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PROJECT SIMPATICO

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, in my capacity as chairman of the Subcommittee on Government Research, and as one who has recently traveled extensively in South America, I wish to address myself briefly to Project Simpatico, now in the news from Colombia.

The New York Times of Sunday, February 6, carried a story, datelined Bogotá, Colombia, February 5, headlined, "Simpatico Issue Stirs Colombiana," with a subhead, "U.S. Study Project Arouses Criticism in Legislature." Similar stories were carried in the Baltimore Sun and the Washington Star.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at the conclusion of my remarks an article published in the New York Times.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record. (See exhibit 1.)

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, the essence of the stories was that a research project financed by the U.S. Defense Department had caused "widespread concern" and "parliamentary debate" and attacks on the United States in Colombia. The facts of this particular matter—and they are unclassified—raise some very basic U.S. policy questions for which Congress should help find answers.

Last year the U.S. Government spent \$32 million, which is an unclassified figure, in the field of social science and behavioral science research in foreign countries. The money was spent through the Defense Department, State Department, and through the Agency for International Development, with the highest percentage having been spent through the Defense Department. This figure does not include other U.S. agency research in foreign countries nor in-house governmental expenditures to support the research contracts.

Project Simpatico grew out of studies being made for the U.S. Department of the Army by the special operations research office of American University, begun in fiscal year 1963-64 on the subject of civic action of the local military organizations in Latin American countries.

The impetus for the program came from the United States and probably jointly from the American University group and the Department of the Army. At the beginning, no field work in Latin American countries was done, but the work was principally in-house type of research and study.

The special operations research office of American University is a well known and well respected research organization which, according to its published bulletin, carries on research "to support Army missions which involve relationships between U.S. personnel and indigenous persons of other cultures, or which involve U.S. military efforts to influence the attitudes and behavior of indigenous persons, or the form and characteristics of their military and related social, economic, and political system."

I am informed that the scientific purpose of Project Simpatico is to determine how effective—or ineffective—the public service—civic action—projects of the Colombian Government are in improving the lot of the villagers in which the

United States has an interest through the military assistance program. The types of military civic action projects—and civilian communal action projects of other agencies of the Colombian Government—being studied include medical care, road building, and water supply services provided to rural villagers. Their evaluation necessarily includes assessing how development related motivations and attitudes of the people have been affected. Are the people more favorably inclined toward the changes required for economic and social development, and toward the government and the military as change agents attempting to assist that development? What are the desired characteristics of change agents? I am further informed that interview questionnaires, designed to tap these factors, were concurred in by the United States and Colombian Governments before their field use.

Initially Peru, Bolivia, and Guatemala had been tentatively suggested as typical countries where field research might be conducted. Honduras was also considered. Eventually, Colombia was selected for the research field work.

A specific research contract was let for this particular project to the Special Operations Research Office of American University. The contract was in the amount of \$180,000. The contract was to run from March 1965 through March 1966.

Concurrence of the country team in Colombia was asked for and received. Through the Ambassador, concurrence of the Colombian Government was proposed and concurrence was given in June 1965.

American University then entered into a contract on or about August 1, 1965, with a group called National Research of Colombia. This group was to be paid \$88,000 and was to be responsible for the collecting and translating of data gathered in the field. It is my understanding that this local group was and is an existing marketing information research agency and does work for business organizations generally.

It is my further understanding that before work was started and after concurrence of the Colombian Government, contact was made with three Colombian ministries, that an advisory committee was formed in the country with the ministries represented, and that all information collected is to be furnished jointly to the Colombian Government and to the American University group. In October of 1965 a dispute developed between the research contractors and some of those hired to do research. As a result of the dispute, two of the researchers were discharged. Thereafter, other researchers resigned.

None of this information had caused any local disturbance until now. Parliamentary elections in Colombia are scheduled for March.

After the discharge and resignation of local researchers, another group of 14 were employed for this purpose by the local research contractor, and research was started in December, still to be finished in March.

The U.S. Army apparently has an open-end contract with the Special Operations Research Office of the American University and have for some time been interested in the whole concept of civic action, as to its effectiveness and whether or not it is working.

The Operation Camelot affair in Chile, which caused considerable stir last year, was in the same general field except that it was to be a complete study of a single country—Chile—to work out a predictive type model of a Latin American country, involving all the socioeconomic factors, change, revolution, and so forth. This research project was in the final planning stage at the time it became a newspaper story in Chile and was thereafter dropped.

As a result of the newspaper publicity on Operation Camelot, the President of the United States wisely instituted new procedures, and by letter, dated August 23, 1965, ordered that "no government sponsorship of foreign area research should be undertaken which in the judgment of the Secretary of State would adversely affect U.S. foreign relations."

As a result of this directive from the President, a Foreign Affairs Research Council was established, the Chairman of which is the Director of Intelligence and Research in the State Department, Mr. Thomas L. Hughes. The job of this organization as stated in a speech by Mr. Hughes at Hamilton College, October 21, 1965, entitled, "Scholars and Foreign Policy: Varieties of Research Experience," is to screen government-sponsored research in foreign countries for possible foreign policy damage before the research work is begun.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the entire text of that speech be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 2.)

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, I commend the President and the Secretary of State for these new procedures. In the instance of Project Simpatico, they at least made certain of the approval of the country team in Colombia and the concurrence of the local government was first obtained, both of which were sadly lacking in the Operation Camelot situation.

At the time of Camelot affair, there was a similar research project underway in another Latin American country which was suspended at the request of the local government because of the Operation Camelot publicity and is now scheduled for possible future discussions as to its renewal. This project was also on civic action of the local military organization, particularly as to efforts by them for resettlement of Indian people. This project was also being carried on by the American University organization and the contract figure was budgeted at \$121,000.

The facts surrounding Project Simpatico, and the \$32 million expenditure last year—with similar expenditures this year—in research in the behavioral and social sciences in foreign countries by this Government raise several rather serious questions, some of which cannot now be answered, but for which answers should be forthcoming from the Congress and the administration.

I think we can profit from Project Simpatico by giving serious study to some basic policy questions.

First, is the large expenditure for behavioral and social science research in foreign countries justified?

I agree with a recent statement by Secretary of State Dean Rusk when he

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told a congressional committee that "research has become indispensable to the intelligent formulation and implementation of foreign policy." Secretary Rusk has rightly acknowledged the contribution that the social and behavioral sciences can make to foreign policy and has welcomed the increased interest of other governmental departments in social and political research and foreign affairs. However, even with the newly established Foreign Affairs Research Council, it is evident that there is no institutionalized procedures for checking on and determining the justification for individual projects. The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Research Council, Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, who is also the Director of Intelligence and Research in the State Department, recently so stated. In a speech at Hamilton College on October 21, 1965, Mr. Hughes pointed out that there are limitations upon the authority of his new function as follows:

Third, the procedures will clearly state the belief that the sponsoring agency is the best judge of a project related to its mission. We have no intention of second-guessing any other Government agency. Its views as to the value of a study will be taken fully into account. Our review will not mean State Department endorsement of a project; rather the purpose is limited to the avoidance of damage to our foreign relations. \* \* \* Sixth, and most important, the responsibility for the wise expenditure of research funds remains in each agency under the authority of the President and the Congress. The State Department has not become, and does not wish to be, the controller for Government foreign affairs research.

Mr. Hughes also points out that his office distinguishes between two kinds of research. He points out that proposed research supported by the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Intelligence agencies requires screening and prior approval, while all other Government agencies, such as the major domestic departments or the basic research agencies, need only inform his office of proposed research projects, and no prior approval is required.

He makes further distinction in grants made by the National Science Foundation.

Therefore, it seems to me that Congress should take an interest in establishing institutionalized administrative procedures for independent review and determination of the value and justification of each foreign research project and for continuing surveillance of the operation of the research being conducted, its management and administration.

Second, it seems to me that Congress should provide for "civilianizing" all types of contract research being done in foreign countries.

Speaking to this last point, just last fall, in the company of the distinguished Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], I made extensive travels to and studies of four Latin American countries—Chile, Peru, Argentina, and Brazil. In each of these countries, I found a great need to civilize the entire American image in Latin America. As a result of my study of these countries last year and of Project Simpatico most recently, I am of the opinion that social science research in

other countries should be under civilian authority and control.

Senator BAYH and I talked in each country and city with the President, principal cabinet officers, parliamentary leaders, U.S. State Department, Peace Corps and AID personnel, student leaders, opposition party leaders and average citizens. I came away from Latin America immensely depressed, because I felt that the image of the United States held by the average person in the countries I visited was an erroneous and damaging one. A great percentage of the people in those countries mistakenly feel that American policies are dominated by the Pentagon. Many feel that, while we profess to be interested in democratic governments and democratic institutions, we actually feel a closer affinity for military organizations and dictatorships.

This is obviously an erroneous impression. But, when I sought to correct it, I found, over and over again, that I was confronted with the Operation Camelot type of argument. Now, it seems to me, that with Project Simpatico, we have not helped to correct that erroneous impression or clear up that mistaken image of our country in Latin America, but have added to the arguments of those who seek to propagate that mistaken belief in the minds of the people of Latin America.

I feel there is no reason why the bulk of the \$32 million we spent last year in other countries in this field—or similar expenditures this year—should be from the Department of Defense budget. Such foreign research expenditures—by direct appropriation or by transfer of funds—must be placed under institutionalized civilian control.

As a result of the publicity over Project Simpatico, once again we must remind ourselves of the potential damaging result of foreign research financed by the United States in the behavioral and social sciences.

We must understand the pressing need in Latin America to correct our militaristic image. And, we must understand how easy it is for Latin Americans to associate U.S. Government research by a military agency with intervention and militarism. However, erroneously such association is made.

#### EXHIBIT 2

[From the Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 8, 1965]

#### SCHOLARS AND FOREIGN POLICY—VARIETIES OF RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

(By Thomas L. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research)<sup>1</sup>

President McEwen, members of the Root-Jessup Public Affairs Council, ladies and gentlemen, 20 years ago I was introduced to the history of philosophy in a class taught by the then Prof. Robert McEwen, of Carleton College, Minnesota. Since then our paths have separated, although I have reason to believe that our basic philosophies have not. At any rate, when this opportunity came to confront him again after a score of years, I accepted your invitation with appropriate trepidation, worried that his retrospective judgment tomorrow morning might be rather like that absurd couplet which Queen Vic-

<sup>1</sup> Root-Jessup lecture, made at Hamilton College, Clinton, N.Y., on Oct. 21 (press release 280).

toria commanded Tennyson to write commemorating both the telegraph and the illness of the Prince of Wales:

"Across the wires the electric message came; He is no better; he is much the same."

I suspect that it was in that same philosophy class that I was first made aware of some of the dimensions of the problem set for discussion tonight. I learned that in 404 B.C. some energetic young men took over the government of Athens. Several of them had been students at a local academy of political science. The idea occurred to them to appoint a distinguished professor of politics to office. He accepted. His name was Plato. The government—that of Critias and the Thirty Tyrants—was one of the worst Athens has had, before or since. The professor lasted only a few months. An outraged city booted the government out of office. Ever since there has been a certain magnetic tension between scholars and statesmen—a tension into the midst of which, to my surprise, I have lately found myself inadvertently propelled.

And so it came to pass that your committee and I compromised on "Scholars and Foreign Policy: Varieties of Research Experience" as a title for this lecture. I had been tempted by others such as "The Relevance of Research," "The Researcher and the Researched," "Research in Search of an Audience," or again, aiming in the direction of my erstwhile philosophy professor, the more whimsical question: "Laocoon: Research or Foreign Policy?"

At any rate you can see that I was determined to talk about the significant but obscure topic of research and foreign policy, rather than opt for some other, obviously more glamorous, crisis that could readily come to mind. I had mixed motives: partly because two famous sons of Hamilton College—Elihu Root and Phillip Jessup—blended statecraft and scholarship at their rarest and best; partly because yours was the most respectable academic audience available when the need arose to speak to this subject; partly because new procedures setting the first guidelines for U.S. Government behavior in the foreign area research field were being readied for release in Washington; and partly because the State Department, only fitfully adjusting to its reputation as a "bowl of jelly" filled with "irrevocably conventional minds," has simultaneously been attacked for too vigorously disdaining research.

I do have a bona fide claim to speak. The bureau which I head traces its lineage at least back to the time when Elihu Root as Secretary of State first modernized the Department's archaic filing system in use since 1789. In our presumption we like to think that Webster's famous plea in the Dartmouth College case applies to our bureau of research scholars just as it applies to Hamilton: "It is a small college, but there are those who love it."

We are a proud, happy, spirited little band of 360, and we think of things that would astonish you. For instance, already this week we have corporately encompassed about 120 old nations, discovered 2 new ones, estimated 3 elections, cast bets on the composition of 2 cabinets, fretted over 1 unilateral declaration of independence and another mutiny, noted the decline of 2 new emerging forces and the resurgence of 1 old established force, and discounted 3 abortive plots erroneously attributed to the CIA.

We have done our part to sharpen understanding on a variety of standard issues: e.g., which juntas are good ones and which juntas are bad; where reunification is a hope and where it is a hindrance; when the case for counterinsurgency outweighs the case for insurgency, and vice versa; how a coup d'etat may be preferable to a coup de grace; when confrontation is called for and when it gets in the way; how to deescalate unwanted escalations, and how to escalate wanted ones; when religious fervor is a help

and when it is a headache; where building bridges makes sense and where blowing them up makes more sense; when self-determination is morally indispensable and when it is not; why it is sometimes so difficult for both sides to engage at the same time in negotiations from strength.

Not that we are consulted on every foreign policy problem or indeed on every move that the State Department makes. For instance, despite its relevance to research, we were not consulted in advance about Yale University's Columbus Day publication of the pre-Columbian map which so reassured Scandinavia and offended the Mediterranean. The reaction of a monarchist newspaper in Madrid rivaled the kind of protests we have been receiving on Government research projects abroad: Yale's action, it said, was "an incredibly belligerent plan, prepared carefully for some time, to pulverize the glory of Spain in the discovery of the New World by Christopher Columbus." The paper added with a kind of deductive logic only appreciated in New Haven that "if the discovery of America had been left to the Vikings, there would be no Yale University today."

Nor were we consulted last week when art imitated life a little too closely and 9 of 27 paintings by a surrealist Belgian Embassy wife were taken away from a special showing in the State Department's exhibition hall for dealing too frankly with the human anatomy.

Unfortunately this whole episode complicates my life even further. The State Department's art critics and custodians are—and hopefully will remain—anonymous. But the Department's research work, recently augmented by a new assignment of certain quasi-judicial functions in the Government research field at large, has publicly been bestowed upon me. Indeed these duties have now become so insistent that the only time I have for art is en route from my office to the office of the Secretary of State. From an artistic point of view, that is an eminently sobering experience. You will be glad to know that it largely consists of a compulsory viewing first thing every morning of your own benefactor and favorite son. For as the Secretary's private elevator halts at the seventh floor, its steel doors automatically open, and there, unavoidably confronting the passenger, in rich oils and soft lighting, is the Honorable Ellhu Root—waistcoat and all—a triumph of propriety over all artistic waywardness.

#### THE CAST OF CHARACTERS

Consider Ellhu Root's description of his professors here on this campus a hundred years ago:

"These professors were poor as the world goes, but they had a wealth that money cannot create. They loved their subjects and were happy in their work. They rejoiced in the exercise of their powers. They were content with simple pleasures. They filled the atmosphere about them with an enthusiasm for learning and literature. They sought for truth as one who strives in a game. They never talked or thought about money or investments or profits. They took little heed of all those things for which men are striving and wearing out their lives in the marketplaces of a materialistic civilization."

Neither the euphoria of secrecy nor the temptations of affluence were operating in this pastoral scene. There was no security curtain dividing faculty meetings then between the "cleared and the great uncleared." It was long before the coming of age of "social science," let alone "applied" social science; long before professors wanted to make a difference in the hard, political world; long before "policy orientation" pulled academic advisers into important national events; long before the three-way migration began from campus to congressional committee to executive branch office and back again—and hence even longer still before a member of the Cabinet would survey the Washington scene and demand that all Ph. D.'s be prepared to be consulted.

Yet the statistics have continued to rise. Today there are reputedly 6,000 academics in the Cambridge area alone who are consultants to the Government. Sixty-five percent of the total research and development expenditure of this country comes from the Federal Government, 92 percent of that going for defense research. One way or another, parts of the Government itself have now had experience in dealing with substantially the whole range of human endeavor in most parts of the world—and this fact itself has become both a stimulus and a magnet for greater academic involvement.

Few would disagree with Harold Lasswell's description of the problem:

"The continuing crisis of national security in which we live calls for the most efficient use of the manpower, facilities, and resources of the American people. Highly trained talent is always scarce and costly. Hence the crisis poses the problem of utilizing our intellectual resources with the wisest economy. If our policy needs are to be served, what topics of research are most worthy of pursuit? What manpower and facilities should be allocated to official agencies and to private institutions for the prosecution of research? What are the most promising methods of gathering facts and interpreting their significance for policy? How can facts and interpretations be made effective in the decisionmaking process itself?"

These are the right questions, but at best we have made uneven progress in answering them. And along with the progress have come new sets of problems. Especially during the past few months, some of our leading scholars have outdone one another in describing the growing predicament of scholarly research and foreign policy. "American social science is in a crisis of ethics," says one distinguished critic. "Its motives, techniques, and practitioners are falling into disrepute." "The scholar and the policymaker have become somewhat interundistinguishable," says another. A third speaks of the "jungular quality of academic relations with government," of the "corrosion of scholarly integrity and indeed identity in the government-research-university relationship." Still another stresses: "It is in the area of foreign affairs where the academic community and the government attract and repel one another with the most vigor."

Let me set up for you a series of hypothetical characters to dramatize the atmospheres currently surrounding scholars as they conduct foreign area research. These fictional vignettes themselves will serve to suggest some of the current varieties of research experience as they affect U.S. foreign policy. Let us consider the varying perspectives as seen from the campus, from Washington, and from the foreign capital by the willing scholar, the skeptical scholar, the university administrator, the eager bureaucrat, the reluctant bureaucrat, the Congressman, the American ambassador, the overresearched foreigner, the foreign minister, the foreign scholar, and the foreign press.

The willing scholar is deeply convinced that what the Government needs most is creative research and that what he needs most is funds. He can bring to foreign policy councils the best that the academic world can offer to inform the decisionmaking process with better data, systematic analysis, and balanced assessment of probabilities and options. He can help rescue policymakers from misinformation, bias, intuition, and hunch.

This willing scholar glories in his relationship with policy and action. Perhaps he has been asked and decided not to join the Government. In any case he is happy to stay outside and help. He has an active desire for the best of both worlds and feels secure in preserving his integrity. He may or may not be caught up in intramural contentiousness among branches of social science. He may be one of the behavioral scientists who feel that the military services should not sponsor behavioral science research under any circumstances. On the other hand, especially if he is devoted to large-scale re-

search, that they have a good record of not imposing conditions which would infringe on his freedom of inquiry, and that any Department of State censorship constitutes unwarranted control over this freedom.

The skeptical scholar looks on academic-government relations as at best a trial marriage on both sides—or even a highly bigamous relationship replete with conflicting sets of loyalties and new obligations disturbingly imposed on old, established proprieties. He doubts his and his colleagues' ability to resist official influence on their thinking and believes that Government-oriented researchers inevitably become more responders than creators. He believes that when scholars become contractors or consultants to the Government, they tend to find themselves supporters of Government policy and do not ordinarily feel free to make basic criticism or to suggest alternatives outside the general direction of official policy. Some of the skeptical scholars would draw their personal permissible limit of involvement at the Peace Corps; others would go so far as to include State.

The skeptical scholar is for "freedom of thought" and whatever self-interest that protects. He worries about the abuses of research. He is suspicious of Government influence on the allocation of research efforts. He notes that proponents of competing policy positions inside Government attack and counterattack, wielding their own social science researches and corroding the concept of objective research in the process. He may be deeply concerned about the effects of careless research abroad—not only because it embarrasses the U.S. Government and the academic community but also because it dries up his own access to foreign contacts and reduces his own acceptability overseas. And as a final affront, abroad he finds himself suspected of being in the Government's secret employ anyway, despite all his protestations of innocence.

The university administrator has a perspective all his own. "In general the governing need in American academic life is for more reading and research, not less," said Dean McGeorge Bundy in September 1960, in his waning months at Harvard.

"Our best universities . . . have never had a better patron than the Federal Government at its best. . . . Certainly all large-scale financial support creates dangers against which universities must be alert. But what evidence is there . . . that the Federal Government is intrinsically more dangerous than other backers? . . ."

"Some departments in some places [Bundy continued] are dangerously influenced by the marketplace of contract funds. . . . Some men build foolish empires; some spread themselves too thin in conferences and consultations; some are indeed remittance men abroad. Few if any universities have yet made the right place in their communities for the members of large-scale research installations."

He went on to speak of "danger of a weakening, particularly among younger scientists and social scientists, of the great tradition of research and teaching as a single way of life," and he mentioned "the occasional but real problem which is created when too much money chases too little talent."

"These are problems enough [he concluded] but there is not one which cannot be dealt with intelligently, and not one which outweighs the general and overriding fact that American academic men, few of them affluent and none of them saints, are, on the whole, growing in quality and in effective service of all sorts, year by year."

Most university leaders probably agree. Conscious of the ever-increasing contributions of research to policy, aware of the status which recognized research brings to their universities, and pleased with the funds which often accompany prestige in research, they are willing to pay the price of whatever

ethical paradoxes may attend their universities' growing involvement with government.

Even for the trivial problem of the unwanted but tenure-holding faculty member which occasionally vexes a university administration, foreign research may again provide an answer. From time to time there have been suggestions in the academic community that certain presidents are not averse to permitting certain of their faculty to go abroad on indefinitely extended sabbatical leave.

This is a social situation not dissimilar from the famous New York meeting of Theodore Roosevelt, Charles Evans Hughes, and Ellhu Root on March 20, 1917. They were full of war talk and had just led 600 Republicans at the Union League Club in a virtual declaration of war on Germany ahead of the Government. They met in a cafe after the meeting. Theodore Roosevelt was bubbling over with fighting zeal and the conviction that he should have a military command abroad. "You must see Wilson," he declared, turning to Root and Hughes, "and get his consent to let me go." Teddy's voice deepened with solemnity and emotion. "I must go," he said, "but I will not come back. My sons will go too, and they will not come back." For a moment there was silence out of respect for the former President's evident sincerity. Then Root spoke up: "Theodore, if you can make Wilson believe that you will not come back, he will let you go." Sometimes, as we all understand, academic relations are like that.

The eager bureaucrat by definition needs no convincing of the desirability of research. He knows that research can help him to generate and make available new data; discriminate between data so as to select out the trivial from the crucial; evaluate new data against already known facts and anticipate data not yet known; compare events between different societies and through different time periods; identify his alternative choices and assess their likely results; anticipate the probable courses of action of others; and, perhaps most important over the long run, order data into theoretical patterns that will help him understand whole classes of events. He knows that policy problems can be an important stimulation to research as well as a useful test of the utility of research. He may be in the Department of State, familiar with and impressed with the many current uses of behavioral sciences by his department in recruitment, management, consultants, lecturers in training programs, research contracts, professional meetings, and the collection and indexing of information as a public service on research projects. Or, on the contrary, he may be in another department of government which happens to have available funds—and his attitude toward the Department of State may best be summed up in the Biblical cadence, "They toll not, neither do they spin." He wishes the State Department had the initiative as well as the money to take the lead, but as things are, he is willing to do his bit where he is with what he has.

The reluctant bureaucrat wants freedom of action: He thinks of himself as a man who respects action above abstraction. He believes in the sixth sense—only the inside professional can handle problems. He sees academic research as either an ivory tower impediment or irrelevant. He is skeptical about the research product, even suspicious of it. If he is a policymaker, his own self-esteem may be involved. He is not about to be deprived of all but the ceremonial steps in certifying policy, with interpreters and evaluators, shapers and policy-oriented advisers filling up the interstices of the procedures of policymaking. He knows that the meaning of facts is not self-evident. It must be construed—and that is his job. He has a strong feeling that while "factual research"

may be useful, anything beyond that is a highly questionable residue from the over-eagerness of social scientists in selling themselves. In his mind's eye he sees peripatetic squads of affluent professors and subsidized investigators "cross-fertilizing" their foreign travels. Apart from its incomprehensibility, he questions the objectivity, currency, relevance, and excessive cost of the research he has seen. For him research is "academic" in the most pejorative sense.

The Congressman's view is as varied as the many-colored strands that make up the rich tapestry of congressional sentiment: the watchdog of the Treasury, the promoter of liberal arts for the new all-purpose American soldier, the champion of behavioral research, the exposé of excessive governmental secrecy, the traditionalist who finds it hard to jettison the notion that foreign policy should still be considered the prerogative of the Department of State, and the traditionalist who finds it hard not to ask day after day, "Why isn't something done about the State Department?" One of the latter recently became so upset about what he called "that huge unidentified army of unelected bureaucrats buried in the classified civil service ranks at sub-Cabinet level . . . the career, sedentary, oddball, self-satisfied, empire-building bureaucrats infesting the State Department" that he has introduced a bill to abolish the Department itself.

The American ambassador naturally is concerned with avoiding embarrassment and political risk, for good relations with foreign nationals are central to his job and reputation. His position often highlights the short-run disadvantages over the longrun advantages of risky research. He must broker the research pressures from Washington against needs as he sees them, factor in his own reporting function, consider the desire of the host government for some kinds of research and its resistance to others, assist American researchers in approaching their foreign tasks, and try to keep open his own lines to all elements of the society around him. At minimum he will insist on his right to be informed of all U.S. Government-sponsored research in his area. If he is an ambassador to one of the newly developing nations, especially if he has an academic background himself, he may be poignantly aware of the need for research—and therefore of the irony that our consuming new interest in political development is occurring at just the time when doors are closing to sensitive foreign academic intervention.

The overresearched foreigner, be he African prime minister or Asian village chief, is beginning to tire of relating his tribal antecedents to one eager American Ph. D. candidate after another. The number and aggressiveness of our overlapping researchers, the demands on the time and patience of the hosts, the frequent insensitivity to the nuances required by dignity and respect, are adding up here and there to embarrassment, annoyance, and distaste for a new brand of "academic imperialism." The guinea-pig complex begins to fuel latent suspicions of end use. Sometimes it is a question of simple quantitative saturation. Other times it is a question of ethics and judgment.

Foreign ministers, as our protocol officers at home and abroad are coming to discover, are beginning to regard internal research in their countries like internal insurgency, as an extension of international politics. Some foreign governments welcome this development and look upon American research as a new means of cementing their ties with Washington. They see our research as a useful, mutually beneficial effort bringing extra political and economic benefits along with it. Whether they favor or oppose it, however, a decision by the U.S. Government to study is assumed by foreign governments to be a conscious political act. They all attribute motivations and intentions to us which we don't

often deserve. Thus as one scholar with field experience in Latin America wrote recently:

"It is not easy to give Latin Americans a satisfactory explanation of the role of the U.S. Government in the research activity, especially when the research involved is military and uses inflammatory words like war . . . and insurgency in describing the research project. . . . It is hard for Latin Americans to understand why the U.S. Government, especially a military agency of it, would support research in Latin America, if not for a military purpose."

Then if something big and dramatic comes along, like the Army's \$6 million unclassified counterinsurgency study in Latin America, Project Camelot, the scholar looks like an agent. Camelot crashed into the headlines in Chile soon after we had landed troops in Santo Domingo, and it immediately became associated with interventionism and militarism. Camelot was seen as part of a carefully planned policy. Then when it was discovered that our Embassy didn't know about the project, the whole episode became all the more conspiratorial in impact, convincing more critics than ever that our Latin American policy is really being made in the Pentagon. The fact that such projects have been planned without conspiratorial intent is immaterial. A Chilean Assembly debate and committee investigation followed, with an official protest, a banishment, and indeterminate effects on scholars and foreign policy alike.

The foreign scholar is not left unscathed by events of this sort. Ideological-political susceptibilities of intellectuals and government officials in host countries build upon one another and can speed the adverse reactions. The canons of academic openness take on added importance. There is a quickened interest in the foreign academic community in the revelation of sources of funds, premises of studies, nature of data, bases of conclusions of all U.S. research. Moreover, no other country has anything quite like our special phenomena of academic mobility in and out of Government; so this adds to everyone's ability to comprehend the fine distinctions we make about auspices. A fundamental American national resource—the credibility of the independence of private research—tends to disappear and get lost in a blurred impression of Governmental interest.

The environment also includes, of course, the generally large and available publicity on "invisible Government," with all of the lurid allegations of pernicious CIA activity.

At minimum the foreign scholar will want to protect himself from an overidentification with American research; he will want to diversify his contacts and hedge his bets. As Gabriel Almond has pointed out:

"This problem exists even for the more sophisticated indigenous scholar who is not himself worried about involvement with the United States and U.S. sponsored research but who has to worry about the way in which his colleagues or his students will view such involvement."

The foreign press affords a final perspective. It is not only the Communist editor who waits for every morsel of anti-Americanism to expolit across his front pages and for whom the written words of heedlessly drafted research projects are an extra bonanza. Careless, ill-considered, ineptly performed research abroad quickly activates the press and politics of most of the world, embarrassing our friends, delighting our foes, and promoting both the broad-brush polemics of the professional anti-American as well as the satirical stiletos of Punch. The latter's subscribers were recently treated to the following replay of the Camelot affair:

"The U.S. Defense Department is collating intelligence on the internal conditions and prospects of certain foreign countries in case of civil strife which could lead to American

military involvement.' The next probe could be practically anywhere.

"Internal war potential (estimate): This summary to be completed by senior agent in country concerned, and returned to department K 88, Pentagon, Washington.

"Country: Great Britain.  
"Current relation to U.S. class II ally: No. Now reclassified class III shading to class IV.

"Current government: Democratic, mild Socialist, weak.

"Current opposition (if any): Democratic, mild Socialist, ultraweak.

"Potential strong man: Nil. Monty? Old and pro-Mao, but antiquer. Ask Ike.

"Potential junta: Choose from Gavin Astor, Randolph Churchill, Douglas Insole, Lord Chandos, Enoch Powell, Sir Cyril Osborne, Edward Martell. Approach names starred tactfully.

"Military preparedness: 4,000 bearskins, 1 TSR-2, best ceremonial cannon in Europe. Rudimentary navy, three unexploded H-bombs (1956 vintage). Three new rival staff cars at drawingboard stage. Didn't they have that rocket—Blue something? Check and report.

"Mood of populace: Apathetic.

"Indications of Communist leanings: Eagerness to trade with Red China (or anybody); notorious socialized medicine; hysterical press-inspired anti-Americanism over Cuba, Vietnam, Dominica, Rembrandt; failure to distinguish between East and West Germans as objects of distaste; fury over American military buildup (especially arms sales successes); poor evangelical record; adoption of Centigrade thermometer. Consult psychological department re their mother love quotient.

"Probable course of crisis: Deadlock of present U.S.-tolerating Government already reached, causing frustration among leftwing activists, especially one Frank Cousins (currently neutralized by nebulous Cabinet post). He may attempt coup with massive trade union backing, stimulating countercoup by landowners and business interests; latter faction certain to founder on internal dissension over leadership (see appendix G for recent history of Conservative Party and compare our difficulties with Saigon), but will give Reds excuse to intervene and assume command of country. Shock troops of so-called intellectuals reported to be forming guerrilla groups in Hampstead, Islington, and most campuses.

"Suggested military action by United States Nil: Loss of GB unlikely to affect events in southeast Asia, might even simplify things. Anyway, it's a little country and a long way away. Didn't someone say that about some place, some time? Check with records."

**A FIRM NATIONAL POLICY**

I emphasized earlier that most of these illustrations were hypothetical. All the more need to do so, because I have three more characters, none of whom are hypothetical. I take them in order of rank, starting with—

The President of the United States: The eyes of Washington were opened this summer, partly by newspaper publicity, on some of the problems and issues mentioned above. The President quickly decided to establish a firm national policy on the main new issue that concerned the Government—the possibly adverse effect of Government activity in research on foreign relations. He wrote a letter which recognizing this possible harm, specified that proposals for such research should be examined to insure their propriety in this respect. In his letter the President said: "I am determined that no Government sponsorship of foreign area research should be undertaken which in the judg-

ment of the Secretary of State would adversely affect United States foreign relations." Therefore he commissioned my second remaining character to establish effective procedures—and that character is the Secretary of State himself.

The Secretary of State looked at this responsibility with the eyes of a man who had fostered research both as a college professor and college dean, and as president of the Rockefeller Foundation—a man who has shown a positive and personal interest in the research activities in his own Department. Secretary Rusk stated his own belief in the value of research when he told a congressional committee recently that "research has become indispensable to the intelligent formulation and implementation of foreign policy." He has repeatedly acknowledged the contribution that the social and behavioral sciences can make to foreign policy and has welcomed the increased interest of other Government departments in social and political research on foreign affairs.

At the same time he has noted that official sponsorship of research can be very sensitive in our relations with foreign countries, and that there are stages of sensitivity that turn first upon the auspices of the research and secondly on the subject matter.

In his experience with a major foundation, Secretary Rusk learned years ago that sensitivity exists whenever nationals of one country move into another country to investigate matters that are sensitive there. He knows that some research that can be done on a purely private basis becomes sensitive when any government becomes connected with it. He knows that there is still a higher level of sensitivity if the armed forces of a foreign country are involved in the research. As he told the Congress, "the promised value of research undertaken to support our foreign policy must be balanced against the costs of doing it in terms of possible damage to our foreign relations." Clearly someone has to make that initial judgment.

The Director of Intelligence and Research is my remaining character. As chairman of a new Foreign Affairs Research Council, he has been given the responsibility by the Secretary for making this judgment. It will not surprise you to hear that I consider the assignment a reasonable one.

**THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH**

Since the end of World War II our bureau has been the Department's research arm. Our professional analysts are widely acquainted with and respected by private scholars specializing in foreign affairs. We were the first in Government to establish a specific staff, the Office of External Research, based on our conviction that social and behavioral research outside Government was making an essential contribution to foreign policy. For 15 years this office has served as a bridge between Government research needs and resources and the academic community concerned with foreign affairs. Thus in the daily work of our bureau we have found ourselves dealing with many of the varieties of research experience which we have just discussed.

Inside the Government our direct experience with the policymakers has provided a miniature distillation of some of the overall problems of the scholar and foreign policy. In principle the interest is enormous and the market huge. But our scholars are more aware than most of the problems of research consumption: of the congestion of material; of the proliferation and confluence of excessive paper at the top of the Government; of the absorption limits of even the most brilliant policymakers; of the temptations to take arms against a sea of papers, and by opposing, and them; of the quantity-quality

problem, the relativities of numbers, talents, gaps, strains, informal roles; of the unevenness of interests, needs, and attention to specific subjects at specific times.

Our own daily experience has taught us something about work-impact ratios and cost effectiveness. We know something too about writing for an unknown audience which may include a spectrum of readership from desk officer to President. Our own Bureau is living testimony to the tolerance of the rest of the Department of State for a very vibrant, critical, independent group of scholars, writing in its very midst, fearless of policy control.

We lay no claim to extrasensory perception about the relations of scholars and foreign policy; or even about all the exhilarating varieties of research experience. But whatever we are, we are not naive.

We know something about the repertory of research techniques.

We can tell a research design when we see one.

We know that some questions are fundamentally unresearchable.

We understand that it makes some difference whether one sees research from within or without.

We are well aware that the temptation inside the Government is to deal with the immediate and neglect the long term and fundamental.

We know something about the problem of interacting bureaucracies.

We know that there are varying margins of influence for research, as for all other active elements that affect the governmental process.

We know that there are disinterested insiders just as there are disinterested outsiders.

We know that one of the problems is how to keep interested insiders fruitfully in touch with interested outsiders and still preserve all concerned from the taints of special interest and conflict of interest.

We know that ideally there should be a better mix of research efforts within Government and between Government and the scholarly world—a better balance between research and operations, between departmental in-house and external research, between Government and private research, between basic and applied research.

Like all intelligent men, we stop to ask ourselves now and then: What is objectivity?

We are aware that the needs of government have led to some distortion of academic development. For example, the "human relations area" files contain as many source papers on Vietnam as on all of South America.

We are as concerned as anyone else over the tendency of bad research to drive out good.

We are all in favor of letting sleeping dogmas lie.

We know that there has been in the past, and undoubtedly is today, a cultural lag between scholarly discovery and the making of policy, the advent of the Sino-Soviet rift being just one dramatic case in point.

We know, as advanced social scientists have known right along, that Government, like society, needs a continuing refinement and clarification of its goals, a deliberate re-ordering of its priorities, a constant raising to the level of consciousness of its categories of preferred events.

We are absolutely committed to the proposition that there is a greater need for research and understanding on other countries.

Indeed we may know, better than most, what exciting opportunities in foreign affairs confront the research world.

We suspect that our future needs will be greater than our present ones.

We are convinced that after all the values are acknowledged, the preservation of two perspectives, one governmental and one academic, remains indispensable, that homogenization and tendencies toward it are inherently undesirable.

\* For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 23, 1965, p. 323.

\* For background, see *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1965, p. 496.

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Indeed, the deadlines and crises of the research organizations inside Government give us a special stake in the detachment and depth to which private research at its best is conducive. To the degree that the private research community can exercise its untrammeled good judgment, free from outside pressures, any and all, real and imaginary, private research can continue to generate the basic intellectual capital on which we depend.

Because in the past the State Department has not supported empirical, quantitative studies that require large resources, we have been charged with being intellectually conservative. The fact is that we have never had the resources to be anything but conservative in these matters. Nevertheless we recognize the need to find a new balance between private endowments and public support to assure the necessary sustenance of social science research. Many of us are concerned that the overall flow of Government funds to social scientists studying foreign societies should not be reduced, but augmented.

Hence, even as we assume our new role of screening Government-sponsored research for possible foreign policy damage, we are well aware that our major function is not to stifle research but to encourage it. We have no intention of deciding for other Government agencies what research is or is not important, how much they should spend or whom they should hire, or what methods their researchers should employ. The sponsoring agency has been and will continue to be the best judge of the value of a research project in meeting its own needs. State Department review is solely for the purpose of safeguarding our foreign relations from predictable harm.

#### THE NEW PROCEDURES

I know that there has been grave concern over the procedures which will govern our new clearance responsibilities. Those procedures themselves will shortly be released.

In the Department we have set up machinery to review the foreign affairs research proposals of other agencies both thoroughly and expeditiously. This will be done by a Foreign Affairs Research Council, which I chair. The other members represent the Department's Policy Planning and Politico-Military Affairs Offices and our regional and functional bureaus. Our Office of External Research will staff the Council, handling directly the bulk of proposals which I am sure can be reviewed quickly and positively and will not require Council action. In addition to deciding difficult cases, the Council also has been charged by the Secretary with determining Department needs for external research and setting our policy with regard to such research.

Our review procedures, drawn up in consultation with the Bureau of the Budget, will shortly be in the hands of 20 other Government agencies. Let me tell you what our guidelines will be. First, we are concerned only with research projects in the social and behavioral sciences dealing with international relations, or with foreign areas and peoples, conducted in the United States or abroad, which are supported by Federal agencies. We have no intention and no authority to review either private research or research conducted within an agency by Government employees.

Second, we distinguish between two kinds of research: that supported by the foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence agencies; and that supported by all other Government agencies, such as the major domestic departments or the basic research agencies. To us this distinction is a very important one. We see a substantial difference between the foreign policy risks of research conducted abroad in support of the mission of the Department of State or the Department of Defense, for instance, and the

research conducted with the help of such agencies as the Office of Education or the Department of Agriculture. Moreover, we think the grants made by the National Science Foundation to American scholars differ substantially from contracts and grants made by other U.S. Government agencies which are usually designed to produce answers to questions of operational significance to the agencies. It does not seem to us desirable to impose on private research projects supported by the NSF the review and clearance necessary for foreign affairs research funded by operating agencies.

In the first case—the overseas operating agencies—we shall in general request them to make no commitment until we have had an opportunity to review the proposal and give them our clearance. We have told them that they should expect our response within 2 weeks. In the second case—all other agencies, except the NSF—we shall ask them to inform us of their proposed projects. They will not need an explicit clearance from the State Department to go ahead.

Third, the procedures will clearly state the belief that the sponsoring agency is the best judge of a project related to its mission. We have no intention of second-guessing any other Government agency. Its views as to the value of a study will be taken fully into account. Our review will not mean State Department endorsement of a project; rather the purpose is limited to the avoidance of damage to our foreign relations.

Fourth, our review does not extend to grants to academic institutions for general purposes related to foreign affairs research. We are concerned with support of specific research projects having the explicit approval of other Government agencies.

Fifth, we are concerned with the initiation of projects that could stir up sensitivities overseas, not with controlling the findings of Government-supported research. We will not censor research reports or in any other way attempt to influence the findings of scholars whose work enjoys Government funding.

Sixth, and most important, the responsibility for the wise expenditure of research funds remains in each agency under the authority of the President and the Congress. The State Department has not become, and does not wish to be, the controller for Government foreign affairs research.

In these procedures we have made every allowance for ease and speed so as to facilitate research. We hope these procedures will not prove cumbersome. Should they become so in spite of our best judgment at present, they can easily be modified. In fact we plan to review the procedures in 6 months in consultation with interested Government agencies and the Bureau of the Budget.

Hence, to all of our farflung and interested audiences—on the campuses, in Washington, and abroad—let me conclude by saying that we intend to carry out the President's mandate for the protection of our foreign relations, and of Government and private research, against some of the hazards to which they have recently been exposed. But we do not intend to inaugurate an age of procedural overkill. No one I know aspires to be a Lord High Executioner of foreign policy research. None of us have "little lists" (of projects) that never would be missed.

If you as a scholar interested in foreign policy research should ask me whether this will be the winter of our discontent, I would say no. And if you ask me how all the ambiguities, uncertainties, and portentous Solomon's choices will be resolved, I can only think of Velasquez, who, when asked how he mixed his colors, replied, "With taste." We hope to clothe our judgments with wisdom, inform our doubts with discretion, implement the President's order—and do it with all deliberate speed.

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