

repetition of half-truths, they tend finally to reject the whole truth.

If the prospects of a speedy military solution are dim, as is the almost unanimous view of knowledgeable observers, what is the possibility of a negotiated settlement, given the present negotiating positions of the two sides? Will the Vietcong and North Vietnam join us at the negotiating table, accepting our oft-repeated assurance that we are ready for "unconditional" negotiations? The answer to this question is again, No.

The reasons for this are simply stated. The vast expenditure of U.S. planning, intrigue, effort and resources in Vietnam since 1954 practically demands that the Administration paint the situation there in terms of tremendously significant emotional issues—protecting freedom against tyranny—stemming the global communist tide,—defeating the Communist Chinese—created strategy, of "Wars of National Liberation", as I have just indicated. Hence it is true now, just as it was 13 years ago at Geneva, that our Government cannot accept a solution which results in a government other than the one we are supporting, even if it were elected by the people of South Vietnam in impartially supervised elections. We rejected the path of supervised elections in 1956, and to go back to it now would make mockery of a course to which thousands of bureaucratic careers in the CIA, the State Department, the Pentagon and the Executive offices have been committed, and would deny the validity of the great motives we have ascribed to our involvement. Hence we have encouraged and accepted a South Vietnamese Constitution which makes Communism a crime, which even the U.S. has not yet done.

We hail with jubilation the results of elections in which Communists, Communist sympathizers, neutralists, militant Buddhists, and opponents of the Military Junta are permitted neither to run nor to vote. We make no protest over Premier Ky's statement that if an elected government sought to come to terms with the NLF he would overthrow it with the Army. We describe with horror the possibility of National Liberation Front participation in the Government in even the smallest way as "letting the fox in the Chicken coop."

By all these means we make it clear that to us "negotiation" means discussing where the Vietcong will turn in their arms and which routes they will take back to North Vietnam. And we describe this happy state of affairs as restoring freedom and democracy to South Vietnam.

The National Liberation Front sees these actions and accepts them as the true indication of our position rather than the generalizations made by President Johnson for domestic U.S. consumption. Their position, on the other hand, is that the South Vietnamese government is merely a puppet of the U.S., with no support from the people, and is both corrupt and dictatorial. Their aim is to root it out completely. Between these two extremes there can be no compromise.

To complicate the picture even more the Liberation Front and Hanoi completely distrust the U.S. To them our often-reported offer to negotiate is merely a cover to placate U.S. and international opinion, while continuing to escalate. They feel we betrayed the Geneva Agreements, just as France betrayed several agreements she made with the Viet Minh prior to 1954.

This explains in part Hanoi's insistence on specific actions, such as an end to the bombing of the North, before even considering further efforts to negotiate.

At one point in time, I felt that the election of a civilian government in South Vietnam would increase the chances of a negotiated settlement. I am now extremely dubious of that. The present military government, with advice and guidance from U.S. experts, has become quite adept at shaping the outcome of elections. By con-

trolling who votes, who runs, who has access to the media and what they can say, it is hardly even necessary to engage in fraud to insure the proper results. High turn-out of the eligible voters can be insured by the rumor that those who do not vote may have trouble getting food rations. And if worse comes to worse, the advance threat by the Premier of a military coup against any unsuitable government should clinch the case.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that after the September 3rd election, we will see the same people performing the same jobs and following the same policies and practices. The only difference will be in their claim to legitimacy through an overwhelming mandate of the people in a "free" election—thus it was with Diem in 1955 when he received 98% of the vote in a rigged contest against the discredited Bao Dai, who ran from the French Riviera.

In view of those rather pessimistic assertions on my part, what do I see for the future?

As to a military victory, as I intimated earlier, I see no chance whatsoever. An enemy which we claim has roots in only five to seven million of the 14 million population of South Vietnam has suffered over 600,000 military casualties in the last 6 years, at least another 600,000 civilian casualties, and the evacuation of over a million of its women, children, and elderly. This is the destruction of one-third to one-half of its total base of support, according to our figures. Yet this enemy is now nearly 4 times as strong in numbers as it was six years ago, better trained and equipped, and apparently with higher morale. He has sanctuary in Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam. According to General Westmoreland, his manpower is replenished at rates as high as 8,000 per month from North Vietnam, in spite of the greatest aerial bombardment ever used against an enemy. Recruitment from the local peasants seems to remain at a high level. And if we should seek to destroy his sanctuary, especially in North Vietnam, the odds become dangerously high that we involve the 700,000,000 Red Chinese.

I am convinced that while neither China nor Russia wish to be involved in this war, they will commit troops if either Hanoi or the Liberation Front is faced with military destruction. In the meantime, they will provide an increasing array of military hardware and the training to use it. Reports of the use of 122 mm rockets of 6-mile range and pinpoint accuracy are only an indication of our potential problem if the U.S.S.R. should decide to supply North Vietnam with a full range of sophisticated military hardware.

Russia and China will also encourage military diversions on a world-wide scale. Those diversions may include the Middle East, Burma, Thailand, Hong Kong, Korea, the Philippines, various parts of Latin America, and possibly Africa. In this game of escalation and diversion the enemy enjoys a tremendous leverage because of the nature and location of the war, and of the tactics used. According to our military doctrine we require a superiority of 10-1 in manpower to control guerrilla tactics. Yet we fight at the back door of 25% of the human race as potential enemies. Because of the location of the enemy, our logistics problem is massive. Because of the sophistication of our technology, it is tremendously expensive. All these factors run our costs to 25 billion per year at present levels. The enemy's costs probably run to 250 million per year, or 1% of ours. One successful diversionary effort by the enemy involving another of the 50 or so "freedom-loving" nations to which we have made a "commitment," at a similarly remote part of the world, would require total mobilization of the American people and resources.

The present level of involvement in Vietnam has produced major impacts on American society, and will produce even more. An

unhappy and frustrated people will be made even more unhappy by a major federal tax increase in the next few months. For Californians, this will be added to the largest state tax increase in history, which becomes effective today. Despite its size, the federal tax increase will not be enough to prevent the largest budgetary deficit in history, except for the years of WW II. This will increase government borrowing, increase interest rates, reduce the flow of residential mortgage funds, and have a generally unsettling economic effect.

An indignant Congress and an unhappy President will cut domestic expenditures for the War on Poverty, education, space, health, urban blight, and a variety of other programs, crippling many of them and saving 2 or 3 billion dollars, which will have an insignificant effect on the deficit. However, because the programs cut will be those widely hailed as the basis for a "great society", and for which expectations were for a great increase, rather than a cut, the resulting gap between expectations and performance will encourage more and bigger riots. These riots may cost the economy considerably more than the budgetary savings, if the estimates I have seen so far of riot costs are any indication.

At the political level I see very little chance for the re-election of President Johnson under the present circumstances. I likewise see very little chance of the Republicans nominating a candidate who will do any better. None of the three top Republican Presidential prospects—Romney, Reagan, and Nixon—have given a single indication of having a program that can cope with the crisis facing the U.S. and the world today. This country deserves better than what it apparently faces for next year from its great democratic system.

At the very minimum next year's election should provide a dialogue and a choice on the great issues of our time. Is Vietnam really a great crusade, worthy of the full support of the American people? Or is it a tragic error perpetuated by a stubborn and arrogant Executive bureaucracy, from which we should withdraw with a degree of humility? Is the noble effort to create world order under law, conceived in WW II by the Great Powers, to be replaced by a new U.S. Imperialism? Is the Cold War to be the perpetual condition of mankind? Are the problems of poverty, race, urban decay and a society which massively befools its own environment to be solved, as an example to all mankind, or be disregarded?

My guess is that these questions will be submerged in waves of rhetoric, rarely asked, and never answered in realistic terms for fear of alienating a voter. Yet they must be answered soon and adequately. If we are to cope with the present crisis of mankind, they are each related to the other, they require a political philosophy as different from the present as day from night, and yet nowhere on the horizon does there appear such a philosophy.

I have left until last a few brief comments about my own program for a solution in Vietnam. My previous remarks should have made clear my complete disillusionment with the course we have followed. I regard that course as a compound of all that is bad in American foreign policy. Yet as responsible citizens we should always try to answer the question "What would you do if you were making the decisions?"

Up until the present time I have always felt that, although I am a vocal dove in criticizing our Vietnam policy, I could fit within the limits of the consensus posture of the President. I have never advocated a U.S. pull-out of Vietnam. I have never urged turning the government over to the National Liberation Front. I consider our troops to be brave men doing an ugly job in the best way they can. I have accepted in good faith the President's verbal assent to the Geneva