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CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES—II

THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF THE 20TH COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS AND ITS AFTERMATH

From the Translations of The Current Digest of the Soviet Press

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XI. KHRUSHCHEV'S SECRET SPEECH

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[On June 4, 1956, the United States Department of State released a text of the speech delivered by the Communist Party First Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev at a closed session of the 20th Party Congress Feb. 25, 1956. The State Department's introduction to the release pointed out that the session was limited in attendance to delegates from the U.S.S.R.]

["This version," said the release, "is understood to have been prepared for the guidance of the party leadership of a Communist Party outside the U.S.S.R. The Department of State does not vouch for the authenticity of the document and in releasing it intends that the document speak for itself."]

[The editors of this book have made minor stylistic changes in the text to correspond with the translation of terms used elsewhere in the book.]

Comrades! In the Party Central Committee report to the 20th Congress, in a number of speeches by delegates to the Congress, and earlier at plenary sessions of the Party Central Committee, quite a lot has been said about the cult of the individual leader and its harmful consequences.

After Stalin's death the Party Central Committee began to implement a policy of explaining concisely and consistently that it is impermissible and foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics akin to those of a god. Such a man supposedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do anything, is infallible in his behavior.

Such a belief about a man—specifically about Stalin—was cultivated among us for many years.

The objective of the present report is not a thorough evaluation of Stalin's life and work. Concerning Stalin's merits, an entirely sufficient number of books, pamphlets and studies had already been written in his lifetime. Stalin's role in the preparation and execution of the socialist revolution, in the Civil War, and in the fight for the construction of socialism in our country is universally known. Everyone knows this well. At present we are concerned with a question which has immense importance for the Party now and in the future—[we are concerned] with how the Stalin cult gradually grew, the cult which became at a certain specific stage the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of Party principles, of Party democracy, of revolutionary legality.

Because not all as yet realize fully the practical consequences resulting from the cult of the individual leader, the great harm caused by the violation of the principle of collective direction of the Party, and because immense and limitless power was gathered in the hands of one person, the Party Central Committee considers it absolutely necessary to make the material pertaining to this matter available to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Allow me first of all to remind you how severely the founders of Marxism-Leninism denounced every manifestation of the cult of the individual leader. In a letter to the German worker Wilhelm Bloss, Marx stated: "Because of my antipathy to any cult of the individual, I never made public during the

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existence of the International the numerous addresses from various countries which recognized my merits, and which annoyed me. I did not even reply to them, except sometimes to rebuke their authors. Engels and I first joined the secret society of Communists on the condition that everything making for superstitious worship of authority would be deleted from its statutes. [Ferdinand] Lassalle subsequently did quite the opposite."

Some time later Engels wrote: "Both Marx and I have always been against any public manifestation with regard to individuals, with the exception of cases when it had an important purpose; and we most strongly opposed such manifestations as during our lifetime concerned us personally."

The great modesty of the genius of the revolution, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, is known. Lenin had always stressed the role of

the people as the creator of history, the directing and organizing role of the Party as a living and creative organism, and also the role of the Central Committee.

Marxism does not negate the role of the leaders of the working class in directing the revolutionary liberation movement.

While ascribing great importance to the role of the leaders and organizers of the masses, Lenin at the same time mercilessly stigmatized every manifestation of the cult of the individual leader, inexorably combated "hero-and-the-crowd" views—views alien to Marxism—and countered all efforts to oppose a "hero" to the masses and to the people.

Lenin taught that the Party's strength depends on its indissoluble unity with the masses, on the fact that the people—the workers, peasants and intelligentsia—follow the Party. "Only he will win and retain power," said Lenin, "who believes in the people, who submerges himself in the fountain of the people's living creativeness."

Lenin spoke with pride of the Bolshevik Communist Party as the leader and teacher of the people; he called for submitting all major questions to the opinion of knowledgeable workers, to the opinion of their party; he said: "We believe in it, we see in it the wisdom, the honor, and the conscience of our epoch."

Lenin resolutely stood against every attempt aimed at minimizing or weakening the directing role of the Party in the structure of the Soviet state. He worked out Bolshevik principles of Party direction and norms of Party life, stressing that the guiding principle of Party leadership is its collegiality. As early as in the prerevolutionary years Lenin called the Party Central Committee a collective of leaders and the guardian and interpreter of Party principles. "During the period between Congresses," pointed out Lenin, "the Central Committee guards and interprets the principles of the Party."

Emphasizing the role of the Party Central Committee and its authority, Vladimir Ilyich pointed out: "Our Central Committee constituted itself as a closely centralized and highly authoritative group***"

During Lenin's life the Party Central Committee was a real expression of collective leadership of the Party and the country. Being a militant and tireless fighter for the Party's principles in matters of principle, Lenin never imposed by force his views upon his co-workers. He tried to persuade; he patiently ex-

ained his opinions to others. Lenin always diligently saw to it that the norms of Party life were realized, that the Party Statutes were enforced, that the Party Congresses and Central Committee plenary sessions took place at the proper intervals. In addition to V. I. Lenin's great accomplishments for the history of the working class and working peasants, for the victory of our party and for the application of the ideas of scientific communism to life, his keen mind expressed itself also in that he detected in Stalin in time those negative characteristics which resulted later in grave consequences. Fearing the future destiny of the Party and of the Soviet country, V. I. Lenin gave quite correct characterization of Stalin, pointing out that it was necessary to consider the question of transferring Stalin from the position of Secretary-General because Stalin was excessively rude, did not have a proper attitude toward his comrades, was capricious and abused his power.

In December, 1922, in a letter to the Party Congress Vladimir Ilyich wrote: "Having become Secretary-General, Comrade Stalin has acquired immeasurable power in his hands, and I am not sure that he will always know how to use this power with sufficient caution."

This letter, a political document of tremendous importance, known in Party history as Lenin's "testament," has been distributed among the delegates to the 20th Party Congress. You have read it, and will undoubtedly read it again, more than once. You might reflect on Lenin's plain words, in which expressions given to Vladimir Ilyich's anxiety concerning the Party, the people, the state and the future direction of Party policy.

Vladimir Ilyich said: "Stalin is too rude, and this failing, which is quite tolerable in our midst and in relations among us Communists, becomes intolerable in the office of Secretary-General. Therefore, I propose to the Comrades that they think of a way of removing Stalin from this post and appointing to it another person who in all other respects differs from Comrade Stalin in one advantage alone, namely, that he be more tolerant, more loyal, more courteous and more considerate to comrades, less capricious, etc."

This document of Lenin's was made known to the delegates to the 13th Party Congress, who discussed the question of transferring Stalin from the position of Secretary-General. The delegates declared themselves in favor of retaining Stalin in this post, hoping that he would heed Vladimir Ilyich's critical remarks and would be able to overcome the defects which caused Lenin serious anxiety.

Comrades! The Party Congress should become acquainted with two new documents, which confirm Stalin's character as already outlined by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in his "testament." These documents are a letter from Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya [Lenin's wife] to [Lev Borisovich] Kamenev, who was at that time head of the Political Bureau, and a personal letter from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin to Stalin.

I will now read these documents:

"Lev Borisovich! Because of a short letter which I had written in words dictated to me by Vladimir Ilyich by permission of the doctors, Stalin allowed himself yesterday an unusually rude outburst directed at me. This is not my first day in the Party. During all these 30 years I have never heard from any Comrade one word of rudeness. The cause of the Party and of Ilyich is not less dear to me than to Stalin. At present I need maximum self-control. I know better than any doctor what one can and what one cannot discuss with Ilyich, because I know what disturbs him and what does not; in any case, I know better than Stalin. I am turning to you and to Grigory [Zinoviev], as much closer comrades of V. I., and I beg you to protect me from rude interference with my private life and from vile invective and threats. I have no doubt as to what will be the unanimous decision of the Control Commission, with which Stalin sees fit to threaten me; however, I have neither the strength nor the time to waste on this foolish quarrel. And I am a living person and my nerves are strained to the utmost.—
N. KRUPSKAYA."

Nadezhda Konstantinovna wrote this letter on Dec. 23, 1922. Two and a half months later, in March, 1923, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin sent Stalin the following letter:

"To Comrade Stalin.

"Copies to: Kamenev and Zinoviev.

"Dear Comrade Stalin! You permitted yourself a rude summons of my wife to the telephone and a rude reprimand of her. Despite the fact that she told you that she agreed to forget what was said, nevertheless Zinoviev and Kamenev heard about it from her. I have no intention to forget so easily what is being done against me, and I need not stress here that I consider as directed against me what is being done against my wife. I ask you, therefore, to weigh carefully whether you are agreeable to retracting your words and apologizing or whether you prefer the severance of relations between us." (*Stir in the hall.*)
"Sincerely, LENIN—March 5, 1923."

Comrades! I shall not comment on these documents. They speak eloquently for themselves. Since Stalin could behave in this manner during Lenin's life, could thus behave toward Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya, whom the Party knows well and values highly as a loyal friend of Lenin and as an active fighter for the cause of the Party since its creation, we can easily imagine how Stalin treated other people. These negative characteristics of his developed steadily and during the last years acquired an absolutely insufferable character.

As later events proved, Lenin's anxiety was justified: In the first period after Lenin's death Stalin still paid attention to his [Lenin's] advice, but later he began to disregard the serious admonitions of Vladimir Ilyich.

When we analyze Stalin's practice in directing the Party and the country, when we pause to consider everything Stalin perpetrated, we must be convinced that Lenin's fears were justified. Stalin's negative characteristics, which in Lenin's time were only incipient, turned during the last years into grave abuse of power by Stalin, which caused untold harm to our party.

We have to consider this matter seriously and analyze it correctly in order that we may preclude any possibility of a repetition, in any form whatever, of what took place during the life of Stalin, who absolutely did not tolerate collegiality in leadership and in work and who practiced brutal violence not only toward everything which opposed him, but also toward what seemed, to his capricious and despotic character, contrary to his concepts.

Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation and patient cooperation with people, but by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed this concept or tried to prove his viewpoint and the correctness of his position was doomed to removal from the leading collective and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation. This was especially true during the period following the 17th Party Congress, when many prominent Party leaders and rank-and-file Party workers, honest and dedicated to the cause of communism, fell victim to Stalin's despotism.

We must affirm that the Party fought a serious fight against the Trotskyites, rightists and bourgeois nationalists, and that it disarmed ideologically all the enemies of Leninism. This ideological fight was carried on successfully, and as a result the Party was strengthened and tempered. Here Stalin played a positive role.

The Party led a great political ideological struggle against those in its own ranks who proposed anti-Leninist theses, who represented a political line hostile to the Party and to the cause of socialism. This was a stubborn and a difficult fight but a necessary one, because the political line of both the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc and of the Bukharinites led actually toward the restoration of capitalism and capitulation to the world bourgeoisie. Let us consider for a moment what would have happened if in 1928-1929 the political line of right deviation had prevailed among us, or orientation toward "cotton-dress industrialization," or toward the kulak, etc. We would not now have a powerful heavy industry, we would not have the collective farms, we would find ourselves disarmed and weak in a capitalist encirclement.

It was for this reason that the Party led an inexorable ideological fight and explained to all Party members and to the non-Party masses the harm and the danger of the anti-Leninist proposals of the Trotskyite opposition and the rightist opportunists. And this great work of explaining the Party line bore fruit; both the Trotskyites and the rightist opportunists were politically isolated; the overwhelming Party majority supported the Leninist line and the Party was able to apply the Leninist Party line and to build socialism.

Worth noting is the fact that even during the progress of the furious ideological fight against the Trotskyites, the Zinovievites, the Bukharinites and others, extreme repressive measures were not used against them. The fight was on ideological grounds. But some years later, when socialism in our country had been fundamentally established, when the exploiting classes had been generally liquidated, when the Soviet social structure had radically changed, when the social base for political movements and groups hostile to the Party had shrunk sharply, when the ideological opponents of the Party had long since been defeated politically, then the repression directed against them began.

It was precisely during this period (1935-1937-1938) that the practice of mass repression through the state apparatus was born, first against the enemies of Leninism—Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, long since politically defeated by the Party—and subsequently also against many honest Communists, against those Party cadres which had borne the heavy burden of the Civil War and the first and most difficult years of industrialization and collectivization, which had fought actively against the Trotskyites and the rightists for the Leninist party line.

Stalin originated the concept "enemy of the people." This term automatically rendered it unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy be proved; this term made possible the use of the most cruel repression, violating all norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin, against those who were only suspected of hostile intent, against those who had bad reputations. This concept, "enemy of the people," actually eliminated the possibility of any kind of ideological fight or the making of one's views known on this or that issue, even issues of a practical nature. In the main, and in actuality, the only proof of guilt used, contrary to all norms of current law, was the "confession" of the accused himself; and, as subsequent investigation has proved, "confessions" were obtained through physical pressures against the accused.

This led to glaring violations of revolutionary legality, and to the fact that many entirely innocent persons, who in the past had defended the Party line, became victims.

We must assert that, in regard to those persons who in their time had opposed the Party line, there were often no sufficiently serious reasons for their physical annihilation. The formula "enemy of the people" was specifically introduced for the purpose of physically annihilating such individuals.

It is a fact that many persons who were later annihilated as enemies of the Party and people had worked with Lenin during his life. Some of these persons had made mistakes during Lenin's life, but, despite this, Lenin benefited by their work, he corrected them and he did everything possible to retain them in the ranks of the Party; he induced them to follow him.

In this connection the delegates to the Party Congress should familiarize themselves with an unpublished note by V. I. Lenin directed to the Central Committee's Political Bureau in October, 1920. Outlining the duties of the Control Commission, Lenin wrote that the commission should be transformed into a real "organ of Party and proletarian conscience."

"As a special duty of the Control Commission there is recommended a deep, individualized relationship with and sometimes even a type of therapy for the representatives of the so-called opposition—those who have experienced a psychological crisis because of failure in their Soviet or Party career. An effort should be made to quiet them, to explain the matter to them in a way used among Comrades, to find for them (avoiding the method of issuing orders) a task for which they are psychologically fitted. Advice and rules relating to this matter are to be formulated by the Central Committee's Organizational Bureau, etc."

Everyone knows how irreconcilable Lenin was with the ideological enemies of Marxism, with those who deviated from the correct Party line. At the same time, however, Lenin, as is evident from the given document, in his practice of directing the Party demanded the most intimate Party contact with people who had shown indecision or temporary nonconformity with the Party line, but whom it was possible to return to the Party path. Lenin's method of dealing with such people was educated without the application of extreme methods.

Lenin's wisdom in dealing with people was evident in his work with cadres.

An entirely different relationship with people characterized Stalin. Lenin's traits—patient work with people; stubborn and painstaking education of them; the ability to induce people to follow him without using compulsion, but rather through the ideological influence on them of the whole collective—were entirely foreign to Stalin. He [Stalin] discarded the Leninist method of persuading and educating; he abandoned the method of ideological struggle for that of administrative violence, mass repressions and terror. He acted on an increasingly larger scale and more stubbornly through punitive organs, at the same time often violating all existing standards of morality and of Soviet law.

Arbitrary behavior by one person encouraged and permitted arbitrariness in others. Mass arrests and deportations of many thousands of people, execution without trial and without normal investigation created conditions of insecurity, fear and even desperation.

This, of course, did not contribute toward unity of the Party ranks and of all strata of the working people, but, on the contrary, brought about annihilation and the expulsion from the Party of workers who were loyal but inconvenient to Stalin.

Our party fought for the implementation of Lenin's plans for the construction of socialism. This was an ideological fight. Had Leninist principles been observed during the course of this fight, had the Party's devotion to principles been skillfully combined with a keen and solicitous concern for people, had they not been repelled and wasted, but rather drawn to our side, we certainly would not have had such a brutal violation of revolutionary legality and many thousands of people would not have fallen victim of the method of terror. Extraordinary methods would then have been resorted to only against those people who had in fact committed criminal acts against the Soviet system.

Let us recall some historical facts.

In the days before the October revolution two members of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party, Kamenev and Zinoviev, declared themselves against Lenin's plan for an armed uprising. In addition, on Oct. 18 they published in the Menshevik newspaper Novaya zhizn a statement declaring that the Bolsheviks were making preparations for an uprising and that they considered it adventuristic. Kamenev and Zinoviev thus disclosed to the enemy the Central Committee's decision to stage the uprising and that the uprising had been organized to take place within the very near future.

This was treason against the Party and against the revolution. In this connection V. I. Lenin wrote: "Kamenev and Zinoviev disclosed the decision of their party's Central Committee on the armed uprising to Rodzyanko and Kerensky.***" He put before the Central Committee the question of Zinoviev's and Kamenev's expulsion from the Party.

However, after the great socialist October revolution, as is known, Zinoviev and Kamenev were given leading positions. Lenin put them in positions in which they carried out most responsible Party tasks and participated actively in the work of leading Party and Soviet bodies. It is known that Zinoviev and Kamenev committed a number of other serious errors during Lenin's life. In his "testament" Lenin warned that "the October episode of Zinoviev and Kamenev was not, of course, fortuitous." But Lenin did not pose the question of their arrest and certainly not their shooting.

Or let us take the example of the Trotskyites. At present, after a sufficiently long historical period, we can speak about the fight with the Trotskyites with complete calm and can analyze this matter with sufficient objectivity. After all, around Trotsky were people whose origin cannot by any means be traced to bourgeois society. Part of them belonged to the Party intelligentsia and a certain part were recruited from among the workers. We can name many individuals who in their time joined the Trotskyites; however, these same individuals took an active part in the workers' movement before the revolution, during the socialist October revolution itself, and also in the consolidation of the victory of this greatest of revolutions. Many of them broke with Trotskyism and returned to the Party. We are deeply convinced that had Lenin lived such people? We are deeply convinced that had Lenin lived

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such an extreme method would not have been used against many of them.

Such are only a few historical facts. But can it be said that Lenin did not decide to use even the most severe means against enemies of the revolution when this was actually necessary? No, no one can say this. Vladimir Ilyich demanded uncompromising dealings with the enemies of the revolution and of the working class, and when necessary resorted ruthlessly to such methods. You will recall only V. I. Lenin's fight with the Socialist Revolutionary organizers of the anti-Soviet uprising, with the counterrevolutionary kulaks in 1918 and with others, when Lenin without hesitation used the most extreme methods against the enemies. Lenin used such methods, however, only against actual class enemies and not against those who blundered, who erred, and whom it was possible to lead through ideological influence and even retain in the leadership.

Lenin used severe methods only in the most necessary cases, when the exploiting classes were still in existence and were vigorously opposing the revolution, when the struggle for survival was decidedly assuming the sharpest forms, even including a civil war.

Stalin, on the other hand, used extreme methods and mass repressions at a time when the revolution was already victorious, when the Soviet state was strengthened, when the exploiting classes were already liquidated and socialist relations were rooted solidly in all phases of national economy, when our party was politically consolidated and had strengthened itself both numerically and ideologically. It is clear that here Stalin showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality and his abuse of power. Instead of proving his political correctness and mobilizing the masses, he often chose the path of repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual enemies, but also against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the Party and the Soviet government. Here we see no wisdom but only a demonstration of the brutal force which had once so alarmed V. I. Lenin.

Lately, especially after the unmasking of the Beria gang, the Central Committee has looked into a series of cases fabricated by this gang. This disclosed a very ugly picture of brutal willfulness connected with the incorrect behavior of Stalin. As facts prove, Stalin, using his unlimited power, allowed himself many abuses. He acted in the name of the Central Committee, not asking for the opinion of the Committee members or even of the members of the Central Committee's Political Bureau; often he did not inform them about his personal decisions concerning very important Party and government matters.

In considering the question of the cult of the individual leader, we must first of all show everyone what harm this caused to the interests of our party.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin had always stressed the Party's role and importance in directing the socialist government of workers and peasants; he saw in this the chief precondition for successfully building socialism in our country. Pointing to the great responsibility of the Bolshevik party, as the ruling party in the Soviet state, Lenin called for the most meticulous observance of all norms of Party life; he called for the realization of the principles of collegiality in the direction of the Party and the state.

Collegiality of leadership flows from the very nature of our party, a party built on the principles of democratic centralism. "This means," said Lenin, "that all Party business is accomplished by all the Party members—directly or through representatives—who, without any exceptions, are subject to the same rules; in addition, all administrative members, all directing collegiums, all holders of Party positions are elected, are accountable for their activities and are subject to recall."

It is known that Lenin himself offered an example of the most careful observance of these principles. There was no matter so important that Lenin himself decided it without asking for advice and approval of the majority of the Central Committee members or of the members of the Central Committee's Political Bureau.

In the most difficult period for our party and our country, Lenin considered it necessary regularly to convoke Congresses, Party conferences and Central Committee plenary sessions, at which all the major questions were discussed and the decisions carefully worked out by the collective of leaders, were adopted.

We can recall, for example, the year 1918, when the country was threatened by the attack of the imperialist interventionists. In this situation the Seventh Party Congress was convened in order to discuss a vitally important matter which could not be postponed—the matter of peace. In 1919, while the Civil War was raging, the Eighth Party Congress met, adopted a new Party program and decided such important matters as the relationship with the peasant masses, the organization of the Red Army, the leading role of the Party in the work of the Soviets, correction of the social composition of the Party, and other matters. In 1920 the Ninth Party Congress was convened and laid down the guiding principles pertaining to the Party's work in the sphere of economic construction. In 1921 the Tenth Party Congress accepted Lenin's New Economic Policy and the historic resolution entitled "On Party Unity."

During Lenin's lifetime, Party Congresses were convened regularly; always, when a radical turn in the development of the Party and the country took place, Lenin considered it absolutely necessary that the Party discuss at length all the basic questions of domestic and foreign policy and questions bearing on the development of the Party and the state.

It is very characteristic that Lenin addressed to the Party Congress, as the highest Party body, his last articles, letters and remarks. During the period between Congresses, the Party Central Committee, acting as the most authoritative directing collective, meticulously observed the principles of the Party and carried out its policy.

So it was during Lenin's lifetime.

Were our party's sacred Leninist principles observed after the death of Vladimir Ilyich?

During the first few years after Lenin's death Party Congresses and Central Committee plenary sessions took place more or less regularly, but later, when Stalin began increasingly to abuse his power, these principles were brutally violated. This was especially evident during the last 15 years of his life. Was it a normal situation when 13 years elapsed between the 18th and 19th Party Congresses, years during which our party and our country experienced so many important events? These events demanded categorically that the Party should have adopted decisions pertaining to the country's defense during the patriotic war [World War II] and to peacetime construction after the war. Even after the end of the war a Congress was not convened for more than seven years.

Central Committee plenary sessions were hardly ever called. Suffice it to mention that during all the years of the patriotic war not a single Central Committee plenary session took place. It is true that there was an attempt to call a Central Committee plenary session in October, 1941, when Central Committee members from the whole country were called to Moscow. They waited two days for the opening of the plenary session, but in vain. Stalin did not even want to meet and to talk to the Central Committee members. This fact shows how demoralized Stalin was in the first months of the war and how haughtily and disdainfully he treated the Central Committee members.

In practice Stalin ignored the norms of Party life and trampled on the Leninist principle of collective Party leadership.

Stalin's willfulness vis-a-vis the Party and its Central Committee became fully evident after the 17th Party Congress, which took place in 1934.

Having numerous data showing brutal willfulness toward Party cadres, the Central Committee created a Party commission under the control of the Central Committee Presidium; it was charged with investigating what had made possible the mass repressions against the majority of the Central Committee's members and candidates elected at the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

The commission has familiarized itself with a large amount of materials in the N.K.V.D. archives and with other documents and has established many facts pertaining to the fabrication of cases against Communists, to false accusations, to glaring abuses of socialist legality which resulted in the death of innocent people. It became apparent that many Party, Soviet and economic activists who were branded in 1937-1938 as "enemies" were actually never enemies, spies, wreckers, etc., but were always honest Communists. They were only repressed and often, no longer able to bear barbaric tortures, they charged

themselves (at the order of the investigating judges—falsifiers) with all kinds of grave and unlikely crimes. The commission has presented to the Central Committee Presidium lengthy and documented materials pertaining to mass repressions against delegates to the 17th Party Congress and against members of the Central Committee elected at that Congress. These materials have been studied by the Central Committee Presidium.

It was determined that of the 139 members and candidates of the Party Central Committee who were elected at the 17th Congress, 98 persons, i.e., 70%, were arrested and shot (mostly in 1937-1938). (Indignation in the hall.)

What was the composition of the delegates to the 17th Congress? It is known that 80% of the voting participants in the 17th Congress joined the Party during the years of the [Bolshevik] underground before the revolution or during the Civil War; this means before 1921. By social origin the basic mass of the delegates to the Congress were workers (60% of the voting members).

For this reason it was inconceivable that a Congress so composed would have elected a Central Committee, a majority of which would prove to be enemies of the Party. The only reason why 70% of the Central Committee members and candidates elected at the 17th Congress were branded enemies of the Party and of the people was that honest Communists were slandered, accusations against them were fabricated, and revolutionary legality was gravely undermined.

The same fate befell not only the Central Committee members but also the majority of the delegates to the 17th Party Congress. Of 1966 delegates with either voting or advisory powers, 1108 persons were arrested on charges of counterrevolutionary crimes, i.e., decidedly more than a majority. This very fact shows how absurd, wild and contrary to common sense were the charges of counterrevolutionary crimes made, as we now see, against a majority of the participants in the 17th Party Congress. (Indignation in the hall.)

We should recall that the 17th Party Congress is historically known as the Congress of Victors. Delegates to the Congress were active participants in the building of our socialist state; many of them had suffered and fought for Party interests during the prerevolutionary years in the underground and at the Civil War fronts; they fought their enemies valiantly and often nervelessly looked into the face of death. How then can we believe that such people could prove to be "two-faced" and had joined the camp of the enemies of socialism during the era after the political liquidation of the Zinovievites, Trotskyites and rightists and after the great accomplishments of socialist construction?

This was the result of the abuse of power by Stalin, who began to use mass terror against the Party cadres.

What is the reason that mass repressions against activists increased more and more after the 17th Party Congress? It was because at that time Stalin had so elevated himself above the Party and above the nation that he ceased to consider either the Central Committee or the Party. While he still reckoned with the opinion of the collective before the 17th Congress, Stalin in even greater measure ceased to reckon with the views of the members of the Party's Central Committee and even the members of the Political Bureau after the complete political liquidation of the Trotskyites, Zinovievites and Bukharinites, when the Party had achieved unity as a result of that fight and socialist victories. Stalin thought that now he could decide all things alone and all he needed were statisticians; he treated all others in such a way that they could only listen to and praise him.

After the criminal murder of S. M. Kirov, mass repressions and brutal acts of violation of socialist legality began. On the evening of Dec. 1, 1934, on Stalin's initiative (without the approval of the Political Bureau—which was passed two days later, casually) the secretary of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, Yenukidze, signed the following directive:

1. Investigative agencies are directed to speed up the cases of those accused of the preparation or execution of acts of terror.
2. Judicial organs are directed to speed up the preparation of death sentences for crimes of this category in order to con-

sider the possibility of pardon, because the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Central Executive Committee does not consider it possible to accept petitions of this sort.

3. Agencies of the N.K.V.D. [Commissariat of Internal Affairs] are directed to carry out the death sentences against criminals of the above-mentioned category immediately after the passage of sentence.

This directive became the basis for mass abuses of socialist law observance. During many of the fabricated court cases the accused were charged with the "preparation" of terrorist acts; this deprived them of any possibility that their cases might be re-examined, even when they stated before the court that their "confessions" were secured by force, and when, in a convincing manner, they disproved the accusations against them.

It must be asserted that to this day the circumstances surrounding Kirov's murder hide many things which are inexplicable and mysterious and demand a most careful examination. There are reasons for the suspicion that the killer of Kirov, [Leonid V.] Nikolayev, was assisted by someone from among the people whose duty it was to guard Kirov's person. A month and a half before the killing, Nikolayev was arrested on the ground of suspicious behavior, but he was released and not even searched. It is an unusually suspicious circumstance that when the Chekist assigned to protect Kirov was being brought in for interrogation, on Dec. 2, 1934, he was killed in an automobile "accident" in which no other occupants of the car were harmed. After the murder of Kirov, top functionaries of the Leningrad N.K.V.D. were given very light sentences, but in 1937 they were shot. We can assume that they were shot in order to cover the traces of the organizers of Kirov's killing. (Stir in the hall.)

Mass repressions grew tremendously from the end of 1936 after a telegram from Stalin and Zhdanov, dated from Sochi Sept. 25, 1936, was addressed to Kaganovich, Molotov and other members of the Political Bureau. The content of the telegram was as follows:

"We deem it absolutely necessary and urgent that Comrade Yezhov be nominated to the post of People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. Yagoda has definitely proved himself to be incapable of unmasking the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc. The O.G.P.U. is four years behind in this matter. This is noted by all Party workers and by the majority of the representatives of the N.K.V.D." Strictly speaking we should stress that Stalin did not meet with and therefore could not know the opinion of Party workers.

This Stalinist formulation that the "N.K.V.D. is four years behind" in applying mass repression and that there is a necessity for "catching up" with the neglected work directly pushed the N.K.V.D. workers onto the path of mass arrests and executions.

We should state that this formulation was also forced on the February-March plenary session of the Party Central Committee in 1937. The session resolution approved it on the basis of Yezhov's report, "Lessons Ensuing From the Harmful Activity, Diversion and Espionage of the Japanese-German-Trotskyite Agents," stating:

"The Plenum of the Party Central Committee considers that all facts revealed during the investigation into the matter of an anti-Soviet Trotskyite center and of its followers in the provinces show that the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs had fallen behind at least four years in the attempt to unmask these most inexorable enemies of the people."

The mass repressions at this time were made under the slogan of a fight against the Trotskyites. Did the Trotskyites at this time actually constitute such a danger to our party and to the Soviet state? We should recall that on the eve of the 15th Party Congress in 1927 only about 4000 votes were cast for the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition, while there were 724,000 for the Party line. During the ten years that passed between the 15th Party Congress and the February-March Central Committee plenary session Trotskyism was completely disarmed; many former Trotskyites had changed their former views and worked in the various sectors building socialism. It is clear that there was no basis for mass terror in the country in this situation of socialist victory.

Stalin's "four years behind" formulation was also forced on the February-March Central Committee plenary session in 1937, "Deficiencies of Party Work" and

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Methods for the Liquidation of the Trotskyites and Other Double-Dealers," contained an attempt at theoretical justification of the mass terror policy under the pretext that class war must allegedly sharpen as we march forward toward socialism. Stalin asserted that both history and Lenin taught him this.

Actually, Lenin taught that the application of revolutionary violence is necessitated by the resistance of the exploiting classes, and this referred to the era when the exploiting classes existed and were powerful. As soon as the nation's political situation had improved, when, in January, 1920, the Red Army took Rostov and thus won a most important victory over Denikin, Lenin instructed Dzerzhzhinsky to stop mass terror and to abolish the death penalty. Lenin justified this important political move of the Soviet state in the following manner in his report at the session of the All-Union Central Executive Committee Feb. 2, 1920:

"We were forced to use terror because of the terror practiced by the Entente, when strong world powers threw their hordes against us, without scruples over any type of conduct. We would not have lasted two days had we not been ruthless in meeting these actions of the officers and White Guards; this meant the use of terror, but this was forced upon us by the terrorist methods of the Entente.

"But as soon as we attained a decisive victory, even before the end of the war, immediately after taking Rostov, we gave up the use of the death penalty and thus proved that we intend to carry out our program in the manner that we promised. We say that the application of violence stems from the decision to crush the exploiters, the big landowners and the capitalists; as soon as this was accomplished we gave up the use of all extraordinary methods. We have proved this in practice."

Stalin deviated from these clear and plain precepts of Lenin. Stalin put the Party and the N.K.V.D. to using mass terror when the exploiting classes had been liquidated in our country and when there were no serious reasons for the use of extraordinary mass terror.

This terror was actually directed not at the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes but against honest workers of the Party and of the Soviet state; lying, slanderous and absurd accusations were made against them—accusations of "double-dealing," "espionage," "sabotage," preparation of fictitious "plots," etc.

At the February-March Central Committee plenary session in 1937 many members actually questioned the rightness of the established course regarding mass repressions under the pretext of combating "double-dealing."

Comrade Postyshev most ably expressed these doubts. He said:

"I have philosophized that the severe years of the struggle have passed; Party members who lost their backbone broke down or joined the camp of the enemy, healthy elements fought for the Party. Those were the years of industrialization and collectivization. I never thought it possible that after this severe era had passed Karpov and people like him would find themselves in the camp of the enemy." (Karpov was a worker in the Ukrainian Central Committee whom Postyshev knew well.) "And now, according to the testimony, it appears that Karpov was recruited in 1934 by the Trotskyites. I personally do not believe that in 1934 an honest Party member who had trod the long road of unrelenting fight against enemies, for the Party and for socialism, would now be in the camp of the enemies. I do not believe it. *** I cannot imagine how it would be possible to travel with the Party during the difficult years and then, in 1934, join the Trotskyites. It is an odd thing.***" (Stir in the hall.)

Using Stalin's formulation, namely, that the closer we are to socialism, the more enemies we will have, and using the resolution of the February-March Central Committee plenary session, adopted on the basis of Yezhov's report, the provocateurs who had infiltrated the state security agencies, together with unconscionable careerists, began to protect with the Party name the mass terror against Party cadres, cadres of the Soviet state and ordinary Soviet citizens. Suffice it to say that the number of arrests based on charges of counterrevolutionary crimes grew tenfold between 1936 and 1937.

It is known that brutal methods were applied against lead-

ing Party workers. The Party Statutes approved at the 17th Party Congress were based on Leninist principles expressed at the 10th Party Congress. They stated that to apply an extreme measure such as expulsion from the Party against a Central Committee member, against a Central Committee candidate, or against a member of the Party Control Commission, "it is necessary to call a Central Committee plenary session and to invite to the plenary session all Central Committee candidate members and all members of the Party Control Committee"; only if two-thirds of the members of such a general assembly of responsible Party leaders found it necessary, only then could a Central Committee member or candidate be expelled.

The majority of the Central Committee members and candidates elected at the 17th Congress and arrested in 1937-1938 were expelled from the Party illegally through gross violation of the Party Statutes, since the question of their expulsion was never studied at a Central Committee plenary session.

Now when the cases of some of these so-called "spies" and "saboteurs" were examined it was found that all their cases were fabricated. Confessions of guilt of many arrested and charged with enemy activity were gained with the help of cruel and inhuman tortures.

At the same time Stalin, as we have been informed by members of the Political Bureau of that time, did not show them the statements of many accused political activists who retracted their confessions before the military tribunal and asked for an objective examination of their cases. There were many such declarations, and Stalin doubtless knew of them.

The Central Committee considers it absolutely necessary to inform the Congress of many such fabricated "cases" against the members of the Party Central Committee elected at the 17th Party Congress.

An example of vile provocation, of odious falsification and of criminal violation of revolutionary legality is the case of the former candidate member of the Central Committee Political Bureau, one of the most eminent workers of the Party and of the Soviet government, Comrade Robert I. Eikhe, who had been a Party member since 1905. (Commotion in the hall.)

Comrade Eikhe was arrested April 29, 1938, on the basis of slanderous materials, without the sanction of the Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., which was finally received 15 months after the arrest.

Investigation of Eikhe's case was made in a manner which most brutally violated Soviet legality and was accompanied by willfulness and falsification.

Eikhe was forced under torture to sign ahead of time a protocol of his confession prepared by the investigative judges, in which he and several other eminent Party workers were accused of anti-Soviet activity.

On Oct. 1, 1939, Eikhe sent his declaration to Stalin in which he categorically denied his guilt and asked for an examination of his case. In the declaration he wrote: "There is no more bitter misery than to sit in the jail of a government for which I have always fought."

A second declaration of Eikhe has been preserved which he sent to Stalin Oct. 27, 1939; in it he cited facts very convincingly and countered the slanderous accusations made against him, arguing that this provocatory accusation was on the one hand the work of real Trotskyites whose arrests he had sanctioned as First Secretary of the West Siberian Territory Party Committee and who had conspired to take revenge on him, and, on the other hand, the result of base falsification of materials by the investigative judges. Eikhe wrote in his declaration:

"***On Oct. 25 of this year I was informed that the investigation of my case has been concluded and I was given access to the materials of this investigation. Had I been guilty of only one-hundredth of the crimes with which I am charged, I would not have dared to send you this pre-execution declaration; however, I have not been guilty of even one of the things with which I am charged and my heart is clean of even the shadow of baseness. I have never in my life told you a word of falsehood and now, when I stand with both feet in the grave, I am also not lying. My whole case is a typical example of provocation, slander and violation of the elementary basis of revolutionary legality. ***

***The confessions which were made part of my file are not

Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars because correct resolutions of the Party Central Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars which were not made on my initiative or with my participation are presented as hostile acts of counterrevolutionary organizations performed at my suggestion. ***

"I am now alluding to the most disgraceful part of my life and to my really grave guilt before the Party and you; that is, my confession of counterrevolutionary activity. *** The case is as follows: not being able to suffer the tortures to which I was put by Ushakov and Nikolayev—and especially by the former—who utilized the knowledge that my broken ribs have not properly mended and have caused me great pain—I have been forced to accuse myself and others.

"The majority of my confession has been suggested or dictated by Ushakov, and the remainder is my reconstruction of N.K.V.D. materials from Western Siberia for which I assumed all responsibility. If some part of the story which Ushakov fabricated and which I signed did not properly hang together, I was forced to sign another variant. The same thing was done to Rukhimovich, who was at first designated as a member of the reserve network and whose name later was removed without telling me anything about it; the same was also done with the leader of the reserve network supposedly created by Bukharin in 1935. At first I wrote my name in, and then I was instructed to insert Mezhlauk. There were other similar incidents.

"*** I ask and beg you that you again examine my case and this not for the purpose of sparing me but in order to unmask the vile provocation which wound itself like a snake around many persons, in large measure through my meanness and criminal slander. I have never betrayed you or the Party. I know that I perish because of vile and mean work of the enemies of the Party and of the people, who fabricated the provocation against me."

It would appear that such an important declaration was worth an examination by the Central Committee. This, however, was not done, and the declaration was transmitted to Beria, while the terrible maltreatment of the Political Bureau Candidate, Comrade Eikhe, continued.

On Feb. 2, 1940, Eikhe was brought before the court. Here he did not confess any guilt and said as follows:

"In all the so-called confessions of mine there is not one letter written by me with the exception of my signatures under the protocols, which were forced from me. I have made my confession under pressure from the investigative judge, who from the time of my arrest tormented me. After that I began to write all this nonsense. *** The most important thing for me is to tell the court, the Party and Stalin that I am not guilty. I have never been guilty of any conspiracy. I shall die believing in the truth of Party policy, as I have believed in it during my whole life."

Eikhe was shot Feb. 4. (Indignation in the hall.) It has been definitely established now that Eikhe's case was fabricated; he has been posthumously rehabilitated.

Comrade Rudzutak, candidate member of the Political Bureau, member of the Party since 1905, who spent ten years in a Tsarist hard labor camp, completely retracted in court the confession which was forced from him. The protocol of the session of the Collegium of the Supreme Military Tribunal contains the following statement by Rudzutak:

"*** The only plea which he places before the court is that the Party Central Committee be informed that there is in the N.K.V.D. an as yet not liquidated center which is craftily manufacturing cases, which forces innocent persons to confess; there is no opportunity to prove one's nonparticipation in crimes to which the confessions of various persons testify. The investigative methods are such that they force people to lie and to slander entirely innocent persons in addition to those who already stand accused. He asks the court that he be allowed to inform the Party Central Committee of all this in writing. He assures the court that he personally never had any evil designs in regard to the policy of our party because he had always agreed with the Party policy pertaining to all spheres of economic and cultural activity."

This declaration of Rudzutak was ignored, despite the fact that Rudzutak was in his time the chief of the Central Control

Commission, which was called into being in accordance with Lenin's concept for the purpose of fighting for Party unity. In this manner fell the chief of this highly authoritative Party agency, a victim of brutal willfulness: he was not even called before the Central Committee's Political Bureau because Stalin did not want to talk to him. Sentence was pronounced on him in 20 minutes and he was shot. (Indignation in the hall.)

After careful examination of the case in 1955 it was established that the accusation against Rudzutak was false and that it was based on slanderous materials. Rudzutak has been rehabilitated posthumously.

The way in which the former N.K.V.D. workers manufactured various fictitious "anti-Soviet centers" and "blocs" with the help of provocatory methods is seen from the confession of Comrade Rozenblum, Party member since 1906, who was arrested in 1937 by the Leningrad N.K.V.D.

During the examination in 1955 of the Komarov case Rozenblum revealed the following fact: When Rozenblum was arrested in 1937 he was subjected to terrible torture, during which he was ordered to confess false information concerning himself and other persons. He was then brought to the office of Zakovsky, who offered him freedom on condition that he make before the court a false confession fabricated in 1937 by the N.K.V.D. concerning "sabotage, espionage and diversion in a terroristic center in Leningrad." (Stir in the hall.) With unbelievable cynicism Zakovsky told about the vile "mechanism" for the crafty creation of fabricated "anti-Soviet plots."

"In order to illustrate it to me," stated Rozenblum, "Zakovsky gave me several possible variants of the organization of this center and of its branches. After he detailed the organization to me, Zakovsky told me that the N.K.V.D. would prepare the case of this center, remarking that the trial would be public.

"Before the court were to be brought four or five members of this center: Chudov, Ugarov, Smorodin, Pozern, Shaposhnikova (Chudov's wife) and others, together with two or three members from the branches of this center. ***

"*** The case of the Leningrad center has to be built solidly and for this reason witnesses are needed. Social origin (or course, in the past) and the Party standing of the witness will play more than a small role.

"You yourself," said Zakovsky, "will not need to invent anything. The N.K.V.D. will prepare for you a ready outline for every branch of the center; you will have to study it carefully and to remember well all questions and answers which the court might ask. This case will be ready in four or five months or perhaps a half year. During all this time you will be preparing yourself so that you will not compromise the investigation and yourself. Your future will depend on how the trial goes and on its results. If you begin to lie and to testify falsely, blame yourself. If you manage to endure it, you will save your head and we will feed and clothe you at the government's cost until your death."

This is the kind of vile thing which was then practiced. (Stir in the hall.)

Even more widely was falsification of cases practiced in the provinces. The N.K.V.D. headquarters of Sverdlovsk Province "discovered" the so-called "Ural uprising staff"—an organ of the bloc of rightists, Trotskyites, Socialist Revolutionaries, church leaders—whose chief supposedly was the Secretary of the Sverdlovsk Province Party Committee and member of the All-Union Communist Party Central Committee, Kabakov, who had been a Party member since 1914. The investigative materials of that time show that in almost all territories, provinces and republics there supposedly existed "rightist Trotskyite, espionage-terror and diversionary-sabotage organizations and centers" and that the heads of such organizations as a rule—for no known reason—were first secretaries of province Party committees or republic Central Committees. (Stir in the hall.)

Many thousands of honest and innocent Communists have died as a result of this monstrous falsification of such "cases," as a result of the practice of forcing accusations against oneself and others. In the same manner were fabricated the "cases" against eminent Party and State workers—Kossior, Chubar, Postyshev, Kosarev, and others.

In those years repressions on a mass scale were applied which were based on nothing tangible and which resulted in heavy cadre losses to the Party.

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The vicious practice was condoned of having the N.K.V.D. prepare lists of persons whose cases were under the jurisdiction of the Military Collegium and whose sentences were prepared in advance. Yezhov would send these lists to Stalin personally for his approval of the proposed punishment. In 1937-1938, 383 such lists, containing the names of many thousands of Party, Soviet, Young Communist League, army and economic workers were sent to Stalin. He approved these lists.

A large part of these cases are being reviewed now and a great part of them are being voided because they were baseless and falsified. Suffice it to say that from 1954 to the present time the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court has rehabilitated 379 persons, many of whom were rehabilitated posthumously. Mass arrests of Party, Soviet, economic and military workers caused tremendous harm to our country and to the cause of socialist advancement.

Mass repressions had a negative influence on the moral-political condition of the Party, created a situation of uncertainty, contributed to the spreading of unhealthy suspicion, and sowed distrust among Communists. All sorts of slanderers and careerists were active.

Resolutions of the January plenary session of the Party Central Committee in 1938 brought some measure of improvement to the Party organizations. However, widespread repression also existed in 1938.

Only because our party possesses such great moral-political strength was it possible for it to survive the difficult events in 1937-1938 and to train new cadres. There is, however, no doubt that our march forward toward socialism and toward the preparation of the country's defense would have been much more successful were it not for the tremendous loss in cadres suffered as a result of the baseless and false mass repressions in 1937-1938.

We justly accuse Yezhov of the degenerate practices of 1937. But we have to answer these questions: Could Yezhov have arrested Kossior, for instance, without the knowledge of Stalin? Was there an exchange of opinions or a Political Bureau decision concerning this? No, there was not, as there was none regarding other cases of this type. Could Yezhov have decided such important matters as the fate of such eminent Party figures? No, it would be a display of naivete to consider this the work of Yezhov alone. It is clear that these matters were decided by Stalin, and that without his orders and his sanction Yezhov could not have done this.

We have examined the cases and have rehabilitated Kossior, Budzutak, Postyshev, Kosarev and others. For what causes were they arrested and sentenced? The review of evidence shows that there was no reason for this. They, like many others, were arrested without the prosecutor's knowledge. In such a situation there is no need for any sanction; for what sort of sanction could there be when Stalin decided everything? He was the chief prosecutor in these cases. Stalin not only agreed to, but in his own initiative issued arrest orders. We must say this so that the delegates to the Congress can clearly understand and themselves assess this and draw the proper conclusions.

Facts prove that many abuses were committed on Stalin's orders without reckoning with any norms of Party and Soviet legality. Stalin was a very distrustful man, sickly suspicious; we knew this from our work with him. He could look at a man and say: "Why are your eyes so shifty today?" or "Why are you turning so much today and avoiding looking me directly in the eyes?" The sickly suspicion created in him a general distrust even toward eminent Party workers whom he had known for years. Everywhere and in everything he saw "enemies," "double-dealers" and "spies."

Possessing unlimited power, he indulged in great willfulness and strangled a person morally and physically. A situation was created in which one could not express one's own will.

When Stalin said that one or another should be arrested, it was necessary to accept on faith that he was an "enemy of the people." Meanwhile, Beria's gang, which ran the organs of state security, outdid itself in proving the guilt of the arrested and the truth of materials which it had falsified. And what proofs were offered? The confessions of the arrested, and the investigative judges accepted these confessions and did not

it possible that a person confesses to crimes which he has not committed? Only in one way—because of application of physical methods of pressuring him, tortures, bringing him to a state of unconsciousness, depriving him of his judgment, taking away his human dignity. In this manner were "confessions" acquired.

When the wave of mass arrests began to recede in 1939, and the leaders of territorial Party organizations began to accuse the N.K.V.D. workers of using methods of physical pressure on the arrested, Stalin dispatched a coded telegram on Jan. 20, 1939, to the secretaries of province and territory committees and republic Central Committees of the Party, to the Peoples' Commissars of Internal Affairs and to the heads of N.K.V.D. organizations. This telegram stated:

"The Party Central Committee explains that application of methods of physical pressure in N.K.V.D. practice is permissible from 1937 on, in accordance with permission of the Party Central Committee. *** It is known that all bourgeois intelligence services use methods of physical influence against the representatives of the socialist proletariat and that they use them in their most scandalous forms. The question arises as to why the socialist intelligence service should be more humanitarian against the mad agents of the bourgeoisie, against the deadly enemies of the working class and of the collective farm workers. The Party Central Committee considers that physical pressure should still be used obligatorily, as an exception applicable to known and obstinate enemies of the people, as a method both justifiable and appropriate."

Thus, Stalin had sanctioned in the name of the Party Central Committee the most brutal violation of socialist legality, torture and oppression, which led, as we have seen, to the slandering and self-accusation of innocent people.

Not long ago, only several days before the present Congress, we summoned to the Central Committee Presidium session and interrogated the investigative judge Rodos, who in his time investigated and interrogated Kossior, Chubar and Kosarev. He is a vile person with a bird brain, and morally completely degenerate. And it was this man who decided the fate of prominent Party workers; he made judgments also concerning the politics in these matters, because, having established their "crime," he provided therewith materials from which important political implications could be drawn.

The question arises whether a man with such an intellect could alone conduct the investigation in a manner to prove the guilt of people such as Kossior and others. No, he could not have done it without proper directives. At the Central Committee Presidium session he told us: "I was told that Kossior and Chubar were enemies of the people and for this reason I, as an investigative judge, had to make them confess that they were enemies." (Indignation in the hall.)

He could do this only through long tortures, which he did, receiving detailed instructions from Beria. We must say that at the Central Committee Presidium session he cynically declared: "I thought that I was executing the orders of the Party." In this manner Stalin's orders concerning the use of methods of physical pressure against the arrested were in practice executed.

These and many other facts show that all norms of correct Party solution of problems were invalidated and everything was dependent upon the willfulness of one man.

The power accumulated in the hands of one person, Stalin, led to serious consequences during the great patriotic war.

When we look at many of our novels, films and historical "scholarly studies," the role of Stalin in the patriotic war appears entirely improbable. Stalin had foreseen everything. The Soviet Army, on the basis of a strategic plan prepared by Stalin long before, used the tactics of so-called "active defense," i.e., tactics which, as we know, allowed the Germans to come up to Moscow and Stalingrad. Using such tactics, the Soviet Army, supposedly thanks only to Stalin's genius, turned to the offensive and subdued the enemy. This type of novel, film and "scholarly study" entirely ascribes to Stalin's strategic genius the epic victory gained by the armed might of the land of the Soviets, by our heroic people.

We have to analyze this matter carefully because it has a tremendous significance not only from the historical, but especially from the political, educational and practical point of view.

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Before the war our press and all our political-educational work was characterized by its bragging tone: when an enemy violates the sacred Soviet soil, then for each blow of the enemy we will answer with three blows and we will battle the enemy on his own soil and we will win without much harm to ourselves. But these positive statements were not based in all areas on concrete facts, which would actually have guaranteed the immunity of our borders.

During the war and after the war Stalin put forward the thesis that the tragedy which our nation experienced in the first part of the war was the result of the "unexpected" attack of the Germans against the Soviet Union. But, comrades, this is completely untrue. As soon as Hitler came to power in Germany he undertook the task of liquidating communism. The fascists said this openly; they did not hide their plans. To attain this aggressive end all sorts of pacts and blocs were created, such as the famous Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. Many facts from the prewar period clearly showed that Hitler was going all out to begin a war against the Soviet state and that he had concentrated large armed units, together with armored units, near the Soviet borders.

Documents which have now been published show that by April 3, 1941, Churchill, through his Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Cripps, personally warned Stalin that the Germans had begun regrouping their armed units with the intent of attacking the Soviet Union. It is self-evident that Churchill did not do this at all because of his friendly feeling toward the Soviet nation. He had in this his own imperialist goals—to bring Germany and the U.S.S.R. into a bloody war and thereby to strengthen the position of the British Empire. Just the same, Churchill affirmed in his writings that he sought to "warn Stalin and call his attention to the danger which threatened him." Churchill stressed this repeatedly in his dispatches of April 18 and in the following days. However, Stalin took no heed of these warnings. What is more, Stalin ordered that no credence be given to information of this sort, in order not to provoke the initiation of military operations.

We must state that information of this sort concerning the threat of German armed invasion of Soviet territory came in also from our own military and diplomatic sources; however, because the leadership was conditioned against such information, such data were dispatched with fear and assessed with reservation.

Thus, for instance, information sent from Berlin May 6, 1941, by the Soviet military attache, Capt. Vorontsov, stated: "Soviet citizen Bozer***communicated to the assistant naval attache that according to a statement of a certain German officer from Hitler's headquarters, Germany is preparing to invade the U.S.S.R. May 14 through Finland, the Baltic countries and Latvia. At the same time Moscow and Leningrad will be heavily raided and paratroopers landed in border cities. ***"

In his report of May 22, 1941, the assistant military attache in Berlin, Khlopov, communicated that "***the attack of the German Army is reportedly scheduled for June 15, but it is possible that it may begin in the first days of June. ***"

A cable from our London Embassy dated June 18, 1941, stated: "As of now Cripps is deeply convinced of the inevitability of armed conflict between Germany and the U.S.S.R. which will begin not later than the middle of June. According to Cripps, the Germans have presently concentrated 147 divisions (including air force and service units) along the Soviet borders. ***"

Despite these particularly grave warnings, the necessary steps were not taken to prepare the country properly for defense and to prevent it from being caught unawares.

Did we have time and the capabilities for such preparations? Yes, we had the time and capabilities. Our industry was already so developed that it was capable of fully supplying the Soviet Army with everything it needed. This is proved by the fact that although during the war we lost almost half of our industry and important industrial and food production areas as the result of enemy occupation of the Ukraine, North Caucasus and other western parts of the country, the Soviet people were still able to organize the production of military equipment in the eastern parts of the country, install there equipment taken from the western industrial areas, and supply our armed forces with everything necessary.

Had our industry been mobilized properly and in time to supply the army with the necessary materiel, our wartime losses would have been decidedly smaller. Such mobilization had not been, however, started in time. And already in the first days of the war it became evident that our army was badly armed, that we did not have enough artillery, tanks and planes to throw the enemy back.

Soviet science and technology produced excellent models of tanks and artillery pieces before the war. But mass production of all this was not organized and as a matter of fact we started to modernize our military equipment only on the eve of the war. As a result, at the time of the enemy's invasion of the Soviet land we did not have sufficient quantities either of old machinery which was no longer used for armament production or of new machinery which we had planned to introduce into armament production. The situation with antiaircraft artillery was especially bad; we did not organize the production of antitank ammunition. Many fortified regions had proved to be indefensible as soon as they were attacked because the old arms had been withdrawn and new ones were not yet available there.

This pertained, alas, not only to tanks, artillery and planes. At the outbreak of the war we did not even have sufficient rifles to arm the mobilized manpower. I recall that in those days I telephoned to Comrade Malenkov from Kiev and told him, "People have volunteered for the new army and demand arms. You must send us arms."

Malenkov answered me, "We cannot send you arms. We are sending all our rifles to Leningrad, and you will have to arm yourselves." (Stir in the hall.)

Such was the armament situation.

In this connection we cannot forget, for instance, the following fact. Shortly before the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Hitlerite army, Kirponos, who was Chief of the Kiev Special Military District (he was later killed at the front), wrote to Stalin that the German armies were at the Bug River, were preparing for an attack and in the very near future would probably start their offensive. In this connection Kirponos proposed that a strong defense be organized, that 300,000 persons be evacuated from the border areas, and that several strong points be organized there: antitank ditches, trenches for the soldiers, etc.

Moscow answered this proposition with the assertion that this would be a provocation, that no preparatory defensive work should be undertaken at the borders, that the Germans were not to be given any pretext for the initiation of military action against us. Thus, our borders were insufficiently prepared to repel the enemy.

When the fascist armies had actually invaded Soviet territory and military operations began, Moscow issued the order that the German fire was not to be returned. Why? Because Stalin, despite evident facts, thought that the war had not yet started, that this was only a provocative action on the part of several undisciplined sections of the German Army, and that our reaction might serve as a reason for the Germans to begin the war.

The following fact is also known. On the eve of the invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union by the Hitlerite army, a certain German citizen crossed our border and stated that the German armies had received orders to start the offensive against the Soviet Union on the night of June 22, at 3 o'clock. Stalin was informed about this immediately, but even this warning was ignored.

As you see, everything was ignored; warnings of certain army commanders, declarations of deserters from the enemy army, and even the open hostility of the enemy. Is this an example of alertness of the head of the Party and chief of state at this particularly significant historical moment?

And what were the results of this carefree attitude, this disregard of clear facts? The result was that already in the first hours and days the enemy destroyed in our border regions a large part of our air force, artillery and other military equipment; he annihilated large numbers of our military cadres and disorganized our military leadership; consequently, we could not prevent the enemy from marching deep into the country.

Very grievous consequences, especially in reference to the

military commanders and political workers in 1937-1941 because of his suspiciousness and through slanderous accusations. During these years repressions were instituted against certain parts of the military cadres, beginning literally at the company and battalion commander level and extending to the higher military centers; during this time the cadre of leaders who had gained military experience in Spain and in the Far East was almost completely liquidated.

The policy of large-scale repressions against the military cadres led also to undermined military discipline, because for several years officers of all ranks and even soldiers in the Party and Young Communist League cells were taught to "unmask" their superiors as hidden enemies. (Stir in the hall.) It is natural that this caused a negative influence on the state of military discipline in the first war period.

And, as you know, we had before the war excellent military cadres which were unquestionably loyal to the Party and to the fatherland. Suffice it to say that those of them who managed to survive despite the severe tortures to which they were subjected in the prisons showed themselves real patriots from the first war days and fought heroically for the glory of the fatherland. I have here in mind such comrades as Rokossovsky (who as you know, had been jailed), Gorbатов, Meretskov (who is a delegate to the present Congress), Podlas (he was an excellent commander who perished at the front) and many, many others. However, many such commanders perished in camps and jails, and the army saw them no more.

All this brought about the situation that existed at the beginning of the war and which was a great threat to our fatherland.

It would be incorrect to forget that after the first severe disaster and defeats at the front Stalin thought that this was the end. In one of his speeches in those days he said: "All that Lenin created we have lost forever."

After this, Stalin for a long time actually did not direct the military operations and ceased to do anything whatever. He returned to active leadership only when some members of the Political Bureau visited him and told him that it was necessary to take certain steps immediately in order to improve the situation at the front.

Therefore, the threatening danger which hung over our fatherland in the first period of the war was largely due to the faulty methods of directing the nation and the Party by Stalin himself.

However, we speak not only about the moment when the war began, which led to serious disorganization of our army and brought us severe losses. Even after the war began, the nervousness and hysteria which Stalin demonstrated, interfering with actual military operations, caused our army serious damage.

Stalin was very far from an understanding of the real situation that was developing at the front. That was natural because during the whole patriotic war he never visited any section of the front or any liberated city except for one short ride on the Mozhaisk Highway during a stabilized situation at the front. To this incident were dedicated many literary works full of fantasies of all sorts, and many paintings. Simultaneously, Stalin was interfering with operations and issuing orders that did not take into consideration the real situation at a given section of the front and which could not help but result in huge personnel losses.

I will allow myself in this connection to bring out one characteristic fact that illustrates how Stalin directed operations at the fronts. There is present at this Congress Marshal Bagramyan, who was once the Chief of Operations in the Headquarters of the Southwestern Front and who can corroborate what I will tell you.

When there developed an exceptionally serious situation for our army in the Kharkov region in 1942, we correctly decided to drop an operation whose objective was to encircle Kharkov, because the actual situation at that time would have threatened our army with fatal consequences if this operation were continued.

We communicated this to Stalin, stating that the situation demanded changes in operational plans so that the enemy would be prevented from liquidating a sizable concentration of our army.

Contrary to common sense, Stalin rejected our suggestion

and issued the order to continue the operation aimed at the encirclement of Kharkov, despite the fact that at this time many army concentrations were themselves actually threatened with encirclement and liquidation.

I telephoned to Vasilevsky and begged him, "Alexander Mikhailovich, take a map" (Vasilevsky is present here) "and show Comrade Stalin the situation which has developed." We should note that Stalin planned operations on a globe. (Animation in the hall.) Yes, comrades, he used to take the globe and trace the front line on it. I said to Comrade Vasilevsky: "Show him the situation on a map; in the present situation we cannot continue the operation which was planned. The old decision must be changed for the good of the cause."

Vasilevsky replied that Stalin had already studied this problem and that he, Vasilevsky, would not see Stalin further concerning this matter because the latter did not want to hear any arguments on the subject of this operation.

After my talk with Vasilevsky I telephoned to Stalin at his villa. But Stalin did not answer the telephone and Malenkov was at the receiver. I told Comrade Malenkov that I was calling from the front and that I wanted to speak personally to Stalin. Stalin informed me through Malenkov that I should speak with Malenkov. I stated for the second time that I wished to inform Stalin personally about the grave situation which had arisen for us at the front. But Stalin did not consider it convenient to raise the phone and again stated that I should speak to him through Malenkov, although he was only a few steps from the telephone.

After "listening" in this manner to our plea, Stalin said, "Let everything remain as it is!"

And what was the result of this? The worst that we had expected. The Germans surrounded our army concentrations, and consequently we lost hundreds of thousands of our soldiers. This is Stalin's military "genius"; this is what it cost us. (Stir in the hall.)

On one occasion after the war, during a meeting of Stalin with members of the Political Bureau, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan mentioned that Khrushchev must have been right when he telephoned concerning the Kharkov operation and that it was unfortunate that his suggestion had not been accepted.

You should have seen Stalin's fury! How could it be admitted that he, Stalin, had not been right! He is, after all, a "genius," and a genius cannot help but be right! Everyone can err, but Stalin considered that he never erred, that he was always right. He never acknowledged to anyone that he made any mistake, large or small, despite the fact that he made not a few mistakes both in the matter of theory and in his practical activity. After the Party Congress we shall probably have to re-evaluate many wartime military operations and to present them in their true light.

The tactics on which Stalin insisted without knowing the essence of the conduct of battle operations cost us much blood until we succeeded in stopping the opponent and going over to the offensive.

The military know that as early as the end of 1941, instead of great operational maneuvers flanking the opponent and penetrating behind his back, Stalin demanded incessant frontal attacks and the capture of one village after another. Because of this we paid with great losses until our generals, on whose shoulders rested the whole weight of conducting the war, succeeded in changing the situation and shifting to flexible maneuver operations, which immediately brought substantial changes in our favor at the front.

All the more shameful was the fact that after our great victory over the enemy, which cost us so much, Stalin began to downgrade many of the commanders who had contributed so much to the victory over the enemy, because Stalin excluded every possibility that services rendered at the front should be credited to anyone but himself.

Stalin was very much interested in the assessment of Comrade Zhukov as a military leader. He asked me often for my opinion of Zhukov. I told him then, "I have known Zhukov for a long time; he is a good general and a good military leader."

After the war Stalin began to relate all kinds of nonsense about Zhukov, among other things the following: "You praised Zhukov, but he was a bad general. He used to behave as follows: He used operation at the front Zhukov used to behave as follows: He used

to take a handful of earth, smell it and say, 'We can begin the attack,' or the opposite, 'The planned operation cannot be carried out.'" I stated at that time, "Comrade Stalin, I do not know who invented this, but it is not true."

It is possible that Stalin himself invented these things for the purpose of minimizing the role and military talents of Marshal Zhukov.

In this connection Stalin very energetically popularized himself as a great leader; in various ways he tried to implant in the people the fiction that all victories gained by the Soviet people during the great patriotic war were due to the courage, daring and genius of Stalin and of no one else. Exactly like Kuzma Kryuchkov [a famous Cossack who performed heroic feats against the Germans], he put one dress on seven persons at the same time. (Animation in the hall.)

A propos of this, let us take, for instance, our historical and military films and some literary works; they make us feel sick. Their true objective is propagation of praise for Stalin as a military genius. Let us recall the film "The Fall of Berlin." Here Stalin alone acts; he issues orders in a hall in which there are many empty chairs, and only one man approaches him and reports something to him—that is Poskrebyshev, his loyal shield-bearer. (Laughter in the hall.)

But where is the military command? Where is the Political Bureau? Where is the government? What are they doing, with what are they occupied? There is nothing about them in the film. Stalin acts for everybody; he does not reckon with anyone; he asks no one for advice. Everything is shown to the people in this false light. Why? In order to surround Stalin with glory, contrary to the facts and contrary to historical truth.

The question arises: And where are the military on whose shoulders rested the burden of the war? They are not in the film; with Stalin in, no room was left for them.

Not Stalin, but the Party as a whole, the Soviet government, our heroic army, its talented leaders and brave soldiers, the whole Soviet people—these are the ones who assured the victory in the great patriotic war. (Stormy and prolonged applause.)

The Central Committee members, Ministers, our economic leaders, leaders of Soviet culture, directors of territorial Party and Soviet organizations, engineers and technicians—every one of them in his own post gave generously of his strength and knowledge toward ensuring victory over the enemy.

Our hard core showed exceptional heroism; surrounded by glory are our whole working class, our collective farm peasantry and the Soviet intelligentsia, who under the leadership of Party organizations overcame untold difficulties and, bearing the hardships of war, devoted all their efforts to the cause of defending the fatherland.

Great and brave deeds were accomplished during the war by our Soviet women, who bore on their backs the heavy load of production work in the factories, on the collective farms and on various economic and cultural sectors; many women participated directly in the great patriotic war at the fronts; our brave youth contributed immeasurably at the front and at home to the defense of the Soviet fatherland and the annihilation of the enemy.

Immortal are the services of the Soviet soldiers, of our commanders and political workers of all ranks; after the loss of a considerable part of the army in the first war months, they did not lose their heads and were able to reorganize in the course of combat; in the course of the war they created and toughened a strong and heroic army, and not only withstood the strong and cunning enemy, but crushed him.

The magnificent and heroic deeds of hundreds of millions of people of the East and of the West during the fight against the menace of fascist subjugation which loomed before us will live centuries and millenia in the memory of thankful humanity. (Stormy applause.)

The main role and the main credit for the victorious conclusion of the war belongs to our Communist Party, to the armed forces of the Soviet Union, and to the tens of millions of Soviet people raised by the Party. (Stormy, prolonged applause.)

Comrades, let us reach for some other facts. The Soviet

Union is justly considered a model multinational state because we have in practice assured the equality and friendship of all the peoples who inhabit our great fatherland.

All the more monstrous are the acts, initiated by Stalin, which are gross violations of the basic Leninist principles of the nationalities policy of the Soviet state. We refer to the mass deportations from their native territory of whole nations, including all [their] Communists and Young Communists, without any exception; this deportation action was not dictated by any military considerations.

Thus, already at the end of 1943, when there occurred a permanent breakthrough on the fronts of the great patriotic war benefitting the Soviet Union, a decision was taken and carried out concerning deportation of all the Karachai from the lands on which they lived. In the same period, at the end of December, 1943, the same lot befell the whole population of the Kalmyk Autonomous Republic. In March, 1944, all the Chechen and Ingush peoples were deported and the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was liquidated. In April, 1944, all Balkars were deported to faraway places from the territory of the Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Republic and the republic itself was renamed the Kabardian Autonomous Republic. The Ukrainians avoided this fate only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them. Otherwise, he would have deported them too. (Laughter and animation in the hall.)

Not only no Marxist-Leninist, but also no man of common sense can grasp how it is possible to make whole nations responsible for inimical activity, including women, children, old people, Communists and Young Communists, to use mass repression against them and to expose them to misery and suffering for the hostile acts of individual persons or groups of persons.

After the conclusion of the patriotic war the Soviet people stressed with pride the magnificent victories gained through great sacrifices and tremendous efforts. The country experienced a period of political enthusiasm. The Party came out of the war even more united; Party cadres had been tempered and hardened in the fire of the war. In such conditions nobody could have even thought of the possibility of some plot in the Party.

But it was precisely at this time that the so-called "Leningrad case" was born. As we have now proved, this case was fabricated. Those who innocently lost their lives included Comrades Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, Rodionov, Popkov and others.

As is known, Voznesensky and Kuznetsov were talented and eminent leaders. Once they stood very close to Stalin. Suffice it to mention that Stalin made Voznesensky first assistant to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Kuznetsov was elected Secretary of the Central Committee. The very fact that Stalin entrusted Kuznetsov with the supervision of the state security agencies shows the trust Kuznetsov enjoyed.

How did it happen that these persons were branded enemies of the people and liquidated?

Facts prove that the "Leningrad case" is also the result of willfulness which Stalin exercised against Party cadres.

Had a normal situation existed in the Party Central Committee and in the Central Committee Political Bureau, cases of this nature would have been examined there in accordance with Party practice, and all pertinent facts assessed; as a result, such a case, as well as others, would not have happened.

We must state that after the war the situation became even more complicated. Stalin became even more capricious, irritable and brutal; in particular, his suspicion grew. His persecution mania reached unbelievable dimensions. Many workers were becoming enemies before his very eyes. After the war Stalin separated himself from the collective even more. He decided everything alone, without any consideration for anyone or anything.

The arrant provocateur and vile enemy, Beria, who had murdered thousands of Communists and loyal Soviet people, cleverly took advantage of this incredible suspicion. The elevation of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov alarmed Beria. As we have now proved, it was Beria who "suggested" to Stalin the fabrication by him and by his confidants of materials in the form of declarations and anonymous letters, and in the form of various rumors and talk.

"Leningrad case"; persons who suffered innocently are now rehabilitated and the glorious Leningrad Party organization has been restored to honor. Abakumov and others who fabricated this affair were brought before a court; their trial took place in Leningrad and they received their just deserts.

The question arises: Why is it that we see the truth of this case only now, and why did we not do something earlier, during Stalin's lifetime, to prevent the loss of innocent lives? It was because Stalin personally supervised the "Leningrad case," and the majority of the Political Bureau members at that time did not know all of the circumstances in these matters, and could not therefore intervene.

When Stalin received certain materials from Beria and Abakumov, without examining these slanderous materials he ordered an investigation of the "case" of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov. With this their fate was sealed.

Instructive in the same way is the case of the Mingrelian nationalist organization which supposedly existed in Georgia. As is known, decisions were adopted on this case by the Party Central Committee in November, 1951, and March, 1952. These decisions were made without prior discussion with the Political Bureau. Stalin had personally dictated them. They made serious accusations against many loyal Communists. On the basis of falsified documents it was shown that there existed in Georgia a supposedly nationalist organization, the objective of which was liquidation of Soviet rule in that republic with the help of imperialist powers.

In this connection, a number of responsible Party and Soviet workers were arrested in Georgia. As was later proved, this was a slander directed against the Georgian Party organization.

We know that at times there have been manifestations of local bourgeois nationalism in Georgia, as in several other republics. The question arises: Could it be possible that in the period during which the above-mentioned resolutions were adopted nationalist tendencies had grown so much that there was danger of Georgia's leaving the Soviet Union and joining Turkey? (Stir in the hall, laughter.)

This is, of course, nonsense. It is impossible to imagine how such assumptions could enter anyone's mind. Everyone knows how Georgia has developed economically and culturally under Soviet rule.

Industrial production in the Georgian Republic is 27 times as great as before the revolution. Many new industries have arisen in Georgia that did not exist there before the revolution: iron smelting, an oil industry, machine building, etc. Illiteracy, which in prerevolutionary Georgia embraced 78% of the population, has long since been eliminated. Could the Georgians, comparing the situation in their republic with the hard situation of the working masses in Turkey, have aspired to join Turkey? In 1955 Georgia produced 18 times as much steel per capita as Turkey. Georgia produces nine times as much electric power per capita as Turkey. According to data of the 1950 census, 65% of Turkey's total population is illiterate, and 80% of the women. Georgia has 19 institutions of higher learning, which have about 39,000 students; this is eight times as many as in Turkey (per 1000 inhabitants). The prosperity of the working people has grown tremendously in Georgia under Soviet rule.

It is clear that as the economy and culture develop, and as the socialist consciousness of the working masses in Georgia grows, the source from which bourgeois nationalism draws its strength evaporates.

As it turned out, there was no nationalist organization in Georgia. Thousands of innocent persons fell victim to willfulness and lawlessness. All of this happened under the "inspired" leadership of Stalin, "the great son of the Georgian people," as Georgians liked to refer to Stalin. (Stir in the hall.)

Stalin's willfulness showed itself not only in decisions concerning the domestic life of the country but also in the international relations of the Soviet Union.

The July plenary session of the Central Committee studied in detail the reasons for the development of conflict with Yugoslavia. It was a shameful role that Stalin played there. The "Yugoslav affair" contained no problems that could not have been solved through Party discussions among comrades. There was no substantial basis for the development of this "affair," it was entirely possible to have

that country. This does not mean, however, that the Yugoslav leaders did not make mistakes or did not have shortcomings. But these mistakes and shortcomings were monstrously magnified by Stalin, which resulted in the breaking of relations with a friendly country.

I recall the first days when the conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia began artificially to be blown up. Once, when I came from Kiev to Moscow, I was invited to visit Stalin, who, pointing to the copy of a letter lately sent to Tito, asked me, "Have you read this?" Not waiting for my reply, he answered: "I will shake my little finger—and there will be no more Tito. He will fall."

We have paid dearly for this "shake of the little finger." This statement reflected Stalin's mania for greatness, but he acted just that way: "I will shake my little finger—and there will be no Kossior"; "I will shake my little finger once more, and Postyshev and Chubar will be no more"; "I will shake my little finger again—and Voznesensky, Kuznetsov and many others will disappear."

But this did not happen to Tito. No matter how much or how little Stalin shook not only his little finger, but everything else that he could shake, Tito did not fall. Why? The reason was that, in this case of disagreement with the Yugoslav comrades, Tito had behind him a state and a people who had gone through a severe school of fighting for liberty and independence, a people who gave support to their leaders.

You see to what Stalin's mania for greatness led. He had completely lost a sense of reality; he demonstrated his suspicion and haughtiness not only in relation to individuals in the U.S.S.R., but in relation to whole parties and nations.

We have carefully examined the case of Yugoslavia and have found a proper solution which is approved by the peoples of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia, as well as by the working masses of all the people's democracies and by all progressive humanity. The liquidation of the abnormal relationship with Yugoslavia was done in the interest of the whole camp of socialism, in the interest of strengthening peace in the whole world.

Let us also recall the "case of the doctor-plotters." (Stir in the hall.) Actually there was no "case" outside of the declaration of the woman doctor Timashuk, who was probably influenced or ordered by someone (after all, she was an unofficial collaborator of the agencies of state security) to write Stalin a letter in which she declared that the doctors were applying allegedly improper methods of medical treatment.

Such a letter was sufficient for Stalin to reach an immediate conclusion that there were doctor-plotters in the Soviet Union. He issued orders to arrest a group of eminent Soviet medical specialists. He personally issued advice on the conduct of the investigation and the method of interrogation of the arrested persons. He said Academician Vinogradov should be put in chains, another one should be beaten. Present at this Congress as a delegate is the former Minister of State Security, Comrade Ignatyev. Stalin told him curtly, "If you do not obtain confessions from the doctors we will shorten you by a head." (Tumult in the hall.)

Stalin personally summoned the investigative judge, gave him instructions, advised him on the investigative methods to be used; these methods were simple—beat, beat and, once again, beat.

Shortly after the doctors were arrested, we members of the Political Bureau received transcripts of the doctors' confessions of guilt. After distributing these, Stalin told us, "You are blind as young kittens; what would happen without me? The country would perish because you do not know how to recognize enemies."

The case was so presented that no one could verify the facts on which the investigation was based. There was no possibility of trying to verify the facts by contacting those who had made the confessions of guilt.

We felt, however, that the case of the arrested doctors was questionable. We knew some of these people personally, for they had once treated us. When we examined this "case" after Stalin's death, we found it to be fabricated from beginning to end.

This ignominious "case" was set up by Stalin; he did not, however, have the time in which to bring it to a conclusion (as he conceived that conclusion), and for this reason the doctors are

In the same places they were working before; they treat top individuals, not excluding members of the government; they have our full confidence; and they execute their duties honestly, as they did before.

In organizing the various dirty and shameful cases, a very base role was played by the rabid enemy of our party, the agent of foreign intelligence, Beria, who had stolen into Stalin's confidence. In what way could this provocateur gain such a position in the Party and in the state as to become the First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and a member of the Central Committee's Political Bureau? It has now been established that this villain climbed up the government ladder over an untold number of corpses.

Were there any signs that Beria was an enemy of the Party? Yes, there were. As far back as in 1937, at a Central Committee plenary session, the former People's Commissar of Public Health, Kaminsky, said that Beria had worked for the Mussavat intelligence service. But the Central Committee plenary session had barely concluded before Kaminsky was arrested and then shot. Did Stalin examine Kaminsky's statement? No, because Stalin believed in Beria, and that was enough for him. And when Stalin believed in anyone or anything, then no one could say anything that was contrary to his opinion; anyone who would have dared to express opposition would have met the same fate as Kaminsky.

There were other signs also. The declaration which Comrade Snegov made to the Party Central Committee is interesting. (Incidentally, he was also rehabilitated not long ago, after 17 years in prison camps.) In this declaration Snegov writes:

"In connection with the proposed rehabilitation of the former Central Committee member, Lavrenti Kartvelishvili, I have entrusted to the hands of the representative of the Committee on State Security a detailed deposition concerning Beria's role in the disposition of the Kartvelishvili case and concerning the criminal motives by which Beria was guided.

"In my opinion it is indispensable to recall an important fact pertaining to this case and to communicate it to the Central Committee, because I did not consider it suitable to include in the investigation documents.

"On Oct. 30, 1931, at the session of the Organizational Bureau of the All-Union Communist Party Central Committee, Kartvelishvili, Secretary of the Transcaucasus Territory Committee, delivered a report. All members of the Executive of the territory committee were present; of them I alone am alive.

"During this session J. V. Stalin made a motion at the end of his speech concerning the organization of the Secretariat of the Transcaucasus Territory Committee composed of the following: First Secretary, Kartvelishvili; Second Secretary, Beria. (This was the first time in the Party's history that Beria's name was mentioned as a candidate for a Party position.)

"Kartvelishvili answered that he knew Beria well and for that reason refused categorically to work with him. Stalin proposed then that this matter be left open and that it be settled in the process of the work itself. Two days later a decision was arrived at that Beria would receive the Party post and that Kartvelishvili would be deported from the Transcaucasus."

This fact can be confirmed by Comrades Mikoyan and Kaganovich, who were present at that session.

The long unfriendly relations between Kartvelishvili and Beria were widely known. They date back to the time when Comrade Sergo [Ordzhonikidze] was active in the Transcaucasus; Kartvelishvili was Sergo's closest assistant. The unfriendly relationship impelled Beria to fabricate a "case" against Kartvelishvili.

It is characteristic that in this "case" Kartvelishvili was charged with a terroristic act against Beria.

The indictment in the Beria case contains a discussion of his crimes. Some things should, however, be recalled, especially since it is possible that not all the delegates to the Congress have read this document. I wish to recall Beria's bestial disposition of the cases of Kedrov, Golubev, and Golubev's mother by adoption, Baturina, persons who wished to inform the Central Committee concerning Beria's treacherous activity. They were shot without any trial and the sentence was passed *ex post facto*, after the execution.

Here is what the old Communist Comrade Kedrov writes to

the Central Committee through Comrade Andreyev (Comrade Andreyev was then a Central Committee secretary):

"I am appealing to you for help from a gloomy cell of Lefortovo prison. Let my cry of horror reach your ears; do not remain deaf; take me under your protection; please help remove the nightmare of interrogations and show that this is all a mistake.

"I suffer innocently. Please believe me. Time will testify to the truth. I am not an agent-provocateur of the Tsarist Okhrana. I am not a spy; I am not a member of an anti-Soviet organization, of which I am accused on the basis of denunciations. I am also not guilty of any other crimes against the Party and the government. I am an old Bolshevik, free of any taint; I have honestly fought for almost 40 years in the ranks of the Party for the good and the prosperity of the people. ***

"*** Today I, a 62-year-old man, am threatened by the investigative judges with more severe, cruel and degrading methods of physical pressure. They [the judges] are no longer capable of becoming aware of their error and of recognizing that their handling of my case is illegal and impermissible. They try to justify their actions by picturing me as a hardened and raving enemy and are demanding increased repressions. But let the Party know that I am innocent and that there is nothing which can turn a loyal son of the Party into an enemy, even right up to his last dying breath.

"But I have no way out. I cannot divert from myself the swiftly approaching new and powerful blows.

"Everything, however, has its limits. My torture has reached the extreme. My health is broken, my strength and my energy are waning, the end is drawing near. To die in a Soviet prison, branded a vile traitor to the fatherland—what can be more monstrous for an honest man? And how monstrous this is! Unsurpassed bitterness and pain grips my heart. 'No! No! This will not happen; this cannot be,' I cry. Neither the Party nor the Soviet government nor People's Commissar L. P. Beria will permit this cruel, irreparable injustice. I am firmly certain that given a calm, objective examination, without foul rantings, without anger and without the fearful tortures, it would be easy to prove the baselessness of the charges. I believe deeply that truth and justice will triumph. I believe, I believe."

The old Bolshevik, Comrade Kedrov, was found innocent by the Military Collegium. Despite this, he was shot at Beria's order. (Indignation in the hall.)

Beria also cruelly treated the family of Comrade Ordzhonikidze. Why? Because Ordzhonikidze had tried to prevent Beria from realizing his shameful plans. Beria had cleared from his way all persons who could possibly interfere with him. Ordzhonikidze was always an opponent of Beria, which he told Stalin. Instead of examining this matter and taking appropriate steps, Stalin permitted the liquidation of Ordzhonikidze's brother and brought Ordzhonikidze himself to such a state that he was forced to shoot himself. (Indignation in the hall.) Such was Beria.

Beria was unmasked by the Party Central Committee shortly after Stalin's death. The particularly detailed legal proceedings established that Beria had committed monstrous crimes, and Beria was shot.

The question arises why Beria, who had liquidated tens of thousands of Party and Soviet workers, was not unmasked during Stalin's lifetime. He was not unmasked earlier because he had very skillfully utilized Stalin's weaknesses; feeding him with suspicions, he assisted Stalin in everything and acted with his support.

Comrades, the cult of the individual acquired such monstrous proportions chiefly because Stalin himself, using all conceivable methods, supported the glorification of his own person. This is confirmed by numerous facts. One of the most characteristic examples of Stalin's self-glorification and of his lack of even elementary modesty is the edition of his "Short Biography," which was published in 1948.

This book is an expression of the most dissolute flattery, an example of making a man into a godhead, of transforming him into an infallible sage, "the greatest leader," "sublime strategist of all times and nations." Finally, no other words could be found with which to exalt Stalin to the heavens.

filling this book. All we need to add is that they all were approved and edited by Stalin personally and some of them were added in his own handwriting to the draft text of the book.

What did Stalin consider essential to write into this book? Did he want to cool the ardor of his flatterers who were composing his "Short Biography"? No! He marked the very places where he thought that the praise of his services was insufficient.

Here are some examples characterizing Stalin's activity, added in Stalin's own hand:

"In this fight against the skeptics and capitulators, the Trotskies, Zinovievites, Bukharinites and Kamenevites, there was definitely welded together, after Lenin's death, that leading core of the Party***† that upheld the great banner of Lenin, rallied the Party behind Lenin's behests, and brought the Soviet people onto the broad road of industrializing the country and collectivizing the rural economy. The leader of this core and the guiding force of the Party and the state was Comrade Stalin."

Thus writes Stalin himself! Then he adds:

"Although he performed his task of leader of the Party and the people with consummate skill and enjoyed the unreserved support of the entire Soviet people, Stalin never allowed his work to be marred by the slightest hint of vanity, conceit or self-adulation."

Where and when could a leader so praise himself? Is this worthy of a leader of the Marxist-Leninist type? No. It was precisely against this that Marx and Engels took such a strong position. This was always sharply condemned by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, too.

In the draft text of his book appeared the following sentence: "Stalin is the Lenin of today." This sentence appeared to Stalin to be too weak, so in his own handwriting he changed it to read: "Stalin is the worthy continuer of Lenin's work, or, as they say in our party, Stalin is the Lenin of today." You see how well it is said, not by the people, but by Stalin himself.

It is possible to give many such self-praising appraisals written into the draft text of that book in Stalin's hand. Especially generously does he endow himself with praises pertaining to his military genius, to his talent for strategy.

I will cite one more insertion made by Stalin concerning the Stalinist military genius. He writes: "The advanced Soviet science of warfare received further development at Comrade Stalin's hands. Comrade Stalin elaborated the theory of the permanently operating factors that decide the outcome of wars, [the theory] of active defense and the laws of counteroffensive and offensive, of the cooperation of all services and arms in modern warfare, of the role of big tank masses and air forces in modern war, and of the artillery as the most formidable of the armed services. At the various stages of the war Stalin's genius found the correct solutions that took account of all the circumstances of the situation." (Stir in the hall.) And further, writes Stalin: "Stalin's military mastery was displayed in both defense and offense. Comrade Stalin's genius enabled him to divine the enemy's plans and defeat him. The battles in which Comrade Stalin directed the Soviet armies are brilliant examples of operational military skill."

This is how Stalin was praised as a strategist. Who did this? Stalin himself, not in his role as a strategist, but in the role of author-editor, one of the main creators of his self-adulatory biography.

Such, comrades, are the facts—the shameful facts, we should say.

And one additional fact from the same "Short Biography" of Stalin. As is known, the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Short Course)" was written by a commission of the Party Central Committee.

This book, incidentally, was also permeated with the cult of the individual leader and was written by a designated group of authors. This fact was reflected in the following formulation in the proof copy of the "Short Biography" of Stalin:

† [Omitted portion, as found in "Joseph Stalin: Short Biography," (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1949, p. 89) is as follows: "***consisting of Stalin, Molotov, Kalinin, Voroshilov, Kulbyshev, Frunze, Dzerzhinsky, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, Kirov, Yaroslavsky, Mikoyan, Andreyev, Shvernik, Zhdanov, Shkiryatov and others." — Trans.]

"A commission of the Party Central Committee, under the direction of Comrade Stalin and with his most active personal participation, has prepared a 'History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Short Course).'"

But even this phrase did not satisfy Stalin. The following sentence replaced it in the final version of the "Short Biography":

"In 1938 appeared the book, 'History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Short Course),' written by Comrade Stalin and approved by a commission of the Party Central Committee." Can one add anything more? (Stir in the hall.)

As you see, a surprising metamorphosis turned a work produced by a group into a book written by Stalin. It is not necessary to state how and why this metamorphosis took place.

A pertinent question comes to mind: If Stalin is the author of this book, why did he need to praise the person of Stalin so much and to transform the whole post-October historical period of our glorious Communist Party into solely the product of "the Stalin genius"?

Did this book properly reflect the efforts of the Party in the socialist transformation of the country, in the construction of socialist society, in the industrialization and collectivization of the country, and also other steps taken by the Party in undeviatingly traveling the path outlined by Lenin? This book speaks principally about Stalin, about his speeches, about his reports. Everything without the smallest exception is tied to his name.

And when Stalin himself asserts that he himself wrote the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Short Course)," this calls at the least for amazement. Can a Marxist-Leninist write about himself thus, praising his own person to the heavens?

Or let us take the matter of the Stalin Prizes. (Stir in the hall.) Not even the Tsars created prizes which they named after themselves.

Stalin recognized as the best a text of the national anthem of the Soviet Union which contains not a word about the Communist Party; it contains, however, the following unprecedented praise of Stalin: "Stalin brought us up in loyalty to the people/He inspired us to great labors and feats."

In these lines of the anthem the whole educational, directing and inspirational activity of the great Leninist party is ascribed to Stalin. This is, of course, a clear deviation from Marxism-Leninism, a clear debasing and belittling of the role of the Party. We should add for your information that the Presidium of the Central Committee has already adopted a decision concerning the composition of a new text of the anthem which will reflect the role of the people and the role of the Party. (Loud, prolonged applause.)

And was it without Stalin's knowledge that many of the largest enterprises and cities were named for him? Was it without his knowledge that Stalin monuments were erected throughout the country—these "memorials to the living"? It is a fact that Stalin himself, on July 2, 1951, signed a decision of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers concerning the erection of an impressive monument to Stalin on the Volga-Don Canal. On Sept. 4 of the same year he issued an order making 33 tons of copper available for the construction of this impressive monument. Anyone who has visited the Stalingrad area must have seen the huge statue which is being built there, and that on a site which hardly any people frequent. Huge sums were spent to build it at a time when people of this area had been living in huts since the war. Consider yourself, was Stalin right when he wrote in his biography that "****he never allowed****the slightest hint of vanity, conceit or self-adulation?"

At the same time Stalin gave proofs of his lack of respect for Lenin's memory. It is not a coincidence that, despite the decision taken more than 30 years ago to build a Palace of Soviets as a monument to Vladimir Ilyich, this Palace was not built, its construction was always postponed, and the project allowed to lapse.

We cannot fail to recall the Soviet government resolution of Aug. 14, 1925, concerning "the establishment of Lenin Prizes for educational work." This resolution was published in the press, but to this day there are no Lenin Prizes. This, too, should be corrected. (Stormy, prolonged applause.)

During Stalin's lifetime, thanks to known methods which I have described, and according to the "Short Biography" of Stalin, all events were explained as if Lenin played

only a secondary role, even during the October socialist revolution. Many films and many literary works incorrectly presented and inadmissibly belittled Lenin.

Stalin loved to see the film, "Unforgettable 1919," in which he was shown on the steps of an armored train and where he practically vanquished the foe with his own saber. Let Kliment Yefremovich [Voroshilov], our dear friend, find the necessary courage and write the truth about Stalin; after all, he knows how Stalin fought. It will be difficult for Comrade Voroshilov to undertake this, but it would be good if he did. Everyone will approve of it, both the people and the Party. Even his grandsons will thank him. (Prolonged applause.)

In speaking about the events of the October revolution and the Civil War, the impression was created that Stalin always played the main role, as if everywhere and always Stalin had suggested to Lenin what to do and how to do it. But this is slander of Lenin. (Prolonged applause.)

I shall probably not be sinning against the truth when I say that 99% of the persons present here heard and knew very little about Stalin before 1924, while Lenin was known to all; he was known to the whole Party, to the whole nation, from children to graybeards. (Stormy, prolonged applause.)

All this has to be thoroughly revised, so that history, literature, and the fine arts properly reflect V. I. Lenin's role and the great deeds of our Communist Party and Soviet people, the creator-people. (Applause.)

Comrades! The cult of the individual leader caused the employment of faulty principles in Party work and in economic activity; it brought about gross violation of inner-Party and Soviet democracy, sterile administration by fiat, deviations of all sorts, covering up of shortcomings and varnishing of reality. Our country gave birth to many flatterers and specialists in false optimism and deceit.

We should also not forget that due to numerous arrests of Party, Soviet and economic leaders, many workers began to work uncertainly, showed overcautiousness, feared everything that was new, feared their own shadows and began to show less initiative in their work.

Take, for instance, Party and Soviet resolutions. They were prepared in a routine manner, often without considering the concrete situation. This went so far that Party workers read their speeches even at the smallest sessions. All this produced the danger of formalizing Party and Soviet work and of bureaucratizing the whole apparatus.

Stalin's reluctance to consider life's realities and the fact that he was not aware of the real state of affairs in the provinces can be illustrated by his direction of agriculture.

All those who interested themselves even a little in the national situation saw the difficult situation in agriculture, but Stalin never even noted it. Did we tell Stalin about this? Yes, we told him; but he did not support us. Why? Because Stalin never traveled anywhere, did not meet city and collective farm workers; he did not know the actual situation in the provinces.

He knew the countryside and agriculture only from films. And these films had dressed up and beautified the existing situation in agriculture.

Many films pictured collective farm life as if the tables bent under the weight of turkeys and geese. Evidently Stalin thought that it was actually so.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin looked at life differently. He was always close to the people; he used to receive peasant delegates, and often spoke at factory gatherings; he used to visit villages and talk with the peasants.

Stalin cut himself off from the people and never went anywhere. This lasted tens of years. The last time he visited a village was in January, 1928, when he visited Siberia in connection with grain deliveries. How then could he have known the situation in the provinces?

And when he was once told during a discussion that our situation on the land was a difficult one and that the livestock situation was especially bad, a commission was formed and charged with drafting a resolution entitled "Means Toward Further Development of Livestock Raising on Collective and State Farms." We worked out this draft.

Of course, our proposals of that time did not contain all possibilities, but we did say ways in which livestock raising on

the collective and state farms could be improved. We proposed then to raise the prices of animal products to create material incentives for the collective farmers and M.T.S. and state farm workers in the development of livestock. But our draft was not accepted and in February, 1953, was laid aside entirely.

What is more, while reviewing this draft Stalin proposed that the taxes paid by the collective farms and by the collective farmers should be raised by 40,000,000 rubles. According to him, the peasants were well-off and the collective farmer would need to sell only one more chicken to pay his tax in full.

Imagine what this would have meant. Certainly 40,000,000,000 rubles is a sum which the collective farmers did not realize for all the products which they sold to the government. In 1952, for instance, the collective farms and the collective farmers received 26,280,000,000 rubles for all their products delivered and sold to the government.

Did Stalin's position rest, then, on data of any sort whatever? Of course not.

In such cases facts and figures did not interest him. If Stalin said anything, that meant it was so—after all, he was a "genius" and a genius does not need to count, he only needs to look and can immediately tell how it should be. When he expresses his opinion, everyone has to echo it and to admire his wisdom.

But how much wisdom was contained in the proposal to raise the agricultural tax by 40,000,000,000 rubles? None, absolutely none, because the proposal was not based on an actual assessment of the situation but on the fantastic ideas of a person divorced from reality. We are currently beginning slowly to work our way out of a difficult agricultural situation. The speeches of the delegates to the 20th Congress please us all. We are glad that many delegates speak, that there are conditions for the fulfillment of the Sixth Five-Year Plan for animal husbandry, not during the period of five years, but within two to three years. We are certain that the commitments of the new Five-Year Plan will be met successfully. (Prolonged applause.)

Comrades! If today we sharply criticize the cult of the individual leader which was so widespread during Stalin's lifetime and if we speak about the many negative phenomena generated by this cult which is so alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, various persons may ask: How could it be? Stalin headed the Party and the country for 30 years, and many victories were gained during his lifetime. Can we deny this? In my opinion, the question can be asked in this manner only by those who are blinded and hopelessly hypnotized by the cult of the individual leader, only by those who do not understand the essence of the revolution and of the Soviet state, only by those who do not understand in a Leninist manner the role of the Party and of the people in the development of Soviet society.

The socialist revolution was accomplished by the working class and the poor peasantry, with the partial support of the middle peasants. It was accomplished by the people under the leadership of the Bolshevik party. Lenin's great service consisted in that he created a militant party of the working class; he was armed with Marxist understanding of the laws of social development and with the science of proletarian victory in the struggle with capitalism, and he steered this party in the crucible of the revolutionary struggle of the masses of the people. During this struggle the Party consistently defended the interests of the people, became their experienced leader, and led the working masses to power, to the creation of the first socialist state.

You remember well Lenin's wise words that the Soviet state is strong because of the awareness of the masses, because history is created by the millions and tens of millions of people.

Our historic victories were attained thanks to the organizational work of the Party, to the many local organizations, and to the self-sacrificing work of our great people. These victories are the result of the great drive and activity of the people and Party as a whole; they are not at all the fruit of Stalin's leadership, as was pictured during the period of the cult of the individual leader.

If we are to consider this matter as Marxists and as Leninists then we must state unequivocally that the leadership practice which came into being during the last years of Stalin's life became a serious obstacle in the path of the development of Soviet society.

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problems—the solution of which could not be postponed—concerning the life of the Party and state. During Stalin's leadership our peaceful relationships with other nations were often threatened because one-man decisions could and often did cause great complications.

In the recent years when we managed to free ourselves of the harmful practice of the cult of the individual leader and took several appropriate steps in the sphere of domestic and foreign policies, everyone saw how activity grew before their very eyes, how the creative activity of the broad working masses developed, how favorably all this influenced the development of the economy and of culture. (Applause.)

Some comrades may ask us: Where were the members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee? Why did they not assert themselves against the cult of the individual leader in time? Why is this being done only now?

First of all we have to consider the fact that the members of the Political Bureau viewed these matters in a different way at different times. Initially, many of them backed Stalin actively because Stalin was one of the strongest Marxists and his logic, his strength and his will greatly influenced the cadres and Party work.

It is known that Stalin, after Lenin's death, especially during the first years, fought actively for Leninism against the foes of Leninist theory and against those who deviated. Basing itself on Leninist theory, the Party, headed by its Central Committee, started on a great scale the work of socialist industrialization of the country, agricultural collectivization and the cultural revolution.

At that time Stalin gained great popularity, sympathy and support. The Party had to fight those who attempted to lead the country away from the correct Leninist path; it had to fight Trotskyites, Zinovievites and rightists, and the bourgeois nationalists. This fight was indispensable. Later, however, Stalin, abusing his power more and more, began to fight eminent Party and government leaders and to use terroristic methods against honest Soviet people. As we have already shown, Stalin thus treated such eminent Party and government leaders as Kossior, Rudzutak, Eikhe, Postyshev and many others.

Attempts to oppose groundless suspicions and charges resulted in the opponent falling victim of the repression. This characterized the fall of Comrade Postyshev.

In one of his speeches Stalin expressed his dissatisfaction with Postyshev and asked him, "What are you actually?"

Postyshev answered clearly, "I am a Bolshevik, Comrade Stalin, a Bolshevik."

This assertion was at first considered to show a lack of respect for Stalin; later it was considered a harmful act, and consequently resulted in Postyshev's annihilation and in his being branded without reason as an "enemy of the people."

In the situation which then prevailed I talked with Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin. Once when we two were traveling in a car, he said: "It has happened sometimes that a man goes to Stalin by invitation, as a friend. And when he sits with Stalin, he does not know where he will be sent next, home or to jail."

It is clear that such conditions put every member of the Political Bureau in a very difficult situation. And when we also consider the fact that in the last years Central Committee plenary sessions were not convened and that the sessions of the Political Bureau occurred only occasionally, from time to time, then we shall understand how difficult it was for any member of the Political Bureau to take a stand against one or another unjust or improper procedure, against serious errors and shortcomings in the practice of leadership.

As we have already shown, many decisions were taken either by one person or in a roundabout way, without collective discussions. The sad fate of Political Bureau member Comrade Voznesensky, who fell victim to Stalin's repressions, is known to all. It is characteristic that the decision to remove him from the Political Bureau was never discussed, but was reached in a hasty fashion. The same is true of the decision to remove Suznetsov and Rodionov from their posts.

The importance of the Central Committee Political Bureau was reduced and its work was disorganized by the creation within the Political Bureau of several committees—so-called "quintets," "sextets," "septets" and "noventaries." Here is,

for instance, a resolution of the Political Bureau of Oct. 3, 1946:

"Stalin's Proposal:

"1. The Political Bureau Committee for Foreign Affairs ('sextet') is to concern itself in the future, in addition to foreign affairs, with matters of internal construction and domestic policy.

"2. The sextet is to add to its roster the Chairman of the U.S.S.R. State Economic Planning Commission, Comrade Voznesensky, and is to be known as a septet.

"Signed: Secretary of the Central Committee, J. Stalin."

What a card player's terminology! (Laughter in the hall.) It is clear that the creation within the Political Bureau of such committees—"quintets," "sextets," "septets" and "noventaries"—was against the principle of collective leadership. The result of this was that some members of the Political Bureau were thus kept from participation in the most important state matters.

One of the oldest members of our party, Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, found himself in an almost impossible situation. For several years he was actually deprived of the right of participation in Political Bureau sessions. Stalin forbade him to attend the Political Bureau sessions and to receive documents. When the Political Bureau was in session and Comrade Voroshilov heard about it, he telephoned each time and asked whether he would be allowed to attend. Sometimes Stalin permitted it, but always showed his dissatisfaction. Because of his extreme suspicion, Stalin toyed also with the absurd and ridiculous suspicion that Voroshilov was a British agent. (Laughter in the hall.) It's true, a British agent. A special tapping device was installed in his home to listen to what was said there. (Indignation in the hall.)

By unilateral decision Stalin had also cut off another man from the work of the Political Bureau—Andrei Andreyevich Andreyev. This was one of the most unbridled acts of willfulness.

Let us consider the first Central Committee plenary session after the 19th Party Congress when Stalin, in his talk at the plenary session, characterized Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov and Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan and suggested that these old workers of our party were guilty of some baseless charges. It is not excluded that, had Stalin remained at the helm for another several months, Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan would probably not have delivered any speeches at this Congress.

Stalin evidently had plans to finish off the old members of the Political Bureau. He often stated that Political Bureau members should be replaced by new ones.

His proposal after the 19th Congress concerning the selection of 25 persons to the Central Committee Presidium was aimed at removing the old Political Bureau members and bringing in less experienced persons, so that these would extol him in all sorts of ways.

We can assume that this was also a design for future annihilation of the old Political Bureau members and in this way a cover for all the shameful acts of Stalin which we are now considering.

Comrades! In order not to repeat errors of the past, the Central Committee has declared itself resolutely against the cult of the individual leader. We consider that Stalin was excessively extolled. However, in the past Stalin undoubtedly performed great services to the Party, to the working class and to the international workers' movement.

This question is complicated by the fact that all that we have just discussed was done during Stalin's life, under his leadership and with his concurrence; here Stalin was convinced that it was necessary for the defense of the interests of the working classes against the plotting of the enemies and against the attack of the imperialist camp. He saw this from the position of the interests of the working class, the interests of the working people, the interests of the victory of socialism and communism. We cannot say that these were the deeds of a giddy despot. He considered that this should be done in the interests of the Party, of the working masses, in the name of defense of the revolution's gains. In this lies the whole tragedy!

Comrades! Lenin often stressed that modesty is an absolutely personification of the greatest modesty. We cannot say that we

have been following this Leninist example in all respects. Suffice it to point out that we have called many cities, factories and industrial enterprises, collective and state farms, Soviet institutions and cultural institutions after the private names—as if they were the private property, if I may express it so—of various government or Party leaders who were still active and in good health. Many of us participated in the act of assigning our names to various cities, districts, factories and collective farms. We must correct this. (Applause.)

But this should be done calmly and slowly. The Central Committee will discuss this matter and consider it carefully to prevent errors and excesses. I can remember how the Ukraine learned about Kossior's arrest. The Kiev radio used to start its programs thus: "This is the Radio Station [named for] Kossior." When one day the programs began without naming Kossior, everyone was quite certain that something had happened to Kossior, that he probably had been arrested.

Thus, if today we begin to remove the signs everywhere and to change names, people will think that the comrades in whose honor the given enterprises, collective farms or cities are named also met some bad fate and that they have also been arrested. (Stir in the hall.)

How is the prestige and importance of this or that leader judged? By the number of cities, industrial enterprises, factories, collective and state farms that bear his name. Is it not time we ended this "private property" and "nationalized" the factories, the industrial enterprises, the collective and state farms? (Laughter, applause, voices: "Right.") This will benefit our cause. After all, the cult of the individual leader is manifested also in this way.

We should consider the question of the cult of the individual leader quite seriously. We cannot let this matter get out of the Party, especially not to the press. It is for this reason that we are considering it here at a closed Congress session. We should know the limits; we should not give ammunition to the enemy; we should not wash our dirty linen before their eyes. I think that the delegates to the Congress will understand and assess all these proposals properly.

Comrades! We must resolutely abolish the cult of the individual leader once and for all; we must draw the proper conclusions concerning both ideological-theoretical and practical work.

It is necessary for this purpose:

First, in a Bolshevik manner to condemn and to eradicate the cult of the individual leader as alien to Marxism-Leninism and not consonant with the principles of Party leadership and the norms of Party life, and to fight inexorably all attempts at bringing back this practice in one form or another.

To return to and actually practice in all our ideological work the very important Marxist-Leninist theses about the people as the maker of history and the creator of all mankind's material and spiritual benefits, about the decisive role of the Marxist party in the revolutionary struggle to change society, about the victory of communism.

In this connection we shall be obliged to do much to examine critically from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint and to correct the widespread, erroneous views connected with the cult of the individual leader in the spheres of history, philosophy, economics and other sciences, as well as in literature and the fine arts. It is especially necessary that in the immediate future we compile a serious textbook of the history of our party, edited in accordance with scientific Marxist objectivism, a textbook of the history of Soviet society, a book pertaining to the events of the Civil War and the great patriotic war.

Secondly, to continue systematically and consistently the work done by the Party Central Committee during the past years, work characterized by scrupulous observance—in all Party organizations, from bottom to top—of the Leninist principles of Party leadership; characterized above all by the main principle, collective leadership; characterized by observance of the norms of Party life described in the Statutes of our party; and, finally, characterized by wide practice of criticism and self-criticism.

Thirdly, to restore completely the Leninist principles of Soviet, socialist democracy expressed in the Constitution of the Soviet Union; to fight willfulness of individuals abusing their power. The evil caused by acts violating revolutionary socialist legality which accumulated over a long period as a result of the negative influence of the cult of the individual leader must be completely corrected.

Comrades! The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has manifested with new strength the unshakable unity of our party, its cohesiveness around the Central Committee, its resolute will to accomplish the great task of building communism. (Stormy applause.) And the fact that we present in all their ramifications the basic problems of overcoming the cult of the individual leader, a cult alien to Marxism-Leninism, as well as the problem of liquidating its burdensome consequences, is evidence of the great moral and political strength of our party. (Prolonged applause.)

We are absolutely certain that our party, armed with the historic resolutions of the 20th Congress, will lead the Soviet people along the Leninist path to new successes, to new victories. (Stormy, prolonged applause.)

Long live the victorious banner of our party—Leninism! (Stormy, prolonged applause, culminating in an ovation. All rise.)