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FOIA(b)(3) Our Man Beelzebub

## Gehlen: Spy of the Century by E. H. Cookbridge

(Random House; \$10)

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## The General Was a Spy by Heinz Hohne and Hermann Zolling

(Coward, McCann &amp; Geoghegan; \$8.95)

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A year before Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri, which formally stated the theme of Act I of the Cold War, a prologue was being written and played backstage in Europe by Americans and Germans. They had already identified Soviet Communism as Enemy Number One, not primarily because Russia had Eastern Europe in its grip, but because Soviet Communism was satanic and was set on conquering the world. And as Hugh Trevor-Roper remarks in his introduction to *The General Was a Spy*, "it is legitimate to use Beelzebub to drive out Satan." Beelzebub was willing. Both these spy stories describe how and why, with the collapse of the German armies, the Americans recruited Hitler's Chief of Intelligence against the Soviet Union and underwrote his postwar espionage operations.

Reinhard Gehlen was a professional, an experienced, single-minded anti-Communist with exceptional contacts. Those who hired him were not of the breed of Henry Stimson, who once said quaintly that gentlemen don't read other people's mail. They were what came to be called realists, and they dominated US foreign policy for the next quarter of a century. The US government secretly financed General Gehlen to the amount of \$200 million, and when he finally left his American supervisors and went to work directly for the Bonn government, Mr. Cookbridge tells us, Allen Dulles gave him "a golden handshake in appreciation of the great work he had done for CIA; a gratuity of 250,000 marks had been authorized. Dulles added the not entirely seriously meant condition that Gehlen should use the money to buy a fine house somewhere in the Bavarian mountains."

For the mountains of paper and thousands of

clandestine tips on Eastern Europe and the USSR. Toward the end, it learned that much of the information was useless; and it learned something more disturbing: the Gehlen organization had been penetrated by the Soviets. By the early '60s, Washington's interest had cooled.

*The General Was a Spy* is drawn from a series of articles written by two German journalists for *Der Spiegel*. *Gehlen: Spy of the Century* is the product of a European educated British journalist who was himself an intelligence agent in World War II and was imprisoned by the Gestapo. Hohne and Zolling offer a more detailed and dispassionate account and focus more sharply on the intricacies of the postwar intelligence network inside Germany; they are less revealing than Cookbridge, however, on the American involvement and on the Nazi backgrounds of Gehlen's associates.

Gehlen served any master who served his purpose, which was the undermining and the destruction of Communism. When it could no longer be doubted that the German armies were defeated, Gehlen turned to the *Werewolves*, the young terrorists who were to carry on after Hitler's collapse. The *Werewolf* project had been discussed at one of Gehlen's last meetings with the Fuhrer, whom Gehlen found "most charming." They had also discussed Hitler's order that "gramophone records with sound effects of combat noise and rolling tanks . . . be distributed to front line commands and played from dugouts as near as possible to the Soviet lines." Hitler was mad, Gehlen was not. Yet Gehlen accepted this order, as all the others, knowing it was too late to stave off disaster, but obedient. He did not desert until there was nothing to desert from. He played no

Nazi leaders. He waited until the end and then escaped to Bavaria, in early 1945, taking with him files he knew would interest the Americans—to whom he intended to surrender at a price. He met with Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, senior intelligence officer of the American Zone, who (report Hohne and Zolling) "while fighting was still in progress in France . . . had been prepared to make use of Adolf Hitler's officers in the cause of American strategy" and who "had a most excellent impression of him [Gehlen] at once." Sibert promptly took up with General Bedell Smith, US chief of staff, Gehlen's proposal to set up a German intelligence service "financed by the US and directed against the Soviet Union." Bedell Smith "okayed" the project, according to Hohne and Zolling, but did not inform Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, who had forbidden fraternization with Germans. After lengthy interrogation in Germany, Gehlen was flown to Washington.

Though friendship with Moscow was then official US policy, Cookbridge points out, Gehlen knew that "many generals, above all General George V. Strong, the chief of G-2 army intelligence, and Sibert, were very far from regarding the Soviet Union as a future ally. In fact, a vastly different vision was taking place at the Third Army headquarters at Bad Toelz, near where he [Gehlen] had buried his . . . files. There General Patton was dreaming of rearming a couple of Waffen SS divisions to incorporate them into his Third Army and 'lead them against the Reds.'" Said Patton: "We're going to have to fight them sooner or later. Why not now while our army is intact and we can kick the Red army back into Russia? We can do it with my Germans. . . . They hate those Red bastards."

That, of course, went way beyond anything Gehlen's captors had in mind. They wanted information; Gehlen had it. So, says Cookbridge, they treated him with great courtesy, "wooing him like a wayward lass who can bring a large dowry to offset the blemishes of her past. . . . Gehlen bargained his way into the gray dawn of Cold War espionage, conceding or compromising on some points, using pressures near to blackmail to gain others. It says much for his shrewdness, self-assurance and persistence that he was able to take on of top-ranking American experts." They agreed to covertly subsidize "an autonomous