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FINDINGS OF ANDERSON REPORT HAVE BEEN EXAGGERATED

The Anderson report compares costs in Government-owned and private shipyards. It deals separately with conversion, repair, alteration, and construction, using work on specific ships as a basis of comparison. The report concludes:

1. That in the area of conversions the cost differential (in favor of private yards) was a mere 1.2 percent based on cost to the Department of Defense; and adds, "Since the percentage differentials are small and the adjustments required to establish comparability were both large and unusual, we can reach no conclusion with respect to the relative costs of these conversions;"
2. That in the field of ship repairs "costs * * * are not reasonably comparable on a ship-by-ship basis," but using this inadequate method of comparison anyhow, the report indicates the costs to the Department of Defense at private yards was only 3.4 percent lower than at naval yards;
3. That no significant difference in costs exists in the matter of ship alterations; and
4. That the apparent cost gaps in new construction are attributable principally to the indirect wages and fringe benefits of naval shipyard workers.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE NAVAL SHIPYARDS

Gentlemen, I submit that if there is a differential built into the operation of our naval shipyards, it is the very security of these United States. I need not explain to the members of this subcommittee the necessity for maintaining a maximum degree of readiness in our defense establishment, nor must I dwell on the significant contribution of Government-owned shipyards to that need. One of the greatest stories of World War II was the ability of our shipbuilding and repair facilities, both private and public, to meet and to exceed the demands imposed by a sudden global conflict. It is this very balance, this complementary coexistence which has enabled this Nation to change from a peacetime to a wartime naval establishment with a minimum of headaches and a maximum of success. It is this same coexistence which disproves and destroys the arguments of those of our private shipbuilders who would grab an even larger share of Government work without regard to the effects on our defense preparedness.

"ABUSING" THE YARDS FOR THE NATION'S DEFENSE

The naval shipyards do not turn a profit to stockholders. But rather than return to the Treasury that part of present costs which could be saved by paring our shipyards to the bone, the public yards turn a profit for the people of this country and their future. The public yards have instituted new management and systems engineering procedures, which have been expensive, but which add to the overall strength of our modern Navy. The public yards have borne the cost of advances in technology. When the private yards refuse to shave vital seconds off combat operations, or install back-up safety devices, or work to the most exacting specifications, such tasks are given to the public yards. "Oh, yes," one naval official told me, "we abuse the public yards, and it adds to their expense." But such additions can be the margin of victory, as they have certainly been the thin edge of advancing progress in naval design. The private yards have now leveled charges of cost inflation against our defense establishment for having pioneered in marine technology and vessel construction techniques. We know from this Nation's proud naval history that our shipyards are more than adequate to the challenges of our times. And we know as well, from the inability of our private yards to win construction awards for the world merchant marine fleet, that they have priced them-

selves out of their natural market. By skimping on military requirements the private yards could continue to build ships, but without the technical leadership of our naval shipyards and their responsiveness to the Navy command system, those vessels wouldn't be the fighting ships that the times may require.

ADVANTAGES OF MASS PRODUCTION GIVEN TO PRIVATE YARDS

Presently, private shipyards are subsidized to the tune of approximately 70 percent of all Government work. They often build and repair ships in groups of 10 or 12 at a time while the naval yards struggle along with 1 or 2 contracts. Thus, the private yards are not exposed to the normal risks of private investors; but they continue to cry socialism at naval yard proponents while demanding a return to so-called private enterprise in the awarding of Government contracts. Of course, their costs are lower—the advantages of mass production are available to them but rarely to their publicly owned competition. Considering these advantages and the conclusions of the Anderson report which establishes, I think, that cost differentials are reasonably small, I can't help wondering why the private yards are unable to get their costs down substantially from what they are now. I suspect there is a real need for a thorough examination of the accounting procedures employed at both private and naval shipyards to make certain that private yard apples are not being unfairly compared with public yard oranges.

PUBLIC YARDS ARE THE ONLY WAY TO HOLD COSTS DOWN

I would like to ask this question: What would hold down commercial shipbuilding prices if the private yards ever succeeded in their objective of eliminating their competition? The private yards are after a guaranteed, cost-plus, subsidized noncompetitive cartelized construction program that would open the public purse to their unquenchable thirst for funds. I remind the members of the subcommittee that this is an effort to repair the loss of private merchant marine construction markets with public funds, by draining the national security strength of our Government yards.

Gentlemen, there is no saving to the Government in allotting repair work to private shipyards, for this is the area where the Anderson report found the least difference. Thus, for my part, I find no reason to retain the guarantee of 35 percent of naval ship repairs for private yards in this year's defense appropriation bill. Although the Secretary of Defense has said in the past that the 65-35 percent provision allows a desirable degree of flexibility in work assignments, I respectfully suggest that the Secretary be granted a fuller measure of flexibility by the elimination of this legislative restriction which serves only to support private interests at the expense of the traditional role of America's naval shipyards.

SUGAR LEGISLATION

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, Congress will be required to consider sugar legislation again this session, and there is little prospect that the bill this year will be any less controversial than the ones in the past. If anything, it appears that there will be more difficulty than ever in reconciling the increasing number of special interests involved in sugar trade.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an editorial concerning this matter which appeared in the March 23 issue of the Wall Street Journal.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STABILITY GONE SOUR

The Government annually divides up the American sugar market among foreign and domestic producers and, in the process, indirectly controls U.S. sugar prices. No one has ever been completely happy with the process, and things don't seem to be getting any better.

For years foreign nations have fought for the right to supply the United States; a cut in one country's quota could touch off something of a diplomatic crisis. On one occasion a Latin nation even threatened to turn down U.S. foreign aid unless its sugar quota was raised (it was).

American consumers have had no real reason for happiness either. Though the Sugar Act's elaborate quota system is supposed to assure stable domestic prices, such stability as has existed has usually been at levels above those that would have prevailed in a free market. In effect, U.S. sugar users have been helping to subsidize the economies of a sizable group of foreign nations among which Cuba for a long time was prominent.

Now it's the domestic producers who are dissatisfied. Because world sugar prices currently are high, the U.S. sugar growers would like an increase in their allowable output. Agriculture Secretary Freeman is planning to permit the U.S. sugar men to increase production by 500,000 tons a year, and bills have been introduced in Congress to authorize an even bigger rise. But this would call for a cut in the amount of sugar to be supplied from abroad, and that prospect is stirring discontent in another quarter.

The latest group to get upset about sugar is composed of the dockworkers who belong to the United Weighers' and Sugar Samplers' Association, Local 3, and to the Scalesmen's Local 935. A cutback in imports could mean less work for them on the docks; they plan to urge Congress to stop the domestic producers' raid on sugar imports.

So after years of international pulling and hauling, the Government's sugar controllers soon will be in the middle of a tug of war between domestic producers and labor unions. To some officials in Washington, the idea of a free market should be growing sweeter day by day.

FOREIGN POLICY—OLD MYTHS AND NEW REALITIES

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, there is an inevitable divergence, attributable to the imperfections of the human mind, between the world as it is and the world as men perceive it. As long as our perceptions are reasonably close to objective reality, it is possible for us to act upon our problems in a rational and appropriate manner. But when our perceptions fail to keep pace with events, when we refuse to believe something because it displeases or frightens us, or because it is simply startlingly unfamiliar, then the gap between fact and perception becomes a chasm, and action becomes irrelevant and irrational.

There has always—and inevitably—been some divergence between the realities of foreign policy and our ideas about it. This divergence has in certain respects been growing, rather than narrowing; and we are handicapped, accordingly, by policies based on old myths, rather than current realities. This divergence is, in my opinion, dangerous and unnecessary—dangerous, because it can reduce foreign policy to a fraudu-

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A freeze in strategic retaliatory weapons would therefore pose a major problem for defense industry. If it tried to get into existing civilian markets it simply couldn't continue to do the sort of thing that it is particularly good at doing. Defense firms have had relatively poor success at diversifying into civilian industry, even when the products were as much alike as military and civilian aircraft, though they have been highly successful in changing over to new types of defense products. If new markets of a comparable type do not appear, the defense companies will in many cases have to abandon their relatively specialized defense facilities and staffs and, in order to protect the interests of their stockholders, shift their capital into more routine industries. This may be done by acquisitions, mergers, or new ventures—but in any case the existing people and communities in defense work will often be left high and dry. Moreover, the defense companies will have to act fast: they have enormous overheads, and they work on very slim operating margins. A delay of only a few weeks in taking disagreeable steps may be enough to run a good year's profit into a loss.

This is one place where our semantics could create a barrier to sensible solutions. Defense industry constitutes today one of the major concentrations of truly creative and innovational brainpower in American life. It obtains great dynamism by being operated for private profit by private management, yet is almost wholly dependent on non-private markets: It is important that we understand why this is necessary. Most of the benefits of its activities are too long range, too fundamental or too diffuse to be captured by market processes. Hence it could not offer tangible, timely, and reliable returns to the private investor unless the Government as trustee of the long-term interests of the Nation stepped in and created a market for such activities.

It so happens that national defense is one field where the long term national interest is so clear, and the futility of expecting to meet this need by spontaneously emerging private demand is so obvious, that there has been almost no dissent in principle to such Government expenditures.

It is important to recognize, however, that there is nothing specific to national defense that makes this pattern of organizing and financing economic activities desirable and feasible. There is not, in principle, any reason why such activities organized on a similar private enterprise basis could not be directed to other broad national objectives such as basic resource conservation and development, including particularly our dwindling water supply, waste disposal, planning and implementing urban redevelopment, commutation and other transport systems, weather control, improved aviation facilities and traffic control, industrial development of the oceans, establishment of world-wide communication networks, large-scale production of teaching machines and programs for the eradication of illiteracy, and the worldwide transmission of development skills, information systems, etc. If these tasks were performed by the companies now holding defense contracts this would be no more "socialistic" than the defense program is now.

Such programs would also have a secondary function of essential importance, closely related to their original goal of national defense. They would provide what might be called "standby capacity in defense R. & D. and production capability." This function would be especially important in the event of a weapons freeze which might at some stage break down, as did the moratorium on nuclear testing. It would be extremely important to preserve the Nation's capabilities

for resuming the weapons race if necessary—and the retention of such capability might help to prevent it from becoming necessary. Even in the event of a properly enforced agreement on general and complete disarmament, it is likely that for a good many years the Nation would wish to maintain its capability to rebuild a well-rounded national defense system in the event of some breakdown in the treaty's implementation. Such capability would be best preserved by the mounting of bold new programs of the type here advocated which would not only provide continuing opportunity for the talents and the organizations now employed in defense industry but would also maintain a continuing pressure on our educational institutions to develop a large number of able and highly motivated people with the requisite aptitudes and expertise.

It is hard to imagine the vast benefits that the Nation and the world might derive from a program such as suggested here, even if only \$5 billion a year were involved. The qualitative aspect here is enormously more important than the quantitative one. The sum of \$5 billion spread among consumers, or spent for better State and local government services, or even put into more conventional industrial plant and equipment would have absolutely no comparable effect in raising the Nation's real welfare. There is enormous leverage for welfare in applying advanced systems analysis and utilizing the fantastic skills of the modern computer—to solve our most serious problems. In effect, we would be having a second space program, but one tied firmly to earth. If I see this century aright it is on such great and ambitious programs which exhibit and continually amplify our capabilities to apply science to the achievement of men's goals that our Nation's prestige and influence, as well as its domestic living standards, will increasingly depend.

In closing I should like to avoid being misunderstood by making it clear what I am not saying. First, I am not proposing that all defense companies be kept going. I realize that some are too inflexible and some are too inefficient and high cost. But I think a lot of the criticism on this score overlooks the inherent expensiveness of doing such extensive innovation at such a rapid pace. When one looks at the miracle of the Polaris or Minuteman system, and the order of magnitude of improvement in efficacy over earlier weapons systems that they achieved in a few short years, and if one then compares this with the failure, for example, of the American automobile industry to put into production a single significant innovation for decades, then one suspects that some of the griping about the wastefulness and inefficiency of the defense and space programs is based on using inappropriate criteria, if indeed it does not actually reflect a certain amount of old-fashioned jealousy.

Second, I am not saying that the country owes the defense industry a living. I am saying that the country needs the productive capabilities which defense industry has nurtured, and which will largely be lost if defense companies are allowed to wither on the vine as soon as the need for new weapons slackens.

Finally, I am not saying that any such proposal as I have made would be politically easy to put over. Without the strong support of defense industry itself it would probably have little chance. Defense industry will not support it so long as it continues in the ostrichlike posture which it has so often preferred—endlessly repeating to itself that the cold war would never end and that the need for bigger and better atomic weapons would go on and on and on. Such a posture, I think, invites the booting which the industry will surely receive the moment the Defense Department feels it can dis-

pense with its services. In any case, defense industry could not back such a proposal so long as its own thinking is still dominated by the dogma that defense is the only legitimate purpose for which public funds, in large quantities, ought to be used in mobilizing the activities of private companies. We have now almost got to the point where we feel such programs are legitimate in space. How long do we have to wait until we can apply similar thinking to our problems here on earth?

WHY WE MUST NO LONGER ASSIGN A SET PERCENTAGE OF NAVAL VESSEL REPAIR WORK TO PRIVATE SHIPYARDS

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, the past two defense appropriation acts have included provisions requiring the Navy to allocate 35 percent of naval conversion and repair work to private shipyards. Such provisions represent an unwelcome limitation on the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy and give the commercial shipyards an unwarranted subsidy of guaranteed business. I strongly hope that Congress will not perpetuate this provision into fiscal year 1965. As an indication of my position on this question and with an eye to Senate consideration of this question this year, I should like to acquaint the Senate with arguments against this provision I recently offered in a statement for the Department of Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee.

I therefore ask unanimous consent that my statement before the House Appropriations Committee be printed in the Record at this point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McGOVERN in the chair). Is there objection?

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

The ambitious propaganda and lobbying activities of certain of our industrialists in recent years underscores the legitimacy of President Eisenhower's fears that the Nation's "military-industrial complex" is being motivated by other than strict military needs. "Convention," the current bestseller by Fletcher Knebel and Charles Bailey II, portrays in fiction what can happen in reality to those public officials (even presidential candidates) who have the courage to oppose Government contracts which contribute nothing at all to our defense posture, but many dollars to some of our private "profiteers."

PRIVATE YARDS WANT PREFERENTIAL LAWS, NOT COMPETITION

Until World War II, nearly all naval repair work was performed at naval shipyards. Since then, however, the private shipbuilding industry has managed gradually to win an ever increasing share of this work, not through competition but anticompetitive Government regulations, allotting work to them. And still they search for more, and more. The private shipbuilders point with relish to the now famous Anderson report to support their claim that private yards can satisfy the Navy's needs at less cost to the Government. Of course if the report really showed the private yards were competitive they wouldn't need the anticompetitive regulations. I would like to address myself to that report for a few moments.

lent game of imagery and appearances; unnecessary, because it can be overcome by the determination of men in high office to dispel prevailing misconceptions by the candid dissemination of unpleasant, but inescapable, facts.

Before commenting on some of the specific areas where I believe our policies are at least partially based on cherished myths, rather than objective facts, I should like to suggest two possible reasons for the growing divergence between the realities and our perceptions of current world politics. The first is the radical change in relations between and within the Communist and the free world; and the second is the tendency of too many of us to confuse means with ends and, accordingly, to adhere to prevailing practices with a fervor befitting immutable principles.

Although it is too soon to render a definitive judgment, there is mounting evidence that events of recent years have wrought profound changes in the character of East-West relations. In the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, the United States proved to the Soviet Union that a policy of aggression and adventure involved unacceptable risks. In the signing of the test ban treaty, each side in effect assured the other that it was prepared to forego, at least for the present, any bid for a decisive military or political breakthrough. These occurrences, it should be added, took place against the background of the clearly understood strategic superiority—but not supremacy—of the United States.

It seems reasonable, therefore, to suggest that the character of the cold war has, for the present, at least, been profoundly altered: by the drawing back of the Soviet Union from extremely aggressive policies; by the implicit repudiation by both sides of a policy of "total victory"; and by the establishment of an American strategic superiority which the Soviet Union appears to have tactically accepted because it has been accompanied by assurances that it will be exercised by the United States with responsibility and restraint. These enormously important changes may come to be regarded by historians as the foremost achievements of the Kennedy administration in the field of foreign policy. Their effect has been to commit us to a foreign policy which can accurately—though perhaps not prudently—be defined as one of "peaceful coexistence."

Another of the results of the lowering of tensions between East and West is that each is now free to enjoy the luxury of accelerated strife and squabbling within its own domain. The ideological thunderbolts between Washington and Moscow which until a few years ago seemed a permanent part of our daily lives have become a pale shadow of their former selves. Now instead the United States waits in fascinated apprehension for the Olympian pronouncements that issue from Paris at 6-month intervals while the Russians respond to the crude epithets of Peiping with almost plaintive rejoinders about "those who want to start a war against everybody."

These astonishing changes in the configuration of the postwar world have had

an unsettling effect on both public and official opinion in the United States. One reason for this, I believe, lies in the fact that we are a people used to looking at the world, and indeed at ourselves, in moralistic rather than empirical terms. We are predisposed to regard any conflict as a clash between good and evil rather than as simply a clash between conflicting interests. We are inclined to confuse freedom and democracy, which we regard as moral principles, with the way in which they are practiced in America—with capitalism, federalism, and the two-party system, which are not moral principles but simply the preferred and accepted practices of the American people. There is much cant in American moralism and not a little inconsistency. It resembles in some ways the religious faith of the many respectable people who, in Samuel Butler's words, "would be equally horrified to hear the Christian religion doubted or to see it practiced."

Our national vocabulary is full of "self-evident truths" not only about "life, liberty, and happiness," but about a vast number of personal and public issues, including the cold war. It has become one of the "self-evident truths" of the postwar era that just as the President resides in Washington and the Pope in Rome, the Devil resides immutably in Moscow. We have come to regard the Kremlin as the permanent seat of his power and we have grown almost comfortable with a menace which, though unspeakably evil, has had the redeeming virtues of constancy, predictability, and familiarity. Now the Devil has betrayed us by traveling abroad and, worse still, by dispersing himself, turning up now here, now there, and in many places at once, with a devilish disregard for the laboriously constructed frontiers of ideology.

We are confronted with a complex and fluid world situation and we are not adapting ourselves to it. We are clinging to old myths in the face of new realities and we are seeking to escape the contradictions by narrowing the permissible bounds of public discussion, by relegating an increasing number of ideas and viewpoints to a growing category of "unthinkable thoughts." I believe that this tendency can and should be reversed, that it is within our ability, and unquestionably in our interests, to cut loose from established myths and to start thinking some "unthinkable thoughts"—about the cold war and East-West relations, about the underdeveloped countries and particularly those in Latin America, about the changing nature of the Chinese Communist threat in Asia and about the festering war in Vietnam.

The master myth of the cold war is that the Communist bloc is a monolith composed of governments which are not really governments at all but organized conspiracies, divided among themselves perhaps in certain matters of tactics, but all equally resolute and implacable in their determination to destroy the free world.

I believe that the Communist world is indeed hostile to the free world in its general and long-term intentions but

that the existence of this animosity in principle is far less important for our foreign policy than the great variations in its intensity and character both in time and among the individual members of the Communist bloc. Only if we recognize these variations, ranging from China, which poses immediate threats to the free world, to Poland and Yugoslavia, which pose none, can we hope to act effectively upon the bloc and to turn its internal differences to our own advantage and to the advantage of those bloc countries which wish to maximize their independence. It is the responsibility of our national leaders both in the executive branch and in Congress, to acknowledge and act upon these realities, even at the cost of saying things which will not win immediate widespread enthusiasm.

For a start, we can acknowledge the fact that the Soviet Union, though still a most formidable adversary, has ceased to be totally and implacably hostile to the West. It has shown a new willingness to enter mutually advantageous arrangements with the West and, thus far at least, to honor them. It has therefore become possible to divert some of our energies from the prosecution of the cold war and to deal with the Soviet Union, for certain purposes, as a normal state with normal and traditional interests.

If we are to do these things effectively, we must distinguish between communism as an ideology and the power and policy of the Soviet state. It is not communism as a doctrine, or communism as it is practiced within the Soviet Union or within any other country, that threatens us. How the Soviet Union organizes its internal life, the gods and doctrines that it worships, are matters for the Soviet Union to determine. It is not Communist dogma as espoused within Russia but Communist imperialism that threatens us and other peoples of the non-Communist world. Insofar as a great nation mobilizes its power and resources for aggressive purposes, that nation, regardless of ideology, makes itself our enemy. Insofar as a nation is content to practice its doctrines within its own frontiers, that nation, however repugnant its ideology, is one with which we have no proper quarrel. We must deal with the Soviet Union as a great power, quite apart from differences of ideology. To the extent that the Soviet leaders abandon the global ambitions of Marxist ideology, in fact if not in words, it becomes possible for us to engage in normal relations with them, relations which probably cannot be close or trusting for many years to come but which can be gradually freed of the terror and the tensions of the cold war.

In our relations with the Russians, and indeed in our relations with all nations, we would do well to remember, and to act upon, the words of Pope John in the great Encyclical, *Pacem in Terris*:

"It must be borne in mind," said Pope John, "that to proceed gradually is the law of life in all its expressions, therefore, in human institutions, too, it is not possible to renovate for the better except by working from within them, gradually. Violence has always achieved only destruction, not con-

struction, the kindling of passions, not their pacification, the accumulation of hate and ruin, not the reconciliation of the contending parties. And it has reduced men and parties to the difficult task of rebuilding, after sad experience, on the ruins of discord."

Important opportunities have been created for Western policy by the development of "polycentrism" in the Communist bloc. The Communist nations, as George Kennan has pointed out, are, like the Western nations, currently caught up in a crisis of indecision about their relations with countries outside their own ideological bloc. The choices open to the satellite states are limited but by no means insignificant. They can adhere slavishly to Soviet preferences or they can strike out on their own, within limits, to enter into mutually advantageous relations with the West.

Whether they do so, and to what extent, is to some extent at least within the power of the West to determine. If we persist in the view that all Communist regimes are equally hostile and equally threatening to the West, and that we can have no policy toward the captive nations except the eventual overthrow of their Communist regimes, then the West may enforce upon the Communist bloc a degree of unity which the Soviet Union has shown itself to be quite incapable of imposing—just as Stalin in the early postwar years frightened the West into a degree of unity that it almost certainly could not have attained by its own unaided efforts. If, on the other hand, we are willing to re-examine the view that all Communist regimes are alike in the threat which they pose for the West—a view which had a certain validity in Stalin's time—then we may be able to exert an important influence on the course of events within a divided Communist world.

We are to a great extent the victims, and the Soviets the beneficiaries, of our own ideological convictions, and of the curious contradictions which they involve. We consider it a form of subversion of the free world, for example, when the Russians enter trade relations or conclude a consular convention or establish airline connections with a free country in Asia, Africa, or Latin America—and to a certain extent we are right. On the other hand, when it is proposed that we adopt the same strategy in reverse—by extending commercial credits to Poland or Yugoslavia, or by exchanging Ambassadors with a Hungarian regime which has changed considerably in character since the revolution of 1956—then the same patriots who are so alarmed by Soviet activities in the free world charge our policymakers with "giving aid and comfort to the enemy" and with innumerable other categories of idiocy and immorality.

It is time that we resolved this contradiction and separated myth from reality. The myth is that every Communist state is an unmitigated evil and a relentless enemy of the free world; the reality is that some Communist regimes pose a threat to the free world while others pose little or none, and that if we will recognize these distinctions, we ourselves will be able to influence events

in the Communist bloc in a way favorable to the security of the free world.

It could well be argued * * *

Writes George Kennan—

That if the major Western Powers had full freedom of movement in devising their own policies, it would be within their power to determine whether the Chinese view, or the Soviet view, or perhaps a view more liberal than either would ultimately prevail within the Communist camp—George Kennan, "Polycentrism and Western Policy," Foreign Affairs, January 1964, page 178.

There are numerous areas in which we can seek to reduce the tensions of the cold war and to bring a degree of normalcy into our relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries—once we have resolved that it is safe and wise to do so. We have already taken important steps in this direction: the Antarctic and Austrian treaties and the nuclear test ban treaty, the broadening of East-West cultural and educational relations, and the expansion of trade.

On the basis of recent experience and present economic needs, there seems little likelihood of a spectacular increase in trade between Communist and Western countries, even if existing restrictions were to be relaxed. Free world trade with Communist countries has been increasing at a steady but unspectacular rate, and it seems unlikely to be greatly accelerated because of the limited ability of the Communist countries to pay for increased imports. A modest increase in East-West trade may nonetheless serve as a modest instrument of East-West detente—provided that we are able to overcome the myth that trade with Communist countries is a compact with the Devil and to recognize that, on the contrary, trade can serve as an effective and honorable means of advancing both peace and human welfare.

Whether we are able to make these philosophic adjustments or not, we cannot escape the fact that our efforts to devise a common Western trade policy are a palpable failure and that our allies are going to trade with the Communist bloc whether we like it or not. The world's major exporting nations are slowly but steadily increasing their trade with the Communist bloc and the bloc countries are showing themselves to be reliable customers. Since 1958 Western Europe has been increasing its exports to the East at the rate of about 7 percent a year, which is nearly the same rate at which its overall world sales have been increasing.

West Germany—one of our close friends—is by far the leading Western nation in trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc. West German exports to bloc countries in 1962 were valued at \$749.9 million. Britain was in second place—although not a close second—with exports to Communist countries amounting to \$393 million in 1962. France followed with exports worth \$313.4 million, and the figure for the United States—consisting largely of surplus food sales to Poland under Public Law 480—stood far below at \$125.1 million.

Our allies have made it plain that they propose to expand this trade, in non-

strategic goods, wherever possible. West Germany, in the last 16 months, has exchanged or agreed to exchange trade missions with every country in Eastern Europe except Albania. Britain has indicated that she will soon extend long-term credits to Communist countries, breaching the 5-year limit which the Western allies have hitherto observed. In the light of these facts, it is difficult to see what effect the tight American trade restrictions have other than to deny the United States a substantial share of a profitable market.

The inability of the United States to prevent its partners from trading extensively with the Communist bloc is one good reason for relaxing our own restrictions, but there is a better reason: the potential value of trade—a moderate volume of trade in nonstrategic items—as an instrument for reducing world tensions and strengthening the foundations of peace. I do not think that trade or the nuclear test ban, or any other prospective East-West accommodation, will lead to a grand reconciliation that will end the cold war and usher in the brotherhood of man. At the most, the cumulative effect of all the agreements that are likely to be attainable in the foreseeable future will be the alleviation of the extreme tensions and animosities that threaten the world with nuclear devastation and the gradual conversion of the struggle between communism and the free world into a safer and more tolerable international rivalry, one which may be with us for years and decades to come but which need not be so terrifying and so costly as to distract the nations of the world from the creative pursuits of civilized societies.

There is little in history to justify the expectation that we can either win the cold war or end it immediately and completely. These are favored myths, respectively, of the American right and of the American left. They are, I believe, equal in their unreality and in their disregard for the feasibilities of history. We must disabuse ourselves of them and come to terms, at last, with the realities of a world in which neither good nor evil is absolute and in which those who move events and make history are those who have understood not how much but how little it is within our power to change.

Mr. President, in an address on February 18 at Bad Godesburg, the U.S. Ambassador to Germany, Mr. George McGhee, spoke eloquently and wisely about the character and prospects of relations between the Communist and the free worlds. I ask unanimous consent that Ambassador McGhee's address, "East-West Relations Today," be inserted in the Record at the end of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Latin America is one of the areas of the world in which American policy is weakened by a growing divergency between old myths and new realities.

The crisis over the Panama Canal has been unnecessarily protracted for reasons of domestic politics and national pride and sensitivity on both sides—for reasons, that is, of only marginal relevance to the merits of the dispute. I think the Panamanians have unquestionably been more emotional about the dispute than has the United States. I also think that there is less reason for emotionalism on the part of the United States than on the part of Panama. It is important for us to remember that the issue over the canal is only one of a great many in which the United States is involved, and by no means the most important. For Panama, on the other hand, a small nation with a weak economy and an unstable government, the canal is the preeminent factor in the nation's economy and in its foreign relations. Surely in a confrontation so unequal, it is not unreasonable to expect the United States to go a little farther than halfway in the search for a fair settlement.

We Americans would do well, for a start, to divest ourselves of the silly notion that the issue with Panama is a test of our courage and resolve. I believe that the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, involving a confrontation with nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles, was indeed a test of our courage, and we acquitted ourselves extremely well in that instance. I am unable to understand how a controversy with a small and poor country, with virtually no military capacity, can possibly be regarded as a test of our bravery and will to defend our interests. It takes stubbornness but not courage to reject the entreaties of the weak. The real test in Panama is not of our valor but of our wisdom and judgment and commonsense.

We would also do well to disabuse ourselves of the myth that there is something morally sacred about the treaty of 1903. The fact of the matter is that the treaty was concluded under circumstances that reflect little credit on the United States. It was made possible by Panama's separation from Colombia, which probably could not have occurred at that time without the dispatch of U.S. warships to prevent the landing of Colombian troops on the isthmus to put down the Panamanian rebellion. The United States not only intervened in Colombia's internal affairs but did so in violation of a treaty concluded in 1846 under which the United States had guaranteed Colombian sovereignty over the isthmus. President Theodore Roosevelt, as he boasted, "took Panama," and proceeded to negotiate the canal treaty with a compliant Panamanian regime. Panamanians contend that they were "shot-gunned" into the treaty of 1903 as the price of U.S. protection against a possible effort by Colombia to recover the isthmus. The contention is not without substance.

It is not my purpose here to relate the events of 60 years ago but only to suggest that there is little basis for a posture of injured innocence and self-righteousness by either side and that we would do much better to resolve the issue on the basis of present realities rather than old myths.

The central reality is that the treaty of 1903 is in certain respects obsolete. The treaty has been revised only twice, in 1936 when the annual rental was raised from \$250,000 to \$430,000 and other modifications were made, and in 1955 when further changes were made, including an increase in the annual rental to \$1.9 million, where it now stands. The canal, of course, contributes far more to the Panamanian economy in the form of wages paid to Panamanian workers and purchases made in Panama. The fact remains, nonetheless, that the annual rental of \$1.9 million is a modest sum and should probably be increased. There are other issues, relating to hiring policies for Panamanian workers in the zone, the flying of flags, and other symbols of national pride and sovereignty. The basic problem about the treaty, however, is the exercise of American control over a part of the territory of Panama in this age of intense nationalist and anticolonialist feeling. Justly or not, the Panamanians feel that they are being treated as a colony, or a quasi-colony, of the United States, and this feeling is accentuated by the contrast between the standard of living of the Panamanians, with a per capita income of about \$429 a year, and that of the Americans living in the Canal Zone—immediately adjacent to Panama, of course, and within it—with a per capita income of \$4,228 a year. That is approximately 10 times greater. It is the profound social and economic alienation between Panama and the Canal Zone, and its impact on the national feeling of the Panamanians, that underlies the current crisis.

Under these circumstances, it seems to me entirely proper and necessary for the United States to take the initiative in proposing new arrangements that would redress some of Panama's grievances against the treaty as it now stands. I see no reason—certainly no reason of "weakness" or "dishonor"—why the United States cannot put an end to the semantic debate over whether treaty revisions are to be "negotiated" or "discussed" by stating positively and clearly that it is prepared to negotiate revisions in the canal treaty and to submit such changes as are made to the Senate for its advice and consent.

I think it is necessary for the United States to do this even though a commitment to revise the treaty may be widely criticized at home. It is the responsibility of the President and his advisers, in situations of this sort, to exercise their own best judgment as to where the national interest lies even though this may necessitate unpopular decisions.

An agreement to "negotiate" revisions is not an agreement to negotiate any particular revision. It would leave us completely free to determine what revisions, and how many revisions, we would be willing to accept. If there is any doubt about this, one can find ample assurance in the proceedings at Geneva, where several years of "negotiations" for "general and complete disarmament" still leave us with the greatest arsenal of weapons in the history of the world.

The problem of Cuba is more difficult than that of Panama, and far more

heavily burdened with the deadweight of old myths and prohibitions against "unthinkable thoughts." I think the time is overdue for a candid reevaluation of our Cuban policy even though it may also lead to distasteful conclusions.

There are and have been three options open to the United States with respect to Cuba: first, the removal of the Castro regime by invading and occupying the island; second, an effort to weaken and ultimately bring down the regime by a policy of political and economic boycott; and finally, acceptance of the Communist regime as a disagreeable reality and annoyance but one which is not likely to be removed in the near future because of the unavailability of acceptable means of removing it.

The first option, invasion, has been tried in a halfhearted way and found wanting. It is generally acknowledged that the invasion and occupation of Cuba, besides violating our obligations as a member of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States, would have explosive consequences in Latin America and elsewhere and might precipitate a global nuclear war. I know of no responsible statesman who advocates this approach. It has been rejected by our Government and by public opinion and I think that, barring some grave provocation, it can be ruled out as a feasible policy for the United States.

The approach which we have adopted has been the second of those mentioned, an effort to weaken and eventually bring down the Castro regime by a policy of political and economic boycott. This policy has taken the form of extensive restrictions against trade with Cuba by United States citizens, of the exclusion of Cuba from the inter-American system and efforts to secure Latin American support in isolating Cuba politically and economically, and of diplomatic efforts, backed by certain trade and aid sanctions, to persuade other free world countries to maintain economic boycotts against Cuba.

This policy, it now seems clear, has been a failure, and there is no reason to believe that it will succeed in the future. Our efforts to persuade our allies to terminate their trade with Cuba have been generally rebuffed. The prevailing attitude was perhaps best expressed by a British manufacturer who, in response to American criticisms of the sale of British buses to Cuba, said: "If America has a surplus of wheat, we have a surplus of buses."

In cutting off military assistance to Great Britain, France, and Yugoslavia under the provisions of Section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, the United States has wielded a stuffed club. The amounts of aid involved are infinitesimal; the chances of gaining compliance with our boycott policy are nil; and the annoyance of the countries concerned may be considerable. What we terminated with respect to Britain and France, in fact, can hardly be called aid; it was more of a sales promotion program under which British and French military leaders were brought to the United States to see—and to buy—ad-

vanced American weapons. Terminating this program was in itself of little importance; Britain and France do not need our assistance. But terminating the program as a sanction against their trade with Cuba can have no real effect other than to create an illusory image of "toughness" for the benefit of our own people.

Free world exports to Cuba have, on the whole, been declining over recent years, but overall imports have been rising since 1961.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be inserted in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks two tables provided by the Department of State showing the trade of selected free world countries with Cuba from 1958 to 1963.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2).

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the figures shown in these tables provide little basis for expecting the early termination of free world trade with Cuba. The export table shows U.S. exports to Cuba in both 1962 and 1963 exceeding those of any other free world country. These American exports consisted almost entirely of ransom payments for the Bay of Pigs prisoners and should not be confused with normal trade.

There is an interesting feature to this table, which may not be well known. It is that the exports from Cuba to various allies of ours, particularly Japan, the United Kingdom, Morocco, and others, have been going up, and have been very substantial. This reflects, I believe, the importation from Cuba of sugar to a great extent, and also accounts for the accumulation by Cuba of substantial foreign aid as a result of the dramatic increase in the price of sugar during the past couple of years.

The exports from the free world to Cuba have been going up in similar instances, in the case of Japan, but generally speaking they have not been increasing. Of course, since 1958, when we accounted for more than half of Cuba's exports, they have gone down rather dramatically. In any case, the tables will speak for themselves.

I should like to make it very clear that I am not arguing against the desirability of an economic boycott against the Castro regime but against its feasibility. The effort has been made and all the fulminations we can utter about sanctions and retaliation against free world countries that trade with Cuba cannot long conceal the fact that the boycott policy is a failure.

The boycott policy has not failed because of any "weakness" or "timidity" on the part of our Government. This charge, so frequently heard, is one of the most pernicious myths to have been inflicted on the American people. The boycott policy has failed because the United States is not omnipotent and cannot be. The basic reality to be faced is that it is simply not within our power to compel our allies to cut off their trade with Cuba, unless we are prepared to take drastic sanctions against them, such as closing our own markets to any

foreign company that does business in Cuba, as proposed by Mr. Nixon. We can do this, of course, but if we do, we ought first to be very sure as apparently Mr. Nixon is, that the Cuban boycott is more important than good relations with our closest allies. In fact, even the most drastic sanctions are as likely to be rewarded with defiance as with compliance. For practical purposes, all we can do is to ask other countries to take the measures with respect to Cuba which we recommend. We have done so and in some areas have been successful. In other areas, notably that of the economic boycott, we have asked for the full cooperation of other free world countries and it has been largely denied. It remains for us to decide whether we will respond with a sustained outburst of hollow and ill-tempered threats, all the while comforting ourselves with the myth that we can get anything we want if we only try hard enough—or, in this case, shout loud enough—or we can acknowledge the failure of our efforts and proceed, coolly and rationally, to reexamine the policies which we now pursue in relation to the interests they are intended to serve.

The prospects of bringing down the Castro regime by political and economic boycott have never been very good. Even if a general free world boycott were successfully applied against Cuba, it is unlikely that the Russians would refuse to carry the extra financial burden and thereby permit the only Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere to collapse. We are thus compelled to recognize that there is probably no way of bringing down the Castro regime by means of economic pressures unless we are prepared to impose a blockade against nonmilitary shipments from the Soviet Union. Exactly such a policy has been recommended by some of our more reckless politicians, but the preponderance of informed opinion is that a blockade against Soviet shipments of nonmilitary supplies to Cuba would be extravagantly dangerous, carrying the strong possibility of a confrontation that could explode into nuclear war.

Having ruled out military invasion and blockade, and recognizing the failure of the boycott policy, we are compelled to consider the third of the three options open to us with respect to Cuba: the acceptance of the continued existence of the Castro regime as a distasteful nuisance but not an intolerable danger so long as the nations of the hemisphere are prepared to meet their obligations of collective defense under the Rio Treaty.

In recent years we have become transfixed with Cuba, making it far more important in both our foreign relations and in our domestic life than its size and influence warrant. We have flattered a noisy but minor demagog by treating him as if he were a Napoleonic menace. Communist Cuba has been a disruptive and subversive influence in Venezuela and other countries of the hemisphere, and there is no doubt that both we and our Latin American partners would be better off if the Castro regime did not exist. But it is important to bear in

mind that, despite their best efforts, the Cuban Communists have not succeeded in subverting the hemisphere and that in Venezuela, for example, where communism has made a major effort to gain power through terrorism, it has been repudiated by a people who in a free election have committed themselves to the course of liberal democracy. It is necessary to weigh the desirability of an objective against the feasibility of its attainment, and when we do this with respect to Cuba, I think we are bound to conclude that Castro is a nuisance but not a grave threat to the United States and that he cannot be gotten rid of except by means that are wholly disproportionate to the objective. Cuban communism does pose a grave threat to other Latin American countries, but this threat can be dealt with by prompt and vigorous use of the established procedures of the inter-American system against any act of aggression.

I think that we must abandon the myth that Cuban communism is a transitory menace that is going to collapse or disappear in the immediate future and face up to two basic realities about Cuba: first, that the Castro regime is not on the verge of collapse and is not likely to be overthrown by any policies which we are now pursuing or can reasonably undertake; and second, that the continued existence of the Castro regime, though inimical to our interests and policies, is not an insuperable obstacle to the attainment of our objectives, unless we make it so by permitting it to poison our politics at home and to divert us from more important tasks in the hemisphere.

The policy of the United States with respect to Latin America as a whole is predicated on the assumption that social revolution can be accomplished without violent upheaval. This is the guiding principle of the Alliance for Progress and it may in time be vindicated. We are entitled to hope so and it is wise and necessary for us to do all that we can to advance the prospects of peaceful and orderly reform.

At the same time, we must be under no illusions as to the extreme difficulty of uprooting long-established ruling oligarchies without disruptions involving lesser or greater degrees of violence. The historical odds are probably against the prospects of peaceful social revolution. There are places, of course, where it has occurred and others where it seems likely to occur. In Latin America, the chances for such basic change by peaceful means seem bright in Colombia and Venezuela and certain other countries; in Mexico, many basic changes have been made by peaceful means, but these came in the wake of a violent revolution. In other Latin American countries, the power of ruling oligarchies is so solidly established and their ignorance so great that there seems little prospect of accomplishing economic growth or social reform by means short of the forcible overthrow of established authorities.

I am not predicting violent revolutions in Latin America or elsewhere. Still less am I advocating them. I wish only to suggest that violent social revolutions are a possibility in countries where feu-

dal oligarchies resist all meaningful change by peaceful means. We must not, in our preference for the democratic procedures envisioned by the Charter of Punta del Este, close our minds to the possibility that democratic procedures may fail in certain countries and that where democracy does fail violent social convulsions may occur.

We would do well, while continuing our efforts to promote peaceful change through the Alliance for Progress, to consider what our reactions might be in the event of the outbreak of genuine social revolution in one or more Latin American countries. Such a revolution did occur in Bolivia, and we accepted it calmly and sensibly. But what if a violent social revolution were to break out in one of the larger Latin American countries? Would we feel certain that it was Cuban or Soviet inspired? Would we wish to intervene on the side of established authority? Or would we be willing to tolerate or even support a revolution if it was seen to be not Communist but similar in nature to the Mexican revolution or the Nasser revolution in Egypt?

These are hypothetical questions and there is no readily available set of answers to them. But they are questions which we should be thinking about because they have to do with problems that could become real and urgent with great suddenness. We should be considering, for example, what groups in particular countries might conceivably lead revolutionary movements, and if we can identify them, we should be considering how we might communicate with them and influence them in such a way that their movements, if successful, will not pursue courses detrimental to our security and our interests.

The Far East is another area of the world in which American policy is handicapped by the divergence of old myths and new realities. Particularly with respect to China, an elaborate vocabulary of make believe has become compulsory in both official and public discussion. We are committed, with respect to China and other areas in Asia, to inflexible policies of long standing from which we hesitate to depart because of the attribution to these policies of an aura of mystical sanctity. It may be that a thorough reevaluation of our Far Eastern policies would lead us to the conclusion that they are sound and wise, or at least that they represent the best available options. It may be, on the other hand, that a reevaluation would point up the need for greater or lesser changes in our policies. The point is that, whatever the outcome of a rethinking of policy might be, we have been unwilling to undertake it because of the fear of many Government officials, undoubtedly well founded, that even the suggestion of new policies toward China or Vietnam would provoke a vehement public outcry.

I do not think the United States can, or should, recognize Communist China, or acquiesce in its admission to the United Nations under present circumstances. It would be unwise to do so, because there is nothing to be gained by it so long as the Peiping regime main-

tains its attitude of implacable hostility toward the United States. I do not believe, however, that this state of affairs is necessarily permanent. As we have seen in our relations with Germany and Japan, hostility can give way in an astonishingly short time to close friendship; and, as we have seen in our relations with China, the reverse can occur with equal speed. It is not impossible that in time our relations with China will change again—if not to friendship, then perhaps to "competitive coexistence." It would therefore be extremely useful if we could introduce an element of flexibility, or, more precisely, of the capacity to be flexible, into our relations with Communist China.

We would do well, as former Assistant Secretary Hillsman has recommended, to maintain an "open door" to the possibility of improved relations with Communist China in the future. For a start, we must jar open our minds to certain realities about China, of which the foremost is that there really are not "two Chinas," but only one—mainland China; and that it is ruled by Communists, and is likely to remain so for the indefinite future. Once we accept this fact, it becomes possible to reflect on the conditions under which it might be possible for us to enter into relatively normal relations with mainland China. One condition, of course, must be the abandonment by the Chinese Communists, tacitly, if not explicitly, of their intention to conquer and incorporate Taiwan. This seems unlikely now; but far more surprising changes have occurred in politics, and it is quite possible that a new generation of leaders in Peiping and Taipei may put a quiet end to the Chinese civil war, thus opening the possibility of entirely new patterns of international relations in the Far East.

Should such changes occur, they will open important opportunities for American policy; and it is to be hoped that we shall be able and willing to take advantage of them. It seems possible, for instance, that an atmosphere of reduced tensions in the Far East might make it possible to strengthen world peace by drawing mainland China into existing East-West agreements in such fields as disarmament, trade, and educational exchange.

These are long-range prospects, which may or may not materialize. In the immediate future, we are confronted with possible changes in the Far East resulting from recent French diplomacy.

French recognition of Communist China, although untimely and carried out in a way that can hardly be considered friendly to the United States, may nonetheless serve a constructive long-term purpose, by unfreezing a situation in which many countries, none more than the United States, are committed to inflexible policies by long-established commitments and the pressures of domestic public opinion. One way or another, the French initiative may help generate a new situation in which the United States, as well as other countries, will find it possible to reevaluate its basic policies in the Far East.

The situation in Vietnam poses a far more pressing need for a reevaluation of American policy. Other than withdrawal, which I do not think can be realistically considered under present circumstances, three options are open to us in Vietnam: First, continuation of the antiguerrilla war within South Vietnam, along with renewed American efforts to increase the military effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Army and the political effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Government; second, an attempt to end the war, through negotiations for the neutralization of South Vietnam, or of both North and South Vietnam; and, finally, the expansion of the scale of the war, either by the direct commitment of large numbers of American troops or by equipping the South Vietnamese Army to attack North Vietnamese territory, possibly by means of commando-type operations from the sea or the air.

It is difficult to see how a negotiation, under present military circumstances, could lead to termination of the war under conditions that would preserve the freedom of South Vietnam. It is extremely difficult for a party to a negotiation to achieve by diplomacy objectives which it has conspicuously failed to win by warfare. The hard fact of the matter is that our bargaining position is at present a weak one; and until the equation of advantages between the two sides has been substantially altered in our favor, there can be little prospect of a negotiated settlement which would secure the independence of a non-Communist South Vietnam.

Recent initiatives by France, calling for the neutralization of Vietnam, have tended to confuse the situation, without altering it in any fundamental way. France could, perhaps, play a constructive mediating role if she were willing to consult and cooperate with the United States. For somewhat obscure reasons, however, France has chosen to take an independent initiative. This is puzzling to Americans, who recall that the United States contributed \$1.2 billion to France's war in Indochina of a decade ago—which was 70 percent of the total cost of the conflict. Whatever its motivation, the problem posed by French intervention in southeast Asia is that while France may set off an unforeseeable chain of events, she is neither a major military force nor a major economic force in the Far East, and is therefore unlikely to be able to control or greatly influence the events which her initiative may precipitate.

It seems clear that only two realistic options are open to us in Vietnam in the immediate future: the expansion of the conflict in one way or another, or a renewed effort to bolster the capacity of the South Vietnamese to prosecute the war successfully on its present scale. The matter calls for thorough examination by responsible officials in the executive branch; and until they have had an opportunity to evaluate the contingencies and feasibilities of the options open to us, it seems to me that we have no choice but to support the South Vietnamese Government and Army by the

most effective means available. Whatever specific policy decisions are made, it should be clear to all concerned that the United States will continue to meet its obligations and fulfill its commitments with respect to Vietnam.

These, I believe, are some, although by no means all, of the issues of foreign policy in which it is essential to re-evaluate longstanding ideas and commitments in the light of new and changing realities. In all the issues which I have discussed, American policy has to one degree or another been less effective than it might have been because of our national tendency to equate means with ends and therefore to attach a mythological sanctity to policies and practices which in themselves have no moral content or value except insofar as they contribute to the achievement of some valid national objective. I believe that we must try to overcome this excessive moralism, which binds us to old myths and blinds us to new realities and, worse still, leads us to regard new and unfamiliar ideas with fear and mistrust.

We must dare to think about "unthinkable" things. We must learn to explore all of the options and possibilities that confront us in a complex and rapidly changing world. We must learn to welcome rather than fear the voices of dissent and not to recoil in horror whenever some heretic suggests that Castro may survive or that Khrushchev is not as bad a fellow as Stalin was. We must overcome our susceptibility to "shock"—a word which I wish could be banned from our newspapers and magazines and especially from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

If Congress and public opinion are unduly susceptible to "shock," the executive branch, and particularly the Department of State, is subject to the malady of chronic and excessive caution. An effective foreign policy is one which concerns itself more with innovation abroad than with concillation at home. A creative foreign policy—as President Truman, for one, knew—is not necessarily one which wins immediate general approval. It is sometimes necessary for leaders to do unpleasant and unpopular things, because, as Burke pointed out, the duty of the democratic politician to his constituents is not to comply with their every wish and preference but to give them the benefit of, and to be held responsible for, the exercise of his own best judgment.

We must dare to think about "unthinkable things," because when things become "unthinkable," thinking stops and action becomes mindless. If we are to disabuse ourselves of old myths and to act wisely and creatively upon the new realities of our time, we must think and talk about our problems with perfect freedom, remembering, as Woodrow Wilson said, that "The greatest freedom of speech is the greatest safety because, if a man is a fool, the best thing to do is to encourage him to advertise the fact by speaking."

EXHIBIT 1

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
U.S. INFORMATION SERVICE, OFFICE OF THE
PRESS ATTACHÉ, BONN/BAD GODESBERG

Ambassador George C. McGhee today urged a patient search for even limited

East-West agreements "in the belief that the resolution of small differences is not only worthwhile in itself but can prepare the ground for an eventual resolution of greater differences."

The Ambassador of the United States to the Federal Republic of Germany spoke at the Redoute in Bad Godesberg under the auspices of the German Foreign Policy Society (Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Auswaertige Politik e.V.)

His address was entitled "East-West Relations Today." The text, as prepared for delivery, is attached.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS TODAY

It is indeed an honor for me to have been asked to appear before you tonight. The German Society for Foreign Policy is well-known abroad as a group dedicated to purposeful and sober examination of the outstanding international issues of the day. In the United States we appreciate it as a distinguished body of representative leaders from the political, professional, and economic mainstreams of German life, who have consistently recognized and encouraged the value of German-American friendship within the framework of an Atlantic partnership.

The manifestations of the close understanding which exists between your country and mine are many. It was my privilege recently to accompany Chancellor Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder on their visit with President Johnson. The subject on which I shall speak tonight figured largely in their very fruitful discussions. I would like to begin my presentation by reminding you of a passage in the communique issued at the conclusion of their talks:

"The President and the Chancellor had an extended discussion of the current state of East-West relations. They were determined that the basic rights and interests of the free nations must be defended, and in particular they agreed that there should be no arrangement that would serve to perpetuate the status quo of a divided Germany, one part of which is deprived of elementary rights and liberties. On this basis, the President and the Chancellor agreed that it is highly important to continue to explore all opportunities for the improvement of East-West relations, the easing of tensions, and the enlargement of the prospects of a peace that can be stable because it is just. They continue to hope that this effort of the Western powers will meet a constructive response from the Soviet Union."

This statement, issued jointly by the leaders of our two Governments, is, so to speak, the text upon which I shall elaborate. Let me at the outset, however, make an explanatory point. East-West policy is only one aspect of total foreign policy, just as the words I have quoted are an excerpt from a longer document which also covers many other matters. The subject of easing tensions and promoting prospects of peace in East-West relations seems to me, however, particularly to deserve our study. This is true not only because it is important, but because of all the major components of foreign policy it is the most complicated to manage and the most likely to encounter public misunderstanding.

Let me emphasize that in what I have to say I shall not be delineating a new policy, nor do my remarks prestage any reconfiguration of or shift of emphasis within total U.S. policy. My aim is the more modest one of presenting for your consideration the line of reasoning which supports an approach to East-West relations which has great continuity in American foreign policy, since it traces back through the last four U.S. administrations.

My method will be to lay before you tonight the arguments for and against two very different approaches to current problems of East-West relations. One is to search pa-

tiently for possible areas of agreement, however small, in the belief, that the resolution of small differences is not only worthwhile in itself but can prepare the ground for an eventual resolution of greater differences. The other course is to refuse to seek accommodations on any matter in the absence of progress toward solving the central issues between East and West, in the belief that a general state of tension in world affairs exerts a useful pressure under which the East eventually may yield on these large issues. When I have done I hope you will agree with me that the first alternative—which is the policy of my country—is the course for the North Atlantic nations to follow.

My basic thesis will be that as East-West tensions rise, positions tend to become more inflexible both in terms of principle and in terms of administration of policy. Opportunities for improving the situation consequently tend to become fewer and less promising. However, as these tensions decline, positions can become less rigid and opportunities for improving the situation can become greater in number and more promising. Even though we cannot hope to eliminate tension until we eliminate its causes, the reduction of tensions can help achieve the aims of the Western allies.

You will observe that, in these remarks, I have adopted Horace's advice, drawn from the example of Homer, to begin in medias res. There is at least one way in which you are comparable to Homer's audience. There is no need for me to remind you that long years of struggle have preceded the present moment; there is no need to point out that the issues we shall consider together are not the end of the story, but represent only a short period of history during which the final outcome still hangs in the balance. The members of this society require no instruction in the history of the postwar period. I need, however, to take only a moment to set the scene, so to speak, with a brief description of the situation between East and West as it exists today.

II

In some respects the events of 1963, as have the immediate prospects for 1964, evolved in the shadow of the Soviet Union's attempt to shift the balance of power in its favor by the emplacement of offensive missiles on Cuba. The Soviet plunge at Cuba was sudden and reckless. This very recklessness lent a concentrated and dramatic quality to the Cuban denouement which has, for example, not recently characterized Soviet moves in Berlin. The gravity of the challenge and the firmness with which it was met have led to a recognition of the Cuban drama of 1962 as a watershed for subsequent international affairs.

The Cuban crisis was the continuation of a series of deliberate efforts to intrude Communist power and influence into new areas. Such attempts have been made since 1945 in many areas, but most forcefully in Iran, Turkey, Greece, Berlin, Korea, Laos, and Vietnam. In each case these efforts have been successfully countered by the West—although in Laos and South Vietnam, as in Cuba, the task is not yet completed. The special significance of Cuba is that it presented not only the sharpest, but perhaps also the terminal episode of a menacing strategy of nuclear threat which seems to have dated from the Soviet orbiting of the first sputnik in 1957.

If the last 14 months have given evidence of a new sobriety in the Soviet assessment, this probably traces to the following factors:

1. Western military strength has greatly increased. Even though the Soviet Union since 1958 has overlaid its bid with too weak a hand, the Western position has subsequently been greatly improved by a massive mobilization of resources. As President Johnson pointed out in his budget message of January 21, the United States within the past 3 years has increased by 100 percent the nuclear weapons in our strategic forces, and

by 60 percent the tactical nuclear forces deployed in Western Europe. We have increased by 45 percent the number of combat-ready divisions, and by 35 percent the number of our tactical fighter squadrons.

2. We have demonstrated both in Cuba and in Berlin a firm will to commit these forces where necessary. The Communists can remain in no doubt on this point.

3. The Soviet Union is now in deep economic difficulties, as an outcome of the mismanagement of its economy and of excessive diversion of resources to an inflexible military and space budget. The consequences have been a decline in absolute agricultural output and an inability to maintain adequate resource inputs into vital segments of industry.

4. The deepening Sino-Soviet split is another major fact of life with which the Soviets now must deal, although so far its precise impact on Soviet policy toward the West is hard to assess. Peiping has directly challenged the authority of Moscow, and is now engaged in a direct contest to assert its leadership over the world Communist movement and in the developing lands of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

With the doubtless unnecessary caution that none of these considerations implies in any way a Soviet abandonment of the ultimate goal of world domination, I now turn to the specific topic I have suggested for your consideration.

III

Let us begin by disposing of an argument against seeking agreements with the East which is distinct from the argument already introduced.

The Communists, it is often pointed out, cannot be trusted. The Soviet Union appears to regard international agreements as valid only so long as it is to its own interests to invoke their provisions. Communist China is even blunter in its assertion of its own interests against the rule of law and the peace of the world community. In Berlin, in southeast Asia, and elsewhere the Communist record of disregard for their international obligations is too glaring to require comment. This is, unfortunately, a fact of international life with which Western statesmen must deal. It has led some observers to view that there should be no agreements, since the Western signatories will regard agreements as binding and therefore as limiting their freedom of action, whereas the Eastern Powers will not.

Furthermore, it can be argued that the Communist notion of negotiation is such that the very process of discussing possible accommodation is dangerous. Often enough their offers to talk with us are plainly prompted, not by a desire to reach any agreement but by a hope that they can, without yielding from their own position, pry concessions from the West. They attempt to pocket without payment any concessions put forth as part of a Western proposal for a compromise. They are unembarrassed to suggest that the remedy for their violation of an agreement is a conference to make a new agreement giving them what they want. To them, what is negotiable at any given time is not the difference between the positions of the East and the West, but the difference between what they possess and what they desire. If they had their way, negotiation would be a sort of cattle chute along which the unsuspecting nations of the West would move under Communist prod—slowly, perhaps, but toward an inevitable destination.

I have no quarrel with those who stress that it is foolish to trust Communist professions of good faith in subscribing to an agreement. It seems to me, however, that no logic leads from this premise to the conclusion that the West should hold no conversa-

tions and make no treaties with the East. Such a conclusion reflects, not distrust of the Communists, but distrust of ourselves. It underestimates our resources of skill and experience in conducting East-West talks, and in devising means to ensure the enforcement of agreements reached. It also fails to allow for the fact that, in certain circumstances, the Soviets can be led by their own interests to negotiate an agreement which is also in our interest.

IV

Before I elaborate this point I would like to invite you to scrutinize the idea that at least a certain degree of tension in East-West relations is to the advantage of the West. Here, I believe, we must first of all be careful not to make the common error of discussing tension as if it had an existence of its own, independent of the real issues and real events of our world. We must also be sure to distinguish between the causes of tension and its effects.

Tension between nations and groups of nations arises when their major national and joint objectives overlap and conflict, as now is the case between East and West. There is, first of all, the incompatibility of Communist aims with the desire of other nations to live undisturbed in peace. The dispute over the means they will employ, in which the Communist powers today are engaged, has not shaken their continuing common commitment to world revolution. I should like to underline that point by quoting from a statement by Chairman Khrushchev published last month in the magazine *Kommunist*:

"It goes without saying that this does not mean that under conditions of peaceful co-existence the contest lessens between governments of differing social structures. On the contrary, peaceful coexistence stipulates an economic fight in the form of economic competition, and political and ideological struggle."

A further source of tension is the fact that the Communist leaders now control large areas of the world, including the Eastern Zone of Germany, in which the satisfaction of legitimate national aspirations has been denied.

The specific issues and situations from which tension can spring are many and varied. Unhealthy tension in an individual frequently occurs in what in medical terminology is called a syndrome, and the analogy is not without usefulness in considering the kind of tension with which we are concerned. A syndrome is a group of symptoms produced by factors which may originally have been unrelated, but which interact to produce a cumulative effect more harmful than the mere sum of the influences each exerts. Similarly, tension between nations is aggravated by the fact that it takes many forms, which can interact and reinforce each other.

One of the most important causes of military tension is the threat to Europe posed by the presence of large-scale Communist arms in the East. Ranged against this is a NATO establishment in Europe, which, whatever its need for improvement, possesses awesome capabilities at every level of force. The tensions arising from this confrontation in Europe are heightened and complicated by the fact that, in other areas of the world—in Cuba, Laos, and South Vietnam—the Communists are pursuing their objectives by means of active subversion and terror. Encompassing all this is the nuclear balance of terror between East and West, based on a destructive capacity which, if employed, would cost hundreds of millions of lives within the space of hours. All these elements enter into the syndrome of world tension.

The fundamental issues between East and

West flare into headlines when the Soviets try to put missiles into Cuba, or stop allied convoys on the autobahn to Berlin, or—as happened late last month—wantonly shoot down three American Air Force officers who strayed over East Germany in an unarmed training plane. It would, however, be a gross oversimplification to say that there are no tensions during periods in which the Communist powers choose to refrain from such acts. That the absence of a crisis is identical with the presence of a detente is only something the Communists would like us to believe. It is not to our interest to talk or behave as if it were true.

From that, however, it does not follow that it is to our interest to have the tension between East and West reflect itself in dispute, crisis or confrontation. Indeed, to adopt that view would be to fall in with the Communist argument that tension has no existence apart from its more acute manifestations. We must take the more responsible course of trying to control such manifestations so that they do not lead to general conflict, while we search for a way to penetrate to the real causes of tension.

Some claim that the pressure on the Communist powers to yield gains to the West is greatest when relations between East and West are at their worst. I believe that this view reflects a misappraisal of both the origins and the angers of tension. The fact of the matter is that the West exerts only a peaceful pressure upon the East. Our military might is essential to us as a deterrent and in warding off military pressure from the East; however, we have foresworn its use save for defense, and this fact is known to our adversary.

Thus a worsening of relations gives the West no new lever to move the Eastern powers from their entrenched positions. The real instruments available to us to achieve our own objectives are the resources and the attractive power of our prospering free societies, backed up by a united determination to press for the solution of problems by all peaceful means. These instruments are not more, but less effective in a time of crisis than in a time of relative calm.

There is no reason to expect that the adversary will, unless he is forced to do so, obligingly offer unconditional surrender on our terms. A state of heightened tension and conflict charges the political atmosphere with fear and suspicion. Aroused peoples will not permit their political leaders to make concessions—and even in Communist states the leaders must take some account of these pressures. All prospect that the adversaries might meet each other halfway in a peaceful settlement vanishes. Minor problems, rather than being solved, are aggravated and multiplied. Issues are created which need never have existed. Violence or even war could result from artificial challenges which were never part of the basic conflict of vital interests.

There is another school of thought which alleges that the reaching of minor agreements will lull the West into a false feeling of complacency, arising from an illusion of detente—that the West will find the status quo so acceptable that long-range goals will be forgotten and central issues will be allowed to remain unresolved. This could be so, but it need not be so. National memories are not so short as that. People who have determination, and who take the long view, will never cease trying to achieve their basic aspirations or to regulate their basic problems.

I believe the nations of the West, including both the United States and the Federal Republic, have the necessary determination. That we give each other the credit for having it is the measure of our confidence in each other. We have, after all, labored together for almost a generation now with the

problems of East-West relations. I do not believe that our wisdom is so small, or our fixity of purpose so fragile, that we need constantly to be recalled to our duties through crises and clashes with the adversary. We have our common goals clearly in view, and we are not likely to lose sight of them.

The alternative we propose to a policy of no agreements is a policy of search for agreements whenever and wherever possible. Although in practical terms this search is more likely to lead to limited agreements than to major settlements, we do not just for that reason rule out the latter. The Austrian treaty is an example of a major breakthrough, made possible by prolonged and patient exploration which led to an arrangement consistent with the vital interests of both sides.

Such a course requires us patiently to pursue a dialog with the adversary, seeking both to clarify issues and to identify the relatively limited areas in which negotiation may now be possible. The necessity for patience has been recommended by many eminent counselors, including Wilhelm Wolfgang Schuetz of the Kuratorium Indivisible Germany. In speaking of the search for German reunification he said:

"We must have the courage to take the long path, if no one can show us a short path. That means, we must also have the courage under given circumstances, to proceed in stages on this path to unity."

President Johnson, in addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations, put the thought in these words:

"Peace is a journey of a thousand miles, and it must be taken one step at a time."

v

The process of differentiating between the negotiable and the nonnegotiable differences is itself a long and arduous one. However, even at this stage it has not been without result. Merely to achieve a clearer understanding of the hard core issues which divide East and West is a gain for us. One of the pressing dangers of our time is the possibility that the Communist leaders will stumble into war through failure to recognize what our vital interests are. For example, the intermittent discussions of Berlin which have taken place for some time now between the United States and the U.S.S.R. have thus far not been successful. They have, however, permitted us to make unmistakably clear that the West has vital interests in Berlin upon which the Soviet Union must not infringe. To that extent the danger of war by miscalculation has been reduced.

Most talks between East and West are not negotiations at all in the sense in which we use that term in the West. In certain circumstances, however, they can and do lead to genuine and even successful bargaining—even though these circumstances may be limited. Since no person and no nation can willingly concede interests which are vital, real negotiations must be confined to matters which are not regarded by either party as compromising such interests. In other areas, however, discussions can lead to genuine and even successful bargaining.

Parenthetically, I would like to make clear what in the American view, East-West negotiations are not. They are not an effort calculated merely to produce a favorable attitude on the part of the Soviets—or a superficial detente unsubstantiated by concrete evidence of progress. They are not based on the vague hope that somehow, if we make unilateral concessions to the Soviets, we will thereby induce in them a feeling of good will or a sense of obligation to make compensatory voluntary concessions to us. The history of our relations with the Soviets provides no basis for assurance that such expectations would be justified.

Yet, even after the ground is narrowed by prudent skepticism of Soviet intentions, ex-

perience has shown that some room for progress still remains. Not all agreements have to be based on trust. The most common transaction between individuals all over the world—the exchange of goods over a counter for cash—does not involve the element of trust. In East-West relations, the doctrine of caveat emptor must be applied with special care. However, if each party has correctly analyzed the advantages that an agreement offers him, and if, as in the case of a purchase, there is a simultaneous exchange of considerations freely agreed upon, then a basis can be provided for successful agreements even in the absence of confidence.

Where an agreement requires a series of actions to be undertaken over a period of time, special safeguards are of course required. There must be some policing mechanism—some arrangement whereby considerations flow equitably and concurrently between the parties, with either being able to stop if at any time it should appear that the other has ceased to fulfill his part of the undertaking. Within these limitations, however—which are well understood by those experienced in the process of negotiation—the carrying out of agreements within well-defined areas is entirely feasible.

The opposition of aims between East and West is so great that areas in which the interests of both coincide are hard to discern. Nevertheless, certain areas have been found and we believe others may exist. We did, for example, find a common interest in ending large-scale nuclear testing, and confirmed it in the partial test ban treaty concluded in 1963. I do not want to overstate the importance of this development. It does illustrate, however, both the persistence and continuity with which successive American administrations have sought progress in this field, and the slowness of progress with which we have to reckon. The test ban treaty is the fruition of ideas proposed by the United States in April 1959, and elaborated by joint British-American initiative in 1961 and 1962.

Other small steps have been taken by mutual consent. The first was agreement to install a "hot line" for direct communication between Washington and Moscow in moments of crisis. This was a limited recognition by the Soviet of a mutual interest in averting the outbreak of war through accident or miscalculation. The United States and the U.S.S.R. jointly formulated the declaration adopted by the United Nations against placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the earth. A broad agreement on principles of law for outer space has been reached.

We are also discussing certain purely bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union, and are currently negotiating a consular convention and a new cultural exchange program. Particularly in the exchange program we seek to promote contacts with the peoples of Eastern Europe. These contracts are also multiplied by tourism and by increased freedom of movement between East and West. Such exchanges contribute directly to diversification and liberalization of closed societies.

Thus there is some evidence that the Soviet Union has come to perceive, in certain very restricted fields, a mutuality of interest with the West. You are doubtless familiar with the message sent by President Johnson to the opening session of the Geneva Disarmament Conference on January 20 of this year. The five major proposals put forward by President Johnson are an earnest of our belief that it may be possible further to limit the arms race and the danger of war by agreement.

The issues are too grave, and the dangers too real, for us to dismiss the possibility of more agreements with the facile assumption that whatever the Soviet Union will accept must be against our interests. The assumption is not necessarily valid. If the margin of advantage over disadvantage to each party

proves on careful analysis to be roughly equal, an agreement can result in a net advantage to both. The essence of a normal business transaction is that each party, from his own point of view, makes a gain. There is no reason why, with proper caution and much patience, we cannot arrive at agreements of this kind with the Soviet Union.

Nor does a prudent determination to protect ourselves and our interests preclude the possibility of independent, but reciprocally balanced actions being taken step-by-step by both sides, even in the absence of prior agreement. Indeed, unilateral actions of this nature are in fact already taking place. The United States has reduced its military budget. It is closing certain plants producing fissionable material, and has invited the Soviet Union to follow suit. The Soviet Union has announced a military budget reduction whose real effect we are now weighing. Real movement in direction of the relaxation of tensions could result if actions on the part of one side are balanced by concurrent movement by the other. This assumes, if balance is to be maintained, that we do not pay for reversible actions on their part with irreversible actions on our side.

vi

Unfortunately the possibilities for limited agreement have not yet directly touched upon the central matters of dispute between East and West. In pursuing the resolution of lesser matters through negotiation and compromise, we must obviously weigh the effect on larger issues in making them harder or easier to settle at some future time.

I will offer two propositions. The first is that history provides little encouragement to believe that major differences between nations can be overcome by peaceful negotiation leading to one massive compromise. Such differences usually persist either until one party succeeds in imposing its will upon the other, or until the passage of time and the evolution of world affairs so change the international environment that the issues themselves are changed in nature or eliminated.

I believe that, in the case of the hardcore differences between East and West, agreement will in most instances have to await an alteration in world relationships sufficiently drastic to remove the particular issue in question from the vital interest category. With respect to these problems, then, we must exercise great restraint. We must seek solutions by indirection—through the promotion of evolutionary change in the context in which the problems appear on the world scene.

My second proposition is that, if the principle of balance of advantage and disadvantage can be achieved, there is no reason why attempts to reach agreement with respect to minor problems should wait upon the solution of the vital ones. Let me again suggest a medical analogy. A physician may find that a patient is suffering, not only from a serious and persistent malady, but from minor ailments which complicate his condition. If the physician cannot cure the major malady at once, he will certainly not for that reason fail to try to cure the minor ones. In East-West relations, the clearing away of minor differences can permit us both to diagnose the major problems more clearly and to eliminate the distractions which hamper us in coming directly to grips with them.

Moreover, the reaching of even a minor agreement creates a confidence and an expectation that more will follow. It begins to be felt that perhaps other differences of a similar nature can be composed. Some hope may even begin to dawn that even larger issues can be attacked with some prospect of success. A beginning of possible movement is sensed in the polar ice pack of opposing positions which had seemed frozen into eternal immobility.

There are dangers in this, of course. I do not suggest that we should lose our caution or our sense of values. We must take great care not to allow a current of optimism to sweep us into a trap of Communist devising. I do believe, however, that there is more possibility for agreement to follow upon agreement than to emerge from a situation in which the two sides have drawn back from meaningful contact in mutual suspicion—to hurl recriminations at each other. Once a sufficient number of minor tensions are removed through isolated agreements, moreover, it might be found that the remaining issues are less formidable than was originally assumed.

Secretary of State Rusk has summed up the prospect for the near future in these words:

"I do not see on the immediate horizon dramatic and sweeping solutions to divisive and dangerous problems. But we must work at them steadily, patiently, and ceaselessly. Small steps are worth taking because we may find them to be the key to larger ones."

VII

In conclusion, then, I submit that it is to the advantage of the West to seek agreements with the East where grounds for a workable agreement in our mutual interests may be found to exist. We should pursue this endeavor without excessive expectations for rapid or spectacular success, but also without discouragement. It must go on at all times, at many levels, and over all questions—including the minor ones but also the most difficult ones.

It cannot be proven with mathematical certainty that through a relief of tension re-

sulting from a succession of minor agreements, one can reach the ultimate goal of a complete relaxation of tensions. I do believe, however, that one can prove the reverse—namely, that a policy of failing to seek relief for such tensions will inevitably foreclose the possibility of reaching this goal.

There are, I believe, agreements which can be sought now in the field of disarmament, in the prevention of war by miscalculation and in trade and cultural exchange—both by nations and by groups of nations. We must always take into account, however, that where groups of nations are involved, they must be in accord on the proposals to put forward. No one nation can get too far ahead of its allies.

At the same time we make proposals for minor agreements we must continue to think in terms of ultimate solutions for the major problems, no matter how remote the chances for successful negotiation may be. The West should always, for example, be in a position of readiness to negotiate for German reunification, in the context of the security of Europe, just as we should be in a position to discuss the nondissemination of nuclear weapons.

Moreover, although necessarily such positions on major issues do not start where a negotiation might be expected to end, they must be more than propaganda positions. Insofar as they can, they must take into account not only the psychology but the vital interests of the adversary. Otherwise the positions of both parties will always remain so far apart that one can never really test whether or not they can be accommodated.

In these remarks I have tried to present

in outline a coherent philosophy supporting a positive approach to East-West relations. It seems to me that the formulation of such a philosophy is essential at this time. I express this conclusion now, not with the feeling that the last word has been said upon this subject, but with the hope that many others will be stimulated to speak and write about it.

The stance that we adopt now in our relations with the East will have an important bearing on the future of mankind. We cannot afford to let our posture be determined by an instinctive reaction to a danger we perceive, on the one hand, or to an impulsive hope we might suddenly conceive, upon the other. Neither provides adequate ground on which to base a policy which must deal simultaneously with the dangers we face and the hopes we cherish.

Our democratic nations can best reach a consensus through free discussion and consultation. Neither division of opinion nor an unreasoned acquiescence in a certain course is an adequate response to the problems with which we are confronted. Division weakens us. Passive acceptance of a certain policy robs us of the popular support, and the diverse resources of ideas and diplomatic skills, which, when applied in concert, are the special strength of the West.

In the final analysis, the West as a whole must determine the course it will pursue in its relations with the East. To all of us, and to the generations which will follow ours, nothing can be more important than that we make our respective contributions to the fateful joint decisions we face with wisdom, courage and clear purpose.

EXHIBIT 2

Trade of selected free world countries with Cuba, 1958-62 and 1963 (data are as available)

[In millions of U.S. dollars]

	Exports from free world countries, f.o.b., to Cuba							Exports from free world countries, f.o.b., to Cuba					
	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963		1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
Canada.....	18.2	16.3	13.9	31.9	10.7	6.2 (Jan.-Sept.)	Pakistan.....	.6	3.1	2.4	4.7	1.7	None (Jan.-June)
United Kingdom.....	26.0	42.6	20.5	12.4	7.2	4.2 (Jan.-Aug.)	United Arab Republic.....	(1)	(1)	9.3	9.8	8.2	(2)
Spain.....	12.1	7.8	9.8	4.3	1.4	1.4 (Jan.-June)	Morocco.....	.1	(1)	(1)	2.8	5.6	.4 (Jan.-June)
France.....	9.4	14.3	10.7	5.8	1.8	3.7 (Jan.-Sept.)	Tunisia.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	1.1	2.7	(3)
Italy.....	11.0	8.3	5.3	4.0	1.4	.4 (Jan.-July)							
Federal Republic of Germany.....	31.2	29.6	14.6	11.8	5.7	5.2 (Jan.-Oct.)	Total, selected countries.....	147.2	163.6	121.2	133.5	72.7	38.0 (Partial year only)
Netherlands.....	6.2	8.2	6.7	10.3	6.2	9.0 (Jan.-Sept.)	United States.....	546.9	438.6	223.7	13.7	13.4	37.0 (Jan.-Sept. 6)
Belgium-Luxembourg.....	13.4	14.9	8.8	4.1	1.3	2.6 (Jan.-Sept.)	All other free world.....	93.3	86.0	46.9	28.4	20.0	(2)
Mexico.....	3.8	2.8	1.6	3.6	.8	.2 (Jan.-June)	Total, free world exports to Cuba.4	787.4	688.2	390.8	175.6	106.1	(2)
Japan.....	5.4	10.0	6.1	11.8	10.6	2.2 (Jan.-Sept.)							
India.....	9.8	5.6	11.6	15.1	7.4	2.5 (Jan.-Aug.)							

	Imports by free world countries from Cuba 7							Imports by free world countries from Cuba 7					
	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963		1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
Canada (f.o.b.).....	19.4	12.2	7.5	5.1	2.6	2.7 (Jan.-June)	United Arab Republic.....	(1)	(1)	1.8	10.2	8.8	(2)
United Kingdom.....	49.8	28.5	23.2	15.0	19.9	29.8 (Jan.-Aug.)	Morocco.....	16.3	15.7	19.4	6.9	22.4	0.1 (Jan.-June)
Spain.....	18.4	7.3	10.3	9.2	8.5	3.5 (Jan.-June)	Tunisia.....	(1)	.2	2.0	1.0	4.6	(2)
France.....	7.6	8.4	13.0	1.2	2.3	3.1 (Jan.-Sept.)							
Italy.....	2.3	.6	.5	.3	.2	31.8 (Jan.-July)	Total, selected countries.....	192.4	132.3	122.3	82.8	115.9	95.3 (Partial year only)
Federal Republic of Germany.....	7.1	12.1	9.4	2.0	5.8	1.8 (Jan.-Oct.)	United States (f.o.b.).....	527.3	474.7	357.3	35.1	6.8	(3) (Jan.-Sept. 6)
Netherlands.....	16.5	8.3	11.9	4.3	3.6	10.4 (Jan.-Sept.)	All other free world.....	66.8	45.5	33.4	46.1	6.4	(2)
Belgium-Luxembourg.....	4.7	3.2	5.3	.8	1.4	2.0 (Jan.-Sept.)	Total, free world imports from Cuba.4	786.0	652.5	513.0	164.0	129.1	(2)
Mexico.....	.7	.7	.9	.2	(1)	(1) (Jan.-June)							
Japan.....	48.4	35.1	17.9	24.3	35.8	10.1 (Jan.-Sept.)							
India.....	(1)	(1)	.2	(1)	None	None (Jan.-Aug.)							
Pakistan.....	1.2	(1)	(3)	2.3	(1)	None (Jan.-June)							

1 Not reported.
 2 Not available.
 3 Negligible.
 4 Based on official foreign trade data of 77 free world countries.

5 Preliminary, based on incomplete data in some cases.
 6 No United States trade was reported in October 1963.
 7 C.e.f. except as noted.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is the Senator familiar with the adage that, "A fool can keep his mouth shut and pass for a sage"?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am familiar with that.

Mr. MILLER subsequently said: Mr. President, I believe the distinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] is to be complimented for speaking his views on the situation involving Cuba, Panama, and the Soviet Union. In his position as Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations it is desirable that his views be made clear. He is possessed of a broad background of experience, and I am sure his conclusions have not hastily been arrived at.

But I think it would be most unfortunate if members of the press and the general public received the impression that other and differing views are not held by other Members of the Senate on the basis of which conclusions of a different nature have been drawn with equal deliberation.

The Senator from Arkansas suggests that we have made the Cuban situation far more important in our foreign relations and in our domestic life than its size and influence warrant.

It is precisely this attitude which has brought about such a sharp cleavage between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party over the conduct of foreign affairs.

Republicans remember that the 1960 Democratic Party platform promised the people of the United States the following:

The new Democratic administration will also reaffirm our historic policy of opposition to the establishment anywhere in the Americas of governments dominated by foreign powers, a policy now being undermined by Soviet threats to the freedom and independence of Cuba. The Government of the United States under a Democratic administration will not be deterred from fulfilling its obligations and solemn responsibilities under its treaties and agreements with the nations of the Western Hemisphere. Nor will the United States * * * permit the establishment of a regime dominated by international, atheistic communism in the Western Hemisphere.

This was a well-worded and carefully reasoned statement. Unfortunately, as too often has been the case with promises of the Democratic Party, this pledge has been thrown in the wastebasket. As a result of the failure of this administration to fulfill its commitment to the American people, the international Communist conspiracy has firmly established a government 90 miles off our shores. Premier Khrushchev has declared that the Monroe Doctrine is dead. Ever since the blockade of Cuba, called by our late President in 1962 for a short period, was lifted, our prestige in Latin America has steadily diminished.

Spokesmen for this administration have uttered glittering generalities about our hopes for freedom for the Cuban people. Fine words have been said to the effect that Cuba, as a base for subversion and overthrow of Latin Ameri-

can governments, is not acceptable to the United States. But there has been no meaningful followthrough, no action, to reduce these glittering generalities and fine words to deeds.

It is a little late now for leading spokesmen for the Democratic Party, such as the Senator from Arkansas, to imply that the campaign promise of 1960 has not been carried out and should not be carried out because the "size and influence" of the Communist government in Cuba doesn't warrant the effort.

Let us not be so naive as to look upon the situation in Cuba as that of an independent, sovereign nation. The Government of Cuba is under the control of Moscow, because that is the way the international Communist conspiracy operates. It is incorrect to refer to Castro as a mere nuisance. It is more to the point to say that the leaders in the Kremlin and their puppet in Cuba represent a real menace to the Western Hemisphere. This is no old myth. Nor is it a new reality. It is a continuing reality.

I would agree with the Senator from Arkansas that our political and economic boycott, such as it has been, has been a failure. The accommodation policy in dealing with Communist aggression which this administration has been following foredoomed any political and economic blockade.

What is needed is a return to a policy of firmness—the policy which characterized the 8 years of the Eisenhower administration, and a resolve on the part of the leaders of this administration to fulfill the promise made to the American people in 1960. If the proven export of Communist subversives and war materiel from Cuba to Latin America is to be stopped, deeds—not words—will be required. The Organization of American States looks to the United States for leadership. If our Government takes a firm position, I believe the OAS will follow suit—just as occurred when our late President imposed the blockade of Cuba. And, to use his words, if the OAS does not follow such leadership, then we must go it alone.

For almost 4 years now, I have been calling for a war materiel blockade of Cuba. Under such a blockade, we would permit food, clothing, supplies, and even buses into Cuba—and out of Cuba. But no war materiel could come in, and none could go out. Under such a blockade, our allies could trade with Cuba, as they now insist on doing, but Cuba as a base for subversion and overthrow of Latin American governments would end. There will be some who will suggest that this may mean war. They said the same thing when President Kennedy ordered the blockade of Cuba, but they were 100 percent wrong. We should not let their timid and unrealistic suggestions hinder us from carrying out our duty to maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere, because the security of the Western Hemisphere is inseparable from our own security.

I think it most unfortunate that the Senator from Arkansas listed three options in dealing with Cuba, and completely overlooked this obvious option.

Perhaps he deludes himself by listing three options in such a fashion that two of them seem to be obviously excluded, leaving us to settle with an option of inaction and a breaking of the promise made by his party in the 1960 campaign. Indeed, his suggestion that the option of invading Cuba carries with it a threat of a global nuclear war is poorly conceived, because we know that Premier Khrushchev is not about to commit suicide—any more than he was at the time of the Cuban confrontation. If, every time our security is menaced by Communist aggression, we are supposed to stand still and do nothing because someone suggests that we might have a global nuclear war, then the United States can no longer claim to be the true leader of the free world. This is a "peace at any price" policy. It inevitably means the loss of our self-respect and national honor, both of which must be preserved if a just and lasting peace is ever to be attained.

In this connection, it could be exceedingly dangerous for our President to say, as he did yesterday, that nuclear war "is impossible." Does this mean that we should forget about a nuclear fallout shelter program? Has Premier Khrushchev ever made such a statement? Soviet military doctrine clearly envisages the possibility of a nuclear war. Why should not we? Is it because we do not like to think about such a thing that we hope the possibility will just go away if we use the word "impossible"? I think it would be much wiser and safer, and infinitely more realistic, if our President and others waited until we had nuclear disarmament, with effective inspection and controls, before talking about the "impossibility" of nuclear war.

I believe that the Senator from Arkansas, sincere as he is in his convictions, has arrived at some very unrealistic conclusions for the simple reason that he has proceeded from some very false premises. I would suggest that he read the campaign promise of his party in 1960 and bend his efforts toward fulfilling it instead of thinking up reasons why it should be repudiated.

Mr. JAVITS subsequently said: Mr. President, I wish to comment very briefly on the speech delivered by the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], which I have had the pleasure of reading.

I make this statement because I am devoted to a bipartisan foreign policy and believe that it consists of our contributing the very best thinking of which we are capable on American foreign affairs without any reference whatever to party interest or party advantage. As the late Senator Vandenberg said, politics stops at the water's edge.

It is for that reason, and in deference to the very considered statements of the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, recognizing the importance which it must assume in the policy of the United States and in the eyes of our allies all over the world, that I believe people like myself, who have been identified with the concept of bipartisanship in foreign policy for so long, ought to make some comment on the Senator's remarks.

I shall reserve the right at another time and on another occasion to deal with the matter at greater length.

On the matter of East-West trade, I find myself in substantial agreement with the Senator from Arkansas. First, nothing will stop our allies from engaging in nonstrategic trade with the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union. Of course they will deal with Communist China, but we will not and should not.

Second, this is a very disruptive factor in the NATO alliance, and there is no denying that it is a cause of tension and difficulty between ourselves and our closest allies.

The one condition that I do not find in what the Senator said is that our allies too must give something. I hope they will be wise enough to see their own interest as we see ours; and as we may have to take a broader view of nonstrategic trade with the eastern bloc, so I believe they must at least agree to certain fundamental rules of trade, in light of East European countries' constant threat against the markets of the Western World, which they have shown themselves able to push in matters like residual fuel oil, aluminum, linseed oil, and other products, where their potential is serious.

The Eastern bloc should give some assurance of fair trade practice with the free world, if the United States is to take a more liberal view with respect to trade with them in nonstrategic goods, and to bring them closer together with our allies and in that way be more helpful for the Atlantic Community.

On the matter of Panama, the Senator from Arkansas recommends that we, with all magnanimity, which is the greatest power of the strong, show our willingness to negotiate all questions, including the 1903 treaty with Panama.

I agree with the Senator, and I believe that the President of the United States now has done just that. Whether he has done this later than he should have will probably be debated in the next national campaign. However, he has done it.

Now it is time to say to the Panamanians themselves:

"Do not be guilty of the tyranny of weakness by being unreasonable, even though you are in an election campaign. This is a moment when the people of the United States are offering to be magnanimous, openhanded, and just."

I strongly urge Panama to seize the hand of friendship and clasp it for the good promise which it gives.

This, too, I do not find in the Senator's speech. It is no fault of his own. He suggested the right course, and, I believe, on this he makes a useful statement.

On the matter of Cuba, I find myself in disagreement with the Senator from Arkansas, and for this reason:

Even if we accept the thesis of the Senator from Arkansas that Castro is a nuisance but not a grave threat, and that we cannot get rid of him except by means wholly disproportionate to the objective, Cuban communism—Castroism, in fact—does pose a grave threat to the other Latin American countries

because it gives them an object to which they can be led by Communists in trying to realize themselves.

I do not believe that we will get what the Senator from Arkansas prescribed as a prompt and vigorous use of the established procedure of the inter-American system against any act of aggression, which must include—and he does not include it—subversion and inflammatory communism and Castroism, while we accept Castro as a fact. Whether or not we may have failed with our methods of blockade and boycott, we thoroughly disapprove of Castro, and this fact that we thoroughly disapprove of Castroism is essential in American policy and must be continued to be pressed home.

It is only our firm disapproval that will stir the other American nations into the feeling that Castroism is unacceptable; that it should not be accepted; and that there should be a prompt and vigorous use of the procedures of the inter-American system to give the people of Cuba a chance through self-determination to assert themselves. So I do not agree with the Senator from Arkansas on that point. I state my disagreement frankly because what I propose is a fundamental and important aspect of our system.

I cannot go along with the feeling of the Senator from Arkansas that we must accept the idea of violent overthrows of government in Latin America. I believe we fail to understand the capabilities and possibilities inherent in some reconciliation of views with the private enterprise system of the United States and Europe, which could have, in my judgment, a strong impact upon that system in Latin America and could create conditions in which I believe, in many countries, notwithstanding the vested feudalism and oligarchies to which the Senator refers, there would be much benefit, and which could provide some social justice and make violent upheavals unnecessary.

On the subject of the Far East, I am glad to observe that the Senator from Arkansas, notwithstanding the new look and the idea of dispelling myths, of which he speaks, feels that we should not recognize Communist China or acquiesce in its admission to the United Nations under present circumstances. I agree with that view. I feel that that is our best policy; that considering the way the proposal has been advertised to the world, the Communist Chinese would take it as a complete cave-in by the United States and the whole free world if we now took a position analogous to that of the French.

Finally, on the question of South Vietnam, whatever may be the interim comfort that the Senator from Arkansas gives President de Gaulle in his suggestions for a review of the Far Eastern situation, he ends with the view that there is no course but to support Vietnam—both its government and its army—by the most effective means available. We must do that. We must do the best we can to bring self-government and just government to the people of South Vietnam.

I do not believe in extending the war;

neither do I believe in pulling out. I believe we must persevere. That is the best course. So whatever may be the interim reasoning, I feel that is the right prescription.

In deference to an obviously massive presentation by the Senator from Arkansas, and speaking as one who has been for so long devoted to a bipartisan foreign policy, I felt I should make these views a part of the RECORD contemporaneously with the Senator's speech.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I am about to suggest the absence of a quorum—

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold his suggestion?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I withhold it temporarily. I yield the floor.

Mr. MORSE. I have an understanding with the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN] that I may make a few remarks before the quorum call.

Mr. President, I express my appreciation to the Senator from Arkansas, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, of which I have the honor to be a member, for making the speech on foreign policy that he has made this afternoon. Although I disagree with much of his speech, nevertheless it is of very great importance that in the debate which will be waged in this body for the next few weeks and months on foreign policy, one point of view be presented as cogently as the Senator from Arkansas presented it this afternoon.

However, some of us hold different points of view; and I propose to address myself to some of those differences this afternoon. I say to my chairman that there are parts of his speech and some concepts that he has expressed with which I find myself in agreement. I certainly find myself in complete agreement that the time has come to puncture many American myths with respect to foreign policy. For several weeks and months past I have been seeking to puncture some of those myths.

One of the myths is that the United States has a right to engage in unilateral action in the field of foreign policy by intervening in various parts of the world, for determination by the United States as to what policy shall prevail in those parts of the world, while at the same time we sign treaties, pacts, and international agreements in which we pledge, pontifically, I am afraid—and I fear history will recall somewhat hypocritically, too—our dedication to a substitution of the rule of law for the rule of force.

The unfortunate ugly fact is that, too frequently, American practice cannot be squared with our professions in the field of foreign policy. The Senator from Arkansas has referred this afternoon to some of the trouble spots of the world, and has made certain suggestions as to how American foreign policy in relation to those trouble spots might be improved. I agree with him that there is a sore need for improving our policy. I do not agree with some of his suggestions as to the preferences we ought to follow by way of new policy.

Underlying my criticism of much of American foreign policy is my criticism that we do not take the initiative in try-

ing to lead the factions of the world which have likewise signed international agreements, pacts and treaties to a settlement of our disputes by the application of the rules of reason and of law. For example, I believe that the American signature on the Acts of Bogatá, Rio, Caracas, Punta del Este and Havana and the Organization of American States Agreements imposes a solemn trust upon our country. Yet we have been inclined to honor those treaties too frequently in the breach. We have an obligation in regard to South Vietnam to exercise some world leadership in seeking to bring that trouble spot, a threat to the peace in Asia—and it can become a threat to the peace in the world—into the procedures of the United Nations after we have first tried to arrive at some accommodations with our cosignatories to the SEATO Pact.

The United States has not taken the slightest initiative up to the hour in which I speak to seek to bring this great issue in southeast Asia into the procedures of international law under the organizations created by treaties to which we have affixed our signature. We have followed a unilateral course of action in South Vietnam. I shall use it this afternoon not as my only example, but as the main example of the thesis that I propose to present and shall continue to defend.

Yesterday President Johnson addressed some notable words of foreign policy wisdom to the National Legislative Conference of the Building and Construction Trades Council in downtown Washington. His remarks cannot help but impress the American people and the world with his deep desire to deal with world problems without resort to force of arms.

Therefore it is with great regret that I read his comments about Vietnam. As reported in the New York Times, he said:

In Vietnam, divergent voices cry out with suggestions, some for a larger scale war, some for more appeasement, some even for retreat. We do not criticize or demean them. We consider carefully their suggestions. But today finds us where President Eisenhower found himself 10 years ago. The position he took with Vietnam then in a letter he sent to the then President is one that I could take in complete honesty today. And that is that we stand ready to help the Vietnamese preserve their independence and retain their freedom and keep from being enveloped by communism."

I ask unanimous consent that, at the conclusion of my remarks, there be printed in the Record the New York Times report of the President's speech, which sets forth the verbatim account of what the President had to say about foreign policy in his speech of yesterday.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MORSE. Elsewhere, the President said something that I think he has not applied to South Vietnam. He said:

The people in this country have more blessed hopes than bitter victories. The people of this country and the world expect more from their leaders than just a show of brute force. And so our hope and our purpose is to employ reasoned agreement instead of ready aggression; to preserve our

honor without a world in ruins; to substitute, if we can, understanding for retaliation. My most fervent prayer is to be a President who can make it possible for every boy in this land to grow to manhood by loving his country instead of dying for it.

The President said yesterday that today finds us just where we were 10 years ago in South Vietnam. But that is not quite true. We are \$2 billion poorer for the economic aid we have put into that area of 14 million people, and we are, in addition, an unknown amount poorer for the military aid we have put in. We have added 15,000 U.S. troops to the ante since 1954. Over 200 Americans have been killed there.

Even so, the military and political situation in South Vietnam has deteriorated since 1954. That is, in fact, why we have stepped up our rate of financial aid and our rate of military participation. Our rate of aid is apparently well over the mark of half a billion dollars a year.

But certain other factors have changed even more. First, the local government we have been supporting there has changed hands, not once, but twice. The faction that has held power in South Vietnam has, ever since 1954, done so only through American financial and military support. But the faction that holds power now cannot be described as anything but an American puppet.

The pretense of regional security has been dropped long ago. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization has dropped out of the picture, although it was on the basis of our membership in that Organization that we went into South Vietnam in 1954.

Let us never forget that the signatories to the SEATO compact made a reference to South Vietnam only from the standpoint that that area, which is not a member of SEATO, is an area of mutual concern and interest to the signatories. That is a pretty slender reed on which to lean in order to justify American intervention in South Vietnam.

There is no multilateral policy of SEATO signatories; there is no multilateral action being taken by SEATO to deal with the civil war in Vietnam.

I care not how others may describe it—we cannot escape the realities. The difficulty in South Vietnam is a difficulty of the Vietnamese among themselves. As I have said before on the floor of the Senate and elsewhere, we should not forget that families are split in South Vietnam—fathers on one side, sons on the other; uncles on one side, nephews on the other.

I am at a loss to understand what we are doing in South Vietnam. I understand the alibis and rationalizations, but I am satisfied history will record that the facts do not support the alibis and rationalizations of the Government of the United States vis-a-vis South Vietnam.

We are there, we say, at the invitation of the South Vietnamese Government. But that government is our own creature. We know it and the world knows it. One might as well try to claim that the Soviet army is in East Germany only on the invitation of the East German Government. A puppet is a puppet, and

South Vietnam has not had more than a U.S. puppet government in its 10 years of existence.

Freedom in South Vietnam? I do not believe that more than the tiny fraction of its 14 million people who have benefited and prospered from American assistance can be considered to be "free" in any sense that Americans understand the word. Let us keep in mind, when we hear that the United States is fighting for "freedom" in South Vietnam, that what is really meant is that we are trying to preempt the area from what we fear may be communism.

When one takes into consideration, the large percent of ignorant and illiterate people in South Vietnam, people who do not understand the difference between freedom and enslavement, between democracy and communism—and who could not care less—one begins to understand some of the operative facts that must be considered as we come to reappraise and reevaluate our policies in South Vietnam.

We think we are keeping Communists out. That is why we are in South Vietnam.

FAILURE OF DOMINO THEORY

But look at something else that has changed drastically since 1954. Ten years ago we heard about the "domino" theory. Indochina was divided up into four parts—it was virtually quartered. North and South Vietnam were created in the eastern half of the country, both bordering on the South China Sea. Laos and Cambodia were created out of the western half; Laos to the north and Cambodia to the south.

South Vietnam was the first "domino" in the line. Next to it was Cambodia and Laos, then Thailand and Burma. Below Thailand stretches the Malaysian Federation, and beyond that, Indonesia.

These were the row of "dominoes" all of which were expected to drop into the lap of communism if South Vietnam did so.

One of the greatest fallacies of the "domino" theory was that any country not in the Western camp was considered to be in the Communist camp. That was where the theory began to lead us astray.

I shall always be proud of the fact that I spoke out against the Dulles so-called "domino" theory when he first sold it to the American people and persuaded the Government to go along with it. In my judgment, it was a highly fallacious theory when John Foster Dulles concocted it; and it has been a highly fallacious theory ever since.

We convinced ourselves that any nation not imbedded with American economic and military aid programs, and all their attendant advisers, was as good as Communist.

But what has happened to the row of "dominoes" since 1954? North Vietnam has always been outside the scope of American influence. Laos was neutralized by agreement; Cambodia has recently ousted all American aid missions and declared herself neutral.

I digress to say that Cambodia was right, and the United States was wrong,

in the recent Cambodia-United States issue.

When the facts are known about the policy of the United States and U. S. advisers in South Vietnam, and the activities of the CIA in that part of the world, the Prince of Cambodia will be sustained in the annals of history.

We had better face our mistakes. We had better recognize that American foreign policy abroad is not always perfect and right. We had better face the fact that some of those who implement, execute, and administer American foreign policy abroad sometimes make "bloopers" in administrative policy.

It is sad to find ourselves in the position that a Prince of little Cambodia becomes so exasperated at American foreign policy that he says to the American Government, "Get out." He made it perfectly clear that he was going to put us out or we would have to fight to stay in. He has not gone Communist. There is this assumption, in the "domino" theory, that if U.S. influence, aid, and military assistance were taken out of some country it would be sure to go Communist. Cambodia has made the domino theory look absurd. The "domino" theory became absurd when Cambodia eliminated American influence in the sense that we like to exercise our influence in that part of the world.

Long ago Burma put herself outside the circle of American military protection. Indonesia certainly is neutral insofar as her sympathies and policies toward America and China are concerned.

The only countries left in the row of dominoes, as we originally conceived it, are South Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia. Yet none of the rest, except North Vietnam, which was never in the row, has become a Communist state. Undemocratic and totalitarian, yes, but so are South Vietnam and Thailand.

Does anyone really believe that South Vietnam and Thailand are great showcases of democracy?

Does anyone believe that South Vietnam and Thailand are great examples of democratic self-government on the part of the people?

Nonsense. They are not. I am not one who insists that they must be. I would hope that voluntarily and by conviction, by recognition that after all, economic freedom is for the mass of their people and can be obtained and perpetuated only by realizing that economic freedom will give them political freedom, they would come over, in the course of time, into the family of democratic nations.

Please note my language, "in the course of time." In my judgment, no Senator will live long enough to see political freedom—in the sense that we use the term, somewhat loosely, I admit—prevail in Asia. But, if we can be helpful, if in our generation we can help lay the foundation for economic freedom of choice in some of the underdeveloped areas of the world, we can leave a legacy of inheritance which will give future generations of their people a better opportunity to develop political and economic freedom.

But it will never be done with American bullets. It will never be done with American military force. It will never be done with American military aid. It will be done, as I have been heard to say before, by using the descriptive term "with American bread" as the symbol of American economic freedom.

The only countries left in the row of dominoes, as we originally conceived it, are South Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia.

Perhaps one can say that as South Vietnam goes, so goes Thailand; but it cannot be said that as goes South Vietnam so goes southeast Asia. South Vietnam and Thailand are already separated by the neutralist states of Laos and Cambodia.

If any slogan is useful in this part of the world, it would be that as the rest of southeast Asia goes, South Vietnam will go, too, no matter how much American treasure and blood are spent to prevent it.

The "dominoes" are taking themselves out of the Western lineup. We cannot preserve even South Vietnam as an American puppet for long.

The most optimistic American forecast for South Vietnam was made by the Secretary of Defense when he said that we would aid that country "forever."

That is our outlook and our prospect, Mr. President—"forever"—as much as she needs, and as long as she needs it.

That is the announced American policy of recent days. It is a sad commentary that we present that image of the United States to the world, that we present the image of the United States on a unilateral basis, that we offer continuation of our program in South Vietnam "forever," if we deem it necessary.

But I warn today that in due course of time some other nations will have something to say about it. I do not believe that is a myth. I agree that we had better pierce some American myths of American foreign policy. If anyone holds to the mythical view that the United States can continue unilateral military action on a selective basis in various parts of the world and not encounter serious trouble with other nations, he is mistaken. We had better re-evaluate that myth, and promptly.

REASON SHOULD BE APPLIED TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

If the policy stated by the Secretary of Defense is the policy of the Johnson administration in South Vietnam, then every President 10 years, 20 years, 50 years from now will find himself where Eisenhower and Johnson found themselves. But the price will go up every decade just to keep the United States in the same place.

President Johnson is proud, and rightfully so, that the United States has not hastened to send marines into Cuba. He rightfully points to the activities of the United Nations to keep the peace in Cyprus, however belated was our support for taking that issue to the U.N.

In regard to the Cyprus issue, for some time the United States opposed taking it to the United Nations. One trial balloon after another was sent up to find out whether American public opinion

would accept sending American boys to Cyprus as a sort of peacekeeping force. If there was ever an issue that should have gone to the United Nations, it is the issue of Cyprus. Cyprus is not a member of NATO. Why the United States and Great Britain in their first proposal took it upon themselves to decide that they were going to handle it under NATO procedures, I could never understand.

We must recognize that the signature of our country on the United Nations Charter has a solemn meaning. When an area of the world begins to threaten the peace of the world, and other countries follow the course of action that Greece and Turkey were following, and there is a country which is victimized of its rights by their course of action under the United Nations Charter, we should be in the lead in urging that the dispute be submitted to the United Nations. We should never have permitted Khrushchev to get ahead of us. Then when Khrushchev proceeded to announce that the matter ought to go to the United Nations, that fact made it supposedly wrong.

We must pierce the myth that the origin of an idea can necessarily make it a bad idea. As educated men and women we should never forget that the origin of an idea has nothing to do with the merits of the idea. The internal contents of the idea determines its merits.

As the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] pointed out so clearly in his speech this afternoon, we must face unpopular ideas, too. We must be willing to deal with ideas in the field of foreign policy, and to weigh them and appraise them and evaluate them on the basis of their intrinsic merit.

We muffed it again in connection with Cyprus by throwing away an opportunity to say to the world that we join in urging that the Cyprus issue be taken immediately to the United Nations because the United Nations exists, supposedly at least, to prevent a threat to the peace of the world.

I feel the same way, as Senators will observe before I have finished, with regard to southeast Asia.

I believe American unilateral action in southeast Asia should stop now. It should never have started. I opposed going into South Vietnam, I oppose staying in South Vietnam, and I favor getting out of South Vietnam now. I also favor making some proposals to the peace-loving nations of the world for handling the South Vietnam crisis with honor. That is the greatest obligation of statesmanship that confronts my Government in this critical hour.

The President does not believe it necessary to send Marines into Cuba.

Why, then, does the President believe it necessary or desirable to send our Special Forces to South Vietnam? What American vital interest in South Vietnam deserves the presence of American men in uniform?

Why, too, is not the United Nations the place for the South Vietnam issue, just as it is the place for the Cyprus issue? Why, indeed, does not the President apply his prescription for "reasoned

agreement" and understanding to South Vietnam?

FIRST OBLIGATION TO VIETNAM IS THAT OF SEATO

Neither the President's remarks of yesterday nor the speech today of the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee gives any explanation of why this country has not used the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or the United Nations for the South Vietnam issue. Is it because none of our treaty partners thinks we are right in trying to hold it as a U.S. area of influence? Is it because the Asiatic members of SEATO do not want to associate themselves with the United States in its campaign to stay in Asia? Is it because France, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand know that the white man is being thrown out of nonwhite countries and that the effort to stay will be increasingly costly?

As I have asked before, I ask again, of the signatories to SEATO: Where is Pakistan? Where is Australia? Where are Thailand, the Philippines, Great Britain, and France? Why should not we take the lead in asking for an extraordinary meeting of either the heads of state or the foreign ministers of the SEATO members and try, to use the President's words, to "sit down and reason together," to see what accommodations, if any, can be arrived at?

The mere fact that an idea comes from De Gaulle should not cause us to reject it. Let us look at the idea. Let us see if we cannot reach an honorable accommodation through SEATO.

Does anyone argue that the difficulty in South Vietnam does not threaten the peace of Asia and could very well spread into a holocaust far beyond southeast Asia? That danger exists.

What are our moral and legal commitments under the United Nations Charter? I believe that our obligations call upon us to seek to exercise some leadership among nations and to have the signatories sit down and reason together, to use the President's words, to see if there cannot be worked out an accommodation in connection with South Vietnam which will preserve legitimate rights, preserve the peace, and relieve the United States of conducting a unilateral military course of action in South Vietnam which I cannot reconcile with our obligations under treaties to which we have already affixed our signature.

Why is there no joint SEATO action in South Vietnam? It is an area of mutual interest to all SEATO partners under the protocol to the SEATO treaty. Why are we acting unilaterally there? The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee declares that "it should be clear to all concerned that the United States will continue to meet its obligations and fulfill its commitments with respect to Vietnam." What obligations and commitments do we have toward Vietnam that are any more or less than those of every other SEATO member?

None. But we have mistakenly built up many emotional commitments to ourselves. We took a tiger by the tail 10 years ago and no one in high office knows how to let go of it. So we call that a commitment. What is really meant is

face and prestige. We backed a puppet there 10 years ago, and we are afraid the world will laugh at us if we recognize that it has been a flop. The government to which we gave the backing in 1954 is gone, and the U.S. Government was glad to see it go.

I say that we have a greater commitment to SEATO, to the United Nations, and to world peace than we ever had to any government of South Vietnam, whichever one it may be at the moment. When are we going to begin honoring those obligations?

So long as the United States maintains a unilateral intervention in South Vietnam it is going to cost ever more American money and American blood. There are no Chinese soldiers fighting in South Vietnam; there are no Russian soldiers. The only foreign troops are Americans.

There are no Thais, or Australians, or French, or Pakistanis, or Filipinos fighting in South Vietnam. Why not?

They signed a treaty obligation in which they joined the United States in recording at least that this area of Asia was an area of mutual concern and was of interest to the signatories. They walked out on us. We walked in. That was a walk in the wrong direction.

Until there is an answer to that question I shall continue to urge that American troops be brought home. Every time an American dies in Vietnam, the flag should be lowered to half mast over the Capitol, over the White House, over the State Department, and over the Pentagon, because those boys are dying in the execution of a unilateral policy that no longer has a direct bearing on the defenses of the United States. They are dying because civilian and military leaders set us on this mistaken course 10 years ago and we have been unable and unwilling to change it for domestic political reasons.

We cannot justify this killing of American boys in South Vietnam. I think it is important, unpleasant as it is, disruptive as it may be to some people to discuss this issue openly and frankly with the American people. The final decision of this foreign policy does not rest with the President. It rests with the American people. Foreign policy does not belong to the President of the United States. It belongs to the American people.

The American people are entitled to know the facts about American foreign policy in South Vietnam. I am satisfied that once the American people obtain the facts about American foreign policy in South Vietnam, they will repudiate the policy of this Government, which policy has continued through a Republican and Democratic administration. It is a wrong policy. It can be righted only by ceasing to follow a course of seeking to solve the problem by American military force, and resorting to the laws of reason as they are epitomized in the existing procedures of international law.

That must be the glorious objective of this Republic. We must stop talking out of both sides of our national mouth in regard to what our objectives are in American foreign policy. We must stop

saying to great international conclaves that we stand foursquare for the application of the rule of law, while at the same time using the rule of force in South Vietnam.

France gave up this hopeless struggle 10 years ago. Yet, today it is France that is offering political leadership to this same part of the world. Our military and economic leadership to which the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fulbright] accords so much credit, has not kept Cambodia, Burma, Laos, or Indonesia from neutralizing themselves. It is time we provided some up-to-date political leadership, too, and that means a drastic change from the 10-year-old failure known as the domino policy.

"The people of the world, I think, prefer reasoned agreement to ready attack," said President Johnson yesterday. "And that is why we must follow the Prophet Isaiah many, many times before we send the marines, and say, 'Come now and let us reason together.'"

Mr. President, when is the United States going to apply your words to Vietnam?

When are we going to sit down and offer to reason together with the nations of SEATO and the nations of the United Nations in respect to resolving the threat to the peace in South Vietnam?

The same question might be put to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Why are not the comments he makes about Cuba and how we should deal with it, generally applicable to Vietnam as well? Why is there one policy in Cuba and another policy in South Vietnam?

In the Caribbean, we have the Rio treaty, we have a hostile but not a threatening government in Cuba, and the committee chairman recommends that we not proceed unilaterally to deal with it.

In South Vietnam we have the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, we have the possibility of a government there that could be neutral rather than Communist, yet he proposes that we continue a unilateral intervention in South Vietnam.

If I understood the Senator correctly, he proposes a wait-and-see policy. He suggests that we wait and see what our leaders downtown decide as to what should be the change in our foreign policy if any.

SENATE HAS ITS OWN FOREIGN POLICY DUTIES

That is not our obligation as Members of the Senate. Our obligation as Members of the Senate under the Constitution is to exercise our checking power, for we are a coordinate and coequal branch of the Government with the executive. When in our judgment the executive branch of the Government is following a mistake in foreign policy, it is our constitutional duty to check the executive branch of the Government by exercising all the constitutional authority that the Constitution gives us.

I have no intention of joining in any policy to wait and see what the executive branch of the Government proposes. To the contrary, I intend to continue doing what I can to draw this issue, not only in the Senate, but across this Na-

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tion. Our policy in South Vietnam must be understood by the American people so that they can render their final judgment as to what it should be.

On March 4, I pointed out that we have learned that a Communist government in Cuba does not necessarily call for military action by the United States against it. It calls for U.S. military action only when it undertakes some course or policy that threatens the security of the United States.

I submit that the case for U.S. military action in South Vietnam is infinitely weaker than the case for it in Cuba, and yet there is no good case for it in Cuba, either.

CUBA MUST BE VIEWED IN PERSPECTIVE

I find myself in agreement with much that the Senator from Arkansas said in regard to the problem of Cuba, in regard to our trade policy, our embargo policy, our quarantine policy, our attempt to get our allies abroad to follow our wishes in regard to Cuba. I believe he is quite right. It will never work that way.

I am perfectly willing to take Castro on in any application of the procedures of the United Nations, in any dispute that exists between the United States and Cuba. As the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD will show, when I started the fight against Castro in the Senate, I was the one to start it, and it was some time before other Senators spoke out against Castro. Almost immediately after Castro came into power and started his blood baths and placed under house arrest Judge Urrutia, the first President of Cuba under the Castro regime, I said that all we had was a substitution of one totalitarian regime for another. The CONGRESSIONAL RECORD will show that I said I did not know whether he was a Communist, but that he was following Communist procedure, and there is no more freedom for the individual under a Fascist regime—which was the Batista regime—than under a Communist regime, which has come to be the procedure and, in fact, the admitted policy of Castro.

I am not afraid to take on any of the Communist leaders in an exchange of proof with respect to the differences we have with them, under the procedures of the international law, as administered by the United Nations and its agencies. If that should become our policy, it would take the world by storm; it would set an example of seeking to substitute the rule of law for the jungle law of force. What have we to lose by that? Certainly we are not afraid of our case, are we?

In the matter of international adjudication, one has to be willing to take the decisions that go against him, as well as the decisions that go for him. But if one has a case, he does not have to worry about the decision.

We should not become excited by the nipping at our hind legs by Castro. Any time Castro starts an aggressive action against the United States, the world knows we will take the steps necessary to defend our security. President Kennedy in his great, heroic course of action in October, 1962, proved that to Khrushchev and to Castro, and also to the

world. The Communist world knows that.

In my judgment, there is another myth that we must pierce: We must pierce the myth that we have something to lose by a resort to international law procedures for the settlement of disputes between our country and other nations. Quite the contrary is the case, Mr. President; I believe we shall do more to promote the cause of peace in the world by our being willing to adjudicate such differences under existing procedures and principles of international law, than we shall accomplish by all the military aid we are shipping around the world on the pretext that we are containing communism. That is a myth, too.

As we come to examine the myths in our foreign policy and as we come to appraise our foreign policy in what I am satisfied will be a debate on foreign policy in our country for months to come, I hope that our decision will be to speak out strongly in favor of using such international law methods of settling the disputes we have with Cuba. Most of those disputes are economic; and Castro cannot win, in my judgment, in any adjudication in regard to the economic course of action he has taken against the United States and against United States investors in Cuba.

So I ask this question: When are we going to apply this great ideal of President Johnson's to actual, practical foreign policy problems and cases in the world; when are we going to sit down and reason together?

I am at a loss to understand why we find ourselves able to accept a Communist-dominated Cuba 90 miles away, while we send upward of 15,000 special forces 7,000 miles away to Vietnam where we have no vital interests at all.

The American people do not want the Marines sent into Cuba. The President is quite right about that. But neither do the American people want to become involved in a war on the Asiatic mainland, either. The President will find that out soon enough.

RELATIONS WITH PANAMA

The last point I wish to make involves Panama. I am proud of the President of the United States for the great statement he issued recently in regard to Panama. That statement pleases me very much, and I congratulate the President of the United States. I believe he is completely correct. In fact, President Johnson has been correct right along in regard to Panama, for he has made perfectly clear that the United States stands ready and willing to discuss and negotiate with the President of Panama, or with the diplomats whom the President of Panama assigns to the negotiation, on any subject matter that has created misunderstandings between Panama and the United States, after the President of Panama reestablishes diplomatic relations. But certainly the Panamanians and their President have no right to expect the United States to go hat in hand to any bargaining table, prior to the restoration of diplomatic

relations, and to sit down and discuss anything with the Panamanians under those circumstances. President Johnson has made that very clear, and I believe he has been completely correct about that matter; in his last statement he has gone even further, by setting forth the details, thus showing his good will and his sincere desire to have the United States reach an understanding with Panama, after diplomatic relations have been restored.

But many persons have overlooked the basis for a settlement of the Panamanian dispute that President Kennedy and President Chiari laid down in an official communique they jointly issued on July 13, 1962. I have it before me now. It will be recalled that a conference was held in Washington, D.C., between the two heads of state—between the President of the United States and the President of Panama—on June 12 and June 13, 1962, and that at the close of their conference, the two Presidents issued a joint communique. I ask unanimous consent that the joint communique be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the joint communique was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JOINT COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY AND PRESIDENT ROBERTO F. CHIARI, OF THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA, FOLLOWING MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 12-13, 1962

The meetings of the President of the Republic of Panama and the President of the United States of America during the past 2 days have been marked by a spirit of frankness, understanding, and sincere friendship. During their talks the two Presidents discussed general relations and existing treaties between their two countries, their mutual interests in the Panama Canal, and topics of worldwide and hemispheric concern. They emphasized the close and friendly ties on which have been established a mutually advantageous association through partnership in a Panama Canal enterprise. On the conclusion of these talks, they agreed to publish the following joint communique.

They reaffirm the traditional friendship between Panama and the United States—a friendship based on their common devotion to the ideals of representative democracy, and to their determination that both nations should work as equal partners in the cause of peace, freedom, economic progress, and social justice.

The Presidents recognize that their two countries are bound together by a special relationship arising from the location and operation of the Panama Canal, which has played such an important part in the history of both their countries.

The President of Panama and the President of the United States agreed upon the principle that when two friendly nations are bound by treaty provision which are not fully satisfactory to one of the parties, arrangements should be made to permit both nations to discuss these points of dissatisfaction. Accordingly, the Presidents have agreed to appoint high level representatives to carry on such discussions. These representatives will start their work promptly.

As to some of these problems, it was agreed that a basis for their solution can now be stated. Accordingly, the two Presidents further agreed to instruct their representatives to develop measures to assist the Republic of Panama to take advantage of the commercial opportunities available through

increased participation by Panamanian private enterprises in the market offered by the Canal Zone, and to solve such labor questions in the Canal Zone as equal employment opportunities, wage matters and social security coverage.

They also agreed that their representatives will arrange for the flying of Panamanian flags in an appropriate way in the Canal Zone.

In order to support the efforts of the Government of Panama to improve tax collections in order to meet better the needs of the people of Panama, President Kennedy agreed in principle to instruct his representatives to work out in conjunction with the Panamanian representatives arrangements under which the U.S. Government will withhold the income taxes of those Panamanian and non-U.S. citizen employees in the Zone, who are liable for such taxes under existing treaties and the Panamanian income tax law.

The President of Panama mentioned a number of other practical problems in relation between the two countries of current concern to his Government including the need of Panama for pier facilities and the two Presidents agreed that their representatives would over the coming months discuss these problems as well as others that may arise.

The Presidents reaffirmed their adherence to the principles and commitments of the Charter of Punta del Este. They agreed on the need to execute rapidly all steps necessary to make the Alliance for Progress effective; they recognized that the Alliance is a joint effort calling for development programming for effective use of national as well as external resources, institutional reforms, tax reforms, vigorous application of existing laws, and a just distribution of the fruits of national development to all sectors of the community.

The two Presidents declared that political democracy, national independence, and the self-determination of peoples are the political principles which shape the national policies of Panama and the United States. Both countries are joined in a hemisphere-wide effort to accelerate economic progress and social justice.

In conclusion the two Presidents expressed their gratification at this opportunity to exchange views and to strengthen the friendly and mutually beneficial relationship which has long existed between Panama and the United States. Their meeting was a demonstration of the understanding and reciprocal cooperation of the two countries and strengthened the bonds of common interests and friendship between their respective peoples.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I wish to read three short paragraphs from the communique, because I believe they bear out my statement that the joint communique really laid down the guiding principle which also is reaffirmed in the statements by President Johnson. I now read the three paragraphs:

They reaffirm the traditional friendship between Panama and the United States—a friendship based on their common devotion to the ideals of representative democracy, and to their determination that both nations should work as equal partners in the cause of peace, freedom, economic progress, and social justice.

The Presidents recognized that their two countries are bound together by a special relationship arising from the location and operation of the Panama Canal, which has played such an important part in the history of both their countries.

The President of Panama and the President of the United States agreed upon the principle that when two friendly nations are bound by treaty provisions which are not

fully satisfactory to one of the parties, arrangements should be made to permit both nations to discuss these points of dissatisfaction. Accordingly, the Presidents have agreed to appoint high-level representatives to carry on such discussions. These representatives will start their work promptly.

I repeat the key words:

The President of Panama and the President of the United States agreed upon the principle that when two friendly nations are bound by treaty provisions which are not fully satisfactory to one of the parties, arrangements should be made to permit both nations to discuss these points of dissatisfaction.

Does anyone believe for a moment that when President Kennedy and President Chiari issued that statement, in which they made specific references to treaty relationships with which one party disagreed and with which one party had found difficulty they did not need to discuss their differences? What an insult to the memory of President Kennedy and what an insult to our intelligence if such an interpretation were to be placed upon that language. It is perfectly clear—as clear as the English language can be—that what those two Presidents recognized in the conference that they had in Washington, resulting in the joint communique, that the Panamanians were very much dissatisfied with the treaty.

They have been dissatisfied with the treaty for some years. That is as clear as a bell. The two Presidents discussed the fact that there was a disagreement over the treaty. They agreed that the differences ought to be talked out—which means, of course, that the differences ought to result in a modification that would be fair and reasonable between the parties.

As I said at the White House at a conference on the Panama question—as the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the majority leader who are present in the Chamber know—in my judgment, President Kennedy on June 13, 1962, laid down a pattern for the resolution of the differences between the United States and Panama over the treaty. Of course, if Panama has a case and can present the proof, we ought to be willing to change the treaty in any way warranted by the facts. That question is for the negotiators. It is not for the senior Senator from Oregon to determine.

I have my own personal views. We cannot possibly maintain a perpetuity clause in any treaty in the year 1964. Let us face it.

As the Senator from Arkansas pointed out in his speech this afternoon, we must not forget that Panama came into being because the United States sent its warships into the area at a time when the Panamanians were revolting against Colombia, which had jurisdiction over what is now Panama. We sent in U.S. warships, and we stopped the Colombians from landing on what is now Panamanian soil.

Everyone who knows history knows that. He knows also that following that incident we negotiated the treaty of 1903 with the Panamanians. Whom do we think we are kidding if we think that

the treaty negotiations were carried on between parties of equal standing and equal power? They were carried on between the United States and a new weak, little country, that owed its very existence—its very birth—to the United States. Does anyone think that whoever was in charge of the Panamanian negotiations in 1903 could say to the United States, "We will not grant you an 'in perpetuity' clause"?

Of course they would grant it, because we had the bargaining advantage. We took advantage of that bargaining advantage.

It has caught up with us. We no longer have the advantage. The Panamanians now have tribunals to which they can ultimately resort. I am perfectly willing to predict this afternoon that, if we do not negotiate with the Panamanians in regard to the treaty, it will not be many years before they will have us before an international tribunal. I am perfectly willing to predict, too—though honest and sincere people, equal to me in honesty and sincerity can disagree with my conclusion—that we will lose the case. Certainly we are losing it in the tribunal of public opinion in the Western Hemisphere.

Therefore, though I cannot speak for President Kennedy, I can read the great communique that President Johnson has issued. President Kennedy saw the handwriting on the wall; President Johnson sees the handwriting on the wall. We shall have to negotiate a new treaty. As the President has rightfully said, we cannot sit down and even start negotiations until there is a restoration of diplomatic relations.

I have finished my major remarks. I shall be glad to yield to any Senator who may wish to ask me questions. I have presented my speech this afternoon in a spirit of complete professionalism, with no personal criticism of my President or the chairman of my committee, having but honest difference of opinion with each. That is the way debate in the Senate should be conducted; we have some problems in foreign policy which will call for further exchanges of points of views such as have taken place this afternoon between the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Oregon.

I now yield to the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I should like to have the Senator clarify two points with regard to the question of Panama which he has discussed. I was under the impression that at the very early stages of the controversy, shortly after the difficulties arose, the President of Panama was willing to resume diplomatic relations, and then presumably there were to follow some negotiations. Then a difference arose as to the interpretation of the words "discuss" and "negotiate."

Mr. MORSE. A semantic difference. Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is what I had reference to. I agree with the Senator. I did not develop it fully. I do not think we ought to negotiate without a resumption of diplomatic relations with Panama.

Mr. MORSE. I so assumed.

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Mr. FULBRIGHT. I believe I failed to mention it.

Mr. MORSE. I took that for granted.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But the point is that at the beginning we were on the verge of a resumption of relations, and later negotiations, and then there arose the unfortunate difference of view in respect to the words "negotiate," and "discuss." Is the Senator in agreement with that interpretation?

Mr. MORSE. I am in complete agreement. But I would supplement it with another incident involved in the early negotiations which I think was most unfortunate. In the early exchanges of notes between the official representatives of Panama and the United States, it was understood among them that the word "discuss" had certain connotations in the United States and the word "negotiations" had certain connotations in Panama. It was most unfortunate that they were willing to have individual interpretations, but somewhat different in meaning, to be circulated in each country, and that they were willing to have the interpretation and understanding of the word used to be interpreted in the United States as meaning "discuss" and in Panama meaning "negotiate." That difference ought to have been scotched right there. They should have reached an agreement that they would use a single word, and that it would have an identical meaning in the public information media of each country.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I personally have no knowledge about whether what the Senator has said is accurate or not. I was making the point that if the two countries resumed relations and then sat down to discuss the question, I could not see any substantial difference whether one word or the other were used, especially in view of our constitutional processes, which are well known to the Panamanians, under which the Executive could not give a firm commitment to do anything without the advise and consent of the Senate. The Panamanians must have known that, and the proceedings would be in the nature of a discussion or negotiation subject to the provision of the Constitution that the resulting understanding would have to be approved by the Senate.

Mr. MORSE. I always thought this particular controversy was a semantic tempest in a teapot.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is what I mean.

I do not want to take too much time. I know the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING] is waiting to make a comment.

My next question is about Vietnam, which is a much more troublesome one. What influences my views perhaps differently from those of the Senator from Oregon is that this matter has been proceeding for 10 years or longer, and we cannot judge it as if it were to be a new involvement, and the question was whether we should become involved or not become involved. That question might be a very different one from that which faces us. Rightly or wrongly, we are deeply involved.

The Senator mentioned unilateral action. Both from personal discussions and from public documents, and from other sources that have been available to others, I have no doubt that many of our friends and allies, and even neutrals, place great reliance on what we say we are trying to bring about—a condition in which some settlement might take place.

No one suspects us of a wish to acquire South Vietnam or of having any ambitions of that sort. Our motives are quite above reproach; namely, we would like to see the people given an opportunity to obtain their independence and make their own free choice.

If my memory of history is correct, the South Vietnamese were proceeding to do just that quite well until about 1957 or 1958. Then the guerrilla warfare was inspired. Although these are matters on which there can be a difference of opinion as to fact, I believe that the guerrilla warfare was initiated and supplied and urged on dissident groups in South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese.

They were jealous of the progress being made. There was a pretty clear case made to that effect. I believe there have been findings to the effect that the supplies for many of the guerillas came from the North Vietnamese.

I agree that an element of civil war is involved, but a very strong element of outside interference is also involved. Such facts are difficult to document, but studies have been made. A CIA commission has made a study of the situation. It has been confirmed that the source of much of the trouble is North Vietnam.

I cannot go along with the suggestion of the Senator from Oregon that we just withdraw, in view of the past history. If this country were considering the question merely of whether or not we should go into South Vietnam at this time, there might well be a different answer; but I believe we are committed to the point where it would be quite disastrous for this country to withdraw. I am extremely reluctant to expand the commitment.

The Senator from Oregon is not quite correct in calling the present Government a puppet government. If he means that the Government is dependent on the aid of this country to maintain itself, I think he is correct in that sense; but if he means that this country handpicked the head of the Government and put him in power, that is a different matter.

As I tried to say in my prepared remarks, in this situation we have little choice but to try to stabilize conditions to see if we cannot help the present Government acquire, and I hope merit, the support of the people of that country who are free to exercise any choice. Then the question would be how long this country should continue that kind of support.

The administration itself has indicated that it does not look at this involvement as a permanent one, but as one to provide an opportunity for the Government and the people of South

Vietnam to maintain their independence.

Whether or not there will be negotiations will be a matter for the future. I confess that I believe an effort to bring the United Nations into this situation would be a futile one. I do not believe the enemies of the South Vietnam Government would pay the slightest attention to the United Nations. With the difficulty the United Nations has in maintaining peacekeeping troops in other areas—we are about to lose some of them—I do not see that the suggestion is a practical one. Therefore, as a practical matter, I do not see any alternative in this problem, with all due respect to the Senator's sentiments about law.

I believe he and I are the only two Members of the Senate at the present time who voted against the Connally amendment, for whatever that is worth. At the time we thought it worthwhile to give the court some authority.

Mr. MORSE. And we were right.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. All other Senators who supported us have either retired or been defeated.

The Vietnamese situation is one in which I do not see any feasible way in which it will be possible to apply any rules of law.

Mr. MORSE. I understand very clearly the views of the Senator from Arkansas with regard to this question. I respect them. However, I disagree with them.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator elaborate as to how those rules could be applied in South Vietnam?

Mr. MORSE. First let me make some comments I wanted to make before the last interjection. I suppose we ought to have some appreciation of the British viewpoint at the time of the American Revolution, when the British did not look with favor upon the French assisting the American Colonies. We should also recognize that at the time of the War Between the States the Union Government was somewhat concerned about some attempts on the part of the Confederacy to obtain support from England and elsewhere.

The fact that one group in South Vietnam is obtaining assistance from North Vietnam and another group is obtaining assistance from the United States does not change in the slightest degree the fact that it is a civil war. It is a civil war.

We do not like the sources from which the Vietcong are obtaining assistance, and the Vietcong do not like the sources from which the South Vietnamese are getting assistance. But it is still a civil war, and I think we should recognize that fact.

So the question goes back to our entrance into that area. I see no reason why we should continue a wrong course of action. To the contrary, it is important that we correct a mistake. A horrendous mistake was made in this country's going into South Vietnam. We ought to get our troops out. I am not saying we ought to get out tonight, but we should try to use procedures which are available for us to arrive at an accommodation.

The Senator from Arkansas is a little concerned as to how those procedures are to be devised. We never know until we try. We should call for an extraordinary meeting of at least the foreign ministers of the SEATO nations to see what they are willing to do, if anything. Does the Senator know what I think it might lead to? It might lead to an implementation of a neutralization program—naughty as the word seems to be in some quarters, it is, nevertheless, a meaningful word.

There are all kinds of neutralization programs. I do not know what the emphasis would be. However, it might lead to a neutralization program. It might get France back into the picture. It might get Great Britain back in. At least, we should give our SEATO members an opportunity to be of assistance in trying to resolve the matter and bring the shooting to an end. France is a member of SEATO. Her views on Vietnam have every bit as much standing as ours do. SEATO was created for the very purpose of handling on a multilateral basis the kind of situation that developed in Vietnam. If it is not going to be used to handle it, SEATO should be dissolved officially, as well as practically.

I do not agree with the Senator from Arkansas that the United Nations has no stake in the problem. I am surprised that certain groups in the United Nations have not been embarrassing us by pressing for United Nations action. The situation calls for United Nations action. The Charter of the United Nations provides that, whenever there is a situation which threatens the peace in any area of the world, the United Nations cannot stand by and not take note of it.

Until we try, we shall never know what can be done by the so-called procedural approach that I, for what of a better description, call a resort to the application of the rules of law.

The United States is not trying. The United States said to the world, as the Secretary of Defense has said, "We are going to do it forever if it is necessary to carry out this policy." I am objecting to the policy. I do not believe we should do it forever. I do not believe it should be done for the immediate future. We must make a choice and follow the procedures.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

Mr. MORSE. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] and then I shall yield to the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING].

Mr. ELLENDER. This discussion has brought to mind my second visit to Saigon in which I had the pleasure of meeting President Diem. At that time we were in the process of trying to rehabilitate about 250,000 Vietnamese who voluntarily moved down from the north after the partition was drawn.

We constructed a series of canals at a distance of approximately 1 kilometer apart and on those canals certain sections were measured off and given to the newcomers. As it turned out, many of the sections, or plots, were too small for the earning of a good living. Many of the people were given land to farm

which was not suitable for farming in the first place. As a result, many of them became dissatisfied. Some of these were located in the northern part of South Vietnam wherein they could not make a living and these grouped themselves in an area within 25 or 30 miles northwest of Saigon. Another group of these dissidents was in the delta.

When I last saw President Diem, I asked him to try and arrange some way to get these dissidents together. I told him I did not believe the newcomers were being treated fairly by his Government. They were not allowed to share very much of our aid, for example. There were other injustices also. I told President Diem that he should meet with these people, who were even then beginning to make trouble, and promise them that justice would be done. I told him then to follow up his promises.

This was never done. The situation went from bad to worse, and I believe this is the reason President Diem refused to see me when I returned to his country some years ago.

I am in complete agreement with what the Senator has said that this is more or less a civil war between the people of South Vietnam and some of those from North Vietnam who moved after South Vietnam was declared independent.

Let us be truthful about it, that is just what it is.

Mr. MORSE. I wish to thank the Senator from Louisiana for his comments. I completely agree with his observations and the observations he made the last time I made a speech on the floor of the Senate in opposition to the United States Government policy in South Vietnam.

I believe it has been helpful. I believe the Senators comments are unanswerably right.

I wish to apologize to the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING]. I have been keeping the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, Mr. Mann, waiting downstairs in the committee room for 35 minutes and I owe him an apology as well; but I apologize to the Senator from Alaska for leaving now when he is about to speak.

Mr. GRUENING. Not at all.

Mr. MORSE. The Senator from Alaska will discuss this matter, as I know he will, and then I shall come back to the Chamber as soon as I can and read the transcript of his speech, because the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING] is my leader in regard to this question. We have been standing shoulder-to-shoulder in our objections to certain phases of American foreign policy. I know of no one for whom I have a higher regard in his knowledge of foreign policy than the Senator from Alaska. If he will, therefore, accept my apologies for leaving the Chamber at this time to go down to the committee room to meet the Assistant Secretary for Latin American affairs, I shall return as soon as possible.

Mr. GRUENING. There is no need for the Senator to apologize to me.

EXHIBIT 1

EXCERPTS FROM JOHNSON'S TALK TO LABOR
And before I conclude, for a moment, if I may, I would just like to simply talk to you

about your family and mine, about their future and their country.

Last Sunday—Palm Sunday—as I sat in church I thought about all the problems that face this world—ancient feuds and recent quarrels that have disturbed widely separated parts of the earth.

You have seen five or six different wars appearing on the front page of your morning newspaper and you've heard about our foreign policy.

The world has changed and so has the method of dealing with disruptions of the peace.

There may have been a time when a commander in chief would order soldiers to march the very moment a disturbance occurred, although restraint and fairness are not new to the American tradition.

As a matter of fact, some people urged me to hurry in the Marines when the air became a little hot on a particular occasion recently.

But the world as it was and the world as it is are not the same any more. Once—once upon a time even large-scale wars could be waged without risking the end of civilization. But what was once upon a time is no longer so, because general war is impossible. In a matter of moments you can wipe out from 50 to 100 million of our adversaries or they can, in the same amount of time, wipe out 50 or 100 million of our people, taking half of our land, half of our population in a matter of an hour.

So general war is impossible and some alternatives are essential.

The people of the world, I think, prefer reasoned agreement to ready attack. And that is why we must follow the Prophet Isaiah many, many times before we send the Marines, and say, "Come now and let us reason together."

THE QUEST FOR PEACE

And this is our objective—the quest for peace and not the quarrels of war.

In this nuclear world—in this world of 100 new nations—we must offer the outstretched arm that tries to help instead of an arm-length sword that helps to kill.

In every trouble spot in the world this hope for reasoned agreement instead of rash retaliation can bear fruit. Agreement is being sought and we hope and believe will soon be worked out with our Panamanian friends.

The United Nations peacekeeping machinery is already on its merciful mission in Cyprus and a mediator is being selected.

The water problem that disturbed us at Guantanamo is solved not by a battalion of marines, bayonetting in to turn on the water, but we sent a single admiral over to cut it off.

And I can say to you that our base is self-sufficient in lean readiness and a source of danger and disagreement has been removed.

In Vietnam divergent voices cry out with suggestions, some for a larger scale war, some for more appeasement, some even for a retreat. We do not criticize or demean them. We consider carefully their suggestions. But today finds us where President Eisenhower found himself 10 years ago. The position he took with Vietnam then in a letter he sent to the then President is one that I could take in complete honesty today. And that is that we stand ready to help the Vietnamese preserve their independence and retain their freedom and keep from being enveloped by Communism.

We, the most powerful nation in the world, can afford to be patient. Our ultimate strength is clear and it's well known to those who would be our adversaries. But let's be reminded that power brings obligations.

The people in this country have more blessed hopes than bitter victories. The people of this country and the world expect more from their leaders than just a show of brute force. And so our hope and our purpose is to employ reasoned agreement instead of ready aggression, to preserve our honor

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without a world in ruins, to substitute if we can understanding for retaliation.

My most fervent prayer is to be a President who can make it possible for every boy in this land to grow to manhood by loving his country—instead of dying for it.

ADJOURNMENT OF HOUSE FROM MARCH 26 TO APRIL 6, 1964

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Chair lay before the Senate, House Concurrent Resolution 284, and I ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McGovern in the chair). The concurrent resolution will be read for the information of the Senate.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Resolved, That when the House adjourns on Thursday, March 26, 1964, it stand adjourned until 12 o'clock meridian, Monday, April 6, 1964.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the concurrent resolution?

There being no objection, the concurrent resolution was considered and agreed to.

LET US MAKE THE "NEW REALITIES" REAL REALITIES

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the distinguished junior Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has delivered a major address entitled, "Old Myths and New Realities." It is a great speech; it is a timely speech; and more than that, it is a historic document. I desire to congratulate him.

In essence the Senator from Arkansas in a sense applies to our changing times the unforgettable words of James Russell Lowell, in his poem, "The Present Crisis," written over a century ago, when he said:

New occasions teach new duties;
Time makes ancient good uncouth;
They must upward still, and onward,
Who would keep abreast of truth.

The Senator from Arkansas most cogently points out that our foreign policies are rigidified by habit, timidity, and fear, and that it is high time we reassessed them; that it is time that we related them to deep-seated current changes. I agree. This sound idea has been expressed for particular areas; namely, southeast Asia, by our distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], and by my able colleague, the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT], who gave a masterly presentation on the subject, delivered on March 11.

The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] has included some memorable and happily phrased precepts, particularly in his final paragraph, when he says:

We must dare to think about unthinkable things, because when things become unthinkable, thinking stops and action becomes mindless. If we are to disabuse ourselves of old myths and to act wisely and creatively upon the new realities of our time, we must think and talk about our problems with perfect freedom, remembering, as Woodrow Wil-

son said, that "The greatest freedom of speech is the greatest safety because, if a man is a fool, the best thing to do is to encourage him to advertise the fact by speaking."

I could not agree more fully with this other statement of his:

We must learn to welcome rather than to fear the voices of dissent.

Was not our Nation born of dissent?

And finally, he states:

An effective foreign policy is one which concerns itself more with innovation abroad than with conciliation at home.

But, as to this, I wonder whether this interjection of not seeking "conciliation at home" does not run the risk of rejecting the importance of considering public opinion in a country dedicated to—maybe it is a myth but should not be—rule by the people. It is certainly desirable that our foreign policymakers not shy away from innovating, especially where old policies are manifestly obsolete and ineffective. But should not they likewise seek to find out what the sentiments of the American people are, and when they are strongly held, be in a large degree guided by them?

I should like to think that such consideration would be applicable to the war we have been carrying on in South Vietnam for 10 years at the cost of billions of dollars and with an increasing loss of American lives, and with no evidence of success—indeed with every evidence of failure—despite the repeated optimistic forecasts of those who made these disastrous policies there, cannot bring themselves to admit that they were wrong, and propose, as the Senator from Arkansas does, to continue to give to the patient more of the same medicine which has failed to cure him.

While I find myself in agreement with the general principles enunciated by the Senator from Arkansas, as I have said I do find myself in disagreement with his conclusions about South Vietnam. He says that—

It seems clear that there are only two realistic options open to us in Vietnam in the immediate future—the extension of the conflict in one way or another, or a renewed effort to bolster the capacity of the South Vietnamese to prosecute the war successfully on its present scale.

To me, the extension of our war there is unthinkable, and this is one of the "unthinkable things" that we should think about and not only think about but act upon. If by saying "we have no choice but to support the South Vietnamese Government and army by the most effective means available" we can interpret that as material assistance, economic assistance, cooperation in efforts at basic reform so that the tyrannies which have oppressed the people of South Vietnam no less than they have oppressed those in North Vietnam may end, but not to the continuation of our troops in combat, I would be inclined to agree. But if the Senator feels—and his speech is not quite clear to me at that point—that we must continue to keep our men in combat, although theoretically they are only advisers and technicians, I would disagree most emphatically, and I hope that in this case

he would, as he says earlier, "welcome rather than fear the voices of dissent." Those voices of dissent have been heard very emphatically in my office for the last 2 weeks from all parts of the country, since I made a speech on the floor of the Senate on March 10, urging that we reverse our Vietnam policy—perhaps "innovate" would be the Senator's term—and pull our men out of the firing line. I intend to put into the RECORD the correspondence that I have received on this subject. It is virtually unanimous in support of the position that I have taken and runs directly counter to the Senator from Arkansas' belief that "we have only two realistic options in Vietnam in the immediate future."

Maybe pulling our American boys out, as I have suggested, is one of the unthinkable things that the Senator properly says we must think about, and I feel we need not only think about them but act upon them.

As I have stated on this floor, President Johnson inherited the mess in Vietnam. It was not of his making. Now if ever is the time to rethink our futile, costly, tragic unilateral involvement begun 10 years ago. That involvement has been perpetrated by the very weaknesses, by the very myths in policymaking which the able chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has so eloquently decried. Now is the time to put an end to the lethal hypocrisy that our 15,000 Americans there are merely advisers. They are instead, and have been, engaged in combat—combat never authorized or approved by the Congress. They have been sacrificed to a mistaken policy. These sacrifices should cease at once. They have been sacrificed to the myths that the Senator from Arkansas would replace by new realities. The realities are that American boys in uniform have been sent into combat and killed for an unknown and disastrous concept which remains unchanged because the architects of these policies and their successors cannot admit their tragic errors and fit their reports and optimistic forecasts to justify past error.

So I find myself in agreement with the principles which the able Senator from Arkansas has so eloquently expounded, but not with his application of these principles in southeast Asia.

As to their application, I find myself in full agreement with the views of the senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], as he so forthrightly expressed them in recent days in the Senate and again earlier this afternoon.

MILDRED HERMANN

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, a great woman, Mrs. Mildred Hermann, of Juneau, Alaska, has died. To her, as to few others, are applicable the words of Paul to Timothy:

I have fought a good fight; I have finished my course; I have kept the faith.

A valid and eloquent tribute to Mildred Hermann was rendered her by a former Alaska legislator, Vern Metcalfe, a brilliant and enlightened journalist and

now commentator and reporter for station KJNO in Juneau. It tells much and tells it well; but not all of Mildred Hermann's achievements could be included in any one tribute; as, for instance, the organization of the women's clubs throughout Alaska and her unceasing efforts to raise funds for the anti-cancer campaign. There was much else.

Vern Metcalfe's tribute so impressed the Alaska State Legislature, now in session in the State's capital, Juneau, that the house membership had it spread on the record. They fully appreciated Mildred Hermann's great contribution to good government, to civil morality, to the basic essentials of responsible freedom in her part of America—Alaska—that her life embodied.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial obituary by Vern Metcalfe, as well as Senate Concurrent Resolution 19 of the Alaska State Legislature, be printed at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial and resolution were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the House Journal of the Alaska State Legislature, Third Legislature, Second Session, Mar. 20, 1964]

EDITORIAL OBITUARY
(By Vern Metcalfe)

Mildred Hermann died Monday morning and with her, in effect, came the passing of an era. Mildred was a good friend of this reporter and for that reason I feel that an ordinary notice of death, or obituary, is not sufficient. I feel that way for many reasons other than the friendship she extended to me.

Mildred Hermann, as anyone who knew her can tell you, was not an ordinary woman. She was many things to Alaska and her death takes us back to Alaska's battle to gain admission to the Union. It is not sufficient for me to say that she was one of the foremost exponents of statehood. She was more than that. She made statehood a personal crusade, spent greatly of her time and money in this struggle to make us, in her frequently heard words, "first-class citizens."

I am not certain what inspired this zeal but few people were in the vanguard any longer than was Mildred Hermann. She was the secretary of the Alaska Statehood Committee and capped this long-range effort by being elected a member of the Constitutional Convention. Mrs. Hermann was an attorney and had clerked for Alaska's great Delegate to Congress, James Wickersham. She learned both law and a passion for self-determination from Wickersham and she was one person that kept the late Delegate and Federal judge's memory alive.

During the height of the statehood battle, and it was just that, Mildred Hermann, in the company of many other Alaskans, testified before Congress on the reasons we should be admitted. A portion of her testimony was used in an attempt to embarrass this fine woman and to, in my opinion, degrade her intelligence. A hostile U.S. Senator asked if Mrs. Hermann really believed that Alaska could readily afford this luxury, particularly Alaskan taxpayers. Mrs. Hermann, and I'm not quoting exactly, replied in effect, "that this might cause some belt tightening but Alaskans have eaten beans before and can, if necessary, eat beans again." When she later sought election to the then Territorial Senate opponents constantly taunted her with "let them eat beans" but it did not deter Mildred Hermann. Very little, if anything, ever did.

Mildred was never afraid to express an opinion and for several years right after World War II she pioneered radio legislative

commentary. Her blasts at the canned salmon industry and others that she thought were opposed to Alaska's best interests were classics and she also left many a shattered legislative ego as well.

Her interests in community affairs should not be neglected since for many years she was practically a one-woman crusade against cancer. She also was active in the fight against tuberculosis and heart disease. Her other activities included the Soroptomists, the Toast Mistress Club, Beta Sigma Phi, Eastern Star, and membership in the Alaska Bar Association.

I think the thing that most of us who knew her will remember best was that Mrs. Hermann wasn't just a "joiner." She was a "doer", being a leader in everything she became interested in. She was a close friend of ERNEST GRUENING, although they were of opposite political faiths. This went for Senator BOB BARTLETT as well and both men never neglected to mention Mildred Hermann when credit was being given to the really few of those who brought Statehood to Alaska.

Her two children, Russell R. Hermann and Mrs. Barbara Ann Marshall, both knew of all of this and we are certain their children will be told of it as they grow older. The comment today by myself is merely to inform new residents that a great Alaskan died on Monday, March 16th. Those who have been here prior to statehood know this and this, in my own insufficient way, is my farewell to her. We'll all miss her and remember the good she did as she passed this way. Thank you.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 19

Concurrent resolution relating to the late Mildred R. Hermann

Whereas with the death of Mildred R. Hermann the State has lost one of its most dedicated and beloved citizens; and

Whereas the spirit and record of personal and public service of Mildred Hermann established her in the hearts of a generation of Alaskans as a most remarkable woman; and

Whereas as a young widow she managed to raise a family, teach herself to qualify as an attorney, and devote so much of her time and energy to the public good; and

Whereas her enviable and prodigious record as an attorney helping the underprivileged would in itself qualify her for the highest expressions of esteem from her fellow citizens; and

Whereas she served with spirit and outstanding ability in the vanguard of the battle for statehood as the executive secretary of the Alaska Statehood Committee and when the battle was won she was accorded the affectionate sobriquet of "the grand old warhorse of the statehood movement" from one editorialist; and

Whereas in 1955 she was one of the seven delegates elected at large from the Territory to the Alaska Constitutional Convention of 1955-56, served with distinction at the convention, and energetically and enthusiastically campaigned for the ratification of the Constitution; and

Whereas she gave unstintingly of her time and services to many worthy charitable causes, serving as a director of the Alaska Chapter of the American Cancer Society, and as an active worker for and supporter of the Alaska Tuberculosis Association and the Alaska Heart Association: Be it

Resolved, That the legislature joins with the people of the State of Alaska in paying homage to the memory of Mildred R. Hermann as a particularly outstanding Alaskan woman, citizen and pioneer whose personality, service, and accomplishments will long be cherished as inspiring memories for those who knew and worked with her, and to express and extend to her son and daughters the heartfelt sympathy and condolences of

the people of Alaska on their loss, which is shared in great part by the people themselves.

GREEK INDEPENDENCE DAY

Mr. HART. Mr. President, 143 years ago on the 25th of March, the Greek nation won its struggle against the Ottoman Empire and achieved its independence.

The 25th of March again this year will be marked by Greeks the world over with joyous ceremony, and I today join all my Greek friends in commemorating this historical event.

Mr. President, throughout the centuries the Greek people have been in the forefront in the struggle for the liberty of the individual. Western civilization is founded on the principle that every individual is born free and, with his fellow man, to form a government to rule over them reflecting the will of the informed majority with protection for the basic rights of minorities.

It can be said with historical accuracy that this principle had its genesis in ancient Greece and was among the most glorious gifts bestowed by that civilization upon Western Europe. On European soil this principle was developed and perfected to the end that the benefits flowing from it might reach all of mankind. And indeed, the democratic form of free society has been carried to all parts of the world bringing civilization and the good life to hundreds of millions of people.

But this glorious principle from ancient times to the present has been constantly threatened with annihilation by an aberration which holds one individual so supreme that his authority is absolute and that all other individuals in the realm are like chattel of the ruler.

This black principle has held sway in the East for centuries and today sits like a plague athwart almost the entire Asiatic continent and has brought such suffering and degradation to masses of people as to reduce Medusa to tears.

In the very dawn of European history, Greek city states began putting into practice the principles and theory of democratic government. But soon the Greek people were called to defend their way of life against the Persians who would carry the Eastern principle of autocracy to European soil. The heroic Greeks met and repulsed the Persians and thus saved Europe from domination by the autocratic principle.

In the Christian era, the Greeks for centuries opposed and stemmed the incursions of the despotic Ottoman Turks into Europe before being overwhelmed. This calamity did not extinguish the flaming spirit of the Greek people. They resisted and fought the Ottoman with all their might until they won their national freedom in 1821 and they established the modern Greek state.

In the Second World War, the vastly superior forces of the Axis Powers overcame a valiant and heroically resisting Greek Army. Throughout the dark days of occupation, the Greek people struggled against their oppressors until the glorious day when the Nazis and Fascists were defeated.