON. Of course not. I was not born yesterday. I am not offering an amendment at this time since, without a unanimous agreement, a motion to table could be offered at any time at any hour. I want to get an agreement here so that we can vote under orderly procedures.

Mr. AIKEN. In opposing the Mansfield amendment, one has to oppose the position of the President as stated after the treaty and the Interim Agreement had been signed.

Mr. JACKSON. I do not believe that follows. In fact, the White House has endorsed my amendment.

Mr. AIKEN. There is no other interpretation in the minds of the people of this country. One either approves the position of the President or he does not. Personally, I think that the President has done everything within his power to bring war to an end and restore peace to this world. But what is going on here is convicting millions of people in this country that he is not doing that. I believe that he is. But there are so many others that are using this almost farcical situation here in the Senate to say that he did not mean it at all.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President——

Mr. AIKEN. The attitude of the Senator from Washington in opposing the President gives greater credence to that belief.

Mr. JACKSON. I am not opposing the President. Let me comment on something that is very clear to the American people. I hope the Senator will stay on the floor just for a moment. I believe that the American people—and the great majority, I think, of the Members of this body—understand the objective of trying to achieve strategic parity with the Soviet Union. That is what my amendment suggests as a matter of policy, and my amendment is supported by the White House.

How in the world can a Senator go to his constituents and say, "Well, I voted against the amendment that had as its objective a negotiation to achieve parity and equality with the Soviet Union in strategic arms"?

Parity is what our politicians on both sides of the political aisle in this country have been insisting upon for years—as a minimum.

I am suggesting that if the Senate adopts the barebones agreement that is before us without some policy statement to make it clear that we want to achieve strategic equality in the ongoing negotiations, it can only result in trouble.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, he has made the assertion that that is what the politicians on both sides are in favor of, what the Senator is advocating. I think that the Senator is correct. The politicians are.

Mr. JACKSON. I will let each Senator decide that question.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, the American people have been told repeatedly that we have not only equality with the Russians in this field, but that we have superiority in many fields.

Mr. JACKSON. We are talking about the future. As the Senator knows, my amendment is a policy statement relative to strategic arms negotiations that will get underway this fall.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, does the Senator from Washington agree that given their present momentum in advancing their military technology, both qualitatively and quantitatively, and given our current lack of momentum, the Soviets would, in the absence of an equitable agreement, in a short period of time achieve or exceed superiority?

Mr. JACKSON. I do not think there is any doubt about that. This is what the argument is all about. For the life of me, I cannot understand how the Senate would deny this Nation a policy guideline which stipulates to our SALT II negotiators that when they proceed to meet with the Russians in Geneva in October, next month, it shall be their objective to adhere, for offensive strategic weapons, to the principle of equality that obtains in the ABM treaty. What in the world is wrong with that?

I know of the other extraneous arguments that are brought up—that we have a lot of warheads in Europe. Those war-

heads are under the enormous nuclear threat posed by comparable Soviet forces, and those comparable forces cannot be ignored.

The Senator has talked about a situation where we are not trying to compare apples and oranges, but are trying to compare oranges and oranges—and that is, their ICBM's with our ICBM's and their land-based forces with our land-based forces. And I think our amendment is a reasonable proposal for the Senate to adopt as a guideline for our negotiators.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield further, does the Senator believe that if the Soviet Union could achieve or did achieve absolute superiority and if we allowed ourselves to be in a position of inferiority, they would not be somewhat more reluctant to negotiate an agreement on trade tariffs?

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator is correct. And not only would that be true, but I would say that Soviet strategic superiority would be the most destabilizing development that could take place on this planet. The risktaking that Moscow would engage in and the adventurism that the Soviets are prone to undertake from time to time would increase manyfold. And the increasing effects on the problems of world diplomacy would be enormous—if the Soviets achieved superiority. I do not think there is any doubt whatever of that. It is the political implications that could be the most serious. There has been a tendency, I think, to interpret the relative strategic posture of the two countries in terms of a nuclear race. I think Soviet strategic superiority would have its greatest impact on the diplomatic and political situation and the future chances of individual liberty.

Mr. TOWER. Does not it sometimes appear that we profess too much our innocence of any desire to engage in military confrontation? Does not the historical record show that the United States has always acted with vigorous restraint? In the period since World War II, we could have at one time or another fought a preemptive war and won it and won it decisively. We have been provoked many times.

Does the Senator think that the United States actually chooses war as a matter of policy and that the United States would try to impose its will on the rest of the world because of the superiority of our military establishment? I do not think that anyone believes that is so.

Mr. JACKSON. I cannot believe it. No other country in the history of the world had available to it the destructive capability that was a monopoly and that was held by the United States. We then exercised a great degree of restraint in the post-World War II period.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, in 1948, for example, when we were severely provoked and when it was apparent that the Soviets were treating our post-war agreement as a scrap of paper and backing up their actions with a blatant show of force, did we not show great restraint? We could have indeed fought a preemptive war and won it.

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator is correct. In 1948 the Soviet Union took over Czechoslovakia by a show of military force and directed the subversion from within. We had a nuclear monopoly at that time. At that time the Soviet Union did not have any nuclear weapons. It was not until August or September of 1949 that they were able to achieve their first nuclear capability.

In Korea and in other situations we could have, if we had made it a matter of national policy, reserved the right to use nuclear force. However, we made it very clear that we would not do so. Not only that, but at the end of World War II, as the Senator will recall, we offered the Acheson-Lilienthal proposal involving on our part a turning over of the nuclear arms to an international body under the U.N., and the Soviet Union vetoed that proposal.

Mr. TOWER. The Senator is absolutely correct. That would lead me to believe that the Soviet Union does not have any fear of the United States being an aggressor nation that chooses to use war as a national policy.

It appears to me that the Soviet Union does want national superiority for one reason, and that is so that it can impose its will on the rest of the world.

Some people say, "What difference does it make if the Soviet Union has superiority?" I think it makes this difference. If they are superior, it is unlikely that we will ever fight a war. However, what is likely is that they will be able to achieve their goals through their nuclear force.

Mr. JACKSON. Nuclear blackmail.

Mr. TOWER. The Senator is correct, nuclear blackmail.

Mr. JACKSON. Ballistic blackmail. Some people have warned about that. I warned about it in a speech in 1946.

The tendency has been to treat strategic arms as an action-reaction type of thing, particularly in terms of a nuclear war. Too many people overlook the fact that it is the diplomatic and foreign policy implications of this power in the hands of the Soviet Union that we have to be thinking about, and how they will be using that power to achieve their foreign policy objectives without fighting a war, so to speak. I believe that is what the Senator is referring to.

Mr. TOWER. The Senator is correct. I concur. Does it not follow that we must then necessarily negotiate from a position of present military strength if we are to achieve a limitation of strategic arms that will continue to lead the people of the world to feel reasonably sure in their aspirations toward self-determination.

Does it not occur to the Senator from Washington that actually the adoption of his amendment would strengthen the hand of the President in these negotiations and actually perhaps result in a better agreement in the final analysis than if we failed to serve notice that we will not accept inferiority? It occurs to me they would be much more willing to negotiate and that it would strengthen the hand of the President.

Mr. JACKSON. I agree with the Senator from Texas. The objective we all seek is to bring about a stabilization of forces in the world so there will be less of a threat to the peace of the world. Secondly, in time there can actually be a reduction of the money that has to be spent on all sides in connection with the armament program of the countries that are involved. This is what we are trying to do.

As I said a moment ago, I would like to see the Soviet Union follow the example we set when we rolled back on our ABM forces. We had four sites authorized, we cut back and agreed to two in the ABM treaty—which in effect was really one, and the Soviets did no cutting back.

There is the greatest opportunity now that I have ever experienced in my lifetime, with the two nations going to Geneva, for the Russians to agree to cut back their intercontinental ballistic missile forces, land based and sea based, to a point of equality or parity with the United States. This would save money for the Soviet Union and it would save money for the United States. If we want to make headway, as we all do, in trying to limit and control arms, I think the amendment I will offer at the appropriate time will help our Government achieve that objective. This is the kind of objective we all seek in order to bring about the kind of stabilization we want for all mankind in this troubled world.

Mr. TOWER. I completely concur with the remarks of the Senator. This is extremely constructive and I believe it is necessary. I hope that at such time as the Senator offers the amendment the Senate will adopt it.

Mr. JACKSON. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I shall be brief in my remarks today as the Senate continues its consideration of the interim agreement on strategic offensive weapons. I have already spoken several times on this important matter and I shall have more to say as the debate progresses and as the arguments of those who oppose my effort to offer guidance for future SALT negotiations are brought before us. Today I wish to dwell for a moment on my belief that the adoption of my amendment to the SALT authorizing resolution could be a great step toward a winding down of United States-Soviet strategic arms competition and toward the achievement of a stable strategic balance.

Let me say, first, that I share the view of the administration and, I believe, a majority of the Senate, that the interim agreement is not the basis for and is unacceptable as a permanent treaty. Such a treaty must provide for United States-Soviet equality. The present U.S. advantage in strategic weapons technology, which now offsets Soviet numerical superiority, cannot be assured in a long term treaty. What may be a tolerable basis for an interim agreement, therefore, would be intolerable as the basis for a treaty. It is for this reason that I have sought, along with 30 of my colleagues, an amendment that would place the Senate on record in support of a future SALT agreement that adheres, for offensive weapons, to the principle of equality that obtains in the agreement signed in Moscow on defensive weapons.

I must say, Mr. President, that I am

puzzled at the continuing refusal of the severest critics of U.S. strategic weapons procurement and deployment programs to join with me in calling upon the Soviet Union to reverse its weapons buildup and content itself with equality with the United States in strategic offensive weapons.

Senators opposing our amendment have often called for restraint in strategic weapons programs, urging that we "take risks for peace." I would like to hear those same Senators urge the Soviet Union to refrain, for example, from proceeding beyond the 42 nuclear submarines they now have either operational or under construction.

Mr. President, the Soviets are permitted but certainly not obligated to build 62 nuclear submarines of the Polaris type under the interim agreement. The United States, as Senators know, is limited to 44 such boats although, in reality, we will have only 41 during the life time of the 5-year interim agreement. I find this disparity disquieting as I have said before and I would very much like to see it narrowed. I am certain that many Senators share my view on this point.

Why, then, should the Soviet Union not stop building submarines at their current level—which is reliably reported by our intelligence sources to be 42 Y-class submarines? Alternatively, why should the Soviet Union not halt its construction program after it places its 44th Y-class submarine under construction thereby limiting itself to the number to which we, on an interim basis, are limited? Either formula, in my view, would be very much preferable to the further expansion of Soviet submarine forces beyond 42 to, in the extreme, as many as 62 submarines. Surely all Senators can agree that it would be a most desirable result of the follow-on SALT negotiations if some formula along these lines could be arranged. I propose that a leveling on the basis of equality such as this should be the central objective of the SALT II deliberations when they resume later this autumn. And I have offered my amendment advising the President that he ought to seek such a treaty to enable the U.S. Senate, which must ratify any treaty to emerge from these continuing talks, to express itself along these lines in advance of the negotiations.

Of course, the sort of eventual submarine balance outlined here is merely one example of the way in which I believe that the principle of equality can contribute to a reversal of the trend of the last several years in which we have seen the unrelenting growth of Soviet strategic forces. Such a result would greatly increase the security of our own nuclear deterrent, possibly enabling the United States to avoid future strategic programs that might otherwise be required to meet our strategic objectives.

One could easily multiply the examples of the stabilizing effects of the equality principle. Under the limits agreed to on an interim basis and now before the Senate, the Soviets have an advantage in missile throw weight that, while already very large, is subject to still further increases. As things now stand, the overall Soviet intercontinental missile throw weight is approximately four times our own. Now, as many Senators know, the overall throw weight of a nation's missile force determines, in the final analysis, the nature and size of the attack that it can deliver. Assuming that technology tends to equalize out in the long run—and it always has in the past—it is generally true that the greater the throw weight, the greater the capability of the force and the greater the number of warheads that can be delivered by it. It is, by the way, because of these considerations that we cannot assume that the central U.S. advantage in the present strategic situation—our superior number of warheads—would continue, under any long-term SALT II treaty, to offset the considerable Soviet throw weight advantage.

Part of this enormous Soviet throw weight advantage is made up of their older, liquid-fueled SS–7 and SS–8 ICBM's. Would it be unreasonable to propose that, as part of a SALT II agreement, the Soviets dismantle these weapons and thereby bring their ICBM throw weight down—and closer to our own? This would be a move in the direction of fairness. And it would be a move in the direction of slowing the arms buildup by beginning to narrow the now considerable disparity between the larger Soviet force and our own smaller one.

There is an added reason why the dismantling of the Soviet SS–7 and SS–8 missiles would be a step in the right direction. These weapons are obsolete. The United States, which once possessed a substantial force of equivalent weapons, abandoned them long ago. Senators doubtless recall the Atlas and Titan I missiles that used to be a significant part of the U.S. inventory. Under the interim agreement the Soviets are permitted to exchange the obsolete SS–7 and SS–8 missiles for new submarine launched missiles on a one-for-one basis. But the United States, which has already retired its equivalent Atlas and Titan I missiles, is granted no such trade-in privilege. So the dismantling of the SS–7 and SS–8 missiles, of which there are over 200, would be a move in the direction of equality in terms both of throw weight and the trade-in provisions of the interim agreement.

Again, Mr. President, the Soviets presently have under development new ICBM's which, in the view of our experts, would enable them to increase still further their missile throw weight without going beyond the 1,618 ICBM's permitted under the interim agreement. The actual deployment of these new weapons would widen rather than narrow the current disparity by increasing the present four to one Soviet advantage still further. Should we not propose, as the basis for a SALT II agreement, that the overall effect should be a narrowing of the gap between our respective forces? If the Soviets are intent on deploying new and bigger missiles, should there not be, as a basis for SALT II, some compensating reductions in other Soviet systems so that we move closer to, rather than further from, United States-Soviet equality? Or better yet, perhaps they can be persuaded to refrain from deploying bigger missiles in the first place. Surely such a result would increase our security and enable us both to forego new strategic programs and make it possible for both countries to have more funds available for important domestic programs.

Mr. President, I pointed out earlier that the Soviets are free but not obligated to build the full complement of 62 submarines, and I suggested that the principle of equality in my amendment points to the wisdom of their stopping with a smaller number. As Senators know, under the ABM treaty the United States is free but not obligated to build a missile-defense site around Washington, D.C. We have, for good reasons, elected not to exercise our right and option to deploy an ABM to defend our capital. I would urge that the Soviets consider the wisdom of likewise refraining from exercising their option with respect to deploying additional nuclear submarines.

Mr. President, the world would be very much safer if SALT II were to result in an agreement which, because it was based on the principle of equality, brought Soviet force levels into line with our own. Costly arms programs could be obviated. The foundation would be laid for reductions on both sides leading to smaller and more secure strategic forces requiring lower budgets and reducing present uncertainties.

Now, some Senators might argue that the Soviets would never agree to a SALT II treaty based on the principle of equality agreed to in the ABM treaty. Such a decision on the part of the Soviets would be regrettable and, let me add, it would be indefensible. The United States cannot and should not be forced to accept a SALT treaty on offensive weapons that departs from that principle.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to join with me and the other cosponsors in supporting an amendment that could lead to a turning around of the strategic build-up that has, with intensity increasing since 1965, threatened to upset the strategic balance. Many of my colleagues have frequently come to this Senate chamber to urge, to argue, to implore the United States not to develop or deploy strategic weapons. Where are they now when the subject is to get the Soviets to reduce their strategic forces to achieve an equalization and a stabilization that would serve the cause of peace? If ever there was a time for the Senate to advise both the President and the Presidium, this is it.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the following bills, in which

4. (Unclassified - GLC) Talked at some length with Mr. David Carper, on the House of Representatives Legislative Counsel's staff, about procedural alternatives for House action on the Ervin bill as it was attached as Title II of H. R. 12652 by the Senate. (See Memo for the Record.)

5. (Unclassified - GLC) Received a call from Lt. Commander F. W. Levine, Production Coordination and Dissemination Division of the Naval Intelligence Operations Department, who said that the Secretary of the CNO executive panel had contacted their office in the interest of obtaining the transcript of Mr. Helms' testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on qualitative improvements in Soviet missile systems. I told Levine that the last time the Director appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee was during its hearings on the SALT agreement and that his testimony concerned our detection capabilities. I added that there was a strict understanding with the Foreign Relations Committee that there would be only one copy of the transcript of our briefings (the Committee's copy) and that no copy would be made without the expressed permission of the Committee. Commander Levine said that the request that was put to him was rather vague and that he would get more details and be back in touch with me.

25X1

JOHN M. MAURY
Legislative Counsel

cc:
O/DDCI
25X1 [redacted]
Mr. Evans
Mr. Houston
Mr. Thuermer
Mr. Clarke
DDI
DDS
DDS&T
EA/DDP
OPPB
Item 1 - FBIS

the Senate on necessary business—necessary indeed. Necessary for the country that we legislate without that kind of assistance, necessary that we not be asked to put half of the people in this country on the welfare rolls, necessary for the safety of the country that he not testify on these various bills he stuck in.

No, Mr. President, if we really want to help the people of this country, do not put on them a burden of inflation so heavy that, while they think they are reaching for goodies, their backs are broken by the endeavors, the meaningless endeavors, of those who have loaded them with the purported goodies in the first place.

Let us do what we can afford to do. Let us do more than we have ever done before. Let us exceed our record in the general welfare area by doing more than has ever been done before. But let us not burden the people of this country with so heavy an inflationary load that their taxes will take away from them that with which they have been able to buy goods in the marketplace.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

The Senator from Colorado has 21 minutes remaining on the bill. The time of the Senator from Massachusetts has been consumed.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, this has been an enlivened and heated debate, if I might say so. I would like to get back on the bill if I can.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, would the Senator from Colorado yield me 1 minute?

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Washington.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I, too, want to get back on the bill. However, I could not sit here and listen to a recital of what happened on the HEW bill without standing up and saying something.

The Senator from Pennsylvania says that this administration has done a great deal more than has ever been done before in the field of health, education, and welfare.

If we had followed for the last 4 years the President's budgets in the field of health, education, and welfare, we would have been back where we started 5 years ago. So we have added to it. The Senate passed a ceiling on this bill on social services. The House would not accept it. I did not hear one word from the White House about the House of Representatives not accepting that. And that is undoubtedly, I think, what the Senator from Minnesota was talking about—health, education, part of the welfare, rehabilitation, and those things.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I could stand here all afternoon and give budget figures that were lower than the year before. Surely, these came out with little increases. The increases were added here by the Senate and voted for by most Republicans, but not by the House.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, when Mr. Nixon gets up and makes his acceptance speech, he will say piously, "I did all this for the people."

I would like to have the television cameras turned around behind the President so that they would see the papers and see what he really did. They would see that he vetoed the measure and would see all the other things that he has not been doing for the neglected people.

(This marks the end of the colloquy which occurred during the debate on the National Science Foundation Act Amendments and which by unanimous consent was ordered to be printed in the RECORD at this point.)

## INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, statements have appeared in the press in recent days to the effect that the Soviet Union "lied" to the United States, on the number of submarines which the Soviet Union had "under construction" at the time the President signed the interim agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms. Quoting from one press story, reporters were told that—

> The Soviet Union claimed to have 48 *Yankee* class submarines, while "firm intelligence" puts its strength at only 42.

The implication of this statement is that the U. S. negotiators relied on this claimed Soviet strength and thus gave the Soviet Union an artificially strong position from which to bargain, and that our representatives were deceived and unaware of the facts.

The facts are as follows:

First. Dr. Kissinger at a press conference in Moscow on May 26, had the following colloquy:

> Dr. KISSINGER . . . The base number of Soviet submarines is in dispute. It has been in dispute in our intelligence estimate exactly how much it is, though our intelligence estimates are in the range that was suggested.
>
> Question: 41 to 43?
>
> Dr. KISSINGER. I am not going to go beyond what I have said. It is in that general range. The Soviet estimate of their program is slightly more exhaustive. They, of course, have the advantage that they know what it is precisely.

Second. Dr. Kissinger at a press conference in Moscow a day later, May 27, stated in answer to a question:

> Because of the difficulty of the fact that some of the Soviet boats have 12 missiles and some have 16 missiles, the Soviet argument was that they had 48 submarines under construction with 768 missiles. Our assessment was less. The figure we adopted is 710, if you consider new missiles, and 740 if you add in the 30 of the older missiles that they have on submarines.
>
> In either event, if they want to get up to the ceiling of 950 modern submarine-launched missiles, they have to retire 30 of the old submarine-launched missiles plus 210 of the ICBMs.

(The foregoing statements are printed in the hearings of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, at pages 102 and 107.)

Third. The President and the American negotiators were fully informed that the Soviet Union claimed that 48 submarines were—deployed or—under construction. They also knew that our intelligence estimates were that the number under construction was in the range of 41 to 43 or 44.

Fourth. U.S. intelligence estimates have now firmly fixed on the figure of 42 new Soviet submarines deployed or under construction, according to our criteria as to when construction begins.

Fifth. The explanation for the confusion that arises from the difference in U.S. estimates of the number of submarines deployed or under construction and Soviet statements, is a different view as to—that one does not know at—what precise point in the assembly process one can assert that construction begins.

Sixth. I am satisfied after a full briefing that there is no evidence that the United States was deceived with respect to the number of Soviet submarines deployed or under construction at the time the interim agreement was signed by the President.

## STRATEGIC EQUALITY AND AMERICA'S SAFETY

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, in addressing ourselves to the interim agreement on strategic offensive arms signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, I believe all of my colleagues share a common central conviction: That this agreement and those which may follow are of vital importance to the future well-being of America. Because this is so, many of us now find it imperative that, in ratifying this agreement, the Senate of the United States meet its constitutional responsibility and give the advice without which our consent becomes mere acquiescence.

I have found a most revealing lesson in reviewing this country's recent approach to the limitation of strategic armaments. You might recall, for example, that in the midsixties it was widely predicted that the United States had such an imposing lead in strategic arms that the Soviet Union would not even attempt to catch up. When in subsequent years it appeared that the U.S.S.R. was, in fact, determined to do precisely that, many people predicted that Moscow sought no more than something called strategic parity, defined in terms of generally equal numbers of major intercontinental strategic systems. And now, in so short a time, we find that the Soviet Union has surpassed this Nation, not by small but by substantial margins, in numbers of ICBM's, in numbers of submarine-launched nuclear missiles, and by an enormous margin in the total throw-weight of their offensive weaponry.

This is the situation which confronts us and which must be in the forefront of our deliberations on this agreement. We must ask ourselves whether it can be a matter of indifference that the balance of strategic power has altered so sharply in this short period. And we must ask whether the Senate, as a responsible coequal branch of this Government, wishes to enshrine the existing disparity

by approving the interim agreement without additional expression of views. I believe the Senate should declare that it will exercise its solemn responsibility and state to the executive leadership—with a clarity that cannot be misunderstood by the leadership of the Soviet Union—that any final agreement negotiated on this subject must contain far greater equity. I ask the Senate to declare that this country should not, cannot and will not accept an inferior position in so vital an element of our national defense.

This is what my bipartisan, broadly cosponsored amendment says clearly and simply. I confess to wonderment that any of my Senate colleagues could be content with less. I am certain most of my colleagues agree on the necessity that we not accept in SALT II levels of intercontinental strategic weapons that are inferior to the levels of intercontinental forces permitted for the Soviet Union.

I remind you that when we entered into the SALT I discussions we were superior in numbers of intercontinental strategic weapons but were prepared to accept inevitable, equitable and—some would say—perhaps even desirable, a rough numerical equality between ourselves and the Soviet Union. At a time when our numbers were greatly in excess of theirs we saw this for what it was—a major concession from our earlier position of manifest superiority. But while we were exercising this self-imposed unilateral restraint, Soviet efforts proceeded on what can only be described as a crash basis.

In some quarters a myth has grown up that the size of forces of our potential adversary is a matter of indifference so long as we maintain some minimum level of retaliatory force. The argument is made that anything beyond this minimum is redundant, without meaning for security—mere "overkill." The fallacy of that notion hardly needs to be addressed. People and nations attach meaning to the relative strategic position of the two superpowers: We do, our allies do, and our potential adversaries do. When we had a large strategic advantage in the 1960's, we were confident that there were limits to Soviet adventuresome actions. And even when those limits were breached—as in the case of the Cuban missile crisis—our great superiority in strategic weaponry contributed to a reestablishment of a more satisfactory relationship, that is, the withdrawal of Soviet strategic offensive forces from Cuba.

Mr. President, the political impact of strategic forces is all too frequently overlooked. As a distinguished former Israeli scholar has said it is the perception of the power of the United States and the Soviets that—

will determine which superpower is likely to "blink first" in a potential confrontation crisis and which one, in anticipation of such a denouement, will be tempted to precipitate such a crisis; it will sway other states and will play a major part in shaping the global "lineup".

If we again find ourselves in a crisis confrontation, as we have in the recent past in the Middle East, would we want our President and our country to face such a crisis with manifestly inferior strategic forces? Would our own fortitude in such circumstances be as great as it was in the past? Would our allies be as confident of our determination? And most dangerous of all, would our adversaries? Such a situation is rife with temptation and opportunity for disastrous miscalculation.

Much American thinking about Soviet behavior has been distorted in recent years by the highly simplistic mechanistic "action-reaction" dialog models, spawned in the 1960's. These models, in effect, deny the significance of Soviet political aims and deny the existence of a deliberate and dynamic Soviet policy in which military power plays a vitally important role. Soviet leaders are good enough Leninists to appreciate the value of the initiative.

And a distinguished student of Soviet policy pointed out:

Militancy is so deeply entrenched in the mentality of the Soviet elite; it follows so naturally from the character of its personnel and its relationship to the population at large.

Accordingly, he observed, the Soviets understand the use of threats of blackmail:

Soviet methods of waging political warfare is the practice of making limited, piecemeal encroachments on Western positions to the accompaniment of threats entirely out of proportion to the losses the West is asked to bear.

We have learned from recent history that the opportunity to exert political pressure behind the cloak of massive military power is a technique only too well understood by the Soviet Union. Remember Czechoslovakia. Soviet military power can be used to snuff out the freedom of millions of people, by threats and blackmail, without firing a shot.

The question before us now is not whether the United States should attempt to reestablish a massive superiority in the weight of our nuclear armaments. Though our industrial base is much superior in size and sophistication to that of the Soviet Union, I and my colleagues who support my amendment are not advocating that. To the contrary we are insisting only that our nation not make it the law of the land that the United States must accept a position of inferiority. And, as I have said, far from "building up" I would hope the United States would secure a follow-on SALT agreement that would obligate the Russians to "build down."

Some people, including members of this body, have argued that to give our advice in approving this agreement is to somehow signal a lack of trust and confidence in the Soviet Union. Can we responsibly discharge our duties to the nation by reliance on an act of faith? I confess I find this a uniquely American naivete which I do not believe the Soviets reciprocate. Let me quote from testimony before our Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations by the director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University:

When the United States makes a proposal to the Soviet Union, it invariably includes in it provisions designed to make it palatable to the other party; in other words, it makes concessions in advance of actual negotiations, assuming the other party will do likewise. But where the other party is a country like the Soviet Union, without a great commercial tradition and furthermore impelled by ideology toward intransigence, this assumption does not hold. The Russian position always represents the actual expectations of the Soviet government, weighted down with additional unrealistic demands to be given up in exchange for the other side's concessions. In this sense, the Russians always enjoy an immense advantage in negotiating with a country like the United States. Any compromise works in their favor insofar as the American preliminary position already includes some concessions which need not be fought for at all.

If there are those among my colleagues in the Senate who feel some of us are overly lacking in trust of the Soviet Union then I suggest they cite their basis for adopting a less prudent approach. Is it because Soviet society is liberalizing? Andrei Amalrik, the liberal Soviet writer, would challenge this view. He maintains that not merely is the present degree of freedom in the USSR minimal compared with what is required of a developed socity, and is moreover shrinking, but that the whole concept of "liberalization" is misleading, since it implies some sort of deliberate plan to adapt the Soviet system to modern conditions. Amalrik said:

As we know there was, and there is, no such plan.

At the same time he feels that it is equally false to think of the regime making piecemeal concessions to the pressures of society.

One cannot help but be impressed with the irony that on almost the same day some few months ago the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee was attacking Radio Free Europe, while Alexander Solzhenitsyn was risking his liberty by speaking out in defense of Radio Free Europe.

Mr. President, over the last 3 years in my capacity as chairman of the SALT Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, I have endeavored to follow the course of the negotiations and the evolution of the American position. I have been dismayed at the rapidity with which we have tended to recede from sound positions related to our strategic objectives to positions dictated only by a hasty desire to accommodate Soviet recalcitrance. In some cases, the result has been the adoption of positions unrelated or even contrary to the requirements for strategic stability. I am not alone in thinking this. I know of no one in a responsible position in the administration who believes that the interim agreement, with the wide disparities in numbers and size of strategic launchers, is acceptable to the United States as a permanent and final agreement.

Mr. President, we are not a nation which has based its survival on unsupportable sociological theories about our adversaries. Nor are we a people who believe that our fate can be entrusted to someone other than ourselves. We are prepared to live in peace with all na-

tions on a basis of mutual tolerance. But this does not mean that we can abandon our military margin of safety.

For all these reasons, Mr. President, it is not in the interest of this Nation, nor is it beneficial to the future of individual liberty, that the United States accept an inferior position in any long-term agreement on strategic offensive weapons. The Senate should join with our SALT negotiators and administration spokesmen in rejecting, for the future, the sort of disparities in strategic weapons that we have agreed to, on an interim basis, in the present agreement. My amendment provides the Senate with the opportunity to declare itself in favor of strategic equality and strategic stability. I am certain that, in view of the fundamental soundness of that position, we will vote to affirm it.

## EFFORTS TO VOTE ON SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 241

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, for the past 2 weeks I have endeavored to work with the able Senate leadership in an effort to find agreement on the disposition of Senate Joint Resolution 241. I very much regret that we have failed in our efforts to bring this matter to a vote before the August recess.

From the outset I have announced repeatedly my willingness to agree to limit debate on the interim agreement, on my amendment to Senate Joint Resolution 241 and on all amendments to my amendment. I have rejected the suggestion that we ought to arrive at a piecemeal unanimous-consent agreement that would cover the disposition of some amendments while leaving the disposition of other related amendments for the indefinite future without time limitation.

Mr. President, I have been willing to accept any reasonable and fair procedure for bringing this matter to a conclusion. I was willing—and I worked with the leadership to secure agreement on this—to divide the votes on Senate Joint Resolution 241, some to take place now, before the recess, and some to take place at a time certain after the recess. I have been willing to set aside a generous amount of time for the discussion of any and all amendments. I am sorry to report that all such efforts have met with failure.

As the leadership is aware, I gave immediate approval to a limitation on debate on the ABM treaty. That was disposed of in 1 day. I believe that it would be helpful to include in the RECORD at this point excerpts from the discussion that took place on the floor on the 11th and the 14th and my statement the 16th. On those occasions I believe I that I made clear my willingness to proceed to an expeditious consideration of these matters and a timely vote.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AUGUST 11, 1972

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, during the course of the colloquy the Senator indicated he had been waiting for a week to vote, that there had been a delay in the consideration of the interim agreement, and the Senator is correct.

Now, is the Senator prepared to consider this afternoon a time certain to vote on the Senator's amendment?

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator is aware that my position on a unanimous agreement has been clear from the very beginning. It was made clear to the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD) las week. What really surprised me was that when the Senator from Washington offered an amendment, the pending business was laid aside. I made no objection to the unanimous-consent request. I made it clear that I would enter into a fair and equitable unanimous-consent agreement. I will be glad, when I complete my statement, to discuss that with the majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Well, I think we ought to discuss a few things publicly before we get to that, because we have discussed this privately, and we have reached a tentative agreement—very, very tentative—but would the Senator consider the possibility of voting at a time certain, say on Monday, on his amendment, with a time limitation of 1 hour on all other amendments after that, and with 4 hours on the bill?

Mr. JACKSON. Well, I do have to talk to some of my colleagues. I have not been able to do that with one Senator who is away and will not be back until Monday night. I can say this much: I will certainly make every effort to reach a unanimous consent agreement to vote some time in the afternoon or early evening on Monday, in any event not any later than Tuesday, and I hope it will be Monday; but I do want to have a chance to do that. I have been holding the floor most of the afternoon, and I want to talk to my colleagues in that regard. But I want to cooperate with the majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I appreciate the Senator's cooperation. I would be prepared to give the Senator to whom the Senator from Washington refers a live pair if the one vote did not make a difference in the result of the tally.

Could the Senator meet with his colleagues sometime this afternoon and, for the benefit of the Senate, perhaps make a proposal which would be agreeable to both sides?

Mr. JACKSON. I will certainly try, and I will do everything I can. I told the Senator right along I would, and I told the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD), as the majority leader knows, at the very beginning, I was the one who agreed immediately to a unanimous-consent agreement on the ABM treaty that we worked out. In indicated that as soon as I had some idea when the Interim Agreement was going to come up—and I, of course, had no way of knowing when it was going to come up, after it had been set aside each day—that I would agree to a fair unanimous-consent arrangement after consultation with other Senators who might or might not be out of town.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator.

Mr. JACKSON. Again I want to reiterate that I shall do everything I can achieve that objective.

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AUGUST 14, 1972

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, let us keep the record straight, and I hope the majority leader will note this:

The Senator from Arkansas has said that I am trying to delay this matter. I think the record will disclose that the Senator from Washington has agreed to a time limitation provided that all amendments are included in that limitation. Am I correct? I ask the majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, if the Senator will yield.

Mr. JACKSON. I do not want to be accused of delaying this matter, because the record is to the contrary.

Mr. MANSFIELD. We did reach a tentative agreement yesterday in the minority leader's office, at a meeting attended by the distinguished Senator from Washington, and the agreement was to vote on the pending amendment at 4 o'clock today, to be followed by a vote on the Brooke amendment at 6 o'clock at which time the amendment of the Senator from Washington would be laid before the Senate.

I say the agreement was tentative. Then there was another meeting at which it was pointed out that it was only an open ended agreement, and it was thought that all amendments should be considered on a limited time basis.

I endeavored with might and main to reach an agreement on that basis, with the consent of the distinguished Senator from Washington, but my efforts met with failure.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, the record will disclose that I have indicated I am willing to reach a unanimous-consent agreement on the bill and on all amendments thereto, under appropriate arrangements. That is my position.

I say to the majority leader that I am not trying to hold up action on his amendment. I am just continuing where I left off. As Senators will recall, I did not finish my formal statement on Friday. I have no desire to delay, but two or three Senators indicated they had amendments to my amendment—and one of them is a member of the Senator's committee—perfecting amendments from the floor.

I just want the record clear here. The facts are that on the ABM treaty debate I joined in advance to the unanimous-consent agreement to vote at a time certain. It was all worked out with the assistant majority leader. I assured them of the same course of action, in connection with the pending agreement. But let us keep the record straight. When the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations talks about the Senator from Washington delaying the measure, I think he should state all the facts.

So I shall undertake to do this in a proper way; and I am ready and willing for a unanimous-consent agreement to be entered into under the proper terms, so that we can limit debate. The majority leader understands that, and I stand by my word. I regret that the Senator from Arkansas would deny this arrangement and an effort to reach an accommodation to move along; but if he wants to do it, that is his right.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator has shown himself to be most cooperative. I wonder whether he would consider another possibility, and that is that the vote on the pending amendment, by itself, occur at a time certain.

Mr. JACKSON. Certainly.

Mr. MANSFIELD. What time?

Mr. JACKSON. Four o'clock?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Fine.

Mr. ALLEN. Reserving the right to object. Mr. President——

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, with the right of the Senator from Washington to retain the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLEN). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if I may have the attention of the distinguished Senator from Washintgon, he may recall that earlier today I suggested that it might be possible to have a vote on the pending amendment. And he indicated that there was a possibility. Could I ask if there is any pos-

sibility that the pending amendment could be voted on this afternoon?

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I personally have no objections. However, others want all the amendments on a unanimous-consent agreement brought together as close as possible in one day. So I would have to object.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON, AUGUST 16

It will be two weeks tomorrow since I introduced my amendment calling for U.S.-Soviet equality in a SALT II treaty limiting offensive nuclear weapons. Two weeks ago both the ABM treaty and the Interim Agreement signed in Moscow were brought before the Senate. I voted to ratify the ABM treaty which provides for U.S.-Soviet equality.

The time has come for opponents of my bipartisan amendment to end their continuing oblique attacks on the principle of equality in SALT II by permitting the Senate to vote its approval of the Interim Agreement along with the advice of the Senate that we must insist upon equality in the future.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I very much hope that those of my colleagues who oppose the advice that I should like the Senate to give along with its consent to the interim agreement, would nevertheless agree to a time certain for a vote on final passage following the forthcoming recess. I will make every effort to accommodate a fair and equitable arrangement that will give the President the approval he needs and the advice I believe the Senate will vote to offer.

## ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GRANT-KOHRS RANCH NATIONAL HISTORIC SITE, MONT.

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on S. 2166.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BEALL) laid before the Senate the amendment of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 2166) to authorize the establishment of the Grant-Kohrs Ranch National Historic Site in the State of Montana, and for other purposes", which was to strike out all after the enacting clause, and insert:

That, in order to provide an understanding of the frontier cattle era of the Nation's history, to preserve the Grant-Kohrs Ranch, and to interpret the nationally significant values thereof for the benefit and inspiration of present and future generations, the Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter referred to the as "Secretary") is hereby authorized to designate not more than two thousand acres in Deer Lodge Valley, Powell County, Montana, for establishment as the Grant-Kohrs Ranch National Historic Site.

SEC. 2. Within the area designated pursuant to section 1 of this Act, the Secretary is authorized to acquire lands and interests in lands, together with buildings and improvements thereon, by donation, purchase or exchange. The Secretary shall establish the Grant-Kohrs Ranch National Historic Site by publication of a notice to that effect in the Federal Register at such time as he deems sufficient lands and interests in lands have been acquired for administration in accordance with the purposes of this Act.

SEC. 3. Pending such establishment and thereafter, the Secretary shall administer lands and interests in lands acquired for the Grant-Kohrs Ranch National Historic Site in accordance with the Act of August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535; 16 U.S.C. 1, 2-4), as amended and supplemented, and the Act of August 21, 1935 (49 Stat. 666; 16 U.S.C. 461 et seq.), as amended.

SEC. 4. There are authorized to be appropriated $350,000 for land acquisition and not to exceed $1,800,000 (July 1971 prices) for development plus or minus such amounts, if any, as may be justified by reason of ordinary fluctuation in construction costs as indicated by engineering cost indices applicable to the type of construction involved herein.

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, the amendments of the House to S. 2166, to authorize the establishment of the Grant-Kohrs Ranch National Historic Site in the State of Montana, are technical in nature and do not change in any way the substance of the bill as passed by the Senate.

Therefore, Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendments of the House of Representatives to S. 2166.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Nevada.

The motion was agreed to.

## ENROLLED BILL PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that today, August 17, 1972, he presented to the President of the United States the enrolled bill (S. 3824) to authorize appropriations for the fiscal year 1973 for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and for making grants for construction of noncommercial educational television or radio broadcasting facilities.

## ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT TO 10 A.M.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today it stand in adjournment until 10 a.m., tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## RURAL DEVELOPMENT ACT, 1972—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on H.R. 12931, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BEALL). The report will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 12931) to provide for improving the economy and living conditions in rural America, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses this report, signed by a majority of the conferees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the consideration of the conference report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report.

(The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of June 4, 1972, at pages H5643–H15650.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following staff members of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry have the privilege of the floor during the consideration of the conference report: Mike McLeod, John A. Baker, Forest Reece, and James E. Thornton.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I yield to my colleague, the ranking minority member of the committee, the distinguished Senator from Iowa.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. MILLER. Do I understand correctly that there is a 30-minute time limitation on the conference report?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct—15 minutes to a side.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I do not recall any bill providing for rural areas development ever considered by the Senate that received longer and closer attention than the bill now before the Senate.

The Senate will recall that in the Agricultural Act of 1970, we adopted in title IX a strong, forthright statement of national policy of balanced national growth giving highest priority to rural community development.

Section 901(a) of that act stated:

The Congress commits itself to a sound balance between rural and urban America. The Congress considers this balance so essention to the peace, prosperity, and welfare of all our citizens that the highest priority must be given to the revitalization and development of rural areas.

To help implement that policy, the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry established a standing Subcommittee on Rural Development. This subcommittee, under the leadership of the junior Senator from Minnesota, joined by a bipartisan group of dedicated Senators, held seven separate field hearings in various parts of rural America.

In addition, the subcommittee held a total of 10 days of hearings in Washington. At these hearings, testimony was received from a broad range of witnesses—Cabinet members and farmers, conservationists and developers, educators and bankers, State Governors and individual citizens, economists and architects, area development specialists and electric power experts, young and old—a total of 350 individual witnesses. Also, the subcommittee received a great deal of information and statistics which were printed in the hearing record.

Following these hearings, the Rural Development Subcommittee met in executive sessions and reported to our full committee two separate bills to improve rural conditions. The full committee then held nine executive sessions over the period from November 2, 1970, to March 21, 1972, to consider the two subcommittee bills and a variety of other rural development bills that had been introduced by many Senators and referred to other subcommittees. From all

## ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF AN AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 1391

At the request of Mr. SAXBE for Mr. SCHWEIKER, the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Delaware (Mr. BOGGS), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), the Senator from Nevada (Mr. BIBLE), the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK) and the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF) were added as cosponsors of amendment No. 1391 intended to be proposed to the bill (S. 3755) to amend the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970.

## ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

## HAM RADIO OPERATORS PERFORM A SERVICE

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, February 26, 1972, will be a date long remembered by West Virginians. At 8 a.m., a slag dam gave way at the head of Buffalo Creek in Logan County. Torrents of water swept over the narrow valley, leaving total devastation in the flood's wake. I viewed the damaged area, and I can personally attest to the overwhelming chaos and destruction wrought by the savage waters.

Out of the ruins of disaster often come tales of heroic actions performed by individuals who act in response to human need, with little thought to personal comfort and safety. I want to acknowledge a group of such individuals today: A group of ham radio operators, led by Mr. Willie Flannery, of Mallory, W. Va.

Minutes after the flood, Mr. Flannery alerted a number of West Virginia hams to the disaster, giving what proved to be an amazingly accurate estimate of the scope of the damage. An emergency net frequency was quickly chosen. Stations were set up in key areas to coordinate the activities of the various relief organizations through instant radio communication, answer the hundreds of frantic requests from concerned relatives, and make arrangements for the disposal of food and supplies, which poured in.

Many of the ham participants sacrificed vacation time or took leave from jobs to give round-the-clock service in this crucial emergency. One ham drove from Chillicothe, Ohio, in response to a request for a radio-equipped jeep. With the aid of another ham, he set up and operated the Lorado station for the first 3 days.

There were at least 4,000 amateur radio stations in the Eastern United States which aided in transmitting emergency information. Relief groups, such as the Salvation Army and the Red Cross, were able to use the radios to transmit vital information about medical emergencies, needed medical supplies, emergency rations, and sources of food and clothing.

In these impersonal times, it is reassuring to know that there remain people all over America who respond to emergencies in the manner of these ham radio operators. In behalf of all of the people of West Virginia, I want to say a heartfelt, grateful "Thank you."

## SENATOR ALLEN J. ELLENDER IN MEMORIAM

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, Time, in this great building, is often an elusive intangible, frequently an abhorred catalyst. We get caught in the "rat race," losing perspective. Or we see only the annals of history before us, guiding our lives. When a great Senator falls, however, we are forced to view this man's life, now completed, and understand, with great humility, the impact he has had on us all.

Much has already been said about Senator Ellender. He was the Dean of the Senate, the President pro tempore, the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, and the former chairman of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

Great eulogies have expounded the thrust of this man's intelligence, personal charm, wisdom, and influence on agriculture.

I feel, that just as important, Senator Ellender should be remembered by future generations by the insight gained from his travels.

He visited the Soviet Union five times. He was a leader in realizing that Russia was not a deadly menace to us after all. Senator Ellender should be known as an innovator in thought and practice, a man of insight and commonsense.

Senator Ellender will not be soon forgotten, by the Nation, my own State of Ohio, the Senate, and myself. I consider it a privilege to have served in the same Congress as the late Senator Allen J. Ellender. He was a great person and a great Senator.

## DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE RESOLVE SAM–D CONFLICT WITH SALT

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, on June 26, 1972, I wrote Secretary of Defense Laird and Secretary of State Rogers to express my concern regarding the compatibility of the Army's SAM–D system with the terms of the SALT Treaty on ABM's.

I noted in my letters that several Pentagon witnesses had told Congress in recent years that SAM–D would have a capability, not only against enemy aircraft, but against enemy ballistic missiles as well. I queried whether such a capability would bring SAM–D within the definition of an ABM system in article II(1) of the treaty or within the article VI prohibition against the testing of nonABM systems in an ABM mode. The answer, I pointed out, was not clear on the face of the treaty, since that document fails to address the question directly. I therefore called upon the administration to either demonstrate SAM–D's compatibility with the treaty or to cancel the system along with prohibited parts of the Safeguard ABM system.

Both the Defense and State Departments have now replied to my letters. Both take the position that development and deployment of SAM–D would not violate the ABM Treaty.

The key to their argument is the distinction which they draw between strategic and tactical ballistic missiles. The ABM Treaty, they point out quite correctly, applies only to systems designed to counter strategic ballistic missiles. They argue that SAM–D, on the other hand, is being designed to provide defense only against tactical ballistic missiles.

And the category into which a given missile falls, they suggest, depends on the velocity and trajectory altitude of its reentry vehicles. Only if a missile's reentry vehicles have a maximum velocity exceeding two kilometers per second or a maximum altitude exceeding 40 kilometers is it to be regarded as a strategic ballistic missile.

It is highly important that this distinction has now been placed on the public record. The ABM Treaty itself fails to spell out what dividing line between the two classes of missiles the two parties had in mind during the course of their negotiations. At least the U.S. view on this matter is now clear. This in itself should serve to clarify potential issues when SALT II negotiations begin this fall. And since present design specifications for SAM–D do not call for it to intercept strategic ballistic missiles as here defined, continued development of SAM–D as those negotiations continue would be compatible with U.S. interpretation of the ABM accord.

This does not mean, however, that we should cease to be concerned about SAM–D's potential ABM capabilities or that these potential capabilities would not become an issue during SALT II negotiations. During SALT I negotiations, U.S. representatives repeatedly voiced their concern about a possible Soviet upgrading of their Talinn air defense system into a nationwide ABM network. SAM–D would be much more sophisticated than the Talinn system and considerably more susceptible to upgrading. Given our own concern about Talinn, we should not be surprised if Soviet negotiators become increasingly concerned about SAM–D if that system's development proceeds along the path toward deployment.

Nor should we be oblivious to the fact that SAM–D deployment, or any changes either in SAM–D design characteristics or the present U.S. distinction between strategic and tactical ballistic missiles, might reawaken many of the dangers laid to rest by the recent ABM accords.

There are other reasons, too, why a U.S. option to deploy SAM–D should not be construed as a U.S. obligation to deploy the system. Its projected costs have more than doubled in the past 3 years, to the point where it is expected to be every bit as expensive as the C–5A and F–14 programs and much more costly than a possible National Command Authority ABM site. And these increased projected costs of recent years have been accompanied by lingering doubts regarding the system's military efficacy. Its field army air defense role in Europe might be served quite well by other existing and projected weapons, such as the Redeye, Vulcan-Chapparal, and improved Hawk family of Army SAM missiles and the new F–15 fighter. Perhaps some supplement to

pects of the biomedical sciences, are set forth in an article which I and my legislative assistant, Mel Levine, wrote and which was published in the August 5, 1972, edition of the Saturday Review of Science.

In reviewing both the technical and the ethical aspects of this general area, it has become evident to me that the public knows very little about these new technologies—or, indeed, about the social impact of the biomedical sciences in general. At the same time, the scientific community has not focused nearly enough of its time and attention upon the social and ethical implications of the research it is pursuing in a number of complicated and important areas.

Accordingly I believe that it is imperative for the Federal Government to begin to make it easier for the rest of society to understand the powerful and important implications of the biomedical sciences.

This effort could be pursued in a variety of ways. I believe that a number of approaches are important. I have set forth some of them in my article in the Saturday Review and I shall have more to say about those at a later date.

But I do believe that a simple and effective way to begin to achieve this technological assessment is through the bill I have just introduced, or, in amending section 301 of the Public Health Service Act, we reach research funds which are administered by the Food and Drug Administration—see page 383 of the fiscal year 1973 budget; the Health Services and Mental Health Administration—see page 388 of the fiscal year 1973 budget; the National Cancer Institute—see page 413 of the fiscal year 1973 budget; the National Heart and Lung Institute—see page 414 of the fiscal year 1973 budget; the National Institute of Dental Research—see page 415 of the fiscal year 1973 budget; the National Institute of Arthritis and Metabolic Diseases—see page 416 of the fiscal year 1973 budget; the National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke—see page 417 of the fiscal year 1973 budget; the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases—see page 418 of the fiscal year 1973 budget; the National Institute of General Medical Sciences—see page 419 of the fiscal year 1973 budget; the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development—see page 419 of the fiscal year 1973 budget; the National Eye Institute—see page 421 of the fiscal year 1973 budget; the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences—see page 422 of the fiscal year 1973 budget; the Research Resources program—see page 423 of the fiscal year 1973 budget; the appropriations for Health Manpower—see page 424 of the fiscal year 1973 budget; National Library of Medicine—see page 427 of the fiscal year 1973 budget; and General Research Support Grants—see page 433 of the fiscal year 1973 budget.

It is important to effect as broad as a biomedical base as possible, to require that as many research projects as possible in the biomedical sciences consider the social implications of that research. For, to the extent that the public and the Congress understand the biomedical sciences, we will be able better to evaluate their importance. To the extent that we understand in advance what social and ethical questions are raised by these sciences, we will be better prepared for the developments that follow.

The agencies which I have just mentioned carry out the major biomedical research programs within the Federal Government. Therefore, I believe that this change in section 301 of the Public Health Service Act will effectively begin to focus on the important biomedical programs which involve Federal funds.

I think it is imperative at this point to make it abundantly clear that by no means am I suggesting any controls whatever on science or on scientific research. To the contrary, I believe that, if the public does not understand well in advance the social implications involved in this research, such controls might be more likely to occur at a later date. For an uniformed public is more likely to react to scientific breakthroughs out of fear and skepticism, while an informed citizenary will better understand the positive value of biomedical research and technology.

I understand the problems that are involved in any ethical, moral—that is, subjective—evaluation. I do not mean to suggest by this legislation that objective answers are possible in this area. It will be impossible to quantify this social analysis.

Nevertheless, the analysis is urgent—and it must be conducted both by scientists and nonscientists. For, if we do not understand the possibilities inherent in the biomedical sciences, we will be less likely to approach these issues through reasoned analysis. If their dramatic potential astounds the lay—nonscientific—community rather than inspires it, that community will be less likely to welcome such new developments. Accordingly it is imperative that we all understand the social implications of the biomedical sciences.

This closer relationship between the biomedical sciences and the rest of society must begin at once. I hope, therefore, that this bill will receive the immediate attention it deserves. Though it is short in length, I believe very deeply that it is long in merit. I hope that it will be considered carefully and promptly.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 3894

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That section 301 of the Public Health Service Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(j) apply one quarter of one per centum of amounts provided for grants for research or research training projects for any fiscal year as are recommended under subsection (d) of this section, toward research into the possible social consequences of biomedical technologies."

## ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF A BILL

S. 3644

At the request of Mr. HUGHES, the Senator from California (Mr. TUNNEY), the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) were added as cosponsors of S. 3644, a bill to amend the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act, and other related acts, to concentrate the resources of the Nation against the problem of alcohol abuse and alcoholism.

## SENATE RESOLUTION 347—ORIGINAL RESOLUTION REPORTED PROVIDING ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

(Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.)

Mr. ERVIN, from the Committee on Government Operations, reported the following resolution:

*Resolved,* That Section 4, S. Res. 258, Ninety-second Congress, second session, agreed to March 17, 1972, is amended by striking out the amount "$830,000" on page 2, line 22, and inserting in lieu thereof the amount "$929,210."

## NATIONAL NO-FAULT MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE ACT—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 1417

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. SPONG submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 945) to regulate interstate commerce and to provide for the general welfare by requiring certain insurance as a condition precedent to using the public streets, roads, and highways in order to have an efficient system of motor vehicle insurance which will be uniform among the States, which will guarantee the continued availability of such insurance, and the presentation of meaningful price information, and which will provide sufficient, fair, and prompt payment for rehabilitation and losses due to injury and death arising out of the operation and use of motor vehicles within the channels of interstate commerce and otherwise affecting such commerce.

AMENDMENTS NOS. 1420 AND 1421

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on table.)

Mr. EAGLETON submitted two amendments intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 945), supra.

## HANDGUN CONTROL ACT OF 1972—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 1419

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. STEVENS submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 2507) to amend the Gun Control Act of 1968.

these weapons might be needed for defense in depth of the field army. But proliferated smaller SAM systems might be more reliable under combat conditions and also more survivable. Finally, SAM-D's bomber defense role in CONUS remains exceedingly dubious, for the simple reason that any defense of our population against a bomber threat is suspect once defense against missiles has been foreclosed.

The Senate Armed Services Committee has promised to conduct in-depth hearings on SAM-D's military capabilities in the next year. I hope that these hearings will be of the same depth and quality as its recent hearings on the Close Air Support and F-14 issues, and that the recommendation emerging from the hearings will not be predetermined by the fact that SAM-D is technically in compliance with the recent ABM Treaty as interpreted by the United States.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD my June 26 letter on SAM-D to Secretary of Defense Laird, the reply of the Defense Department, and the reply of the State Department to a similar letter.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JUNE 26, 1972.

Hon. MELVIN R. LAIRD,
*Secretary, Department of Defense,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MEL: One purpose of the recently concluded ABM Treaty with the Soviet Union was to place clear restrictions not only on ABM systems as commonly understood, but also on other systems, such as air defense systems, which could be made to perform an ABM role. On several occasions during the past few years, Administration spokesmen have expressed concern that the Soviets' Talina Line air defense system might be upgraded for just such a role.

My purpose in writing today is to inquire as to the compatability of a new United States air defense system—the Army's SAM-D program—with the terms of the recently concluded treaty.

Several Defense Department witnesses have told Congress in recent years that SAM-D will have some capability not only against aircraft, but also against tactical and strategic ballistic missiles. The following are two examples of the testimony in this regard which has appeared on the public record:

(1) "SAM-D would be capable of defeating tactical ballistic missiles with ranges less than (deleted), air to surface missiles, and sub-launched cruise missiles. This system represents a radically new approach to . . . air defense. The application of the latest advances in miniaturized electronic circuitry, computer technology, radio data link techniques, and the phased array radar concept will give the system a mobility and multimission capability never before achieved in an air defense system." Lt. Gen. A. W. Batts, Army Chief of Research and Development, to the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 5, 1970.

(2) Question: "What capability will the SAM-D have against a CONUS SLBM and ICBM threat?"

Answer: "Based on the results of studies completed to date, the SAM-D system used as a defense against strategic ballistic missiles (even if SAM-D is modified) would be critically senstitive to variations in a number of threat perameters. To obtain a capability against a reasonabl range of possible threat characteristics would probably require SAM-D to be supported by the SAFEGUARD Missile Site Radars. Therefore, SAM-D may be useful as a possible future augmentation to SAFEGUARD should the need arise, but it does not appear by itself to provide a viable defense system."

Question by Senator John C. Stennis and reply by Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Dr. John B. Foster, Jr., before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Februray 26, 1970.

In light of these acknowledged capabilities, it appears to me that continued developments, testing, or deployment of SAM-D could violate the ABM Treaty. Here are the reasons why.

First, Article II(1) of the Treaty defines an ABM system as any "system to counter strategic ballistic missiles" which includes interceptor missiles or radars "constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or a type tested in an ABM mode."

It would seem to me that a system with any capability against strategic ballistic missiles, however limited, would be covered by this definition. And if SAM-D is an ABM system within the meaning of the Treaty, several things follow.

Its deployment in a nation-wide bomber defense network would be a violation of Article I(2)'s prohibition against the deployment of, or laying a base for, a nation-wide ABM system.

Its further development, testing, or deployment would be in violation of Article V(1)'s prohibition against mobile land-based ABM systems.

And its deployment in defense of NATO would be a violation of Article IX's prohibition against the transfer to other countries or the deployment outside the United States of ABM systems or their components.

Second, even if SAM-D is not covered by Article II(I)'s definition of an ABM system, it would appear covered by Article VI of the Treaty. Under Article VI, the United States undertakes not to give non-ABM interceptor missiles or radars any ABM capabilities and not to test such missiles or radars in an ABM mode.

It would appear that this provision—the language of which closely parallels that of Article II(I)—was included in the Treaty specifically to forestall arguments that a system like SAM-D was not a true ABM system. This impression is strengthened by Secretary Rogers' statement in the State Department's interpretation of the Treaty submitted to the President on June 10, 1972, that this undertaking "would, for example, prohibit the modification of air defense missiles (SAMS) to give them a capability against strategic ballistic missiles."

Finally, it appears that deployment of SAM-D and its phased-array radar in Europe might violate Article VI's prohibition against the deployment of radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack anywhere but on the borders of one's own nation.

It is difficult to believe that SAM-D and its limited capabilities against ballistic missiles were not specifically considered by both sides during the recent SALT negotiations. If SAM-D was considered, however, and a decision made to permit its deployment, this is not made clear anywhere in the Treaty or its supporting documents.

I have tried nonetheless to anticipate the arguments which might be made in support of a contention that SAM-D was not covered by the Treaty. Unfortunately, I find such arguments quite unpersuasive.

It might be argued, for example, that while SAM-D has a capability against ballistic missiles, its capability is against tactical ballistic missiles only and does not extend to strategic ballistic missiles as the latter term is used in the Treaty's Article II(I) definition of an ABM system.

But no definition of a strategic ballistic missile is actually given in the ABM Treaty itself, and it is difficult to believe that anyone would subscribe to a definition which excluded the CONUS SLBM and ICBM threat against which, according to Dr. Foster, SAM-D would have at least a limited capability.

Moreover, the United States has made the unilateral statement that the phrase "tested in an ABM mode" covers the situation when "an interceptor missile is flight tested against a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory." It seems arguable to me that the flight trajectories of "tactical" and "strategic" ballistic missiles are sufficiently alike in their characteristics as to be covered by this statement.

Turning to another point, one might argue that agreed understanding D is, in any event, sufficent evidence that SAM-D's deployment in Europe would not violate Article VI's prohibition against the deployment of radars for early warning attack outside one's own borders.

Agreed Understanding D *does* constitute a commitment that the Parties will not deploy phased-array radars having a potential exceedng "three million watts" except under certain conditions. It is also true that SAM-D's phased-array radar does have a potential well within that limit. But Agreed Understanding D does not specifically state that all phased-array radars within that limit are automatically in compliance with the early warning limitation of Article VI.

I believe it is important to clarify the question of SAM-D's compatibility with the ABM Treaty prior to congressional ratification. A failure to do so could spark controversy later and complicate the second round of the SALT negotiations.

Accordingly, I would appreciate it if you would address yourself to the issues raised by this letter, with particular attention to the following questions:

(1) Does SAM-D's capability against ballistic missiles bring it within the scope either of Article II(1)'s definition of an ABM system or provsion (A) of Article VI, as interpreted by the United States?

(2) If SAM-D is within the scope of Article II(1) or provision (A) of Article VI as interpreted by the United States, have any plans been made for termination of the program, and if not, why not?

(3) Would it be feasible to develop SAM-D in such a way that its capability against ballistic missiles was deleted? If so, what consideration is being given to this approach, and what are the arguments against it?

(4) If SAM-D's capability against ballistic missiles does not bring it within the scope of Article II(1) or provision (A) of Article VI as interpreted by the United States, what is the reasoning by which this conclusion is reached?

(5) As interpreted by the United States, what is the meaning of the term "strategic ballistic missiles" as used in Article II(1), and if the term is meant to exclude "tactical" ballistic missiles, which of the following classes of Soviet missiles is, in fact, excluded—SRBMs? MRBMs? IRBMs? ICBMs? SLBMs? Is it true that SAM-D would have no capability whatsoever to intercept "strategic ballistic missiles" as so defined?

(6) What is the meaning of the phrase "flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory" as used in the unilateral statement of the United States as to the meaning of the phrase "tested in an ABM mode?"

(7) Would deployment of SAM-D in Europe violate Article VI's prohibition against deployment of radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack outside national boundaries, as interpreted by the United States? Why or why not?

(8) Was SAM-D specifically discussed during negotiating sessions with the Soviets? What certainty do we have that the Soviets'

interpreattion of its compatibility with the ABM Treaty is identical to ours?

I apologize for the length of this letter and the detailed nature of the questions raised. I think it important, however, that considerable additional light be shed on this very complex subject. I would very much appreciate a reply to my questions prior to the start of Senate floor debate on the ABM Treaty.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government.*

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THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING,
*Washington, D.C., July 24, 1972.*

Hon. WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government, Joint Economic Committee. Congress of the United States, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have been asked to answer your letter of June 26, 1972, concerning the relationship of SAM–D and SALT. As you are well aware, DoD has been concerned about the use of SAM's in an ABM mode for a considerable period of time. The DoD efforts in this regard have been focused on the potential degradation of the U.S. deterrent if the Soviets upgraded their extensive SAM deployments to defend urban areas.

Based on this concern, substantial analysis within DoD has been directed at understanding the interrelationship among SAM equipment limitations, the technical limitations on upgrading SAM's, and the effectiveness of various offense responses to counter upgraded SAM's. During the negotiation of the ABM Treaty, both sides were well aware of SAM–D, and the Treaty does not preclude this system. However, the Treaty precludes testing such systems as SAM–D in an ABM mode and we will not do so.

The answers to your specific questions are provided in the attachment. If I can be of further assistance in this matter, please let me know.

Sincerely,

LEONARD SULLIVAN, Jr.
(For John S. Foster, Jr.).

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QUESTIONS OF CHAIRMAN PROXMIRE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON PRIORITIES AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE WITH ANSWERS. SUBJECT: SAM–D SALT RELATIONSHIP

(1) Does SAM–D's capability against ballistic missiles bring it within the scope either of Article II(1)'s definition of an ABM system or provision (A) of Article VI, as interpreted by the United States?

The SAM–D program is not in conflict with either Article II(1) or Article VI(a) of the ABM Treaty.

(2) If SAM–D is within the scope of Article II(1) or provision (A) of Article VI as interpreted by the United States, have any plans been made for termination of the program and, if not, why not?

As stated in (1) above, the SAM–D program is not in conflict with either of these provisions, and thus does not need to be terminated.

(3) Would it be feasible to develop SAM–D in such a way that its capability against ballistic missiles was deleted? If so, what consideration is being given to this approach, and what are the arguments against it?

If the SAM–D program were redirected so that the system had *no* capability against any ballistic missile, even short range tactical ballistic missiles, the system would not be operationally effective in an air defense role. This is true primarily because there is an overlap in the attack characteristics between tactical ballistic missiles, aircraft, and aircraft-launched air-to-ground missiles. Thus, deletion of a capability against all ballistic missiles would deny a capability against aircraft and aircraft-launched missiles. There is, however, a distinct separation in attack characteristics between the above class of threats and long range strategic ballistic missiles. No consideration is being given to reducing SAM–D performance capabilities.

(4) If SAM–D's capability against ballistic missiles does not bring it within the scope of Article II(1) or provision (A) of Article VI as interpreted by the United States, what is the reasoning by which this conclusion is reached?

Simply stated, SAM–D is not in conflict with Articles II(1) or Article VI(a) for the following reasons:

SAM–D is being designed and developed as an Air Defense system, not as an ABM system to counter *strategic* ballistic missiles.

SAM–D will not be tested in an ABM mode.

(5) As interpreted by the United States, what is the meaning of the term "strategic ballistic missiles" as used in Article II(1), and if the term is meant to exclude "tactical" ballistic missiles, which of the following classes of Soviet missiles are, in fact, excluded—SRBMs? MRBMs? IRBMs? ICBMs? SLBMs? Is it true that SAM–D would have no capability whatsoever to intercept "strategic ballistic missiles" as so defined?

The term "strategic ballistic missiles" is meant to exclude "tactical" ballistic missiles. The distinction between these two classes of missiles results from the different flight characteristics of the re-entry vehicle, e.g., velocity, which is related to the range of the missile, and trajectory altitude. A strategic ballistic missile operated at or near maximum range reaches an altitude well above the atmosphere and a peak flight velocity of about four to seven kilometers per second. By comparison, other ballistic missiles operate at lower velocities and altitudes which are in or near the aircraft regime.

The SAM–D system does not have the capacity to intercept strategic ballistic missiles and will not be tested in an ABM mode. SAM–D, therefore, will not have the operational capability to intercept strategic ballistic missiles in flight trajectory.

(6) What is the meaning of the phrase "flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory" as used in the unilateral statement of the United States as to the meaning of the phrase "tested in an ABM mode"?

As stated in my testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on June 13, 1972, this phrase means, in my view, a flight trajectory with a maximum velocity exceeding two kilometers per second, or a maximum altitude exceeding 40 kilometers.

(7) Would deployment of SAM–D in Europe violate Article VI's prohibition against deployment of radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack outside national boundaries, as interpreted by the United States? Why or why not?

SAM–D is neither an ABM system, nor is its radar a system to provide early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack and, therefore, its deployment is not restricted by Article VI.

(8) Was SAM–D specifically discussed during negotiating sessions with the Soviets? What certainty do we have that the Soviets interpretation of its compatibility with the ABM Treaty is identical to ours?

SAM–D was not discussed with the Soviets. The ABM Treaty places no limits on air defense systems per se. However, certain collateral constraints have been placed on air-defense systems as an extension of the limits placed on ABM systems. These include limits on power aperture product of phased-array radars and the obligation not to give air defense systems an ABM capability or to test air defense systems in an ABM role.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
*Washington, D.C., July 31, 1972.*

Hon. WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Secretary has asked me to respond to your inquiry as to the compatibility of a new United States air defense system—the Army's SAM–D program—with the terms of the recently concluded ABM Treaty. I understand that a similar inquiry has been sent to Secretary of Defense Laird and that the Defense Department is answering your technical questions.

SAM–D is an advanced surface-to-air missile system, which is in early engineering development. The primary mission of SAM–D is air defense of the field army against high-flying supersonic enemy aircraft and air-launched missiles.

The ABM Treaty does prohibit the testing of SAM–D in an ABM mode, and the development and deployment of SAMXD as an ABM system. The U.S. has no intention either to test or to deploy SAM–D in an ABM mode. The ABM treaty does not preclude continuing development or deployment of SAM systems.

I hope the above information will be helpful to you and the Committee.

Sincerely,

DAVID M. ABSHIRE,
*Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.*

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## ST. LOUIS NATIONAL STOCKYARD

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the July 1–2 issue of the St. Louis Globe-Democrat contains a most interesting article on the National Stockyards in St. Louis for contrast with the Chicago Stockyards that have only a past. The future of the National Stockyards looks bright in serving the whole middle or heart of America.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE NATION'S RED MEAT CAPITAL—ST. LOUIS NATIONAL STOCKYARDS IS BOOMING SINCE BEEF CATTLE OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN SNOWBALLING IN MISSOURI'S OZARK COUNTIES

(By James Floyd)

The men wear boots, straw stetsons and the weathered look that comes from too much sun and wind. They eye the feeder cattle driven into the arena and make their bids with almost imperceptible nods of the head or flicks of the hand.

"Forty, forty, forty . . . I got forty," auctioneer Col. Bill Serman singsongs.

Sherman punctuates his rapid-fire auctioneering with raps from the rubber hose he uses for a gavel until the lot of five, six, seven or eight feeder cattle are sold.

The cattle are then headed out to Missouri, Illinois and Iowa feeder lots. They will be back at St. Louis National Stockyards within a year for sale as fat cattle.

The feeder auction is a colorful small part of the action at the massive 99-year-old National Stockyards.

The stockyards are the hub of an important area industry, an incorporated town with its own police and fire department, a place where you can get a steak and a great Bloody Mary at the plush Stockyards Inn while you buy and sell cattle, hogs and sheep.

"We're just starting to take wing," Cap Smith, public relations director of National Stockyards, said, "We're going to expand tremendously."

Salt

# Senate

THURSDAY, AUGUST 3, 1972

The Senate met at 10 a.m. and was called to order by the President pro tempore (Mr. EASTLAND).

PRAYER

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, Creator and Lord of Life, who hast made the heart of man a temple for Thy spirit, in this quiet pause open our hearts that we may be receptive to the divine entrance. May there come upon us the hush of solemn thoughts, a new awareness of Thy presence, a more fervent love of Thy ways, a more resolute determination to do Thy will. May the busy pace of daily duty never deprive us of the knowledge of Thy constant grace and goodness and Thy guiding light.

Preserve us from all that is base or mean or unworthy. May integrity of character and fidelity to high trusts be the cardinal and crowning glory of our lives. Nourished by Thy spirit and filled with Thy grace may we be good workmen for Thee, for this Nation, and for the world. And when evening comes breathe through the things that are seen the peace of the unseen and eternal.

We pray in the Redeemer's name. Amen.

## THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Wednesday, August 2, 1972, be dispensed with.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, the Armed Services Committee, the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, and the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I yield back my time.

## ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the distinguished Senator from Virginia (Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.) is now recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

## THE SALT AGREEMENTS

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, the Senate Armed Services Committee, of which I am a member, has concluded hearings concerning President Nixon's two agreements with the Soviet Union for the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons.

On July 20, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee completed deliberations on these same agreements and approved them without a dissenting vote.

Two separate documents were submitted to Congress by the President: a permanent treaty governing defensive—ABM—systems; and an interim agreement, governing offensive weapons.

The ABM Treaty restricts the Soivet Union and the United States to two defensive networks each. One would shield a major offensive weapons site, and a second would be placed near each country's capital.

The Senate will vote tomorrow on this treaty dealing with defensive weapons. A two-thirds vote is needed for approval.

In the case of the second agreement, a 5-year limitation on offensive weapons, a majority vote in each House of Congress is required.

This interim agreement covers only numbers of offensive missiles to be deployed by each country.

The United States will be restricted to 1,054 land-based missiles, while Russia will be permitted 1,618; the United States would be restricted to 41 Polaris-Poseidon submarines with 16 missiles each, while Russia would be permitted 62 Y-class submarines with 16 missiles each.

The agreement does not prevent modernization of missiles, nor does it limit numbers of warheads.

The signing of these two agreements in Moscow occasioned a considerable expression of optimism in the United States about the prospects for peace and an end, or a major reduction, of the arms race.

This was only natural, given the course of our history since the beginning of World War II.

The people of the United States have been praying for peace, fighting for peace, working for peace, and yearning for peace continually for over 30 years.

In May, when it was announced that President Nixon had signed strategic arms limitation agreements in Moscow, many optimists foresaw a stabilized world, with mutual trust and respect between the superpowers.

Many of these optimists felt that with these agreements, defense expenditures could immediately be reduced.

More than anything else, I want a world of peace; I also want to reduce governmental expenditures. But, my recollection of the Russian track record in world affairs made me skeptical of the first, and my many years of experience in the Government made me skeptical of the second.

As a result of this skepticism, I listened intently to the witnesses who appeared before our committee, and questioned them on the effect of the two separate documents submitted to the Congress by the President.

By the time the final testimony was completed, I had reached two conclusions: First, that these agreements are not as significant as some commentators and officials would have us believe; and second, they will not result in reduced military spending.

The agreements would be truly significant if we could be sure that they would lead the way to a more stable world, but we cannot be sure this will be the result. We can hope that the SAL agreements herald world peace, but hoping for peace is hardly new.

As regards savings in defense expenditures, the agreements will not of themselves result in a reduction in military spending. In fact, in some areas there will be increases in the defense budget.

For example, some of the defensive configurations being considered under the two-site ABM Treaty proposal will cost more than the four-site one planned before the agreement.

Incidentally, it should be noted that Russia gets the better of the bargain, in terms of protection, from the two-site ABM agreement. The system already installed around Moscow provides protection for Soviet missiles in that region, whereas a network of ABM's around Washington, even if approved, would not provide any defense for U.S. offensive missiles.

In addition to the ABM increase, other accelerations of weapons development have been linked to the SALT agreements.

One is the ULMS-Trident submarine and underwater-launched missile system, for which the 1973 budget request is $906.4 million. The program cost for 10 of these systems is now estimated at $13.5 billion.

Another is the B–1 bomber. Requested funds for this plane for fiscal 1973 are $444.5 million. A fleet of 244 B–1's would cost $11.1 billion.

The comments of President Nixon concerning the Moscow agreements, at his June 22 news conference, indicated that he feels approval of rapid development for new weapons systems is essential to preserve national security under the SALT pacts. The President said:

> The Secretary of Defense has a responsibility, as I have a responsibility, to recommend to the Congress action that will adequately

protect the security of the United States. Moving on that responsibility, he has indicated that if the SALT agreement is approved, and then if the Congress rejects the programs for offensive weapons not controlled by the SALT agreement, that this would seriously jeopardize the security of the United States. On that point he is correct.

But then the President added these words:

The arms limitation agreements should be approved on their merits. I would not have signed those agreements unless I had believed that, standing alone, they were in the interest of the United States.

His statements are, in my view, somewhat ambiguous. But I think it is clear that the President feels new offensive weapons are necessary if we are to maintain our security under the Moscow agreements.

It is important to bear in mind that many weapon systems are not covered by the Moscow agreements.

President Nixon, in his press conference, stressed that Mr. Brezhnev had told him unequivocally that in areas not controlled by the agreement on offensive weapons, the Russians will go ahead with their programs.

What are the areas not covered by the agreements?

The agreements do not limit land mobile ICBM's—which Russia has and we do not—surface ship-based missiles, land and sea-based cruise missiles, air-launched missiles, nor land-based ballistic missiles with less than strategic ranges—about 3,000 nautical miles. This last category includes intermediate range ballistic missiles—IRBM's—medium range ballistic missiles—MRBM's—and short range tactical ballistic missiles—SRBM's.

These facts underscore the point that we are not dealing with a budgetary issue—that is, an issue of savings on defense dollars—in considering the arms limitation agreements.

The real question before the Congress is whether these agreements are consistent with national security and strength.

I am not persuaded by arguments that military strength has brought about U.S. involvement in conflicts.

I am persuaded that the opposite is true, and that U.S. efforts to keep major conflict from happening over the past quarter century have been successful in direct proportion to that strength.

I am persuaded that a strong America is indispensable to peace and freedom.

If security and strength are the real questions, what is the position of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have the responsibility for military preparedness?

Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee as follows:

I believe that the deterrent capability of the strategic forces will not be impaired by the agreement so long as we vigorously press forward with necessary programs which are permitted under its terms.

Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr., Acting Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army testified:

Although the ABM Treaty has indeed limited our SAFEGUARD deployment, we must bear in mind that an unconstrained Soviet Union could have significantly increased its launchers in five years. Thus, viewed in this light, we believe that overall, we gain by the agreements.

Gen. John D. Ryan, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, when testifying stated:

. . . the Strategic Arms Limitations Agreements can give us a reasonable strategic posture if we take a few prudent steps to assure that we maintain our technological lead, make qualitative improvements in our strategic forces and maintain effective surveillance, warning and command and control capabilities.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Adm. Thomas Moorer, testified in like vein.

I noted earlier, as have many others, that under the agreements the Soviet Union will have superiority in sheer numbers of weapons.

But testimony also indicates that what the United States lacks in quantity, it makes up in quality. Its missiles are more sophisticated and probably more accurate than those of the Soviet Union.

In terms of the number of warheads that each missile can carry, the United States is ahead of the Soviet Union. This does not take into account new Russian development not covered by the agreements, but rather the present status.

On balance, our military experts are convinced that the U.S. combined strategic forces, under these agreements, would remain strong enough and diverse enough to withstand any preemptive first strike from Russia and to retaliate with a force capable of destroying most of the Soviet Union's population and industrial base.

This being the case, the agreements do not seem to compromise national security.

These new arms limitations may or may not represent a step toward a more peaceful and stable world. But because they appear not to weaken our national security, and because they also apply brakes to apparent Soviet ability and willingness to continue increasing their already formidable strategic power, I shall support the SALT agreements.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a letter from Lt. Gen. W. P. Leber, Systems Manager for the Safeguard ABM project, in which he cites the cost of the two-site ABM proposal as compared to the four-site proposal previously planned.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GRAVEL). Without objection, it is so ordered.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
*Arlington, Va., June 21, 1972.*

Hon. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.,
*U.S. Senate,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SENATOR BYRD: The Secretary of the Army has asked me to reply to your inquiry concerning SAFEGUARD cost estimates.

As you stated in your letter, the SAFEGUARD 4-site cost estimated in February 1972 was $8.0 billion. This is still the estimate for a 4-site deployment, but the $8.0 billion was then, as it is now, stated as a DOD acquisition cost; i.e., the RDTE, procurement and construction cost through completion of the last site. This DOD acquisition cost does not include the operating accounts, OMA and MPA, which would bring the total DOD direct cost to $8.9 billion.

In your letter, you asked for a justification of the difference between the 4-site cost estimate of $8.0 billion and an $8.5 billion cost estimate for a 2-site deployment (Grand Forks plus NCA). On 13 June 1972, in testimony before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Secretary Laird estimated that the total DOD direct costs, including OMA and MPA, of the Grand Forks site plus the least costly of the NCA deployments under consideration, would be $8.7 billion. The DOD acquisition cost of this deployment would be $7.7 billion. Hence, the $8.0 billion 4-site acquisition cost estimate should be compared to the $7.7 billion acquisition estimate for two sites, not to the $8.7 billion total 2-site cost. Conversely, the $8.7 billion estimated total cost for the two sites can be compared to an estimated $8.9 billion total cost for four sites. Either way, the current preliminary estimate for this particular 2-site deployment is slightly less, rather than somewhat greater, than the corresponding estimate for 4 sites. However, I must emphasize that there are a variety of NCA configurations under consideration and, if one of the more costly options is finally selected, the 2-site costs could in fact, exceed the estimated 4-site costs.

There are a number of reasons why even the least costly Grand Forks plus NCA deployment estimate closely approaches estimated 4-site costs. First, as you mention, our 2-site estimate reflects in construction and hardware costs, the lost effort expended for the 4-site deployment but not needed for the 2-site deployment. This includes contract termination costs as well as site restoration costs. Second, schedule differences also come into play. While one would ordinarily believe a 2-site deployment would be completed considerably earlier than a 4-site deployment, in this case the opposite is true because of the relatively late decision to change to NCA in favor of the MINUTEMAN defense sites that were scheduled for earlier completion. The stretchout of the program adds significantly to the 2-site costs. Third, because the threat to NCA varies considerably from that to the MINUTEMAN sites, particularly as it affects system software, significant additional development and testing is required. Last, this same consideration dictates increases in hardware requirements for an NCA deployment, for data processing equipment, for example, thus further increasing the cost. Taken collectively, the reasons cited above account for an increase of approximately $1.5 billion in DOD acquisition costs for the least costly Grand Forks plus NCA deployment as compared to a 2-site deployment consisting of Grand Forks plus Malmstrom.

I hope this information is of value to you.

Sincerely,

W. P. LEBER.

## TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be a period for the transaction of routine morning business not to exceed 15 minutes with statements made therein limited to 3 minutes.

consequently produced fundamental social changes.

The Progressive interpretation began to lose its appeal in the aftermath of World War II, a period which was not sympathetic to class-oriented explanations of the Revolution. Bernard Bailyn of Harvard and his student Gordon Wood, now of Brown, broke the ground for a new interpretation during the 1960's.

Bailyn decided that the colonists were sincere in their accusations and determined to discover the reason why the Americans verged so close to a paranoia in their view of the British government. Bailyn came to understand the Revolution as being primarily ideological in origin.

He uncovered unexpected influences shaping the American's thoughts and reexamined their ramifications. One of these influences was the Latin classics, although the colonials' knowledge of them was at times superficial. The Americans also drew from the political and social commentaries of the Enlightenment writers of Europe.

Bailyn's major contribution has been the recognition of the role of yet another group, the reputation theorists of the English Civil War and Commonwealth period. All shared important common attitudes. All were hostile to the phenomena in 18th century English government which increased the potential for corruption. They postulated that government was a constant struggle between power and liberty. Rulers needed power to conduct affairs of state, but power corrupted and tempeted its possessors to expand its limits at the expense of liberty.

Of great importance were the changes in the conception of the proper structure of government which the patriots developed. These involved the theories of representation, sovereignty, and constitutionality. In the English conception of representation, the elected officer did not have to answer to his constituents. The responsibility of the elected officeholder was to rule, acting as his own intellect guided him, and not to follow the dictates of his district.

The provincials, however, returned to the medieval attitude that the representative was an attorney, working on behalf of those who sent him to the legislature. They thus had to reject the contention that a delegate was not responsible to his constituents.

The English made Parliament sovereign, but the Americans obviously could not accept the sovereignty of Parliament, and when independence came, they could not agree whether the central government or the states inherited the mantle. Federalists finally devised the solution by making the people rather than the legislature sovereign.

In ensuring popular control of the government, the most important innovation was the redefinition of the world "constitutional" and the use of written constitutions. The English constitution was unwritten, and the terms "constitutional" and "unconstitutional," simply meant "legal" and "illegal."

The Americans came to understand that the primary function of the constitution was to define the boundaries of governmental powers, to limit what the legislature might do. The Constitution was a fundamental law. It designated what "part of their liberty" the people were to sacrifice to the necessity of having government by describing the form of the government and the extent of its powers.

Where will historians go from here? The approaching bicentennial of the War for Independence will surely encourage more study of our Revolutionary heritage. Perhaps the National Historical Publications Commission in the future attempt to make documents available which will allow scholars to examine more thoroughly the experiences of the common man in history. Then we may be able to produce a balanced, pluralistic account of the origins of our nation.

REMARKS OF DR. CAROL RUTH BERKIN

Long after the Revolution was over, John Adams made this judgment: one third the colonial population had enlisted under the banners of liberty and independence; one third had remained loyal to their King; and one third had chosen no side at all in the conflict raging about them. Adams used this over-simplified division of the population to emphasize that the call for revolution had not been unanimous. The founding fathers, in short, had won their contest against indifference and resistance as well as British armies and Parliament.

The indifference requires little explanation. But what of the resistance? It was real enough. Of a population of 2,500,000, estimates now run that 100,000 were active and exiled loyalists. Somewhere between 6 and 15% of the colonial population actively and openly and consistently opposed independence. To this must be added those who, from fear or pressure, did not publicly profess their allegiance to George III.

The colonists were well aware of the nature of this war. In 1780 no one needed to tell General George Washington that this was a civil war. His army at that time numbered 9,000, only a thousand more than the number of loyalists enlisted in the British army against him!

Who were these loyalists? And why did they choose to resist independence? To understand the Tory, we must look at the nature of the revolution itself. The colonials did not divide along class lines, and the revolution was led by the existing colonial leadership: planters, merchants, lawyers, and the political elite.

But in the second struggle to determine who should rule at home, the Tory had no role. His political crisis centered upon independence. It was this question of allegiance which divided colonists in 1775–1776, and that division did not develop along the lines of "haves" and "have nots."

Neither, tragically, was it a sharp ideological gulf which separated the Tory from his neighbor. There was a unity of opposition to the Stamp Act and to the Townshend Acts.

Likewise, the American mercantile world was united in its early opposition to England's restrictive trade measures. The cleavage in the merchants' ranks grew not over political content, but political strategy. Specifically, the radical merchants wanted to move quickly, using extra-legal means and were willing to accept the logical consequences of their escalation—independence—while those who become Tories balked at measures which lead to rebellion.

It was the price one was willing to pay for the redress of these grievances which separated the Tory from the Whig. Much, in truth, was to be risked. Human society had yet known but three political alternatives: anarchy, tyranny, and the British constitution, the latter representing the highest achievement in human social organization. To withdraw from this political system even for the sake of real issues and real evils, was to invite anarchy and chaos.

Most loyalists doubted from the start that an attempt at independence could succeed. Respect for legal means and for legitimate government, fear of change, a conviction that rebellion was doomed to failure, and an admiration for the British system of government under which the colonies had thus far prospered—these were important factors in the Tory's decision to remain loyal to the existing authorities. But no examination of motive can end wholely with the psychological or ideological. Let us then look at loyalism in its practical aspects.

A look at the map of the colonial world is helpful. Loyalism literally surrounded the revolution geographically. Trappers, traders, huntsmen were all anxious that the wave of settlement be held back. The British government had been consistent in its efforts at containment, but an independent American government might easily succumb to the land hunger of its citizens.

To the French Catholics of Canada, the anti-Catholic bias of many revolutionary leaders was well-known: did the Americans have partnership or domination in mind?

The stronghold of the loyalist movement was the maritime city for several reasons. The port cities housed the greatest concentration of government agencies and royal bureaucrats. Men whose livelihood depended directly and wholely upon the royal government's apparatus would be found in these urban and maritime areas—and their decision for loyalty is hardly remarkable.

Many Tories fled the colonies to Britain, where the strangeness of English society soon struck the refugees. They realized that society held no true place for them. For the long years of the war, they alternately cursed and longed for their native land. The New Englanders, in short, remained New Englanders.

Their situation was exacerbated by their dependence on the British government's largesse, for few had any money when they arrived in England. This uprooting, the inactivity, the home-sickness, the poverty, all took their toll upon the New England loyalist.

All of this attests to the American Revolution as a civil war, as a rending apart of the whole.

## CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION ANALYSIS OF SALT AGREEMENT

### HON. LES ASPIN

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Tuesday, August 1, 1972*

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, the Center for Defense Information has published in its third edition of the Defense Monitor an excellent analysis entitled "SALT and Afterward" describing both the advantages and disadvantages of the recent SALT accord. Unfortunately much of the debate surrounding these agreements has been charged with partisan politics. This analysis offers respite from the political battle and presents an objective and balanced view of the SALT accord. I recommend it to my colleagues for careful study. It follows:

SALT AND AFTERWARD

The SALT accords, signed May 26th in Moscow, were written in the face of a rapidly moving nuclear arms race. At the time of the signing the United States was installing multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRV) on its land and sea-based missiles. It was going forward with a program to greatly expand the destructive power of its strategic bombers by equipping them with short range attack missiles (SRAM). Together these steps would increase the US strategic nuclear warhead and bomb total from about 5700 in 1972 to more than 10,000 in 1976. On top of this the United States was developing a new strategic submarine called Trident, with new missiles to go with it, and a new strategic bomber, the B–1.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was building new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers at a rate of 250 per year. These included silos for the huge SS9 missile, capable of carrying 25 megatons (a US Minuteman II carries about 1 to 2 megatons). The Soviets had dug 25 silos possibly for a new missile even larger than the SS9. They were building new nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile submarines at a rate of 7 to 9 per

year, and could at this rate have twice as many such submarines as the United States in five years. The Russians were, however, years behind in MIRV. They were working on MIRV technology but had yet to test what US technicians considered to be a MIRV system.

Thus, the two superpowers were running their nuclear race in different ways. The United States was concentrating on MIRV, while holding its missile totals constant and reducing megatons. The Soviet Union was increasing numbers of missile launchers and deploying larger vehicles to carry fewer warheads but with greater megatonnage. Both sides were developing anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems.

For the question "Who's ahead?" there were as many answers as there were ways to measure the strategic arms balance.

In numbers of ICBM launchers, the Soviet Union had come from behind and passed the United States.

In numbers of submarine missile launch tubes the Soviets were catching up, and would in a few years pass the United States.

In numbers of heavy bombers the United States had a 4 to 1 lead.

In numbers of separately targetable nuclear weapons, the United States had a 2 to 1 lead, and because of this country's head start in MIRV, this lead was rapidly widening in favor of the United States.

In total megatons the Soviets had about a 2 or 3 to 1 lead.

When all these measures were considered together the Soviet Union clearly had come from a position of nuclear inferiority to a position of rough parity.

THE ACCORDS

The SALT accords consist of a treaty limiting ABMs, a five-year Interim Agreement which puts certain partial limits on offensive weapons development pending further arms talks, a protocol to this Interim Agreement, and a number of statements of "interpretation", some agree and some unilateral. Based on all these documents, the following is a summary of the main provisions of the accords:

*ABM Treaty*

Each country agrees not to build an ABM system for defense of its entire territory or major region. This amounts to a pledge that neither will try to upset the present deterrent balance by deploying ABMs ot protect its general population and industry.

Each will limit ABM systems to two sites—one in defense of its national capital, the other in defense of an ICBM field. These must be at least 1300 kilometers (800 miles) apart, which means the Soviet ICBM field to be protected must be east of the Ural Mountains, away from the major western USSR population centers.

No more than 100 ABM launchers and 100 intercepter missiles may be deployed at each site.

Restrictions are set on numbers, types and placement of ABM radars to foreclose a radar capability for nationwide defense of either country.

In addition to these basic provisions, the two countries agree to ban sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based ABMs; not to deploy ABM systems of new kinds without prior discussion; not to convert air-defense or other systems to an ABM role; not to build radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missiles except along the edges of the country facing out; not to transfer ABM systems to other states or deploy them overseas.

There is no on-site inspection. Each side will use its own technical means of verification and each pledges not to interfere with these means or resort to deliberate concealment.

A Standing Consultative Commission will be established to implement the treaty and consider questions involving it.

The ABM treaty is of unlimited duration but either side can withdraw for supreme interest.

The treaty would require the United States to cut back its 12-site ABM program (of which four sites have been approved by Congress) to a maximum of 2. The Administration plans to complete the ABM site on which construction is farthest ahead—at the ICBM field at Grand Forks, N.D. It has halted work on three other sites at ICBM fields and has asked Congress to approve an ABM site at Washington, D.C. The treaty permits Russia to continue its ABM site already under construction at Moscow and to start a second site at an ICBM field.

*Interim Agreement and Protocol*

These deal with offensive nuclear weapons. In general they limit the numbers of ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to levels which each side agrees are presently deployed or under construction. These limitations are for five years, pending further SALT talks. With agreed "interpretations" the limitations are as follows:

No additional fixed, land-based ICBM launchers may be started during the freeze above the numbers deployed and "under active construction" at the time of signing—1,054 for the United States, and about 1,618 for the Soviet Union.

Launchers for so-called "light" ICBMs (the U.S. Minuteman and Soviet SS11 and 13) and "older" LCBMs (the U.S. Titan and Soviet SS7 and 8) may not be replaced by "modern heavy ICBMs" (the Soviet SS9). The SS9 class missiles may, however, be made heavier Russia has 288 SS9s now and 25 apparently larger silos dug. It could therefore end up with 313 "modern heavy" ICBMs of SS9 size or larger. The United States has no "modern heavy" ICBMs and plans none.

Within these restrictions, ICBMs may be replaced with more modern ones—for example with MIRV. But in the process of modernization, launchers may not be increased in size more than 10–15%.

The number of launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) each side presently has deployed or under construction was stipulated to be 656 U.S. and 740 USSR. These numbers can be increased subject to two provisions:

"Additional SLBM launchers may become operational only as replacements for an equal number of "older" ICBM launchers (first deployed prior to 1964) or for launchers on older nuclear-powered submarines or for modern SLBM launchers on any type of submarines.

"During the five year freeze the U.S. is limited to 44 modern ballistic missile submarines and 710 SLBM launchers. The Soviet Union is limited to 62 modern ballistic missile submarines and 950 SLBM launchers."

As in the case of ICBMs, submarine missile systems can be modernized. Single-warhead missiles can be replaced by MIRVed missiles. New submarines can be substituted for old.

Destruction or dismantling of old ICBMs or submarine missiles must begin by the start of sea trials of a replacement ballistic missile submarine.

Each side agrees not to significantly increase its number of test and training launchers for ICBMs or SLBMs.

There were several unresolved points of disagreement in the accords:

"The Soviet Union stated unilaterally that if US allies in NATO should increase their numbers of ballistic missile submarines beyond those presently in operation or under construction, the Soviet Union would have the right to make a corresponding increase in its number of submarines.

"The United States was unable to get agreement on a common definition of "heavy" ICBMs. The US considers it to be any missile bigger than the largest existing "light" ICBM, which is the Soviet SS11.

"The United States was unable to get agreement to include mobile ICBMs in the freeze. (Mobile ABMs are banned). The United States declared unilaterally that deployment of mobile ICBMs during the freeze would be considered 'inconsistent with the objectives' of the agreement."

WHAT THE ACCORDS MEAN

*From an Arms Control View*

The SALT accords can be examined from several viewpoints. One of these is the viewpoint of international arms control—that is, in terms of what effect the accords will have on the arms race.

Among the achievements in this regard:

The SALT accords represent the first—even though partial—limitations by the United States and Soviet Union dealing with the fundamentals of their arms race. Previously, the two countries had agreed to bar nuclear weapons from the Antarctic, from outer space, and from the sea bed. They had agreed not to test them in the atmosphere, underwater or in space and not to give them to other countries. But never had the two superpowers reached agreement on the nuclear weapons targeted at each other.

The ABM treaty bans the kind of ABM system which could be most de-stabilizing—a nation-wide or major regional defense of population and industry. Such a system, undertaken by either country, could threaten the other's deterrent and cause it to respond with additional offensive buildup. The complex restrictions on ABM sites should convince each side the other is not developing an ABM for defense of large areas. The treaty rules out a US ABM for population defense against China, which this country once planned but later abandoned.

Freezing ICBMs, SLBMs, and ballistic missile submarines at levels deployed and under construction is a first step in limiting offensive nuclear weapons, a step on which future SALT talks can build. Broadly speaking, the accords accommodate themselves to the different kinds of offensive weapons buildup which each side now has underway—Soviet construction of more and bigger missiles and US MIRV. They allow each side to substantially complete the round it now has in progress. The new levels become the starting point for attempting to freeze the arms race.

*Among the debits from an arms control viewpoint:*

Except for ABMs the accords do not stop any of the major weapons programs now in progress. This is because numerical limits are set high, qualitative improvements are allowed, and many weapons systems—including bombers, air-defense, anti-submarine warfare, air-breathing strategic missiles and tactical nuclear weapons—are not covered. Under SALT the United States can continue conversion of Minuteman and Polaris to MIRV, development of Trident submarines with new missiles, the B–1 bomber, research on "site defense" for ICBMs, submarine-launched cruise (air breathing) missiles and new submarines in which to carry them. The Soviet Union can continue, up to a point, building additional land and sea-based missile launchers, and could develop and deploy MIRV.

Because all these programs are allowed, and because numerical limits are set so high, military planners on each side will still point to future possibilities rather than existing or likely forces to justify their own building programs.

*From a US Defense View*

The accords can also be looked at from a much narrower view of US military defense.

*Advantages:*

Since only the Soviet Union is presently building up its number of offensive weapons launchers, it is to the advantage of the United States to put ceilings on these numbers. Within the totals the number of "heavy"

ICBMs Russia can have is limited to 313. Without SALT, the Soviet Union could, at present rates of construction, exceed the freeze ceiling Instead of 62 modern ballistic missile submarines it could have 80 or 90. The US has no plans to add to it numbers of ICBMs or build "heavy" ones. It could, under the freeze, build 13 Trident submarines. Defense Secretary Laird has said only ten are planned. Actually the first Tridents would not become operational until after the 5-year freeze, and are therefore more related to future rounds of SALT than the first.

Freezing the number of ICBM launchers, especially "heavy" ones, will leave only one route for the Soviet Union to develop increased "counterforce" capability to knock out US ICBMs—qualitative improvements such as increased accuracy, MIRVing, and throw weight.

The ABM limit plus the limits on ICBM numbers lessen the chance that the Soviet Union could develop the capability for a successful "first strike"—that is, the ability to knock out enough US missiles to suffer no or substantially less damage in return.

*Criticisms:*

On the surface, a number of criticisms of the treaty can be made:

"The accords allow the Soviet Union more ICBM launchers, SLBMs and ballistic missile submarines the the United States.

"Only the Soviet Union can have "modern heavy" ICBMs, with capacity to carry more megatons than U.S. missiles. (Also more MIRVs than U.S. missiles if the Soviets develop a MIRV.)

"The Soviet Union retains more megatonage and more throw weight than the United States."

On the other hand, the SALT accords provide several effective limitations on Soviet weapons. Assuming recent Soviet construction rates were to continue until 1977, the Soviets could have built 200 ICBMs but now are limited to 1618. The Soviets could have built 1200 SLBMs, but are now limited to 950; and they could have built 80–90 modern ballistic missile subs but now are limited to 62.

While ICBM numbers are frozen at levels deployed and under active construction, the Russians did not say exactly how many they have under construction. The United States considers the freeze level to be 1618 for the Soviet Union. Dr. Henry Kissinger said on June 15 that the Russians could not exceed the freeze level to any significant degree without the United States detecting it, and if this happened the whole agreement would be in question.

An important factor in the defense controversy is MIRV. If the Soviet Union does not develop MIRV, it will still have little more than 2500 warheads five years from now when the United States will, under presently planned programs, have more than 10,000.

If the Soviet do develop MIRV, two key questions will be: How fast? And how much?

The Soviet Union appears to be years behind this country in MIRV. The United States began MIRV tests in August, 1968. The first squadron of Minuteman III missiles became operational Jan. 8, 1971; the first wing of 150, on Dec. 13, 1971. The Soviet Union has also been working on multiple warhead technology since about August, 1968, but it has yet to test a MIRV system as the United States knows the term. The Russians tested a triple-warhead system in which the warheads may or may not have been independently targetable. (US analysts differed on this point.) But these tests stopped in late 1970, suggesting that the Russians might have decided to start over on a new tack.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird said June 5 that Russia "could have a MIRV capability in 24 months." But he did not say how many they might have by then.

Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) has said that when the Soviets achieve MIRV ". . . the combination of their vastly superior payload and modern MIRV technology will give them superiority in warheads." There have been published reports that Soviet missiles larger than SS9s could hold up to 20 MIRVs each. (A US Minuteman holds up to 3; a Poseidon, 10 to 14). But other defense analysts believe this overstates what Russia could realistically achieve in MIRV during the next five years.

Table IV shows the Center for Defense Information's calculation of what the Soviet Union probably could achieve in MIRV during the five years of the Interim Agreement, if it develops MIRV. At the end of five years it would have some 3800 warheads compared to more than 10,000 for the United States under programs now planned. (Table III)

If the Soviet Union were to embark on an extensive program to MIRV its missiles, it could have some 14,000 warheads. This would involve installing 20 MIRVs in its bigger missiles and MIRVing its smaller missiles by the same factors as the United States. But it is doubtful that Russia could achieve this level in five years. The United States could have more than 16,000 warheads in the 1980s by exceeding present plans. This would include MIRVing all Minuteman missiles instead of only 550 of them, plus building ten Trident submarines and a fleet of B–1 bombers. (See Table V)

However, such calculations of marginal advantages for the United States or Soviet Union—whether they be in warheads, launchers or megatons—overlook one important point: Both countries have the power to destroy each other several times over, and this will remain the case during the five years of the Interim Agreement.

Gerard Smith, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, when asked during hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee June 19 whether Russia would get ahead of the United States during the five year agreement, replied: "Nothing the Soviets can do within the five year agreement will offset the present strategic balance between the US and USSR."

COST

The immediate cost impact of the SALT acords on the fiscal 1973 defense budget has been listed by the Defense Department as follows:

(In millions)

| | |
|---|---|
| Reducing ABM program to two sites | −$711 |
| INCREASES IN OTHER STRATEGIC PROGRAMS | |
| Accelerate and complete development of Site Defense | +60 |
| Develop submarine-based cruise missile | +20 |
| Accelerate bomber rebasing | +45 |
| Augment verification capabilities | +13 |
| Develop improved reentry vehicles for ICBMs and SLBMs | +20 |
| Improved command, control and communications | +10 |
| Net change | −543 |

Secretary Laird has testified that the total ABM saving through 1981 as a result of SALT would be $9.9 billion, figured in 1968 prices.

Further savings could come from the first round of SALT if the United States decided that, as a result of the recent accords, it could safely stop or slow down some of its other major nuclear weapons programs, such as Trident, the B–1, or air defense. The Administration wants to go ahead with these programs. The question of what this country's pace in nuclear weapons building should be following the first round of SALT has become a major issue.

POLICY FOLLOWING SALT

Secretary Laird told newsmen June 6: "I could not support the (SALT) agreements if Congress fails to act on the movement forward of the Trident system, on the B–1 bomber, and the other programs that we have outlined to improve our strategic offensive systems during this five year period." Admiral Moorer said the Joint Chiefs were in accord with the SALT agreements provided the older programs went ahead.

In a briefing for Senators and Congressmen June 15, Dr. Henry Kissinger, assistant to the President for national security, considerably moderated this stand. He said the Administration wants Congressional approval of both SALT and the new weapons programs but: "We are not making them conditional. We are saying that the treaty is justified on its merits, but we are also saying that the requirements of national security impel us in the direction of the strategic programs . . ."

Laird told the House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations June 5 that "Just as the Moscow agreements were made possible by our successful action in such programs as Safeguard, Poseidon and Minuteman III, these future negotiations to which we are pledged can only succeed if we are equally successful in implementing such programs as the Trident system, the B–1 bomber, NCA defense, Site Defense, SLCM, and accelerated satellite basing of strategic bombers. We must also initiate certain other measures in areas such as intelligence, verification, and command, control, and communications."

Transmitting the SALT agreeemnts to Congress, President Nixon said: "Just as the maintenance of a strong strategic posture was an essential element in the success of these negotiations, it is now equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic modernization program to maintain our security and to ensure that more permanent and comprehensive arms limitation agreements can be reached."

The Administration's position is that if the United States had not been deploying MIRVs and going forward with other programs it would have lacked the bargaining power to obtain a ceiling on Soviet building of SS9s and other systems.

CONCLUSIONS

*Arms Control*

The ABM treaty limits ABM systems and therefore is a significant and stabilizing step in limiting the arms race.

The five-year agreement on offensive weapons allows the United States and Soviet Union each to continue its present round of nuclear buildup, and then establishes a partial, quantitative freeze at the resulting new levels. This is a start which can be followed up in future SALT negotiations.

*US Security*

The accords place ceilings on numbers of offensive weapon launchers at a time when only the Soviet Union is increasing these numbers. Without the accords, Soviet construction could be greater. The offensive freeze plus the ABM limitation lessen the chances of Russia ever becoming able to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against this country without being destroyed in return. The accords thus tend to make nuclear war less likely.

While Russia under the accords will continue to lead the United States in numbers of launchers and total megatonnage, the United States will retain its lead in numbers of warheads. These differences, however, are less important than the fact that each country retains the power to destroy the other several times over.

*Weapons Policy*

If theobjecti ve of SALT is to limit weapons proliferation and thereby reduce tensions, the open end "bargaining chip" game has severe deficiencies. For so long as the United States and Russia are free to develop and build larger and better "chips", real limits will not be imposed. The goal of future SALTs should be to reduce and ultimately eliminate strategic weapon systems.

## MISS LAKE COUNTY OF CALIFORNIA

### HON. DON H. CLAUSEN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Tuesday, August 1, 1972*

Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN. Mr. Speaker, I wish to take this opportunity to bring to the attention of the House of Representatives a poem written by a lovely young lady who, to me, represents the very finest qualities of America's youth.

She is Kathleen Ann Covey of Lakeport, Calif., in the First Congressional District. Miss Covey is serving as Miss Lake County and was present at a recent ceremony I attended in California.

At that time she read the poem she composed for the occasion and I was touched by the depth of feeling she exhibited for her home area. Those of us who live in northern California share a great pride in the bounty nature has given us—a pride that is reflected in Miss Covey's composition.

I proudly submit her work for publication in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD and for the attention of all Members of Congress:

POEM

(By Kathleen Ann Covey)

I stood upon a hill, looking out to the world
Seeing life in its stillness.
A peace of country living seen in the distance,
Where nestled among the trees
Proud and tall stands a church steeple,
Weathered with the years.
Reflected in the lake below, Mt. Konocti, a legend in itself.
A valley filled with history seen from every view.
An ancient Indian mountain, a hundred year old church,
Yet a youngness is seen here too.
Towering among the trees, the courthouse built not so long ago.
Here, we stand looking out at the babe of history
The freeway now complete.
A playground for the young, a fountain for us all
A storehouse of information,
But BEST of all, our county in all its splendor.
I stand upon a hilltop, looking out to the world.
An outstretched hand, a friendly "hi", warm smile
To greet a passerby.
But BEST of all, a moment of beauty, renewal of life,
As they too may now stand upon a hilltop,
And see life capturing history and helping to write another page.
A gift we give to all who come
Whether from near or from far
The beauty of God's creation seen from a hilltop.

## TIGHTENING UP THE LAW ON AUTO EMISSION DEVICES

### HON. ROBERT H. STEELE

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Tuesday, August 1, 1972*

Mr. STEELE. Mr. Speaker, I have introduced legislation which would make an important contribution to cleaning up air pollution in America. The legislation would prohibit tampering with antipollution devices which have been installed in automobiles in compliance with regulations under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970.

Automobile emissions are one of the leading sources of air pollution in this country today. Autos emit 64.7 percent of the carbon monoxide, 45.7 percent of the hydrocarbons, and 36.6 percent of the nitrogen oxides. In many cities. they account for more than 90 percent of carbon monoxide, more than 80 percent of hydrocarbons, and more than 70 percent of nitrogen oxides.

These pollutants constitute a serious threat to the health and well-being of all our people. Hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides form oxidants, which cause respiratory and eye irritation and possible changes in lung function. They are extremely toxic to many plants and can physically weaken such materials as rubber and fabrics. And the aerosols formed in the production of these oxidants contribute significantly to white smog, which reduces visibility.

Carbon monoxide can be fatal in large amounts. Smaller concentrations place greater strain on persons with heart disease. Exposure for several hours to certain carbon monoxide levels can affect brain function, changing, for example, time-interval discrimination. In this way, it is feared, high carbon monoxide levels could contribute to traffic accidents.

The 100 million motor vehicles on the road today are the source of about 60 million tons of carbon monoxide, 16 million tons of hydrocarbons, and 7 million tons of nitrogen oxides annually—1,200 pounds of carbon monoxide, 320 pounds of hydrocarbons, and 140 pounds of nitorgen oxides per car. In an uncontrolled vehicle—that is, a car sold before any pollution-control devices were required—these emissions come from the engine crankcase, from fuel evaporation in the fuel tank and carburetor, and from the exhaust pipe.

To stop motor vehicles from spewing these large quantities of pollutants into the air, Congress enacted the Clean Air Act and the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. These acts provided for a vehicle emission control program based on the following premises. First, that ambient concentrations of carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides, and oxidants in our large urban areas are much too high and must be greatly reduced; damage to health and to the environment have been shown. Second, that since there are only a few major manufacturers of automobiles, control is best carried out at the source—on new vehicles. Third, that since automobiles are sold nationwide, control should be at the Federal and not the State level.

Regulations issued under the law have already had some effect. The amount of carbon monoxide emitted by vehicles under present controls is 62 percent lower than that emitted by uncontrolled vehicles. Hydrocarbons have been reduced by 73 percent in controlled cars.

The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 and the regulations issued under the act require auto manufacturers to produce 1975 models which will emit no more than .41 grams of hydrocarbons per mile, or a reduction of 90 percent from 1970 levels of 4.1 grams per mile. The 1975 cars must emit no more than 3.4 grams per mile of carbon monoxide, also a 90 percent reduction from the 1970 level of 34 grams per mile.

The 1973 cars are restricted to nitrogen oxides emissions of 3 grams per mile, the first restrictions imposed on those pollutants. By 1976 nitrogen oxides must be reduced to 0.4 grams per mile. Uncontrolled cars emit 6 grams per mile of those pollutants. The table in the appendix shows the amounts of pollutants emitted under controlled and uncontrolled conditions.

In May 1972, William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, rejected requests by auto manufacturers for a 1-year extension of the 1975 emission deadline. Mr. Ruckelshaus recommended the use of noble-metal catalysts to meet the new requirements. He promised to allow the replacement of catalysts at least once during 50,000 miles of vehicle operation if that is necessary to keep the emission controls effective.

But, it has been charged, emission controls impair the performance of the vehicle. Auto manufacturers and others claim that the antipollution devices reduce gas mileage and contribute to hesitations. However, V. W. Makin, president of Matthey-Bishop, Inc., the world's largest refiner of platinum and an experimenter with catalytic converters, said that his firm's own tests showed the fuel penalty under the 1974 emissions requirements would be no greater than 5 percent and that the reduction in performance would be negligible. Furthermore, New York City has shown that its antipollution controls in police cruisers have not cut down driveability. Neither have they increased fuel consumption nor breakdowns. Fred C. Hart, director of the clean air program in the city, told the St. Louis Post Dispatch:

> The obvious conclusion is that if New York City can accomplish as much as it has, the auto manufacturers, with much greater resources, should be able to do much better.

Nevertheless, many car owners have been removing the antipollution devices from their automobiles. When they go to mechanics, these owners usually do not specify that they want the emission controls unfixed, although some do. Most of them only say that they want improved performance. But they realize, and do not care, that the tuneup may involve an unfixing.

SALT



THE WASHINGTON POST DATE 6 JUL 72 PAGE 2

# Soviets Halt Big-Missile Tests, Apparently Because of SALT

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Soviet Union, in an apparent attempt to display restraint to the United States, has suspended space maneuvers with its fearsome SS-9 Scarp rocket.

Washington specialists link the suspension with the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). Some of the SS-9 exercises in space last year and earlier appeared to be tests of a system for blinding American observation satellites that look down on the Soviet Union.

Under the SALT agreement recently negotiated, neither side is to interfere with methods of verifying how much weaponry the other is deploying. Spy satellites like the American Samos (Satellite and missile observation systems), are such a method.

Also, under an earlier agreement made through the United Nations, the United States and the Soviet Union announce the general characteristics of the vehicles they shoot up into space. Both sides also watch this space traffic with radars on the ground.

The international space log shows that the Soviet Union has desisted from SS-9 maneuvers in space so far this year, in contrast to earlier years.

Last year, for example, the SS-9 went into space maneuvers on six different occasions. Three of those shots appeared to be tests of a system to inspect and, on command, destroy foreign observation satellites.

Specifically, on Feb. 25, April 4 and Dec. 3 Soviet rocket troops sent SS-9s whooshing out of the space port at Tyuratam on satellite inspection drills. The launches were logged as Cosmos 397, 404 and 462. The Soviets did not detail the missions but Western space spacialists interpreted them as satellite intercepts.

The SS-9 was flown a fourth time in 1971 in what appeared to be another test of its space bomb system—the so-called FOBS, for fractional orbital bombardment system.

launched Aug. 8 and labeled Cosmos 433 by the Soviets.

The FOBS would fly out low from the Soviet Union launch pad and go nearly around the world to hit the United States from the south, eluding the radars guarding our northern approaches.

Since the United States has not flight-tested any space systems comparable to the Soviets' satellite intercept or FOBS vehicles, the Russians might have reasoned it would have been impolitic of them to stage maneuvers this year when the SALT agreement appeared in reach.

While Pentagon civilians, including former Air Force Secretary Harold Brown have argued that the FOBS space bomb technique does not make enough sense technically for the United States to pursue, there is still considerable uneasiness in the Air Force about the lack of a system for inspecting satellites.

Within the last few weeks, several U. S. aerospace firms at the Air Force's request prepared new proposals for satellite inspection vehicles which could maneuver close enough to another nation's observation satellite to knock it out of commission with a non-nuclear explosive.

If the SALT treaty holds, no such systems would be deployed by either side. Article XII states that "each party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other party . . ."

However, research and development—including flight tests—seem to be allowed by the treaty as long as the vehicle does not have the ability to knock down missiles.

## THE SALT AGREEMENTS

HON. WILLIAM L. SPRINGER
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Thursday, June 29, 1972*

Mr. SPRINGER. Mr. Speaker, much has been said about the strategic arms limitation agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union which will probably be followed by SALT II—further talks in arriving at some mutual relationship on disarmament between our two nations. Chalmers M. Rogerts, a special columnist for the Washington Post, has written an excellent article, "Judging the Merits of the SALT Agreement." It is a hardheaded well analyzed article and one of the few I have seen that shows the in-depth research which was done in preparation of it.

The article follows:

JUDGING THE MERITS OF THE SALT AGREEMENT

(By Chalmers M. Roberts)

In judging the merits of the strategic arms limitation (SALT) agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union it is necessary to do two things: first, to appraise the meaning of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty and the details, including the numbers, of the interim agreement on offensive weapons; second, to judge the twin pacts in the larger context of the changing Washington-Moscow relationship. The two seem to me to be inseparable.

The ABM treaty has the great virtue of so limiting such defensive measures as to remove fears on either side that the other could indulge in a first strike attack. If such an attack could ever be conceivable to any rational leader, it would become so only when he felt that his own weapons and the bulk of his population would be so protected by an elaborate nation-wide ABM system as to make a second or retaliatory strike by the other nation a risk worth taking.

Given the undoubted ability of the offensive to overwhelm the defensive and given the grave doubts by many experts as to the efficacy of any ABM system, such fears doubtless have been gravely exaggerated in both Washington and Moscow. But that does not detract from the fact that such fears have existed, that they impelled vast expenditures regardless of their validity and that under terms of the SALT treaty on ABMs this should come to a halt if not an end. "Zero ABMs," which means a complete abolition by both sides of any ABMs, would have been better than the two site option agreed upon. But two, at least, is far, far better than unlimited ABMs.

So at least one factor that threatened to destabilize the balance of terror has been cut back to manageable proportions. It seems to me it would make sense for Congress to refuse funds for the building of an ABM around Washington despite the asymmetry that would involve, given the existence of a site now in existence around Moscow. Likewise, it would make sense for the Soviets not to build their second site around an offensive missile field. Should Congress so decide, the Moscow decision is most likely to be affected by the Soviet perception of a changing Moscow-Washington relationship.

Now turn to the offensive weapons agreement. It is evident enough that the Nixon Administration paid a stiff price, negotiated at the finale in Moscow, to win Soviet assent to inclusion of a limitation on submarine launched missiles (SLBMs). I think, however, it was a price worth paying.

The United States long has had a triad of strategic weapons system: ICBMs, SLBMs and long-range bombers. According to the figures presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee by Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, the sum total of the rival triads (one bomber being equated with one missile) will be 2,499 for the Soviets to 2,167 for the United States. Even these figures are not the whole story, however. The total megatonnage in the Soviet arsenal under the agreements is much the larger but the total number of American warheads, due to the American multiples (MIRVs), is far larger than that of the Russians.

In sum, the apples and oranges of nuclear weaponry have been added up to what can fairly be termed rough parity for weapons of one nation that can reach the soil of the other. Even here, it should be noted, some of the American apples have been excluded from the basket; the fighter-bombers based in Western Europe and on carriers, known as forward based systems (FBS). It seems to me the net of all these figures and factors is that the offensive agreement is a good deal for both superpowers.

In reading over all the official American explanations, by the President, Secretaries Laird and Rogers, Adm. Moorer and above all by Henry Kissinger, one is struck by a single theme: it would have been much worse if there had been no agreements reached. It is an uncontroverted fact that, as Sec. Laird kept saying so loudly and so long, the Soviets did have a great momentum going on offensive arms, from the giant SS-9 missiles to submarines. So, as the admiral put it, "we have forestalled a 1977 ratio of about three to two in their favor." I have no doubt he is right because I have no doubt that Moscow would have gone on building, lacking an agreement, to something like that amount of superiority. At some point the United States would have responded with a new program of its own.

The action-reaction phenomenon in strategic arms has been evident for years, for decades in fact. The current Soviet momentum clearly dates from the humiliation Moscow suffered in the 1963 Cuban missile crisis. The American preponderance at that time, in turn, was the result of early Kennedy Administration decisions to build a vastly superior force, rather than to accept some form of parity.

President Nixon was the first chief executive to accept parity as a principle though he sought to soften the blow to American pride by using instead the word "sufficiency." Whether he did so as an intellectual exercise, or whether he did so because he knew the Congress and the country simply would not put up the money for superiority in such costly weapons, is not material. That can be left to the historians. The fact is he did so. And only because he did so is there the agreement now before Congress for approval. Perhaps the best clue to Mr. Nixon's submarine decision was Dr. Kissinger's remark at a Moscow press briefing. Discussing the high price paid for the submarine section of the agreements, Dr. Kissinger remarked that "the United States was in a rather complex position to recommend a submarine deal since we were not building any and the Soviets were building eight or nine a year, which isn't the most brilliant bargaining position I would recommended people find themselves in."

In discussing the agreement, Secretary Laird has said he accepted them only on the premise that the United States will go forward with the multi-billion dollar Trident submarine and the equally costly B–1 bomber and some other programs as well. In essence, this is the old bargaining chip idea now being applied to the SALT II round due to begin this fall. The hope is to reach a permanent treaty covering offensive weapons systems to replace the five-year interim agreement now before Congress.

A good many in and out of Congress deride the bargaining chip argument. I do not. History teaches that Moscow respects muscle, not weakness. I thought there was validity in years past to the contention that keeping the American ABM program going was a bargaining chip; I think it proved so. The same argument now has validity. But that is not to say that everything that Sec. Laird and the Joint Chiefs would like is necessary, or even desirable at the speed they request. It sees to me further funding of the Trident project makes sense, in part because it will tend to move the core of the strategic power more to sea where it is least vulnerable. The B–1 is of lesser value, in my view, and should receive only limited funding at this point.

In his remarks at the Moscow dinner for Mr. Nixon, Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny remarked that despite "differences of social systems," there are "objective factors that determine similarity of interests" that influence Soviet-American relations. It was of course such a Kremlin view that permitted the Soviet leaders to let the President come to Moscow at a time he had challenged Soviet interests by mining the harbors of North Vietnam. It was simply one more demonstration of practicality over principle. One could say the same thing about Mr. Nixon's climb down from "superiority" to "sufficiency."

This sort of thing was codified in the declaration of basic principles signed in Moscow by President Nixon and Soviet Communist Party chief Leonid Breshnev. They said, among other things, that the two nations "will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence." Or as Dr. Kissinger put it to members of Congress at the White House: "We are compelled to coexist."

This theme, of course, is not new. Back in 1954 President Eisenhower declared that "since the advent of nuclear weapons, it seems clear that there is no longer any alternative to peace, if there is to be a happy and well world."

Just as many Americans have difficulty accepting parity instead of superiority, so the Russians have difficulty abandoning the secrecy on which they have so long counted, from Stalin through Khrushchev. This is evident in their refusal to give the numbers of their own ICBMs or to agree to a definition of "heavy" missiles and other pertinent terms. In short, the old suspicions of the Cold War are far from gone. It took a long time, on our side, for officials to abandon such terms as "international Communism." It would be useful for Secretaries Rogers and Laird to abandon the phrase "negotiating from a position of strength," which they both used in their testimony to Congress. And it would be useful for the Soviets to abandon some of the jargon of their own ideology such as "the imperialists."

The SALT agreements seem to me to be very important in themselves. But they are far more important if they form part of what Dr. Kissinger has called "vested interests in a continuation of a more formal relationship" between the two nations. We should, as Dr. Kissinger went on to say, "have no illusion" that such will occur or that, if it does, it will be quick and simple. The ideological differences, and the national rivalries too, remain. But there are, as Podgorny said, "objective factors" as well which tend to force each nation to move in the direction of a more stable and rational relationship.

Each side interacts on the other. In the past when the Soviets were weak the Americans sought to exploit that weakness. If America becomes weak I have no doubt the Soviets will exploit that weakness. The changes therefore must be gradual, not precipitate. To me, the Nixon demand—as specified by Sec. Laird—for massive new arms goes too far. But so, in the other direction,

Mr. and Mrs. William K. Divers, Mr. and Mrs. Howard Duff, Mr. and Mrs. Michael Stevenson—S & L Foundation, Inc.

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## LOCAL RADIO STATION RISES TO THE OCCASION

### HON. GOODLOE E. BYRON

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Thursday, June 29, 1972*

Mr. BYRON. Mr. Speaker, a grateful Brunswick, Md., certainly owes its sincere thanks to Country Frank Manthos and his hardworking and unselfish staff at WTRI Radio. During the height of the recent devastating flood that hit our area—and for the days that followed—WTRI operated around the clock on an emergency basis serving as a clearing center for the homeless and confused citizenry.

Rising to the occasion they created a flood fund which provided immediate help to families in the surrounding area effected by the storm. Pleas for clothing, food, furniture, tools and transportation were broadcast on a continual basis and efforts were coordinated with city and area officials, fire companies, fraternal organizations, police, and many, many more civic-minded groups.

It is said that in times of great emergency, dedicated public service—regardless of personal exhaustion—is brought into sharp focus. And certainly this was never more proven than by Country Frank and his tireless staff of workers. I join with all western Marylanders in this wholly inadequate but sincere tribute to their dedicated civic efforts which were far beyond their normal obligations.

Thank you one and all.

## SACB: AN ALIEN CREATURE

### HON. ROBERT F. DRINAN

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Thursday, June 29, 1972*

Mr. DRINAN. Mr. Speaker, on Friday, June 23, 1972, the New York Times published an excellent article by Senators ERVIN and PROXMIRE with respect to the wasteful and dangerous Subversive Activities Control Board. I commend this excellent analysis to the attention of my colleagues.

The article follows:

AN ALIEN CREATURE

(By Sam J. Ervin and William Proxmire)

WASHINGTON.—Once again the Administration has come before the Congress with a request—this year for almost three-fourths of a million dollars—and the plea that the moribund Subversive Activities Control Board be allowed to survive yet another year. Again there is a flurry of activity before June 30 to distract the Congress from the board's 22-year history of inactivity, at a price thus far of almost $7 million.

We believe the time has finally come to end this perennial exercise in futility and waste. The board is an anonmaly and an unnecessary appendage to our Government. It is a distasteful relic of the McCarthy era, incapable of performing any significant constitutional function.

The Constitution expressly provides two ways to protect our country against domestic danger by civil means. First, Congress may punish dangerous acts and, subject to strict First Amendment limitations, dangerous words. Second, those of us who esteem our system, the best yet devised by man, may use our First Amendment freedoms to instruct the ignorant, convert the doubting and combat the efforts of those who undertake to destroy or injure it.

Before the Internal Security Act of 1950 was adopted, our country steadfastly adhered to the principle that government ought not to punish anybody for anything except for a crime of which he has been convicted in a constitutionally conducted trial in a court of justice.

The Internal Security Act injected a novel concept into our system: that to protect society, our country should maintain a governmental agency to stigmatize publicly organizations the Government considers intellectually or politically dangerous, and visit upon such organizations and their members severe penalties. The Internal Security Act of 1950 created the Subversive Activities Control Board. By an amendment in 1954, the board was given jurisdiction to act on petitions of the Attorney General to identify and require the public registration of "Communist-action," "Communist front," and "Communist-infiltrated" organizations, and members of "Communist-action" organizations.

The act automatically imposed severe penalties upon the members of the organizations stigmatized by the board. The S.A.C.B. has been moribund since its existence in part because the courts have struck down its major approach—disclosure of individual members through compulsory registration. These rulings left the Subversive Activities Control Board with virtually nothing it could constitutionally do.

Apart from the constitutional questions, the board has proven to be a gross waste of taxpayers' funds. Congress has appropriated nearly $7 million to fund the board over the last 21 years. The Attorney General has brought only 26 petitions alleging organizations to be "Communist-action," "Communist front," or "Communist-infiltrated." Of these 26 petitions the board has issued only eight final orders determining that the organizations fell within the definitions of the act—one organization, the Communist party of the United States, was designated a "Communist-action organization * * * seven groups "Communist front" organizations. In spite of these eight final orders, the board has never registered a single organization or individual. The majority of the remaining cases have been dropped either because the board has found that the organization did not fall within the provisions of the act, or because the board's orders were vacated pursuant to a Federal court decision.

On July 2, 1971, President Nixon issued Executive Order No. 11605, which attempts to confer on the Subversive Activities Control Board vast powers to harass and stigmatize Americans.

In the last year—a year of "great activity" under the new Executive Order—the board did no more than hold four days of hearings. Aside from the absurdity of expending almost one-half million dollars in such a futile exercise, we submit that the Nixon order, which purports to confer new powers on the board, has no legal force. Its promulgation was beyond the constitutional power of the President, it is a direct violation of the doctrine of separation of powers for the President to rewrite statutes enacted by Congress. It is void for overbreadth and vagueness under the Fifth Amendment right to due process. It violates the First Amendment and due process rights of all the members of the organizations or groups designated except those who share the illegal aims of the organizations or groups.

The board will have even less to do next year than it had last year. Inasmuch as the courts have rendered it incapable of performing its basic functions under the Internal Security Act, Congress will again be asked to appropriate almost one-half million dollars for practically no purpose whatsoever. It is for this reason that the Senate struck the entire appropriation for the board. The issue is now before a conference committee.

The S.A.C.B. has no rightful place in our land. It is not the function of government in a free society to protect its citizens against the thoughts or associations it thinks hazardous. The time has come to remove this alien creature from our Government.

does the budget cutting program of Sen. George McGovern. It is up to Congress, as it approves the SALT agreements, to find the mean between the extremes. If it does, then 1972 could well become a date to remember when hope superceded fear without allowing illusion to supplant rationality.

## A TRIBUTE TO THE LITHUANIAN SPIRIT

### HON. ROBERT H. STEELE

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Thursday, June 29, 1972*

Mr. STEELE. Mr. Speaker, within recent months the international community has become more and more aware of dissent within the Soviet Union. In the past, we in the Congress have viewed with grave concern and spoken out in behalf of Soviet Jews, Ukrainians, and other oppressed minorities within the Soviet Union who suffer cultural-religious and political injustices. It is indeed appropriate that we now focus our attention and concern on Lithuania and her courageous people.

Soviet domination of Lithuania since 1940 has neither extinguished the desire for freedom nor has it been successful in erasing the Lithuanian ethnic spirit. In fact, there has been a rebirth of Lithuanian determination to reassert ethnic identity. Petitions, riots, and self-immolation by young Lithuanians within recent months have challenged the regime, which insists on forced russification and assimilation. Furthermore, despite official harassment by the Communist regime, traditional religious beliefs persist.

On March 28, 1972, the Washington Post reported that petitions from 17,000 Lithuanian Roman Catholics were sent to U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim in February. In their petition the Lithuanians complained that local officials curb freedom of religion by limiting the number of new priests trained and by controlling the assignment of priests to parishes. In addition, Catholics have not been allowed to rebuild churches destroyed during World War II and have difficulty in getting permission to hold services in private homes. These petitions were sent to the U.N. following unsuccessful attempts to induce the government to implement religious freedoms guaranteed by the Soviet constitution.

The Soviet leader's insensitivity to human spiritual needs is made clear by their preference for violent repression, arrests, and threats. On May 14 a young Lithuanian Catholic, Roman Talanta, burned himself to death for "political reasons" in the city of Kaunas. The incident triggered 2 days of rioting by nationalists. The incident was the most striking in a week that saw concentrated efforts by the authorities to prevent demonstrations during President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union. Political dissidents and Jewish activists had been warned and threatened with prison and labor camps. Jews were told that demonstrating would foreclose their chances of emigrating to Israel.

Talanta's suicide and burial were almost immediately followed by thousands of young Lithuanians swarming into the streets shouting "freedom, freedom, freedom for Lithuania." Local police, reinforced by "internal forces" clashed with thousands of demonstrators which eventually led to 800 arrests and two deaths. The Soviet press, as expected, conveniently denounced Talanta as "mentally disturbed" and a "drug addict."

Although the rioting was not reported in the Soviet central press, the Lithuanian Communist party leader held a special political meeting with local leaders in early June. Western diplomats interpreted the meeting as evidence of high-level concern over unrest in Lithuania, yet the low level representation from Moscow tended to indicate that the Kremlin felt local authorities could handle the situation.

However, the spurt of protest and the fires of Lithuanian patriotism which have been building up were not easily extinguished. In early June another youth in the city of Varena burned himself to death.

The tragedy of these events are overwhelming, yet the Kremlin remains insensitive to demands for justice, religious freedom, and human dignity. I believe it is fitting that we pay tribute to these two young men who gave their lives in protest. Let us hope and pray that these tragic incidents are not repeated and that justice, religious freedom, and human dignity will be a reality for Lithuania and her people.

## MOONWARD BOUND

### HON. OLIN E. TEAGUE

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Thursday, June 29, 1972*

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, our Nation has undertaken a long and difficult road on space cooperation with the Soviet Union. There may be progress and setbacks in our attempts to establish both programs in space exploration and possibly later in space utilization. A New York Times editorial of Monday, April 17, 1972, is enthusiastic about the prospects and opportunities of joint United States-Soviet space cooperation. I offer this editorial for consideration of my colleagues and information to the general public.

MOONWARD BOUND

By this time most Americans are so blase about successful Apollo flights that it was left to a foreigner to pay adequate tribute to the smooth launch of Apollo 16 toward the moon. Yevgeny Yevtushenko, a Soviet guest at Cape Kennedy yesterday, said Apollo 16 ranked with the Grand Canyon as the most impressive sight he had seen in this country. In this mood of admiration, Mr. Yevtushenko expressed the hope that American and Soviet astronauts will some day cross the Milky Way together in the same spirit in which their fathers met at the Elbe in 1945.

Implicit in Mr. Yevtushenko's tribute was the understanding that astronauts Young, Duke and Mattingly are moonward bound as envoys for all mankind. Their mission will be performed on a stage to which all nations have access. If they land on the moon, it will not be as imperialists to seize territory but as explorers seeking knowledge to be made available to all. Soviet scientists have already been given lunar material brought back by earlier Apollo flights. American scientists have received lunar material obtained by Soviet unmanned probes.

The Apollo effort began in 1961 in an aura of cold was Soviet-American rivalry. But yesterday the Moscow television news gave the Apollo 16 launch equal time with events in Vietnam. Soviet-American space cooperation—perhaps a prelude to truly international teamwork—could help greatly in easing world tensions. It would be an unexpected but welcome by-product of the Apollo program.

## AWARD FOR BETTY

### HON. DONALD D. CLANCY

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Thursday, June 29, 1972*

Mr. CLANCY. Mr. Speaker, the U.S. Marine Corps League has selected a very good friend of mine, Betty Donovan, for a well-deserved honor. For many years, she has been the best friend in the Cincinnati area of men in the military services. Betty is a topflight writer, reporting on the assignments and activities of area servicemen. In 1970 she went to Vietnam and wrote a series of articles about hometown boys that was widely proclaimed and thoroughly read.

I comend to your attention the following story about Betty and the award she is to receive as published in the Cincinnati Post and Times-Star:

Betty Donovan, who has written about servicemen and their families for the Cincinnati Post since 1944, has been chosen by the Marine Corps League of the U.S. to receive the Dicky Chapelle Award.

The presentation will take place Aug. 11 at the annual Marine Corps League Convention at Anaheim, Cal.

The award is given annually to a woman who has contributed "in an outstanding and meritorious way" to the welfare of the U.S., the Marine Corps and the Marine Corps League.

Mrs. Chapelle, a free lance journalist, was killed Nov. 4, 1965, while on patrol with a group of Marines near Chu Lai in Vietnam. Marines on active duty and members of the Marine Corps League established the award program in her honor.

Betty, in private life Mrs. Charles Rentrop, widow of the long-time City Hall reporter for The Post and Times-Star, will be presented the award by entertainer Martha Raye, who received the award last year.

The Marine Corps League of Greater Cincinnati and several individuals nominated Better for the award.

They cited her contributions through articles about Vietnam and Southeast Asia, written for the Post and Times-Star when she went there in 1970 and her articles about servicemen and their families and the plight of returning servicemen.

Betty was notified of the award in a letter from H. Lynn Cavin, national commandant of the Marine Corps League.

"It was not just a professional, but a personal, matter where my Charlie and I and servicemen were concerned. I guess we were

proudest of the fact that we had more than 200 'courtesy grandchildren' who were named Betty or Charlie after us by our servicemen and their families." Betty said.

In addition to Miss Raye, past recipients have been Esther Clark of the Arizona Republic Phoenix Gazette, Verona Devney of Project HOPE, Lucy Caldwell of the USO and Marjorie Merriweather Post.

Gen. Lou Walt, retired former assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, also will be present at the award ceremony.

Betty has two daughters and 10 grandchildren, William E. Daily, one of her sons-in-law, is on the faculty of Xavier University. Her other son-in-law, Willis H. Martin, is warrant officer at Port Eustis, Va., following his third tour in Vietnam.

## BRUCE HERSCHENSHON

### HON. JOEL T. BROYHILL

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Thursday, June 29, 1972*

Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, Mr. Bruce Herschensohn, former Director of Motion Pictures and Television, U.S. Information Agency, made the commencement address at McLean High School in my congressional district, on June 10. Several persons who attended believed that Mr. Herschenshon's remarks would be of interest to our congressional colleagues, and have asked that I insert the text of this address in the RECORD. I include it at this point in the RECORD:

COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS BY BRUCE HERSCHENSHON

Throughout all of your lives, the month of September has served as an usher. Each year, September has escorted out a vacation and brought in the dreaded advertisements of back-to-school clothes and it has brought in the first day of the new semester with squeaky chalk, varnished desks and the slowest clocks in the world. Also it has brought back old friends and the sight of some almost forgotten faces that would once again be passed in locker-lined hallways. It would come with the last heat wave of the season, the world series, Jewish holidays and football try-outs. There was very little element of surprise.

But today, September is losing its job and it will no longer be the arrogant usher. Some of you will go on to universities, some into marriage, some into a career—but all of you, today, are done with what is called compulsory education.

And that's good.

Now, for the first time, free choice is yours. Other than the gift of birth and the gift of love, today, June the 10th, is the greatest gift you will ever receive. From this day forward, September will no longer be arrogant and demanding. From this day forward, it's your choice. You can choose now to live in Arizona or Alaska, be a bricklayer or a banker, quote Confucius or quote Christ. You can become a hero or a hobo. It's your choice.

Many have died for the gift you are receiving free-of-charge, today. The gift is perishable, breakable and non-returnable and only the brave really appreciate it. It is true that many who are not brave prefer to live without it. There are those who want the security of regimentation where each person is cut from the same cloth. They do not want the responsibility that goes with free choice, where each person sews his own cloth and guides the needle in and out from this moment until the moment he dies.

Because it is both an ending and a beginning, this day will be remembered by you throughout the rest of your lives. But it is really only one in a series of forthcoming graduations through which most of you will pass. The forthcoming graduations will be without Pomp and Circumstance, without ceremony, without cap and grown. But they will come with a diploma—a diploma less tangible than the one you hold today, but just as real.

They will come with each success and each failure, each victory and each defeat, each high and each low—and you are bound to have all of them.

But with perception even the failures and defeats and lows will bring their diplomas and give to you a continuing scale of values—a scale of values which is based on being able to separate the important things from trifles. I have known, as I'm sure you must know, some who have no scale of values, who have stopped the learning process some past June in a ceremony very much like this one. When compulsory education was over, their learning process was over. They go through life existing rather than living and they go through life in a world of trifles. Moments make them. They never make the moment.

You can recognize them in an instant. They are the negativists who greet without a smile, who talk of the things they dislike rather than the things they admire, who prefer to condemn rather than commend. Afraid of their inferiority, it makes them feel superior. They are people of accusation and prejudice.

When I graduated from high school, we had a speaker at our commencement exercises who was a positivist and who spoke with optimism and pride in the young, and with optimism and pride in the country. He used words such as "duty" and "honor" and "law" and "prayer". In those days, they were not words of controversy.

But this isn't June of 1950. It is June of 1972. A little over two decades have passed. Today if someone chooses the word "duty" does it mean he disapproves of dissent? If he chooses the word "honor" does it mean he thinks of nothing else? If he chooses the word "law" does it mean he ignores justice? If he chooses the word "prayer" does it mean he's a religious fanatic? Of course not—but it's a time when old values and beliefs and ideals are put under microscopes and, if a germ is suspected, the germ is no longer searched for, isolated and removed. Instead, unfortunately, too often the entire idea is destroyed.

Sometimes, to be sure we don't over-simplify anything, we are in danger of over-complicating everything. We not only question values, we throw them out before the questions are answered.

I would like to briefly discuss a few important words which have been used and mis-used recently. The words are "young" and "old" and "prejudice" and "love" and "youth" and "Utopia".

The words, "young" and "old" have recently been opened to more examination than perhaps any other words. They have, in fact, polarized many into camps that each day seem to find a new reason for disrespect and distrust. I consider myself ideal to talk about them, since, by my age, I am completely unacceptable to both. I am too old to be young and too young to be old.

Since the mid-sixties, the young have been attacked and applauded, blamed and blessed, condemned and congratulated for every vice and every virtue of our time. We single out one youth from a crowd and say he speaks for all young people. We single out one from a crowd and say he is representative of the new generation. We single out one from a crowd and say he is typical. But I have yet to meet a typical Italian or a typical Catholic or a typical black person or a typical old person. It seems to me that the young generation has its share of fools and geniuses.

For anyone to want to deal with young people as a group, and for any of the young people to want to be dealt with as a group, is a new way of writing an old word called "prejudice".

Because he is young, should he be denied the right to express an opinion?

Because he is young, should he assume his opinion must be obeyed?

Because he is young, must he be wrong?

Because he is young, is he automatically right?

Perhaps we have forgotten what "young" means. To some, it is one end of a chronological scale of age. It was just that to Webster who said, "Being in the first or early period of life. Not having existed long. The period preceding maturity."

In recent years both the old and the young have become guilty of prejudicing themselves against age-groups, often times listening to the loudest and then generalizing. All of us, during these past two decades have taken some satisfaction in feeling prejudice is finally removing itself from our ways of life. It isn't.

Under the disguise of removing prejudice, which any sane man would be for, we have too often allowed prejudices not to be removed, but to be traded one for another.

As soon as the word "nigger" finally became unacceptable, the word "wasp" became acceptable.

When drinking finally became frowned upon, dope became accented.

When criminals finally became subjects for cure rather than only condemnation, the police became the condemned.

When new ideas were finally examined with favor, old and proven ideals were often discarded.

In total, the prejudices we would all like to see disappear have lessened, but have not disappeared. Some prejudice that existed two decades ago still exists. Some prejudices are the same as they were. Some prejudices have simply been traded for others. It has been a game of trade in the disguise of complete morality.

It has come about in my view, because we have redefined words to suit our own incapabilities. The word "love" itself has gone through a metamorphosis within the last two decades. Once it meant the highest honor, the greatest degree of compassion and sensitivity, the truest loyalty—worth living for, and even worth dying for. But today we have made it a cause rather than an emotion.

Some of you have already known love. Some of you have yet to feel it. Some, perhaps, may never know it.

If it has come, or if and when it comes, you will hear your mate or perhaps others, tell you there are compromises to make in an acceptance of love and in a joining together of two people. There are. Compromise a weakness for a strength but never a strength for a weakness. Compromise a liability for an asset but never an asset for a liability. Compromise selfishness for selflessness but never selflessness for selfishness. Compromise destruction for creativity but never creativity for destruction. Real love will never ask you to be worse—only to be worthy. Those who don't understand the word will find, as the years progress, that they hold a mirror rather than another hand. And through that mirror they will see wrinkles get deeper, characteristics get harder and the ends of their lips get lower. If they misinterpret love when they are young, they will frown at life when they are old.

The word "old" has also come under misinterpretation as of late. I have heard it said that those who live in your parents' time and your grandparents' time have left a horrible world for all of us. And we have shaken our heads at prior follies. But despite the evils that still exist in the world, most of the fatal diseases of a century ago are now controlled. Traveling to a foreign coun-

encouraging homeownership; encouraging people to make charitable contributions; encouraging exploration for oil; and so forth.

Because foundations were in some cases being used as a rather blatant tax dodge by the wealthy, and because some legitimate foundations were using their money in ways of questionable propriety and even outright partisan political action, Congress in 1969 enacted a number of provisions regulating them. For one thing, all "private foundations," as defined by the Internal Revenue Code, must pay an excise tax of 4 percent on their income. The stated purpose of this excise tax is that its revenues should approximate the cost of a stepped-up program of IRS audits of private foundations. In addition to the excise tax, a number of other provisions were enacted to regulate the operation of the foundations to eliminate certain questionable practices.

Mr. Speaker, the present definition of "private foundations" excludes hospitals and educational institutions. It also excludes churches and their affiliated organizations. So why do we discriminate against homes providing care to the elderly, the disabled, and children. It makes no sense whatever.

These nonsectarian organizations, by and large have been in existence for many many years and are able to offer long-term care services at a reduced cost because of the existence of an endowment, the income from which is used to offset operating costs; thereby reducing the cost of care to the residents/recipients. If they were church affiliated—performing the same function—they would not be classified as a private foundation, and would not be subject to these deleterious tax provisions. Why discriminate when we are talking about care for the aged?

At a time, Mr. Speaker, when the Congress is laboring to increase social security benefits, increase medicaid and medicare benefits, increase Federal retirement benefits, and increase the number of subsidized housing units for the elderly, we cannot permit these organizations to be penalized under our tax laws. The dissipation of resources dedicated to such a social good must be terminated. Certainly we do not want to foist upon the taxpayers burdens heretofore borne by eleemosynary organizations. We must eliminate this "penalty" imposed upon those organizations. In all likelihood, Mr. Speaker, these are the only organizatons which provide an absolutely necessary community service—which I might add, has been hit the hardest by rising costs—that of providing long-term care of the aged at a reduced fee for those who are least able to pay.

Mr. Speaker, in order to correct this serious situation, I am today introducing legislation to amend section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code to include homes for the aged, handicapped, and children. The result will be to exclude them from the definition of private foundations.

Mr. Speaker, I am also introducing legislation to amend section 4940 of the Internal Revenue Code to change the levy on all private foundations "excise tax" to a "service charge," and reducing it from 4 percent to 1½ percent. One purpose of these changes is to firmly establish the principle that this levy is intended only to cover the cost of audits, and is not a revenue producing device. The threats facing our charitable institutions, which are a major strength of the United States, are great enough without the added threat of being slowly devoured by taxation.

Certainly we do realize that private charitable institutions are a major force for good in this country, and worth preserving and encouraging. The ever growing role of government in our society is too often accompanied by distressing conformity, and lack of initiative. Lest we destroy all diversity in this country, and levy ever higher taxes on our citizens in the process, we should recognize the great value of our private and charitable institutions.

In addition to establishing the proper role of the section 4940 levey as only to cover the cost of audits, the reduction of it to 1½ percent is justified by the fact that at the present, the cost of audits is running far below the amount being raised by this section. According to the Department of the Treasury, in its first full year the 4 percent tax produced $33.9 million, while related IRS expenses totaled only $19.3 million. Since these figures do not include the amount of penalties assessed, or additional income produced by the audits, it seems entirely consistent with the purpose of section 4940 to reduce it to 1½ percent, which is the actual cost of auditing.

Mr. Speaker, to some people this will appear as a "tax loophole." Well, as it is used, that label which often comes with sinister connotations—is appropriate. But, as with many other exemptions, exclusions, deductions, and credits in our tax laws, there is a sound purpose for this tax-free status. In addition to doing something that government by its nature cannot do, namely assure diversity in our country, these private institutions also fill needs of our society much more cheaply than government could ever do. And, in the process, they do it in a self-reliant, compassionate way that government seldom evidences.

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## SALT AND AFTERWARD

### HON. MICHAEL HARRINGTON

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Friday, June 30, 1972*

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, the historic SALT accords signed by the President in Moscow a little more than a month ago will shortly be before this body for approval. Much to my dismay these SALT agreements have not resulted in decreased defense spending, but rather the Defense Department is attempting to accelerate our weapons production under the SALT umbrella.

The administration has rationalized this increase in defense spending by calling it a necessary "bargaining chip" for future SALT talks. I however find such an argument to be unconvincing. Both sides now have more than enough nuclear weapons to serve as bargaining chips for future arms limitation agreements. The way to limit weapons is not to build more of them.

I would like to call attention to a report entitled "Salt and Afterward" written by the Center for Defense Information and which appears in the June 30, 1972 edition of their publication, the Defense Monitor. This report is required reading for all those who are still under the misperception that the United States gave away too much in the SALT agreement or who share the administration's belief that the way to limit nuclear weapons is to build more of them.

The report follows:

SALT AND AFTERWARD

The SALT accords, signed May 26th in Moscow and now before the US Congress for approval, were written in the face of a rapidly moving nuclear arms race.

At the time of the signing the United States was installing multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRV) on its land and sea-based missiles. It was going forward with a program to greatly expand the destructive power of its strategic bombers by equipping them with short range attack missiles (SRAM). Together these steps would increase the US strategic nuclear warhead and bomb total from about 5700 in 1972 to more than 10,000 in 1976. On top of this the United States was developing a new strategic submarine called Trident, with new missiles to go with it, and a new strategic bomber, the B-1.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was building new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers at a rate of 250 per year. These included silos for the huge SS9 missile, capable of carrying 25 megatons (a US Minuteman II carries about 1 to 2 megatons). The Soviets had dug 25 silos possibly for a new missile even larger than the SS9. They were building new nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile submarines at a rate of 7 to 9 per year, and could at this rate have twice as many such submarines as the United States in five years. The Russians were, however, years behind in MIRV. They were working on MIRV technology but had yet to test what US technicians considered to be a MIRV system.

Thus, the two superpowers were running their nuclear race in different ways. The United States was concentrating on MIRV, while holding its missile totals constant and reducing megatons. The Soviet Union was increasing numbers of missile launchers and deploying larger vehicles to carry fewer warheads but with greater megatonnage. Both sides were developing anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems.

For the question "Who's ahead?" there were as many answers as there were ways to measure the strategic arms balance.

In numbers of ICBM launchers, the Soviet Union had come from behind and passed the United States.

In numbers of submarine missile launch tubes the Soviets were catching up, and would in a few years pass the United States.

In numbers of heavy bombers the United States had a 3 to 1 lead.

In numbers of separately targetable nuclear weapons, the United States had a 2 to 1 lead, and because of this country's head start in MIRV, this lead was rapidly widening in favor of the United States.

In total megatons the Soviets had about a 2 or 3 to 1 lead.

When all these measures were considered together the Soviet Union clearly had come from a position of nuclear inferiority at the

time of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis to a position which many weapons experts saw as parity, and which some viewed with alarm as indicating future Soviet superiority unless the United States speeded up its weapons programs.

THE ACCORDS

The SALT accords consist of a treaty limiting ABMs, a five-year Interim Agreement which puts certain partial limits on offensive weapons development pending further arms talks, a protocol to this Interim Agreement, and a number of statements of "interpretation" some agreed and some unilateral. Based on all these documents, the following is a summary of the main provisions of the accords:

ABM TREATY

Each country agrees not to build an ABM system for defense of its entire territory or major region. This amounts to a pledge that neither will try to upset the present deterrent balance by deploying ABMs to protect its general population and industry.

Each will limit ABM systems to two sites—one in defense of its national capital, the other in defense of an ICBM field. These must be at least 1300 kilometers (800 miles) apart, which means the Soviet ICBM field to be protected must be east of the Ural Mountains, away from the major western USSR population centers.

No more than 100 ABM launchers and 100 intercepter missiles may be deployed at each site.

Restrictions are set on numbers, types and placement of ABM radars to foreclose a radar capability for nationwide defense of either country.

In addition to these basic provisions, the two countries agree to ban sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based ABMs; not to deploy ABM systems of new kinds without prior discussion; not to convert air-defense or other systems to an ABM role; not to build radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missiles except along the edges of the country facing out; not to transfer ABM systems to other states or deploy them overseas.

There is no on-site inspection. Each side will use its own technical means of verification and each pledges not to interfere with these means or resort to deliberate concealment.

A Standing Consultative Commission will be established to implement the treaty and consider questions involving it.

The ABM treaty is of unlimited duration but either side can withdraw for supreme interest.

The treaty would require the United States to cut back its 12-site ABM program (of which four sites have been approved by Congress) to a maximum of 2. The Administration plans to complete the ABM site on which construction is farthest ahead—at the ICBM field at Grand Forks, N.D. It will halt work on three other sites at ICBM fields and has asked Congress to approve an ABM site at Washington, D.C. The treaty permits Russia to continue its ABM site already under construction at Moscow and to start a second site at an ICBM field.

INTERIM AGREEMENT AND PROTOCOL

These deal with offensive nuclear weapons. In general they limit the numbers of ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to levels which each side agrees are presently deployed or under construction. These limitations are for five years, pending further SALT talks. With agreed "interpretations" the limitations are as follows:

No additional fixed, land-based ICBM launchers may be started during the freeze above the numbers deployed and "under active construction" at the time of signing—1054 for the United States, and about 1618 for the Soviet Union.

Launchers for so-called "light" ICBMs (the US Minuteman and Soviet SS11 and 13) and "older" ICBMs (the US Titan and Soviet SS7 and 8) may not be replaced by "modern heavy ICBMs" (the Soviet SS9). The SS9 class missiles may, however, be made heavier. Russia has 288 SS9s now and 25 apparently larger silos dug. It could therefore end up with 313 "modern heavy" ICBMs of SS9 size or larger. The United States has no "modern heavy" ICBMs and plans none.

Within these restrictions, ICBMs may be replaced with more modern ones—for example with MIRV. But in the process of modernization, launchers may not be increased in size more than 10–15%.

The number of launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) each side presently had deployed or under construction was stipulated to be 656 US and 740 USSR. These numbers can be increased subject to two provisions:

Additional SLBM launchers may become operational only as replacements for an equal number of "older" ICBM launchers (first deployed prior to 1964) or for launchers on older nuclear-powered submarines or for modern SLBM launchers on any type of submarines.

During the five year freeze the US is limited to 44 modern ballistic missile submarines and 710 SLBM launchers. The Soviet Union is limited to 62 modern ballistic missile submarines and 950 SLBM launchers.

As in the case of ICBMs, submarine missile systems can be modernized. Single-warhead missiles can be replaced by MIRVed missiles. New submarines can be substituted for old.

Destruction or dismantling of old ICBMs or submarine missiles must begin by the start of sea trials of a replacement ballistic missile submarine.

Each side agrees not to significantly increase its number of test and training launchers for ICBMs or SLBMs.

There were several unresolved points of *disagreement* in the accords:

The Soviet Union stated unilaterally that if US allies in NATO should increase their numbers of ballistic missile submarines beyond those presently in operation or under construction the Soviet Union would have the right to make a corresponding increase in its number of submarines.

The United States was unable to get agreement on a common definition of "heavy" ICBMs. The US considers it to be any missile bigger than the largest existing "light" ICBM which is the Soviet SS11.

The United States was unable to get agreement to include mobile ICBMs in the freeze. (Mobile ABMs are banned.) The United States declared unilaterally that deployment of mobile ICBMs during the freeze would be considered "inconsistent with the objectives" of the agreement.

WHAT THE ACCORDS MEAN: FROM AN ARMS CONTROL VIEW

The SALT accords can be examined from several viewpoints. One of these is the viewpoint of international arms control—that is, in terms of what effect the accords will have on the arms race.

*Among the achievements in this regard:*

The SALT accords represent the first—even though partial—limitations by the United States and Soviet Union dealing with the fundamentals of their arms race. Previously, the two countries had agreed to bar nuclear weapons from the Antarctic, from outer space, and from the sea bed. They had agreed not to test them in the atmosphere, underwater or in space and not to give them to other countries. But never had the two superpowers reached agreement on the nuclear weapons targeted at each other.

The ABM treaty bans the kind of ABM system which could be most de-stabilizing—a nation-wide or major regional defense of population and idustry. Such a system, undertaken by either country, could threaten the other's deterrent and cause it to respond with additional offensive buildup. The complex restrictions of ABM sites should convince each side the other is not developing an ABM for defense of large areas. The treaty rules out a US ABM for population defense against China, which this country once planned but later abandoned.

Freezing ICBMs, SLBMs, and ballistic missile submarines at levels deployed and under construction is a first step in limiting offensive nuclear weapons, a step on which future SALT talks can build. Broadly speaking, the accords accommodate themselves to the different kinds of offensive weapons buildup which each side now has underway—Soviet construction of more and bigger missiles and US MIRV. They allow each side to substantially complete the round it now has in progress. The new levels become the starting point for attempting to freeze the arms race.

*Among the debits from an arms control viewpoint:*

Except for ABMs the accords do not stop any of the major weapons programs now in progress. This is because numerical limits are set high, qualitative improvements are allowed, and many weapons systems—including bombers, air-defense, anti-submarine warfare, air-breathing strategic missiles and tactical nuclear weapons—are not covered. Under SALT the United States can continue conversion of Minuteman and Polaris to MIRV, development of Trident submarines with new missiles, the B–1 bomber, research on "site defense" for ICBMs, submarine launched cruise (air breathing) missiles and new submarines in which to carry them. The Soviet Union can continue, up to a point, building additional land and sea-based missile launchers, and could develop and deploy MIRV.

Because all these programs are allowed, and because numerical limits are set so high, military planners on each side will still point to future possibilities rather than existing or likely forces to justify their own building programs.

FROM A U.S. SECURITY VIEW

The accords can also be looked at from a much narrower view of US military security:

*Advantages:*

Since only the Soviet Union is presently building up its numbers of offensive weapons launchers, it is to the advantage of the United States to put ceilings on these numbers. Within the totals the number of "heavy" ICBMs Russia can have is limited to 313. Without SALT, the Soviet Union could, at present rates of construction, exceed the freeze ceiling. Instead of 62 modern ballistic missile submarines it could have 80 or 90. The US has had no plans to add to its numbers of ICBMs or build "heavy" ones. It could, under the freeze, build 13 Trident submarines. Defense Secretary Laird has said only ten are planned. Actually the first Tridents would not become operational until after the 5-year freeze, and are therefore more related to future rounds of SALT than the first.

Freezing the number of ICBM launchers, especially "heavy" ones will leave only one route for the Soviet Union to develop increased "counterforce" capability to knock out US ICBMs—qualitative improvements such as increased accuracy, MIRVing, and throw weight.

The ABM limit plus the limits on ICBM numbers lessen the chance that the Soviet Union could develop the capability for a successful "first strike"—that is, the ability to knock out enough US missiles to suffer no or substantially less damage in return.

*Criticisms:*

A number of criticisms have been made against the treaty on US security grounds:

The accords allow the Soviet Union to have

more ICBM launchers, SLBMs and ballistic missile submarines than the United States.

Only the Soviet Union can have "modern heavy" ICBMs, with capacity to carry more megatons or more MIRVs than US missiles.

The Soviet Union will retain advantage in total megatonnage and throw weight.

Though ICBM numbers are frozen at levels deployed and under active construction, the Russians did not specify exactly how many they have under construction. The United States considers the freeze level to be 1618 for the Soviet Union.

In reply to these criticisms, Administration officials have said that without the SALT ceilings, assuming recent Soviet construction rates were to continue, the Russians could have, in 1977, more than 2000 ICBMs instead of the 1618 permitted; 1200 SLBMs instead of the 950 permitted and 80 to 100 modern ballistic missile submarines instead of the 62 permitted. As to Russia's refusal to specify its ICBM total, U.S. officials said that if the Russians were to significantly add to the number 1618, the United States would quickly know about it and would have the right to withdraw from the treaty.

An important factor in the security controversy is MIRV. If the Soviet Union does not develop MIRV, it will still have little more than 2500 warheads five years from now when the United States will, under presently planned programs, have more than 10,000.

If the Soviets do develop MIRV, two key questions will be: How fast? And how much?

The Soviet Union appears to be years behind this country in MIRV. The United States began MIRV tests in August, 1968. The first squadron of Minuteman III missiles became operational Jan. 8, 1971; the first wing of 150, on Dec. 13, 1971. The Soviet Union has also been working on multiple warhead technology since about August, 1968, but according to U.S. officials it has yet to test a MIRV system as the United States knows the term. The Russians tested a triple warhead system in which the warheads may or may not have been independently targetable. (U.S. analysts differed on this point.) But these tests stopped in late 1970, suggesting that the Russians might have decided to start over on a new tack.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird said June 5 that Russia "could have a MIRV capability in 24 months." But he did not say how many they might have by then.

Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) has said that when the Soviets achieve MIRV ". . . the combination of their vastly superior payload and modern MIRV technology will give them superiority in warheads." There have been published reports that Soviet missiles larger than SS9s could hold up to 20 MIRVs each. (A U.S. Minuteman holds up to 3; a Poseidon, 10 to 14.) But other defense analysts believe this overstates what Russia could realistically achieve in MIRV during the next five years.

Table V shows the Center for Defense Information's calculation of what the Soviet Union probably could achieve in MIRV during the five years of the Interim Agreement, if it develops MIRV. At the end of five years it would have some 3800 warheads compared to more than 10,000 for the United States.

Assuming Russia could MIRV its missiles to the maximum figures indicated in public print, it could have more than 14,000 warheads. It is doubtful Russia could achieve this level in five years. The United States could also have 14,000 warheads by MIRVing all its Minutemen and building the B–1 and Trident. This would be permitted by the SALT Interim Agreement.

However, such calculations of marginal advantages for the United States or Soviet Union—whether they be in warheads, launchers or megatons—overlook one important point: Both countries have the power to destroy each other several times over, and this will remain the case during the five years of the Interim Agreement.

Gerard Smith, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, when asked during hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee June 19 whether Russia would get ahead of the United States during the five year agreement, replied: "Nothing the Soviets can do within the five year agreement will offset the present strategic balance between the US and USSR."

COST

The immediate cost impact of the SALT accords on the fiscal 1973 defense budget has been listed by the Defense Department as follows:

Reducing ABM program to two sites, minus $711 million.

Increases in other strategic programs:

Accelerate and complete development of Site Defense, plus 60 million.

Develop submarine-based cruise missile, plus 20 million.

Accelerate bomber rebasing, plus 45 million.

Augment verification capabilities, plus 13 million.

Develop improved reentry vehicles for ICBMs and SLBMs, plus 20 million.

Improved command, control and communications, plus 10 million.

Net change, minus $543 million.

Secretary Laird has testified that the total ABM saving through 1981 as a result of SALT would be $9.9 billion, figured in 1968 prices. (The 1968 estimate for a 12-site ABM was $18.4 billion, of which $13.4 billion remains to be spent. The 1968 estimate for a two-site program was $8.5 billion, of which $3.5 bililon remains to be spent. The SALT saving is $13.4 billion minus $3.5 billion.)

Further savings could come from the first round of SALT if the United States decided that, as a result of the recent accords, it could safely stop or slow down some of its other major nuclear weapons programs, such as Trident, the B–1, or air defense. The Administration wants to go ahead with these programs. The question of what this country's pace in nuclear weapons building should be following the first round of SALT has become a major issue.

POLICY FOLLOWING SALT

Secretary Laird told newsmen June 6: "I could not support the (SALT) agreements if Congress fails to act on the movement forward of the Trident system, on the B–1 bomber, and the other programs that we have outlined to improve our strategic offensive systems during this five year period." Admiral Moorer said the Joint Chiefs were in accord with the SALT agreements provided the other programs went ahead.

In a briefing for Senators and Congressmen June 15, Dr. Henry Kissinger, assistant to the President for national security, considerably moderated this stand. He said the Administration wants Congressional approval of both SALT and the new weapons programs but: "We are not making them conditional. We are saying that the treaty is justified on its merits, but we are also saying that the requirements of national security impel us in the direction of the strategic programs . . ."

Laird told the House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations June 5 that "Just as the Moscow agreements were made possible by our successful action in such programs as Safeguard, Poseidon and Minuteman III, these future negotiations to which we are pledged can only succeed if we are equally successful in implementing such programs as the Trident system, the B–1 bomber, NCA defense, Site Defense, SLCM, and accelerated satellite basing of strategic bombers. We must also initiate certain other measures in areas such as intelligence, verification, and command, control, and communications."

Transmitting the SALT agreements to Congress, President Nixon said: "Just as the maintenance of a strong strategic posture was an essential element in the success of these negotiations, it is now equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic modernization program to maintain our security and to ensure that more permanent and comprehensive arms limitation agreements can be reached."

The Administration's argument is that if the United States had not been deploying MIRVs and going forward with other programs it would have lacked the bargaining power to obtain a ceiling on Soviet building of SS9s and other systems.

Others have challenged this "bargaining chip" approach. Sen George McGovern told the Priorities Subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee June 16 that if the United States had followed a policy of restraint in weapons building, both American and Soviet MIRVs could have been stopped. He said building weapons for bargaining purposes "can only push up the terms of ultimate arms control agreements."

The Arms Control Association said: "The US should review its unilateral weapons programs and pursue only those that have a security need in light of the new strategic situation." Thus, a fundamental issue has been raised—whether the way to ultimately curb the nuclear arms race is to build more weapons for "negotiating strength" or whether it is to exercise more restraint in weapons building.

It is an issue which, no doubt, both the United States and Russia face as they contemplate the next round of SALT in October.

CONCLUSIONS: ARMS CONTROL

The ABM treaty bans the kind of ABM systems which would be most de-stabilizing and is therefore a significant step in limiting the arms race.

The five-year agreement on offensive weapons allows the United States and Soviet Union each to continue its present round of nuclear buildup, and then establishes a partial, quantitative freeze at the resulting new levels. This is a start which can be followed up in future SALT negotiations.

U.S. SECURITY

The accords place ceilings on numbers of offensive weapon launchers at a time when only the Soviet Union is increasing these numbers. Without the accords, Soviet construction could be greater. The offensive freeze plus the ABM limitation lessen the chances of Russia ever becoming able to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against this country without being destroyed in return.

While Russia will continue to lead the United States in numbers of launchers and total megatonnage under the accords, the United States is expected to retain its lead in numbers of warheads. These differences, however, are less important than the fact that each country has the power to destroy the other several times over.

WEAPONS POLICY

The Administration should reconsider its present policy which says that the way to limit nuclear weapons is to build more of them. Both the United States and Russia appear to have approached the recent round of SALT determined to "negotiate through strength." Each had nuclear buildups in progress. But somehow these bargaining chips didn't get bargained. They are being built. The initial round of SALT has made the US deterrent more secure. The United States now does not need to build Trident submarines and B–1 bombers and submarine cruise missiles to convince the Soviet Union that both countries have good reason to bring their arms race under control and eventually reduce nuclear arms. Each side already has more than sufficient nuclear power to bargain toward this end.

## OPEN LETTER ON THE ELECTION PROCESS

### HON. FRANK ANNUNZIO

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Friday, June 30, 1972*

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call to the attention of my distinguished colleagues and especially to the people of America an open letter which appeared on Friday, June 30, 1972, in the New York Times.

This letter is a warning to all Americans who believe in the direct election of their public officials, and unless we as Americans become more involved and more articulate, a small minority will threaten not only our election process but will destroy the free institutions that exist in America.

I want to ask that every American read carefully the following open letter which appeared in newspapers throughout the country including the Chicago newspapers, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal:

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE DELEGATES OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION FROM ELECTED NONCOMMITTED DELEGATES FROM COOK COUNTY, ILL.

The basic McGovern Commission recommendation was to eliminate the convention system of selecting delegates. The Democratic Party of Illinois became one of the first in the Union to change the method of delegate selection from convention to popular election. This provided that the Democratic voters themselves would decide who would represent them at the Democratic National Convention.

An election was held on March 21, 1972. It was an open election. Anyone who wanted to run could run by filing a nomination petition containing 600 signatures. There were as many as 15 to 36 candidates in each district competing for six to eight convention delegate seats.

Fifty-nine uncommitted delegates were elected. It is inconceivable that hundreds of thousands of voters should be disenfranchised after having cast their votes in accordance with the statutes of the State of Illinois and the Constitution of the United States.

The uncommitted delegates endorse the McGovern Rules providing there should be proper representation of all elements in society, but in an open election it is *impossible* to guarantee established quotas of blacks, women, young people and other categories. The laws of the United States provide that the voter alone has the right to decide who shall hold office.

The motives of the challengers who are seeking to disenfranchise the hundreds of thousands of voters are highly questionable. It is significant that some of the challengers who now seek to become delegates did not offer themselves to the people as candidates in the March 21 election. Instead, they organized caucuses after the election to select themselves and their friends and those who were defeated by the voters.

In the caucuses the challengers violated almost every rule of the state party and the McGovern Commission. They closed the doors to everyone but themselves and the defeated candidates. They are asking the Convention to disenfranchise the hundreds of thousands of voters who went to the polls and cast their votes from the delegates of their choice. The challengers have substituted for the voter's choice the very candidates who were defeated in a regular, legal election and those who never stood for election.

It is a shocking commentary on our democratic process that the credentials committee of the National Democratic Convention is being asked seriously to consider the action of a self-appointed group of individuals who decided to select themselves as representatives of hundreds of thousands of citizens of Cook County for the selection of a nominee for President of the United States.

Since we were legally elected, we are entitled to be part of the Illinois delegation at the National Convention.

(NOTE.—This advertisement prepared and paid for by Elected Non-Committed Delegates of Cook County: Claire Roddewig, Janie Bailey, Co-Chairmen; Information Committee.)

## U.S. FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICY AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE

### HON. GUY VANDER JAGT

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Friday, June 30, 1972*

Mr. VANDER JAGT. Mr. Speaker, on Wednesday, June 21, 1972, Prof. Robert B. Stobaugh of the Harvard Business School appeared before the Republican task force on international economic policy, of which I have recently become a member. Following this seminar on "Foreign Economic Policy in the 1970's" I had the occasion to discuss further, at length with Professor Stobaugh, the implications of his testimony and those of the other partcipants. These included representatives from the administration, the business community, the labor unions, and the League of Women Voters. In what was a very illuminating and candid dialog, the focal issue became more and more that of labor's views of international finance, trade, and the multinational U.S. enterprise, as evidenced in the Hartke-Burke legislation now before the Congress.

And as regards these considerations, the presentation of Dr. Stobaugh was extremely timely and thought provoking. Dr. Stobaugh is eminently well qualified to speak on such matters having worked first as head of the International Division of Monsanto Corp., and then having taught for several years in the international business area at the Harvard Business School. He recently was responsible for a study of "U.S. Multinational Enterprises and the U.S. Economy," under contract with the U.S. Department of Commerce.

This study, published by Commerce in "The Multinational Corporation: Studies on U.S. Foreign Investment," vol. I, sought to shed new light on what effects foreign direct investment has on employment with a specific focus on the effects of foreign direct investments by U.S. multinational enterprises. As of the date of this study's publication, despite this interest, no previous study had provided a relevant basis for policy formulation.

Dr. Stobaugh's research revealed that investments in factories abroad by the large U.S. firms usually have a favorable effect on both U.S. employment and on the U.S. balance of payments.

As my colleagues are aware, there is today in many quarters, widespread interest in, and general confusion concerning what role multinational enterprises have now and can have in the future, vis-a-vis U.S. foreign investment policy. I thus strongly recommend to my colleagues the following provocative testimony of Dr. Stobaugh on this question. I am sure my colleagues will want to consider as especially pertinent Dr. Stobaugh's proposals concerning first, an international agreement on trade in services, analogous to the GATT on trade in goods; and second, an adequate program to retrain workers who lose their jobs because of imports.

These and other considerations raised in Dr. Stobaugh's presentation are issues of importance to us all regardless of politics. The Congress cannot waste any time in giving serious attention to such matters on their merit.

Dr. Stobaugh's experience and knowledge in this field dictates that just such a consideration be given the following presentation:

U.S. FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICY AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE

(Statement of Prof. Robert B. Stobaugh, Harvard Business School)

There are two types of foreign investments—portfolio and direct. In a portfolio investment the investor owns shares in a company but does not controls its operations. In direct investment the investor not only owns part or all of the company but also controls its operations. Our discussion this morning deals only with foreign direct investment, since by definition a firm must control its foreign affiliates to be called a multinational enterprise.

Other criteria used to define multinational enterprises, such as size of sales or spread of foreign operations, are quite arbitrary. In order to obtain a list of firms to study, we at Harvard Business School arbitrarily took *Fortune* magazine's annual list of the 500 largest U.S. firms and their annual list of the 200 largest foreign firms and selected those companies manufacturing in six or more foreign countries. These firms account for a substantial part of all foreign direct investment; for example, the 187 U.S. firms that met our criteria account for three-fourths of all U.S. foreign direct investment in manufacturing.[1]

Foreign direct investment, and this is largely investment by multinational enterprises, has been growing faster than either world production or world trade. From 1950 to 1970, the output from facilities owned by foreign direct investors grew at an annual rate of 10 per cent, compared with annual growth rates of slightly less than 8 per cent for the non-communist world's Gross National Product and slightly more than 8 per cent for the non-communist world's trade. As a result, by 1970 the output from the facilities owned by foreign direct investors was 6 per cent of the non-communist world's GNP and about the same size as the non-communist world's trade.[2]

About 60 per cent of all foreign direct investment is owned by American companies, and another 10 per cent is invested in the United States by foreign companies. Thus, the United States is involved in 70 per cent of all foreign direct investment.[3]

By the end of this year the book value of U.S. foreign direct investment will approximate $100 billion. About 90 per cent of this investment is equally distributed among three major geographical areas: Europe,

Footnotes at end of article.

of the committee's report are now circulating among professional groups, associations of providers of mental health services, and voluntary associations of citizens so that we may have the benefit of their consultation and interest.

It is my fondest hope that through the efforts of this journal's task force with a goal, the efforts of the staff and of the individuals supported by the National Institute of Mental Health, and the efforts of professional groups, voluntary groups, and parents throughout the world, we shall be able to offer our children not only more care and better care, but the great boon of freedom from illness via prevention and cure. This journal will help lead the way.

## DETROIT'S ETHNIC FESTIVALS

### HON. LUCIEN N. NEDZI

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Friday, June 30, 1972*

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Speaker, we all know about the troubles which have beset our large cities. From time to time, however, there is a brighter side, as in the case of Detroit's ethnic festivals.

The Detroit Metropolitan Area is blessed with a sparkling variety of ethnic influences. In 1970, Mayor Roman Gribbs, buoyed by the success of the annual Greektown Festival, decided to enlarge the concept. The result has been gratifying, as the June 28, 1972, editorial of the Detroit Free Press testifies.

Under leave to extend my remarks, the editorial follows:

FLOURISHING ETHNIC FESTIVALS

New, innovative ideas for big cities in America abound. Like fireflys, they are hatched, glow with intermittent bursts of enthusiasm, and summarily die. But Detroit is fortunate enough to have a laudable concept transformed into an even more pleasing reality.

The downtown ethnic festivals have been a total success. They have drawn, and will continue to draw throughout the summer, millions of suburban citizens downtown for a fun time. Where the downtown area on weekends was once a series of concrete canyons virtually devoid of humanity, there are now thousands of people enjoying the area in safety.

The idea and its realization have been the work of Detroit Mayor Roman S. Gribbs. Shortly after taking office, Hizzoner looked into the possibility of the city's sponsoring events similar to the long-established Greektown festival. In the summer of 1970, he held three new festivals downtown. Last summer, the number grew to 14, and attracted more than two million citizens.

This year's program, which began with the Irish festival June 2, has been expanded to 19 festivals which will run every weekend until Sept. 24. Latin American, Polish, Indian, Mexican, Scandinavian, Afro-American, and Armenian are but a few of the festivals remaining for the citizens to enjoy.

Under Mayor Gribb's guidance, the city has organized the festivals which spring alive on weekends in the riverfront area behind Cobo Hall. Plainclothes police unobtrusively patrol the large crowds to insure safety. Health inspectors make certain that the food sold is of good quality. Stroh's brewery provides cups of beer and ice cream at cut-rate prices. And thousands and thousands of people of numerous nationalities and backgrounds mingle and meet in a pleasant atmosphere.

So far, the only problems encountered with the festivals have been a result of their huge popularity. Food stands occasionally run out of goodies. Other city projects should be so lucky. The City of Detroit makes no direct financial profit from the festivals; it only breaks even. And there is no admission charge for the festivals.

The ethnic festivals have been such a success that officials from other cities have visited them to learn about the possibilities of instigating similar happenings in their own cities.

Mayor Gribbs says that he is "personally pleased" with the unqualified success of the festivals. The rest of Detroit joins him.

1972 ETHNIC FESTIVALS

July 1–4—American.
July 1–4—Greek (Greektown, Monroe Street).
July 7–9—Far Eastern.
July 14–16—Captive Nations.
July 14–16—Bavarian (Harmonic Park).
July 21–23—Afro-American.
July 28–30—India.
August 4–6—Ukrainian.
August 11–13—Polish.
August 18–20—Scandinavian.
August 25–27—Armenian.
September 1–4—International.
September 8–10—Mexican.
September 15–17—Arab.
September 22–24—Latin American.

## CITY OF CHICAGO RESOLUTION

### HON. GEORGE W. COLLINS

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Friday, June 30, 1972*

Mr. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, several years ago, the city of Chicago as well as several other metropolitan cities initiated reduced fare plans for the elderly. However, with this reduction additional financial difficulties developed within the transit authorities in providing adequate service with less revenue. In view of this situation, the city council of Chicago, adopted the following resolution introduced by Mayor Daley at their meeting of June 14. I am hopeful that my colleagues will find this to be of great concern. The resolution reads as follows:

RESOLUTION

Whereas, the number of persons 65 years or older in the United States today is approximately 20 million—ten percent of the total population; and

Whereas, between 1960 and 1970, older Americans increased in number throughout the Nation by 21 percent, as compared with an 18 percent growth in the under 65 population; and

Whereas, nearly 6.5 million older Americans are now classified as poor or near poor, and one out of every four individuals 65 and older—in contrast to one in nine for younger persons—lives in poverty; and

Whereas, the ability to travel is vital to the elderly in order to acquire basic living necessities and to participate in spiritual, cultural and recreational activities; and

Whereas, the White House Conference on Aging, on December 2, 1971, adopted recommendations which call for "travel at half fares or less on a space available basis on all modes of public transportation", for the elderly, and "operating and capital subsidies" by the Federal government to make this and other recommendations possible; and

Whereas, in February, 1972, Mayor Richard J. Daley and Michael Cafferty, Chairman of the Board, Chicago Transit Authority, testified before Congressional Committees, urging that the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 be amended to provide operating subsidies for urban mass transportation systems; and

Whereas, on March 8, 1972, Robert J. Ahrens, Director, Mayor's Office for Senior Citizens, in testimony before the U.S. House Select Subcommittee on Education recommended operating subsidies for mass transit systems for any proven loss which results from a program of reduced fares for the elderly; and

Whereas, numerous mass transit systems, including the Chicago Transit Authority, have instituted reduced fare programs for senior citizens and continue to experience fiscal difficulty in attempting to provide an adequate level of services; and

Whereas, Congress is currently considering legislation (as part of the "Omnibus Housing Act of 1972") that carries the important provision of subsidy for urban mass transportation; now, therefore,

Be it resolved, That the Mayor and members of the City Council of the City of Chicago in meeting assembled this 14th day of June, A.D., 1972, urge the inclusion within the "Omnibus Housing Act of 1972" of provisions calling for the reimbursement to urban mass transit systems for proven losses attributed to the reduction of fares for senior citizens; and

Be it further resolved, That a copy of this Resolution be forwarded to the House Banking and Currency Committee of the United States Congress.

## RECENT SALT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.S.R.

### HON. STROM THURMOND

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

*Friday, June 30, 1972*

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the Greenville, S.C., News of June 17, 1972, contains an article which I consider most relevant to the continuing debate about the strategic arms agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The writer explains that recent administration statements on the "escape clause" in the treaty and American interpretations of certain aspects of the agreement both give further evidence that approval is in the best interest of this country.

With regard to the escape clause, the President stated that the United States would probably withdraw from the defensive agreement if no acceptable offensive agreement is reached within the 5-year interim period. Withdrawal could also occur if the Soviets expanded or improved their defensive missiles beyond limitations set forth in the treaty.

Another safeguard is the American insistence on counting strategic weapons of our European allies separately, thus assuring the United States of additional weapons if the need arises. These comments deserve the consideration of the Congress.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial, entitled " 'Fine Print' Alleviates Fears," be printed in the Extensions of Remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial

was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Greenville (S.C.) News, June 17, 1972]

"FINE PRINT" ALLEVIATES FEARS

Details submitted by President Nixon to to Congress on the defensive missile treaty and the interim offensive missile agreement with the Soviet Union reveal some important areas of disagreement, which paradoxically make the landmark agreements safer for the United States and the free world.

Most important, perhaps, is the escape clause in the treaty, which permits either country to withdraw upon six months notice. In his explanatory remarks, the President made clear that he had informed the Soviet Union the United States probably would withdraw from the defensive missile treaty if an acceptable offensive missile treaty were not negotiated within the five-year limit of the interim agreement.

In addition the United States could withdraw if it found the U.S.S.R. to be improving defensive missiles beyond the bounds of the treaty or the understandings reached with leaders of the Kremlin. This involves both numbers and quality of weaponry.

The "fine print" revealed by the President's communications to Congress also goes far to explain and justify the numerical superiority in land-based offensive missiles and nuclear submarines allowed to the U.S.S.R. in the interim agreement on offensive weaponry.

Previously it was known only that the United States was depending upon technical superiority and ability to deliver more nuclear tonnage to offset the Soviet numerical advantage. The "fine print" shows the United States also is taking into consideration modern submarines built by this country's European allies.

The Soviet Union insists that allied subs be included in the limitation; America holds otherwise. Since this issue is unsettled the United States can proceed legitimately on the assumption that it can count on allied submarines, and of course can cancel the agreements if the U.S.S.R. insists otherwise.

These details, and probably others not yet fully explained, tend to cast uncertainty upon the effectiveness of the treaty and interim agreement. But they do safeguard this country against finding itself locked in an iron-bound box with no avenue for escape.

On balance the treaty and interim agreement appear to be a forward step toward a stable, honorable world peace. Such a step is needed to alleviate justified fear of a nuclear holocaust and to provide a basis for continuing negotiations on more meaningful limitations of both strategic and tactical armaments.

Further study and debate will be required before the Senate can reach a decision on ratification of the treaty and both Senate and House can vote upon the interim agreement. But the recently-disclosed details give further evidence that approval of both in the best interests of this country.

## RETIREMENT OF GEORGE ROBINSON

### HON. LESLIE C. ARENDS

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Wednesday, June 28, 1972*

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I want to join in the chorus of congratulations and accolades raised by my colleagues in tribute to our good friend, George Robinson, on the occasion of his well-earned retirement from his service to the Members of the House of Representatives.

Congressman Bill Hill brought George to Washington from Colorado in 1947 to join our congressional staff. Bill Hill was always a great judge of character, and in the case of George Robinson he made an extraordinary choice, to the credit of the great State of Colorado, and to the benefit of the hundreds of Members of Congress George has served so faithfully and so well.

As the acting minority leader, I know I may express these sentiments on behalf of all of my colleagues on this side of the aisle, in wishing George and his good wife, Ethel, every happiness and satisfaction in the years ahead, as they return to Colorado.

George Robinson will be remembered gratefully and fondly here at the Capitol, and we hope he will come back often to see us.

## CENTENNIAL YEAR OF "CRACKER JACK"

### HON. MORGAN F. MURPHY

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Friday, June 30, 1972*

Mr. MURPHY of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, more than 100 years ago, the great city of Chicago was laid waste by a most devastating fire which took more than 200 lives and caused damage in excess of $200 million. At the same time, a German immigrant with $200 in savings opened a small popcorn stand with one popper.

Since then, Chicago has rebuilt itself into one of the greatest cities in the world. And the immigrant, F. W. Rueckheim built his little popcorn stand into a company that is known to practically every man, woman and child in the world. I am speaking of "Cracker Jacks."

This is the centennial year for "Cracker Jacks," and I would like to join with them in celebrating it. Although baseball may be our national pastime, I think it is accurate to that Cracker Jacks have become a national institution.

Since this is the year designated for the celebration of the rebuilding of Chicago and for 100 years of fine products made by the "Cracker Jack" company, Mayor Richard J. Daley has proclaimed this period as "Cracker Jack Time in Chicago."

I would like to insert into the RECORD at this time a chronology of events which depict both the growth of Chicago and the growth of the famous "Cracker Jack." I think all candy lovers in the Nation will find it interesting:

CRACKER JACK CHRONOLOGY—IT'S BEEN A CRACKER JACK CHICAGO FOR 100 YEARS

Cracker Jack, a company whose beginnings coincided with the rebuilding of Chicago after the holocaust of 1871, grew as the city boomed. The development of the little popcorn stand of 1872 into the world's largest user of popcorn in 1972, is indicative of the pioneer spirit that has been Chicago's since the days of the early settlers.

The "we can do it" energy of the people of Chicago was infused in F. W. Rueckheim, a German immigrant, who came to Chicago to work on his uncle's farm in 1869. Two years later he moved to the city to help clean up after the blaze. He had been earning $150.00 per year on his uncle's farm and had saved $200.00 while there.

The story of F. W. Rueckheim and the growth of Chicago are intertwined. They are each representative of the vitality, vigor and vision that make Mideast America what it is today.

In 1871—Chicago, population 334,270, was laid in ashes; three and one-half square miles were burned over, 18,000 buildings destroyed, 200 persons killed and 100,000 persons made homeless. Total loss was estimated at 200 million dollars.

In 1872—F. W. Rueckheim went into the popcorn business with $200.00, one stand, one popper and a partner at 113 Federal Street (then called Fourth Avenue).

And the Chicago Public Library was founded.

In 1873—F.W.'s brother, Louis, bought out the partner and became Bro. in F. W. Rueckheim & Bro.

In 1875—The *Chicago Daily News*, the first one-cent paper, was founded. (Previously, *The American* became a daily in 1839, the *Chicago Morning Democrat* became a daily in 1840, and the *Chicago Tribune*—the first to use the name in the country—issued its first paper in 1847.)

Between 1875 and 1884—The brothers moved the firm five times in nine years, doubling and quadrupling their manufacturing space as demand increased, lastly to a three-story brick building at 266 South Clinton Street.

Meanwhile, the open Board of Trade was organized in 1877; the first Bell & Edison telephone system was installed in Chicago in 1878; the Art Institute of Chicago was incorporated in 1879, and the first electric lights were installed in 1880. The first cable cars were run—on State Street south to 39th Street—in 1882 and used until 1906; and the first asphalt pavement was laid in 1882.

In 1887—Chicago's first municipal electric lighting system was put into operation. In 1889 Hull House was founded by Jane Addams and Ellen Gates Starr. The Chicago Symphony Orchestra began its first season, and the University of Chicago was chartered in 1890; and the Chicago and South Side Rapid Transit Railroad (the "Alley L") opened the first elevated line, from Congress to 39th Street, in 1892.

Chicago's population passed the 1,000,000 mark in 1890.

In 1893—Twenty-one million people who flocked to Chicago for the World's Columbian Exposition, enjoyed wonders like the Ferris Wheel, Little Egypt, and a popcorn-peanuts-and-molasses confection introduced by the Rueckheim Brothers who made and sold their new treat at the fair.

In 1896—Louis Rueckheim solved the problem of separating the popcorn kernels from one another and perfected the confection. F. W. gave the treat to a salesman who replied, "That's a cracker jack!" "So it is!" said F. W., and it has been ever since. The name was trademarked, and the slogan, "The More You Eat, The More You Want," was copyrighted.

In 1897—The Scenic Theater, first moving picture theater in Chicago, opened at 567 South State Street.

In 1899—The wax-sealed package was developed to protect the flavor and crispness of Cracker Jack until it reached the hands of the consumer. This carton was used until the moisture-proof package was perfected in 1902.

In 1900—The sanitary and ship canal was opened and the current of the Chicago River was reversed.

In 1903—F. W. Rueckheim & Bro. became Rueckheim Bros. & Eckstein and bought two

## PRO-SALT ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED

### HON. JOHN M. ASHBROOK

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Thursday, June 29, 1972*

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, in the weeks ahead there will be an extensive debate on this body regarding the merits or lack of merits of the SALT agreements. I strongly oppose this agreement and feel it is against our vital interests. My esteemed colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. HOSMER), recently presented his rational argument for the SALT agreements. I think that some of his arguments should be answered and present here a different view.

I believe there are certain fallacies in the arguments my colleague presented and offer arguments in opposition to some of the basic statements he made. The fallacies and facts follow.

FALLACIES IN PROPONENT'S ARGUMENT FOR SALT PACT

*Fallacy:* "It is generally conceded that America and Russia cannot risk attacking each other because their nuclear arsenals are sufficient to withstand surprise attack and still have enough undamaged retaliatory hardware left over to inflict unacceptable harm on the aggressor."

*Fact:* This is not generally conceded at all. In a speech on April 13, 1972, Dr. Edward Teller, one of the greatest living nuclear scientists, was asked the question, "If the Soviets launch a surprise nuclear attack against the United States, what would be the result?" He replied, "The question is when. Right now, they could do terrible damage. In a few years, if present trends continue, it is practically certain that it will be the end of the United States. The United States will not exist—not as a state, not as a power, not as an idea. I think that more than 50 percent of our people would be killed. I believe that the Soviets could so behave that there would be very few casualties in Russia because we would not have forces enough left to retaliate. They have excellent defenses: air defenses, missile defenses, civil defenses. It is possible that, in a few years, we shall be at the mercy of the Soviet Union, unless present trends change."

Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research, told U.S. News & World Report that the Soviets "would require a little over 400 SS–9s to knock out all but a small fraction of our Minuteman" missiles. The Soviets have 313 now.

*Fallacy:* "The rationale of the ABM limitation is obvious. Each new ABM built by one side can be nullified by the other's new offensive installation. It is in nobody's security interest to spend money for that kind of an arms race only to end up poorer, but no safer than before."

*Fact:* This is like saying that, just because arsonists can buy more and more matches and gasoline cheaper than we can buy fire engines, we should stop maintaining fire departments. Rational men are willing to spend money to protect their homes and families against destruction, regardless of the cost. Arguments like this have kept our 200,000,000 Americans completely defenseless against Soviet nuclear missiles and it overlooks the clear fact that while we have stood still, the USSR has moved full speed ahead.

*Fallacy:* "The actual number of nuclear warheads in the U.S. deterrent package considerably exceeds those of the Soviets because of our many multiple independently guided re-entry vehicles (MIRVs)."

*Fact:* The United States simply has no reliable information on how many warheads the Soviets have. The Soviets won't tell us, satellite reconnaissance cannot detect this, and the SALT Pact does not allow any on-site inspection.

The most important error in this equation, however, is that the Soviet warheads are so vastly more powerful than ours that there can be no comparison. Many of our warheads, such as those on our MIRVed Poseidon, are only 50 kilotons; whereas the warheads on the Soviet SS–9s are 25 megatons, and they are getting ready to deploy super SS–9s of 50 megatons. Thus, *one Soviet warhead* now may carry 24,950,000 tons of TNT-explosive equivalent *more* than one of ours can carry, and will soon carry 49,950,000 more than ours.

Thus, when SALT proponents talk about "warheads" they overlook the fact that they equate 50,000 with 25,000,000. When we add up the destruction that these warheads can cause, the Soviets have a tremendous superiority over the United States.

*Fallacy:* "The greater accuracy of the U.S. warheads gives them a proportionately large kill capability, ample for nuclear sufficiency."

*Fact:* There is *no* proof that the U.S. warheads are any more accurate that the Soviets. In fact, the reverse may be true. Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard specifically admitted while he was in office that the United States deliberately did not improve the accuracy of the Minuteman because the Soviets might think that was provocative.

In October 1971, Senator James Buckley proposced an amendment to appropriate a small amount to do the research so that we would have the option of improving the accuracy of our Minuteman and Poseidon missiles if we want to. The Administration lobbied against and defeated that amendment.

*Fallacy:* "U.S. allies and near allies possess strategic deterrent forces which augment the Free World's over-all deterrent posture."

*Fact:* The Soviet Union has at least 600 IRBMs and MRBMs targeted on Western Europe ,against which Western Europe has neither defense nor deterrent. In conventional weapons, the Warsaw Pact has the NATO powers outgunned by at least two to one.

It is ridiculous to imply that our allies can help us protect the United States against the Soviet nuclear missile force. In fact, our allies' only hope of defending themselves is *our* nuclear umbrella.

*Fallacy:* "The arrangements impose no limitations whatever on certain U.S. systems contributing to our deterrent strength, such as Strategic Air Command bombers and U.S. aircraft based overseas on land and on aircraft carriers."

*Fact:* It is vastly more advantageous to the Soviet Union than to the United States that certain strategic forces were excluded from the SALT Pact. In strategic bombers, the Soviets now outnumber us by 900 to 450. (Their medium-range bombers are refuelable and also can use Cuba as a base. McNamara scrapped our 1,000 medium-range bombers and abandoned the bases close to Russia from which they operated.) Our B–52s have now developed metal fatigue because of excessive use in Vietnam, and no replacements for them have even been ordered. The Soviets are at least five years ahead of us in their version of a new supersonic bomber, called the Backfire, which has already been flight-tested. Our B–1 is still only a wooden mockup.

The SALT Pact imposes no limitations whatever in many areas in which the Soviets are now ahead and now can, under the terms of the treaty, go even further ahead, namely, (1) missile megatonnage, (2) space weapons, (3) fractional orbital weapons, (4) mobile ICBMs, (5) reload capability of their ICBMs, (6) cruise missiles, and (7) satellite interceptors.

*Fallacy:* "Sufficiency to deter is something in the mind of the beholder, and when one side feels a mix of bombers, IBCMs and SLBMs with which it is satisfied, the other side would need to assume very large and unknown risks of miscalculation in order to assess it as insufficient."

*Fact:* Countries which falsely and foolishly believed they had "sufficiency to deter" and were "satisfied" with it, have gone down to ignominious defeats. In 1939, France was supremely confident that the Maginot Line give it "sufficiency to deter." France found out that she was wrong.

On December 7, 1941 the United States did not have overwhelming sufficiency to deter. As a result Japan attacked us and Germany declared war on us. Wars are prevented by overwhelming superiority. Instead of superiority, the SALT Pact freezes the United States as a poor second to the Soviet Union in every category of the nuclear weapons which will control the future.

Senator Henry Jackson summed up the SALT Treaty very well: "Simply put, the agreement gives the Soviets more of everything: more light ICBMs, more heavy ICBMs, more submarine-launched missiles, more submarines, more payload, even more ABM radars. In no area covered by the agreement is the United States permitted to maintain parity with the Soviet Union."

History proves that weakness invites aggression. The now-officially proclaimed military inferiority of the United States to the Soviet Union is a dire threat to the lives and freedom of all Americans. We should heed the omnious warning of Winston Churchill (who unsuccessfully tried to warn his country to rearm in time to prevent World War II):

"Sometimes in the past we have committed the folly of throwing away our arms. Under the mercy of Providence, and at great cost and sacrifice, we have been able to recreate them when the need arose. But if we abandon our nuclear deterrent, there will be no second chance. To bandon it now would be to abandon it forever."

## ACES WEEK

### HON. PETER W. RODINO, JR.

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Thursday, June 29, 1972*

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Speaker, the system of capitalism, of competitive private enterprise has been the foundation for prosperity, for growth and accomplishment in this Nation. While such a free system has not been without its challenges—nor will it be devoid from future question—it has been the ability of our economic-political system to respond to such testing that is the measure of its success.

I am particularly pleased therefore, Mr. Speaker, to note that New Jersey Governor William T. Cahill declared ACES—Americans for the Competitive Enterprise System, Inc.—Week. ACES is a nonprofit, economic-educational corporation which conducts 3-day seminars in high schools throughout New Jersey on the operation of the free economic system. The importance of the educational

aspects of discussion, dissemination of information and providing a forum for question, cannot be overestimated. And, I would especially like to commend ACES officers, Robert W. Kane, Jr., chairman of the board; H. Alan Christenson, president; and Robert M. Moran, executive director for their valuable efforts in the operation of this program.

Following is the text of the executive proclamation declaring ACES Week:

PROCLAMATION

Whereas, there are many misconceptions concerning the operation of our free enterprise system by students and teachers alike; and

Whereas, only two percent of our high school students study economics during their four years of high school; and

Whereas, the free enterprise system has contributed to one of the highest standards of living in the world; and

Whereas, Americans for the Competitive Enterprise System, Inc., fulfills a vital educational need by discussing the difference between the various economic systems throughout the world with high school students; and

Whereas, bringing students from over 70 high schools in Northern New Jersey to visit local businesses exposes many of them for the first time to the world of work;

Now, therefore, I, William T. Cahill, Governor of the State of New Jersey, do hereby proclaim May 14–20, 1972 as ACES Week in New Jersey.

## MR. ROUSH'S ACTUAL REMARKS ON CAPITOL EXTENSION

SPEECH OF

### HON. J. EDWARD ROUSH

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Wednesday, June 28, 1972*

(Mr. ROUSH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROUSH. Mr. Speaker, I am a member of the Legislative Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations handling this matter. I am in disagreement with the majority of the members of my subcommittee.

At this particular moment, I would like to address myself to this matter of the need for additional space. It seems to me there is a great deal of space in this Capitol Building, which, is first, not used, and, second, is misused. I, for one, think it is a desecration of this monument in which we conduct the Nation's business to have barbershops in one of the main corridors of this building. I think it is a desecration to have restaurants in this building. If I had my way, that space would be better used and could be used to meet some of the needs we have insofar as our congressional requirements are concerned.

But let us talk for just a moment about the need that my chairman has spoken of. I refer to the concern for the needs of our visitors. I was under the impression that the reason we chose Union Station as the National Capital Visitors' Center was to relieve us of some of the problems we have here. A few moments ago I spoke with the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. GRAY) who very graciously gave me some figures and information concerning that proposal.

First of all, it will be under construction within a matter of 2 or 3 weeks. It should be completed within 18 to 24 months. It will have eating facilities, a restaurant, and a cafeteria. There will be two large theaters and one small theater. The two large theaters can accommodate 500 people every 15 minutes. There is going to be constructed an $11 million parking area which will accommodate 2,000 cars, 200 tourist buses, and arrangements will be made to transport people back and forth from that center, which is not too far away, to the Capitol Building.

I think this is a proper plan for the accommodation of those people who want to visit the National Capital.

I do not want to walk just in the paths of my predecessors. There are changes needed in this building. These changes can be accomplished as we restore it. There are changes needed inside this building to better accommodate the people who work here, and the people who use it, and the people who visit it, but I, for one, cannot accept the arguments which have been advanced here today in favor of extending the west front of the Capitol.

## LATE J. GORDON CANFIELD, NEW JERSEY

SPEECH OF

### HON. DOMINICK V. DANIELS

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Tuesday, June 20, 1972*

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, it was with deep regret that I learned recently of the death of former New Jersey Representative J. Gordon Canfield.

Gordon Canfield, as he preferred to be known, first served as an assistant to another New Jersey Representative, George Seger. After this experience he went on to serve for 10 consecutive terms in the House from what was then New Jersey's Eighth Congressional District.

Congressman Canfield had recognized the need for strong drug enforcement laws before many of his colleagues and fought for authorization for U.S. narcotics agents to conduct investigations overseas. He was also interested in a strong American merchant marine and traveled incognito to London during World War II to study U.S. merchant marine operations there.

He was instrumental in bringing into use multicolored postage stamps in the U.S. mails.

Mr. Speaker, I am sure that my colleagues join me in an expression of deep sympathy to Gordon Canfield's beloved wife, Dorothy, and their two sons, Carl and Allen, as well as their five grandchildren.

## A REPLY TO MR. MEANY

### HON. PHILIP M. CRANE

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Thursday, June 29, 1972*

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, there have been charges by many leaders of organized labor to the effect that corporate profits have been rising at a faster rate than have the wages of individual workers.

In considering the real meaning of statistical data there is a tendency to compare figures which are unrelated, or which are based upon different criteria. This seems to be the case with much of the consideration of corporate profits and wage rates.

Discussing this problem in a letter to Mr. Nat Goldfinger, director of the department of research of the AFL–CIO, Mr. R. J. Ryan, chairman of the board of the Nooter Corp., points out that—

Increases in wages and salaries are usually stated on a "unit" basis as a percentage of base pay for each worker. . . . On the other hand, profits of corporations are usually stated "in total" *which includes* increases in capacity due to demands of a gradually expanding population and work force.

Mr. Ryan points out that—

A better analysis of corporate profits would be made if profits were shown as a percentage of sales and as a return on stockholders' equity.

He calls attention to the fact that—

Since 1966 to 1971, which covers our greatest period of inflation, both profit on sales and return on stockholders' equity *are down.*

If statistical measurements are to be meaningful, they must measure the same thing. Thus, states Mr. Ryan:

If *unit* measures are used in defining wages, this same measure should be used in defining profits.

Similarly, he notes:

If *total profits* are used as a measure then *total wages* likewise should be used as a measure. In other words, compare "apples and apples".

I wish to share Mr. Rayn's thoughtful analysis with my colleagues, and insert it into the RECORD at this time:

NOOTER CORP.,
*Saint Louis, Mo., June 9, 1972.*

Mr. NAT GOLDFINGER,
*Director, Department of Research, AFL–CIO, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. GOLDFINGER (AND MR. MEANY): Many thinks for your detailed response of May 17th to my "Open Letter to George Meany".

I think there is a common error committed by many people when comparing wages and salaries with corporate profits. Increases in wages and salaries are usually stated on a "unit" basis as a percentage of base pay for each worker, or in cents or dollars per hour per worker, etc.

On the other hand, profits of corporations are usually stated "in total" *which includes* increases in capacity due to demands of a gradually expanding population and work force. Labor is not alone in this type of comparison!

Industry and financial reporting institutions often make the same type of compari-

subject ourselves to a liability that would not exist absent that undertaking. Furthermore, such an undertaking would compel us to adopt such procedures as would be necessary to guarantee our performance that we think would be disproportionately time consuming and expensive.

I am sorry that our reply cannot be more positive, but I hope that you will try to appreciate our dilemma.

Sincerely,

———— ————.

JUNE 1, 1972.

MR. ARYEH NEIER,
*Executive Director,*
*American Civil Liberties Union,*
*New York, N.Y.*

DEAR MR. NEIER: This is in response to your letter dated April 25, regarding persons and institutions maintaining accounts at our bank.

Records concerning a customer's banking transactions are definitely confidential, and it has been this bank's long-standing policy not to disclose to third parties information about an account except when legally required to do so or with the customer's written consent. This will continue to be our policy.

At present we do not send the customer a copy of the subpoena or otherwise notify him when we are required to disclose information regarding his banking transactions.

Sincerely,

———— ————.

MAY 4, 1972.

MR. ARYEH NEIER,
*Exectuive Director,*
*American Civil Liberties Union,*
*New York, N.Y.*

DEAR MR. NEIER: Thank you for your recent letter of April 25 to the President of our bank in which you discussed the need for banks to protect the right of privacy of their customers.

The management of our bank completely agrees with the principles set forth by you.

Sincerely,

———— ————.

MAY 2, 1972.

ARYEH NEIER,
*Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union, New York, N.Y.*

DEAR MR. NEIER: Your letter of April 25, 1972, addressed to our president has been handed to me for reply.

———— is committed to the proposition that transactions with its customers are confidential. It takes all steps available to it to protect that confidentiality. Where possible, it undertakes to advise its customers of the service of a subpoena in order that the customer may attack the subpoena if he so desires.

Very truly yours,

———— ————.

MAY 4, 1972.

MR. ARYEH NEIER,
*Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union, New York, N.Y.*

DEAR MR. NEIER: This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1972.

We appreciate the spirit of your letter and wish to assure you that our Bank has been and will continue to be most conscientious in observing the confidential nature of the affairs of our customers. We feel that our existing procedures and training programs comply with the letter and the spirit of the law regarding these rights.

Sincerely,

———— ————.

## ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without prejudice to the distinguished senior Senator from Virginia (Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.), who is detained because of a previous commitment, the Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) for not to exceed 15 minutes.

## UNITED STATES WILL LEAD IN STRATEGIC BALANCE DURING SALT AGREEMENT EVEN IF NO STEP-UP IN NEW WEAPONS—NUCLEAR POWERS' ARSENALS COMPARED

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, with the Senate about to consider the merits of the ABM Treaty and the associated interim agreement dealing with ICBM's and submarines, it is only prudent that we examine the strategic arsenals available to the world's nuclear powers.

For that reason I have charts at the back of the Chamber which I think spell out the message I am trying to give to the Senate.

Somehow, in all the excitement about this bilateral treaty, we have overlooked the fact that three other nation's have tested and deployed nuclear weapons. France, Great Britain, and the People's Republic of China—PRC—each have specific nuclear capabilities against European and Asian countries, and in particular, the U.S.S.R.

### FEARS ABOUT SOVIETS UNFOUNDED

Fears have been expressed lately that during the initial 5 years of the treaty and interim agreements, the Soviet Union will vigorously pursue the development and deployment of new strategic weapons systems. It is said that the treaty will allow the Russians to surpass the United States in strategic power. This simply is not true. A close look at the strategic systems of the five nuclear powers shows that the United States will retain a significant overall strategic advantage over the Russians during the initial period of the SALT agreement.

Based entirely on unclassified data and measured by a number of indices, the United States need not fear that Soviet or Chinese strategic power will surpass or threaten that of the United States alone, let alone the United States and our allies. On the contrary, it appears that U.S. strategic power will grow measurably and widen the present lead even without the super acceleration called for by the Secretary of Defense.

### USE OF CLASSIFIED DATA

Comparing strategic forces is more than a simple exercise of counting launchers or adding up megatonnage. Other factors are just as important. In the next few minutes, I will suggest a number of additional variables to use in assessing overall strategic capability.

All the facts I cite and those on the accompanying tables come from unclassified public sources such as the Institute for Strategic Studies, Janes, SIPRI, congressional hearings, and official Defense Department data. Because of the sensitive nature of this information, undoubtedly there is some built-in error factor involved. It would be a service to Congress and the American public if the Defense Department would release official figures along the lines of my tables every 6 months. Experts in the U.S.S.R. know these facts. Our specialists know these facts. It is time that the American public be allowed to see just what weapons the world's nuclear powers possess. In the nuclear age, it is a basic "need to know."

### ASYMMETRICAL FORCES

The strategic forces of the United States and U.S.S.R. are not symmetrical. Different technologies are involved that result in different deployment decisions. In general terms, the Soviets lead in megatonnage, the United States leads in numbers of warheads.

Due to the early Soviet development of large boosters and perhaps an inclination toward a "biggest in the world" philosophy, the U.S.S.R. continued to work with very large missiles and liquid propellants. They tend to follow conservative R. & D. patterns—making each successive missile larger but in the same mold. The SS–6 space booster is a perfect example of this conservative design commitment. An impartial observer would admit that the Soviets have not been particularly innovative.

As a result of this design tendency, U.S.S.R. missiles generally have large throw weights. This in turn has degraded their accuracy since they decided to concentrate on large warheads that enter the atmosphere with a degree of turbulence.

The United States on the other hand rather quickly decided to exploit new technologies. While the Soviets were concentrating on large boosters, we improved our computers, guidance, and reliability. This occurred in several ways.

First, the United States changed over from storable liquid propellants to the more reliable solid propellants. All of our missiles, with the exception of the Titan II, are now solid propellant.

Second, we phased out our older Titan I and Atlas missiles. The Soviets have kept their older SS–7's and SS–8's.

Third, we went to hardened underground silos. The Soviets soon followed but they still retain many above-ground, unhardened launch facilities.

In sum, each country made different technical decisions early in their programs and this has resulted in the development of asymmetrical missile capabilities. In almost every case, however, history has shown that the U.S. decisions have concluded in more modern, more sophisticated missiles. Let us look at some of the factors involved in assessing strategic power: Accuracy, readiness, reliability, command and control, and early warning.

### ACCURACY

There is no doubt that U.S. missiles are more accurate than their Soviet counterparts. U.S. reentry vehicles are sharply pointed so as to penetrate the atmosphere without creating undue turbulence. This capability, combined with onboard computers, inertial guidance, and accurate target knowledge from reconnaissance satellites, provides the United States with significant advantages. The circular error probables (CEP) of many U.S. missiles are under one-quarter mile.

Soviet reentry vehicles are rather blunt and do not penetrate the atmosphere

with great accuracy. Nor do they carry as sophisticated computers or guidance equipment.

RELIABILITY

U.S. missiles also enjoy a decided advantage in reliability, both at launch and in-flight. Solid propellants store better and are less susceptible to accident. There have been problems with portions of the Minuteman fleet in previous years, but these appear to be solved now. The Soviets have only one operational solid propellant strategic missile system, the SS–13, and it is deployed in limited quantities; 60 to 100 launchers.

READINESS

Missiles must be constantly on ready status. Years underground in difficult environmental conditions can have undesirable results. In general, solid propellants are less subject to the constant checking needed for storable liquids. A decisionmaker can have more confidence in the readiness of a solid propellant force than one consisting of storable liquids or cryogenics.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The United States has invested considerable thought and resources into its command and control facilities. Elaborate safeguards are built into the system. Targeting flexibility has been increased and plans are underway for more improvements. At present, most of our missiles can be retargeted quickly, although there are a limited number of options. It is not thought that Soviet command and control facilities are as sophisticated.

EARLY WARNING

U.S. satellite technology not only provides accurate targeting information, but some degree of early warning capability. Infrared sensors can detect missile exhausts. In addition, there are many radars that scan the horizon over the U.S.S.R. A worldwide communications network links these stations. Due to geographic limitations and a lag in computer and camera technology, the U.S.S.R. does not have as complete or accurate early warning systems.

STRATEGIC SUBMARINES—WE WILL GROW STRONGER

There is now a rough numerical parity in numbers of strategic submarines between the United States and U.S.S.R. The Soviets, however, will be allowed to build up to 62 ballistic-missile submarines while the United States is limited to 44. This apparent Soviet superiority is more than dispelled—and this has not been stressed either in the press, in the public, or in congressional debate—by U.S. advantages in on-station time, number of reentry vehicles, and submarine quietness.

Due to geographic limitations such as longer transit times to and from aiming points, the percentage of Soviet submarines ready to launch missiles on U.S. targets is quite small. With 25 active Y-class submarines, for example, only a handful are on station at any one time.

U.S. submarines with advanced bases at Holy Loch, Scotland, Guam, and Rota, Spain, have less distance to travel and therefore, can be onstation a higher percentage of the time, about 60 percent, according ISS.

When considering numbers of reentry vehicles, the U.S. lead is overwhelming. We are in the process of going from 656 reentry vehicles to over 5,000 by fiscal year 1975. At present we have about 2,096 sea-based reentry vehicles. Using the 60-percent onstation formula, at any one time the United States could destroy over 1,250 Soviet targets with our sea-based missiles alone. Nothing the Soviets can do over the next 5 years will alter this assured destruction capability of our submarines. In fact, we will grow immeasurably stronger.

The quietness of U.S. ballistic missile submarines is insurance that the Soviets will not be able to locate and destroy our underseas deterrent. They cannot now detect, track, or destroy even one of our submarines, except by a fortuitous stroke of luck. In the vew of the experts the next 5 years will not see Soviet ASW programs progress to the point that our submarine fleet is vulnerable.

STRATEGIC BOMBERS

There has been an arms control climate in the present U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic bomber relationship. Neither side has deployed a strategic bomber, with the exception of a small number of FB–111's, for over 15 years. The Soviet bomber fleet has remained constant at about 140 Tu–20 Bears and Mya–4 Bisons. Some of the Bears carry a 300-nautical-mile range air-to-surface missile called the AS–3 Kangaroo.

On the U.S. ledger are 195 B–52 C/F series and 255 B–52 G/H series and 72 FB–111's. Most it not all of the C/F series is presently engaged in Southeast Asia. By any measure of bombers, overall numbers, megatonnage, range, electronic countermeasures—ECM—or air-to-surface missiles, the United States is considerably ahead. This advantage will grow as the operational short-range attack missile—SRAM—is fitted on the FB–111's and the B–52 G and H's.

The Soviets have tested a new supersonic bomber called the Backfire, but it has not gone into production. Some experts question the range capability of the Backfire suggesting that it may be used primarily for European or Chinese targets.

OTHER "STRATEGIC" SYSTEMS

Present definitions of strategic systems are not precise. Counting only ICBM's, SLBM's, and long-range bombers as strategic systems distorts the true strategic relationship. A Soviet general must consider any attack on Moscow as a strategic attack whether it comes from a strategic bomber, a strategic missile, submarines, or any tactical delivery vehicle.

For example, the United States has 900 carrier-based aircraft, 1,200 land-based strike aircraft, and about 325 Pershing missiles, all capable of delivering a nuclear payload on Soviet soil. None of these usually are counted as "strategic" systems yet they alone could destroy Moscow or Leningrad.

ALLIED FORCES

The French and British have forces that must be considered in any strategic overview. Nine French silo-launched IRBM's already are operational and nine more will become active in 1972. These missiles have a 1,875-statute-mile range, capable of hitting parts of the Soviet Union. The French also have two SSBN submarines with 16 tubes each. They are planning for a total force of five submarines. One is now under construction.

The Mirage IVA aircraft can also carry nuclear weapons to the Soviet Union. At least 36 Image IVA's are available for this mission. While there is some question about the role of French forces in NATO, a military planner in Moscow must consider the French as potentially hostile.

The British have four Polaris A–3 submarines which we provided them in 1967. The Polaris A–3 has 16 tubes with each missile carrying three multiple reentry vehicles—MRV's. They also have a dwindling number of V bombers, some equipped with the Blue Steel air-to-surface missile, that can bomb Soviet targets. None of these French or British figures include the hundreds of tactical aircraft which in an emergency, NATO countries could press into use in a "strategic" role in Europe.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

China has no strategic capability against mainland United States. They have a small number of old TU–4's and about 30 TU–16's. The TU–16's have a range of about 1,500 statute miles.

There are reports that the Chinese have deployed 20 or more MRBM's with ranges up to 1,000 nautical miles and possibly a small number of IRBM's. These missiles are aimed at the Soviet Union.

The Chinese have modern industrial facilities. They have built both solid and liquid propellant plants, thereby indicating a broad approach to missile development. They have tested a nuclear tipped missile and have demonstrated an IRBM/ICBM capability by launching satellites. The Chinese seem to be preparing for a full range test of an ICBM either over India, into the Indian Ocean or into the Pacific. Instrumentation ships have been built to monitor tests outside the border of China. Their ICBM program, however, has proceeded slower than most experts predicted.

NO DANGER OF U.S. INFERIORITY

Looking at the arsenal available to the world's nuclear powers provides dramatic evidence that comprehensive lower limits need to be negotiated during SALT II. Until that process occurs, however, there is no danger of the United States slipping into a position of inferiority.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that three tables showing the strategic weapons of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the other nuclear powers, respectively, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the tables were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TABLE I.—U.S. STRATEGIC SYSTEM IN MID-1972

| Designation | Number of launchers or platforms | Warheads per launcher | Total warheads | Megatonnage per warhead | Maximum range | 1st deployed | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Minuteman I | 320 | 1 | 320 | 1MT | 6,500+NM | 1962 | Solid propellant. |
| Minuteman II | 500 | 1 | 500 | 1–2MT | 7,000NM | 1966 | Do. |
| Minuteman III | 180 | 3 (average) | 540 | 200KT | 8,000NM | 1970 | Do. |
| Titan II | 54 | 1 | 54 | 5–10MT | 6,300NM | 1962 | Stored liquid propellant. |
| Polaris A–2 | [1] 160 | 1 | 160 | 700KT–1MT | 1,500NM | 1962 | Solid propellant. |
| Polaris A–3 | [2] 336 | 3 (MRVs) | 336 | 200KT | 2,500NM | 1964 | Do. |
| Poseidon C–3 | [1] 160 | 10 (average also has penaids) | 1,600 | 50KT | 2,500+ | 1971 | Do. |
| B–52 C/F | 195 | 4 bomb average plus Hound Dog | | Average 1–5MT, possible 20MT, Hound Dog 4MT. | 11,500SM | 1955 | Hound dog range 680NM, Quail range 350NM. |
| B–52 G/H | 255 | Same plus Quail | | do | 12,500SM | 1958 | About 195 older B–52s are deployed to Southeast Asia and therefore are not configured for nuclear delivery. |
| FB–111 | 72 | Carries SRAM and gravity bombs. | | 6 bombs totaling 5MT. SRAM is about 200KT. | 3,800SM | 1970 | |

[1] 10 subs.

[2] 21 subs.

TABLE II.—U.S.S.R. STRATEGIC SYSTEM, MID-1972

| Designation | Number of launchers or platforms | Warheads per launcher | Total warheads | Megatonnage per warhead | Maximum range | 1st deployed | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SS–7 Saddler | 210 | 1 | 210 | 5MT | 5,700NM | 1961 | Near obsolete. |
| SS–8 Sasin | | 1 | | 5MT | 5,700NM | 1963 | Do. |
| SS–9 Scarp | 288 | 1 (some may have 3 MRV's) | 288 | 15–25MT | 9,000NM | 1965 | Storage liquid propellant. |
| SS–11 | 950 | 1 | 950 | 1–2MT | 5,500NM | 1966 | 100 targeted against China and Western Europe. |
| SS–13 Savage | 60–100 | 1 | 60–100 | 1MT | 4,500NM | 1968 | Solid propellant. |
| New ICEM's under construction | 91 | 1 | 91 | | | | Probably a mix of types. |
| Tu–20 Bear (also known as Tu–95) | 100 | Gravity bombs and AS–3 Kangaroo missiles (range 300NM). | | | 7,800SM | 1956 | |
| Mya–4 Bison | 40 | Average 2 gravity bombs | 80 | | 6,050SM | 1956 | |
| SS–N–5 Serb (hotel and golf classes) | [1] 30 | 1 | 30 | 1MT | 300NM | 1961 | |
| SS–N–6 Y–Class (Sawfly missile) | [2] 400 | 1 | 400 | 1MT | 1,500NM | 1969 | |
| New class | ([3]) | | | | | ([4]) | |

[1] 10 subs.

[2] Plus (25 subs.).

[3] 18 subs (12 plus 16 tubes).

[4] Under construction.

TABLE III.—STRATEGIC SYSTEMS FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, PRC IN MID-1972

| Designation | Number of launchers or platforms | Warheads per launcher | Total warheads | Megatonnage per warhead | Maximum range | 1st deployed | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| France: | | | | | | | |
| SSBS(IRBM) | 9 current (18 total in 1972) | 1 | 9 | 150KT | 1,875SM | 1971 | Silo launched. |
| SSBN(sub) | 32 (2 subs) | 1 | 32 | 400KT | 1,900NM | 1971 | 5 subs total planned (1 under construction). |
| Mirage IVA | 36 minimum | | | | 2,000SM | 1964 | |
| Great Britain: | | | | | | | |
| SSBN (Polaris A–3) | 64 (4 subs) | 3 (MRV's) | 64 | 200KT | 2,500NM | 1967 | U.S. supplied. |
| V bombers | 56 | 1 plus Blue Steel. | | | 4,000SM | 1960 | Role changed to emphasize tactical delivery. |

Note: PRC—China has no strategic capability against the United States. They have a small number of TU–4's, about 30 TU–16's with ranges up to 1,500SM and 20 or more deployed MRBM's with 1,000NM range aimed at the USSR.

China has solid and liquid propellant facilities. They have tested a nuclear tipped missile at Lop Nor and have demonstrated an IRBM capability. Their ICBM program has moved along slower than most experts have expected.

## THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE'S FINDING WAS A STEAL

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the action by the Democratic Credentials Committee in depriving Senator McGOVERN of 151 of his Californian delegates was an outrageous steal.

Senator McGOVERN won the California primary election playing under the rules of the game which his opponents did not protest during the State's primary election.

The legal right of Senator McGOVERN to all 271 delegates was tested in the courts. The courts decided that Senator McGOVERN was clearly entitled under the law to all 271 delegates. Following that, one of the most highly respected lawyers in the Nation, Burke Marshall, was assigned as the Democratic Party's official referee to carefully examine the challenge to McGOVERN's right to all 271 delegates.

Marshall decided that Senator McGOVERN's right to these delegates was clear, that it complied fully with State law, that once the election had been held under that law with full acquiescence by all contestants the winner was entitled to what the law provided.

Now Senator McGOVERN's opponents in a naked power play have ganged up on him to change the rules after the game is over.

I have disagreed with Senator McGOVERN on many of his proposals in this campaign and I have said so. But in this controversy I am with him all the way.

If the convention should sustain the Credentials Committee and deprive McGOVERN of 141 of his California delegates and in doing so stop his nomination, it will damage our party not only in this election but in years to come.

Consider the disillusioning letdown for the thousands of young Senator McGOVERN supporters who worked their hearts out for Senator McGOVERN. Consider the disappointment of millions of other young McGOVERN supporters who were just beginning to feel that in this country you can achieve a real chance to change what is wrong with America by working within our system—what a letdown for them.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator. That is just what I need. And what a cynical spectacle for those outside our party—especially the independent voters who decide elections. What are they to think of a party that rejects the results of a fair and free election in which Senator McGOVERN earned 271 delegates, of a party which ignores the findings of an objective nonpartisan count that Senator McGOVERN is legally entitled to the 271 delegates, of a party that tosses aside the finding of the official referee—one of the Nation's outstanding legal scholars—that Senator McGOVERN has won all 271 delegates fairly and squarely.

From the reports I have heard the convention is likely to sustain its credentials committee and deprive Senator McGOVERN of 141 of the delegates he won and is counting on.

This would certainly put Senator McGOVERN's nomination in serious jeopardy. Suddenly it is clear that Senator McGOVERN could lose. And what if he loses the nomination as now seems very possible indeed? Who could win? Let us face it. If Senator McGOVERN could be stopped at the convention without the California steal the nomination of another Democratic candidate would pose as strong, perhaps a stronger, challenge to President Nixon than Senator McGOVERN could have. But if Senator McGOVERN loses the nomination after he is denied the 141 delegate votes he won in California, the Democratic nominee, whoever he is—however vigorously he campaigns—whatever political developments between now and November may do for him—will probably lose because he will suffer the fatal defect—the Nation will think he stole the nomination—unfairly, illegally, by a sheer power play from the man who honorably won it.

Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I thank the Senator from Virginia for so graciously yielding some of his time to me.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Virginia is now recognized for 13 minutes.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished senior Senator from Kentucky.

## EXTENSION OF THE PUBLIC DEBT LIMITATION—THE BENNETT AND CHURCH AMENDMENTS

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I shall vote against the amendment of the Senator from Utah (Mr. BENNETT) which would increase social security benefits by 10 percent, and for the amendment of the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) to increase benefits by 20 percent. I have no doubt that the increase will have some inflationary aspects, whether it be 10 percent or 20 percent. It will also place additional burdens upon employers and upon the presently employed, as additional payments will be required to finance the increased payments to beneficiaries. But these arguments against increases have always been made. The table which I shall place in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks compares the benefits and the cost of benefits under the Church and Bennett amendments and H.R. 1, as passed by the House. Even the 20-percent increase will not provide large increases in payments, but it will help, as will the 3-percent cost-of-living provision.

The stark fact is that those who are now receiving social security benefits are the chief victims of inflation, and many are living in straitened circumstances. They are the people and dependents of people who helped build the economy from which many now receive rich rewards—employers and employees alike.

In the last 2 days we voted to authorize over $9 billion for the OEO program to assist those who are not employed, those who may not be qualified for employment and others employed at low wages. We will be called upon to vote billions in welfare for those who are not employed and the working poor. I must say that, while I am sure many of these may not be able to work—many are women with children—there are some, to be frank, who will not work.

I think it proper that we should be willing to provide increased social security benefits to those who have worked, and to their families. I am glad to vote for the 20-percent increase.

I ask unanimous consent that the table I referred to earlier be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COMPARISON OF PENDING SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS

| | Church | Bennett | H.R. 1 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proposed increase | 20 percent | 10 percent | 5 percent. |
| Taxable wage base | Raised to $10,800 in 1973; $12,000 in 1974 with automatic increases as wages increase. | Retains present tax base of $9,000 with automatic increases after January 1975. | Raised to $10,200 this year with automatic raises thereafter as wages increase. |
| Tax rate | 1973–77, 4.6 percent; 1978-2010, 4.5 percent; 2010, 5.35 percent. | 1973–77, 4.45 percent; 1978–2010, 4.4 percent; after 2010, 5.3 percent. | 1972–74, 4.2 percent; 1975–76, 5 percent; 1977, 6.1 percent. |
| Minimum monthly payment | $84.50 | $77.50 | $74.00. |
| Automatic cost of living increases | Benefits would rise by 3 percent when consumer price index rises by 3 percent. Would be financed by increases in the taxable wage base. | Identical except financed equally by increases in the wage base and tax rate. | Benefits would rise by 3 percent when consumer price index rises by 3 percent. |
| Average monthly payment | $161 up from $133 (single), $270 up from $223 (couple), $137 up from $114 (widows). | $147 single, $247 couple, $126 widows | $141 single, $234 couple, $120 widows.* |
| Effective date | September 1972 | September 1972 | June 1972. |

* This is without increase to 100 percent of husband's benefits.

## TRIBUTE TO THE MAJORITY WHIP, SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, tonight, hopefully the Senate will complete 3 difficult weeks. As the conclusion of these 3 weeks approaches, I want to comment briefly on one of our colleagues.

The last 3 weeks, it seems to me, have been one of the busiest and one of the most difficult periods this year. The Senate convened as early as 8:15 in the morning and continued as late as 9 o'clock or later in the evening.

The legislation handled was important; it also was controversial. Due to the long hours, the importance of the legislation, and the controversial nature of the legislation, tempers became frayed from time to time. Senators became weary, and I think all Members of the Senate have been under somewhat of a strain.

But one Member of the Senate has had the responsibility of seeing that the Senate proceeded in an orderly and appropriate way. Throughout the year, and especially during the past 3 weeks, he has been the first Senator to arrive in the Senate each morning, and he has been the last to leave each night.

I just want to say these few words in admiration and tribute to the distinguished Senator from West Virginia (Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD) the acting majority leader, a man whose tact and patience and good will were indispensable to the workings of the Senate during the past few hectic weeks.

I wish that every one of the 1,700,000 West Virginians could come to the Capitol and sit in the gallery and watch Senator ROBERT C. BYRD as he undertakes the responsibilities and duties of the acting majority leader of this great body. I am sure that every one of those 1,700,000 of his fellow citizens would be as proud of him as we in the Senate are proud of him.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I am glad to yield to the distinguished Senator from Utah.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I want to associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from Virginia regarding the majority whip, Senator ROBERT C. BYRD. I think the performance of the Senator from West Virginia has been superb, and

DURHAM, N.C.,
*June 22, 1972.*

The leadership you have demonstrated in bringing about the abolishment of the Subversive Activities Control Board is the kind of leadership that we need more of from more of our elected representatives on all levels. As a taxpayer and a citizen, I sincerely thank you and heartily congratulate you on being unwilling to continue to see money appropriated for a do-nothing Board.

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DURANGO, COLO.,
*June 17, 1972.*

I wish to congratulate you on your highly critical comments concerning the Subversive Activities Control Board. It is encouraging to hear someone of your stature speak in such an enlightened fashion concerning such a worthless board.

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CEDER GROVE, N.J.,
*June 25, 1972.*

I applaud the letter which appeared recently in the New York Times concerning the abolition of the Subversive Control Board which you signed jointly with Senator Proxmire.

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TRYON, N.C.,
*June 26, 1972.*

If you have succeeded in removing from the appropriations the $36,000 a year salaries, that is an achievement, and I heartly applaud your efforts.

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DALLAS, TEX.,
*June 25, 1972.*

This is one agency that is long past due to be abolished. We have other means of handling subversives, and this is only a gimmick to rob the taxpayers.

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WYNNEWOOD, PA.,
*June 24, 1972.*

The SACB is a stench in the nostrils of anyone familiar with its history, and particularly a citizenry groaning under the burden of taxes which have gone to thus far perpetuate it. I congratulate you on your efforts, and pray that you may prevail.

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SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
*June 22, 1972.*

Anent your recent comment of SACB, all I can say is "right on". Anything you can possibly do to get rid of these fossils would certainly be appreciated.

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WINSTON-SALEM, N.C.,
*June 17, 1972.*

The Senate vote last Thursday must be gratifying to you as it is to those of your constituents who feel the same way about the erosion of our civil liberties and the right to dissent.

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ROCKY MOUNT, N.C.,
*May 2, 1972.*

I heartily agree with your position that the Subversive Activities Control Board should be abolished. Certainly the question of its continued existence should be decided by the legislative branch and not by the President.

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EAST ORANGE, N.J.,
*June 23, 1972.*

Your "An Alien Creature" in the current issue of the New York Times hit the nail right on the head. Thanks to both you and Senator Proxmire to bring this to the attention of New York Times readers.

Almost silly to enlarge on your in-depth treatment of the potential recurrence to Joe McCarthyism.

DURHAM, N.C.,
*June 25, 1972.*

"Permit me to thank you for the article that you and Senator Proxmire had in the New York Times of June 23 on the Subversive Activities Control Board. Your position, I feel, is based on the fundamental principles of the Constitution and displays the healthy Jeffersonian respect for the common sense of our people that the Founding Fathers held. Our institutions are still, praise be, secure enough to survive without the services of these self-styled saviors that have been imposed upon us. And as you have shown, if we depended upon them for the protection of our liberties we should be in a parlous state indeed, for they have done nothing since 1950 to justify their existence. Keep up the good work!"

## CURRENT U.S. POPULATION

Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, I wish to report that, according to current Census Bureau approximations, the total population of the United States as of July 1 is 209,291,174. This represents an increase of 133,192 since June, or roughly the equivalent of the population of Montgomery, Ala. It also represents an addition of 1,713,828 since July 1 of last year, an increase which is more than twice the population of Dallas, Tex.

Salt file

## THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION ACCORDS

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, shortly after we return from our recess, we will be asked to act upon the Strategic Arms Limitation Accords. It is vitally important that Senators fully understand the full implications of these vitally important agreements.

I believe that certain aspects of the ABM Treaty and Bahrain Agreement have not been sufficiently aired. For this reason, I ask unanimous consent to have the following items printed in the RECORD: A statement which was presented before the Committee on Foreign Relation yesterday morning; a statement presented before that committee the day before by Dr. Donald A. Brennan of the Hudson Institute; and an article by Dr. Brennan which appeared in the June 23, 1972, issue of National Review.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TESTIMONY OF SENATOR JAMES L. BUCKLEY

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee to express my views on the Strategic Arms Limitation Accords signed by President Nixon in Moscow on May 26th. I have followed these developments with intense interest not only because of their effect on our national security, but on our role in international affairs as well.

Throughout the course of the negotiations, it had been my hope that agreements could be concluded that would fulfill the traditional objectives of arms control; namely, to reduce the risk of war, or if war should occur, to mitigate its consequences. Having had an opportunity to study the agreements in some detal, I have reluctantly concluded that unless appropriate measures are taken, they will achieve neither goal. In fact, they could well increase the ultimate risk of war by undermining our alliances while encouraging Soviet intransigence in any future confrontations. If we have learned anything from the great conflicts of this century, it should be that weakness invites attack, and that aggressor nations seem inevitably to overestimate the willingness of free men to retreat.

We are dealing, of course, with two separate agreements: the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement placing limitations on certain categories of strategic offensive arms. I will discuss, in brief, the risks which I believe to be inherent in each before recommending to your Committee certain safeguards which can be adopted by the Congress in order to minimize these risks.

I will say at the outset that I will vote against ratification of the ABM treaty for the reason that I have strong misgivings as to both the prudence and the ultimate morality of denying ourselves for all time—or denying the Russians, for that matter—the right to protect our civilian populations from nuclear devastation. I am not suggesting that we have the technical means to do so at the present time, but I challenge the morality of precluding the possibility of developing at some future date new approaches to anti-ballistic missiles defenses which could offer protection to substantial numbers of our people. I question, in short, the basic doctrine on which the SALT Accords have been constructed; a doctrine which requires us to dismantle our defenses before agreement is reached on dismantling the weapons of mass destruction.

The immediate effect of the Treaty, of course, is to limit anti-ballistic missile systems to nominal levels, where each side agrees to defend its national capital and one strategic missile site with not more than 100 anti-ballistic missile interceptors per site. I would argue that this agreement is inappropriate on its face.

For some years, American defense policy has been dominated by theories such as "assured destruction" or a contemporary variant of assured destruction known as "strategic sufficiency". It has been a cardinal objective of these theories that U.S. security is best maintained by establishing a system whereby active defense is severely constrained on the theory that strategic stability will be assured by the mutual vulnerability of the citizens of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

This is the doctrine that the ABM Treaty signed in Moscow seeks to prepetuate. Thus the agreement goes so far as to prohibit the development, test or deployment of sea, air or space based ballistic missile defense systems. This clause, in Article V of the ABM Treaty, would have the effect, for example, of prohibiting the development and testing of a laser type system based in space which could at least in principle provide an extremely reliable and effective system of defenses against ballistic missiles. The technological possibility has been formally exluded by this agreement.

There is no law of nature I know of that makes impossible the creation of defense systems that would make the prevailing theories obsolete. Why then should we by treaty deny ourselves the kind of development that could possibly create a reliable technique for the defense of tens of millions of our civilians against ballistic missile attack? Why should we not at least be in a position to deploy such a system with the least possible delay in the event that we should find it necessary to terminate the agreement under the conditions allowed in Article XV?

There are other defects inherent in the Treaty. For example, it is technically possible

for the Russians to "net" for tie in their Moscow ABM defense system into the system which they are allowed for the defense of a strategic missile site. For some unknown reason, the Soviet Union may deploy its site for the protection of an ICBM base as close as 800 miles from Moscow, while the United States may not deploy one closer than 1400 miles from Washington. These relative proximities would enable the Soviet Union, with appropriate radar and data processing equipment, to have the more effective type of radar coverage for its two ABM systems which comes from the capability to tie them together electronically. This disparity in the effect of the ABM Treaty on the United States and Russia becomes even more significant when it is considered that the disposition of the Moscow defense system would permit them to defend about 350 of their ICBMs in the Moscow area or the equivalent of about two U.S. ICBM bases.

There are also two problems which have to do with the capability of our existing surveillance system to detect violations of the treaty by the Soviet Union.

The Treaty contains language which prohibits the deployment of a "rapid reload capability" for ABM missiles. But the nature of the Soviet ABM missile launcher makes it relatively simple for the Soviet Union to covertly develop for later deployment, a rapid reload capability. There must be a more realistic means of insuring compliance with the rapid reload prohibition of the treaty than is possible with satellite surveillance. Otherwise, it would be a rather simple matter to develop the necessary mechanical devices and to store them in warehouses from which they could be deployed at launch sites in a matter of days.

The other possibility relates to the upgrading of eixsting or new antiaircraft systems to an ABM role. There are those who believe, for example, that the existing SA–5 missiles, with their effective altitude of 100,000 feet, could be given an ABM capability and connected with the necessary radar installations without detection.

In the Interim Agreement, the United States has accepted a position of significant quantitative inferiority in every area of offensive strength which is subject to its control. Depending on how the parties choose to exercise their options under the agreement, the Soviet Union will be able to deploy, in round figures, between 1,400 and 1,600 intercontinental ballistic missiles to our 1,000, and up to 1,000 submarine-launched ballistic missiles to our 700. She will be able to expand her fleet of modern Y-class nuclear-powered submarines to 62 while retaining 23 diesel-powered G-class submarines, for a total force of 84 missile launching submarines in comparison with the fleet of 44 which we will be allowed to maintain.

Most significantly, because of the enormous size of Russia's heavy missiles, the ceilings placed on intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles will provide the Soviets with a more than four times advantage over the United States in the payload capacity or "throw-weight" of these weapons systems. This means that the Russians will be guaranteed the *capability*, during the term of the agreement, to deploy with these weapons more than four times as many warheads as the United States should they achieve parity with us in warhead design.

Because such parity has not yet been achieved, it is argued that the United States is likely to retain its existing two-to-one advantage in deliverable warheads during the life of the agreement. This argument is based on U.S. superiority in manned heavy bombers, in multiple warhead technology, and in forward based systems. I believe, however, that it is important to emphasize the fragile and transitory character of this "advantage."

First, with regard to the U.S. superiority in manned bombers, this advantage quickly disappears when one includes the medium bomber forces available to both sides. While the United States has about 75 medium range FB–111 bombers in the Strategic Air Command which can operate from forward bases as part of our retaliatory force, the Soviets have approximately 550 TU–16 Badgers and approximately 150 TU–22 Blinder medium bombers which are refuelable and quite capable of reaching the United States and then landing in airfields in Cuba or Mexico.

Second, while a combination of skillful warhead miniaturization and relative accurate guidance systems provides the United States with a formidable present advantage in multiple warhead technology, we have little reason to be complacent. It should be noted that the United States developed its multiple warhead hardware in approximately three years, from 1966 through 1969. Discussions of the engineering characteristics of our multiple warhead missiles have been widely disseminated in trade journals and Congressional hearings. It would be imprudent, at best, to presume that the Soviets are so technologically retarded that they would be incapable of developing and deploying significant numbers of multiple warheads within the five year term of the Interim Agreement.

It has been argued that our intelligence estimates give the Soviet Union only a limited capability to develop multiple warhead technology. I would point out that these intelligence analysts are the ones who have consistently underestimated Soviet nuclear force objectives. It is these same intelligence analysts who advised Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in the mid-1960's that the Soviet Union had permanently accepted the status of strategic inferiority.

It is these same intelligence analysts who concluded in 1964 that the Chinese Communists would detonate a primitive nuclear device made of plutonium rather than the uranium device actually detonated which required a huge gaseous diffusion plant for the manufacture of nuclear material.

With respect to these and other advantages which the United States may currently possess in non-controlled strategic offensive weapons, it should be noted that there is nothing in the SALT Accords to prevent the Soviet Union from overtaking us in every category while these accords prohibit us from overtaking the Soviet Union in those areas where they have been assured substantial margins of superiority.

There are additional hazards in the Interim Agreement which result from ambiguities in its text or from the inadequacy of its provisions for vertification. For example:

1. The agreement places a ceiling on intercontinental ballistic missiles based on the number of light and heavy missile launchers in place or under construction as of July 1, 1972. Yet the United States has no definitive information as to the size, number and approximate location of land-based Soviet strategic missile forces. At the present time, the United States is relying entirely on its own intelligence estimates. It should be noted that the general area in which Soviet ICBMs are deployed is in North-Central Asia, where the normal cloud cover is among the heaviest of any region in the northern hemisphere. It is entirely possible that at some time subsequent to July 1, 1972, scores of additional ICBMs could be discovered by our reconnaissance satellites. As the agreement only prohibits "starts" on new construction after that date, we would face the practical difficulty of not being able to establish whether or not newly discovered missile sites had been constructed in violation of the agreement.

2. It is not at all clear that the so-called "national technical means of vertification" available to the United States will suffice to provide conclusive evidence as to whether or not Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles (M/IRBM) will be upgraded to an intercontinental capability through the replacement of obsolescent SS–4 and SS–5 missiles with "variable range" SS–11 missiles. It has already been noted in the press and elsewhere that the Soviet Union has begun to place SS–11 missiles in her M/IRBM fields in the western part of the Soviet Union. If the United States does not obtain ironclad proof that an upgrading to an intercontinetnal capability is not taking place, the Soviet Union could add an additional 700 ICBMs to its arsenal without detection.

3. While it is agreed that missiles and launchers may be modernized and replaced so long as the respective ceilings on light and heavy missiles are not exceded, nowhere is there an unambiquous definition of what is meant by a "heavy missile". The United States has issued a unilateral definition, but this is somewhat less than satisfactory. If, for example, the Soviet Union were to exchange its existing SS–9s for new missiles having twice their payload capacity—and this may well be possible even within our own definition of what constitutes a heavy missile—the resulting threat to our land based forces could be so formidable as to allow us no prudent alternative but to develop and deploy a mobile ICBM system on an urgent basis.

I am quite prepared to accept the proposition that given the rate at which the Soviet Union has been overtaking us in its deployment of ICBMs and nuclear powered submarines, the risks which we are most assuredly assuming under the Interim Agreement are nonetheless far smaller than those we would be assuming if current trends were allowed to continue. I do feel, however, that it is most important that the Congress recognize that we are in fact assuming substantial risks so that we may take appropriate measures to minimize them during the term of the agreement and to place ourselves in an optimum position to negotiate a satisfactory SALT II agreement within the next five years; or should this fail, to move swiftly to recapture a posture of nuclear parity. I believe that these protections can be secured by attaching appropriate reservations to the SALT accords.

Specifically, I recommend that the Senate attach the following reservations and instructions to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems:

1. A reservation which will result in the automatic termination of the Treaty at the expiration of the five-year term of the Interim Agreement unless the parties shall have earlier concluded an agreement for the limitation of offensive weapons which shall establish approximate parity in the payload capacity of their respective strategic offensive forces; such agreement to avoid the ambiguities contained in the Interim Agreement, and to provide a mechanism for the fool-proof varification of compliance.

2. Instructions to the American representatives on the Standing Consultive Commission provided for in Article XIII of the Treaty requiring them to establish procedures at the earliest possible date which will provide the United States with absolute, fool-proof assurances that

(a) The Moscow ABM system will not be tied into the other ABM system permitted the Soviet Union under the Treaty;

(b) Existing or future air defense systems will not be upgraded to an ABM capability; and

(c) The Soviets will not develop a stand-by "rapid reload" capability for their ABMs.

The instructions should stipulate that a failure to secure such assurances will constitute an "extraordinary event" jeopardizing the "supreme interests" of the United States within the meaning of Article XV of the Treaty.

With respect to the Interim Agreement limiting certain strategic offensive arms, I recommend that the Congress incoroprate

the following provisions in its Joint Resolution approving the Agreement:

1. An acknowledgement that the United States cannot prudently enter into the Interim Agreement except with the understanding that it must immediately intensify its investment in military research, development and procurement so as to

(a) preserve those areas of strategic superiority which it currently enjoys, and

(b) achieve the maximum qualitative improvement possible during the term of the Interim Agreement in those weapons systems in which it will be frozen into a position of quantitative inferiority.

2. The issuance of instructions to the American representatives on the Standing Consultive Commission to secure the earliest possible agreement as to the following:

(a) Verification by the Soviet Union as to the exact number, size, and approximate location of all land-based Soviet strategic missile launchers in existence or under construction as of July 1, 1972.

(b) A fool-proof mechanism for verifying that the SS-11 varibale range missiles which replace the obsolescent SS-4 and SS-5 medium and intermediate range missiles do not have an intercontinental capability.

(c) A definition as to what constitutes a "heavy missile" within the meaning of the Interim Agreement.

These instructions should stipulate that a failure to secure such agreement shall constitute an "extraordinary event" jeopardizing the "supreme interests" of the United States within the meaning of Paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the Interim Agreement.

I believe that if the Senate and the Congress will condition their ratification and approval of the Strategic Arms Limitation Accords in such a manner, and if the Congress will give further evidence that it understands their inherent risks by launching a serious and sustained program to upgrade our strategic and military capabilities within the limits imposed by the two agreements, then we will not only minimize those risks as they affect our physical security, but will at the same time avoid a critical dilution of our influence in world affairs.

If we do anything less, if it appears that we are willing to retreat to a position of permanent strategic inferiority, then we will see subtle but corrosive forces at work in the world arena which will have the most serious implications for the United States and for the cause of peace.

We can expect, for example, to see the Soviet leaders intensify their diplomatic pressures around the globe; and in any future confrontations with the West, to assume more confident and intransigent attitudes. By the same token, to the extent that the relative strategic position of the United States declines, so will the options which are available to an American President in any such future political crisis, with the inevitable erosion of his ability to support vital U.S. foreign policy objectives. And it is not only our own diplomatic options which would be affected by an understanding that the Soviet Union has achieved a position of strategic supremacy. In testifying before this Committee yesterday, Dr. Donald G. Brennan, of the Hudson Institute, pointed to the following adverse political consequences:

"The new imbalance of power will become established in the minds of our allies, which will ultimately lead them to be more responsive, perhaps unduly responsive, to Soviet diplomatic pressures and initiatives."

Nor can we expect the Japanese to accept with equanimity so dramtic a change in the relative strength of the super powers. Japan will be left little choice but to either seek an accommodation with the Communist powers or, in the alternative, to develop an independent military and strategic capability which will guarantee her a degree of independence in matters affecting her own security.

What I am suggesting, in short, is that unless we couple the SALT Accords with a clear indication that we will settle for nothing less than nuclear parity, unless we launch credible programs for the modernization of our strategic capabilities within the limits set by these Accords, these agreements will prove not only dangerous to the security of the United States but to the stability of the world.

G. K. Chesterton once said: "I do not believe in fate that falls on men however they act. I do believe in a fate that falls on men unless they act." Chesterton's point is relevant to the facts of international life which we face today. I trust that we will not, for the first time in our history, entrust our fate to others. Only we can make sure that our own security, and that of the Free World, is not placed in jeopardy.

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STATEMENT OF DONALD G. BRENNAN

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee. It is a pleasure and a privilege for me to appear before you once again. As some of you know, the subject of arms control and disarmament has been a major field of my study for perhaps a dozen years, and I am grateful for your invitation to testify on the historic proposed agreements now before you.

A detailed biographical sketch is attached at the end of my statement. Let me mention here that I organized and edited the volume *Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security*, often called the "bible" of arms control, which was endorsed by Senator Fulbright among others, and have collaborated with, or consulted or testified for, many Congressional groups and agencies of the Executive Branch on matters concerning arms control, including at least four prior occasions on which I have presented testimony to this Committee. (These were the hearings on the establishment of ACDA, on the Partial Nuclear Test Ban, on ABM in the spring of 1969, and on the ratification of the Geneva Protocol on Chemical and Biological Warfare in the spring of last year.)

I have supported, in one way or another, every arms-control agreement that has been established since World War II. I have also been an active advocate for a dozen years or more of a suitable Soviet-American agreement limiting strategic offensive weapons; such an agreement was a particular focus of my work in the mid-1960's. It is therefore a matter of particular disappointment to me that the proposed agreements now before you are such that I cannot support them.

The difficulties with the two agreements are quite different; the proposed ABM Treaty does the wrong thing well, and the Interim Agreement does the right thing badly.

To begin with the ABM Treaty, we and the Soviets have agreed not to defend ourselves—not only against each other, but, interestingly, against anyone else either. I believe that, at least on the American side, this agreement stems purely from a sophomoric ideology and fashion. Let me elaborate this point.

The idea has taken hold in the United States that the best route to nuclear peace and security resides in a strategic posture in which we and the Soviets maintain a capability to destroy a large fraction—say, one-quarter to one-half—of each other's population and cities, and in which no attempt is made by either side to interfere with the "Assured Destruction" capability of the other. Such a posture is often called a "Mutual Assured Destruction" posture; it has the property that the obvious acronym for it—M-A-D—provides at once the appropriate description for it; that is, a Mutual Assured Destruction posture as a goal is, almost literally, mad. If technology and international politics provided absolutely no alternative, one might reluctantly accept a MAD posture. But to think of it as desirable—for instance, as a clearly preferred goal of our arms-control negotiations, as the proposed ABM Treaty automatically assumes—is bizarre.

As some of you probably know, I have often suggested a reduction-to-absurdity proof of the madness of MAD. If a MAD posture were genuinely desirable, we and the Soviets could have an arms-control agreement to mine each others cities. The Soviets could plant large thermonuclear explosives under, say, the first hundred American cities, and we could do the same there; this arrangement would save most of the present troubles and costs of ICBM's, SLBM's, bombers, and so on, and of course would make any and all active defense systems (such as ABM and air defense) completely irrelevant, at least as far as Soviet-American confrontations were concerned. And yet, despite the "obvious" technical effectiveness of a mined-city posture for implementing MAD, I suspect that few of you would care to sell such a program to your constituents.

Your constituents would have the right reaction. Some would describe the reaction as naive, or unsophisticated; however, it would in fact represent the wisdom of rejecting a wholly unproved theory when it leads to absurd consequences.

The main theory involved is that a MAD posture is the best way to protect against nuclear war altogether. This theory is reflected in the preamble to the proposed ABM Treaty, and in the Letter of Submittal of June 10, 1972 from Secretary of State Rogers: "Effective limits on antiballistic missile systems . . . will decrease the risk of outbreak of nuclear war . . .". There is, of course, not the slightest shred of evidence in support of this idea. Many nuclear strategists, including those who have achieved the greatest prominence in the field, do not believe it is true. The prevalent popularity of this theory can only be described as a fashion. Yet the Government is apparently prepared to gamble that the theory is true, and thereby commit us to a MAD posture indefinitely.

The Treaty itself contains evidence that the theory is little more than a fashion. If, as is usually argued in support of the theory, stability resides in high hostage levels, and the interposition of ABM on both sides would be destabilizing because of reducing those levels, it should be similarly destabilizing if the hostage levels were reduced by direct cuts in offensive-force levels. But the same Treaty preamble which extols limits on ABM systems—without regard to their technical characteristics, including effectiveness—also has the Parties "Declaring their intention . . . to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament. . . .". This is something less than consistency.

It is possible to make a technical case—I personally do not believe it—that it would be unwise to use currently available ABM technology (in conjunction with cuts in offensive forces) to begin to move away from a MAD posture. However, there is no such technical argument to be made about all possible future systems of missile defense, of whatever effectiveness and other characteristics.

In consequence of both my work with Hudson Institute and my occasional consulting work for the Government, I have been close enough to the analyses of American positions for the SALT to know what major alternatives and avenues have been considered and examined within the Government. I should like to state flatly for the record that no serious consideration has been given to possible alternatives to a MAD posture.

Passing now to the Interim Agreement,

the basic intention of this is to establish the beginnings of a freeze on strategic offensive forces. The trouble is simply that it is a bad beginning, not that the objective itself is unwise. On many occasions in the past, both in published articles and in lectures, I have urged a freeze of some kind for offensive forces. However, I never supposed that the United States would formally accept ceilings that, in every particular controlled by the agreement, allowed the Soviets substantially greater capability than permitted the United States.

The Interim Agreement does exactly that. It may be that, in some particulars not controlled by the agreement, such as members of warheads, the United States still retains some kind of lead; however, under the terms of the agreement, it is open to the Soviets to close the leads that we have, and then some, while it is not open to us to close the Soviet leads.

The payload capacity, or "throw weight" as it is often called, permitted the Soviets in their ICBM and SLBM forces is perhaps four times ours. The throw weight of a strategic force is unquestionably the most important single parameter for characterizing the potential of that force, even though other parameters—notably the number, yield and accuracy of warheads that can be delivered—are of more immediate importance. If the Soviets choose to do so, they can deploy as many warheads per ton of throw weight as we can, and since they are permitted roughly four times as many tons, they can ultimately deploy roughly four times as many warheads as we. They may not choose to do so; they may choose some other way of using their payload; but the important fact is, we have signed an agreement that says, in effect, that we have not only become, but are willing to remain, the second nuclear power.

The real Administration argument for the Interim Agreement is that it will limit the extent to which the Soviets will achieve strategic-force lead more reliably than any other approach in sight. But that Soviet advantage, by any reasonable assessment, is already real, and may well become greater as the Soviets deploy MIRVs and otherwise upgrade their permitted force in the coming years. The political consequences of this superiority, or more precisely of the general public recognition of it, are several, and all bad.

First, it will reinforce and confirm previously established Soviet, images and expectations of a declining American role in world affairs. Within the past two years, Soviet commentators on the American scene have exhibited increasing contempt for the United States, its power and its role in international affairs. For instance, Soviet analysts often make such remarks as: "The United States must be adjusting itself, in the manner of the United Kingdom at the end of World War II, to its loss of power and influence in the world." The Soviets correspondingly think of themselves as very much in the ascendant. These Soviet attitudes and expectations will be reflected in their peacetime bargaining and will increase their aggressiveness in possible crisis confrontations.

Second, the Agreement and the Soviet lead it establishes will do much to establish an image of American inferiority in American government circles. The effects of this, of course, will be the obverse of those to be expected from the attitudes in the Soviet bureaucracy, though probably less marked in degree.

Third, the new imbalance of power will become established in the minds of our allies, which will ultimately lead them to be more responsive, perhaps unduly responsive, to Soviet diplomatic pressures and initiatives. To use the current jargon, the Interim Agreement will contribute to "Finlandizing" tendencies in the policies of our allies.

Fourth, enshrining this degrees of Soviet superiority as a substantially permanent thing will almost certainly have adverse consequences in any serious crisis that may develop. For instance, we could not reasonably expect as favorable an outcome in a replay of the Cuban missile crisis. (The success of that outcome did not reside so much in the immediate outcome in Cuba as that the Soviets were deterred from counter-escalating in Turkey, or, especially, in Berlin, a fact that apostles of parity find convenient to ignore.)

It is in a certain sense true that different degrees of superiority can in the last analysis be translated only into different degrees of "victory" that would in any event be Pyrrhic. However, this often-repeated observation conveniently ignores the fact that most political leaders and many military leaders are not academic strategists: These leaders not only count weapons, they tend to think in terms of who will come out "ahead," and their (perhaps simplistic) attitudes about these matters will influence their expectations, demands and flexibility in a crisis (other things—such as the guts and the political support of the leaders on the scene—being equal). Therefore, a commitment to a position of strategic disadvantage is, at least in some statistical sense, an invitation to be pushed around in the next crisis. The Soviets understand this very well.

In a press conference in Moscow on the occasion of the signing of these agreements, Henry Kissinger repeatedly made the point that the terms of the Interim Agreement were influenced by the fact that the Soviets had ongoing ICBM and SLBM construction programs, while we did not. As he put it on one occasion, it was not the most brilliant bargaining position he would recommend people to find themselves in. He could not reasonably have made the point in that setting that, if the American Government found itself in that uncomfortable position, the responsibility must rest with the American Government; but I can, and do, make that point here. There has been a collective failure.

This brings me to the final point of whether to recommend acceptance or rejection of these agreements. The argument can reasonably be made that, although both agreements represent important failures, the best course of action in view of current political realities is simply to accept them. I am sympathetic to this argument. I also doubt very much whether any recommendation of mine will alter the expected acceptance of these agreements.

But it seems appropriate that someone should say, unambiguously and on the record, that both of these agreements are wrong, that the United States ought not to be in the position these agreements will leave us in, and that the country would ultimately be best off by rejecting them both and then doing what is right. I hereby take this position.

I shall be pleased to answer any questions.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Donald G. Brennan is a mathematician and student of national security problems. His special interests are in advanced military policy, alliance relationships in Europe, and selected areas of arms control, such as policy issues relating to ballistic missile defense.

Prior to joining Hudson Institute, of which he was President from July, 1962 until May, 1964 and where he now conducts research studies, Dr. Brennan worked for nine years as a research mathematician and communication theorist at Lincoln Laboratory of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a research laboratory engaged in technical studies for the Government. In addition to his technical research there, he devoted substantial time to studies of arms control and national security problems.

Dr. Brennan's serious interest in arms control began in 1957, when he was organizer of a group that led to the 1958 Summer Study on Arms Control held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, under the auspices of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He was an organizer and co-director of the 1960 Summer Study on Arms Control, again held in Cambridge under American Academy auspices. He was a member of the Academy's Committee on International Studies of Arms Control in 1961–66, serving as its chairman in 1961–62, and has been a frequent participant in international conferences relating to arms control.

Dr. Brennan has served as a consultant to the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Executive Office of the President, and to several research organizations. He is editor of the well-known anthology, *Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security* (New York, George Braziller, 1961), sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and guest editor of its predecessor, the special (Fall 1960) issue of *Daedalus* on "Arms Control". He has edited studies of future military technology and several publications on arms control. He has contributed articles on arms control to a number of journals and books, and has lectured on national security subjects at many universities, the U.S. National, Air, and Naval War Colleges, The Canadian National Defense College, and defense study centers in London, Bonn, Paris, and Oslo, among others, and has given seminars on arms control in Moscow. He is a frequent witness at Congressional hearings concerned with national security affairs.

Born in 1926 in Waterbury, Connecticut, Dr. Brennan received the B.S. (1955) and Ph.D. (1959) degrees in mathematics from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he was a Gerard Swope Fellow and received other graduate and undergraduate prizes and awards. Prior to entering M.I.T., he was engaged in radio engineering as a registered professional engineer in the State of Connecticut. He is a Senior Member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers and a member of Sigma Xi, the American Mathematical Society, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He was a member of the President's National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation Year in 1965.

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SALT HITS THE FAN

(By Donald G. Brennan)

INTRODUCTION

On Friday, May 26, 1972, Richard Nixon (for the United States) and Leonid Brezhnev (for the Soviet Union) signed what will probably prove to be the most important arms-control agreements yet negotiated in the nuclear era—or, it may be, in any other era. But their indubitable importance does not, unfortunately, automatically make them a cause for rejoicing: the San Francisco earthquake, for instance, was important too. It remains to be seen whether the agreements of May 26 will prove to be more or less of a disaster than the earthquake. Unlike the earthquake, there is some possibility, not as large as we should wish, that the agreements will not be a disaster at all; and some very remote chance, which neither the American body politic nor the Administration bureaucracy deserve, that they will prove a resounding success.

Whatever their chance of success, they are

profoundly unwise. And the unwisdom is not confined to the United States merely; it is certainly shared by some of our Allies, and may well be shared, though in reduced degree, by the Soviet Union.

The agreements are two: A proposed treaty limiting the deployment of defense against ballistic missiles, called the Treaty on ABM's, and a proposed Interim Agreement limiting certain kinds of strategic offensive forces, namely ICBM's and SLBM's (Inter-Continental and Sub-Launched Ballistic Missiles, respectively). The problems of these two are very different.

The Interim Agreement enshrines, not merely Soviet parity, but Soviet strategic superiority, of a potentially substantial degree. The unwisdom of this agreement resides in the dramatic proclamation it provides that the United States has not only become, but is apparently willing to remain, a second-class power. This foolishness is, of course, in no way shared by the Soviets; indeed, as one prominent American strategist put it, the Soviets must be pinching themselves to make sure they are not dreaming.

The ABM Treaty is more symmetric in its immediate effects; in contrast to the Interim Agreement, it does not allow the Soviets four times as much as we are allowed. Apart from a limited (but potentially significant) defense of national capitals, and a limited (and strategically insignificant) deefnse of missile fields, we and the Soviets have agreed not to defend ourselves—not only against each other, but, interestingly, against anyone else either. On the American side, this agreement stems purely from ideology and fashion, and is pure insanity; on the Soviet side, the Politbureau may have accepted the same ideology, in which case they share equally in the insanity. It is as if we and the Soviets had become seized with a theory that motor vehicles were bad for us, and, proceeding from that theory, we both agreed to destroy all the motor vehicles of all kinds we produced in the future. This example illustrates that the mere fact that we and the Soviets might agree on some completely symmetric arrangement would not of itself prove that the arrangement was in our interest. In my view, the ABM Treaty provides an equally good illustration.

In the immediately following analysis of the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty, I shall concentrate on their shortcomings. I shall return later to the circumstances and forces that led to these agreements.

## II. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT

The basic provisions of the Interim Agreement are as follows. First, we and the Soviets undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based ICBM launchers after July 1, 1972. Second, it is agreed not to convert land-based launchers for "light" ICBM's into launchers for "heavy" ICBM's. Third, it is agreed to limit SLBM launchers and submarines therefor to the numbers operational and under construction as of the date of signature (May 26), except that additional launchers (and appropriate numbers of submarines) may be constructed as replacements for an equal number of obsolete ICBM launchers or for launchers on older submarines. In a protocol appended to the Interim Agreement, this is spelled out: the U.S. may have no more than 710 SLBM launchers, and no more than 44 submarines; of those, launchers above 656 and submarines above 41 (the current numbers) must be replacements for equal numbers of obsolete ICBM launchers (in our case, the Titan II). The Soviet Union may have no more than 950 SLBM launchers and no more than 62 "modern" submarines therefor; of those, launchers over 740 (the presumptive current number) must similarly be replacements for older ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers. Fourth, subject to the foregoing restrictions, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers is permitted. Fifth, it is provided that compliance with the agreement shall be monitored with "national technical means of verification", meaning such things as reconnaissance satellites, and it is also agreed not to interfere with each other's means of observation or to use deliberate concealment measures that could impede that verification.

The intended immediate purpose of this agreement is to freeze strategic offensive forces where they now stand, understanding that whatever is under construction at the prescribed date is to be included as if finished. Such an objective is not fundamentally irrational; I have myself urged consideration of a different freeze in other times and circumstances. The difficulties with this proposal stem largely from the fact that the United States strategic forces have not changed very much in basic capacity for the past eight years, while the Soviet payload capacity—the amount of weight their missile force could deliver on targets, sometimes called the "throw weight"—has increased enormously since 1966, and it now stands at something perhaps four times the payload capacity of the American force. A secondary problem resides in the extraordinarily generous terms given to the Soviets for converting some of their obsolete missiles into additional modern SLBM's and submarines.

Supporters of the agreement will point out, and correctly, that, while the Soviet Union has more launchers than does the United States, we have—we believe—many more warheads deployed on those launchers. This estimate stems from the belief that the American technology for MIRV (Multiple Individually-targeted Re-entry Vehicles) is much further advanced than the Soviet technology, and that we have deployed MIRV warheads on a substantial fraction of our strategic force while the Soviets have scarcely started, if they have begun at all. However, if the Soviets wish to achieve large numbers of warheads by deploying lighter MIRV warheads within their existing payload capacity, the technology for doing so is easily within their reach; whereas we are precluded from achieving the payload capacity of the Soviets by the terms of the Interim Agreement.

The throw weight of a strategic force is unquestionably the most important single parameter for characterizing that force, even though other parameters—notably the number, yield, and accuracy of warheads that can be delivered—are of great importance. Some examples of how payload capacity can be used may be instructive. For example, the maximum capacity of a Poseidon launcher is probably in the region of 3,000 pounds. It has been widely reported that the Poseidon missile can accommodate from 10 to 14 MIRV warheads, which must therefore weigh something in the neighborhood of 300 pounds each. They would be relatively "small" weapons of perhaps 50 kilotons each, but they could attack 10 separate targets. Some models of the Soviet SS–9 missile have only a single large warhead, and some might think that, at least for many purposes, a single Poseidon missile was worth 10 SS–9's. In fact, however, that single SS–9 warhead is often estimated to be perhaps 25 megatons, which would suggest that the missile payload capability should be in the region of 12,000 pounds, or about four time the payload capability of a Posidon missile. Therefore, if a Poseidon booster could launch 10 MIRV warheads, the SS–9 could launch 40 of the same kind. The SS–9 probably has from 5 to 10 times the payload capacity of our various models of Minuteman missile, and the Soviet force of approximately 300 SS–9's would alone probably have two to three times the payload capability of our entire Minuteman force. However, the Soviets have perhaps another 1,300 ICBM's in addition to their SS–9 force, most of which are also larger than our Minutemen. Considering both SLBM and ICBM payload, it is probably that the Interim Agreement will allow the Soviets a throw weight roughly four times ours, with present booster technology. Either side is a liberty to improve its booster technology; in fact, the Soviets have recently given evidence of a new model of SS–9 that might have perhaps twice the payload capability of earlier models.

Some Administration analysts argue that the Soviets do not now have MIRV technology and could not deploy significant numbers of MIRV warheads within the lifetime of the Interim Agreement, which is limited to five years. However, we ourselves developed MIRV from "scratch" in about six years, and the system development for the advanced specific systems probably did not take more than three or four years. Since our own MIRV programs have been noisily advertised to the Soviets since early 1968 (and public mention of the idea can be found as far back as 1963), it would be very surprising indeed if the Soviets did not by now have some very advanced ideas on how to do MIRV. And some Administration analysts do in fact believe that the Soviets could achieve substantial MIRV capability within the lifetime of the Interim Agreement; for instance, Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in his statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 15 February that: ". . . our intelligence specialists believe that by the mid or late 1970's the Soviets could have MIRVed SLBM's in their operational forces."

Thus, published comparisons of Soviet and American missile forces showing a substantial American lead in warheads, as for instance in a chart on the front page of *The New York Times* for May 27 showing 5,700 warheads for the U.S. and 2,500 warheads for the Soviet Union, should be understood as having, in all probability, a highly limited lifetime of validity. It should also be understood that, even at present, these Soviet warheads are very much larger and more destructive than ours. (The Soviets also derive certain other technical advantages from their large payload capability.)

Supporters of the agreement have already argued, and will surely further argue, that the Soviets cannot deploy large numbers of MIRV warheads within the lifetime of the agreement. In evaluating this position, at least two points should be borne in mind. First, if no better agreement is negotiated as a successor to this one before its expiration, there will very likely be intense pressures simply to renew it. Second, the estimates that the Soviets could not get substantial MIRV capability come from the same community of intelligence analysts who, for instance, led former Defense Secretary McNamara to announce in the mid-1960's that the Soviets had accepted permanent strategic inferiority, and who were confident in advance of the first Chinese nuclear explosion in October, 1964, that that bomb would be a plutonium device. It proved to be a uranium bomb; and it is an easy point that an operating diffusion plant for separating U–235 is very much harder to conceal than a MIRV test.

I myself believe that, if the Soviets have paid any significant attention to MIRV technology in the past, as is very likely, it would be well within their capability to deploy up to 10,000 or more MIRV warheads on their allowed booster force within the lifetime of this agreement if they choose to do so. They could do this with sufficient yield in warheads, combined with sufficiently upgraded guidance in their missiles, so that they could virtually wipe out the whole of the Minuteman force with less than half of their missile force.

This is not to say that the prospect of launching such an attack would be attractive to the Soviets under ordinary circumstances; the United States has important offensive forces other than Minuteman, and these other forces will, in all likelihood, retain considerable deterrent persuasiveness.

But the lopsided nature of this situation would likely have important adverse consequences, as discussed below.

The estimates that are given for the Soviet ICBM force, incidentally, such as the number 1,618, are all derived from American intelligence; the Soviets have firmly resisted confirming these estimates. Hence, the limitation in the Interim Agreement on numbers is stated as a prohibition on new silo starts, not as an absolute ceiling on numbers. Thus, our estimates of the Soviet strategic forces are really lower bounds. If we later discover a whole field of ICBM's, which I am told has happened in the past, there may be some controversy over just when it was started. There may also be possible room for controversy over what constitutes "light" or "heavy" ICBM's.

The chief justification heard within the Administration for not only accepting, but engraving this embarrassing posture in a formal agreement, is that the Congress would not in any event provide the money to provide the forces that would be necessary to equalize the Soviet strategic force. Inndeed, it is believed, and sincerely, that, if it were not for this agreement, the Soviets would increase their margin of superiority to some even larger, and perhaps indefinitely increasing, extent. For example, the current rate of construction of Soviet ballistic-missile submarines is around 9 or 10 per year, and if that rate were continued, in five years the Soviets could have not 62, but perhaps 90 modern missile-launching submarines. Therefore, instead of having the 50 percent superiority in submarines the agreement will give the, at least potentially, they could have a two-to-one margin on the assumption that Congress would not provide the several billion dollars necessary to keep such Soviet superiority from developing. While this argument is perhaps fairly widely believed within the Administration, it is at the bery least not seriously tested, and may well be false, as I shall indicate later.

Some Administration analysts would also like to argue that the degree of strategic superiority given the Soviets by the Interim Agreement, while admittedly large, is nevertheless less than I have depicted it above. The chief arguments they would advance are: (a) the agreement does not include bombers, in which we have substantial superiority; (b) the agreement also omits what are called the "Forward-Based Systems", i.e., nuclear delivery systems we have based in Europe; and (c) the apparent Soviet superiority in submarines (62 Soviet versus 44 American subs allowed) is not real, since the Soviets do not or cannot operate their submarines as efficiently as we can with our bases (in Rota and in Holy Loch) closer to the Soviet Union. These arguments, in fact, are much more cosmetic than tenable. As for (a), it is possible to believe in the superiority of American bomber forces only as long as Soviet medium bombers are not counted; they have some seven hundred of these, for which they have refueling capability sufficient to enable them to attack targets in the United States and continue on to airfields in Cuba and Mexico, so they do not even have to rely on suicide missions.

As for (b), the Soviets have some seven hundred IRBM's or MRBM's that can attack European targets, to which our Forward Based Systems are mainly in response, and these Soviet missiles are in no way constrained by the agreement; they can build as many more as they please. As for (c), there is nothing to prevent the Soviets from adopting more efficient means of using their submarines; for instance, they could re-supply the submarines, and change their crews, from ocean-going tenders so as to enable them to keep a larger fraction of the submarines on station a larger fraction of the time. Of course, the Soviets *may* not do this, but it would certainly not be difficult for them to do so and there is no obligation in the proposed agreement for them not to do so. The real argument for the Interim Agreement, in the minds of its supporters within the Administration bureaucracy, is that it will limit the extent to which the Soviets will achieve srategic superiority more reliably than any other approach in sight.

But that Soviet strategic superiority, by any reasonable assessment, is already real, and will likely become more stark with the passage of time as the Soviets deploy MIRV and otherwise upgrade their permitted force. The political consequences of this superiority, or more precisely of the general public recognition of it, are several, and all bad.

First, it will reinforce and confirm Soviet images and expectations already established of a declining American role in world affairs. Within the past two years, Soviet commentators on the American scene have exhibited increasing contemptuousness of the United States, its power, and its role in international affairs; for instance, Soviet analysts can often be heard or seen making remarks such as: "The United States must be adjusting itself, in the manner of the United Kingdom at the end of World War II, to its loss of power and influence in the world." The other side of this coin, of course, is that the Soviets correspondingly think of themselves as very much in the ascendant. These Soviet attitudes and expectations will predictably be reflected both in their peacetime bargaining positions and in their aggressiveness in possible crisis confrontations.

Second, and conversely, the agreement will more clearly, widely, and unambiguously establish an image of American inferiority in many pertinent minds in the bureaucracy of the American Government. The effects of this, of course, would be the obverse of those to be expected from the attitudes in the Soviet bureaucracy.

Third, these attitudes and expectations will become much more clearly and firmly established in the minds of our Allies, which will ultimately lead them to be more responsive, and perhaps unduly responsive, to Soviet diplomatic pressures and initiatives. To use the jargon currently used by professionals in regard to these matters, the Interim Agreement will contribute to "Finlandizing" tendencies in the policies of our Allies.

Fourth, enshrining this degree of Soviet superiority as a substantially permanent matter, and therefore inculcating attitudes and expectations of the type mentioned above, will almost certainly have adverse effects in any serious crisis that may develop. For instance, we could not reasonably expect nearly as favorable an outcome in a replay of the Cuban missile crisis. (The success of that outcome did not reside so much in the immediate outcome in Cuba itself as in the fact that the Soviets were deterred from counter-escalating in Turkey, or, especially, in Berlin, a fact that apostles of parity find convenient to ignore.)

There is, of course, a certain sense in which it is true that different degrees of superiority could in the last analysis only be translated into different degrees of "victory" that would in any event be completely Pyrrhic. However, this often-repeated observation conveniently ignores that most political leaders, and many military leaders, are not academic strategists: these leaders not only count weapons, they are prone to thinking of such questions as who will come out "ahead", and their (possibly simplistic) attitudes about these matters will influence their expectations, demands, and concession in a crisis, other things (such as guts and political support of the leaders on the scene) being equal. Therefore, a commitment to a position of strategic inferiority is, at least in some statistical sense, an invitation to being pushed around in the next crisis. Mr. Nixon has just engraved this invitation and handed it to the Soviets in Moscow on a platter.

### III. THE ABM TREATY

The key terms of the Treaty on ABM's are as follows. To begin with, "Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this treaty." Thus, the basic philosophy is clear: apart from the exceptions indicated, we may not defend our homeland against missile attack. Second, Article III provides for a limited defense of one hundred interceptors of Moscow and Washington, and another defense system similarly limited to one hundred interceptors of ICBM silo launchers in some area remote from the defense of the national capitals. Third, both we and the Soviets undertake not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. Fourth, it is prohibited to transfer ABM systems or their components to other states or to deploy them outside Soviet and American national territory. Fifth, it is provided that compliance with the provisions of the treaty shall be monitored by "national technical means of verification", as in the Interim Agreement, and similarly there are obligations not to interfere with such means or to use deliberate concealment measures.

Many readers will not be familiar with the bizarre rationale on which this proposed treaty rests. It may therefore be useful to explain the conceptions that the architects of this treaty had in mind, and to show that the ideology on which the treaty rests is, in fact, just as bizarre as it seems.

American strategic nuclear policy has been dominated in recent years by an idea called "assured destruction." This concept is that the dominant task of the U.S. strategic forces is to be able to amount a nuclear attack that would reliably destroy a substantial fraction of the Soviet society, even after a major Soviet strike on American forces. Recent public statements of the Nixon Administration have emphasized a doctrine called "strategic sufficiency", but it is clear that something like the concept of "assured destruction" still dominates American strategic policy, even if the terminology itself is no longer used in official statements.

This domination extends to strategic arms-control matters. It is widely argued that the most peaceful, stable, secure, cheap, and generally desirable arrangement is one in which we and the Soviets maintain a "mutual assured destruction" posture, in which no serious effort is made by either side to limit the civilian damage that could be inflicted by the other. Most of the opposition in the West to substantial systems of missile defense for cities, including the opposition embodies in the proposed ABM Treaty, derives from the alleged benefits of such a posture. And much of the opposition to the Safeguard ABM system, which was not intended to provide a substantial defense of cities, stemmed from a concern that it might expand to provide such a defense.

I believe that the concept of mutual assured destruction provides one of the few instances in which the obvious acronym for something yields at once the appropriate description for it; that is, a Mutual Assured Destruction posture as a goal is, almost literally, mad. MAD.

If the forces of technology and international politics provided absolutely no alternative, one might reluctantly accept a MAD posture. But to think of it as desirable—for instance, as a clearly preferred goal of our arms-control negotiations, as the current SALT proposal automatically assumes—is bizarre. This can be made very clear by considering the simplest and most effective means of realizing it.

At present, we and the Soviet achieve a MAD posture by means of long-range missiles and bombers armed with thermonuclear weapons. There are, however, many problems associated with these forces; missiles and bombers may be attacked before they are launched, they may fail to perform properly, or they may fail to penetrate enemy defenses. Concern about such vulnerabilities in our posture helps drive the arms race. These forces are also expensive; the U.S. alone spends about $8 billon a year on them.

Now, if it were genuinely desirable to have a MAD posture, we could achieve it far more effectively, reliably and cheaply than at present. We and the Soviets could have an arms-control agreement to mine each other's cities. We could install very large thermonuclear weapons with secure firing arrangements in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and so on, while the Soviets could install similar weapons and arrangements in New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, and so on.

It is technically feasible to make such a system very secure, and the vulnerabilities mentioned above could be eliminated, which would reduce arms-race pressures. While such a system would have its own technical problems, analysis indicates they would be far simpler to solve than those of the present system. It would also be much cheaper than the current system; it could save billions.

Yet almost everyone will judge it starkly absurd, even after consideration. And, since a mined-city system is clearly the best way of realizing a MAD posture, it follows that a MAD posture as a goal is itself fundamentally absurd—it is, indeed, mad.

This reduction-to-absurdity argument is useful for sharply drawing attention to the fact that something must be wrong with MAD as a way of life. However, one can discuss the problems of MAD directly. There are at least three interrelated problems.

The first is that, in spite of our best efforts, a major nuclear war could happen. An institutionalized MAD posture is a way of insuring, now and forever, that the outcome of such a war would be nearly unlimited disaster for everybody. While technology and politics may conspire for a time to leave us temporarily in such a posture, we should not welcome it—we should rather be looking for ways out of it. And they can be found.

The second fundamental difficulty is, in essence, political: The body politic of the United States did not create a Department of Defense for the purpose of deliberately making us all hostages to enemy weapons. The Government is supposed, according to the Constitution, to "provide for the common defense", and plainly most Americans would revolt at the idea that a mined-city system is a sensible way to do this. They would be quite right. The Defense Department should be more concerned with assuring live Americans than dead Russians.

The third fundamental difficulty is moral. We should not deliberately create a system in which millions of innocent civilians would by intention be exterminated in a failure of the system. The system is not *that* reliable. If we accept a MAD posture as an interim solution, we should be seeking ways out of it, not ways to enshrine it.

Why, then, do some Americans advocate a MAD posture? The advocates involved are, in the main, technical or technically oriented people accustomed to theoretical models, and the arguments involve appeals to "stability" of various kinds and reference to other sophisticated jargon—jargon that I understand very well, having helped to articulate it a decade or more ago. For instance, one argument sometimes heard—it is, e.g., reflected in the preamble of the proposed ABM Treaty—is that this posture will best protect against nuclear war altogether, but this proposition is very dubious indeed.

While these advocates are undoubtedly sincere, and many of them are even intelligent, I believe they have been bemused by theoretical models of strategic interactions, models which seem sophisticated and intellectually appealing but which are in fact much oversimplified descriptions of reality. Indeed, some few technical people, who have at least had the integrity to follow the logic of their analysis to its conclusion, have been so bemused by these models that they have seriously advocated the actual deployment of a mined-city system.

Well, if an institutionalized MAD posture is not desirable as a permanent way of life, and it is not, what alternative is available? The answer is to provide increasing emphasis on defense, and corresponding reduction in the relative effort devoted to strategic offensive forces.

There is much controversy about just how effective defense (such as ABM) can be made against current offensive forces, or against further enlarged offensive forces. I cannot discuss this controversy here. However, there is very little controversy over the fact that defense can be made quite effective if the opposing offense is suitably reduced, while allowed defense is built up. This is precisely the direction that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks should have taken, but did not.

Even if it were held that currently achievable defense is too ineffective to be useful against even a suitably reduced offensive threat (a position that few informed persons would believe), it makes little sense to preclude the possiblity of a more effective defense being found in the future. The current proposed treaty would do so.

It might be possible to achieve similar effects simply by sharply reducing offensive forces, without any defense, if it were not for two factors: (a) there are other countries in the world besides the United States and the Soviet Union, and (b) perfect inspection of sharply reduced offensive forces probably cannot be achieved, and defense can provide protection against clandestine weapons.

The MAD philosophy originally took hold in the American arms-control community in about 1960. This might have been ultimately unimportant but for the fact that Robert S. McNamara became a fanatic adherent of this school, and he imposed an "Assured Destruction" philosophy on the civilian staffs in the Pentagon with the full force of his arrogance. This was, in some sense, a *tour de force,* because at the time he did so, the Soviets conspicuously did not share this philosophy, although he often asserted that they did. But the evidence is enormous that, at least up until the late 1960's, the Soviets did not hold the view that a MAD posture was desirable. For instance, Premier Kosygin himself, when asked about a moratorium on missile defenses at a press conference in London on February 9, 1967, replied, in part, "I believe that defensive systems, which prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms race, but constitute a factor preventing the death of people. Some argue like this: What is cheaper, to have offensive weapons which can destroy towns and whole states or to have defensive weapons which can prevent this destruction? At present the theory is current somewhere that the system which is cheaper should be developed. Such so-called theoreticians argue as to the costs of killing a man—$500,000 or $100,000. Maybe an anti-missile system is more expensive than an offensive system, but it is designed not to kill people but to preserve human lives. I understand that I do not reply to the question I was asked, but can draw yourselves the appropriate conclusions." This does not sound like the comment of a man who was friendly to a moratorium on missile defense.

Many other Soviet pronouncements, both public and private, official and unofficial, left no doubt that Soviet strategic views favored heavy emphasis on active defense, at least up through 1968 and at least some portion of 1969. Beginning in about 1969 or 1970, either the Soviet Government began changing its views, or else they decided at least to make us think they had changed their views, and the overt indications in the negotiations in the SALT for the past two years have suggested whole-hearted Soviet acceptance, at least at the top of the Soviet Government, of the MAD philosophy.

If the Soviets have indeed accepted this position, they had a good deal of American help in getting there. Throughout almost the whole of the 1960's, almost every American who argued with almost any Russian about arms-control matters tried to make the point that missile defenses were wicked. This stemmed, of course, from the commitment in certain American quarters to the MAD ideology. Up until 1968, the universal Soviet reaction to this argument was a polite raspberry.

However, some of the spokesmen from whom they heard could not be easily ignored. In particular, Mr. McNamara did his very best to persuade the Soviets of this philosophy, both in his public statements (such as the successive "Posture Statements") and in his private meetings with Soviets, notably at the Glassboro Conference in June 1967, when he forcefully argued the case for a MAD posture directly to Kosygin. The Soviet Premier did not assimilate this idea, at least at that time. Another forceful input to the Soviets came from then-President Lyndon B. Johnson, who, according to his memoirs, sent Premier Kosygin a secret letter in January 1967, warning him that the incipient deployment of Soviet missile defenses had put him under pressure to "increase greatly our capabilities to penetrate any defensive systems which you might establish". Johnson continued: "If we should feel compeled to make such major increases in our strategic weapons capabilities, I have no doubt that you would in turn feel under compulsion to do likewise." It seems very likely that this letter was stimulated by McNamara.

Perhaps the most persuasive argument brought to bear on the Soviets was not an argument *per se,* but the American decision of late 1967 and early 1968 to proceed with a major MIRV program for the American strategic offensive force, leading to the deployment of Minuteman III and Poseidon. This program was intended to add something like five thousand additional warheads to the American offensive force. The almost theological, not to say fanatic, attachment Mr. McNamara had for the MAD philosophy is reflected in the fact that, while he viewed the beginnings of a Soviet system for the defense of their homeland as highly provocative, he apparently saw nothing provocative in spending several billion dollars to add several thousand additional warheads to the American force, especially at a time and under circumtances that would have made it impossible for the Soviets to know what accuracy these weapons might achieve.

For whatever combination of reasons, the Soviets have now either accepted the MAD philosophy or have at least decided to humor us by pretending that they have. It should be mentioned that, to the time of writing, one cannot detect many signs of this philosophy in the papers of Soviet colonels writing for each other in *Red Star;* however, this may only indicate that the message has not yet come down adequately from the top. Some well-placed Soviets have in fact indicated to Americans, very privately, that acceptance of the ABM Treaty will necessitate a major doctrinal overhaul in the Soviet military establishment, and may well require a considerable shuffling of senior personnel. It will be interesting to watch if such a development does in fact come to pass.

Some kinds of ABM systems could be deployed for some objectives that would be compatible with a generally prevailing MAD posture. In fact, the Sentinel ABM system initiated by McNamara in September, 1967, and the Safeguard System that the Nixon Administration has been constructing, were both designed to be compatible with a MAD posture. This compatibility resided in the fact that the defense of the entire country that these systems would have provided was what is called a "light" or "thin" defense; a large and sophisticated attack, such as the Soviets would be capable of mounting, would easily have overwhelmed a thin overall defense of our cities. (At McNamara's instruction, the Sentinel system design also had some specific weaknesses intended to make the system more easily penetrable by the Soviets.) Such a light area defense was intended, in the case of the Sentinel System, to provide protection of the entire country against possible Chinese attacks that may become feasible if the Chinese develop an ICBM force.

The Nixon Administration retained the anti-Chinese light area defense objective of the Sentinel System and added additional objectives for the Safeguard System, chiefly the provision of added protection of our ICBM and bomber forces. The three-fold objectives of the Safeguard program have been stated many times by the Nixon Administration; for instance, as given in the most recent "Posture Statement" issued by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird in February 1972 (p. 76): "Protection of our land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union; defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which the People's Republic of China is likely to be able to mount within the decade; and protection against the possibility of accidental attacks from any source." These objectives made sense, even within the framework of a MAD posture, and the program was accordingly supported, especially in its early phases in 1969 and 1970, by many people who were willing to accept such a posture.

It is instructive that nothing in either Moscow agreement provides a substitute means (to Safeguard) for satisfying these objectives. The Interim Agreement does not provide sufficient protection of our land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviets (I shall give evidence for this shortly), and of course nothing in either agreement does or can do anything about the possibility of nuclear attacks from China or accidental attacks from any source. Therefore, the Administration's previously declared objectives for Safeguard combined with the current proposed agreements constitute a strategic *non sequitur*.

The worst aspect of this relates to the protection of our retaliatory forces. The repeatedly declared Administration objective in linking the negotiation of an ABM agreement to an agreement limiting strategic offensive forces was that it was necessary to limit the threat to Minuteman in order to accept constraints that would limit our ability to protect Minuteman. However, we are quite some distance from having achieved that link-up. To quote again from Secretary Laird's most recent Posture Statement (p. 78) "With significant qualitative improvements in Soviet ICBM's even without increases in the number of Soviet ICBM's [i.e., exactly the situation permitted by the Interim Agreement], the postulated threat to Minuteman in the last half of the 1970's could grow to a level beyond the capabilities of the four-site Safeguard defense of Minuteman. Therefore, we propose [initiating an additional ABM defense program for protecting Minuteman beyond the four-site Safeguard System]." Thus, even the full four-site Safeguard System, which would have entailed many more than 100 interceptors, was judged by Mr. Laird inadequate to protect Minuteman against the threat now permitted the Soviets under the Interim Agreement; yet we have negotiated away all but a small part of that Safeguard System, to say nothing of the capability to add additional active defense.

Evidently the gains of this agreement are not to be found in terms of the often-expressed objectives of the Safeguard program. There are two possible intellectual justifications for accepting this treaty, in the light of the objectives the Government has expressed. The first is that, while these agreements themselves are inadequate, supplementary agreements to be sought in following negotiations will redress these imbalances. However, the Soviets will surely have very little motivation to degrade the situation they now find themselves in, and I do not believe an argument of this form should be given any significant weight. The other possible justification would be of the form that, while the agreements may in some sense constitute an immediate strategic loss, the various political and economic gains that may develop as a consequence of these agreements in the future will more than compensate for the strategic costs. An argument of this form is in fact indicated in President Nixon's last foreign policy statement. While this argument cannot be dismissed, there is no doubt that such a calculation of gains and losses requires considerable optimism about the consequences of having these agreements and considerable pessimism about the future if the agreements were not in force. I shall return to this issue below.

IV. WHAT BROUGHT US HERE?

The question of what brought us to the point of accepting these agreements can be answered at several different levels, and in terms of several different individuals and groups within the Government.

President Nixon, for example, genuinely wants peace, he genuinely would like to save money, and he genuinely would like to be re-elected. With respect to this last objective, he obviously understands quite well that negotiation of these agreements, especially if they are accepted without too much of a battle, will be of substantial domestic political value. I believe it is quite fair to say that this fact contributed significant pressure to the American negotiators. However, it would be quite wide of the mark to think of the agreements merely as a cheap electoral trick or to think that the agreements do not have a substantial base of support in the bureaucracy.

Many people in the Executive Office—i.e. the President's own staff—place considerable emphasis, in justifying these agreements, on the argument that—as concerns the Interim Agreement most especially—the Congress would not provide the wherewithal to close an increasing gap in strategic forces.

While this argument is probably sincere, it is possible to believe that it may in fact be less important than a perception that is less frequently articulated, but which is likely held by the President and by some of his key people in the Executive Office, that money for military purposes would be very scarce even if Congress itself were not an obstacle. Trying to find several billion dollars a year in extra money for the Defense Department at the present time would entail choices among very unpleasant alternatives, such as raising taxes, attempting some kind of tax reform, or taking large amounts of money out of other programs the Administration was only recently supporting. These alternatives would, of course, look especially unpleasant in an election year.

This perception is probably at least partially responsible for the high hopes that many Administration people have placed on achieving suitable agreements in the SALT. It may also be related to the fact that the President himself has not conspicuously gone so bat for his military establishment, apart from Vietnam. The Congress may make an easy scapegoat, but the Congress cannot fairly be reckoned the chief villain of the piece when the President has never once gone to the country to explain that our military posture was in jeopardy and that more money was needed for strategic forces. If the President had chosen to lead on this matter, many of us believe that the country might well have followed; but the experiment was never tried.

The main bureaucratic force behind the proposed ABM Treaty was the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, known as ACDA. Most of the staff of this agency has had a theological commitment to a MAD posture, and a corresponding degree of opposition to active defenses for cities, for years. Other bureaucratic forces in support of this treaty can be found in other agencies, especially in the Department of State, and are mainly but not wholly, less ideological in character; some view it as an additional means of saving money, or as a device for attempting to reduce the momentum of the strategic arms race, and are simply less concerned with distinctions between defensive and offensive forces. And some are simply pessimistic about the prospect of achieving sufficient technical effectiveness of missile defense, now or in the future.

One of the more interesting bureaucratic case studies, in relation to these agreements, can be found in the Department of Defense. A decade ago, it would have been absolutely inconceivable that, for instance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have approved either of these agreements, much less both of them. Their approval would have been almost as unthinkable five years ago, and they probably would have resisted the agreements as recently as three years ago. Within the past three years, however, and especially within the past two, a very noticeable loss of morale has been detectable within the Defense Department. In the face of the buffeting they have received from the Congress, from the President's own Bureau of the Budget, and from the general public, the military staffs themselves have been looking increasingly to the SALT to help "save" their situation.

Even to the present time, however, it is most implausible that the Joint Chiefs could regard these agreements with enthusiasm; more likely they simply faced their own set of unpleasant alternatives, and judged these agreements to be the least unpleasant. The bureaucratic history of the proposed agreements probably contributed some share of the unpleasant way the alternatives were structured.

Some comments in the press have tended to suggest that Henry Kissinger was the chief architect of these agreements. It would probably be much more accurate to think of him as presiding over the national security apparatus as a sort of chairman, and attempting to impose some degree of order and competence on that apparatus, than as a personal mastermind of the agreements. Kissinger's main (and very considerable) strength is in international politics; perhaps because of the technical components involved, he has never been as strong with stategic nuclear issues. Kissinger's personal contribution to events can probably be found much more in the President's determined resistance to cutting American troop levels in Europe, and in the missions to Peking and Moscow, than in these two strategic agreements. Their origins are both more diffuse in character and remote in time.

V: WHERE NEXT?

It is clear that these are not the arms-control agreements one would wish to have in an ideal world. I personally have supported, and without serious reservation, every arms-control agreement or treaty that has come up for acceptance or ratification

since World War II. For the first time, I find it doubtful that one should counsel acceptance of these agreements. (The ABM Treaty will require a two-thirds vote for ratification in the Senate; the Interim Agreement will require a majority vote in both houses.)

The basic difficulty, of course, is that one does not have a free choice to start over again to produce better agreements; it would otherwise be easy to advise rejection. But the choice is not free. In view of all the circumstances prevailing, both domestically and internationally, should one therefore accept a conspicuous American declaration of strategic inferiority, and accept the conspicuous idiocy of a permanent commitment to a MAD posture, and simply hope that the agreements will ultimately contribute to the evolution of a secured peace with freedom? Or should one attempt to insist that the President should do what is right, and the Congress should do what is right, and the public should do what is right, including a willingness to spend much more money if the Soviets are recalcitrant about establishing more sensible agreements—and, incidentally, almost surely lose the battle? I do not know, and I can believe that honest and intelligent men, who understand the issues thoroughly, and who are as hostile as I am to the agreements, could easily differ on the answers.

At the very least, the debate associated with these agreements, in the Congress and out of it, should force attention to a number of important questions. Some of these concern technical details, but which may be of sufficient importance to influence the acceptability of the agreements. For example, in the ABM Treaty, why should a local defense of ICBM silos limited to 100 interceptors require the astonishing total of 20 radars? With respect to the Interim Agreement, what kind of confidence can the Administration have that the Minuteman force is not seriously jeopardized? Is there any sensible way to require, as a condition of acceptance, that the Soviets must at least provide declarations of their own force levels? Other types of questions should concern more basic philosophical issues, such as whether we wish to live forever under a MAD posture or whether we wish to provide formal acknowledgment (via the Interim Agreement) of Soviet superiority. It may well be that some judicious reservations could be attached to these agreements that would lessen their unfortunate effects.

The United States has suffered something like wounds from a number of sources in recent years—Vietnam, student activism, declining credibility of both the Government and the media, and, not least, a declining American role in world affairs, occasioned largely by declining morale at home. Many of us will feel that Mr. Nixon has now rubbed SALT in our wounds. But we should not forget that there are, in fact, good reasons to slow down the strategic arms race; and if the agreements are accepted, we must, of necessity, share Mr. Nixon's hope that their positive effects will, over the long term, outweigh their immediate strategic costs.

The costs are real.

## THE WAR STILL TEARS AMERICANS' CONSCIENCES

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, opposition to our military adventurism in Southeast Asia continues to flow deeply in the conscience of the Nation, despite the gratifying reduction in American troop casualties.

While our troops in Vietnam have fallen below 50,000 for the first time in 8 years, there has been a relentless increase in the number of American fighting men stationed in Thailand and with the 7th Fleet in the South China Sea. With this manpower, the intensity of our unilateral air war has escalated to its highest pitch ever. The massive destruction from our tons and tons of bombs and thousands of gallons of napalm has laid waste a productive land and killed and maimed its people.

A decade ago, many Americans felt that altruism and brotherhood were justification for our forcible intervention in Vietnam. Today, those same humanistic feelings have become the basis for the pity and mercy that a majority of the citizens of this country now hold out to the hundreds of thousands of Indochinese civilians whose lives and families have been shattered by our impersonal bombing from on high.

The executive refuses to end this war, so the legislative branch must—totally and at the earliest practicable time.

That is the message that I am receiving in letters from around the country, and I am sure other Senators are receiving the same message from thousands of Americans.

One notable example of this feeling came in my mail yesterday, and I wanted to share it with the Senate. It is a petition from 256 faculty members of Iowa State University at Ames, Iowa. There are 25 graduate assistants among the signatories, but all the remainder are members of the faculty.

Mr. President, I sincerely welcome the receipt of this petition and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD along with a letter from two members of the faculty council, transmitting the petition.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY,
*Ames, Iowa, June 26, 1972.*

HON. HAROLD HUGHES,
*U.S. Senator, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.*

MY DEAR SENATOR HUGHES: At its regular meeting on May 9, 1971, the Faculty Council of Iowa State University passed a resolution providing for the initiation and distribution of the enclosed petitions among the faculty of this university. We feel that it would be helpful to outline the debate which took place that evening.

At the request of a constituent, the Council considered a motion which would have put the Faculty Council on record as opposing the mining of the North Vietnamese harbors by American forces. A full discussion followed during which it was pointed out that the Faculty Council, as a body representing many individual faculty members, should not take sides on highly controversial issues. The motion was defeated.

Following this, a motion was introduced that the Faculty Council initiate the distribution of a petition expressing opposition to the American posture in Indochina and to the mining of the harbors in order that faculty members, as individuals, might express their opinions. The motion passed, and the petitions enclosed are the result of that action.

A third motion, which would have involved the Council in initiating a petition to be sent to you and to Hanoi condemning the actions of the North Vietnamese was discussed. It was noted that faculty members at Iowa State do not participate in the election of the government of North Vietnam, so that our standing in relation to that government does not lend itself to petitioning. The motion was defeated.

These petitions have been signed by faculty members of this University and, where indicated, by graduate assistants. We respectfully submit them to you for your consideration.

For the Faculty Council,
BENJAMIN S. COOPER,
*Assistant Professor of Physics.*
W. DOUGLAS PRITCHARD,
*Associate Professor of Music.*

On May 9, 1972, Faculty Council at Iowa State University voted to authorize the establishment and distribution of petitions in opposition to the American posture in the Indochina conflict. The resolution stipulates that the petitions be sent to the President of the United States as well as to all members of the Iowa delegation in Washington, D.C.

"We, the undersigned Faculty Members, stand in opposition to the U.S. military presence in Indo-China and to the current escalation of the conflict as manifested by the President's mining of the harbors in North Vietnam."

D. K. Bruner, English, James A. Lowrie, English, N. W. Yates, English, R. W. Davenport, Speech, Pearl Hogrefe, English, Lillian O. Feinberg, English, James Weaver, Speech, Richard L. Herrnstadt, English, Richard Gustafson, English, R. E. Hoover, English, Will C. Jumper, English.

Robert R. Bataille, English, Frank E. Haggard, English, Genevieve Meininger, Foreign Language, George Lopos, English, Julie Braun, English, Leonard Feinberg, English, Albert L. Walker, English, Gordon W. Herbster, English.

W. Douglas Pritchard, Music, Richard H. von Grabow, Music, Charles Stark, Music, Mildred Laughlin, Music, Ruth Wagner, Music, Laurie Ticehurst, Music, Martha N. Folts, Music, Marion Barnum, Music, Gary C. White, Music, Jerry Pruett, Music, Joseph Messenger, Music, Carl O. Bleyle, Music, Ilza Niemack, Music.

Jeanette Bohnenkamp, Food and Nutrition, Edythe Glass, Child Development, Willa Choper, Child Development, Donna C. Nelson, Child Development, Patricia A. Johnson, Linda Carson, Joan Herwig, Child Development, Carol L. Anderson, Child Development Extension, Michael Jacobowitz, Child Development, Jeanne Dixon, Child Development, Shirley Shaw, Child Development, Lynn M. Graham, Child Development, Stefan M. Silverston, Computer Science, D. L. Ulrichson, Computer Science.

Alan F. Wilt, History, Dan Robinson, Education, Suzanne Robinson, Reg Smith, Danielle Harder, Sociology.

Patrick Kavangh, Mechanical Engineering, E. E. Anderson, Mechanical Engineering, Premo Chiotti, Metallurgy, Arnold Kahn, Psychology, Kenneth Carlander, Zoology and Entymology, Mike White, Math, Clair W. Keller, History and Education, Mark E. Neely, History, Marvin C. Papenfuss, Math, H. C. Brearley, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, J. W. Menne, Psychology.

Richard Van Iten, Philosophy, Barton C. Hacker, History and Mechanical Engineering, Wayne S. Osborn, History, Steffen Schmidt, Political Science, J. B. Scheeler, Civil Engineering, Richard W. Pohl, Botany, Richard Koupal, Music, Thomas A. Weber, Physics.

Joseph H. Kupfer, Philosophy; John W. Elrod, Philosophy; Harold I. Sharlin, History; Adrian A. Bennett, History; Philip B. Zaring, History; Achilles Avraamides, History; James W. Whitaker, History; Richard N. Kottman, History; Philip H. Vaughan, History; Faye P. Whitaker, English; Kenneth G. Madison, History; Dorothy Schwieder, History; John Hannaway, History; George T. McJimsey, History;

Don C. Rawson, History; James B. Sinatra, Landscape Architecture; Robert S. Hansen, Chemistry.

Benjamin S. Cooper, Physics; Robert A. Leacock, Physics; D. M. Roberts, Nuclear Engineering; N. W. Dean, Physics; S. A. Williams, Physics; Bing-lin Young, Physics; Mike R. Haas, Physics; Laurent Hodges, Physics; David R. Torgeson, Physics; James W. Bloom, Physics; P. Spencer Young, Physics; Stan W. Kocimski, Physics; William C. Egbert, Physics; R. H. Good, Jr., Physics; L. D. Krase, Physics.

Joseph J. Eitter, Physics; Cheryl Cate, Physics; M. S. Haque, Physics; Tom Corrigan, Physics; E. M. Jensen, Physics; Robert M. Jacobel, Physics; James R. Toplicar, Physics; Fred L. Ridener, Physics.

Duncan Mallam, English, C. Buell Lipa, English, Dale McCay, English, Keith G. Huntress, English, Gretchen Hettinga, English, Rachel M. Lowrie, English, M. B. Drexler, Speech.

Sherry Hoopes, Speech, Eric G. Clemens, Architecture, Linda R. Galyon, English, J. D. Beatty, English, Gayle Emmel, English, Bev Benson, English, A. E. Gaylon, English, Elizabeth Bukels, English, Charles H. Sohn, English, M. H. Dunlop, English, Phyllis Glass, English, Donald Dunlop, English, Patrick D. Gouran, Speech, Dainis Bisenieks, English.

Betty Morgan, Speech, Robert F. Charles, Speech, N. E. Hagler, Speech, Frank E. Brandt, Speech, Jane Cox, Speech, Claudia Edwards, English, Pearl Zinober, English, Russel O. Peterson, English, Paul B. Nemiroff, Speech, Terrence Horland, Speech, Patricia Hendricks, English, Janellyn Staley, English, Ronetta Kahn, English.

Carol Harms, English, Cheryl Marsh, English, Alan D. Beals, English, Victor Vrbanowitz, English, Robert S. Boston, English, Mary Spraggins, English, Cynthia Davenport, English, Richard Phenegar, Speech, Max K. Culver, Speech, Owen D. Thorson, Speech, H. C. Eichmeier, Speech, Barbara Matthies, English, Mary Catherine Limbird, English, Frances Pedtke, English, Candace Strawn, English, Judi Berzon, English, Annabelle Irwin, English.

Hugo F. Franzen, Chemistry, Jerome W. McAllister, Chemistry, B. G. Gerstein, Chemistry, R. E. McCarley, Chemistry, G. J. Small, Chemistry, W. Trahanovsky, Chemistry.

George Zyskind, Statistics, H. T. David, Statistics, Oscar Kempthorne, Statistics, Barry C. Arnold, Statistics, Glen Meeden, Statistics, Dean Isaacson, Mathematics, K. Robert Kern, Extension, Marjorie Graves, Extension, D. Candace Hurley, Extension, Joy C. Banyas, Extension, Leon E. Thompson, Extension, Carl Hamilton, Vice Pres. for Information & Development.

Robert P. Hogan, Information Asst., Donald J. Wishart, Extension, James L. Warner, Information Service, Paul Lem, Extension Visual Planner, J. Clayton Herman, Extension, Larry R. Whitting, Editor, C.A.R.D., Virginia Harding, Extension, John F. Heer, Editor, Ag., David L. Lendt, Asst. to Vice Pres., Ellis A. Hicks, Zoology & Entomology, Gordon Munson, Information Assistant, Robert W. Pritchard, Extension.

George G. Koerber, Electrical Engineering, W. B. Boast, Electrical Engineering, J. P. Basart, Electrical Engineering, J. W. Nilsson, Electrical Engineering, John R. Pavlat, Electrical Engineering, Thomas M. Scott, Electrical Engineering, M. H. Mericle, Electrical Engineering, E. C. Jones Jr., Electrical Engineering.

Clayton G. Holloway, English, Richard R. Wright, English, James R. Dow, Foreign Language, Helga B. Van Iten, Foreign Language, Dennis Phillips, Foreign Language, G. Buford Nosman, Jr., Foreign Language, Ann Vinograde, Foreign Language, Rainer Rumold, Foreign Language, Patricia Sullivan, Foreign Language, Barbara von Wittich, Foreign Language, Raymond Vondran, Library, Joanna Courteau, Foreign Language, Frederick Schwartz, Foreign Language, Harry A. Kahn, Foreign Language, Margaret S. Johnson, Foreign Language, Charlotte Bruner, Foreign Language, Allen S. Grossman, Physics.

J. C. Mathews, Mathematics, George Seifert, Mathematics, Norman Parker, Mathematics, K. A. Heimes, Mathematics, D. E. Sanderson, Mathematics, Chuck Riley, Mathematics, R. W. Neufeld, Mathematics, J. Colby Kegley, Mathematics, David F. Wooten, Mathematics, George W. Peglar, Mathematics, Edward S. Allen, Mathematics.

C. J. Triska, Electrical Engineering.
A. V. Pohm, Electrical Engineering.
C. S. Comstock, Electrical Engineering.
T. A. Smay, Electrical Engineering.
R. J. Zingg, Electrical Engineering.
C. L. Townsend, Engineering Extension.
Robert E. Post, Electrical Engineering.
Paul R. Bond, Electrical Engineering.
Glenn E. Fanslow, Electrical Engineering.
Robert L. Samuels, Electrical Engineering.
Richard C. Morrison, Physics.
David W. Lynch, Physics.
Ronald Fuchs, Physics.
Richard G. Barnes, Physics.
Kenneth L. Kliewer, Physics.
Michael Yester, Physics.
F. C. Peterson, Physics.
Lester T. Earls, Physics.
Charles L. Hammer, Physics.
James L. Wolf, Physics.
John R. Clem, Physics.
G. C. Danielson, Physics.
Jon J. McCarthy, Physics.
Clayton A. Swensen, Physics.
William J. Kernan, Physics.
Percy Carr, Physics.
Sunil Sinha, Physics.
C. Stassis, Physics.
D. K. Finnemore, Physics.

## UNION CARBIDE CORP. AWARDS SCHOLARSHIPS FOR CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

Mr. BROCK. Mr. President, last week our Government renewed its commitment to the youth of America with the President's signing of the Higher Education Act of 1972—S. 659. Just as the Government has its stake in our Nation's young people, so do many in the private sector. Among these is the Union Carbide Corp., which this week is sponsoring a constituent of mine, Miss Katrina Knox, of Columbia, Tenn., for participation in the Washington Workshops Congressional Seminar.

Each year the Union Carbide Corp. selects a number of highly qualified high school students to join in the fine learning experience offered by the Washington Workshops, and I congratulate Katrina on her being chosen as a Union Carbide scholar.

In spite of the brief time the participants are on Capitol Hill, valuable experience in the legislative process is gained. Such experience cannot be acquired in the classroom, the media, or from books on the subject, but only through direct involvement in the daily activities of Congress.

Mr. President, the image held by many people who have not had the opportunity to be involved in such activities, differs widely from that held by the Senators, Representatives, and the Capitol Hill staff. Katrina and the other students will leave after a week on Capitol Hill with a greater understanding of and new insights into the legislative process.

Katrina is one of 200 Washington Workshops students directly learning about American Government this week on Capitol Hill. I heartily commend Union Carbide and the many private organizations who make such scholarships available to outstanding young Americans.

## JACL CONVENTION

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, this week representatives of the Japanese American Citizens League—JACL—are holding their biennial convention in Washington, D.C. It is my pleasure to note their presence in this city, our Nation's Capital, and to welcome them.

Concurrent with this meeting is the exhibit at the Smithsonian Institution concerning the internment of thousands of Japanese Americans during World War II. This exhibit serves to remind all Americans of the terrible injustice which was inflicted on our Japanese American citizens at that time.

Japanese Americans have good reason to be proud of their heritage and their traditions, of their culture and the example they set of constructive citizenship. I welcome those who have come to Washington this week, and I send best wishes on this occasion to all Japanese Americans throughout the land.

## ANNOUNCEMENT OF POSITION ON LEGISLATIVE ROLLCALL NO. 265

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER) was unavoidably absent from the Senate yesterday at the time of the final passage of legislation to amend and extend programs administered by the Office of Economic Opportunity.

I wish to announce that Senator ELLENDER desires to be recorded in favor of the legislation.

## CONFIRMATION OF NOMINATION OF CARROLL G. BRUNTHAVER, OF OHIO, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND COMMODITY PROGRAMS

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, on June 22 the Senate confirmed the nomination of an exceptionally qualified man, Mr. Carroll G. Brunthaver, of Ohio, to be Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and Commodity programs.

Carroll G. Brunthaver has been deeply involved in agriculture all of his life. Born in Fremont, Ohio, on March 27, 1932, he grew up on his family's grain and livestock farm, and later farmed it with his father. Mr. Brunthaver's brother still operates the home farm. Mr. Brunthaver was active in 4-H and FFA, earning the FFA State Farmer degree in his senior year of high school.

He received his B.S. degree in agricultural economics from Ohio State University in 1954, and after 4 years as an Air Force jet pilot he returned to Ohio State and received his Ph. D. in agricultural economics in 1960.

Mr. Brunthaver has served as an assistant county extension agent, and on

be voting this afternoon. I am sorry that this is the way it has gone.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma has the floor.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oklahoma yield?

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished acting majority leader.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I say to the distinguished Senator from New York that I have no feelings on this matter one way or the other. The only reason that I objected was that we have gotten a hangup now on the debt limit bill. The bill seemed to be moving rather well before this discussion developed. The distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) is here and ready to offer his amendment. Once we get through with the debt limit bill, we could then move rapidly, because the two remaining items on the schedule have time agreements thereon.

Once we finish the debt limit bill, later this afternoon, I would not object. But for the moment I object for the reasons stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma has the floor.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Illinois.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I feel it very important that we establish in the RECORD that the minority as of this moment, 12 o'clock noon, has removed its objection and we stand ready to move forward with the legislation that overwhelmingly passed the Senate in 1970.

We are, I think, within an hour or two of finishing the markup of the bill and reporting it.

I deeply regret this. I fully take into account that other Senators do have other things on their schedule. However, I want to make it absolutely clear that the minority stands ready now to move the bill out of the committee so that it can be reported to the Senate.

Mr. JAVITS. And the agreement would only have to apply to this one committee.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma has the floor.

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Alabama.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, the junior Senator from Alabama stated when he reserved the right to interpose an objection to the unanimous-consent request that he would not interpose an objection, but he thought it was only fair, since at the time he originally planned to object to the request, he was the only Democratic member, out of some 10 members of the committee, who was present on the Senate floor. And since this seemed to be a colloquy between Members on the other side of the aisle, he thought it only fair that the Democratic members of the committee be consulted as well. So to that end he wished to suggest the absence of a quorum.

The distinguished junior Senator from West Virginia has interposed an objection to the unanimous-consent request, and the junior Senator from Alabama has withdrawn his suggestion of the absence of a quorum.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, would the Senator from Oklahoma yield me 1 minute?

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I extend my appreciation to the junior Senator from Alabama for withholding his suggestion regarding the absence of a quorum, because I was only interested in moving the program along.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I appreciate that.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, as I said, I had no feeling one way or the other on allowing committees to meet. I had intended to call up some consent items on the calendar at this time. However, I think I have imposed on the time of the Senator from Oklahoma too much already. I shall defer calling the consent items, and I thank the Senator from Oklahoma very much for yielding.

(This marks the end of the colloquy which took place earlier in the day and which, by unanimous consent, was ordered to be printed at this point in the RECORD.)

## ENROLLED BILLS PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on today, June 30, 1972, he presented to the President of the United States the following enrolled bills:

S. 1893. An act to amend the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act to restore the Golden Eagle Passport Program, and for other purposes;

S. 3338. An act to amend title 38, United States Code, to increase the rates of compensation for disabled veterans; and

S. 3715. An act to amend and extend the Defense Production Act of 1950.

## ADDRESS BY SENATOR BAKER ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, the distinguished senior Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER) drafted an excellent speech on the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements in which he described the signing as "the most significant achievement of the 1970's." Although he had intended to deliver the speech as the keynote speaker at the 18th annual meeting of the American Nuclear Society, several critical votes made it impossible for him to attend the meeting in Las Vegas. As a fellow member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy I ask unanimous consent to have the remarks of Senator BAKER printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS OF SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.

Good evening ladies and gentlemen. I am indeed honored to have been asked to address the Eighteenth Annual Meeting of the American Nuclear Society here in Las Vegas, Nevada. I shall not speak this evening on any of the more familiar topics which have been discussed at great length in the past few days, such as power plant siting or controlled nuclear fusion, but rather address myself to what I consider to be the most significant achievement of the 1970's—the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements in Moscow, May 26.

The agreements are historic for many reasons, but none so persuasive as what they represent in terms of hope for peace in the world. Though only a beginning, the agreements constitute the first time since man developed the atomic bomb, that he has stepped *away* from the brink of nuclear disaster rather than closer. As such, these historic agreements mark the beginning of a long and difficult journey toward the day when all mankind might envisage a world, at last free from the awesome threat of nuclear war.

We cannot realistically expect to negotiate the threat of nuclear warfare out of existence, but we can minimize the potential for its usage and thereby minimize its threat. This is what the Soviet Union and the United States have begun by reaching accord on these first Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements. The premise upon which these agreements were based, their effect, and prospects for further limitation shall be the subject of my talk tonight.

To say that the SALT agreements were based upon a single premise is perhaps simplistic for there were hundreds of factors that played a role in the four long years of negotiations, but for reasons of time, I should like to boil down all of those factors into two basic concepts which I believe were at the heart of our position—Nuclear Sufficiency and Mutual Vulnerability.

Sufficiency is the cornerstone of our position and appropriately so, for it represents the unalterable view that while we must allow virtual parity or equality to exist before both sides would find it to their mutual advantage to negotiate limitations, we must never negotiate from a position of clear strategic inferiority. It is for this reason that neither side found it to their advantage to unilaterally disarm and that the decision of the Congress to fund construction of an Anti-Ballistic Missile system proved, in retrospect, to be a wise one.

During the mid-1960's, when we noticed that the Soviets were constructing nuclear missiles and submarines at an alarming rate and that the clear first-strike advantage that we had held for some twenty years was beginning to diminish, we changed our strategy and undertook to establish a credible deterrent capability. The fact that many were unsure about the effectiveness of our ABM became inconsequential to the Soviets who primarily took note of the fact that we were constructing a $10 billion system to defend our second-strike capability. Had we not begun construction of an ABM system, the Soviets very easily could have felt that a massive first-strike would inflict such heavy damage upon the U.S. that we would be rendered virtually impotent to retaliate, and even if we did retaliate, the damage would be so slight as to make the price worth paying. But, the Soviets were not offered such an opportunity and were instead faced with the very real probability that if they attempted a surprise first-strike attack, they, too, would suffer massive damage and loss of life.

Once both nations knew that the other had the power to inflict irreparable damage, the question became how fast and how irreparable. Fortunately, this is a question that neither side could find a satisfactory answer to, and so they turned to negotiations. The purpose of such negotiations was to assure that neither side found an answer to

the question: the question of Mutual Vulnerability.

Mutual Vulnerability depicts the situation in which both nations consider their defensive capability inadequate to avoid massive loss of life in the result of a nuclear war and therefore consider nuclear war too costly to initiate.

It is a little frightening, but in my view, very realistic. You may recall that before the Soviet Union had the bomb, Bernard Baruch recommended that we share all secrets with the Soviets in return for guarantees that the atom only be used for peaceful purposes, but the Soviets refused. They refused because they felt that they were at a distinct disadvantage and they were determined to catch up with the United States. At any rate, the agreements just signed, more than anything else, serve to guarantee that we remain mutually vulnerable.

The Defensive Agreement, which is in the form of a treaty, limits each side to two ABM sites; one for defense of their national capital and one for defense of an ICBM field. Each site would consist of 100 ABM interceptors or a total of 200 per country. The limitation on number of sites and missiles, in addition to the limitations on radar and the stipulation that the two ABM sites be no closer than 1300 kilometers or 800 miles, guarantees that huge populated areas of both countries will be exposed or vulnerable. This was the intent of the treaty.

The Interim Offensive Agreement, on the other hand, is much more complex and slightly different in intent. It limits each country to the number of ICBM's that are currently deployed or under construction at the time of the signing of the treaty or July 1. This means that the Soviet Union is limited to about 1618 ICBM's and that the United States is limited to 1054. Although the Soviet Union will be allowed about 313 large SS–9's under the agreement, they will be prohibited from converting other ICBM silos to accommodate the large SS–9 types. Other silos can be modified, but not "significantly."

Construction of submarine launched ballistic missiles on all nuclear submarines will be frozen at current levels. This means that SLBM's may be constructed only to replace either land based ICBM's or older submarine launchers.

The results of these freezes are that the United States accepts a position of inferiority to the Soviets in number of missile launchers (2,359 to 1,710), but this numerical inferiority is not to be confused with any sort of qualitative inferiority and those worried by the numerical question may rest assured that the nation's security has not been jeopardized by the apparent disadvantage—in fact, to the contrary.

Nullifying the effect of a numerical inferiority in missiles is the fact that not only does the United States possess significantly more nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles in strategic bombers, but it also holds a decisive advantage in sophistication of warheads. Some experts estimate that we are at least two years ahead of the Soviets in development of the more effective Mutiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV).

Such an advantage currently gives the United States a clear edge in effectiveness of weapons, but this edge will not last for long, for under the agreements, modernization is allowed to continue, and the Soviets have announced that they will proceed with their work on the MIRV, as they expect us to proceed with construction of the B–1 supersonic bomber and the new Trident missile launching submarine, and proceed we must. Although a continuation of the arms race seems inconsistent with the goals of the latest agreements, it is, in fact, quite consistent for it continues our position of sufficiency and serves to maintain the balance of strength between the two forces, a balance without which there would be no reason to negotiate further limitations. It should be noted that the United States offered to ban testing of the multiple warhead before we ever tested ours, but the Soviet Union refused. It should also be noted that the B–1 supersonic bomber and the Trident submarine programs are not projects to increase the size of our bomber or submarine fleets, but rather to replace the aging B–52 and the old Polaris which have been around for years.

From this position of strength, we shall proceed with caution to negotiate what is now called SALT II or the second round of the arms limitation talks. Goals for these talks include a more permanent offensive agreement which might result in reductions of the large SS–9's in exchange for an aggregate reduction on the part of the United States, limitations on "throw-weight" or megatonnage, and limitations on technical advances in warheads such as the MIRV.

These are all abtainable goals if both sides work in earnest toward their achievement and abide by the spirit of the first agreements. Without trust, negotiations are an exercise in futility. It is my hope, as I think it is of most Americans, that we can proceed together down the long and difficult road of limitation and disarmament, not just for our own sake, but for the sake of all mankind whose hope for a world, free from the threat of nuclear holocaust might indeed, one day, become a reality.

## THE PRESIDENT'S VETO OF THE PUBLIC BROADCASTING ACT

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, today the President has seen fit to veto H.R. 13918. In doing so, he has left the Corporation for Public Broadcasting without an authorization of funds for fiscal year 1973, which begins tomorrow; and substantially reduced the amount of money available to individual States to construct educational broadcasting facilities.

In its short existence, the Corporation has been responsible for "Sesame Street," "Misterogers Neighborhood," the "Electric Company" and many other such programs which have not only educated our children, but inspired them to become better human beings.

The Corporation has been able to do this, and more, while still in its infancy and operating without permanent financing as promised by this administration and the preceding one.

The administration has not submitted an alternative—a permanent financing plan as promised—and it has, by vetoing H.R. 13918, left public broadcasting with no alternative.

At a time when the Surgeon General of the United States has told us we need more of the prosocial programs provided by public broadcasting, President Nixon has moved to give us less. My committee has received hundreds, even thousands, of letters from grateful mothers telling of their esteem for these wounderful programs. I wonder how President Nixon would answer them in light of his action today.

The program for construction of educational broacasting facilities began in 1962 has suffered as well today. This program has enabled the individual States to build educational radio and television stations which in turn serve the individual communities and regions throughout the country. These individual stations are the cornerstone of public broadcasting. Since 1962, they have increased dramatically in number so that they are located in every State except Montana and Wyoming.

The President's action, therefore, can only inhibit the local service which such stations provide.

As part of my longstanding commitment to public broadcasting I shall do my utmost to help override the President's veto. In view of the overwhelming majority, 82–1, by which H.R. 13918 passed the Senate, I believe the possibilities are good for favorable action here. I am less optimistic about the chances in the House of Representatives, however.

Nevertheless, we cannot allow a program which has given the American people so much, and has the potential to give even more, wither for want of adequate funding. Long-range financing is still the absolute necessity if public broadcasting is to succeed. In the meantime, the administration which is responsible for initiating such a plan, should not be allowed to hinder even the minimal growth and development of public broadcasting which the 2-year authorization in H.R. 13918 would provide.

## CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1973

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STAFFORD). Pursuant to the previous order, the Chair now lays before the Senate, House Joint Resolution 1234, which the clerk will state.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

H.J. Res. 1234, making continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1973, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the joint resolution?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution.

## ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would ask the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN) if he will kindly defer so that the Senate may receive a message from the House of Representatives.

## MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 15390) to provide for a 4-month extension of the present temporary level in the public debt limitation, requests a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. MILLS of Arkansas, Mr. ULLMAN, Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts, Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin, and Mr. BETTS were appointed managers of the conference on the part of the House.

## PUBLIC DEBT LIMITATION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on H.R. 15390.

SALT



THE EVENING STAR

DATE 28 JUN 72 PAGE 21

# New Panel to Monitor Arms Curb Compliance

New York Times News Service

U.S. intelligence officials have established a committee to monitor Soviet compliance with the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty signed in Moscow on May 26.

The five-man committee is to begin functioning on Saturday, the cutoff date agreed on by the two governments for the construction of new sites for offensive missiles.

Administration officials said the committee was set up to avoid the repetition on a broader scale of the violation of the Suez Canal truce in August 1970, when the Soviet Union and Egypt moved into position SAM-2 and SAM-3 antiaircraft missiles after the cease-fire with Israel.

At that time, U.S. intelligence services were unprepared to monitor Soviet and Egyptian fulfillment of the truce terms. This was a source of major embarrassment to the United States, which had negotiated the truce, and the incident nearly led to the collapsed of the cease-fire.

The new committee, officials said, is to be headed by Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, deputy director of Central Intelligence.

Its members are to be Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Ray S. Cline, director of the State Department's Intelligence and Research Agency; Andrew Marshall, intelligence coordinator of the National Security Council at the White House; and a CIA official still to be designated.

The committee, officials said, will be linked to the White House verification panel, a senior body of the National Security Council responsible for the strategic arms negotiations.

The Moscow agreements on the limitation of defensive and offensive nuclear weapons formally come into force on ratification by the U.S. Senate and the Supreme Soviet. However, both sides have agreed to abide by the treaty from the date it was signed by President Nixon and Soviet Party Leader Leonid I. Brezhnev.

Salt



Can we not show a love for our country? A love that surmounts all fears, all weaknesses and dedicates men to preserve with their lives the land they love?

I am not asking that we dedicate ourselves to becoming a nation of warmongers. No, I ask that we dedicate ourselves to work for peace. I firmly believe a strong aggressive, defensive posture is the best offense available to a country whose democratic ideals prevents it from initiating an attack against any enemy unless provoked beyond endurance.

Until we have made our country so impregnable, so invulnerable that an attack would be suicidal, will our enemies keep their distance. Until we have done this, the possibility of America becoming a major battlefield in a new world conflict becomes more apparent with each passing day.

Gentlemen. Now is the time for us to look to our defenses, time to follow the heritage which is ours. The time to demonstrate, once again, to all the world, that democracy is a living thing, transcending all other ways of life, and worth protecting at any cost.

## VA DIRECTOR JOE ANDERSON HONORED FOR SERVICE

### HON. ED EDMONDSON

OF OKLAHOMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Monday, June 26, 1972*

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, probably no other Member of this body is more aware than yourself of the many outstanding abilities of the man who served as your administrative assistant for nearly 3 years, Mr. Joe Anderson.

Since leaving your staff and becoming Muskogee Regional Director of the Veterans' Administration, Joe Anderson has unselfishly dedicated his time and efforts in behalf of the veterans of Oklahoma and our Nation.

I was recently provided with a resolution adopted by the Disabled American Veterans of Oklahoma which indicates the very high regard and appreciation felt for Joe by all veterans in Oklahoma. This recognition of Joe's consistent and tireless efforts, above and beyond the call of duty, demonstrates the outstanding record he has achieved as our Regional Director for the Veterans' Administration, and I include the text of the DAV resolution at this point in the RECORD:

RESOLUTION

Whereas, the Disabled American Veterans of Oklohoma hold many meetings each year at the state, district, and chapter level to inform veterans and their beneficiaries of changes in laws and regulations affecting veterans' programs; and

Whereas, Joe W. Anderson, Director, Veterans Administration Regional Office, Muskogee, Oklahoma, has contributed significantly to the success of these meetings by having himself and/or other members of his staff present to discuss various phases of veterans' programs. Many of the meetings convened on weekends, but participation of the Director and his staff was not reduced on this account, and, now, therefore, be it

Resolved, that the Department Convention, Department of Oklahoma, Disabled American Veterans, held in Lawton, Oklahoma, June 9, 10, and 11, 1972, does hereby express and record its appreciation to Joe W. Anderson and his staff for outstanding service far beyond normal duty requirements to the exservicemen of Oklahoma; and, be it further

Resolved, that copies of this resolution be sent to Joe W. Anderson, Director, Veterans Administration Regional Office, Muskogee, Oklahoma; to Donald E. Johnson, Administrator, Veterans Affairs, Veterans Administration Central Office, Washington, D.C., and to the members of the Oklahoma Congressional Delegation.

## THE SALT AGREEMENTS

### HON. JOHN B. ANDERSON

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Monday, June 26, 1972*

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, last Saturday the Washington Post carried an excellent background article by Chalmers Roberts on the strategic arms limitation agreement reached in Moscow. Mr. Roberts notes that the concessions made by both sides involved a mixed nuclear basket of apples and oranges, and the ability to reconcile this mix has produced an agreement which is a sensible and stabilizing step in the direction of curbing the arms race.

In discussing the prospects for SALT II and the use of the proposed Trident submarine and B–1 bomber as bargaining chips, Mr. Roberts says:

A good many in and out of Congress deride the bargaining chip argument. I do not. History teaches that Moscow respects muscle, not weakness. I thought there was validity in years past to the contention that keeping the American ABM program going was a bargaining chip; I think it proved so. The same argument now has validity.

Mr. Roberts concludes that the SALT agreements are very important in themselves, but that they are far more important in terms of a continuing process of attempting to achieve "a more stable and rational relationship." Mr. Speaker, at this point in the RECORD I include the Roberts article and commend it to the reading of my colleagues. The article follows:

JUDGING THE MERITS OF THE SALT AGREEMENT

(By Chalmers M. Roberts)

In judging the merits of the strategic arms limitation (SALT) agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union it is necessary to do two things: first, to appraise the meaning of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty and the details, including the numbers, of the interim agreement on offensive weapons; second, to judge the twin pacts in the larger context of the changing Washington-Moscow relationship. The two seem to me to be inseparable.

The ABM treaty has the great virtue of so limiting such defensive measures as to remove fears on either side that the other could indulge in a first strike attack. If such an attack could ever be conceivable to any rational leader, it would become so only when he felt that his own weapons and the bulk of his population would be so protected by an elaborate nation-wide ABM system as to make a second or retaliatory strike by the other nation a risk worth taking.

Given the undoubted ability of the offensive to overwhelm the defensive and given the grave doubts by many experts as to the efficacy of any ABM system, such fears doubtless have been gravely exaggerated in both Washington and Moscow. But that does not detract from the fact that such fears have existed, that they impelled vast expenditures regardless of their validity and that under terms of the SALT treaty on ABMs this should come to a halt if not an end. "Zero ABMs," which means a complete abolition by both sides of any ABMs, would have been better than the two site option agreed upon. But two, at least, is far, far better than unlimited ABMs.

So at least one factor that threatend to destabilize the balance of terror has been cut back to manageable proportions. It seems to me it would make sense for Congress to refuse funds for the building of an ABM around Washington despite the asymmetry that would involve, given the existence of a site now in existence around Moscow. Likewise it would make sense for the Soviets not to build their second site around an offensive missile field. Should Congress so decide, the Moscow decision is most likely to be affected by the Soviet perception of a changing Moscow-Washington relationship.

Now turn to the offensive weapons agreement. It is evident enough that the Nixon Administration paid a stiff price, negotiated at the finale in Moscow, to win Soviet assent to inclusion of a limitation on submarine launched missiles (SLBMs). I think, however, it was a price worth paying.

The United States long has had a triad of strategic weapons systems: ICBMs, SLBMs and long-range bombers. According to the figures presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee by Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, the sum total of the rival triads (one bomber being equated with one missile) will be 2,499 for the Soviets to 2,167 for the United States, Even these figures are not the whole story, however. The total megatonnage in the Soviet arsenal under the agreements is much the larger but the total number of American warheads, due to the American multiples (MIRVs), is far larger than that of the Russians.

In sum, the apples and oranges of nuclear weaponry have been added up to what can fairly be termed rough parity for weapons of one nation that can reach the soil of the other. Even here, it should be noted, some of the American apples have been excluded from the basket: the fighter-bombers based in Western Europe and on carriers, known as forward based systems (FBS). It seems to me the net of all these figures and factors is that the offensive agreement is a good deal for both superpowers.

In reading over all the official American explanations, by the President, Secretaries Laird and Rogers, Adm. Moorer and above all by Henry Kissinger, one is struck by a single theme: it would have been much worse if there had been no agreements reached. It is an uncontroverted fact that, as Sec. Laird kept saying so loudly and so long, the Soviets did have a great momentum going on offensive arms, from the giant SS–9 missiles to submarines. So, as the admiral put it, "we have forestalled a 1977 ratio of about three to two in their favor." I have no doubt he is right because I have no doubt that Moscow would have gone on building, lacking an agreement, to something like that amount of superiority. At some point the United States would have responded with a new program of its own.

The action-reaction phenomenon in strategic arms has been evident for years, for decades in fact. The current Soviet momentum clearly dates from the humilitation Moscow suffered in the 1963 Cuban missile crisis. The American preponderance at that time, in turn, was the result of early Kennedy Administration decisions to build a vastly superior force, rather than to accept some form of parity.

President Nixon was the first chief executive to accept parity as a principle though he sought to soften the blow to American pride by using instead the word "sufficiency." Whether he did so as an intellectual exercise, or whether he did so because he

knew the Congress and the country simply would not put up the money for superiority in such costly weapons, is not material. That can be left to the historians. The fact is he did so. And only because he did so is there the agreement now before Congress for approval. Perhaps the best clue to Mr. Nixon's submarine decision was Dr. Kissinger's remark at a Moscow press briefing. Discussing the high price paid for the submarine section of the agreements, Dr. Kissinger remarked that "the United States was in a rather complex position to recommend a submarine deal since we were not building any and the Soviets were building eight or nine a year, which isn't the most brilliant bargaining position I would recommend people find themselves in."

In discussing the agreements, Secretary Laird has said he accepted them only on the premise that the United States will go forward with the multi-billion dollar Trident submarine and the equally costly B–1 bomber and some other programs as well. In essence, this is the old bargaining chip idea now being applied to the SALT II round due to begin this fall. The hope is to reach a permanent treaty covering offensive weapons systems to replace the five-year interim agreement now before Congress.

A good many in and out of Congress deride the bargaining chip argument, I do not. History teaches that Moscow respects muscle, not weakness. I thought there was validity in years past to the contention that keeping the American ABM program going was a bargining chip; I think it proved so. The same argument now has validity. But that is not to say that everything that Sec. Laird and the Joint Chiefs would like is necessary, or even desirable at the speed they request. It seems to me further funding of the Trident project makes sense, in part because it will tend to move the core of the strategic power more to sea where it is least vulnerable. The B–1 is of lesser value, in my view, and should receive only limited funding at this point.

In his remarks at a Moscow dinner for Mr. Nixon, Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny remarked that despite "differences of social systems," there are "objective factors that determine similarity of interests" that influence Soviet-American relations. It was of course such a Kremlin view that permitted the Soviet leaders to let the President come to Moscow at a time he had challenged Soviet interests by mining the harbors of North Vietnam. It was simply one more demonstration of practicality over principle. One could say the same thing about Mr. Nixon's climb down from "superiority" to "sufficiency."

This sort of thing was codified in the declaration of basic principles signed in Moscow by President Nixon and Soviet Communist Party chief Leonid Brezhnev. They said, among other things, that the two nations "will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence." Or as Dr. Kissinger put it to members of Congress at the White House: "We are compelled to coexist."

This theme, of course, is not new. Back in 1954 President Eisenhower declared that "since the advent of nuclear weapons, it seems clear that there is no longer any alternative to peace, if there is to be a happy and well world."

Just as many Americans have difficulty accepting parity instead of superiority, so the Russians have difficulty abandoning the secrecy on which they have so long counted, from Stalin through Khrushchev. This is evident in their refusal to give the numbers of their own ICBMs or to agree to a definition of "heavy" missiles and other pertinent terms. In short, the old suspicions of the Cold War are far from gone. It took a long time, on our side, for officials to abandon such terms as "international Communism." It would be useful for Secretaries Rogers and Laird to abandon the phrase "negotiating from a position of strength," which they both used in their testimony to Congress. And it would be useful for the Soviets to abandon some of the jargon of their own ideology such as "the imperialists."

The SALT agreements seem to me to be very important in themselves. But they are far more important if they form part of what Dr. Kissinger has called "vested interests in a continuation of a more formal relationship" between the two nations. We should, as Dr. Kissinger went on to say, "have no illusion" that such will occur or that, if it does, it will be quick and simple. The ideological differences, and the national rivalries too, remain. But there are, as Podgorny said, "objective factors" as well which tend to force each nation to move in the direction of a more stable and rational relationship.

Each side interacts on the other. In the past when the Soviets were weak the Americans sought to exploit that weakness. If America becomes weak, I have no doubt the Soviets will exploit that weakness. The changes therefore must be gradual, not precipitate. To me, the Nixon demand—as specified by Sec. Laird—for massive new arms goes too far. But so, in the other direction, does the budget cutting program of Sen. George McGovern. It is up to Congress, as it approves the SALT agreements, to find the mean between the extremes. If it does, then 1972 could well become a date to remember when hope superceded fear without allowing illusion to supplant rationality.

## MONEY FOR EDUCATION

### HON. JAMES ABOUREZK

OF SOUTH DAKOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Monday, June 26, 1972*

Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. Speaker, when talking about educational problems, the word "crisis" automatically springs to mind. One year there is a crisis in science education and we are not keeping ahead of the Russians. The next year we discover a reading crisis and that Johnny cannot read. The year after that it is something else. The fact of the matter is, there are crises. But they are symptoms of a much bigger, more pervasive, and continual crisis that has been present in education for some time and has been growing worse and worse. That is the financial crisis.

The real irony of this situation is that in terms of supply and demand, there are almost enough qualified teachers to provide the needed educational services of our society for the first time since World War II. Yet we find that because of cost factors and inflation, school district after school district cannot take advantage of the supply and instead find themselves cutting back in terms of educational services. This means that instead of smaller classes, there are larger ones. Instead of more individualized instruction, there is less. Instead of more time to meet the pupils' needs, the teacher has less.

Then comes the demand to cut back on the frills. I do not believe that special teachers for art, music, drama, industrial arts, and physical education are frills. Yet these are the first to go.

I want to make it clear that I do not believe that the culprit in the increasing cost of education and the cutbacks is teachers' salaries. It is true that teachers' salaries have gone up—but at a pace that is behind and not ahead of other professional workers. This despite the fact that teacher salaries have long been considered notoriously and even scandalously low in our society.

For the most part, one cannot fault the efforts that have been made at the local level to provide adequate funding to meet the educational needs of the community. Since 1966 when the Elementary and Secondary Act went into effect, State and local taxes have supplied an additional $15.7 billion for schools raising the total revenue collected from their own tax sources to $39 billion. Over the same time, funds from the Federal Government have increased from $900 million to $2.9 billion.

It is clear that States and localities cannot continue their massive efforts without help. I recognize that there are many problems with Federal aid to education that must still be worked out. For all of that, the Federal Government remains that last major untapped source of adequate funding to meet the financial crisis about which I have been talking. I was pleased to have been a supporter of the Quality Education Appropriations Amendment to the Office of Education Appropriations bill. This successful amendment added nearly $354 million to key education programs. This is an encouraging step for those of us who believe in a reordering of our national priorities. Education must come higher on our list of national concerns.

## IN MEMORIAM—MARTHA TURNER LONG

### HON. BILL CHAPPELL, JR.

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Monday, June 26, 1972*

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Speaker, I want to join the people of Marion County, Fla., in acknowledging their deep sense of loss at the untimely passing of Martha Turner Long at the young age of 35. Mrs. Long gave 7 years of loyal, efficient, and devoted service as secretary to the Marion County Planning and Zoning Board and its director. By her courteous and polite manner, she brought great credit and recognition to herself, her office, and to Marion County. She was a dedicated wife and mother, held in high esteem by all whose lives she touched. Her exemplary life has contributed to our heritage and traditions and will serve as a goal that we and future generations should strive to attain. I wish to express my sympathy to the family of Martha Turner Long, an ever-faithful servant of the public and a contributor to good government.

SALT



THE WASHINGTON POST DATE 6 JUN 72 PAGE 3

# Inspector Satellite to Police SALT Weighed by Air Force

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

The U.S. Air Force is taking a new look at satellites that could rocket into space and inspect foreign spacecraft looking down on the United States.

The arms control agreement with the Soviet Union has given impetus to proposals for such inspector satellites. President Nixon has assured Congress that the United States will keep track of the Soviet missile buildup, a promise hinged on the ability to keep counting missiles with observation satellites.

Right now, both the United States and the Soviet Union spy on each other from space by satellite. Neither side has interfered with the other, in contrast to Russia's desperate effort to knock down U-2 spy planes which used to fly over her territory—an effort that was ultimately successful in downing Francis Gary Powers.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union over the last few years has conducted several sets of exercises which many Western space specialists see as designed to perfect satellites that could inspect, and possibly destroy, U.S. satellites.

The United States is behind Russia in this field. The Air Force has sponsored a number of studies but has yet to fly the first inspector satellite. One argument against doing it has been the fear of looking provocative and extending the arms race to outer space.

In the environment of the recent Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), aerospace companies see their chances improved for getting beyond paper studies and individual pieces of hardware.

Several of the companies are preparing proposals for submission this week to the Pentagon in hopes of obtaining one of two Air Force study contracts for the satellite inspector.

The off-and-on satellite inspector effort has been heavily classified by the Pentagon through the years. But the basic idea has not changed much since former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara told Congress in secret testimony in 1968 that "we are exploring the development of a non-nuclear surveillance or destruction capability against hostile satellites . . ."

McNamara said any one of a number of rockets could carry the satellite inspector into space—the Spartan, Polaris, Thor or Minuteman. One way for the satellite to home in on another would be by the heat it would give off in space—so-called infra-red sensors.

LTV Aerospace worked with the Air Force on a sensor for a satellite inspector under a secret project called 922. The sensor was launched into space successfully from Cape Kennedy but the doors on the sensing unit failed to open, dooming the test.

Salt



# EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

## PHILIP PHILBIN

SPEECH OF

### HON. HASTINGS KEITH

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Wednesday, June 14, 1972*

Mr. KEITH. Mr. Speaker, I was deeply saddened to learn of the death of our former colleague and friend from Massachusetts, Philip Philbin. Phil had many virtues, among which were numbered kindness, competency and, above all, integrity.

I would like to make the observation that during all the years I knew Phil not once did I hear him make a remark criticizing another person. This rare trait has and will always come to mind when I think of Phil, for it is indeed rare to know a man of such great benevolence.

During his 26 years in the Congress Phil never turned a constituent or a fellow colleague away who came to him for help. Even while he helped others he went about his own work quietly and expertly and diligently.

On Saturday I, with many of my colleagues, traveled to Clinton to pay my last respects to this man I had known so well and had liked so much. I would like to share with you the words of the pastor of Our Lady of the Rosary Church in Clinton—a tribute delivered from a fellow Clintonian on behalf of all of us who had the privilege of knowing Phil Philbin.

At the time when Congressman Philbin retired from public life we who were his colleagues and friends gave him testimony of our love and affection.

Today we are again gathered together, this time to mark his passing on to eternal life. This is another expression for a beloved friend.

As a Congressman, Philip Philbin worked with you as a colleague or served you as Representative; as a fellow Clintonian he was a life-long friend to his town and its people; and as a faithful Christian he shared the same hope and ideals we are expressing today.

Congressman Philbin was a politician here in his district—that is a title of respect—none of this cynicism is attached to it which is found in some other places. Here we have his example of 28 years of integrity and honesty in public service. The newspapers have recorded the accomplishment of those years of service but this morning we have another sort of testimony—the presence of so many of his former colleagues. This confirms our high opinion of the job he did in Washington. Perhaps an even greater tribute is the presence of the so many people he served—those for whom he managed to make the impersonal procedure of the Government personal and for whom he removed the roadblocks of bureaucracy.

Phil Philbin was also our fellow Clintonian. Years of service in Washington never separated him from his home town. He always found the time to keep up contact with its people. He had a keen sense of family ties and local tradition. You could not meet him without being reminded of some family member he knew of or inquired for.

A fine example of his capacity for friendship was his association with the late Senator David I. Walsh. His loyalty outlasted death, for each year since Senator Walsh's death, Phil Philbin arranged for memorial ceremonies, and so kept alive the memory of another great Clintonian.

Lastly, Phil Philbin was a faithful Christian—which is not a separate title but the sum of all his roles in life.

It is our sincere hope that today, together with his namesake, the Apostle Philip, his wish has been fulfilled. To this we add our love and affection for a friend we will greatly miss, but never forget.

## SALT—NEXT STEP IN DISARMAMENT

### HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Wednesday, June 21, 1972*

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, Gen. Thomas S. Power, "Design for Survival," said:

It is, therefore, up to the American people to decide which road to survival they want to choose. The choice is by no means easy. The active proponents of one-world government have a very saleable product to sell—peace without an arms race—and they are both vocal and convincing.... Unfortunately, however, our approach—survival through military supremacy—ostensibly entails far greater sacrifices and risks, and therefore has less appeal to those who seek a quick and easy way out. Still, it is the only approach which will permit national survival. This is the approach we have followed to this day, and it has proved successful.... The two approaches permit of no compromise because they point in exactly opposite directions. Therefore, in making their choice, our citizens must select one or the other, realizing that once they have chosen the road to disarmament and one-world government, there can be no turning back.

The principal features of the SALT arms limitation agreements made in Moscow between the United States and Soviet Russia, and soon to be presented to both Houses of Congress, are summarized as follows by a select group of Senators including BARRY GOLDWATER and JAMES BUCKLEY:

The Moscow agreements freeze the United States at a 4-to-1 disadvantage comparing our overall missile payload to that of the Soviet Union;

The Soviet Union has three missiles for every two of ours, theirs are substantially larger, and the agreements guarantee that this gap will remain and probably widen;

Soviet missiles carry payloads several times larger than those of U.S. missiles, an advantage which the agreements not only protect, but allow to be enhanced;

The agreements forbid the United States to increase the number of its nuclear submarines while authorizing the Soviets to continue building them until they equal and then surpass the United States.

On the House Floor recently some fiscal conservatives were trying to cut appropriations to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I raised the question: For what purpose are we supporting a Disarmament Agency in any form? The fact is that since 1962 we have been enagegd in formal disarmament negotiations in Geneva, conducted by this Agency, always with the stated purpose of "the total elimination of all armed forces and armaments except those needed to maintain internal order within states and to furnish the United Nations with peace forces." It is significant to note that Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1962 under a Democratic administration when these negotiations began, reappears 10 years later under a Republican administration as a leading big-name negotiator of the SALT agreements. Reducing American forces to a level of permanent inferiority to the Soviets is a long step toward the kind of disarmament sought since 1962, most likely to be followed, once accomplished, by a push to limit U.S. arms to the point that they are inferior to those of the United Nations as well.

Such disarmament is buying national suicide on the installment plan. Last year Gen. Curtis LeMay, former Air Force Chief of Staff and founder of the Strategic Air Command, warned that if present trends in arms limitation continue, this country can look forward within 18 months to some type of ultimatum from our principal arms rivals. Even the disarmament-prone New York Times pointed out in an editorial June 5:

That [Soviet] edge includes 40 per cent more intercontinental ballistic missiles (1408 to 1000) and missile-launching submarines (62 to 44), one-third more submarine-launched ballistic missiles (950 to 710) and a threefold Soviet advantage in megatonnage of total missile payload. Much of this appears in writing in the five-year agreement freezing strategic offensive missiles.

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird admitted a year ago that "we have been in a period of almost moratorium since 1967 on new strategic weapons deployment" while noting in the May 4, 1972, issue of Commander's Digest that we are "in a period of vigorous Soviet military expansion at sea, on the land, in the air and in space."

Shortly before the SALT agreements were finalized in Moscow, the Senate Judiciary Committee released an updated study pointing out that of 25 agreements signed at previous summit meetings, 24 had been violated. So we dare not even fall back on the forlorn hope expressed in a recent State Department briefing for congressional wives, admitting that the SALT agreements establish a missile gap favoring the Soviet Union, but nevertheless justifying them on the grounds that without the agreements the gap would expand. If we abide by the agreements, we can be sure that the gap will expand as soon as the Soviets decide that the time has come to break it.

Let the State Department be advised never to talk to women, especially when one of those women is my wife. Let the American people be advised that we must pay heed to General Power's warning and fight for America's national survival. SALT must be returned to its proper place—the dinner table.

KEMP END-THE-WAR RESOLUTION

## HON. JACK F. KEMP

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Wednesday, June 21, 1972*

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Speaker, to follow is the full text of House Concurrent Resolution 634 which I have introduced. It is my fervent hope that this resolution will make it possible for this Chamber to endorse a goal of peace in Vietnam with a unanimity to which it is seldom accustomed.

The resolution follows:

HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 634

Whereas the continuing war in Southeast Asia is of great concern to the people of the United States;

Whereas the current military invasion of South Vietnam by the forces of North Vietnam has contributed to the escalation of the war;

Whereas a lasting peace in that region can be achieved only through agreement between the Great Powers, the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam, the Republic of (South) Vietnam, and the indigenous people of the latter two countries; and

Whereas the United States Congress cannot by a leigslative Act impose an agreement upon the parties so as to end the war, guarantee the release of the prisoners of war, settle political issues, guarantee the peace, alleviate human suffering in the region, guarantee self-determination of the people of Vietnam, and reunite the American people: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring)*, That it is the sense of the Congress that the policy of the United States for the promotion of peace in Southeast Asia should be to immediately resume and continue negotiations to achieve the following objectives and agreements:

1. An immediate cease-fire by all forces;

2. Complete and total withdrawal by the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam of all men and equipment from the Republic of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos;

3. Concurrent withdrawal of all remaining military forces of the United States, the People's Republic of China, and of the Soviet Union, and all other foreign military forces, from Vietnam;

4. A cessation of the shipment of arms and war materials to the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and to the Republic of (South) Vietnam;

5. Free elections, supervised by the United Nations:

(a) to determine whether the two countries should be reunited under a common government;

(b) to determine the form of government for the reunited country if a reunited country is preferred by the people of both countries;

(c) to determine the form of government for each country if separate and sovereign countries are preferred by the people of each country;

6. Supervision and enforcement of the peace in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia by the United Nations; and

7. Economic aid to the countries of Southeast Asia by the United States and other members of the United Nations: Be it further

*Resolved*—

A. That in order to facilitate negotiations toward the objectives and agreements enumerated above, it is the sense of Congress that immediately after the achievement of a cease-fire, all prisoners of war then held by the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam, the Republic of (South) Vietnam, and by insurgent forces, be released, under the supervision of the International Red Cross for voluntary repatriation, and that all parties to negotiations prepare and exchange lists of the missing and unrecovered dead so that the International Red Cross may make a full accounting for all missing persons.

B. Immediately after the confirmation by formal agreement of the policies and procedures set forth in this resolution between the national parties named herein and any necessary additional parties and the completion of action taken to return all prisoners of war, as specified in paragraph A; the parties to this agreement shall announce a certain date for the complete and final withdrawal of all foreign military personnel from all Indochina, and the total withdrawal must take place on or before December 31, 1972.

INDIAN POINT NO. 2

## HON. HAMILTON FISH, JR.

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Wednesday, June 21, 1972*

Mr. FISH. Mr. Speaker, on Monday, June 19, 1972, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board held a licensing hearing at Croton on Hudson concerning the licensing of a proposed atomic energy plant known as Indian Point No. 2.

Due to severe environmental effects caused by Indian Point No. 1 plant which is in operation, the present proposal to license a second nuclear energy plant in the same location has caused grave concern among residents of that area. At the June 19, 1972, hearing I made a limited appearance before the Board and issued the following statement. I include it in the RECORD so that my position in this matter will be known not only to the Board, by to my colleagues in the House:

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HAMILTON FISH, JR., BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

Mr. Chairman, I am Hamilton Fish, Jr., Member of Congress representing the 28th Congressional District of New York. My present District includes four counties which border the Hudson River and the entire area I represent has had a long continuing, historic interest in the Hudson for transportation, fishing and recreation. Further, I am now running for re-election in the new 25th Congressional District, which contains Dutchess, Putnam and Northern Westchester Counties, as well as parts of Ulster and Columbia Counties. All of these counties border on the Hudson River. Most significantly, the Indian Point plant is physically located in the new 25th.

Thus, it is for the purpose of protecting these traditional interests of my present and future constituents that I am making this limited appearance before you today. I am appearing to express my concern over the possible consequences of a nuclear accident at this plant, as well as the environmental and public health implications of the proposed routine emission of radioactive materials from this plant into the water and into the air.

THE GRAVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ASLB

Mr. Chairman, you and your colleagues have a grave responsibility, one that demands the best of scientific and technological competence on one hand and the rare ability to integrate into your deliberations, consideration of public welfare on the other. You have before you a record in which the utility argues strongly about the need for this additional generating facility and warns of the potential power shortages that could occur should this project be delayed. It further asserts that the anticipated environmental effects are at least balanced in the scale of public values by the benefit of the electrical output of the plant. To counter the powerful voice of this utility, which is well amplified by the voices of its experts, there is only the feeble voice of the intervenors, who lack the resources to launch the exhaustive analysis of the assumptions, oversights, or even possible errors in the analyses of the utility and of the AEC itself. So the fundamental thought I would leave with you is that this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board should assert to the utmost its independence under AEC regulations, and that it probe deeply and incisively into the assertions of the utility. Further, that it treat with close attention the views of the intervenors, for in those views may be contained the kernels of some fundamental truths that bear directly upon the issue whether this plant should be licensed to operate, and, if so, under what special conditions.

ATTENTION TO NONRADIOLOGICAL FACTORS

Mr. Chairman, at this stage of the licensing process for the Indian Point 2 nuclear power plant, you have to dal with the non-nuclear environmental effects. You well know, the Calvert Cliffs decision with its judicial reading of the National Environmental Policy Act. You may know that in the Congress, I was an original co-sponsor of this legislation and have since been a vigorous supporter of it. Because of the interest of my constituents in the Hudson River, in preserving its quality and character, I particularly welcomed that part of this decision having to do with AEC's responsibility to consider the effects of nuclear power plants upon water quality. I would recall for the Board part of what Judge Skelley Wright wrote. He said, and I quote:

"NEPA mandates a case-by-case balancing judgement on the part of federal agencies. In each individual case, the particular economic and technical benefits of planned action must be assessed and then weighed against the environmental costs; alternatives must be considered which would affect the balance of values. . . . In some cases, the benefits and possible costs may lie anywhere on a broad spectrum. . . . The point of the individualized balancing analysis is to ensure that, with possible alternations, the optimally beneficial action is finally taken."

Going further, the Court made it abundantly clear that while the granting of a license by the AEC is contingent upon a water quality certification, the AEC is not precluded from demanding water pollution controls from its licensees which may be *more strict* than those demanded by the certifying agency. The Court clearly expects the Commission to balance the overall benefits and costs of a particular proposed project, and consider alterations (above and beyond the applicable water quality standards) which would further reduce environmental damage. Yours is the heavy responsibility of giving substance to this judicial reaffirmation of the purposes of NEPA.

THE NATURE OF MY PARTICIPATION

At the outset let me say that I do not pretend to know about the intricacies and subtleties of design of a nuclear power plant. I am not a professional nuclear engineer, nor a health physicist, nor an expert in the effects of waste heat and what to do about it. I am none of these. Rather what I have to say reflects my continuing awareness as a Member of Congress who has strongly supported and closely followed the enactment and subsequent application of the National Environmental Policy Act.

THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE INTERVENOR

In preparing this statement of concern, I have come to learn something of the built-

Campanelli arrived later to thank Locust and pick up his car.

Locust had paid a $20 wrecker charge, taken the car home, bought parts and repaired the defects himself. He did that not with the idea of being repaid but to help his new-found friends.

Campanelli finally persuaded Locust to accept partial repayment, but it was only after he had stayed the night and promised to call if the car broke down on the way to New York.

## THE SALT AGREEMENTS

Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, President Nixon returned from Moscow with two important agreements on strategic arms limitations. These agreements are a good first step toward eventual lessening of the arms race.

The SALT agreements have been inappropriately criticized. Some people claim we are defenseless or might be left defenseless. The fact is we can destroy each other many times over. Some Senators are saying we did not get as much as we gave. Still, we must begin somewhere, and again the fact is that we can both destroy each other.

It is true that the agreements were not final. We must continue to develop some new weapons systems to be prepared for the next round of talks. But we must begin somewhere. We must make serious attempts to talk to the Soviets and the Chinese.

In all the debate, the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) has been outstanding in his ability to pick out the important issues. He has recognized the need to take reasonable risks for peace. His June 18, 1972, interview on ABC's "Issues and Answers," along with the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON), is an excellent example of Senator PERCY's defense of President Nixon's commendable and cautious first step toward ending the arms race.

I ask unanimous consent to have the text of the program printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the program was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

"ISSUES AND ANSWERS," JUNE 18, 1972

Guests: Senator Charles H. Percy (R. Ill.) and Senator Henry M. Jackson (D. Wash.)

Interviewed by: Ted Koppel, ABC news diplomatic correspondent; and Bob Clark, ABC News Capitol Hill correspondent.

Mr. CLARK. Gentlemen, welcome to "Issues and Answers."

We want to get your reaction first if we may to some mysterious signs that something is going on in various capitals of the world in a new effort to end the Vietnam War.

Soviet President Podgorny was interviewed in India this morning on his way back to Russia from Hanoi and he says among other things that the Soviets will do everything possible to bring about deescalation of the war in Vietnam, and he also told newsmen that he expects the Vietnam peace talks in Paris will be resumed soon.

Do either of you think that we are at long last succeeding in enlisting the support of the Communist powers in bringing the Vietnam war to an end?

Senator JACKSON. I really think there is some movement here. It is my judgment that we are very close to reaching an understanding. Certainly Podgorny wouldn't be in Hanoi, and the top Hanoi representative in Peking and Dr. Kissinger about to arrive in Peking, and two summit meetings having been held—it seems to me this scenario is quite clear. We are very close to some kind of understanding.

Mr. CLARK. Well, Senator, are you expressing a personal opinion? You are often privy to what is going on in the administration at the highest levels. Do you have reason to believe that we are close to reaching an understanding?

Senator JACKSON. It is a personal judgment on my part but there are other factors that I think give some credence to that personal judgment.

Mr. CLARK. And Senator Percy, would you share that optimism?

Senator PERCY. There is no hard evidence at all that we are close to an understanding. What there is is evidence that we may be resuming the Paris peace talks. There is solid evidence now that Henry Kissinger does intend to discuss Vietnam in Peking, and from Mr. Podgorny's statement alone there is evidence now for the first time that the Soviet Union is attempting to work toward some sort of a cease-fire across the board, and assist in this regard, all of which, I think, is part of the initiative undertaken by the President to have a new solid foundation on which we can build our relationships with the Soviet Union. There is hope, but nothing hard in evidence today that would say that we are on the brink of an understanding.

Mr. KOPPEL. Well Senator Jackson, let me approach this from a slightly different angle. You have expressed some fear that perhaps the President settled for a weaker kind of SALT agreement simply because this is a political year. Can we take that similar approach on the Vietnam settlement, wouldn't it behoove the President before early November to reach some kind of settlement, even if it is less than we should be settling for?

Senator JACKSON. I don't think there is any doubt about that. The President, of course, modified in his speech his position regarding a settlement on Vietnam. You will recall that he agreed to have all of our troops out in four months, provided that our prisoners are returned. There is an immediate stand-still cease-fire. And that got lost in the rhetoric of the moment. And the facts are that this was quite a significant concession made by our government. Therefore I wouldn't be surprised that we are able to reach some understanding on a stand-still cease-fire. There isn't any doubt that the North Vietnamese are really being hurt now, and they are in a better position on the ground than they were a few months ago because of the invasion across the DMZ.

Mr. KOPPEL. Well Senator Percy, other than the proposals that the President made on May 8 can you see the United States making any more concessions? We have been very tough up until this point and yet now we seem to have made about as many concessions as we can. If it turns out in a few weeks that we have given away something more would you be satisfied with a settlement like that?

Senator PERCY. I want to see us get out of Vietnam and settle this war and end our involvement in it, totally and completely. I think the President's proposals are imaginative, creative, and they do not leave our destiny in the hands of South Vietnam. They are agreements that we can reach directly with Hanoi. I fully support his initiatives in this regard.

Senator JACKSON. I think there is a clear point we want to get out, but we want to get our prisoners of war out, and this is the big hang-up. Let's not kid ourselves. This is the hang-up about getting our prisoners of war out. Every time we get down to, about to reach some kind of general understanding, it is always on the prisoners of war, plus other demands.

Senator PERCY. But this is one of the three parts of the President's proposal. The only difference is whether they are actually out, or what is an agreement to get them out, and I would be willing to settle for an agreement, because I can't imagine Hanoi not observing that agreement if they signed and sealed it.

Mr. CLARK. To get back for a moment to what is going on currently, we have had a brief moratorium on the bombing of Hanoi, the Hanoi area, while President Podgorny was there. Would either of you feel that this might be the time, again, to call a temporary halt in the bombing of North Vietnam until we see what is going on?

Senator PERCY. If it would help bring about a negotiated settlement in Paris which would end this war totally and completely—not just our involvement but for everyone—I would certainly support it, but we would have to have some evidence that it would bring that about.

Mr. CLARK. Senator Jackson, you have been optimistic that something is happening. Would you stop the bombing?

Senator JACKSON. I am not saying they are about to settle this long, drawn out conflict but before we stop the military pressure which obviously is having some impact, I would certainly say that it would be mandatory that we have a definite understanding that there is going to be some kind of resolution within a period of time. Otherwise we get into this old filibuster business that has been going on over four years now, the Paris talks, and I want to get all our men out, I want to get all our prisoners out, and I want to get our involvement to an end. But I think we would have to have some kind of very clear and unambiguous arrangement by which the final phases of the talks could be held and terminated.

Mr. CLARK. So until you see more concrete signs of what is going on you would not call a halt to the current bombing of North Vietnam?

Senator JACKSON. No, I would not.

Senator PERCY. The most hopeful thing would be to have a stand-still cease-fire right now. All bombing, all ground action, all sea action stopped. If we stand on that ground, then I would tend to say the chances of working out something are better. But as long as the hostilities are carried on at the present level that they are, working the rest of it out is much more difficult.

Mr. KOPPEL. Now Senator Percy, the President suggested just that a couple years ago. We haven't heard a great deal about this stand-still, or cease-fire in the past two years. To the best of your knowledge does that offer still stand?

Senator PERCY. I think it certainly would. I would support such an offer.

Senator JACKSON. I happened to have been the author of course of the bipartisan letter that went to the President in September of 1970 suggesting a stand-still cease-fire. I supported it.

Senator PERCY. And I remember co-sponsoring that. It was a fine initiative.

Senator JACKSON. That's right. And the President utilized a part of that in connection with these talks that were held in secret through Dr. Kissinger, when he revealed that we had done that. But now, you see we are in a little different context, are we not, we are in the context of there having gone over the DMZ, holding certain areas of South Vietnam, and I believe the President's requirement, of course, involves the tying of all three things together.

Mr. KOPPEL. But I mean the President has not withdrawn that offer, has he; it is still on the table?

Senator JACKSON. That may be technically true, but I believe what we are really talking about now is a standstill cease-fire as a part of a package involving all of our troops being out in four months and a return of our prisoners. That is it. It is 1, 2, 3, and I support that move. I think it makes sense.

On the House side, this critical situation has been actively studied by the distinguished chairman of the House Republican Task Force on Labor-Management Relations, Representative SHERMAN P. LLOYD, of Utah. Representative LLOYD put his finger on the nub of the matter when he declared on the floor of the House recently that Congress should be taking advantage of this present respite from recurring transportation strikes and emergency atmosphere they engender to enact a permanent mechanism to prevent future crises.

Mr. President, I applaud the distinguished gentleman from Utah for his perceptive remarks, which I believe are worth repeating for thoughtful consideration by the Members of this Chamber as well. Accordingly, I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows.

[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 24, 1972, page H4953]

COOLING-OFF PERIOD FOR CONGRESS

Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Speaker, our existing labor laws provide cooling-off periods for the parties to negotiate a settlement free from the heated and emotional atmosphere of a strike. We are all too sadly familiar with the tragic and economically devastating consequences which result when they fail to effectively use these "cooling-off" periods.

Mr. Speaker, from recent accounts in the press, it appears that the threats of a renewed dock strike and a nationwide railroad strike have apparently dissipated. This is news for which I know everyone is most grateful. Beyond that, however, Congress has in a very real sense now been given its own cooling-off period—in other words, a chance to debate and vote a permanent mechanism to prevent damaging transportation strikes free from a crisis atmosphere.

Mr. Speaker, in testimony earlier this year, our Task Force on Labor Management Relations warned that continued congressional inaction in this area would be an open invitation to repeated tragedy.

In this regard, we cannot ignore the fact that a number of major labor contracts in the transportation industry will be expiring next year.

Mr. Speaker, Congress must act before the present cooling-off period expires.

## SALUTE TO EDUCATION

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I wish to join Senators in a salute to education.

Education plays a critical role in the lives of all Americans. More than 60 million Americans are now full-time students; 3.3 million more are professional staff. These figures do not include the millions of children who watch "Sesame Street," or the millions who receive formal education each year from industry, the Peace Corps, the military, Federal manpower programs, and adult and continuing education. When we include all of these people, 125 million Americans are part of this country's education system.

Expenditures for formal education exceeded $65 billion last fiscal year and were handled by 50 States, five territories, the Federal Government, 18,000 operating school districts, and more than 2,500 institutions of higher education.

Our society and the technology which supports it continue to increase in complexity and require individuals possessed of more sophisticated educational background and preparation. In addition, one of the dominant features of contemporary life is change. It is all about us, its pace increasing, its impact on our lives more insistent.

High technology, population growth, greater human density, unprecedented advances in communications and data processing, the systematic pursuit of knowledge, and the managerial revolution have stamped the present and the future with the characteristic of continual change.

Things are moving so fast we are beginning to suffer from what author Alvin Toffler calls future shock. He contends that the rapid pace of change is not merely creating a changed society, but developing an entirely new society.

The study of the future as a way of gaining a firmer grasp on the present has begun to attract the attention of an increasing number of scholars and analysts. The presence of change places great stress on education. In earlier times, for example, we could afford to think of education as preparation for life. Our society, our technology, our way of life evolved at a comparatively slow pace so that each of us could prepare for a career upon which we could then enter and remain.

Now we experience three, four, or five career changes in the course of our lives. Old techniques and skills become obsolescent; new ones need to be acquired. Education is still preparation, to be sure, but it now must be preparation for change. And education has become equally important as a continuing or recurrent activity, following us along in our professional and personal lives to the point of retirement and beyond.

I am sure that with proper leadership and appropriate governmental assistance our educational system will meet the challenges of the future.

## INASMUCH AS YOU HAVE DONE IT UNTO ONE OF THE LEAST OF THESE

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, the Durham, N.C., Morning Herald for Wednesday, June 7, 1972, contains an article entitled "Trouble-Plagued Family Finds Friend in Durham," which recounts how Lewis Locust, of Durham, befriended a family of strangers who virtually became stranded in Durham when their car broke down while they were en route from New York City to Miami, Fla.

This newspaper item makes it manifest that Lewis Locust is entitled to the blessing implicit in the words of the Gospel according to Matthew, chapter 25, verse, 40, where the King says:

Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me.

I ask unanimous consent that this human interest story be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TROUBLE-PLAGUED FAMILY FINDS FRIEND IN DURHAM

(By Jim Lasley)

There will forever be a place in the hearts of an Auburn, New York, family for Lewis Locust of Durham.

For two days he assumed the responsibility of the family's welfare, and he did it not because they were friends or family but simply because of his concern.

Locust was recognized at a Durham City Council meeting Monday night and is scheduled to receive additional recognition next Tuesday night by the Durham Human Relations Commission.

He rescued Mrs. L. J. Campanelli and her five children when their car broke down on Interstate 85. Never having seen them before he took the six into his home, gave them money to continue the trip by train, repaired their car and later received Campanelli into his home.

Locust did all that, and more, because he thought it was the right thing to do.

"I didn't think it was going out of my way or it was an imposition. You just don't put a lady and five children out on the side of the road," he said.

Locust, a Vietnam veteran and student at North Carolina Central University, figures that anyone with any concern for humanity would have done the same.

"They were just nice people," he said. "And you treat nice people right. . . . I don't think I've done anything so great."

Campanelli, however, was overwhelmed by Locust's actions, so much so that he wrote Mayor James R. Hawkins.

"Mr. Mayor," the letter said, "If your city has a man of the year award, or if you award a citation for exceptional deeds or acts of kindness I would be most pleased if you were to submit the name of Lewis Locust. . . .

"Unselfish actions such as those can be expected from family or best friends, but from a complete stranger I would call this extraordinary."

For Campanelli and his wife it was a lesson in action, something they maybe never would have truly gotten across to their children.

"With today's constant reference in newspapers and on TV concerning the problems between blacks and whites this experience was the living proof for my children, of what we have tried to instill in them, that regardless of color it is the individual that counts."

Locust is black; the Campanelli's are white.

The story began on April 30, as Locust and Campanelli told it:

Locust was at a service station filling up with gas. Mrs. Campanelli and her children were on the way to Miami to meet Campanelli.

There was trouble with the car. She pulled in at a service station and asked the young man for help. Repairs were made by Locust and he was directing the Campanelli's to the interstate highway when the brakes failed. The car went out of control but didn't wreck.

Locust took charge, transferring belongings and people to his car. Then it was to his home where his mother, a teacher, arranged sleeping accommodations and prepared food.

The next day Locust obtained train passage for the mother and her children. Campanelli funds were running unexpectedly low.

Train time was that night, so Lewis took the family to the zoo, lunch, and a movie, paying for everything himself.

At the end of the day Locust was still in charge. He saw the family on the train, leaving them with a container of fried chicken to eat on the way.

As the train was leaving, he shook hands with Mrs. Campanelli, pressing $48 in her hand for emergencies.

In the next few days Locust had the car repaired. It was ready and paid for when

Mr. CLARK. Senator Jackson, you have been leading almost a one-man fight in the Senate protesting the nuclear arms agreements that were signed in Moscow. There appears to be at this moment overwhelming support in Congress in favor of those agreements.

Do you have any new evidence or any reason to believe that somehow you can turn the tide and convince Congress that these nuclear arms pacts are dangerous to the United States.

Senator JACKSON. Well, I think this coming week as the hearings get under way we will try to find out what is in the agreement.

You know, there are a lot of misconceptions. The American people have the idea that this is going to end the arms race. It is a license on both sides to spend tens of billions of dollars.

Mr. KOPPEL. Senator Jackson, you were just about to outline what you consider to be some of the major weaknesses of the SALT agreements.

Senator JACKSON. Yes. We all want to see an end to the arms race. We all join in that effort. We all want to see less tensions in the world. The problem, I think, is that the public has certain misconceptions. They think that this is going to mean an end to the arms race. The facts are, on both sides, under the agreements, tens of billions of dollars will be invested on the part of the respective countries on strategic arms. The Russians will spend more; they will get more. We don't have parity. Most Americans thought we would end up with parity. We don't know how many missiles we are talking about that are decontrolled. We have a lot of misconceptions about what is in this agreement.

Mr. KOPPEL. Well now, Dr. Kissinger was talking about, for example, the figure of 1618 offensive missiles.

Senator JACKSON. Yes, sir, and I asked him the question, why is it that we have in the agreement a specific limitation on the number of Polaris-type submarines with missiles, but we don't have it on land-based missiles, and he has told me he doesn't know for sure why that is the case. What we are relying on is our estimate of what the Russians have land-based. I think it is a good question. Why are we specific on one and not on the other?

Mr. CLARK. Well, Senator, Dr. Kissinger did say at that briefing you both attended at the White House this past week that our detection procedures are good enough that they can't be off significantly; that 1618 figure might be off slightly, but not significantly.

Senator JACKSON. Let me give a simple explanation to that question. All we have to do is watch one place where the submarines are turned out. That task is totally different than watching the whole Eurasian land mass, where the land-based missiles are deployed. This is why the Russians agreed on the number of submarines, but didn't agree on the number of land-based missiles to be deployed.

Now, this can be an element of great controversy because the cut-off date is coming soon, July 1st, and it is the number of missiles deployed or under construction.

I think we have to know, don't we, how many we are talking about?

Mr. CLARK. Do you really feel the Russians might have substantially more than 1600 missiles?

Senator JACKSON. What do you mean by "substantial?" These are significant. This is part of the problem. We have got to nail it down. I think the constitutional responsibility of the Congress is to nail down these ambiguities. Who ever heard of an agreement being worth anything that failed to be explicit? What we want to do is to avoid future tensions so there are misunderstandings. We want to see a stabilization of relations, not a destabilization.

Mr. KOPPEL. Senator Percy, Senator Jackson believes there is a very broad issue, and an important one: The question of American intelligence-gathering abilities. Can we really keep accurate track of how many land-based missiles the Soviets have?

Senator PERCY. I think that Senator Jackson himself, who incidentally I believe is performing a great service, in exactly what the President would want the Congress to do, a searching inquiry into these agreements and every conceivable question that can be asked about them, and we will begin that process in the Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow with Secretary Rogers and Secretary Laird.

But Senator Jackson has himself revealed movements the Soviet Union have made, digging more holes, enlarging those holes. He revealed intelligence reports which he felt was for the good of the country and I agree with him.

Our aerial reconnaissance is so accurate and so good I do not doubt that we can verify these agreements and maintain them. Our technology in that area is absolutely superior, and I will admit there are certain phases of the agreement that should be brought out.

I go back to this premise: No agreement we have ever entered into with any other nation has ever been more thoroughly and exhaustively researched and prepared for. No one is more confident to put a final seal of approval on those agreements from the Executive Branch than President Nixon. He has thoroughly done his homework over a lifetime and particularly intensively for three and a half years so I believe these agreements will be supported by the Congress but we will be performing our separate and absolute obligation that we have to ask the searching questions that Senator Jackson has been asking and will be asking.

Mr. KOPPELL. Senator Percy, you had a distinguished record in business. Would you enter into a contract where the consideration and basic subject matter is not spelled out on a bilateral basis?

Senator JACKSON. Now, this is what we are talking about and this, of course, is one of the key questions that we want to ask this coming week. It is spelled out on submarines. Why didn't we get the Russians to agree on the same basis on land-based missiles, and I am not——

Senator PERCY. You have asked the question and I will try to answer it. I have negotiated international agreements in business over a period of a quarter of a century. I have never seen as thoroughly prepared a set of agreements as these. I have never entered into one that didn't have some area of disagreement as to interpretation.

Senator JACKSON. But, Senator, this is the heart of the whole agreement; it isn't a minor detail.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Brezhnev and the President initialed, even, a memorandum which interpreted the agreement, to try to nail down every single thing that they could, and I really feel that these have been as thoroughly prepared as any agreements that could possibly be entered into.

Senator JACKSON. How do you explain why you have spelled out the number—there is 62 Polaris-tye submarines, and agreed to, but they are not spelled out on the biggest part of the agreement and that is on land-based missiles. Now how would you explain—how would you write a letter and explain it?

Mr. CLARK. Well, Senator, if we could relate this to your specific concerns what is it you are worled about, that somehow the Russians are going to cheat on this agreement?

Senator JACKSON. No, I think that the key thing that we must do first of all is to nail down these ambiguities. It is that simple. If you don't, you are immediately going to be in a debate here——

Mr. CLARK. Except the agreement has already been signed with the Russians. How do you nail it down now?

Senator JACKSON. Well, I think you nail it down by calling—there are a lot of things—this is what we will get into. You can have reservations, you can have understandings. After all, bear in mind, Mr. Clark, they sent up not just these agreements, but they sent up understandings that are a mile long, and there are our interpretations not joined in by the Russians. It is obvious there has to be further clarification.

Senator PERCY. Well, there is going to be, too. We know this is just the beginning phase—we trust a period of refined agreements that will cover everything, mutual reduction of forces, that will cover bombers. They could well say "Why don't you cover bombers? You have got far more bombers than we have, why don't we cover the intermediate missiles?"

Senator JACKSON. Why don't we cover specifically what we are talking about first. How can you possibly have an on-going viable agreement that will stand up and not cause conflict? I want to get an agreement that will work, and this is just but one example. What is a heavy missile? It is not defined.

Senator PERCY. Fine. What do we consider is an SS-9?

Senator JACKSON. Well, that is not defined. Can you take that kind of missile and put it in another missile of that size. We think they are allowed 313.

Senator PERCY. In the memorandum of interpretation they have said if you increase the size of the missile by more than 15 percent, this is substantial upgrading of that missile. I think that interpretation was very clear—

Senator JACKSON. We say it is 313. The Russians don't agree as to the number, and that again is an example of the kind of clarification I think that we need to have. What we want is—

Senator PERCY. You are asking the question will we strengthen SALT II negotiating hand in nailing down some of these things?

Mr. CLARK. Gentlemen, if we can go back very briefly to the Moscow Agreements, they would permit each of the two countries, Russia and the United States, to complete two ABM sites. The United States is completing one in North Dakota. The Administration also wants to ring the capital, to ring Washington with a defensive missile system. Are each of you ready to vote the money to complete or to start—we haven't started yet—a defensive missile system around Washington? Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. I much preferred a zero ABM all along. I much prefer a single site to a double site. I would want more evidence as to what the ABM around Washington will really accomplish.

Mr. CLARK. At the moment you would not expect to support the Administration on this, Senator Jackson?

Senator PERCY. It is a quarter of a billion dollar decision.

Senator JACKSON. Well, this is one of the great mistakes the Administration made. They are on notice that they can't get the fight through on Washington. We voted it down two years ago in the Armed Services Committee. I led that effort, and I also led the effort to save the ABM, but this is a silly arrangement that was made, in my judgment, and at best they will get the one site in North Dakota.

Mr. CLARK. So you would agree then that is unlikely the President is going to get a defense missile system——

Senator PERCY: It would be quite a struggle——

Mr. KOPPEL. Well, gentleman doesn't that kind of eliminate one of the crucial aspects of the SALT agreement? Do we still have an agreement——

Senator JACKSON. Well, we are not required to—we are permitted to, but we are not required to.

Mr. KOPPEL. Will it considerably weaken us, though, Senator.

Senator JACKSON. Absolutely. The real tragedy—the Administration had held out what all of us had fought for, and that is a two-site minimum, to defend Minuteman. Now, that makes sense because we did not add on to our offensive forces, and I supported that effort. But to turn around and pour hundreds of millions of dollars into defending Washington, which is not defendable in a missile context that we are talking about, to me makes no sense, and they were aware of it and they were on notice and that is why I think the ABM agreement was an unwise one, because we came out on the short end of the stick. Moscow's not dismantling anything. We are dismantling the site in Montana. They get to go forward with the site they already have, this huge complex around Moscow, which also covers some of their——

Senator PERCY. But, as you say, if it makes no sense at all, why do we care if they want to make a mistake, rather than our making a mistake?

Senator JACKSON. Senator Percy, their site in Moscow also covers some of their offensive systems, which an ABM site here will not do.

Senator PERCY. A system around Moscow isn't worth a thing. You cannot defend that on a practical basis.

Mr. KOPPEL. Gentlemen, while we are on the subject of money, though, I would like to ask what seems to me to be a very basic question: The administration seems to have rationalized this kind of agreement to the public at large on the basis of cutting military spending. Instead we find that we are going to have a larger military budget next year than we have this year. Why?

Senator PERCY. Our budget request is $83.4 billion. We are going ahead apparently, according to the administration, with two sites instead of twelve. They are prepared to cut out three-quarters of a billion dollars right away because of the SALT agreements, and that should multiply many fold in future years.

Mr. KOPPEL. But we do have a bigger military budget upcoming for next year than we had this year.

Senator PERCY. That is mainly because of pay increases which now constitute 54 percent of our whole budget.

Mr. KOPPEL. What I am concerned about, Senator, is that we seem to be getting into kind of a spiral where Dr. Kissinger, for example, the other day says we have to go ahead with certain programs, otherwise we are weakened in our negotiations in SALT-II.

I can just see this going on for years where the administration will be saying: We are not going to be able to trust the Russians, or if the Russians break an agreement, we still have to go along preparing the same kinds of systems, new systems, that we have all along.

Senator PERCY. Assume that this agreement will suddenly and dramatically cut our defense budget in half and that would be a delusion. We are not implying that at all. But it is the beginning of arresting an unlimited nuclear arms race and that is what it is. It is a beginning. You have to begin this journey at some point, and it has now begun.

Senator JACKSON. Ted, let's be frank about this. The administration's presentation of this proposal makes it mandatory for Congress to increase funds for strategic arms. It is going to increase our budget. It is not going to cut it in half, it is not going to decrease it, it is going to increase it. Not this coming year, but the year after and the year after. Now that is what is involved here. Now let's get these facts out on the table. We are going to start doing it in the Armed Services committee on Tuesday, and they are going to build the so-called new type of ULMS submarine which will cost $1 billion a boat. Now that is what the administration is proposing.

Senator PERCY. I don't agree with that at all and I will have no part in that kind of an escalated step-up because of the agreement.

Senator JACKSON. That is your President's proposal.

Senator PERCY. Absolutely not. That is a misinterpretation of what his intention is.

Senator JACKSON. Well that is his proposal. The budget is already up there.

Mr. CLARK. I would like to ask you at least one political question. You are still a candidate for the Democratic Presidential nomination, though you dropped out of the primaries. Senator McGovern is expected to pick up some 200 votes on Tuesday in the New York primary which will put him within almost 200 votes of the number he needs to go over the top. Is McGovern stoppable at this stage?

Senator JACKSON. I believe that he is running into real resistance. It is possible, but not probable.

Mr. KOPPEL. On that note, thank you very much, Senator Jackson, Senator Percy, for being with us on Issues and Answers.

## GETTING THE MOST OUT OF OUR SCHOOLS

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, two recent articles by Sylvia Porter tell us how communities across the Nation often ignore one of the their most valuable resources, their schools, through "wasteful disuse." And Miss Porter goes on to suggest that the community education concept is one of the best ideas she has found to stop this extravagance and make the schools full-time partners in the community.

As the Porter articles make clear, the benefits of a community school program can be made available through only a modest increase in the school budget. The school can become a total community center for people of all ages, operating extended hours throughout the year.

To get the most out of our schools, I have introduced S. 2689, The Community School Center Development Act, which would promote the development and expansion of community schools in all 50 States. Senator WILLIAMS joined me in introducing this bill last fall, and 20 other Senators have since become cosponsors.

I invite more Senators to join in support of S. 2689. Sylvia Porter's articles point to many of the compelling reasons why such support is in the best interests of citizens of all ages throughout the Nation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that these articles be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Evening Star, June 13, 1972]

WASTEFUL DISUSE OF SCHOOLS

(By Sylvia Porter)

In one rural area near New York, property taxes have just about gone out of sight—primarily, of course, to finance the handsome, beautifully landscaped elementary and high schools.

In a matter of days, these schools will be closing for the term and in large part will be unused and wasted until the kids go back in the fall.

This is a real squandering of resources. This is, in the words of Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, "a kind of disuse of schools and extravagance that modern America cannot abide." This is, in today's environment plain stupid.

Last year property taxes climbed more than 9 percent, on top of a 35 percent upsurge between 1967 and 1970.

Many older Americans are now paying 20 to 40 percent of their incomes to the local tax collector. So distasteful and oppressive have local property taxes become that only 47 percent of local school bond issues were approved during the last fiscal year, a new record low and a resounding come-uppance for school officials—for the biggest chunk of all property taxes goes for schools. Also, the National Education Association points out, local school districts bear more than half of school costs today; the state kicks in 41 percent, the federal government about 7 percent.

Yet, while the cost of supporting the elementary and high school system has nearly tripled during the past decade to almost $50 billion, the typical school is locked up about 50 percent of the time.

The majority of the schools are used only five days a week, 39 weeks a year. The schools are restricted to the formal education of Americans between the age of five and 17 or 18. Even pre-school "Head Start" children have been banned from the elementary school in some cases.

Meanwhile, there is a mounting need for further education of the older American—ranging from vocational retraining to retirement preparation and planning, consumer education, nutrition, music, arts, crafts.

What's the answer?

One is to find new ways to use idle public schools, And this answer also would help to slash local tax bills by avoiding the need to build additional expensive facilities and by keeping more real estate from falling off local town tax rolls.

In fact, some 300 U.S. communities have done precisely this—with a wondrous array of activities and services and with refreshingly positive results. For instance:

In Gloucester City, N.J., a broad tutorial program has been set up, using the elderly along with elementary school students to "help kids with their homework" and personal counseling.

In Salem, Oregon, about 100 different classes and activities are going on, with some 2,000 attending each week—ranging from knitting lessons to mountain climbing and small business administration. One lady involved in the program noted tartly that this was the first time she had set foot in the local school in 32 years. The extra cost of expanding the Salem school has been about 6 percent of the regular budget. "With that 6 percent, the time the school is open can be increased by two-thirds," say officials in charge.

Your local school could be, in the words of Barry E. Herman of New Haven's Winchester Community School, a place where:

Children and adults can study and learn and where learning can take place 18 hours a day or more;

Educational or vocational skills of people of all ages can be upgraded for the benefit of the individual and the community;

People of all ages can take part in such activities as sports, physical fitness programs, informal recreation, arts and crafts, musical programs, civic meetings, adult education, home economics, tutoring;

People can find health services, counseling services, legal aid, employment services, homemaking help;

are "more than five years behind the U.S." in multiple warhead technology.

There is no doubt that the Soviets are somewhat behind on MIRV technology, because they took the wrong road to begin with. But in numbers of missiles, in warhead weight, and in all other respects one can think of, the Soviets now have every advantage that a MIRV technologist could ask for. They also have excellent scientists.

If the Soviets are going to go "all out," therefore, they sould soon be MIRVing their SS–9 missiles, and also the still bigger missiles they will soon be deploying. They may even multiply greatly their MIRVing capability, by adapting the "cold launch" technique of our Polaris-Poseidons to their SS–9 missiles.

The calculated risk in SALT, in short, is an immensely big risk. If we do not want the most disagreeable kind of surprise, we have to do three things, regardless of cost.

We have to go ahead, full speed, with the ULMS or Trident program. We have to go ahead with the B–52 replacement, the B–1 bomber. Above all, we have to go ahead with maximum improvement of the Minuteman system—which can more or less true up the nuclear-strategic balance in a fairly short time.

This will cost a lot of money. The arms race will not end, as the White House warned the congressional leaders. That leads to the real criticisms of the President. First, he did not directly ask the country, three years ago, for the kind of maximum effort that might have prevented the present imbalance.

The President did not do this because he thought he could not defeat the Democratic opposition in Congress. Against the background of the SALT agreement, however, the President will again have great difficulty with Congress in doing what needs to be done now. One has to conclude that he is gambling, probably quite shrewdly, on a much more pliant Congress after election day next November.

## JAPAN'S FIGHT AGAINST ITS DRUG AND NARCOTIC PROBLEM

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I invite the attention of the Senate to an article published in the June 19 issue of Time magazine, which recounts Japan's fight against its drug and narcotic problem.

About 10 years ago, Japan cracked down on the hard drug problem with a vengeance. It is a harsh program which confines addicts for a minimum of 30 days of treatment, and forces them to go through the pain process of "cold turkey"—withdrawal unassisted by chemical crutches. It is a program of tough law enforcement, which hands out a life sentence for narcotic pushers.

But, more important, in terms of the overall well-being of the Japanese society, it is an effective program. Heroin use in Japan has been virtually eliminated. Even organized crime there has steered clear of hard drug traffic.

I think the Japanese have a program that the U.S. Government might very well examine closely. Although some people might flinch at the toughness of Japan's crackdown on drugs, it produces the desired results of protecting individuals in society from the evils of drug abuse and addiction.

This is not the case here in the United States, where drug addiction has become virtually epidemic.

In the midst of the national drug and narcotic crisis, pushers continue to ply their dirty trade in cities and suburbs alike. We passed new laws to combat narcotics, but more and more narcotics flow into the country from places like Southeast Asia, Turkey, and France. The fact is, hard drugs are now easier to get than ever. Moreover, they are cheaper. Hard drugs are one of the few commodities in America which have escaped the effects of inflation. Heroin is actually getting cheaper, reportedly costing on the street now only about 40 percent of what it cost in 1965.

As addiction increases, so does crime. The crime rate in the United States runs about 10 times higher than our population growth. Addicts, men, women, and children, turn to lawlessness and violence in order to support their habit. Drugs and narcotics are unraveling the country's moral fiber, turning human beings into desperate animals and making cities unsafe for law-abiding people. The problem is particularly acute among our young people. There are daily reports of drug traffic and addiction in our colleges, high schools, and even elementary schools.

If the ever-increasing rate of drug addiction is any indication, if higher and higher crime is any indication, our Nation's approach to narcotic control and enforcement is a failure. We seem to be trying to shovel out the ocean with a teaspoon.

To my way of thinking, there could be no penalty too harsh for someone who peddles the ruin, the wasted lives, and human suffering and agony that comes from drug addiction. Drug traffickers are worse than murderers, and they should be treated as capital felons.

We need a nationwide assault on illegal drugs and narcotics, at every level of government, Federal, State, and local. We need tougher laws and tougher enforcement and tougher courts that will take narcotic pushers off the streets and put them away where they will no longer be a menace to the American society.

I ask unanimous consent that the Time magazine article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Time magazine, June 19, 1972]

### SAYONARA HEROIN

Only a decade ago, a heroin epidemic threatened Japan. An estimated 40,000 addicts provided a market for the growing traffic in hard drugs, and some users brazenly mainlined on street corners in such areas as Yokohama's Kogane-cho (Gold Town). Today, says Dr. Yoshio Ishikawa of the Serigayaen mental hospital, heroin addiction "has become a subject without a living example for study, like smallpox," and medical students may finish their entire education without seeing an actual addict. Police and narcotics agents face the same triumphant scarcity.

Heroin use in Japan has been virtually eliminated by stringent enforcement of a 1963 law that provided for harsh handling of both pushers and addicts. A life sentence is meted out for selling *butsu* (the Japanese gangsters' untranslatable coinage for heroin). Mere possession can mean several years in jail. To cut off the demand, the government required that every user caught be confined for at least 30 days of treatment. The most Draconian fact—by American standards—is that each addict's treatment begins with "cold turkey," or withdrawal unassisted by chemical crutches such as methadone.

The ordeal can be excruciating. Early in the process, which can take a week or ten days, the addict's eyes water and his nose runs while sweat pours from his body. By the third day, he is likely to be wracked by severe intestinal cramps, diarrhea, vomiting and nerve spasms. Goose bumps cover his body; they make his skin resemble that of a plucked fowl and give the process its name in the U.S. Cold turkey is rarely fatal—the Japanese claim 100% survival for those treated in hospitals—but the urge to commit suicide can be strong.

### VERGE OF HELL

Many U.S. physicians believe that such agony is neither necessary nor desirable. They prefer to assist the addict through his withdrawal with other drugs (TIME, Jan. 4, 1971) and even to keep a patient on a heroin substitute indefinitely if necessary. But the Japanese, who have always taken a puritanical attitude toward drugs, regard this as a continuation of addiction.

The country's first antidrug law, adopted in the 1880's, prescribed *zanshu*, decapitation with a samurai sword, for those trafficking in narcotics. Opium eating, a major problem in 19th century China, never caught on in Japan. After World War II, however, heroin began to gain a foothold. Rival gangs pushed the drug among prostitutes and in the underworld generally, bringing Japan to what Tokyo Social Worker Michinari Sugahara called "the verge of hell."

The authorities moved to end heroin use before it spread to the country's teen-agers. A government-financed public relations campaign, assisted by the press, lectured the public on the drug's social, moral and medical dangers. The 1963 statute persuaded drug abusers that the government meant business. Some pushers reacted to the new law by simply dropping out of the business. In some brothels, the gangsters themselves forced girls to go through cold turkey; those reluctant to kick the habit were sometimes tied to their beds until withdrawal symptoms ended. Others were put in government-run hospitals that had been constructed specifically for drug offenders.

The medical profession cooperated fully with law enforcement agencies, taking the attitude that addiction is not merely a personal medical problem but an offense against society. Says Tokyo Narcotics Agent Hiromasa Sato: "Addicts found no alternative but to capitulate, and eventually submitted to cold turkey. *Sayonara.*"

### NOT FOR EXPORT

Drug abuse has not been completely eradicated, of course. Youngsters now go in for glue sniffing and amphetamines, and a heroin arrest is still made occasionally. But Japan's success has been dramatic enough to awe visiting American experts. Can the Japanese system be exported to the U.S.? Many U.S. exports think not. Japan's population is homogeneous, generally law-abiding and, where national goals are concerned, responsive to official appeals for cooperation. Americans are far more heterogeneous and resistant to authoritarian preaching. The young, in particular, insist increasingly on asserting their "individual rights." Many officials feel that it would be difficult to get wide support for a system that emphasizes the punishing process of withdrawal.

Dr. Vincent Dole of New York's Rockefeller University Hospital, a pioneer in the use of methadone, argues that physicians should relieve, not increase, the suffering of the heroin addict. Most drug users apparently agree. Addicts are far more likely to turn themselves in for treatment if chemical substitutes

the association to seek a college degree in their chosen field of endeavor.

Mr. President, I know my colleagues will join me in saluting the Red River Valley Fighter Pilots Association for its good works and dedication to repatriation of the POW's and MIA's. Our hats off to the River Rats.

## SALUTE TO EDUCATION

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, today's Salute to Education comes at an appropriate time, just as teachers and parents, school administrators and government and judicial officers are pondering the means by which we can best furnish quality education and equality of educational opportunity to all the Nation's children.

America's schools should be complimented on the way they have performed a difficult task that involved 46 million children and $45 billion last year, each figure a substantial increase over the year before.

The task will be no easier in the future. Problems of higher enrollments, problems with school support and financing of facilities are becoming more and more complex.

We are all confident that the good work will continue and will improve just as it has for almost 200 years—since the Government first granted funds and determined that an education should be the right of every child.

American citizens, involved in a responsible partnership of local, State and Federal governments, will keep in sight the goal of ever improving education for their children.

## A MONUMENT TO THE BLACK SOLDIER

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, on June 12, the city of Baltimore unveiled a new sculpture in Monument Square in the heart of the city. The Memorial to the Black Soldier, sculpted and presented to the city by Prof. James E. Lewis of Morgan State College, represents long-overdue recognition of the contribution which our black community has made and continues to make to Maryland and to this Nation. Both in military and civilian endeavors, the black citizens have been full participants in meeting the obligations of citizenship, in spite of the fact that they have not always been participants in enjoying the benefits of citizenship.

The new monument is also indicative of the efforts of Mayor William Schaefer to bring the population of Baltimore together, to emphasize the unity requisite to the survival of our cities.

The master of ceremonies at the dedication was the Honorable Theodore R. McKeldin, twice Governor of Maryland and twice mayor of Baltimore. Governor McKeldin has, during a long career of dedicated service to Maryland, gained a deep appreciation for the commitment of our black citizens. I ask unanimous consent that, for the benefit of my colleagues, Governor McKeldin's remarks at the unveiling of the Monument to the Black Soldier be inserted in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Mayor Schaefer has asked me to preside on this significant occasion, and I am honored by the request.

Mayor Schaefer's administration has been marked by an earnest desire to bring the different peoples of Baltimore together. This ceremony today is part of that kind of progressive administration all cities need if they are to thrive.

This ceremony is also symbolic for another reason. We are, with this monument, trying to erase some of our errors of the past. In this country we have done the Blacks two types of disservice. We have either excluded Blacks altogether from an area of activity or we have let him participate but never acknowledged his participation. The total exclusion of Blacks can be seen in such an area of American life as professional baseball where for years Blacks were so excluded that they had to form their own leagues. The tragedy is that there languished probably some of the great baseball players of the age. We can see how many by just looking at how many Black stars appeared once the odious color barrier was lowered.

But the second form of discrimination, letting Blacks participate but ignoring that participation, has been as tragic. We have, for instance, let Blacks fight in our wars but we have done little or nothing to recognize their contribution. Our history books were blank. Our newspapers were vacant. Our archives are bare. Blacks have fought for this country, died for this country, and, yet, one would hardly know it by looking around. This discrimination of silence has had its corrosive effects as much as the discrimination of exclusion. Not only have Blacks been denied pride in their own people's accomplishments, but we have been kept ignorant and stifled about our true history and our common humanity. As with all other forms of discrimination this, too, has served to impoverish both those discriminated against and those discriminating.

A hopeful sign is that we are finally trying to do something about it. Our schools are beginning to teach Black history. Our television stations are starting to run programs on Black culture. Our government is trying to acknowledge the contributions of the Blacks.

This monument and this ceremony are part of that effort. But monuments are static symbols of the past unless they spur us to action. Our former silence will be truly broken when we recognize by word and deed that Blacks, who have been slaves in this land, have contributed significantly to the progress of America because they, too, believe this can be a Promised Land.

Let our history books and our governments and our newspapers and our television stations recognize this, but most importantly, let each of us remember the important part Blacks have played and are playing in American life.

## THEY'LL GO ALL OUT

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, the distinguished columnist, Joseph Alsop, in an article printed today in the Washington Post points out some of the potential danger to the national security should the Congress fail to provide an adequate defense budget.

Mr. Alsop points out that the reason some have criticized the SALT agreements with the Soviet Union is that in 1966, "the United States began to neglect the nucelar-strategic balance." The columnist contends that Persident Nixon, to meet his duty to insure the national security, was forced to negotiate the SALT agreements because—

The Joint Chiefs judged that if we start from scratch, where we are now, and the Soviets go on at their present tempo, the Soviets will be even further ahead five years from now without the SALT agreement.

He says that we can expect the Soviets to "go all out" in an effort to achieve maximum strategic weapons development.

Mr. President, the Congress must examine carefully all of the facts and probabilities in consideration of the strategic arms situation and apply those findings accurately in development of a sufficient defense budget. I ask that Mr. Alsop's article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, June 21, 1972]

THEY'LL GO ALL OUT

(By Joseph Alsop)

Privately, both President Nixon and Dr. Henry A. Kissinger have warned congressional leaders that they still expect the Soviets to make a "maximum" effort of strategic weapons development, within the limits of the SALT agreement.

"They'll go all out," is the quoted assessment on this highest of all levels.

If this is the message that Moses-Nixon has brought down from the mountaintop in Moscow, a serious question arises. The question is why it is sensible to sign a SALT agreement, aimed to halt the arms race, which will admittedly do no such thing. The answer comes in three parts.

First, the SALT agreement writes into a treaty and the accompanying executive agreement what seem like great advantages for the Soviets; yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff were strongly favorable. The JCS are favorable, in turn, because they believe that in the existing situation, the U.S. will be worse off without the SALT agreement's extremely modest limits on Soviet weapons-deployment.

In other words, the Joint Chiefs judged that if we start from scratch, where we are now, and the Soviets go on at their present tempo, the Soviets will be even further ahead five years from now without the SALT agreement. This is the bitter result of the follies committed since 1966, when the U.S. began to neglect the nuclear-strategic balance.

Second, no sort of change in the basic pattern of Soviet behavior is promised by the Nixon-Kissinger warning, "They will go all out." But there is a real chance of this kind of change if the United States also does what needs to be done about the nuclear-strategic balance in the vital interval just ahead.

We got a SALT agreement, such as it is, because we rejected the advice of the wise fools who favored unilateral disarmament. Conceivably, at this strange stage in history, we may get something like enduring stability for this weary world, if we just do a bit more to keep our guard up in the years immediately ahead.

Third, however, that last "if" is certain to be decisive. There is zero room for maneuver if the U.S. government's optimists (who include the people in the White House, for once) prove to be as wrong as usual.

One thinks of 1949, when the great Dr. Vannevar Bush had to tear a whole chapter from his forthcoming book, because the Soviets had just tested their first nuclear weapon. (In the chapter, he had said this could not happen for fifteen years!)

One thinks of 1949, in turn, because the White House has also bought the view of the Bush-like people in the U.S. intelligence community. These people hold the Soviets

and rivers. We cannot neglect our other conservation practices on the land. There is also a need for more county SCS technicians to help with technical assistance, and early announcement of the program in July so lay-out and survey work can be done in the fall and plans drawn up during winter months. Our county had 4 and 5 county SCS technicians about 5 years ago. Now we have only 2 and 3. In many cases today, the $2500.00 limit that each farmer can earn, does not cover but 25% of the cost of large pollution control practices, and many erosion control structures, if they are large, due to the fact of increased costs in the last five years. Cost of earth moving equipment has raised from 15 to 25 dollars per hour. With this great part of the cost that must be born by the farmer, he cannot afford to control the problems on his farm. Many young farmers today do not have over 10% net worth in their operation, and cannot borrow the additional money needed.

I urge you to consider that this cost share limit be raised to $5,000, for large pollution and erosion control practices. I also urge that Congress continues to permit ASC Committees to maintain practices of 1970 and earlier years in their county programs where they feel the need arises. Farmers should have 100% cost sharing on a stream bank fencing practice as he is giving up land on each side of the stream or river, from which he has no source of income. Keeping cattle out of streams is the greatest method I know to stop stream bank erosion.

When local, state and private individuals contribute 114 million dollars per year to help out on water shed protection and for conservation practices and soil surveying; and the farmers have and are willing to match every dollar the federal government will provide in REAP funds; let it not be said by future generations that their forefathers did not care or understand the necessity of controlling erosion and pollution.

Now man has only one choice left. To conserve what he has left of the soil and water, or face poverty and starvation as many of the older countries of the world that did not conserve their soil, have experienced.

This is God's land for today's generation to use and preserve for future generations.

Remember, man cannot survive without the fertile soil and unpolluted air and water.

Let us get closer to the problem by putting ourself in the place of a raindrop.

A RAINDROP FELL

"There's nothing unusual about that, but its environment decides whether it will cause destruction or add to the bounties of the earth.

"I fell to earth, I know not where, but the soil was hard and barren. Small as I was, I moved a small particle of soil. In no time at all, there were millions more like me, and now we formed a body of water. We started moving, taking the path of least resistance, which was easy because there was no plant cover and the soil was smooth. As we moved, we picked up particles of soil, making us more abrasive, causing other particles to move. Soon we had a small ditch started, and as we moved along at an ever increasing speed, we left much damage behind us on the field. Not many of us stayed behind to soak into the soil.

"We met many others coming from another direction, also seeking a lower level. We were no longer a trickle, we were now a stream with considerable more power. Look! There's a sharp curve ahead! It looks like some before had started to cut the bank. We are strong, fortified with good top soil. Each one of us took on a little more, making a great cut in the bank. What was that? A tree just fell behind us! We washed the dirt away from its roots. So on we go, ever increasing in size and power until the river banks will not be able to hold us within its bounds. Just as I thought, we are now beginning to spread out over lush farm land where there is something planted in rows. The dirt is loose and moves very easily. Soon the plants have become our victims and travel along with us. The plants caught on to something, probably a fence which caused us to slow down and back up and spread out over more fertile fields until we can break down the fences. As we slow down, we are losing the soil particles. They are settling back on the ground. Many of these particles we have moved hundreds of miles.

"At last we are back in the banks of the river, leaving destruction untold behind. Some buildings destroyed, roads washed out, crops destroyed, bridges washed away and huge piles of earth moved to where it is of no value, so man will have to move it in order to farm his land. Also along the way we have picked up chemicals and much unpurified sewage, we are not pure and clean like we were when we started out. Certain species of fish cannot live in our environment any longer. As we slow down, we deposit acres of new land that was not here years ago. Now we are mixing with other water which seems salty. We must have reached the ocean! What will my destiny be?

"A few years later! Something is happening! I'm being picked up as vapor into the air and carried by wind and clouds out over the land. Suddenly some cold air is encountered and condensation takes place. Down I come as a rain drop once more. Where will I land? If it is the same area as before, great changes have taken place. This is called conservation, maybe even a watershed area. That was a soft landing. Either trees or grass has been planted here. There are millions of us here, but we aren't moving fast. Many of our number are soaking into the soil, as we move slowly down the slope, to provide moisture for the crops until more of us arrive.

"At last we are forming a body of water, but we are quite clear yet. We have very little soil with us. Maybe we can move some now. Guess not! This must be a terrace as there is not much slope and we move very slow. What's ahead? Looks like a creek, but it seems different. It must be a sod waterway or a diversion.

"There is grass on the bottom and on the sides, and we are moving toward a larger body of water. Must be a structure to hold water back, but I am clean, and not carrying much soil with me. I think there are fish in my presence. Look! On the bank there is a boy and a girl fishing. Is it a farm boy and girl, or is it a boy and girl from the city, who may never have come so close to nature before?

"Well, I must say, this journey was shorter than the last one, and not as exciting as I caused no destruction. But I am proud that someone was caring for his land and conserving the water for the benefit of all mankind."

Thank you, gentlemen, for the opportunity of sharing some of my views with you today.

## A TRIBUTE TO EDUCATION

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, education has played a unique role in the history of our country. Our educators are probably best known as innovators, but let us also remember that we are the first country in the world to have provided universal education for our children. We are continuing to devote increasing resources to the education of our citizens.

The presence of not only a literate but also a knowledgeable citizenry has contributed to the rapid economic development which has characterized our past. It has also been essential to the proper operation of our political process.

If we are to continue to improve the quality of life for all of our citizens, we must place high priority on education in the future. We must be willing to provide educational opportunities which satisfy the needs of our diverse citizenry. Only when we have an equality of opportunity, allowing people to develop their talents to the limits of their abilities, will education have gained the position which it must have in our society.

## BARBITURATE LEGISLATION SUPPORTED BY SENATOR FRANK E. MOSS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Utah (Mr. Moss) for his support of two bills which I have introduced relating to barbiturate drugs. S. 3538, would require all manufacturers and producers of solid oral form barbiturates to place identifying marks or symbols on their products. This would facilitate police efforts in tracing barbiturates diverted to the illicit market back to the original production and distribution sources. S. 3539, would provide for the rescheduling of four commonly abused short acting barbiturates from schedule III to schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act. This change would subject these particular barbiturates to stricter production and distribution controls as well as to more stringent import and export regulations.

These two bills attempt to deal with the most significant aspects of production, distribution, and diversion of the short-acting barbiturates. I welcome Senator Moss as a cosponsor of both of these needed pieces of legislation.

Mr. President, Senator Moss has supplied a statement for the hearing record relating to barbiturate legislation that I held on June 12 and 13, 1972. For the benefit of Senators, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF SENATOR FRANK E. MOSS

Subject: S. 3538 and S. 3539, to curb Drug Abuse.

Mr. Chairman, I commend you and the Subcommittee for holding hearings on these bills (S. 3538 and S.3539), which place misused drugs under greater restrictions.

All too many of our citizens—and our young people especially—are using, and misusing, barbiturate drugs. Because they are inexpensive, they are readily available. We have all known young men and women whose wide use of "Downers" has brought tragedy into their lives.

The abuse of psychotropic drugs has been increasing at an alarming rate. On the street these sedatives are known as "Red Devils," "Red Balls," "Rainbows," "Goofers," and "Downers."

This abuse, however, is not limited exclusively to the street culture. More and more these drugs are being introduced into our American way of life. Drug abuse has been introduced into such diverse groups as college, high school, and junior high school students, industrials workers, businessmen, middle-class party-goers, and members of the Armed Forces. Even children in the fourth grade of grammar school are not immune to the dangers of these drugs.

It has been estimated that as many as four million school age youth have abused barbi-

I am afraid the administration must be counted among them—who argue that because we now have more MIRV (multiple-independently-targeted reentry vehicle) warheads than the Soviets it is safe for the President to have granted the Soviets (as he has done) a license to outdistance us by 4-1 in payload capacity.

But MIRV is not frozen under this agreement. The Soviets, therefore, can—and will—proceed very rapidly under the agreement to catch up with us in the MIRV field. We know they are hard at work on it. Since the Soviets are permitted so many more missiles than we have and so many missiles many times more powerful than our own (as much as four or five times as large), the Russians could end up overwhelming us in numbers of warheads as well as numbers of missiles and missile size.

In the course of our Senate hearings on SALT—long before the Moscow summit—we warned the administration many times that the Congress, at my initiative, had turned down funds for an ABM site around Washington, D.C., on the grounds it would not be effective. The Soviets could easily overwhelm that ABM site. I was amazed, therefore, to learn that the President had signed an agreement in Moscow that called for a deployment on our part that the Congress had previously rejected while abandoning a sensible deployment that the Congress had approved—namely, additional ABM sites to protect our deterrent land-based missile forces.

I think we must also recognize that the next phase of the SALT negotiations cannot help but be influenced by the outcome of SALT I. Within the five-year life of the interim arms agreement, that is, by mid-1977, we will be in the position of having to ask the Soviets for *parity*. In other words, we will be asking them to give up in SALT II what they have gained in SALT I. Yet what possible reason is there to expect that the Soviets will be willing to do this? Or, more to the point, what political and diplomatic concessions will we be forced to make so that the Soviets will not further widen their margin of superiority? For is it reasonable to believe that the Soviets will not attempt to gain political and diplomatic benefits from the strategic arsenal in which they have invested so heavily, and which we have now licensed them to expand?

I have said on several occasions that increased Soviet strategic capabilities can embolden the Soviets, can increase their willingness to take risks, can harden their bargaining position in negotiations, and can therefore lead to new instability in international affairs. Operating from a much more favorable correlation of forces, the Soviet leaders could be expected to seek fresh advances, especially in the third world.

Nothing that has happened in recent months—whether on the Indian subcontinent, in the Mideast or with the Soviet supplied North Vietnamese offensive across the DMZ—can be cause for altering this assessment.

Summits are difficult at best and a summit in an election year before a nationwide TV audience is a very doubtful instrument of sound diplomacy. One must ask whether we would not have been much better off to continue the SALT I negotiations, do some tough bargaining, and seek secure agreements rather than insist on the hasty signing of less secure ones.

The American people will be bitterly disappointed if the many serious problems in the SALT accords have the effect of both diminishing our security and forcing increases in the defense budget. As the administration has presented its program, there will be no savings in the defense budget as a result of SALT, and already there are proposed increases.

As much as I can understand the desire to believe that the Moscow summit heralds a new era of peace and cooperation, I must say that there is no substitute for facing facts. The Moscow arms agreements, I believe, raise as many questions as they answer.

## THE COUNTY ASC COMMITTEES

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, sometimes, because of our frustrations with modern problems, we tend to overlook the great good being accomplished by many American citizens in on-going, long-term Government programs. A program of this nature which very much deserves credit is that of the county ASC committees which function throughout the Nation in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Just recently I was reminded of this again when I read the testimony given before the Senate Subcommittee on Agricultural Appropriations by Mr. Boyd Frank of Clear Lake, Wis., which happens to be my hometown. Mr. Frank, as his testimony demonstrates, is the type of selfless American who makes our Government function at its best. His thoughtful and constructive testimony epitomizes the excellent approach of a good organization to one of those persistent problems, soil erosion, that worries all thoughtful Americans. But while many of us just worry, Mr. Frank and his associates are working diligently and intelligently on our behalf. Because of the importance of his work, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Frank's thoughtful testimony be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF BOYD FRANK

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am Boyd Frank of Clear Lake, Wisconsin. I am a dairy farmer and operate a 200 acre farm. I have also served for 13 years on the County ASC Committee and have had a great interest in the conservation of our soil and water of our County, State and Nation.

I certainly appreciate the opportunity to appear today in support of increased funding for the Rural Environmental Assistance Program to 500 million dollars, which was authorized by Congress in 1936. Much has been accomplished in the years past, under the program known as the Agriculture Conservation Program, more recently named the REAP (Rural Environmental Assistance Program). In our State of Wisconsin which I am familiar with and also in other States, I am sure this program has offered much in its more than 35 years of existence.

According to the latest survey of Wisconsin, 52% of our cropland, or 6.4 million acres needs conservation practices applied. Of the 6.4 million acres, 3.6 million acres need the extra protection of terraces, stripcropping, contour farming, grassed waterways and other water outlets and diversion terraces, to properly manage runoff water. 541,000 acres need annual cover of crop residues or other cover crops for protetcion to meet conservation needs as well as pollution abatement. 566,000 acres need a permanent type of grass or legume cover used in a long rotation so that land is under cover for a longer period of time, maybe five years at a time.

482,000 acres should be planted to trees or left in grass on a permanent basis. Also, there are 1.2 million acres that have too much water and need proper drainage. Of our 2.8 million acres of pasture land, 72% needs conservation practices applied. Nearly 1 million acres need to be re-established to grass and legumes which require lime and fertilizer.

Forest land—14 million acres—48% needs conservation treatment as follows: 3.2 million acres need planting; 3.6 million acres needs Timber Stand Improvement. With these needs and interest by farmers to carry out these practices, many farmers' requests have to be turned down, due to a shortage of funds each year. (As of this date, more than $70,000.00 in requests remain unapproved in our county).

With this great amount of our land that is not under erosion control practices, it is no wonder that the mouth of the Mississippi River is constantly being moved south. As I stood by the Mississippi River in New Orleans, I was told that the mouth of the river was originally at that point, but now it is many miles south and the Mississippi delta which covers 15,000 square miles of land had passed this point. I realized that some of it was from our county and state, and that it was the best part of our soil; the organic matter which is the easiest to move.

This is in fact the greatest loss of our nation's assets, as it is top soil that cannot be replaced by man, but only by nature. It would take 1000 years to build one inch of soil by natural decay of plant growth. With this loss of ½ or 3 inches of our top soil, it is causing the use of larger amounts of fertilizer to be applied to produce crops, and greater losses of fertility due to elements leaching out of the soil. There is a direct relationship between the amount of organic matter and calcium (commonly called lime) in the soil and the amount of nutrients and moisture it will absorb and hold.

As farms get larger, machinery must also get larger to operate these farms. The fields have doubled and tripled in size, causing more opportunity for erosion. There are also larger concentrations of cattle on given areas.

As I see it, our problem of soil erosion and the pollution of our lakes and streams is becoming greater because the amount of land we have to raise crops and use for recreation is less each year. Also, more and more of our land is being covered with concrete, asphalt, or buildings, which causes greater water run-off.

In my observation concerning how government money is spent to control water and prevent soil erosion, certainly that spent on small structures and practices on the land are far more important and outweigh the benefits of those for large dams.

For example—a Corps of Engineers dam in our county and an adjoining county, about 10 million dollars was spent to protect one city, but it did nothing for the protection of soil and control of water on farm land except right near the river below the dam. If this had been used in REAP practices, I am sure all the run-off water and erosion in the county could have been controlled. We also have a watershed that has done a wonderful job. It consists of 11 major dams, and several small dams in the area constructed under ACP funds. This only cost about 1.5 million dollars and covers about 36,000 acres.

I cannot emphasize enough that the duty of sharing the cost of preserving our soil and water, is the duty of each and every citizen. Therefore, the federal government should surely share in the cost with the farmers, who are caretakers of the land only for their generation. The time has come when we can no longer move on to new land, when what we have is the spoils of man's neglect.

Today we also have other problems arising. Air and water pollution from many sources. The one covered by REAP funds pertains to animal waste, which again is brought about by larger units of farming operations where large numbers of livestock are confined in smaller areas. Farmers are aware of what is happening, and are willing to try and do something about it, but they cannot stand the cost involved to correct them without cost sharing. Because of this, there is a greater need to increase REAP funds to include this part of pollution of our streams

that there is a clear margin of benefits over the costs, for Indians.

TO ESTABLISH ELIGIBILITY OF URBAN AND RURAL INDIANS

What are clearly required today are specific actions by the Federal Government to end its long history of broken commitments to the Indian people. I strongly believe, for example, that the concept of trust responsibility extends to all Indian people, regardless of where they reside.

Specifically, I call for the full implementation of a new eligibility study completed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which calls for extending eligibility for Federal services to three main groups of off-reservation Indians—urban, rural, and state reservation. The time has come to fulfill the commitment of the United States to all of the 800,000 Indians who for too long have known only the repeated violation of their civil rights, a struggle against ill health, malnutrition, and poverty, and the denial of equal opportunity in education and employment.

It is particularly important that all relevant programs and services be coordinated under the Bureau of Indian Affairs to reach those Indians who are isolated in rural poverty or condemned to an existence of despair in the city, for their migrations can be traced precisely to the encouragement provided by a federal policy or program.

I strongly supported the enactment of the Indian Education Act of 1971, subsequently incorporated in the Education Amendments of 1972 passed by Congress. This act launched the needed shift in eligibility policies in authorizing increased Federal financial assistance to meet the special education needs of Indian children. For it based this new assistance directly on the number of Indian children enrolled. The clear intent of Congress is that the discriminatory allocation of educational services for Indians under Public Law 874 shall end forthwith. A further important provision in this legislation calls for direct Indian participation in education policy determination, from the local to the national level.

I have also joined several Senators in immediately communicating to the Senate Appropriations Committee our strong support for additional funds recently passed by the House to establish additional urban Indian service centers. It is important to recognize that this appropriation will help the BIA extend its services to off-reservation Indians for the first time, enabling urban Indians to apply for critically needed social benefits and to obtain vital health, educational, and employment services.

TO PROVIDE JOBS AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

I believe the decade of the 1970's must be the decade of decisive advances in Indian economic self-development. The economic condition of the 450,000 Americans of Indian ancestry living on or near a federally recognized reservation, colony, rancheria, or pueblo is appalling, not to mention the desperate plight of Indians who have relocated into urban and rural poverty.

I have long been involved in encouraging corporations to locate on or near reservations, including the Navajo lands, to provide critically needed jobs. I am fully aware of the problems which must be met, but I strongly believe this direction must be pursued to promote economic self-sufficiency among the tribes.

I am committed to a Federal policy of Indian self-determination, without termination of the legal and historical relationship between the Indians and the Federal Government. And I have jointly sponsored, with Senator HENRY JACKSON, a bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to contract with tribal organizations so they may directly plan and administer Federal programs of educational, agricultural, and social welfare assistance.

Meanwhile, I believe it is essential to substantially increase appropriations for health services and housing assistance critically needed by Indians.

But with an unemployment rate that is 10 times the national average, the Indian people are rightly demanding extensive Federal efforts to provide job opportunities and to promote economic self-development. I have called for substantial increases in economic development revolving loan funds. And the Employment Opportunities Act of 1972, which I have introduced, should be administered to assure Indians a fair measure of the more than 1 million public service jobs that can be created under this bill and related measures.

Finally, I have fully supported the establishment of an American Indian Development Bank, to assist Indians and Indian tribes in the development of industrial and agricultural facilities and enterprises, and in the development of their natural resources. I believe the initial capitalization for this bank should be set at least at $500 million.

With 80 percent of reservation Indians living in poverty, a total approach to Indian socio-economic development must be launched without delay. Urban Indians must also be enabled to undertake programs of community economic self-development. And to meet the special needs of rural Indians, I believe a Federal program of substantial assistance for Indian cooperatives is now required on a sustained basis. This can provide an essential tool for joint economic efforts by Indians and to end their exploitation as consumers.

The time has come for a totally new direction in national policy toward the Indian people. We must enable the Indian to again stand with pride and to have hope in the tomorrows of this great land. We must acknowledge the rich heritage this pluralistic Nation enjoys in the traditions and values of the Indian people, and the strength it can receive from their direct involvement in its economic, educational, social, and political life.

## SALUTE TO EDUCATION

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I commend the National Education Association for initiating a salute to education today, June 21. Education continues to hold the key to social mobility and the self-actualization of countless individuals in our society today.

As indication of the impact of education, in 1971 estimated fall enrollment in our public schools was 46.1 million; projected figures reveal that by the fall of 1978, 6.2 million more students will have enrolled—an increase of nearly 1 million students per year. During the same 7 years, college enrollment is expected to increase by 63 percent. These young people will comprise the future leadership of our country. Education has played a vital role in preparing them to deal with the complex problems of today.

The mainstay of our education system is the dediction of teachers throughout this Nation. Approximately 2 million men and women have given their time and talents to the education not only of our children, but also of adults interested in continuing their education. During the fiscal year 1970, over 8 million adults were enrolled in education programs—an increase of 10.2 percent over 1969. Experimental programs such as English as a second language have proven highly successful for recent citizens and adult education has even reached into the home with programs designed to show parents how to make education more vital to their children. More important, librarians across the country have given their time so that many public schools library facilities can stay open at night for community use. All of these programs are possible because teachers are willing to devote their extra energy to special evening programs in addition to regular daytime classes.

Of course higher education is increasingly crucial in this technological age. This year, Congress passed a bill, S. 659, which promises to have a revolutionary impact on our system of higher education. The bill attempts to establish access to higher education as a basic Federal right by providing financial assistance to all those who need it. The bill also provides desperately needed operating subsidies to help meet the skyrocketing costs of education. Congressional passage of my amendment to prohibit sex discrimination in educational institutions gives me particular pride. I personally would like to thank those teacher organizations, administrators of education, and countless individuals who have contributed to the passage of this legislation. Women are now guaranteed equal opportunities in admissions, scholarship aid, and faculty status.

The academic community is to be commended for its continued advancements—not only in the area of improved teaching techniques, but also in the effort to expand equal educational opportunity to all.

## FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD FAILS IN ITS DUTY—WHAT DO THEY HAVE TO HIDE?

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I am sorry to report that the Federal Reserve Board ducked, misled, hid out, avoided calls, and gave us the idiot treatment in connection with my request Monday for a report to me on the name of the bank

or banks involved in issuing the $100 Federal Reserve bills found on the men caught bugging the Democratic National Committee.

I think their refusal to cooperate was both a despicable act and unworthy of them as an arm of the Congress.

As the ranking Democratic member of the Senate Banking Committee and as chairman of the Financial Institutions Subcommittee, before 10 a.m. on Monday, June 19, I not only requested the names of the bank or banks which issued the notes but also the name of the person or persons receiving the funds—estimated at $6,300—the source of the check or financial instrument used to purchase the $100 bills, and other pertinent details.

FEDERAL RESERVE KNOWS WHO ISSUED $100 BILLS

I did this for several reasons. First, Federal Reserve notes were involved, they were in numerical sequence, and commercial banks keep details of transactions of this size. Those who paid for this job could be traced through the bills.

Second, in this case the executive branch is a party of interest. One of the men caught was directly connected with the Nixon campaign. I hope that higher ups may be innocent of these wrongdoings. But with the executive branch having a conflict of interest, it was essential that the Federal Reserve Board, which is an agent of the Congress, should give Congress the facts promptly, fully, and completely.

WRONG AND MISLEADING INFORMATION

Until 4 p.m. on Tuesday, the Federal Reserve gave us the run-around. For example, at the same time that the FBI told my staff on Monday they had already been in touch with the Federal Reserve to identify where the bills came from, Chairman Arthur Burns wrote me that:

> We at the Board have no knowledge of the Federal Reserve bank which issues those particular notes.

Until 4:00 p.m. Tuesday, even after newsmen had traced the bills to the Miami and Philadelphia Federal Reserve Districts, the Federal Reserve was telling my staff they had no information and the Reserve Bank at Philadelphia refused to return our calls. Finally, at 4:00 Tuesday the Federal Reserve stated that the information ". . . should not be released to anyone other than the investigative authorities," namely the FBI and Justice Department.

FEDERAL RESERVE FORGETS IT IS AN AGENT OF CONGRESS

The fact that the Federal Reserve, an agent of Congress and independent of the executive branch refused to cooperate with Congress while falling all over itself to aid the executive branch suggests they have something to hide.

One would have to be extraordinarily naive not to feel the Federal Reserve may be covering up for someone high in the executive branch of our Government who is directly involved with the espionage action against the Democratic National Committee.

Chairman Arthur Burns should reread the Constitution. It provides that Congress, not the executive, has the money power. Under our Constitution the Federal Reserve Board is directly obligated to Congress and is independent of the executive branch.

Certainly with the President of the United States and his supporters a party at interest, the Federal Reserve Board should recognize their clear constitutional obligation to the Congress. In this case they have failed to do so.

## SALT: SOME BASIC QUESTIONS

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, in connection with the scrutiny by Congress of the Moscow arms limitation agreements, I ask unanimous consent that the text of my article raising some basic questions about SALT, which was published in Newsday on Sunday, June 18, 1972, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Ideas, Newsday's Journal of Opinion, June 18, 1972]

ARE WE NO. 2?

(By Senator HENRY M. JACKSON)

With President Nixon to the Moscow summit went the hopes of all Americans for progress toward a lessening of international tensions and the instabilities that cause wars. Individual views of the results of the summit may vary, but I believe all Americans respect the President's sincerity and the scale of his efforts in Moscow.

President Nixon has now submitted the strategic arms limitation agreements signed in Moscow to the Congress for its advice and perhaps consent. The Congress, in carrying out its constitutional responsibilities, must study carefully the impact of these agreements on our deterrent posture and the future foreign policy of this country. One cannot give a responsible final judgment until all of the hearings have been held and until all the evidence is in. I will endeavor to play the role of a good lawyer in examining the witnesses and pursuing the facts.

I must say, however, that what I already know is enough to raise some very serious questions that go to the heart of the security of the United States and the future of individual liberty. All Americans want to see the strategic balance become more stable. We all desire the increased security that flows from a potential aggressor's knowledge that he simply can't execute a disarming first strike against our deterrent forces. Unfortunately, I see nothing in the present agreements that lessens the threat to security of these deterrent forces. On the contrary, far from placing us in a condition of stable deterrence, the agreement permits the Soviet Union to continue its offensive build-up in a way and on a scale that could prove highly dangerous. Simply put, the agreement gives the Soviets more of everything: more light ICBMs (Intercontinental ballistic missile), more heavy ICBMs, more submarine-launched missiles, more submarines, more payload, even more ABM (anti-ballistic missile) radars. In no area covered by the agreement is the United States permitted to maintain parity with the Soviet Union.

Something was basically wrong with the administration's approach to such difficult and vital arms control negotiations. In May 1971, the agreements existed only in outline and many critical issues were still outstanding. Nevertheless, President Nixon publicly announced that there definitely would be a U.S.-USSR agreement on the strategic arms. In effect, he said we had decided to purchase the house even before knowing the price! The administration then compounded its error by instructing our SALT delegation to see to it that President Nixon had a final agreement ready to sign at the Moscow summit. We thus put ourselves over a barrel. As in all bargaining, the side more eager for agreement at a specified date will pay more to get it. There is clear evidence that the self-imposed deadline led to major concessions by the United States that have had the result of gravely increasing the disadvantages to us of the agreements.

For example, on May 20, just six days before the signing, the U.S. caved in to the Russians and withdrew our key proposal to include in the agreement a mutual ban on the deployment of land-mobile ICBM launchers. On May 26—the very day of the Moscow signing—the President capitulated on the vital requirement to get agreement with the Russians on a common definition of the all important term "heavy missile." The administration resorted to a weak and unilateral assertion as to what we understand a "heavy missile" to be, while the Soviets have chosen even to withhold comment on our definition. The failure to resolve disagreement on this term raises doubt about the central claim that is being made for the agreement: that it will prevent the Soviets from deploying more huge SS-9 type missiles.

The pressures imposed by public relations requirements at the summit made matters even worse. We were still negotiating on the plane carrying the two SALT delegations from Helsinki to Moscow for the signing ceremonies. There existed no copies of the agreement other than the ones signed by the principals so that the press corps was left to rely on vague and partly misleading briefings about the contents of the agreements. The initial press, radio and TV reports from Moscow were full of misinformation. As a result, the false figures circulated in these early stories confused most Americans. Top administration officials are still contradicting each other about what these agreements mean. The full content of the agreements—essential to any evaluation of their import—was not given to the Congress or made available to the public until 19 days after the Moscow signing.

It was only after I made repeated demands for these additional "private understandings" that the administration admitted their existence and announced its willingness to release them.

This is no way to negotiate. If you negotrate this way you inevitably end up with unsatisfactory agreements. And as Robert A. Lovett has warned: "Do not give unilateral concessions, particularly to the Russians. They will not feel gratitude. They will feel contempt for your gullibility."

The strategic arms agreements have one overriding fault: They freeze the United States at a serious numerical inferiority in both ICBMs and submarines while they authorize the Russians to continue their buildup. Not only do the Soviets get 1,618 ICBMs to our 1,054 ICBMs, but they are permitted to exercise options that would give them 62 modern nuclear ballistic missile submarines to our 44. The crucial question for the nation and for the cause of world peace is whether these numbers add up to stable parity or unstable inferiority.

Now there are some who argue that "numbers don't matter—that both sides have "sufficiency" and that therefore the strategic balance is stable. Wishful thinking springs eternal and strong. How curious it is that the people who hold to the "numbers don't matter" doctrine are the same ones who believe that without an immediate arms control agreement the world is in danger of a greater nuclear war. Either numbers matter or arms limitation agreements don't—you can't have it both ways.

Among those who acknowledge that numbers do indeed matter there are those—and

are offered than if the prospect is cold turkey. The flaws in that argument are that American treatment programs have a high relapse rate and that the addiction epidemic is nowhere near being checked in the U.S.

## THE U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENT

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., in the June edition of Scientific American, gives us a scholarly description of the nuclear deterrent on which the United States increasingly relies for its defense—our submarine-based nuclear missiles. He points out that from submarines alone the United States will soon be able to deliver 5,540 nuclear warheads against 5,120 targets. With a U.S.–U.S.S.R. agreement on the limitation of ABM's, our invulnerable submarines will continue to have the power to virtually destroy the U.S.S.R.

In short, our submarine-based deterrent is secure. The restraint with which Dr. Scoville describes the administration's plans to inflict a new $40 billion missile submarine fleet upon the taxpayers is admirable, if unwarranted. These new nuclear submarines would be larger than the Soviet's newest cruiser, so large I am told, that we will not have bases capable of serving them. The bases will be constructed or expanded at an additional cost. The environmental and political consequences of a sunk Trident submarine armed with perhaps 240 nuclear warheads are rarely considered, even by Dr. Scoville. And for the phenomenal expense and all the implicit dangers, the greatest of which is the destabilizing effect of another lurch forward in the arms race, we gain at best a marginally improved strategic submarine force.

It was not long ago that Mr. Laird said the United States had to proceed with a 15-percent increase in strategic programs for fiscal year 1973 because we could not bank upon a SALT agreement. Now he says that we must go forward because we do have a SALT agreement. I urge Members of Congress to read Dr. Scoville's article before accepting Mr. Laird's logic, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MISSILE SUBMARINES AND NATIONAL SECURITY

(Land-based missiles are giving way to submarine missiles as a secure deterrent to a nuclear first strike. The question now is whether or not the U.S. should spend perhaps $40 billion on a new missile fleet)

(By Herbert Scoville, Jr.)

In recent years, as the nuclear-weapons arsenals of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have continued to grow, the concept of deterrence has become almost universally accepted as the key to maintaining national security and preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war. "Winning" a nuclear exchange is no longer regarded as a rational strategic objective; in such an exchange everyone, participant and nonparticipant alike, would be a loser. In keeping with the deterrence principle President Nixon affirmed in his State of the World Message of February 9 that "our forces must be maintained at a level sufficient to make it clear that even an all-out surprise attack on the U.S. by the U.S.S.R. would not cripple our capability to retaliate." For the Russians to feel secure they must have a similar capability; only then would a stable strategic balance exist.

The primary attribute required of any deterrent force is the ability to survive a "counterforce," or preemptive, attack. Ballistic-missile submarines are almost ideally suited to satisfying this requirement. Although they are expensive compared with other strategic weapons (more than $100 million per submarine exclusive of the missiles), their mobility and invisibility make them virtually immune to destruction in a surprise attack. In contrast, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) can readily be located with the aid of surveillance satellites, so that they must be regarded as "targetable" in the event of an enemy first strike. Attempts to "harden" such fixed missile-launchers (that is, to increase their resistance to the effects of nuclear explosions) are in the long run doomed to futility, since in the absence of qualitative arms-control agreements improvements in offensive missiles, particularly improvements in accuracy, will inevitably make fixed missile-launchers vulnerable and hence reduce confidence in their deterrence value.

The advent of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's), which are currently being deployed on a large scale by the U.S., creates a situation in which the "exchange ratio" strongly favors the attacker. Thus a single missile with, say, six warheads can potentially destroy six enemy ICBM's if they are caught in their silos. Moreover, strategic bombers are extremely vulnerable while they are on the ground and would therefore be very susceptible to annihilation in a surprise missile attack. Attempts to avoid this weakness by maintaining aircraft on continuous airborne alert have proved to be expensive and potentially dangerous. Even the current 15-minute ground alert is not completely satisfactory, since adequate warning would be more difficult to obtain if fractional-orbital-bombardment systems (FOBS) or depressed-trajectory missiles launched from submarines were used to attack the bombers.

Hence given the present state of military technology and reasonable anticipated advances, the primary element in the strategic-deterrent forces of both the U.S. and the U.S S.R. will continue to be the ballistic-missile submarine. All other strategic systems will remain secondary. Moreover, it seems likely that any agreement that may emerge in the near future from the strategic-arms-limitation talks (SALT) will further enhance the relative importance of the missile-submarine forces. Since the chances that MIRV's will be limited by a SALT agreement are extremely low, ICBM's will become increasingly vulnerable. The more likely limitations on anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) systems, on the other hand, would guarantee the retaliatory capability of even a comparatively small number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's). The expected failure to limit antiaircraft defenses and to restrain qualitative improvements in offensive-missile systems would further decrease the value of strategic bombers. Although there will probably not soon be restrictions on antisubmarine-warfare (ASW) measures, the technology in this area is so far behind that it could not possibly threaten the submarine deterrent, if it can threaten it at all, until far in the future. In sum, the Navy will increasingly be the principal military guardian of our national security.

What characteristics must an SLBM force have in order to fulfill its function as a deterrent against the initiation of nuclear warfare by the U.S.S.R.? (Since China is so far behind both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in this respect, the same forces would be more than adequate to deter China as well.) First of all, the submarines should be designed to operate in, and fire their missiles from, large enough ocean areas in a variety of directions around the U.S.S.R. so as to decrease their vulnerability to ASW detection and tracking and to facilitate the penetration of any ABM system. The closer these areas are to ports in the U.S., the less will be the time lost in moving to and from operational stations and the less will be the need for overseas bases. Higher submarine speeds will also reduce this travel time and increase the ability to break contact with a trailing ASW submarine or surface vessel. The gains here may be marginal, particularly since tracking vessels will probably be faster than any missile submarine. The faster a submarine moves through the water, however, the more noise it will produce, and in countering ASW measures quietness may be much more important than speed. The reduction of submarine noise is the most critical element in preventing detection and continuous covert tracking, both of which must rely on passive acoustic sensors.

If an ABM defense is a realistic possibility, then the submarine missiles must have enough payload capacity to allow the use of multiple warheads and other penetration aids. The entire submarine force should be large enough so that the destruction of a few submarines by a concerted enemy attack, by slow attrition or perhaps by a series of accidents does not seriously degrade its overall capability. If continuous tracking by antisubmarine submarines or other ASW vessels ever becomes a realistic operation on a large scale, then the more vessels there are in the missile-submarine fleet, the harder it will be for this tactic to be successful in destroying the entire force. Ballistic-missile submarines cannot be used to attack other submarines and are no threat to the SLBM deterrent of the other side.

In addition to an adequate number of submarines, missiles and warheads, it is essential to have secure and reliable communications between these vessels and their command authorities. It is not enough to send the submarines to sea with sealed orders. Controls to prevent inadvertent or unauthorized firing are an absolute necessity, and reliable methods for ordering retaliation in the event of a surprise attack are required. These communications must be jam-proof; the potential attacker cannot be allowed to hope that a communications failure might prevent a retaliatory strike.

The submarines must also be able to navigate accurately, so that after they have moved through the oceans into their operational areas they will always be in a position to fire their missiles at predetermined targets. High navigational accuracy is not as great a requirement for a retaliatory strike against cities as it would be if the submarines were to be used in a counterforce role for destroying such "hard" targets as enemy missile sites. In fact, if one side wishes to use missile submarines only as deterrent weapons, then it is important that the accuracy-yield combination of the system not be so great as to give the other side concern that the submarines have a first-strike capability against land-based ICBM's; otherwise the position of mutual stable deterrence will be eroded.

With these general principles in mind, let us examine how the U.S. missile-submarine forces have developed over the years. The U.S. launched the first nuclear-powered submarine, the *Nautilus*, in 1955, but it was not until the late 1950's that development of long-range missiles had proceeded to the point that these could be installed in such submarines. The first ballistic-missile submarine, the *George Washington*, became operational in November, 1960. It was armed with 16 solid-fuel Polaris *A–1* missile, which could be fired at a rate of about one per minute. The range of this missile was about 1,200 nautical miles and the warhead yield about one megaton. The submarines were designed to fire their missiles while submerged, using compressed gases to expel the missile; the rocket engine is then ignited after the missile has cleared the surface. By 1963, 12 more Polaris submarines were operational.

Meanwhile the development of more advanced missiles continued. The next generation missile, the *A–2*, had a range of about 1,500 nautical miles. The first test of the *A–3* missile, with a range of 2,500 nautical miles and a "triplet" reentry vehicle, was conducted from a submerged submarine in the fall of 1963. The triplet reentry vehicles, which could carry three individual nuclear warheads each, did not have independent guidance; the three warheads were intended to reenter the atmosphere in a shotgun pattern with the target at the center. Since such warheads cannot be aimed at separate targets, they do not alter the exchange ratio and do not provide any first-strike advantage. Their advent was therefore not in itself regarded as destabilizing.

In the early 1960's there was considerable debate over the appropriate size of the Polaris fleet. The Navy originally sought 48 ships, and the final decision was to build 41. One factor limiting the number of submarines is the problem of manpower recruitment. Nuclear-submarine duty, which involves 60-day underwater cruises, calls for a certain type of person who is not easy to find and who must be highly trained. Normally each vessel has two crews of about 140 men who go on alternate patrols.

By the end of 1966 all 41 Polaris submarines were operational; eight carried A–2 missiles and 33 were eventually fitted out with A–3's. Thus the force carried a total of 1,712 warheads, but since the triplet warheads cannot be aimed separately, 656 was the maximum number of separate targets that could be hit. Of course, not all of these submarines can be kept at operational stations at all times. In general a submarine spends 60 days at sea and 30 days in port for maintenance. In addition the submarine might take five or more days to move from the U.S. to its launch point and the same period to return. If a submarine wished to avoid detection by moving quietly and therefore slowly, the travel time would be even greater. Thus the number of submarines at launch stations at any one time could be reduced to some 20 to 25 ships. The situation is improved by using forward bases (on Guam, at Holy Loch in Scotland and at Rota in Spain), which reduces the time needed to reach launch stations from five or six days to one or two days.

With a range of 2,500 nautical miles, a submarine-launched missile can hit Moscow from most of the North Atlantic (inside an arc extending from the tip of Greenland to North Africa), from the Mediterranean and even from some parts of the Indian Ocean, a total sea area of about six million square miles [*see illustration below*]. The sea area from which a submarine-launched missile could hit important targets other than Moscow, say targets only 200 miles inside the U.S.S.R., is even larger [*see illustration on opposite page*]. One high-ranking Navy officer reported in 1964 that a Polaris submarine equipped with the A–3 missile could operate in 15 million square miles of ocean area while covering its targets in the U.S.S.R. No land target anywhere in the world is inaccessible from attack by the A–3 missile.

Although mobility provides a submarine with the tremendous advantage of improving its survivability, it creates a new problem: the determination of its location at the moment when the missile is to be launched toward its target several thousand miles away. Unless the missile is provided with some means of determining its position during flight or with a terminal-homing capability, the accuracy at the impact point can never be better than the uncertainty in the launch point. To determine the launch position calls for accurate submarine navigation, which is made more difficult by the requirement that in order to avoid disclosing its presence the submarine should not surface to determine its location. The attitude of the ship with respect to the vertical and true north at the time of the launch is also needed. When the missile force is being used for deterrent purposes, an accuracy greater than a few thousand feet is not needed; it is only necessary to be able to hit a large urban complex. Today this order of accuracy in locating the position and attitude of a submarine can be readily achieved. The U.S. has made tremendous advances in the development of inertial-navigation systems in recent years, and reasonably accurate position fixes can be obtained even after the submarine has been submerged at sea for many days.

The inertial-navigation system in a Polaris submarine is a complex system of gyroscopes, accelerometers and computers that relate the movement and the speed of the ship in all directions with respect to true north. If an initial position is known, then this system will provide continuous data on the ship's position. For an absolutely stationary submarine, or one whose motion can be corrected for, inertial sensors can determine without external data the vertical, the true north, the latitude and all velocity components by inertially sensing the earth's gravitational and rotational vectors, but there is no way of determining the longitude by inertial means. Submarines that have been voyaging at sea for protracted periods and whose inertial-navigation errors may have become unacceptably large can, by trailing an antenna while they are still submerged, get a radio "position fix" from navigation satellites or land-based transmitters. It may also be possible to locate a submarine by reference to accurately known geographical landmarks on the ocean bottom such as seamounts. In sum, the present technology has advanced to the point where the location and attitude of the submarine could in principle no longer be the critical factor in obtaining missile accuracies down to less than an eighth of a mile.

A deterrent force must also be able to receive communications from national command centers. Direct command and control originating with the President and with many verification checks is vital to prevent unauthorized launching; it is also essential that command authorities be able to communicate in times of crisis with the submarine captains without fear of interference by the other side. Otherwise communication would be the Achilles' heel of the submarine deterrent. There are a number of means of communicating with a submarine, at least one way from shore to ship, that do not require the submarine to surface. Very-low-frequency (VLF) radio waves can penetrate a short distance into the water, so that a receiving antenna does not need to be exposed at the surface. Moreover, the submarine can operate at a considerable depth, since it can trail an antenna as much as several hundred feet above its deck. The U.S. has a number of land-based VLF transmitters at various locations around the world for communication with Polaris submarines, and more recently an airborne VLF system has been devised in order to eliminate the possibility that the fixed land-based stations would be destroyed in a surprise attack.

The use of satellites for relaying messages to submarines provides an alternative means of communication. Recently much research has been devoted to extremely-low-frequency (ELF) waves, which can penetrate even deeper into the water. The Navy project named Sanguine proposed to set up a vast antenna for this purpose in Wisconsin. The data rate of such a system would be quite low, but it would be adequate for command-communication purposes. The project has run into difficulties with local residents because the large antenna currents and the potential hazard to living things. For comunication from a submarine to the command center the problem is more difficult; it calls at the very least for trailing an antenna close to the surface and must in any case be avoided in order to prevent disclosure of the submarine's location to listening enemy radios. Fortunately such communication is not essential to the viability of the submarine deterrent force.

By the end of 1966 the U.S. submarine-missile force together with its support systems was by itself more than adequate to deter any nuclear attack on the U.S. It had more than enough missiles and warheads to devastate the U.S.S.R. even when only a fraction of the submarines were on station. It could operate in ocean areas on all sides of the U.S.S.R., and the Russians ASW capability was quite rudimentary, with virtually no ability to "draw down" the size of the U.S. fleet. At that time the Russians had no ABM system deployed.

Military technology did not, however, stand still. The need to operate in restricted sea areas close to the northern coast of Europe and the Mediterranean in order to reach Moscow and other interior Russian cities created fears that someday ASW measures might become a threat. More important, concern that the U.S.S.R. might deploy a large ABM system capable of coping with our missile-submarine force was becoming more acute every day. The Russians were in the process of deploying an ABM defense around Moscow, using a large interceptor missile estimated to have a single-warhead yield large enough to destroy all three warheads of the Polaris A–3. In addition they were deploying radars and defensive missiles in the "Tallinn system" widely throughout the U.S.S.R. Some "worst case" analyses of U.S. planners, particularly during the early phases when that hese facilities were for ABM defense. factual information was limited, postulated that these facilities were for ABM defense. Later, as more data became available, the predictions were scaled down to the effect that the Tallinn system was an antiaircraft defense that could perhaps be upgraded to provide an ABM capability. (Now even this upgrading is not considered practicable by most experts.)

As a result research and development proceeded on a next-generation missile for the Polaris submarine that would give increased future assurance of penetrating any ABM defense and would at the same time give the submarines enough flexibility to operate at greater distances from the U.S.S.R. To increase either the payload or the range significantly called for a larger missile, and the resulting Poseidon missile required enlarging the launching tubes in the Polaris submarines, a costly and time-consuming task requiring 13 or more months. Since many of the submarines were due for overhaul in any case, however, the two shipyard activities could be combined with a minimum loss in operational readiness for the fleet as a whole. The cost of converting a Polaris submarine to carry the advanced Poseidon missiles is on the average $29 million, with another $38 million for normal submarine overhaul and replacement of the nuclear fuel.

The new Poseidon missile is about twice as heavy as the Polaris A–3 and has a payload about four times as great. Although its nominal range of about 2,500 nautical miles is the same as that of the A–3, a trade-off between range and payload is always possible, so that the potential range of the Poseidon is somewhat greater. The new missile incorporates MIRV technology, that is, the ability to disperse many warheads aimed at separate targets. The technique developed for this purpose employs the "bus" approach, in which shortly after burnout of the propulsion stages the missile's final stage (the bus) is aimed at a first target point and releases a warhead, which then follows a ballistic trajectory to that target while the bus is redirected toward a second aim point. The same procedure can be repeated until all the warheads have been sent to individual targets. If a single target is to be attacked, then MIRV technology allows the warheads to

approach the target at widely spaced intervals and on different trajectories so that no more than one warhead can be destroyed by a single ABM interceptor. The Poseidon is reported to be capable of carrying 14 warheads, each with a yield of about 50 kilotons, several times the yield of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. Warheads can be traded off for either ABM penetration aids or increased range. The nominal complement is usually taken as being 10 MIRV warheads. Department of Defense officials have repeatedly stated that these warheads do not have the accuracy-yield combination to provide a first-strike capability against hardened silos (a "circular-error probability" of about an eighth of a mile or better would be needed with that yield), but the Russians might still be concerned on this score.

As with the Polaris A–3, a Poseidon missile with a range of 2,500 nautical miles can launch warheads at Moscow not only from large areas of the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean but also from some parts of the Indian Ocean, a total area of about six million square miles. Targets within 200 miles of the border of the U.S.S.R. can be reached from some 15 million square miles. These large ocean areas present great problems for any possible future ASW system. To deploy detection and tracking systems throughout these waters is a prodigious, if not impossible, task. Furthermore, on short notice these areas might be somewhat enlarged if it ever became critical by reducing the Poseidon payload, either by eliminating penetration aids or by cutting down the number of warheads in each missile.

The first Poseidon missile was tested in August, 1968, and the development of the entire Poseidon system was completed two years later. The first Polaris submarine went to sea with Poseidon missiles in March of last year. At present about 10 submarines have been converted. The program calls for modifying 31 submarines to carry these new missiles, leaving 10 to be equipped with the older A–3's. When the program is completed in 1976, the U.S. submarine force will be able to launch 5,440 warheads at 5,120 separate targets. It should be possible to keep considerably more than half of these submarines on station at all times, and in times of crisis the operational readiness can be stepped up if necessary. This is an awesome force, capable of overwhelming even a massive ABM defense system. There is, of course, no evidence that the Russians have any intention of building a large ABM system with nationwide coverage, and it is highly likely that such a system will be precluded in the first stage of a strategic-arms-limitation treaty.

Even one missile submarine can launch 160 warheads at separate industrial centers in the U.S.S.R., an attack that the Russiains could not afford even if the U.S. had been annihilated. This means that any ASW system would have to be able to eliminate almost instantaneously every single submarine, a herculean task. Today it is difficult, if not impossible, to destroy even a single submarine that follows skilled evasion tactics. Yet if ABM defenses were forbidden by treaty, an ASW system that has still to be devised would be the only threat to the submarine deterrent. That is one reason why an ABM agreement at SALT would by itself be such an important gain to the security of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

The U.S.S.R. has always lagged considerably behind the U.S. in the development of nuclear submarines and SLBM's. The first Russian nuclear submarine was built about four years after the *Nautilus*, and Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, the director of the U.S. nuclear-submarine program from the beginning has made it clear he believes the Russian submarines are technically inferior to the U.S. ships. The first Russian ballistic-missile submarines were diesel-powered and therefore had limited endurance and cruising ing range. Their first nuclear-powered missile submarine carried only three missiles with a 300-nautical-mile range, which in later models was extended to about 700 nautical miles.

By the late 1960's it must have been obvious to military planners in the U.S.S.R. that their land-based ICBM's would become increasingly vulnerable to the U.S. MIRV's, which were then under development and which had been publicly justified as providing an improved counterforce capability. The Russian deterrent needed shoring up with a more effective SLBM force, whose value had been demonstrated by the U.S. In 1966 the U.S.S.R. launched its first Y-class submarine, which carries 16 missiles with a reported range of 1,300 miles. This class of vessels was similar to the Polaris submarines, which the U.S. had put into operation seven years earlier. All the Russian SLBM's deployed so far have had storable liquid fuels, whereas all the U.S. missiles have had solid fuels. The Russians apparently decided to continue with the Y-class design and began building submarines at a rapid pace, initially at the rate of six to eight per year and currently at nine per year. Two shipyards are engaged in this work, one at Severodvinsk on the Arctic Sea and one in Siberia on the Pacific. At present the Russians have about 26 Y-class submarines operational and another 16 under construction.

Although the Russians have tested a new missile with a range of about 3,500 miles, John Stuart Foster, Jr., chief research scientist for the Department of Defense, recently reported that this missile was so long that he did not believe the Y-class submarine could be modified to launch it. The Russians have never even tested multiple warheads on their submarine missiles, let alone MIRV's. Their missiles are each armed with a single warhead with a yield of about one megaton. These missiles have no capability for attacking our ICBM silos, but it has been postulated that they might be employed to attack our bombers on the ground and our command and control centers, using a depressed trajectory to achieve the necessary surprise. The missiles have not, however, been tested in this mode, and this approach would, in any case, entail a reduction in their already limited range.

The U.S.S.R. will have a slightly larger ballistic-missile submarine fleet than the U.S. when it completes those vessels now under construction (42 to 41). Even then, however, the capabilities of the Russian fleet will be far inferior to those of the U.S. Polaris fleet. President Nixon in his 1972 State of the World Message said that "our missiles have longer range and are being equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads. Moreover, our new submarines are now superior in quality." The shorter range of the Russian missiles requires that their submarines operate fairly close to the U.S. coast in order to be able to strike inland U.S. targets; this makes the Russian submarines potentially more vulnerable to a U.S. ASW system [*see illustration on page 20*]. On the other hand, the population centers and industrial complexes on the east and west coasts of the U.S. can be reached from much larger ocean areas, and these targets would be quite satisfactory if the SLBM's were to be used for deterrent purposes [*see illustration on page 21*]. The restricted range would be a serious factor only if the SLBM's were to be used against our bomber bases or missiles in the interior of the U.S.

There are other reasons why the parity between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in operational submarines cannot be evaluated on numerical grounds alone. Since bases in the U.S.S.R. are farther from the operational launching areas and since the Russians have no locations available for forward bases, more time is wasted getting submarines on station and it takes more submarines to maintain the same deterrent force operational at any one time. It would take Russian submarines a minimum of six days in the Atlantic and eight days in the Pacific to reach the nearest launch stations, so that the transit time to and from home ports, in many cases a quarter to a third of the duration of the patrol, seriously degrades the operational readiness of the Russian fleet. This disadvantage can be only partly alleviated by using submarine tenders for maintenance and crew exchange at sea. Moreover, in any East-West comparison the small British and French missile-submarine fleets, each of which may eventually consist of four submarines and 64 missiles, must be added to the U.S. total.. Thus, whereas the Russians now have an adequate missile-submarine deterrent, their fleet is markedly inferior to that of the U.S. and its allies and provides no threat to the U.S. deterrent.

As the first phase of SALT is drawing to an end, then, it is becoming universally recognized that ballistic-missile submarines are the essential foundation of a secure and stable strategic balance. Under these circumstances it is only natural to investigate ways to still further improve submarine missile systems. The U.S. has had a research and development program in this area for several years, so that the developments at the frontiers of technology could be incorporated in the successor to the Polaris-Poseidon system. The particular system proposed by the Navy for this role has been called ULMS, for undersea long-range missile system.

One obvious way to improve the present submarine missile would be to extend its range, making possible the launching of missiles from larger ocean areas in all directions around the U.S.S.R. Increasing the missile's payload would allow the incorporation of more warheads per missile or additional ABM-penetration aids. Payload can, of course, always be traded off for range. A longer-range missile would reduce the time required to move from U.S. ports to launching areas and thereby reduce the need for overseas basing in order to maintain the submarines on station for a larger fraction of their cruising time. With a range of 4,500 nautical miles a missile could reach Moscow shortly after the submarine leaves the U.S., whereas with a range of 2,500 nautical miles at least three days' travel would be required. Thus for a 60-day cruise lengthening the missile range by 2,000 miles could increase the period of operational effectiveness by about 10 percent if forward bases were abandoned.

More advanced guidance systems employing terminal control (the ability to change the path of the warhead during reentry) are being developed to avoid interception by ABM systems or to improve accuracy. Higher accuracy obtained by this means or others is not required if missiles are to be used as deterrent weapons. Indeed, it might be construed by the other side as an attempt to attain a counterforce capability for a first strike. Although it is more difficult to acquire such a capability with a submarine missile system than with an ICBM because of the inherent limitations on the payload and the nuclear explosive yield and because of navigational complications, there are no scientific barriers to its achievement. The greatest technical restriction on the use of SLBM's for a counterforce first strike may lie in command and control. It may be feasible to preprogram and command the initial launchings, but there will inevitably be failures. The difficulties of directing subsequent firings to destroy the silos missed the first time appear to be virtually insurmountable.

The submarine itself can be improved by making it quieter as it moves through the water, thereby rendering detection and track-

ing by passive acoustic techniques more difficult. Although increasing the speed of the submarine will make it somewhat harder for enemy ASW ships to follow it, the higher speed will also raise the level of noise produced by the submarine. In any case it is probably a losing proposition for a missile submarine to try to outrun an ASW vessel, which can always be designed to move faster. High speed will enable the submarine to reach its launch area more rapidly and thus reduce the time it spends in a nonoperational condition, but again the potential gains are not large, and they may be outweighed by the disadvantages. If all other factors are equal, it will require a bigger power plant and larger submarine, both of which will increase cost and detectability. Increasing the depth at which a submarine can operate is not particularly significant, at least for the depths that are likely to be achieved in the next generation of submarines; submarines can be detected acoustically and destroyed by nuclear depth charges or homing torpedoes at any reasonable depth.

If space for more and larger missiles is needed to increase the destructive capacity and the ABM-penetrability of any single submarine, then larger submarines with bigger power plants will be required. The larger the submarines, however, the fewer the ships that will be available for the same investment. Therefore, if funds are limited (and they always are), this means a smaller fleet, which is more vulnerable to being wiped out in a simultaneous surprise attack. Thus there are many trade-offs in system design, and the final decision on a successor to the Polaris-Poseidon system should be based only on the nature of the specific threat.

In 1971 $104.8 million was appropriated for the advanced development of ULMS. Although this evpenditure still left options through this expenditure still left options procuring a specific new submarine system. This year the Department of Defense is seeking $977 million for ULMS. If that amount is authorized, the U.S. will be irrevocably committed to a large and very expensive new shipbuilding program. Unclassified details of the proposed ULMS program are still scarce, but it appears that the submarine in the system would be quite large (more than twice the size of the Polaris ships) and that it would be capable of launching 20 to 24 large missiles equipped with MIRV's. It is proposed to have a higher maximum speed and to incorporate the latest available silencing techniques, although these two objectives are competitive.

The ULMS program has been divided into two parts. The first stage (ULMS 1) would involve a new missile with a range of about 4,500 nautical miles capable of being deployed in the present Polaris submarines as well as in any new vessel. The second stage (ULMS 2) would include the development of the new submarine and a still more advanced missile with a range of about 6,000 miles that would be too big to be substituted for the Poseidon in the existing Polaris ships. A maneuvering reentry vehicle (MARV) is also being developed for the new ULMS missiles. According to one estimate, the total cost of a program for 30 such ULMS vessels would be $39.6 billion [*see illustration at right*].

So far no convincing case has been made for the need to proceed with a replacement for the Polaris-Poseidon system and for making a commitment to a new large, high-speed submarine. Russian construction of SLBM's is no justification for ULMS; the Russian missile submarines do not in any way threaten the Polaris deterrent. Numerical superiority in launchers is meaningless; all authorities agree that the U.S. is far ahead qualitatively and can deliver from submarines about 5,000 warheads to fewer than 700 for the U.S.S.R. Even if we foolishly choose to race the Russians in the number of SLBM's, ULMS is certainly not the way to do it; each ULMS system will probably cost five or more times per missile launched than the Russian Y-class system.

The Poseidon with 10 or more MIRV's on each missile has a far greater capability than is needed to overwhelm any Russian ABM system that can be foreseen at present. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified in February that "the Moscow ABM system even with improved radars and more and better interceptors could still be saturated by a very small part of our total missile force. In any event, the programmed Minuteman III and Poseidon forces, with their large number of reentry vehicles, provide a hedge against a future large-scale Soviet ABM deployment." Since such a large-scale ABM deployment will almost certainly be precluded by a first-stage SALT agreement, there is nothing in the ABM area that would require replacement of the Poseidon; in fact, even the Poseidon MIRV's will not be needed if a SALT ABM treaty is realized.

Therefore it is necessary to examine antisubmarine warfare to determine if there is anything that would currently justify the major ULMS step. Without going into a detailed analysis of possible ASW measures and countermeasures, suffice it to say that no evidence has yet been presented that the Russian ASW program could present a threat to the Polaris deterrent in the next decade. [An article on the ASW situation by Richard L. Garwin will appear in next month's SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN.] Admiral Levering Smith, director of the Navy's Strategic Systems Project, testified in 1969 that even the new generation of Russian ASW submarines will not be able to follow our Polaris submarines and that the U.S.S.R. has no specific new ASW methods that would make the Polaris fleet vulnerable to attack. That is still true today. The U.S. has spent tens of billions of dollars on ASW efforts over the past 20 years and still does not have any system that could even begin to approach the kind of capability that would be needed to eliminate 20 to 30 missile submarines almost simultaneously. The Russians are far behind the U.S. in this area, and they have the serious geographical disadvantages of remoteness from and unavailability of land areas contiguous to the oceans in which this ASW systems would have to operate. Since the nature of the potential ASW threat to the Polaris-Poseidon system cannot even be foreseen at this point, ULMS, if built now, may be designed to cope with the wrong threat. The most obvious improvement to Polaris-Poseidon would be to increase the range of the missile in order to enlarge the ocean areas from which missiles could be launched. The deployment of such a new long-range missile might cost nearly seven billion dollars, however, and in any case, as the maps on pages 18 and 19 how, the Poseidon system already has a tremendous operational flexibility and is not threatened in its present launch areas.

Thus there are strong arguments for keeping both the ULMS missile and the ULMS submarine options in the research and early development stage. This would allow the exploration of all approaches, including smaller, slower but quieter submarines, and would avoid the making of a premature commitment to a large, expensive submarine and missile program. We must not fall into the trap of buying new military hardware just because we have made technological advances; there is no quicker way to price ourselves out of the security market. The submarine missile force is the backbone of our deterrent; its present strength and invulnerability obviate the need for its replacement for at least a decade.

## DEATH OF HAROLD WESTON

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, on Monday, April 10, Harold Weston, past president of the Federation of Modern Painters and Sculptors, and chairman of the National Council on the Arts and Government, died at his home.

Mr. Weston was long one of the leaders championing the concept of Federal support for the arts. Indeed, he was one of the first witnesses in the early 60's when hearings were held on what was to become the legislation which established the National Endowment for the Arts. From that time on, Mr. Weston continued to work with the Special Subcommittee on Arts and Humanities. His views were incisive and of much value, and his death deprives us of a leader in this field. I ask unanimous consent that this obituary, biography, and eulogy be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, April 12, 1972]

HAROLD WESTON, LED ARTISTS' FEDERATION

Harold Weston, artist and past president of the Federation of Modern Painters and Sculptors, died Monday at his home, 282 Bleecker Street. He was 78 years old and lived also at St. Hubert's, N.Y., in the Adirondacks.

Mr. Weston prepared at Phillips Exeter Academy for Harvard, from which he was graduated in 1916. A volunteer Y.M.C.A. secretary in World War I, he served with British forces in India, Mesopotamia and Iran, and then traveled in that area, picking up themes for his first one-man show here in 1922. His last was in 1961.

In between, his works included murals in the lobby of the Federal Procurement Building in Washington, 1936-38, and many paintings in the Phillips Gallery and other collections.

Mr. Weston, as vice chairman of the National Council on the Arts and Government, was active in urging art patronage by the Federal and state governments. In World War II he was director of Food for Freedom, Inc., urging relief measures.

Surviving are his widow, the former Faith Borton; 2 daughters, Mrs. Esty Foster Jr. and Mrs. William H. Sudduth Jr.; a son, Bruce; and 11 grandchildren.

BIOGRAPHY OF HAROLD WESTON

Harold Weston, painter, etcher, muralist and author, was born in Merion, Pennsylvania, on February 14, 1894, and died at his home in New York City on April 10, 1972.

Mr. Weston attended Phillips Exeter Academy, class of 1912, and was graduated from Harvard in 1916, magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa.

He began painting as a child, influenced, perhaps, by winning fist prize in a children's competition at John Wanamaker's store in Philadelphia. His first one-man show of oils, consisting of 150 Adirondack and Persian landscapes, was held at the Montross Galleries in 1922. His canvases of that period, executed in brilliant color with bold outlines and distorted forms, were widely publicized and created for the artist an immediate reputation.

Forty one-man exhibits of Weston's oils, watercolors and etchings have been held in New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Chicago, St. Louis, San Francisco, Paris, and other cities. He has participated in numerous group shows in the United States and Europe. He received the Third Prize for American Painting at the Golden Gate nternational Exposition in 1939.

Paintings and etching by Harold Weston are owned by many private collectors, and over 300 examples of his work are in museums or public collections, among them: Phillips Collection, Washington; Whitney Museum of American Art; Museum of Modern Art; Fogg

Public Law 119, 84th Congress, approved June 30, 1955 (69 Stat. 225);
Public Law 295, 84th Congress, approved August 9, 1955 (69 Stat. 580).
Public Law 632, 84th Congress, approved June 29, 1956 (70 Stat. 408).
Public Law 85–471, approved June 28, 1958 (72 Stat. 241).
Public Law 86–560, approved June 30, 1960 (74 Stat. 282).
Public Law 87–305, approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 667).
Public Law 87–505, approved June 28, 1962 (76 Stat. 112).
Public Law 88–343, approved June 30, 1964 (78 Stat. 235).
Public Law 89–348, approved November 8, 1965 (79 Stat. 1310).
Public Law 89–482, approved June 30, 1966 (80 Stat. 235).
Public Law 90–370, approved July 1, 1968 (82 Stat. 279).
Public Law 91–151, approved December 23, 1969 (82 Stat. 856).
Public Law 91–300, approved June 30, 1970 (84 Stat. 367).
Public Law 91–371, approved August 1, 1970 (84 Stat. 694).
Public Law 91–379, approved August 15, 1970 (84 Stat. 796).
Public Law 92–15, approved May 18, 1971 (85 Stat. 38).

Titles II and VI terminated June 30, 1953. Titles IV and V terminated April 30, 1953. The remaining powers of titles I (except section 104), title III, and title VII (except sections 708, 714, and 719) under present law will terminate June 30, 1972.

RECORDS OF EMERGENCY LOAN GUARANTEE BOARD

During the hearings on S. 699 and S. 1901, the Comptroller General testified about access to information on the Lockheed loan guarantee. The Comptroller General indicated that while the GAO has received all the data it has requested from Lockheed Aircraft Corp., his office has not been able to obtain certain records of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board established by the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act (Public Law 92–70). These records involve the information on which the Board relied in approving a $250 million loan guarantee for the Lockheed Aircraft Corp., including several credit analyses of the company prepared by the New York Federal Reserve Bank. The Act requires the Board to make certain statutory findings before approving a loan guarantee, including a finding that the prospective earning power of a loan guarantee applicant furnishes reasonable assurance that the loan will be repaid.

The Comptroller General has testified that the chairman of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board has clearly violated the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, as well as other statutes in not giving the GAO access to the aforementioned records of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board. On the other hand, the General Counsel of the Treasury has written that the Board is not legally required to make such information available to the General Accounting Office.

This committee does not wish to referee a legal dispute between the Comptroller General and the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board. However, there are certain overriding questions of public policy which transcend the legal arguments involved. In view of the highly controversial nature of the Lockheed loan guarantee and the size of the U.S. financial commitment, this committee believes the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board should cooperate fully with the GAO in making its records available. In passing the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act, the committee does not believe that Congress intended to deny to the GAO any information of a type which it has customarily collected in the past from other Government agencies, or authorize GAO access to records which it has not customarily collected in the past from other Government agencies.

## ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The distinguished Republican leader is now recognized.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I yield back my time.

## ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the distinguished Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) is now recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

## THE ISSUE OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE SALT AGREEMENTS

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the SALT agreements now before the Congress represent probably the most important international accords presented for congressional approval since the Versailles Treaty following World War I. I think it is highly significant that the President himself made this analogy, in his remarks to Members of Congress at the White House on June 15. It is an analogy which highlights the authority and responsibility of Congress with respect to these agreements—and the life and death issues they deal with. The SALT agreements are easily the most outstanding achievement of President Nixon's administration—an administration which already had a number of outstanding diplomatic accomplishments to its credit.

Thus far, the role of the executive branch has been primary with respect to these agreements; and its conduct of the complex negotiations leading to the SALT agreements has been excellent. Within the spectrum of the negotiating possibilities, the results must be judged a maximal rather than a minimal achievement.

But, the focus of attention now has shifted to the Congress, and particularly the Senate. In my judgment, the Senate already has played a very important role in success of the SALT negotiations. The great Senate debates of 1968, 1969, and 1970 on strategic arms issues helped importantly to guide the executive branch of our Government and the Soviet Government—for we know that the Soviets avidly read the Senate debates. The issues and the principles which were established and clarified in the Senate debates have now found expression in the SALT agreements.

I urge the President to accelerate the pace of negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit these weapons systems which might be pursued by each as "bargaining chips," so that both sides can avoid expenditures and obligations for new weapons systems which could be justified only as "bargaining chips." The relationship established with the Soviet Union should now be such as to make this entirely feasible.

As the primary role with respect to the SALT agreements now passes to Congress we should consider at the same time Congress role with respect to the vital issues involved in these particular agreements, and the constitutional question of the relationship of congressional and Executive authority on arms agreement and warmaking powers.

I believe that President Nixon by untying our hands on the new offensive weapons systems has consciously create an opportunity for us jointly to restore a good measure of the proper constitutional balance between the Executive and the Congress in national security affairs and thus to reduce the strain which has resulted from the constitutional imbalance which reached crisis proportions with respect to the Vietnam war.

In his June 1 report to the Congress at the conclusion of his trip to the Soviet Union, President Nixon said:

> We can undertake agreements as important as these only on a basis of full partnership etween the executive and legislative branches of our Government.

This statement, together with the very act of making an immediate report to a joint session of Congress, represents a marked departure from the approach contained in President Nixon's April 26 and May 8 speeches in which he took the position that the strength and authority of the office of the President is the keystone to our national security and morality.

On June 15, in quite a different vein, President Nixon told Members of Congress:

> I think that the hearings that you will conduct must be searching because only in that way will you be able to be convincing to yourselves and only in that way will the Nation also be convinced . . . What we are asking for here, in other words, is cooperation and not just rubber-stamping by the House and the Senate. That is essential because there must be follow-through on this and the members of the House and Senate, it seems to me, must be convinced that they played a role as they have up to this point, and will continue to play a role in this very, very important field of arms control.

In the same spirit, on June 19 Secretary Rogers told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

> We are pleased to know that the Congress plans full consideration of these two documents, both with officials of the Executive branch and with the public. This is a process that is fundamental to our American system.

This new spirit in the executive branch respecting the authority and responsibility of Congress in national security matters could lead to enactment of a war powers bill, settle vexing questions of the invocation of executive privilege and overclassification of documents, and limit the use of executive agreements without congressional consent. It could in this way signal an important transformation in the politics of our Nation and help significantly to restore unity and concord within our deeply divided society. Healing the wounds of Vietnam is an overriding challenge and a necessity to our well-being as a nation.

As the President himself has said in a spirit of respect—cooperation by the Congress does not mean "rubberstamping"—if the Congress is to fulfill its own responsibilities. With respect to the SALT agreements the President has

# Senate

TUESDAY, JUNE 20, 1972

*(Legislative day of Monday, June 19, 1972)*

The Senate met at 9 a.m., on the expiration of the recess, and was called to order by Hon. HARRY F. BYRD, JR., a Senator from the State of Virginia.

## PRAYER

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, before whom the generations rise and pass away, we thank Thee for days that are past and work that is done. We thank Thee now for the new day and for work yet to be done. By Thy strength and in Thy wisdom help us to undertake our tasks as did our forefathers, holding firmly to truth and justice, striving for the better world that is yet to be—

"March on, O soul, with strength,
As strong the battle rolls,
Gainst lies and lusts and wrongs,
Let courage rule our souls:
In keenest strife, Lord, may we stand
Upheld and strengthened by Thy hand."
—GEORGE T. COSTER.

We pray in the Redeemer's name. Amen.

## APPOINTMENT OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please read a communication to the Senate from the President pro tempore (Mr. ELLENDER).

The second assistant legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE,
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,
*Washington, D.C., June 20, 1972.*

*To the Senate:*

Being temporarily absent from the Senate on official duties, I appoint Hon. HARRY F. BYRD, JR., a Senator from the State of Virginia, to perform the duties of the Chair during my absence.

ALLEN J. ELLENDER,
*President pro tempore.*

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR., thereupon took the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

## THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Journal of the proceedings of Monday, June 19, 1972, be approved.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees may be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 829, S. 3715.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be stated by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

S. 3715, to amend and extend the Defense Production Act of 1950.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed, as follows:

S. 3715

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That section 303(b) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2093(b)), is amended by striking out "June 30, 1975" and inserting in lieu thereof "June 30, 1985".

SEC. 2. The first sentence of section 717(a) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2166(a)), is amended by striking out "June 30, 1972" and inserting in lieu thereof "June 30, 1974".

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 92-868), explaining the purposes of the measure.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

### PURPOSE OF THE BILL

The bill would extend the Defense Production Act of 1950 for 2 years—from the present expiration date of June 30, 1972, to June 30, 1974. The bill would also amend the Defense Production Act by extending from June 30, 1975, to June 30, 1985, the time in which purchase and sales contracts may be entered into concerning materials in the Defense Production Act inventory.

### GENERAL STATEMENT

The bill would extend for 2 additional years, through June 30, 1974, the remaining temporary powers of the President under the Defense Production Act of 1950. These include power to establish priorities for defense contracts; power to allocate materials for defense purposes; authority to guarantee loans made in connection with defense contracts; authority to make loans and purchases to build up our defense capacity and assure supplies of defense materials and to carry out existing contracts; authority to employ without compensation and when actually employed employees, including advisers and consultants; and provision for the establishment of a reserve of trained executives to fill Government positions in time of mobilization. The Act also establishes the Joint Committee on Defense Production.

These powers are scheduled to expire on June 30, 1972. They must be extended. Some of the powers are needed now to maintain production schedules on missiles and all other defense contracts; others are needed for longer range preparedness programs; and other powers must be maintained in readiness for immediate use in possible future emergencies.

The bill would also amend section 303(b) of the act to extend from June 30, 1975, to June 30, 1985, the authority to enter into commitments to purchase materials for the Defense Production Act inventory and sell materials already contained in that inventory. The extension of this restriction is important not only from the standpoint of new purchases which might be contemplated, but it is critical from the standpoint of ongoing disposal programs for the sale of excess Government contracts which would extend beyond 1975. The bulk of the remaining Defense Production Act inventory consists of materials which can best be disposed of through long-term contracts which permit introduction of these materials into markets with minimum disruption. The General Services Administration would be precluded from entering into favorable long-term agreement for the disposal of such excess materials unless this extension is made. The most recent amendment of this section was contained in Public Law 88-343, approved June 30, 1964, which extended from June 30, 1965, through June 30, 1975, the maximum period which these sales could be made.

Hearings were held on two bills to amend the Defense Production Act, S. 669 and S. 1901, on April 12 and 13, 1972. Testimony was received from Gen. George A. Lincoln, Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, Hon. Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, and other interested persons. The committee voted unanimously to report this committee bill to the Senate.

### PREVIOUS LEGISLATION

The Defense Production Act of 1950 (Public Law 774, 81st Congress, 64 Stat. 799, 50 app., U.S.C. 207) was approved September 8, 1950. The original act contained seven titles:

Title I. Priorities and allocations.
Title II. Authority to requisition.
Title III. Expansion of productive capacity and supply.
Title IV. Price and wage stabilization.
Title V. Settlement of labor disputes.
Title VI. Control of consumer and real estate credit.
Title VII. General provisions.

The various titles of the act were amended, extended, or terminated by the following public laws:

Public Law 69, 82d Congress, approved June 30, 1951 (65 Stat. 110).

Public Law 96, 82d Congress, approved July 31, 1951 (65 Stat. 131).

Public Law 429, 82d Congress, approved June 30, 1952 (66 Stat. 296).

Public Law 94, 83d Congress, approved June 30, 1953 (67 Stat. 121).

Public Law 95, 83d Congress, approved June 30, 1953 (67 Stat. 129).

Public Law 94, 84th Congress, approved June 28, 1955 (69 Stat. 180).

thereby facilitated a responsible and independent role for Congress. The main issue before the Nation is not ratification of the SALT agreements. The treaty and agreement, quite rightly, enjoy overwhelming support in the Congress and will certainly be approved, but the key question is what the United States should do respecting new offensive strategic weapons systems not prohibited by the SALT agreements. What is there to the bargaining chip arguments as to induce Congress to authorize major weapons systems as bargaining chips?

President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger, quite properly, have forcefully stated the sincere view of the executive branch that rapid development of such new offensive strategic systems as the B–1 bomber and the Trident/ULMS submarine system are needed for national security—and especially as "bargaining chips" for the next round of SALT negotiations.

But quite significantly, Dr. Kissinger, speaking for the President respecting the relationship between the SALT agreements and the new arms requests, said:

Our position is that we are presenting both of these programs on their merits. We are not making them conditional. We are saying that the treaty is justified on its merits, but we are also saying that the requirements of national security impel us in the direction of the strategic programs, and we hope that the Congress will approve both of these programs as it examines each of them on its merits.

In this respect, the President has left us free by untying our hands on the new weapons systems issue for the next 5 years. It is a tribute to the President, as well as to the Congress that he has chosen to do this, without of course sacrificing his own right of advocacy and persuasion.

Together with some of my colleagues, I approach the need as well as the prudence of pushing ahead with expensive new offensive strategic weapons systems with concern and doubt. I shall, of course, reserve final judgment on each system respectively pending full investigation of all the pertinent considerations respecting each system.

The reasons for my skepticism concerning the need to push ahead now with new offensive weapons systems, as well as my concern regarding the efficacy of such measures as "bargaining chips" for SALT II, found expression in Dr. Kissinger's own extraordinary briefing of June 15. On that occasion, Dr. Kissinger told us:

But to the extent that balance of power means constant jockeying for marginal advantages over an opponent, it no longer applies. The reason is that the determination of national power has changed fundamentally in the nuclear age . . . now both we and the Soviet Union have begun to find that each increment of power does not necessarily represent an increment of usable political strength. With modern weapons, a potentially decisive advantage requires a change of such magnitude that the mere effort to obtain it can produce disaster. The simple tit-for-tat reaction to each other's programs of a decade ago is in danger of being overtaken by a more or less simultaneous and continuous process of technological advance, which opens more and more temptations for seeking decisive advantage. . . . In other words, marginal additions of power cannot be decisive. . . . There was reason to believe that the Soviet leadership might also be thinking along similar lines as the repeated failure of their attempts to gain marginal advantage in local crises or in military competition underlined the limitation of old policy approaches.

Later on in his briefing, Dr. Kissinger told us:

As long as it—ABM Treaty—lasts, offensive missile forces have, in effect, a free ride to their targets. Beyond a certain level of sufficiency, differences in numbers are therefore not conclusive.

Dr. Kissinger also told us:

The quality of the weapons must also be weighed. We are confident we have a major advantage in nuclear weapons technology and in warhead accuracy. Also, with our MIRV's we have a two-to-one lead today in numbers of warheads and this lead will be maintained during the period of the agreement, even if the Soviets develop and deploy MIRV's of their own.

It is evident that the issue resolves down to the question of basic judgments respecting the best way to enhance our national security and strengthen the structure of world peace. As a Senator and member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I am deeply gratified by the approach taken by President Nixon in the SALT agreements and in his attitude of partnership with the Congress.

It is the duty of Congress to reciprocate and to join with the President in finding the best means to protect our security. Equally, we must respond to the offer of partnership by seeking a new stability of relationship between Congress and the Executive on national security issues. I hope the new partnership can be consummated by enacting, with Presidential concurrence, the War Power Act recently adopted by the Senate.

## COMPREHENSIVE HEADSTART, CHILD DEVELOPMENT, AND FAMILY SERVICES ACT OF 1972

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.). Under the previous agreement, the Chair lays before the Senate S. 3617, which the clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Calendar No. 760 (S. 3617), a bill to strengthen and expand the Headstart program, with priority to the economically disadvantaged, to amend the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, and for other purposes.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The pending question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK), which the clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 16, lines 5 and 6, beginning with the word "which" strike all through the word "sponsor" in line 6.

On page 18, line 8, beginning with the word "except" strike out through line 10.

On page 20, between lines 3 and 4, insert the following new paragraph:

"(2) In the event that a state has submitted a prime sponsorship plan under subsection (a) of this section to serve a geographical area covered by the plan of an applicant under paragraphs (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (a), the Secretary shall designate to serve such area the applicant which he determines has the capability of more effectively carrying out the purposes of this title with respect to such area."

On page 20, line 4, strike out "(2)" and insert in lieu thereof "(3)".

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair will state that debate on this amendment is limited to 1 hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK) and the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON) or his designee.

Who yields time?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. I ask unanimous consent that the time be equally charged against both sides of the bill.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears no objection, and it is so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. 1251

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I yield myself 15 minutes and call up my amendment No. 1251.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will read the amendment.

The legislative clerk read the amendment (No. 1251) as follows:

On page 16, lines 5 and 6, beginning with the word "which" strike all through the word "sponsor" in line 6.

On page 18, line 8, beginning with the word "except" strike out through line 10.

On page 20, between lines 3 and 4, insert the following new paragraph:

"(2) In the event that a State has submitted a prime sponsorship plan under subsection (a) of this section to serve a geographical area covered by the plan of an applicant under paragraph (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (a), the Secretary shall designate to serve such area the applicant which he determines has the capability of more effectively carrying out the purposes of this title with respect to such area."

On page 20, line 4, strike out "(2)" and insert in lieu thereof "(3)".

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, the committee, in drafting the legislation which we have before us, foresaw and provided for the possibility of two or more local applicants seeking designation as the prime sponsor to serve the same area, insofar as the child development facilities may be concerned. What they did not do, however, was to make any determination, except by implication, as to what should be done where a State and local applicant also applied to be the prime sponsor in any given geographical area.

It strikes me that, instead of setting up a predetermination, which the committee bill has in fact done, to see that whenever there is an application by a local sponsor for a geographic area and by the State which would cover the same area, the local sponsor would succeed in this, what we really should do is give the Secretary the discretion to select, from among competing applicants, the one

for its fine work toward the goal of improving the quality of education for all of our citizens. But, moreover, I think that this is an appropriate time to pay tribute to education itself.

As a former educator I am familiar with the value that a good education has for our young people. I have no fonder memories than of the times in my high school classes when I could broaden the world of my students with new knowledge and new understanding. To be complete men and women we must all try to expand our views of the world around us. We must learn tolerance and understanding by becoming more familiar with the hopes and fears of our neighbors. We must employ our talents and abilities to the fullest possible extent by being better informed of the many opportunities which exist in our society.

Education is an invaluable tool in achieving these necessary elements of adulthood. I am proud to have been a part of the educational system in my community, and since coming to Congress I have sought to do everything possible to see that the good educational system in our country is maintained.

## "NONE DARE CALL IT CONSPIRACY"

### HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Monday, June 19, 1972*

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, last fall I agreed to write the introduction for a most interesting and significant book by Gary Allen entitled "None Dare Call It Conspiracy," which I will soon be bringing before you serial fashion in the RECORD. It explores the evidence for a concerted plan and pattern in the many reverses freedom, law, and faith have suffered in this century.

This book included a prediction that, like virtually all others on this subject, it would be attacked by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith—an organization which, as William Buckley once said, itself frequently engages in defamation. This prediction was right on target, and the attack began with the letter to me which follows, together with reply:

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF
B'NAI B'RITH,
*June 1, 1972.*

Hon. JOHN G. SCHMITZ,
*Irvine, Calif.*

DEAR CONGRESSMAN SCHMITZ: We were distressed to read your introduction to and endorsement of *None Dare Call It Conspiracy* by Gary Allen, and we hereby call upon you to withdraw your endorsement and repudiate this anti-Semitic propaganda book.

Because you are a political scientist, we would have expected you to detect quickly the long discredited anti-Jewish charges that allege an insidious role being played by so-called "international bankers" which this book exhumes.

Despite Mr. Allen's pitifully weak disclaimer about anti-Semitism, his book revives anti-Semitic campaigns of the 1920's carried out by agents of the late Henry Ford, Sr. through the *Dearborn Independent*—charges later repudiated publicly by Mr. Ford—and again revived in the 1930's by Father Charles E. Coughlin, the notorious radio-priest.

We can only assume that you read the book too quickly or that you did not read it at all, a not uncommon problem plaguing very busy public officials who, too often, unfortunately rely upon the judgment of others.

As a political scientist, we urge you to check with Professor Carroll Quigley, of Georgetown University, whose writings are cited extensively in *None Dare Call It Conspiracy* as being supportive of Gary Allen's thesis, whereas the exact opposite is true.

The Birch Society's campaign to distribute millions of copies of *None Dare Call It Conspiracy* is a very serious matter because the kinds of anti-Jewish lies contained in the Allen book have been used by hate groups throughout the world for more than 50 years to foster hatred of Jews. During the 1930's and the 1940's we saw the ugly consequences of such campaigns.

Mr. Schmitz, in the name of human decency and honest scholarship we urge you to publicly withdraw your name from this book and to dissociate yourself from this insidious campaign.

We await your reply.

Sincerely,

HARVEY B. SCHECHTER.

JUNE 16, 1972.

Mr. HARVEY B. SCHECHTER,
*Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Los Angeles, Calif.*

DEAR MR. SCHECHTER: Your letter of June 1 to me regarding Gary Allen's book None Dare Call It Conspiracy, occasioned by the fact that I wrote the Introduction to it, is one of the most remarkable confirmations of the book's thesis I have seen. For if you turn to pages 39 and 40, you will read:

The Jewish members of the conspiracy have used an organization called the Anti-Defamation League as an instrument to try to convince everyone that any mention of the Rothschilds or their allies is an attack on all Jews. In this way they have stifled almost all honest scholarship on international bankers and made the subject taboo within universities.

"Any individual or book exploring this subject is immediately attacked by hundreds of A.D.L. committees all over the country. The A.D.L. has never let truth or logic interfere with its highly professional smear jobs. When no evidence is apparent, the A.D.L., which staunchly opposed so-called 'McCarthyism,' accuses people of being 'latent anti-Semitics.' Can you imagine how they would yowl and scream if someone accused them of being 'latent' Communists?

"Actually, nobody has a right to be more angry at the Rothschild clique than their fellow Jews. The Warburgs, part of the Rothschild empire, helped finance Adolf Hitler. There were few if any Rothschilds or Warburgs in the Nazi prison camps! They sat out the war in luxurious hotels in Paris or emigrated to the United States or England. As a group, Jews have suffered most at the hands of these power seekers."

Gentlemen, you are right on cue.

Of course, I would not deny that some bigoted individuals might distort the facts and conclusions in Gary Allen's book to fit their own prejudices, just as they might do with many other books. As a Catholic, I have seen anti-Catholic bigots do this just as anti-Semites have done it. Gary Allen specifically warns on page 10 against those who "because of racial or religious bigotry . . . will take small fragments of legitimate evidence and expand them into a conclusion that will support their particular prejudice, i.e., the conspiracy is totally 'Jewish,' 'Catholic' or 'Masonic.' These people do not help to expose the conspiracy, but sadly play into the hands of those who want the public to believe that all conspiratorialists are screwballs." But if the possibility of distortion is to be accepted as a reason for the suppression of truth, then all of us are the losers.

Insofar as you speak for one of the world's major religious faiths, going back to Abraham who is the "father in faith" for Christians, Jews and even Moslems, I believe you have a duty to make an objective examination of the evidence which suggests that many of the principal manipulators of twentieth century history are characterized by a deep and abiding hostility to any genuine belief in and worship of God and any attempt to live and work according to His commandments. My experience in public life has shown me that I have much more in common with believing Jews than with the secular humanists who have gained such a predominant position in our nation today. It would be most interesting to see with which of these two groups you find yourself and your organization most often in alignment.

There is not a word in Gary Allen's book which could possibly be construed by any reasonable man as an attack on any religious faith. Rather, he points out repeatedly that the conspirators of our time are dedicated to the destruction of all religious faith. Even for those who do not accept his thesis, the hostility of the dominant forces in the modern world to religion is very obvious and should provide a solid basis for cooperation and alliance among all believers as against nonbelievers. Gary Allen and I and The John Birch Society and many others are ready and eager for such cooperation and alliance. We have not attacked your faith. Why then do you attack us?

As for your objections to his thesis itself, it is a subject on which reasonable men may differ—but not one which you can reasonably claim to be "discredited." The arguments for it deserve to be considered on their merits. Your letter gives no indication that you have done so. In fact, I can only describe your position on the issues raised by this book as betraying a deeply entrenched intellectual bias of your own. In the interest of the honest scholarship to which you refer in your concluding paragraph, I would urge you and your colleagues to try to free your minds of this bias and then take another look at this question.

Jews and Catholics suffered and died together in both Nazi and Soviet concentration camps. You may have read of the recent beatification at the Vatican of Blessed Father Maximilian Kolbe of Poland, who was starved to death in a Nazi death camp after volunteering to take the place of a young father originally selected for the same kind of death. By your campaign against those who are making every effort to arouse the American people to the danger of totalitarian world conquest, you are making it more likely that similar horrors will take place here in America. If this happens, those on what you call "the right" will be among the first victims—I sincerely hope, not with your approval.

Yours very truly,

JOHN G. SCHMITZ,
*Member of Congress.*

## MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN—HOW LONG?

### HON. WILLIAM J. SCHERLE

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Monday, June 19, 1972*

Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, a child asks: "Where is daddy?" A mother asks: "How is my son?" A wife asks: "Is my husband alive or dead?"

Communist North Vietnam is sadistically practicing spiritual and mental genocide on over 1,600 American prisoners of war and their families.

How long?

The ongoing U.S. deployment of Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) on both Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles is sure to maintain that advantage for the period of the agreement; the U.S. warhead inventory may well exceed 10,000 by 1977.

Having flight-tested no MIRV system to date, the Soviet Union can hardly convert its throw-weight advantage into a warhead advantage during these years. Even if they successfully develop MIRV technology, only the larger Soviet missiles look promising as MIRV platforms, and it is not realistic to expect a complete replacement of their existing missile force with MIRV-capable boosters. Judgments may vary, but no one can doubt that Soviet acceptance of continued U.S. MIRV deployment represents a concession of the first magnitude.

The tough Soviet delegation made other adjustments in its original positions, as did the American team. The illustrations here suffice, however, to highlight the fact that SALT I began an important learning process for both sides and persuaded each that its own security required realistic consideration of the other's security needs. There were no one-sided or disproportionate concessions.

PRELUDE TO PARITY

One can only appraise the achievements of SALT I by examining the agenda for SALT II, the second phase of the negotiations which is expected to begin later this year. The true worth of the ABM treaty and the five-year missile freeze lies in what President Nixon has rightly termed the "unparalleled opportunity" they create.

Critics may damn the frenetic atmosphere surrounding the last hours of diplomatic activity, although the issues resolved in those final moments were relatively marginal ones on which the options had been thoroughly explored in advance. Arms control advocates may lament the tardiness and scope of the strategic freeze. Yet the delay in setting the freeze may prove invaluable, because the long and methodical diplomacy preceding it has engendered a degree of mutual confidence which is indispensable to further steps toward reinforcing strategic stability. SALT I has made the cautious decision; the time is at hand for bolder action.

The tight limits on ABM have virtually removed the threats to stability which might arise from defensive deployments. The pressing need now is to curb the instabilities which might arise through offensive deployments threatening the survivability of either side's deterrent weapons. Ambassador Gerard Smith stressed this point on May 9 when he told the Soviet SALT delegation that the follow-on negotiations should seek "to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces." Both countries well understand that, unless progress is made on this front, the ABM limits may not endure.

Two central threats loom on the offensive side of the equation: (1) Highly accurate, multiple warhead systems which could destroy land-based ICBM silos, and (2) developments in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities which might jeopardize the sea-based forces.

The logic and the structure of the ABM treaty open promising possibilities for coping with these problems. The prohibition of extensive defenses greatly simplifies the deterrent problem. No feasible attack could destroy all of either side's retaliatory weapons; even a small fraction of surviving, single-warhead systems would be able to deliver unacceptable damage to an attacker.

Thus, there is no longer any need for the United States or the Soviet Union to retain the option of MIRVing its boosters, since MIRV is superfluous to deterrence in a situation where there are no defenses to penetrate. Indeed, in the new strategic environment the effect of MIRV systems is not to bolster deterrence by hedging against a non-existent ABM system but to weaken it by posing a threat to the survivability of land-based ICBMs. Thus, in light of the guiding standard of stable deterrence, both sides should perceive their common interest in seeking a ban on MIRV systems.

The potential centerpiece of SALT II could well be a trade of the U.S. MIRV systems now in deployment for a comparable number of Soviet missiles, including the gigantic SS-9s which have caused such consternation. Land-based forces might be phased down to 500 single-warhead systems, while the U.S. Poseidon fleet could be converted to single warhead systems.

The Soviets have been reticent about entering a MIRV limit until they perfect the technology, but skillful diplomats should be able to underscore the advantages Moscow would reap by foregoing MIRV development in return for a suspension of U.S. MIRV programs before they are fully deployed and refined to pinpoint accuracies. The President has stressed that U.S. MIRV systems are intended exclusively for retaliatory purposes, but the Soviets must realize that unrestricted testing in the future may push the technology to such precise delivery accuracies that even relatively small U.S. warheads would jeopardize hardened missile silos. That prospect is still some years away, but only concerted measures to inhibit MIRV testing and deployment can guard against it.

Each side clearly has a greater interest in persuading the other not to deploy MIRV than it has in deploying such systems itself. So long as the United States persists in its own MIRV deployment, it cannot hope to induce the Soviet Union to refrain from similar weaponry. There is a powerful case for the United States to slow its MIRV programs and to offer SALT II a chance to devise mutual restraints on this provocative and unnecessary technology.

MIRV is the principal qualitative innovation which might undermine the quantitative limitations sketched by SALT I. Henry Kissinger has intimated that "questions of technological change" will be addressed in SALT II. The ABM treaty not only facilitates such an effort; it offers vital precedents, for it specifically establishes a number of qualitative limits on defensive systems. Under the treaty, development, testing and deployment of rapid-reload launchers and multiple-interceptor launchers are banned. Sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile ABM components are ruled out and radars are strictly controlled in numbers and characteristics. Test activities are restricted to designated ranges and the upgrading of anti-aircraft systems is closely regulated.

All of these controls deal with qualitative features of defensive systems. Parallel controls applied to offensive systems and monitored by the highly effective means planned for the ABM treaty could provide a strong barricade against destabilizing modifications of offensive missiles.

A sensible course would be to limit future missile tests to perhaps 10 or 20 a year, and to specify that there be no testing at all of multiple warheads or penetration aids. To convince the Soviet Union that the United States actually eliminates its existing MIRV boosters should pose no difficulty. Satellites could monitor the destruction of Minuteman III silos, just as they could the SS-9 and other complexes.

In the radically altered setting of joint planning for mutual security, it is conceivable that the two sides can agree to more intimate inspection to guarantee that Poseidon and analogous Soviet missiles are carrying only single warheads. The exchange of technical information and crew training arrangements for the proposed joint space venture afford encouragement that the ancient shrouds over the advanced technology of both sides may now be partially removed.

Even without local inspection, however, a stringent prohibition against testing multiple payloads could be verified reliably; since neither side could maintain MIRV systems and crews without frequent operational tests, this kind of ban would provide high confidence that neither, was retaining such weapons. Elimination of large "MIRV-able" boosters would mean that any clandestine work on a Soviet MIRV would be futile, since there would be no significant force to carry such payloads.

In short, having forestalled the instabilities that might flow from large-scale ABMd deployment, the two powers could drastically reduce the potential installibities on the offensive side by precluding MIRV systems. And such a measure could be enforced through precisely the kinds of test constraints they are relying on to verify compliance with the ABM limitations.

ANTI-SUBMARINE WAREFARE

If limits on MIRV would enhance the survivability of the land-based deterrent, there is comparable value in measures to reduce the likelihood that sea-based forces will become vulnerable. This suggests that SALT II should give intensive study to controls over anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

A first and urgent goal would be to limit the number of hunter-killer submarines and other ASW forces to levels consonant with the maximum survivability of the SLBM fleets. It may be helpful to constrain certain undersea surveillance systems, since the invulnerability of the subs hinges directly on their ability to evade detection. One important possibility would be to carve out sizeable areas of the oceans as SLBM sanctuaries in which no ASW forces would normally intrude.

A third major objective of the coming phase of arms control discussions ought to be a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons tests. There is growing confidence that national means of verification can monitor such an agreement and the administration is actively considering the proposal. By inhibiting further refinement of warheads for either offensive or defensive missiles, an end to underground nuclear tests could contribute markedly to other efforts to prevent destabilizing breakthroughs.

In weighing these and other options for SALT II a cardinal rule of systematic arms control comes into play. It is extremely helpful to have a broad and diverse set of reinforcing agreements, the violation of any one of which would be insufficient to destabilize the balance—but quite sufficient to indicate that one or the other side was acting in bad faith. Conversely, compliance with a number of interlocked arrangements would testify powerfully to the continued dedication of the partners to the common interest enshrined in the agreements.

As the two countries approach SALT II, they face a special hazard. Both sides may be so busy hedging against possible violation of the first accords—by all-out programs to modernize their allowable missiles, submarines, and bombers—that they will lose sight of the unprecedented chance to reduce their need for such hedges.

President Nixon has won some vindication for his thesis that he needs on-going strategic programs to gain bargaining leverage in the negotiations. But it would be tragic indeed if that proposition were taken to warrant full-speed ahead on a host of possibly superfluous programs. That tragedy can only become more likely if the administration feels compelled to defend the agreements of SALT I by buying off its critics with promises of major new weapons.

The United States certainly will wish to continue gradual improvements in its arsenal, but SALT I justifies a moderate, not an accelerated, pace in this realm.

From the diplomatic standpoint, it is fortunate that the planned modernization efforts take time; for example the Soviets could not reach their potential ceilings on SLBM deployment for several years. The U.S. Trident SLBM system would not go on station until late in the decade and the B-1 bomber, if approved, is some years away from operation. There is ample time to use them as bargaining chips, and absolutely no necessity to become wedded to them before diplomacy determines whether both sides can safely content themselves with lower hedges against some hypothetical future attempt to upset the equilibrium.

The imperative task now is to sustain the momentum toward a reliable system of mutual security, a momentum which will be seriously threatened if either nation embarks on a campaign to pacify domestic criticism by intensifying the qualitative arms race.

Nothing Richard Nixon has done speaks so well of his judgment and his courage as the beginning he has made on strategic arms limitation. If SALT II is to fulfill the immense promise of SALT I, the President's diplomacy needs—and deserves the confidence of the Congress and the country. He has earned it.

## "GENIAL JIM"

### HON. JAMES J. DELANEY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Monday, June 19, 1972*

Mr. DELANEY. Mr. Speaker, so often we take for granted many of our national institutions. For this reason millions of people were shocked to learn that one of America's great and revered institutions, the Honorable James A. Farley, former chairman of the Democratic National Committee, distinguished prior Postmaster General, statesman, and a legend to legions, had been incapacitated by exhaustion and forced to rest in the hospital.

Jim Farley has for so many years shared his wisdom, counsel, and insight with the Nation at large it somehow seemed he would go on and on, not even having time to rest.

I know his great multitude of friends will be delighted to know that he is recovering quickly and will soon resume his arduous schedule. In this connection, I would like to share with my colleagues a recent article by Ernest Cuneo concerning the hectic pace maintained "Genial Jim," which recently appeared in the Paterson, N.J. News.

The article follows:

HOW DARE FARLEY GET CHEST PAINS

(By Ernest Cuneo)

WASHINGTON.—A wave of indignation swept New York City, as it became known that the ubiquitous General James A. Farley, following a few pains in the chest, had ordered himself off to a hospital for an examination.

It must be explained to outsiders that the health of General Farley, eighty-four this month, is regarded as the final proof that New York City is the healthiest city in the world, come hell, high water or smog, which, incidentally, frequently happens.

Farley fans were quickly reassured, however, as the burly giant from Grassy Point brushed aside the medicos to issue his own bulletins. He was feeling fine, he reported, but the doctors had insisted on a rest and, a reasonable man, he had met them more than half-way.

He would confine his working day while in the hospital to a strict eight hours and utilize only two of his battery of secretaries. Incoming calls would be restricted to members of his family because, following the old Farley formula, if you receive one you receive all, and there's no point in tying up the switchboard of the hospital.

He also agreed to restrict outgoing calls; this he has faithfully done, confining them to his famed far-flung network of prominent Democrats, and confining his inquiries into the health of his beloved Democratic party, which, of course, has been in more or less failing health since Mr. Farley departed as its national and New York State chairman.

The Hon. James A. noticed the pain in his chest as he prepared to go to a banquet. He has attended 105 banquets and 131 luncheons within the last 12 months, which is enough to give most people a pain just to think of it. During this time, an average of 120 letters a day went out over his famed green-ink signature.

At the end of this month, as he has for years, he will receive over 6,000 birthday cards from every state of the Union and every quarter of the globe, remarkably enough. Even more remarkably though, they will be answered on a first name basis. His record of personal thank-you letters still stands, and presumably will for some time.

More particularly, after the 1936 Presidential Election, James A. sat down and dictated no less than 36,000 letters to the Democratic workers, precisely enumerating what each did and assuring each that his efforts made the total possible.

This crash job wore out six secretaries; it was completed just in time to get out the Christmas cards.

Let no man decry the power of the letter. On contributed volume alone, James A. Farley was entitled to hold his Cabinet office of Postmaster General. Actually, however, the general dates his success in politics to a single letter he wrote when he was a young Democrat in a Republican county. His town was about even when James A. became a candidate for town clerk, which he won by one vote.

As the new town clerk made his way down the village street in the fall night, an elderly pillar of the Republican party accosted him.

"Jim," he said, "I voted for you, because you were the only one who wrote us a letter of sympathy when our daughter died. I think anybody that much interested in other people would be good for the town as its clerk."

Well, of course, letters have taken America's most prolific letter writer a long way since—and so has his interest in people. It is said of him that he is the only man who can walk from Seattle to Key West and never be out of hailing distance of a friend.

The personnel is different, of course, but the patttern is the same; younger people come up to him and say, "Mr. Farley, you were my father's friend, and you wrote him when he was ill," etc. etc.

The Hon. James A. Farley doesn't smoke, and pursuant to a promise he made his mother when he was a boy, he has never taken a drink, nor indeed, does he take the Lord's name in vain.

All this adds up to proof that none of these are needed to be the merriest man and the warmest companion in New York City. Like Central Park, James A. Farley is a New York landmark, the living symbol of its open-handed and open-hearted traditions.

That's why everybody is a bit indignant at the general, in violation of his own ebullient tradition, getting a pain in the chest. Thousands, of course, have written him in conventional manner. This, perhaps, explains his terrific spirit, hospital or not; James A. Farley always feels well when there are mountains of mail to answer, and from the amount of it being delivered where he's at, it is perfectly apparent that the U.S. Mails are about to receive another massive transfusion of James A. Farley's famous green ink.

## CAPT. ROLAND BRANI—AN OUTSTANDING POLICE OFFICER

### HON. HAROLD R. COLLIER

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Monday, June 19, 1972*

Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to pay tribute to the memory of Roland Brani, who died recently after having served as a member of the Cicero, Ill., police department for three and a half decades.

During my postcollege days when I was a news reporter and columnist, I had occasion to cover the Cicero Police Department and local court sessions. It was during this time that I met and came to know Patrolman Brani. He was a sincere, dedicated officer of the law who moved from the bottom of the ladder in his department to the rank of captain and then chief of detectives. He maintained this post up until the time of his death.

One of the truly great tributes paid to him was by the International Association of Chiefs of Police which voted him one of the 10 outstanding police officers in the Nation. Certainly the best way to judge an individual and his professional worth is by the esteem in which he is held by those who are most closely associated with him in his field.

Mr. Speaker, the town of Cicero has adopted a resolution which I insert in the RECORD as further recognition that Captain Brani served his community with great distinction throughout his long career.

The resolution follows:

RESOLUTION

Whereas, the Good Lord is his infinite wisdom has chosen to take unto his fold Captain Roland Brani, an outstanding member of the Police Department of the Town of Cicero for the past 35 Years, and

Whereas, notwithstanding his mild, friendly and modest nature, he was the recipient of the greatest respect of each and every man who served in his command, and

Whereas, Captain Roland Brani, known by his many friends as "Beef", had achieved an enviable record, second to none in the entire Nation, filled with feats of bravery, courage, wisdom and accomplishment in the finest tradition of American Law Enforcement, and

Whereas, his reputation as a "Law Enforcement Officer" was justly recognized and complimented when he was chosen by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, an organization comprising over 400,000 members, as one of the "Ten Most Outstanding Police Officers In The Nation",

Now, therefore, be it resolved by the President and Board of Trustees of the Town of Cicero, individually, and as duly elected representatives of the industrial, commercial and residential citizens of the Town of Cicero, and on behalf of the many Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Court Personnel, Police Officers throughout the State, and all others who had the privilege of knowing or working with the "Captain," we offer his bereaved family our deepest and most sincere sympathy for the great loss they have suffered by his passing.

Be it further resolved that Captain Brani will forever be in our hearts and thoughts and we shall be eternally indebted to him for the unselfish and total dedication of his entire self to the health, welfare, safety and betterment of this Community and all of its people, and "Our Captain Roland Brani" will always be remembered by the proud citizens

in danger of becoming delinquent. Therefore, the training authority established under title II of the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act has been retained. The committee also understands that YDDPA's responsibility for providing training will cease when and if H.R. 45 is enacted into law. H.R. 45 would establish an Institute for Continuing Studies of Juvenile Justice, one of the primary purposes of which is to provide training.

The committee also recognizes the importance of the Federal role in providing technical assistance to State, local, and private agencies in the area of delinquency prevention and rehabilitation. The 1972 amendments retain the technical assistance authority contained in title III with the requirements that particular emphasis be placed on technical assistance relating to the development of juvenile delinquency plans. The special expertise developed under the act should be readily available to LEAA and to state planning agencies in the preparation of comprehensive State juvenile delinquency plans.

The committee retains its concern about the administration of the 1968 act, particularly with regard to the level of funding. The 1972 amendments provide for a $75 million authorization. However, the pattern of severely limited budget requests and appropriations appears to be a continuing problem. In fiscal 1972, for example, although $75 million was authorized, only $10 million was requested and $10 million appropriated. In fiscal 1973, although the committee's amendments contain a $75 million authorization, only $10 milion has been requested.

In reporting the 1972 amendments to the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act, the committee accepts the YDDPA program in its present form as a possible means for improving the administration of the act, but does not consider this to be a comprehensive response to the delinquency crisis. At the April 28, 1972, hearings, a representative of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) testified that the youth service system is a worthwhile concept but does not present the total answer to the national problem of juvenile delinquency prevention. The NCCD concluded that the low level of funding fo YDDPA as well as the emphasis on utilizing existing services assures that juvenile delinquency prevention will be an appurtenance to other program goals.

In moving into programing youth services systems, YDDPA has relinquished responsibility for coordinating the current diverse array of juvenile delinquency programs. The need for such coordination remains. At the April 28 hearings, representatives of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and LEAA testified favorably on the progress of the Interdepartmental Council. The Council, under the chairmanship of the Attorney General, has met regularly during the past year to review ways in which the Federal effort might be made more effective. Since the Council appears to be a useful mechanism for providing communication between Federal agencies concerned with juvenile delinquency, the committee recommends the transfer of the annual reporting requirement regarding Federal juvenile delinquency activities from YDDPA to the Interdepartmental Council.

In reaching its decision to recommend a two year extension of the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act, the committee had extensive discussion of how long an extension would be appropriate. Some members were concerned that the 1972 amendments might be regarded as a comprehensive answer to the delinquency problem of this Nation. They emphasized the need for continued study of the entire Federal juvenile delinquency effort with a view toward enacting new comprehensive legislation next year. Those committee members who supported a longer extension of the act were concerned about the difficulties of administering the program on a short-term basis. However, a majority of the committee is agreed that the 1972 amendments are no substitute for the vigorous national leadership, coordinating authority, and substantial resources necessary for an effective Federal response to the problems of juvenile delinquency.

The amendments were agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

## FLAMMABLE FABRICS ACT—AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote by which H.R. 5066 was passed last Friday, and its third reading, be reconsidered, for the sole purpose of offering a technical amendment which is made necessary by the changes that were made in the bill by the floor amendments adopted by the Senate last Friday.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered, and the bill will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

H.R. 5066, an act to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1972, to carry out the Flammable Fabrics Act.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 1, after line 7, insert:

"SEC. 2. That the Flammable Fabrics Act be amended by adding a new section at the end thereof, as follows."

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON) I ask unanimous consent to insert a statement regarding the Flammable Fabrics Act amendments adopted by the Senate on Friday.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR MAGNUSON

On Friday the Senate took a major step toward protecting our nations' children from the risks of injury by fire from childrens' sleepwear.

Our amendment to H.R. 5066, adopted as amended by a vote of 65 to 0, directs the Secretary of Commerce to promulgate a flammability standard for children's sleepwear to be effective no later than July 1, 1973.

Under the procedures of the Flammable Fabrics Act routine standards are not effective for one year after the date of their final promulgation. However the Act does contemplate some occasions when more rapid action is necessary. In the case of flammability standards for Children's Sleepwear, sizes 7 to 14, the Secretary is directed to utilize the procedures of the Act in so far as practicable. This means that he will hold hearings and receive public comment on the standard he promulgates for Children's Sleepwear, but the standard once developed will not wait for the routine twelve months delay for it to take effect. As a result of the action of the Senate, if joined in by the House, the standard for Children's Sleepwear will be effective not later than July 1, 1973.

I commend the able senior Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. COTTON) and the other able members of this body who worked with me to arrive at a solution to the problems confronting our nation's children arising out of the intrinsic flammable character of most fabrics.

I am looking forward to the support of the members of the House and the responsible members of industry. The Secretary of Commerce will need our support as he seeks an appropriate standard. If this effort receives the attention it deserves there should be a major improvement in the availability of flame resistant farbrics for all types of children's garments in the marketplace within the next few years, and at least for children's sleepwear, an absence of any garment which does not meet an adequate test for flame resistance, after July 1, 1973.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD subsequently said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that H.R. 5066 be printed as it passed the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHILES). Without objection, it is so ordered.

## THE NIXON-BREZHNEV TREATY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the hearings on the Nixon-Brezhnev treaty start this morning in the Committee on Foreign Relations. They will be most important, I think, to the future of this Nation, to the Soviet Union, and very likely to the rest of the world.

The President has indicated that one of his principal goals is a generation of peace. I want to assure him that that is the goal of the Senate, the Congress, and the American people, as well.

I wish to express the hope that the hearings will be gone into in detail and that then a favorable report from the Committee on Foreign Relations will be issued expeditiously so that the Nixon-Brezhnev treaty can be taken up on the floor of the Senate as soon as possible.

If things work out, I would hope it would be possible to do so before we recess at the end of this month. If not, then certainly when we come back between the two national conventions.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD three editorials which were published in the Great Falls Tribune of Great Falls, Mont., under date of May 25, 1972, entitled "Generation of Peace"; May 28, entitled "The Arms Treaty"; and June 6, entitled "Harnessing the Missiles"; and an article entitled "The Rationale for Defense Spending Grows More and More Irrational," written by D. J. R. Bruckner, and published in the Los Angeles Times of June 19, 1972.

There being no objection, the editorials and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GENERATION OF PEACE

A "generation of peace," which President Nixon has declared is one of his principal goals, may be assured if he and Russian Party Chief Leonid I. Brezhnev agree on an arms limitation program.

authorized under title III are made, so that special emphasis will be placed on providing technical assistance in the development of juvenile delinquency prevention and control plans. Further, the requirement of making an annual report is shifted to the Interdepartmental Council, established by the 1971 amendments, as a means of increasing coordination among Federal agencies responsible for juvenile delinquency prevention and control. The amendments also provide adequate fiscal authorization for the operation of the act.

BACKGROUND

The Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act was enacted by Congress in 1968 to help States and local communities strengthen their juvenile justice programs. This assistance was to be broad in scope including courts, correctional systems, police agencies, law enforcement, and other agencies which deal with juveniles, and was to encompass a wide range of preventive and rehabilitative services to delinquent and predelinquent youth. The act also provided for the training of personnel employed or about to be employed in the area of juvenile delinquency prevention and control, and for comprehensive planning, development of improved techniques and information services in the field of juvenile delinquency. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was charged with administering the act, because that Department was believed to have particular expertise in dealing with the preventive and rehabilitative aspects of delinquency.

The report accompanying the act clearly sets forth the congressional intent that the act be administered as part of an integrated network of antipoverty, antislum, and youth programs. The report states that the legislation should not be just another categorical program administered in relative isolation from much larger efforts such as the community action program, model cities, and the Manpower Development and Training Act. Thus, Congress clearly intended that the programs administered under the act serve to coordinate all Government efforts in the area of juvenile delinquency and to provide national leadership in developing new approaches to the problems of juvenile crime.

As the committee noted in the report accompanying the 1971 amendments, the original promise of the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act has not been fulfilled. The first 3 years of the administration of the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968 were marked by delay and inefficiency in implementing the broad legislative mandate. More than a year and a half elapsed before a Director was appointed for the Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration, the agency within HEW charged with administering the act. To date, only one annual report has been published, despite a legislative requirement that such reports be made each fiscal year. In this March 1971 report, YDDPA conceded its own failure to implement the goals of the 1968 Act. With the exception of the portion of the YDDPA budget spent on State comprehensive juvenile delinquency planning, funds were spread throughout the country in a series of underfunded, scattered, unrelated projects. The subcommittee found that juvenile delinquency programs have not been a major priority of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare even though it has had responsibility for administering the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act.

This lack of priority by HEW has been compounded by the consistent failure of the Department to request more than a small proportion of the amount authorized by Congress for each fiscal year, resulting in pitifully small appropriations for YDDPA. In fiscal 1970, example, $50 million was authorized under the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act. However, only $15 million was requested and only $10 million appropriated. In fiscal 1971, $75 million was authorized, $15 million requested, and $15 million appropriated. From 1968 to 1971, HEW requested only $49.2 million for operation of the act out of a total authorized amount of $150 million. The serious deficiencies in HEW's administration of the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act are further demonstrated by the failure of YDDPA to expend the limited resources appropriated. From 1968 to 1971, out of the small sum of $30 million appropriated, only half, or $15 million, was actually expended.

The fiscal record of the administration of the 1968 Act reflects HEW's limited view of the Department's role in developing a program commensurate with the delinquency problem. Thus, the fulfillment of the original purposes of the act has been rendered virtually impossible because of inadequacies both in appropriations and in administration.

One of the major problems in the administration of the 1968 act has been the confusion of roles in the juvenile delinquency field between HEW and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Department of Justice set up under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Under the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968, HEW was intended to provide assistance to States in preparing and implementing comprehensive State juvenile delinquency plans. But LEAA, with vastly larger resources than YDDPA, soon became dominant in the criminal justice planning field.

In an exchange of letters on May 25, 1971 the Secretary of HEW and the Attorney General acknowledged the existing inadequacy in coordinating the juvenile delinquency activities of their respective agencies. The May 25 letters specified that each State should develop a single comprehensive criminal justice plan which would comply with the statutory requirements of both the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act and the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act. The Secretary and the Attorney General agreed that HEW was to concentate its efforts on prevention and rehabilitation programs administered outside the traditional juvenile correctional system while LEAA was to focus its efforts on programs within the juvenile correctional system. Despite this allocation of responsibility for delinquency prevention to HEW, the minimal level of funding for the operation of the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act raises serious doubts about the possible effectiveness of YDDPA in providing national leadership in the prevention of delinquency.

The problems of the role of HEW under the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act should be viewed in the larger context of the lack of primary responsibility in any one Federal agency for all juvenile delinquency programs. Juvenile Delinquency programs are presently spread among more than 40 different agencies. There are no central goals and priorities to guide the planning and development of these diverse and scattered programs. The national direction and coordination of delinquency programs envisioned by the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act for HEW has not engaged in that Department.

In a response to the clear need to develop more effective coordination of the Federal juvenile delinquency effort, the committee in the 1971 amendments to the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act established an Interdepartmental Council consisting of representatives of the major Federal agencies involved in the area of juvenile delinquency. The Council was to meet on a regular basis to review the efforts of the various agencies in combating juvenile delinquency and make certain that the overall Federal effort was coordinated and efficient. The 1971 amendments also gave YDDPA an additional year to prove its effectiveness in the fight against juvenile crime and to develop a strategy which would efficiently deploy the limited resources of HEW.

NEED FOR LEGISLATION

Juvenile crime in this country has reached crisis proportions in the past decade. Arrests of juveniles for violent crimes have increased by 167 percent. Arrests of juveniles for property crimes, such as burglary and auto theft, have jumped 89 percent. Almost two-thirds of all arrests for serious crimes are of young people under the age of 21. Our failure as a nation to deal with this crisis is tragically clear. The recidivism rate for institutionalized delinquents is the highest of any age group—between 74 and 85 percent. Many if not most adult criminals have a juvenile record.

Congress responded to the alarming increase in juvenile crime by enacting the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act in 1968. The first 3 years of the act's operation were marked by administrative weakness and lack of direction. In extending the act for 1 year, in 1971, Congress clearly indicated its intention to review carefully the administration of the 1968 act.

At committee hearings on April 28, 1972, representatives of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare testified on the progress that YDDPA has made during the past year in increasing its effectiveness. In defining the Department's role in preventing juvenile delinquency more clearly, YDDPA has specifically concentrated its work on the development of systems which provide coordinated youth services as well as funds for initiation of needed services which are otherwise not available. Twenty-three youth services systems were started in fiscal 1971, and YDDPA estimates that there will be 13 more such systems by the end of fiscal 1972. YDDPA also testified that the present act, with its emphasis on state juvenile delinquency planning perpetuates the confusion about HEW's role in the criminal justice planning process and in providing grants for preventive and rehabilitative services.

It was in light of this testimony that the committee developed the 1972 amendments to the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act. These amendments are designed to reflect the focus on youth services systems which HEW itself feels would be the most effective use of its limited resources in the juvenile delinquency area. The principal amendment, the new title I, would encourage the development of coordinated youth services systems separate from the juvenile justice system through grants to public or nonprofit private agencies. YDDPA is to serve as a catalyst to bring together resources from a broad range of public and private health, education, employment, and other agencies which would provide services to delinquents or youth in danger of becoming delinquent and their families. YDDPA's funds will be concentrated on selected youth services systems to maximize fully the impact on this program.

The committee believes that the administration of the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act has improved during the past year and can be substantially improved in the future by defining the scope of its activities in accordance with the 1972 amendments. Therefore, the committee recommends repeal of the sections of the 1968 act relating to grant authority for State planning and for preventive and rehabilitative services. Under the 1972 amendments, grants may be made for preventive and rehabilitative services if such services are part of a coordinated youth services system and are not already available in the community.

The committee recognizes the great need for improved training of personnel working with youths who are delinquent or who are

President Nixon's journey to Moscow already has succeeded in several significant areas. The delegations of the two superpowers have agreed to cooperate in research on environmental problems. They also formalized an earlier agreement for coordinated health research on cancer, heart disease and environmental health.

It's encouraging that President Nixon and Soviet Party Chief Brezhnev are realistic enough to attempt to set limits on the nuclear arms race. Each knows that the chances for peaceful coexistence in a troubled world will be enhanced greatly if the superpowers agree to establish a ceiling on both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.

President Nixon and Party Chief Brezhnev know that the two nations now have a nuclear capacity to destroy the world, that each power has sufficient intercontinental nuclear missiles to accept a devastating surprise strike and still have enough nuclear might to destroy the attacking nation. They know that the U.S. has an estimated nuclear capacity equivalent to 18 billion tons of TNT and that Russia has an estimated 19-billion-ton arsenal of nuclear weapons. There won't be much left on earth if the weapons in the two arsenals are exploded.

The best wishes of the entire world, concerned about the possibility of a nuclear holocaust if an atomic war breaks out, will rest with President Nixon and Party Chief Brezhnev.

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### The Arms Treaty

The nuclear arms limitation agreement signed in Moscow Friday by President Nixon and Russian Party Chief Leonid I. Brezhnev marks an historic milestone in world history.

The treaty, if ratified by the U.S. Senate, may bring an end to the costly arms race in which both superpowers have been competing for more than two decades. Without such a treaty, the two great nations will continue the shaky state of equilibrium called the "balance of terror," a state in which each nation has more than enough nuclear weapons to demolish the other within a few hours.

Under the arms limitation agreement, each of the superpowers still is left with the ability to accept a surprise strike and be able to retaliate with sufficient power to destroy the attacking nation.

Military experts say the U.S. has nuclear warheads with the power of 18 billion tons of TNT and that Russia has a nuclear arsenal with the power of about 19 billion tons of TNT. The other nuclear nations, Britain, France and China, also have nuclear weapons so the total world nuclear tonnage is equivalent to more than 40 billion tons of TNT.

Only two atomic bombs have been exploded in war. The first killed 78,150 persons in Hiroshima, Japan, Aug. 6, 1945; the second killed 73,394 persons three days later when dropped by a U.S. plane over Nagasaki, Japan. The two bombs, each with an atomic power equivalent to 20,000 tons of TNT, injured about as many persons as they killed and the effects of radioactive damage still linger in the two cities.

The two bombs dropped over Japan are baby ones when compared to the giant nuclear warheads in the intercontinental missiles Russia and the U.S. are able to launch at 15,000-miles-an-hour speeds against targets as far as 10,000 miles away.

President Nixon and the Russain leaders know that if the nuclear weapons are turned lose, no nation will win—that it will be a case of murder-suicide if one nation starts such a nuclear war.

President Nixon and the Russian leaders rate a "thank you" from all nations for agreeing to limit the nuclear race. President Nixon is entitled to great personal credit for his efforts to obtain the agreement, one he has maintained is needed to assure a "generation of peace."

### Harnessing the Missiles

The nuclear arms limitation treaty which President Nixon signed in Moscow May 26 has been greeted with a favorable response throughout the nation but also has raised strong opposition in many quarters.

The treaty, which must be ratified by the Senate before it goes into effect, will be debated thoroughly in Congress in coming weeks.

Many who are criticizing the agreement are saying that the pact gives the Russians an edge in the nuclear weapon field. President Nixon answered such fears by saying that the nation will continue to be stronger than any other nation on earth.

Opponents apparently fail to understand that each of the two superpowers has an overkill capacity almost beyond comprehension. Each nation possesses the nuclear capability to accept a surprise attack and still retaliate with sufficient might to destroy the attacking country.

Many fail to appreciate that war has changed so radically in the nuclear age that began at the end of World War II. In that war, the United States exploded a total tonnage of bombs equivalent to 2 million tons of TNT—bombs dropped over a period of four years.

Two of the 200 nuclear-tipped Minuteman missiles now deployed in Montana pack as much explosive fury as all the bombs we dropped over Germany and Japan in World War II. A Minuteman missile can race through space at 15,000 miles per hour and rain nuclear death on an entire city within a half hour from the time the signal is flashed in Washington, D.C.

The Minutemen missiles in Montana have 100 times more explosive power than all the bombs we dropped in World War II. The Montana missiles are only part of the 1,054 intercontinental missiles in the U.S. arsenal—which also include powerful missiles in our submarines—and giant nuclear bombs in our bombers.

Military experts estimate the U.S. has a nuclear arsenal equivalent to 18 billion tons of TNT and that Russia's arsenal may be equivalent to 19 billion tons of TNT.

That's enough nuclear power to devastate the entire earth—a fact opponents of the arms limitation treaty may want to think about as they attempt to defeat the treaty.

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### The Rationale for Defense Spending Grows More and More Irrational

(By D. J. R. Bruckner)

New York—Early this year the Administration justified its increased military budget requests by arguing that it would need funds for new weapons if the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks failed. Last week it was arguing that it needs more funds for new weapons to give the Russians an incentive to proceed with SALT II and agree to a treaty limiting offensive weapons.

Some congressional critics of the military budget have been trying to find a way to tie the arms agreements to the debate over spending, in an effort to cut funds, but the Administration could have ignored that effort safely. The arms agreements and the budget are two quite distinct matters which could be handled separately. Evidently the President finds some advantage in co-opting the tactic of his critics; it is probably a political advantage in an election year.

The rot set into our thinking about the military when Congress agreed 25 years ago to eliminate the War Department and call the new combined services agency the Defense Department. And last week the President was telling more than 100 members of Congress at the White House that his aim is to insure the "security" of the nation. The Russian leaders were telling their people the same thing in one of those long, allusive, code-worded articles in Pravda defending the summit agreements. Neither leadership suggested to its constituency that security might be best achieved by disarmament rather than by armament. In fact, the chief U.S. arms negotiator Gerard Smith told the Russians on May 9 that an objective of the Salt II talks on offensive weapons "should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces." That means, in translation, that our safety lies in our unrestrained ability to bomb one another to hell.

Mr. Nixon displayed his mastery of this weird language of the politics of war when he told the congressmen that the Russians told him that "they were going forward with defense programs in the offensive area . . ." His conclusion was that "since they will be going ahead with their programs, for the United States not to go forward with its programs would mean that any incentive that the Soviets had to negotiate the follow-on agreement would be removed." Do you understand?

This is all of a piece with the American threat to abrogate and ABM treaty if SALT II does not produce an offensive weapons treaty within five years. Henry Kissinger actually argued in the congressional briefing at the White House that it was our deployment of the Safeguard ABM missile that made the new ABM limitation treaty possible.

We are invited to conclude that, if one step up in the arms race made one treaty possible, another step up will make another treaty possible. The theory that an increase in military spending will encourage Russia to make more arms limitation treaties gains an illusory persuasiveness from the fact that there is an ABM treaty before Congress. But why would not a cutback in military spending encourage the Russians to negotiate just as well? We do not know; we have never tried that method.

The proposed $83.2 billion Defense Department budget includes initial funds for Minuteman II and Poseidon missiles, a new B-1 bomber for the strategic arsenal, a new Trident submarine to cost something more than $1 billion. Wonderful. In 25 years we have spent more than $1,000 billion on our war machine. This commitment, we are supposed to believe, has persuaded the Russians to sign a treaty limiting additions to one part of the machine; spending billions more to improve other parts of the machine will lead to another treaty. And then?

If a new and different reason is needed to justify this increased military budget, you must expect that one will be found, treaty or no treaty. We have seen the unsettling spectacle of Admiral Thomas Moorer, chief of the Joint Chiefs, telling Congress that the military might withhold its approval of the ABM treaty unless the military budget for offensive weapons goes up. Defense Secretary Laird then issued a warning that the Russians are building multiple warhead missiles, although it turns out in fact that there has been no testing of such weapons by Russia and that the situation has remained unchanged all year. Then Laird was up in the Capitol arguing that the arms limitation agreements would be dangerous unless we become better armed.

Interntaional affairs might be in fact as totally unreasonable, perhaps lunatic, as these guys want to make us believe. But I suspect there is another angle to this effort, a political angle. A storm will be stirred up in Congress, but Mr. Nixon's treaty and agreement will be approved anyway, and he can go before the voters as a victor in a tough fight with a stubborn Congress. And Sen. Hubert Humphrey, in his California campaign, demonstrated to the White House the effective use of frightening people about any cuts in the military budget, convincing them that restraint is weakness abroad and a source of unemployment at home.

The words are used in different ways now, and the arguments sound different, but in fact, the condition of the war machine will be a chief concern of this campaign as it has been the chief concern of every campaign since 1940.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I merely want to underscore the statement just made by the distinguished majority leader that the hearings on the Nixon-Brezhnev treaty began at 10 a.m. today. I hope that they can be conducted as expeditiously as is necessary for a full hearing. It would be an excellent thing if we could act on this treaty before we adjourn for the first of the two national conventions If not, of course, I think we really must be prepared to do it between the conventions. But I hope we can do it, as the distinguished majority leader says, in the near future.

There is, so far as I know, no great, no massive objection to the terms of the treaty in any area of which I am aware. It is another way to bring about a betterment of our chances for peace. It is another step in the search for peace. Meanwhile, other steps are going on with Mr. Podgorny in Hanoi, Mr. Kissinger in the People's Republic of China and, perhaps, Mr. Le Duc Tho in the People's Republic of China.

The number of nations interested in putting an end to this ulcer which bleeds away the strength of the North Vietnamese, the South Vietnamese, the United States, and its allies is, of course, of the greatest importance to all of us. It is the prayer of all Americans and of people of good will everywhere that we find an end to this utterly miserable condition in which we find ourselves.

We wish success to all who are engaged in this common search for peace.

## THE NIXON-BREZHNEV TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, last week the President and Dr. Henry Kissinger met with approximately 130 Members of Congress to discuss and explain the Moscow agreements on the Arms Limitation Treaty and Agreement.

Because these talks encompassed such vital elements on these particular matters. I ask unanimous consent that the President's statement, Dr. Kissinger's statement, and the question-and-answer session—all at the White House—be inserted at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT—THE STATE DINING ROOM

Ladies and gentlemen, we are beginning a little late because I understand traffic is quite heavy around the White House this morning due to the arrival of the President of Mexico. We must go forward with the schedule, because there is a Joint Session, as you know, today and we do want the members of the committees present here today to be able to attend that session. We will have to adjourn this meeting at approximately 12:00 o'clock, or at best, five minutes after 12:00, to give you plenty of time for questions.

A word about the format of this meeting. I will make a statement, and then I will have to depart in order to prepare for the arrival of the President of Mexico. Dr. Kissinger will then make a statement, and then it will be open to questions to members of the committees who are present here.

In order to facilitate recognition of Members, someone who knows all of the Members who are here, Clark MacGregor, will moderate the question and answer period, but we will try to be just as fair as possible among the members of the committees and between the House and the Senate, and Clark will, of course, be responsible in the event it isn't fair.

In any event, let me come directly now to my own remarks, which will not be too extended, because Dr. Kissinger today will be presenting the Presidential views. He will be telling you what the President's participation has been in these negotiations. The views he will express I have gone over with him in great detail, and I will stand by them.

I noted in the press that it was suggested that I was calling down the members of these committees for the purpose of giving you a pep talk on these two agreements. Let me lay that to rest right at the outset. This is not a pep talk and Dr. Kissinger is not going to make you a pep talk either.

When I came back from the Soviet Union, you will recall in the Joint Session I said that I wanted a very searching inquiry of these agreements. I want to leave no doubt about my own attitude.

I have studied this situation of arms control over the past 3½ years. I am totally convinced that both of these agreements are in the interest of the security of the United States and in the interest of arms control and world peace.

I am convinced of that, based on my study. However, I want the members of the House and the members of the Senate also to be convinced of that. I want the Nation to be convinced of that.

I think that the hearings that you will conduct must be searching because only in that way will you be able to be convincing to yourselves and only in that way will the Nation also be convinced.

In other words, this is not one of those cases where the President of the United States in asking the Congress and the Nation to take on a blind faith a decision that he has made in which he deeply believes.

I believe in the decision, but your questions should be directed to Dr. Kissinger and others in the Administration for the purpose of finding any weaknesses that you think in the negotiations or in the final agreements that we have made.

As far as the procedures are concerned, as you know, you will be hearing the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the head of the CIA, and of course, Ambassador Smith, in the sessions of your various committees.

I know that a number have suggested that Dr. Kissinger should appear before the committees as a witness. I have had to decline that particular invitation on his part, due to the fact that Executive privilege had to prevail.

On the other hand, since this is really an unprecedented situation, it seemed to me that it was important that he appear before the members of the committee in this format. This is on the record.

All of you will be given total transcripts of what he says. All of you will have the opportunity to ask these questions and in the event that all of the questions are not asked on this occasion, he, of course, will be available to answer other questions in his office from members of the committee as time goes on, during the course of the hearings.

What we are asking for here, in other words, is cooperation and not just rubberstamping by the House and the Senate. That is essential because there must be follow-through on this and the members of the House and Senate, it seems to me, must be convinced that they played a role as they have up to this point, and will continue to play a role in this very, very important field of arms control.

Now, let me go to the agreements, themselves, and express briefly some of my own views that I think are probably quite familiar to you, but which I think need to be underlined.

I have noted a great deal of speculation about who won and who lost in these negotiations. I have said that neither side won and neither side lost. As a matter of fact, if we were to really look at it very, very fairly, both sides won, and the whole world won.

Let me tell you why I think that is important. Where negotiations between great powers are involved, if one side wins, and the other loses clearly, then you have a built-in tendency or incentive for the side that loses to break the agreement and to do everything that it can to regain the advantage.

This is an agreement which was very toughly negotiated on both sides. There are advantages in it for both sides. For that reasons, each side has a vested interest, we believe, in keeping the agreement rather than breaking it.

I would like you to examine Dr. Kissinger, and the other witnesses, before the committee on that point. I think you also will be convinced that this was one of those cases where it is to the mutual advantage of each side, each looking to its national security.

Another point that I would like to make is Presidential intervention in this particular matter, Presidential coordination, due to the fact that what we have here is not one of those cases where one department could take a lead role.

This cut across the functions of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, it cut across, also, the AEC, and, of course, the Arms Control Agency.

Under these circumstances, there is only one place where it could be brought together, and that was in the White House, in the National Security Council, in which all of these various groups participated.

There is another reason, which has to do with the system of government in the Soviet Union. We have found that in dealing with the system of govenment in the Soviet Union, that where decisions are made, that affect the vital security and in fact, the very survival of a nation, decisions and discussions in those cases are made only at the highest level. Consequently, it is necessary for us to have discussions and decisions at the highest level if we are going to have the breakthroughs that we have had to make in order to come to this point of a successful negotiation.

The other point that I would make has to do with what follows on. The agreement that we have here, as you know, is in two stages: One, the treaty with regard to ABM defensive weapons; and second, the offensive limitation, the Executive Agreement, which is indicated as being, as you know, not a permanent agreement—it is for five years—and not total. It covers only certain categories of weapons.

Now we are hoping to go forward with the second round of negotiations. That second round will begin, we trust, in October. That means that we can begin in October, provided action is taken on the treaty and on the offensive agreement that we have before you at this time, sometime in the summer months; we would trust before the 1st of September. I don't mean that it should take that long, but I hope you can finish by the 1st of September so we can go forward with the negotiation in October.

The other point that should be made with regard to the follow-on agreements is not related to your approval of these agreements. It is related to the actions of the Congress on defense. I know there is disagreement among various Members of Congress with re-

## SALT: THE ACCORD DESERVES OUR SUPPORT

**HON. WILLIAM L. SPRINGER**

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Monday, June 19, 1972*

Mr. SPRINGER. Mr. Speaker, Alton Frye, a joint fellow of the Council of Foreign Relations and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars has written a number of studies on the United States and foreign strategies as well as foreign policy.

He has written an extremely detailed article in the Sunday Star of June 18 in which he says:

Nothing Richard Nixon has done speaks so well of his judgment and his courage as the beginning he has made on strategic arms limitation.

In view of the length of the SALT talks and the details that were considered as well as the need of the discussions, I felt sure my colleagues would want to read the splendid article by Mr. Frye titled, "SALT: The Accord Deserves Our Support."

The article follows:

[From the Washington Star, June 18, 1972]

SALT: THE ACCORD DESERVES OUR SUPPORT

(By Alton Frye)

Cynics say it is a typical American failing to know the price of everything and the value of nothing. This human frailty is serious enough in the routine exchanges of everyday life. In the great transactions of international politics, the tendency can be fatal to the most enlightened and essential undertakings.

The point comes to mind because of the surprising reaction in some quarters to the historic Nixon-Brezhnev agreements to limit strategic arms. The general enthusiasm for this momentous breakthrough in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) has been tempered not only by grumblings on the far right but by the disturbing response of a few respected commentators and congressmen.

Crosby Noyes alleges in The Star that the agreements give Russia nuclear "superiority on a silver platter." Seeking to ward off unjustified euphoria. The Wall Street Journal wonders whether the accords should be approved "anytime during a presidential campaign." Paul Warnke terms the agreement to limit offensive weapons "slightly worse than none at all," although he warmly endorses the ABM treaty. Sen. Henry Jackson, D-Wash., reserves his final judgment on the understandings, but blasts the "comic opera" procedures in Moscow and charges that the agreements give the Soviets "more of everything."

These are thoughtful and knowledgeable observers. Their opinions will carry weight with many of their fellow citizens. But close analysis reveals that the hasty critiques of the SALT agreements share a common fault: They are preoccupied with short-term balances which are totally inadequate to measure the long-term investment in mutual security which the United States and the Soviet Union have now made. And even in gauging the short-term balances, they badly misread the ledger written in Moscow. In effect the early criticisms of the Moscow summit overstate the price and understate the value of what was done there. Let us see why this is so.

THE CONTEXT OF SALT

In 1970 the Senate urged President Nixon to make a freeze on further deployment of strategic weapons the first priority of the SALT negotiations. While a freeze then would have set somewhat lower and more advantageous ceilings, the Moscow agreements contain a reasonable approximation of this objective—which was recommended by an overwhelming majority of senators.

The proposed treaty limits anti-ballistic missile deployment to no more than two sites with a maximum of 100 defensive missiles each, a force totally insufficient to weaken the credibility of either side's capacity to retaliate and hence to deter war. The interim agreement on offensive weapons halts ICBM deployments at the existing levels (about 1,618 on the Soviet side and 1,054 on the American) and limits modern submarine-launched missiles (SLBMs) to those now operational and under construction (710 on the Soviet side and 656 on the American).

Unnecessary confusion has grown out of the provision permitting conversion of some land-based missiles into sea-based weapons; briefly put, the Soviet Union can build to a total of 950 missiles on subbmarines but only if it phases out 240 launchers already deployed, i.e., if it actually reduces its land-based force to 1,400 missiles or so.

In sum, the ceilings provided in the interim agreement would permit the Soviets to deploy up to 2,350 long-range missiles on land and sea, compared with a total of 1,710 for the United States. It is the starkness of this numerical contrast which suggests, at first glance, that the United States accepted less equitable terms than it should have demanded.

But these gross figures do not reflect the crucial dimensions of the strategic bargain struck at SALT. Imbedded in that bargain are other commitments and detailed restraints which leave little doubt that the outcome of SALT is a decisive turn toward greater security. It is remarkable how far these understandings go toward fulfilling the U.S. conceptions of the requirements of strategic stability.

The United States sought explicit confirmation that mutual deterrence would be the basis for erecting a stable balance. The Soviets agreed. By curtailing ABM deployment, both sides have ratified the principle that mutual deterrence depends on mutual vulnerability. They may not welcome the condition of reciprocal terror, but they recognize the fact and acknowledge that neither has yet conceived a safe way to alter it.

The United States sought explicit acceptance of the de facto "open skies" arrangements, through which satellites keep each side appraised of the other's strategic inventory and innovations. The Soviets agreed. By committing themselves to avoid interference with observation satellites and other verification techniques, and by foregoing deliberate measures to conceal strategic capabilities from observation, the two countries have installed a necessary building block for confident progress on more substantial arms arrangements.

The United States sought to test Russian acceptance of the principle of mutual deterrence by demanding that the overall freeze include a firm limit on the gigantic SS-9 class missile, weapons which have perplexed U.S. planners because of their potential capacity to destroy American missile silos. The Soviets agreed. The interim agreement suppresses the number of supersize boosters to around 300, a level well below the danger point calculated by the Department of Defense.

The United States insisted that the freeze cover ballistic missile submarines, since the Soviet Union has been building such systems at a rapid clip (eight or nine a year) while the United States in the next five years will add no subs to the 41 it now has in service. In a decision critical to the success of the negotiation, the Soviets agreed. Without such a limit, the present building rate would have given the Soviets more than 80 missile-launching submarines by 1977, just as their present pace of ICBM construction would have produced by that year a land-based force alone in excess of 2,800 missiles.

The blunt truth is that no U.S. effort, even on a crash basis, could have matched this Soviet rate, launcher for launcher and boat for boat, during the five years governed by the interim agreement. The interruption of the massive Soviet building program is a stupendous gain to American security and international stability.

Any genuine negotiation must produce movement toward accommodation by both parties. One can only gain a distorted picture of the process by focusing exclusively on the concessions made by one side. Yet some commentators have done precisely that, implying that the United States has been too eager in conceding presumed advantages to the Soviets. As a partial corrective, one ought to understand the numerous and substantial concessions made by Moscow in its determination to promote a mutually acceptable balance.

The foremost issue on which the Soviet Union yielded is one which casts an utterly different light on the gross balance in ICBMs and Strategic Land-Based Missiles. At the outset the Russians had insisted with considerable justification that a fair definition of "strategic weapons" would include all systems capable of delivering a nuclear attack on the homeland of the other party. In order to facilitate a preliminary understanding they reluctantly agreed to treat only long-range missiles, excluding not only the U.S. strategic bomber fleet of about 460 planes but also the enormous number of forward-based systems maintained by the United States in Europe and on aircraft carriers.

These latter types of weapons are unique to the United States, in the sense that Moscow has no true carriers and no forward bases from which to mount a strike on this country with tactical fighter-bombers.

What this means is that the Soviets have granted the Americans at least for the short run, more than 2,000 additional aircraft capable of devastating all of the Soviet Union west of the Ural Mountains. Furthermore, the U.S. B-52s are being modernized with the Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM) which will vastly increase the lethality of the force; each plane can carry 24 such missiles. And, expensive though they are, the B-52s have demonstrated over Haiphong in recent days that they can survive and function in the densest anti-aircraft environment yet tested in combat.

Those who are tempted to toss off the significance of the Soviet concession on this point should ask themselves how we would view an understanding which left the Russians with a free and unrestricted ride on more than two thousand delivery vehicles, each one of which is quite capable of demolishing any city in the United States. Had the Soviets been adamant in demanding immediate limits on forward-based systems—which play a dual conventional-nuclear role in the NATO posture—SALT could well have collapsed.

Clearly, SALT II and the coming conferences on European security will face hard and complex negotiations on these systems and similar Soviet weapons targeted on Western Europe, including particularly the several hundred Soviet intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles.

Another factor is central to evaluating the simple numbers of launchers controlled by the interim agreement. The superficial Soviet advantage in numbers and sizes of missiles is paired against a staggering American advantage in deliverable warheads. Roughly described, the Soviets will have a three-to-one lead in "throw-weight" or megatonnage, while the United States will have a three-to-one lead in warheads.

for its fine work toward the goal of improving the quality of education for all of our citizens. But, moreover, I think that this is an appropriate time to pay tribute to education itself.

As a former educator I am familiar with the value that a good education has for our young people. I have no fonder memories than of the times in my high school classes when I could broaden the world of my students with new knowledge and new understanding. To be complete men and women we must all try to expand our views of the world around us. We must learn tolerance and understanding by becoming more familiar with the hopes and fears of our neighbors. We must employ our talents and abilities to the fullest possible extent by being better informed of the many opportunities which exist in our society.

Education is an invaluable tool in achieving these necessary elements of adulthood. I am proud to have been a part of the educational system in my community, and since coming to Congress I have sought to do everything possible to see that the good educational system in our country is maintained.

## "NONE DARE CALL IT CONSPIRACY"

### HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Monday, June 19, 1972*

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, last fall I agreed to write the introduction for a most interesting and significant book by Gary Allen entitled "None Dare Call It Conspiracy," which I will soon be bringing before you serial fashion in the RECORD. It explores the evidence for a concerted plan and pattern in the many reverses freedom, law, and faith have suffered in this century.

This book included a prediction that, like virtually all others on this subject, it would be attacked by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith—an organization which, as William Buckley once said, itself frequently engages in defamation. This prediction was right on target, and the attack began with the letter to me which follows, together with reply:

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF
B'NAI B'RITH,
*June 1, 1972.*

Hon. JOHN G. SCHMITZ,
*Irvine, Calif.*

DEAR CONGRESSMAN SCHMITZ: We were distressed to read your introduction to and endorsement of *None Dare Call It Conspiracy* by Gary Allen, and we hereby call upon you to withdraw your endorsement and repudiate this anti-Semitic propaganda book.

Because you are a political scientist, we would have expected you to detect quickly the long discredited anti-Jewish charges that allege an insidious role being played by so-called "international bankers" which this book exhumes.

Despite Mr. Allen's pitifully weak disclaimer about anti-Semitism, his book revives anti-Semitic campaigns of the 1920's carried out by agents of the late Henry Ford, Sr. through the *Dearborn Independent*—charges later repudiated publicly by Mr. Ford—and again revived in the 1930's by Father Charles E. Coughlin, the notorious radio-priest.

We can only assume that you read the book too quickly or that you did not read it at all, a not uncommon problem plaguing very busy public officials who, too often, unfortunately rely upon the judgment of others.

As a political scientist, we urge you to check with Professor Carroll Quigley, of Georgetown University, whose writings are cited extensively in *None Dare Call It Conspiracy* as being supportive of Gary Allen's thesis, whereas the exact opposite is true.

The Birch Society's campaign to distribute millions of copies of *None Dare Call It Conspiracy* is a very serious matter because the kinds of anti-Jewish lies contained in the Allen book have been used by hate groups throughout the world for more than 50 years to foster hatred of Jews. During the 1930's and the 1940's we saw the ugly consequences of such campaigns.

Mr. Schmitz, in the name of human decency and honest scholarship we urge you to publicly withdraw your name from this book and to dissociate yourself from this insidious campaign.

We await your reply.

Sincerely,

HARVEY B. SCHECHTER.

JUNE 16, 1972.

Mr. HARVEY B. SCHECHTER,
*Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Los Angeles, Calif.*

DEAR MR. SCHECHTER: Your letter of June 1 to me regarding Gary Allen's book None Dare Call It Conspiracy, occasioned by the fact that I wrote the Introduction to it, is one of the most remarkable confirmations of the book's thesis I have seen. For if you turn to pages 39 and 40, you will read:

The Jewish members of the conspiracy have used an organization called the Anti-Defamation League as an instrument to try to convince everyone that any mention of the Rothschilds or their allies is an attack on all Jews. In this way they have stifled almost all honest scholarship on international bankers and made the subject taboo within universities.

"Any individual or book exploring this subject is immediately attacked by hundreds of A.D.L. committees all over the country. The A.D.L. has never let truth or logic interfere with its highly professional smear jobs. When no evidence is apparent, the A.D.L., which staunchly opposed so-called 'McCarthyism,' accuses people of being 'latent anti-Semitics.' Can you imagine how they would yowl and scream if someone accused them of being 'latent' Communists?

"Actually, nobody has a right to be more angry at the Rothschild clique than their fellow Jews. The Warburgs, part of the Rothschild empire, helped finance Adolf Hitler. There were few if any Rothschilds or Warburgs in the Nazi prison camps! They sat out the war in luxurious hotels in Paris or emigrated to the United States or England. As a group, Jews have suffered most at the hands of these power seekers."

Gentlemen, you are right on cue.

Of course, I would not deny that some bigoted individuals might distort the facts and conclusions in Gary Allen's book to fit their own prejudices, just as they might do with many other books. As a Catholic, I have seen anti-Catholic bigots do this just as anti-Semites have done it. Gary Allen specifically warns on page 10 against those who "because of racial or religious bigotry . . . will take small fragments of legitimate evidence and expand them into a conclusion that will support their particular prejudice, i.e., the conspiracy is totally 'Jewish,' 'Catholic' or 'Masonic.' These people do not help to expose the conspiracy, but sadly play into the hands of those who want the public to believe that all conspiratorialists are screwballs." But if the possibility of distortion is to be accepted as a reason for the suppression of truth, then all of us are the losers.

Insofar as you speak for one of the world's major religious faiths, going back to Abraham who is the "father in faith" for Christians, Jews and even Moslems, I believe you have a duty to make an objective examination of the evidence which suggests that many of the principal manipulators of twentieth century history are characterized by a deep and abiding hostility to any genuine belief in and worship of God and any attempt to live and work according to His commandments. My experience in public life has shown me that I have much more in common with believing Jews than with the secular humanists who have gained such a predominant position in our nation today. It would be most interesting to see with which of these two groups you find yourself and your organization most often in alignment.

There is not a word in Gary Allen's book which could possibly be construed by any reasonable man as an attack on any religious faith. Rather, he points out repeatedly that the conspirators of our time are dedicated to the destruction of all religious faith. Even for those who do not accept his thesis, the hostility of the dominant forces in the modern world to religion is very obvious and should provide a solid basis for cooperation and alliance among all believers as against nonbelievers. Gary Allen and I and The John Birch Society and many others are ready and eager for such cooperation and alliance. We have not attacked your faith. Why then do you attack us?

As for your objections to his thesis itself, it is a subject on which reasonable men may differ—but not one which you can reasonably claim to be "discredited." The arguments for it deserve to be considered on their merits. Your letter gives no indication that you have done so. In fact, I can only describe your position on the issues raised by this book as betraying a deeply entrenched intellectual bias of your own. In the interest of the honest scholarship to which you refer in your concluding paragraph, I would urge you and your colleagues to try to free your minds of this bias and then take another look at this question.

Jews and Catholics suffered and died together in both Nazi and Soviet concentration camps. You may have read of the recent beatification at the Vatican of Blessed Father Maximilian Kolbe of Poland, who was starved to death in a Nazi death camp after volunteering to take the place of a young father originally selected for the same kind of death. By your campaign against those who are making every effort to arouse the American people to the danger of totalitarian world conquest, you are making it more likely that similar horrors will take place here in America. If this happens, those on what you call "the right" will be among the first victims—I sincerely hope, not with your approval.

Yours very truly,

JOHN G. SCHMITZ,
*Member of Congress.*

## MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN—HOW LONG?

### HON. WILLIAM J. SCHERLE

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Monday, June 19, 1972*

Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, a child asks: "Where is daddy?" A mother asks: "How is my son?" A wife asks: "Is my husband alive or dead?"

Communist North Vietnam is sadistically practicing spiritual and mental genocide on over 1,600 American prisoners of war and their families.

How long?

gard to what our defense levels ought to be. I think, however, I owe it to you and to the Nation to say that Mr. Brezhnev and his colleagues made it absolutely clear that they are going forward with defense programs in the offensive area which are not limited by these agreements.

Under those circumstances, since they will be going forward with their programs, for the United States not to go forward with its programs—and I am not suggesting which ones at this point; you can go into that later—but for the United States not to go forward with its offensive programs, or worse, for the United States unilaterally to reduce its offensive programs would mean that any incentive that the Soviets had to negotiate the follow-on agreement would be removed.

It is for that reason, without getting into the specifics as to what the level of defense spending should be, as to what the offensive programs should be, I am simply saying that if we want the follow-on agreement, we have to take two steps: First to approve these agreements; and second, we need a credible defensive position so that the Soviet Union will have an incentive to negotiate a permanent offensive freeze. That is what we all want.

These are just some random thoughts that I had on this matter. I will simply close by saying that as one stands in this room in this house, one always has a tendency to think of some of the tragedies of history of the past. As many of you know, I have always been, and am, a great admirer of Woodrow Wilson. As all of you know, the great tragedy of his life was that after he came back with the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, due to ineffective consultation, the Senate rejected the treaty and rejected the League.

We, of course, do not want that to happen. We do not think that it will happen. We have appreciated the consultation we have had up to this point, and we are now going forward with this meeting at this time.

I will only say that in looking at what Wilson said during that debate, when he was traveling the country, he made a very, it seemed to me, moving and eloquent statement. He said: "My clients are the children. My clients are the future generation."

This is an election year, and I realize that in an election year it is difficult to move as objectively as we ordinarily would move on any issue, but I would respectfully request the Members of the House and Senate, Republican and Democratic, to approach this in the spirit that Wilson explained in that period when they were debating whether they should go forward with the League of Nations, remembering that our clients are the next generation, that approval of these agreements, the treaty limiting defensive weapons, the agreement limiting offensive weapons in certain categories, and also the continution of credible defense posture, will mean that we will have done our duty by our clients, which are the next generation.

Thank you.

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CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING BY DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

Dr. KISSINGER. Gentlemen, the President has asked me to present to you the White House perspective on these agreements, and the general background, with the technical information and some more of the details to be supplied by the formal witnesses before your various committees.

I will read a statement to you which we will distribute. It is still in the process of being typed.

In considering the two agreements before the Congress, the treaty on the limitation of available missile systems and the interim agreement on the limitation of offensive arms, the overriding questions are these: Do these agreements permit the United States to maintain a defense posture that guarantees our security and protects our vital interests? Second, will they lead to a more enduring structure of peace?

In the course of the formal hearings over the coming days and weeks, the Administration will demonstrate conclusively that they serve both of these goals. I will begin that process this morning by offering some general remarks on the agreement, after which I will be happy to take your questions.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE 1970'S

The first part of my remarks will deal with U.S.-Soviet relations as they affect these agreements. The agreement which was signed 46 minutes before midnight in Moscow on the evening of May 26th by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev is without precedent in the nuclear age; indeed, in all relevant modern history.

Never before have the world's two most powerful nations, divided by ideology, history and conflicting interests, placed their central armaments under formally agreed limitation and restraint. It is fair to ask: What new conditions now prevail to have made this step commend itself to the calculated self-interests of both of the so-called superpowers, as it so clearly must have done for both willingly to undertake it?

Let me start, therefore, with a sketch of the broad design of what the President has been trying to achieve in this country's relations with the Soviet Union, since at each important turning point in the SALT negotiations we were guided not so much by the tactical solution that seemed most equitable or prudent, important as it was, but by an underlying philosophy and a specific perception of international reality.

The international situation has been undergoing a profound structural change since at least the mid-1960s. The post-World War II pattern of relations among the great powers had been altered to the point that when this Administration took office, a major reassessment was clearly in order.

The nations that had been prostrate in 1945 had regained their economic strength and their political vitality. The Communist bloc was divided into contending factions, and nationalistic forces and social and economic pressures were reasserting themselves within the individual Communist states.

Perhaps most important for the United States, our undisputed strategic predominance was declining just at a time when there was rising domestic resistance to military programs, and impatience for redistribution of resources from national defense to social demands.

Amidst all of this profound change, however, there was one important constant—the continuing dependence of most of the world's hopes for stability and peace upon the ability to reduce the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The factors which perpetuated that rivalry remain real and deep.

We are ideological adversaries, and we will in all likelihood remain so for the foreseeable future.

We are political and military competitors, and neither can be indifferent to advances by the other in either of these fields.

We each have allies whose association we value and whose interests and activities of each impinge on those of the other at numerous points.

We each possess an awesome nuclear force created and designed to meet the threat implicit in the other's strength and aims.

Each of us has thus come into possession of power singlehandedly capable of exterminating the human race. Paradoxically, this very fact, and the global interests of both sides, create a certain commonality of outlook, a sort of interdependence for survival between the two of us.

Although we compete, the conflict will not admit of resolution by victory in the classical sense. We are compelled to coexist. We have an inescapable obligation to build jointly a structure for peace. Recognition of this reality is the beginning of wisdom for a sane and effective foreign policy today.

President Nixon has made it the starting point of the United States policy since 1969. This Administration's policy is occasionally characterized as being based on the principles of the classical balance of power. To the extent that that term implies a belief that security requires a measure of equilibrium, it has a certain validity. No national leader has the right to mortgage the survival of his people to the good will of another state. We must seek firmer restraints on the actions of potentially hostile states than a sanguine appeal to their good nature.

But to the extent that balance of power means constant jockeying for marginal advantages over an opponent, it no longer applies. The reason is that the determination of national power has changed fundamentally in the nuclear age. Throughout history, the primary concern of most national leaders has been to accumulate geopolitical and military power. It would have seemed inconceivable even a generation ago that such power once gained could not be translated directly into advantage over one's opponent. But now both we and the Soviet Union have begun to find that each increment of power does not necessarily represent an increment of usable political strength.

With modern weapons, a potentially decisive advantage requires a change of such magnitude that the mere effort to obtain it can produce disaster. The simple tit-for-tat reaction to each other's programs of a decade ago is in danger of being overtaken by a more or less simultaneous and continuous process of technological advance, which opens more and more temptations for seeking decisive advantage.

A premium is put on striking first and on creating a defense to blunt the other side's retaliatory capability. In other words, marginal additions of power cannot be decisive. Potentially decisive additions are extremely dangerous, and the quest for them are destabilizing. The argument that arms races produce war has often been exaggerated. The nuclear age is overshadowed by its peril.

All of this was in the President's mind as he mapped the new directions of American policy at the outset of this Administration. There was reason to believe that the Soviet leadership might also be thinking along similar lines as the repeated failure of their attempts to gain marginal advantage in local crises or in military competition underlined the limitation of old policy approaches.

The President, therefore, decided that the United States should work to create a set of circumstances which would offer the Soviet leaders an opportunity to move away from confrontation through carefully prepared negotiations. From the first, we rejected the notion that what was lacking was a cordial climate for conducting negotiations.

Past experience has amply shown that much heralded changes in atmospherics, but not buttressed by concrete progress, will revert to previous patterns, at the first subsequent clash of interests.

We have, instead, sought to move forward across a broad range of issues so that progress in one area would add momentum to the progress of other areas.

We hoped that the Soviet Union would acquire a stake in a wide spectrum of negotiations and that it would become convinced that its interests would be best served if the entire process unfolded. We have sought, in short, to create a vested interest in mutual restraint.

At the same time, we were acutely conscious of the contradictory tendencies at

work in Soviet policy. Some factors—such as the fear of nuclear war; the emerging consumer economy, and the increased pressures of a technological, administrative society—have encouraged the Soviet leaders to seek a more stable relationship with the United States. Other factors—such as ideology, bureaucratic inertia, and the catalytic effect of turmoil in peripheral areas—have prompted pressures for tactical gains.

The President has met each of these manifestations on its own terms, demonstrating receptivity to constructive Soviet initiatives and firmness in the face of provocations or adventurism. He has kept open a private channel through which the two sides could communicate candidly and settle matters rapidly. The President was convinced that agreements dealing with questions of armaments in isolation do not, in fact, produce lasting inhibitions on military competition because they contribute little to the kind of stability that makes crises less likely. In recent months, major progress was achieved in moving toward a broadly-based accommodation of interests wtih the USSR, in which an arms limitation agreement could be a central element.

This approach was called linkage, not by the Administration, and became the object of considerable debate in 1969. Now, three years later, the SALT agreement does not stand alone, isolated and incongruous in the relationship of hostility, vulnerable at any moment to the shock of some sudden crisis. It stands, rather, linked organically, to a chain of agreements and to a broad understanding about international conduct appropriate to the dangers of the nuclear age.

The agreements on the limitation of strategic arms is, thus, not merely a technical accomplishment, although it is that in part, but is must be seen as a political event of some magnitude. This is relevant to the question of whether the agreements will be easily breached or circumvented. Given the past, no one can answer that question with certainty, but it can be said with some assurance that any country which contemplates a rupture of the agreement or a circumvention of its letter and spirit must now face the fact that it will be placing in jeopardy not only a limited arms control agreement, but broad political relationship.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE ARMS TALKS

Let me turn now to the more specific decisions we had to make about what the agreement should do and how it could be achieved.

We knew that any negotiations on arms control, especially ones involving those central weapons systems which guarantee each side's security, were found to be sensitive and complicated, requiring frequent high-level decisions.

The possibility of a deadlock would be ever present, and the repercussions of a deadlock could not help but affect U.S.-Soviet relations across the board. We had to begin, therefore, by assessing what the situation was in terms of armaments in place and under construction; what realistic alternatives we had at the negotiating table; and how a tentative or partial agreement would compare with no agreement at all.

For various reasons during the 1960s, the United States had, as you know, made the strategic decision to terminate its building programs in major offensive systems and to rely instead on qualitative improvements. By 1969, therefore, we had no active or planned programs for deploying additional ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles or bombers. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had dynamic and accelerated deployment programs in both land-based and sea-based missiles. You know, too, that the interval between conception and deployment of strategic weapons systems is generally five to ten years.

At the same time, both sides were in the initial stage of strategic defense programs, each approaching the anti-missile problem from a different standpoint. The Soviets wanted to protect their capital. The United States' program concentrated on protecting our retaliatory forces. Both sides also possessed weapons which, although not central to the strategic balance, were nevertheless relevant to it. We have aircraft deployed at forward bases and on carriers. The Soviet Union has a sizable arsenal of intermediate-range missiles able to attack our forward bases and devastate the territory of our allies.

A further complication was that the composition of forces on the two sides was not symmetrical. The Soviet Union had given priority to systems controlled within its own territory while the United States had turned increasingly to sea-based systems.

The result was that they had a panoply of different ICBM's while we essentially had one general class of ICBM's, the Minuteman, together with a more effective and modern submarine force operating from bases overseas and equipped with longer-range missiles.

All of this meant that even arriving at a basic definition of strategic equivalency would be technically demanding and politically intricate.

Looking beyond to the desired limitations, it appeared that neither side was going to make major unilateral concessions. When the national survival is at stake, such a step could not contribute to stability. The final outcome would have to be equitable and to offer a more reliable prospect for maintaining security than could be achieved without the agreements.

With these facts in view, the President, in the spring of 1969, established a group of senior officials responsible for preparing and conducting the SALT negotiations.

I acted as Chairman, and the other members included the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

This group, called the Verification Panel, has the task of analyzing the issues and factors and submitting for the President's decisions those options which commanded support in the various departments and agencies.

The Verification Panel analyzed each of the weapons systems which could conceivably be involved in an agreement. It compared the effect of different limitations on our program and on the Soviet programs, and weighed the resulting balance. It analyzed the possibilities of verification, and the precise risk of evasion, seeking to determine at what point evasion could be detected and what measures would be available for a response. This was done in various combinations so that if one piece of the equation changed, say the ABM level, the Government would be able to determine the effect of that change upon the other components of a particular negotiating package.

Our aim was to be in a position to give the negotiations a momentum. We wanted to be sure that when stalemates developed, the point at issue would not be largely tactical, and that the alternative solutions would be analyzed ahead of time and ready for immediate decision by the President.

SUMMARY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

In the first round of the talks, which began in November of 1969, the two sides established a work program and reached some tentative understanding of strategic principles.

For example, both sides more or less agreed at the outset that a very heavy ABM system could be a destabilizing factor, but that the precise level of ABM limitations would have to be set according to our success in agreeing on offensive limitations.

In the spring and summer of 1970, each country put forward more concrete proposals, translating some of the agreed principles into negotiating packages. During this period, we, on the American side, had hopes of reaching a comprehensive limitation. However, the initial search for a comprehensive solution gradually broke down over the question of defining the scope of the forces to be included.

The Soviets believed that strategic meant any weapons system capable to reaching the Soviet Union or the United States. This would have included our forward-based aircraft and carrier forces, but excluded Soviet intermediate range rockets aimed at Europe and other areas.

We opposed this approach, since it would have prejudiced our alliance commitments and raised a distinction between our own security and that of our European allies.

We offered a verifiable ban on the deployment and testing of Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles. The Soviets countered by offering a totally unverifiable production ban, while insisting on the freedom to test, thus placing the control of MIRV's effectively out of reach.

At this juncture, early in 1971, with the stalemate threatening, the President took a major new initiative by opening direct contact with the Soviet leaders to stimulate the SALT discussions and for that matter, the Berlin negotiations, and providing progress could be achieved on these two issues, to explore the feasibility of a summit meeting.

The Soviet leaders' first response was to insist that only the ABM's should be limited, and that offensive systems should be left aside. But as far as we were concerned, the still incipient ABM systems on both sides were far from the most dynamic or dangerous factors in the strategic equation. It was the Soviet offensive programs, moving ahead at the average rate of over 200 land-based and 100 sea-based missiles a year, which we felt constituted the most urgent issue. To limit our option of developing the ABM system without at the same time checking the growth of the Soviet offensive threat was unacceptable.

Exchanges between the President and the Soviet leaders embodying these views produced the understanding of May 20, 1971. As any workable compromise in the field must do, that understanding met each side's essential concerns. Since the offensive systems were complex and since agreement with respect to all of them had proved impossible, it was agreed that the initial offensive settlement would be an interim agreement and not a permanent treaty, and that it would freeze only selected categories at agreed levels.

On the defensive side, the understanding called for negotiations towards a permanent ABM solution with talks on both issues to proceed simultaneously to a common conclusion.

This left two major issues for the negotiators, the precise level of the allowed ABM's, and the scope of the interim agreement, specifically what weapons would be included in the freeze.

Devising an equitable agreement on ABM's proved extremely difficult. The United States had virtually completed its ABM site at Grand Forks, and we were working on the second site at Malmstrom. Hence, we proposed freezing deployments at levels operational or under construction, that is to say, two ICBM sites on our side, and the Moscow defense on the other.

The Soviets objected this would deny them the right to have any protection for their ICBM's, a new formula was then devised allowing each side to choose two sites, one each for national capital and ICBM defense or both for ICBM defense. The resolution of the ABM issue was completed after our Chiefs of Staff, supported by the Secretary of De-

fense, decided that a site in Washington to defend the National Command Authority was to be preferred over the second ICBM-protective site at Malmstrom. They reasoned that while a limited defense would not assure the ultimate survival of the National Command Authority, it would buy time against a major attack while the radars in both the NCA defense and the defense of ICBM's would provide valuable warning. Moreover, an NCA defense would protect the National Command Authority in the event of a small attack by some third country or even an accidental or unauthorized launch of a weapon toward the United States.

The President accepted their recommendation.

What about the offensive weapons freeze? Early in the discussions about the implementation of this portion of the May 20 understanding between the President and the Soviet leaders, it was decided to exclude from the freeze bombers and so-called forward-based systems. To exclude, that is, the weapons in which this country holds an advantage.

We urged the Congress to keep this fact in mind, when assessing the numerical ratios of weapons which are subject to the offensive freeze.

There was also relatively rapid agreement following the May 20 breakthrough that intercontinental ballistic missiles would be covered. This left the issue of the inclusion of submarines.

With respect to ICBM's in submarines, the situation was as follows: The Soviet Union had been deploying at the average annual rate of 200 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 100 sea-based ballistic missiles a year. The U.S. had completed deployments of Minuteman and the 41 Polaris submarines in 1967. Of course, as you know, we are engaged in increasing the number of warheads on both our ICBM's and submarine-launched missiles. We were, and are, developing a new submarine system, although it cannot be deployed until 1978 or until after the end of the freeze. In other words, as a result of decisions made in the 1960's, and not reversible with the time-frame of the protected agreement, there would be a numerical gap against us in the two categories of land- and sea-based missile systems whether or not there was an agreement. Without an agreement, the gap would steadily widen.

The agreement would not create the gap. It would prevent its enlargement to our disadvantage. In short, a freeze of ICBMs and sea-based systems would be overwhelmingly in the United States' interest.

These basic considerations undoubtedly impelled the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that any freeze which was to command their support must include the submarine-based system. The only possible alternative was a crash program for building additional missile-launching submarines. The President explored this idea with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations. Their firm judgment was that such a program was undesirable. It could not produce results before 1976—that is, toward the very end of a projected freeze—and only by building a type of submarine similar to our current fleet, and without many of the features most needed for the 1980's and beyond.

The President once again used his direct channel to the Soviet leaders, this time to urge the inclusion of missile-launching submarines in the offensive agreement.

After a long period of hesitation, the Soviet leaders agreed in principle at the end of April. Final details were worked out in Moscow between the President and the Soviet leaders.

My purpose in dwelling at such length upon the details of our internal deliberations and negotiations has been to make one crucial point: Neither the freeze of ICBMs nor the freeze of submarine-launched missiles was a Soviet idea, and hence, it is not an American concession. On the contrary, in both cases it was the Soviet Union which reluctantly acceded to American proposals after long and painful deliberation.

PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT

I will not spend this group's time in further review of the frequently arduous negotiations in Vienna, Helsinki, and during the summit in Moscow leading to the final agreement. I do want to pay tribute on behalf of the President to Ambassador Smith and his delegation, whose dedication, negotiating skill and patience contributed decisively to the outcome.

Let me summarize the principal provisions of the documents as signed. The ABM treaty allows each side to have one ABM site for defense of its national command authority and another for the defense of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The two must be at least 1,300 kilometers, or 800 miles apart in order to prevent the development of a territorial defense. Each ABM site can have 100 ABM interceptors.

The treaty contains additional provisions which effectively prohibit either the establishment of a radar base for the defense of populated areas or the attainment of capabilities to intercept ballistic missiles by conversion of air defense missiles to anti-ballistic missiles.

It provides for withdrawal by either party on six months' notice, if supreme national interests are judged to have been jeopardized by extraordinary events. By setting a limit to ABM defenses the treaty not only eliminates ones area of potentially dangerous defensive competition, but it reduces the incentive for continuing deployment of offensive systems.

As long as it lasts, offensive missile forces have, in effect, a free ride to their targets. Beyond a certain level of sufficiency, differences in numbers are therefore not conclusive.

The interim agreement on offensive arms is to run for five years, unless replaced by a more comprehensive permanent agreement which will be the subject of further negotiations, or unless terminated by notification similar to that for the treaty.

In essence this agreement will freeze the numbers of strategic offensive misssiles on both sides at approximately the levels currently operational and under construction. For ICBM's this is 1054 for the United States and 1618 for the Soviet Union. Within this overall limitation, the Soviet Union has accepted a freeze of its heavy ICBM launchers, the weapons most threatening to our strategic forces.

There is also a prohibition on conversion of lights ICBM's into heavy missiles. These provisions are buttressed by verifiable provisions and criteria, specifically the prohibition against any significant enlargement of missile silos.

The submarine limitations are more complicated. In brief, the Soviets are frozen to their claimed current level, operational and under construction, of about 740 missiles, some of them on an older type nuclear submarine. They are permitted to build to a ceiling of 62 boats and 950 missiles, but only if they dismantle older ICBM's or submarine-based missiles to offset the new construction.

This would mean dismantling 210 ICBM's and some 30 missiles on some nine older nuclear submarines. Bombers and other aircraft are not included in this agreement.

In sum, the interim offensive agreement will keep the overall number of strategic ballistic missile launchers both on land and at sea within an agreed ceiling which is essentially the current level, operational or under construction. It will not prohibit the United States from continuing current and planned strategic offensive programs, since neither the multiple-warhead conversion, nor the B-1 is within the purview of the freeze and since the ULMS submarine system is not, or never was planned for deployment until after 1977. The agreement will stop the Soviet Union from increasing the existing numerical gap in missile launchers.

Finally, there are a number of interpretative statements which were provided to the Congress along with the agreements. These interpretations are in several forms: Agreed statements initialed by the delegations, agreed interpretations or common understandings which were not set down formally and initialed, unilateral interpretations to make our position clear in instances where we could not get total agreement.

In any negotiation of this complexity, there will inevitably be details upon which the parties cannot agree. We made certain unilateral statements in order to insure that our positions on these details was included in the negotiating record and understood by the other side.

The agreed interpretations and common understandings for the most part deal with detailed technical aspects of limitations on ABM systems and offensive weapons. For example, it was agreed that the size of missile silos could not be significantly increased and that "significantly" meant not more than 10 to 15 percent.

In the more important unilateral declarations we made clear to the Soviets that the introduction of land mobile ICBM's would be inconsistent with the agreement. Since the publication of the various unilateral interpretative statements, suggestions have been heard that the language of the treaty and agreement in fact hide deep-seated disagreements. But it must be recognized that in any limited agreements, which are between old time adversaries, there are bound to be certain gaps.

In this case the gaps relate not so much to the terms themselves, but rather to what it was impossible to include. The interpretations do not vitiate these agreements, but they expand and add to the agreements.

WHAT DO THE AGREEMENTS MEAN?

Taking the longer perspective, what can we say has been accomplished?

First, it is clear that the agreement will enhance the security of both sides. No agreement which fails to do so could have been signed in the first place or stood any chance of lasting after it was signed. An attempt to gain a unilateral advantage in the strategic field must be self-defeating.

The President has given the most careful consideration to the final terms. He has asked me to reiterate most emphatically this morning his conviction that the agreements fully protect our national security and our vital interests.

Secondly, the President is determined that our security and vital interests shall remain fully protected. If the Senate consents to ratification of the treaty and if the Congress approves the interim agreement, the Administration will, therefore, pursue two parallel courses.

On the one hand, we shall push the next phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the same energy and conviction that have produced these initial agreements.

On the other hand, until further Arms limits are negotiated, we shall push research and development and the production capacity to remain in a fully protected strategic posture should follow-on agreements prove unattainable and so as to avoid giving the other side a temptation to break out of the agreement.

Third, the President believes that these agreements, embedded as they are in the fabric of an emerging new relationship, can hold tremendous political and historical significance in the coming decades. For the first time, two great powers, deeply divided by their divergent values, philosophies, and so-

cial systems, have agreed to restrain the very armaments on which their national survival depends. No decision of this magnitude could have been taken unless it had been part of a larger decision to place relations on a new foundation of restraint, cooperation and steadily evolving confidence. A spectrum of agreements on joint efforts with regard to the environment, space, health, and promising negotiations on economic relations provides a prospect for avoiding the failure of the Washington Naval Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand pact outlawing war which collapsed in part for lack of an adequate political foundation.

The final verdict must wait on events, but there is at least reason to hope that these accords represent a major break in the pattern of suspicion, hostility, and confrontation which has dominated U.S.-Soviet relations for a generation. The two great nuclear powers must not let this opportunity slip away by jockeying for marginal advantages.

Inevitably an agreement of such consequence raises serious questions on the part of concerned individuals of quite different persuasions. I cannot do justice to all of them here. Let me deal with some of the most frequently asked since the agreements were signed three weeks ago.

Who won?

The President has already answered this question. He has stressed that it is inappropriate to pose the question in terms of victory or defeat. In an agreement of this kind, either both sides win or both sides lose. This will either be a serious attempt to turn the world away from time-worn practices of jockeying for power, or there will be endless, wasteful and purposeless competition in the acquisition of armaments.

Does the agreement perpetuate a U.S. strategic disadvantage?

We reject the premise of that question on two grounds. First, the present situation is on balance advantageous to the United States. Second, the Interim Agreement perpetuates nothing which did not already exist in fact and which could only have gotten worse without an agreement.

Our present strategic military situation is sound. Much of the criticism has focused on the imbalance in number of missiles between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But, this only examines one aspect of the problem. To assess the overall balance it is necessary to consider those forces not in the agreement; our bomber force which is substantially larger and more effective than the Soviet bomber force, and our forward base systems.

The quality of the weapons must also be weighed. We are confident we have a major advantage in nuclear weapons technology and in warhead accuracy. Also, with our MIRV's we have a two-to-one lead today in numbers of warheads and this lead will be maintained during the period of the agreement, even if the Soviets develop and deploy MIRV's of their own.

Then there are such factors as deployment characteristics. For example, because of the difference in geography and basing, it has been estimated that the Soviet Union requires three submarines for two of ours to be able to keep an equal number on station.

When the total picture is viewed, our strategic forces are seen to be completely sufficient.

The Soviets have more missile launchers, but when other relevant systems such as bombers are counted there are roughly the same number of launchers on each side. We have a big advantage on warheads. The Soviets have an advantage on megatonnage.

What is disadvantageous to us, though, is the trend of new weapons deployment by the Soviet Union and the projected imbalance five years hence based on that trend. The relevant question to ask, therefore, is what the freeze prevents; where would be be by 1977 without a freeze? Considering the current momentum by the Soviet Union, in both ICBM's and submarine launched ballistic missiles, the ceiling set in the Interim Agreement can only be interpreted as a sound arrangement that makes a major contribution to our national security.

Does the agreement jeopardize our security in the future?

The current arms race compounds numbers by technology. The Soviet Union has proved that it can best compete in sheer numbers. This is the area which is limited by the agreement.

Thus the agreement confines the competition with the Soviets to the area of technology? And, heretofore, we have had a significant advantage.

The follow-on negotiations will attempt to bring the technological race under control. Until these negotiations succeed, we must take care not to anticipate their outcome by unilateral decisions.

Can we trust the Soviets?

The possibility always exists that the Soviets will treat the Moscow agreements as they have sometimes treated earlier ones, as just another tactical opportunity in the protracted conflict. If this happens, the United States will have to respond. This we shall plan to prepare to do psychologically and strategically and provided the Congress accepts the strategic programs on which the acceptance of the agreements was predicated.

I have said enough to indicate we advocate these agreements not on the basis of trust, but on the basis of the enlightened self-interests of both sides. This self-interest is reinforced by the carefully drafted verification provisions in the agreement. Beyond the legal obligations, both sides have a stake in all of the agreements that have been signed, and a large stake in the broad process of improvement in relations that has begun. The Soviet leaders are serious men, and we are confident that they will not lightly abandon the course that has led to the summit meeting and to these initial agreements. For our own part, we will not abandon this course without major provocation, because it is in the interest of this country and in the interest of mankind to pursue it.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

At the conclusion of the Moscow summit, the President and General Secretary Brezhnev signed a Declaration of Principles to govern the future relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. These principles state that there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence in the nuclear age. They commit both sides to avoid direct armed confrontation, to use restraint in local conflicts, to assert no special claims in derogation of the sovereign equality of all nations, to stress cooperation and negotiation at all points of our relationship.

At this point, these principles reflect an aspiration and an attitude. This Administration will spare no effort to translate the aspiration into reality. We shall strive with determination to overcome further the miasma of suspicion and self-confirming preemptive actions which have characterized the Cold War.

Of course the temptation is to continue along well worn paths. The status quo has the advantage of reality, but history is strewn with the wreckage of nations which sought their future in their past. Catastrophe has resulted far less often from conscious decisions than from the fear of breaking loose from established patterns through the inexorable march towards cataclysm because nobody knew what else to do. The paralysis of policy which destroyed Europe in 1914 would surely destroy the world if we let it happen again in the nuclear age.

Thus the deepest question we ask is not whether we can trust the Soviets, but whether we can trust the Soviets, but whether we can trust ourselves. Some have expressed concern about the agreements not because they object to their terms, but because they are afraid of the euphoria that these agreements might produce.

But surely we cannot be asked to maintain unavoidable tension just to carry out programs which our national survival should dictate in any event. We must not develop a national psychology by which we can act only on the basis of what we are against and not on what we are for.

Our challenges then are: Can we chart a new course with hope but without illusion, with large purposes but without sentimentality? Can we be both generous and strong? It is not often that a country has the opportunity to answer such questions meaningfully. We are now at such a juncture where peace and progress depend on our faith and our fortitude.

It is in this spirit that the President has negotiated the agreements. It is in this spirit that he asks the approval of the treaty and the Interim Agreement and that I now stand ready to answer your questions.

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QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION AFTER A BRIEFING BY DR. HENRY KISSINGER

Mr. MACGREGOR. Gentlemen, as the President indicated in his report to the Joint Session of Congress two week ago tonight, he places the highest importance on executive-legislative partnership in the further carrying forward of the constitutional process with respect to the treaty and the agreement.

This session this morning is designed to further that commitment on the President's part and to give to you and through you the American people, an opportunity for the fullest possible debate and the fullest range of questions.

The President has asked me, and I would like to do so, to recognize the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Fulbright.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. MacGregor.

Dr. Kissinger, first, may I say I think that was an extraordinarily thorough and enlightening statement. The only regret I have is that he didn't make it public so all the country could have heard it, because I think it is a very great description, I think, of what these agreements mean.

I am thoroughly in accord with the spirit with which you have given them and the way the President has presented this agreement for our country. I have only one serious question about it.

There does appear to me to be an inherent inconsistency in the attitude as expressed by the Secretary of Defense the other day. For background, I will read one sentence. This is a quote from his testimony before the Armed Services Committee: "I could not support the agreements if the Congress fails to act on movement forward of the Trident system, the B–1 bombers or other programs that we have outlined to improve our strategic offensive systems during this five-year period."

Now, the explanation that Mr. Kissinger has made about maintaining our security during the five-year period I accept as a general statement, but in view of the fact that we know the Soviets have no aircraft carriers whatever, they have a very small and not very modern bomber force, they have no forward bases similar to ours, unless you consider Cuba perhaps a forward base.

But so far, we have no evidence that it is being so prepared. They are not planning a Trident system that I know of. Their system of submarines is traditional and similar to the ones they already have.

In view of this, it seems to me to couple the approval of the ABM and the interim agreement with Congressional approval of these vastly expensive programs raises a serious question about our determination to

accept this agreement in the spirit in which I think it was negotiated and the spirit which you have stated. That is a gradual relaxation of the tensions, and not to use these agreements as an excuse for a greatly enlarged arms system of our own.

This is the only thing that has bothered me about them. I, of course, am personally extremely pleased with the overall agreements with the sole exception, do we mean it, as I have said, and you yourself so offer, put yourself in the place of the Russians, if we proceed immediately to a very large expansion of our weapons system, would this not leave in the mind of General Grechko and his colleagues a question about our sincerity in really moving toward a reduction in the arms race.

This is the only question I have and it is the one which bothers me and I wish you would enlarge upon the necessity of proceeding at once and tying these agreements with the approval of programs about which there were serious questions even before this agreement was made, there were very serious questions about the A–14 and B–1 before these negotiations were agreed on.

Now, we seem to be put in the position of being pressured into that in order to get an agreement with which I thoroughly in accord.

Dr. KISSINGER. As the President pointed out, and as I also said in my statement, Mr. Chairman, we intend to move on two tracks: One, we hope to start the second round of SALT negotiations as soon as the Senate ratifies the treaty and the Congress approves the interim agreement.

If the schedule that was tentatively suggested to you by the President were met, that is to say, approval by the end of August, we would hope to have the first session of the second round of SALT sometime during October and then to begin the process again. We will pursue those negotiations with the attitude towards bringing about a change in the international climate that I have described.

At the same time, the question arises of what we should do in our national defense posture while we engage in these negotiations. It has been the judgment of this Administration that we must continue these programs which preserve our strategic position. I do not, in this setting, want to go into each individual weapon system because I believe that the appropriate committees will examine the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to them.

Our view, however, is that we must continue those strategic programs which are permitted by the agreement and those research and development efforts in areas that are covered by the agreement in case the follow-on agreement cannot be negotiated.

Our experience has been that an on-going program is no obstacle to an agreement and, on the contrary may accelerate it. That was certainly the case with respect to Safeguard. We are in the position with respect to various categories of weapons that the Soviet Union has an accelerated program, and we have none. Therefore, our position is that we are presenting both of these programs on their merits. We are not making them conditional. We are saying that the treaty is justified on its merits, but we are also saying that the requirements of national security impel us in the direction of the strategic programs, and we hope that the Congress will approve both of these programs as it examines each of them on its merits.

Mr. MACGREGOR. I am sure if the President were here, he would like to have recognized the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Chairman Morgan.

Congressman MORGAN. Thank you, Clark, and I want to thank Dr. Kissinger in inviting us to brief us on it.

When the President appeared here in the short appearance he made before this group, he spelled out the reason why this had to be done in Moscow at such a high level, because it crossed over so many agencies and because of the form of government of the Soviet Union.

He also ended up by saying that you would not be available for testimony on Capitol Hill, in which I agree. But I just wondered, with the five committees who are represented here today, who are going to consider over in the Senate side the Treaty of the ABM's and over on the House side this, the limitation that has been set by you and the President, of September 1, whether you would be available by these committees for consultation as we go along.

Dr. KISSINGER. I would be delighted to meet with members of these committees in groups, on an individual basis, or in the kind of setting that we have worked out before, in which I will meet with the committees at the invitation of the Chairman in some setting that maintains the position of Executive privilege.

But I will be fully available to answer any questions and we are prepared to go as far as is humanly possible with respect to Executive privilege.

Certainly, to make available to the Congress any answers that we can.

Congressman MORGAN. I want to assure you that the Committee on Foreign Affairs will go to work on this as soon as we get back from the Democratic Convention.

Mr. MACGREGOR. I am sure we would like to hear from the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the Honorable John Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Well, Mr. Chairman, and colleagues of the Congress, I certainly didn't come here to make a statement. I came to listen and to learn. I did respond when I walked in, to a request that I would say just a word.

Gentlemen and ladies here in the Congress, I have been on the Armed Services Committee since before we had ICBM's and I have thought many times the growing realization I had of what these could mean and now what they do mean in our hands and then this same weapon in the hands of our adversaries.

So, I have been driven into a corner of wanting very much to have some kind of an agreement that would be the germ, perhaps, of something that would relieve the tensions and assure our safety.

I do have one major reservation about this situation I am going to mention, but I do believe if we can approve it, it is a start, maybe not much of a start, but it is a start. That is the biggest thing I see about it.

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May I just respond one moment to the very major point that the Senator from Arkansas made, about if we get these agreements, why go on with the ULM's. I remember so well the ABM debate that we had in the Senate. The most outstanding point in my mind, I was convinced that the great probability was that by putting in the ABM for whatever it was worth, it might increase the chances of getting some kind of a start on agreements.

Not that I have any perception, but as I have understood, from the President at other briefings, they thought that was a major point in getting this.

This same reasoning applies, I think. I am going to support the B–1 and the ULM's and frankly, I am going all of the way on ULM's now, even though I had in mind supporting it only for a limited amount this year, and not on an all-out program.

I have in mind now, the statement you made, Dr. Kissinger, but I am not under its impact exactly, and I have said these things because they were old thoughts. But it is quite helpful.

By the way, is this an open meeting, is the press here? Anyway, the reservation I have is on this surveillance, our power to detect any cheating. That hadn't been gone into here and it hasn't been gone into in other briefings that I have been to, and I don't insist on any question being answered on it, but I raise that point.

If you want to comment on it, you may. I want to make this observation. I think that we are more than doers out there in the Congress. We are not going to say just Yes or No. We have to actively make up our mind on this, and take a position for future generations.

I believe that will help us approach it. Do you want to comment on that detection and surveillance?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I am sure that when Mr. Holms testifies in executive sessions, that he can go into more detail than I can. In fact, all I can do is to make the statement that we are confident that national means of verification are sufficient to monitor the numerical limitations of this agreement.

We studied this problem in great detail before we entered negotiations, and determined for each category of weapon the margin of error that we thought our collection systems had and what we could do to react once we found out that there had been a violation.

In each of these cases, we found that the margin was well within tolerable limits. In this case, however, where we are dealing with numbers, we are confident that the national means of verification are sufficient to give us the highest degree of confidence that this agreement will be lived up to, or that we will know it almost immediately if it is not lived up to.

Mr. MACGREGOR. The President is aware that the members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy have developed a tremendous expertise which applies directly to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and to the interim agreement and we are delighted to see the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Honorable John Pastore, from Rhode Island.

Senator Pastore, do you have a question?

Senator PASTORE. Not exactly a question for the moment because I have asked it before and I think it has been answered. I think the one dominant question here is whether or not in these agreements we have reserved to ourselves the military potential that will constitute a deterrent against an attack upon us, and also whether or not in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff they are all unanimous that this is a good agreement.

Dr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, we would not have entered into this agreement if we thought it impaired our capacity for deterrence. As was pointed out in my statement, we believe that it maintains the capacity of deterrence and at the same time, enables the world to start toward turning away from the arms race as well as improving the whole international climate.

Secondly, at every stage of this agreement we consulted in the greatest detail with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This has been pointed out, both in my statement, but it was done throughout the work of the Verification Panel in which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is represented and at every decision that the President made, the International Security Council

I do not know of any significant decision—I don't know of any decision with respect to this agreement that was made which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not unanimously supported.

During the final stages of the negotiation in Moscow, we were in direct touch with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the various proposals unfolded, and, of course, you will be calling Admiral Moorer yourself, but I am certain that he will confirm the unanimous support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for this agreement.

Mr. MCGREGOR. Yes, Congressman.

Congressman NEDZI. Dr. Kissinger, on March 14, the President gave as a rationale for the broad safeguard system, part of his rationale, was the defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which the People's Republic of China is likely to be able to mount within the decade.

Has anything happened to that threat, and in that connection, are you able to tell us anything about your forthcoming visit to China?

Dr. KISSINGER. Our estimate of the Chinese nuclear capability is still approximately what it was at the time that Safeguard was developed. Our estimate of the likelihood of our being involved in any nuclear conflict with the People's Republic of China is considerably less than it was at the time that the Safeguard program was submitted to the Congress, because of the political developments that have happened since then, specifically the opening toward China.

Therefore, we accept now that in the overall context of the contribution that this agreement could make toward world peace and toward improving general relationships, and in the light, also, of improvement of relations with the People's Republic of China, that we could pay this price of foregoing the additional protection that the President requested in his original statement.

We could do this all the more so because if our estimates turn out to be incorrect, we have such an overwhelming retaliatory capability vis-a-vis any other country other than the Soviet Union, that the idea of a third nuclear country attacking the United States is a rather remote possibility

Congressman NEDZI. Didn't we have it three months ago?

Dr. KISSINGER. I was talking about the justification which the President gave when he started the Sagefuard Program. I don't know what March 14th statement you are talking about. It must have been March 14, 1969.

Congressman NEDZI. My apologies.

Dr. KISSINGER. It was not March 14th of this year.

Congressman NEDZI. I stand corrected.

Dr. KISSINGER. That was 1969. Then with respect to my visit to the Peoples Republic of China, it was foreseen in the Shanghai Communique. It was tentatively agreed to at the time of the President's visit to Peking that sometime during the course of the summer we would send a senior representative to the Peoples Republic. We intend to review the whole range of international problems as they affect American-Chinese relationships.

Mr. MACGREGOR. When I recognized Congressman Nedzi, I was looking unsuccessfully for the Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, Congressman Hebert of Louisiana. I don't see Eddie, but I do see the ranking majority Member of the Committee, and the Vice Chairman of the Committee on Atomic Energy. I would like to recognize Congressman Mel Price.

Congressman PRICE. Mr. MacGregor, Mr. Hebert has important business in Louisiana today and could not be here. But I would like to advise the group that the committee will mark up the Procurement Bill and all the items in there are going to be approved this afternoon.

Senator BENNETT. My question is partly a request for additional clarification. Do I understand that Mr. Kissinger's statement will be available to us as well as that of the President?

Dr. KISSINGER. That is correct.

Congressman HANSON. Dr. Kissinger, as I understand the ABM Treaty, it anticipates the construction of an ABM site at the capital of each of the two countries, plus one other site.

Dr. KISSINGER. That is correct.

Congressman HANSON. With respect to an ABM system to protect our Nation's Capital, is it the intention of the Administration to push forward for authorization and construction of this system around Washington and how important is it to the credible defense to which reference was made that we do proceed to authorize and construct this protection for the Nation's Capital? Will our position be significantly weakened in terms of future negotiations if we fail to take this step?

Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, we will request this authorization. Secondly, it was the judgment of our senior military leaders that a second site in the Capital area would be more useful than a second site in Malstrom. It would give additional warning time in case of a major attack and it would give protection against an attack by a third country. It is for this reason that we are recommending to the Congress and requesting the Congress to authorize its construction.

Senator JACKSON. Dr. Kissinger, first I want to compliment you on a very fine statement. I think we all want to see an end to the arms race, but I think we all should agree that if you are going to have an agreement it should be one that will stabilize and not destabilize. When you have a number of ambiguities such as we have in the present arrangement, I think it is fraught with some trouble.

For example, I just want to illustrate a couple: There are a lot of them. But we do have, for example, a bilateral understanding on the number of advanced strategic type submarines, the Y Class, Polaris. That is defined specifically. But there is no specific limitation other than our unilateral statement as to the number of land-based missiles, intercontinental, that are permitted.

Would you comment? The same is true of "What is a heavy missile?"

Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to the numbers of missiles actually being deployed, the Soviet Union has been extremely reluctant to specify precise numbers, that is true. We have operated with a number of 1618. There is absolutely no question that if our intelligence should reveal that the Soviet numbers significantly exceed that figure that the whole premise of the agreement will be in question.

Now, what will maintain this agreement is not the fact that we can wave these provisions and take it to court at any particular moment, but what will maintain this agreement is the consequences the other side will face if it turns out that it has turned into a scrap of paper and that it is being circumvented.

If this agreement were being circumvented, obviously we would have to take compensatory steps in the strategic field. But beyond that, as is pointed out in my statement, the two countries have a unique opportunity right now to move into an entirely different relationship of building additional trust.

If it turns out that through legalistic interpretations of provisions of the agreement of through falling to specify numbers about which we have left absolutely no doubt as to our interpretation and where are hereby reaffirmed, if it should turn out that those numbers are being challenged in any significant way at all, then this would cast a doubt. It would not only threaten disagreement, but it would threaten the whole basis of this new relationship which I have described.

We are very confident that our national means of detection give us the highest degree of confidence that these numbers cannot be exceeded without our knowing and that if they are exceeded that the consequences I described will follow.

Now, with respect to the definition of heavy missiles, this was the subject of extensive discussions at Vienna and Helsinki, and finally Moscow. No doubt, one of the reasons for the Soviet reluctance to specify a precise characteristic is because undoubtedly they are planning to modernize within the existing framework some of the weapons they now possess.

The agreement specifically permits the modernization of weapons. There are, however, a number of safeguards. First there is the safeguard that no missile larger than the heaviest light missile that now exists can be substituted.

Secondly, there is the provision that the silo configuration cannot be changed in a significant way and then the agreed interpretive statement or the interpretive statement which we made, which the other side stated reflected its views also, that this meant that it could not be increased by more than 10 to 15 percent.

We believe that these two statements, taken in conjunction, give us an adequate safeguard against a substantial substitution of heavy missiles for light missiles. So, we think we have adequate safeguards with respect to that issue.

It is, however, true, Senator Jackson, that within these limitations, improvements, qualitative improvements, are possible which will increase the capabilities of each of these missiles and this is one of the reasons why we have advocated qualitative improvements in our strategic forces. But as far as the break between the light and the heavy missiles is concerned, we believe that we have assurances through the two safeguards that I have mentioned to you.

Congressman STRATTON. Dr. Kissinger, I have one question with regard to one of the unilateral statements that was published the other day. Under the agreement, as I understand it, we have 41 Polaris submarines and we could go to 44 if we turned in our Titans. But the Soviets say that they are considering the British and the French Polaris submarines to be part of our force and that if the total goes over 50 they will consider the agreement breached. The British have four. The French have one and three others in construciton, which means that if the French ones are completed, then we could only have 42 without putting it over the total of 50.

Could you comment on how we can hold down the British and French as part of this agreement?

Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, the Soviet Union has not said that they would consider the agreement breached. The Soviet Union has said that they would then reserve the right to ask for additional compensation.

Secondly, we have emphatically rejected that interpretative recitation and have written our rejection of that into the record. So, we do not consider that we have agreed to this Soviet interpretation. You have to remember the interpretative statements are in a number of categories. There are those that are agreed and initialed. There are those orally agreed. There are those that are unilateral and not challenged and then there are those that are unilateral and challenged.

I would think that a unilateral statement that was challenged at the time it was made would not be the most determining feature in our own policy with respect to this.

But, finally, the provisions that permit the trading in of one type of missile for another do not have to be implemented. We have the right, but we don't have the obligation, to trade in the Titans for additional submarines and given our construction program at this moment, with no additional submarines of the Polaris type being built, we may well decide not to exercise the option and keep the Titans, in which case your question would be moot.

But in any event, we have not accepted this Soviet interpretation.

Congressman PIKE. Dr. Kissinger, if I understand the philosophy whereby one of these agreements requires a treaty and the other is an executive agreement, it has to do with the fact that the executive agreement is lim-

ited to a term of years. As we look ahead to SALT II, I would like to ask this question: For how long a period of years could an executive agreement be made which was not required to be a treaty? Could it be for 25 years, for example?

I would also like to ask a question in this regard: the tentative agreement was fairly well leaked or publicized in some manner before the President went to Moscow. I would simply like to ask whether there were any substantive changes made at Moscow.

Dr. KISSINGER. The first question is an important Constitutional question: At what point does an executive agreement achieve character of such permanence that it should really more properly be in the form of a treaty?

There were two reasons why the executive agreement was put into that form. One was because of its limited duration and secondly because of its limited scope. That is to say, here we had an agreement, the major categories of which were going to be included again in a more comprehensive negotiation leading to a more permanent arrangement.

For example, the disparity which is involved for a limited period of time might not prove acceptable for a more permanent arrangement.

For this reason, that is to say, the limited duration and the limited scope, it was decided that an Executive Agreement which, however, is submitted to the entire Congress, was more appropriate.

If you got to the point where you made a 25-year agreement, I don't want to prejudge that issue, but as a political scientist and not as a presidential assistant, it would look more like a treaty to me. But I don't want to get into that.

Now, with respect to the second question, the general outlines of the agreement were shaped, really, in three ways. One was by negotiations in Helsinki and Vienna, which did most of the detail. But the policy decisions that were brought about through direct contact between the President and the Soviet leaders which led to the May 20, 1971 breakthrough and then, again, to the formula which led to the inclusion of the submarines—which we were in Moscow there were four major issues that had not been resolved in Helsinki, which were known as issues, but the solution of which could not have been leaked because it hadn't been achieved. Those were the subjects that were most intensively discussed between the President and the General Secretary, primarily the issue of how you calculate the submarine limits, and at what point the replacement of submarines has to start, and which submarines had to be counted for replacement purposes, and questions of this type.

There were subsidiary issues having to do with the silos, I mentioned interpretative statements, and matters of this kind, none of which had been settled in Helsinki, and had to be settled in very extensive conversations between the president and the General Secretary and between members of our delegation in Moscow and their Soviet colleagues.

Mr. MCGREGOR. Senator Javits?

Senator JAVITS. I would like to revert to the question asked by Senator Fulbright and Senator Stennis, because they raise some, to my mind, very serious points.

On the assumption that the treaty can be denounced in six months, but the agreement cannot be denounced at all, it is is breached, either party can treat it as an end. What do you advise us to about the September 1 date the President names, if by then we have not determined that we wish to authorize any additional weapons systems in view of the fact that the President has made it clear that he made this agreement on the assumption that we, too, would press forward with our weapons plans as the Russians are?

And the second part of that question is: Is this the total bill or are there more weapons systems to come within the next five years that we are going to have to authorize because we have made this deal?

Dr. KISSINGER. First, I think it is not correct to say that you have been asked to authorize weapons because we have made this deal. All of the weapons that you are being asked to authorize had been requested prior to the deal and were judged to be necessary before the deal. The question is not whether the deal impels them, but whether the deal makes them dispensable.

This is the shape of the debate.

Secondly, I am frankly not sure about the withdrawal provisions of the defensive agreement. I thought it had the same withdrawal provisions.

It is my impression that the offensive agreement has exactly the same withdrawal provisions of the defensive treaty, so that we are protected.

Thirdly, as I have said, we are requesting both of these programs on their own merit, and, therefore, it is up to the Congress to decide how to deal with them.

Senator PERCY. Dr. Kissinger, I would like to first express that in dealing with our two major adversaries, you will always be as skillful and successful as you have in skirting around the Executive privilege question.

I think in the case of the treaty and the agreements, you have been, and the President has been, and Secretary Rogers.

My question pertains to the second allowable site that each party can have. Neither one of us has even begun the preparation of those two sites. Neither one of us have either site in our original defense strategy plan. Is it possible that we could reach an agreement that neither one of us go ahead with those two sites and would we take the initiative in suggesting that might be a possibility?

Dr. KISSINGER. The question of the deferral of the second site had been considered and had been rejected by both sides. The Soviet Union had taken the position that it could not agree to an ABM limitation that did not give it the right as long as we were in a position to defend ICBM's in which they could not also defend some ICBM's of their own.

So, therefore, our failure to go ahead with our second site would, in effect, give them two sites to our one. The only possibility for us would have been to scrap the site we had and build an entirely new one in Washington, and it seemed to us not a good policy to begin a disarmament agreement by which we had to scrap everything that we had done in order to build something entirely different from what we started out to do.

Mr. MACGREGOR. If you have any complaint about this process, I am the one to complain to, but I have not identified to date the following hands, and I would like to recognize you in this order, if I may. Senator Ervin, Congressman Gubser, Congressman Fascell, Congressman Leggett, and Congressman Frelinghuysen, and then we will go on from there.

Senator ERVIN. I would like to ask this question. I think we had the wisest of all Americans in Benjamin Franklin, and he said, "Beware of being lulled into dangerous security." My question is this: Wouldn't a ratification of the treaty and the approval of the Limited Arms Agreement make it all the more imperative for us to go forward with the Trident and with the B-1 bomber, and other programs to keep from being lulled into a dangerous sense of security?

Dr. KISSINGER. That is the position of the Administration.

Congressman GUBSER. I seem to get from your remarks that we do, under the treaty, have the option of going ahead with Malmstrom instead of the protection of the National Capital. Is that correct or was that possible at one time?

Dr. KISSINGER. This was considered at one time, and then when we reached a point where we were talking about two sites, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that if there were to be two sites, they would rather have the second site around the National Command Authority than in Malmstrom. Whether we could have obtained Soviet acquiescence in two ICBM sites rather than having the second site in Washington, we cannot judge today, because we accepted the recommendations of our military leaders that if there were to be a second site, that second site should be in Washington.

Congressman FASCELL. Dr. Kissinger, what does the protocol address itself to, and what were the circumstances which brought it about; and, secondly, we know what is excluded from the Interim Agreement and we know what we can proceed with in terms of, qualitative improvements because they won't be deployed until 1975. What is it that the Russians have excluded from the Interim Agreement and what is it that the Russians can proceed with in terms of qualitative improvement that might not be deployed until after 1975?

Dr. KISSINGER. The protocol came about because the submarine question could have been an extraordinarily complicated one, and the complications arose from this fact. We do not have a program for building missile-carrying submarines until 1978 at the earliest. The Soviet Union had been producing over the last last few years at the rate of eight missile-carrying submarines a year. It has built additional facilities which would enable it nearly to double this production rate, although up to now they have used it mostly for the conversion of older submarines into more modern types. But they do have a very substantial production capability.

Therefore, a freeze on submarine construction was bound to stop a very dynamic Soviet program, and it was not affecting any on-going American program. Therefore, a formula had to be found which at one and the same time met our needs for some equivalent, and took account of the reality that the Soviet Union without this agreement could have produced at the rate at least of eight to nine a year, so that over the period of the freeze, the Soviet Union could have built up to eighty to ninety submarines, that is an additional 40 to 45 to something like 43 to 44 they now have under construction.

This was the situation we faced. So we developed a formula which enabled the Soviet Union, if it wished, to go beyond their present level up to 62, which is well short of their capacity, but only at the price of trading in some of the older ICBMs and some of the older missiles on earlier nuclear submarines, so that the Soviet Union has to trade in 240 missiles in order to be able to build up to this agreed level.

So the submarine agreement has the dual advantage of stopping the Soviet program on construction well short of its capacity; and secondly, retiring for the first time by international agreement a substantial number of other missiles that we, in our annual statements, had been carrying as part of the Soviet missile force.

So we needed a protocol to determine those things.

Then there was the second question of at what level does the process of trading-in start? That is to say, at what point do you determine that the Soviet Union must trade in these ICBMs and older submarine missiles for newer ones. The ambiguity here arose from the fact that while our intelligence is adequate to tell us when they are putting submarines at sea, and how many submarines are under construction in the sheds at any given moment, there is some difficulty in defining the term "under construction."

If you start the process of "under construction" when the hull sections are being

built, before they are moved into the sheds, you get a different figure than if you get the figure in the sheds. Therefore, this was a subject of some complicated negotiation to determine the level at which the trade-in would start, which is, as expressed in the communique, at the level of 740 ballistic missiles on submarines, which includes 30 older ones, which is to say, therefore, at the level of 704 to 710 of the newer submarines.

This is the explanation for this rather complex calculation of the protocol.

Now as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, their bombers are outside of this system and theoretically they could start building up their bomber force without being limited by this agreement.

Historically, the Soviet Union has not put the emphasis on its bomber force that we have. Its operating procedures and experience is far below the level of our Air Force. We do not consider it probable that they will make a major effort in that field, but this is one field in which they could make progress.

The field in which it is most likely that they will make progress is in the modernization of the missiles that are permitted under the agreement. That is, they will not violate the numbers of the agreement, but they will improve the quality, accuracy, number of warheads and this is what will represent a threat to our strategic forces.

Congressman LEGGETT. Doctor, I want to commend you and the Administration on the negotiation of what I think is an extremely remarkable agreement. I have my reservations that perhaps the Department of Defense is stampeding in the opposite direction, though, of the spirit of the negotiations.

I am concerned that in the bill that we marked up yesterday in the Armed Services Committee we increased the hard site Sprint nuclear program clearly outlawed as far as deployment 100 percent.

We accepted the budget figures which had a 900 percent increase in the ULMS or Trident program. Of course, the answer you originally gave was that we needed this as a bargaining chip perhaps for Phase 2 or 3, however, it seems to me we have successfully negotiated the limitation on the number of land-based missiles without an accelerated program, limited the submarine tubes without an accelerated program.

We perhaps have wasted several million dollars in the ABM program in making that a bargaining chip and aren't we perhaps doing the same thing in developing the big bargaining things which obviously will never be deployed if you are successful in your negotiating program?

Dr. KISSINGER. Let me say two things: One, it is not easy to prove the motivations of the other side in making an agreement. I would think it probable however that we could not have negotiated the limitations on offensive weapons if it had not been linked to the limitations on defensive weapons and to their desire of stopping the deployment of the ABM system.

So, what drove these negotiations for the first year was their desire to limit our ABM deployment. And it was not until we insisted that we could not agree to an ABM treaty without offensive limitations that they reluctantly included the offensive limitations.

Secondly, I think we will deploy, even if we are successful in the negotiations that it is very likely we will deploy ULMS and Trident and then retire a similar number of the older submarines, use them for replacement purposes rather than additions to the current submarine fleet.

So, I cannot fully accept the assumption that they will not be deployed. What would almost certainly happen though if an agreement were successful is a substantial replacement of the older Polaris boats.

Congressman LEGGETT. Of course, those older Polaris are a quarter billion dollars a piece, zero defects and a third of a mile CPI. It is hard to conceive that they are obsolete or will be.

Dr. KISSINGER. I don't want to go into the technical weapons characteristics. I think you will get more competent witnesses than me on that subject.

Congressman FREYLINGHUYSEN. I am sure we all appreciate both your presentation and the question and answer period which you have given us. I would like to congratulate you on a masterful presentation. I think Clark is to be congratulated on the music that he has provided to supplement the high points.

My question gets back to this level of defense spending. The President and you both said you hoped for an earlier resumption of the SALT talks. Assuming ratification of the treaty, you didn't really answer Senator Fulbright's question as to whether the Soviets might not consider defense spending an indication of our sincerity or insincerity. Do you think that there is any chance that there is not an expectation on the part of the Soviets with respect to defense spending that might jeopardize successful talks following the ratification of the treaty?

In other words, does the other side hook our spending and our attitude towards defense to further talks?

Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, this last round of talks took nearly 2½ years. So, even if the talks start again this fall, they are likely to be prolonged. We would expect that the first session will deal with general principles rather than with detailed negotiating packages.

All the more so in the next round, we are getting into the more complicated issues of how to control technological change where national means of inspection are not as reliable as they are with respect to sheer numbers.

Now, there is no question that the Soviet Union will judge our intentions in part by the level of our defense spending, for good or evil, and that we cannot take the position that our defense spending is irrelevant to our general political relationship.

The question is: If we speed too little on defense, if we create such a unilateral weakness then we destroy their incentive to negotiate seriously. If we spend too much and give them the idea that we are gearing up simply for getting a tremendous spurt to get ahead of them, then we create the other problem.

So our problem is to get our defense expenditures at a level that does not create a unilateral weakness and give them pressure for agreement but does not get us into an area where it had the counter-productive tendency of generating a new round on their side.

We believe that we are navigating that course. But it is a serious question and it is a serious problem and we have to be alert to both of these dangers.

Mr. MACGREGOR. John Hunt wishes to make a statement in explanation for the departure of a number of members of Congress.

Congressman HUNT. Let me thank you for the clear and concise explanation of your mission this morning. On behalf of the Armed Services Committee, you will notice some of us are leaving. It is not because of any discourtesy to you, sir, or because we are not interested.

The fact is we have a conflicting schedule of subcommittees that are getting ready for an important mark-up of the legislation this afternoon in the absence of Mr. Hebert.

So, if you permit me for a moment to explain, that is the reason they are leaving.

Dr. KISSINGER. Thank you. I thought they were like my Harvard students. (Laughter.)

Congressman HARRINGTON. At the risk of being repetitive, to follow on Congressman Freylinghusen's question and Senator Fulbright's question, I am puzzled that this year and last year we saw a $6 billion increase in defense spending requested and if the estimates given us by the Assistant Secretary of Defense Moot are correct, we can expect a $5 billion increase in Southeast Asia.

I have seen before the tide was even out, before our committee, hundreds of millions of dollars sought for additional spending in the procurement bill for the betterment of systems that were not part of your agreement in Russia.

On three levels I am puzzled, one, sound economic policy which appeared to be both centered in the White House as a concern prior to the present occupancy in the White House looking toward the era of 1964 and 1968, public confidence that has been led to believe that somehow out of this whole business will come a reduction, not an increase, in the overall spending in the defense area and in general, whether or not in going to these talks you didn't have enough of an outline of questions in coming before Congressional committee and members of the Executive Branch did to be able to live this year with the procurement and appropriations bill as they were without adding to them in the way and with the timing I think has been chosen to do it.

I would like to have you address yourself to some of those considerations, particularly as a constituent might say to me, "What do you mean it is going to cost more for defense? I thought you fellows were negotiating for reductions in tensions and costs." I think that is the problem most of us have.

Dr. KISSINGER. It is our intention and conviction that as these talks proceed into other areas that we will be able to bring about a substantial reduction in defense expenditures as a result of these talks.

There are, of course, certain savings in the ABM program. What we are finding out is that the combination of certain trends has produced requirements which are not themselves the cause of the agreement, but which have come to a head at about the same time by accident as the agreement.

One of these problems is that for a number of years we had significantly slowed down the modernization of our strategic programs so that our strategic weapons now were essentially designed in the early 60s, while those of the Soviet Union were designed in the late 60s and this has created a certain technological requirement.

This is the reason for this additional expenditure. This other figure for Southeast Asia that you mentioned is a projection forward of current rates and may or may not be necessary, depending on how long current rates are being sustained.

Congressman HARRINGTON. I am quoting Assistant Secretary Moot.

Dr. KISSINGER. I know and he projected them forward over a period of months which may or may not be necessary because he was being proper with the Congress by giving his best estimate, but he was projecting current expenditure rates.

If there were negotiations, for example, if the offensive slows down, there are many factors that could affect this. I am just trying to give you an idea.

Thirdly, the increase in the defense spending has been caused to a considerable extent also by military pay increaess which now consume about 54 percent of our defense budget. I have seen a chart—I think the Secretary of Defense can do it much better than I—that shows what the present defense establishment would cost if the pay scales were still those of eight or 10 years ago.

So, it is a combination of these factors that have produced the increase of defense costs while forces have actually been shrinking.

Senator COOPER. I would like to join with others in thanking you and showing appreciation for your very fine statement.

The first question I will ask is not one

that I suggest myself, but it was asked the day the agreement was announced. I am sorry Senator Jackson is not here, but he wouldn't mind my saying he asked the question.

Are there any other understandings, secret understandings, which have not been made public or will not be made public? I think we will be asked, and it is just as well to ask it now.

Dr. KISSINGER. There are no secret understandings. We have submitted to the Congress the list of all the significant agreements and interpretive statements, and so forth. What we have not done is to go through the record to see whether Ambassador Smith might have said something that they interpreted in a certain way, and this is why we put on the qualification "significant", because otherwise we would have to submit the entire record.

According to the best of our judgment, there are no secret understandings, and all the significant interpretive statements have been submitted to the Congress.

Senator COOPER. May I ask one more question? I notice in your explanation, it is said that the United States asked for a prohibition on mobile land-based missiles. You later withdrew that. But you did say that if the Soviet Union went ahead with deployment, you would consider it serious enough to break the agreement. Is the Soviet Union going ahead with mobile land-based missiles?

Dr. KISSINGER. Let me make one other comment with respect to the first thing about secret understandings.

There are, of course, in the discussions, general statements of intentions. For example, we have conveyed to the Soviets what I have also said here publicly on the record: that the option of converting the Titans into submarines, given our present construction program, was not something we would necessarily carry out. But we do not consider that as a secret agreement, that sort of thing. This was simply a statement of general unilateral intentions.

Now, with respect to the land-based mobile missiles, we have made an interpretive statement according to which the deployment of land-based mobile missiles would be inconsistent with the purposes of the agreement. Then this raises the question of whether our national means of verification are adequate to monitor this.

The national means of verification are adequate to monitor over a period of time whether a land-based mobile missile is being deployed. The margin of error with respect to total numbers would be great, if you have a margin of error of five percent, and I am giving you a fictitious figure; it might be 15 percent with respect to mobile missiles.

But the fact of the matter is, what we have to monitor is not total numbers of land mobile missiles; what we have to monitor is the fact that they are deploying any of them. We are quite confident that within a reasonable period of time after the initial deployment, and maybe not in the first month, but over a three- to four-month period, and well before they can develop a substantial capability, we will be able to tell whether they have deployed a land mobile missile and we can draw the appropriate conclusions.

So as to the fact of deploying a land mobile missile, we are confident that we will discover it well before they could deploy enough to have any effect.

Congressman MONAGAN. Dr. Kissinger, you have said that these agreements, our confidence in them, is not based on trust, but enlightened self-interest, and yet I think you would agree with any bilateral arrangements, with the credibility of the other party to the contract, where that is very important, you have also said that there is reason to believe that the area of distrust and suspicion may be at an end.

I just wonder, in view of that question of credibility, is there any specific reason that you have for coming to this conclusion?

Dr. KISSINGER. We are not basing this agreement on trust, and we believe that this agreement can be verified; and secondly, that it has adequate safeguards to prevent its being violated. We also believe that we have started a process by which we can move international relations into a new era, and we base this on the fact that we agreed with the Soviet Union over the past two years on the issue of Berlin, which has removed one of the primary causes of tension in the world for the foreseeable future, and a whole spectrum of agreements on health, space, environment, rules of navigation, that we are on the verge of making progress with them in other fields such as commercial agreements, and finally, we have signed a Declaration of Common Principles which it would have been no point to sign unless we meant to move in a major effort in that direction.

So, for all of these reasons, we believe that there is a basis, that we have an opportunity both in the Soviet Union and in the United States, to move into a new era. Whether both sides have the wisdom to do it, and even if they have the wisdom they are not caught by events in areas in which they cannot control their decision, this remains to be seen. But I think we have the opportunity to turn a significant page in history, and as far as this Administration is concerned, we are going to make a major effort in that direction.

Senator PELL. It is an excellent presentation. I have three short questions.

First, if the Soviet expenditures for arms remains static, or should decline, or ours go up, wouldn't that have a reverse effect on their willingness to move into SALT II?

Secondly, are any of the provisions of the seabed disarmament treaty in conflict with our own treaty which you have negotiated, in view of the fact that we apparently still consider the possibility of weapons of mass destruction stored on the seabed floor, and they are prohibited by the seabed disarmament treaty?

Third, why, in this set of negotiations, was the constitutionally normal course of Congressional consultation, advise as well as consent, not engaged in?

Mr. MACGREGOR. When did you stop beating your wife?

Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to the seabed, I am not aware that we have any intention of deploying weapons on the seabed, and we have no intention of violating the seabed agreement, so unless you know of some weapon that I am not aware of, I would have to say that this is not planned.

We believe that the defense expenditures will stay roughly in balance and that the Soviet incentive to come to an agreement will not be reduced by our being stronger. On the contrary. So the judgment has been that our strength, if anything, gives them an additional incentive to make a negotiation, if we do not carry it to a point where they are convinced that this is just a subterfuge for a massive effort to get ahead of them. If that should become their conviction, then, in fact, we have a problem.

I have to repeat: We have to navigate between that, on the one hand, weakening ourselves unilaterally, and on the other hand between having them see these negotiations simply as a stage by which we try to achieve superiority. Either of these things would be self-defeating.

As for the process of consultation with the Senate, as Senator Fulbright knows, this is not my specialty, but it has been my understanding that Mr. Smith and the appropriate Secretaries have been in close consultation, and we have tried from here to be on a personal basis in contact with key Senators.

Mr. MACGREGOR. Might I add in that respect, Senator Pell, that at least since I have been here, that is, January 4, 1971 to date, it has been Ambassador Gerard Smith's intention, following the directions of the President, to make himself readily available to the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, here in Washington as well as in Helsinki and Vienna. I would be delighted to talk to you further about that, but I had thought that was worked out to the reasonable satisfaction of the Members of the Congress.

Congressman FRASER. Dr. Kissinger, let me say first that I have thought that the consultations with Ambassador Smith have been good, both here in Washington and in Vienna.

I listened with some care to the answer you gave to Senator Percy's question on the ABM sites. I can appreciate the Soviets would want to have a symmetrical arrangement with ours, but I was not quite clear from your answer whether in fact you have evidence that the Soviets intend to go ahead with their option to protect an offensive missile site.

The reasons I ask that is that since building the National Capital Defense is not a bargaining chip clearly because we have now put a cap on ABM and since we have a two to three times lead over the Soviet Union building a site over the Capital is not going to give us any significant benefit from the possibility of attack. It will not even give us more time.

Unless we already know the Soviets are going to build a second ABM, why couldn't we wait on ours and save the taxpayers several billions of dollars?

Dr. KISSINGER. It depends on how you define "how do we know". We have no evidence that they have started construction. We have the impression that they have the firm intention of proceeding. I have no evidence whatever to the contrary that they do not intend to proceed.

All the conversations the Presidential party had with them left the impression that they have a firm intention of proceeding with their second site. As for the argument of how much time you gain, the effort to overwhelm, in itself, is apt to give some additional time but I would not insist that this will add a huge span of time to the warning.

Congressman ZABLOCKI. Dr. Kissinger, the President and you have made it quite clear that it would be desirable to have the treaty ratified and the Executive Agreements approved by Congress in order that Phase II could begin in October.

We fully understand the system of the Soviets and there is no ratification on their part as we have it here, and I am sure the Soviets understand that this is an election year and we have political conventions and there may be an opportunity not to meet, that is a ratification and approval of the Executive Agreements.

Is it absolutely necessary that the treaty be ratified and Executive Agreements approved by Congress before Phase II can begin, sometime in October? Indeed, cannot Ambassador Smith meet with his counterparts, even though the Senate and the Congress have not finished their work as far as the treaty and Executive Agreement are concerned?

If I may ask just a second question, I think it is in the report, but what problems were there, or why didn't we pursue with greater determination the inclusion of MIRV's in the Executive Agreement?

Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to the first question actually, the Soviets do go through a ratification procedure. They have their Supreme Soviet approve it but with all respect, it is a little more tractable than our Congress.

The reason why, really, we can have some exploratory informal talks and we probably

will at various levels, but the reason it would be difficult to start formal sessions is because we have to know from what base we are operating. It is rather an embarrassing position to have a senior negotiator operate on the basis of the assumption of a ratification.

Also, it would be somewhat presumptuous towards the Congress to assume a ratification that has not in fact taken place. Yet, on the other hand, unless you make some assumption, you really have not got a fixed base from which you can operate.

Therefore, the beginning of the second phase of SALT really has to follow congressional ratification. We understand the pressures of this year and this is simply a fact.

Now, with respect to MIRV, MIRV is a complex issue for this reason: You can count numbers with national means of verification, but it is much more difficult to determine how many warheads are confined in the master warhead.

Now, you have some indications but it is not very easy. Therefore, with respect to the deployment of MIRV, the inspection requirements have to be a little bit more rigid than would be otherwise the case.

Now, we have made two proposals, two linked proposals, one is a ban on the testing of MIRV, this we are prepared to monitor by national means of inspection, and second, a ban on the deployment of MIRV for which we asked for spot-checks on on-site inspection. Now we considered the test ban absolutely crucial because we could have been somewhat more lenient on the frequency of on-site inspection if there had been a test ban on MIRV's because without testing, by definition, it is not easy to deploy them. It is, in fact, impossible to deploy them.

The Soviet Union, for not ununderstandable reasons, because they are behind in MIRV technology, refused a test ban. They also refused a deployment ban as such. What they proposed was a production ban but without inspection. A ban on production is totally unverifiable in the Soviet Union while they could verify ours through our budget and other methods through which our industrial production generally becomes known.

So, the Soviet counter-proposal for a production ban without a test ban was generally unacceptable to us and when we reached that stalemate, we could not proceed any further. This was the obstacle to proceeding on the MIRV's.

Congressman ZABLOCKI. What encouragement do you see, or optimism that this may be an area that in Phase II we may find some common ground on?

Dr. KISSINGER. Phase II, Mr. Congressman, will be very much more difficult than Phase I, because there, we will deal with technological problems and there we will require even more ingenuity with respect to Phase II than was shown in Phase I.

If one can have optimism with respect to it, it is because now the Soviet technology has gone somewhat further probably so that they may be more willing to accept a test ban which will at least put a limit on further deployments, and secondly, you will remember when we started these negotiations in 1969, we were going through a crisis in the Middle East and the Berlin Critis. We were emerging out of this whole miasma of suspicion and it was the first time we engaged with the Soviets in any major negotiation, so the climate was different.

Now, we have established a pattern in which the Chief of State on our side, the President and their political leaders, can be in constant contact with each other and I believe we can perhaps move a little more creatively in the early stages of SALT II than we could in the early stages of SALT I.

I must also say that the subject is more difficult. Certainly, we had conversations of the breadth and precision in Moscow that would have been unimpaginable three or four years ago with respect to strategic questions, but this gives us some hope that at least we can talk about the gut issues.

Senator FULBRIGHT: Can I ask you to comment on one aspect, on the significance of ABM, so much more has been said about the agreement.

How do you evaluate what appears to me to be a renunciation of the effort to create a defense? What you have left in the ABM is surely nothing more than a token. Hasn't each country, in effect, said, "We recognize, we have no defense to almost total devastation in view of the capacities for destruction, or within the existing weapons", and if that is true, isn't this the experience, and I don't know why you would say it would be much more difficult.

If they live up to that and we give them no reason to believe we haven't accepted in good faith that our population is hostile to their weapons, and vice versa, and it seems to me it ought not to be more difficult if you believe in that.

Dr. KISSINGER: I believe, Mr. Chairman, this is a very good point. The limit on ABM's or effective ABM's of both sides, really creates a situation, as I said in my statement, in one sentence, in which the offensive weapons of both sides really have a free ride into the country of the other.

So that therefore, the difference in numbers is somewhat less signficant than you would assess otherwise. There is still a danger that one side will get such an enormous numerical advantage in warheads that it can completely obliterate the force of the other.

But in the absence of significant defenses, even relatively small forces can do an enormous amount of damage.

Therefore, too, if we can move into the second phase of SALT, into an explicit recognition that both sides will try to stay away from counter-force strategies, from the one danger that now exists, or the overwhelming danger, that they will try to destroy each other, then perhaps the premium on MIRV's will be reduced, because, as you remember very well, Mr. Chairman, MIRV's were developed at first as a hedge against ABM.

So I think we will find, in perhaps unexpected ways, that the new strategic relationship that is created by this treaty will create realizations on both sides as to the significance of usable strategic power that over a period of the next negotiations could have quite dramatic impacts.

I am very glad that you asked that.

Mr. MACGREGOR: It is very close to 12 noon. We appreciate your participation and your presence and your patience, and we thank you for launching what the President has called an effective Legislative-Executive partnership.

## MEXICO'S PRESIDENT—AN OUTSPOKEN VISITOR

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article published in the U.S. News & World Report for June 26, 1972, entitled "Mexico's President—An Outspoken Visitor."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MEXICO'S PRESIDENT—AN OUTSPOKEN VISITOR

It is a concerned and frank-speaking President of Mexico who has been touring the United States on a six-day visit.

From the start, Luis Echeverría Alvarez made it clear that he had no intention of confining himself to the sort of "hands across the border" platitudes that have characterized previous state visits between the two nations.

Addressing a joint session of the U.S. Congress, President Echeverría strongly criticized an American foreign policy of coming to terms with other strong countries while "ignoring the rights and interests of less-developed nations."

Mexico's leader noted that the U.S. "is encouraging dialogue with other world powers that have different ideologies"—namely, Russia and Communist China.

"Nevertheless," Mr. Echeverría told Congress, "these changes have not yet been reflected in the policy of the United States toward the Third World and toward the Latin-American countries, in particular."

The Mexican President, both in his speech to Congress and in talks at the White House, pinpointed specific problems that, in his view, now cloud relations between his nation and the U.S.

Biggest of these is the high salt content of the Colorado River. The U.S., in agreeing to share its water, had also agreed to improve its quality. Mexicans maintain the salinity in the Mexicali Valley and sharply reduced farm output.

"It is impossible to understand," Mr. Echeverría told Congress, "why the United States does not use the same boldness and imagination that it applies to solving complex problems with its enemies to the solution of simple problems with its friends."

The Mexican leader's words drew a quick response. President Nixon next day agreed that Mexican farmers should get water as pure as Americans do. He pledged prompt action to achieve this.

TRADE PROBLEMS

Trade between the two nations has emerged as a special concern of President Echeverría, who warns of the damage caused by protectionist measures taken at the behest of American "minority groups."

An example cited by Mr. Echeverría is imports into the U.S. of Mexican winter fruits and vegetables. These now are controlled by strict "voluntary" quotas set in consultation with Florida and California growers. They sometimes have forced the Mexicans to destroy strawberry and tomato harvests.

Another worry "south of the border" is the possible passage of a measure currently before Congress, which would affect more than 300 "in-bond" factories, American-owned, operating in Mexico. Organized labor in the U.S. is giving considerable support to the bill as a means of blocking the "export of U.S. jobs."

On this point, the Mexican President is believed to have received assurance from President Nixon of his opposition to the bill, as well. Studies carried out for the White House conclude that the bill would cause little change in the job picture—and might even worsen it. The bill's prospects for passage are rated as "very dim."

The visit of President Echeverría is a break with the past in another important respect—after two days in Washington, he became the first Mexican President in history to cross the U.S. on a series of personal appearances. Cities on the schedule included New York, Chicago, San Antonio and Los Angeles.

President Echeverría's plans on this whirlwind tour of major cities include meetings with Mexican-American groups.

The changes in Mexico's foreign policy that caused President Echeverría to do things differently on this U.S. trip have been dictated by economic problems at home as well as by a changing world picture.

Mexico, after years of rapid growth, is beset with the sort of economic headaches that plague many other developing countries. It runs a trade deficit of 1 billion dollars, has a foreign debt of 4.5 billion dollars, and a heavy debt-servicing burden.

DRIVE TO EXPORT

To improve its foreign-payments position, the nation has pushed a major export drive,

rents with that of other areas, can intensify the plague on other localities.

The air we breathe knows no city, county and state boundaries. When a polluter in Pennsylvania can put a Miamian in the hospital, the problem obviously is nationwide, not local. It behooves every citizen to demand strict Federal action to control the smokey stacks even a thousand miles away; the cough he prevents may be his own.

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The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. ABZUG) is recognized for 30 minutes.

[Mrs. ABZUG addressed the House. Her remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

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## THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF EDITH GREEN

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, those of us who have enjoyed the privilege and honor of serving in the House with Representative EDITH GREEN, know of her dedication to America and of her valuable contributions to sound legislation, particularly in the field of education.

Long known for her distinguished work in that field, she has again been brought deservedly to the attention of the entire country through a recent article in the Christian Science Monitor. It appeared on Monday, June 12, 1972, under the heading "School-Trend Watcher." In this article Mrs. GREEN talks with a reporter about her views on education, the financial difficulty facing our schools, and misuse of schools as a tool for social change. No one is better qualified than Mrs. GREEN to speak on this matter.

I commend the article to my colleagues and I congratulate Mrs. GREEN not only for what she has said but for the outstanding work she has done in this most important field throughout her career.

The article is reprinted below.

CONGRESSWOMAN GREEN—SCHOOL-TREND WATCHER

(By Marion Bell Wilhelm)

When Edith Starrett, the bright-eyed daughter of two dedicated teachers, yearned to become an electrical engineer, she was advised not to try for a "man's career."

Her second choice was law. Again, she was counseled out of a profession that would relegate a young woman to a "back office."

So Edith Starrett grew up to become a teacher, as was advisable for a woman looking for regular employment in the 1930's. Today she is one of the most powerful spokesmen for American education in the U.S. Congress.

After 18 years on the House Education and Labor Committee, Rep. Edith Starrett Green (D) of Oregon says philosophically: "As it turned out, the career that was chosen for me has been invaluable to my work in Congress, and I suppose it even makes me a little impatient with those of my colleagues who have never taught school."

As the chairman of the Special Subcommittee on Education, Mrs. Green keeps her eye on trends and changes throughout the 50 states and the District of Columbia. She has sponsored major legislation to help rescue the nation's schools from the gathering storms of "a social hurricane."

DECLINE OF CONFIDENCE

All over the United States, she notes, school tax levies and bond issues are being defeated. Property taxes are high and uneven. Too often, she says, those making school policy are untrained in educational and professional skills.

"People seem to be losing confidence in the public schools," she observed in a recent interview. "I fear the day may be coming when we just won't have an educated citizenry. Already, we can see some evidence of this in some of our big cities."

Representative Green's goal is to see the federal government eventually take over 35 percent of all educational costs from kindergarten through college. This would help equalize education for all Americans, she believes, while maintaining the quality of their best schools. She calls the coming changes in the financing of education "revolutionary."

However, the trend toward national financing contains some pitfalls, she cautions.

In a number of states, she points out, suits have been brought by citizens questioning the equality of education in school districts with widely divergent tax revenues. If the local property tax is abandoned for some kind of statewide tax, parents in states such as Mississippi or Alabama might also bring suits claiming inequality with states such as Connecticut. National equalization, though beneficial in some ways, could be disastrous, in Mrs. Green's opinion, "if we settle for mediocrity."

LEGISLATION INTRODUCED

"I introduced a bill last year in which I proposed that the federal government by the year 1976 would contribute 25 percent of the total cost of education in the average district," she says, "and this session I am introducing a bill that would provide one-third of the cost. At present, we are contributing 7 or 8 percent.

"But I am not persuaded that money alone is going to buy quality. Here in the District of Columbia, for example, our schools are decaying before our eyes. And yet they have the highest per capita expenditure for education of any city of similar size in the nation."

Nor does Mrs. Green think that busing is the way to achieve the best education. She says: "I think a careful reading of the evidence shows that a child's education and his ability to be educated depend more upon the environment in which he lives than on the six hours a day in which he is transported to a school outside his neighborhood. I think that the task is much greater than we have assumed. We're going to have to change homes, and we're going to have to change neighborhoods."

TOO BIG A BURDEN

Any attempt to place the major responsibility for social reform on the schools alone is doomed to failure, she asserts.

"It may be that a youngster who is attending a very poor school and is bused has an opportunity for a higher quality of education," she adds, "but I think that, overall, the reverse is accomplished. I had lunch with some school-board members in Los Angeles, for example, a year and a half ago. This last year they had to cut out $50 million in programs and services for children in the Los Angeles schools because they didn't have enough money.

"Then a state court came along and said, 'You're going to have to desegregate.' The superintendent's office told me last November that for the first year their estimate on the cost of buying buses and hiring bus drivers will be $42 million."

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. SIKES' remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

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## KISSINGER TESTIFIES IN NIGHTCLUBS BUT NOT BEFORE CONGRESS

(Mr. ASHBROOK asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, Presidential Adviser Henry Kissinger is a law unto himself. While his free-wheeling antics make him a one-man successor to the old rat pack which used to be fashionable at the White House, he apparently holds out a double standard on his briefings. Rarely will he be quoted. He will not testify before congressional committees and yet, according to an article in the May 29, 1972, International Herald Tribune, he showed no qualms at "testifying" in a Moscow night club about U.S. defense and negotiation information which should be treated as highly confidential, if not secret. Will he make the same statements before appropriate congressional committees or does he limit his discussions of our Nation's secrets to bars and the jet set crowd?

According to that news report, Mr. Kissinger discussed the balance of American-Soviet nuclear weaponry in the dim Skylight Room of the Intourist Hotel. The account noted:

To American newsmen based in Moscow, it was astonishing to hear the principal strategic adviser to the American President discussing the level of both nations' nuclear arsenals in a Moscow nightclub.

Astonishing to them, possibly, Mr. Speaker, but not astonishing to many Americans who do not trust Mr. Kissinger. One of the reasons that many of us have so little confidence in President Nixon's foreign policy conduct is Mr. Nixon's confidence in Mr. Kissinger and his coterie. There are many reasons for firing Henry Kissinger. This is probably the least of them and yet it is a part of the story of arrogance at the seat of power and national security in Washington.

The entire story is included at this point:

KISSINGER TELLS ALMOST ALL: STORY OF SUCCESS COMES OUT IN MOSCOW NIGHTCLUB

(By Murrey Marder)

MOSCOW, May 28.—None who experienced it will quickly forget the climax of an improbable diplomatic presentation that leaped between the Kremlin Palace of the Czars; a well-worn diplomatic bargaining room in Helsinki; the American Embassy here, and ultimately the nightclub of Moscow's Intourist Hotel. No one fully orchestrated this production, which dramatized the world's first nuclear arms limitation.

In the seductively dim Skylight Room, which happens to be on the hotel's ground floor, between a bandstand and a circular, raised dance floor, against a background of champagne buckets, President Nixon's inex-

exercise, weight control, stress, hypertension, and cigarette smoking.

Fifth. Better administration, to be achieved by giving the National Heart and Lung Institute greater authority to coordinate the activities of the Federal Government relating to heart diease.

Sixth. Closer cooperation between the National Institute, the medical profession, and the concerned public. The vehicle for this will be a restructured National Heart and Lung Advisory Council, in which Federal officials, medical experts, and public representatives will participate.

The prospects are good that we will see enactment of this legislation before the end of this year. In the House, floor action on the proposals which I am supporting should take place in a few weeks. In the Senate, a similar bill, which incorporates all of the principal features of the legislation pending in the House, has already been passed.

The proposals now being considered in Congress will give a strong impetus to the campaign against heart disease, but success will not be possible without the active involvement of concerned citizens throughout the country.

HEART ASSOCIATIONS

That is why it is essential to have the continued support of heart associations. These organizations bring together people who want to do something about heart disease in communities in all parts of the United States. They provide a valuable link between the medical profession and the general public. They have helped build the foundation of popular support that has made it possible to win Congressional approval of expanded Federal heart programs.

Volunteers are the most important resource of every heart association. Thanks to the support of public-spirited persons who are willing to contribute their time and skills, heart associations have compiled an impressive record of accomplishments.

These associations have helped to inform the people about the symptoms of heart disease and to alert them to the risks inherent in smoking, improper diet, overwheight, and high blood pressure. This has involved the distribution of school health kits, the organization of nutrition and weight control classes, and the provision of speakers and informational materials.

The heart associations have introduced a new preventive technique through their PhonoCardioScan programs, which detect abnormal heart sounds in school-age children.

Another valuable association service is supplying data on the latest developments in heart research to doctors and nurses. Training sessions in mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and closed chest heart massage have prepared firemen, police, school personnel, and other individuals to give emergency assistance to heart attack victims.

Volunteers have made all of these programs possible. Volunteers will be needed to continue and expand them so that your association can contribute to the stepped-up campaign against heart disease that is now commencing.

With the vigorous support of heart association members throughout the United States, I am confident we can look forward to new progress in controlling the ravages of heart disease.

## TAXATION WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. GALIFIANAKIS) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GALIFIANAKIS. Mr. Speaker, in 1772 taxation without representation oppressed the American people. Two hundred years later we have taxation with reprsentation but without justification. That may be progress, but I doubt it.

I refer specifically to the $8 billion the Federal Government is estimated to have withheld unnecessarily from millions of American taxpayers. In effect, the Government has confiscated the property of American citizens and plans to hold that property and enjoy the benefits thereof for up to 1 year without paying any compensation.

The excuse, of course, is that this sorry situation is the taxpayer's fault. He or she, we are told, should have had enough sense to overdeclare personal exemptions, to claim more exemptions than he or she really has. I should not be too surprised. This is no more nonsensical than many provisions of our tax code. What is even more absurd is the attempt to blame the victim for the crime.

In reality, bureaucratic miscalculation and ineptitude are responsible for this economic fiasco, and in my opinion the Government should accept responsibility and pay the price for its mistake. The Government failed to adequately alert the American people about the recent increase in the withholding tables, and as a result, many taxpayers are being compelled to make, in effect, interest-free loans to the U.S. Treasury.

Several of my colleagues have suggested that the Government consider offering such taxpayers interest-bearing bonds instead of no-interest refund checks. In the light of the inflationary pressure likely to be incited by the cashing of millions of huge refund checks, the interest-bearing bond approach appears to be an effective instrument for correcting this gross inequity without substantial damage to the fight against inflation.

Therefore, I urge both the Congress and the administration to expedite its consideration of this subject and make a prompt effort to right this obvious wrong.

## POLLUTION RESPECTS NO BOUNDARIES

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GIBBONS) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, much of Florida was plagued earlier this month by smog and haze which has been traced, by weather satellite photographs and other means, to smokestack emissions from as far away as Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee.

In some areas of Florida these air pollution conditions caused a significant increase in respiratory ailments and in hospitalizations for these ailments. The situation in Dade County, Fla., became so bad that county officials have threatened Federal court action against these out of State polluters.

I think that this incident is just one more indication that we are going to have to be sure that strict Federal air pollution standards are enforced nationwide if any of us are to live to enjoy the benefits of clean air and clean water in our local communities. It also serves as a warning that we as a community of nations are going to have to do a good deal more than we are now doing if we are to stop the pollution of our planet.

At this point in the RECORD, I would like to insert an editorial on the recent "out of State pollution" problem in Florida which appeared in the Tampa Tribune of June 2:

POLLUTION RESPECTS NO BOUNDARY LINES

A complaint from Dade County this week emphasizes that the problem of air pollution is national, not local, and why national standards are so important.

Dade County (as was much of the rest of Florida) was blanketed with haze last week. In the Miami area particularly, there was a notable increase in respiratory attacks and hospitalization of victims.

In a protest to Federal officials and pollution control directors of three states, Peter Baljet, Dade pollution control chief, said weather satellite photographs and other studies had clearly established that smokestack emissions from Ohio, Pennsylvania and Tennessee had ridden air currents southward, and a temperature inversion had trapped the smog over Florida.

Baljet asked the three states and the U.S. Environmental Protective Agency to act immediately against offenders. He said under the Federal anti-pollution act the county could go into a U.S. court for injunctions against out-of-state polluters, and threatened to do so "if the administrative route fails."

That the Environmental Protection Act has sufficient teeth in it to assure clean air for everyone was made plain Tuesday by the action of U.S. District Court Judge John H. Pratt in Washington. Judge Pratt, acting in a suit brought by four ecology groups, ruled that the Federal law requires not only that states adopt pollution standards, but that they also prohibit high-quality air from deteriorating even to the level of the standards.

He ordered William D. Ruckelshaus, director of the EPA, not to approve state pollution control standards unless they expressly contained the non-degradation element. The four plaintiffs argued that Congress, in enacting the law, held its purpose was to protect and enhance air quality, and Judge Pratt, agreeing, stated, "On the face, this would appear to permit no significant deterioration of air quality."

Ruckelshaus responded that he doesn't believe he has the authority to require a non-degradation policy in clean-air areas. He asked a review of the decision, and said if Judge Pratt is upheld the courts must define the principle clearly enough for him to write appropriate regulations. He said the court's decision would open up a new area of standards for state anti-pollution plans, including those nine states, Florida among them, whose rules have received final Federal approval.

Judge Pratt's ruling, however, makes special sense in light of Dade County's plight. Even mild pollution at the point of emission, when combined in the upper air cur-

haustible security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, gave the American version of what Mr. Nixon described as the "enormously important" strategic arms agreement signed two hours earlier in the Kremlin.

Over the nightclub's public address system, listeners heard what must surely have been some of the most unusual statements uttered out loud in the Soviet Union.

KISSINGER HUMOR

The Kissinger sense of humor, leavening the sobering statistics of nuclear warfare and grueling around-the-clock sessions of intensive bargaining here, was on display in an incongruous setting. Pressed by American newsmen to supply hard details on the balance of American-Soviet nuclear weaponry. Mr. Kissinger was saying: "The Soviet Union has been building missiles at the rate of something like 250 a year. If I get arrested here for espionage, gentlemen, we will know who is to blame."

To American newsmen based in Moscow, it was astonishing to hear the principal strategic adviser to the American President discussing the level of both nation's nuclear arsenals in a Moscow nightclub.

The nightclub revelation was anticipated by no one, including Mr. Kissinger. The road to it was long, tortuous, and constantly subject to the unpredictable interplay of international developments that reached from Moscow and Washington to the mined harbors of North Vietnam.

It was learned here yestreday from Nixon administration sources that one critical breakthrough to an American-Soviet agreement on strategic arms limitation was reached during Mr. Kissinger's initially secret Moscow talks with the Soviet Communist party's general secretary, Leonid I. Brezhnev, April 20–24.

In their meeting, which centered both on Vietnam and the scheduled summit talks, Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Brezhnev reached basic agreement, it is said, on including a limitation on nuclear missile-firing submarines in a first-stage SALT agreement. The accord was considered a breakthrough for the United States, which pushed hard for submarine limitations, although later new problems were to arise over exactly how the complex submarine freeze would be applied.

Simultaneously, the United States and the Soviet Union were sliding toward new tension over the American bomber attacks on the Hanoi and Haiphong region prior to Mr. Kissinger's arrival in Moscow. That slide toward the risk of a great power confrontation sharply accelerated with President Nixon's May 8 decision to order the mining of North Vietnam's harbors to try to cut the Soviet Union's sea supply line to its allies in Hanoi. American-Soviet developments were heading in exactly opposite directions at the same time: toward high prospects of coexistence, and toward confrontation.

The total inside story of the tense days between May 8 and Mr. Nixon's arrival in Moscow May 22 is still buried in secrecy. But as portions of the tale emerge they reveal increasingly that what evidently saved the summit from postponement or collapse over President Nixon's mining order was that by then the two nations were deeply involved in negotiating subjects of superior mutual interest—most especially SALT.

By the time Mr. Nixon arrived here last Monday, it was expected on both sides that a SALT agreement would be reached during his visit because the basic political decisions and most of the technical decisions has been thrashed out during 30 months of negotiating, with meetings alternately in Vienna and in Helsinki. But last-minute bargaining hangups, it was conceded, might possibly extend beyond the summit. So the pressure was on for both sides.

On Tuesday, Mr. Kissinger said, the President and Mr. Brezhnev spent the afternoon and evening on four unresolved SALT disagreements, resolving all but two of them. One group of remaining problems concerned the terms for interchanging land missiles with submarines, and another obstacle was how to deal with older Soviet submarines.

STALEMATES BROKEN

By noon Friday, the stalemates were broken, and the Russians were anxious to announce the result Friday night to avoid disrupting the summit schedule. Joint instructions were flashed to the U.S. and Soviet negotiators in Helsinki, and the final agreement was literally pieced together by American Ambassador Gerald C. Smith and chief Soviet negotiator Vladimir S. Semyonov on an American plane that brought them to Moscow Friday evening.

But the task of publishing the agreement and explaining it to the world was barely beginning at that point, with a signing ceremony set for 11 p.m. in the Kremlin.

At 10:02 p.m., American newsmen traveling with the President were assembled in the U.S. Embassy for an on-the-record briefing by Ambassador Smith and Mr. Kissinger, both operating under heavy strain.

Mr. Smith called it "the freshest treaty that I have ever talked about." In fact, it was so fresh that no one in the room had a copy to show to newsmen. That produced tumult.

Criticism already was being raised in Congress about the still-unseen treaty, especially charges that it gave lopsided submarine advantages to the Soviet Union. Mr. Smith and Mr. Kissinger firmly denied that, and then—in an unusual sequence—began revealing, in Moscow, intelligence information to sustain the American assurances.

This session, and the one afterward in the Intourist Hotel, produced on-the-record exchanges between American newsmen and officials never before heard in Moscow.

Reporter: "The basic story (about the treaty) is going to go out of this session. I think we have to get figures on submarines and other estimates, otherwise the story will go out in a garbled way . . . Is this figure of 42 Y-class submarines an accurate one that they will be allowed to complete, and we with 41?"

Mr. Smith: "I don't know about this figure of 42 submarines. I have seen all sorts of speculations about Soviet submarines, but it is perfectly clear that under this agreement, if the Soviets want to pay the price of scrapping a substantial number of other important strategic weapons systems, they can build additional submarines."

NOT AS CONSTRAINED

Reporter: ". . . I think you are evading the point . . ."

Mr. Smith: "I am purposely evading the point because that is an intelligence estimate that I am not in a position to give out . . ."

Mr. Kissinger: "Since I am not quite as constrained or don't feel as constrained as Ambassador Smith, lest we build up a profound atmosphere of mystery about the submarine issue, I will straighten it out as best I can.

"The base number of Soviet submarines is in dispute. It has been in dispute in our intelligence estimate exactly how much it is, though our intelligence estimates are in the range that was suggested."

Question "41 to 43?"

Mr. Kissinger: "I am not going to go beyond what I have said. It is in that general range. The Soviet estimate of their program is slightly more exhaustive. They, of course, have the advantage that they know what it is precisely." (Laughter).

The briefing was interrupted for the 11 p.m. signing ceremony. The frustrated newsmen watched the three official documents being signed on television. They still had no copies of the "landmark" treaty.

Later, over 100 weary, deadline-stricken U.S. reporters were assembled to meet with an equally tired Mr. Kissinger in the only available hall, the Intourist Hotel nightclub.

As he proceeded through 45 minutes of exhausting questioning, Mr. Kissinger, sleepless most of the past furious week of diplomacy, still displayed his whimsical aplomb and command of detail on a subject that has preoccupied him for years before and since he came to the White House.

NO SPRINKLING OF LEVITY

There was no sprinkling of levity to ease tension, however, when Mr. Kissinger was asked if "the United States got stuck with a submarine deal." Replied Mr. Kissinger firmly "that is an absurdity. It is a total absurdity. It was the United States which insisted that the submarines be included. . . . So this is not something that the Soviets forced on us. It is something we urged on the Soviets . . ."

If this "important first step" in limiting defensive and offensive nuclear missiles succeeds, said Mr. Kissinger, "the future will record that both sides won."

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(Mr. ASHBROOK asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. ASHBROOK'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

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## NETWORK ANTI-NIXON BIAS DOCUMENTED

(Mr. DEVINE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Speaker, the publication known as First Monday, sponsored by the Republican National Committee, revealed some very interesting facts about the networks, as well as their commentators.

Although First Monday is a politically oriented journal, the revelations in the June 5 issue should have much broader exposure for the benefit of the public; thus I am inciuding the following:

SOVIET SUMMIT LEAVES MEDIA CHICKEN LITTLES WITH EGG ON THEIR FACES

(By John Heywood)

The U.S.-Soviet summit meeting has among other things, left the media Chicken Littles with egg on their faces.

The President had barely faded from the TV screen on May 8 when the network sneerleaders, hand-wringers and hand-shakers went to work.

As a result of the President's just announced initiatives in Vietnam, steps taken to protect American lives and prevent a Communist take-over of South Vietnam, CBS's Eric Sevareid stated flatly: "I would suspect that the summit will not come off." His CBS colleagues Marvin Kalb and Collingwood voiced similar opinions. Collingwood said ". . . certainly the Moscow summit meeting, from which so much had been expected, is now in jeopardy . . ." Kalab declared: "One casualty of the President's mining and blockade may well be his upcoming summit to Moscow. Those who began packing and dreaming of caviar in Russia are beginning to unpack and return to some dry cereal."

CHANCELLOR: SUMMIT IN JEOPARDY

NBC's John Chancellor said on May 8: "The summit is in jeopardy today." Saying the USSR "can't sit still for this," NBC White House correspondent Richard Valeriani asked "How can they receive him (the President) now?"

Edmund Stevens of NBC observed: "The President's announceemnt will be pretty hard

for them (the Soviets) to swallow . . . it practically killed the prospects (of a summit) . . .". ABC's Ted Koppel said: "I don't see how he (the President) can go."

Characterizing the President's actions as a "threat to the peace of the world," inviting "Soviet retaliation," the *New York Times* editorialized that "a big question mark hangs over projected summit" and "there remains no certainty that it will take place." *Times* columnist Wicker branded the President a "true emperor" and worried about the world turning into an "ash."

Not to be out-done in their denunciation of the President, the *Washington Post* opinionized: "The Moscow summit is in the balance, if it has not yet toppled over." In another editorial wondering about the national interest and the self-respect of the Soviet Union, the *Post* foresaw a possibility that "the China glow," "the Moscow summit," and "the prospects of reaching SALT, trade and European agreements before next January" might all go down the drain. *Post* columnist, Joseph Kraft proclaimed the summit "in hazard" and blasted the President for putting up for grabs "the structure of world order, and the lives of thousands of Vietanmese and hundreds of Americans."

The fact of the matter is, as columnist Joseph Alsop put it: "The Soviet response to the mining of Haiphong harbor was about as tough and stiff as a length of sadly overcooked spaghetti." Those who made hysterical predictions conjuring up the wildest sort of apocalypse performed a disservice to their readers and viewers in that their ravings contributed to an irrational dialog on a subject of the utmost sensitivity, a subject which cried out for sensible discussion.

In short, much of the media's post-May 8 commentary on the President, Vietnam and the summit gives reasons to question not the judgment of the President, but rather the perspicacity of those who so badly misjudged him and subsequent events.

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CBS News Accentuates Negative, Distorts Facts in Reporting Vietnam Action

During the past several weeks since the North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam, the *First Monday* Media Monitor has picked up a few items of interest, items which show that when it comes to astigmatisms nothing sees things quite like the CBS eye:

"DEFEAT" NOT A DEFEAT

On the evening of May 6, 1972, CBS Evening News viewers were greeted by anchorman Roger Mudd telling them: "The South Vietnamese suffered two more defeats today trying to push back the Communists in the Central Highlands." One of the "defeats" cited by Mudd was at Firebase 42 where enemy forces reportedly killed or wounded at least 100 South Vietnamese in a three-hour assault.

Meanwhile, on NBC, Don North was reporting from Firebase 42 and his more detailed account showed that the battle wasn't quite the defeat CBS had made it out to be.

Pointing out that the attackers were an estimated company of North Vietnamese sappers ("probably the most feared enemy soldiers in Vietnam"), North reported that the base had been destroyed but "if the enemy mission had been to overrun and hold this firebase, as they have so many others, they failed." North said the base was not overrun due to the fighting of the elite South Vietnamese airborne unit that had "beaten off" the attack by the North Vietnamese.

VOLUNTEER ARMY MISREPRESENTED

In the same May 6 CBS Evening News broadcast, there was a film report from Hue, South Vietnam, showing a volunteer army marching through the streets. As the camera focused on a close-up of a man who looked like a 150-year-old Ho Chi Minh in a helmet, CBS reporter David Henderson (in Hue) intoned ominously:

"Led by a brass band playing patriotic marching tunes, the local militia for the ancient imperial capital of Hue paraded through the streets today to show off their strengths. The ragged army of volunteers will be the *first line of defense* when the expected enemy attack comes. The militia is made up of men too old or too young to be in the regular army, veterans—some of them disabled, local officials and teachers."

Henderson went on to point out that the parade was through mostly empty streets because most of the people left as "they were not impressed with the militia to protect them. Local armies in this country have a reputation for panicking and running away when attacked."

NOT FIRST DEFENSE LINE

The fact of the matter is that the volunteer army shown on CBS News was not and is not the "first line of defense" of the city of Hue. As an Associated Press story reported: "The government has provided 20,000 weapons for volunteers to defend the city if the army cannot hold off the North Vietnamese." The AP report labeled the local militia "the last-ditch volunteer defenders of Hue." Thus, by presenting this disorganized group of volunteers as the primary defenders of Hue, CBS gave their viewers a much gloomier picture than the facts warranted.

The final items involve CBS reporter Bob Simon and things he said and didn't say.

In an April 29 report from Hue, Simon was reporting on the Communist shelling of Highway One and the thousands of refugees on the road. Commenting at one point on how the people had to learn for themselves that the road was being bombarded, Simon said: "The Communists were not aiming for civilians, at least one can't imagine why they would, there were more important targets on the road . . ."

COMMUNIST TERROR TACTIC

What one can't imagine is why Simon would wonder why the Communists would shell civilians. They have done so as a terror tactic since the beginning of the Vietnam war.

Just last week in a press conference, Defense Secretary Laird cited facts and figures to show the Communists "complete lack of regard" for civilians: Since the Communists invaded six weeks ago, the South Vietnamese city of An Loc, a two square mile area concentrated with a civilian population, has been hit by 35,000 rounds of enemy artillery. The four days before Quang Tri fell, the Communists were putting into that civilian population area a total of 3,000 rounds a day. The last day before it fell, the city took 4,600 rounds. As Laird put it: "They sprayed artillery into those civilian centers just as if they were using a water hose."

Another Simon report, April 28, ended on a very moving note. As the camera pans slowly showing the bodies of dead and injured men, women and children, South Vietnamese refugees, strewn across a road after their truck had hit a Communist mine, Simon says:

NOTHING LEFT TO SAY?

"By evening government spokesmen are saying another grand victory has been won in Quang Tri province, the situation is once again stabilized. But there will be more fighting and more words. Words spoken by generals, journalists, politicians. But here on Route One, it is difficult to imagine what those words can be. There is nothing left to say about this war. There is just nothing left to say."

Nothing left for Bob Simon to say obviously. But is there really nothing left to say about a truckload of innocent refugees killed and maimed by a Communist mine put there by an enemy who throughout the entire war in Vietnam has deliberately murdered civilians as an instrument of national policy? Is there really nothing left to say about an enemy who after years of aggression continues to try and enslave his fellow countrymen by force and violence? Is there nothing to be said about how 12 of North Vietnam's 13 regular army divisions are now engaged in aggression outside its borders against Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam? Is there nothing to be said about North Vietnam's violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords and the 1968 understandings which led to a cessation of U.S. bombing? Is there nothing to be said about North Vietnam's truculence and refusal to negotiate in good faith an end to the war?

Of course there is plenty to be said about the war. But the odds are you won't hear it or see it on CBS.

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(Mr. GUDE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. GUDE'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

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## THE ABSURDITY OF SOME FEDERAL PROGRAMS

(Mr. SKUBITZ asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Speaker, it is not often that I find myself unable to respond to inquiries from my constituents. Some 30 years on Capitol Hill, as an aide to two Senators and as a sitting Member of this honorable body, have given me the experience not to be surprised by any inquiry, to expect almost anything from a citizen and even more and stranger things from Government, and to cope with all of these.

But I confess that two recent letters from constituents have me nonplussed. I am chagrined at my own ignorance of what brought the circumstances about, when and how I, as one Congressman, supported such a proposition, what to do about it, and how to answer the plaintive comments of my constituents.

In the interest of brevity, I want to read the two letters. I have, of course, deleted the names of the writers and other personal references.

———, KANS.,
*May 2, 1972.*

Hon. JOE SKUBITZ,
*House of Representatives,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR JOE: Curiosity combined with anger (perhaps you have heard from others before now) prompt this letter to you.

———, and his wife ———, who live about one and a half blocks east of me in ———, and who have lived on welfare all of their life are building a new house and it's nothing small. Of course, it can't be because they have either thirteen or fourteen children.

By the grape vine—they got an FHA loan and are to repay it at forty something dollars a month.

Those of us who work for a living, pay our taxes, contribute to all drives, etc., can't even consider such a thing as a new home—many of us even have to study all circumstances before we can even invest in a car. Yet we have to support such as this and can't help but wonder how such things are done.