McGARVEY

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM UP THE FLAGPOLE STATION WRVR/FM

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INTERVIEW WITH PATRICK J. MC GARVEY

DANIEL MACK: Come with us now, back to the mid-60s when we have asked not what we could do for ourselves but what ourselves could do for our country or something like that. With Patrick McGarvey who was a young man in his twenties, then, decided to join the CIA, the Central Intelligence Agency. He'd just been in training about a week now, and all of a sudden he's at this orientation session when in steps Allen Dulles. This is just a preview of a tape that we'll hear later on in the program, ex-CIA agent Patrick McGarvey describing one orientation session back in the mid-60s.

PATRICK J. MC GARVEY: I look on that year of training as sort of though if I were a Sioux Indians, the rites of passage into the Sioux Indian tribe as a brave because it's so structured psychologically by advancing through the very basics of intelligence to capping your training program off with a paramilitary demonstration of blowing up bridges and exiting submarines and that sort of thing that it's bound to have an obvious, fraternal kind of impact on you and they really, what we called, pump it to you, during that period, and really psych you up.

And of course in the 60s, late 50s and early 60s, early 60s particularly with John Kennedy's ask not what you can do for your country [sic], it was the place to be within government. And they trotted Allen Dulles out for us in the first or second day of our training program and he was the king. He came out on the stage of the auditorium there with his tweed jacket and leather patches on the sleeves and his pipe and his twinkly eyes like Santa Claus and he launched into a story which started off, with, I can't imitate his Establishment accent, but nevertheless, it went something to the effect that when he was a Foreign Service officer posted to Geneva, Switzerland in 1917, he had the Saturday

duty one morning. And he got a phone call from the railroad station and it was a man with a foreign accent wanting to speak to an American official. And he said, now I toyed with this notion; he said, I had a date to play tennis that afternoon with a comely young lady. And he said, were I to go down to the railroad station and meet with this man, I couldn't have made my date, he said; I made a decision on the spot that the young lady would take first priority and I refused the man.

And he paused and he lit his pipe and we're all sitting there in the audience, thinking, yeah, that's the way to do it, I'd go with the broad myself, you know; the hell with this old weird sounding guy.

And when that had sunk in, his pipe lit, he took a couple of puffs, he looked at us, and he says, twenty-two years, I found out that man's name was Lenin.

And of course that sunk in and then he launched into the, you know, we're saying, you really blew it, Al, you know; and then he launched into the forefront -- in intelligence, you're on the forefront of the world scene, you're days ahead of the diplomatic community; you're days ahead of the world press; and all of us of course being in in our early to mid-20s, were highly impressionable, all of our own, personal emotional identities were beginning to get wrapped and entwined in the agencies and we became true believers.

And by the time the year of training was over, you know, we were ready to do or die for the old CIA.

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MACK: This is Up The Flagpole. I'm Daniel Mack and I'm talking with Patrick J. McGarvey, the author of "C.I.A., The Myth and The Madness"; it's a book just published by Saturday Review Press and it's a book that catalogues the foibles and the bumblings and the mistakes of the CIA and tries to debunk the myth that it's a topnotch, well run, highly efficient, well organized James Bond sort of operation that many of us in our private paranoias think it is or even our collective paranoia. The book goes through the - some of the successes but generally the shortcomings of the CIA, showing that it's just another government agency and if you know something about the way the Social Security people run or the way the Congress runs itself, you should probably know something about the way the CIA runs itself.

It's filled with a number of anecdotes and stories that run from the absolutely outrageous to the hair-raising, to the hilarious and it's a delightful book and it took me three hours and I read it in one sitting and I enjoyed it very very much. And I just wondered if I really should indulge myself in enjoying

a book about the CIA so much, whether or not - this isn't just another CIA plot; getting a book like this published does do a little bit of debunking about the CIA, but nonetheless, it maintains its shroud of secrecy and I think at one point you describe the Direcotr of the CIA, Helms, as having a peculiar relationship with the press, that he'll talk to them and give a little bit of inside dope on generally another agency and that this way he keeps the hounds off his own heels. I was just wondering if a book like this doesn't really do that about the CIA itself.

MC GARVEY: Well, this is again, part of the myth aspect of CIA. I have been suspect, in my own family, and among friends and among - generally among people who know me; they don't believe that I've actually left Intelligence. And I don't honestly have an adequate answer to that other than the fact that I say that I know that I have. I sleep better at night and am a happier person as a result of it all.

MACK: All right, let's use that as the basis; and let's go on, you describe in labyrinthean detail the intelligence structure in the United States which numbers about a hundred and fifty thousand men which is probably a hundred thousand men more than necessary; we can get into the figures; do you want to roughly give some sort of outline, as simply as possible, on just what the intelligence structure is?

MC GARVEY: Well, essentially there's ten federal agencies of government involved in intelligence. It's a pyramid-like structure - at the top you've got the CIA; then each one of the four services has got their own intelligence elements.

You've got the FBI, the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Security Agency, and the Treasury Department, also in intelligence.

Now CIA came about after World War II when the internal bickering and feuding between the four branches of the service finally proved that you need somewhere a centralized authority in intelligence; in other words, the Army would pick a piece of - a tidbit of intelligence up during the wary, they wouldn't share it with the Navy, the Marine Corps or the Air Force.

And out of that sprung the concept of a Central Intelligence Agency. However, as in most large organizational changes, there were compromises made at the very beginning and the basic compromise that was made in intelligence was to retain the departmental structure and build this superstructure of CIA on top of the nine departments that were already involved.

And the result has been the fact today that you've got ten agencies involved in all four basic phases of ingelligence, of collecting, of processing, of analyzing, and of reporting. The

obvious, most blatant problem there is the tremendous and enormous duplication of effort that results.

MACK: Which is in a certain way, it's a check and a balance on things, isn't it?

M GARVEY: Well, yeah, everyone has to keep everyone else honest. When I was at CIA, I worked for a while in the military intelligence shop. Now that came into being, that very shop came into being because we couldn't trust the analysis that the Defense Intelligence Agency was coming up with and the conclusions, particularly, it's not so much when you get into the area of let's say the Soviet capability, but, rather, it was in the area of estimating what Soviet intentions would be with their military capability.

And of course the military always took the hard-nosed worst case approach to things. So the CIA found that it couldn't really rely on the judgment of its uniformed brethren so that they put together a shop of their own.

And that goes throughout the entire structure of intelligence; as a minute example, they've got an agricultural, economic analysis section, where we'll get earth satellite photography of the Soviet wheat crop and from this photography, deduce and project a forecast of Soviet wheat production.

Now the men at the Pentagon will come, based on the same evidence, they'll come to a different set of conclusions than will the man at CIA and also the men at the National Security Agency are analyzing the same thing and they come to another set of conclusions.

The result is that you form a committee; you get together and you hammer these things out and you reach a consensus of an estimate of what's going to happen and you know one common expression in intelligence is, a camel is a horse built by a committee. So many of the intelligence estimates come out intending to be horses, but looking like camels.

MACK: Are many of the conclusions that are reached independently by the various branches of the agency, are they independent of the data, are they almost - are they the conclusions that are desired, wanted?

MC GARVEY: Well, yah, you've always got that problem; you've got -- the military intelligence scene is dominated by the budgetary interests, in other words, I point out one example in the book where the Air Force wanted to increase the number of tactical fighter squadrons that we had in Western Europe. So to do this they took the available intelligence evidence and indicated that

the eastern European countries Air Forces' capability was far greater than it actually was.

Closer analysis of the evidence that they had come up with showed a lot of the evidence to be faulty. So we got ourselves into a fight with the - it ended up going to the Bureau of Budget and was resolved in this one instance, against the Air Force. But you end up with a situation where for the first couple of years that I was in intelligence, I enjoyed the daily battles with the Pentagon; the daily battles with the State Department and other agencies of government, because you actually felt like you were contributing to policy.

But what it really is is a form of bureaucratic incest. And it's sort of like kissing your sister. A couple of years of that routine and you begin to ask yourself, well, what am I really doing, am I just playing an incestuous little game with information and are mypurposes guided by the principle of informing the President as best I can or am I protecting the vested interests of the particular agency I'm working for?

MACK: You called the men in the intelligence branch, I guess there's a hundred and fifty thousand now working; you say, it turns men into vegetables, what do you mean by that.

MC GARVEY: Well, in two areas, one in the operational area and two is in the other side of the business, the analytical side; in the operational area, I met, for example, the man who ran the base in Central America from which the Bay of Pigs operation was mounted and this poor guy was a quivering, alcoholic wreck. And this was several years after the Bay of Pigs.

Now, of course, the Agency kept him on the payroll andthey made him an instructor in maritime operations at their training facilities. But the guy could barely live with himself; he really had tremendous emotional problems about the whole thing having gone down the tubes and felt personally responsible for it.

There's the phenomenon of the burned-out case officer which is the spy who came in from the cold. It's the guy who spent twenty to twenty-five years working overseas and when you're working in the area of human intelligence, you're looking for human weakness. So your own consumption of alcohol, your own involvement in vice and things licentious in your own preying on the periphery of human weakness has got a degenerating and debilitating effect on you emotionally and even physically.

And these burned out guys are pretty tragic individuals to meet in their late 40s and early 50s.

MACK: Now you spent fourteen years in the CIA yourself. How much of a vegetable did you turn into?

Mr. McGarvey doesn't correct

MC GARVEY: Well, I got a duodenal ulcer and ended up having six operations and today I'm minus a stomach, a spleen, and a goodly part of my intestines. It got to me.

MACK: There's one story that tried to lighten it a little bit about getting into the seamy side of things and that's the CIA thought it was important to check on the health of King Farouk. And how was this accomplished? Did you just go to his doctor and ask, how is the King?

MC GARVEY: No, they set up a crazy operation. I think it was in Monte Carlo. And he used to vacation there and play at the gaming tables. They set up a weird situation wherein they got some plumbing from the outside of the men's room hooked into the urinal and they collected samples of his urine when he went into the bathroom, to go to the bathroom.

Now, to make sure they had the right man's sample, they had to put a CIA agent in one of the commodes. And when Farouk came in with his little transistor radio, he didn't say anything, he just pushed a button which beeped the signal to the men outside, collect this urine.

And of course they whisked it off to Washington and put it through the normal urine lab tests. And from there evolved, you know, a medical breakdown of King Farouk's condition.

MACK: All right, now, let's just take that sort of information and just follow it to see how it gets up to the President. The way any information whether it be the analysis of satellite photographs of the wheat crop in the Soviet Union, in the Ukraine, or the analysis of King Farouk's urine or some of the other crazy stories you tell, it goes through a number of processes of analysis and then summarization and then rewriting, and it ends up in this crazy labyrinthean kind of report system.

MC GARVEY: That's right. At the top of the structure, and it takes a goodly amount of time for the information to percolate up to the top. But at the top, the President every day receives something that's called the PICL, P-I-C-L, the President's Intelligence Check List. It usually runs six to eight pages in length and it's a top secret skimming of the crop of overnight and the last twenty-four hour developments in the world of intelligence. It's much like the news summary index in the New York Times; just crops or takes those issues that the Agency knows are currently on the President's mind, then ...

MACK: Can you give me an example of what would be on one of these -- I mean, six to eight pages is not very long.

MC GARVEY: No, it's much the same, as well, I think John Kennedy put it well, in a press conference, he was asked questions much in the same vein and Kennedy's reply was, well, most days I get more information out of the New York Times.

For example, when the SALT talks were going on, I'm sure that there were daily reports to the President which would analyze, a) what went on at the SALT talks on a particular day and b) contrast what was going on at the diplomatic table with what was going on in the Soviet research and development area, whether in fact, they are cutting back in research or deployment of ABMs and things like that.

And people have a tendency to think that intelligence is a sort of straight line to the creator, the inner circle and the real truth. And lamentably, that's not the case.

John Kennedy was very accurate when he said, maybe he gets more information out of the New York Times, primarily because it's better written in the times.

But essentially, he gets a summary of the world news with an occasional background or mention of intelligence operations that do influence news.

Lyndon Johnson in a presss conference was asked something along these lines and he says, well, he says, we have a few secrets in government, he says, but give the press and the tv a week or so and they usually know them also.

MACK: It's Patrick McGarvey, an ex-CIA agent, and author of a book, "C.I.A., The Myth and Madness" and we'll be back with more stories in a minute.

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MACK: This is Up The Flagpole on WRVR New York. I'm Daniel Mack and I'm talking with Patrick J. McGarvey, the author of the "C.I.A., The Myth and The Madness". We're describing the clay feet of the CIA.

You talk about the fate of the free world being in the hands of the intelligence officers. Is this ...

(CROSS TALK)

MC GARVEY: ... high blown and high flown, I would think, that's rhetorical ...

MACK: What I'm asking really is seriously is to what extent does intelligence affect the safety of United States?

MC GARVEY: Well, to a tremendous extent. It does. Because decisions on military spending, for example are based almost solely on a reading of the intelligence by the intelligence community of the Soviet military intentions and capabilities.

Now, if the analysis of the technical aspects of Soviet weaponry is wrong, then the conclusions that are gone from the capabilities and said to be Soviet intentions could also be gone.

However, we make enormous budgetarydecisions based on that kind of information. The Vietnam War every four months we had to do a total reassessment of the picture of the North Vietnamese will to persist.

Now, obviously we kept saying, intelligence kept saying those guys are going to hang in there. What gets done with that intelligence judgment is another matter. In the case of Lyndon Johnson, Walt Whitman Rostow, Lyndon Johnson himself, chose to ignore those conclusions that intelligence was writing of and chose to interpret things more along the lines of what the military was interpreting.

MACK: How much time left? Fifteen minutes. Okay.

Is there a direct fact between what the intelligence gathered and the ability of you and I to sit here and talk about this sort of thing? Are we going to see red either red hordes come sweeping through San Francisco or Russian -- you see what I'm saying, this is part of the myth which I think you tried to get at in the book. That people do believe that we have to spend ... billion dollars a year and sustain the hundred and fifty thousand employees because it's part of being a Democratic society.

MC GARVEY: Senator Fulbright, when I talked to him, before I wrote the book, he talked about this cold war mentality that prevails in Congress and particularly in the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees in both Houses and all the Pentagon and the intelligence people have to do is wave what I call the National Security Flag and Congressmen immediately shrink away from probing any deeper. The Pueblo Mission was a beautiful example of that. The hearings that were held on the Pueblo and the EC-1(?) twenty-one shootdown; no one challenged the Pentagon remark that the Pueblo mission was vital and essential to American national security and that's why it was run -- within intelligence we were able to document and -- but it never did make the official record that the Pueblo missionwas totally unnecessary.

Now it was targeted against three essential targets in North Korea. One was the activity at the jet fighter fields in North

Korea. Two was the activity and the deployment of North Korean air defense radar. And three was the activity of the - the daily activity of the Soviet Navy fleet out of Vladivostok in the Sea of Japan.

Now there were already two land based intercept stations in Japan who monitored the Soviet fleet activity to the point where we knew when they changed a roll of toilet paper on a Soviet cruiser.

The Air Force was flying sixty missions a month, reconnaissance missions a month up over the Sea of Japan and getting -- that's two a day - getting accurate readouts of the activity of the jet fighter field, and also the deployment and the activity and the kinds of radar that were being used in the air defense radar system. And then as a sort of a backup to it all, there was a landbased intercept site in South Korea which monitored all the activity in and out of Won Thon Harbor which was another target that the Pueblo was working against.

A lot of these things - you know, one problem I see, was that when the Pueblo then happened, the information that the government gave out to the public was accurate. The problem in my view comes from the information that they didn't give out to the public; that acts of omission; they didn't mention for example that intelligence with radar tracking data showed that the Pueblo had, in fact, violated North Korean territorial waters four times before it was seized in a three day period.

They didnt' talk about the fact that those targets were already being adequately covered by other sources of intelligence information. It's those acts of omission that are not put into the public arena that worry me.

MACK: (UNCLEAR) ... I think a good example of the duplication of effort and then the omission of certain information; you quote one other example in recent history that is just almost the opposite of that and that's the raid on the prisoner of war camp or supposedly the prisoner of war camp in North Vietnam.

MC GARVEY: That's right.

MACK: Thong Kay(?) where the information that was supposed -- the intelligence that that raid was based on was sorely lacking. You want to describe that?

MC GARVEY: Well, I know the fellow who personally put together those reports and it goes to the basic problem that with at the defense intelligence agency, the operating credo is intelligence exists to justify whatever operations wants to do. And in this case, President Nixon obviously determined that he wanted a grandstand gesture about the POW problem and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of course went along with this.

So the Joint Chiefs of Staff came to intelligence and they said, look, we're going to raid a POW camp in North Vietnam; pick one out for us.

Now the fellow who did the picking out, the information base about where the POWs were being kept in North Vietnam was sketchy to non-existent. There just was very very little information so they went through the files, they pushed all the buttons on the computers and they came up with prisoner interrogation report of a North Vietnamese soldier who was captured in South Vietnam in 1970, I think it was, in 1969 and he in his initial debriefing made mention of the fact to the Army guy who did it that he used to be stationed up around Son Tay(?) and the rumor in his camp was that there were American prisoners of war there in this compound.

So the next step was to take overhead photography of that Son Tay area and they did in fact find a compound. And it was walled and it had buildings inside of it and there were signs of human activity there; there was a garden growing and there were clothes hanging on the clothes line.

But that information, the man had been up there in Son Tay area in 1966 or -'7, some years prior to his actual capture. And that was the basis on which the Son Tay prisoner of war camp was mounted. The JCS refused to accept the notion from intelligence that we don't know enough about where the POWs are. They refused to accept that. And of course intelligence wasn't on this enough to say that directly to the JCS. So they said, give us something, give us the best you've got.

Now the best you've got is terrible, but they still give it to them and there's another saying in intelligence that if you want it real bad, you're going to get it real bad. And in this case, they did. And they raided the camp and there was no sign of American prisoners up there.

But here again, you know, if we had, I think, that what we need is every five years, have something along the lines of a Hoover Commission which just takes a fullblown look at all of what's going on in intelligence. And then in the interim of every five years, the President already has a mechanism called

the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Governor Rockefeller and many other famous Americans are on it.

And these men could provide an annual report to Congress. It's unclassified.

Or(?) intelligence. ... the stupid way this Mickey Mouse aspect of it and just get down to the hard facts of, all right, here's the intelligence budget; here's how much we're spending; here's our organizational management problems that we have encountered this year and here's how we're going to remedy these problems.

I mean, they do this in agriculture, they do this in labor, why can't they do this in intelligence?

MACK: Is there any evidence that the stories - the story of Son Tay, the story of the Pueblo, the EC-121 that was shot down over North Korea, these all happened anywhere from two to four years ago when you were still with the CIA. Is there any reason that things have changed since then? That decisions are being made on any more evidence, are being made any more wisely than they were made then?

MC GARVEY: I don't think so. I see something going on now in our government decision making process that worries me and that is President Nixon made some cosmetic changes at the top of the intelligence structure in 1971 after he was - after the Son Tay Camp raid, after the problem of bickering delayed progress in the SALT talks for a long time. Bickering within intelligence.

What he did is realign the very superstructure of it and redefine some of Richard Helms's responsibilities and brought intelligence closer to the National Security Council arena where Henry Kissinger operates.

Now, Henry Kissinger obviously is a capable guy but he's not so totally capable that he can, you know, make all of the necessary judgments and analysis on the intelligence information he's gotten. They've brought the flow of information now is even a little more discrete right to Henry Kissinger and he makes the considerations.

Now his considerations are not solely in the objective intelligence field; they've got other, you know, much far broader policy implications of where he would like to see policy go and that sort of thing.

I don't - I see further problems in that area.

MACK: Would you want to decentralize this? Have it go to another committee of men? I would think it would be one step

in one direction. I don't know -- it would be good or bad but to have it go to one man rather than this committee system you were describing earlier.

MC GARVEY: Yah, well, here's -- my feeling on what's wrong in intelligence organizationally is that the problems don't exist at the top -- how that information goes from the Director of Central Intelligence to the President is irrelevant because the problems in my view exist at the bottom in the lower intestines of those ten departments of government. If you correct those problems, today, we've got ten departments; my idea is to have maybe four departments functionally organized. Correct those basic problems and you're going to get a better quality of information going up to the top than how that information gets transmitted to the White House is irrelevant to the issue.

But today the focus and the concern is on that aspect of it. Organizationally, I think it's time to re-ask some basic questions, do we need a departmental approach to intelligence? I don't think we do. I think we need a functional approach. There's as I said before, four phases of intelligence: there's collection. Right now, we've got ten agencies collecting information. There is processing. Today we rely so much on technology that the computer is very active in the intelligence field and the ... from one orbit of the earth from an earth satellite produces on the order of two hundred tons of information put onto paper. So the processing angle of this is very critical. And this is of course where things bog down.

I think that we could form an organization where you would have a collection element. This way, immediately, the ringers would stick up in the collection program. You'd see where you're duplicating your effort.

In the processing phase today, the National Security Agency has a computer element and they process all this information. Now, for them to turn around and say, hey, we don't need this information is a form of heresy or blasphemy in their own organization. They're not going to call their own boss to task; whereas if there was a processing department separate from the collecting department; they could take a more objective view of what's being collected and say, hey, we don't need this. This is one of the basic problems.

Then I think more important than the organizational aspects of intelligence are some of the philosophical ones. The idea of secrecy in government. Obviously, in my opinion, we've got to have secrecy in intelligence first. I think it should be constrained and restricted primarily to the area where you're

actually protecting a source of information; much the same as a newspaper reporter who has a confidential source; he wants to protect that.

Today we don't have that situation. The sources of information are protected but far far too many other things are protected. Bureaucratic judgments and things of that nature. The budget. Any control of any organization is through the money they spend. Today the House and Senate Appropriations Committee are -- they're -- one of their responsibilities of course is to review the intelligence budget. Now the only part of the CIA or the whole intelligence budget and there's five to six billion dollars spent a year, the only part that the House and Senate sees is about five percent of that, which represents the housekeeping budget for the CIA headquarters; the entire rest of that is buried in the Agriculture Department budget, the Labor Department the Commerce Department and all other agencies of the government which have nothing to do with intelligence. Under miscellaneous items. It's just broken up and diffused throughout the system.

The rationale for that is the old World War II Cold War mentality that you can't let the opposition know what you're spending. My opinion and observation on that is first of all that the KGB in Moscow, the America Desk knows pretty well to the buck what we're spending on intelligence and if they did know, I ask the question, what difference does it make if they know how much we're spending? Every year on the appropriations for the Defense Department budget, which is more critical than intelligence, they have appropriations hearings that fill nine and ten volumes and they lay out the Defense program, the Research program, the weapons systems program in elaborate detail. Now, the Soviets obviously come over and pick up copies of those documents at the House Documents Room in the Capitol Building and take them back and analyze them.

Yet they still can't influence(?) the American defense budget. I asked the same question about the intelligence budget. I think it's time to quit playing schoolboy games with them. The only people who are getting shortchanged in that process are the American people who are footing the bill.

Now, if Congress would sit down and require that the budget be investigated in its entirety every year, they, themselves, even though they're not technical experts in intelligence, their own human wisdom would point out obvious areas of problems. And that veil of secrecy around the budget is probably one of

the fundamental areas that once you tear that veil down and let some sunshine in there, you're going to have far fewer problems.

MACK: Okay, we'll take a break and we'll be right back.

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MACK: I'm Daniel Mack and the program is Up The Flagpole. Talking on tape, I'm afraid with Patrick J. McGarvey, an ex-CIA agent, a man who spent fourteen years in the service of the CIA, sometimes dubbed -- Confusion of America -- as well as the Central Intelligence Agency and we're talking -- we talked yesterday, and playing the tape now about the way the CIA operates. (PROGRAM INTERFERENCE) ... ... examples of King Farouk's urine to check on his health when the Ministry could just as easily go to his doctor and say, Excuse me Doctor, I understand one of your patients is named King Farouk. Could you tell me what sort of health he's in? No, no, they don't do that, they wait till the King goes to a casino in Monte Carlo and they especially fix up the men's room so that they collect King Farouk's urine when he's at the urinal and other such things of the CIA that cost us, the taxpayer five to six billion dollars a year and it employs a hundred and fifty thousand Americans though in strange peculiar ways.

This is WRVR NEW YORK 106.7 FM.

How would the Congress go about checking on the budget of the CIA? I'm led to believe that there's a certain connection between the Congressmen that sit on the review panel and the CIA itself.

MC GARVEY: That's right. There's a very obscure but I think very important part that is generally overlooked by the public and that is that the CIA retains the right and privilege, if you will, of passing or clearing with those members of Congress who will sit on the four select subcommittees to review intelligence.

Now, this is all done under the guise of we can only have men who can get a top secret clearance for this kind of proecess. The result in practical terms has been generally, you have southern, very conservative, almost reactionary Congressmen whose main purpose it strikes me and was said to me by Senator Fulbright is to protect CIA from an enquiring public.

But the basic fact does remain that CIA does have some say in its own degree of influence on which members of Congress actually sit on those subcommittees.

MACK: You quote one Congressman, I believe it's Jamie Whitten,

as being somewhat criticial and outspoken against the CIA. Well, what committee does he sit on?

MC GARVEY: He's on the Appropriations Subcommittee and in his years of experience reviewing intelligence budgets, the only time, the only part of the intelligence budget really that comes to the public view is the Defense Intelligence Agency. When the Defense Department budget is being reviewed. So Jamie Whitten has got some obvious strong feelings about what's going on in intelligence and every year, consistently, he's used the appropriations hearings as a sort of platform to vent his own feelings on the subject.

MACK: Is this going to make any change, though? We're still going to have the Southern Congressmen in control, aren't we?

MC GARVEY: Yah, really, essentially, I don't hold any illusions, that, for example, my book will bring about any realistic change. The change has to come from a number of areas. First of all, of course, would be the President. Second would be the Congress. Now there's been over two hundred resolutions tabled in the House of Representatives since 1950 trying to form a Joint Committee on Intelligence in the same way that there is and has been a Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which would bring together of let's say the Government Operations Subcommittee which is really important because the Operations Subcommittee gets into the day to day nitty gritty of management of resources.

Now if they were to take a realistic look at what goes on in intelligence, those guys could have a heck of a clout. It would bring together the Foreign Affairs people, committees in the House and Senate slide(?) who obviously have an interest in intelligence but who have been kept out of the intelligence picture. It would bring together, of course, the Appropriations Committee members and it would also bring together people from the Armed Services Committee because so much of the intelligence really directly military policy(?).

Unless we get something more realistic and more rational along those lines, the thing is just going to continue to muddle along.

MACK: Patrick McGarvey's book "The C.I.A. Myth And Madness" is published by Saturday Review Press.

It's very funny the way that Congress gets into this. We'll be talking about Congress in a little while and the way the cold war lingers on, still freezing certain elements, certain institutions in our society. And there's a certain amount of truth in the statement that this fear of the monolithic communist ogre coming across the Arctic or slithering across the Pacific Ocean onto

the shores of California does keep us doing strange things, such as supporting this crazy CIA to the tune of over five billion dollars, keeping a hundred and fifty thousand men employed in the Armed Services basically when they could be used other places and once again it falls in the lap of Congress, those fellows and women who allot our money for us. Maybe we could write to them. The one Congressmen that mentioned there, Jamie Whitten seems to be very concerned about the way the money's spent and spent too lavishly on intelligence and that there could be an intelligent use of money for intelligence in this country. No one is disputing the fact that some form of intelligence is needed and I just wish it would be applied to the budget.

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