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ideas which flowed from the academic communities of the Nation in the early days of the Roosevelt Presidency. The social science faculties of the universities doubtless miss an interplay with the problem-oriented workings of the Government in its day-to-day affairs.

I am making a systematic endeavor, in my position as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, to promote a better two-way communications channel between Government and the universities especially at the policy level. The Committee on Foreign Relations has contracts with some 20 educational institutions (including the Russian Institute here at Columbia) in connection with an overall foreign policy review which we expect to have completed by early next year. This is an attempt to spur the rate at which ideas can flow directly from the universities to the practicing politician.

The Committee on Foreign Relations has also been promoting a series of informal exchanges between outstanding scholars in the field of foreign affairs and Members of the Senate. This is not an isolated phenomenon. Similar activties are underway in the House of Representatives and in fields other than foreign policy.

Perhaps out of this process and out of literally thousands of discussion and study groups throughout the country, there can be developed the kind of agreement on our foreign policy objectives which is based on a habit of the mind; the kind which will come only after we, as people, have steeled ourselves to look unpleasant facts in the face and to react rationally instead of trying to wish them away.

There is nothing inevitable about the survival of the United States. Survival is the reward of civilizations which meet the responsibilities history thrusts upon them. It is the job of you, of me, of every American to see to it that our country, in this age, meets those reponsibilities.

Every generation has what Franklin Roosevelt called a rendezvous with destiny. We Americans in 1959 have to determine—and soon—whether we are going to keep our rendezvous.

I hope it is not later than we think.

Truman Diamond Jubilee

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. VANCE HARTKE
OF INDIANA
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Monday, May 11, 1959

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, last Friday Indiana Democrats celebrated the Truman diamond jubilee in Gary, Ind. I had the honor of speaking to this group, which was participating in the national celebration of President Truman's 75th birthday. I am very grateful that I was asked to participate in this celebration, since President Truman was good enough to open my campaign in Fort Wayne, Ind., last fall. I ask unanimous consent that my remarks in Gary at the Truman diamond jubilee celebration be printed in the Appendix of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SPEECH OF SENATOR VANCE HARTKE, DEMOCRAT, OF INDIANA, AT TRUMAN DIAMOND JUBILEE, GARY, IND., MAY 8, 1959

Sheriff, Ray, mayors, friends, and fellow Democrats all, this is my first trip back to Gary since the eventful election of last November.

Many times since then I have been reminded of the day the people of Lake County were so patient that night and so wonderful to me on election day. I regret sincerely that Senate business has not permitted me as much time in Indiana as I would like to have. God willing, I shall tour the State again following the present session of Congress. Perhaps we can visit again then.

I am reminded also tonight of another election campaign, one that took place 10 years before the one in which I was privileged to head a statewide victory ticket. I refer, of course, to the 1948 election campaign.

Well we remember that Harry S. Truman stood almost alone at his nomination in Philadelphia. Among the few with him was the late Alben W. Barkley.

During the campaign that followed, we heard everywhere that everyone had deserted Harry Truman and the Democratic Party. Gone were the extreme conservatives of the day. Gone were the extreme liberals of the day. Down the path between the extremes went Harry S. Truman, a plain-speaking man who took his case directly to the people.

There were those then and since who thought of President Truman as a lightweight. And there were those of us who insisted all the time that history would record Harry S. Truman as one of the great Presidents of all time.

I remember Harry Truman, too, when the time came to open our campaign last fall. It was he who responded to our beckon. And how he packed the galleries and the arena floor of the Fort Wayne Coliseum.

"I don't give 'em hell," he declared. "I just tell the truth and it sounds like hell to some of the people."

I remember Harry Truman as a man who has principles and stands by them. I remember Harry Truman as a man who acted boldly and with great courage.

Tonight Harry Truman—a man warm of smile, hearty of handshake, practical as a Missouri farm boy, wise as a world renown statesman, political as only a real party man can be—turned 75 years old. Nobody in his right mind expects Harry Truman to collapse in his rocking chair, go back to Independence and retire. We would be disappointed if he did. America would be less rich if he did.

We need men like Harry Truman today.

I wonder sometimes when I hear of certain people high in our Government complain about dynamic leadership if we have gone so far in the few years since President Truman's occupancy of the White House that we have forgotten what real leadership is. One thing for sure: When H.S.T. was living in the White House, there was never any question about who was boss, where we were going or how we were going. Our allies knew where we stood. Our enemies knew where we stood. Above all, we ourselves knew where we stood.

Right or wrong—and over and over we are learning how overwhelmingly often he was right—Harry Truman made decisions and stuck by them. Yet, he was never arrogant.

Remember, he was not too big to visit Wake Island to see General MacArthur. Yet, when the general failed to heed orders from the President, Harry Truman fired him.

When the time came for a decision on dropping the atomic bomb, Harry Truman consulted and prayed. Then he ordered the bomb dropped. "I did not like the weapon," Mr. Truman said. "But I had no qualms if, in the long run, millions of lives could be saved."

This capacity to make decisions was brought to my mind again only yesterday. The day before I was privileged to have breakfast with Mr. Truman in the company of several other Senators. That was Wednesday. Then, on Thursday, I read in the Washington Post that President Eisenhower before leaving for a golfing holiday had decided that the 22d amendment to the Constitution was perhaps a good one. This is the amendment barring a President from serving more than two terms.

Over and over President Eisenhower has told news conferences that he believes the amendment is bad. Suddenly, and without any apparent new information, he decides it is right.

I wonder if he is just trying to disagree with President Truman.

Of course Mr. Truman made other decisions, but I believe a few—mostly in the field of foreign affairs—are sufficient to recount here tonight to prove the very greatness of the man.

Is there doubt in anyone's mind here tonight that the Truman doctrine, the Marshall plan and point 4 preserved the free world? Without them, I fear, the Middle East would have been lost, Europe would still be in the depths of postwar darkness and despair if not indeed wholly behind the Iron Curtain, Africa would be lost and Asia would be more Communist than it is.

The Truman doctrine rescued Greece and Turkey. Mr. Truman continued his efforts to rebuild these strife-torn lands so that now they are bulwarks guarding our interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Turkey, for instance, is all that stands between Soviet Russia and the vast oil reserves of the Middle East. Turkey, for instance, has supplied proportionately more troops for U.N. actions than we have.

Then there was Italy. Communists had reached a pinnacle of success in that land. They were in position to take over peacefully and through the ballot. But Harry Truman's bold action aided the gallant fighters for democracy in that war-torn land.

In Berlin the Russians had moved to block our supply lines. Harry Truman did not sit idly in the White House or Burning Tree Country Club or Augusta Golf Club. He ordered the Berlin airlift. And thus we stopped effectively for the first time, Russian expansion.

From this, all our allies and the neutrals of the world were on notice that we had principles and that we would, above all, stick by these principles.

The Marshall plan has rebuilt Europe until today the Western countries of the continent are proud proof that our system works. I wish you all could see, as I have recently, the vast difference between East and West in Germany. And what has happened in West Germany has happened everywhere in Europe among our allies.

Mr. Truman's point 4 program is a bold, imaginative program to provide technical know-how to backward countries. It has taken the stigma of colonialism from us. It has helped countries help themselves. It has built new free countries loyal to us and our way of life—vital allies in a life and death struggle.

You know and I know that Harry Truman's most controversial decision was Korea. When he made it, Congress backed him to the hilt. The vote was virtually unanimous. But when the war dragged on, his critics called it Truman's war.

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but cast off the anchor of economic shibboleths that keep up tied to a rate of economic growth of 2 to 3 percent a year. The Rockefeller Brothers Fund report last spring put the attainable minimum rate of growth at 5 percent a year.

I know that this figure was described as visionary by the apostles of economic standpattism. Yet I also recall that the same adjective was used in 1941 when Franklin Roosevelt called for the production of 50,000 airplanes a year. The standpatters did not begrudge him what they felt was just a propaganda gambit to frighten the enemy. Yet they were certain among themselves that such an actual production goal was unattainable. As the event proved, Roosevelt was guilty of a gross understatement of purpose. For we were producing 100,000 planes a year before long.

We could do much the same sort of thing for our current needs, if we had the leadership that could make its own vision and its own determination the source of the Nation's vision and determination.

Why do we keep kidding ourselves that we can get along with a little more when we know very well that we need a great deal more? Why do we congratulate ourselves that the shortage of classrooms, far from getting better, is simply not getting worse? Why do we think it is progress if we stand still?

In my judgment, we give too little attention to the long-range questions of national policy, and too much, relatively, to short-term tactical problems. Since last summer, our national attentions has been focused, in turn, on the Middle East, the Far East, and Europe. Jarred by a revolution in Iraq, we sent troops to Lebanon and vowed that we needed a long-term policy to bring peace and stability to the Middle East. Then we withdrew the troops from Lebanon, and the Middle East continues to fester like a running sore. It is without peace, without stability, and without much of a policy on our part.

Next we were confronted with the crisis last fall over Quemoy and Matsu. During that period, a few people pointed out that what was really needed was not so much a solution of the Quemoy-Matsu question, but a long-term policy which would take into account the realities in the Far East. Then the Chinese Communists turned off the heat as suddenly as they had turned it on, and today, several months later, we are no nearer a Far Eastern policy then we were before.

At the moment, our attention is centered on Berlin. I do not want to minimize the gravity of the Berlin crisis. It could supply the cause of world war III; just as the Middle East could have supplied it; and might yet; just as Quemoy and Matsu could have supplied it, and might yet.

The point is that we have to keep Berlin in perspective. It is illustrative of many of the long-term issues between us and the Soviets; but in itself it is only a short-term tactical move on their part.

I think the Berlin crisis will be settled. I hope it will be settled in a way which will lead to a broader settlement of at least some of the issues which divide Eastern and Western Europe. But the most ideal settlement one can imagine would still leave us with many serious problems in other parts of the world; and especially it would leave us in our same position vis-a-vis the Soviets in the economic competition which will determine whether or not the United States remains a first-class power.

And after the Berlin crisis is settled, we have to be prepared to meet another crisis somewhere else. So long as we stay on the defensive, it is folly to assume that the Soviets will not continue to probe and trust and keep us off balance.

Our Government ought to take to heart the sage advice of Demosthenes: "As a general marches at the head of his troops, so ought—politicians—to march at the head of affairs; insomuch that they ought not to wait the event, to know what measures to take, but the measures which they have taken, ought to produce the event."

It would be rather satisfying, just once, we could get in the position where it is the Soviets who are reacting to our initiatives and not the other way around.

In order to get into such a position, a number of things are necessary.

We need a State Department that is hospitable to new suggestions instead of foreclosing all inquiry with an automatic "no".

We need more concentrated Executive energy instead of buckshot spray in the White House.

We need more broad international vision and less local politics in Congress.

We need a national resurgence of self-awareness about where we stand in history.

But above all, we need to learn how to talk to each other again—to reach a working agreement on what our paramount national interests really are.

THE ROLE OF THE SENATE

It is on this last point, which is central to all the others, that I think the Senate has its greatest role to play.

Despite the large measure of agreement on many of our foreign policy actions in recent years, we do not have in this country a national agreement on what our role in the world really is. We agree on the kind of world we want to live in—we agree that we want it to be peaceful, prosperous, secure, and preferably one in which the Communists have gone away some place else. But these are ideal objectives. The likelihood of attaining all of them is as improbable as the hope an elephant might have of turning itself into a ballet dancer. In any case, we have only the foggiest notions of how even to approach our prescription for an ideal world.

Here again, it is necessary to distinguish between short-term tactics and long-term policy. We do have a deep-seated national unity in regard to protecting our rights in Berlin. But we do not have anything like this same kind of unity in regard to meeting the Soviet economic threat. Indeed, we are not even united on the nature and magnitude of that threat.

The kind of national agreement on our world role which I have in mind is akin to the sort of natural consensus that has been present in support of British foreign policy for many generations. In many respects, it is an unspoken agreement which in large measure is taken for granted and which, in turn, takes a great deal for granted. It is the kind of agreement which develops over a period of years as a result of much public thought and discussion. But it is also the kind of agreement which creates a national confidence and assurance out of which come predictable public reactions to specific situations.

It is the lack of this sort of agreement that has made so much of our recent foreign policy both half-hearted and halfway. If Americans were thoroughly convinced that we were in the world to say and were well-settled in our own mind as to how we fit into the world, we would not go through our annual soul-searching debates over foreign aid. We would not go through our quadrennial wrangles over the reciprocal trade program. We would not be trying to fight change around the world. Instead, we would be trying to influence the direction the movement for change takes and we would be in tune with it. We would be exercising the world leadership role in which, in large part, we are defaulting.

Our defaults in world leadership are not exclusively faults of foreign policy. The image which we present to the world is based on many policies we think of as domestic in nature. This is one of our weaknesses. We have failed to relate domestic policies to foreign policies.

For the same reason, we have sacrificed the interests of the whole people to the demands of the few—the few who prefer high prices to full steel production, the few who prefer uneconomic protective tariffs to low prices, the few who oppose the use of our resources for education, housing, highways, and who, in effect, prefer that our resources go into the high profit luxury trades.

In short, our foreign policy has represented the lowest common denominator of national agreement because too many people and too many special interests have been given a practical veto over policy.

It is precisely at this point that I think the Congress as an educational institution—has its greatest opportunity. That is the opportunity of increasing the understanding of all Americans of the interaction of domestic and foreign policy, so that the parochial interests of the few may not thwart the Nation. Not until we agree in the very marrow of our bones that most of our domestic policies have foreign policy aspects and most foreign affairs affect our domestic life will we be able to discharge our world responsibilities.

As has often been said, there are limits on what the United States can do abroad—just as there are limits to what the Senate can do about the general conduct of foreign policy.

Constitutionally, our role is essentially negative. We can refuse to ratify treaties or to pass legislation which the President wants. We can attach reservations to treaties or we can amend bills to bring them more nearly in line with our own views. But these actions, too, are more likely to be effective if they are negative than if they are positive. We can, for example, keep the President from spending money by denying appropriations. But we cannot force the President to spend more money, simply by increasing appropriations. We can advise the President that he ought to enter negotiations for a given treaty. But we cannot force him to do so.

For both constitutional and practical reasons, the Senate should not concern itself obsessively with the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy. I repeat that this is the prerogative of the executive branch, and properly so. I also repeat that the Senate itself is very poorly equipped to engage in administrative matters.

But over and beyond this, the Senate can, I think, make a useful contribution through the public discussion of long-range, basic problems of foreign policy. I have touched on some of these problems today, and I have alluded briefly to others. In the months ahead, I intend to explore these further.

I have said many times that we in the United States operate under a most extraordinarily difficult system of government. Democracy may have reached its peak in our country, but it is an extremely complicated piece of machinery to operate. It requires of the people that extra measure of determination and ability often characteristic of a few individuals in a community, but seldom a characteristic of most of the people. It requires especially education and self-discipline.

I hope in the months ahead we may draw on the wealth of information, the ideas and professional ability that are to be found in academic communities such as this. Unfortunate experiences during the past decade have, I fear, seriously damaged good relations between government and the academic world. We have both suffered. Government misses the bold, astringent, pragmatic, inventive

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not our own, which so many other peoples of the world have adopted for their own usage—to their own eventual sorrow.

Still, we have to deal with the world, not as we would like it to be, but as it is. And as much of the world is, the Soviets, by parading themselves as the example of a peasant people made over swiftly into a giant industrial power, have become the merchants of hope. We, on our part, have been made out to seem the defenders of hopelessness, and the arch beneficiaries of a status quo outstripped by history.

What can we do about all this? It does not lie within our power to prevent the Communists from peddling hope; but it does lie within our own power to prevent ourselves from representing despair.

I turn now briefly to the second world force I mentioned—the demand for improved living standards.

The material wealth of this world is poorly distributed, to say the least. The United States, with 7 percent of the world's population, produces 50 percent of the world's wealth. At the other end of the scale, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia—to give but three examples—have more than 20 percent of the world's population, yet produce only 7 percent of its wealth.

The implications this has for us, as the greatest of all creditor nations, are plain enough, if only we would stop snoring with our eyes open. Our creditor position demands that we give our debtors a chance to buy in our markets by selling their own products here more readily. Our position also demands that we export more capital to underdeveloped countries so that they can increase their own industrial production to our mutual advantage. For it is a demonstrable fact that the greatest volume of foreign trade from which everyone stands to gain is carried on not between industrial and nonindustrial nations. It is carried on within the community of industrial nations—between the United States and Canada, the United States and Great Britain, the European Common Market, and so on.

We are in for serious trouble if we think that we are at liberty to get richer while most of the rest of the world gets poorer. In a poker game played with stacked cards, and where all the chips come to be concentrated in relatively few hands, the other players will be tempted to do one of three things: to change the rules, to quit, or to shoot from the hip. Leaving the economics of the matter out of account, the political imperatives of the universal demand for a rising standard of living are such that, unless we act sensibly to help meet it, the Soviets will appropriate that demand for their own purposes, in the same way that they have captured and distorted nationalism.

The technological revolution is the third force within whose context we must give form and focus to our foreign policy. My comments on this score, like those which have come before, will have the character of truisms. Yet they are worth reemphasis just the same.

Technology works in chain reactions. For example, the improvement in transportation and communication was in part responsible for the growth of nationalism. From the same cause, the poor nations of the world could better see how the rich nations lived. This in turn spurred the demands of the poor for economic development—even as those same technological advances made it feasible to meet the demand. And so on and on—up to the final step in the chain reaction, namely, the creation of military weapons that can destroy everything.

Now the key point in all this is, that technology is becoming progressively internationalized. No nation now has a clear monopoly over its secret. Nor can any nation fully control its social and political effects, with the precision of an experiment conducted in a laboratory. If the Soviet Union, for example, is quite different in an industrial sense from what it was less than a decade ago, the pressures of technological change have unleashed social and political pressures that the rulers of the Russian state have not fully subdued.

One thing, however, can be said in this general connection. If the Soviet Union did not start the worldwide technological revolution, any more than it started the other two revolutions I have mentioned, it is exploiting all three to its advantage in a degree to which we are not. And the reason, I suspect, is that they know more clearly what they want to do and work harder at it.

Consider, for example, our relative performance in the matter of economic growth. The figures are not so spectacular as the sputniks and missiles, but they are more alarming.

Briefly, even when we discount the U.S. recession year of 1958, Soviet industrial growth during the 1950's has been in excess of 2½ times the American growth rate—9.5 percent a year as against 3.6 percent. And the rate in Communist China is even greater than in the Soviet Union. I recognize the need for a qualification—that the percentages are computed from vastly different base points of reference. Still, despite this qualification, and despite the element of spread-eagle oratory in Khrushchev's promise that the Soviet Union will outstrip the United States per capita production by 1970, the threat is real enough. Whether it materializes in 1970 or later, it will surely come unless the disparity in present trends of growth is changed.

To be sure, the theoreticians in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce would have a rough time of it. For they have taught us that free enterprise is inherently and absolutely more productive than any other system; and moreover, that democracy and capitalism are one and the same thing. They would therefore be hard pressed to explain how it was that communism, based on State capital, outdistanced us in the production of things.

I also recognize that if we were no longer the richest nation in the world, we might suffer in the eyes of the underdeveloped nations—who would then look to communism and not to us as having the more promising method of economic advancement. Yet the Soviet growth has already been such as to impress many underdeveloped countries with this general idea.

What ought to count is not wealth per se, but what one does with it. Indeed, if we could be sure that the increased Russian production would be applied in full to an increase in Russian living standards, we ought to welcome the development. Paul Henri-Spaak, the wise and distinguished secretary general of NATO, has said that "a rich Communist is probably less to be feared than a poor Communist." We might even look forward to the day when the Soviets become as snug and complacent as we have become. In fact, when I lie in bed at night wondering what I can do to help the cause of peace in the world, my fancy starts to play with this idea that we should use some $20 billion of our $40 odd billion defense budget on the purchase of television sets, hi-fi phonographs, ankle-deep carpets, block-long automobiles—and give the lot of these annually to the Russian people as a free gift. The argument can be rather persuasively made that something of the sort will eventually happen through the growth of the Soviet Union's own economy.

But the fanciful elements to one side, what worries me about this argument is the emphasis on "eventually". Eventually can be a long time; and even then we would still be faced with the growing and ominous power of Communist China. In the meantime, we must deal with a set of variables that enter into the international politics of the present hour, and promise to continue to do so for the next decade or two.

It seems to me that within this time span, the growing Soviet wealth can be used by the Kremlin to meet the following objectives: (1) reinvestment to make possible still further expansion; (2) increased living standards; (3) greater arms production; (4) more loans and other investments in underdeveloped countries generally and perhaps also in Communist China and the East European satellites; (5) trade wars with the West.

We do not know, of course, in what proportion these purposes will be served. We do know that the Soviets can switch from one purpose an another as it suits their convenience. Khrushchev has bluntly and forthrightly declared economic war on us. We discount at our peril his seriousness of purpose and his ability to carry it out.

Indeed, in my judgment one of the most difficult problems we face is how to meet Soviet trade practices. For in a growing line of products, the Soviets are reaching a point where they can disrupt world markets and world trade patterns almost at will. This has happened already with tin, aluminum, and benzene. And the list is growing, while the practice itself finds the decentralized, private trading economies of the West poorly equipped to deal with this kind of competition from the Soviet Union.

Frankly, I do not know how to meet Soviet economic warfare. But I do know that we must start at once to think about the problem in a systematic way. I also know how not to meet the Soviet economic challenge. I know that it cannot be met so long as we make a balanced budget the sole and overriding aim of Government policy—as if Government itself were just a bookkeeping operation. If that is all there is to it, then we would be well advised to abolish the Presidency, the Congress, and the courts, and install some certified public accountants in their place.

I also know that Soviet economic warfare cannot be met so long as it is our national policy to pay a one-fifth higher price for generators to be used in an Arkansas dam, merely to give the order to a Philadelphia firm instead of to one in England. If American business cannot compete even with British business, which works in approximately the same kind of economic framework, how can we ever expect to compete with Russian buisness, which operates as a political arm of the state?

The question as to how we allocate our resources is certainly as important, and in many respects, more important than the rate of our economic growth. What counts is the uses to which the growth is put. Leaving the question of quality to one side, we ought to be sobered by one single representative fact. It is that the Soviet Union devotes 8 percent of its gross national product to education, while the United States devotes but 3 to 4 percent. Yet there is in the United States an enormous margin for luxury that could be drawn upon for purposes that are in the interest of the whole Nation, without depriving anyone of what would still remain the highest material standard of life in the world.

The question we have to decide is a question of priorities. It is not—or need not be—difficult to resolve. For it does not call for a choice between guns and butter, or between electronic computers and television sets. It may call for a choice between better schools and teachers, or more country club memberships. But this could hardly be called an austerity program. Moreover, the whole of the educational and other programs that we need for national strength—here at home and abroad—would bear all the more lightly on the Nation if we could

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courage and should relieve troubled leaders from any illusion that they are prevented from taking diplomatic initiative by a suspicious and restraining public.

Past Secretaries of State have often been prisoners of the people, but the same can hardly be said today. The signs are clear to those who would see that if our leaders choose to lead, the people will follow. In the end, this is perhaps the most hopeful development on the present unhappy world scene.

Our Responsibilities in World Affairs—Address by Senator Fulbright

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JOHN SPARKMAN
OF ALABAMA
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Monday, May 11, 1959

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, on the evening of May 7, 1959, the very learned and distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], delivered the Gabriel Silver lecture on international understanding at Columbia University in New York. His subject was "Our Responsibilities in World Affairs." It was a fine presentation and thought provoking. I ask unanimous consent, therefore, that it be printed in the Appendix of the RECORD:

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OUR RESPONSIBILITIES IN WORLD AFFAIRS

(Remarks of Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT, chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Gabriel Silver Lecture on International Understanding, Columbia University, May 7, 1959)

In the Constitutional Convention, when it was proposed that each session be opened with prayer, Alexander Hamilton jumped to his feet with an objection. "I am opposed on principle," he said, "to calling on any foreign power for help."

As a new chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, this narrow view from a Founding Father is not at all to my liking. On the contrary, I seek help from various sources—and especially from the "foreign power" Alexander Hamilton tried to keep outside the 3-mile limit.

I have come to do this for many reasons. In the first place, I have had pointed reminders that a chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is also a Senator from a single State—a State whose people have legitimate local interests which demand his attention in the Congress. If he fails to speak the local voice—while trying at the same time to serve the national interest—it seems safe to make one prediction about his future. The people of his State will see that he has time to write his memoirs, following the next election.

In the second place—and this is much more important where foreign affairs are concerned—the chairman and his committee colleagues often find themselves in a constitutional no man's land. We want to do our best to contribute to the energy, the strength of will, and the clarity of purpose which the effective conduct of our external relations demands. But the question constantly is: How can we make this contribution when the constitutional boundary line between the Senate and the Executive in this general area is so uncertain?

In times past, the rivalry between the Senate and the Executive, over the conduct of foreign affairs, found both too weak to advance, too strong to surrender—and may I add, too proud to ask for mercy. We want to avoid such a result today. But the practice of the matter is shot through with problems.

For example, if my committee colleagues and I tried to detail a solution to any crisis of the moment in our foreign affairs, the immediate effect would be an increase in the post office deficit. For there would follow a flood of mail charging us with a dangerous usurpation of the Executive's constitutional responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations. On the other hand, if we tried to lay down guidelines for the longer range problems of foreign policy, the same letter-writers would inform us that we have a special taste for the fuzzy and impractical, when America's real need is for specific solutions to the latest problem in the headlines.

Meanwhile, whether we deal with the problems of the here and the now, or with those of the day after tomorrow, my committee colleagues—indeed all the Members of the Senate—face a further complication. The professionally trained personnel, and the complex communication network that is involved in formulating and executing foreign policy, are not, and should not be, under the direct control of the Senate. They are, and should remain, under the direct control of the President—if for no other purpose than to read and answer Mr. Krushchev's latest note, but it is a complex system.

To all this, there is a more immediate reason why I feel the need of guidance from above. It is, quite simply, that you have asked me to speak this evening about "Our Responsibilities in World Affairs." The danger here takes the form of an analogy to a German professor who spent his life writing a three-volume treatise on the "Secret of Hegel." When the work was finally published, the reviewer observed that the "author should be congratulated for having written so much about the secret of Hegel yet managing just the same to keep the secret to himself."

Still, despite the danger that you will apply that same judgment to what I have to say, let me come to my theme by putting three questions. First, what are the issues of foreign policy which now face the Nation? Second, among those issues, which are as transient as the wind, and which are like the deep current of a river? And third, what is the proper role of the Senate with respect to those issues? Our responsibility in world affairs is to understand these three issues and then to take appropriate, effective action to meet them.

The issues of foreign policy that we face are born of three revolutions abroad in the world. One is the revolution of nationalism. The second revolution is in the will for improved living conditions. And the third is the technological revolution. Each of these has an inner connection with the other. All share the common word "revolution." All defy the attempt of any single nation to exercise a full control over the course the three revolutions take. All three would have occurred if Karl Marx and Joseph Stalin had never been born. And perhaps most ominous of all, few Americans seem yet to have grasped the full significance of these three worldwide revolutions.

Let me take them up in order.

First, nationalism: We must disabuse ourselves of the notion that the American War of Independence had anything in common with the spirit of nationalism that is now sweeping through the newly independent countries and through most colonial areas. Our own case was one where American Englishmen had demanded English rights from British Englishmen—including the right to be represented in the British Parliament. Indeed, had Benjamin Franklin's plan for representation been accepted by King George III, with a little stretch of the imagination one can conceive of a sequel, admirably suited to be scenario material for Hollywood.

Specifically, in the year 1860, the population of America for the first time exceeded that of Great Britain. Hence the American members of the English Parliament would have been in the majority and would promptly have voted to move the English Crown to this country. Whereupon there would have followed the spectacle of Queen Victoria sailing up the Potomac River, to be greeted at the Georgetown landing by her new Prime Minister—Abraham Lincoln.

Unfortunately for Hollywood, Benjamin Franklin's plan was rejected and we had our revolution. But unlike the general case nowadays in nationalist revolutions, the racial factor did not enter into the picture. The social factor did not enter either, since the chief revolutionaries in America were card-carrying English Whig gentlemen of the highest pedigree. Nor, for that matter, was the technological element a motive for revolution. The greater part of England, like the greater part of the United States, still lived off a barnyard economy in rural isolation.

Today, by marked contrast, the national revolutions going on all around us represent, only in part, a desire for political independence for its own sake. They also express a desire to erase the memory of racial subservience; a desire to be the author of one's own history, and a desire to stand in the sun with a distinctive national personality. For the latter reason, it is closely related to the demand for better living conditions, for the prestige and the respectability associated with industrialization and material prosperity.

In the maturity of our own industrial civilization, it is easy enough for us to sermonize the newly independent nation on the theme that the producer, not production, should be the object of social effort; that the human soul, and not the human body, should be the paramount good one ought to seek. But we can scarcely blame these people if, to our sermonizing, they answer: "It is true enough that man does not live by bread alone; but at least he lives if he has bread." Nor can we blame them if they go on to add: "Unless we can get bread-producing machines from the West, then we will get them from the Communist bloc, and, if necessary, in the Communist manner."

Meanwhile, the daily spectacle unfolding before our eyes is the way the Soviet Union has identified itself in many countries with the cause of nationalism while we are identified with that of imperialism. Why should this be so, in defiance of all logic and the history of our actual interests? The reason, I suspect, is that the Soviet Foreign Office and the Politburo are better at simple arithmetic than are the American State Department and the National Security Council. For the Soviets and their local Communist agents make it appear that they are on the side of the people; whereas we make it appear that we are on the side of the oligarchs who rule the people. Too often we find our friends and allies liquidated as a new group takes over.

To be sure, both we and the Soviets use the same words—peace, freedom, democracy, self-government, social justice, and independence. And I suppose that we ought to take a certain pride in the fact that these words, first taught in the West, express such universal hopes that the Soviets have seized upon them for their own purposes. Yet it is infuriating to see that in the Russian translation and application, these words are twisted into a caricature of the meaning we give them. It is all the more frustrating to observe that it is the Russian version, and

Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000200940176-6