

Soviets Set Booby Traps With Powers Release

**Red Variation on an Old Theme:
'You Can Do Business with Kremlin'**

WORLD ROUNDUP

For Francis Gary Powers, the sudden release from a Soviet prison was a great event. But the U-2 pilot's personal happiness carried with it problems and questions for the United States.

Examined from any vantage point, Soviet "magnanimity" was as prickly as a porcupine.

● In arranging for the Powers release, the Soviets had bypassed the U.S. government and approached a private citizen. This was a needle whose diplomatic jab was certain to have diplomatic repercussions.

● Lawyer James Donovan, who negotiated the release, was handed a small timebomb: Marvin Makinen, an American Fulbright scholar arrested by communist police on trumped-up charges, would also be released "if better relations" between the Soviet Union and the U.S. "should develop as a result of the incident." To the communists, better relations means knuckling under to them.

● Powers, a flier from whose "crash" over Russia the Soviets had milked every drop of propaganda value, was traded for Colonel Rudolf


Ivanovich Abel, a high-ranking, highly-trained espionage expert, ready and able to serve his masters on other assignments.

Soviet Tranquillizer

During his trial, Abel had disclosed nothing, conceded nothing. Powers had sung like a bird, but the most serious aspect of the Powers-Abel exchange, observers are convinced, was the lulling effect it would have on the American public. From the moment the trade was announced, pundits in and out of government began looking for deep portents. "A sign of a 'thaw' in the Soviet attitude," was the first reaction of the perpetual optimists. "You can do business with the Kremlin."

From that point on, they were off in a blizzard of horse-radish. The deep- and fuzzy-thinkers at the State Department hinted that the episode was an indication that Soviet Dictator Khrushchev was in greater trouble with his Chinese communist allies than the world knew, that he needed to come to an understanding with the U.S. and enlist American aid against his own "yellow peril." Nikita, it was also argued, was "coming to his senses," "seeking some kind of modus vivendi with the West."

The facts, as seen by the more hard-headed on Embassy Row, hardly fit this rosy view. Comrade Khrushchev, it was clear, had simply offered a very shrivelled carrot while continuing to swing a very big stick. In no critical area—



Negotiator Donovan
(Wide World Photo)

disarmament, Berlin, Laos, atomic testing, South Vietnam, or Cuba—was there the slightest indication that he was pre-

paring to budge an inch. Discernible to the naked diplomatic eye was a toughening up.

And the wily, warty Soviet boss still continued to play the game of double-dealing maneuver. Hard on the heels of the Powers release, he had dusted off that old ploy: the call for a "summit of 18 nations." At such a meeting he could, as he has always done in the past, pull every propaganda stop, unabashed and unhin-

dered by any U.S. counter-moves. Refusal by the U.S. to agree to the meeting would be touted by the Reds as a sign of American ingratitude and suspicion after his generosity in releasing Powers.

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