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'Last of the Giants'

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# Inside Stories From Talks With

This article, on the Central Intelligence Agency, is the third in a series of selections from "The Last of the Giants," a new 4-volume of memoirs of C. L. Sulzberger, foreign affairs columnist of The New York Times.

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## Officials of the CIA

By C. L. SULZBERGER

Special to The Bulletin

Washington, August 7, 1956

Dined and talked until the early hours with Frank Wisner and Gates Lloyd. They are in the same trade (CIA). Frank said Allen Dulles (then head of the CIA) was extremely upset by my column criticizing American propaganda.

Wisner told me McCarthyism is, unfortunately, by no means dead in the government, and I should not forget this. M, who was suspended from the State Department on a phony, trumped-up charge, was finally forced back by pressure.

But now — two years later — he has been exiled to a consular position at the fever-hole of Paramaribo, (then capital of Dutch Guiana), the nearest post we have to Devil's Island.

Frank told me that he was astonished to discover, when he went to Romania during the war, that practically all the agents furnished by Zaslani (later Reuven Shiloah), Israeli intelligence boss, to the British from Romanian Jews in Palestine, were working for Zaslani's network all the time — and not for the British, who didn't know.

Washington, July 23, 1958

Dined last night at Wisner's. Allen Dulles boasted to me that CIA had been seeing de Gaulle regularly before he came to power, through a French contact. He also said they had an excellent agent among the ultras who plotted in Algeria. Maybe, but it seems indiscreet to say as much.

Washington, July 24, 1958

Dined with Allen Dulles and Senator Fulbright. Tomorrow, Fulbright's committee investigates Dulles's CIA. They were polite and friendly with each other, but Fulbright made no bones about his intentions to make Dulles squirm. He felt CIA should have known more about the Iraqi coup in advance.

The military information and plans of the Bagdad Pact that are now available to Nasser (and Russia?) are admittedly embarrassing.

Dulles thinks the way our intelligence is set up is more logical than Britain's. We have in one organization what they have in three and a half. It is better that way, and better to have the organization known.

Washington, October 12, 1960

This afternoon, saw Allen Dulles in his CIA office. On the wall a map shows the route of the Soviet ICBMs to the Pacific from the general region of Kirghizstan. Allen said the takeoff point was deliberately changed on the map for security reasons.

We talked about Gary Powers. (U-2 spy shot down over Russia). The CIA has a theory that no man should ever be ordered to commit suicide if captured and this was not in contracts with agents.

The CIA thought there was more chance of a man's individual nobility prompting him to such an act if there were no such advance order.

Allen said Powers had done nothing wrong and probably would have had a hard time committing suicide either by

needle, even had he wanted to. First he was parachuted out and secondly he was in a

cumbersome 'pressure' suit. Thirdly, he was captured, pronto-on landing.

### Dulles' View

Nevertheless, Dulles left me with the impression he thought Powers should somehow have knocked himself off. He said Powers had been brainwashed or brain-conditioned prior to the trial. It was clear he had told the Russians more than emerged, because his previous "testimony" was always referred to.

I gather Dulles is unhappy with Powers' behavior but doesn't like to say so. Powers had a specific, short-term contract with CIA and was paid between \$25,000 and \$30,000 a year, about what a good, civilian jet pilot gets.

Under the law, he must be paid as long as his contract runs, even though in jail. (He was later freed in an exchange.)

Paris, April 19, 1961

Lunched today with Kim (Kermit) Roosevelt. He is now vice president of Gulf Oil Co. in charge of government relations, but he is still linked with the CIA.

Kim was in charge of the operation in Iraq when we got rid of Mossadegh in 1953. That one was relatively easy as we were able to calculate that if we could produce an open fight between Mossadegh and the Shah, the Shah would gain popular support. He did. The British had tried to get up to take the line of intervention many months earlier, but we waited until the local situation was right — unlike Cuba.

Kim was on a secret mission in 1955 with Bob Anderson, later Eisenhower's secretary

of the Treasury. The mission, sent out by Eisenhower himself, sought to try and make peace between Egypt and Israel. Anderson and Kim talked to Nasser hour after hour. There was a corollary mission to Ben Gurion.

Chet Bowles (then under secretary of state) offered Kim these ambassadorial posts; Tehran, Cairo, and Rabat. Kim pointed out that he could not go to Iran because the Russians had evidence of what his activities had been in overthrowing Mossadegh in 1953. Likewise, Kim told Bowles it would be useless to send him to Cairo.

At the time of the Iraqi revolution, Nasser sent a team into Bagdad which grabbed all the Bagdad Pact intelligence files — well filled with Kim's name.

Were Kim to be our ambassador, Nasser would be in a position to blackmail him and us by releasing such documents whenever convenient.