

BRITISH AND DUTCH DESCENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, AND HOW DO YOU ACCOUNT FOR THESE DIFFERENCES?"

HON. JAN F. W. HAAK: The difference between the British and the Dutch in South Africa? I assume that this question has to do with the political difference. I will state it to you as shortly as I can. In 1910 a Union was formed. The four provinces at that time united to form the Union of South Africa. There was a coalition and new parties. Then in 1912 those parties split. General Hertzog who became Prime Minister in 1924 said that he believed that if the interest of South Africa clashed with that of Great Britain, or with the interests of the empire, then the interest of South Africa must be given priority. He coined this phrase: "The interest of South Africa must always be placed first." That was the cause of the political division which started in 1912. That approach has been the cause of our differences since then.

In 1924 the party of Hertzog, which broke away in 1912, took over the government. He decided that it was time that we had our own South African nationality. It was time that we should have our own South African flag. The result was that since then we have had two flags, the Union Jack and also our own National Flag. We have had two nationalities—Union nationality and British nationality. There was always a difference of opinion on that.

In 1932 there was a coalition between the parties of General Smuts and General Hertzog. They agreed on the main points. The points of agreement were on our native policy. But they couldn't agree on one, and that was whether South Africa had the right to remain neutral in case Great Britain was involved in a war. They agreed to differ on that point.

In 1939 that issue divided the party of General Hertzog and General Smuts. General Hertzog had to resign as Prime Minister and the United Party of General Smuts took over in 1939. After the war the National Party again took over in 1948. Since then we have abolished the Flag of Great Britain as our flag. We have now only one flag, the National Flag. We have only one nationality, a South African nationality. We had two National Anthems, now we have one. There was a right of appeal from our highest court to the Privy Council—that was abolished, too.

We want to build up those factors which unify and work for unity. The only outstanding factor was that of a republic. In October of this year we had the referendum, which was won by the Republicans. The only issue at stake was whether we should replace the Queen of Great Britain who is also Queen of South Africa, with our own President. It is expected that on the 31st of May, 1961, South Africa will become a republic, and the head of state will be the President instead of the Queen. The Queen of Great Britain is Queen of South Africa out of her own right; not because she is the British Queen. We have our own laws making her the Queen of South Africa.

As to our Commonwealth membership, all parties agree that we should maintain our membership. We feel that this is a constitutional issue. Ghana, India, Pakistan and Ceylon have all become republics and continued membership was not denied to any of those countries. We see no reason why continued membership should be denied to South Africa. I don't know whether anything has happened in the last six weeks. I have had no news from South Africa as far as that is concerned. Maybe something appeared in your newspapers which did not come to my notice. In any case, as far as our relationship with Great Britain and the Commonwealth is concerned, we feel that now that we are to become a republic, that issue which has been the dividing factor in our politics since 1910 is a closed issue. We are all agreed on our continued membership in the Commonwealth.

We feel that that issue which was an issue for 50 years has come to an end now.

ALLEN B. CROW: (Reading Question) "TO WHAT EXTENT WILL THE THREATENED BOYCOTT UPON THE PART OF OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS AFFECT SOUTH AFRICA?"

HON. JAN F. W. HAAK: Mr. Chairman, I have indicated that last year the British boycott did not have any effect. Instead of having a detrimental effect, our exports to Great Britain increased. There was a boycott on fruit, organized by some British Labor Unions. It is interesting to note that our export of fruit to Great Britain increased by about \$15 million, while there was a boycott. Those who buy, buy the article, the flavor they prefer, and they compare the prices.

As far as Africa is concerned, some countries have started to boycott. Pan American Airways operating to South Africa had some trouble in Ghana when they said that before landing in Ghana we must declare that we are not in favor of apartheid. That ban has been lifted already. I think that once the African states begin to divide their loyalty—and I think that is bound to happen—then there will be a better relationship among those countries who stand with the Free World against the Communists. I think that there will not be a unified action to boycott the South African products.

ALLEN B. CROW: (Reading Question) "WHAT PERCENT OF THE WEALTH OF SOUTH AFRICA IS OWNED BY ITS CITIZENS, AND WHAT PERCENTAGE BY FOREIGN INVESTORS?"

HON. JAN F. W. HAAK: Mr. Chairman, that's very difficult to say. Our Reserve Bank made a compilation about 1956, and in it proved that direct foreign investments in the Union amounted to 1,600 million pounds. That's about \$5,000 million. Investors in Great Britain had about 60 or 70 per cent and in the United States approximately 20%. But what percentage of our total economy that represents, is very difficult to say. I think that the major interest in mining is owned by South Africans and certainly the major interest in our industry is held by South Africans. It's very difficult to say what percentage that will be.

ALLEN B. CROW: (Reading Question) "DOES SOUTH AFRICA SELL ITS GOLD ON THE FREE MARKET, OR TO THE BANK OF ENGLAND AT A FIXED PRICE?"

HON. JAN F. W. HAAK: South African gold is sold to our Reserve Bank, and our Reserve Bank sells it to the Bank of England. There is a fixed minimum price, but if there is an increase of price we receive the benefit. The South African Reserve Bank only pays a percentage, a commission, to the Bank of England.

ALLEN B. CROW: (Reading Question) "IF THE UNION GOVERNMENT IS SO SURE AND CONVINCED OF THE CORRECTNESS OF ITS POLICY, WHY DOES IT DENY FREEDOM OF SPEECH TO THE OPPOSITION, FOR EXAMPLE, THE BISHOP WHO WAS DEPORTED?"

HON. JAN F. W. HAAK: There is full freedom of religion and freedom of speech as far as the political parties are concerned. I think if the Bishop was so sure of his own church activities, he would not have fled the country immediately when we had those disturbances. You know that he fled South Africa immediately when the disturbances broke out. I think that's an indication. Surely no man will leave South Africa because of religious reasons only, or because of his religious activities or church activities. The fact that he left of his own accord is an indication that there was something wrong.

ALLEN B. CROW: The last question is a clipping that appeared on the first page of the *New York Times* of a few days ago:

**"WORLD COURT GETS SOUTH AFRICA CASE"**

It refers to the mandate that was given by the League of Nations over South West Africa. This case was filed by the governments of Ethiopia and Liberia, first on the basis that in South West Africa the segregation policy remained, "the civil rights of the inhabitants of South West Africa have been suppressed, they cannot vote, join trade unions, live where they wish or travel freely about the country without special passes. They are denied adequate schooling and can hold no grants or leases on land. The complaint also charged that the territory's inhabitants were liable to criminal prosecution for leaving a job and were subject to curfew orders and forcible deportation without appeal. Membership in political parties is forbidden and severe criminal penalties, including corporal punishment, is provided for violators, the Court was told.

"South Africa is accused of having extended its administration and legislation to South West Africa with a view to absorbing the mandate territory into the Union."

**WILL THIS MANDATE BE REVOKED?**

HON. JAN F. W. HAAK: Mr. Chairman, any indictment is always only one side of the story. You can only judge when you've heard the answer to that indictment. As this is being referred to the World Court, I think it is best to wait until you hear the other side, too, when you will be able to judge. But seeing that this is sub judice, I don't think it is incumbent on me at this stage to give the answer on behalf of the government. There are men more capable of doing so, and I would therefore prefer not to give the answer. All I can say at this stage is, that is the indictment, judge after you have heard the other side.

# "Is United States Intelligence Answering The Red Challenge?"

## THE JOB OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

By LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK, *Washington, D. C., Inspector General, United States Central Intelligence Agency*  
*Delivered before the Economic Club of Detroit, Michigan, November 21, 1960*

IT IS A GREAT pleasure to be with you in Detroit today. I can think of few places where the subject of this talk could more appropriately be given. You should well know that the "Red challenge" is not to our Intelligence services alone but to our entire way of life. Principal among the targets has been the business interests of the United States abroad.

Typical of the approach that the Communists have made to this particular target is that of the Brazilian Communist Party, which has tried to recruit Brazilian businessmen, who dislike foreign competition, on the thesis that their objectives are the same.

The Red challenge to the south, in Latin America, has concentrated to an extremely large degree in the field of international trade and business. The Soviets have granted a \$100 million economic aid to Cuba, ostensibly for the purchase of equipment, but also used to a certain degree for the purchase of arms.

A similar loan has been made to Argentina. Mexico turned down one of the same size. Just within the last few days they have made a very astutely timed offer of a tin smelter to Chile.

The point here is that the economic offensive of the Soviet Union is closely tied in to a wide-scale, world-wide effort on the part of the Communists, intensifying their openly avowed objective of Communization of each and every country, and that the principal target of this effort is the major obstacle which stands in their way—the United States of America.

The trade challenge is just one that is facing us. Those of you in the business field know the extremely favorable credit opportunities that the Communists offer and the various other aspects of their work in this area. But I want to enumerate the other challenges the Communists are posing today and very briefly describe how they go about this.

One of the most insidious of their efforts is the peace movement, stemming out of the activities of the World Peace Council in Vienna and the Peace Partisan Committees which have been organized throughout the world. The Communists are taking advantage of a natural tendency against nuclear weapons, against armed strength, and using as dupes the many honest, earnest people who would like to see war abolished from the world.

Their efforts in this field show precisely how the atheistic, materialistic Communist movement works, because by specific directive they endeavor to recruit patriotic priests and leaders of other religious movements to lend their peace offensive dignity.

A second major effort on the part of the Communists—also equally dangerous because of its target—is the youth movement. Recognizing that the capture of minds in their formative stage is one of the most valuable assets they could gain, the Communists throughout the years have placed tremendous emphasis in this particular field.

Look at Cuba and the organization of the Latin-American Youth Congress in Cuba last year. Started originally by groups in various Latin-American countries which had no Communist affiliation, capture in the course of progress by the various national Communist parties, so that when the Latin-American Youth Congress was held in Havana in July, 1960 it was Communist controlled and dominated to the extent that quite a few of the young people there went on immediately to training camps in Cuba similar to those used by the Cuban militia for training in guerrilla warfare and other subversive activities.

Indicative of the effort that the Communists are putting in the youth field, and using Latin America again as an example, in 1955 at the Warsaw World Youth Festival there were 1,000 from Latin America. The same number went to Moscow in 1957, but in 1959, 1,380 went to Vienna.

How much do they want to spend on this? It cost them \$932,000 to take the delegates to Moscow in 1957; \$60,000 of this came from Latin America.

Now equal to their intensive drive in the youth field has been their effort to organize labor throughout the world. In the Western European countries and the United States this has come to naught, to a large degree, although in France and Italy they have made some progress. But in the underdeveloped countries where industrialization is just starting, where trade unions are a new thing, where trade union leaders themselves have to be trained, the Communists through the World Federation of Trade Unions are making a very intensive effort, and are taking union leaders back behind the Iron Curtain for training and sending them forth to organize all of the

newer areas in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia.

There are many other front organizations that I could mention, in which the Communist challenge is intensive. And the danger in this is that many of the front organizations outside of the United States are not recognized as such by the people of the areas. Thus this is an insidious and highly dangerous element to the future stability of many now democratic countries.

One of the key elements in this effort has been the Communist delegation, diplomatic and otherwise, for through these missions the Communists have been able to provide the necessary support essential to all of these types of activities. The Communist missions, for example, act as a channel for all reports and messages going back to Moscow. These include the biographic sketches of candidates for conversion. They make the travel arrangements for these candidates and for the loyal Communists to go behind the Iron Curtain for the various Communist meetings, for vacations, and for medical assistance. Furthermore, they act as the funding mechanism for Communist activities throughout the world and to pay the salaries of the key members of the subversive cadres of the Communist Party.

In this effort I should stress to you that the Communists are extremely adept in working at two levels, the first level being the official, avowed, recognized Communist Party. In recent years there has been a growth of the accepted Communist Party. Again using Latin America as an example, five Communist parties were legal in Latin America in 1954; nine are legal today; yet in all but a very few of these republics the Communists are able to operate with a certain amount of freedom.

In those areas where they cannot operate with freedom, they operate through adjoining areas, with the Communists in those areas dealing with the underground cadres in those countries where communism is repressed.

That is the open element—the officially recognized party. Every Communist party in the world has a subversive cadre. These are well organized, highly compartmented, and staffed by skilled professionals of which they always seem to have a reserve. And the technique as directed from Moscow is to use one to try and achieve parliamentary strength or recognition, and to use the second where the first fails. This leads to the next element of the Communist challenge, which is direct subversion.

Here, of course, we have many modern examples of where they have been too successful. Perhaps the most obvious and closest is that of Cuba. Many people in this country and in the world, for example, and in Latin America, looked to the advent of Fidel Castro in Cuba as a welcome change from what had been described as a dictatorship. And yet I believe that everybody in this room today recognizes the incredible speed with which the Communists moved in and took over the complete control of power in Cuba, through the efforts of such men as Raoul Castro, Ernesto "Che" Guevara and Antonio Nunez Jimenez, who today are the key Communist leaders in the Cuban government.

Here was an effort mounted largely through the subversive field in which the Communists have succeeded in taking over complete control of a government in this hemisphere. Gentlemen, this was not by accident, it was by direction from Moscow. At the Nineteenth Party Congress, of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, orders were given that Cuba would be the base of Communist activity in the Western Hemisphere. This has been confirmed by ample evidence in the various Communist parties throughout the Western Hemisphere.

And then last but not least is the challenge of the Communist intelligence services. Here we have a challenge which should in no way be underestimated. The Federal Bureau of

Investigation in the United States which has the complete and exclusive jurisdiction for internal security in this country, has made available to many committees of the Congress excellent material illustrating the methods by which they operate. The role of the Intelligence Services of the government is to deal with the Communist intelligence threat elsewhere in the world. And of course this varies from country to country. Some of our friends and neighbors have good internal security services, and others—particularly the newer ones—have poor to non-existent services.

Consequently, you will find that the Communist effort, while not neglecting those areas with good internal services, moves immediately into the newer areas where they can operate with relative impunity.

Of course, the leader in this effort is the Soviet Intelligence Service, a highly competent, skilled, aggressive and ruthless organization, but one which we should never underestimate or feel that in any way their ideology lessens their professional capacity. Nor should we be misled by what we see as a potential and possible split between the Russians and the Chinese, because we would be misleading ourselves if we thought this in any way lessened their effectiveness, or their cooperation on the working level, or their ability to allocate areas for operations.

In careful attention to the work of the Soviet and the Communist intelligence services throughout the world, we have noted with interest how the Russians will allocate to the other satellites and the lesser services specific jobs and specific areas to cover. And we have also watched with interest the difference in technique of the operation of these services. While the parent service uses what we would call "quality" operations, some of the satellite services go in for the mass production basis. Taken as a total, a very formidable challenge.

What are we doing to meet these challenges that threaten the very existence of our way of life? How good is our Intelligence Service? How effective is it in combatting communism throughout the world? How well does it keep our government informed? Do we have those ingredients of information which taken together, analyzed and assessed make intelligence so essential for the policy makers in the government.

Not only is intelligence vital in diplomacy, but it is absolutely essential in defense, for you must know the composition of the enemy forces, the weapons they will use, the direction of the attack and their intentions, in order to enable our own defense structure to be properly constructed and properly alerted.

This is not an easy question to answer, particularly in public. If we say too much about how much we know, or how we operate, or what we are doing, we are providing hostile services with essential ingredients of information such as we are constantly looking for from them. Yet, on the other hand, it is of great importance that the American public have confidence in the work of their intelligence organization, which in one sense of the word certainly could be regarded as our first line of defense.

In order to approach an answer to this subject, let me describe to you very quickly the evolution of our intelligence organization since World War II. As you may remember, we went into World War II with various intelligence services operating out of Washington—the Army, the Navy, the State Department and others—and with very little in the way of a central organization, with the result that in many instances not all of the information was ever compiled or assessed or analyzed in one place, nor was one view presented to the President and the policy makers in the government.

President Roosevelt was so seriously concerned about the quality of his information that in 1940 he called on a New York lawyer, William J. Donovan, and asked him to make

two trips for him, one to the Mediterranean and Balkan area, and one to England. The President particularly wanted to know whether the British would stand and fight, and he was also interested in all of the various elements that were active in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Donovan came back with basically three important items of major information. First, the British would stand and fight, and that they would hold out until aid could come. Secondly, he warned the government that the Germans were undoubtedly going to move into North Africa. Third, he urged the President to create an organization to combine all the information and intelligence activities of the Federal Government.

President Roosevelt asked him to see Attorney General Jackson, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Knox. These three gentlemen rapidly agreed with Donovan that an organization should be created to combine intelligence information and the unorthodox warfare elements of the government, with the result of the creation of what was first known as the Coordinator of Information Office. This was short-lived because it combined domestic information, news, propaganda, as well as intelligence.

In 1942 it was split into two organizations, the Office of Strategic Services under Donovan, and the Office of War Information.

Now, in the course of the war, the Office of Strategic Services, working with Army and Navy Intelligence, and also importantly with our Allies, particularly the British and the French, mounted a fairly major clandestine effort against the enemies. This included dropping agents behind enemy lines, dropping guerrilla leaders into various countries—France, Norway, Italy, Burma, Thailand—and, equally important, organizing for the first time an over-all research organization to prepare those encyclopedias of information required to conduct diplomacy or to conduct military operations in any area of the world, with such vital facts as not only the gradients of the beach and the composition for landing craft, the depth of the waters in the ports and the harbors, and the utilities, but the political structure and the internal security services and the police.

It has been generally agreed that the Office of Strategic Services made a contribution to the war effort, and certainly it left certain heritages for the peace-time. Perhaps the most important of these was the fact that General Donovan and General John Magruder and others in the organization were looking forward to peace-time and recognized the need, in fact the necessity, for a peace-time intelligence service, with the result that as early as 1942 a paper was prepared outlining a possible structure for a peace-time service, and again in 1944, Donovan circulated in Washington a proposal for a national central intelligence organization.

Needless to say, this was not acted upon during war-time, and when demobilization came, the Office of Strategic Services was disbanded on the 18th of September, 1945. Fortunately, certain cadres were retained from this organization, one under the Secretary of the Army, and the large research organization that had been developed was transferred intact to the Department of State where it still resides as a major element in their research staff.

In the Fall of 1945, Ferdinand Eberstadt, another New York lawyer, was preparing the so-called "Unification Act," and this had in it a proposal for a Central Intelligence Agency. But President Truman wished to act more quickly, and in January, 1946, he created a Central Intelligence Group, to be staffed by representatives of the other services, plus a permanent civilian cadre, to coordinate the intelligence effort of the government.

And finally in July, 1947, the National Security Act was passed which created in one fell swoop the Department of

Defense, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency. This Act, interestingly enough, embodied many of the principles which Donovan had put forth in his paper, which are quite important for a modern-day understanding of how our intelligence works.

First, he felt very strongly that there should be one voice of intelligence in the Federal Government; a man to whom the President and the highest deliberative body in the Executive branch, the National Security Council, could look for a statement on what was going on, or what the threat was to the country.

Secondly, Donovan recognized that departmental responsibility should be preserved and maintained so that each of the departmental organizations could collect and process that intelligence essential to its work. For example, the Army could collect and process intelligence on the ground forces of the world.

Finally, another important provision was that this new organization would have no domestic responsibilities, other than a base from which to operate, and that internal security should be exclusively the prerogative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and that the new intelligence organizations should look entirely outside of the United States. Finally that this organization would coordinate the over-all work of the intelligence agencies of the government, and that the Director would report to the National Security Council and the President.

Since the passage of this Act some 13 years ago, our intelligence organization has evolved, become much more closely coordinated, and we think has become more efficient. Under the Director of Central Intelligence, it operates through what is called a United States Intelligence Board on which the Directors of all of the intelligence services either sit or are represented. This Board is not only the Board of Directors of the intelligence services, it is also the final substantive authority, passing on to the President those vital documents called "National Intelligence Estimates," perhaps the most important documents created in the intelligence mechanisms of our government.

The National Intelligence Estimates illustrate very well the degree of achievement in an integrated service that we now have in the United States. A National Estimate is a statement of what is going to happen in any country, in any area, in any given situation, and as much as possible into the future. We naturally would like to project them as far in the future as we could, but the information isn't always available upon which we can make these projections. And often there are certain current day situations in which we do not have all of the intelligence available that we would like to have, if we could get it. But these estimates are put together under a Board of National Estimates, which operates in the C.I.A., but as a service of common concern. And each of the responsible departments prepares the original draft on that section which comes under its purview.

Thus, the Department of State would draft the section on the political or economic or sociological development in a country or an area or a situation, while the Army would deal with ground forces, the Air Force with the air forces, the Navy with the naval forces, and the Department of Defense under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the guided missile threat, with each of the services making their particular contribution.

The Board of Estimates would then go over this very carefully, sometimes very heatedly, and would arrive at a common view, or, if possible, any one of the intelligence services has the right of dissent from the view which will be expressed as that of the Director of Central Intelligence. Thus, if anyone

of them feels strongly enough about what they think the interpretation of the facts should be—for remember that they are all dealing with the same facts—they can go on record before the senior policy makers of the government as indicating that they do not believe the interpretation as presented is correct, but that a certain variation is correct.

This system, which I have watched very closely since the war, has resulted in a high degree of unanimity among the intelligence services, yet with that important right of dissent maintained. For I am sure that all of you having read the various statements made by our military leaders in World War II on intelligence recognize the importance of one voice. Often many possibilities were offered the military commanders by their intelligence officers of what the enemy might do, such as stage a massive counter offensive, maintain a stalwart line of defense, resort to unorthodox warfare, or sue for surrender.

Faced with this broad spectrum of possibilities, obviously the military commander is often placed in the position of deciding himself what the enemy is going to do, whereas this truly is a responsibility of his intelligence officer. So today intelligence is speaking with one voice, or close to one, to the policy makers.

Finally, we should recognize that the intelligence effort of the United States is a massive effort. The flow of information alone into Washington is of tremendous proportions. We not only have all of the information coming in from the press, the radio, travelers abroad, from the official representatives of other governments as transmitted by the Foreign Service of the United States, from the service attaches, and then from the intelligence organizations. Part of the major responsibility of our intelligence organization is to sift and filter this material, to remove the significant, to add the highly classified or sensitive material which we have obtained through a variety of means, and to present to the policy makers in concise and readable form that which they think the situation to be, and what they think is going to happen.

The security aspects of intelligence in the world today are of a very high order. The Communists are extremely sensitive about intelligence efforts, and ascribe to our work all types of activities, some of which are very flattering in their proportions. The Communists tell their own people very little; consequently, make it even more difficult to find out what is going on in this vital effort toward self preservation.

Further, in the last two years we have noted a very distinct Communist campaign directed particularly at United States intelligence efforts, but also at Western intelligence efforts. Through their very adept and facile use of fabrication, planted documents, etc., they have tried to discredit our work, our Director and the work of various other services, and to split the work of the various allied intelligence organizations. While this is flattering, it is also dangerous. In fact, in Khrushchev's visit to the United States, you will recall that he made several comments about American intelligence efforts, indicating or implying that he read some of our messages, that he received some of our documents in fact, some agents were being paid by both sides. A very skillful propaganda warrior, Mr. Khrushchev, but in his efforts to sow discord and distrust of U. S. intelligence in this country, he failed.

The importance of our work today I don't believe can in any way be underestimated. If we achieve what is our principal objective, and that is to keep United States policy makers better informed at all times than those of any other country in the world, we have the possibility of peace. For if our diplomats are better armed with facts when they sit at the conference table, they certainly have the tools for successful negotiation.

But on the other side, as I mention at the start, intelligence is absolutely essential to national defense. Incorrect or inac-

curate intelligence, or mis-estimates of the future direction of the army of those powers which have hostile intentions for this country, could be such an important and decisive factor in our defense structure that we might be well arming for the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time. Consequently, it is absolutely essential that we get up-to-date and vital information on what the Communist powers are doing and are planning to do.

No intelligence officer, if he is worth his salt, is ever satisfied with the amount of information or the accuracy or the validity of the information that he has at any time. He is constantly striving to get more and more information, and to assemble those vital ingredients which we call "hard facts"—which we are absolutely certain of. I think you can recognize where some of those come from. While today I could not say that we have all of the hard facts that we need, I think it can be said today that we have reasonable assurance that we can anticipate any hostile activities directed at this country. Our objective is to have absolute assurance.

ALLEN B. CROW: We have a number of questions, Mr. Kirkpatrick.

(Reading Question) "HOW DID IT HAPPEN THAT OUR GOVERNMENT WAS MISLEAD OR MISTAKEN REGARDING CASTRO'S INTENTIONS IN CUBA?"

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK: I think that there was a general under estimation of the ability or the depth of penetration of the Communists in the 26th of July movement. There is no question that it was an under estimation of the speed and ability of the Communists to take over. And I would suggest that you look at the original Cabinet that Castro set up in Cuba, in which you will find very few leftwingers and no Communists. Of course, that has evolved or changed or revolved over the years until today all of the respectable Cubans, or practically all of them, have gotten out of the government.

ALLEN B. CROW: (Reading Question) "DO THE RUSSIANS AND CHINESE COMPETE OR COOPERATE IN LATIN AMERICA?"

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK: Cooperate. They will work very closely together. The Chinese Communists are starting to move in now with their China News Agency, which is always the forerunner and the center of their intelligence and subversive activities. They might compete if the Chinese got too strong, but I don't foresee that in the foreseeable future. I think the competition there is on much higher levels and ideological, and I just urge that this country not over estimate that competition.

ALLEN B. CROW: (Reading Question) "DO THE OTHER NATIONS OF THE FREE WORLD HAVE SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS TO THE C.I.A. WITH WHICH YOU COOPERATE?"

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK: Yes. All governments are a little differently organized for intelligence and national security. There are no two exactly alike in the world. We cooperate to a very large degree with some of our colleagues in the NATO powers and in other powers in the Far East, and this is a very important aspect of our work.

ALLEN B. CROW: (Reading Question) "COULD A MISSILE ATTACK BE LAUNCHED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HAVING PREVIOUS KNOWLEDGE OF IT?"

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK: This is a very difficult question to answer. A missile attack will be noted by many different types of intelligence collection. I think you gentlemen should be aware of the fact that with the tremendous technological advances in recent years of an almost overwhelming capacity, that there, too, have been technological advances in information collection mechanisms. When you say, "Will the Central Intelligence Agency necessarily know in advance," I don't think any of us would say, "Yes, absolutely, we are going to spot it." But it might be spotted by radar or other scientific

methods of collection. And I could answer that by saying the odds are exceedingly good that intelligence collection of some form will spot any missile attack. Now, the goal of course will be that we will want to watch them taking the missiles out to the site, or even better, have the Kremlin order in advance, or know that they are thinking of issuing such an order. Because when you speak of missiles moving into sight, you are at 11:59 in the time of the world.

ALLEN B. CROW: (Reading Question) "HOW DEPENDABLE ARE REFUGEES IN PROVIDING THE INFORMATION WHICH YOU REQUIRE?"

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK: It depends on where they come from and what they did before they took refuge. If they were scientists or technicians coming from key factories or areas behind the Iron Curtain, they can provide exceedingly valuable information. If they were farmers or privates in the Red Army, or something like that, generally the information they have is negligible.

ALLEN B. CROW: (Reading Question) "WHAT ARE THE SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE MEN WHO ARE SELECTED FOR THE STAFF OF THE C.I.A., AND FROM WHENCE ARE THEY OB-

TAINED?"

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK: We have a recruiting program in which we go to colleges and universities, research organizations and foundations, and of course through our many extensive contacts with business. We are constantly on the lookout for professionals of a wide variety of interests and of experience to come to work for us. We have a program in which each year we bring in junior officers to be trained to make a lifetime career with us. Intelligence work is work in which there is no substitute for experience. It is difficult to have what you would call on-the-job training in this work. Yet our junior officers must be taken out under the wing of experienced officers. It's an exacting and a dedicated profession. The type of person we are looking for is somebody of high intelligence with a wide variety of interests, a great amount of emotional stability, and ability to stand up under stress. We don't give formal exams, but we'll put them through a very intensive assessment program even before we start the security clearance.

We also have a large number of applicants; in fact, since last May the number of applicants has doubled.

## Deterioration Of Relations

BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND LATIN AMERICA

By MR. ALFONSO MARTÍN, Bogotá, Colombia

Delivered at a meeting of the International Relations Club and Theta Xi fraternity, Lafayette College, Easton, Pennsylvania, November 15, 1960

COPYRIGHT

IT IS RATHER extraordinary that I should find myself here tonight, at the suggestion of a countryman of mine (Carlos Londono, a junior majoring in international affairs at Lafayette from Medellín, Colombia) who is a champion wrestler, a good student, an intrepid leader, a conscientious Pan-Americanist. I am too old to wrestle; I am too lazy to study; I am not an intrepid leader, but a docile husband. I am, however, a conscientious Pan-Americanist, profoundly preoccupied and chagrined by the threatening and ever-increasing deterioration of the relations between the U. S. A. and the Latin American nations. Perhaps this last qualification warrants my having accepted the honoring challenge for me to talk to you tonight.

The topic that I have chosen concerns the dire problem that endangers the ultimate liberty, tranquility and right to develop freely of the wrestler in question, of myself and of scores of millions of individuals in our free American nations.

As a foreigner who has been granted the privilege of coming to your country to educate our two children, it is my accepted obligation not to indulge in political issues. I trust, therefore, that my heartfelt expressions of thought and feeling will in no way deter from my non-political status.

I am not an expert in social and political behaviorism. I am a simple observer, who fears that the good things in his life are in jeopardy, and that he and his friends and neighbors might suddenly find that the sun no longer shines, that the freedom of a starlit evening or of a dewy dawn is no longer ours, that the priceless right to fish, or paint, or drive a taxicab, or drill for oil, or write a book, or sell insurance, or teach arithmetic in grammar school has gone to hell—a hell where the devil with the longest tail has the uncontested power to bruise our knees and then to force us to kneel on brine and crawl towards the copper statue of a despot, which exudes sulphur and lies, plus a smell that kills the staunchest daffodils that ever grew.

The Oxford Dictionary defines a poet as follows: "A writer in verse (or sometimes in elevated prose) distinguished by

imaginative power, insight, sensibility, and faculty of expression." Were I a poet with the imaginative power, insight, sensibility and faculty of expression to adequately paint for you—as I clearly see it—the diabolical and realistic picture that lies right around the corner from our complacent existence!

In my generation, the people of some Latin American countries were quite friendly to the U. S. A.; some were more indifferent; a few were frankly antagonistic; one sole Latin nation was sincerely, warmly fond of the U. S. A. The people in said friendly nation loved chewing gum, hot dogs, baseball, Hemingway, Miami, Arrow shirts, westerns, jazz, Marilyn Monroe and the Monroe Doctrine. In the whole world, no country—including Canada—ever liked and respected the North American form of life as much as the people of Cuba did. Something happened. A dictator was ousted. A struggling zealot replaced him, with the blessings of the U. S. A. and of other countries. Then, in a few months, Cuba became the world's most aggressively anti-American nation on earth. Right before the strained eyes of the world, communism arrived here and took over.

Cuba, as we all know, is a beautiful, colorful, tropical island, only 40 minutes away from the continental U. S. A. It was our most devoted, pro-American friend two years ago. It is our most furious and ignominious enemy in November of 1960.

What exactly happened? Few experts really know. However, something is appallingly and completely obvious. If this miraculously complete turn-about took but a breathlessly short period of time, surely the same transformation can be effected more rapidly and even more easily in two or five or more of the Latin American nations, where the masses do not have the sincere, popular affection that the masses of Cuba did have for the U. S. A. and the American people.

The communists work around the clock, while we, in our relatively carefree form of life, watch TV; they plot and connive, while we're out on fishing trips; they are flexing and strengthening their totalitarian muscles, while we're vacation-