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It is still possible, even in Washington, to come upon persons to whom the name Central Intelligence Agency suggests very little or means nothing at all. This is as it should be. At the same time, the creation and development of a national intelligence agency have inevitably been accompanied by a certain amount of national interest, so that those citizens who read their papers, watch TV or listen to their radios realize that something new had been added to the government whose activities are of considerable significance.

The word "intelligence" is associated in the public mind with the word "spy", and the word "spy" with such words as "glamor" about which the less said the better. Consequently one would guess, without going to the trouble of conducting a scientific survey of opinion, that the concept of "Central Intelligence" must be quite interesting as compared with the truth.

This does not, of course, apply to the members of your CIC Association who are completely aware of the nature of intelligence and counter-intelligence. Nevertheless, it may be well to review briefly where the Central Intelligence Agency stands with relation to the United States Government and what purposes it is designed to serve.

The law which established the Agency (the National Security Act of 1947, Section 102 (d)) makes it, above all, an Agent of the National Security Council, the President's principal advisory group on matters of foreign policy. The Agency is directed to advise the Council concerning intelligence activities of the government that relate to national security; to make recommendations to the Council regarding the "coordination" of governmental intelligence activities; to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security" (which, however, will be primarily intelligence

furnished by other agencies of the government than CIA); to perform, for the benefit of these other agencies, such services of common concern as may be more efficiently accomplished centrally, and to perform such other functions as the National Security Council may direct.

In addition to these statements of function, there are three provisos in the Law: that the Agency shall have no internal police powers in the United States; that the "existing" Agencies shall continue to do their own intelligence work, and that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting sources and methods of intelligence. The first of these is of obvious importance and should be borne in mind by any person giving thought to the problem of Central Intelligence.

What is interesting about all this, and what may not be altogether clear to some casual observers is that the Agency, as established by law, is not so much an activity in itself as an integrating organism related to the activities of others. It takes the product of others, and, with their help, attempts to translate it into material relevant to the formation of national policy. It makes recommendations to the National Security Council on how to get the best results from instrumentalities of intelligence in existence and which may be created. It stands ready itself to undertake services that cannot satisfactorily be performed in any one part of the intelligence structure of the government but can best be done by all working together under a single head.

In other words, gentlemen, the wartime intelligence structure of the government, as you knew it ten years ago, is still relatively intact. G-2 provides intelligence to the Army as it has always done, including counter-intelligence. ONI is still the source of naval intelligence. CIA comes into

the picture where intelligence is "related to the national security" which means that it is more than of Army concern, or Navy concern, or State concern but must be considered by all three, as well as by other Agencies including the FBI; correlated as among all concerned, and passed on to the National Security Council as material related to the foreign policy of the United States.

Since CIA has a part in the collection of intelligence, it must also be interested in counterespionage. This does not, of course, affect the operations of the Army Counter Intelligence Corps which continues its usual activities. Under agreed policies providing for full cooperation, CIA and the CIC have operated in harmony, each supplementing the activities of the other. What the creation of CIA does in this field is primarily to make certain that full use of counterintelligence shall be made for national as well as purely Army purposes.

To summarize, when the President created a Central Intelligence Group eight years ago, and when the Congress made the Group an Agency seven years ago, they established an organization to provide material for the safety of America. What the President and the Congress recognized was that we must never again allow ourselves to be ambushed as at Pearl Harbor because our various intelligence agencies were working independently at cross purposes. The problem was to integrate intelligence for recognized and sensible goals, all related to the ultimate safety of the nation. Central Intelligence was the answer.

Although the functions of Central Intelligence are primarily supervisory, its job is no less big or important. The Director of Central Intelligence has an enormous responsibility. For one thing, he must direct an Agency of the government which is no mean job in itself. But far more to the point is his

responsibility to make sure that adequate intelligence is available to the government and that it is so used, understood, and distributed that national disaster cannot be the product of a failure of intelligence. In a world so constituted as ours in the 1950's, it must be evident that today there is no substitute as there was when events and machines moved slower for intelligence as a first line of defense.

Allen W. Dulles, the present Director, has the confidence of the National Security Council to which he reports and merits yours as well. His experience in the intelligence field goes back over at least thirty years. He was one of those principally concerned with the formation of CIA and has watched it closely from the beginning. His brilliant record with OSS during the war is well known; his achievements as Deputy Director and Director of Central Intelligence over the past three years are generally unknown as perforce they must be. It is safe for me to say that they are very considerable.

He and his predecessors, Admiral Sidney Souers, General Hoyt Vandenberg, Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, and General Walter Bedell Smith, have all faced an exceedingly intricate and difficult job in building up the instrument of government outlined in general terms by the President and the Congress. It may be said with confidence that as a result of strenuous efforts not only on the part of the Directors but those under their command and those in other agencies cooperating with them, an organization has been achieved today of which the USA should be proud. It would be as foolish to say today as it would have been before 1941 that a Pearl Harbor in one form or another cannot possibly happen to the United States, but there is no question whatever that we are better protected in that regard now than we have ever been before in our history.

That intelligence in any form must operate in secrecy and seclusion goes without saying. The American people recognize the necessity for a secret agency carrying on far flung overseas activities. You have every right to be confident that the intelligence business which all of you have reason to understand will be well and successfully conducted and will play its full part in the maintenance of our security in this extremely uncertain world.