

IDEOLOGY OF ERNESTO CHE GUEVARA EXPLORED

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The death of Ernesto Che Guevara, officially confirmed in Bolivia in October of 1967, finally solved the mystery about the Argentine-Cuban revolutionary. But his death and the failure of the guerrillas led by him in Bolivia also provided new fuel for the violent controversies carried on by continental left-wing forces about the means of the Latin American revolution.

Although Guevara became famous as a daring guerrilla leader, his real significance lies in the ideological field. As Marxian theorist of a particularly militant proletarian internationalism, as strategist and tactician of guerrilla warfare in Latin America, and as a reformer in Cuba, his was without doubt the most prominent and ablest intellect of Cuban Marxism besides Fidel Castro, and he had great influence on the thought and actions of the young revolutionary forces. His ideas, which were proclaimed loudest in Havana, will probably continue to play a part with the Latin American left. This is already assured by the fact that the discrepancy between the idea of armed struggle propagated by him and Cuba and the more moderate course of action advocated by the Soviet Union and the majority of the Latin American Communist Parties has entered a stage of open antagonism which cannot be settled overnight. For this reason alone, it appears useful to examine the ideological legacy of Che Guevara.

It must be mentioned beforehand that Che Guevara has not left a comprehensive theoretical work. With the exception of his book on guerrilla warfare La Guerra de Guerrillas (The Guerrilla War), Havana, INRA*1960, translated into all world languages), his ideas are found scattered in a great number of speeches, interviews, official documents and other publications. In spite of this somewhat splintered character, his ideological legacy does not lack a certain coherence. Only Guevara's last manuscript could not be taken into account here: his still-unpublished diary on the guerrilla episode in Bolivia. However, that too -- this much is known -- leaves his fundamental theses unchanged.

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I. Che Guevara's Radical Global Concept

The general line of action followed by N. Khrushchev, but also by the present leaders of the Soviet Union, is that of coexistence, of peaceful competition between states with different social systems, of avoidance of policies which might lead to a direct confrontation with the US and to atomic war, and of the realization of the socialist revolution in developed and underdeveloped countries in a peaceful way with participation of the non-Communist sectors of the population. This line of action ran into growing resistance not only in China but also in the militant movements of many of the developing countries.

1. Enemy of Peaceful Coexistence

Che Guevara was bitterly opposed to the politics of "peaceful coexistence," where his reasons were of a political and doctrinal nature. On the one hand, due to the strained relations between the US and Cuba and their consequences, he held that peaceful coexistence was illusory and impossible. ". . . The aggressive nature of the US's monopolistic capitalism makes any agreement impossible; the relationships will of necessity remain strained or become worse until the final destruction of imperialism."¹ Like Fidel Castro, Che Guevara refused to sign the Nuclear Agreement of August 1963 and spoke against the suggestion advanced by Brazil, Chile and Mexico in the UN to create a nuclear-free zone in Latin America.²

On the other hand, Guevara saw in the general concept which had been worked out by the international conference of the Communist Party of 1960 and by the last conferences of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in which great significance was seen in the possibility of realizing the socialist revolution in a peaceful manner and of developing the "state of national democracy" in the "Third World" a renunciation of the armed fight for independence in colonial and economically dependent areas and a watering-down of the struggle against imperialism in general. He was convinced of the inevitability of armed struggle in the underdeveloped world and above all in Latin America, and saw in Vietnam the shining example for the even greater conflict "which awaited imperialism on the Latin American continent." He prophesied that "the final victory in this struggle will also signify the end of US imperialism."³ The process of disintegration of the "imperialist world system" he thought to be so far advanced at the present that there exists a real possibility of changing the existing balance in the world and of sealing the "fate of imperialism" through the armed struggle for independence. Hence, in the final analysis, the idea of coexistence of the Communist states meant for Guevara a strengthening of imperialism and neo-colonialism.

¹Footnotes may be found following the text.

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2. Militant Proletarian Internationalism

Che Guevara's concept of proletarian internationalism far exceeds the limits set by the Eastern European countries.⁴ He judged that "there are no limits in this struggle of life or death." "The victory of any nation over imperialism is our victory, and its defeat is defeat for all of us. The practice of proletarian internationalism is not only a duty . . . , but an urgent necessity. It is our international duty . . . with our efforts to help bring about the liberation of the nations as quickly and as radically as possible."⁵ What he meant by this is obvious from the following reproach addressed to Moscow and Peking: "The solidarity of the progressive world with the people of Vietnam today resembles the bitter irony of the plebeians who encouraged the gladiators in the Roman arena. The point is not to wish the victim of aggression success, but to share his fate." It would have been their duty "to make Vietnam an inviolable part of the socialist world and to force the US into a decision -- even at the risk of world war."⁷

This is the way, similar to Fidel Castro, in which Che Guevara conceived of the "basic line of action of militant anti-imperialism and internationalism" of Cuba. The development of socialism in Cuba was for him only one of the fundamental tasks of the new regime -- and not even the most important. The more meaningful task was to actively and with all possible means advance the "anti-imperialist struggle for liberation wherever it had started or where conditions were ripe for it. Long after Guevara had left Cuba, Fidel Castro said, ". . . Our Country is fighting for its wealth and its future, but it will never want to achieve this future at the dishonorable price of the betrayal of its international duties."⁸ For Che Guevara, this postulate was not only of political but also of eminent moral significance. He feared that a revolution which concentrated only on the solution of its own economic problems and forgot militant proletarian internationalism would soon cease being a guiding force for humanity.⁹ Glancing at Eastern Europe, he felt that it would certainly degenerate to sluggish indolence in which the real revolutionary spirit would be lost.

3. War and Peace

No problem has been more vigorously disputed during the past years within world Communism than the question of war and peace. In this connection it has frequently been asked whether Guevara's militant anti-imperialism does not represent a particularly extreme pro-war doctrine. This question cannot be answered in the affirmative without reservations. For him, nuclear conflict was not an unavoidable means of carrying out the world revolution. But neither did he draw back from a world war which might be the consequence of a local fight for liberation. With regard to Cuba, he explained: "For the right to build up socialism according to the will of our people, we must pay any price."¹⁰ And, at another point, "If it has fulfilled its role as example for Latin America, our nation will be completely happy, even if because of it nuclear war should come about."¹¹ That this was not mere rhetoric became apparent during the rocket crisis of 1962.

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Che Guevara considered the anti-imperialist struggle for liberation in Africa, Asia and Latin America to be historically justified and necessary. "If anybody opposes it," it was his opinion that "it is permissible . . . to employ arms in the fight for peace."¹² He demanded of the Communist countries to make this fight for liberation their fight, and he blamed them for having betrayed Vietnam out of fear of a global conflict with the US. He wrote, "Since the imperialists extort humanity with the threat of war, it is a wise reaction not to fear war! . . . It is our duty to liberate it at any price."¹³ He said it was the task of Latin America to create a second or third Vietnam which would then introduce "the final victory over imperialism" in a global conflict.

Che Guevara talked of the suffering and the victims of such a struggle as nothing by saying, "They would be less than those which we would have to suffer if we continuously avoided war so that others would have to do the dirty work for us."¹⁴ His statement that "US imperialism is weaker than we think; it is a giant on clay feet," does not permit us to interpret this to mean that he may perhaps have had in mind a peaceful submission by the US.¹⁵

Thus, it is obvious that Guevara's ideas on war and peace do not agree with the Soviet line but are closer to Mao's.

4. The Unity of the Anti-Imperialist Struggle

In the writings from the time Che Guevara spent in Cuba, we find no hint as to his position with regard to the schism in the Communist world. Nevertheless, it was hardly a secret to anyone that he sympathized with Peking as far as the tactics and strategy of the so-called anti-imperialist struggle was concerned. Only after he had left Cuba, he wrote, "In view of the malice and inflexibility with which the respective points of view are advocated, we, the dispossessed, can take our stand neither on the one side nor on the other side of the discrepancies . . . , even though we sometimes agree more with the assertions of the one side than with those of the other."¹⁶ This statement, which may be interpreted as being pro-Chinese is however not based on a relationship of ideological dependence by Guevara on Peking. Early in 1960, Che Guevara admitted to the author that he knew neither Mao Tse-tung's writings nor anything else about China, and in 1963 he explained to a US student delegation that any agreement of his position with that of Peking was "purely accidental." He blamed both Moscow and Peking for the continued existence of the schism.¹⁷

Guevara had no illusions about the prevailing contradictions. They were said to have reached such intensity and bitterness that there was little or no hope for a dialogue or perhaps even a reconciliation. Nevertheless, he passionately called for unity. He wrote, "The time has come to bury our discrepancies and to employ all of our forces in the service of our struggle." And his reason for this was that "The enemy is at hand; he attacks us daily and threatens us with new attacks, and these attacks shall unite us today, tomorrow, or the day after.

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Anyone who is the first to see this and who prepares for the necessary unity will receive the gratitude of the nations."¹⁸

Guevara considered the unity of the Communist world movement to be more than merely a theoretical, academic question. For him it was the prerequisite for "the creation of a common front of all underdeveloped countries with the Communist countries against imperialism." The manner in which "imperialism" proceeds against both groups of countries "justifies with elementary logic the necessity of an alliance -- and if there is no other reason for a close alliance, the common enemy provides it."¹⁹ But Guevara was skeptical of the Eastern European countries. Independently of them, he pleads everywhere -- at the World Conference for Trade and Development (Geneva, 1964), in the United Nations (December, 1964), and during his stay of several months in Africa and Asia (early in 1965) -- "to establish the unity of the camp of the underdeveloped countries."²⁰ He was, without doubt, the spiritual originator of the Tricontinental Conference held in Havana in January 1966 and the founder of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS), which was given the task to become the mouthpiece for the liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and to advance and coordinate their armed struggle.²¹

II. Che Guevara on the Strategy and Tactics of the Revolution in Latin America

Guevara's ideological complex which is most significant and most nearly complete in itself concerns the revolution in Latin America. This was his most important business. Guevara's contribution consists in his having clarified the theoretical theses which were designed to serve as fundamental guidelines for the strategy and tactics of an armed struggle for liberation and for guerrilla warfare. Even today, these theses are still an integral part of Castro-Marxism, especially of the OLAS mentioned above which has its seat in Havana.

1. The Theories Derived from the Cuban Revolution

Che Guevara's theses on the Latin American revolution are primarily characterized by the extrapolation of the Cuban example to the conditions on the whole continent. Its motto is: "What was possible in Cuba can be repeated in Latin America." With reference to this, we have to call attention to the following authoritative theses:

Objective and subjective conditions. According to Guevara, the Cuban example proved that wherever latifundium and capital are allied with US capitalism and where, as a consequence, political dependence and underdevelopment prevail -- and this is said to hold for most countries of Latin America -- the objective conditions for a revolution according to the Cuban example are given. He specified that "these objective conditions are based on hunger -- the common denominator of the masses of Latin America -- the reaction of the masses to this hunger, the government terror and the hatred which is a product of this terror."²² Of course, in some countries (such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico),

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he did not consider the objective conditions for a revolutionary development as being immediately present. But in most of the countries of Latin America he judged the objective conditions to be incomparably more ready than those which had existed in Cuba.²³

As far as the subjective conditions are concerned, the Cuban revolution was said to have shown that these can be created during the struggle itself. Guevara stressed that the revolutionary consciousness "is created through the struggle, through armed struggle," because only this struggle would bring "clearly into consciousness the necessity of a radical revulsion and the defeat of the army by the people's forces." Fidel Castro also explains that "Man himself, the revolutionary process, creates the revolutionary consciousness."²⁴ Like him, Che Guevara was of the opinion that there was no need for politically-prepared masses to get a revolution under way, but that one needed only a small guerrilla nucleus with the capacity to draw the masses into the struggle, as in Cuba.

The Hopelessness of the Peaceful Way. Next, Che Guevara feels that the Cuban experience has proven until everybody became weary of it that it is impossible in Latin America to effect thorough reforms for the masses in a peaceful manner. He thus thought the struggle which aims only at creating civil legality without putting itself the task of assuming power to be completely senseless.²⁵ In guerrilla warfare, the masses must be convinced of the impossibility of carrying on the struggle for social gains within the framework of civil conflict.²⁶

Justification of the Armed Struggle. Third, he thought the Cuban revolution to have shown the correctness of the idea of an armed fight and of the fighting methods of guerrilla warfare. Che Guevara did in fact warn not to underestimate the role played by the constitutional methods of fighting, but he left no doubt that he considered armed fighting -- according to Cuban example -- the principal way "of getting to power."²⁷ After all, without destruction of the existing army, even the victory in a popular election would provide no guarantee. The conflict with the reactionary classes would soon spring up again, and the danger of a military coup d'etat would always be there. Hence, Guevara had little regard for the more moderate theses of many of the Communist parties. His fighting motto was that of the Second Declaration of Havana: "It is the duty of each revolutionary to make revolution." Referring to the hesitating Communist parties, he wrote, ". . . Nobody has the right to believe that liberty can be obtained without struggle."²⁸ Besides, he thought the Cuban experience to have shown that, in Latin America, guerrilla warfare is the only correct form of fighting for power to be used by the masses.²⁹

Rural Areas as Center of Gravity in the Fighting. Fourth, he thought the Cuban revolution to have clearly shown that "the basic armed struggle in the underdeveloped part of America must be carried out in the rural areas."³⁰ Guevara opposed those who wanted to concentrate the fighting in the cities and ignored the large part of the rural population. He said that because of the inhuman conditions under which they live, theirs would be the decisive part in the national struggle for

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liberation. In the end, the country would conquer the cities with the help of an army of peasants.³¹ To the forces in the city should be given the role of merely supporting the guerrilla bands operating in the rural areas. The decisive factor in this was that Guevara saw the principal contradiction in Latin America in the gap between the backward rural areas and the far more highly developed cities. To this was added his tactical consideration that the nucleus of guerrillas in the country would continue to guarantee the continued existence of the revolutionary leadership, even if the movement in the city were to be destroyed by the enemy.

Support by the Rural Population. As a basic prerequisite of successful guerrilla fighting, Che Guevara postulated, according to the Cuban example, the support of the guerrillas by the local rural population. He found this support to be a condition "sine qua non" for the struggle against a powerful army with modern equipment.³² Guevara considered it a foregone conclusion that the masses of the workers and peasants of Latin America would take the side of the guerrillas, join them, and supply them. After all, on the basis of the Cuban experience, they would know that it is possible to win with the guerrillas; secondly, they would have thus become conscious of the fact "that the future belongs to the people, since it is for social justice."³³ He figured that without comprehensive support by the rural population, guerrilla warfare could not be recommended in Latin America, either.

The similarity of Guevara's postulates with the theses of Mao Tse-tung on peasant war and the encirclement of the city by the country is obvious. The OLAS conference in Havana (1967) accepted all of these theses. Contrary to this, they are not accepted today by the majority of the Latin American and European Communist parties which point out the difference in the conditions in Cuba and in Latin America.

2. Exception from the Cuban Example

From within the ranks of many orthodox Communist parties, repeated statements have been made since the triumph of Fidel Castro which consider it questionable whether the Cuban revolution could be repeated and which point toward the "exceptional character" of the case of Cuba. Che Guevara himself was aware of some of these exceptions in the Cuban model.

Polarization of the Forces. Guevara admitted that the success of the Cuban revolution was made possible by the support which Fidel Castro was also given by many sections of the propertied classes and by the passive behavior of the US. "Thus, non-revolutionary forces actually helped in the establishment of the revolutionary regime . . . , US imperialism was disoriented, and it did not succeed in understanding the true significance of the Cuban revolution."³⁴

However, Che Guevara felt that this formula today could no longer be successfully be applied in Latin America because of the later change-over to the socialist revolution in Cuba. He thought that the propertied classes of Latin America had learned their lesson from this and that

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"even imperialism on the continent could no longer be taken by surprise."³⁵ He maintained that "The Cuban revolution has given the signal It has drawn the line in the sand and introduced a process of polarization of the forces: the exploiters on one side of the line, the exploited on the other."³⁶ He further assumed that this polarization process would become more strongly accentuated with the continuing radicalization of the Cuban revolution. Neutrality would, of necessity, become the exception, and the contrary positions of the bourgeoisie and the working class would become more clearly defined. Finally, the polarization of the antagonistic forces would explode in a global conflict.

Revolution Without Bourgeoisie. Che Guevara was convinced of the fact that, because of the polarization which had occurred, one must no longer expect the participation of wide strata of the middle class and the lower middle class in the revolution. Even though he thought that there existed contradictions "between the national bourgeoisie and imperialism, these bourgeoisies have shown that they fear the people's revolution more than the suffering of imperialist suppression . . ."³⁷ For this reason, the majority of them have allied themselves with "imperialism" and openly resist the revolutionary efforts of the masses. Hence, the possibility of the participation of the Latin American middle classes in the revolutionary struggle, as it was postulated by the declaration of the 81 Communist parties (Moscow, 1960), was decidedly denied by Che Guevara. Also, he thought that the tactics successfully employed by Castro to disguise his movement by giving it an exclusively anti-dictatorial and even slightly anti-Communist appearance before the seizure of power, could not be repeated. Today, such a disguise would be illusory and damaging. Hence, the struggle for liberation would have to be carried on in the name of Marxism-Leninism in Latin America and would have to openly pursue the goal of the "realization of the socialist revolution."³⁸ He thought it absolutely necessary that it identify itself with the Cuban revolution. Guevara reasoned that with the "victory over imperialism" and over local reactionary forces in Latin America, too, the first stage of the socialist revolution would be attained ". . . Then the people could begin with building up socialism."³⁹

The Continental Character of the Struggle. Due to its tactics during the period of the uprising, the Cuban revolution did not become an object of global conflict between the US and the Soviet Union prior to its triumph but attained its victory, in a way, "isolated" from other world affairs. Guevara considered a repetition of this happy state of affairs impossible in Latin America. He was certain that now the US would leave nothing undone in order to give not only political but also military support to the ruling oligarchies. Hence, military intervention by the US and by the reactionary neighboring states would make the success of the revolution in each country much more difficult to attain. He thought that from this arises the necessity to reply "to the unification of the forces of suppression with the unification of the forces of the people."⁴⁰ Consequently, Che Guevara conceived of "The organization of a continental fighting front against imperialism and its local allies."⁴¹ This idea was realized in the OLAS and probably also in a kind of strategic supreme command of the guerrilla movements.

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Thus, on a number of significant questions, Che Guevara admitted the exceptional position of the Cuban revolution. However, he did not conclude from this that a repetition of this revolution would therefore be impossible on the continent, but that it would just be much more difficult and could take much longer. For example, in Bolivia, Guevara is said to have expected the fight to take about ten to twenty years.⁴² His basic conception of the correctness of an armed struggle in Latin America was not diminished by this but rather strengthened.

3. The Guerrilla as the Military Arm in the Struggle for Liberation

For Che Guevara, guerrilla war was the primary military instrument of the revolutionary movement. Hence, he attributed decisive significance to the tactics of guerrilla warfare. What were his relevant fundamental ideas?

Phases of Development of the Guerrilla. Guevara wrote that after the selection of the area of operations, a guerrilla war would generally run through three stages.⁴³ In the first stage, that of strategic defense, he thought it was the principal task of the guerrillas to get to know the terrain, to carry out limited attacks, and above all to prevent their own destruction.⁴⁴ In this stage, during which also contact with the population and future strongholds would have to be built up, there would be "three conditions for the survival of the guerrillas: constant mobility, constant vigilance and constant distrust."⁴⁵ As soon as the guerrillas had overcome their relative tactical inferiority, had grown in numbers and had established a solid stronghold in an area in which the army would no longer dare to attack, the guerrilla war would enter its second phase. During this, the guerrillas would resort to ever more powerful strikes, would force the opposition forces into the defensive and would enlarge the liberated zone. The third and last phase would be introduced with bringing out the guerrillas, now organized in strong units, and would lead to the occupation of the large cities and to the total destruction of the enemy.⁴⁶

Fighting Tactics of the Guerrillas. Like Mao Tse-tung, Che Guevara saw the basic problem of a weak guerrilla group as opposed to a powerful regular army in the following tactic: "In view of the general superiority of the enemy, we must find the tactical way of attaining relative superiority at a selected point."⁴⁷ By the concentration of superior forces or the use of the terrain, the correlation of the forces would have to be shifted and superiority of one's own forces would have to be created. Under no circumstances should a struggle be entered into "which does not bring victory as long as one is able to determine 'how' and 'when'."⁴⁸ Guevara ascribed decisive significance above all to the element of surprise and to the speed with which the guerrillas hit the enemy, where he assigns an important role to night attacks, fast retreats and evasion movements. On the other hand, he scorned the idea of guerrilla war as "passive self-defense" of a certain area, without regard to the rest of the country.⁴⁹ Such a tactic would necessarily lead to the localization, surrounding and destruction of the guerrilla. Even in the beginning stage, the guerrillas

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should "constantly develop their capacity to attack the enemy." Only by consistently using the Vietnamese principle of "armed propaganda," i.e. of the demonstration of their military strength and invincibility, Che Guevara believed, can they win the population to their side and thus serve as catalyst of the popular forces.⁵⁰

Disturbance of the Existing Balance. The tendency toward institutionalism in the countries of Latin America was evaluated by Che Guevara as being unfavorable to the development of a guerrilla war. But even more he was afraid that the ruling classes, "who assume the appearance of democratically-elected representatives of the people," could succeed in blunting the class struggle by economic and social concessions and in averting the social explosion. Hence, he demanded that it must be the task of the guerrilla to prevent this backward development. He wrote, "It is necessary to disturb by force the balance between the oligarchic dictatorship and the pressure of the masses." "The dictatorship tries to maintain itself without use of force"; hence, it would be necessary "to force them to show themselves without disguise, in their true form as a violent dictatorship of the reactionary classes; this would . . . intensify the struggle to such an extent that it is no longer possible to withdraw."⁵¹ The guerrilla actions would force the democratic regimes to rid themselves of their pseudo-legality and to use terror against the guerrillas and their allies in the cities and in the country. Hence, he thought the main concern was to press on with the progressive radicalization of the revolutionary process.

Vietnam as Example. By using the guerrilla war, he not only wanted to force the downfall of the prevailing orders in Latin America, but also wanted to level a ruinous attack against the "imperialism of the US." For this reason, Guevara demanded the simultaneous development of guerrilla movements in several Latin American countries. Each was supposed to try to transform itself as fast as possible into an invincible people's army and thus force the US to secure the stability of the government, whose armed forces would collapse under the guerrilla attacks, by sending its own regular troops.⁵² Guevara reasoned that with this the tactical aim, "to lure the enemy from his natural environment and to force him to fight in regions where his living habits will collide with the existing realities," was attained. The cost in privations, victims and repeated defeats in the end would wear down the US soldiers and would bring about the class struggle in the US itself. Thus, for Che Guevara, the road for Latin America to take was that of Vietnam.

4. The Guerrillas as Political Center in the Struggle for Liberation

In addition to their decisive military function, the guerrillas, according to Che Guevara, also have significant political tasks which are designed to increase their revolutionary resonance and striking power.

The Guerrilla as Propagandist and Social Reformer. "The guerrillas are the fighting vanguard of the people." According to Guevara, this axiomatic necessity requires of the guerrillas that they create political

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conditions which are necessary for establishing revolutionary power.⁵³ Thus, it is the important task of the guerrillas to convince the local rural population of the justice and necessity of the armed struggle. In this, however, neither proclamations to the people nor personal dialogue are sufficient. The important point is to demonstrate the humanitarian goals of the guerrillas, to help the peasants "technically, economically, morally and culturally,"⁵⁴ in other words, to demonstrate with actions to the population the moral superiority of the guerrillas over the regular soldiers.⁵⁵ As an example, Guevara mentions the execution of agrarian reform in the liberated areas as it was carried out by Castro in the Sierra Maestra of Cuba. As a consequence of such measures, the land-hungry peasant population would take the side of the guerrillas and thus create the prerequisite for developing the guerrillas into a popular army and for extending and radicalizing the revolution.

The Guerrilla as Political Leader of the Revolution. However, Che Guevara took one more decisive step. He demanded that the guerrillas are to be considered not only as the military but also as the political center of the national liberation movement. Thus he remained true to the example of the Cuban revolution with respect to this point, too, in which the military and political leadership had been with Fidel Castro's headquarters. Guevara argues that, on the one hand, "the backbone of the political power of the movement remained unbroken, even when the revolutionary forces in the city suffered a defeat."⁵⁶ On the other hand, the guerrilla activity could not be directed from the city without robbing it of its striking power and efficiency, especially if one would try to subordinate the actions of the guerrillas to the goals of political maneuvers in the urban areas. For this reason, Guevara demands that both the political campaigns of the movement and the actions in the cities must be subordinated to the guerrilla war as the fundamental fighting method. Even in countries in which there is a large urban preponderance, "the political center of the struggle must therefore be developed in the country." In addition to this, he also demanded that "the military and political leaders . . . , as far as possible, should not be identical."⁵⁷ With this, Che Guevara definitely opposed the thesis which had been used by the Communist party of Venezuela and also by the Communist party of Bolivia and which consisted of the argument that the guerrillas should only represent the armed branch of the revolutionary movement, while the political center of gravity should remain in the city in the hands of the party leadership.

Challenge to the Leadership Role of the Orthodox Communist Parties. Guevara's conviction that the orthodox Communist parties of the continent had lost their "leadership role in the revolutionary and anti-imperialist struggle" was in back of his thesis of the central political role of the guerrillas.⁵⁸ Guevara was strengthened in this conviction by the partly passive, partly negative attitude of the majority of the Latin American Communist parties toward the Cuban call for armed fighting in the Second Declaration of Havana (1962) and by the almost unanimous condemnation of the course of guerrilla warfare recommended by Cuba and by the OLAS by all of these parties in recent times.⁵⁹ As early as 1963 he wrote,

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"Nobody can claim the title of vanguard like a diploma handed out by a university. To be the party of the vanguard means to lead the working class in its struggle for power, to guide it in its conquest of this power, and to show it the shortcuts available for this road."⁶⁰ Guevara accused the traditional Communist parties of occupying themselves only with the forms of legal fighting. In his opinion, they were striving only for alliance with other forces and, in this way, were indefinitely postponing the seizure of power. He thought that under present conditions the guerrillas were the only force which would consistently identify itself with the justified demands of the masses for radical solutions.

With this, Che Guevara denied the Communist parties of Latin America the moral right to lead the masses and he postulated instead that the future party, as in the case of Cuba, would have to grow out of the guerrilla nucleus. "The guerrilla is the germ of the party and not vice versa."⁶¹ In the same sense, Fidel Castro had attacked the "right-wing course" of the Communist parties of Latin America and had claimed for the guerrilla movements the leading political role in the continental fight for liberation.⁶² Thus, from the very beginning, there was hidden in Guevara's theses on the Latin American revolution the ambitious idea to **call into** life, through the guerrillas, a new radical left front for the **whole** continent which would be independent of the existing Communist parties and which would take its direction from Havana.

III. Che Guevara on the "Building of Socialism"

Che Guevara's ideas on the reconstruction of society in many ways put his personal stamp on the Cuban model of the "building of socialism." Of course, he formulated nothing concrete on the question of institutionalizing the revolution. Also, in the purely economic area he has left no original ideas; his theses on the priority of industrialization and on a strict centralism are today considered outdated even in Cuba. Nevertheless, Guevara has made a lasting contribution to the "development of the socialist order of society in Cuba, namely in the area of education and morals.

1. The Building of Socialism, the Individual, and Ethos

The Aim of Communist Society. Like Marx, Guevara considered the dictatorship of the proletariat and the building of socialism a preliminary stage in which the socialization of the means of production, the maximal development of technology, and a just property distribution had to be secured so that later the classless society of Communism with its optimal satisfaction of demands could be realized. But, for him, satisfying the material requirements was not the only and not even the most important concern. Socialism and Communism meant more to him than the destruction of the capitalist order and the creation of socialist conditions of production and distribution; they meant above all overcoming old ideas and replacing them by new ones.

In addition to the development of technology, Che Guevara therefore considered it to be the principal task of the socialist state "to create

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the new man" who is poisoned "neither by the ideas of the 19th century nor by those of our decadent . . . 20th century." "It is the man of the 21st century whom we have to create."⁶³ Hence, it is not the function of the dictatorship of the proletariat to keep down the classes which have been deprived of power, but to call forth spiritual and moral change in the victorious masses and above all in the young.

The Significance of the Revolutionary Consciousness. In selecting the correct instruments for the mobilization of the masses, Che Guevara always came back to the model of the guerrillas who had aroused a readiness to make sacrifices and a fighting enthusiasm in the people and, after the triumph, a growing devotion to the revolutionary cause. He believes that only in this way was it possible to skip over certain stages and to realize the "transition to socialism in Cuba" within barely two years.⁶⁴ Hence he demanded that it be a postulate that "to find a formula which will perpetuate this heroic attitude in the daily work, be one of our most important tasks from the ideological point of view."⁶⁵ However, in his opinion, this formula could in no way consist of ways and means which were a legacy of capitalism and in using them one would get into a "blind alley without escape" and "open the door to revisionism." Only by moral means would the state be able to prevent that the adult generations, who, for a large part, are affected with the reprehensible remainders of yesterday, "become morally corrupt and infect the growing generation."⁶⁶ Hence, Che Guevara demanded that the instrument of mobilization of the masses must basically be of a moral character.

Moral and Material Inducements. Guevara called the material inducement a damaging anachronism and, therefore, rejected it in principle as a lever for an accelerated development. He held that ". . . it is a remainder of the past; in the new society to be created there will be no room for it . . . ; it will be replaced by a moral inducement, a consciousness of duty and the new revolutionary attitude."⁶⁷ He left no doubt that he considered the moral inducement to have been the support and principal point of orientation of the Cuban revolution. At the same time, he was convinced that with the moral inducements he could, in the end, achieve a faster development of the productive forces than with material ones.⁶⁸ Che Guevara's idea of the budget finance system which he introduced and defended passionately also was based on this consideration. Che Guevara thought it superior to the system of self-financing and was convinced of the fact that it was closer to the stage of Communism, because it was not based on the capitalist concepts of profitability, self-interest, and material inducements. He saw the budget finance system as an important instrument for the development of the revolutionary consciousness and believed strongly that, in the final analysis, it would prove to be superior to the bonus system and the principle of economic accounting even with regard to the increase of productivity.⁶⁹ Finally, voluntary work played an important role in Che Guevara's conception of the development of man under socialism and communism.

Example and Messianic Calling. In connection with the task of creating a new "kind of man" during the "period of the building of

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socialism," Che Guevara demanded of the revolutionary elite to act as examples of their own ideas. By being a living example, something which Guevara took very seriously, he also wanted to gain distance from those Communist parties into which had crept the abuse of power and a return to the life of the bourgeoisie. He considered this duty to be an example of historical calling and thus gave it the characteristics of a mystical self-sacrifice and a devotion to the revolution which far exceeded the normal measure of devotion of the Marxist rationale. Even of the guerrilla fighter he had demanded that he be a "perfect ascetic."⁷⁰ Later he demanded of the revolutionary leaders that "in their daily dosage of human emotion" they must "not descend to the level which the ordinary human being shows them."⁷¹ Though he considered the elite to be the interpreters of the desires of the masses, as executors of the laws of history, he still thought them, however, to be far above the people.⁷² His unshakable belief in the inevitability of the predestined path caused him to admit that "all tasks of the revolutionary vanguard are at once magnificent and cause for anxiety."⁷³ In a completely charismatic spirit, he announced that, "In order to be able to say that we are the ideal, that as a nation we are leading all of America, we, the leaders, must pay a daily price . . . with our self-sacrifice."⁷⁴ All of this reflects a Messianic mysticism which constitutes a part of the legacy of Che Guevara which must not be underestimated.

2. Criticism of the East European Attitude

Che Guevara's passionate appeal to the moral obligation of the socialist state was directed above all to its relationship to other states, in particular to those of the underdeveloped world.

Help for the Third World by the "Socialist Countries." The complete dependence of Cuba on the assistance of the developed Communist countries prompted Guevara to examine this problem first. In doing this, he developed the idea that this aid -- contrary to that which the West grants -- must not be based on purely commercial interests but on the moral obligation unselfishly to help make it possible for the developing countries to join the highly industrialized nations soon. He blamed the East European countries for letting themselves be guided by world market prices in their economic relations with the areas of the Third World, prices which are determined by the capitalist nations and by the price gap between raw materials and manufactured goods caused by these nations. He accused them of profiting by this situation, "since they generally export manufactured goods and import raw materials from the Third World."⁷⁵ From this, Guevara concluded that under these conditions there can be no question of "mutual profit," that such an exchange could rather be said to be "immoral in nature," and that by it the Communist nations would, in a way, even become "accomplices in imperialist exploitation."⁷⁶ He claimed that the "socialist countries" have "the moral obligation to discontinue their silent conspiracy with the Western exploiting countries The development of the countries which are now on the road to liberation (should) cost the 'socialist states' something."⁷⁷

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Simultaneous Development of Socialism and Communism. Guevara rejected, on principle, the thesis of the development of socialism and Communism in two stages strictly separated in time. On the national level, in Cuba, he saw possibilities of a certain parallel development of socialism and Communism, e.g. through socialist educational measures and Communist advancement of consciousness. But, on an international level, Che Guevara definitely rejected the Soviet thesis that the realization of Communism would first occur in a single country. To strive for absolute satisfaction of all demands in a single country, e.g. the Soviet Union, at a time at which two-thirds of humanity still remain in the abyss of underdevelopment was for him -- as he once explained it to a group of his closest co-workers -- an "abject amorality,"⁷⁸ because, first, this country pursues its goal by way of discriminatory economic relations with the Third World and, secondly, because in this way the point at which the underdeveloped countries would be able to join the industrialized nations is being moved into an even more distant future. Because of this point of view, which sounds like Maoism, Guevara rejected the concept of economic competition with the West as a long-range overall strategy. In its place, he demanded massive help for the underdeveloped world as prerequisite for an accelerated "defeat of imperialism" and, when the time comes, a common and more or less simultaneous development of the "socialist" and the underdeveloped countries toward Communism.

IV. Concluding Considerations

One basic attitude which unequivocally characterizes his position within world Communism runs like a red thread through all of Che Guevara's ideology: the fact that he opposed, on principle, the Moscow-lining concepts. In all areas, whether it be the general strategy for the anti-imperialist struggle, that of the fight for liberation in the underdeveloped world, or that for building the socialist society, his ideas depart from these concepts on significant points. In place of peaceful coexistence, of the popular front tactics, and the emphasis on the satisfaction of material demands, he puts the militant anti-imperialism of the Third World, with the Communist countries or without them, direct armed fighting for liberation and emphasis on the moral development under socialism and Communism. This inadvertently calls to mind Mao Tse-tung's theses on cultural revolution, on permanent popular struggle, and on the encirclement of the city by the country in a universal sense. In spite of this apparent relationship of the basic conceptions, it would be wrong to speak of an ideological dependence on Peking by Che Guevara. If Guevara sympathized much more with China than with the Soviet Union, then this is explained by the fact that he -- like Mao Tse-tung -- formulated his Marxist theory exclusively from the point of view of the problems and the requirements of the Third World; and in that respect Latin America has more in common with China than with Eastern Europe. Hence, it is correct to say that Castro-Marxism, of which Che Guevara was the most prominent ideologist, is basically a product of their own experience and of the Latin American realities.

Thus, the significance of Che Guevara's ideas must be seen in the fact that they contributed theses for a new, essentially independent Latin

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American Marxism which renounced many of the formulas of the conventional Communist parties of the continent and took on the role of a rival in the revolutionary process. Both, Che Guevara as well as Fidel Castro, have repeatedly and in recent years with increasing emphasis pointed out this original, independent character.⁷⁹ It is not clear whether Che Guevara supported Fidel Castro's break with China early in 1966; but it is obvious that this pointed dispute was the logical consequence of Guevara's theses on the independence and the originality of the ideology of Cuban Marxism. The will toward independence of this new Marxism is not only expressed with regard to the Communist parties of Latin America and the so-called modern revisionism in general, but also with regard to Peking with the goal of establishing a third Communist center of force with Havana as the new Mecca. Thus, in the final analysis, the significance of Che Guevara's ideas must also be seen in the fact that it exceeds by far the concept of freedom of action and tactical independence of the individual Communist parties as given at the conference in Karlovy Vary, as well as Togliatti's polycentralism or the theory of the "unity of multiplicity."

Especially with reference to the international solidarity of the liberation movement, Guevara's position was even further to the left than that of Fidel Castro himself. While the latter acted with reservation during the crisis in the Dominican Republic in the spring of 1965 and thus, de facto, recognized the priority of the consolidation of socialism in Cuba, Che Guevara was, even with reference to Vietnam, definitely a champion of consistent use of the principle of proletarian internationalism, no matter what the consequences might be.

Mysticism, Messianism, and belief in an elite gave Che Guevara's theories markedly romantic and idealistic characteristics and an emotional force which could not help but rouse, particularly, an impatient youth within and outside of Latin America.

In this connection we can speak of an objective significance of the ideological legacy of Che Guevara. And we can do this regardless of the fact that Che Guevara's theses as well as the programmatic OLAS declarations⁸⁰ which have largely incorporated these theses are almost uniformly rejected as voluntaristic and romantic left radicalism by the pro-Soviet Communist parties of Latin America and Europe.⁸¹

After what has been said, the interesting question arises whether developments will pass over Che Guevara's legacy or whether his ideas will live on after his death, as he had prophesied, and will continue to be effective in Cuba and in the revolutionary liberation movement of the Third World.

As far as Cuba is concerned, his main theses will certainly continue to be of significance. His theses on the Latin American revolution have been incorporated into the declaration of the OLAS conference organized by Havana.⁸² The fundamental role of moral inducements has repeatedly been stressed by Fidel Castro. However, especially the latest deterioration of relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union must be evaluated

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as a triumph of Che Guevara's ideas. The condemnation of the Soviet Union by Castro because of the re-establishment of diplomatic and economic relations with the different countries of Latin America, his remarks about capitalist tendencies in the Russian economic system, the proceedings recently held in Havana against a so-called "micro-fraction" of pro-Soviet Communists, and the decision by Cuba not to take part in the Budapest conference are all an indication that today Che Guevara's fundamental conceptions with regard to Eastern Europe are reflected to a greater extent in Cuban domestic and foreign policies than they were even during his lifetime.⁸³ Nor will this probably change in the foreseeable future.

Compared to this, the survival of Che Guevara's ideas on the Latin American continent must be considered doubtful. Negative experiences with guerrilla warfare, up to now, in many places have brought about the point of view that many of his theses do not withstand an objective analysis of the present Latin American conditions. The reproach that he stayed too closely with the Cuban model and that he did not sufficiently take into consideration the Latin American conditions is probably justified. Both Guevara's theses on the willingness of the peasant population to join the guerrillas and on their capability to develop a broad revolutionary popular movement, as well as his conviction of the invincibility of the guerrillas can be subjected to this objection. Beyond this, there arises the basic question whether, today, in Latin America, even in the most backward countries, there even exist the objective conditions for an armed struggle for liberation and a guerrilla war.

On the other hand, as is apparent from the latest reports, the economic and social progress in Latin America advances at an alarmingly slow rate.⁸⁴ In several important areas such as in agriculture there is stagnation or even a regressive tendency, while in the area of foreign economic aid the situation appears to be considerably less favorable than ten years ago. Furthermore, the more favorable rates of growth are, in the long run, completely insufficient to stop the continual increase of the gap between Latin America and the highly industrialized nations, let alone of decreasing it. The difficulties which face even the most progressive governments in Latin America in the enactment of even modest economic reforms and social programs are well known.

From these circumstances, important conclusions may be drawn. After all, Guevara's basic conception rests on the assumption that a solution of the fundamental problems of Latin America is impossible by peaceful means, by way of the capitalist economic order and of representative democracy, or with the help of the US. As long as this thesis is not convincingly disproved by facts, above all by a general and lasting economic improvement, Che Guevara's ideas will probably continue to find disciples in intellectual and student circles and among the discontented masses of Latin America.

Summary

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Because of the important role Ché Guevara played in the Cuban revolution and as the organizing brain of armed revolt in Latin America, the author considers that his recent death in Bolivia marks an opportune moment for an analysis of his ideological heritage. The urgent need for such a study is felt to be underscored by the present challenge posed by the Havana controlled OLAS to Latin American peaceful development and because of the growing rift between Castro's Cuba and the pro-soviet CP on the continent.

As regards Ché Guevara's global concepts concerning the anti-imperialist struggle, the author shows that he rejected the concept of peaceful coexistence, considering it a betrayal of the liberation struggle fought in many parts of the world. Ché Guevara interpreted the principle of international proletarian solidarity as an obligation to give more than just lip-service support to this struggle. In his "Message to the Tricontinental" in 1967 he even rebuked the two big communist powers for failing to make Vietnam their battle-ground at the proper time. From this the author concludes that Ché Guevara did not rule out the possibility of a nuclear conflagration. The threat of war, he taught, should not deter the masses in the underdeveloped countries from fighting for their liberation at any cost. To doom the stronghold of world imperialism, the United States, the country he called "a giant with clay feet", Ché Guevara pleaded for unity in the communist world and advocated a close and militant alliance between the communist nations and the progressive countries and liberation movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The author deals thereupon with the core of Ché Guevaras heritage — his thesis regarding the basic strategy and tactics of armed revolt and guerrilla warfare in Latin America. He points out that one the hand Ché Guevara professed the Cuban revolution to be *the* example, because it had demonstrated a) that in many Latin American countries conditions were ripe for revolution, b) that armed struggle and the guerrilla war method focussed on the countryside and based on peasant support rather than on the city movement, were the only correct solutions for seizing power. The author notes, however, that Ché Guevara admitted exceptional circumstances had favored the triumph of the Cuban revolution that could not be expected to

repeat themselves on the continent. He held, above all, that the rapid transition to socialism of the Cuban revolution had produced a polarization of forces in Latin America, aligning all reactionary forces and U. S. imperialism on one side and the popular masses on the other. Neither the middle classes nor the United States could therefore be deceived and surprised again (as they had been in Cuba!); repressive measures would be severe from the outset and the struggle long and hard. Consequently, Ché Guevara ruled, revolutionary war in Latin America would have to be waged without the support of the bourgeoisie and on an openly anti-imperialist, Marxist and pro-Cuban label.

Ché Guevara called for armed struggle on a continental scale to counteract the close military collaboration between the so-called Latin American "ruling oligarchies" and U. S. imperialism. Small guerrilla units, operating in a number of countries according to a coordinated strategy and hit and run tactics were to sharpen existing contradictions making the struggle more and more radical. Gradually they were to grow into large peasant armies, turning finally Latin America, as Ché Guevara put it, into the torch of a second or third Vietnam. Attention is also called to the fact that Ché Guevara did not consider the guerrilla only as the main military instrument, but as the political center of the whole revolutionary movement as well. He maintained that the revolutionary party should grow out of the guerrilla and not vice versa. Most of these views, the author points out, are rejected by the orthodox CP of Latin America and

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Europe.

The article goes on to discuss Ché Guevara's ideological contribution to the period of constructing socialism in Cuba, noting that Ché Guevara the economist was less influential than Ché Guevara the moralist. The author stresses his conviction that socialism as well as communism only made sense in terms of the creation of a morally superior man and explains thus, why the development of a revolutionary consciousness was more important to Ché Guevara than the problem of satisfying the material needs. For mass-mobilization he therefore relied on moral incentives, looking upon material incentives as harmful remnants of the capitalist past.

Particular attention is also called to the fact that Ché Guevara considered existing trade relations between the communist nations of Eastern Europe and the underdeveloped countries to be immoral and the former "accomplices of imperialism", because of their basing trade on world-market prices. He also objected on moral grounds to the Soviet thesis of constructing communism in one country first and advanced the idea that simultaneous development of socialism and communism was possible to a certain degree.

As to the conclusions, the author points out that while Ché Guevara's views differed from pro-soviet conceptions on all major points, their apparent coincidence with those of Mao Tse-tung was not due to ideological dependence on Peking.

The importance of Guevara's ideological heritage is above all seen in the fact it laid the groundwork for an independent Latin American marxism as advocated by the Cuban revolution and the OLAS, implying a direct challenge to the orthodox CP in Latin America with the objective of forging a third force of world communism in the name of the underdeveloped countries. But it is also seen in the idealism and mysticism in which Ché Guevara had wrapped his ideology, that necessarily exercise an appeal, especially in the ranks of the youth.

As to the future of Ché Guevara's heritage, the author feels that it will preserve its place in the Cuban revolution. As to Latin America he points out some obvious flaws and contradictions in Ché Guevara's writing about the inevitability of the revolutionary path. New realities shaping up on the continent might render Ché Guevara's ideas ineffective. But facts pointing into the other direction are also signalled out, and the article finishes on the ominous note, that unless decisive progress is attained on the continent, the spirit of Ché Guevara might well continue haunting the Latin American scene.

FOOTNOTES

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1. Monthly Review, New York, September 1961, p. 222.
2. Cf. Revolucion, Havana, 13 January 1964.
3. Revolucion, 21 December 1963.
4. The reader may recall that during the last few months Cuba has repeatedly accused the Soviet Union of supporting Vietnam with weapons while, in Latin America, it is betraying the liberation movement by policies of an economic rapprochement with existing regimes.
5. Second Seminar on Economics of the Afro-Asiatic Solidarity Organization, Algeria, 24 February 1965, El Mundo, 25 February 1965.
6. Message to the Tricontinental, Special Havana, Supplement, Executive Secretariat of the OSPAAAL, Havana, 16 April 1967, p. 8. See also "Trikont Aktuell," Munich, Trikont Publishing Co., 1967, pp. 11-1 .
7. Ibid.
8. Granma, Havana, 30 August 1966.
9. "El Socialismo y el Hombre en Cuba," first published in Marcha, Uruguay, Revolucion, 13 April 1965.
10. Revolucion, 17 August 1964.
11. First Latin American Youth Convention, Havana, 1960.
12. Revolucion, 17 August 1964.
13. Message to the Tricontinental, op. cit., p. 10.
14. Ibid., p. 19.
15. Hoy, Havana, 29 December 1964, cit. according to the journal International Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 4.
16. Message to . . . , p. 22.
17. Ibid., p. 8.
18. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
19. El Mundo, 25 February 1965.
20. Cuba Socialista, Havana, May 1964, p. 24.

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21. Cf. "General Declaration of the First Latin American Solidarity Conference," Havana, 31 July - 10 August 1967, Granma, 11 August 1967.
22. "Cuba, Historic Exception or the Vanguard in the Anticolonialist Struggle?" Verde Olivo, Havana, 9 April 1961.
23. Cf. also Fidel Castro according to Hoy, 27 July 1963.
24. Cf. Granma, 27 July 1966.
25. Cuba Socialista, September 1963, p. 6.
26. La Guerra de Guerrillas (Guerrilla Warfare), printed in the INRA Press (Nat. Inst. for Agrarian Reform) on behalf of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, 6 April 1960, p. 12.
27. Cuba Socialista, *ibid.*
28. Message to . . . , p. 19.
29. Cf. Fidel Castro, according to Granma, 27 July 1966, as well as the proclamation of the OLAS Conference, July-August 1967, *ibid.*, 11 August 1967.
30. La Guerra de Guerrillas, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
31. Verde Olivo, Havana, 9 April 1961, p. 26.
32. La Guerra de Guerrillas, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
33. Verde Olivo, *ibid.*, p. 29.
34. Verde Olivo, *ibid.*, p. 24 f.
35. *Ibid.*
36. Cuba Socialista, September 1963, p. 12 f.
37. Verde Olivo, *ibid.*, p. 27.
38. Message to . . . , *op. cit.*, p. 18.
39. Cuba Socialista, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
41. Revolucion, 23 December 1964.
42. Fidel Castro, according to Granma, 16 October 1967.
43. Cuba Socialista, *op. cit.*, p. 15 f.

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44. La Guerra . . . , op. cit., p. 23.
45. Cuba Socialista, op. cit., p. 13.
46. Ibid., p. 15.
47. Ibid., p. 14.
48. Ibid., cf. also La Guerra . . . , op. cit., p. 19.
49. Introduction to Vo Nguyen Giap's book, "The People's War, the People's Army," Granma, 26 November 1967.
50. Cuba Socialista, op. cit., p. 8.
51. Ibid.
52. Message to . . . , p. 16.
53. Cuba Socialista, op. cit., p. 14.
54. La Guerra . . . , p. 60.
55. Ibid., p. 37.
56. Verde Olivo, op. cit., p. 24.
57. Cuba Socialista, op. cit., p. 7.
58. The reader is reminded that the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Socialista Popular) did not approve of the guerrilla fighting and that it joined Castro only at the very last moment.
59. Cf. letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Venezuela to Fidel Castro in El Mundo, 11 August 1967. Also see the resolution of the Communist Party of Brazil, Le Monde, 6 January 1968.
60. Cuba Socialista, op. cit., p. 5.
61. Jules Regis Debray, "Revolution in the Revolution?" Politica, No. 163, Mexico, 1-14 February 1967, p. XXX.
62. Cf. El Mundo, 11 August 1967.
63. Socialism and Man . . . , op. cit.
64. El Mundo, 26 March 1963.
65. Cf. footnote no. 63.

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66. Ibid.
67. El Mundo, 26 March 1963.
68. Socialist Planning, its Significance, Cuba Socialista June 1964, p. 17.
69. Cf. Revolucion, 16 March 1964.
70. War., op. cit., p. 180.
71. Revolucion, 13 April 1964.
72. "There exists no alternative, we must prepare for the fight . . .," Message to the . . . , p. 19.
73. Revolucion, 13 April 1964.
74. Ibid.
75. Cuba's Position at the World Trade and Development Conference, Cuba Socialista, May 1964, p. 14.
76. Second Seminar on Economics of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization, El Mundo, 25 February 1965.
77. Ibid.
78. Cf. also Fidel Castro, Granma, 2 May 1966.
79. "The Cuban Revolution Has its Own Characteristic," Che Guevara, El Mundo, 26 March 1963. Similarly, Castro, "Cuba Has Its Own Line," Revolucion, 30 September 1963. Cf. also Castro in Granma, 2 October 1966.
80. General Declaration of the First Latin American Conference for Solidarity, Havana, 31 July to 10 August 1967.
81. Cf. "Current Questions of the Strategy and Tactics of the Communist Movement in Latin America," Einheit, No. 3, 1966, pp. 385 ff.
82. Granma, op. cit., 11 August 1967.
83. Fidel Castro's statement at Guevara's death that "the political and revolutionary ideas of Che Guevara will be of permanent value for the revolutionary process of Cuba and of Latin America," was therefore not mere rhetoric. (El Mundo, 19 October 1967.)
84. "The Alliance for Progress and the Prospects for Progress in Latin America 1961-1965," Union Panamericana, Washington, 1967. Cf. also "Recent Development in Latin America," IA-ECOSOC, May 1967.