

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

# Germany Crus of U.S. — Red Hush

CPYRIGHT

By Drew Pearson

George Zaroubin, former Russian Ambassador to the United States, used to remind his staff that Soviet officers were once given a special section in the Pentagon in Washington, guarded by their own Red Army troops, from which they could send their own coded messages to Moscow without monitoring or other interference by the United States.

Ambassador Zaroubin, who was more friendly to the United States than most people realized, cited this as an illustration of how closely the U. S. and U. S. S. R. had worked together during the war, and how mutual trust prevailed at that time.

For there is no trust between Russia and the United States today. There is profound distrust, plus fear that commitments, if made, will be broken. And if we are to begin a period of peaceful competition, or coexistence, as Khrushchev indicated in his recent Foreign Affairs article, there has got to be trust in each nation's commitments. It's important to remember, however, that trust did prevail during the war, and has been attested to by such hard-boiled statesmen as

Winston Churchill and Adm. William D. Leahy, who sat in on the Potsdam talks and signed the declaration of unconditional surrender of Germany in 1945. Fear, induced by Harry Leahy wrote in his memoirs that "Russia would make a separate peace with Germany, particularly when we were unable to mount a second front in 1942, had proved unfounded. Russia had kept every military agreement made before then."

But as the war neared its final stages, suspicion began to creep in. Significantly it was generated by exactly the same problem which caused deadlock at the recent Geneva conference and deadlock at the summit conference of 1955 and has disrupted American-Russian relations for 15 years—the future of Germany.

The Soviet leaders were deathly afraid that a new and powerful Germany might rise again, and that it would help

Because this basic problem of Germany will be the main subject of conversation between Eisenhower and Khrushchev. It's important to go back and examine history. The first flareup of distrust between the U. S. S. R. and its allies occurred in March, 1945, just two months before Hitler's surrender. Alan Dulles, brother of the late John Foster Dulles, who was U. S. ambassador in Bern, Switzerland, had

German Foreign Minister, who wanted to see the surrender of Germany in Northern Italy.

Facing it straight with our Russian allies, the State Department informed Moscow of this move to Moscow. But when Foreign Minister Molotov wanted three Soviet officers present at any talks to be held with the Germans, Gen. John H. Deane, U. S. military attaché in Moscow, opposed. His recommendation was accepted in Washington, and a meeting was held with General Deane on March 18 at Locarno, Switzerland, with two allied officers present, but no Russians.

## Stalin Had Savage

This proved a series of blunts, a sort of protest from Moscow. Stalin, in a hasty note to Roosevelt, claimed that the talks were permitted the Nazis to transfer three divisions from the western front to the eastern front, thus saving British-American lives at the expense of Russian lives.

Stalin's second salvo came in a second note to the American government, in which he said the heart of the matter was almost without doubt the future of Germany. At the same time, the Germans continued the attack on the United States.

Stalin's deathly fear of a new and powerful Germany was the main subject of conversation between Eisenhower and Khrushchev.

Stalin's deathly fear of a new and powerful Germany was the main subject of conversation between Eisenhower and Khrushchev.

Stalin's deathly fear of a new and powerful Germany was the main subject of conversation between Eisenhower and Khrushchev.

At the same time, Harry Truman, who in his memoirs frankly admitted his own inadequacy in coping with the crisis following EDE's death, also suffered from an inferiority complex. He too was suspicious.

How the distrust grew and the means by which Eisenhower and Khrushchev may remove it will be the subject of future columns.

(Copyright 1954, The Graduate, Inc.)