

struck down by the Supreme Court, and which has caused the whole structure of policy negating the idea that that represents the American way, which it definitely does not.

These articles show how urgently legislative attention is required. I would say that one of the greatest challenges faced by the Congress is whether it can exorcise this completely obsolescent and very damaging and harmful provision of law, or whether it must sit with its hands folded and allow a provision of law with which such a great majority of the country disagrees, and which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down as being contrary to our beliefs. The question is whether that provision must remain imbedded in the law because we do not have the necessary procedures or a way of manifesting our will to change it. I shall do everything I can to bring about such change. It is a real challenge to the Congress, and one of those challenges which will determine how the Congress stands in the eyes of the country. If we cannot cope with anything as elementary as that problem, it seems to me the country must take a very dim view of our capacity for running the country's business.

SIXTH ANNUAL OBSERVANCE OF LAW DAY, USA

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, today, May 1, marks the 6th annual observance of Law Day, USA. Observance of this day, inaugurated by the American Bar Association in 1958, and now designated by Presidential proclamation, gives us Americans an excellent opportunity to reaffirm our devotion to and respect for the great heritage of American law.

Embodied in our Constitution we find the basic tenet that we are a government of laws and not of men. Article V of the Bill of Rights assures each person that the Federal Government shall not deprive him of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The 14th amendment provides that the State government shall respect this same rule. Through the consistent and continuous application of this principle we assure the freedom and equality of every individual.

Due process of law is maintained and protected through our courts. These bodies interpret our legal ideals and maintain our traditional concepts of justice through the impartial application of these principles. While our rules of law and means for enforcing them are not perfect, they allow more personal freedom than any other system known to man.

Many people have been attracted to the shores of this Nation, knowing that in America they need not fear discrimination and tyranny. These immigrants have recognized and appreciated the climate of freedom and security which the Anglo-American tradition of law has been able to offer.

The occasion that we Americans are commemorating today is in sharp contrast to the observances presently going on in Communist nations. We reserve

this day as a reminder of the many freedoms we enjoy as Americans, freedoms which are constantly protected by our body of laws. The Communists use this day for a raw display of power which serves to intimidate their people and to make them aware that the only rules guiding their government are rules of physical power, administered by men outside of a framework of law. There is no room in such a system for individual freedom and expression.

We must remind ourselves and the rest of the world that the strength of our system is based on far more than overt displays of physical force. It is our belief in the protection of human rights, rights which the Communists refuse to recognize, which can best express the idea that we seek to make peace and prosperity, with freedom, a living reality throughout the world.

To survive and to fulfill its purpose, our code of law and the Nation which it sustains need the support and dedication of the people whom they serve. Law Day provides us with an appropriate opportunity to reflect on the importance of law in the American way of life.

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, today, as on every May 1st since 1958, the Nation is celebrating Law Day. It is altogether fitting that we should pause for a moment in this age of rockets and missiles, to give recognition to our system of law which is so basic to peace and order in our own society as well as in the world at large.

The purpose of Law Day is to help us to become more aware of the significance of the rule of law in the preservation of freedom and the maintenance of peace. Bar associations, civic groups, and private and public organizations across the length and breadth of the Nation will hold ceremonies today directed at fostering an abiding respect for law and providing an occasion for the American people to rededicate themselves to freedom.

Our observance will serve to focus attention on the rule of law where the rights of people are governed by established rules, where the essential interests of individuals are guaranteed through limitations on the authority of the state, and where disputes are decided by impartial courts. It will help to demonstrate to the world the meaning of reliance on the rule of law.

In his proclamation of January 28, requesting our people to observe today as Law Day and to participate in ceremonies suitably signaling its significance, President Kennedy stated:

In a time when all men are properly concerned lest nations, forgetting law, reason, and moral existence, turn to mutual destruction, we have all the more need to work for a day when law may govern nations as it does men within nations; when systemized reason may bring us a confident future; when moral development of the human race may assure us a peaceful and law-abiding world.

It is in this spirit and with this hope that we celebrate Law Day today, knowing how essential law has been to the preservation of our own freedom and believing that the greatest promise for

the consummation of our expectations of peace and tranquillity for the future lies in the development of a system of law among nations.

ANATOMY OF DECISION"—FIC- TIONIZED STUDY OF EXECUTIVE DECISION PROCESS IN AN INTER- NATIONAL SECURITY CRISIS

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, 3 months ago on February 1, 1963, a written study was filed at the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., that is of specific interest with relation to the international Haitian-Dominican crisis of the past few days.

It was a fictionized study of the executive decision process in an international security crisis entitled "Anatomy of Decision." I think it is interesting reading on the interplay between the White House, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense on the making of vital decisions in time of crisis.

It is a unique piece of writing, for while it is fiction, it is documented fiction with some 225 citations from some 121 publications. Yet I think its achievement of sustained interest gives it the potentiality of an excellent 3-act play.

Because of the interest that I feel that Members of this body would have in reading it and because of the potential interest that students of government and international and military affairs might have in it, I ask unanimous consent that it be placed in the body of the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the study was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

ANATOMY OF DECISION—A FICTIONIZED STUDY OF THE EXECUTIVE DECISION PROCESS IN AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CRISIS

(Prepared by William C. Lewis, Jr., brigadier general, U.S. Air Force Reserve, for completion of vol. II of course 4, War College Extension Course, Air University, February 1, 1963)

PART 1. DETECTION

Chapter 1. Discovery

It had been a raw, bone-chilling day so typical of Washington in mid-March. The days were getting longer but that was not much consolation from the mixed weather pattern of snow, sleet, and rain—and those reckless impatient drivers, who literally panicked at the drop of the first snowflake—making the drive home even to nearby Georgetown a nightmare.

Scott Davidson sat by the warming fireside leisurely enjoying his nightly predinner martini with his attractive wife Martha, who had a knack for relaxing him with intelligent conversation about matters other than intelligence—Central Intelligence (14:57), that is. As his right hand stroked the soft hair of the head and back of "Cappy," the English setter, sitting by his chair, he gave a gentle sigh of relief with this fleeting peace of mind.

Central Intelligence Agency

For nearly 3 years things had not been going well for the CIA (91:31). Hindsight on the Quahog Bay invasion failure had cast such a shadow on the Agency for a year that his predecessor as Director had resigned in bitterness (5:7). Faulty intelligence had been a major defeat in the Abuc misadventure (94:68). Scott himself had been one of the critics pushing for the resignation—and when it came the President in a "put up

crease of 21.2 percent. Of this number 52.6 percent were under 50 years of age. Only in Gary, Los Angeles, and Indianapolis was a higher percentage of physicians under 50 years of age. In regard to training, Detroit with 17 board-certified Negro physicians was tied with Philadelphia for fourth place among the 14 communities we studied.

Community awareness

The previous papers have already clearly indicated a high degree of community awareness in Detroit which was focused on the problem of integration in medicine, as demonstrated in the Medical and Hospital Study Committee and the followup committee. Thus, Detroit provides an excellent example of the effectiveness of this approach.

Contacts between white and Negro physicians

The contacts established between white and Negro physicians were among the most important aids to achieving staff appointments at predominantly white hospitals in Detroit. A study of the 25 Negro physicians having such appointments indicated that 15—or 60 percent—had either attended the 2 medical schools in the Detroit area or had spent their internships and residency periods in predominantly white hospitals in Detroit. At these hospitals, they established professional relationships with white physicians which were directly responsible for their appointments to the hospital staffs.

In other cases, professional contacts established in governmental and predominantly Negro hospitals led to affiliations at predominantly white voluntary hospitals. For example, one Negro physician was helped in securing affiliation at a white hospital by staff members of this hospital with whom he had worked at the Veterans' Administration hospital. In another case, close professional relationships between the staffs of a white and a Negro hospital led to the appointments of at least three Negro physicians to the staff of the white hospital. In this instance, the superintendents and medical directors of the two hospitals were close personal friends; some of the key men at the white hospital also served on the staff of the Negro hospital; the chief pathologist of the white hospital conducted most of the meetings for the staff of the Negro hospital; and furthermore, the Negro hospital often used the laboratory of the white hospital.

In another case, a Negro physician was able to get a desired affiliation with a predominantly white hospital as the result of working with an influential staff member of this hospital at the Detroit Receiving Hospital. Still another Negro physician desiring affiliation with a specific hospital deliberately accepted an appointment at a clinic because this clinic was also serviced by important physicians from the hospital with which he desired affiliation. This technique proved successful, and after 2 years the Negro physician was able to get the appointment he wanted.

There was also a number of instances in Detroit where affiliations were secured because a Negro physician had studied or worked under white physicians of high prestige in other communities. We also found instances where Negro physicians on a staff were instrumental in getting other Negro physicians appointed.

In general, we found in Detroit that the majority of appointments to hospital staffs required that somebody on the staff be actively interested in pushing the application. A white hospital administrator made this point:

In every case where a Negro has been accepted he has been screened very carefully, and there was always somebody on the staff who had personal knowledge of the individual concerned and would speak up for him. It would be very difficult for a Negro to be put on the staff if he had not had previous

contact with the white physicians already on the staff.

Interest of influential persons

In view of the prevalence of professional contacts between Negro and white physicians, there were comparatively few white physicians or administrators who appeared to be especially active in promoting integration. We encountered, however, two instances where integration in specific hospitals was clearly the result of the interest of key persons on the staffs.

In one case, the hospital was a very large one. Negro physicians on the staff pointed out that their appointments were directly due to the interest taken in their cases by the administrator. This particular person had been interested in integration for many years, but he felt that it should be encouraged by persuasion and education, rather than by determination of policy on his part. Consequently, his effect on integration in hospital appointments developed only slowly and required the operation of some of the other forces that have been discussed.

The other case concerned a medium-size, predominantly white hospital. A number of interviewees stated that the integration in staff appointments was the direct result of the personal interest in integration taken by the chief of staff of this hospital. He initiated the recruitment of qualified Negro specialists and insisted that they be given staff appointments. In this he also had the support of several of the department heads and thus was able to overcome the initial resistance of many white staff members.

Action by Negro physicians

The actions taken by Negro physicians in Detroit in order to achieve integration were an extremely important component of the Detroit experience.

Negro hospitals

The presence and the relative importance of Negro hospitals in a community are significant in two ways: they indicate the degree of integration in the community and they influence the integration process.

Predominantly Negro hospitals were absent in the six communities which had the highest degree of integration as measured by our index of the percentage of Negro physicians having appointments at predominantly white hospitals. These communities were: Gary, New York, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Indianapolis, and Boston. Detroit, where Negro hospitals were relatively unimportant, was in seventh place, and the communities with important Negro hospitals followed.

Our data indicate that the presence of Negro hospitals influences the process of integration in two ways.

First, that Negro hospitals can provide a focal point for the self-segregation of Negroes. Such a hospital provides a place where Negro doctors can hospitalize their patients and thus reduces the doctors' needs to become affiliated with predominantly white hospitals. Furthermore, a predominantly Negro hospital provides a physical facility where Negro physicians meet, and this, in turn, can easily lead to the formation of a strong Negro ingroup, which may even resist integration.

Second, the presence of Negro hospitals reduces the pressure on white physicians and hospital administrators to admit Negroes to staff positions at predominantly white hospitals. The absence of Negro hospitals, on the other hand, puts strong pressure on whites to make some provision for the needs of Negro physicians and patients.

At the time of study in 1956 Detroit had three predominantly Negro hospitals which were approved by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. These three hospitals had a total of 324 beds. In the total situation of medical services for the Negro community and hospital affiliations for Negro

physicians, the three Negro hospitals were not significant either in the actual services they provided or in their influence on the actions of the Negro community. This is illustrated by the fact that an attempt to enlarge one hospital and make it a focal point for Negro physicians failed because of the lack of community support. There was no indication that the three Negro hospitals influenced integration in other Detroit hospitals either positively or negatively.

REPORT OF PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION

The panel created by President Kennedy to study the problem of mental retardation has published its report, "A Proposed Program for National Action To Combat Mental Retardation." The report defines mental retardation as "a group of complex phenomena stemming from many different causes, but one key common characteristic found in all cases is inadequately developed intelligence." Except in the very young, mental retardation can be distinguished from mental illness by the fact that it is usually present at birth or begins in childhood, whereas mental illness usually occurs after there has been normal development.

Severe mental retardation is frequently associated with organic defects and is usually fairly evenly distributed throughout the population regardless of socioeconomic status. On the other hand, mild mental retardation which constitutes the bulk of the cases can seldom, with our present biomedical techniques, be associated with specific organic defects and cases are heavily concentrated in low socioeconomic income groups.

Some of the measures needed to combat mental retardation cited by the panel are: (1) more research regarding the causes of retardation and in methods of care, rehabilitation and the learning process of the retarded; (2) better preventive health measures including strengthened maternal and child health programs, protection from known hazards in pregnancy such as radiation and drugs, and extended diagnostic and screening services; (3) educational and vocational programs for both children and adults geared to the needs of the retarded; (4) more comprehensive and improved clinical and social services; (5) development of a wide range of local community facilities for care; (6) a new enlightened legal as well as social concept of mental retardation; (7) intensified recruitment of professional personnel in all fields of science and service with provision of opportunities for them to acquire firsthand knowledge about mental retardation and the creation of a Domestic Peace Corps to stimulate voluntary service; (8) programs of education and information to increase public awareness of the problem of retardation.

The report is available from: Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.; 65 cents.

Mr. JAVITS. I call attention to the very serious and most distressing situation which exists under the Hill-Burton Act, which, in the terms of the legislation itself, allows separate but equal facilities for whites and Negroes in hospitals as accommodating the requirements of the Hill-Burton Act. This act gives the Federal Government a very important share in the construction of new hospitals and presents a situation which urgently requires legislative attention. It is literally shameful that in this day and age, after the Supreme Court decision of Brown against the Board of Education in 1954, we still have imbedded in the Hill-Burton Act—and, incidentally, in the Morrill Act with respect to land-grant colleges—the separate but equal doctrine which has been

or shut up" manner challenged him to accept the appointment as the CIA Director.

He had no choice but to accept—and now 2 years later he thought he knew how the man he had criticized felt. While he had given the CIA a thorough overhauling, his record was no better on the surface than that of his predecessor. The seemingly dramatic victory in the Abuc missile threat crisis had launched his administration with a great flush of success.

Yet, he and his Agency had not looked nearly as good as Florida's U.S. Senator Cutting, who had been so right so far in advance of the CIA on the Russian buildup in Abuc. Cutting had gambled on the reports of the Abuc refugees and had made a blistering attack on the administration (61:44). The CIA was more skeptical because it had been more cautious—and Cutting had emerged smelling like a rose in public opinion.

And in the 2 years that followed, it seemed as though the first flush of success on the Abuc crisis had actually served as a contrast to make the CIA look worse and worse. When the Olljurts had been deposed in the Dominican Republic, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had warned of the danger of a Communist takeover. But the CIA had sided with the State Department in urging a hands-off policy other than steaming up some naval vessels in the adjacent seas.

Intelligence gathered by the CIA had clearly indicated that the revolution had been led by antidictator rebels rather than by Communists. That intelligence was accurate. But now it did not look so to the American public.

For the vacuum of our hands off policy had been quickly filled by Russia in her exploitation of the fierce nationalism-neutrality feeling of the successful Dominican rebels. Economic and technical assistance was poured into the Dominican Republic by Russia and through such assistance imperceptibly a Russian orientation set in.

On top of this, the Russian representatives and technicians inspired the Dominican rebels to pursue their latent national aspiration to take over neighboring Haiti. And they had done it within 2 years after deposing the Olljurts—not by invasion or military action, but rather by infiltration and subversion, which they had quickly learned from the Russian representatives and technicians.

New Caribbea

The final act was supposedly a plebiscite of Haiti and the Dominican Republic that voted for a merger of the two countries into the new nation of Caribbea—more accurately, Communist Caribbea. Intelligence gathered by the CIA revealed that it was a rigged plebiscite in which the great majority of anti-Communists and those Haitians opposed to the merger were not permitted to vote. But the United States had been unable to do anything about it because of the doctrine of respect for self-determination and because of the fierce sensitivity of Latin American countries to outside intervention.

Many refugees from Haiti and the Dominican Republic—from the new Caribbea—had gone to Florida and New York—and several articulate ones to Senator Cutting with grave stories of a Russian buildup in new Caribbea. Scott Davidson so often in these days had felt like saying, "This is where I came in" (63:A-15).

No; the days had been long and hard. But this end of a hard, long and cold day was peacefully pleasant with comforting Martha, loyal "Cappy," the glowing fireplace and the martini. Martha had stopped talking for some 5 minutes as she had sensed Scott's retrospective mood.

The President Calls

But the quiet was not to last long as it was pierced by the shrill ring of the tele-

phone on the bookshelf back of Scott's lounge chair. A reluctant "Davidson speaking" was answered with "The President wishes to speak with you" and quickly followed by the irritated and troubled voice of the President.

"Scott, have you heard about the show that Cutting and Hartley put on in the Senate late this afternoon?"

"No, but they do it so often these days that they're outpacing the Ed and Chesley show—and they say the same thing over and over."

"Well, this time it isn't the same thing. My Senate liaison man was in the gallery and he is of the opinion that it is serious. He said that Cutting not only produced statements of Dominican refugees that the Russians are transforming new Caribbea into a huge bunker (30:42a) (108:28, 30) but also produced what they claim are pictures of Russian missiles, planes, submarines and ships in new Caribbea—and he told me that the pictures are going to be shown on the 8 o'clock 'Today' TV program in the morning with Cutting and Hartley appearing on that program. We checked with NBC and they confirmed this. I also asked Cutting for copies of the pictures—and he told me that he was sending them over."

Straightening up in his lounge chair, Davidson said, "But, as you know, Mr. President, the Defense Intelligence Board has taken the position that the Russians would never put offensive missiles in Caribbea because they would be too exposed (46:4). I'll be right over."

"No need for that Scott, right now. I'm not concerned about Cutting because he is a meticulous man. But I am concerned about Hartley. You'll remember he called for our blasting Abuc out of the Caribbean and he's up for reelection this year and this is a natural for him. Ordinarily he wouldn't be taken seriously, but this time the Cutting pictures could make a difference, and public opinion on new Caribbea seems to be ripe for political exploitation by Hartley."

"What can I do, Mr. President?" Scott said a little wearily.

"Get your CIA boys together with General Mack of the Defense Intelligence Agency (22:197) in the Pentagon. I'll have the Cutting pictures sent over to General Mack's office. I'll have Mack notified to set the conference up in his office for 9 o'clock tonight and to have his people there to meet with you and your people. But be sure to have your dinner because you'll have a full night. I want you and Mack to have a full intelligence report on the Russian buildup in Caribbea together with an analysis and evaluation of the Cutting pictures on my desk at the White House at 6:30 tomorrow morning. That will give me time to prepare comment and reply to whatever Cutting and Hartley say on the 'Today' show."

Chapter II. Investigation

With a "Will do, Mr. President," by Scott the conversation terminated. Scott then called his CIA deputy and gave instructions for the conference in General Mack's office.

Shortly thereafter upon call from the White House, Lt. Gen. Carroll Mack, U.S. Army Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (21:51) (22:197), in turn called the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (25:140, 148), the ACNO Director of Naval Intelligence (28:156, 160) and the Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (24:181, 189) and requested their attendance at the conference at 9 o'clock that night. He also called the Director of Intelligence and Research of the State Department (121:5) inviting him to attend the conference.

Intelligence Conference

At 9 o'clock sharp in room 3E258 (27:C-9) in the Pentagon, the conference was called to order by General Mack, who then turned

the chairmanship of the conference over to Scott Davidson. By that time several sets of prints of the Cutting pictures had been made. They were passed around to the attendants at the conference. In addition to these prints, the White House had obtained copies late that afternoon from the Senate official reporters of the remarks made by Senators Cutting and Hartley a few hours before in the Senate.

Davidson outlined the situation summing up with the requirement of the President that the group make a thorough but succinct evaluation and analysis of the status of any Russian military buildup in Caribbea—and specifically, evaluation of the Cutting pictures—to be placed on his desk in a little more than 12 hours later at 6:30 the next morning. "In short," he said, "gentlemen, our time is short and our mission is awesome. Yet, we have to a great extent already made our personal evaluations. The only new factor at this point is the Cutting pictures. Are they genuine? Do they make a significant difference?"

The group worked throughout the night (61:50) calling in photographic intelligence experts of their staffs and the latest intelligence evaluations of new Caribbea and its Russian relations. Comparisons and arguments were made. The Air Force and the Navy contended that the Cutting pictures, even if authentic, did not change their evaluations which had been that a very threatening Russian military buildup had been underway for some time and that the Cutting pictures only corroborated those evaluations.

The prior evaluations of the Army and the CIA had been that admittedly Russian military equipment had been sent into Caribbea but that it was in the nature of military assistance for internal security rather than for external action and was of defensive rather than offensive character and thus constituted no serious threat. The State Department Director of Intelligence and Research sided with the evaluation that there was no serious threat.

Evaluation

At 2:30 the combined photographic intelligence experts reported to the group that they were of the unanimous opinion that the Cutting pictures were: (1) authentic and (2) disclosed evidence that was indicative, but not conclusive, that the character and numbers of missiles, IL-28 jet bombers (8:A1) (17:A1), submarines and ships had extensive external potentials.

After an hour of close questioning and discussion, the Army, the CIA, and the State Department representatives concluded that there was indication of a significant change. At that point, two staff members were directed to draft a report. That draft was completed in an hour and a half and then presented to the group. A few changes were made and the final draft was approved by the group, as an informal agent of the U.S. Intelligence Board (5:7) (60:6), and signed by Scott Davidson as head of the CIA and General Mack as Director of Defense Intelligence Agency with noted concurrence by the State Department Director of Intelligence.

The group dispersed to return to their offices or homes for short naps. At 5:30 a.m., Scott Davidson called Jack Brandt, the Special Adviser to the President on National Security Affairs, out of bed with a cryptic, "We've finished the report the President wants. Meet me at the White House as soon as you can get there." At 6 Davidson handed the report to Brandt—and at 6:30 Brandt knocked on the small library room door of the President and entered with the report (2:18).

The President sat down at the small desk and began to read the four-page report, first with a hurried scanning prompted by

impatience to get the findings, and then second and third slow readings as if he were digesting the facts and observations supporting the findings—findings that the Cutting pictures were authentic and significant, but at this point only strongly indicative rather than conclusive. He was most impressed with the changed positions of the Army, CIA, and State.

Call of National Security Council

Looking very tired at the very start of the day, he glanced upward and said, "Jack, call the members of the National Security Council (109:31) and tell them to be here for a meeting at 9 this morning. This should be a good test of their ability to bridge the gap between civilian policymakers and military strategists (74:49) for a judicious co-ordination of our political and military strength—the elements of national policy (74:56). On your way have my breakfast sent in."

At 8 he watched Cutting and Hartley on television. Surprisingly their discussion lacked the dramatic punch he had anticipated. It was conducted on such a restrained key as almost to be dull. Hartley was remarkably restrained. Perhaps it was because the precise and meticulous Cutting dominated the discussion and obviously strained for an unemotional, matter-of-fact tone. Perhaps it was because, at the outset, the obviously proadministration NBC moderator-commentator had cuttishly reminded Hartley of the effective manner in which the President had met the Abuc threat without invasion and bombing.

And perhaps it was because to the untrained eyes of the viewing public the true meaning of the pictures did not come through. Whatever it was, the President was confident that it would not significantly stir the public any further from its already indicated concern about Caribbea.

Yet, the President was concerned because he knew the Russian Embassy was carefully watching the telecast and he could not know what impact the Cutting pictures had on the Russian experts. Because of this and his appraisal of the lack of appeal of the telecast to the public, he called his press secretary at the end of the program and said, "Joe, the telecast didn't hurt enough to require a reply. I want to play it down in order to avoid tipping our hand in any manner to the Russians. So tell the press that I have no comment on the matter."

Chapter III. National Security Council

At 9 sharp the members of the National Security Council (76:56, 57) (108:30) entered the office of the President—Vice President Jim Landon, Secretary of State Arthur Burgess, Secretary of Defense Carter Topping and Emergency Planning Director Tom Kelly. Others present were the secretariat officials Jack Brandt, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (109:35), his deputy Carl Smith, and the Executive Secretary Brinkley Walter (109:36)—and Scott Davidson.

"I assume you saw Cutting and Hartley on the NBC telecast at 8," was his manner of opening the meeting. Vice President Landon responded first with "Yes, that damn Hartley has more guts than brains—but he can hurt us at the next election."

Open With CIA Briefing

"We're not here to discuss politics," the President observed acidly, "and we might as well get to the point immediately. Scott (109:40) read the report and then we'll get down to brass tacks and make minimum decisions."

When Scott finished reading the report, the President turned to Defense Secretary Topping (26:121, 128) and said, "Intelligence has thus performed its warning role (48:8) Carter, what's your reaction? Are we in real trouble? Are we in a 'falling domino' posi-

tion as Eisenhower spoke of on Indochina in 1954? (13:261) I mean military and physical danger—aside from the psychological factor and international prestige."

Secretary of Defense

Topping slowly adjusted his glasses, leaned back in his chair, rubbed his nose and stared upward as though addressing the ceiling instead of the President. No offense was taken by the President as he had become accustomed to this gesture—and had even good naturedly told Topping that sometimes he didn't know whether he was talking to a higher Authority or seeking Divine Guidance for his answer.

In measured words, the Defense Secretary said, "I don't know. I thought the Russians after their quick backdown on Abuc would not push so hard again so soon. But I can't forget how accurate Cutting was on the Russian buildup in Abuc. I never did believe that he got all his information from refugees but strongly suspected much of it came directly from sources inside the Pentagon. Whatever the sources, he was right and made us look bad—and I am not about to discount him again on these pictures."

Secretary of State

Turning to Secretary of State Burgess (29:63, 73), the President said, "How about you, Art? Do you think Khrushchev is preparing for two steps forward after his one step backward on Abuc?"

"I doubt it, Mr. President," Burgess quickly replied. "I think Khrushchev learned his lesson in the Abuc crisis on American credibility that our patience and willingness to go more than half way for negotiated peace is not unlimited and that we will fight when we are convinced we are really threatened. But I'd rather get the thinking of my Kremlinologists (7:17) before giving you a firm opinion."

Emergency Planning Director

Nodding at Emergency Director Kelly, the President said, "It's your turn, Tom. What are your thoughts?"

With his typical disarming candor, Kelly raised his hands outward and sighed, "I'm not an expert on this and you know it, Mr. President. My job is to mobilize the resources to back up the military and diplomatic decisions (32a:59). All I'll say is that I wouldn't put a wooden nickel on that loudmouth Hartley. He tries to yell us into a shooting war yet he violently opposes giving us a cent for civil defense and screams about the waste of taxpayers' money on stockpiling."

CIA Director

The irony of Kelly's remarks about Senator Hartley was reflected in the sardonic smile of the President as he wheeled his chair around to face Scott Davidson, who had been seated to his immediate right for reading the report. "And you, Scott?" he questioned.

"Well, this is getting close to policy decision, Mr. President, and you know the CIA is forbidden from policy formulation. I'm ever mindful of the gap (116:26) or line drawn between intelligence and policy (33:17)."

"Come now, Scott, no one thinks you would try to tell me what to do."

"No, of course not, but you never know when that woman on the Senate Armed Services Committee will ask me when I am before the committee whether I ever made policy decisions—and I want to be able to remain snow white pure so that I can say I only collect and evaluate intelligence and never recommend decisions (15:53, 54, 83). They won't be able to ignore her seniority and keep her off the Subcommittee on the CIA forever."

Visibly irritated, the President glared, "Forget about her—there is such a thing as executive privilege, you know, that even that

relentless woman can't pierce. What do you really think?"

"Frankly, I'm concerned, Mr. President. Perhaps it's because I can't forget that Cutting looked so good so far in advance on the Abuc missile crisis. The photographic intelligence analysts say the Cutting pictures are not proof positive but they hedge and say that they should not be discounted or underrated. They resort to the escape clause distinction between the words 'indicative' and 'conclusive.'"

The Vice President

At this point, Vice President Landon, who had remained uncomfortably silent since the President had cut him off with the no politics remark, broke in with "I think that's the nub of our problem here. The Cutting pictures are indicative enough—with his past record of being so right—that we can't discount them. Yet, this is too serious and risky business to accept them as gospel truth and act prematurely and precipitously on them. I suggest that we try to corroborate them before we make any decision on how great the threat is and on what we decide to do."

"You've got a point, Jim," the President admitted, "We've got to double check."

With soft sarcasm, Jim Landon replied, "Oh, that's something I learned from politics—especially that time when I was elected to the Senate by a thin 100 votes."

"Touché, Jim. I had a close one myself. But how do we doublecheck without tipping our hand to the Russians? The only thing about the Senate show and the telecast this morning that worried me was the disclosure of the Cutting pictures."

Defense Boss Topping moved forward to the edge of his chair and volunteered, "I don't think that will be too difficult, Mr. President. We already have the Navy-Marine amphibious exercise going on in the Caribbean (19:6) and specifically in the Windward Passage and Mona Passage—maneuvers that were scheduled and announced several weeks ago. We could have some carrier-based aircraft on those maneuvers accidentally fly off course and do photographic reconnaissance on the western half of Caribbea perhaps without arousing suspicion. To cover the eastern half we could have the Air Force from Ramey Air Force Base make flyovers."

"But that would bring diplomatic repercussions and protests from Caribbea," objected diplomat boss Burgess, "and we run the risk of Caribbea protesting to the OAS, and perhaps the U.N. It could damage our image in Latin America."

"To hell with our image in Latin America," exploded the "Veep," "the greatest impairment we had there was from our timidity on the Quahog Bay invasion fiasco. They'll respect us a damn sight more if we do stand up (68:A-14) as we finally did on the Abuc missile issue before backsliding on the submarine bases there. Sure, they may gripe and criticize us—but only like a younger brother scolds his older and bigger brother."

With obviously hurt feelings, Burgess met this explosion with a muted, "I'm a little tired of having the charge of timidity hurled at the State Department—we have just as much courage as anyone else. I'm only trying to think ahead. Besides, if Caribbea should protest to the OAS, it might give the Russians a cub to protest to the U.N. and thus set up a doubleheader program for stalling. That could hamper you, couldn't it Carter?"

Defense Secretary Topping drawled out a slow, "Yes," and then continued, "But since you are thinking about my department, Art, I'll do a little thinking about yours—you know, under the law we do have to integrate military policy and foreign policy. I suggest that to take the focus off of Caribbea we also have carrier-based planes in the maneuvers make the mistake of flying off course

and over Jamaica—and the Air Force planes also fly over the northern Leeward Islands. "Then if they all protest it will tend to confuse the protests of Caribbea and Russia—or if Jamaica and the Leeward Islands don't protest, Caribbea and Russian protests will be discounted to that extent as far as Latin American countries and the OAS are concerned."

Chapter IV. Initial Presidential decisions and staff implementation

At that point, the President broke in. "I agree with Jim that we immediately doublecheck the cutting pictures. While I'm not so sure, Carter, that pincer aerial reconnaissance you suggest can be pulled off without incident, I think your plan is sound and I want it carried out today."

President's First Decisions

Turning to his Special Adviser on National Security Affairs, he said, "Jack, jot down these decisions from this meeting."

"First, I want the Secretary of Defense upon leaving this meeting to start the ball rolling on the aerial photo reconnaissance over Caribbea—such surveillance would give me hours of warning, time enough to head off any attack (18:47)."

"Second, the Director of Defense Intelligence Agency will have a thorough analysis and evaluation made of photographs taken on these flyovers. Then he shall give a briefing to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the CIA, and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs."

"Third, that group shall then give its appraisal of the situation in a report—and make it short."

"Fourth, the Secretary of State shall hold a briefing conference with the Under Secretary of State, the State Department Director of Intelligence, the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs—in anticipation of diplomatic protests against the flyovers. He shall direct the Kremlinologists (7:17) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs to prepare a 'think' memorandum for me as to their educated guesses on what Khrushchev and his Caribbean stooges may do about the flyovers."

"Fifth, the composition of the National Security Council is too limited for pooling the best brains on this threat. While I want the NSC to continue as a body for very candid discussion and debate (31:64), I want to make sure that it is more a planning agency than a bargaining forum (44:145). So I'm setting up an Executive Committee of the National Security Council (40:4). In addition to myself, it will be composed of the regular members of the NSC except the Emergency Planning Director, you as my Special Adviser on National Security Affairs, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General (40:4), the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the CIA Director, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and the Ambassador to the United Nations (36:A1) (101:A21). Notify them immediately. The Executive Committee, in effect my 'War Council' will take over as the agent of the NSC until we have made our final decisions. It will take the place of both the old Operations Coordinating Board (47:71, 72) (42:56, 57) (82:64) (109:36) that was abolished in 1961 (81:649) (105:24) and the NSC Planning Board (43:64) (85:20) (109:37), which has been dormant in my administration as contrasted to the Eisenhower administration."

He then rose from his desk with a "That wraps it up. The Executive Committee will meet as soon as we get the evaluations from the flyovers. Good hunting, Carter—and brace yourself, Art, for the verbal blasts from Khrushchev and his Caribbea stooge. Thank you for coming."

Defense Implementation

Upon return to his office in the Pentagon, Carter Topping summoned to his office Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilbert Roswell (26:121, 129), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Tigh Maxwell (26:125, 137), Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency General Mack, Assistant Secretary for Manpower Paul Norman (26:124, 133), and Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics Robinson Roderick (26:123, 131) and relayed the instructions of the President.

"Tigh, get the wheels turning immediately on aerial photo reconnaissance flights over Caribbea by Navy F84 Crusaders, Air Force RF-101 Voodoos, and SAC U-2's (106:E5). General Mack, give Tigh a set of the Cutting pictures, for I want special attention by the flyovers to those spots the Cutting pictures allegedly cover. I want a thorough analysis, evaluation, and report within 36 hours."

"We didn't get to any discussion of possible action this morning but the broad alternatives are fairly clear now ranging from doing nothing more than a strong diplomatic protest to full-scale invasion of Caribbea—with the possible intermediary thresholds of air and sea blockade or selective pinpoint bombing. We've got to be ready for anything and plan for the worst and hope for the best. Personally I think the Cutting pictures will hold up."

"So, Tigh, I want the JSC to review all war gaming to date and direct intensive war game planning on all reasonably foreseeable potentials (108:30) in this situation. I want Operation X (invasion of Caribbea if ordered) updated (81:50). Get going on this immediately—together with the drafting of such plans and orders as are necessary for movements of personnel and equipment."

"Robby, get your boys working on a report on the logistics capabilities and the major logistics problems arising from the situation. And Paul, I'll want a thorough manpower appraisal (82:96)—especially our Reserve callup capability with specific attention to the airlift capability of the troop carrier wings of the Air Force Reserve."

"Gil, we've got precious little time if the Cutting pictures do hold up. It's the old story of wanting something yesterday on a time target. But I want all of this I have requested as soon as possible because I'm sure the Executive Committee of the National Security Council will be called into session by the President within a couple of days—and then the discussion on decisions to be made by the President will start. I want as much as you can get me by that time. So you've got the job of riding herd on Tigh, General Mack, Robby, and Paul, and putting together their reports in an overall summary for me. That's it—now get going, fellows."

State Implementation

At the same time, wheels had started turning in the State Department. State Secretary Art Burgess called Under Secretary Jim Batt (29:63, 73) to his office and said, "Jim, I've just come from a NSC meeting at the White House and it looks as though we may be on the brink of the moment of truth with Khrushchev for the Communist buildup in Caribbea may be greater than we have calculated. I want to get committees started considering proposals ranging from invasion to a diplomatic approach to Russia (56:A31). I want you to set up a luncheon conference for me today. Besides yourself have the Under Secretary for Political Affairs (29:63, 74), the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (29:64, 78) and the Director of Intelligence and Research (29:63, 75) (80:975) there to brief me on the Caribbea situation."

"Also get the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs (29:63, 75) (79:8) together with our Kremlinologists this afternoon for a brainpicking session

among themselves on anticipating the Kremlin's mental processes and reaction to our making flyovers on Caribbea—and if necessary, alternative actions ranging from a strong diplomatic note protesting any Communist military buildup in Caribbea to full scale invasion of Caribbea. Tell them I want a 'think' memorandum from them by noon tomorrow. They'll probably have to work all night."

Thus, the spadework started at Defense and State. It continued around the clock the rest of that day and for all of the next day. For the time being the Indians were taking over and the chiefs were the "waiters"—for policy, strategic and tactical decisions had to wait for analysis, appraisal and anticipatory evaluation.

Enemy Threat Confirmed

This was a time of a relative behind-the-scenes silence—a silence of urgency that was to be broken 2 days later by General Mack's telephone call to CIA Director Scott Davidson at an early hour of 6 a.m., with the terse words, "The new pictures have been made and fully analyzed—they back up the Cutting pictures 100 percent." (62:95)

"I'll be at your office at 8 sharp," was the reflex response of Davidson. "I'll get the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and bring him with me. Will you see that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are there?"

"Right," Mack replied, "it shouldn't take long for the briefing for it's so clear cut. May take a little time for the group to draft an appraisal report for the President."

Four hours later his National Security Affairs Adviser, Jack Brandt, handed the group's three-page appraisal report to the President. He read it slowly at first without expression, oral or facial—put it down on his desk and then sighed, "It's even worse than what the Cutting pictures indicated. Round up the NSC Executive Committee for a meeting here in an hour—at 11 o'clock sharp. Also have General Mack here."

PART 2. DISSECTION

Chapter V. First meeting of NSC executive committee

There was a full attendance at the meeting. The President opened it with the observation "Aerial reconnaissance photographs taken of Caribbea by our RF-101's in Florida, our B-47's at Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico, our U-2's (87:E11) there and at the Guantanamo Naval Base, and the F-8U Navy planes from the Second Fleet on maneuvers in the Windward Passage, establish beyond any doubt that an offensive buildup in Caribbea has reached a highly developed stage (63:A-15). It represents a threat of very serious proportions to the United States both here at home and abroad."

Intelligence Photographic Briefing

"General Mack will now show you pictures taken during the past 2 days."

Detailed blowups of the pictures were then flashed upon a large screen and General Mack meticulously coordinated his briefing pointer and commentary in analysis of the pictures. It was a study of grim faces when the briefing terminated and the lights were turned back on. The pallor grew even heavier when CIA Director Davidson read the three-page Davidson-Mack report which had triggered the President's call of the meeting.

President Frames the Picture

Again the President took over. "As I see it, gentlemen, the beginning of the decision time starts right now—and time is of the essence (104:26) in these decisions. We have certain obvious alternatives (11:45). On one extreme end, I can make the decision to do nothing—to let matters ride along and hope that the buildup is nothing but a calculated bluff by Khrushchev in the belief that he would not start a nuclear war with attack on this country from Caribbea be-

cause if he so decided to attack he could strike us with ICBM's launched from Russia itself. I can make the decision to do nothing for fear of starting something that will eventually escalate into nuclear war.

"On the other extreme, there is the alternative of a sudden, without warning full-scale invasion of Carribea on the hypothesis that with the military advantage of surprise, we can occupy Carribea as a quick fait accompli before Russia can take any effective retaliatory action. But this involves the greatest risk of all-out-war—and we must guard against disaster (11:46).

"In-between alternatives are (a) carry a protest to the United Nations, or (b) blockade Carribea until the offensive military capability is removed, or (c) make air strikes on the offensive sites (81:50).

"Which shall it be—or what shall it be—is there any course that will accomplish the objective of meeting the threat without impairing the security of our country? The floor is open for discussion and for the sake of order, we shall proceed by presidential succession seniority. That means that you are up first, Mr. 'Veep.'"

"Veep" Sizeup

In the characteristic gesture that telegraphed nervousness and concern to his close associates, Jim Landon tightened his mouth, pushed his lip up and backwards at the same time and stiffly rubbed them with the three middle fingers of his right hand.

"You will recall, Mr. President," he nasally drawled, "that at the meeting 2 days ago of the NSC, I made two basic observations. The first was that we should make the flyovers immediately to double check on the Cutting pictures. The second was that we should do so regardless of the risks—that it was about time we shed our seeming timidity and took on a posture of courage—that our image in Latin America and the world had been weakened far too much by our past caution.

"We shed our timidity at first on Abuc and forced the Russian pullout of missiles and bombers. We established credibility with Khrushchev. But then we backslid as we did nothing when it was discovered that the Russians had missile submarine bases in Abuc under the guise of fishing bases (2:18) and retained Russian aircraft and military forces under the defensive facade. We lost much of the credibility we had gained (18a:35).

"I think the worst decision that we could make now would be the decision to do nothing—to take a cautious wait-and-see decision and to hope for the better. For there comes a time when we must stand. Thank God, we did stand in Abuc up to the point of the submarine bases—but that will mean nothing if we do not stand now.

"I'm not so sanguine now as to advocate that we make a full-scale invasion of Carribea—because I want to hear what the Joint Chiefs of Staff say first. But if the choice is between do nothing and coast or invade as soon as possible, I'm for invading—because there is only one direction for coasting—and that is down hill. That's my say in a nutshell."

Showing no reaction, the President looked at Art Burgess and simply said, "Your time at bat, Art."

Secretary of State Urges Restraint

Tapping his knee with his fingers, the Secretary of State moistened his lips and said, "Well, Mr. President, I guess that I'm ingrained with the traditional diplomatic attitude that all differences should be settled by agreement at the conference table rather than by bullets on the battlefield, to use archaic war terms. In my first task to identify the crucial international problem (112:64), I must first stress peace through negotiation.

"I disagree fundamentally with the Vice President, for I think the worst thing we can do would be to invade—to be guilty of starting the warfare. It would violate our deepest traditions (19:6). I think even if we pulled it off with complete victory and without any retaliation of force from Khrushchev, we would still be the loser—for we would have lost the impeccable reputation of never having started a war—of never having been the attacker—and we would lose what remaining confidence, prestige and influence we have not only in Latin America, but throughout the entire world as well. We must maintain a decent respect for the opinions of mankind (37:5) (102:14).

"Fortunately, I don't think that we are faced with the disastrous choice of nuclear war or humiliating surrender. I think we can take action that will sober and restrain Khrushchev. That action is to lodge a complaint in the forum of world opinion, the listening post of the human race (115:71)—the United Nations—against the Russians and Carribea—to exercise our right to bring the matter before the Security Council of the U.N. (47:A-4) and to demand that the U.N. send an inspection team into Carribea.

"By doing this I think we would expose Khrushchev to the world—and we would win a psychological victory of significant proportions—significant in that it would bring home to the people of Latin America, as nothing else has before, the Communist threat against their own security and freedom. I think, and so do my Kremlinologists, that this would have a significantly enough psychological effect on Latin American countries as to make Khrushchev stop and pause. Our Ambassador to the U.N. shares this opinion.

"I would propose that we concurrently call for a session of the Organization of American States and push for an OAS resolution condemning the buildup and expressing solidarity in opposition to it. We must recognize that foreign policy and defense policy are directed toward the world environment (84:47). My Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, our Ambassador to the OAS, and my Politico-Military Affairs staff have expressed confidence that we would get solid backing on this in the OAS.

"Even if these estimates should be wrong, we would still have open the alternatives for military action. But I do agree with the Vice President on one point—that I'm not irrevocably wedded to this position because I first want to hear what the Joint Chiefs of Staff—and the Secretary of Defense—have to say—particularly about what military strength we have to back up any stronger foreign relations policy than that which I have now proposed."

Defense Secretary Favors Firmness

Now it was Defense Secretary Carter Topping's turn in the line of presidential succession. He looked at the Secretary of State and directed his initial remarks to him instead of the President with "Art, have you received any protests from Carribea or Khrushchev on the flyovers?"

"No," replied Burgess, "and frankly I'm very surprised. There hasn't been a peep from them. I think that shows that they are not trigger happy—and that we can have some hope that they are amenable to reason."

Scowling, his face flushed but the knuckles of his hand white with tenseness, the usually impeccably cool Topping, with the cutting incisiveness of an M-60 machinegun, said, "Well, I've received a complaint from them—not in words but in a missile that killed one of my boys now in a watery Windward Passage grave with his U-2 plane. They were trigger happy enough to pull the trigger on him. I received the confirmation of this just

before I left the Pentagon for this meeting." (2:18) (57:A2)

Then turning to the President, Topping said, "To me, Mr. President this is more than the loss of a young, heroic Air Force major. It is a clear indication that Khrushchev and his stooges in Carribea are acting instead of talking—that they are not going to be restrained by diplomatic words alone—that the only thing they will understand and pause about now is action on our part.

"In my opinion, taking this up in the U.N. and the OAS first before acting will not only not restrain them—but will tip our hand and will give them more time to stall and delay us—and in the meantime to accelerate their own buildup in Carribea.

"I can tell you now that we certainly have the strength to restrain them and whip them if they choose to fight. For this time we will be fighting in an area of greatest advantage to us rather than in a place to their own advantage like Berlin, Laos, or Vietnam.

"I don't think we will have to resort to a full-scale invasion—at least not at the very beginning. I think we can take action short of that. But I do think that we will have to take some military action instead of wishful-hoping diplomacy alone in a United Nations that has amply demonstrated its difficulty in achieving quick response—or in an OAS which, with the exception of the Abuc crisis, has failed to give us solid backing.

"I think we should act first and then take the diplomatic steps—for I think the OAS will be more likely to support us after we have acted unilaterally than if we go hat in hand in advance begging their help.

"I think we have more than one choice between invasion and the U.N. We could invoke a full blockade—or a limited blockade. Or we could decide on selective, pinpoint bombing of offensive points. But I have not reached a firm conclusion in my own mind."

Treasury Secretary Sides With Diplomacy

Now it was Treasury Secretary George Dawson's turn. A direct look from the President was sufficient signal to him. "My judgment is questionable on two points, Mr. President. First, Treasury has little basis for informed judgment as compared to State and Defense. Second, as a former Under Secretary of State, we all know that I am oriented to the diplomatic approach on a matter like this. I agree with Art. I think we should exhaust our diplomatic potentials before resorting to military action—but with a warning in that diplomacy that we will resort to military action if necessary."

Attorney General Raises Moral Issue

"What's the judgment of our legal expert?" the President asked of Attorney General Ken Roberts.

"Mr. President, as a lawyer I think in terms of the legality of any action that we take—and actually that means thinking in terms of the morality of any action that we take," was Roberts' solemn response (19:8).

"The Secretary of State made a good point when he said that we should not stain the impeccable moral reputation and prestige that we have of never having started a war. I agree with him—but I don't think he is quite accurate because our country does have one stain in its record and that was the Mexican War. In my travels around the world that is the one argument thrown against me by the Commies that I have never been able to deny.

"For us to attack Carribea—either by full-scale invasion or by limited, pinpoint bombing—without warning, would be just as immoral as the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor (87:E11). It would impair the confidence of the other nations in the world against us for a long, long time. And as a nation we would have a guilt complex for a long time. It just isn't worth the military tactical advantage of surprise.

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"Whatever we do—I feel strongly that we should clearly and firmly establish in advance a legal and moral basis for our action," he concluded.

Impact of the Attorney General's words was clear from the prolonged silence among the group. That silence was not broken until the President said, "I don't think there is need for any further discussion from the rest of you present since the rest of the Executive Committee are under those who have already spoken—that is, unless any of you who have not spoken do have a point you would like to make."

Chairman of the JCS Speaks Up

At that point, Tigh Maxwell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stood up directly and said, "Mr. President, as a military man I am not unmindful of the moral obligations we have to mankind and I am proud of the moral history of our country. I want to keep it as high as possible. But there is more than one way to measure morality. It is not immoral to shoot a murderer in self defense. It is not immoral to attack those who, if given more time and further opportunity, will kill all freedom and liberty in the world. The United States must demonstrate by actions as well as by words that we are militarily invincible while supremely devoted to peace." (34:25)

U.N. Ambassador Fires Back

Almost simultaneously as Tigh Maxwell sat down, Steve Adler, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, was on his feet. This was the second moment of personal difference tension in the discussion and the tremor of Adler's voice threatened an emotional explosion as he said, "Mr. President, we Americans are not the sole judges of morality—and we cannot fashion and shape the standards of morality to suit our own convenience and expediency. Nor can I agree with Defense Secretary Topping that the United Nations has amply demonstrated its difficulty in achieving quick response. I would recall your attention to the magnificently quick response that the United Nations gave when South Korea was invaded by the Communists."

"But that was accomplished only because the Russians had absented themselves at the time in a boycott they were carrying on against the United Nations," broke in Topping, "had the Russians been present they would have used their veto in the Security Council to block and stall action. Look what they did when the Hungarian uprising was brought before the U.N."

Adler then shot back with, "Well, if you decide to invade don't keep me in the dark as you did on the Quahog Bay invasion fiasco and yet look to me to defend such a policy in the U.N." (30:B11)

President Steps In

Sensing that the discussion was about to shift from an objective discussion of policies to a subjective clash of personalities, the President incisively cut in with "Gentlemen, this is no time for the luxury of polemics—or for 'gales of controversy' (67:50) as Senator Jack Henry has put it. Nor is it a time for final decisions."

"But the discussion has been constructive in its brutal frankness. And I could not have asked for greater productivity than this session has given me. Frankly, it has resulted in steering my tentative decisions in specific directions. Other than to say I am prepared to use force, but prefer to use the threat of force first (101:A21), I am not yet ready to indicate what those directions are—simply because I will not make final decisions until I have more information and more specific evaluation."

No. 64—7

Chapter VI. Task forces

"In order to achieve this, I am now appointing five task forces (105:24) to work from the close of this meeting continuously until I call another session of the Executive Committee. I want each task force to be prepared at all times with a succinct but thorough report of its evaluations and recommendations to me in the mission assigned to it. Those missions are clear from the titles of the task forces."

Intelligence Task Force

"Task Force No. 1 will be the Intelligence Task Force. It will be chairmaned by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and its members will be the Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of Intelligence and Research of the State Department (121:5), and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It will be in effect the U.S. Intelligence Board (32:39) minus the AEC and military services representatives (5:7). It will report to me through Jack Brandt, my Special Adviser on National Security Affairs."

Diplomatic-Political Task Force

"Task Force No. 2 will be the Diplomatic-Political Task Force. It will be chairmaned by the Under Secretary of State with the Vice Chairmen being the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (6:1-6) (23:23) (26:123, 132). Its membership will be divided into two teams. Team A will be the Soviet Affairs Team captained by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (29:65, 78) and composed of our Ambassador to the United Nations (29:70, 88), the Department of Defense Regional Director for the Sino-Soviet Region (26:124), the State Department Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs (29:65, 68), and Art Burgess' 'Kremlinologists'."

"Team B will be the Western Hemisphere Affairs Team captained by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and composed of our Ambassador to the Organization of American States (29:561), the Department of Defense Regional Director for the Western Hemisphere Region (26:132), and the State Department Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (29:64, 78)."

"Task Force No. 2 will report to me through the Secretary of State."

Military Task Force

"Task Force No. 3 will be the Military Task Force. It will be chairmaned by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman will be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its members will be the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (79:8) (105:24). It will report to me through the Secretary of Defense."

Legal Task Force

"Task Force No. 4 will be the Legal Task Force. It will be chairmaned by the Deputy Attorney General (20:6) and its members will be the Legal Adviser of the State Department (29:63, 75) (20:6) (121:6), the General Counsel of the Department of Defense (26:125, 134), and the Special Counsel to the President (19:6). It will report to me through the Attorney General."

Information Task Force

"Task Force No. 5 will be the Information Task Force. It will be chairmaned by the Director of the U.S. Information Agency and

its members will be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (23:25), the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (26:124, 133) (29:64, 76), the Special Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations, and my Press Secretary. It will report to me through the Vice President."

"I shall expect all task forces to consult, confer and cross-check with each other as may be found necessary or desirable—and I shall expect each task force to prepare a program of implementation in its own area of action once the basic decisions have been made."

"I want the Strategic Air Command put on alert 3 and all other Armed Forces on alert 4 (18:47)."

"Be prepared for call at any time, gentlemen. I don't want a case of mixture of improvisation and panic as on Dienbienphu (100:35). That concludes the meeting."

One by one the group quickly filed out of the President's office with a sense of urgency to get the task forces into action. The only remark made was that of the Secretary of State that "Unless we keep our wits, we may be fighting for our lives within a week." (61:54)

Task Forces at Work

Within the hour, all five task forces (86:47) were hard at work—giving real meaning to the observation that "Defense and foreign policy are a seamless web." (44:133) No. 1 (Intelligence) started with the reports of the latest U-2 flyovers of Caribbea and then turned to consideration of intelligence which might give clues as to what might be the objective of Khrushchev and what other steps might be anticipated. Was this merely a squeeze play directed to put pressure to get us out of Berlin? Was it a further move of the Soviets to control the major narrow water passages of the world—the Skagerrak, the Dardanelles, Suez, the Malacca Straits, Panama (49:83, 92) and this time the Windward Passage and the Mona Passage?

Team A of Task Force 2 was brainstorming its Kremlinologists on the possible reaction of "Khrushchev and Company" to each of the alternative courses of action set forth by the President. It then turned to discussion of what had to be done with respect to our allies—especially those of NATO—on these possible courses of action. Should we confer with them before making decisions or should we act unilaterally—but with advance notice and how short notice? Should we bypass the United Nations?

The other half of Task Force 2, Team B, began its discussion with the anticipated reaction of Latin American countries to each of the alternatives and quickly came to agreement that invasion or air strike would alienate these countries in varying degrees. On the other hand, there was general agreement that we should avoid the appearance of asking their permission to act for while that might please their national egos it could indicate weakness and timidity in our leadership.

Defense Secretary Topping, upon return to the Pentagon, called in his special assistant, his comptroller, and his Assistant Secretary on Manpower and gave them instructions for "crash" action. The special assistant was instructed to prepare a memorandum on the economic effects of each of the alternative courses of action. The comptroller was instructed to set the wheels in motion for all financial authority necessary (62:96). The Assistant for Manpower was instructed to draw up necessary papers for a callup of the Reserve and National Guard (62:96).

Task Force No. 3 (Military) began with a review and continued updating of Opera-

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tion X (61:50), an invasion plan of Caribbea that had first been drawn up 3 months past. It was brought up to the hour with revisions for specified places and timing. Concurrently, it gave instructions that each of the alternative military courses of action listed by the President be war gamed.

After some discussion, it was decided that inasmuch as any military action would be essentially sea and air—at least at the outset before placing any ground forces on Caribbea—the Chief of Naval Operations be designated the operational commander (7:26) (61:50), subject to final decision by the Commander in Chief. In turn, his principal deputies would be the Commander of the Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANT), the Commanding General of the Army Forces, Atlantic (CINCARLANT), and the Commanding General of the Air Forces, Atlantic (CINCAFLANT) (96:11).

It was further decided that sea, air, and land forces should be immediately deployed into prepositions designed to carry out any of the listed alternative courses of military action instead of waiting until the decision was made by the President on which course of action to take initially. This entailed the movement of Army divisions, Air Force units, and naval forces to the southeastern United States—a concentration of Air Force units at Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico—rushing marines to the Guantanamo Naval Base—and the positioning of naval vessels in the Caribbean area, particularly around the Windward Passage and the Mona Passage and that portion of the North Atlantic between the two passages.

Task Force No. 4 (Legal) first indulged in self-analysis and concluded that its mission was more than just determining the legal aspects of each of the alternative courses, but instead included the drafting of such proclamations (61:52), statements or addresses that the President might make.

Task Force No. 5 (Information) in very short order came to the conclusion that its mission was to get the word out once the final decision had been made—and to not only get the word to the American and foreign press in such form as the President decided but to the key Members of Congress—and to the people of the Caribbean and Latin America areas, especially to the people of Caribbea.

"Cross-Fertilization"

Once all task forces had gotten well underway on their own identifications of their missions and plans to execute those missions, a "cross-fertilization" of inquiries and exchange of opinions between the task forces set in. It was this "cross-fertilization" that actually, even though unconsciously, not only informally coordinated the work of the task forces—but, more important, veered them gradually to some grounds of agreement despite their differing original courses.

For example, the Kremlinologists of Team A of Task Force 2 (diplomatic-political) contacted Task Force 4 (legal) stressing the importance of the legality factor with the report that the Russians "had a feeling for 'legality'" (19:6) and that a good legal basis and presentation would undoubtedly have a sobering effect on the Russians.

Team B (Western Hemisphere affairs) members of Task Force 2 advised Task Force 5 (Information) of its opinion that getting information to the people of the Caribbean and Latin American areas, as soon as possible after the principal decision had been made, was extremely desirable psychologically. They requested Task Force 5 to develop plans for requests to selected American radio stations to beam special broadcasts in Spanish once the decision had been made and approval given by the President.

Task Force 2 (diplomatic-political) and Task Force 3 (military) were continuously

calling Task Force 1 (intelligence) for the latest intelligence not only on U-2, RF-101 and F-8U photos of the critical sites and area but also for related intelligence with respect to the Soviets and Latin America. These three task forces exchanged opinions not only as to intelligence clues on Khrushchev's real intentions on Caribbea itself but also as a part of the overall pattern on tactics and strategy.

Task Force 2 queried Task Force 3 on the extent of our military strength to back up alternative diplomatic actions, threats and commitments. In turn, Task Force 3 queried Task Force 2 for frank appraisal of what support we could expect from our allies—specifically NATO—as to the best evaluations of their intentions on giving military support. Would they be alienated by a blockade? If the matter was taken first to the U.N. and the OAS for debate before action, how long would it take? How much time would be taken by diplomatic maneuvering—precious time in which military forces could be deployed and prepositioned?

Task Force Reporting

The chairman of each task force reported at least every 4 hours to the Designate for further reporting to the President. These Designates, in turn, did two things—first, they relayed the reports with their personal observations to Jack Brandt, the President's Special Adviser on National Security Affairs—second, they met with each other twice a day to report to each other, to discuss and exchange opinions.

Their reports were then amalgamated into one report prepared by Brandt for the President (43:65). From time to time, the President called one or more of them in to ask questions and to consult further—and to request further information.

Time Closes In

This process continued around the clock for 4 days. In midafternoon of the fourth day, CIA Director Scott Davidson went to the office of Jack Brandt, the President's Special Adviser on National Security Affairs and with grim face said to Brandt, "Our decision planning time has about run out. I've got to see the President."

With automatic reflex, Brandt said, "Let's go," and they walked directly to the office of the President where they were immediately ushered in. As soon as the door closed, Davidson tersely said, "Mr. President, our time for deliberation has run out. The aerial photo reconnaissance (7:18-25) (86:38-41) (108:29) over Caribbea strongly indicates that the Russian buildup is going at such an amazing pace that their missiles will be fully installed and operational and their bombers will be completely assembled and operational within a week." (2:16)

"That settles it then," the President concluded, "Jack, call a meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC for tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock. Tell the task forces to be prepared with their final recommendations for tomorrow will be D-day—decision day—for me."

Chapter VII. Task forces' recommendations

The next morning the President opened the meeting on the dot of 9 o'clock with the short statement of "Gentlemen, as you may know, photo reconnaissance over Caribbea in the past 4 days reveals that the Russians and their Caribbea puppets will be ready to go operationally with their missiles and bombers there against us within a week (2:16). And as you may have guessed, I have not finally decided—but I can no longer delay my final decision. That is what this meeting is for—to hear from the task forces—and the Cabinet members under whom they have worked. We'll start first with the CIA Director heading Task Force No. 1—the Intelligence Task Force. Speak up, Scott."

Intelligence recommends air strikes

CIA Director Davidson pounded and emptied his pipe on the ash tray stand adjacent to his chair as he started with "There is basically nothing that I can add on behalf of the Intelligence Task Force to the briefing that I gave you the other day—other than to state that the situation has grown graver. In our opinion, the Caribbea-Russian forces will be in an operational position, at their present rate of buildup, to strike us within a week or 10 days at the latest. If we are going to take any action other than a protest, we are going to have to take it within the next 2 or 3 days. We just can't wait even a week."

"Were we of the Intelligence Task Force making the decision, we would act first and talk later. For in our opinion, thus far, talk has gotten us practically nowhere. We recommend selective air strikes not only on the missiles (87:E1) (98:A2) and the bombers in place on Caribbea—but also air strikes on the oil refineries and petroleum depots to cripple general operations in Caribbea—strikes to be made without warning for our intelligence estimates are that any advance threat or notice would result in the Russians flying heavy concentrations of their own aircraft in Caribbea ahead of us if they can."

"We believe that the best course of action is fait accompli because we have again lost credibility with the Russians and this is the action that is necessary to restore that credibility. That's our recommendation."

It was clear from the expression on the President's face that this recommendation troubled him as he turned to the Diplomatic-Political Task Force No. 2 Chairman, the Under Secretary of State, and said, "All right, now let's have the advice of the Diplomatic-Political Task Force."

Diplomats Recommend Political Negotiation

Slowly clearing his throat, the Under Secretary of State, in the formal tone that had been ingrained in him as a career foreign service officer, said, "Mr. President, we believe that we must arrive at the kind of measured response that would remove the threat by (a) posing a minimum risk to ourselves and our allies, (b) involve a minimum danger of escalation toward higher orders of violence, (c) be consistent with our treaty obligations, and (d) not contravene the principles for which we stand as a nation. (9:A12) (107:1)

"Mr. President, Task Force No. 2 is of the firm opinion that we should make at least one more try at reason with the Russians. We prefer political negotiation to military action. I want to point out, in this respect, that this preference is fully concurred in by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (10:20), who is regarded as the key person at the crossroads of State-Defense-JCS relations (79:3)—and between the two focal points for 'military' and 'political' advice (109:39).

"To take military action against Caribbea, either by invasion or by selected air strikes, would not only cost us friends and allies in Latin America (61:50), but would brand us as an aggressor in the eyes of the world. It would probably result in the killing and injury of Russian military and technical personnel in Caribbea, which could lead to nuclear retaliation on our country by Khrushchev and we would be escalated into that which we all want to avoid—an all-out nuclear war. Public support for U.S. foreign policy to be effective is absolutely necessary (38:59). We doubt if the American public favors an invasion."

"We recommend that we take the case to the United Nations and to the Organization of American States and show that the peace of the world is threatened, and the security of the Western Hemisphere is jeopardized, by the Russian buildup in Caribbea. We

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believe that the United Nations will face up to the situation and act just as it did in Korea—and that the OAS member states will at least see the threat and solidly back us."

Military Recommend Invasion

No reaction was registered by the President, who then said, "How about the Military Task Force?"

The Deputy Secretary of Defense stood and said, "Mr. President, it is the considered judgment of the Military Task Force that military action is mandatory and urgent. We do not believe that the Russians will respond to political negotiation. We agree with the conclusion that we have again lost our credibility with the Russians because we have bent over backwards so long in prolonged talk in this protracted conflict of the cold war that they doubt that we will act. We believe that military action is necessary to restore that credibility."

"Nor do we believe that we can obtain the necessarily effective reaction and prompt action in taking our case to the United Nations or the Organization of American States. In the first place, we have seen how our traditional allies—specifically our NATO allies—acted when we tried to persuade them not to trade with Abuc a few years ago and how they initially protested our quarantine as violation of freedom of the seas (16:35)."

"We have seen how the so-called neutral nations, who held themselves in such righteous indignation as the moral arbiters of the world, how they were so silent when Khrushchey resumed open-air nuclear tests (13:56) and when Red China invaded the leading neutralist nation, India. And we have seen in the past how difficult it was to gain support from the members of the OAS through attempted persuasion—but how, when we exercised our power and acted, they fell in step behind us in solid unity."

"No, we believe that military action is absolutely necessary in this crisis. For further detail on why and what action we believe should be taken, with your permission, I would like to defer now to the Vice Chairman of the Military Task Force, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell."

As the President nodded his approval, Gen. Tigh Maxwell strode over to a map on an easel and picked up a pointer. "Mr. President," he said, "what I am about to say is the unanimous opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (26:125, 136). Khrushchey has caught us with our southern flank exposed (71:8). Your attention is first called to this narrow water strait between Caribbea and Cuba—the Windward Passage—and to the Mona Passage between Caribbea and Puerto Rico. We believe that among the principal reasons for Khrushchey's grab for Caribbea is his overall strategy of gaining control of the narrow water passages throughout the world—the Suez Canal, Gibraltar, the Skagerrak, the Dardanelles, the Malacca Straits, the Panama Canal (49:83, 92)—and the Windward Passage and the Mona Passage here."

"If he remains in Caribbea, not only does he present an immediate threat of missile and bomber attacks on our country from Caribbea (68:A-14)—but also a longer range threat of taking over control of the waters approaching the Panama Canal. Not only that, he would greatly neutralize and offset the present military-geographical defensive advantage that we have against unfriendly Caribbea in the Guantanamo Naval Base to her west and Puerto Rico to her east. So much for the Western Hemisphere."

"Now let us look at Europe—and specifically at Berlin. If Khrushchey establishes nuclear-capable, operational missile, bomber and submarine forces in Caribbea, he offsets the present wide advantage and super-

iority that we have over Russia on ICBM operational capability (99:A15). By such a military 'leap frog' action he will drastically change the missile balance of power (120:46) presently from one of a decided inferiority to one of a clear superiority for Russia."

"For if he moves to take Berlin and to push us out and we threaten to resist, he can then point to his missiles in Caribbea poised to zero in on us. Then we have the choice of backing down or not only of fighting a nuclear war in a place of his choosing but also of his having the ability to rain nuclear bombs on us that he does not now have."

"We do not believe that he is prepared to go to war now—and particularly in an area to his own disadvantage—in the Caribbean Sea—which has been regarded as an American ocean. But if Mr. Khrushchey is ready to go to nuclear war over Caribbea now, he is ready to go to war now or at any future time (61:16) in other places throughout the world far more to his advantage geographically. If he is going to launch missiles from Caribbea, he will simultaneously launch them from the Soviet Union itself (66:A-23)."

"We think he's bluffing—otherwise he has picked the wrong war in the wrong area and at the wrong time. And we think he is bluffing from a combination of his own desperate weakness of ICBM inferiority (99:A15) and the lack of our own credibility in his mind. He's bluffing like we did on the ultimatum for him to get out of Laos and when we did nothing when he called that bluff. We think the tables are reversed now."

"We believe we must take military action to call his bluff—again to restore our credibility—and to prevent him from drastically changing the balance of military power by this one bold, desperate attempted leapfrog, this attempted blackmail (55:60)."

"That action can range from an air and sea blockade to all-out invasion. We think the most realistic step is the most unpleasant step—invasion. For even if we do blockade and the Russian missiles and bombers are taken out of Caribbea, the Communist government will still be there—and still constitute a potential threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere and ultimately to our own security."

"We have the necessary capacity (54:A-10) and strength (59:A1, A4) (96:11) (117:A-1, A-5) (98:11) (117:A-1, A-5) for a successful, full-scale invasion (20:37), which could be completed within a few days—or, at the most, a month, if the resistance is strong (61:50)."

General Maxwell then gently laid his pointer at the base of the map and walked back to his seat.

The President then pointed to the Deputy Attorney General and said, "You're up now for the Legal Task Force."

Lawyers Recommend Blockade

"Mr. President, the members of the Legal Task Force are neither military experts nor political-diplomatic experts, so we are somewhat embarrassed to recommend outside the legal aspects. But you have asked us to—and we will—and admittedly with our opinion being dominated by the legal aspects of military action or political negotiation."

"We are opposed to invasion because we do not believe that there is a sound legal basis for it. We are a highly moral-conscious Nation and people—and 'legal' is but another term for 'moral'—for what is right morally. For the same reason, we are opposed to selected air strikes or any other similar military action. We do not want the United States placed in the position of a Pearl Harbor in reverse."

"On the other hand, we can see a sound legal basis for an air and sea blockade against military shipments as contrasted to food, shelter, and medicinal shipments to Carib-

bea. It would particularly have a sound legal basis if we were to place the proposed blockade before the United Nations and the Organization of American States for their approval. This is what we recommend."

Information Recommendations

All eyes then shifted to the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, the Chairman of the Information Task Force, as the President nodded in his direction. His brow wrinkled and his eyebrows shifted up and down as he looked up with a reticent smile and through the smoke of the ever-present cigarette that had become his trademark in the past pre-Government days with TV audiences.

"I feel as though I was about to do a TV documentary, Mr. President. My Information Task Force is sharply divided on the big decision, although it is unanimous on what to do once that big decision is made, whatever it is. We're practically evenly divided between military action and political negotiation. Perhaps the Deputy Attorney General has given us the easy way out with the middle compromise his task force recommends."

"But, of this, we are unanimous and sure. Whatever the decision—it must be given to as many people as quickly as it can be (93:1, 2)—so that they may know why we have made the decision that we have. And it should be announced as dramatically as possible and with the maximum impact."

"In a democratic society the public must be kept informed of the major issues in national defense policy. It is extremely important that public opinion in our own country vigorously support the decision. It is extremely important that the message be gotten across to the people of Latin America (35:12)—and especially to the people of Caribbea. We must get the message through to the Russian people. We must use all the facilities at our command. Even in this crisis, the truth must be our guide, but dreams must be our goal—dreams of peace (114:4)."

"Not only are the media of communication of great importance—but for impact purposes, the forum or forums of communication are of the greatest importance—for the atmosphere, the arena and the surroundings of the message can well control the mental and emotional manner in which the message is received."

"For that reason, we recommend that the President make the announcement of his decision—what it is and why—in the world's foremost international forum, the United Nations. As soon as the decision has been made, we recommend that the President request a time to go before the General Assembly of the United Nations to make an address of utmost importance. We further recommend that such address be televised to the world through our communications satellites Telstar II and Skyfon, thus taking advantage of the U.N. multilingual concurrent translations. We recommend that the Vice President shortly thereafter go before the Organization of American States with substantially the same message on behalf of the President."

"Finally, not only do we recommend that all Government broadcast facilities such as VOA (92:1), the AFRTS (78:76) and RIAS (111:86) be assigned to such broadcasts, but also that powerful American commercial non-Government radio stations, that can beam broadcasts to Latin America, be used for such purposes, preferably through voluntary cooperation—but mandatory, if necessary, through national security authority. Any other recommendations we have, Mr. President, deal only with detailed implementation of your decision—and add nothing to the discussion at this time."

PART 3. DECISION
Chapter VIII. NSC members'
recommendation

At that point the President pivoted his chair around to face Jack Brandt, his Special Adviser on National Security Affairs, and said, "Jack, you have been coordinating the work of the task forces—and I must say that, in my judgment, the task forces have done an excellent job in spite of their different conclusions and recommendations—they have gone forward with vigor—and you have had the best overall knowledge of the work and the recommendations. Because of that I want to have your opinion and recommendations."

Special Adviser on National Security Affairs

Edging to the front of his chair and biting his lower lip, Brandt said, "It may appear that I'm bellicose—and maybe I am—maybe I'm on the 'hard' side between the division of your 'hard' and 'soft' advisers (55:60)—but the more I think on this and the more information that we get, the more I am convinced that this is really the moment of truth in the cold war up to this point—and that we have no choice but to take a calculated risk of nuclear confrontation that admittedly has a dangerous chance of escalating into nuclear war."

"In my opinion, Khrushchev is either proceeding from great strength or great weakness. If he is proceeding from great strength, then I think he is willing to start a nuclear war now or at any time in the future. So that I don't think that in the long run any temporizing expedient such as political negotiation in the United Nations will either bring peace or enhance our national security."

"It only delays the day of reckoning. And a delay now, that permits him missile, bomber, and submarine operational capability in Caribbea, strengthens him and weakens us in the balance-of-power struggle."

"Because we are so far ahead of him on ICBM strength (99:A15), I am convinced he is leading from weakness. We have the conventional strength with which to invade Caribbea—and I think the term 'liberate' is more accurate and better psychologically than the term 'invade.' Khrushchev doesn't have the conventional strength to match ours—and especially with his enormous problem of logistics, as he would have to fight far from his source of supplies, while we fight almost in our own backyard."

"Thus, it seems to me that the only choice left for him is to decide whether Caribbea is sufficiently in the national interest of Russia—in the long-term strategy of communism—to fight a nuclear war. I don't think it is—because not only do we now have a great ICBM superiority over him but a clear nuclear superiority (120:46)."

"No, I think he'll back down—and run away to confront us another day at some other place of greater advantage to him—just like he did in the Abuc crisis. In short, he has again doubted our credibility because we didn't push against his submarine—phony fishing—bases in Abuc. I think this is the chance to prove our credibility to him again. If we don't do it now—it will be that much harder later on—and perhaps fatally impossible."

"I'm for all-out liberation military action on Caribbea instead of timid political negotiation. Any in-between action such as blockade or air strikes is only a difference in degree for once we take an act of confrontation, the risk of war is one. The principle is the same as declaration of war from the standpoint of risk—the difference is only in degree."

Decision Count-Down

The President slowly turned his chair as if the words of Brandt had fallen very heavily upon him. There was a long silence

in the room as the President thought of how the survival of the world in the next few days depended upon his wisdom and courage—upon how well he could guess—and upon the frightening unknown of how sane and prudent a man Khrushchev really was—or was not—through all of his bluster and bluff. Only the President could make the decision (109:41).

"We must bring this discussion to a close—and I am going to do this by asking the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Vice President in that order to express their opinions and recommendations. My mind is made up sufficiently at this point to disclose my decision to you when they have finished—but I want to hear them one more time because what they have to say may change my mind in some respects and in some details. Art Burgess, will you start it off and make it as short as possible?"

Secretary of State—Diplomacy

The Secretary of State emitted a sigh audible throughout the room and started with "My position is not easy, Mr. President, but I still believe that there must be left an ounce of reasonableness in Khrushchev. Perhaps we could discuss with him the possibility of our dismantling our missile bases in Turkey if he will do the same in Abuc (1:A21) (69:A25) (75:B-1) (98:A1), as suggested by Columnist Fearlapp and the conservative press in London (50:404)."

"Russian history shows a clear pattern of Russia itself refraining from initiating military action except from fear (64:A-13). I do not think we have yet reached the disastrous point where our differences cannot be discussed at the diplomatic table—where we have to start shooting instead of talking. If we shoot, then I think we will destroy the last shred of any reasonableness left in Khrushchev. He will shoot back and the escalation game will be on and will not end until all-out nuclear war has perhaps killed off the entire world."

"I do not like to wear my war record on my sleeve—but I have no choice at this time. As a holder of the Congressional Medal of Honor for action in World War II, I say with all the sincerity of which I am capable that we should not take military action—we should not act unilaterally—we should take our case to the United Nations and the Organization of American States."

Secretary of Defense—Controlled Response and Options

The depth and warmth of feeling with which Secretary of State Arthur Burgess spoke was in sharp contrast to the detached, unemotional, and seemingly cold tone in which Defense Secretary Topping spoke. To some, he was seemingly an electronic, mechanical computer that had taken on human form (62:95). The few close, close friends he had, protested that such characterization did not do the man justice (62:99). But throughout the discussions on the crisis, his image was certainly more than of an electronic machine than that of a mortal human being with emotions and fears.

"It is my concept, Mr. President," he began, "that while this crisis presents grave danger to us, it also gives us a golden opportunity (92:96) in more than one respect. First, it is a golden opportunity because we can make a stand—a confrontation—in an area of the world to our advantage and to the disadvantage of Khrushchev—militarily because of the logistics factor—weaponwise because of our conventional advantage in equipment, in our strike command, in our naval control of the Caribbean—and psychologically in the deeply instilled feeling of the Latinos against foreign control."

"Second, it gives us a golden opportunity to reconvince Khrushchev, beyond any doubt, of our credibility—and I mean specifically nuclear credibility, which the woman

Senator alleged we have again lost when we failed to push against his submarine bases in Abuc. I must admit that she apparently was right to some extent because otherwise Khrushchev would not have had the nerve to attempt making Caribbea a submarine, missile, and nuclear bomber base against us. For if we stand—with our conventional superiority at this particular place on the globe—Khrushchev cannot hope to fight a conventional war with us. He then has no choice but nuclear war or a backdown."

"That brings me to the third reason why I feel this is a golden opportunity. It is a golden opportunity for us because it is we, who have the choice. It is we, who have what I call the power of controlled response (3:24) and the exercise of options (2:20). We maintain the initiative from the start—we act first—Khrushchev can be kept constantly in the position of reacting and countering. And this is certainly a refreshing change for us."

"We are not in the position of our choice being limited to a surrendering backdown or starting a nuclear war. We have the options (2:20)—and several of them. We can plan step by step. We can force Khrushchev to make the decision to raise the threshold—to escalate—instead of having that decision forced upon us."

"Our missile bases in Turkey are about outmoded and we have been on the verge of removing them (88:B23)—the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made this decision because we have enough intercontinental missiles so that we no longer need the intermediate range missiles (89:D13) in Turkey."

"But the suggestion of a dismantling trade on missile bases in Abuc and Turkey is unthinkable because Turkey is in NATO and this would undermine the confidence of all other NATO nations in us."

"I vigorously oppose limiting our action to an appeal to the United Nations and the Organization of American States. I oppose starting our action that way because it would waste the loss of valuable time—and that could be fatal."

"Nor do I agree with CIA Director Davidson that we make air strikes without warning—or with your Special Adviser on National Security Affairs and with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that we should invade Caribbea. Either action would limit our options and reduce our controlled response."

"Instead I propose that the first step to be taken be the imposition of a sea and air Blockade of Caribbea (98:A1) and that it be maintained until Caribbea and Russia do two things. First, they must dismantle and ship out of Caribbea not only all missiles and bombers but all Communist military equipment, whether from Russia or any of her satellites. Second, I propose further that the blockade be maintained until inspection teams from the Organization of American States can fully determine that such action has been taken."

"A deadline should be set for the beginning of the dismantling and removal of the missiles, bombers, and submarines—within 48 hours after the announcement of the imposition of the blockade. That deadline should have teeth in it with the notice that unless such dismantling starts within that time we will then exercise what I call our second option—our second degree of controlled response—the bombing of some missile sites."

"If that does not start the Russians dismantling within 24 hours, then I recommend the exercise of our third option—our third degree of controlled response—a full-scale invasion of Caribbea. Our readiness now is such that we can, in my opinion, make successful landings and occupy all of Caribbea within a few days because of present maneuvers that are going on and the concentration of forces we have built up in Florida, Puerto Rico, and Panama. Even

if we should run into resistance, complete occupation could be achieved in a month (61:50).

"At no time should we use nuclear explosives first. We should force that decision upon Khrushchev. We should retain the 'conventional option' (3:24). Only after Khrushchev's first use of nuclear explosives should we consider nuclear retaliation according to the damage caused, and the intent indicated, by his use of nuclear explosives. If Khrushchev attacks U.S. soil, then I propose war plan AA-1, which you know in detail, be invoked.

"I recognize that a President is often left to figure out his options for himself (77:56, 57)—but these are my recommended options."

Attorney General—To U.N. and OAS First
Looking at the Attorney General, the President said, "All right, Ken, let's have your final word."

"I am in basic agreement with the Secretary of State that this should first be taken to the United Nations and the Organization of American States. I am bitterly opposed to either air strikes or invasion as I feel this would be immoral—particularly to strike without warning just to have the military advantage of surprise," was the response of the Attorney General.

"I think that we should take the legal step of appeal to the international and regional bodies of the U.N. and OAS first—for actually that is appealing to the highest legal authority there is—the court of world opinion. The U.N. and OAS are our forums—our media of communication—for appeal to the court of world opinion (51:1).

"I admit that we have a good chance of quick military victory with a surprise air attack or invasion. But in the long run (45:20), I think we will lose from it—we will have won a battle but lost a war—for where we now have world opinion on our side, we would lose it—by military attack—and Khrushchev would gain it.

"But I have changed my mind somewhat since the beginning of our discussions. I am no longer completely opposed to any military action—with some reluctance I can see the advantage of the military action of a blockade since it would not mean actual shooting unless Russian ships—or potentially, even ships of our NATO Allies—might try to run the blockade. Even then I don't like the idea of a blockade in that it cuts off shipments of some necessities to the people of Carribea.

"If your decision should be a blockade or an advance warning of air strike of missile and bomber sites or possible invasion, I feel that we still should go before the United Nations and the OAS with such notice before acting. To that extent we would at least have the semblance—and the image with some—of having acted legally or with a legal basis. And even the legal predicate approach, our Kremlinologists tell us, makes a salutary impression on the Russians (19:6).

"It's a little like the difference between straight touch football and 'flag' football, where grabbing the detachable flag from the waist of the ball carrier removes any doubt and avoids any argument as to whether the ball carrier has been touched or not. And now that I've gone off on touch football I'll stop."

Vice President—All the way—Invasion

Turning to Vice President Jim Landon, the President said, "Jim, the final quarterback call is yours."

"My first point, Mr. President, is that I disagree with the Attorney General that invasion or air strike would be a reverse Pearl Harbor—an attack without warning. After all for months now—yes, even years—you have been warning that the United States would not tolerate threats to the security of the Western Hemisphere. You have even spelled that out by specifically identifying

any Russian offensive military buildup in any nation in the Western Hemisphere as a threat to the security of the hemisphere.

"I'm afraid that the Attorney General, like so many Americans, has been somewhat confused in his thinking by the result of the steady deterioration of our military credibility after the first flush of victory on Abuc wore off—to the extent that our strong words of warning have little, if any, meaning because we did not back up those strong words with strong action on the submarine bases in Abuc. In other words, that our past strong words of warning so lost their meaning by lack of backup action that they have not been considered actually to be warnings.

"I don't like the limited action of a blockade—because even if you do get the Communist missiles, bombers, and submarines removed—and it will not be easy to determine when, and if, that has been done in view of the way the Russians and their puppets have lied—and specifically in denying all along that they were building up in Carribea. As I started to say, even if you get the missiles, bombers, and submarines removed, you still will not have removed the basic threat—the continued existence of a Communist government in Carribea that would destroy our country any time the Communists thought it could be done" (65:A-19).

"The only real way to remove that threat—to cut out the cancer soon enough—is to overthrow the Communist regime—and the only way to do that is by invasion and occupation.

"Let us not delude ourselves on two points that have been raised—on the moral issue—and on the claim that psychologically we would lose the friendship of the Latinos by invasion. If a criminal faces you with a cocked gun on the verge of killing you and then terrorizing your neighbors and your community, whether you are a policeman or not, it is your moral duty to shoot him not only in self-defense but for the protection of your neighbors and your community.

"As for the psychological reaction of the Latinos, make no mistake about it. They respect power (120:46). Historically they have always responded to power. They have contempt for any country that does not use its power for its defense and for its dignity and self-respect. I know—because I have traveled and talked with the man in the street in Latin America. To a man and woman, they have told me that while their politicians would probably have criticized us for a short time if we had invaded Abuc at the time of the invasion fiasco at Quahog Bay, inwardly they would have had much more respect for us if we had gone all the way and thrown out that bearded 'psycho' Ortsac (19:6).

"So I say that we shouldn't throw away this second chance to do the right thing—to go all the way—to invade, throw out the Communist regime and liberate Carribea with a free, democratic government.

"I have only one further thought. If you should decide to announce publicly your decision in advance by going to the United Nations as recommended by the USIA Director, I believe that you should also go before the Organization of American States instead of me going before the OAS—because the Latinos are proud people and they would feel slighted if you went before the United Nations and did not go before the OAS. Psychologically, they are just as important, if not more important, than the people of Europe and Asia on this matter. That's my say—it's your ball now, Coach."

Chapter IX. Final presidential decisions Measured Choices

There was a long silence. Then the President leaned forward placing his elbows on his desk and said, "Thank you, gentlemen. I have made my final judgment (58:A1).

Actually it is not a matter of decisions—but rather a matter of choices (77:56, 57)—measured choices (73:E1). It is this—a course of action to start at a minimum place (54:A-10) (118:A-6) with a blockade to get the missiles, bombers and submarines out of Carribea and, if necessary, to escalate upward first to air strikes and then to invasion.

"I shall observe certain legal and psychological aspects by taking the matter to the U.N. and the OAS and to the American people in broadcasts tomorrow—broadcasts announcing the blockade order and the ultimatum but not disclosing the potential escalating steps—broadcasts that I want sent to every possible person in the world through Telstar II, Skyfon and all the major TV and radio networks and the Voice of America, RIAS and all our facilities for overseas broadcast.

Blockade—Limited

"Now specifically, I have decided to order a sea and air blockade against all shipments of war materials (118:A-6) to Carribea. The definition and list of war materials will be spelled out by the Legal Task Force and the Military Task Force working together. But it shall specifically include oil (68:A-14). I have decided to cover the oil factor in this manner first rather than following the recommendation of air strikes (72:A-31) 'on petroleum facilities in Carribea because of the time and effort it would take to restore such facilities to Carribea's economy and daily life should they be destroyed. And it shall specifically exclude all items for food, shelter and health of the people of Carribea.

"The blockade shall start day after tomorrow—D-day—at 6 a.m. and continue until all missiles, bombers and submarines have been removed from Carribea (118:A-6)—both offensive and defensive because I don't want any loopholes given to the Russians.

"The blockade shall cover the range of longitude 67° W. to 75° W. and latitude 17° N. to 21° N. Pursuant to the previous recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the blockade shall be commanded by the Chief of Naval Operations."

Give Enemy Time To Think

"I want to avoid the mistake that has been made too often in past wars—the failure to give the enemy a face-saving manner in which to retreat and back down. In this case I want Khrushchev to be able to determine in his own mind that he can honorably back down (70:E1) and that he does not have to start war. I want to give him time to think. (2:16) (4:94)

"For that reason I want the first Russian ship approaching or entering the blockade zone to be permitted to pass through without challenge (73:E1). I think that will give the message to Khrushchev to pause—that we are still reasonable and that he still has the opportunity to back down gracefully and with face.

"However, if he doesn't back down after the first ship is permitted to pass through—then from that time on I want the challenges and inspections with each successive ship entering the blockade zone to be stepped up and become stronger. In other words, stop the second ship but make only a token inspection—then with the third ship make a more detailed inspection, and so on—thus showing Khrushchev we really mean business but that he can still get himself out of the situation peacefully."

Ultimatum To Remove Offensive Weapons

"The declaration of the blockade shall carry an ultimatum that unless dismantling and removal of the missiles and bombers—and removal of submarines and deactivation of submarine bases—starts within 48 hours after the declaration, we shall take military action to render ineffective such weapons and facilities. But we shall not disclose or tip our hands as to what that military action will be.

"I shall announce in the blockade declaration that in order for us to determine whether such dismantling and removal has started within the ultimatum period, that I am ordering continuous aerial reconnaissance and inspection of Carribea both by high flights by our U-2's and low-level flights at 200 feet (4:93) (53:A-12) (54:A-10) by our RF-101 Voodoos and F-8U Crusaders."

Second Option—Air Strikes

"If such dismantling and removal does not start within the 48-hour ultimatum period, then I have decided that the first offensive military action shall be three air strikes—one against the principal missile site, one against the principal group of bombers, and one against the principal submarine base—all to be made simultaneously at 7 a.m. on D-plus-two day at 1 hour after the expiration of the ultimatum."

Third Option—Invasion

"If these air strikes do not produce a favorable response within 24 hours, then the second offensive military action will be taken with a full-scale invasion of Carribea, including air strikes against all missile, bomber, and submarine sites. Major forces for the invasion operation shall be SAC and StrikCom (95:19) (96:11).

"Any further offensive military action will depend upon the response to the invasion. Should Russia strike our country, then we shall proceed with the first stage of Operation AA-1, which I have already authorized to the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon a contingency basis."

Take Case to United Nations

"At the close of this meeting, I want the Ambassador to the United Nations to make two requests to the U.N. The first request will be for me to address the General Assembly on an undisclosed matter of extreme urgency at 6 p.m. tomorrow night. The second request will be for an extraordinary meeting of the U.N. Security Council immediately following my address at which time our Ambassador to the U.N. will present our case (47:A-4) (97:A-1) (110:A-21) and call upon Russia to remove the missiles, bombers, and submarines from Carribea—and ask for adoption of a resolution calling for such action if Russia refuses."

Task Case to Organization of American States

"Also at the close of this meeting, I want our Ambassador to the 'Organization of American States to request an extraordinary session of the OAS in Washington for tomorrow night at 8 p.m.—giving me time to return from the U.N. in New York—at which time I shall make an address similar to my U.N. speech but in which I shall call upon the OAS to adopt a resolution which our Ambassador will present immediately following my address."

"That resolution shall propose condemnation of Russian interference in the Western Hemisphere and pledge Western Hemisphere solidarity in support of the decisions I will have announced in my U.N. and OAS addresses. It shall also request the other members of the OAS to provide military and economic support to the United States on the Carribea crisis. I shall propose in both my U.N. address and my OAS address that the OAS send inspection teams into Carribea to determine if missiles, bombers, and submarines have been removed following the ultimatum."

Take Case to American People

"Because I want to capture the eyes and ears (119:42) of the people and to enlist their support (119:43), at 10 p.m. I want to make a brief 10- to 15-minute TV and radio report to the American people explaining the urgent necessity of my action (12:35) stating that for the implementation of my decisions, as announced in my U.N. and

OAS speeches, I am declaring a national emergency and, under previously enacted congressional authority, am preparing for mobilization of all Ready Reservists and National Guardsmen. The greatest importance of this, for the time being, is to remove any lingering doubt in Khrushchev's mind about our credibility."

Psychological Moves

"And on this psychological score of credibility—again to get the message across to Khrushchev loud and clear that we mean business—even nuclear war, if necessary—I want two other steps to be taken. First, I want all families and civilians evacuated from the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba and Ramey Air Force Base and all of our military and naval facilities in Puerto Rico."

"Second, I want low level photo-reconnaissance flights (53:A12) to be made at noon sharp on D-day right over the main streets of Port au Prince and Santo Domingo—close enough for the people in the streets to see clearly the United States markings of our planes and even our cameras, if possible."

Diplomatic Notices

"Three hours preceding my U.N. address, I want our Ambassador to the NATO organization to inform that organization of the contents of my address—and simultaneously our Ambassadors to each nation with which we have a security pact. While this is an American decision made unilaterally, I want to touch all bases (101:A21) with our key allies as well as the U.N. and OAS (11:48). Russia and her satellite countries, including Carribea, shall not be notified by our Embassies until 1 hour before (103:9) the very beginning of my U.N. address."

Congressional Briefing

"Tomorrow at 3 p.m., I want to hold a meeting here with the Speaker of the House, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate and the House, the Senate and House chairmen and ranking minority members of the Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations Committees (81:54)—together with the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—to brief them on my decisions, and reasons therefor, prior to my U.N. address—and to request that they make preparations for a possible call of a special session to take appropriate legislative action—even declaration of war, if necessary."

NSC Meeting To Formalize Decisions

"Now I want the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and my Special Adviser for National Security Affairs to remain for a routine meeting of the National Security Council to formalize my decisions. Jack, get Emergency Planning Director Tom Kelly over here immediately—he's the only NSC member who is not a member of this Executive Committee and not here now."

Decision—A Collective Process

"That's it, gentlemen. Only God knows if we have decided right—yes, perhaps even more accurately, if we have guessed right—made the wise choices. I could not have asked more from you. Collectively you have really guided (53:A12) (54:A-10) (118:A-6) and formed my decisions even though only I could make the final decisions—and even though probably none of you agree completely with all facets of my decisions. I could not have had a better team."

Divine Decision

"And in closing this meeting, I ask that you bow your heads and join me in a prayer to Almighty God, who is really the one who will make the final decision in this matter: 'Almighty God, we pray that we may do your will—that our decisions are in reality your decisions—and that in these decisions

and our actions we will bring and preserve peace to everyone, regardless of nation, in this world. Amen."

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115. "United Nations: Guardian of Peace," Department of State Publication 7225, September 1961, pages 33-37, "Listening Post of the Human Race." In WCNF, volume II, chapter 17, pages 71-72.

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117. "United States Had Five Divisions Set to Invade Cuba," the *Washington Evening Star*, November 29, 1962, pages A-1 and A-5, Washington, D.C.

118. Voss, Earl H., "United States Has Little Hope of Soviet Policy Shift," the *Washington Evening Star*, December 18, 1962, pages A-1 and A-6, Washington, D.C.

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Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, in placing this study in the *RECORD*, I am not including the preface and the table of contents in the study. However, I do wish to mention that part of the preface which states:

In this connection, a disclaimer is made that, while there are marked similarities in this fictionalized study to contemporary events and persons, and while such contemporary factors are used for citation purposes in the text, no living person is depicted in this study.

TRANSSHIPMENT OF WHEAT BY POLAND AND YUGOSLAVIA TO OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, some weeks ago I received a letter in which the writer stated that he had information that wheat shipped to Poland in large tankers is transloaded to other ships in the Baltic and suggesting that this wheat which comes from the United

States under Public Law 480 goes behind the Iron Curtain. I have received similar reports about our Public Law 480 program in Yugoslavia.

I asked the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations to check this matter with the Department of State and I hold in my hand a letter to Mr. Marcy of the Foreign Relations Committee staff from Assistant Secretary of State Dutton. This letter is dated April 19 and I ask unanimous consent that it be inserted in the *RECORD* at this point.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the *RECORD*, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., April 19, 1963.

Mr. CARL MARCY,
Chief of Staff,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. MARCY: Thank you for your letter of April 11, 1963, requesting a report on the alleged transshipment of Public Law 480 wheat by Poland and Yugoslavia to other Communist countries.

The Department has received in recent months several inquiries about alleged transshipments by Poland and Yugoslavia of the Public Law 480 agricultural commodities they had received from the United States. On each of these occasions the Department made a separate check but no substantiating evidence was uncovered. Upon the receipt of your inquiry, the Department again checked all available sources of information, including intelligence sources, but again there were only negative reports. It should be noted in this regard that Poland and Yugoslavia failed to produce enough wheat last year to meet their domestic needs and were obliged to turn to foreign suppliers.

As you know, our Public Law 480 sales programs are carefully reviewed to assure that the commodities sold are well within the consumption requirements of the receiving country, will not displace normal commercial marketings of such commodities and will not result in the increased availability of those or like commodities for export to other countries. Under the terms of our Public Law 480 agreements, Poland and Yugoslavia agreed not to resell or transship to third countries Public Law 480 commodities unless specifically approved by the U.S. Government.

The Department, which maintains careful surveillance to insure compliance with the Public Law 480 agreements, would, of course, be seriously concerned about any violation of these agreements. The record shows, however, that Yugoslavia and Poland have always lived up to their Public Law 480 commitments.

If I can be of further assistance to you in this matter, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,
FREDERICK G. DUTTON,
Assistant Secretary.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I must say that the letter is a model of ambiguity. In short, it states that the Department has had a number of inquiries about alleged transshipments of Public Law 480 commodities but that no substantiating evidence was uncovered. The letter also states that there still continue to be only negative reports, when my specific inquiry was checked against all available sources of information.

After these statements the letter contains some disarming comments about the general nature of our sales to Poland and Yugoslavia and that Poland and