

**MORNING SESSION**

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:02 a.m., in the Caucus Room, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (Chairman, Committee on Armed Services), presiding.

**PRESENT:** Senators Russell (Chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Saltonstall, Johnson (Texas), Morse, Kefauver, Knowland, Cain, Stennis, Flanders, Long, George, Smith, Green, Lodge, Sparkman and Gillette.

**ALSO PRESENT:** Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge, of the staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate; and Pat M. Holt, assistant clerk, Committee on Foreign Relations.

**Senator Russell.** The Committee will be in order.

Just as the Committee recessed on yesterday, we had reached Senator Cain. He was given assurances that his position would be maintained on today. Senator Cain, you may proceed.

**TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GEORGE C. MARSHALL, ACCOMPANIED BY FELIX LARKIN, GENERAL COUNSEL**

**Senator Cain.** Thank you, sir.

**General Marshall,** good morning. If I did not believe that the free world through the United Nations has failed to keep its own promises and has failed to carry out its mission in Korea, because of these failures the free world is headed from my point of view for trouble of a far more serious character than confronts us at this perilous time, I would not bother, sir, to consume a minute of your time or ask you a question, but because I do believe deeply on this matter, I have a number of questions, but they have been so designed as to permit of the briefest kind of answer.

During the extended course of your testimony, General Marshall, you have not suggested how long the Korean war is likely to continue or what additional methods and means and strength may be employed to conclude that war.

It is because of this uncertainty that I seek information at the outset concerning the agencies of authority which consider the policies involved in the Korean war, but before beginning that inquiry, General Marshall, may I ask if you have had the *Washington Post* of this morning called to your attention?

**Secretary Marshall.** I read a copy myself.

**Senator Cain.** It is against that paper, sir, that I would like to ask you several questions. You testified yesterday that the message of the President of January 13 was sent to General MacArthur in order to give the political factors involved in a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Security Council of January 12.

Is it not a fact, sir, that the January 12 communication was dispatched by mail so that it cannot have been in General MacArthur's hands when he received the President's telegram of January 13?

**Secretary Marshall.** The directive I referred to was of January the 11th. January 12 was not a directive. It was a proposal to the National Security Council and it was shown to General MacArthur by General Collins in addition to being mailed out.

**Senator Cain.** Do you know, General Marshall, the contents of the message which General MacArthur sent and to which the President's message of January 13 was a reply?

I have been advised that the message of January 13 was in response to a request for advice from General MacArthur, and if that is a fact, it has not thus far been mentioned in these hearings.

**Secretary Marshall.** In several of General MacArthur's communications, once the Chinese Communist forces had developed in Korea, he stated that this had changed the character of the war and it required a consideration of a change of policy on the highest governmental level.

The message you refer to from the President to General MacArthur developed from the fact that a directive was prepared by the Chiefs of Staff, and the question was whether that should include in it other than purely military terms. It was decided that it was better to send the directive on a purely military basis and then have the President himself send the message of January 13.

**Senator Cain.** If I have understood you, then, sir, correctly, you have stated it to be a fact that the January 13 message of the President to General MacArthur was a direct reply to a specific inquiry from General MacArthur asking for instructions because his previous instructions were not clear. And did not then General MacArthur ask specifically whether he was to evacuate immediately or to attempt to stay on in Korea for a limited time or to hold out indefinitely? That is my understanding of the chronological facts in the question, General Marshall.

**Secretary Marshall.** As I stated before, there were numerous references by General MacArthur to the decisions of this Government once the Chinese Communist military effort had developed in Korea. Various messages in reply were sent as to the status of affairs and as to the governmental considerations, notably in the effort to obtain an action by the United Nations to declare the Chinese aggressors in Korea.

Now, this message of January 13 to General MacArthur was in an endeavor to make clear to him the position in which we stood from the President, because the message in the form of a military directive had been sent him on the 11th at a very critical time in the progress of military events in Korea.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, do you know it to be so that General MacArthur, before receiving the communication from the President of January 13, had stated that in his opinion he could hold on in Korea for any length of time up to the complete destruction of his own forces, if political considerations or political factors dictated such a course?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think that is included in one of his replies.

**Senator Cain.** I think you have told us that General MacArthur stated in previous messages that the decisions required involved questions of a highest national and international importance, above and beyond that which could be made by a theater commander on his own responsibility?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct, sir.

**Senator Cain.** Do you not know it to be so, sir—at least I was so advised from a news dispatch of yesterday coming out of New York, which quoted General Whitney as saying—that General Collins and General Vandenberg, two members of the JCS, were present with General MacArthur and his senior staff officers when the January 13 message arrived from the President?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think it will be better, Senator, to ask them directly:

**Senator Cain.** Thank you, sir.

Have you been advised that during that meeting, which

was attended by General MacArthur, General Collins and General Vandenberg and others that General Vandenberg or General Collins said he thought it, the message, meant evacuation after a limited period in which it would appear that our troops were being forced out of Korea by military pressure?

**Secretary Marshall.** I do not recall at the moment the exact account that General Collins gave us of his interview, but he can testify to that.

**Senator Cain.** I thank you, sir.

Do you know whether or not it is so that General MacArthur interpreted the January 13 message clearly to mean that there would be and should be no evacuation, and that General Vandenberg expressed himself as inclined to agree with General MacArthur's interpretation of the message?

**Secretary Marshall.** The message distinctly said it was not a directive.

**Senator Cain.** I hope you will not misunderstand this question. Why were not the messages from General MacArthur to which the President was replying on January 13, made available to this Committee yesterday so that the whole of the matter concerning the circumstances of the President's reply might have been made available to this Committee and the nation at the same time?

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't quite get the point, Senator.

**Senator Cain.** The point I seek to establish, sir, is that from my point of view—and I stand to be corrected—the message of the 13th of January was not sent on the President's initiative; it was sent primarily in response to one or more messages seeking advice from General MacArthur in the field.

**Secretary Marshall.** I couldn't answer that specifically yes or no. As I have repeated, there were a number of questions from General MacArthur along this general line. There were messages from the Chiefs of Staff which involved military factors and called to his notice political factors.

In this particular case—and the Chiefs of Staff can testify to you directly themselves—in drawing up their directive to him the question was whether or not any mention or whether or not they should inject into that both the military and the political, and it was decided it would be far better to make a complete separation, and that was the genesis of the President's message, to the best of my understanding.

**Senator Cain.** I thank you, sir.

Would you tell us as precisely as you can, General Marshall, how the January 13 message of the President contradicts or modifies or clarifies the January 12 recommendations of the JCS?

**Secretary Marshall.** They were two quite different things. One was a series of possible actions in a great dilemma to be considered by the National Security Council because of their involvement.

The message by the President, as I think he states in there in so many words, was to bring General MacArthur into complete understanding of the attitude of this Government as expressed by the President himself.

**Senator Cain.** I think I have understood you to say that the January 13 message was sent to General MacArthur for a number of reasons, one of which was to throw some light on the January 11 directive, to which you made reference yesterday; is that correct?

**Secretary Marshall.** The expression "throw some light" I don't think is quite accurate to the point in this case. It was to avoid complicating the directive of January 11 with political factors and to have them go to General MacArthur as a distinct statement.

**Senator Cain.** May I ask, sir, why did the January 13 message of the President state precisely in the language

of the President "The President's program is not to be taken in any sense as a directive"—when it had a relationship to a directive of two days before? Why was one a directive and the other merely an expression of opinion?

**Secretary Marshall.** In other words, I am quite certain the Chiefs of Staff can, I think, give you a very direct answer on this, although probably it is in the State Department bailiwick.

In order to avoid any confusion in regard to the directive they sent him—I might state for myself, that I found it desirable never to write a letter to a commander in the field—I had learned that early in the war, because it either watered down, or gave some other possibility of interpretation to the directive. I expect that is the reason that I was not involved in that particular drafting.

**Senator Cain.** I thank you, sir.

General Marshall, you referred in your previous testimony to two voices in our Government, in a matter of American policy. Your reference was obviously made to the voice of the State Department, or our Administration as a whole, or General MacArthur; but at this time I wish to ask you this question:

Do you take the view that the Congress of the United States, a co-ordinate branch of the Government, should have no part in the making of American policy in the world?

**Secretary Marshall.** No, sir. I would not put it that way; but the President has a constitutional power in stating our foreign policy, and I am talking about stating it, not discussing it.

**Senator Cain.** Is it not true, sir, that under the Constitution, the power to declare war and the power to make peace is a function of the Congress, and that our Constitution, therefore, calls for two voices in the making of American policy and the taking of American action?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think there you have a difference, that you get into, pretty legalistic for me, between a statement to the world on a policy, and an action, legalistically, under our Constitution, by both the Congress and the President.

**Senator Cain.** I am seriously interested in your view, sir.

My next question is: Since the Constitution states that Congress shall have the power, and I quote "to make rules for the Government, and regulations of the land and naval forces," do you wish your testimony of recent days to stand, that no commander of high rank should furnish to a member of Congress, and particularly to a minority leader of the House of Representatives, information that may be sought from that commander?

**Secretary Marshall.** I would have to qualify that to the extent of saying that you had a very special situation here, in which the views of the supreme commander in the field were in direct contrast to that of the Administration, and had, in various ways, been given public notice, to our embarrassment in our relations with our allies and in the development of fears among those allies.

Now, I think the answer has to be directly related to that statement.

I had to answer that at considerable length yesterday, in relation to an article, or an answer by General Collins, the Chief of Staff, to the Foreign Relations or the Foreign Affairs Committee.

I took the view there, and I think it is a correct one, that when we were involved in the special position of a man, and particularly in regard to military operations, there it is not at all the procedure that would be followed by a member of the War Department, a member of the Defense Department coming before committees of Congress, and also statements before committees of Congress,

after the event.

Here was a world position of the Supreme Commander of United Nation forces and here was the President of the United States as the executive agent for those United Nation forces, and the declarations one way or the other by that Supreme Commander have to be very intimately related to that.

As I recall—the letters will show—Mr. Martin asked whether this should be treated confidential or not, and there was no reference to that in General MacArthur's reply.

**Senator Cain.** Certainly both of us are in agreement that the question itself is very troublesome, and the question has given rise to most of the inquiry in which all of us are and have been engaged for some time.

May I suggest, General Marshall, that if you consider that you have previously answered adequately to your satisfaction any question I may ask you this morning, if you would merely say so, that will be quite sufficient for me.

**Secretary Marshall.** Thank you.

**Senator Cain.** Because then I can retrace my steps and get the substance of your answer.

This is a question which appears to be pressing, but I just want your own view of it. Did you, General Marshall, withhold from this joint Committee any information or comment because it might seem to reflect upon the Democrat Administration in power which you have called the constituted authority?

Isn't that the plain implication of your statements here that Army officers and members of the military service in command positions must not give any information which could be the basis of criticism of our differences as to the manner in which the armed forces of the United States were being employed?

**Secretary Marshall.** That was not my intention whatever and I don't think I can recall anything that I have withheld along that line.

I am having particular reference in all of this to leadership in the field of the going operation and a developing situation.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, if you will help me now, sir, understand the nature and position of those authoritative sources that have the management of the Korean war in their hands, I will appreciate it.

You testified on Page 804 of the hearing several days ago that proposals pertaining to directives which are issued from week to week or sometimes from day to day are forwarded from the JCS to yourself as the Secretary of Defense, and by yourself to the President. Is my understanding correct, sir?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct, to a limited extent because in certain cases it goes direct to the National Security Council.

**Senator Cain.** I wanted to ask you about that in a minute, but I wanted to know more than I presently know of the nature of the directives that by-pass the National Security Council.

**Secretary Marshall.** They are of a nature that do not develop changes of policy and matters of great serious moment. The President requires that he see all the instructions from the executive agent of the Chiefs of Staff, who is General Collins, before they go to General MacArthur, or General Ridgway. And for convenience I would either take those to the President but as a rule General Bradley does in connection with his morning appointment.

Now if it is a very important thing and yet not one that seems to be a general policy consideration in a large way, I would take that personally to the President myself. But that has been seldom the case.

But when a measure or proposal such as that of January 12 came up, that went directly to the National Security Council as a matter of course.

**Senator Cain.** Because it involved high—

**Secretary Marshall.** Very major decisions.

**Senator Cain.** —and fundamental national policy.

**Secretary Marshall.** Exactly.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, you testified on page 804 of the hearings that basic directives flow from the JCS to the Defense Secretary to the National Security Council to the President; is that correct, sir?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir, and that is a statutory requirement.

**Senator Cain.** You have stated that the National Security Council is composed of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board; is that correct?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct.

**Senator Cain.** Will you briefly outline the functions of the National Security Council?

**Secretary Marshall.** Pardon my delay in answering this.

**Senator Cain.** Certainly, sir. These questions are not only of interest to me, but several of my colleagues have said since the hearings began that they had never heretofore understood the importance of the National Security Council, and I think the nation ought to understand its relationship to other activities.

**Secretary Marshall.** In the first place, it is a statutory organization and the law reads:

"There is hereby established a council to be known as the National Security Council, hereinafter in this section referred to as the Council. The President of the United States shall preside over the meetings of the Council, provided that in his absence he may designate a member of the Council to preside in his place.

"The functions of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to co-operate more effectively in matters involving the national security. The Council shall be composed of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board; and the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments and of the military departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board when appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at his pleasure.

"In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct for the purpose of more effectively co-ordinating the policies and functions of the departments and the agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council:

"1. To assess and appraise the objectives, commitments and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power in the interest of national security for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and

"(2) To consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in con-

nection therewith.

"(c) The Council shall have a staff to be headed by a civilian executive secretary who shall be appointed by a President, and who shall receive compensation at the rate of \$10,000 a year. The executive secretary, subject to the direction of the Council, is hereby authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Council in connection with the performance of its functions.

"(d) The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require."

**Senator Cain.** I thank you, sir.

General Marshall, do we then rightly conclude from what you have just read that the National Security Council is with respect to national and global security matters in which this country has a definite interest, and the war in Korea, by all odds the most important policy-making body in the United States?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is right, sir.

**Senator Cain.** It, therefore, goes without question that its members ought to be individuals possessed of high capacity and of names which call forth confidence to the extent possible from the American people.

Mr. Secretary, what is your relationship and acquaintance with Mr. Robert J. Smith?

**Secretary Marshall.** I may know him, but I don't recall.

**Senator Cain.** He is the Vice Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, sir.

What is your acquaintance and relationship with Mr. Jack O. Gorrie?

**Senator Lodge.** What is that name?

**Senator Cain.** Jack O. Gorrie.

**Secretary Marshall.** I may know him, but I don't recall the name.

**Senator Cain.** He is, sir, the executive assistant of the National Security Resources Board.

General Marshall, will the acting head of the National Security Resources Board, for Mr. Symington, its secretary, resigned some weeks ago, attend meetings of the National Security Council—will the acting head?

**Secretary Marshall.** I presume so, sir.

**Senator Cain.** Will you state, sir, how often the National Security Council meets, and are minutes taken of those meetings?

**Secretary Marshall.** Usually it meets Wednesday afternoons. At one time it was meeting twice a week.

**Senator Cain.** Senator Marshall, are you quite familiar with the basic functions of the National Security Resources Board?

**Secretary Marshall.** I have read the directive and I have attended some of the meetings.

**Senator Cain.** I thank you, sir.

Has the opinion of the National Security Board been requested by the President of the United States concerning the selection of a new Chairman for the National Security Resources Board?

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't know, sir.

**Senator Cain.** Has the question of who ought to replace Mr. Symington as the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board—for that replacement will become automatically a member of the National Security Council—been discussed by the National Security Council since the resignation of Mr. Symington?

**Secretary Marshall.** I recall no such discussion.

**Senator Cain.** May I ask if the dismissal of General

Douglas MacArthur was discussed by the National Security Council?

**Secretary Marshall.** It was not.

**Senator Cain.** May I ask, General—for I think this question is very important—why it was not, when I bear in mind what you have just read to this Committee, a part of which charges the National Security Council with advising the President of the United States with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to co-operate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

It is my interpretation of the statute—and I seek not to go backwards and to get any change in the decision to remove General MacArthur—that there was every reason to believe that the National Security Council was required to consider the question of General MacArthur's removal in the interests of national security. I may be wrong.

**Secretary Marshall.** I think that is a matter of opinion, sir. I do not think so.

**Senator Cain.** I have understood you, General Marshall, to testify that the Secretary of the Army was directed to notify General MacArthur in Tokyo that General MacArthur was to be removed.

I have understood you to say that the Secretary of the Army did not fulfill this mission because of a breakdown in communications.

I have understood you to say that the Secretary of the Army was not informed before he left the United States for the Far East that General MacArthur was to be relieved.

Is my understanding correct, sir?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct sir, except that the matter of his making the delivery to General MacArthur was prevented not only by a breakdown of power, but by a later decision of the President to proceed immediately with the relief.

**Senator Cain.** I thank you, sir.

Would you give us in just a sentence or two the primary functions of the Secretary of the Army? Well, perhaps that isn't necessary. I seek to save the General as much as I possibly can of his time. Let me ask my next question.

**Senator Russell.** I have here another copy of the National Security Act of 1947.

**Senator Cain.** I know, General Marshall, that the Secretary of the Army is responsible for the discipline and morale of the Army of the United States.

Would you tell me how a decision would be reached to relieve General MacArthur without consultation by the JCS and others in high authority with the Secretary of the Army?

**Secretary Marshall.** In the first place, the Secretary of the Army was not here, and in the next place, as I endeavored to explain yesterday, General MacArthur was not serving under the Secretary of the Army; he was serving not only as a commander of the United States air, naval, and Army forces in Korea, but also as the Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea.

Therefore, it would not, in my opinion, be the function of the Secretary of the Army to enter into the matter of his relief or retention on duty.

**Senator Cain.** I may appear, General Marshall, to be even more curious than some of my colleagues, but I am endeavoring to anticipate the requirements of the future, and I want to know before I get through, with your help, if I can, by exactly what means our Supreme Commander in the Far East was removed, so I will know whom to question should there be a recurrence in some other



General Marshall, were the views of either the civilian Secretary of the Navy or the civilian Secretary of the Air Force requested in connection with the dismissal of General MacArthur?

**Secretary Marshall.** Not to my knowledge.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, I am advised that the Secretary of the Army is a member of the Armed Forces Policy Council, which advises the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces.

Was the question of General MacArthur's dismissal referred to that Policy Board?

**Secretary Marshall.** It was not.

**Senator Cain.** I thank you, sir.

I have gathered then from your answers—and I want to be very certain if I am right—that no civilian within the Department of Defense or the Department of the Army was consulted or had any influence in the dismissal of General MacArthur, is that correct, sir?

**Secretary Marshall.** I am supposed to be the civilian Secretary of Defense. Out of my past I was a soldier. My answer would be that I am the supposed civilian representative of the Department of Defense. I recall your action in connection with clearing the way for my nomination as to the importance of having a civilian as Secretary of Defense.

**Senator Cain.** It is not my intention or desire to embarrass you, General Marshall. I have and have had a very real respect for your military knowledge. I address you as General because old soldiers never die and you are and will remain, for as long as you live, sir, a five-star general.

I just want our people to know—and it is without any criticism of you whatsoever—that we created through the National Security Act of 1947 a Defense Establishment which was designed to have at its head as the Secretary of Defense a civilian. It was designed to have at the head of each one of the three services a civilian.

Under the circumstances which pertain, though the Chief of Staff of each of the services is in himself subordinate to the civilian head of each of those three services, none of the civilians were conferred or consulted with or had any part to play in a great question which involved basically the national security of our country. I think it is a bad procedure, sir.

General Marshall, will you please relate any conversations you had with Admiral Sherman, with General Vandenberg, with General Collins either individually or collectively covering, (a) the question of replacing General MacArthur in his several commands, and (b) the method to be followed in replacing the General.

**Secretary Marshall.** I had no personal discussions with any one of the three officials that you have mentioned in the matter. General Bradley carried the questions to the Chiefs of Staff and came back with the information desired which was largely one of procedure so far as military-command relationships were concerned, not the political aspects, not the public aspects.

After the Chiefs of Staff had had a meeting on Sunday afternoon, the 9th, I believe, of several hours, they came to my office with General Bradley and they each stated respectively their views, and the common view of the three.

I, as I recall, did not discuss the matter with them. I heard what they had to say. General Bradley—there must have been some discussion. I don't crystallize it in my mind now because it lasted from 4 o'clock until 6, but I think it related to procedure which would be followed in the event of General MacArthur's relief in order to protect the interests of the Army. That is my recollection.

During that conversation no Chief of Staff of any of the three services reflected in your presence on the method, the wisdom or lack of wisdom in peremptorily relieving General MacArthur of his command?

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't recall any such, other than I think entirely the discussion on Mr. Pace.

**Senator Cain.** As to how Mr. Pace was to be employed in this question?

**Secretary Marshall.** If and how.

**Senator Cain.** By indirective I have served under your command across the seas, so you know that I seek not to embarrass you at any time, but the reason I have asked some of these questions is that it would not have been possible for a conversation of that character to have taken place if those three civilian Secretaries had been present at such a meeting, because in being civilians they would not be content with a staff officer's rapid evaluation of the situation.

Those civilian Secretaries would have asked pressing questions concerning aren't there other alternative courses which we might follow.

It is a great pity if not tragedy in my view that such a procedure was not followed.

General Marshall, you have repeatedly stated that General MacArthur was relieved of all of his commands on receipt of orders because of your desire to free General Ridgway, General MacArthur's successor, of any embarrassment. I am unable to—

**Secretary Marshall.** Embarrassment or complications?

**Senator Cain.** I am unable to understand what you have meant.

May I ask if General Ridgway was not sent to Korea at the direct request of General MacArthur?

**Secretary Marshall.** I was not in the Department at the moment that that decision was taken; but my understanding is that General MacArthur either made the request, or specifically confirmed it, but that can be looked up and the information furnished.

**Senator Cain.** General MacArthur testified that General Ridgway did come to Korea at his direct request.

I have understood, and I can easily understand this, that it was the view or the wish—casual, probably—of the Defense Department to send a general other than General Ridgway to Korea, but that the Defense Department immediately concurred in General MacArthur's personal request that General Ridgway come to him.

I think there is some small measure of importance in that question of mine, and in your answer.

I want, in my own right, now, to take just one or two seconds to have the record show again that General MacArthur has publicly said to this Committee, and the country, that he and General Ridgway had a mutual and high respect for each other. General MacArthur testified:

"General Ridgway was my selection and recommendation as the commander of the Eighth Army after the unfortunate death of that very magnificent soldier, General Walker.

"I have known General Ridgway for 30 years. I don't think you could have a more admirable selection in the Far East than General Ridgway. I hold him in the highest esteem, not only as a soldier but as a cultured gentleman and one of the most magnificent characters I have ever been acquainted with."

I asked General MacArthur a question as to whether or not from the moment General Ridgway went to Korea, he was not under General MacArthur's direct command, and the General's answer is this:

"That is absolutely correct, and I don't know how there could have been any more complete co-opera-

tion, devotion and loyalty than between General Ridgway and myself."

General, given this information, may I ask you again how did you and your associates conclude that it would embarrass General Ridgway if General MacArthur was given time in which to personally turn over his several commands to General Ridgway?

**Secretary Marshall.** I have already stated my views to that. Do you wish me to state them again?

**Senator Cain.** No, sir. If you think you have stated them adequately, that is sufficient for me.

**Secretary Marshall.** I think I have, sir.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, I have stressed this point because I am not going to be a party to a movement which is afoot in this country to discredit General MacArthur by an implication that bad blood existed between General MacArthur and General Ridgway, and that General Ridgway was sent to Korea in anticipation of the removal of General Douglas MacArthur; and your observations have helped in clearing away any possible uncertainty that exists on that question.

**Secretary Marshall.** I will go further than that to say that any such idea is extraordinarily incorrect.

**Senator Cain.** I think that statement is very good for our country, and I personally and officially appreciate it.

**General Marshall.** you have stated many times, sir, that it was not advisable to order General MacArthur back to this country for discussions with the JCS, with yourself, and perhaps with the National Security Council and the President, which might easily have resolved or found an adequate answer for the differences between General MacArthur and those in higher authority in this country, because of the critical situation in Korea. I do not understand, sir, your stated reasons when I consider that General Ridgway took command of the Eighth Army last December.

Would you tell us, please, why the situation would have become more critical. If General MacArthur had been brought home for consultation? I call your attention to the fact that General MacArthur was relieved of his commands in the face of what the President announced to the country was a pending offensive by the enemy.

**Secretary Marshall.** I do not, I think, imply that the situation would have been made the more critical by General MacArthur's return to Washington, but that his return to Washington seemed inadvisable in view of the critical situation. I have gone into this before, but I will do it again, Senator.

General MacArthur theretofore at various times—I will refer to some of the dates here if you wish me to—has indicated a reluctance to come to this country in connection with various factors relating to the Far Eastern question, and at this time, as you say, a pending offense, an advance of his troops, was just about to take place. And when the President consulted me and then instructed me regarding his having an opportunity to discuss with General MacArthur the various factors, and with others at the same time the President would take with him, and with the Ambassador of ours to Korea, he stated that he desired General MacArthur to meet him in Hawaii, and that he, the President, would go that far, and that would not take General MacArthur away from Tokyo for an undue length of time at such a critical period. And I suggested to the President that in view of the circumstances, it seemed to me that if the President was willing to go to Wake Island, he should give General MacArthur the chance to decide for himself what to do; and I put the question up to General MacArthur—Hawaii or the President's willingness to go as far as Wake Island—and General MacArthur replied, "Wake Island."

There was an example, at least, of my own feeling as

to the critical importance of his being on the ground at that time.

Now, as to his relation to the offensive procedure that was going on in Korea at the time of his relief, his relief brought about another commander, so that there was no question about who was in control of the situation, and that commander came directly out of Korea; that is directly out of Korea, and intimately familiar with every stage of the military fight in that region. In fact, he was largely the director of it, and I would state that if it had been found necessary to succeed General MacArthur with somebody other than General Ridgway, I don't know exactly how I would have appraised that situation, but it would have been quite different, because of the fact that an entirely new man was being put into the position; whereas the great issue was the battle, and General Ridgway was intimately familiar with every phase of it.

**Senator Cain.** May I ask how much prior warning General Van Fleet had that he was going to take over command of the Eighth Army in the face of an offensive which, presumably, was even beginning to move as of the time General Van Fleet was brought into Korea?

**Secretary Marshall.** General Van Fleet had been on 12-hours alert for some time—I think a matter of one or two months, because they felt that General Ridgway was taking some risks in the way he was moving about in his theater, and flying up to the advance posts there, and in the light of what had happened to General Walker, that we must have another man immediately available in case General Ridgway met with some accident or became a casualty.

Actually, Van Fleet was in Florida at the time, and his interpretation was that he could fly back by air in three or four hours, so that he was in the status of an alert, and he was immediately ordered back to Washington to get under way to go to Japan. I have forgotten whether his instructions were sent Monday or in advance of the decision. I don't think it was; I think it was sent after the decision Monday morning.

**Senator Cain.** You certainly know the attitude of mind of General Ridgway.

**Secretary Marshall.** I did not quite understand, Senator.

**Senator Cain.** I say you certainly know the attitude of mind of your great commander, General Ridgway, who can cover more ground more rapidly and more effectively than any person I have ever previously known.

My own view is that one of his handicaps as Supreme Commander in the Far East, is that he has occupational and administrative duties in Japan, which will keep him from doing what he would most like to do, which would be to lead his troops into action.

**Secretary Marshall.** I might add that we gave him the freedom to make his own decision as to when he transferred the actual command to the army; that is, if he wished to make Van Fleet his deputy during a period of this fight, so that he could go to Tokyo and come back, and be in a clear status of the army commander, or transfer the command immediately. He chose to transfer the command immediately.

**Senator Cain.** Well, you had, sir, no other course to pursue, did you? I mean, with the removal of General MacArthur and with imposing two different commands on his successor, General Ridgway, you had to leave it up to the discretion of General Ridgway as to where he could be of the greatest amount of service to his responsibility, and at the time he took command of not only the commander—not only the continued command of or was then in command of the Eighth Army, but was going to be Supreme Commander in the Far East.

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct, sir.

**Senator Cain.** One fact seems to remain before me. General Ridgway had imposed upon him new responsibilities at the very moment when he was straining every effort to defeat the offensive of the enemy.

General Marshall, so far as I know, General MacArthur has probably turned more swords into useful ploughshares than any military figure in history.

All of us recognize General MacArthur to be an outstanding world military leader, and one of the great Americans of all time.

We likewise know that leadership is the crying need of the world at this time.

Against this background this question: Did you, sir, or others in your presence, appreciate and understand that the methods you and others had in mind for removing General MacArthur would destroy his usefulness as a national leader within the Administration in this continuing day of crisis? Was that one of the considerations before you and other serious-minded people?

**Secretary Marshall.** The serious considerations that were discussed within my recollection related to the immediate reactions that would flow from his relief, and which I think we had a correct estimate of, and very particularly the reactions of his army, which was the most important reaction of all to be considered. Beyond that, I do not think the discussion went.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, one last question about the MacArthur question, please: Was either the Chairman of the Senate or the House Armed Services Committee consulted regarding the MacArthur removal?

**Secretary Marshall.** I cannot answer that. As I said before, I got the impression, if not the statement, of the President, that he had seen several—I think he mentioned four—important leaders, and discussed that with them on Sunday, the 9th. Who they were I do not know, except one case, and I would not state that.

**Senator Cain.** Well, may I ask you this—

**Senator Russell.** Senator Cain, will you pardon me just a moment?

**Senator Cain.** Certainly, sir.

**Senator Russell.** I should like to state in this connection that I had no knowledge whatever that this matter was even under consideration. Since you involved me in that question, I state further that I happened to be out of the city at the time, and knew nothing about it until the final order came to me that action was taken.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, on the basis of your testimony we know that the JCS discussed the General MacArthur question. We know that the President did; we know that the Secretary of State did; we know that Mr. Harriman did; we know that you did. So far as we know, no one else was consulted.

I think it very important for us to determine, if we can, the names and portfolios of every single American who had anything to do with this question.

My question to you is to whom might we turn for information regarding those members or those citizens in or out of the Congress whose views were requested or who were consulted about the removal of our Far Eastern Commander?

**Secretary Marshall.** Certainly not the Secretary of Defense, because I don't know, in the first place, and it isn't my role, in the second, to describe just what the President does. I should think the President himself was the individual concerned.

**Senator Cain.** I thank you, sir.

General Marshall, I should like very briefly to refer to the relationship between Western Europe and the Far East. Is it not generally agreed that the primary desire

and aim of Russia is to secure control of Western Europe?

**Secretary Marshall.** I would assume so.

**Senator Cain.** Is it not generally agreed that the defense establishment of our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty is several years away to be prepared to effectively resist any large-scale aggression in Western Europe?

**Secretary Marshall.** I will not—I do not wish to answer the question as to several years away, Senator; but—

**Senator Cain.** They are not immediately prepared?

**Secretary Marshall.** They are not immediately prepared.

**Senator Cain.** I thank you, sir.

General Marshall, are the United States and our allies in Western Europe not proceeding on the assumption that an aggression is not likely to take place in Western Europe until the allies have created an adequate defense establishment?

**Secretary Marshall.** To that I would say certainly, so far as the officials involved in this matter in this Government are concerned, our present conception is that we can never tell at what moment the reaction from Russia might come.

You have to evaluate or guess the Russian appreciation of our power atomically, how much of a deterrent that is, and other factors within Russia itself with which we are not sufficiently familiar.

**Senator Cain.** Is there any reason to believe, on the basis of your intelligence reports, that an aggressor is presently threatening to invade Western Europe?

**Secretary Marshall.** The impression from the reports that we gather from many sources is there has been a continuous build-up and not necessarily in strength, though it may be, but particularly in arrangements, specifically in the satellite states, and in regard to dispositions of Soviet troops in Western Europe, and as to Soviet increases in strength, as we understand them, in the Far East.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, is it not generally agreed that America and her Western European allies would become immediately involved in war if an aggressor occupied Berlin or any part of Western Europe by force?

**Secretary Marshall.** I would assume so.

**Senator Cain.** I seem to recall, General Marshall, that Russia publicly protested against our sending American divisions to join the North Atlantic Treaty International Army. Did the Russians not state that this act by us increased the possibility of war in Europe?

**Secretary Marshall.** I do not recall the exact wording of the statement, but I think that was the general effect.

**Senator Cain.** My memory seems to tell me that Russia protested the establishment of our air lift to Berlin.

**Secretary Marshall.** Very specifically.

**Senator Cain.** Has Russia, General Marshall, to your knowledge ever protested against our considering the need for bombing military installations which are being employed by our present enemy, Red China, in Manchuria or China?

**Secretary Marshall.** I do not recall that specific allegation or statement in regard to that, but I think there has been a great deal that has come out through Pravda and others as to American aggression, imperialistic effort.

**Senator Cain.** But as the Secretary of Defense you know of no official protest that Russia has lodged either with our Government or with the United Nations?

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't recall such.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, you have gone over this ground quite a number of times. If you care to recapitulate in just a sentence or two, I would appreciate it.

What are your fundamental reasons for assuming that an aggression will not take place in Western Europe until we are better prepared to meet it, while seemingly you believe that Russia will enter the Korean conflict if we bomb and destroy military installations possessed by the Red Chinese?

I ask this question in part because it has seemed apparent to me for some time that Russia could presently, today, defeat any forces which might be opposed to her in Western Europe.

**Secretary Marshall.** In regard to Western Europe, first I go on the basis myself that Russia may step into the aggression at any moment. Also that that is no argument that we do not do our best to prepare for it even though it may take two or three years.

In other words, we don't sit impotent and say Russia can act at any time and therefore we do nothing. That is the sense of the European situation, and those arguments came up in connection with the rearmament proposals.

They came to me in some cases direct because I was called in to testify, though I was not then in the Government in respect to specific office.

I felt that we could never follow any such course as that, to just say we can do nothing because they can intervene, and again you had other involvements, other possibilities to consider which I have already referred to.

Now I will try to be brief again in regard to the difference I think in the situation in the Far East, and it is this in the main: that Russia possesses a very valuable ally in China. That you might say is a Russian protectorate in a sense but one who is paying a great bill of human lives and other things in order to fulfill that role.

Now in view of their treaty with the Chinese Communist regime or Government, if it appears that they have failed to support that Government in its fight in Korea, we have a very special situation because it affects every other satellite of the Soviet Government.

They get their example from that, and to use the common expression in this country, that they have been sold down the river after a great sacrifice of life, so it has seemed to me and my associates and advisers that we are confronted by a Soviet Government in a very difficult position itself as to what it does in relation to the failure up to the present time of the Chinese Communist forces to drive us out of Korea.

**Senator Cain.** I thought, sir, the other day you testified with reference to the treaty that you did not know very much about it?

**Secretary Marshall.** I read into the record the two pertinent sections.

**Senator Cain.** My interpretation of that treaty was that it ran between Russia and China and was directed at a militaristic Japan in the future, or an imperialistic Japan in the future.

**Secretary Marshall.** It ran directly to what?

**Senator Cain.** To the Japanese question and not even by implication, as I read it, to the Korean question.

**Secretary Marshall.** It uses the expression "or any other nation or people."

**Senator Cain.** Allies, yes, sir, assisting Japan.

**Secretary Marshall.** Assisting Japan.

Now, if you recall they alleged several times that we had introduced Japanese into Korea.

**Senator Cain.** I do so recall.

**Secretary Marshall.** And we felt that that was for the very purpose—

**Senator Cain.** Of setting the stage?

**Secretary Marshall.** —setting the stage for the very actions we have been concerned about.

Now here are the exact—it uses the word "rebirth of Japanese imperialism"; that is in it. But "violation of the peace," and they say we have violated the peace, that it was not aggression or invasion of Korea. But we are all familiar with that business.

But it has a very pertinent relation to the possible Soviet interpretation of this treaty, certainly the instructions to their own people.

(Reading) "The violation of the peace on the part of Japan or any other State which should unite with Japan directly or indirectly in acts of aggression."

That gives them a very wide latitude in view of some of their perversions of the facts in the past.

**Senator Cain.** Yes, sir. You do not then put very much credence in the belief held by some that Russia might be very strongly inclined to let China and the United States wage war against each other to the further weakening of both powers, and by that means leaving Russia in a far stronger position even than she is today.

**Secretary Marshall.** I would qualify that as to the weakening of China, but I would say that the Soviet Government would be perfectly ruthless in its relationship to China in this matter if the Chinese could continue to embroil us in a general action out there which would weaken our general position.

**Senator Cain.** Thank you, sir.

As a result of your testimony on Thursday I read a large headline in the *Washington Daily News*, which went like this—"U. S. not strong enough to risk war—Marshall." Does that reasonably well represent your view, Mr. Secretary?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, we certainly do not wish to risk war at any stage, and now in particular when we haven't yet developed our strength.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, are we and our allies not stronger today than we were last June when the Korean conflict began?

**Secretary Marshall.** Certainly we are materially stronger, because in the period of six months we doubled the strength of personnel in the Army alone in that time, and that is a very rapid development. But we haven't had an opportunity for this all to crystallize into the means to be employed, nor have we been able to obtain the materiel which is an essential part of our defense.

Now, as to allies, they have moved at a very slow pace until our reaction to the Korean affair, and that stimulated and accelerated, brought to a head in an effective manner the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

**Senator Cain.** I understand, sir, that since V-J Day we have spent roughly a hundred billion dollars for our own defense and that of our allies. I do not know how much money or what amount of materiel and arms we have provided our North Atlantic allies with since the Korean war began. It must, however, be a very large figure and amount of supplies.

Do you know to what extent our assistance in Western Europe in the last 10 or 11 months has added to the state of defense preparation of our allies in Western Europe?

**Secretary Marshall.** I would have to get you the data. I remember the last paper I looked at about a month ago showed that about 50 per cent of the product of the first appropriation in the rearmament had been shipped in goods to Europe. The others were more long-term items and there was a question, once, in one particular instance which I would not care to publicize, where the thought was—that the demands exceeded the capacity to digest it.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, have you reason to know that there are today more combat divisions among our allies in Western Europe than there were 10 months ago?

**Senator Cain.** Thank you, sir.

**Secretary Marshall.** I know what it was to be—

**Senator Cain.** But you do not know whether it has so become?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, it is a question of how you evaluate the particular unit, whether you call it really an effective division, or not; and that is what General Eisenhower has been in the process of determining, and he has not yet reported to us in detail.

**Senator Cain.** I can think of no more important answer, because it is against that answer that we, in the Congress, must devise plans for the future.

General Marshall, please, if you will, sir, define the hazards and the risks which are present today, with reference to Korea, that were not present and recognizable last June?

This question is predicated on the fact that Russia and China are geographically situated today where they were last June; and that our Defense Establishment, and a good many of us in the Congress, were completely aware, last June, that Red Chinese forces were situated in considerable strength in Manchuria, and that other Red forces could easily be transported to that area.

What about the risks, today, that were not recognized last June, when we entered this conflict?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, of course I would have to very carefully evaluate what we thought last June, because I not only was not in that, but was very remote from it.

**Senator Cain.** I am going to get into that question, sir, because I seek to find out, as an American citizen, whether we thought, last June—

**Secretary Marshall.** The Chiefs of Staff can answer you as to that, sir.

**Senator Cain.** Thank you, sir.

General Marshall, we have been told in the press that there are far more than a half million Red Chinese deployed today in North Korea.

Would you tell us from what areas these troops are being supplied?

**Secretary Marshall.** I would have to question the Chiefs of Staff on that. I can give it to you roughly, but I don't think it would be accurate.

**Senator Cain.** Thank you, sir.

General Marshall, in a colloquy with Senator Hickenlooper on Thursday, the subject of bombing Red Chinese bases came up. You said this:

"At the present time, in the opinion of my military advisers, and my own, the ground forces of the allies have suffered in a rather remote way from our failure to do the bombing that you have just referred to."

I fail, sir, to see either logic or reason in this reply.

If those supply depots had been destroyed by bombing, how would the Chinese Reds now be maintaining more than a half million troops in North Korea?

**Secretary Marshall.** The destruction of those supply bases, and all, would depend, in its effectiveness, on the keeping interrupted the railroads and all, coming down from Manchuria, across the Yalu, into Korea.

Now, we have been bombing the bridges and the tunnels in Korea, and the supplies come on down the road.

Where unlimited man power is available, there is a very quick repair in such matters; but when you are—

**Senator Cain.** What do you mean by that, "when limited man power is available?"

**Secretary Marshall.** Unlimited man power.

**Senator Cain.** I beg your pardon, sir.

**Secretary Marshall.** The repairs are very quickly made.

of airfields in China, by us, during the war, they said it was hardly worth the effort, that the hordes of Chinese were carried in by the Japanese, and all the holes filled up in a matter of an hour or two, and things were back to where they were before, and it was a question of whether this particular effort was justified, except as a momentary interruption.

However, in reference to my reply to Senator Hickenlooper, as to the remote way—

**Senator Cain.** That phrase.

**Secretary Marshall.** It is a two-way road there, which I had in mind, because we have been spared a great deal because we haven't set up a bombing air war.

Now, I stated my own intense interest, and the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff, for air action across the Yalu at the time of this very serious build-up of Chinese Communist forces in Korea, which General MacArthur very graphically pictured as the way they were rolling down the road and coming across the bridges of the Yalu, and our close distance from the Yalu gave our planes almost no room in which to operate.

Now, we dropped the pressure on the issue when the situation entirely changed, and when we were far back, several hundred miles from the Yalu.

**Senator Cain.** Do you mind if I interrupt?

You say we dropped the pressure when we were—

**Secretary Marshall.** I am talking about the hot pursuit.

**Senator Cain.** When we had retired.

**Secretary Marshall.** When we got within about 200 miles back and we had that distance in which to operate against their communications.

**Senator Cain.** Yes, sir.

**Secretary Marshall.** But in relation to the period when we were aggressively trying to force our allies into an agreement, we—meaning the Chiefs of Staff—got into other discussions which were rather opposing this procedure for the reason that we didn't want any risk of retaliatory bombing on our bridgehead, beachhead, on the northeastern coast of Korea where our losses might have been terrific in shipping and evacuation, [deleted] We had a very compact target, the ships tied up to the docks, a very vulnerable target, and we could have been done considerable harm.

We went ahead with our effort to get action to meet the situation on the Yalu, but we realized as we talked about it that we might get into deep trouble in this beachhead where we were evacuating. It is on the northeastern coast.

[Deleted]

**Senator Cain.** I hope, sir, you will not think I am burdening the record or you. I do not pretend to be a soldier of any capacity, but I have spent many days in the field, and I am asking these questions in an effort, a deep effort, to understand what we are doing.

**Secretary Marshall.** I may suggest, Senator, that you can get very direct responses to these from the Chiefs of Staff, because they did the elaborate discussion, and they came in with the recommendations.

**Senator Cain.** But the theory and the subject of logistics is one over which you have been an acknowledged authority for a good part of your life, sir.

General Marshall, it seems to me logical to assume that thousands and thousands of enemy forces have been maintained in Korea because they have been supplied from Rashin. General MacArthur said of Rashin:

"It is the great central distributing point from Manchuria down the east coast of Korea. Its usefulness to the enemy is self-evident. Great accumulations, depot accumulations, were made there." End



of his quotation. Now, I am just assuming that is a military estimate of a situation made in a theater of operations by officers who were on the ground.

How, then, do you reconcile this military estimate, which was concurred in by General Stratemeyer, with your statement of the other day that our ground forces have suffered in a rather remote way from our failure to bomb enemy supply sources?

**Secretary Marshall.** Senator, if you will propound that question to the Chiefs of Staff, they will tell you exactly why they came up with the recommendation that we should not bomb Rashin.

**Senator Cain.** Thank you, sir.

General Marshall, my understanding of the requirements of a military campaign is that forces cannot fight without being supplied in the field with weapons, food, ammunition and clothing. If the Chinese Reds were prevented from supplying their forces in the field, to my mind, the war in Korea would soon be over.

Against this truism, have I not understood you to testify that you have been and are today strongly in support of an effective naval and economic blockade of China?

**Secretary Marshall.** Correct, sir.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, you have testified that you could only comment on the effectiveness of our economic blockade of China. You said that you knew very little about what other nations were doing to establish an economic blockade of Red China. Did I understand you correctly?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think I added to it something in regard to the supplies going to the port of Hong Kong, specifically rubber.

**Senator Cain.** Yes, but you said you were not very familiar with what steps our allies were taking to impose an economic blockade of their own on Red China.

**Secretary Marshall.** I was not familiar with what steps they were taking because they weren't taking the steps that we thought were necessary.

**Senator Cain.** What we are trying to get at is: Who in our Government is driving in hope that our allies will take the same sort of steps that we are taking, because of your testimony that an effective naval and economic blockade of China would result possibly in the end of the war and certainly in minimizing the loss of life to which our forces are exposed every day in the week?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is carried on through the State Department, and I also added in my statement the other day here on May 7 we had gotten the agreement with the British and the French which was the most important agreement to get through the necessary resolution to the United Nations.

**Senator Cain.** Thank you, sir. Here is a question which perhaps you will suggest I should ask of the Secretary of State. I will be glad to do it, but I want to pose it to you.

You have said in your testimony that Great Britain is giving some present consideration to joining with us to impose an economic and naval blockade on China. I have reason to believe that this is a contrary position to one the British have held for months. I must read this short passage.

On Monday, April 9, only a little over a month ago, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Britain's chief representative to the United Nations, spoke before a large American audience in San Francisco on a day when I was there. In that speech Jebb warned against the danger of any military action, air raids or naval blockades against China as inevitably leading to unlimited war; nor, he said, did he

for fear they might be dangerous, double-edged or merely useless. End of the reference to Jebb.

It seems fantastic to this American, General Marshall, that a chief representative of one of our chief allies should so firmly oppose before an American audience your views as given to this Committee as Secretary of Defense and as a member of the National Security Council.

Please tell us again what positive steps are being taken today to get Great Britain and the rest of our allies in agreement on the need for a complete economic and naval blockade of Red China.

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, as you suggested that is a question for the State Department, but they have been pressing in every way. They have to get an action, formal action by the United Nations in connection with it, and as I just said, on May 7 the United Kingdom and France indicated they were now prepared to support a resolution introduced by the United States for an international embargo against Communist China. There has been a change of view.

**Senator Cain.** Thank you, sir. General Marshall, I suppose we agree that the allied forces have been confronted by two different kinds of wars since our forces were first committed in Korea.

As I understand it, the first war began in June against the North Korean aggressor, and ended in late November when the Chinese Reds committed their forces across the Yalu River. The second war finds us at war with the North Koreans and with the Red Chinese.

Will you explain for the benefit of this Committee what we are doing to win the second war that we did not do and employ in practically winning the first war? What I am getting at is, is our general plan today what it was when we were confronted with an entirely different situation last June?

**Secretary Marshall.** I would say it is not, for the reason that at that time we possessed forces of sufficient strength and of competence to destroy the North Korean Army, and General MacArthur did destroy it.

[Deleted]

**Senator Cain.** Thank you, sir.

On March 28, 1951, the New York Times said this:

"General Marshall declared today that he was astonished at the relaxation in public and Congressional support for a long-term defense effort. Exploring emotional reaction to day-to-day events, General Marshall observed that the Soviet Union's activities covered the globe. In his opinion, he said, the world situation was now more serious than last November."

You did not at that time, sir, clarify your remark about how the world crisis had worsened. I wonder if you would care to do so now, and I will appreciate your opinion as to whether the world situation is more serious or less serious than it was last March.

**Secretary Marshall.** Last March?

**Senator Cain.** That is when you made this comment, sir, in a news conference, the first, I think, you held, after you became the Secretary of Defense.

**Secretary Marshall.** Are you referring, when you say last March, to the change of the situation between last March and now? My statement was made in March.

**Senator Cain.** Yes, sir.

**Secretary Marshall.** In reference to November—

**Senator Cain.** And you said that the world situation was in March worse than it was in last November.

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct, sir.

**Senator Cain.** And I wonder, in your opinion—

**Secretary Marshall.** And just a few minutes ago I

answered that.

**Senator Cain.** I thank you, sir.

**General Marshall.** you have suggested that no request was made of the Department of Defense or of the Far East command for an estimate of the military situation before the United Nations resolved to employ military force to stop the aggressor in Korea. Is my impression concerning this a correct one?

**Secretary Marshall.** I will have to ask you to state it again, because I don't recall—

**Senator Cain.** Thank you. I read rapidly in the hope that you may have time saved, sir, thereby.

You have suggested in all of your testimony, which began last Monday, that no request was made of the Department of Defense or of the Far East command for an estimate of the military situation before the United Nations resolved to employ military force to stop the aggressor in Korea.

**Secretary Marshall.** I didn't recall that I stated that, sir, because I was not connected with the Department at that time, and the exact maneuvers, diplomatic and otherwise, that took place in regard to the decision to go into Korea, I only knew from reading the messages from General MacArthur.

**Senator Cain.** That is to say, General Marshall, in your capacity as Secretary of Defense, you do not know whether a military opinion was requested of either our Defense establishment or of General MacArthur's command in the Far East prior to the decision of the United Nations to commit American forces in Korea?

**Secretary Marshall.** I would say, Senator, that I could look into the records and see, but I was not an actor at the time.

**Senator Cain.** Thank you, sir.

I had better ask those several questions then directly of one or more of the JCS.

**General Marshall.** in your opinion, are there today any considerable number of Communists in the officer corps of our Army, Navy or Air Force?

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't know of any, sir.

**Senator Cain.** What action would you take if you found Communists within our armed forces, particularly in its officer corps?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think there is a prescribed action in connection with loyalty tests and matters of that sort, which I cannot quote offhand.

**Senator Cain.** Well, you are certain, sir, that if Communists were found among the officer corps, that they would summarily be dismissed from the service?

**Secretary Marshall.** Within our recourse to law in the manner of doing it.

**Senator Cain.** Do you, General Marshall, out of your wide experience, see any difference between Russian, Chinese and American Communists?

**Secretary Marshall.** My own reaction is that the Chinese Communist leadership is identical with the Soviet Communists, and these groups in America, so far as I obtain from the press, and what I got while I was Secretary of State, have the same objectives and employ different means, according to the circumstances.

**Senator Cain.** Are those objectives the total destruction of free institutions and control of them on the face of the earth?

**Secretary Marshall.** I am not quite so certain as to that, but I do feel absolutely certain it is the complete domination—

**Senator Cain.** Of the world?

**Secretary Marshall.** —of the world.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, would you explain to the Committee what you had in mind in June of 1946 when you strongly urged the passage of H.R. 6795, which

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you called the Chinese Communists and Nationalist Army, in a letter supporting this bill, where you said, "Without passage of the bill the President and myself would lack authorization to carry out a phase of American policy toward China which appears vital to the success of our announced policy. The President, under the terms of the bill, will have the authority to proceed at his discretion in accordance with the situation toward the establishment by the Chinese of unified or national defense forces to include in its leadership both Communists and leadership"—

**Secretary Marshall.** What was the bill?

**Senator Cain.** The bill, sir, was this: "A bill to provide military advice and assistance to the Republic of China; to aid in the modernizing of its armed forces for the fulfillment of obligations which may devolve upon it."

**Secretary Marshall.** I understand what the bill is.

**Senator Cain.** The date of this testimony, at which your letter was read, was June 14, 1946.

Just what were we trying to get at when we, in America, were insisting that Communists and Nationalist Chinese leadership be amalgamated within the future armies of China?

**Secretary Marshall.** The bill, as I recall, referred to the establishment of an army mission to Japan, isn't that correct?

**Senator Connally.** China.

**Senator Cain.** Did he say Japan? He meant China.

This is what the Secretary of State said in support of your letter with reference to the bill. He was answering a question apparently by Mr. Eaton.

**Senator Lodge.** What is the date of that?

**Senator Cain.** June 14, 1946, Senator.

"What General Marshall was asked to do, and agreed to do, and what is necessary to be done, is that when the plan for the amalgamation of the two armies is accepted and begins to go into effect, those units of the Communist Army which are going to be amalgamated within the Nationalist Army will receive a period of training from 60 to 90 days before they march out to join their opposite numbers in the other Army."

**Secretary Marshall.** I recall now what the issue is.

**Senator Cain.** Yes.

**Secretary Marshall.** Under the political-consultative-conference recommendation, which was agreed to by all concerned, there was to be a demobilization of the Nationalist Army from some 400 divisions, more or less, to 50, and on the Communist side, from a million and a half troops to 10 divisions—in other words, 60 divisions in all.

Now it was found in this committee, to which I was the adviser by reason of this arrangement which the Chinese had entered into among themselves, that when we tried to establish a rate of demobilization—and it had to be a comparative rate—between the Nationalist divisions and the Communist divisions, that we had no measure of organization or setup in a very formal way in connection with the Communist forces. They did not have definite divisional organizations; they had very little artillery; they had no specific unit, except in a few cases, that was a division. And they were unwilling to accept any setup of comparative demobilization rates, we thought, because they had no organized unit of that character as the basis of such a procedure.

Now it was thought that, with the setting up of this military mission of ours to the Nationalist Government in China, that one of its subsidiary functions would be to try to get this force of the Communists in such a shape that we could amalgamate the units and demo-

Roughly, at a certain stage, which was about a year later than the initiation of the maneuver, there were to be two Nationalist divisions and one Communist division in certain armies, they call them—we call them army corps—and in others there were to be two Communist divisions and one Nationalist division. That amalgamation would not have occurred for about a year.

Now, in the first place, this was the normal request to get legal authority other than the President's war power to set up this mission, which the Navy had already gotten; and at the same time we wanted to have it so written that we could bring in these additional men which we needed for about 60 days or something like that to get this Communist group in a form that we could bring them in and amalgamate them with the others.

The whole thing, the whole procedure, was in accordance with this agreed program between the Nationalist Government and the Communist regime as to the exact procedure to be followed in reducing the troops.

**Senator Cain.** Well, I think it is just a statement of fact that all of us have learned a very great deal in recent years with reference to the general subject and objectives of Communism.

**Secretary Marshall.** I think you have to have in mind that we had the Soviets as our allies during the war, and we have now a question of something—whether it was a civil war or whether it was something more far reaching.

**Senator Cain.** This bill, which did not become law, and which was supported strongly by our Government, simply meant that in 1946 there was no deep-seated recognition on our part that you simply cannot mix Communists and free leadership. We thought it was possible.

Is it fair to ask you, sir, that if this proposition were presently before us, or before us immediately before the Korean conflict that there would have been any desire on our part to encourage an amalgamation of Nationalist and Chinese Communist armies in China?

**Secretary Marshall.** No, sir. We reached a point where—well, you couldn't mediate; that is the reason I left. And later on we did away with our executive headquarters there for the conduct of cease-fire procedure and abandoned any effort along that line.

**Senator Cain.** I ask that question not as any point of criticism but to show how rapidly this world is moving.

**Senator Russell.** Did you complete your statement, General?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think I will drop it. Yes.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, have we reason to believe that the allied mission in Korea is a different mission today than it was for several months after war began last June?

**Secretary Marshall.** I am sorry, I can't answer that offhand. I should be able to, but I can't.

**Senator Cain.** Permit me to help if I may.

You testified the other day—I have the words down somewhere—that our mission in Korea when we undertook it—

**Secretary Marshall.** I recall that.

**Senator Cain.** —was to make of Korea, I use the phrase, free, united and self-controlled. I think you used independent, unified and democratic.

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes.

**Senator Cain.** Has that original mission been changed?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is what I am sorry I can't give you the answer to.

**Senator Cain.** Do you think, sir—I offer this without criticism but I want to get the facts—that the following comment from the President of the United States on

October 10, 1950, is a correct statement of fact?—The President said with reference to General MacArthur: "His mission has been to repel aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area as called for by the United Nations."

In your opinion is that a correct statement of fact?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think it is, sir.

**Senator Cain.** Thank you. Do you think this comment from Ambassador Austin, offered to the General Assembly of the United Nations, on Oct. 6, 1950 is a correct statement of fact?—"In June and July of this year the Security Council gave all the necessary military authority to the United Nations commander to repel the aggressor army and restore peace in Korea."

**Secretary Marshall.** I think he is referring to movements north of the 38th parallel, and I do not think he is referring to air bombing.

**Senator Cain.** No, sir. He is referring, as I understand it, to General MacArthur having possessed sufficient authority to win the first war against the North Koreans, which was concluded as of the time the Chinese Reds entered a new conflict. My own impression is that that is a correct statement as of the time he gave it in October of 1950.

**Secretary Marshall.** I should think so.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, does the United Nations commander presently possess "all the necessary military authority to repel the aggressor army and restore peace in Korea"?

**Secretary Marshall.** Except as to air action. [Deleted]

**Senator Cain.** It would include a sufficient number of troops within that authority to carry out his mission to repel the aggressor, sir?

**Secretary Marshall.** The authority is not a question of the number of troops. The shipment of troops to him doesn't change the policy.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, if the United Nations commander does not now possess the necessary military power to carry out his stated mission to repel the enemy in Korea, must we not then logically conclude that the Korean mission has been changed? That is to say we are no longer presently attempting to force the aggressor out of Korea; we have changed our posture. In other words, we are now resisting, where for a long time we were determined to repel attack.

**Secretary Marshall.** For a long time our purpose was to halt the aggression and to destroy the cause of the action, which was the North Korean Army.

**Senator Cain.** Right, sir.

**Secretary Marshall.** At the present time the method of destroying the cause of it has changed.

**Senator Cain.** Thank you, sir.

**Senator Saltonstall.** Senator Cain, would it be possible to have read General Marshall's answer to your previous question on that subject?

**Senator Cain.** Certainly, sir.

(Whereupon the record was read by the reporter.)

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, I hope you will reflect on the following paragraph which the President used in a speech before the General Assembly on October 24. The title of his speech was "A New Page in History." In it the President stated these things as being true:—and to me this is the crux of the whole dilemma which surrounds the free world right now.

"In uniting to crush the aggression in Korea, these member nations have done no more than the Charter called for. But the important thing is that they have done it, and they have done it successfully.

"They have given dramatic evidence that the Charter works. They have proved that the Charter is a living instrument backed by the material and moral

In your opinion, why did the President—make no reference to him as a person, that is not intended—say these things last October when they are so totally contrary to the facts of today? And I draw particularly your attention to these two comments:

“United to crush the aggressor,” and that “contributions both moral and material are being provided by all the free members of the United Nations,” and those comments were made last October.

**Secretary Marshall.** Will you read the first part of your question? I don't mean the present statement.

**Senator Cain.** In your opinion why did the President say these things last October with such conviction when these things are so totally contrary to the facts of today?

**Secretary Marshall.** They were evidenced by the facts of the period of which he was talking about, and in the language of the messages from General MacArthur, an entirely new situation had developed, in one way which had developed and in another way which had not.

It was another effort to do the same thing, first by the North Koreans that failed, now by the Chinese Communist forces.

**Senator Cain.** Well, there was a great hope and a great inspiration in what our Chief Executive said last October. How very, very far we have slid backwards on the basis of the facts from what we thought was possible to be true just a few short months ago.

General Marshall, in thinking about Korea and about possible and likely future acts of aggression, I ask you, if you will, to comment briefly on the following quotation from the same speech in which the President said:

“To maintain the peace, the United Nations must be able to learn the facts about any threat of aggression. It must be able to call quickly upon the member nations to act if the threat becomes serious. Above all, the peace-loving nations must have the military strength available, when called upon, to act decisively to put down aggression.”

Have you any solid reasons to offer, on or off the record—I care not which—why the many members of the United Nations failed so completely in 10 months of war, and against that beautiful declaration of the President four months after the war began, to satisfy the requirements of the war in Korea?

[Deleted]

**Senator Cain.** Mr. Secretary, I wrote this question, and therefore, I will read it as I wrote it, but I think now, against what you have just said, part of it is not necessary.

It seems clear to me that either the United Nations or the United States can be charged with a serious lack of leadership in the last 10 months. After 10 months of war, 14 out of 55 free nations have contributed any forces to Korea.

I spent, sir, all of last August and July in Europe, last summer; I wanted to get an answer as to why people weren't contributing more to a war which belonged to them as well as to my country.

There was no evidence during that period of any kind—and I went to every official source in every country in Europe—that our American Government was encouraging the governments of our allies to participate in the Korean war.

There was likewise little evidence that these governments were even thinking about the question.

You are about as well qualified as anyone I can think of to reflect on the question of why we have done, collectively, so little in 10 months, to crush an enemy who is determined to crush and destroy our forces.

[Deleted]

did not give you any answer that you couldn't get out of the information you generally have, in the press from these various countries, as to their feelings, their all agreeing to the principles of collective action, and afraid, here and there, of this consequence or that consequence; and also of their political, we will say, inability to meet the issue.

I imagine that is a very great factor in various countries.

**Senator Cain.** It is, sir.

**Secretary Marshall.** We had some tragic examples of that, particularly when Mr. Stimson was Secretary of State; and we had the birth of the First World War, and the political repercussions; general public support or influence discredited, practically, what he was proposing, and that applied to some of the greatest countries in the world at that time.

**Senator Cain.** Thank you, sir.

Against what you have just said concerning political uncertainties throughout the world, and particularly among some of our allies, and about fear in general, let me ask this question—purely personal:

I see no reason, Mr. Secretary, why we should fail to face up to mistakes, and refuse to recognize mistakes when they are made. It seems to me that it is reasonable to believe and admit, publicly, so that we can get on a more positive course of action, that the United Nations had absolutely no understanding of what it was undertaking when it resolved to crush the Korean aggressor last June.

Against everything you have said, there couldn't have been any evaluation of what was likely to happen, or else the United Nations simply weren't prepared to undertake it.

We have undertaken something that, up to date, is beyond our capacity to master, or so it seems to me.

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, I get the implication from the form of the question that unless we could see the way clear to the end, at the very start, we should do nothing.

I cannot agree with that.

Also, I think everyone must recognize that when you once start a military action, it sets up a chain of reactions, and it is pretty difficult to tell exactly where that is going to end.

We have had a great many examples of that in history.

**Senator Cain.** That is why I asked that question some few minutes ago: What are the hazards present today that were not recognized last June; because to me, the trap we found ourselves in was an obvious possibility from the very moment on the 25th of June that our Government committed American forces to that area of conflict.

**Secretary Marshall.** As I have said before, I was not an actor in the Government at that time, but I should say you were faced with a situation where you just established before the world that you would not protect any country which has set up a really and truly democratic country, under our assistance and attendance—at the accouchment, and let all the world see, and the smaller nations in particular, that they would sink without any support from us.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, it is my own view that the choice of decision lies much more fully with our enemies today than it lies with us.

**Secretary Marshall.** That is very much the case.

**Senator Cain.** As a military man of great experience, you have testified that we should not authentically tell the enemy anything. I enjoyed your use of the word “authentically.” I remembered it sufficiently well to write it down.

May I ask you, sir, if the Department of Defense wrote any part of the President's speech of April 11 in which he advised the enemy that the free forces have no intention of bombing Manchuria or China or permitting the Chinese Nationalist troops to be engaged against their countrymen, who are our enemies?

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't recall, sir. We generally are called upon to send somebody from the Defense Department to the White House to see—to participate in, at least, the revision or the drafting of any speech.

**Senator Cain.** As a military man of great experience, do you approve of the declarations of intention which the Chief Executive stated to the enemy of April 11 in which he advised the enemy of what we were not going to do in the future?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is a question of judgment as to what result they were attempting to get at in connection with that matter. That is a considered statement, and not an accidental disclosure, and just exactly what was the purpose of that, I have not discussed with the President, so I cannot answer it.

**Senator Cain.** Your answer is interesting to me, because you are the chief military adviser to the President of the United States, and that the President, now or in the future, should decide to advise the enemy of adopting a military course of action without consultation with his Secretary of Defense is completely beyond my comprehension, sir.

**Secretary Marshall.** I stated that we had a representative, I assume, at the White House at the time that speech was drafted, to bring—

**Senator Cain.** You so stated, sir, but you did not state that whoever your representative was took up the question of the advisability of such a declaration being made to our enemy.

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, he came back undoubtedly from the White House to consider with our people in the Defense Department; I don't recall the specific issue being brought to me personally.

**Senator Cain.** Thank you.

General Marshall, the United Nations has repeatedly stated its determination to put out any fire of aggression which is started by any aggressor anywhere.

As the Secretary of Defense, as a military man, do you approve of offering this sort of advice to our potential enemies?

**Secretary Marshall.** I would rather not comment on that, sir.

**Senator Cain.** All right sir.

I think it is important because we have set up a determination in terms of words which, in terms of fire power, we have not been able to accomplish in the first test of our determination.

It seems to me, sir, that this type of declaration has added substantially to the enemy's power of decision.

Do you not think that these declarations permit an enemy to choose his own time and place for an aggression? I think you can answer that one, if you will, sir.

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, I would say that they don't restrict his choice of the time and place. He is aware of most of those, in the first place, and he is now being told in this particular instance that we will resist in any region. How we'll resist is another matter, of course.

For example, we have the Communist effort to dominate Indo-China. Now, how do we participate there? The French are carrying out the main resistance; we are providing material; we are providing planes and transportation to that extent, and we have other provisions that I cannot mention.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, these are two brief questions. Perhaps you will think they are repetitious,

in which event you will just pass them by.

Do you not believe as a military strategist that it is unwise to, for the free nations, say that they are going to stop aggression unless they are prepared to do so?

**Secretary Marshall.** You are now, I think, Senator, getting involved in or involving me, rather, in a debate as to—

**Senator Cain.** I have no intention of doing that sir.

**Secretary Marshall.** I mean involving me in a debate as to the wisdom of certain procedures and declarations, and to their possible effects. It may be a very deliberate intention to create a certain impression, and I would have to sit down and analyze each one with some care.

**Senator Cain.** Now, I would prefer to ask that question when the Secretary of State comes here.

**Secretary Marshall.** These all amount to a phase of psychological warfare. Maybe it is not a wise phase; maybe you don't agree with that, but I could not offhand reply.

**Senator Cain.** Well, we Americans of both parties at this table are trying, with the help of so many distinguished and qualified witnesses, to determine what is the wise course of action to pursue in the future.

From my limited background and knowledge, brain power, I think the free nations are on very unsound grounds in some of the declarations they have made, because they have not, in practice, been able to live up to their declarations.

You testified, General Marshall, the other day, that you only know of our atom-bomb strength through what you read in the press.

**Secretary Marshall.** No, I don't think I said that, sir.

**Senator Cain.** I understood you to say that.

**Secretary Marshall.** That certainly would not be the case. Now, what is the question, sir?

**Senator Cain.** I merely said that you testified that you know only of our atom-bomb strength through what you read in the press.

I was merely going to ask you to whom should this Committee turn for the fullest possible information we are entitled to have?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think there must be some misunderstanding of the statement. I don't recall that—

**Senator Cain.** I would withdraw the question easily.

General Marshall, as we move as rapidly as we can to a conclusion, how would you characterize the conflict in Korea? Is it, in your opinion, a police action or a war, and if it is a war, would you define it to be a large or a small war?

**Secretary Marshall.** I would characterize it as a limited war which I hope will remain limited.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, I read daily in the press that our forces can practically calculate to the individual how many casualties they inflict on the enemy.

In a couple of newspapers in front of me, there are 51 chances out of 52, that I could open it up and see where on yesterday some authoritative source in the Far East said that we killed 5,000 or 4,083. They are very specific.

No reference has been made, however, in recent weeks to my knowledge, to American or allied casualties.

Would you tell us, as a military man, how we can be so accurate with reference to the enemy, while taking so much time to evaluate our own losses? I believe, sir, that my nation would be more anxious about the Korean war, and treat it much more realistically if our casualties, rather than those of the enemy, were in the headlines of every American paper every day.

**Secretary Marshall.** As to the delay, Senator, the first factor is we wait until the next of kin have been notified.



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**Senator Cain.** Notification. **Secretary Marshall.** As to the—I think there are pretty regular announcements of casualties.

**Senator Cain.** Well, I personally have not seen them in the daily press recently.

**Secretary Marshall.** There are weekly announcements in detail.

As to accuracy, I will say this: While the snow was on the ground it was a comparatively easy matter to check. The aviator or an artilleryman or even the infantryman gave his estimates of what he had done, and then they went over the ground, if they didn't actually take it over by conquest, with these small planes, and actually counted the casualties.

For example, I know—I am just thinking of various instances when I was concerned with the same problem, in my mind as to the accuracy of the statement where, in one case, there was a battalion, or there was an action and it was fought, and it was thought that it was taken against some 3,000-odd of the enemy, and they felt they had inflicted 1,100 casualties.

When they took over the ground they found 2,800 casualties.

They had another case that I can recall now at the moment of where in another battalion we had seven killed and 22 wounded, and when they took over and counted, they had 300 enemy casualties.

They had another case where the Navy bombarded Wonsan, a port on the east coast of China, and later on they landed a group the way they do from time to time, and they counted either 3,800 or 4,800 dead as a result of their catching these fellows in buildings. It was a concentration point.

Now, there we had exact figures, and there we had a confirmation of the previous estimates, and in most cases, the estimates were below what actually was discovered.

Now, here very recently in the last few days we had a highly exaggerated estimate by pilots as to the number of planes destroyed in one bombardment at Sinuiju. I think they said 35 planes; actually, the report finally came back to us from the photographs and others that one plane was destroyed and one damaged.

Well now, there is the check—all the point I am trying to make is—

**Senator Cain.** Yes, sir.

**Secretary Marshall.** There is the check; and I think that the casualties inflicted have been far—have been considerably under the estimates for the reason that we don't pick up the wounded. We don't get that part.

They are all drawn off, as a rule, so under the old schedules of probabilities, which is not the case now—I don't know what the probability scale is now—it was four wounded to one killed.

Well, of course, if that were true, it would be a tremendous casualty list. I don't think that holds any more. I think it is probably almost one to one or two to one.

**Senator Cain.** I raise the question partly because it seems to me we place an undue emphasis for public consumption on how many we are killing of the enemy, when I individually as an American, am much more concerned with how many Americans are being killed by the enemy.

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, there is a release that comes out every week. There is no holding back on that.

**Senator Cain.** I did not so mean to imply.

**Secretary Marshall.** I have been very much interested as an important question with respect to the comparative rate of casualties from January, February, March and April, as compared with the previous period of six

months, from January through June, involvement as part of that period, although they had the heaviest proportions of losses incurred in those early days at the end of June.

**Senator Cain.** Have our casualties, General Marshall, before the recent counteroffensive—

**Senator Russell.** General, did you finish that statement about casualties?

**Secretary Marshall.** I have something else. The rate of casualties per 100 men per week in the last two months is one quarter the rate during the period of June-August, and one half the casualties of November and December.

**Senator Cain.** What is the date from which you are reading, sir?

**Secretary Marshall.** Through May 4. This is a percentage rate which doesn't appeal to me much because it is a little difficult to understand.

I was trying to get a clear statement because it is not only of profound interest as to casualties, but it is of equally profound interest as to the extent to which we can conduct this operation against the Chinese without too serious an attrition on our own part.

Now the casualties per week per 100 starting back in June, June 25-August 25 were one and two tenths per cent. In other words, the casualties of 100 men per week at that rate were one and two tenths per cent, and that of course includes large numbers in those days who were absent, unaccounted for, prisoners presumably.

From the 25th of August to the 23d of September, the casualties per 100 per week were one and four tenths per cent. September to October, one month, nine tenths of a per cent; October through November 17, three tenths of a per cent per 100 per week.

Now the 17th of November through the 15th of December there were six tenths of one per cent. You see, it is considerably lower than it was in June and August, but it is going up in connection with those heavy operations of that period.

From the 15th of December through the 12th of January there was seven tenths of a per cent out of 100 men per week. The 25th of January to the 9th of February, two tenths of one per cent. That happened to be that very critical period, but it was critical in the sense that we had gotten into a position and they had not caught up with that position.

**Senator Cain.** Those are all battle casualties, sir?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir, these are battle casualties.

**Senator Cain.** You are not referring to theater illnesses and things of that character?

**Secretary Marshall.** No. From the 9th of February through the 9th of March, five tenths of a per cent for every 100 men. From the 9th of March through the 6th of April, three tenths of one per cent, and the 6th of April through May 4, three tenths of one per cent, so we have had an average really from January through April of about three tenths of a per cent per 100 per week.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, do you consider a casualty to be any individual who is killed or wounded or sick or hurt or lost in the combat area?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is this in terms of killed or wounded or missing, of course. Now what I had them go back and check carefully was whether the eliminations by serious frostbite were involved there, and they have yet to tell me, but they thought they were not in these figures.

**Senator Cain.** That was the question that we had in mind.

**Secretary Marshall.** When it comes to the sick out of the campaign, I think they have always exceeded the casualty rate, but in most instances those men go back because it is a temporary situation, except that during

the winter campaign, those that were crippled by reason of frostbite, frozen feet in particular and those that were casualties by reason of pneumonia, they did not go back because that would render them continuously susceptible to a return of the previous difficulty.

**Senator Cain.** Well, when you get an answer to your question as to whether or not the frostbite and other sickness cases are included—

**Secretary Marshall.** I know the other sickness cases are not. I heard it was a possibility that maybe the frostbite was in this.

**Senator Cain.** If it would not be inconvenient, I would appreciate your advice on this thing.

Just a few more questions, sir. The Senator from California has asked me to ask a question which I think is pertinent. Do these figures refer to the combat area or to the communications zone as well?

**Secretary Marshall.** This is the combat area.

**Senator Cain.** That would be restricted to Korea itself?

**Secretary Marshall.** Korea itself, and I have not given you comparative casualties. I know at one stage when I was checking up on the casualties of a month here rather recently, there were 99 per cent Army and one per cent combined Navy and Air.

**Senator Russell.** Where do you place the Marine Corps?

**Secretary Marshall.** Army and Marine Corps—ground troops.

**Senator Cain.** I have never been in Korea, sir. You have testified that we should give no consideration to withdrawing from Korea because in part it would expose the Koreans to assassination and destruction.

I share that view of yours that we shouldn't get out unless we have to. However, if we long continue our present policy of what appears to me to be containment in Korea, will the free forces through the use of their air, naval, and artillery power not largely destroy all of North Korea and the civilians who live in that tragic piece of real estate?

**Secretary Marshall.** I lost the question part of it at the end.

**Senator Cain.** If we stay where we are in Korea without forcing a decision by military arms, is it not likely or is it not logical to assume that a few more months of this procedure will destroy the future usefulness of all of North Korea?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, of course, that is a factor in this matter, particularly as we have had to be ruthless in destroying buildings which shelter the enemy and conceal them from our view.

As to the hydroelectric plants and installations of that character, we have kept, we haven't bombed them out in most instances because their relation to it was not immediately so direct as to demand that destruction, and they always remained a possibility in negotiations, but here, recently, when they blew out the gates of the reservoir, that affects that very directly; but that was unavoidable, that had to be done.

**Senator Cain.** As just a citizen, I am concerned about civilians everywhere. Military necessity has required us to do things in this Korean war that we have never had to do before, at least, so far as I know, in protecting the integrity of our own troops.

As I understand it, we have had to pursue a scorched-earth policy in front of our operations just to give our own people a chance to live.

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct.

**Senator Cain.** You have been known to me nearly all my life, General Marshall, as a man of the highest moral character. You will agree that we started out last June, in concert with our friends in the United Nations, to crush the enemy and to restore Korea to a united, inde-

You will probably agree—I think you have already so stated—that the free forces have waged war for months against the North Koreans and the Red Chinese.

Please just satisfy my deep-seated curiosity and tell me what modern-day factors require a formal declaration of war against our enemies. That is an important question, General Marshall.

**Secretary Marshall.** Not only a moral question, but it certainly bears a very direct relation to our democratic processes.

**Senator Cain.** Right.

**Secretary Marshall.** Reference has been made here to the constitutional right of the Congress.

**Senator Cain.** I made those references, sir.

**Secretary Marshall.** That is the law, and it is inconceivable that we could have a surprise attack and gain the advantages of such a sudden procedure. With the debate in Congress that can't be done. So under our constitutional setup that cannot be done.

Now my own reaction to it is that there is an immense advantage on the part of the nation that can move into the conflict in a moment without any formal declaration, and I think there is a much greater disadvantage in the long term as a result of having done so. So that we have to face the tremendous disadvantage of being put under attack in a moment—we don't know where. And the world knows that we can not do that ourselves. We cannot and we would not.

Now, as I say, I have sat in a seat where I feel probably more vulnerable to the disadvantage than most people would, because you just can't tell where the event is going to break out. And yet I do feel that our great strength before the world lies in the fact that we would not do such a thing as that.

In a sense it's rather an academic discussion because our Constitution forbids it, and we are certainly not going to change the Constitution to a more violent form of action. It goes contrary to all of our feelings.

But I would say this: When you are considering that there are a great many other considerations that should come into play, and the principal one is that it should be apparent before the world that if they do seize this advantage, they are going to pay a terrible price absolutely and certainly. And that means a state of preparedness in some way that we can maintain without its destructive effect on our economy and without its unfortunate effect on our young men.

**Senator Cain.** Is this a fair question, the answer to which in my opinion could be completely off the record if that is your wish? — It seems to me if we were not associated with others—and I am among those who think we ought to be associated with others—that it would be inconceivable to believe that the United States of America would be at war for 10 months against ruthless enemies without the Congress recognizing that state of war officially and declaring war upon our enemy. Am I right or wrong in my anxiety over this question of morality, General?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, there you are getting a little beyond the question of morality. You are getting around very directly, not beyond but you are getting around, it seems to me, very directly to the question of the complications of collective action. I might say that the reactions to these troublesome problems that grow out of collective action are much more emphatic among those who are trying to direct the military effort. But we have to come before the public, and we have to in a very careful manner, and we have to restrain ourselves in our dealings with our allies if we hope to be able to pursue on the basis of collective action.

a relation to what you have just stated.

Perhaps we have reached a state in the development of the world where official war is a thing of the past. Perhaps the best we can look forward to is an age of aggression which will never formally be recognized as being war and which will generally reach no positive decisions. Do you share any of my apprehension on this subject?

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't quite believe that, sir. Certainly some very peculiar things have gone on in these years—notably the state of what amounted to an actual war in China with the Japanese for a long period of time, which we did not recognize as a war. Of course, there were certain reasons for that, legal and others, in connection with what we might do to help in the situation, but it led to that precedent with regard to the matter you have just questioned me on.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, if we are to carry out our stated mission, which is to make Korea free, but remain satisfied with a war which may reach no final decision for years, will we not injure our ability to wage a larger war if it comes, and will we not indicate or run a risk of indicating to the free citizens of the world that their governments—there being a distinction I make between a citizen and his government—will we not indicate to the free citizens of the world that their free governments are unable to collectively get together to crush aggression, Korea being the first example?

**Secretary Marshall.** I believe you used the plural in there when you said "years"?

**Senator Cain.** Yes, sir.

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, I would say that if the Korean situation prolonged itself into years, then we are in a very difficult, very dangerous situation.

**Senator Cain.** I used the word plurally because there has been no evidence yet submitted by anyone that gives any indication of when it is to be concluded.

**Secretary Marshall.** I think I referred to examples of that before, which came before committees of Congress, as to our policy in Greece and as to our policy in the Berlin blockade and other policies.

**Senator Cain.** Thank you, sir.

Will you state what reasons you may have as to how we might reach a reasonable and lasting settlement of the Korean war without convincing the Chinese Reds that they will be decisively defeated on the field of battle?

**Secretary Marshall.** I will say this—that our attitude in the matter in December was one thing, we were in a very weak position; and our attitude now is quite another.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, General MacArthur testified and did so at some length in front of a map, that if Formosa is occupied by an enemy, that the first line of defense for the United States would logically move back to the West Coast of America. May I ask to what extent do you agree with this military estimate of that situation?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think that is an overemphasis—when you put it that way—as to the result; but I think it would be a highly dangerous business for the United States to have Formosa pass into unfriendly hands.

**Senator Cain.** Thank you, sir. Two more questions.

A very great deal has been said on what General MacArthur did and did not recommend either to the JCS or to the public. Will you state if there is any truth whatsoever in the following comment which was recently offered about General MacArthur by a prominent person? I ask this question directly and pointedly because, to the extent we can, we seek to have fair play for every person who appears as a witness before this Committee—

The quotation: "We are in a far better position in

Korea to meet the added force of Red China with the allied powers who are with us there than we would be in if we had to continue with what we are doing in Korea and at the same time commit the monumental folly which MacArthur said is necessary of sending an independent additional armed force from this country to the mainland of China."

I think you have testified that General MacArthur never violated a military order, and I ask you if you have ever known him to suggest or recommend committing an American ground force to the mainland of China.

**Secretary Marshall.** I recall no recommendations of that character of his.

**Senator Cain.** General Marshall, I wish only to express my real appreciation for this opportunity to ask you a number of questions which are and have been of very great concern to me.

**Senator Russell.** General, I have one or two questions I wanted to ask while Senator Lodge is returning. I have been sitting here listening to this testimony, and I am one member of the Committee that has heard practically every word that has been testified.

As I understand it, North Korea borders both on Manchuria and on Soviet Russia.

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct.

**Senator Russell.** It has been stated that this Rashin was an important distribution center for supplies that come in from Soviet Russia. How could we completely interdict the supplies that are coming from unfriendly sources to our enemies in North Korea by merely bombing in Manchuria? Would it not be necessary also to bomb communications and bases in that portion of Soviet Russia which adjoins Korea to absolutely interdict those supplies?

**Secretary Marshall.** Are you talking specifically in regard to Rashin or the whole proposition?

**Senator Russell.** I am talking about the whole proposition—of the fact that Korea adjoins both Manchuria and Soviet Russia. If we bomb the bases in Manchuria, would that, even if it were completely successful—

**Secretary Marshall.** The source of supply that comes from Russia is in their industrial area, which is far back from the Manchurian frontier.

**Senator Russell.** How do they bring it into Korea? Do they have to come in through Soviet Russia?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir; it comes in from Soviet Russia, goes into Manchuria, and comes down on the Eastern Manchurian Railroad.

What I am trying to explain, Senator, is that the source of supply comes from far back in the Soviet Union where it has its industrial setup.

Now the bombing that has been referred to here. I believe, relates to destroying the supply accumulations that you have, depots, after it is brought down near the frontier—notably Mukden, and I presume other points to the southeast of Mukden towards Antung. Quite certainly they would have dispersed their supply depots against the possibility of air attack.

Also, I presume that they have depots that are north of Mukden—Chanchung, for example. To what degree they would have established and organized supply depots, I don't know; but the bombing generally, I believe, that has been referred to here pertains largely to between Mukden and the Yalu frontier, and to Rashin. That is inside Korea, but very close to the frontier.

**Senator Russell.** What prompted the question was your statement here the other day that if they bombed Rashin, and incidentally I believe it has been bombed on

one occasion, that they would remove their supply bases a short distance away, across the frontier—and if they moved those bases across the frontier, would they be on Soviet territory, or Manchurian?

**Secretary Marshall.** In that case they would be in Soviet territory.

**Senator Russell.** Would be within Soviet Territory?

**Secretary Marshall.** However, I would like to add, Senator, that I was speaking from recollection and the Chiefs of Staff can answer that with precision, because they were the ones concerned over the matter and made the final recommendation, and they can give you the distances and facts and railroad connections which are related to the bombing, for instance, and destroying of Rashin; but as to the renewal of the same service across the boundary in Eastern Siberia—

**Senator Russell.** Well, is it possible to bring supplies from Eastern Siberia directly into Korea?

**Secretary Marshall.** It is, by way of Rashin.

**Senator Russell.** Do the Soviets have any supply depots in Eastern Siberia?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, I presume they have—with relation to Vladivostok, and their troops on that portion of the frontier.

**Senator Russell.** Well, if supplies were moved from Vladivostok to the Korean border, do you know how they would be handled? Would they be brought over Soviet territory, or would they go through North Korea—

**Secretary Marshall.** That portion of the Korean border, they would be brought from Soviet territory.

**Senator Russell.** The point I want to make is: Is it possible to, even if you destroy the bases in Manchuria, to completely shut off all sources of supply beyond the North Korean border, without also bombing the territory of Soviet Russia?

**Secretary Marshall.** It would be possible to work considerable damage to the supplies coming down in by way of the main arteries, down through Mukden, and to the southeast, and across the Yalu River.

I would have to turn to the Chiefs of Staff to give you the exact railroad setup, as to leading into Rashin, whether it would be a return of stores from the Vladivostok district, up to the northwest, and then into Rashin, or whether it would be supplies coming from the west, down to Rashin—I cannot answer that accurately, Senator.

**Senator Russell.** I will take that up with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

All right, Senator Lodge.

**Senator Lodge.** Before I begin, Mr. Chairman, when I made the suggestion yesterday evening, I had in mind that it would shorten the initial round of questions. I certainly am not criticizing any of the members of the Committee, and I think there has been very good feeling all the way around.

I simply wanted to indicate a way to a democratic and orderly procedure that might tend to shorten somewhat the proceedings, or shorten the time necessary.

Now, Mr. Secretary, if there is any question that I ask you, that you would rather I would ask somebody else, I hope you will tell me; and if there is anything you want off the record, I hope that you will say so.

I will begin with a few isolated questions, and then I have one or two points I would like to develop.

In response to Senator Cain, you stated that the casualty rate had been falling in Korea; and I wondered how it compared with the last six months, let's say, with the casualty rate in World War II in Europe.

Do you have any idea what such a comparison would show?

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't know how we would get

at the end of that war when there was a general troop advance or defense. You could take a casualty rate in the Battle of the Bulge, for example, and get a very definite rate, and there I think the rate of casualties was much heavier.

At the present time the casualty rate is, considering combat, very low. In the latter part of June and in July and in August it was high, particularly in terms of missing. I don't know how I could answer that, Senator. I will have to look at the records and see if we can just take one piece that is comparable to the Korean action.

**Senator Lodge.** Yes. Would you have any idea of the ratio of American casualties to enemy casualties in this Korean war as compared with the war against the Germans?

**Secretary Marshall.** I will have to get that information for you, sir.

**Senator Lodge.** I have been asked to ask you this question. Why do we still reject the use in Korea of 33,000 troops offered by the Chinese Nationalists? Do we still? Why do we still reject the use in Korea of 33,000 troops offered by the Chinese Nationalists?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think I have answered that before, but I will do it again. In the first place, the 33,000 number has rather gone out of the picture because that was the first proposal of the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, and to which there was an unfavorable reaction both from General MacArthur and from the Chiefs of Staff reaction and the global effects.

Then later in November to 60,000, that General MacArthur I think expressed a desire for, and the view of the Chiefs of Staff as to that were, first, that the primary hazard there is the defense of Formosa, and, in the next place, that the report that they had received which General MacArthur's Fox committee of some 37 men indicated a state of readiness which didn't seem to be conducive of successful action by those troops, and more in particular from that record it appeared that if they were taken out and they were the best equipped and the chosen troops, it would greatly weaken that garrison.

**Senator Lodge.** Is that still the position today?

**Secretary Marshall.** But the main consideration of course was the possible effect on our relations with our allies and development of an enlarged war.

**Senator Lodge.** Is that still the position today?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Lodge.** Using hindsight, do you think it would have been better for all concerned if our military effort had stopped at the waist of Korea in the general neighborhood of the line Pyongyang-Wonsan instead of spreading out all along the northern frontier?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, in the light of everything that has happened, yes, but I don't know as that is a fair statement.

In the first place, the movement north of the parallel by the original effort worked out to the destruction, almost complete destruction, of the North Korean Army, which would seem to be a very important factor in establishing the security of the South Korean Republic and making possible a general unification of all of Korea.

Later an entirely different question was posed as to the advance of our force when there were indications of the possibility of a Communist build-up of Chinese troops, and in the light of after events it was, I think, unfortunate.

There is the factor we determined what they had and, as General MacArthur puts it, we upset their plans and precipitated their action and made it known to us.

You have another situation, of course, in Northeast Korea where the Tenth Corps was deployed over a wide area. That deployment, of course, came out of a period

when General MacArthur arrived in the country, to set up a basis for elections and matters of that character.

Then you come to the Monday quarterbacking on the very first moves that would be made in regrouping the entire command in the light of what was happening on the western flank directly south of the river and down towards the 38th parallel. I don't like to answer the question because it is awfully easy to tell what is the right thing the day after.

**Senator Lodge.** On March 31st the New York Times published a dispatch stating that the South Korean Government was being forced to release 120,000 men because it lacked the means to rearm or to feed them, and it quoted President Singhman Rhee of Korea as saying that he had told the United Nations that he is prepared to supply 500,000 men in addition to the 250,000 South Koreans who are now fighting. He repeatedly asked for guns to arm at least 100,000 and hasn't been able to get them. Do you know what the facts are about that?

**Secretary Marshall.** I have described that in some detail in relation to the approach to me by the Ambassador of the South Korean Government to the United States, and my request on the Chiefs of Staff to look in on the matter.

Their message to General MacArthur and General MacArthur's reply to them, and later communications, one within the last week, in connection with what is the advantageous use of these men, to what extent is it profitable to arm them, to what extent we can afford to arm them.

I would rather not get on the record in that matter at the present time because General Ridgway's detailed report of the last 10 days presents a very complicated picture.

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**Senator Lodge.** Thank you.

You stated on Monday that the bombing of Chinese bases might, and I quote, "expose Western Europe to attack by the millions of Soviet troops poised in Middle and Eastern Europe."

Would you care to say what is the basis for the belief in that possibility?

**Secretary Marshall.** Of the effect of our bombing attack or the poised troops in—

**Senator Lodge.** On the fact that the bombing of these Chinese bases might result in an attack on Western Europe.

**Secretary Marshall.** Because we felt that carrying the bombing into China would certainly enlarge the struggle, enlarge the activities and might develop a situation that would be much more difficult to meet in view of the possible Soviet intervention in order to protect China.

The implication, of course, in that is that if we could eliminate the Chinese effort by bombing, that it would be a very powerful consideration in the end. But the general feeling has been that in the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff and myself and the other agencies of the Government, if we restrain our activities, restrict our activities to the Korean border and the seas alongside, that we can possibly carry on to a successful termination a limited war and more particularly one in which we hold our allies with us.

If we had no other reaction than the fact that our allies think that that would provoke a Soviet reaction, we would have to consider very, very seriously whether we just disagree with that and go ahead, the more so when we have to consider their troops on the ground serving with us and whether they would continue in such service.

However, the view is not only that of our allies but

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situation in Korea.

**Senator Lodge.** Is that the principal ground, would you say, on which our allies oppose the policy of delivery of an ultimatum against the Chinese Communists, to be followed by bombing?

**Secretary Marshall.** Will you repeat it, please?

**Senator Lodge.** Do you consider that the principal reason that actuates the allies in opposing General MacArthur's policy of an ultimatum against the Chinese Communists, to be followed by bombing, that fear that it will spread the war and result in Western Europe being invaded?

**Secretary Marshall.** My hesitation is in relation to whether it is only Western Europe, but I will say it is the fear of the invasion of Western Europe.

**Senator Lodge.** Because they know there was a time, was there not, when there was a fear that the strength of the West might get sucked into the Orient to an undue degree, but it is definitely established now, is it not, that we will not permit the major part of our forces to be engulfed in the Orient; isn't that true?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is our hope.

**Senator Lodge.** Certainly, it is true, is it not, that our allies, generally speaking, have as great an interest as we have in success in Korea?

**Secretary Marshall.** I would say certainly that and maybe more, because many of them are very close to the principal enemy, or opponent.

**Senator Lodge.** And our allies have, have they not, just as great an interest as we have in establishing the authority of the United Nations?

**Secretary Marshall.** I would say that is a fact.

**Senator Lodge.** And I believe it is true, is it not, that when the aggression in Korea occurred last summer, the allies applauded our decision to resist aggression in Korea very enthusiastically?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think it had a tremendous effect all over Europe.

**Senator Lodge.** And, in fact, it restored the confidence in Europe in the possibility of avoiding a war, didn't it?

So it certainly seems reasonable to expect, does it not, that a really skillful and persuasive American diplomacy should be able to hold our allies together as regards a sound policy in Asia?

**Secretary Marshall.** That would be my assumption.

**Senator Lodge.** Must we not do three things simultaneously—we have to keep faith with our own troops, carry out the anti-aggression policy, and retain our allies—do all three?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Lodge.** Now, Senator Cain spoke of the contributions that the members of the United Nations were making to the fighting in Korea, which struck a responsive chord with me, because when Senator Sparkman and I were at the United Nations, it became very evident that the contributions of some nations were going to be disappointing, and I issued a statement in September, I think, saying that there wasn't anything that could shake American confidence in the United Nations more than a failure on the part of the members to put up man power in proportion to population.

With that as a background, let me ask you: Is it not true that some nations have military commitments in addition to their commitments toward Korea, so that they are not completely free to do whatever they might like to do with regard to Korea? Isn't that true?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is true.

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**Senator Lodge.** Is it not true that the contribution of other nations to the fighting in Korea is steadily in-



creasing, albeit rather slowly?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think it is increasing. I think we have good prospects for further increases.

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**Senator Lodge.** Yes. Would you say that the fighting in Indo-China had a fairly direct strategic relationship to the fighting in Korea?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think it has a very direct relationship, and I think the operations in Korea in the destruction that has been effected on the Chinese Communists' supposedly picked troops has quite probably restrained action by the Communist Chinese forces on the Indo-China frontier.

**Senator Lodge.** Would you not say that it was vital for the allies, at least not to hamper the operations of troops by sending war materials to the enemy, even though some of them are not sending troops themselves?

**Secretary Marshall.** I quite agree with that, sir.

**Senator Lodge.** It is true, is it not, that in some cases we are obtaining valuable articles in exchange for the shipment of war materials? Do you not understand that to be the case?

**Secretary Marshall.** I understand that to be the case. However, when you speak of war material, I don't think there should be any question about their not permitting any actual material. I think it is in the raw materials that we get into trouble, and some materials of a special kind. I think the time has not only come, but arrived some time back, for the allies to enforce absolutely a strict embargo.

**Senator Lodge.** Upon all finished goods that have a military potential?

**Secretary Marshall.** Finished goods that are directly military, and raw materials and materials of that kind that can have an effect on the fighting of the army, and there, of course, you come to the problem of endeavoring to provide materials that will only be used by the civil population, which you know full well that the civil population will certainly not get if the Chinese Communist armies need it.

**Senator Lodge.** Yes.

**Secretary Marshall.** So, while you have a compassionate interest in the civilian population you cannot control the Communist procedure.

**Senator Lodge.** I am glad to hear you make that statement.

In addition to the many other ways in which allies are helpful, is it not actually essential for us to have bases in Western Europe from which our strategic air force can operate against the Soviet potential in case of trouble?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think that is vital.

**Senator Lodge.** Yes. And, therefore, we cannot make maximum use of our air power without such bases in Western Europe?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct. We would be greatly limited.

**Senator Lodge.** Do you think the Kremlin has enough influence over the Chinese Communists to call off the Korean aggression if they wanted to do so?

**Secretary Marshall.** My assumption would be they could do it in a moment.

**Senator Lodge.** So, they are really the real opponent, are they not?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is our opponent.

**Senator Lodge.** Do you think the Russians are helping the Communist Chinese much at the present moment?

**Secretary Marshall.** They are certainly providing them with the bulk of their war-making materiel. They have provided apparently large numbers of planes, which have not been yet brought into use, and so far as we can as-

the training of the personnel that would employ these planes.

To what extent they are involved in the rehabilitation and build-up of North Korean units, I don't know. They provide a very solid background in front of which the Communist Chinese forces operate.

I think it might be put this way: That the Chinese Communist forces would be utterly unable to maintain themselves without a very direct support by the Soviet Government.

**Senator Lodge.** That is a logistical support, is it not?

**Secretary Marshall.** Logistical support in terms of the actual material, war material, and tremendous moral support that they are standing behind them.

**Senator Lodge.** Do you think they are in a position to increase their help very materially, or do you believe that they are so far away from the main base of Russian military strength that they could not do much more even if the conflict were to broaden?

**Secretary Marshall.** They could do quite a little bit more.

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**Senator Lodge.** My question is a limited question aimed at keeping faith with the troops in Korea, regardless of the American public at home, and regardless of allies or anything else, and it is aimed to get the answer to the question as to whether the decision not to bomb the Chinese bases is directly in the interests of the actual American troops in Korea.

**Secretary Marshall.** I will answer that, Senator, by saying to a certain extent it is, and to a certain extent it is not, and the question is on which side the percentage would favor our troops against the restrictions as to the operations.

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But I must say this: That you have got to consider very carefully the situation at the time. Now, the situation about November 6th—no, we will say November 6th to the end of the month—was one where our troops were at a tremendous disadvantage, because of the processes of the rapid build-up of the Chinese Communist forces in Korea.

There is no question in my mind but freedom to bomb across the Yalu River would have been greatly to the advantage of our troops.

Now that they are 200-and-some miles south of the Yalu, the situation is quite different.

**Senator Lodge.** In other words, the question of whether you bomb, or whether you don't bomb, changes constantly with the factors of time, circumstances and geography, doesn't it?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is right.

**Senator Lodge.** And you cannot lay down an arbitrary rule that is good for all conditions, can you?

**Secretary Marshall.** You cannot; and right under the present considerations, it has seemed that we derive advantages from the fact that no air operations, no hostile air operations are against us.

**Senator Lodge.** I am drawing to my close.

It is said that the services of our men in Korea is buying time, or gaining time for us here in the United States.

Are you satisfied that we are making the best possible use of this time, in so far as creating a big enough Army, Navy and Air Force is concerned?

**Secretary Marshall.** I made a statement the other day that I was much concerned over the delay in getting the necessary legislative action to enable us to go ahead with the various measures that are concerned in the build-up of our forces and that, I think, is a delay that is regrettable, and serious.

As to the production of munitions, I think that the time we need there is to allow that to go through the necessary processes; and I believe, so far as I can ascertain, that we are proceeding there with reasonable rapidity; when you get into the effect of inflationary reactions and limitations of raw materials—the withdrawals of raw materials from civil production—I am not well enough informed to answer that except that I know the inflationary reaction is serious to us because we lose the power to buy the material that was the basis of the original estimate on which the appropriation was made.

**Senator Lodge.** When you referred to legislation, you have particularly in mind, have you not, universal military service and training, is that right?

**Secretary Marshall.** Exactly that, sir.

**Senator Lodge.** I remember that you said on Friday, in reply to Senator Johnson, that in your opinion we were not getting ready fast enough; and in connection with that, I would like to ask you whether you think the Air Force today has got enough tactical strength to provide us with a 2-to-1 superiority in Europe? That is tactical aviation?

**Secretary Marshall.** I will not attempt to answer that. General Vandenberg can answer that directly. He has all the numbers at his disposal.

**Senator Lodge.** Maybe you would not want to answer this question, either, and you can say so, of course, if you don't: Whether you think that the proposed total of 95 air groups which has been the Administration's proposed figure, is big enough or whether it should not be 150 air groups?

**Secretary Marshall.** My reaction to that has been that we will have time, under the present setup that is being made, for the production of planes, to increase that, along with the situation as it appears to us as we get a little further along, because the important thing now is the rapid turnout of planes up to the 95 groups—that is the first thing; and the next thing is a setup of industry in relation to that, in such a manner that they can very quickly increase production if we find that to be a necessary procedure.

I think we have that setup well under way, and as we—I have forgotten the date when the 95 groups was to come into being. Maybe you have it there?

**Senator Lodge.** I wasn't talking about the construction and development that has been authorized as of the end of the current fiscal year; I was talking about for the next fiscal year ending June 30, 1952.

The information that I have is that we are tremendously outnumbered in tactical aviation; that air defense is very inadequate; and in order to build up the tactical force and do the other things we need to do, we ought to have an objective, for June 30, 1952, of 150 groups, rather than 95.

**Secretary Marshall.** I wouldn't reply to that offhand.

In these meetings on the budget, in which the Air brought forward their proposals; and all that was very lengthily discussed, and my understanding of that is—and Mr. Lovett, who presided at each of the meetings, he could answer that directly—that there was a general agreement that the setup, as proposed, was suitable to the situation—of course assuming that our outlay in additional facilities would permit a very rapid rate of increase over and above the original estimates.

**Senator Lodge.** Well, I always understood that the broad tactical theory of the defense of Western Europe presumed that the Western nations would not have a superiority in ground forces, and that their chance of being successful lay in having mobile and highly trained ground troops who could force the enemy to channelize into certain lines where we could then strike him with

overwhelming tactical air power.

Isn't that roughly correct?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is roughly correct.

**Senator Lodge.** And I have further been led to believe, and I made some rather conspicuous statements about it that nobody has challenged, that in so far as that tactical aviation is concerned, we not only do not have any superiority, but we are in a very flagrant inferiority, and that is why I asked the question.

Do you consider that the proposed Army strength of 18 divisions and 18 regimental combat teams is big enough?

**Secretary Marshall.** At the moment it is big enough in the sense that it is about all we can get ready hurriedly in an efficient and effective manner. There may be further increases necessary, and we have the means now of making them in a more effective manner than the original increases which consisted of entirely new divisions and the National Guard divisions in a very limited state of training.

Now particularly if this man-power bill is finally confirmed, we have the means of doing with considerable rapidity what we haven't done up to the present time.

I don't want to disclose at this moment just exactly what the thinking is, but there has been a very careful calculation in the matter, all I would say is that we are trying very hard to see that these things are effective, and that we don't proceed faster than we can produce the effective results. But we set up the machinery like the additional facilities—I am talking about in relation to industry—that makes it possible to make these increases very quickly in an effective manner when we feel we just must do it.

**Senator Lodge.** Do you not feel that we did demobilize too much and too rapidly at the end of World War II?

**Secretary Marshall.** Oh, yes, sir.

**Senator Lodge.** And that we thereby gravely weakened our diplomatic initiative and power for peace by so doing?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir. But I would say there that the important thing was to firmly set up a system that had some chance of enduring, and the failure to do that was the most serious error of all.

Maintaining a very large force, well, I do not think it is a practical political question. But I do think the confused and tumultuous demobilization was very injurious, and I feel more strongly that the failure to establish a very definite procedure for maintaining our defensive posture was a very serious error, just as I think now is the time to do this.

**Senator Lodge.** Well, do you not think then we ought to, given—this is a very broad question but, after all, we have to face broad questions—given the intensity of our national tempo, we are not phlegmatic like some peoples are, and given our political institutions and our economic institutions, do you not think it would be better for us to rapidly build up our military strength and regain the diplomatic initiative we have lost, and organize the peace, and try to do it in a hurry rather than to drag along half in and half out for 10 years?

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't think we are dragging along, sir. I think we are getting this thing in such a way there is some possibility that we will not suffer from these periods of indifference which seem to come so quickly and react against us very directly.

When you build up a force the major consideration is the system under which you do it. Now we labored, and you were a participant in the labor of developing effective troops at the time of the last war. However, your experience was a special one because you were under an unusual driver, as a man, and you were in a unit that was in no way affected by past conditions of that unit.

It was a new unit, and you suffered from none of the limitations that were inherent in another system of development.

So that we went into these preparations and we had a long, unduly prolonged, period of carrying the burden of the force and not getting the advantage of it as a force.

Now I think that is a great error because you carry an immense burden. You have withdrawn man power from industry, and you have not only withdrawn man power from industry, but we could not get the man power to set up the special training that was needed to replace the casualties.

You saw some of the effect of reduced units, which is a very fatal effect.

So that while it appeared to the public, maybe, that we had all these divisions on active duty, actually we were limited by the numbers. Under the conditions, if we could have set up what we have been struggling to do now, and I think are doing very successfully at the present time, this basic condition which enables us rapidly to do something effectively, it is very much better than getting a great many units on active duty when they are going to be longer, much longer, in being brought to a state of fighting efficiency.

Now that is my experience. I was forced in many ways—I say “I”; I was Chief of Staff of the Army—in going along with the immediate calling out of the entire National Guard. I wanted to delay even the way we came into the Selective Service. I was told politically that was not possible; I had to do it right now or it wouldn't work, we couldn't carry it through.

Well, that was wrong. That didn't accelerate our preparation, that almost limited it for the time being, and made the procedure one of embarrassment. We were submerged under complications, under lack of equipment, under all sorts of conditions adverse to a speedy development of efficiency.

I think now we have a setup that has been very rapidly developed to enable us to do these things efficiently and effectively.

Now when do we make the next step in increases is something else that I don't want to go into right now, but I think we have a much more powerful setup than is apparent to the public, and I think also we have a setup that will enable us, I think, to maintain military strength without the shock of having appropriations cut to an extent that causes the collapse of that strength.

Now I have been criticized for talking too much about collapses, but I have seen a good many of them and I saw a very recent one, and where the criticism was, “Not enough is being done,” at the same time I couldn't get things done and there was talk of asking for too much.

Now that's all in a period of about two months. We are never going to change, so we must have something that is a workable procedure. I think we have got it.

I think the power we have developed now is far beyond the comprehension of the general public or they would bring tremendous pressure to bear I think to pass this man-power bill into an effective law as quickly as possible.

I am talking at considerable length, but I feel very strongly about it and I am almost absolutely certain I am right. I apologize for my emphasis.

**Senator Lodge.** Well, that is very, very interesting and just the kind of—

**Secretary Marshall.** The application right now to this Korean situation. Here we are going into this month where certainly in the next three or four weeks we get up to the point of 20,000 men outside of replacements for casualties can go into that force. That is more than a

division a month. Well, that creates a tremendous power that has heretofore been lacking.

**Senator Lodge.** It means you are going to get some real rotation in Korea, doesn't it?

**Secretary Marshall.** When you put in 20,000 fresh men in addition to replacement of casualties a month and the prospect of 25,000 without too long a delay, you are putting in there the equivalent of over a division. Actually that would be 7,000 men more than a division once a month.

That will have a tremendous effect, and we are getting the benefit of those men who come back here with their war experience in all of the units. Now that I think is getting at an effective basis of progression.

**Senator Lodge.** Those men who have come back will be the seed corn for the new Army, will they not?

**Secretary Marshall.** They will be the experts on how you actually do it today.

**Senator Morse.** Mr. Chairman, I would like to raise a precedential point by way of a motion to recess.

**Senator Lodge.** Will you just let me finish? I have listened to everybody else and I would like to just have a chance to finish. I won't be long.

So you think that the objective of the Army is high enough now?

**Secretary Marshall.** At the present moment.

**Senator Lodge.** One final question. Is it now true when you have American troops actually overseas such as we will have in Europe, that it is just as vital for them to have tactical aviation in support of them as it is to have artillery or machine guns or anything else?

**Secretary Marshall.** Tactical aviation is absolutely essential.

**Senator Lodge.** And so if we haven't got the tactical superiority in Europe we certainly ought to go ahead and get it, oughtn't we?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Lodge.** Thank you very much, General.

**Secretary Marshall.** I am sorry I took up so much of your time.

**Senator Lodge.** I am glad you did. I think it is very valuable.

**Senator Russell.** Just one moment. Senator George had a question to ask. Before he does, I want to find out if any member of the Committee wishes us to have the security room manned on Sunday?

**Senator George.** I don't believe we should open it up.

**Senator Russell.** If no one suggests that they want to use it tomorrow, why General Mudge, will you advise the officer in charge to that effect?

**Senator George,** you wanted to ask the General a question.

**Senator George.** I wished to ask the General this. I asked for the initial estimate of the number of our forces and character that would be required to repel the aggression in Korea, the initial estimate, and I am not quite sure you said you would get it or that the Joint Chiefs—

**Secretary Marshall.** I think I recall the question, Senator George. Of course the record will show it. I called on the Joint Chiefs to give me that information.

**Senator George.** I merely wished to know, General—

**Secretary Marshall.** I recall the question. Mr. Larkin tells me that it went to the Chiefs of Staff.

**Senator George.** Now I wish to ask one additional question but merely for the purpose of asking whether the facts are in the record already.

You have spoken of this proposal to pursue the planes that may attack in Korea. You referred to it as the hot-pursuit program, suggestion or recommendation which was vetoed by I believe you said 13 nations.

Secretary Marshall. Thirteen nations.

Senator George. Did you put into the record the names of those nations?

Secretary Marshall. They were the nations who have troops fighting with us in Korea. Those are the only ones we polled on that.

Senator George. And that is in the record. They could be identified from the record already?

Secretary Marshall. Their names I believe are in the record, Senator.

Senator George. You think they are already in the record?

Secretary Marshall. I gave you the name of every country that had a contribution to our forces in Korea.

Senator George. And those were the ones that vetoed the hot-pursuit recommendation?

Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.

Senator George. Also, General, I don't know whether the record discloses the period of when that veto was taking place, over which it was taking place; is that in the record?

Secretary Marshall. I do not think it is. We will obtain the actual dates, though the State Department can give you that accurately and can give you the reactions of the nations.

Senator George. And the period of time over which you were conferring with the nations?

Secretary Marshall. Yes.

Senator George. The State Department can furnish it?

Secretary Marshall. They were the ones who conducted the negotiations.

Senator George. Very well.

Secretary Marshall. That is one specific date in the Defense Department. That is the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff and then the State Department went to work on the nations involved to get their acquiescence.

Senator Russell. There are a number of matters in this same status as those referred to by Senator George. I had a list of them I had asked to have prepared—haven't been able to locate them in this voluminous mass of matter I have accumulated.

I had assumed, Mr. Larkin, that you or someone else was keeping a list of that. When will you be ready to respond to those questions?

Mr. Larkin. We are continually gathering the material, Mr. Chairman, and some of it is difficult to obtain or at least it takes time. I think we have responded to a majority of your written requests. There are a number of verbal requests from members which we are still working on.

Senator Russell. Among them there was one by Senator Knowland on the percentage of arms captured from the Chinese Reds that were of American manufacture as distinguished from Chinese, Russian, and German; and also Senator Knowland wanted to be informed as to whether General Barr ever insisted upon having instructions for American officers and enlisted men to go to the forward units of the Chinese Nationalist Army; as to whether or not General MacArthur in January of 1945 forwarded a communication to the White House to the effect that the Japanese were contemplating complete surrender of everything but the person of the Emperor; whether, in the preparation for the conference at Yalta, military and civilian advisers contacted General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz as to their views on the advisability of having the Soviet Union enter the war in the Pacific; as to whether General MacArthur was first notified about the Manchurian provisions contained in the Yalta Agreement; and also by Senator Knowland to ascertain whether the Joint Chiefs in their memorandum of Dec. 13, 1950, recommended that the

Committee proposed then being considered not include any reference to the admission of Red China to the United Nations or the disposition of Formosa.

I have those listed, and I hope that the Department will see that that information is furnished at the first possible date.

Senator Knowland. I have a correction in the record that won't take half a minute, if I might call it to the attention of the Committee.

Senator Russell. What page?

Senator Knowland. 1415.

Senator Russell. That is in yesterday's transcript?

Senator Knowland. Yesterday's record, on the fourth paragraph down, where I was giving basic data from the United States Department of Commerce on the amount of aid to certain countries during the war years, it read, "France; \$1,770,000,000." The British Commonwealth should have read \$23,904,000,000. Then the Soviet Union, \$10,769,000,000; China, \$1,247,000,000. That is the World War II period.

Either I inadvertently picked up a wrong column here, and read Great Britain, \$4,281,000,000 when it was \$23,904,000,000.

Senator Russell. I made a notation here to check on that because it was inconceivable to me that that included everything.

Senator Lodge. I would like to request that some time in the proceedings we hear Mr. George Kennan on his estimates of the Russian intentions.

Senator Russell. Under the procedure we adopted, if you will drop me a note giving me Mr. Kennan's name and saying you want to hear him on just what you stated there, I will be very glad to proceed with it. When we proceed further with the hearings, I shall bring to the attention of the Committee an entire list of all those that have been requested, and we will evolve some procedure for determining the suggested lengths to which we will go in hearing these people.

The full Committee will have an opportunity to participate but I want members to please let me have them in writing and I can bring them all out and have them before the Committee at the proper time.

Secretary Marshall. May I make a comment?

Senator Russell. Yes, sir.

Secretary Marshall. I recall in the answers I gave to Senator Cain he coupled the naval blockade with the economic blockade.

Senator Cain. Yes, sir.

Secretary Marshall. My reply would indicate that I was applying it to both naval and economic. The answer applied to the economic.

Senator Cain. Would you care to respond to the question as to whether or not you are in support of a naval blockade as well as an economic blockade, General?

Secretary Marshall. Not at the present time, sir, not in support at the present time.

Senator Russell. The Committee will now stand in recess until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m. the Committee recessed to reconvene in the same room at 2:30 p.m.)

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator Russell. The Committee will come to order. Senator Stennis, you may proceed.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I think you have thoroughly exhausted the subject and then covered it and recovered it again, and very eminently, so I think, and you have given us a great deal of very helpful and hopeful light.

I remember when I first came on the Committee you

gave me a good strong briefing on the military man-power bill that was very helpful to me indeed.

Now when you were giving answers there to Senator Lodge there was a little confusion over here and I did not get the benefit of just what you said with reference to this matter of bombing, the hazard that would be entailed from the bombing of the Manchurian or Chinese area. Would you mind briefly repeating that again?

You explained the hazards that would come from it and how it would lead on over, as you thought perhaps, into the European picture. Would you mind repeating that briefly, please?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, we feel that the Soviet interest in the outcome of this Korean struggle is a very vital one as it affects their relations with their satellites, particularly the eastern satellites, and as the Chinese Communist group is the largest and the most valuable potential that they have to fight their battles for them.

Now the bombing into Manchuria, in close proximity, we will say, to the Soviet Union territory, both those cases we think create a hazard that might result in the Soviet intervention which we fear would start a general struggle all over the world.

[Deleted]

We do not think it is advisable to take the hazard which we think is very serious in leading to an all-out war, and in connection therewith, the comparison as to the Western European hazards, we feel are quite different from those that exist in connection with the Korean operation.

The same thought applies to other factors in connection with the extension of our operations outside of Korea proper; and in my discussions, particularly today, and yesterday with Senator Hickenlooper, I also brought out the factor that it was not entirely a one-way street.

[Deleted]

**Senator Stennis.** Well, I thank you, sir, and I apologize for asking you to repeat that, but I thought it might be cut off the record, and I knew that we did not get it here over on this side because of the confusion to the rear somewhere.

Now, there is some thought right along that line, General, of what is going to involve Russia in the war is a victory for us in Korea, and that is the thought to the effect that she is not going to let her side, so to speak, lose, and if that theory should be correct, why, a quick victory over there—I mean a bombing—or hope for a quick victory through bombing—would not be any worse than a slow solution through the present tactics, would it?

**Secretary Marshall.** I wouldn't answer—I couldn't answer that yes or no.

**Senator Stennis.** No.

**Secretary Marshall.** Because you have got two factors in there. You have got a very important factor in there, in that if you take one presentation there it would merely mean that we don't do anything—

**Senator Stennis.** Yes.

**Secretary Marshall.** —for fear we win. Well, we cannot accept that.

So, on the other hand we are fearful of this particular procedure's provoking it.

But our position before the world is quite different if we have been quite sincere and long-suffering in endeavoring to avoid such a development.

**Senator Stennis.** Well, it boils down, after all, in a very broad way to the question of what will Russia do? Or what is going to be her position? That is the main argument, and that is where the real differences of opinion comes about, is it not, General?

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Yes. I think we feel that our great opponent is the Soviet Union.

**Senator Stennis.** Yes.

**Secretary Marshall.** And that opponent exercises a tremendous influence over all these satellite countries and over a country like China, which you may not accurately characterize as a satellite country, but which, nevertheless, is highly dependent on the Soviet Union.

**Senator Stennis.** Well, one thing that has concerned me all along is about the failure of the embargo, the failure to stop the flow of the goods in there, and I can tell from your testimony you have been very much concerned about that.

I am interested in the future operations of the United Nations. It seems to me like the big question involved here is—Is it going to be able to function well enough on this first test to survive as an institution? And I cannot understand why they have been so slow about going into this economic blockade.

Now it is not something you are to blame for, or any individual or anything like that, but any comment or any additional light you could give on that I would think would be very helpful.

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, I can think of none at the moment, Senator, other than your own experience in the political discussions, in reaching agreements; and when you add to it the number of nations involved, it is an extraordinarily difficult matter; when you have their troops involved, you have added to the complications.

Now, I referred, I think before this Committee—but I will state this in case I didn't—that in the last war, we were only involved, so far as our direct negotiatory arrangements were concerned, with the British Commonwealth, that is, Great Britain, as the leader of the British Commonwealth.

**Senator Stennis.** Yes.

**Secretary Marshall.** So, we had a Combined Chiefs of Staff of the British and ourselves. The French did not come back into the struggle for a long time, of course—not that we were not able to raise some troops after taking over North Africa, and equipping them and training them.

Now, we had many difficulties, and yet there were just two sides to our discussions, in the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Now, the minute you add to that a large number of groups, take the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—there we have 12 nations, and they have their chiefs of staff, men like General Bradley, and they have their committees,—

**Senator Stennis.** Yes.

**Secretary Marshall.** Now, when you try to get together with them, you have instantly gotten the increased difficulty of any negotiatory proceedings, and that is bound to be—is bound to make it very difficult.

I think the difficulty increases with each stage of additions to the numbers involved.

Now, I think someone either put the question to me, or made the observation that we were approaching a time when collective action, in some ways, became a rather impractical proposition?

I would say it becomes a difficult proposition, but a very essential proposition, but it requires a great deal of patience.

We have that in our procedures here of necessity, and yet this is all among ourselves.

Now, when you add these other nations to it, that increases the difficulty tremendously; and as we go into this business of this group of nations' being involved in a military question of decision, and all the combinations involved in that, then you have an extraordinarily diffi-



cult procedural setup.

Yet, unless one is opposed to the policy or the theory of collective security toward the peace of the world, there is no other method possible.

Now, how do you do it? Well, I think if you go back through history, you will find time after time, when we have these annoying complications, these dangerous effects of such complications, and yet we have before us what to me is a matter of vast importance. That is, the development, gradual strengthening of the United Nations organization itself.

There has hardly been a time when we weren't involved one way or another in extreme complications—Russian vetoes, for example, complete stalemates, for example, and this time, at least at the start, they made a very rapid approach, but it is nothing unusual, it is nothing unusual when you get into difficulties, to find the complete co-operation at the start developed into a very puzzling complication.

You take, to get very intimate, you take our setup as we went into the Battle of the Bulge. Everything is fine up until the time we get into the battle and then we have recriminations from this source and from that to do something other than what we were doing. That is natural. A nation reacts almost like an individual, and we have got that right now.

**Senator Stennis.** Well, continuing on with that thought, it seems to me like what is on trial here is this idea of collective security in operation, and I believe that the thing that has disturbed the American people more than any other thing about the whole Korean matter is this economic situation, these goods being fed into China.

There might not have been as much noise made about that, but I believe that caused more concern among the thinking people and here is the idea of collective security being on trial and the leading nation, the most powerful nation, taking a strong position for that economic blockade and its people being so deeply concerned about it, it looks to me like that would be a powerful argument.

**Secretary Marshall.** It has caused a great bitterness, of course.

**Senator Stennis.** I mean it would be a powerful argument in favor of the blockade with the other nations going on, argument to them to go on and accede to it.

If that could be cleared up, it would certainly add a great deal to the idea of collective action, it seems to me.

**Secretary Marshall.** I think the economic blockade we are on the way to very rapidly clearing up.

**Senator Stennis.** I am referring to the economic blockade. Now, we voted overnight, the United Nations voted overnight to send troops in there and go to war, so to speak, and now we have spent months since Red China actually came in without taking a final vote to really impose sanctions.

**Secretary Marshall.** The moment the situation became difficult then you were involved in all sorts of, you might say, withdrawals and certainly extreme reticence.

**Senator Stennis.** I know in my study of the United Nations that its conception at the time it was being organized at all, it was greatly emphasized, the effectiveness of an economic blockade on a nation that set out to disturb the peace, so to speak, and it seems to me like the main weapon there is what we have fallen down perhaps the worst on in this first great test of the operations.

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, I would think, Senator, we have a very special condition which I hope will pass, and that is a large number of nations who are very weakly prepared and one nation that is completely prepared

so far as we know, and shows every indication of action completely against our interests.

Now I hope that situation gradually fades away in the world, and if it does to any extent, then I think the United Nations procedures would be greatly simplified.

**Senator Stennis.** And as I understood you a while ago, you said you saw strong hope for developments along that line, even in the last few weeks.

**Secretary Marshall.** I expressed my thought I think as to the developments of accord in connection with this particular operation, but you are always going to have an extremely difficult condition in the United Nations so long as so much of the world is weak and the aggressive nation, the one with an intent which is against all of our interests, is very strong.

**Senator Stennis.** Yes. Well, I had a memorandum here about the nations that objected to the principle that you referred to as hot pursuit when you wanted to invoke this policy there of hot pursuit, and you said just before lunch that you had already put the names of those nations in the record.

**Secretary Marshall.** It went in the record as the nations contributing forces or means to the fighting in Korea.

**Senator Stennis.** Yes. Well, back to the time that Senator George questioned you, I believe that was Monday morning or Tuesday morning anyway, about your mission to China, I was not a member of the Congress when you made that mission and I did not clearly get your testimony the other day, although you were clear. I just did not quite understand it.

Now you went to China, you did not go there as a soldier; you went there as a special representative of the State Department?

**Secretary Marshall.** A special representative of the President, with the rank of Ambassador.

**Senator Stennis.** Special representative of the President with the rank of Ambassador. And you said something the other day, you more or less adopted Senator George's language, but in referring to your directive would you mind repeating again there just what your directive was?

**Secretary Marshall.** My directive was to endeavor to bring to an end the internal strife in China—that is, the civil war—and the policy of our Government, as announced, related to the expressions by the President of the feeling of this country that it be advisable—desirable—that the Chinese would form a representative Government, which means, in effect, a two-party Government, in which all parties would be represented, including the Communist Party. That directive was based on negotiations that had been started by the Kuomintang Government and been carried forward, particularly from 1943 to the summer of 1944, and finally under Mr. Hurley's attendance in the fall of 1944.

That procedure had come to a definite head in October, 1945, when the proposal was made that they have this conference, this PCC, political consultative conference; and on December 18, when they had agreed on the date for that conference, which was Jan. 10, 1946.

Now, my directive in the beginning was to endeavor to use my influence in whatever way it was possible to do so, to bring the fighting to an end, and the desire over there of the various parties interested, Government, the Communists and other parties was to bring the fighting to a close before the meeting of January 10, between these various groups, and that was accomplished on the morning of the 10th. I got out there just before Christmas.

Then, thereafter, when they had reached their own agreements in this political conference of all the parties,

as a result of that, I was called upon to act as an adviser to their representatives towards the demobilization of the military forces and their amalgamation, and then later—

**Senator Stennis.** Now, pardon me, was that the Nationalist forces and the Communist forces?

**Secretary Marshall.** The Communist forces.

**Senator Stennis.** They were going to demobilize? They had agreed to that?

**Secretary Marshall.** They had agreed on that.

**Senator Stennis.** All right.

**Secretary Marshall.** And there were to be 50 Government divisions and 10 Communist divisions, and they were to be amalgamated in army corps—armies as they call them.

So, when I returned to the United States at that moment to see about getting money and technical advice, construction companies, and shipping and surplus property and UNRRA.

And on my return to China in April I found that there had been a very decided break in carrying out the terms of their agreement among themselves. From then on I was involved both in the military side in endeavoring to keep the peace and on the political side in trying to find some basis for implementing their agreements that would be acceptable to all parties.

**Senator Stennis.** Was that—or that never was consummated. The Nationalist power gradually went down from that time on?

**Secretary Marshall.** The Nationalist power started on the downhill the following December.

**Senator Stennis.** Well, the term has been used so much that you went over there to form a coalition with the Nationalists and the Communists. And as I understood the other day, you said that was not the proper use of the term. As I understood, you said you went to help form a representative Government, the two-party system.

**Secretary Marshall.** I was having specific reference to the fact that under the terms of their political agreement among themselves was involved the idea of having a coalition Cabinet, and that was the thing they couldn't start at all. All the other disagreements in the main were based on representation.

I made a misstatement, it was brought to my attention, in the record, when I stated the State Council consisted of representation of which 40 were of the National Government; actually it was 20 of the National Government and 20 of the others.

**Senator Stennis.** All of the others combined?

**Secretary Marshall.** All of the other parties, yes; with the proviso that the Generalissimo had the power of veto, and that could only be overridden by a two-third vote, which meant that part of his own party would have to be disaffected. Now it was a struggle to get that going, which was to be the intermediate setup until a properly based constitution could be agreed upon.

**Senator Stennis.** And did you see hope there—did you expect that plan to work when it was agreed on on January 10?

**Secretary Marshall.** It looked like it was very favorable. It wasn't agreed on January 10. The meeting started on January 10.

**Senator Stennis.** It was started and agreed on soon after that.

**Secretary Marshall.** It looked like it had a fair chance of success because the Communists were very anxious to go through with it, because I think quite evidently they felt that their discipline and their strength, particularly with the people of the lower classes, the peasantry, was so much better than that of the Nationalist

Government that they could gain the control politically.

And the hope in the matter so far as I saw it was that other parties—the Young China Party, Democratic League and so on, I think there were about four—and the non-party group could coalesce and the Generalissimo back them, and they would be a group which I would think would have drawn strength from both the other parties—those that were outraged at the character of the operations of the Nationalist Party in its lower echelons, and those that had gone into the Communist Party, who were not real Communists, these individuals, but they were violently antagonistic to the present regime of the Nationalist Government. And it looked as though there would be enough drawn from those groups, together with what existed in the way of an independent group, which was a very small group, to hold the balance of power between the two, alongside of the evident factor to me and to my associates that the Kuomintang Government was utterly incapable of suppressing the Communists by military means.

**Senator Stennis.** And when you got back over there from your trip to America, to check with these business firms and engineering firms and all, you found that it and already broken apart, and never did operate—

**Secretary Marshall.** It had broken apart to the extent that they hadn't gotten together in the way it was indicated in their agreements, in council.

**Senator Stennis.** Well, there was a matter just a few days ago, mentioned here, that I didn't fully understand.

You were talking about the operation of the State Department and the Defense Department, in working together at what you called the lower echelons, the working squads.

The question was first brought up by Senator Bridges, I believe, about Secretary Louis Johnson, and what changes were made after you went in on that.

I didn't understand exactly how that operated.

You put in the policy, I mean, the program of the lower echelon, working squads from the State Department and Defense Department working together—was that it?

**Secretary Marshall.** I can best explain what the condition was when I went in.

**Senator Stennis.** Yes, sir.

**Secretary Marshall.** There was rather a prohibition against individual contacts that were not formalized; so it consisted, except at the top level, largely of an exchange of memorandums, and what I did was authorize and encourage communications back and forth by the individuals concerned; and when I spoke of the lower level, working levels, I mean the pick-and-shovel men that study the documents and see what all of the implications are that they can figure out, and as a rule, propose the solution.

Well, in doing that, they would discuss, back and forth, so you would have a considerable measure of agreement before you got any further.

Then it would come to the Chiefs of Staff, and they would have meetings directly with members of the State Department.

Finally, when the matter was still in trouble, we would have those meetings in the office of the Chief of Staff, with Mr. Acheson and his assistants, and Mr. Lovett and myself and all the Chiefs of Staff, and go over each phase of the matter; or, in a very vital period, we would meet before we ever really got started in the matter, and discuss it in general, to see how it appealed to the various members, in trying to reach a—

**Senator Stennis.** That was considered the most practical way of getting these viewpoints, and all considered,

is the method evolved?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is what I have always found in such administration. I merely went ahead on the basis on which I was accustomed to.

**Senator Stennis.** Switching over to another subject, I understand General Fox was sent to Formosa by General MacArthur in September, 1950—

**Secretary Marshall.** August.

**Senator Stennis.** August, 1950, and reported back that the troops were not in condition, and so forth—were not, I will say, in condition to go into battle, then.

Well, now, I didn't understand whether there was another mission which went back later, or that presently something is going on, I understand, with reference to training?

**Secretary Marshall.** A military mission has been sent out there.

**Senator Stennis.** Yes, but has there ever been a time when those men were what you would call ready for service in Korea?

**Secretary Marshall.** I could not go back of that commission.

**Senator Stennis.** I mean they were not in August, 1950, but at any time since August, 1950, have they been ready for battle service?

**Secretary Marshall.** I can't tell you that until I see the report of our military mission which has just gone out there.

**Senator Stennis.** Well, I do not mean to try to go into it in detail, but after reading the Wake Island report, the report of the Wake Island conference, General Marshall, the thing that impressed me was how they were all off, you might say, on their intelligence and how far wrong they were as to what was going to happen.

There has been a great deal said about the lack of intelligence and the lack of co-operation among the different agencies of intelligence. As I say, it has a great bearing in my thinking because it is quite disappointing to me to see how far off all of them were at this Wake Island conference. Could you give us any light on the operation of intelligence, or should that come better from the Chiefs of Staff? I leave that to you.

**Secretary Marshall.** I will say this, Senator, and it is a rather touchy subject.

**Senator Stennis.** Well, I am asking it just for light.

**Senator Connally.** Turn the light on.

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, I am trying to answer you.

**Senator Stennis.** I know you are.

**Secretary Marshall.** It is a rather touchy subject, particularly because it takes a long time to develop an effective intelligence service such as we intend for the CIA under General Smith, and one of our great difficulties as I see it is the amount of public discussion in regard to it, because all of that detracts against it.

I think those special agencies, notably Great Britain and others, you never hear of them, I doubt if you even know the designation of the unit. It is just kept entirely out of discussion, comment, and we have a long way to go to reach the point where we have more authoritative sources.

However, in this particular case, it is bound to be a matter of speculation. It is bound to be a matter of speculation.

You could have a concentration of troops as a threat and you could have a concentration of troops with the definite intent to go ahead aggressively; but I believe that we will be quite a while yet before we have developed our Central Intelligence Agency to the point where it can give us more accurate reports.

It is a problem not only of direction, but more particu-

larly of opportunity for development, because you can't do any of these things openly.

We are weakened a great deal by the concentration of public attention on the instrument from which we expect all this secret data, because, if other countries know what we are about, we don't get anything along that particular line. So I think it is of great importance that it be made more effective, but I think it has to be given time and it has to be given more secrecy, more remoteness from public attention, or it can never be very effective, in my own opinion; because its most effective sources you have just got to be absolutely silent about and hardly even think about.

That comes up in a great many matters. In its inception, first build-up, I was opposed to some of the first contacts being proposed, not by the agency, but by others, in connection with the Government; and I thought those contacts should not be because it involved too many people, involved almost essentially a breakdown, and, therefore, it would be an ineffective service; and therefore it is not as dependable as it should be.

**Senator Stennis.** I reckon we can express the hope that the intelligence upon which our Army is having to operate there is better than it was just prior to the invasion by the Chinese Reds. I am sure you have cause to think it will be better.

**Secretary Marshall.** We have a good many struggles with intelligence. The Battle of the Bulge, landing in Normandy was a German struggle for intelligence, our landing in Africa was a struggle for intelligence. All that is involved. Some have been successful and some have not. That is always the case, but I hope it will be improved.

**Senator Stennis.** You spoke of this retaliatory bombing that we could experience. Now, where was this strength to come from, this retaliatory bombing?

**Secretary Marshall.** In November, so far as our information was concerned that I was aware of, there was a build-up in the number of planes that the Chinese Communists were reported to have in Manchuria; but later on in January and particularly March, there were indications of a very decided build-up, which added to the threat of a very effective retaliation, but that was not the case in a large way, as I recall the information, in November.

**Senator Stennis.** Well now, this build-up of that strength, this was not coming directly out of China, was it? Do you not think there was a Soviet connection there when that new air strength—

**Secretary Marshall.** I am quite certain the Chinese did not build the planes.

**Senator Stennis.** Yes. They build practically none, as I understand it, practically none in China.

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't think they build bombers and fighting planes.

**Senator Stennis.** Well, you mention here about the replacements and all. This replacement program for the soldiers, then, is already in operation as to Korea, and it is just a matter now of the wheel continuing to turn, is that correct?

**Secretary Marshall.** Rotation.

**Senator Stennis.** Rotation, yes.

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir. You see, up until March, we couldn't even obtain enough men for the actual replacements of casualties, except by going into our units back here and taking them away from those units, and to that extent decidedly lessening and temporarily destroying, almost, the efficiency of those units.

Finally, in March we began to catch up in the production of trained men so that we reached a point toward the latter part of March where for the first time we could

provide all the replacements from these trained men.

Now, the next struggle was to get enough trained and developed as individuals to start the rotation. So, I think actually what happened in the end of March was that for the first time we provided all the replacements that were needed for casualties, discharges and other gradual reductions of the forces, and about 7,000 men for the first time for rotation.

Now, since that, we have been able in April to provide all the men for replacements, and I think it is 12,000 for rotation.

As we get into this month, May, by the end of May, we ought to be approaching 20,000 for rotation, and be able to meet all of our replacements without touching any of our units in this country.

To step away from the Korean campaign, we want to increase this production of trained men so that we can begin to put in the ranks of the National Guard the trained basic soldiers.

**Senator Stennis.** So you have then the replacement program, and the rotation program already in effect now.

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Stennis.** But that does not involve any reinforcements, not any large-scale reinforcements anyway?

**Secretary Marshall.** It has involved, up to March, including March, the build-up to normal organizational strength because they were still about almost 2,000 understrength in American soldiers. The deficiency was being made up by South Korean soldiers.

But, by the end of March, I think we had replaced, in some cases not even replaced because they had never had them, a full strength of U. S. soldiers.

**Senator Stennis.** You mean the divisions were something like 2,000 short and filled by South Koreans?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Stennis.** But all that you have said does not mean that you are having any additional number of divisions there at any given time?

**Secretary Marshall.** What I have been talking about is the refreshing and stimulating and strengthening of the unit and the great improvement of morale as a result of those actions I have said nothing about reinforcements.

**Senator Stennis.** That we understand.

Thank you very much, General Marshall, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Senator Russell.** Thank you, Senator Stennis.

**Senator Fulbright.**

**Senator Fulbright.** Mr. Secretary, I hesitate to burden this record any further, but for appearances' sake I had better direct a few remarks to show my presence here, and perhaps because of the fact that not all arguments have been thrust upon you in the last six days, but I will try to limit myself to just a few questions.

**Senator Knowland.** Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the Senator would like to speak up. We would like to hear his questions over here.

**Senator Fulbright.** Well, Senator, General Marshall's voice is exhausted, and I unconsciously sort of felt that mine was, too, after talking for a week. I do not blame him.

**Secretary Marshall.** I will try to do better.

**Senator Fulbright.** He sounds just like I feel after I have been talking for four or five hours at a stretch.

You said a moment ago, I believe, in answer to a question of Senator Stennis, that you regard our great opponent as Soviet Russia.

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Fulbright.** You do not regard this struggle as a sort of modern ideological crusade against Communism, I take it?

**Secretary Marshall.** When I said Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union, I was thinking in terms of the Communist Government.

**Senator Fulbright.** Well, that is true; they are communistic, with which I agree. I understood you to say that the enemy we are concerned about is Russia. It is the armies of Soviet Russia.

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct, sir.

**Senator Fulbright.** If those armies did not happen to be Communist, but were the old-fashioned imperialists of the Czars, you would still be concerned about them, wouldn't you?

**Secretary Marshall.** If they had shown the indications—

**Senator Fulbright.** That is what I mean. If they aggressed against, if they invaded countries; if they exhibited a tendency to expand, dominate all their neighbors, which the old-fashioned imperialism did in various instances from Napoleon and the Czars, whenever they had an opportunity.

My only point is that you do not look upon this as sort of a crusade against Communism everywhere and in any form; but it is because it is an aggressive force, and has taken on the power of the Russian state is what concerns you, is it not?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Fulbright.** Now, with regard to Yugoslavia, it was my understanding that the Department of Defense supported our actions in giving relief, assistance to Yugoslavia this year, is that not correct?

**Secretary Marshall.** During my period, that is correct, and I think otherwise elsewhere.

**Senator Fulbright.** If I recall correctly, General Bradley or General Collins—some member came up and testified in behalf of that legislation.

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Fulbright.** Well, now the Yugoslavs are admitted Communists, are they not?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Fulbright.** But the significant thing is they do not adhere nor are they subject to the directions of Moscow, isn't that what makes them different from other Communists?

**Secretary Marshall.** Exactly that.

**Senator Fulbright.** It seems to me a good illustration of the point I am seeking to make is this is not a crusade. What we are really concerned about is the threatening force of arms directed by Moscow, is that correct?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct, with the results that would follow.

**Senator Fulbright.** Granted that Communism has turned out to be an effective tool in the hands of an expansive power and one that has made it difficult for us to combat because as a nation we do not understand very well psychological warfare, for example. We have refused up to now to support adequately a propaganda effort.

Right now the House has recently cut I think 90 per cent off of the recommended program and we have always had difficulty in the Congress in such a program. Well, it is in that field that Communism is especially effective as a propaganda weapon, is it not?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct, sir.

**Senator Fulbright.** It seems to me that is a matter which some of our people are a little bit confused about and it may lead to some important differences as to the way we approach the war.

Now it leads to one other question. General MacArthur made a statement that was received with much enthusiasm that there is no substitute for victory. Now, if it is an ideological crusade, I think that idea fits very

a continuation of the age-old struggle between tyranny in one form or another and the forces of law and order as we believe they are, it seems to me that there is room for qualifying the thought that there is no substitute for victory. Here is what I have in mind. We had unconditional victory in the last war, did we not?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Fulbright.** We defeated Germany and Japan unconditionally.

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Fulbright.** I would not say that the result has been entirely satisfactory, has it?

**Secretary Marshall.** It wouldn't seem so, sir.

**Senator Fulbright.** So it looks as if we are justified in examining that idea of unconditional surrender, does it not?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Fulbright.** Isn't that what you really are approaching in your policy in Korea, that you are seeking a way that you can compromise—compromise is a bad word. It has come to have a meaning perhaps that is difficult to explain, like the word "appeasement," which used to be a very respectable word but now has become a word which you don't dare to use in any connection, so we will leave those two out. But aren't we trying in Korea in a sense not to go for all-out victory in the sense we did in the last war, partly because we found that not to be effective to achieve our purposes, but to do something short of that which in this instance is to avoid a war as long as we possibly can, with the hope that we may never have an all-out war? Isn't that what your real objective is?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is the objective to the extent that it first appeared necessary to destroy the aggressor considering the geographical situation and the continued menace which would follow for the South Korean Government if that aggressor from North Korea remained in organized being.

Now, as I understood the application of the United Nations' action in the matter and our own procedure in connection with it, we were trying to bring to a halt any idea of aggression, of any people who attempt that sort of action, and particularly recognizing that this was an aggression which was undoubtedly stimulated, organized, by the Soviet Union.

**Senator Fulbright.** Yes. I grant that is certainly an essential and, you might say, primary purpose—to prevent the expansion of Russian power, to prevent aggression. But I can not quite agree, nor I do not think you mean to say, that that is all of it, that it is purely negative. It seems to me that we at the same time are trying to establish the machinery by which these international disputes may be settled by some kind of persuasion or reason rather than this idea of complete victory, unconditional surrender.

To put it another way—do you not think we would be perhaps faced with a difficult situation assuming we completely defeated China and Russia? What would we do with them? Would we not have the same situation on a bigger scale that we have had with Germany and Japan—a very difficult situation with regard to administration? We do not have the people. We would not want to go in and administer. I mean that idea of complete victory does not entirely solve the situation, does it? What we really want is for them to give up their aggression and to accept the United Nations, is it not, which would bring a machinery for settling our differences by peaceful means rather by force? Would you not say that is really our objective?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think our real desire is to have

which establish the practice of acting like a decent nation should.

**Senator Fulbright.** That is right, through the United Nations. That is the way we have suggested.

**Secretary Marshall.** That is our machinery—

**Senator Fulbright.** That is the machinery we have accepted—

**Secretary Marshall.** —for that action.

**Senator Fulbright.** It seems to me that this idea there is no policy in Korea, that there is no objective is one that is not sound, even though this objective is a new kind of objective and one is not surrounded by all the glamour and emotional connections that the old-fashioned victory is surrounded with. It is much easier to appeal to most people's emotions by talking with the language and concepts we used a century ago, but it seems to me this objective is just as real, albeit it is a new one, a new kind of objective. But it is one we consciously wanted new because we are not satisfied with the old way of having a war every 25 years. It seems to me that is what we had in mind.

I grant it is a very difficult thing to put into language that is appealing to the press and to the people, but that still remains the job, I think, of the Government to do it.

I just wondered if some thoughts along that line might not be helpful, because I feel very strongly myself that that is what we are groping for in this struggle in Korea, the first and the most real opportunity to try to make the United Nations have some substance and have some real meaning.

We had that opportunity in Ethiopia and it was turned down by the League of Nations. Wouldn't you say that is a fairly good example?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think that is a very good example.

**Senator Fulbright.** If we had done the same thing then as now, or, even better, if we had done the same thing when Hitler moved into the Rhineland and said, "No, you won't"—even if we had to go to war, we might very well have established the principle then we are trying to establish now; is that true?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think that is so. What we are struggling for is a genuine basis of collective action.

**Senator Fulbright.** That is right.

**Secretary Marshall.** To secure the peace.

**Senator Fulbright.** The trouble we have is that those words, "collective action" and "reason" and "reconciliation of differences" don't sound good and they are not sort of vaguely connected with knights in shining armor and they don't look good in headlines and that is why it is extremely difficult to sell these ideas to the people, it seems to me.

The other approach has a great deal more sex appeal in a political sense, political appeal, than the old-fashioned way.

One other thing. I would take it from that that you do not feel that full-scale war with Russia is inevitable at all.

**Secretary Marshall.** I do not think it is inevitable. I think it is a very dangerous possibility.

**Senator Fulbright.** I agree with that.

**Secretary Marshall.** And I think the degree of danger depends a great deal on how we carry ourselves. One simple factor is that we prepare to meet such an emergency in time to have the deterrent action that we so much hope for.

**Senator Fulbright.** I have had a feeling myself—and, of course, I don't pose as an expert—but a sort of feeling about the matter that if we can get through the next 18 months without a real war with Russia, that we might



very well be over the top, that they were not sure.

**Secretary Marshall.** How many months?

**Senator Fulbright.** Just out of the air I said 18 months. I was taking that—that isn't far from what—

**Secretary Marshall.** That certainly will make a great difference in our strength if we proceed in the way we are going and we would present a much more formidable prospect to the Soviet Government in their undertaking an aggressive operation.

**Senator Fulbright.** I think after this initial difficulty with our allies that, as this thing develops, our own differences can be reconciled and we are making progress, I believe, in spite of our mutual criticisms, toward a better understanding among ourselves.

Which brings me up to my last question. If you have any statistics on the casualties of this last three weeks, I have heard it said by, I believe, and read estimates of tremendous casualties, something in the neighborhood of 80,000 for our enemies and some three or four thousand for ourselves, of which a very large percentage were of our allies.

Is there anything secret about those statistics?

**Secretary Marshall.** No, sir; we will get you exactly that.

**Senator Fulbright.** Do you happen to have them?

**Secretary Marshall.** I want to get the exact terms of what you are talking about.

**Senator Fulbright.** What I would think would be interesting, and if they are as I have understood them to be, I think it would be—I do not mean that casualties are ever anything but very sad things, but still they give an insight into the thing.

It was something to this effect: How much of the casualties were our enemies—I don't know whether you have it—between just dead and battle casualties, as a whole, and our own; and especially with our own, how many were Americans and how many were allies.

I was told, and I don't vouch for it at all, because it was unofficial, that ours were somewhere in the neighborhood of 4,000, and that half of those were our allies and half, Americans.

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, you spoke of the last three weeks, and I presume you were referring to, or covering this recent phase of the Soviet attack?

**Senator Fulbright.** That is right.

**Secretary Marshall.** I will obtain that for you, in those terms that you have mentioned.

**Senator Fulbright.** I think it would be very interesting.

**Secretary Marshall.** We have them in a number of different ways, but they are very hard to resolve to a particular period. I will have that done.

**Senator Fulbright.** Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

I want to draw the Chairman's attention to the fact that I took only 20 minutes.

**Senator Russell.** Thank you, Senator.

**Senator Flanders.**

**Senator Flanders.** General Marshall, I also am going to try to be very brief.

Did I call you "General Marshall," or "General MacArthur"?

I intended to say "General Marshall" or "Secretary Marshall."

When General MacArthur was here, I questioned him with regard to whether or not there were any large deposits of, or reserves of, supplies in Siberia which were adequate for carrying on a fairly continued offensive, as distinguished from a defensive.

I don't remember his exact words, but he said he felt that the Soviet preparations were defensive only, and he knew of no large reserves of supplies.

I think you used the phrase "thousands of planes" in the Vladivostok region, and large land forces in Sakhalin.

Do you feel that the Russians are prepared for an offensive movement of some dimensions?

**Secretary Marshall.** I felt, from the information that has been given me from our various sources, that the Soviet had a considerable build-up in the Far East, which had built up in a rather recent period, notably in Sakhalin, and the vicinity of Vladivostok, as to the planes, and Port Arthur and Dairen, as to the planes.

Now, as to the build-up of supplies, I don't recall exactly what has been given me, but as to the possible power of such a Soviet setup, I have gotten the impression from the information, that it conveys a great threat to Japan, and it was that reason in particular that caused me to exercise considerable pressure to have the two divisions of the National Guard sent out to Hokkaido. General MacArthur had asked for four divisions at an earlier period when there were none available for—

**Senator Flanders.** Hokkaido is the northern island—

**Secretary Marshall.** The northern island, which comes very close to Sakhalin, and my own fear without recalling the exact details of the thing—my own fear was very great that our hazard was there, and we should terminate it as quickly as we could do it; [delete] so that my reaction from the data was very different from that I read—which he stated; but I think you could get a more precise answer from the Chiefs of Staff.

**Senator Flanders.** Would you be willing to say whether you think the difference of opinion between yourself and General MacArthur, on this matter, is a difference of judgment, or a difference of information?

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't know, sir. I have checked very carefully to see that all the information from the CIA went to his headquarters, and I presume, of course, he either saw it specifically, or it was briefed for his attention.

**Senator Flanders.** Here is another matter. This is a thing which has puzzled me in the testimony.

Why would the various proposals of January 12th, listed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and sent to General MacArthur on January 12th—conditioned on the conflict being stabilized, or having Korea evacuated—why were these suggested methods of offensive action tied to stalemate, or defeat—perhaps the word "stalemate" is not equivalent to "stabilized," if so, I don't know what stabilized means?

**Secretary Marshall.** I have talked about that in various ways, Senator; but I do suggest that you ask the originators of the phrase, and they can give you a direct answer as to what their intent was.

**Senator Flanders.** I have listened and, to some extent, scanned the testimony and still find myself mystified by that situation; but I will ask the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The next question I am afraid I will have to wait for the answer too: Why is not such a stalemate as you hope for, a justification for the offensive actions proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

I will excuse you—I just ask that question now, and am excusing you from answering, and reminding myself to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I think that is a very mysterious situation, from anything I have been able to read in the record here, or from any of the witnesses.

Now, Mr. Secretary, you and I are about the same age. I looked it up in certain books of reference, and find that I am three months and three days older than you are.

**Secretary Marshall.** That gives you an advantage.

**Senator Flanders.** However, I am not going to pull sen-

We have seen, I think, in our lifetime, I reckon, about five wars. We have seen the Spanish-American War, the Philippine War, the conquest of the native tribes of the Philippines; the First World War; the Second World War; and this war, not now officially a war, but having all of the obvious aspects of a war.

I think in all of those except this last one, we have seen an immense amount of discussion and dissension among the American people, and in the Congress as we approached it.

However, in each case, as Senator Knowland said yesterday, or the day before, when it became obvious that we were in the fight, the American people buckled down and saw it through.

Now, this latest event, it seems to me, has two unusual features: One of them is that almost immediately it seemed to meet the approval of the people—in fact, I must admit, or think, I can say that it met, at the time, with the approval of some of us who are criticizing it now; but it did meet with general approval because it seemed to be the thing to do, both in policy, and as a matter of right and morals as well.

**Senator Flanders.** But there is one thing that it seems to me in which this particular contest differs from any we have ever had, and perhaps differs from anything that the world has seen hitherto, and that is that we are given no idea as to what the military end of our present engagement is going to be. We have presented to us a sort of vacuum. And it is my strong belief that the attractiveness of General MacArthur's program is because it drops into this aching void of one knowing nothing of what the military end is that we are aiming at. And General MacArthur proposes something to put in there and nobody else does.

I am speaking for myself when I say that nobody else does because I cannot get my fingers on anything definite except just keeping on a while longer and seeing what happens.

I think that accounts, aside from General MacArthur's great achievements, his great reputation, and his undoubted picturesqueness—he has offered an end.

I think along with that goes a certain suspicion on the part of the American people that there may be an end in sight, but one which is not thought politic to put into words. It is difficult to think of any conclusion which can be arrived at by negotiation with those who oppose us which does not involve appeasement. So I think that is the question that is in the back of the minds of everybody, and it keeps continually coming to the surface as the real expectation of the end—an end in which the military operations are concluded on an agreement which either immediately or in due course of time, whatever the due course of time may be, involves the recognition of Communist China in place of Nationalist China in the United Nations, and the turning over of Formosa.

Now you have unequivocally and unhesitatingly disavowed for yourself that end to this military operation, as I have heard you and as I have read what you have said. But, in the absence of any other possible conclusion presented, it seems to me that that suspicion is bound to remain and bound to grow.

And so I have made a speech instead of asking you a question, but leading up to this question: Can you suggest any end to these military operations which would be a reasonable conclusion to come to bring them to a conclusion?

**Secretary Marshall.** Of course, I am a little embarrassed there, Senator, with going into statements that lead to the conclusion of a war plan. However, I can say

particularly during the last three months there has developed a procedure as to the way our forces are being conducted, first under General Ridgway, and now under General Van Fleet, which has been highly destructive of Chinese Communist power, meaning trained forces.

[Deleted]

We face a situation where in the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff—and you can ask them directly—of the procedures to be followed—there does not appear at the moment any along the line of the conventional military operation.

Just what we can do to change that aspect is a matter that is constantly under consideration, but, as I have said many times, we feel that the procedures as proposed by General MacArthur of limitations that we should not abandon, I mean of not limitations, of conditions which we consider we should not risk.

Now I appreciate the point of view as to public reactions and congressional reactions in this matter. I don't know what else to say to you at this time. I do not think the situation is so dubious as has been expressed here a great many times, and I am getting an increasing confidence towards the possibility of a satisfactory conclusion. Whether or not it will be a military triumph or not I don't know how you would characterize it.

It would be a triumphant demonstration I think of our military powers in proportion to the people engaged, but it would not include, I am quite certain, the matters that you referred to which you fear in relation to Formosa and the entrance of the Communist Government into the United Nations.

**Senator Flanders.** Have you any thought or suggestion as to with whom we would treat when it came to such a conclusion as we hoped for? Would it be with some exhausted remnant of the North Korean Government or would it be with Communist China or would it be with Russia or who would it be with?

**Secretary Marshall.** I hope it won't be with Russia. I can't answer you specifically, Senator.

**Senator Flanders.** If I knew with whom we could treat, I could make a suggestion.

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, the suggestion might be very valuable. I will say this, though, that in treating certainly with the Soviet Union, and I presume with the North Korean representation, and I also feel certain with the Chinese-regime representation, that we would have to proceed to get the best conditions but we would never dare relax with the feeling that they were conclusive for quite a time.

**Senator Flanders.** Mr. Chairman, may I make a three-minute suggestion?

**Senator Russell.** Yes, sir, we have no limitation here.

**Senator Flanders.** Except that we are supposed to ask questions and listen.

**Senator Russell.** Well, you will not be setting any new precedent if you make a great long statement before you ask a question, Senator.

**Senator Flanders.** Well, I will promise to ask a question at the end of it. This will not take me long, but if we knew with whom to treat, with whom to discuss, here is something we might do.

**Senator Connally.** Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Senator a question?

**Senator Flanders.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Connally.** Would you consider it proper that we might deal with an intermediary, some government?

**Senator Flanders.** Yes, an intermediary between us and whom?

**Senator Connally.** All of them.

**Senator Flanders.** The question is with whom.

Senator Connally. Yes.

Senator Flanders. Yes.

Senator Connally. You suggest that.

Senator Flanders. Yes.

Suppose that we ask our Ambassador, Mr. Austin, in the United Nations to call attention to the immense loss of life, the immense cost and the suffering, both of the armies and the civilian populations that was going on; make the proposal, which is essentially the original United Nations' purpose, of arranging a cease-fire, but setting up a commission to administer the cease-fire, and the withdrawal of forces, but have ready a distinctly United Nations force in which we would not be 90 per cent or thereabouts, of the thing, to maintain civil order, and then spend—allow three years of government under the United Nations to be followed by a free election at the end, and then spend a fraction of what we are now spending, and ask the other nations to appropriate their corresponding fractions to rebuilding that unhappy country.

Now, that is something that is new in the world's history, and it seems to me something new is required; and it just strikes me that if that is subject to the veto power of the Soviet Government that their faces would get very red if they proposed to veto a proposal of that sort.

Secretary Marshall. I don't think they possess a blush.

Senator Flanders. Well, it seems to me that some unusual way out of this thing has to be found, and I am just making this suggestion, and I promised to ask a question at the end of it, and the question would be, do you think it is worth considering?

Secretary Marshall. Well, I think certain phases of that have already been considered. I don't undertake to pass on the complete statement, but I know certain phases of that we have been considering very carefully; how, if the fighting was terminated, would we set up the situation under those conditions.

Senator Flanders. The additional point then that I am recommending, and trying to make, is as to whether the suggestions may not contain in it some things that would tend to end the fighting; that is, not merely to apply it after the fighting, but there may be in it something useful in shortening the period of conflict.

Secretary Marshall. And I might also say that Mr. Pace, if you call him before your Committee, as I believe you are doing, can give you, I think, some very illuminating statements regarding the role he was to carry out in the rehabilitation of Korea after this devastating experience.

Senator Flanders. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General Marshall.

Senator Russell. Senator Sparkman.

Senator Sparkman. I have sat here all through this week listening to you. I have been here, I believe, every session and most of the time and, in addition to that, I have been reading the transcript each day.

I wish to say I think you have made a wonderful contribution in the manner in which you have cleared up many of these things that many of us were wondering about.

I think you have given us a background and perspective that otherwise we might not have had.

I realize that most of the questions that I should like to ask have been asked, most of them many times, and I hope that I shall not keep you very long. I do want to ask just a few brief questions, which I think will call for very brief answers; first, with reference to the use of the Nationalist troops. Now, General MacArthur in his testimony said that in his opinion it would take about four months to make them ready for use.

I did not get whether he meant four months from this

Secretary Marshall. I can't answer that offhand. I have forgotten. All I remember is Chiang Kai-shek offered 33,000 the one period.

Senator Sparkman. In the period—

Secretary Marshall. In the beginning, and it wasn't found advisable to accept them on the basis of efficiency, equipment—

Senator Connally. Didn't he refuse to accept them?

Secretary Marshall. I beg your pardon?

Senator Connally. Didn't he oppose accepting them at that time?

Senator Sparkman. General MacArthur did.

Senator Connally. That is what I am talking about.

Senator Sparkman. For two reasons.

Secretary Marshall. On our side of the water on the ground of the hazard introduced into the general situation in relation to enlargement of the war and the possibility of the Soviet Government coming into the war.

Again in November he made another proposal, which was either 40,000 or 60,000—I think 60,000—and the reaction of the Chiefs of Staff to that was based largely on the Fox group of 37 men.

Senator Sparkman. That was the group General MacArthur himself sent down.

Secretary Marshall. It came from his headquarters under his direction, but it was requested by the Chiefs of Staff.

Senator Sparkman. I remember his testifying—

Secretary Marshall. Covered most of the month of August and they made the report the 11th of September.

Senator Sparkman. As I understand it, this mission recently has been sent in accordance with the recommendations made by that board and in accordance with the recommendations subsequently carried out with the Generalissimo.

Secretary Marshall. That is correct, I think.

Senator Sparkman. Now, General MacArthur also testified before us that it was not his recommendation that the Nationalist troops be moved to the mainland en masse, but that he did think that there were possibilities for a limited number to be used in Korea for some—through infiltration to join the guerrillas, the non-Communists on the mainland, and others to be used in small forays or commando landing parties and such as that.

I don't know whether you care to comment on it or not, but is there very much guerrilla activity going on? That is, back of the Communist lines.

Secretary Marshall. I would not like to talk about that, sir.

Senator Sparkman. I will not press for it.

General MacArthur did say—and as I understand, this has been the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, too—that the primary objective of the forces on Formosa is to defend Formosa.

Secretary Marshall. Correct, sir.

Senator Sparkman. And has been from the first.

Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.

Senator Sparkman. General Marshall, that leads me to this question, and it seems that you are going to have to repeat this just about every day in order to keep people from saying the wrong thing—and that is with reference to Formosa. You have said here, without any equivocation, that it is the policy of our Government, and has been, I believe you said, for at least two years, that Formosa should under no conditions fall into Communist hands.

Secretary Marshall. The reference to two years, I don't think is correct.

Senator Sparkman. I thought I saw that used.

Secretary Marshall. I don't recall making that statement, but it has been for some time the definite policy,

it has been the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff, it has been my own thought, and it has been the policy of the Government.

**Senator Sparkman.** And it is very definitely the policy of the Government now?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct, sir.

**Senator Sparkman.** And that same thing applies to the recognition of Red China?

**Secretary Marshall.** It does.

**Senator Sparkman.** And seating of Red China in the United Nations?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes.

**Senator Sparkman.** And the admission of Red China—

**Secretary Marshall.** Just a minute, Senator. The recognition of Red China I am not commenting on one way or the other, but the two things I was talking about were their introduction to the United Nations and the security of Formosa.

**Senator Sparkman.** And the security of Formosa?

**Secretary Marshall.** From Communist control.

**Senator Sparkman.** Now, General Marshall, you were quoted as saying that you would advocate the use of the veto to prevent the seating of Communist China in the United Nations and, of course, it is charged repeatedly that the United States is going to favor or at least to let go by suffrance the seating of Red China in the United Nations.

Now, you know nothing of any such plan as that, do you?

**Secretary Marshall.** No, sir; I do not.

**Senator Sparkman.** Did you say—the record—it seems there was a break into your answer, and the record was not carried out fully—but, in your opinion, if the veto can be used, do you believe it ought to be used?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, I stepped into pretty deep water there. In the first place, I think I said that the power of the veto is a legal question in some respects, and it is any lawyer's respective view.

As to the policy of this Government as to the use of the veto, I am not sufficiently informed; at the time I was talking about it, I was endeavoring to make clear that I thought very positive action should be taken to prevent Formosa from falling into the control of the domination of any Communist government or regime.

**Senator Sparkman.** Or to allow China to be seated in the United Nations?

**Secretary Marshall.** The same.

**Senator Sparkman.** As I recall, you bracketed the two together.

**Secretary Marshall.** I have not discussed this with the State Department as to the veto provision, because that wasn't exactly my bailiwick, but I did barge into it.

**Senator Sparkman.** General Marshall, I want to say I am certainly in complete accord with you; yet I think it is only fair for the record to show the thing you have just said, that there is honest difference of opinion over the legal question as to whether or not the veto can be used, and I will call your attention—

**Secretary Marshall.** I was merely told by my lawyer in the Defense Department that this was a lawyer's paradise for backs and forths. That is all I know.

**Senator Sparkman.** We will not tie you into legal discussions, but I call your attention to an article in the *Washington Evening Star* of yesterday afternoon, an Associated Press article quoting former United States Senator Warren R. Austin, of Vermont, who is now our Ambassador to the United Nations and our Representative on the Security Council, in which he dictated a statement and, Mr. Chairman, I should like to read the statement into the record. Mr. Austin's statement in part follows, and I quote:

There is a great deal of confusion on the question of whether or not the seating of the Chinese Communists can be vetoed. The Charter of the United Nations gives the great powers the right to the admission of new members, but the Charter names China as a member of the United Nations.

"Therefore the issue is not one of whether or not China should be admitted but rather one posing the question which one of two claimant governments should occupy the Chinese seat. This is a decision to be made by two-thirds majority of the 60 members of the United Nations and not one on which the exercise of the veto will be allowed. It is a question of credentials, not of admission. We believe in rule by law and we believe the law does not give us the power to veto in this matter.

"However, we shall continue to do everything in our power to persuade the majority not to admit the Chinese Reds."

I just thought that in all fairness to the record it would be well to have that placed in it at this point.

**Senator Smith.** Will the Senator yield for just a second?

**Senator Sparkman.** Very briefly, yes.

**Senator Smith.** Would you object to putting in the editorial on the same subject in the *New York Times* this morning?

**Senator Sparkman.** No, no, I would be very glad to because I admit the differences that do exist, real differences of good lawyers, and I would be very glad to have that in at the same point.

**Senator Russell.** The editorial will go into the appendix. I believe that will be Exhibit F, according to the chart I am trying to keep.

**Senator Smith.** Put those two editorials together as they are.

**Senator Sparkman.** This is an Associated Press news item.

**Senator Smith.** Thank you, Senator.

**Senator Sparkman.** Yes, sir.

Now General Marshall, there is another question I am not sure has been answered. If it has, I do not care about cluttering up the record, but the question that has always come into my mind has been this with reference to the use of Nationalist troops, and let me say I for one have always felt that the Nationalist troops on Formosa did constitute a real asset for this country, both for the defense of Formosa and for possible use to help any movement that might be to our advantage, and so I am not one that believes that they just ought to be discredited entirely, but the question has often come to my mind whether or not it would be just as economical and just as feasible to use these additional South Koreans that are available in lieu of the Nationalist Chinese, that is in Korea.

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, the best military opinion I can give you now and coming from out there is our present use of them in filling vacancies in the existing South Korean divisions is their most effective use, and it is not desirable under the conditions that now exist to increase the number of divisions. That is General Ridgway's recommendation, and I think approximately General MacArthur's recommendation.

**Senator Sparkman.** Now, General Marshall, this letter from President Truman on January 13 that you placed in the record yesterday or the day before; I have forgotten which—it must have been the day before yesterday because in yesterday morning's *Washington Post* was a news item headed—"MacArthur's views on message given." General MacArthur himself is not quoted, but General Whitney, his aide, is quoted. The substance

of it is that by the letter of January 13th the President in effect, was intending to pull out of Korea, and that it was to be taken as an excuse—in fact, General Whitney used the phrase—"to make the 8th Army a scapegoat."

Now, I thought, as a matter of fact, the impression I got from reading the letter was the purpose of it, and perhaps the effect of it, was to stimulate greater resistance over there rather than any urging or indication of pulling out or withdrawal.

**Secretary Marshall.** I am quite certain there was no consideration of any kind in the most remote manner of the President trying to make the 8th Army a scapegoat. I think the message itself can be read in plain terms, and I would not endeavor to interpret it because I think it is a simple matter of understanding.

**Senator Sparkman.** Was there any intention at any time to make the 8th Army the scapegoat?

**Secretary Marshall.** I have just answered that.

**Senator Sparkman.** I mean not in connection with this letter but at any time.

**Secretary Marshall.** That would almost be treasonable.

**Senator Sparkman.** Well, I agree with you, and yet that is the statement that I am reading from this—

**Secretary Marshall.** I didn't select that aide, you know.

**Senator Sparkman.** —United Press article. He refers to it in so many words.

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't care to discuss it, Senator.

**Senator Sparkman.** He says, "MacArthur wasn't going to use the 8th Army as a scapegoat."

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't care to discuss his procedure.

**Senator Sparkman.** All right. I just wanted to be certain that we got it onto the record that it was not intended to lessen the resistance but really to step it up, was it not?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think you can read the message from the President and understand it very clearly.

**Senator Sparkman.** That is the way I read it.

Now, I was very glad that you brought out many of these things in a true perspective—for instance, the message to General MacArthur suggesting the possibility of sending arms over there to use to arm South Koreans, by which the number could be increased, as I recall, a minimum of 75,000 and a maximum of 300,000, and he decided it would be better to use it on the Japanese state police. As I understand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff went along with his recommendation.

**Secretary Marshall.** I think that is correct.

**Senator Sparkman.** You told us that, I believe.

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes.

**Senator Sparkman.** Now reading the telegram that he sent back to Mr. Henry Hazlitt in response to his telegram, there is just nothing wrong on the face of it; but when you read it together with the directive that had gone out from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the decision, why, it seems to me that, what shall we say, he was passing the buck. You will recall that he said—

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir, I recall.

**Senator Sparkman.** He said it was a political matter over which he had no control.

**Secretary Marshall.** I didn't know whether you had finished or not. He did not receive a directive from the Chiefs of Staff. He received—

**Senator Sparkman.** A suggestion?

**Secretary Marshall.** —a proposal to which they wished to have a reply. And then he made a reply.

And as to the message he received, I don't care to go into the interpretation, its possible implication.

**Senator Sparkman.** Standing alone it would have been all right. But denying that he had any part in it, it

seems to me that did not coincide with the exchange of the two earlier messages.

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't think he denied he didn't have any part in it.

**Senator Sparkman.** Well, he said it was beyond his control or some such word. I will get the exact language. "The issue is one determined by the Republic of Korea and the United States Government and involves basic political decisions beyond my authority."

I do not care about belaboring that point. You discussed it very fully yesterday, as I recall.

Now, General Marshall, General MacArthur also testified about the trade with Red China, and it is a matter of great concern to all of us, any trade that is going in there, particularly with items that are usable for war purposes.

When he was here he had a report which had been given to him, as I recall, by the consul general at Hong Kong which showed that, I believe, some forty million dollars' worth of products had gone through the Port of Hong Kong over a period of three weeks time.

He said that they contained both proscribed and non-proscribed materials. Then, later on he detailed some of those things that were included in there.

Just yesterday, I attended a Committee meeting of the Banking and Currency Committee in which we had some people up to discuss this question of trade, and in the course of it I was given, and I got, a copy of the speech that Sir Hartley Shawcross, the president of the Board of Trade, made in the House of Commons on May tenth, and I was attracted by this paragraph:

"General MacArthur, if correctly reported, seems perhaps not to have fully appreciated the nature of some of the information in the document itself." He is talking about this report. "He referred by name to a number of items on this so-called strategic list, as I think it was called, but he did not mention the smallness of the quantities of many of the items involved. Thus he referred to petroleum, Diesel oils, fuel oils, gasoline, kerosene, and lubricants. Certainly, they were on the list. His recital of the fact caused very naturally great anxiety. What he does not seem to have pointed out, at any rate so far as the reports over here are concerned, is that the list showed nil quantities as having been exported to China. In fact, all exports of that kind had been prohibited as long ago as July, 1950." I close the quotation.

I presume you have no knowledge of those things yourself?

**Secretary Marshall.** I have not a detailed knowledge.

**Senator Sparkman.** Mr. Chairman, let me ask you, was this report that General MacArthur purposed to be quoting from—I will not say quoting, but listing these things from—was it introduced, placed in the record?

**Senator Russell.** I do not recall that it was.

**Senator Sparkman.** If not, I should like for us to request it from General MacArthur or ask the State Department to get us a copy of that report, and at the same time, I should like for you to ask the State Department to give us a report covering the trade of Japan with Red China from July 1st of last year to the present time.

It is my understanding that several million dollars' worth of goods are going from Japan, and have been, right up certainly until within the last few days.

I do not do this in any sense of criticism, but to indicate the difficulty of this whole thing.

I know that the trade with Japan can be sustained on economic facts, but I think that it is well to have it in the record, have it available for the record in order that we may see the complexity of this whole trade situation.



**Senator Russell.** Under the procedure we have adopted here, if the Senator will just drop me a little note indicating these documents he desires, I shall undertake, as Chairman of the Committee, to secure them for use of the Committee.

**Senator Sparkman.** Yes, Mr. Chairman; thank you, I will do that.

Now, General, just another question or two and I am going to quit: General Marshall, when General MacArthur was before us, an excerpt from a talk given by Dean Rusk was read to him, and I want to quote it to you just very briefly: "What we are trying to do is to maintain peace and security without a general war. We are saying to the aggressors, 'You will not be allowed to get away with your crime. You must stop it.' And at the same time, we are trying to prevent a general conflagration which would consume the very things we are now trying to defend."

The question was put to General MacArthur—he was asked to give his opinion of that statement, and General MacArthur said this, and I quote his words, as found on page 100 of the transcript: "That policy, as you have read it, seems to me to introduce a new concept into military operations, the concept of appeasement."

Do you construe that as appeasement?

**Secretary Marshall.** Will you read Rusk's statement again, please?

**Senator Sparkman.** Yes. "What we are trying to do is to maintain peace and security without a general war. We are saying to the aggressors, 'You will not be allowed to get away with your crime. You must stop it.' At the same time, we are trying to prevent a general conflagration which would consume the very things we are now trying to defend."

**Secretary Marshall.** It does not appear as appeasement to me.

**Senator Sparkman.** Isn't that a statement of what we are trying to do, stop the aggressor and to prevent the spread of the conflagration?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think that is a simple statement of the effort.

**Senator Sparkman.** Secretary Marshall, as I understand, one of the basic differences in the opinions that you have stated here and the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as you have given them and those entertained by General MacArthur, has to do with the ability of the Chinese to fight, the ability of the Soviets to come to her aid, and also as to the tie between Red China and Soviet Russia.

General MacArthur has stated on several different occasions that while China, Red China, and Russia were associates or allies, and I believe he referred to their courses as being parallel, that he considered Red China as being independent and acting on her own.

Do you believe that Red China does act on her own or is she subject to direction and influence from Moscow?

**Secretary Marshall.** I have gone on the assumption that she was operating not only in conjunction with but literally under the direction of the Soviet Union.

**Senator Sparkman.** Well, of course, I think so too and I think, I was greatly surprised when General MacArthur made that statement in effect when he spoke to Congress and again when he testified here that China parallels Russia but is not under the power or the direction, control, the influence of Moscow.

Thank you very much, General Marshall.

**Senator Russell.** Senator Long.

**Senator Long.** I will try to be fairly brief, General Marshall, although I do want to cover several subjects. I believe you have been pretty clear with regard to your mission to China in 1946. There is one thing that I

wanted to get clear in my own mind, however.

I believe you stated that after negotiations broke down, that the Chinese Nationalist troops were defeated by the Chinese Communists notwithstanding the fact that there were about 3 million Chinese Nationalist troops and about a million and a half Chinese Communist troops, is that correct?

**Secretary Marshall.** Those were the comparative strengths I think in December of 1946, and at that time the Nationalist Government was at the peak of its military progress, and from that time on it went into the downgrade. Does that answer the question?

**Senator Long.** Are you now referring to the close of the truce period, the period at which the truce was ended?

**Secretary Marshall.** The truce period closed before that. The general effort of the Nationalist Government to destroy the power of the Communist regime by military action had its beginnings in June.

**Senator Long.** What year?

**Secretary Marshall.** 1946, and it was a sporadic procedure with a great deal of negotiations in the effort to terminate the development of hostilities.

Manchuria was somewhat apart at the time. It was very active fighting there on both sides, but in North China the truce had been generally kept, but as I say, in June it began to react in North China and both sides became heavily involved here and there, and it was constantly increasing the menace of general fighting.

The actual last amelioratory efforts I think were in October. I have forgotten just what the exact date was, but it ceased to be a practical proposition to mediate in any way towards terminating hostilities because for my own part I felt that the Communists were so engaged in at least propaganda attacks against the United States and certainly some deliberate attacks which I referred to in connection with the Marines in North China, that it was no longer a practical proposition for me to attempt to be a go-between between the two governments.

**Senator Long.** You stated that at that time you felt that the Chinese Nationalists were at the very peak of their military power?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir. Not military power so much as the military achievements, but I think I also said afterwards that they had gotten themselves into a position of great weakness by an overextension.

**Senator Long.** Because they had overextended their position?

**Secretary Marshall.** They had overextended their position.

**Senator Sparkman.** Will the Senator yield to me for about 20 seconds to correct an error?

**Senator Long.** Yes.

**Senator Sparkman.** If this may be placed back where I was asking General Marshall questions, I think I asked this question wrong. General Whitney said that this letter told MacArthur to hold his position and that it represented a reversal of policy. I think I stated my question wrong a while ago.

The final question I asked you did bear on the same thing, and, Mr. Chairman, if I may in order that it be straight I would like to insert the item at that point.

**Senator Russell.** Senator, under the procedure we have adopted here, you will have to read it if it gets into the record. Otherwise we can have it appear in the appendix. We will be glad to have it appear in the appendix just as it is.

**Senator Sparkman.** If the Senator will let me read just about 30 seconds, I will do so:

"MacArthur believed, Whitney said, that the mes-

sage differed from previous directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because it directed him to hold indefinitely in Korea. He said MacArthur construed it as the President's implication that he desired our position in Korea to be held indefinitely and that this was a reversal of the views he, MacArthur, had previously received from Washington."

**Senator Russell.** Do you desire the remainder of it to be printed?

**Senator Sparkman.** Yes, I think it would be well for the whole thing to go in as an exhibit.

**Senator Russell.** That will appear in the appendix.

**Senator Sparkman.** Thank you.

**Senator Long.** The point I had in mind is at the time these negotiations broke down, the Chinese Nationalists had about 3 million troops and the Chinese Communists had about a million and a half according to your best recollection.

**Secretary Marshall.** That is my recollection of the period.

**Senator Long.** Now what is your impression of the equipment the troops had? How well were the Chinese Nationalists equipped compared to the equipment available to the Chinese Communists?

**Secretary Marshall.** The equipment of the Chinese Nationalists was of a regular order. They were in divisional units and they had for the most part the equipment appropriate to that sort of a unit.

**Senator Long.** Did it include artillery? Did they have good artillery, good tanks, that sort of thing?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, they had not so many tanks and I don't know how good they were. Their artillery was in part good and a part ineffective.

The Communists were equipped with nondescript material, some that they had taken from the Japanese, some that they had taken from the Nationalist Government in various military encounters, and some presumably that they had obtained from Russia, but we had a very hard time identifying equipment picked up in captures that were of that nature.

As a matter of fact, they seldom lost any equipment. They salvaged all their equipment in most actions because there was a great dearth of it among their troops.

**Senator Long.** Would you say that generally speaking the Chinese Nationalists were far better equipped than the Chinese Communists?

**Secretary Marshall.** Very much so.

**Senator Long.** Notwithstanding that, the Chinese Nationalists were finally driven off the continent during the next two years. What was your impression as to the morale of the Chinese Nationalist troops engaged in those encounters?

**Secretary Marshall.** It depended very largely on leadership, and I thought in the main they had very ineffective leadership and they handled their operations with a great deal of ineptitude, and I think that was the characterization of the operations many times by my observers and those that were out there after I left China.

**Senator Long.** I have read details of even whole divisions that were sent into battle well equipped that surrendered without even firing a shot, it was said, but I am sure what the person who told me that meant was that they surrendered without making a serious effort. Do you know whether any surrenders of that sort occurred?

**Secretary Marshall.** I wouldn't like to answer that because I don't remember specific details.

It was a general impression of their failure to fight to the point of justification of the advantages they possessed in the way of equipment, but not to mention the disadvantages they possessed in the lack of leadership,

effective leadership.

**Senator Connally.** May I intervene right there just for a moment. I heard General Barr. General Barr was our military man with the troops, was he not?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Connally.** He testified and told us that he never knew of a defeat of the Nationalists by reason of their lack of arms or equipment or supplies, ammunition, but that defeats were caused by their unwillingness to fight.

Thank you.

**Senator Long.** I wanted to get the details on that. Now do you believe or have reason to believe that substantial additional military aid from this nation at that time would have changed the result?

**Secretary Marshall.** I do not think so. I think the question was one of leadership, and the question was one of the support of the Army by the people.

**Senator Long.** Do you think they would have changed the result had we had more American military advisers to advise the Chinese Nationalists tactically?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think the presence of American military advisers with the troops would have been helpful, but what was basically lacking was the support of the Army by the people, meaning the men in the Army themselves had acquired a feeling of resentment towards the Government or uncertainty as to the Government which so weakened their willingness to fight that along with the incapacity of leadership their effectiveness was greatly limited.

**Senator Long.** I have heard this story several times, that there was a great amount of, shall we say, graft in the ranks of the Army, that in some cases money that was supposed to go to pay the troops went to the higher-ranking officers, and by the time it got down to the troops, the officers had entered into speculations and inflation had set in so that the money wouldn't buy what it would have brought originally or that possibly the troops didn't get their full amount anyway. Was it your impression based on the advice given you by your military advisers that there was some merit to those rumors?

**Secretary Marshall.** There had been considerable merit to those rumors during periods of the war which General Stilwell brought to my attention.

At the time I was out there, I think in the main that procedure had been halted. Always there would be a certain portion of it because that was sort of habitual under the conditions of the years in China.

Later on I can only guess what would happen when the severely inflationary situation developed and it took so much money to buy anything and the troops or their leaders couldn't meet the situation without getting additional funds.

To what extent that developed, I don't know.

**Senator Long.** Now, it was subsequent to that time that the Greek-Turkish aid program was put into effect, that the Truman Doctrine was announced, is that correct?

**Secretary Marshall.** It was authorized, I think, along about in the late spring of 1947; but probably did not get under way until that summer.

**Senator Long.** Now, in the Greek-Turkish aid program, particularly as applied to Greece, there were actually efforts made by this Government to improve upon the quality of the government by the Greeks, as I understand it, as well as to give them advice and military aid.

That program was announced and adopted subsequent to the unsuccessful attempt to stabilize the situation in China, is that correct?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct, sir.

**Senator Long.** There is some argument that possibly

at the time we undertook that bold policy in Greece that we should have pursued the same course in China.

Looking back on it, do you have the impression that that would have been practical, at the time?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, the effort of our Government, in many ways, through many people, was to try to bring influence to bear that would improve the administrative procedure of the Government, and brighten it up, as it were.

**Senator Long.** Speaking of the Chinese Government, now?

**Secretary Marshall.** Chinese Nationalist Government.

**Senator Long.** Yes, sir.

**Secretary Marshall.** But the doctrine promulgated by the President of the United States was directly along that line.

What we did in Greece, was not done by compulsion; it was not done, we will say, assertively; but it was done by continual efforts along diplomatic lines, by the Ambassador, and it was done—and in this group that was sent out to Greece to make particularly the economic recovery of Greece possible, it was done in connection with that, which, of course, exercised quite an influence on the Greek Government because they were receiving money to do certain things, and if they were unwilling to try to clarify their governmental situation, it was confessedly in a poor way, why, they would be in a rather inconsistent position.

However, I think, in Greece, though I don't know this authoritatively, the complication was—many parties, many parties, and under the threat of changes of control at any moment.

In China, you were not having any changes at all, and had not had for a long period of years, but they were suffering from the corrosive effect of people a long time in authority.

**Senator Long.** By and large, one of the main differences of the result in the Greek policy and the Chinese policy, I take it then, would be the difference of co-operation between the two governments and the difference of understanding between the people who were trying to work it out, and in Greece you had occidental people who seemed to understand our way of doing things better, and in China we had great difficulty in working out an understanding on how to try to meet the situation, I take it?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes; we were dealing with a China of several thousand years of, we will say, culture or methods or procedures, good, bad and indifferent, and with a fixative which was very hard to overcome.

In Greece you had all sorts of complications, but they were quite a different character, I think, in the main.

**Senator Long.** Yes. Now, after the successful approach in Greece and Turkish aid, you then proposed what has now become known the world over as the Marshall Plan to attempt to stabilize the world economy and particularly the free nations. And that was in a large measure proposed, I take it, to prevent the spread of Communism, to prevent governments from falling under the domination of the Soviet; is that correct?

**Secretary Marshall.** It was to produce a healthy situation as rapidly as possible because we felt that in the poverty-stricken state of Europe, if that was long continued, we would have developed an utterly impossible situation governmentally, which would have been largely Communistic.

**Senator Long.** Now there has been some point made that it was originally proposed under the Marshall Plan that the Soviet and her satellites could have shared in that program. Is that correct, that originally they could have participated in it if they cared to?

**Secretary Marshall.** It was wide open so far as west of Asia. And if you recall, Molotov came to Paris with a large entourage of people to work on various aspects of it, and for some reason, which he would not explain, but apparently his feeling that the British and the French had sort of ganged up against the Soviet Union, and that I was in the plot, he, without any notice, departed from Paris.

But, specifically, the proposal was worded so that it included all of those nations. And I might say, I think, that in the discussion with my own people in the State Department there was some opposition to stating it that way because they felt that the entry of the Soviet into the matter would merely mean a stalemate—they would just make it impossible to proceed. I felt that that was a probability, but, that, nevertheless, we must make the proposal in those terms because it would be most unwise for us to set the line of demarcation which the Iron Curtain now does define.

**Senator Long.** In other words, if the world was to be divided into two blocs, one bloc of largely capitalist nations and free nations, and another of Communist nations, if that cleavage were to take place, we should not take the initiative in making it so?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is it, sir.

**Senator Long.** And you didn't want the remaining free nations to go behind the Iron Curtain, or to become Communist because of the economic breakdown of their economy?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is it.

**Senator Long.** Of course, when the Soviet group declined to co-operate, that made it fairly simple for you to go right ahead then with the free nations that did desire to participate?

**Secretary Marshall.** In one way it made it simple, but we had continuous efforts, and in a very disagreeable and dangerous way, by Communist procedures to try to break it down.

**Senator Long.** If the Soviet satellite nations had seen fit to go along, that might itself have posed some problem for the Soviet, in that by those nations co-operating with this nation, their desire would certainly have been to co-operate with our peaceful intentions to better the world generally. It would have been difficult for the Soviet to have lined them up on that basis, inimical to the proper interests of this nation; is that correct?

**Secretary Marshall.** If they had gone along with good faith, it would have had a tremendous effect in Europe.

**Senator Long.** It would have been a tremendous effect in reducing the aggressive designs of the Communists in Russia as well as in their satellite countries.

Now the question has been raised about Formosa, and I would like to get your judgment on it if you would comment on it. Do you believe that if Formosa should fall into unfriendly hands that it actually throws our defenses back to California and the Western Coast of the United States?

**Secretary Marshall.** I will try to recall how I answered that question this morning. I think I said that I did not think it retired our frontiers to that extent, but I thought it would be a great danger to our position in the Western Pacific.

**Senator Long.** Just measuring it on a map or on a globe of the world, roughly, I discovered that it is farther from Formosa to the United States than it is from the equator to the North Pole, and that we have a large and substantial number of islands between Formosa and the United States no matter what course one would take; is that correct?

**Secretary Marshall.** I would have to go sit down with you to study that map. That is a brand-new approach.

greatest Navy that the world has ever known, and having air power that certainly need not take a back seat to any nation, do you see why we would be forced back in our defenses—[Deleted]

**Senator Long.** I see. Now, if we bring Chiang's troops into Korea, speaking of the Chinese Nationalists, would that tend to complicate our problem in trying to arrange negotiations to arrive at a settlement of the Korean question?

I have in mind, for example, that if we get the civil war of China going on in Korea, it might make it more difficult to work out a settlement there.

**Secretary Marshall.** We thought of that difficulty, but our main reaction was to the development of a situation which would introduce the threat of development into a general war and the specific reaction in the opinion of our allies that this would be a very dangerous procedure.

**Senator Long.** I see. Now, you have stated that under no conditions should we let Formosa fall into Red hands, particularly if we were in position to prevent that.

If Chiang's troops are not able to defend it, how are we going to keep it from falling into their hands?

**Secretary Marshall.** The move at the present time by our mission going out there is to try to improve their training and build up, we hope, their morale, and also they have the stimulating effect of the commitment of this Government to help them on the sea in resisting, on the sea and in the air, of course, in resisting an invasion.

**Senator Long.** Do you think that we can afford to make commitments indefinitely that will keep our Navy in position to prevent them from crossing—

**Secretary Marshall.** I could not answer that right now.

**Senator Long.** —to Formosa.

If we expect to do that indefinitely, that, too, makes it more difficult to work out a final settlement of the Korean question, does it not?

**Secretary Marshall.** It is related to it.

**Senator Long.** Now, with regard to the fighting in Korea, how much more, if anything, do you think the Chinese Government, would be able to do in carrying the war to us? You stated, I believe, that she does have a substantial number of airplanes that could be flown in, is that correct?

**Secretary Marshall.** I stated in regard to—Chinese Communist forces?

**Senator Long.** Chinese Communist forces.

**Secretary Marshall.** The reports we have indicate a considerable build-up in the number of planes.

[Deleted]

**Senator Long.** Do you have the impression that China would be able to substantially increase the amount of mechanized equipment that is presently operating against us in Korea?

**Secretary Marshall.** Do you mean to introduce it into Korea or to produce it as a matter of industrial—

**Senator Long.** I mean to send more into Korea. I do not believe she has the industrial potential to produce a great amount, but do you believe that she might have a substantial amount of additional mechanized equipment that could be sent into Korea?

**Secretary Marshall.** We have assumed all along that they have tanks in some numbers, and probably artillery.

**Senator Long.** So far, they have used very little in the way of tanks, have they?

**Secretary Marshall.** They used them a great deal at the start; that is the North China element. Those were all knocked out, of course, in the end.

**Senator Long.** You mean the North Korean elements. You said North China; you mean the North Koreans.

**Senator Long.** Have you seen any evidence of the Chinese Communists using those?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, it is hard to identify a tank from the air as being a Chinese or North Korean tank. Our air has destroyed a good many tanks from week to week, where they have picked them up on the road, and the great difficulty of the Chinese Communist forces in the war and the North Korean forces, has been to bring this heavy equipment forward, because of the damage that is inflicted upon their transportation, and the damage that is inflicted on such heavy materiel by our planes.

They are restricted to movements almost entirely at night, and they have bad, very bad, trails to go over, and then in concealment, photographically and otherwise, we generally can locate about where they are, so that they have had a very hard time introducing this heavier equipment into the fighting since it has developed in the present stage.

**Senator Long.** Well, I take it then that you doubt that they are pulling their punches in so far as using mechanized equipment is concerned?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think they have done the best they could under the circumstances.

**Senator Long.** And so far as you know, there is no reason to believe that they could send large numbers of tanks and half-tracks and motorized equipment in addition to what they have already sent forward?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, they may have been training personnel to handle this additional and larger number of heavy pieces of materiel, because they have had very heavy losses with what they have had, and they have to replace that with trained people, as well as the materiel itself.

I would rather assume that they are having more difficulty in replacing trained personnel than they are in the matter of the equipment. I am just guessing; and they are having great difficulty, I know, with all heavy equipment in carrying it on the front, and keeping it sufficiently concealed there to be ready for a movement forward.

**Senator Long.** Now, China had an Army of a million and a half in the civil war, and, presumably, they have increased their armies substantially more since that time.

Do you believe that they are able to maintain a greater force of man power in the field than they presently have against us?

**Secretary Marshall.** I would have difficulty in answering that, except to say that I do feel that they have had a very serious proportion of their trained force debilitated, dissipated, in one way or another from the actions they have been in.

Now, to what extent they have remaining well-trained elements I couldn't answer that, but the Chiefs of Staff may be able to give you a more direct reply.

**Senator Long.** Well, my impression is that so far they have had between 200,000 and 300,000 men operating against us, who were Chinese Communists.

A country of that enormous population, to a layman, would seem to be capable, at least, of putting millions of men into the field, or at least an army of a million or two million men, and that is a desire I have—I am curious to know whether or not you thought they were able to maintain a larger army in Korea than they are presently maintaining there?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, I think you would get a better answer of that from the Chiefs of Staff, but you have got to consider order in China; you have got to consider their commitments to the south opposite Indo-China; and order in China, and various strong locations

**Senator Long.** General MacArthur made the statement that China is already making her maximum effort in Korea. Are you inclined to agree with that statement?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, I am inclined to agree with that statement.

[Deleted]

**Senator Long.** I would like to ask this question with regard to our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty organization:

Although we need more troops in Europe, I take it, why can't we work out some basis upon which they could share the fighting in Korea, while we send additional American troops to protect the areas within the borders of those nations?

For example, we are sending four divisions, as fast as we can raise them, to Europe. That gives them additional security. Why can't they send some of the divisions that they are raising, in view of that, to help out with the actual fighting, bleeding, and sacrifice that must go into fighting for freedom?

**Secretary Marshall.** We would be getting nowhere on that basis of putting in and taking out at the same time.

What we are trying to build up is a respectable defense in Western Europe.

**Senator Long.** I believe that the average American would be very happy to have them put in six divisions and let us take out six of our combat divisions. They would get better protection, and at the same time have the opportunity to share some of the sacrifices, sir.

Has that been considered?

**Secretary Marshall.** I do not think that has been considered.

**Senator Long.** Now, along the same line, wouldn't all of our troops in Korea be safer if we had a reasonable margin of safety there? In other words, if we had more troops, wouldn't each man be safer, and have a better chance?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think that is so.

**Senator Long.** Therefore I was wondering why not send more troops, even it was more of our own?

**Secretary Marshall.** You ask that from the Chiefs of Staff, and get their direct answer to that, because that is getting right into our general war plans.

**Senator Long.** All right, sir.

Along a different line, do you believe that we could win a war against Russia, if the war was started now?

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't want to talk about it on the record, and I would rather hesitate to talk about it off the record.

**Senator Long.** The point I had in mind is that it has been my feeling that if a war against Soviet Russia occurred in another two years or another year, say, we might have a greater certainty to winning the war, but that to win it would mean a greater cost.

For example, if the war occurred later on, even though we might have our nation better prepared, you would have to recognize the fact that the progress our enemies would make, in terms of atomic preparedness, would enable them to inflict much greater damage upon us, even though we correspondingly would be able to increase—inflict much greater damage upon them.

**Secretary Marshall.** [deleted]

**Senator Long.** Of course the point I had in mind, again, General Marshall, and if you would not care to comment on it, I would completely understand—but it does seem to me that in our planning we are overlooking the fact that even though we might somewhat increase our certainty of victory by postponing a risk that we must someday take, nevertheless we are going to have greater damage done to us by postponing it.

make stronger and more forceful efforts against China, that we could probably shorten the conflict there.

I don't know, but I assume that would be possible, might be possible, and as far as the risk of war with China, at least as far as Russia is concerned, it would seem like it might be unwise just to indefinitely continue to let her feel that we are afraid to call her hand.

**Secretary Marshall.** We are—what?

**Senator Long.** We are afraid to call her hand.

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, you would have to qualify that last expression, because when they are losing many thousands of people with each operation, the question is whether they will end up with any hands.

**Senator Long.** In other words, you are not inclined to go along with those who feel that we are being bled white in Korea, while Red Russia remains aloof, with every bit as much potential as she ever had?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think the desire of the Russians is to have us bled white in Korea. There is no question about that in my mind—to have us more completely engaged there than we can afford to be, in view of the situation, the vulnerability of Western Europe.

**Senator Long.** The point I had in mind being that if we could adopt measures that would bring it to a speedier conclusion there, even at the risk of war with Russia, is she gaining or are we gaining in this case?

I take it that you do believe that time is on our side?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Long.** In postponing an ultimate conflict?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Long.** And of course what you are hopeful of is that we will be able to prevent a war; that sooner or later we will be able to work it out without any war at all—that is our real objective?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct.

**Senator Long.** Do you believe it would be a good idea to further disperse our industry?

**Secretary Marshall.** What?

**Senator Long.** Further disperse our industries in this nation?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is getting into a pretty technical question at the present time. The dispersal of industry is a very expensive business, and a very difficult business when you are trying to increase production.

I would not care to comment on that at this particular moment. I used to know pretty well all the conditions, but I don't know them sufficiently well to comment on them at the present time, except to say that that particular proposal has not been brought to my attention.

**Senator Long.** Now, there are some people who feel that by taking a somewhat hesitant policy about going all out against our enemies, we may be actually encouraging them to become aggressive, on the theory that because we do not meet them with a more forceful solution to the question, that they may be encouraged to think that we are afraid of them.

Do you have any comment to make on that?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, I would say that we have a very difficult situation in relation to things like that, when all of our thoughts have to be expressed publicly, and we don't get theirs at all.

**Senator Long.** General Marshall, so far, with regard to the Berlin blockade and the policy that we followed in Greece, we have had the previous situations where there appeared to be stalemates, and that were enormously expensive to this nation; and in those previous occasions what they called the stalemate proved to be the dawn just before the daybreak, didn't it?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Long.** And that is what you are hoping this



situation in Korea will be?

**Secretary Marshall.** Very much so.

**Senator Long.** A prelude to a victory for what we are trying to accomplish.

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Long.** And so, although in one sense it would appear to be a stalemate, your judgment is that actually we are winning, at least we are day by day reaching what we could regard as a successful outcome of this venture to resist aggression?

**Secretary Marshall.** We are moving toward that.

**Senator Long.** Moving toward—

**Secretary Marshall.** A successful outcome.

**Senator Long.** Originally we started out, I believe, in your language, to repel an attack, or repel an aggression and to destroy the aggressor.

Now, we are not trying to destroy the Chinese aggressors, as a nation, I take it, or as a government?

**Secretary Marshall.** The aggressor in Korea we would destroy, if we could, if that were a practical military operation at the moment.

We are destroying them, in one sense, day by day.

**Senator Long.** Even General MacArthur has not recommended that we attempt to actually destroy the Chinese Government; so in so far as destroying the aggressor, we were at one time attempting to destroy the North Korean Government as an aggressor, but we are not trying to destroy the Chinese Communist Government, as a—

**Secretary Marshall.** We are trying to destroy the North Korean Army, and pacify Korea.

**Senator Long.** Pacify what?

**Secretary Marshall.** Pacify Korea.

**Senator Long.** The statement of the President, on April 11, 1951, is to the effect that we are trying to limit the conflict, and that even though it may not be limited, that we are not going to accept the responsibility of being the ones that broaden it into an all-out war.

That is the policy that this nation is still pursuing, I take it?

**Secretary Marshall.** It is not only the question of not accepting responsibility. We don't want to develop into an all-out war; and particularly if we would lose our allies by doing so.

**Senator Long.** The President said in that speech:

"If the Communist authorities realize that they cannot defeat us in Korea, if they realize it would be foolhardy to widen the hostilities beyond Korea, then they may recognize the fallacy of continuing their aggression. A peaceable settlement may then be possible. The door is always open."

I take it that in line with that, it is your feeling that when they proceeded to launch their last offensive, which cost them enormously in man power, with very little loss in man power to this nation, that that type thing should hasten their realization that they cannot defeat our forces and drive them out and that should hasten the day when you should be able to work out a satisfactory solution to the Korean question.

**Secretary Marshall.** Somewhat along that line, sir.

**Senator Long.** That is all the questions I want to ask you, General. Thank you.

**Senator Russell.** Senator Gillette.

**Senator Gillette.** Mr. Chairman, is it the desire of the Chairman to finish with the General tonight?

**Senator Russell.** Well, of course, if that can be accomplished without curtailing any Senator in the questions that he proposes to propound, I should like very much, if we could, to complete the first round of questions today.

**Senator Gillette.** In compliance with that, I shall be very glad—

**Senator Russell.** General Marshall, what are your wishes in that matter?

**Secretary Marshall.** I beg your pardon?

**Senator Russell.** What are your wishes in that matter?

**Secretary Marshall.** I would like to finish, but I am in your hands.

**Senator Russell.** You may proceed.

**Senator Gillette.** General, a number of years ago when I was company commander, I used to feel sorry for the little fellow who was number eight in the last set of squads down at the end of the line; and during this long week I have been exemplifying that number-eight man down at the left end of the line.

But, realizing how worn and tired you must be in this prolonged grilling, I shall make my interrogation very, very short.

We have been sitting here, as you know, General, in conformity with unanimous-consent request that the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee had secured from the Senate and which he very cogently and very clearly presented at the outset of these hearings.

The Armed Services Committee is not only sitting in that capacity, in conformity with the senatorial permission, but they are sitting in conformity with their responsibility as an agency of the United States under the rules of the Senate. We of the Foreign Relations Committee have been sitting in through their courtesy.

None of us are sitting as a high board of strategy, as I conceive it, but trying to develop facts that will aid in dispelling the confusion that is general throughout the country, which has been brought to a head with the recall of General MacArthur.

In my opinion, there were two great issues that have been joined here:

First, was there such a conflict of views as to the conduct of the military effort in Korea between the Commander in Chief and his Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the one hand, and the field commander, on the other, as to seriously imperil the successful conduct of the war?

Was an implementing field commander taking a position in public pronouncements or statements that would be made public incompatible with or having an adverse effect on policies of our country, which had been determined through the policy-making process?

This hearing, of course, has covered that over and over again, and you have been asked numerous questions and have answered and we shall continue.

I want to ask you just three of four questions in connection with that issue and then I will refer to what I conceive to be the second real issue.

It is asserted that we have been reluctant to accept some of the suggestions made by General MacArthur and those who believe, as he has asserted, that it does not meet with the approval of our allies and that we would risk alienation of our allies.

My first question, is it reasonable to fear that our allies would risk losing United States great economic and military aid by refusing to accept our views as to bombing Manchurian bases and blockading China coasts or using Chiang's troops as a Chinese mainland threat if we presented these proposals with definite insistence?

**Secretary Marshall.** [deleted]

**Senator Gillette.** Thank you, sir.

The second question, can any instance be named where the Soviet Republic at any time, any place or any circumstances, including the Yugoslavian episode, threatened or intimated that she would risk total war with us with our war potential including our atomic-warfare development, if we took certain steps contemplated or suggested by General MacArthur to quickly end the Korean conflict?

**Senator Gillette.** Yes, sir.

**Secretary Marshall.** I thought you said any place.

**Senator Gillette.** Can any instance be named where the Soviet at any time, any place or any circumstance, including Yugoslavia, threatened or intimidated that she would risk total war with us with our war potential, including atomic-warfare development, if we took certain steps to quickly end the Korean conflict?

**Secretary Marshall.** How does that question include Yugoslavia?

**Senator Gillette.** We will eliminate Yugoslavia. Has she at any time to your knowledge intimated or suggested that if we took the steps suggested to end the Korean conflict, that she would risk total war with us?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think there have been implications but I don't recall any specific statement.

**Senator Gillette.** Now the third question, is it reasonable to assume that Soviet rulers would today risk a prolonged highly mechanized war with the free world when the United States and Great Britain together control 80 per cent of the world's oil and could quickly destroy oil fields possibly accessible to the Soviet to keep these supplies from her? Do you think that she would risk a war with that potential?

**Secretary Marshall.** We have felt that she has built up her power to the extent that would enable her to inflict great damage on us.

How it would work out in the long run of the fight, I don't know, but we have been increasingly informed from various sources that she was poised ready to do that if she chose and gave every indication of not allowing the various moves she made to deter her from an action that might precipitate the war.

**Senator Gillette.** Now those three questions I have just asked you of course are slanted somewhat favorable to the MacArthur view. This question I shall now ask you is slanted in the other direction.

Many people are saying throughout the country in commenting on the MacArthur position: "We do not want a general war. We only want to bombard Manchuria and attack China to shorten the Korean conflict."

Now the question: Is it not a fact that there are others with great power uncommitted in this struggle who will take part in that decision? Maybe they will not precipitate a general war if we take the steps indicated, but maybe they will. Would not those of you and us making our decisions be completely irresponsible if not criminal if you did not take into consideration the awful possibilities of a general war?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct, Sir.

**Senator Gillette.** Now I have four or five very short questions, or they can be answered, I am sure, very briefly, that I do not believe have been touched on.

[Deleted]

**Senator Gillette.** Do you believe, General, as a military man, that the threat such as General MacArthur has advocated of an attack by troops of Chiang on the China mainland would have the effect of a diversionary action that would compel Red China to withdraw the pressure on the northern end of Korea?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think that it might be an embarrassment to the Chinese Communist Government, but I do not believe, with my own knowledge of these troops, and with my knowledge of how much support they would have to receive from us—water and air, and particularly in securing their supply service and continuing it in action—that the result would be commensurate with the effort that we would have to make.

**Senator Gillette.** You have argued very cogently, in

that has been made that our present method that we are pursuing of attempting to destroy man power would be relatively useless because of the comparatively inexhaustible man power that could be thrown against us by Red China. You have argued, as I said, in my opinion cogently, that the supply of trained man power is not inexhaustible, that to be effective they must throw in trained troops. You did not in my recollection refer to another factor which seems to me of importance, and I shall ask you with reference to it.

I hold in my hand what purports to be a copy of a memorandum, a letter, given by certain underground Korean forces to Marshall Carter, of the State Department, under date of Oct. 30, 1948, in which the statement was made that "The Soviet Ambassador, Nikolai Vassily, in May, 1948, initiated the idea of a formation of an international Red army in the Mongolian Peoples Republic to be known as the Mongolian Peoples Republic Army, of 250,000 men, and setting out the component parts that they contemplated."

But this statement—"2,000 selective Japanese and others were picked to train 14,500 men to be future officers of this international Red army in Asia, to be called the Soviet Foreign Legion." Is it not a very important factor that the loss of these trained-officer personnel would be probably to a large extent irreplaceable?

**Secretary Marshall.** It would be a matter of certainly very slow replacement, a very serious loss.

**Senator Gillette.** And it would definitely impair, would it not, the efficacy of any forces thrown against us?

**Secretary Marshall.** It would very materially impair their ability to make use of their unlimited man power.

**Senator Gillette.** I wanted to ask you one question with reference to the percentage of casualties. To me it seems deplorable that with practical lack of air force thrown against our men in Korea, or the United Nations army, that we have suffered casualties of approximately 25 per cent of the troops engaged. Is it not true that is a very unusual percentage in the type of warfare we are conducting there?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think the larger portions of those casualties developed during a period when we were tremendously outnumbered.

The casualties, for example, in the few days of June were as high, almost, as any month in the war. The invasion didn't begin until the 25th of June. The casualties in July and August were very heavy, and a very considerable percentage of those were men missing in action, presumably prisoners.

Now, when you come around to the type of warfare we are now engaged in, of the past three months, those casualties, those casualty rates, have been very greatly reduced.

**Senator Gillette.** Just one other question, and then I will revert to this second issue.

You spoke, I think in answer to one of the interrogations propounded to you today, in determining where the President should meet General MacArthur, and in reply to a question as to why General MacArthur had not been asked to come over here where the matter could be canvassed with him, rather than for him to proceed without, I believe you stated that he had shown a "marked reluctance" to come to the United States. Is that correct?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think I stated that I thought it was unfortunate that he had not come to the United States, and gotten in touch with the public and the reactions here, and our other problems relating to the general situation in the Far East as seen in this locale.

**Senator Gillette.** Then, I am in error when I understood you to say that he had shown marked reluctance.

**Secretary Marshall.** Reluctance? I don't really use that language. Of course, the record will show.

**Senator Gillette.** Of course, marked reluctance of any soldier, from a private up to the supreme commander is not usually considered a heavy factor in issuing orders to him, is it?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, the reluctance, if any, expressed by General MacArthur, in my comments would be those of the advisability of his leaving his present responsibilities in the critical state in which they were.

I have here a summary, in answer to questions of some member of the Committee, as to invitations to General MacArthur to come to this country.

I might lead off with one dug out of the record sent by me shortly before I retired as Chief of Staff, Sept. 17, 1945.

I addressed this to General MacArthur:

"When the situation in Japan permits, I suggest that you make a visit home where undoubtedly a series of welcomes and celebrations will be proposed. This would amount to visits to several representative cities throughout the United States, including a stop in your State.

"Admiral Leahy has communicated with you in reference to a request from the Governor of Wisconsin that you come home there. In Washington, the Congress would certainly invite you to address a joint session, and there would be a reception or dinner by the President.

"Following all this, you would probably want to consider a period of rest. Available is a completely staffed de luxe cottage at the Ashford General Hospital—which I believe is a reference to White Sulphur Springs, which was formerly the Greenbriar Hotel—at White Sulphur Springs.

"I believe your return should best be timed with the hearings of the congressional committees on the postwar national defense. They have indicated their desire to have you testify. I understand these hearings will be conducted during late October and November. Please let me have your views concerning such proposed visit, together with your desires.

"It would be well to consider bringing back in your party some representative enlisted men as well as officers and naval officers, in addition to members of your staff."

**Senator Gillette.** What date was that, please?

**Secretary Marshall.** That was my message of Sept. 17, 1945.

General MacArthur did not think it was wise for him to come back at that time.

Further search of the records showed these invitations to General MacArthur, and I will give you a brief response:

On March 1, 1948, Congressman Eaton asked him, on behalf of the Foreign Affairs Committee. He said he was sorry he could not make the trip at that time. That will be in your records up here.

On May 27, 1948, Senator Bridges asked him on behalf of the Senate Appropriations Committee. He said he was sorry he could not make it at that time.

On Aug. 12, 1949, the combined Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees passed a resolution that the Secretary of Defense request General MacArthur and Admiral Badger to return if not incompatible with national interests to give views on pending arms implementation bill.

The Secretary of Defense transmitted the resolution for MacArthur's comments, and MacArthur rejected the invitation. I don't know what the manner of the statement was, but you would have that here in your own

Now, in addition, I found out on inquiry that in 1946 some time in the summer, the President sent a communication through his aide, to General MacArthur, inviting him to come back, in particular to receive a decoration.

I believe that covers that phase of the matter, but I would like to add to it this further statement in regard to one of the questions asked, that is the visits to General MacArthur himself. I found that Admiral Leahy had not made such a visit, but that the Chiefs of Staff, complete with General Bradley, the Chairman, had visited General MacArthur in January and February, 1950; that General Bradley in June, 1950, interviewed General MacArthur in Tokyo, with the then Secretary of Defense, Mr. Johnson; and on the 12th to the 18th of October, as you just referred, he accompanied the President to the interview on Wake Island.

Admiral Sherman made the visit, of course, with the Chiefs of Staff in January and February to Tokyo to see General MacArthur, and in August, 1950, with General Collins, he made another visit. General Eisenhower visited him in the period between April and May, 1946. General Collins, the Chief of Staff of the Army, visited him in October, 1949, and in January to February appeared with the complete Chiefs of Staff group. Then, in July, he proceeded again out there, and interviewed General MacArthur in company with General Vandenberg, and, in August, he duplicated that visit in company with Admiral Sherman; and, then again, he made a visit in early December, 1950, and then again in January, January 12 or 18, I don't know what specific time he was in Tokyo, in company with General Vandenberg he made another visit.

General Vandenberg, I have already referred to, visited General MacArthur with the Chiefs of Staff in January and February. He visited him with General Collins in July, and he visited him again with General Collins in January, 1951. I am sorry to have interrupted the trend of your questions.

**Senator Gillette.** Well, General, that answers much more explicitly, much more fully than I anticipated, the question that I asked you, which was specifically whether marked reluctance was usually a factor in determining orders to be issued from any member of the armed services, from the top to the bottom.

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, his regrets in each case were based on the importance of the situation there.

**Senator Gillette.** I see.

Now I have just one more question, and it is based, it is what I conceive to be this second issue, and it is based on this quotation from General MacArthur's address to the Joint Session of Congress, and I quote:

"Our victory was complete and our objectives had been reached when Red China intervened with a numerically superior ground force. This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders, a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy. Such decisions have not been forthcoming. While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy, as we defeated the old."

Now predicated upon that statement, here is my question: Did our policy makers at a time when we were suffering serious reverses in Korea, through the entry

of new elements into the war, fail to adjust policies to the changed conditions and factors, and actually leave the field commander to operate without specific policies or directions for military implementation?

**Secretary Marshall.** I do not think that was the case.

**Senator Gillette.** That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General.

**Senator Russell.** Gentlemen, that concludes the first round of questions. I have heretofore referred to the unusual nature of these hearings, and I think the Committee might be interested in some data that the staff of the Committee has assembled with respect to this hearing.

We have been here now for nine days and in that period we have heard only two witnesses. That is, so far as I know, a new record for investigations by a committee of the Congress.

The staff has assembled these figures as to dates: General MacArthur was on the stand between 22 and 23 hours, and General Marshall has been on the stand for more than 24 hours. General MacArthur's testimony was 787 pages; up to last evening General Marshall's testimony covered 700 pages, and the estimate for today, compared with the same time for yesterday's, would run it over 900 pages of testimony, and that would be the case of General Marshall.

If you are interested, the words deleted from General MacArthur's testimony on account of the security angle amounted to 2,800, which is 1 4/10 per cent of the total words. The words deleted from General Marshall's testimony up through yesterday were 6,600, for a percentage of 3 8/10 per cent.

When we see these two men who have made such great contributions to their country appear before this Committee and stand this grueling examination, I think I can with certitude observe that these men who came into the Army in the period of the old soldiers of the song not only do not die but they are a tough breed and don't fade very easily.

The members of the Committee have been able to get up, walk around, even retire from the room for a few moments on occasion, and neither of these witnesses has asked at any moment that there be any recess in the hearings for any reason, and have insisted at times when the Committee has indicated a desire to recess, that they desired to have the hearings continue.

General, I want to thank you for your complete co-operation with this Committee. You have been here with us for six days, and you have had propounded to you innumerable questions dealing with a great many different matters.

In view of the fact that you have served as Chief of Staff, as Ambassador and Personal Representative of the President to China at one of the most critical periods of history, served as Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, why you have been asked about not only a number of policies but a number of specific instances.

Your recollection as to details and as to dates of all of these various transactions has been perfectly astonishing to me. I have sat here and wondered if I could recall as vividly incidents of my legislative career over the past

several years as you have this very varied experience that you have had, and I have concluded that I would not like to have been put to the test.

Some of these questions have very frankly been repetitious and your patience has been almost infinite. You have replied to them again and again—not all of them. When I say "all," I mean all of them, of course, haven't been repetitious, but some of them unquestionably have.

I think we are building a record in these hearings, whatever else they might accomplish, that will be a rich treasure house for the historian when he goes to analyze and to write the history of this period of our nation's history.

I thank you, sir, for your co-operation and for the great assistance that you have been to this Committee. I am afraid that it will be necessary for me to request you to be back here on Monday morning at 10 o'clock.

I hope that Senators over the week end, if they don't read this record, will reflect upon these hearings. If they do, I think that they will see that the ground has been rather thoroughly covered as to the general aspects of the issues before us.

It doesn't mean that there won't be other questions that will be asked to elaborate upon to bring out different thoughts on some of these questions, but I hope that it will result in avoiding going over the same ground again and again.

I want to thank the members of this Committee for their splendid co-operation and for the calm and judicious approach that each Senator has made to this subject.

I still hope that these hearings will be of great benefit to the American people and we shall continue in our effort to arrive at the truth, to gain some knowledge of all of these facts that are of such vital importance to enable us to discharge our responsibilities as Senators under the Constitution.

**Senator Knowland.** Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask to have placed in the appendix of our daily record here the citations which have been given by the Government of the United States to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, one of them awarding him the Distinguished Service Medal and the other one awarding him the Legion of Merit, Degree of Chief Commander, and have it appear in our appendix.

**Senator Russell.** Yes, sir; without objection, that will appear in the appendix.

Any other matter to be brought to the attention of the Committee? If not, we stand in recess until 10 o'clock Monday morning.

**Secretary Marshall.** You wish me here, Mr. Chairman?

**Senator Russell.** Mr. Secretary, I am afraid I must ask you to be here.

**Secretary Marshall.** I will be here.

**Senator Russell.** I understand your position. If we don't finish with you, we understand entirely that you must leave here Monday afternoon; but if you can be here Monday morning, we would like to have you.

(Whereupon, at 5:33 p.m. the Committee recessed to reconvene at 10:00 Monday, May 14, 1951.)

## HEARING OF MONDAY, MAY 14

The Committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m. in the Caucus Room, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (Chairman, Committee on Armed Services), presiding.

**PRESENT:** Senators Russell (Chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (Chairman, Committee on

Foreign Relations), George, Green, McMahon, Gillette, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Lodge, Brewster, Johnson (Texas), Stennis, Hunt, Long, Bridges, Saltonstall, Morse, Knowland, Cain and Flanders.

**ALSO PRESENT:** Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services

Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Theodore V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations; and C. C. O'Day clerk.

**Senator Russell.** The Committee will be in order.

Gentlemen, before we resume our questioning of General Marshall this morning, I desire to make a brief statement. It relates to a subject which has caused my increasing concern as these hearings have progressed.

Since this inquiry was first ordered I have experienced a deep sense of uneasiness. It was apparent from the first that the subject matter would be broad, as broad as the foreign policy of the United States. It was equally obvious that it would deal with almost every vital military and diplomatic issue and penetrate to the very heart of the plans for our nation's survival. Such has been the case.

We are taking testimony not only on the general outlines of American foreign policy but on some of the intimate plans and information possessed by our nation. We are entering doors that have been barred, we are opening books that have been guarded, we are unlocking secrets that have been protected in steel safes; in short, we are stripping the nation's security framework to the bare skeleton. In some instances not only is the evidence stamped with the highest security classification, but the very form in which we receive it is secret. Its release without a paraphrase of the words would aid an enemy in breaking our carefully guarded codes and cryptographic system.

I had considerable sympathy for General Marshall the other day when he said that he sometimes feels as though he were compelled to act as a sort of intelligence agent for the Soviet. Many of us have shared his frustrations as we have seen his estimates, his recommendations and his proposed actions printed each day in the press for all the world to read. A certain amount of public discussion on these subjects is inherent in our system. It is unavoidable in a democracy.

At the outset we agreed unanimously that the matters under inquiry are so important that we must have all of the available facts. We have also agreed that the American people are entitled to every single piece of information that can be safely spread on the public record. To those agreements I am a party, but I have insisted with all the power of my being that these hearings should not serve to create an arsenal from which our enemies can draw intelligence weapons that they may use to kill our men in Korea or to imperil our future security.

Gentlemen, I can scarcely conceive of a graver responsibility. American boys are fighting and dying on a little tip of land thousands of miles from this hearing room. Our country is confronted on a perimeter of half a world with the most serious challenge to its very existence.

If any action of ours adds even remotely to the dangers that face our fighting men, if carelessness or indiscretion increases the perils that face our nation, neither our God nor our fellow citizens will ever forgive us, nor would we deserve such forgiveness.

We have undertaken to probe out of these hearings every possible security safeguard that human ingenuity can provide. The original documents and the undeleted record are guarded as carefully as such things can be. The transcript issued to the press and to the public is being censored by the most competent and trustworthy man that we could find, but, gentlemen, all of these safeguards, all of these carefully planned measures depend ultimately upon our acceptance of our responsibilities as Senators.

We can consult security officers, we can install safes, we can post armed guards, but only an individual sense of responsibility can prevent any member of this Com-

mittee from walking outside that door and revealing his knowledge to the world.

There are already cases in point. I have seen at least two newspaper stories purporting to quote unidentified Senators on evidence said to have been submitted to this Committee which did not appear in the released transcript. I shall not, of course, comment on the accuracy or inaccuracy of such stories. To do so might give the Soviets a touchstone for determining which of them are authentic and which are not.

Perhaps neither of these will do material harm, but if others are to follow, we are indeed embarking upon a dangerous course. Somewhere along the line there will be a vital slip, and because of the slip men will die needlessly.

I am, of course, convinced that no Senator would deliberately release information that would endanger his nation or his fellow Americans. That is not the problem.

The great danger is the ever-present threat of a careless word, a slip of the tongue or in disclosing facts in confidence to those unworthy of such confidence. It takes very little to give the agents of the Kremlin a clue which may lead them to a rich mother lode of information.

The evidence being adduced here has not been brought us to appease an appetite for the sensational or to satisfy idle curiosity. It is being supplied to aid us in fulfilling our high constitutional duties.

There have been occasions when I have received information on secret matters that I would rather not have. It was unnecessary to me in the discharge of my duties. Some such information will be presented to this Committee. This has caused me serious misgivings.

I have lain awake at night wondering whether by some incautious act, some error of judgment, we may betray something of vital import to our country. Although carefully censored, even the public record has carried some material which strike me as dangerous. I am sure it is a great understatement to say that there have been some matters publicized which it cannot help the country to have our enemies know.

As the custodians of secret information, we have a double responsibility to the American people. It is our responsibility to make wise, courageous and patriotic use of it.

We have the added responsibility of jealously protecting it to insure it will not be used to our nation's harm. This is no time to gamble with security.

Such stakes as the lives of Americans and the safety of our nation are too precious to hazard. Let us embrace this opportunity to prove that democracy can meet such a challenge. This we can do if we accept in full the responsibilities of Senators of the United States.

Now, gentlemen, when we recessed on Saturday we had completed the first round of questioning of Secretary Marshall. There are those who had not been present and, of course, they will be reached on this second round.

I have only one question, Mr. Secretary.

**Senator Hickenlooper.** Mr. Chairman?

**Senator Russell.** Yes, Senator.

**Senator Hickenlooper.** If it is not offensive, before we get into your question may I be accorded the privilege of a slight comment on your statement?

**Senator Russell.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Hickenlooper.** I agree with the most sensible purposes and objectives of the Chairman's statement. I think we ought to try to follow it most meticulously.

Now, I think that an admonition is not out of order, or out of place; but I call the Chairman's attention, and the Committee's attention, to the great discouragement that occurs to the members of Congress when certain



newspapermen apparently get access to top-secret documents that could come only from administrative agencies, and where no effort is made in tracing down these leaks that come out of administrative agencies; and I think that an admonition and concern should be the portion of this Committee about those unwarranted and unauthorized access to top-secret information that is given certain favored newspapermen and certain favored columnists.

Those things have happened with too great frequency in the past, and have happened under such circumstances that they could not have come from members of Congress or congressional committees, but could have only come from administrative agencies; and I think the admonition can well be taken by the administrative agencies, and I would like to see a far greater zeal on the part of those agencies to protect top-secret documents in the future than they have exercised, apparently, in many instances, in the past.

Now, just one example, Mr. Chairman: I refer to the Wake Island top-secret minutes. That is one of the latest. There is a myriad of them that emanate; and so, I think the Chairman is perfectly proper in his statement to this Committee.

I also feel that there are administrative agencies that have a primary responsibility regarding these documents, these top-secret documents, that can well exercise not only a great deal more discretion but a great deal more of their legal responsibility in seeing that leaks do not occur, and that information, portions of information out of these top-secret documents, are not made available to the public and in that way letting the Kremlin know, if you please, what newspapermen have particularly favored access to information that the committees of Congress are not permitted to have.

**Senator Russell.** I should like to say in reply to that that release from any source whatever, whether it be executive, administrative, or any other branch of our Government, on the part of anyone who is charged with responsibility of handling documents that are classified is abhorrent to me, as abhorrent as it is to the Senator from Iowa or anybody else.

I have been greatly concerned about releases that have apparently come through the administrative agencies of the executive branch. Some of them occurred even before this incident we have under inquiry here that I condemned, but I, of course, have no control over the administrative branch of the Government.

But I do have a very definite responsibility here that has disturbed me greatly, and for that reason I made that statement; but certainly the same admonition that I have undertaken to state here applies with equal force to any portion of the executive branch of the Government.

**Senator Bridges.** Mr. Chairman, may I comment on it, too, just a moment? The thing Senator Hickenlooper refers to disturbed me. If you recall, the Wake Island report which appeared in the *New York Times*, it appeared when it was classified top secret. It appeared there, and the version that appeared in the *New York Times* contained the things that when it was declassified and given to this Committee, the release to the *New York Times* carried certain items and certain matter that, even when it was declassified, were considered to be too classified to be released.

Now, that is certainly a serious breach, and personally I would like to see us find out who released that. That is a violation of a top-secret thing of the United States Government. Who gave this to the *New York Times*, which was classified top secret?

That is the most specific case in connection with these hearings but there have been others, and, as far as I

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...silitary thing that the Defense Department or anybody else has done to find out where that leak came from, not only find out where it came from, but take steps to punish the people that gave it out.

Now, I agree with you on all you say about the Committee and the Senators, but I also say that people who have originally in their possession this top-secret classified information are the chief offenders.

**Senator Russell.** I reiterate that I condemn rather than condone any of the releases to which the Senator refers or any other releases that might have taken place, but I shall not use dereliction on the part of anyone else as an excuse for dereliction on my part, nor do I think this Committee would like to use that as an excuse.

Now, General Marshall, I have one question that I do not intend for you to answer now, but I wish to have you prepare an answer for the benefit of this Committee.

I would like to have you furnish in writing for the record the text of all of General MacArthur's statements which are regarded as having significance in connection with his dismissal.

I would also like you to furnish in writing a full explanation as to why it is contended that each of these statements was considered to be in violation of directives or in conflict with known policies of the United States.

I think it is very important that that matter be presented for the record. We have dealt with it here in bits and dribbles but I should like to see a complete statement, and I think it would be very helpful to this Committee.

**Senator Connally.**

**Senator Connally.** Senator George is in a hurry.

**Senator George.** Go ahead.

**Senator Connally.** Very well.

#### TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GEORGE C. MARSHALL, ACCOMPANIED BY FELIX LARKIN, GENERAL COUNSEL

**Senator Connally.** General Marshall, do you believe that our air power and Navy could win a war against Red China and keep them out of an invasion of—

**Secretary Marshall.** Keep them from—

**Senator Connally.** Keep them from making an invasion of Korea.

**Secretary Marshall.** Formosa, you mean?

**Senator Connally.** No. I mean keep them from coming over like they are now. Could our Navy and Air alone, without any ground troops—

**Secretary Marshall.** I do not think they could, sir.

**Senator Connally.** I believe it is contended by General MacArthur that he would not favor sending a single soldier, ground soldier to China, General—

**Secretary Marshall.** That was my understanding.

**Senator Connally.** —if we become involved in a war with Red China, and Russia should intervene, and then in that case we would have to send ground troops, would we not?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, we would have to accept the fact that we could not reach the ground in China proper except by air and close naval action otherwise.

**Senator Connally.** I believe that is all for the present.

**Senator Russell.** Senator Bridges?

**Senator Bridges.** General Marshall, you said that the reason why General MacArthur was recalled, as he was, and that he got the rather unusual notice, was due to the fact that the plan which you set up or was set up for notifying him of his recall, that of having Secretary Pace formally call on him and notify him, was changed, and you indicated that it was changed for two reasons:

One, that the power of the message could not get through to Secretary Pace on time and, secondly, there was a leak. Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000500090014-6

Now, we have been talking about leaks this morning, and I would like to ask you who was present at the conference where this decision was reached on the recall of General MacArthur?

**Secretary Marshall.** I was not present, Senator, but General Bradley was, and I think the question had better go to him, because I don't recall exactly who was present.

**Senator Bridges.** Well, you were not present when the decision was made?

**Secretary Marshall.** I was not present.

**Senator Bridges.** So, my point that I was getting at is that the leak must have come from a pretty high source, and if you were not present and did not know about the procedure to be followed, why then, of course, you could not be considered responsible for the leak, and the question should be addressed to somebody who was present.

**Secretary Marshall.** I was communicated with over the telephone.

**Senator Bridges.** Yes.

**Secretary Marshall.** About 10:30 at night, I believe.

**Senator Bridges.** Mr. Secretary, with regard to the question that has been asked you on the conflict between the views of the Defense Department and the State Department, are you familiar with the Joint Chiefs of Staff views on the National Security Council policy paper toward Asia which was being considered by the Security Council in 1949?

**Secretary Marshall.** No, I am not familiar, sir.

**Senator Bridges.** If you are not familiar with it, then you could not comment on whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in conflict with the position taken by the State Department?

**Secretary Marshall.** I am not familiar with that, sir.

**Senator Bridges.** What is your basis for believing—you reiterated several times here in answer to several questions that the bombing of Chinese Communist bases and attacking of Chinese Communist lines might involve us in a war with Soviet Russia. But, as I followed your answers to the questions, at no time have you given a specific reason as to why you think the bombing of Chinese Communist bases might bring on a war. I mean you have referred to it in very general terms. I mean do you have some reason for that belief, specific reason for that belief.

**Secretary Marshall.** I am sorry my previous statements were not clear enough. I thought I had explained.

However, it starts with the treaty relationship between the Soviet Government and the Chinese Communist regime; the possible reaction that might be the basis is one factor. Another factor is that carrying of the war into Manchuria, that is, north of the Yalu, would involve a very considerable reaction, and as to the Chinese Communist regime, whether or not the Soviet Government was letting them down in the circumstances that were created by that bombing, and the Soviet reaction as to what extent they could have a satellite as important to them as the Chinese Communist regime develop a feeling that they would have to go it alone.

Those would be the main considerations involved in the opinion that it was dangerous to carry out that bombing you have referred to.

[Deleted]

**Senator Bridges.** Mr. Secretary, you referred several times to the unusual strength or the very sizable strength on the borders up there in this area and indicated it is of unusual strength. I want to ask you if it is not true that Russia has consistently maintained large numbers

so forth on these borders for a period of many years even before this thing started.

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct, sir, but I was given the impression or the information that more recently, notably since I think December, that there had been sizable increases in the garrisons in that region.

**Senator Bridges.** General Marshall, another thing that you have referred to quite consistently in your testimony is the Berlin air lift, and commenting very favorably upon our ability to meet the challenge to the air lift. You haven't discussed at all who was responsible for the necessity of meeting such a challenge to the air lift, in other words, who negotiated the terms which allowed us holding Berlin, for example, without a land corridor accessible or in access to it. Are you familiar with that, General Marshall?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think that came to its head in the Potsdam Agreement, but I cannot be too certain between Yalta and that period.

**Senator Bridges.** But who would we ask that could give us that?

**Secretary Marshall.** The State Department would have the records.

**Senator Bridges.** The State Department would have the details of that thing?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Bridges.** You, General Marshall, according to your testimony, do you see anything strange in the logic which blames the Government of the Chinese Nationalists for its failure to stave off Communism after aid had been cut off to it, and which praises the governments of Europe for being wise enough to accept our aid so that the same thing did not happen to them?

**Secretary Marshall.** I am not quite certain that I understand the question, Senator.

**Senator Bridges.** What I mean is there is a difference of logic here as I see it in running through your testimony where Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalists we are blaming for their failure to resist the Communist hordes in China after we had given them certain aid, and then we turn around and we are praising European governments who have been resisting on Communism, and after accepting our aid.

In other words, what I am getting at is that we have done the reverse in these areas of the world.

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, I am still a little doubtful, but I will try to answer. It seems to me that the way you have stated the question implies that the withdrawal of our aid from the Chinese Nationalist Government brought about the fall, the inability of that Government to resist the Communists' infiltration and military—

**Senator Bridges.** That was what I intended to infer, that it was a major cause of it. I said you were right, I intended to infer that was a major cause in China.

**Secretary Marshall.** Then if I have got the question right, I don't think it's comparable on that basis for the reason that we provided a great deal of aid, and I know while I was Secretary of State we brought before Congress an item of 570 millions which involved the practicability of the Chinese Nationalists or Kuomintang Government of utilizing the funds that they already had to pay for imports into China, to buy the armament they might need, and that would be replaced out of this 570 million that I referred to. Four hundred million was actually appropriated, I believe, and one portion of 125 millions I think was left for them to dispose of as they saw fit. In other words, they could buy arms with it or not as they saw fit.

What actually happened as I analyze the situation was that they had taken the equipment that we had given

They had a great advantage in equipment, they had an advantage in numbers. They lacked in leadership and they lacked the general support of the Chinese public because of the character of government that had been carried on through a period of years.

Now when they had overextended themselves, particularly in the matter of capturing cities, which they had to support, and the communications which they had to cover, they fell you might say, of their own weight. That was quite a different situation in Europe. That is as near as I can answer the question, Senator.

**Senator Bridges.** Are you familiar with the statement made by one of the principal leaders of the Communist Government of Red China to the effect that—back here while the fighting was still going on on the mainland—that they had suffered terrific losses, and that they had lost 1,300,000, or had 1,300,000 casualties?

Are you familiar with that?

**Secretary Marshall.** "They" being who?

**Senator Bridges.** The Chinese Communists announced that they had suffered great losses.

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't recall that statement, sir.

**Senator Bridges.** That differs quite a lot from the information which is put out in this country, that the Chinese Nationalists didn't fight.

If the Chinese Communists suffered 1,300,000 casualties, certainly somebody did something to inflict those casualties, and that came as a statement from one of the Chinese Communist Government officials.

Are you familiar with the statement that Mr. Acheson made March 20, 1947, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in which he said:

"The Chinese Government is not in the position at the present time that the Greek Government is in, not approaching collapse, not threatened with defeat against Communism. The war with the Communists is going on much as it has for the last 20 years."

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, if I was familiar, at that time I presume I was, I have forgotten just the details of that.

**Senator Bridges.** Do you think that is a correct statement, at that time?

**Secretary Marshall.** Hearing it today, the way you have read it, it would seem so.

**Senator Bridges.** You think that the State Department was justified in its opposition to certain congressional demands for aid to China?

Would you say, now, that the rather publicized 80th Congress possessed some foresight, and might have been unnecessarily belittled, in our actions, in the light of recent events in Asia?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is quite a question, Senator.

**Senator Bridges.** If you remember, the 80th Congress did take rather a forthright position on aid to China, and so that it would be—just asking you for comment, General.

**Secretary Marshall.** All I can say is, in the document I read here before a committee, we asked for 575 millions, and, as I recall, I may be incorrect, but as I recall, the Congress appropriated 400 millions, which would have some bearing on that particular question.

**Senator Bridges.** I did not get that.

**Secretary Marshall.** Which would have some bearing on that particular question.

**Senator Bridges.** You asked for how many?

**Senator Bridges.** And Congress appropriated how much?

**Secretary Marshall.** 400 million. That can be checked. I can be wrong, but that is my recollection.

**Senator Bridges.** I want to check on it, too, because I think you are wrong; but I would not say so now. You are talking from memory, and I am, but I certainly would like to check it very carefully.

Well, do you think the statement that Senator McCarran made in the United States Senate recently, when he said, "Thanks to General MacArthur, Japan, who was our enemy, is now our friend, while thanks to the State Department, China, who was our friend, is now our enemy," is correct?

**Secretary Marshall.** I do not think it is. In part it is correct; in part it is not, in my opinion.

**Senator Bridges.** Now, General, do you have a memory of a copy of a draft prepared before you went to China on your mission, Chinese mission, and was there a draft prepared of instructions to you by the Defense Department at that time?

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't recall. There may have been, sir; I don't recall.

**Senator Bridges.** Would you check for us and find out whether that is true? My information is that there was a draft prepared for you, which was prepared and cleared by the heads of the Department at that time, and then your formal directives or instructions which you received from the State Department were far different from this directive which was prepared or suggested by the then heads of the Defense Department; and if so, I think that the Committee should have a copy of each to see the changes in the two directives.

**Secretary Marshall.** I presume when you say "Defense Department," of that period, you are talking about the War Department.

**Senator Bridges.** Let me see—1947, 1948—we had a Defense Department—yes, that is right; it would be the War Department at that time.

No more questions.

**Senator Russell.** Senator George?

**Senator George.** General Marshall, have you any dependable estimates of the petroleum supplies held by the Soviets in Siberia, the Vladivostok area, or in that area?

**Secretary Marshall.** No, sir, I have not with me. I would have to go back to find out.

**Senator George.** Have you that? Is that available?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, I will inquire of the Munitions Board and see if we have anything, and submit it to the Committee, if you wish me to do so.

**Senator George.** I would be very glad if you would do so.

There is no oil in that area that is being taken out of the ground now, is there, of any consequence?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think so, but I am too vague at the moment to answer that.

**Senator George.** Of any great consequence.

Have you any estimate of the oil supplies available to Soviet Russia, the Soviets, in the Western European area?

**Secretary Marshall.** I have not myself, sir. Baku is the nearest principal supply that I recall.

**Senator George.** General, this perhaps does not lie within your knowledge, but even if we had—if Russia had the oil supplies in the Middle East now, it would take her months, would it not, under the circumstances of war, to lay pipe lines and construct the necessary machinery and equipment for the refining of that oil?

**Secretary Marshall.** If she did not control the refining establishments already in that region and they were not destroyed, I would assume that would be the case.

Senator George. I think it is generally conceded, is it not, General Marshall, that even their refining processes are not strictly modern, even those that they have in the Western European and the Baku area, let us say. So I would like for you, if you can, to give us an estimate of the oil in storage, held in tankers—I can conceive of no other way Soviet Russia could have any great supply of oil in the Far East, in the Siberian or Vladivostok area or Manchurian area, available to them.

Secretary Marshall. I think it is generally conceded, is it not, General Marshall, that even their refining processes are not strictly modern, even those that they have in the Western European and the Baku area, let us say. So I would like for you, if you can, to give us an estimate of the oil in storage, held in tankers—I can conceive of no other way Soviet Russia could have any great supply of oil in the Far East, in the Siberian or Vladivostok area or Manchurian area, available to them.

Secretary Marshall. I will take your question from the record and see what information they can give you.

Senator George. What she has available in storage or from production in the Western European area in comparison with the supplies that would be available to the North Atlantic area countries in Western Europe in the event of an outbreak of hostilities.

Now, General, in emphasizing the number of casualties that we might suffer in the event of the bombing of American cities, I think it has been suggested here and outside, as well, by responsible spokesmen of the Government, that the bombing of a single American city would result in more casualties than we have suffered in Korea since June 27 last.

I want to ask you one question, General. Do you not believe that the bombing of a single American city would unify this country against the Soviet forces everywhere instantly and to a higher degree than they have yet been unified?

Secretary Marshall. I would assume that would be the case, exactly as it was with Pearl Harbor.

Senator George. It would mean if Russia should bomb a single American city, she would have decided upon all-out war; is that right?

Secretary Marshall. That would be my conclusion.

Senator George. No further questions.

Senator Russell. Senator Saltonstall.

Senator Saltonstall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; I would like to ask just a very few questions in summing up.

General Marshall, Chairman Russell has asked you for the written statements of General MacArthur that the Defense Department considered violating the President's instructions, and why. That is one question that is before this Committee, as I see it.

The other question is the question of the policy in the Far East.

Now, may I just ask you to see if I have these summed up fairly clearly in my mind—the differences between you and General MacArthur.

Now, I have read and reread General MacArthur's speech before Congress, and I have listened to your testimony. General MacArthur stated emphatically that we should never let Formosa get into the hands of the Chinese. On that I understand you to agree with him?

Secretary Marshall. Yes.

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Secretary, General MacArthur has stated that we should never assent to the Red Chinese becoming a member of the United Nations. Do you also agree with him on that?

Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. Three: General MacArthur advocated an economic and a naval blockade of China. An economic blockade is now, we hope, becoming more effective. When it is effective, I understand from you that you consider a naval blockade becomes relatively unimportant.

Secretary Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Saltonstall. With General MacArthur that no ground troops should under any circumstances be sent onto the mainland of China?

Secretary Marshall. Correct.

Senator Saltonstall. General MacArthur advocates the removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of Chinese coastal areas and Manchuria. As I understand it, on this you do not agree with him as you believe it might tend to bring Russia actively into the war.

Secretary Marshall. [Deleted]

Senator Saltonstall. General MacArthur advocates the bombing of centers of supply in Manchuria.

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, I hope the Senator from Massachusetts will excuse my interruption, but I believe his question applied both to the coast of China and to air reconnaissance of Manchuria, and I do not know whether General Marshall understood that fully in the answer to the question. [deleted]

Senator Saltonstall. I thank the Senator from Iowa.

General MacArthur's statement was on air reconnaissance over China and Manchuria.

[Deleted]

Senator Saltonstall. You are also not in agreement with him as to the advocacy of bombing the supply centers in Manchuria?

Secretary Marshall. Under present circumstances.

[Deleted]

Senator Saltonstall. General MacArthur advocates the removal of restrictions on Chiang's forces on Formosa and logistical support to contribute to effective operations against the Chinese mainland. As I have listened to your testimony and to the evidence given Congress, we are now doing more to help Chiang's forces, and we are sending over a military mission to advise with them. On this, how much difference of opinion now exists between you and General MacArthur?

Secretary Marshall. [Deleted]

We also feel that, at the present time, while we are endeavoring to hold this to a limited war confined to the Korean peninsula, that it would be ill advised to carry out such action since we are directly contributing to the defense of Formosa by the instructions to the Seventh Fleet, by our mission that we have established there, by the supplies that we are shipping there, and that therefore we would be endangering the confinement of the present operations to the Korean peninsula. I think that covers the attitude.

Oh, I remember now. May I add what I was trying to think of. It does not appear to us—and you can question the Chiefs of Staff very directly on this—that the return from such action would be in proportion to the probable results brought about by such action. That is all, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. I thank you, sir. Do I sum that up, what you have just said, reasonably correctly from your previous testimony and what you have just said [deleted]. Is that a fair statement, summary of your statement?

Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir, but it implies the general trend of my answer which I prefer to have off the record.

Senator Saltonstall. Yes. Now I believe that those sum up General MacArthur's recommendations. As I see it, you and he agree on some; the principal ones of which you do not agree are the questions of bombing in Manchuria and the use of Chiang's forces on the mainland.

Does not the real difference between you—and I have been trying to get the differences of opinion to make up my own mind—boil down, as I tried to ask you the other day, to an effort to determine the Soviet's intentions and the Soviet's capabilities to carry out those intentions in

(The reporter read back the last question.)

**Secretary Marshall.** Senator, the portion of your question which brings up the consideration of developing the Soviet intentions I don't quite understand, because we could find out very quickly if we did some of these things that we think hazard our entrance into a full war.

We would learn their intentions in a very positive manner. Now, other than that, I assume you are referring to our intelligence services as to what is going on.

**Senator Saltonstall.** No. Perhaps I didn't put my question clearly, General Marshall.

What I was trying to analyze was the difference of opinion between you and General MacArthur, through your testimony and his, before this Committee, particularly of the effect of bombing in Manchuria, and the use of Chinese Nationalist forces on the mainland.

As I get it, I am asking you, to put it in the form of a question: Doesn't the difference of opinion between you really boil down to the question of trying to analyze, as a calculated risk, to use that expression, the Soviet's intentions in the Far East, and their capability of carrying out those intentions, in other words?

**Secretary Marshall.** I understand that question; and I think—

**Senator Saltonstall.** That is what I am trying to say.

**Secretary Marshall.** That is a positive difference. Analyzing that difference met my previous comment.

**Senator Saltonstall.** Well, haven't we, as members of this Committee, got to determine, in our judgment, if we have to reach a conclusion on this subject, as to whether the calculated risk is best, one way, or the calculated risk is best the other way, as far as the United States is concerned?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think so.

I might add a consideration to those questions that you have just asked, which I would assume General MacArthur did not bring into his statements here in this country: That is, the effect of utilizing Chinese Nationalist troops from Formosa, in Korea; and I would disagree as to that.

**Senator Saltonstall.** What was that last?

**Secretary Marshall.** I would disagree as to that.

**Senator Saltonstall.** I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Senator Russell.** Senator Smith.

**Senator Smith.** General Marshall, I have a few questions here that I would like to ask you, if I may.

I was talking with Senator Thye, of Minnesota, on Saturday, after the hearing, and he raised a question with me with regard to the Yalta Conference; and I told him that I would be glad to join with him in asking certain questions to clear up some doubts in my own mind on that subject.

My first question is: You testified that you were one of the United States representatives at Yalta?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Smith.** Let me ask you: Why were Nationalist China and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek not included in the Yalta Conference?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, that is a question directed at a portion of the Conference with which I am not familiar. I should imagine the reason was that the Russian Government was not at war with Japan at that time, and one of the problems the Japanese had to consider was whether or not the Russian Government would go to war with Japan.

The Chinese Nationalist Government under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was at war with Japan. I should imagine in those circumstances there was that reason, though I don't know, and you will have to ask that of

**Senator Smith.** The reason for my question is that there was some disposition of China's status, and so forth at the Yalta Conference. I was wondering why—

**Secretary Marshall.** I was not in the political portion.

**Senator Smith.** That was the political side, of course. Do you recall what was the secret agreement that affected China at Yalta?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, I wish you would ask that of the State Department and not of me, sir.

**Senator Smith.** I find in the book by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., entitled "Roosevelt and the Russians; the Yalta Conference"—

**Secretary Marshall.** I think I know what you are talking about. I remember your question the other day. We have been checking to see if there was a secret agreement of a military nature.

**Senator Smith.** Mr. Stettinius was there as Secretary of State at that time. He says on page 93 and 94 of that book that on Feb. 11, 1945, the following agreement was signed by Marshal Stalin, Prime Minister Churchill, and President Roosevelt, and then follows the agreement, which is just a page.

Mr. Chairman, if I may have this inserted in this place in the record, I won't read it, except the high spots, but if it has to go in the appendix—

**Senator Russell.** In accordance with our policy, it will have to appear in the appendix unless you read it.

**Senator Smith.** The following agreement, referred to later as the secret agreement, is as follows. Now I am quoting from Mr. Stettinius:

"The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

"1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;

"2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

"(a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union;

"(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored;

"(c) the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;

"3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

"It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

"The heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

"For its part, the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of



China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke."

That is the end of the secret agreement as reported by Mr. Stettinius.

This is important. Mr. Stettinius goes on to say in his book on page 94, just following the quotation of the text of this secret agreement:

"This agreement regarding Japan, a top-secret document, did not appear in the protocol of the Yalta Conference. It was taken to Washington and deposited in the President's personal safe. Few of the President's closest advisers knew of its existence. It was feared that if too many people knew about it, the information would leak out and reach Japan."

Then, a little lower down the same page, Mr. Stettinius writes, and I quote again:

"The Chinese were not notified immediately of this agreement at Yalta for fear the secret would not be kept in Chungking. Marshal Stalin told President Roosevelt at Yalta that the Russians would start sending divisions across Siberia but insisted that this must be done in complete secrecy. The President agreed, therefore, that only after the troop movements were completed would he explain the situation to the Chinese."

"The President, of course, did not live long enough to do this."

That is the end of Mr. Stettinius' quotation.

Now, the question I would like to ask you, first, is were you familiar with this so-called secret agreement with regard to China?

**Secretary Marshall.** I did not know the factors of it at the time.

**Senator Smith.** Can you tell me how was this agreement with Russia carried out; in other words, if Russia was to take over the surrender of Manchuria? I do not remember that.

**Secretary Marshall.** Russia did.

**Senator Smith.** That was my recollection. Did Russia turn over the Japanese captured arms and so forth which they got in Manchuria by surrender, to the Chinese Communists?

**Secretary Marshall.** So far as we know, they left them in dumps in Manchuria, and when they withdrew they were opened to Chinese Communists, who rearmed themselves.

**Senator Smith.** The Chinese Communists got them.

Did this possibly cause Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to lose face in China, and especially in Manchuria? He was not notified of something happening. The Russians came in and took over the surrender of the Japanese, and these arms were turned over to the Communists, just at the time the Generalissimo was having his trouble with the Communists.

**Secretary Marshall.** I think, Senator, most of the weapons from dumps in Manchuria were taken over by the Chinese Communists at a much later date, after the Generalissimo was and had been apprised of the factors that you have been referring to.

My own recollection is that that apparently occurred with the Russian formal withdrawal from Manchuria, after I went to China, and in 1946.

I know they were as far south, as the reports show, as the Yellow Sea at the time I was there, and this was quite a long period before they made the evacuation.

The Chinese Government, I believe, requested a delay of one or two months in the evacuation schedule for the Soviet troops, because they were not prepared to take over, and they wished to take over from the Soviet troops

before the Communists could arrive in force.

Now, I think after that—

**Senator Smith.** You meant by that, the Nationalist Government, Chiang Kai-shek's Government?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Smith.** Very well.

**Secretary Marshall.** Now, after that, the Soviet troops withdrew, and my recollection of the factors involved in that were that they virtually removed most of the rolling stock in that withdrawal, which left little for the National Government to utilize for its troops in following up the withdrawal, and we never knew specifically what happened, but there were rumors, and there were accusations, on the part of the Chinese Nationalist Government that Communist troops had been facilitated in their movement north, and they then obtained these dumps of supplies.

**Senator Smith.** Well, those are the rumors that, I think, and the story, that we have all heard with regard to that; and, of course, it would be followed up by the thought, I think—or I was told so—in China that with those developments the people of China felt that Great Britain and the United States, at least, had not done much for Chiang Kai-shek; and to use a slang expression, they had sold him down the river at Yalta in this secret agreement with the Russians taking over, and those supplies going to the Chinese Communists.

My question is to this purpose: We have been saying later Chiang Kai-shek lost his prestige, lost face. A lot of his troops defected, went over to the other side.

Now, is it not a fair question to ask whether these developments in Manchuria, this secret agreement at Yalta, was not an important contributory factor because of the loss of morale in Chiang's troops, and their later defection, and also the falling away of the Chinese people from Chiang, which you testified to earlier, which undoubtedly was the case?

**Secretary Marshall.** I assume that the knowledge of these proposed concessions, as it were, to be made by the Chinese Nationalist Government in their established relations with the Soviet Government, certainly were a great worry to the Generalissimo. How much was publicized over China generally I don't know. But, on the other hand, there was a movement of troops into Manchuria, which was carried out by our Navy, and they were landed there; and supplies were gotten for them there.

I personally arranged to have all of our subarctic clothing brought down; had the officer go with it until it was all shipped, headed for the Manchurian coast.

We also transported ammunition, I think, directly from Okinawa to the Manchurian coast, as a base of supply for those forces, because they were going in with very inadequate supplies and very inadequate clothing into the winter of early 1946, so that so far as the military reaction is concerned, we had a very large movement I think of five or six armies to Manchuria—these figures are obtainable from the records—and transported by our naval shipping, and the troops themselves equipped with these special clothes that we were providing for them when the first units had gone in there with cotton clothes from down near Canton, and it was 30 and 40 degrees below zero, so you will have to make your own estimate as to the reaction of the troops, as to the Generalissimo losing face.

I would suppose that so far as those troops are concerned, that would not have been the case.

**Senator Smith.** One question more on that China situation when you were there. What steps, if any, were taken by the United States to help train a free and democratic leadership in China? We have heard General Chiang criticized for not developing a democratic leader-

Now I know we did contribute military aid and advice for a time there, but did we contribute any efforts to develop a free and democratic leadership in China to bring about reforms that might have helped Chiang Kai-shek's Administration?

**Secretary Marshall.** I am trying to figure out in my own mind how much is the military part and how much is the political part.

On the military side we set up this military mission to which I have referred, and did it under the war powers of the President, and that was to engage in developing an effective army.

We ran into the difficulty of not being able to convince them that they could do a great deal south of the Yangtze River in preparing a solid basis for their military forces, what we are doing in this country, what we call basic military training.

I wanted that established all over that portion of Central China south of the river, and had virtually picked out the man to direct it and arranged it so it would be done in such a manner it wouldn't revitalize the military control of the civil authority which we were trying to see developed, but we were not successful in that.

As to the commanders, where I thought their great weakness lay, a large number were demobilized but had to be continued on the pay roll, and as to top commanders, we were far less successful because where I proposed the relief of this one and the relief of that one, I was not successful in doing so, notably in Manchuria. They were getting into trouble in which they could not sustain themselves.

That is the best I can give you on the military side. Now, on the political side, in the setup of the military system that was proposed and which was approved in connection with the demobilization of the forces and their reorganization and their integration, it was so set up that the military would no longer have control of the civil authorities, that military command would be restricted to military forces just as it is in this country.

And the supply factor would be handled, so nearly as it was arrangeable, in a way that could not be perverted and twisted off to some other use, and would be less subject to bad faith in the way it was conducted.

That is a statement largely military, but it was basic as to the build-up of any kind of a democratic government, because in each region where there was a military commander he commanded that region and his troops were his sanction for that control. That had to be broken down or we got nowhere beyond a military dictatorship, in effect. So the terms of the demobilization, which are in print, as a matter of fact, envisaged a very careful setup to prevent the continuance of that manner of military control, which was exerted throughout the country.

**Senator Smith.** During that, General, as I read the White Paper, is just about the time some of our representatives in China were arguing in favor of the Chinese Communists, as agrarian revolutionists, and we ought to be turning our attention to them and giving less support to General Chiang and the National Government. It is that turnover of policy that I am trying to locate the timing of.

**Secretary Marshall.** I think you are involved there, Senator, in a gradual procedure.

**Senator Smith.** Yes.

**Secretary Marshall.** For example, there was the period there along about August and September of 1946 when a last effort was made to see if we could call off the military contests, in Central China in particular, that we ceased shipping munitions for use on the battlefield

bringing to a halt the military operations that were then going on and which were developing into a general war all over North China. It had developed into a fight in Manchuria, but we had been able up to the middle of June to avoid that in North China.

Now it was in the final effort to try to control that, in which it was quite evidently a campaign of the Generalissimo to defeat the communistic effort by military action, that the first step was taken to cut off the further shipments at that time of munitions that could be immediately used on the battlefield. For instance, it didn't affect transport planes but it did affect combat planes. However, their state of equipment was such that they were amply provided up through, we will say, into the middle of the winter. It did not succeed to that end. And then there was a gradual procedure where the supply of military materiel, part of that was resumed later on. I have forgotten just what the dates are, but that can be gotten out of the record and particularly out of the State Department evidence.

**Senator Smith.** Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I want to turn again to the MacArthur situation and ask you this question; whether any misunderstandings or disagreements between General MacArthur and the Department of Defense or the Department of State existed prior to the Korean aggression of 1950—June, 1950. We have been discussing here the differences between the departments here and the General since the Korean outbreak. Well, what I want to know now is whether any disagreements or misunderstandings existed between General MacArthur and the Department prior to the Korean outbreak.

**Secretary Marshall.** I cannot answer that, sir.

I can find out, on the Defense Department side. I could have the records looked into and send you an answer; but you can get a direct answer, I think, from General Bradley, as Chief of Staff; and, on the State Department side, I do not know.

**Senator Smith.** You were, I think, Secretary of State prior to the Korean aggression?

**Secretary Marshall.** I was Secretary of State until Jan. 3, 1949; and I ceased to function as Secretary of State the first week of December—

**Senator Smith.** Do you recall any disagreement or misunderstanding with General MacArthur while you were Secretary of State?

**Secretary Marshall.** I would not wish to answer that offhand, because we were in the midst of discussions all the time as to the manner of how the Japanese nation was to be set up again, and more particularly in regard to the economic procedures. All of those matters were settled in the discussions.

Now, just the various phases of the matters, I couldn't testify to, offhand.

**Senator Smith.** Well, could you say whether those discussions on economic and other problems were on an amicable basis, or were there sharp divergencies? I understand that some of the conferring with General MacArthur on the economic situation came to some disagreement with the General.

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, I couldn't answer that very well. I know we sent out various people in connection with it.

**Senator Smith.** Now, General, did any of the policy makers in the Department of State or the Department of Defense get to the Far East, and consider General MacArthur's problems with him, prior to the Korean aggression, in June of 1950; and I ask specifically if any of the following with the Department of State were there:

You testified you didn't go, yourself.

hadn't been out there; Secretary Acheson, of the State Department, had not been out there; Under Secretary Webb, of the State Department, never was out there; Assistant Secretary Dear. Rusk, up to that time, had not been out there; Ambassador Jessup, who had taken quite an active part in developing foreign policies, I was told, had never been out there until after my trip in 1949; and I am just wondering whether I am mistaken in the information that I have, that none of the group, this group, had ever been out there and discussed with General MacArthur, on the ground, some of the problems that he was facing?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think that Mr. Dean Rusk, present Assistant Secretary of State, who is involved in Far Eastern policy, made the trip out there.

**Senator Smith.** Of course he has been there since the Korean outbreak, I know, a number of times; but I was wondering if he had been there prior to that time?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think so, but that information can be obtained from the State Department.

I will ask for it.

**Senator Smith.** Now, none of the following from the Department of Defense was out there:

The Secretary of War, or of the Navy, prior to unification; yourself, since you have been Secretary of Defense—you testified you have not been out there; Secretary Lovett, of Defense, has not been out there.

I understand that of the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air, only Secretary Pace has been out there, and that is very recently.

**Secretary Marshall.** Mr. Matthews has been out there.

**Senator Smith.** Secretary Matthews was out there?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes.

**Senator Smith.** But not prior to the Korean outbreak?

**Secretary Marshall.** After the Korean outbreak.

**Senator Smith.** Of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, only General Collins came out there, when I was there in the fall of 1949.

Of course they have all been out there since the Korean outbreak; but, prior to that, when some of these other problems were brewing, I cannot find that any of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, or any of our leaders in the Defense Department or State Department ever went out there, although all of them were going to Europe constantly.

**Secretary Marshall.** General Eisenhower was out there in April and May, 1946.

**Senator Smith.** '46?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes.

**Senator Smith.** Was he Chief of Staff then?

**Secretary Marshall.** He was Chief of Staff then, and—

**Senator Smith.** I am glad to get that—

**Secretary Marshall.** And General Collins was there in '49.

**Senator Russell.** Let the witness finish answering the question, please.

**Secretary Marshall.** General Collins was there in '49. Those are the principal visits I have here.

**Senator Smith.** That is what I thought, from your testimony, that General Collins had been there, and you say now, General Eisenhower.

**Secretary Marshall.** Now, I am not including Secretary Pace. We would have to look that up, because I think that he was out there several times.

**Senator Smith.** I just am not clear why, with these matters developing out there, if there were any misunderstandings with General MacArthur, there wasn't some attempt made to go out there and try to straighten them out.

Let me ask you this question:

Did any of those named, since the outbreak in Korea,

testified at the time that they had never been to Formosa—that none of our chief policy makers have ever been to Formosa?

**Secretary Marshall.** They are looking up the record now. I haven't got the word, but they can tell you directly, when they come in here.

**Senator Smith.** My next question on this same line is:

Were there any disagreements with General MacArthur that were taken up with him at Wake Island?

From this report that we have had published here, apparently there was nothing very much in the way of a disagreement at Wake Island.

**Secretary Marshall.** All I have had is that report. I have had nothing in addition to that; and General Bradley, who was present, can give you a direct answer.

**Senator Smith.** Well, finally, on this point:

I am troubled by this question: Why could not a personal meeting in Washington or Tokyo have been arranged with General MacArthur, to request him to turn over his Korean command to General Ridgway, in the light of the differences, and discuss the general SCAP situation with him?

It would seem to me, with a matter of this importance, it is hard to understand why someone of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wouldn't have gone to General MacArthur and called attention to this disagreement, and asked him, as I asked him here, the question—whether he wouldn't turn over his Korean command to General Ridgway, in the light of those differences, and he answered that he would have, of course, had he been asked; and I am not clear why it was necessary to take this abrupt action with a man of his caliber, and a five-star general.

**Secretary Marshall.** It was felt, in the opinion of all those I have mentioned, sir, it was necessary to do that.

**Senator Smith.** Had to move rapidly.

Now, could I ask you this question, which may be a little embarrassing, but I do want to get an answer to it?

Is the report true that the removal of General MacArthur had been planned by the Executive Department for a long time, long before you were made Secretary of Defense?

**Secretary Marshall.** It would have to be—depending on just a guess, on my part, or a statement from what I'd know.

I would have said that that was not the case at all; that there was really very genuine regret that the action of dismissal was actually taken, and that very careful consideration was given to ways and means possibly to avoid that action.

I cannot speak for the President. I cannot speak for my predecessors, but I have received no indication whatsoever that there was any such idea on foot.

The general assumption was that General MacArthur would remain in office until the Japanese peace treaty was signed; and the question then was, how—where should he go, and where did he wish to go.

**Senator Smith.** That would be after the Japanese peace treaty—

**Secretary Marshall.** After the peace treaty was signed.

**Senator Smith.** That is what I understood him to say, that it had been in his mind to retire, himself, after the peace treaty was signed, because he felt that he should then withdraw.

**Secretary Marshall.** That was the general assumption, and I have already stated that one of the considerations that were talked over, was this action that was taken, and whether it could be stayed until such time as the peace treaty had been accomplished—and that was considered at some length.

**Senator Smith.** Now, this is just confirming, I think, what you have testified to here before.

It has been stated in some quarters that the United States Government plans eventually to agree to the entrance of the Red Chinese Government into the United Nations.

The testimony presented thus far has not produced any clear understanding on this point.

I think you have testified, or stated quite categorically, that as far as the Defense establishment was concerned, it is unalterably opposed to Red China's entrance into the United Nations.

I think you stated that previously.

**Secretary Marshall.** That part that applies to the Defense Department is correct; but you can question the State Department on the general procedure.

**Senator Smith.** Will it continue to be the policy of the Department of Defense, or does the Department stand ready to consider the question of the entrance of the Red Chinese into the United Nations as a bargaining point in the Korean peace settlement?

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't think that I could be more categorical in my replies than I have already been on that subject.

**Senator Smith.** That lays the foundation for the next question:

Do you believe, General Marshall, that what has happened in China is a conquest of that country by Soviet Russia, and that there is consequently a control of China today by an external power, namely, Russia?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think that is generally a fact.

**Senator Smith.** Does that imply that the admission of Communist China to the United Nations would mean the recognition by the United Nations of the conquest of China by an external power—Russia? Wouldn't that inevitably follow?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think that would be the natural assumption. It means an additional vote of the Communist group.

**Senator Smith.** Would this be something quite different from the mere determination of a procedural question of credentials when the question of the veto comes up?

**Secretary Marshall.** It is undoubtedly a consideration, but as to the procedural part, I won't attempt to answer that.

**Senator Smith.** The statement has been made that it is simply a procedural point for the credentials to be accepted. Here we have a conquest by an external power and control by an external power.

**Secretary Marshall.** Which they will deny.

**Senator Smith.** They will deny it, of course, but they will ask that their puppet be admitted to the United Nations.

Now, the next question is this: Would this control of China by an external power be a sound ground to use the veto against the admission to the United Nations and to the Security Council of this externally controlled Peiping Communist Government?

**Secretary Marshall.** I have already involved myself in the legalistic, and I would rather not answer the question.

**Senator Smith.** I want to get the question in the record as a suggestion. One more question and I am through.

I just want to get this clear, because I am still confused in my own mind by the Joint Chiefs of Staff statement of January 12. You have testified several times, General Marshall, that the January 12 Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations were modified later in January in light of the improved conditions in Korea.

General MacArthur stated before the Congress and before these Committees that the Joint Chiefs of Staff shared his view on the four important courses of action he recommended.

I have gone through the record carefully to see if at any point General MacArthur had been notified that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had changed their views. I can't find any place that MacArthur was notified of the change in their views. I wonder if I am wrong about that. Were his views shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 12 or did he share the Joint Chiefs of Staff views on January 12 and was he incorrect in any respect when he said he had not learned that they had changed their views since that time?

**Secretary Marshall.** Senator, I have done my best here a number of times to explain the relationship between the paper of January 12th which was to the Security Council, and its reference to General MacArthur by General Collins in person as a matter of information, which would naturally be of great interest to him, and the directive of the Chiefs of Staff of the previous day, January 11th and its relationship to the President's message of January 13th.

Now really I think you should go further for information from the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves.

**Senator Smith.** I thank you. I do not want to press that. I just want to make it clear I am not clear on that matter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Senator Russell.** I have just received notification from Senator Byrd's office that he telephoned and asked that I be informed that he is detained in Virginia due to the illness of his mother. He asked that the message go in the record.

Most of us have had the privilege of meeting Mrs. Byrd, the mother of the Tom, Dick and Harry team, three great Americans who have contributed to their country.

I am sure that I voice the sentiments of every member of this Committee and the members of the Senate who are visitors here, when I say that we all fervently hope that Mrs. Byrd's illness will not be serious and that she will soon be restored to complete health.

**Senator Johnson?**

**Senator Johnson.** General Marshall, in the light of present world conditions and present conditions in the Far East, you are of the opinion that the programs and policies that we are now carrying out in Korea is the most prudent and wise policy that this Government could carry out under the circumstances?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct, sir.

**Senator Johnson.** General, do you know whether your viewpoint is shared by the civilian heads of the three services, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force?

**Secretary Marshall.** I wouldn't answer that. I don't know of any difference in viewpoint.

**Senator Johnson.** Do you know of any disagreements they may have as to the wisdom of the present policy?

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't know of any, sir.

**Senator Johnson.** Do you know of any disagreement that any individual member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may have with the wisdom of the present policy?

**Secretary Marshall.** No, sir.

**Senator Johnson.** Do you believe that they are in harmony and agreement with the wisdom of that policy?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is the impression that I have.

**Senator Johnson.** Do you know of any responsible or respected high military man now in the Department of Defense that feels that our policy is unwise?

**Secretary Marshall.** None has been brought to my attention.

**Senator Johnson.** Is it your opinion that General Ridgway feels that our course of action and our program is a wise one?

**Secretary Marshall.** We have had no indications from him to the contrary.

**Senator Johnson.** Have you had any indications from

Joy that they would prefer to embrace or substitute any other program for the program we are now following?

**Secretary Marshall.** I recall, of course, in the case of General Stratemeyer, that he made statements in an interview in relation to the *U. S. News* magazine advocating, I believe, the bombing in Manchuria.

**Senator Johnson.** Have you seen any official recommendation of either General Van Fleet, General Stratemeyer or Admiral Joy in that regard?

**Secretary Marshall.** I have seen none. There may have been communication, as I think there frequently has been between General Stratemeyer and General Vandenberg. I don't know on this particular point, but General Vandenberg can answer that.

**Senator Johnson.** Do you know of any member of the National Security Council that feels it would be the better part of wisdom to embark upon the MacArthur program instead of the one now being carried out?

**Secretary Marshall.** Senator, I do not think that I should comment on the views of a group like that. It is a matter of the individual himself. I hesitate to answer this way because it sets up the implication that there have been such disagreements.

**Senator Johnson.** I know of none but I just assumed that the National Security Council was well aware of our policy and our program, and if there had been any vital disagreement with that policy, that program, we would have heard about it.

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, I am establishing a precedent when I begin to interpret the various members. I am quite sure that our action has been sufficiently harmonious.

**Senator Johnson.** Have you at any time received any recommendations from any of the foreign commanders to the effect that we should abandon our present program and embark upon the MacArthur recommendations?

**Secretary Marshall.** Such recommendations would normally go to the Supreme Commander in Tokyo, and I have no information on that subject. The Chiefs of Staff could give you a more detailed answer.

**Senator Johnson.** You have indicated that in your opinion we are not as prepared as we might be or as we should be at this time. I wonder if you would give this Committee the benefit of your recommendations as to what we can do, what the country can do, what the Congress can do, what your Department can and should do to speed the day when we will be prepared.

**Secretary Marshall.** The most important action that I can think of at the moment is the conclusion before the Congress of their consideration in relation to the man-power act, which contains the basis for a continued improvement in our military posture with a decreased cost. That is not to my mind merely the question of the general discussions, but the time factor is becoming very serious because our further actions, particularly in the way of legislation regarding the reserves and all, are dependent on what the setup is to be.

At the present moment, then, I feel that prompt action regarding that man-power bill—and, I hope, action that does not destroy the most important phase of the matter—should be brought to a conclusion.

As to the appropriations, I think I have already said that I thought the Congress had acted with commendable promptness despite the large sums involved in regard to the various supplementary appropriation items. I believe the Senate still has to act—I am not quite certain—on the third supplemental of some 6½ billions. But what comes in your actions relating to the new 1951-1952 budget I can make no comment on. The hearings

seem to be going along all right and with a very considered understanding of the problems involved.

The general procedure under Mr. Wilson, I would not attempt to analyze that because it is a very complicated matter, and I am principally concerned with the inflationary factors which cut down our Defense Department purchasing requirements.

The attitude of the people, of course, is a very impressive factor in the whole affair; and what I am always worried about, and reference has been made to something of the sort this morning, is that we have to wait for some catastrophe to bring the unified action that the country will always give you.

I am very hopeful that they can all realize that we must move together in reasonable unity and very solidly behind the whole program.

That is talking in generalizations, but my main consideration there is that we don't have to wait for a catastrophe to bring about that energy, that unity that is so essential.

**Senator Johnson.** You mentioned the important basic phases of the man-power program. Would you care to elaborate on what you consider the more important ones?

**Secretary Marshall.** The most important factor in the man-power bill is, of course, the universal military training and service.

I have talked about that so often, I almost give offense by talking about it again. I was concerned in General MacArthur's statement in regard to it, but he prefaced his comments by the fact that he had not studied the bill, and he made a special reference to his concern as to its effect on labor.

Well, of course, he was not aware of the fact that labor has endorsed the bill, and it has been written in a way to cause the least unfortunate effect on the labor situation in our industries.

As to the part that gave me most concern, it was the implication, if not the direct statement, that it was a matter that must have very, very serious consideration. He had said almost the same words before the 72d Congress, and I think ever since then we have been giving it very, very serious consideration; and I cannot think of much else that can be said on the subject.

**Senator Johnson.** Do you know of any proposal advanced by the Department of Defense in your experience that has had more adequate consideration than the universal military training program?

**Secretary Marshall.** Offhand, I cannot think of any, except, maybe—but in a quite different manner—the question of what an officer can and should talk about before a committee, and what he should not, if anything. (Laughter)

**Senator Johnson.** There is certainly no disagreement within the services or within the Department that you are aware of with regard to the bill passed by the Senate on man power?

**Secretary Marshall.** It had the complete endorsement of all the various portions concerned.

**Senator Johnson.** Are you satisfied with the deliveries that are being made to the various services of equipment that would be required to give training and equip them for combat?

**Secretary Marshall.** I have had no reports brought to my attention or to me of what were thought to be serious delays in the matter. But I cannot give you any details at the moment because they have not been brought to my attention, as they would most certainly have been if there were undue delays in the production deliveries.

**Senator Johnson.** In short, it is your opinion that the civilian heads of the services and the military heads



of the services, name of the other responsible and respected officials in the Department believe, as you do, that the program we are now carrying out in Korea is the more prudent one, and the wisest one in the light of all the conditions?

**Secretary Marshall.** The Secretaries, the Chiefs of Staff, and my immediate associates that I work with give me that impression.

**Senator Johnson.** And if they felt otherwise, you think they would be frank enough to submit recommendations to you?

**Secretary Marshall.** I am quite certain they would. I get a great deal of frankness in the day's business.

**Senator Johnson.** Is General Eisenhower familiar with the program we are carrying out in Korea?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think he is.

**Senator Johnson.** Have you received from him at any time in your discussions with him and his problems—have you received any indication that he feels that our program is an unwise one in Korea?

**Secretary Marshall.** I have had no detailed report from General Eisenhower since he has gone to Europe except in one matter which concerned his own local problem, in which he wished to be certain we all understood it and took his point of view.

**Senator Johnson.** I am not asking for detailed reports. Undoubtedly before he went there he was aware of what our policy was and what our program was and how it meshed in with his plans and his program and what I want to ask you is:

Has he at any time given you any indication that he thinks the course we are following out there is not a wise and prudent one?

**Secretary Marshall.** He has given me no such indication. I have been trying to think of what had happened in my few conversations with him before his departure, and I think his only concern was that he was not left without any American acquisitions to his military force.

**Senator Johnson.** Do you think the adoption of the MacArthur recommendations would require adjustments of General Eisenhower's plans and would seriously affect those plans?

**Secretary Marshall.** We fear that it might.

**Senator Johnson.** Thank you, General.

**Senator Russell.** Senator Green.

**Senator Green.** Mr. Chairman, the questions I had in mind to ask are minor ones. They are matters of minor importance, and in view of the length of General Marshall's testimony, I will shorten it by not exercising my right to ask questions.

**Senator Russell.** Senator Morse.

**Senator Morse.** General Marshall, I hold in my hand a document, a secret document, entitled "Joint Chiefs of Staff Report for Senate Committees on Korean Operations."

It is a report which purports to set forth the actions taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the beginning of the Korean war starting June 25, 1950, to April 11, 1951.

It sets forth paraphrased statements of messages and communications which the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to their superiors, the Secretary of Defense, President of the United States, along with communications which they sent to other officials of Government, such as the Secretary of State.

It also contains paraphrased statements of communications which the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to General MacArthur, referred to constantly in the volume as CINCFE.

With that description of the exhibit, Mr. Secretary,

do you wish to ask any further questions of the exhibit?

**Secretary Marshall.** I have read it, sir.

**Senator Morse.** Next I ask you if, in your opinion, the exhibit presents a great deal of evidence in support of the conclusion that the Joint Chiefs of Staff kept General MacArthur informed in great detail as to all steps which were being taken on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with their command obligations and responsibilities with the Korean war?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Morse.** In your opinion, does the exhibit show that the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought at all times in connection with every major problem and many problems that might be classified as not major arising in connection with the Korean war to obtain General MacArthur's views and recommendations with respect to the same?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think it does, sir.

**Senator Morse.** Now, General, I want to turn to the exhibit—I shall not dwell on it any longer than I feel necessary—in order to establish one thing that I think needs to be established in this record, because I look upon this exhibit as the best evidence that anyone has submitted in this hearing as to the relationship, the official relationship, that was maintained between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur, and also the best evidence of any information that has been supplied to the joint Committee to date as to the lengths to which the Government went in its relationship with General MacArthur at CINCFE, in an endeavor to avoid the development of any misunderstandings between the General and the Government.

I think it rather important that the record relate rather definitely some of the major events in connection with the Korean war concerning which subsequent differences of opinion seem to have developed between General MacArthur and the Government.

On page 24 of this document, under Item 32, I find that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are very much concerned about Formosa, and:

"... on July 28, 1950, informed CINCFE that the Chinese Communists had announced their intention of capturing Formosa and that the Communist capabilities therefore could probably be resisted effectively only if the Chinese Nationalists made timely efforts to defend that island. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also informed CINCFE of their recommendation to the Secretary of Defense that the Nationalist Government be permitted to employ its military forces in defensive measures to prevent Communist amphibious concentrations directed against Formosa or the Pescadores even if such measures included attacks against concentrations on the mainland. CINCFE was further informed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended that the United States inform the Nationalist Government, if the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were approved. Later, on 2 August 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCFE that no action had been taken on their recommendations and that pending such action the existing policy toward Formosa would remain unchanged.

"In his reply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 29 July 1950, CINCFE stated his complete concurrence with their recommendations regarding the Island of Formosa and the Chinese Nationalists. He also informed them that he was proceeding to Formosa with a selected group of staff officers on or about 31 July 1950 to make a brief reconnaissance of the situation there."

Now, in view of this exchange between the Joint Chiefs

of Staff and CINCPAC. In 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCPAC were in agreement as to the policies that should be followed with regard to Formosa?

**Secretary Marshall.** It appears so.

**Senator Morse.** Do you know of any incident since July 28, 1950, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCPAC were not in agreement as to policies to be followed in regard to Formosa?

**Secretary Marshall.** The only one I can think of at the moment is the desire of General MacArthur in November to bring some 60,000 Formosan Nationalist China troops into Korea.

**Senator Morse.** Into Korea. But with respect to Formosa itself—

**Secretary Marshall.** That has a relation to that as to what it would do to the garrison of Formosa.

**Senator Morse.** That is correct. I think my question is certainly subject to the qualification you make in respect to it. But let me put my question this way: Save and except for General MacArthur's recommendation in November, 1950, that some 60,000 Nationalist troops should be taken to Korea from Formosa, was there any difference between General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the defense of Formosa proper?

**Secretary Marshall.** I do not recall any, sir.

**Senator Morse.** In respect to—let us pause for a moment now that you have raised this and ask a question or two with regard to his recommendation concerning the use of Nationalist troops in Korea, some 60,000 or thereabouts.

[Deleted]

**Senator Morse.** Another question or two in regard to the Formosan issue and its relationship to the Nationalist troops, General. Am I correct in my understanding that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended against General MacArthur's proposal of November, 1950, for the use of some 60,000 Nationalist troops?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think that is correct, sir. Of course, they can give you a very specific answer, but I think the records show that.

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**Senator Morse.** At the time of the General's proposal in November, 1950, to use some 60,000 Nationalist troops in Korea, had strong representations already been made to the Government by our allies through which representations they made clear that they were opposed to the use of Nationalist troops in Korea?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is my recollection, Senator, but I would prefer that you go to the State Department.

**Senator Morse.** But it is your opinion that this whole question of the use of Nationalist troops in connection with the Korean war from the very beginning of that war has raised a complicated problem with our allies?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct, sir.

**Senator Morse.** Now while we are still on this point of the Nationalist troops, General, it is my understanding that General MacArthur favors the sending of a mission to Formosa, American military mission, to give technical advice and technical training. It is my understanding that he also favors an increase in American military aid by way of equipment to the Generalissimo's troops, is that your understanding?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is my recollection.

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**Senator Morse.** I agree that they should be off the record. However, I just do not see how we can go through the record in the exhibit which the Defense Department has submitted to us without giving some attention to the chronological steps that occurred which I think outline the final disagreement that caused the removal of General MacArthur, and that is why I am—

making any suggestions as to the chronological steps. It is the reasons for the viewpoint of the Chiefs of Staff.

**Senator Morse.** It is my understanding, General, that it is the position of General MacArthur that after we supply the Generalissimo's troops with military aid and technical advice, the question should then be left up to the Generalissimo to decide what he wants to do with his troops thereafter.

**Secretary Marshall.** So long as it does not involve us in a world war, or an enlargement, which we think is dangerous.

**Senator Morse.** I am glad to have your answer. You have anticipated another question I was going to ask you.

**Secretary Marshall.** Of the Korean conflict, without giving adequate return.

**Senator Morse.** I simply say, that I happen to be one who has felt for some time that it was a mistake for us, by way of unilateral action, to prevent the Generalissimo from carrying on war on the mainland of China if he wanted to carry it on.

It seems to me that when we took that course of action we necessarily involved ourselves in a phase of the China war that was bound to result in some embarrassment. But, be that as it may, that is the situation in which we find ourselves, so I now ask you the question, do you know of any offer on the part of the Generalissimo to fight on the mainland without—mainland of China—assistance from American troops, if we desist, if we desisted, from our naval policy of preventing him from conducting a raid on the mainland, and he wanted to do it?

**Secretary Marshall.** I don't recall such.

**Senator Morse.** Do you think the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be in a better position to advise this Committee if the Generalissimo has ever made an offer since the outbreak of the Korean war to fight on the mainland of China on his own initiative, without support from American troops, if we release him from the naval restrictions which now prevent him from conducting an amphibious landing on the mainland, if he wants to?

**Secretary Marshall.** Well, the Chiefs will give you a better answer to that than I can, sir; a more precise answer.

**Senator Morse.** Do you agree with me, General—strike that.

General, do you not think it would be a proper course for our Government to follow, if we are to provide the Generalissimo with the military mission and the military aid which he apparently seeks, find out before we make all those commitments whether or not he would be willing to conduct an operation on the mainland of China?

**Secretary Marshall.** Read the first part.

(The question was read as requested.)

**Secretary Marshall.** I become involved in a rather difficult answer because I would consider at the present moment it would not be advantageous to our interests to have him do so.

In a general way, we should know what he would purpose doing with better equipment, but as to our implying that the equipment would only be produced for that specific purpose or that general purpose, I find myself in some doubt.

We want to make certain that he can manage the defense of Formosa without assistance by ground troops from us, and with the assistance that we could divert from Korea in the air, and by sea to the defense of Formosa.

**Senator Morse.** Am I correct in my understanding that the military assistance we now propose to give to the Generalissimo, including both technical training

from a military mission and military equipment, would not be needed in the quantity that we propose to supply it if his function is to be primarily the defense of Formosa, and not an attack on the mainland of China?

**Secretary Marshall.** I would think the present proposal as to equipment and such, all of the equipment involved, would be needed to make certain of his capability of defending Formosa.

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**Senator Morse.** I am very glad to have that answer, General, because I think, for the record, it is a very important answer because of this problem, namely, I assume that we will be confronted with a rather complicated situation in relation to our allies if they continue to hold what I think is a mistaken point of view, but they have held it to date, the point of view that the United Nations should not give support to the Generalissimo in conducting a civil war in China. But I understand your answer to mean that whatever assistance we now are giving or propose to give to the Generalissimo can be defended, as far as the United States is concerned, on the ground that it is assistance that can be used very effectively in the defense of Formosa, irrespective of whether he sends one soldier to the mainland of China.

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct, sir.

**Senator Morse.** Now, returning to the exhibit of secret information previously identified and referred to, I notice on page 26, item 38, it says that:

"By the end of July it became apparent that it was necessary to expand the scope of air operations beyond that of close support of ground forces and air supremacy. Accordingly on 31 July 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCFE that they would make available to him two additional bomber groups for the destruction of certain military targets."

Item 37 points out:

[Deleted]

**Senator Morse.** Page 27 of the secret exhibit previously referred to indicates, and I find that:

"On August 4, 1950, the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President and the Secretary of State, dispatched a message to CINCFE, after CINCFE's visit to Formosa, reaffirming the decision of the President of 27 June with respect to Formosa, and pointing out that only the President has authority to order or authorize military action against concentrations on the mainland. While keeping the Joint Chiefs of Staff fully informed as to intelligence matters, the message to CINCFE stated that it was in the most vital national interest that no United States action precipitate general war or give excuse to others to do so. He was also informed, however, that his recommendations as to action to be taken were desired whenever appropriate."

Does not this message make clear to CINCFE the policy of our Government in respect to its position on any action that might lead to widening the war or conducting operations on the mainland of China?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think it does, sir.

**Senator Morse.** Does it not, in part, provide an answer to the question that one reads so frequently in the press these days, did the Government keep CINCFE fully advised as to its position on Asiatic policy?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think it does, sir.

**Senator Morse.** Item 41, page 27 of this exhibit says:

"CINCFE replied on 5 August 1950 to the effect that he was operating meticulously in accordance with the President's decision of 27 June which he fully understood. He further stated that he would under no circumstances extend the limitations of his authority as theater commander, and expressed the

hope that neither the President nor the Secretary of Defense had been misled by false or speculative reports from any source."

I have two questions on that paragraph, at least, General. One, does not General MacArthur's reply to the communication of Aug. 4, 1950, previously referred to, make clear that General MacArthur understood the import of the message of August 4th, and apparently also understood that the message of August 4th might be subject to the interpretation that there was some concern on the part of the Government as to whether or not General MacArthur was in agreement with the policies that the government had set forth in not only that message but previous messages?

**Secretary Marshall.** It seems so.

**Senator Morse.** It is rather difficult, is it not, to interpret his assurance set forth in the latter part of this message, that he hoped that neither the President nor the Secretary of Defense had been misled by false or speculative reports from any source, in any other light; is that not right?

It would be rather difficult, I say, to interpret the language from the latter part of his report, which I just read, in any other light than that General MacArthur himself was apparently concerned as he read the message of August 4—

**Secretary Marshall.** I think so.

**Senator Morse.** —concerning whether or not the Government was concerned about his attitude.

In fact, may I ask this question, General, at this point. Is it not true that although General MacArthur did meticulously carry out to the letter the directives that were given to him in regard to military matters, nevertheless, this exhibit as well as other evidence in regard to which you have already testified in this hearing, shows that for many months preceding his recall the relationship between the commander in the field and the Government was such that a considerable amount of effort was gone to by the Government in exchanges with MacArthur to make clear in detail the Government's position on Asiatic policy?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think the record indicates that, sir.

**Senator Morse.** General, would it be a fair interpretation in your opinion to draw from the exhibit, through which I am now going, logically as to what I consider to be some of its major points, that although the relationship between General MacArthur and the Government did not show any failure on the part of the General to carry out meticulously his military directives, it did show a considerable degree of difference between the General and the officials of the Government in regard to the overall Asiatic policy, both military and diplomatic?

**Secretary Marshall.** Read that, please.

(The pending question was read by the reporter.)

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct sir, in my opinion.

**Senator Morse.** It is only your opinion that I seek.

True, I am suggesting certain tentative conclusions that I think the record supports to date, and I am checking those conclusions against your opinion, because I want to be fair to all parties concerned.

Do you think, General Marshall, that in view of the contents of the exhibit which I am now examining in this questioning of you, it would be fair to say that the Government on the one hand and General MacArthur on the other seem to be dealing at arm's length with each other in connection with the conducting of the Asiatic operation?

**Secretary Marshall.** I do not think of any actions on the part of the Government that suggests that it was proceeding on the basis of being at arm's length. I do

feel that beyond the decisions as to policy it was the view of the Government that we had to proceed in a very careful manner in our interchanges with General MacArthur because of his attitude, because of what he had stated publicly in regard to the matter, because of our allies and their reactions and the general complications and delicacy of the situation under those conditions.

**Senator Morse.** Would it be fair to say that one of the problems which developed between General MacArthur and the Government was due to the fact that although General MacArthur carried out meticulously military directives that were sent to him, he nevertheless was inclined from time to time to make such public statements or release such news releases that created both within the Government and within American public opinion that there was not complete harmony and agreement between his administration of affairs in Asia including those of his military command, and the announced policy of the Government with respect to the same?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think that was the case.

**Senator Morse.** In your opinion did not the creation of that attitude concerning what appeared to be a difference between General MacArthur on the one hand and the Government on the other create a very serious situation in connection with our Government's relation to her allies in the United Nations?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think that is correct.

**Senator Morse.** Do you think that the subject matter I am now discussing, which can be summarized by saying that, irrespective of cause, the impression was abroad in this country and in the world that there were differences between MacArthur and his Government, is one of the reasons for our allies wanting to know whose voice spoke in Asia, our Government's or MacArthur's?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct, sir.

**Senator Morse.** And is it fair, do you think, for me to say that the impression of a difference which was created over a period of many months can be pretty much summarized by a phrase that you have already used in this testimony, namely, it was a mistake to have two voices attempting to speak for American policy in Asia?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct, sir.

**Senator Morse.** Now returning to the exhibit previously identified, Mr. Secretary, I find on page 27 the following:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff on Aug. 5, 1950, authorized CINCFE to conduct aerial reconnaissance over all Korean territory including up to the Yalu River on the west coast but short of the Korean-Soviet boundary on the east coast in order to establish the fact of support to the North Koreans by the U.S.S.R. or the Chinese Communists; but that all such flights must respect the northern frontiers of Korea."

Now that was Aug. 5th, 1950, where apparently again he was authorized to do some aerial reconnaissance up to the Manchurian border in one case and apparently on the east coast of China, is that not true?

**Secretary Marshall.** I do not see an indication here of further reference at this time to the general coast of China. With that exception I think that is true.

**Senator Morse.** I think you are right. It doesn't say the east coast of China but it does include all of North Korea.

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Morse.** Now General, page 29 of this exhibit, item 48, under the heading, "The decisions to pass to the offensive in Korea," it reads:

"The Department of Defense made a major effort to build up United States forces in Korea first for

the purpose of halting the North Korean aggression, next for the purpose of stabilizing a military front, ultimately with the objective of passing to the offensive. Although there were some deficiencies, the requirements of CINCFE were met to the extent it was within the power of the Department of Defense to do so, but with due regard to United States Military commitments and requirements elsewhere."

Now I raise this particular point, Mr. Secretary, because of the use in this paragraph of the phrase, "for the purpose of stabilizing a military front," and I want to relate that to the so-called directive or plan of January 12th in which the word "stabilize" is used.

As I read this exhibit—and I have studied it with considerable care—I have formed the conclusion—and I want you to check me as to whether or not you think it is proper—that by stabilize our military officials meant a status of our troops in defense, they meant laying down a line of defense that we could hold without further retreat, they meant a defense position in contrast to an offensive position, and that the proposal of January 12th has to be read in light of what the military meant by stabilize. Am I correct in that interpretation of stabilize as it is used in the directive of January 12th?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think that is correct, sir. You might add to that that it was used in connection with the situation at that time where we had been involved in retirements.

**Senator Morse.** This reference that I have just read on page 29 is in connection with instructions to General MacArthur concerning changing his tactics from a position of stabilization to a position of offensive. Does that not show that the Defense establishment here in this country and CINCFE in Asia understood what the Joint Chiefs of Staff meant by the use of the word "stabilize"?

**Secretary Marshall.** I would assume so, sir.

**Senator Morse.** The January 12 proposal was not only a proposal in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff told General MacArthur of their tentative plans, set forth their tentative recommendations and proposals, but the very language of the order itself made clear, did it not, that they were talking in terms of falling back to the Pusan area or in a territory of proximity thereto, or evacuation?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes sir; except that it was not an order, nor was it a directive. It was not to General MacArthur, it was to the National Security Council.

**Senator Morse.** I am sorry that I used the word "directive," and I think I did in my question. I think I also said, or meant to say, tentative proposals for a program to be followed by CINCFE in case the retreat then being engaged in continued to the point of the beachhead of Pusan or the complete evacuation of Korea. But for the purposes of reiteration and clarification, I want to put the question this way: Am I correct in my interpretation of the tentative proposals which the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised MacArthur on January 12 they were giving favorable consideration to, involved a military plan for continued retreat, possible evacuation, and that they were proposals that should be followed, carried out, when the American-United Nations forces position became stabilized?

**Secretary Marshall.** Yes, correct.

**Senator Morse.** And by stabilization the Joint Chiefs of Staff meant, and the exhibit from which I am quoting shows, that the word "stabilize" is used in that connection in military exchanges, a defense line which they were to hold?

**Secretary Marshall.** Correct.

**Senator Morse.** Against the offensive of the enemy?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct, sir.

**Senator Morse.** Do you think that this exhibit from

which I am taking excerpts shows that when the Chiefs of Staff sent to General MacArthur either directives or recommendations in connection with an offensive, they did not use the term "stabilize"?

**Secretary Marshall.** That is correct, sir.

**Senator Morse.** On page 35 of this exhibit, General, I read:

"Item 20. On Aug. 29, 1950, the President dispatched a personal message to General MacArthur giving him, for his information, the text of a letter which had been forwarded to Ambassador Austin on Aug. 27, 1950. The President mentioned a letter which Ambassador Austin had, on August 25, addressed to Secretary General Lie. This letter admirably summed up the position of the United States Government, as stated by the President in his address on June 27, 1950, and again in his message to the Congress on July 19, 1950."

And then it sets forth seven points, covering the United States Government's position as to policy in Asia.

Do you think, General Marshall, that this message on the part of the President of the United States, to General MacArthur, was a very clear notice to General MacArthur as to his Government's policy as of that time?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think it was.

**Senator Morse.** In Asia?

**Secretary Marshall.** I thought so, sir.

**Senator Morse.** Do you think, then, General Marshall, that I make a correct conclusion from this exhibit, that it does supply an answer to the question: Did the Government keep General MacArthur advised as to its policy in Asia, both militarily and politically?

**Secretary Marshall.** I think it does.

**Senator Morse.** May I say again, to you, sir, that the purpose of this particular examination, as far as the questioner is concerned, is that I think it is of vital importance that the record of this case produce an answer to the question: "Is it true that the Government failed to keep MacArthur advised as to its policy in Asia?" because I think the American people are entitled to know the answer to that question; and as I have completed my examination, or my study of this exhibit, I cannot understand the charge that the Government failed to keep General MacArthur advised as to both its military and political policy for Asia.

To the contrary, I think the Government was just as meticulous in keeping MacArthur advised, as MacArthur was meticulous in carrying out, to the letter, the military directives that he received; but as I read this exhibit, I also come to the conclusion that the sad fact is that for months, although both the Government and General MacArthur were participating in very meticulous conduct in keeping each other informed as to their respective positions, that unfortunately they were dealing at arm's length—that apparently a lack of mutual confidence had developed.

As a juror, I ask you that; but I think you ought to know what is going through my mind, as I ask more questions.

As a juror I would say, after studying this exhibit, which I think to date is the most important exhibit in this whole record—and we have to deal with most of it in secret—but as I studied this exhibit page by page, I came to the conclusion as a juror that the parties to the controversy were dealing at arm's length, because apparently each side felt that was necessary; and I think that is unfortunate, but I think it explains—according to my lights, at least—why the final break became inevitable.

I just don't think you can have a situation where you even have to go to all the detail that apparently the

General MacArthur did in his communications with General MacArthur in order to keep the record perfectly clear.

Now, on page 37, item 21, we find that:

"Prior to the dispatch of the above message"—referring there to the President's message of Aug. 25, 1950, covered by my preceding question—"Prior to the dispatch of the above message, General MacArthur had been invited to speak at the 51st National Encampment of the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Chicago. Unable to appear in person, by a cover letter dated 21 August, he sent a paper to be read at the meeting. In his paper General MacArthur placed much emphasis on the strategic aspect of Formosa and on its importance to American security. President Truman came into possession of a copy of General MacArthur's Veterans of Foreign Wars statement early Saturday morning, 26 August. The President instructed the Secretary of Defense to direct General MacArthur to withdraw his statements to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in order to avoid confusion as to the United States position with respect to Formosa. General MacArthur complied immediately with this directive."

As I think the record shows he did with every directive that was placed in his hands, but the report goes on to say:

"The statement by General MacArthur, however, was published in the *United States News and World Report*."

General, in your opinion, did the publication of the General's letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, referred to in this paragraph 21 on page 37 of the exhibit, accomplish practically the same amount of harm that would have been accomplished if the General had delivered his message in person and had not complied with the request to withdraw his letter?

**General Marshall.** I was not in office at that time. I would assume from what I know of such matters that the fact of the withdrawal would increase the interest in the terms of the message.

**Senator Morse.** Is it your opinion that the publication of the letter in *U. S. News & World Report* provided further evidence that there was not complete agreement between General MacArthur and the Government concerning Asiatic policy?

**Secretary Marshall.** I know nothing whatever, Senator, regarding the circumstances of that release.

**Senator Morse.** Page 41 of this exhibit, paragraph 33, or rather item 33, I find that:

"On 15 September 1950, CINCFE was informed of the following conclusions which had been approved by the President concerning United States course of action with respect to Korea:

"a. Final decisions cannot be made at this time inasmuch as the course of action best advancing United States national interest must be determined in the light of:

"(1) Action by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists;

"(2) In consultation with friendly members of the United Nations; and

"(3) An appraisal of the risk of general war;

"b. The United Nations forces have a legal basis for conducting operations north of the 38th parallel to compel withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind the line or to defend against these forces."

And then the message to General MacArthur sets out further details, including item c:

"c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were authorized to direct General MacArthur to plan for the possible



occupation of North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces. In this event, air and naval operations north of the parallel should not be discontinued; and

"d. General MacArthur should undertake no ground operations north of the 38th parallel in event of occupation of North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces. In this event, air and naval operations north of the parallel should not be discontinued; and

"e. In the event of employment of major Chinese Communist units south of the 38th parallel, the United States would (1) Not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China; (2) Authorize General MacArthur to continue military action as long as it offered a reasonable chance of successful resistance,

[Deleted]

Then the message sets forth other details.

In your opinion, General Marshall, does this message to CINCFE on Sept. 18, 1950, constitute another piece of evidence in support of a conclusion that the Government kept MacArthur advised in detail as to its position and policies on the questions presented by our Asiatic struggle?

Secretary Marshall. I think it does, sir.

Senator Morse. On page 42 I read:

"On 27 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the Secretary of Defense that they had no objection to the Department of State proposals for action by CINCFE in the event the North Koreans sued for peace or for an armistice. Further, they had no objection to the Department of State program with respect to bringing Korean hostilities to an end. General MacArthur advised, from the standpoint of the field commander, that both proposals seemed entirely feasible and practicable."

General Marshall, does not this exchange of messages on Sept. 27, 1950, show that the Government not only was keeping General MacArthur fully advised as to the plans it had under consideration for attempting to bring about an armistice in the Korean war, but as of that date, Sept. 27, 1950, General MacArthur advised the Government that he was not in disagreement with those proposals for an armistice?

Secretary Marshall. Correct, sir.

Senator Morse. Therefore, am I again correct in my conclusion that certainly up to Sept. 27, 1950, there is no doubt about the fact that the Government was keeping General MacArthur fully advised as to its policies, both military and diplomatic?

Secretary Marshall. It seems so to me, sir.

Senator Morse. Page 43 of the exhibit, I find a paragraph, paragraph 36, which reads as follows:

"General MacArthur then submitted his plan for operations north of the 38th parallel, the substance of which was an attack north along the western coastal corridor by the Eighth United States Army and an amphibious landing by the United States Tenth Corps at Wonsan on the east coast of North Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved MacArthur's plan on 29 September 1950."

Does not this item show, General Marshall, that as late as Sept. 29, 1950, this Government and General MacArthur were in agreement as to the military policy that ought to be followed in the immediate future following Sept. 29, 1950, in respect to operations north of the 38th parallel?

Secretary Marshall. It would appear so.

Senator Morse. Does not the paragraph from the secret exhibit from which I just read, in your opinion, justify the conclusion that General MacArthur was certainly receiving prompt action from the Government in

response to his requests for authorization in connection with his recommendations for the conduct of the war in Korea?

Secretary Marshall. I think that is a fact, sir.

Senator Morse. On page 46 of this exhibit I find the following paragraph:

"On Oct. 6, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted to General MacArthur the text of the proposed United Nations General Assembly resolution on post hostilities in Korea. He was informed that the General Assembly would probably vote on the resolution on Oct. 6, 1950, and that any textual changes would be immediately transmitted to him. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further stated that it was considered that the resolution provided for support of operations north of the 38th parallel. After approval of the resolution by the General Assembly, General MacArthur was requested to transmit immediately the text of the resolution to North Korean authorities and to call upon them to lay down their arms.

"On Oct. 7, 1950"—which, incidentally was the very next day—"the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCFE that the General Assembly had passed the resolution on post hostilities in Korea with certain minor textual changes, of which he was informed.

"On 9 October 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognizing that the Chinese Communists might intervene in North Korea, amplified CINCFE's current directive and included, among other things, the provision that, in the event of the employment in Korea of major Chinese Communist units without prior announcement, CINCFE should continue the action as long as, in his judgment, his forces had a reasonable chance of success. He was cautioned, however, that he would obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory."

Do not these three paragraphs in your opinion, General Marshall, taken from page 46 of the exhibit previously identified, show again that our Government was keeping General MacArthur informed step by step of minute details of negotiations that were taking place between our Government and the United Nations?

Secretary Marshall. I think it does, sir.

Senator Morse. On page 49 of the exhibit, item 24, I find that—

"On 21 October 1950 CINCFE replied to the Joint Chiefs of Staff message of 20 October regarding the redeployment of the 2d and 3d Divisions. CINCFE stated that this matter had been discussed with the President at Wake Island. He believed that, upon the close of hostilities, the Eighth Army should be withdrawn to Japan. He hoped this movement would start before Thanksgiving and be completed before Christmas. Upon the cessation of hostilities the 2d Division would be made available for return to the Zone of Interior."

Does not this exchange in your opinion, General Marshall, between CINCFE and the Joint Chiefs of Staff show again that detailed information and careful consideration was being given mutually by CINCFE and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with the post-hostilities problems that would develop in Korea once the North Koreans were defeated?

Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.

Senator Morse. Does not the particular language that I have just cited from the exhibit show that as far as the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned there was at that time no serious disagreement between them and General MacArthur as to what should be done by way of post-hostilities operations?

Senator Morse. I refer now, General Marshall, to page 51 of the exhibit, paragraph 29:

"On 25 October CINCFE informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the instructions reported in his message regarding the lifting of restrictions with regard to the employment of United Nations forces in North Korea were a matter of military necessity. [Deleted] More seasoned commanders were necessary. CINCFE further stated that he saw no conflict between the removal of these instructions and his directive dated 27 September. This directive indicated that the instructions sent to CINCFE could not be considered final since they might require modifications in accordance with developments. CINCFE felt that he had the necessary latitude for modifications in a message from the Secretary of Defense on 30 September which gave CINCFE tactical and strategic latitude to proceed north of the 38th parallel. He further stated that he understood the basic purpose and intent of his directive and would take all precautions. However, he felt that tactical hazards might result from any action other than that which he had directed. He pointed out that the entire subject had been covered in his conference at Wake Island."

[Deleted]

Secretary Marshall. I think, Senator, that there is a confusion there in exactly what is being referred to. That question could be better answered by the Chiefs of Staff. But my recollection is the issue was whether or not he was pushing the United Nations forces, excluding the South Korean forces, too far to the front in connection with the desire to have the South Korean forces carry out the forward movement towards the Yalu River, and avoiding the necessity of having other United Nations forces approach close to the river, and his answer is made to that. But it could be answered more definitely for you by the Chiefs of Staff.

Senator Russell. Gentlemen, I regret very much to interrupt this interrogation at this point, but on Friday last, you will all recall that it was stated that General Marshall had had an engagement of long standing at the Virginia Military Institute for this afternoon and tomorrow.

I assured him that we would undertake to release him by 1 o'clock today. It is almost 1 o'clock now. That matter was discussed, and I am quite sure that all members of the Committee are aware of the factors involved, and it is unnecessary for me to go into any more details.

It is my intention to have General Bradley here tomorrow morning.

Mr. Secretary, it would seem to be necessary for you to return at some later date, and I will communicate with you sometime later in the week.

Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.

Senator Russell. I will communicate with you to arrange a mutually convenient time for your reappearance before this Committee.

Secretary Marshall. If you wish to do so, I can manage to 1:30 without undue inconvenience.

Senator Russell. Well, I have told several members of the Committee that I intended to recess about 1 o'clock and I think that, perhaps, we had best follow that course. So, we thank you very much.

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, may I say that if I find it possible in the meantime to cover through other witnesses further questions on the particular exhibit to which I have been referring this morning, without recalling, as far as I am concerned, General Marshall, I will so advise the Chairman.

Senator Russell. Now well. Of course, so many of these questions are peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs that we may save time by interrupting General Marshall's testimony.

I ordinarily do not like to do that, but in this case, I think that, perhaps, it will serve a useful purpose, and we will have General Bradley here tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock, and if it is possible to do so without too great interruption of the business of the Senate, gentlemen, I intend to have an afternoon session. I will notify you prior to the recessing tomorrow morning as to whether that is possible.

General, I wish to extend to you again our very best wishes for a pleasant day down at V.M.I. I know something about the feeling that all of us have about returning to the atmosphere of the campuses where we had our education.

I also wish to thank you for your assistance to this Committee over a period of seven days. It has been a remarkable exhibition of stamina, both physical and mental, to handle the very wide field of questioning to which you have been subjected, and I think it has covered nearly every point on the globe, and all of the history of the last 10 or 15 years; indeed, if I recall correctly, why, we went as far back as the Napoleonic wars, and the strategy employed in some of those campaigns on one or two occasions.

It has been a very grueling experience, I know, and it is one that would have tested the fire of any man. Throughout it all, you have handled yourself as a soldier would—as the soldier we know you to be.

You have answered the questions fully and frankly, and I am convinced that you have not hesitated to state the facts as you see them to be. Of course, I did not anticipate any other course.

There are few men in the history of our country who have played as prominent a part in the outstanding events in the past several years as you have done.

I referred the other day to the very remarkable fact that you had within a relatively short period of time served as Chief of Staff during the greatest war in which this country has ever been engaged; as Ambassador to China during a very critical period in our history, and as Secretary of State and as Secretary of Defense.

You have participated in thousands of important decisions and have helped to shape the course of our nation during the years to follow the war. You have been generously sharing with this Committee your vast information on a wide variety of subjects.

I also wish to thank you for the time you have given us. You occupy a very important position today, one of the highest in the Government, that of Secretary of Defense; and I know that you have innumerable problems to settle every day in addition to answering the questions that have been propounded here.

The hours that you spent here must have caused a great accumulation of work on your desk.

On behalf of our Committee, I wish to express to you my sincere thanks for your testimony.

Senator Connally. General Marshall, I want to join the Chairman in congratulating you upon the vivid and dramatic events that have transpired at the Virginia Military Institute and these celebrations which will be held. I know what pride and interest the V. M. I. has in your career.

I had occasion some years ago to make an address to the cadets of the Virginia Military Institute, and I know of the high position which you occupy in their admiration and affection. I thank you deeply along with the Chairman for the labor and the toll through which you have gone in these examinations.

I want to say that I have asked many questions, practically no questions, very few. My reasons for that have been that as Cochairman I wanted to give every member of this Committee opportunity to fully investigate all the questions pending before us without my consuming a great deal of time which otherwise might be allocated to them.

Furthermore, as Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations over the years I have been more or less familiar with many of these questions and have had contact with you as Chief of Staff and as Secretary of State and now as Secretary of Defense.

It is possible that when you return I may desire to ask a number of other questions, but I have endeavored to so conduct myself as to shorten as much as possible the time that we have consumed or are about to consume in the investigation of all these questions.

I think this is a most unusual procedure, but I do not regret it because in a democracy like ours we like to think that the people are fully advised as to all important decisions, whether the decision is to be made by them or by their constitutional authorities that they have set up. So, thank you, General, very, very much for the marvelous memory that you possess, for the great ability which you have shown in all of the high positions which you have occupied, by your frankness and by your courage in answering the great variety of questions covering such a long period of years.

I marvel at your ability to remember and recall and to refer to all of the many and multitudinous questions which you have been called upon to decide or to participate in.

So, sir, I strike hands with you across the distance from here to the Virginia Military Institute, and wish for you a great occasion and much joy and success and happiness.

**Secretary Marshall.** Thank you, Senator; thank you, sir.

**Senator Bridges.** Mr. Chairman, are we going to decide before tomorrow, and the taking of a new witness, on Senator Morse's motion as to limiting the first round of questioning?

**Senator Russell.** I have heard no objection to the course suggested, of limiting each Senator to 30 minutes, in order to expedite the hearing, and get around the table.

**Senator Morse.** Mr. Chairman, in fairness to all of our colleagues, some of whom are not here at the moment, I would like to serve notice that I will renew my motion—

**Senator Russell.** I had understood that your motion was pending here, to be acted upon prior to another witness being introduced.

**Senator Morse.** I meant to renew—

**Senator Russell.** The first thing in the morning, the first matter to be considered will be a vote on Senator Morse's motion, which I am sure you all understand,

to limit the questioning to 30 minutes for each Senator, on each round of questions, and that the questioning will be completely exhausted by the time we get through. That will be the pending business in the morning.

General, there is one other matter I should bring to your attention.

General Bradley has communicated with me, and advised me that he, and each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have had some speaking engagements for some months for Armed Services Day, which, of course, is one of the notable days recognized in our country.

The importance of it, as a great day, is as great as it has ever been.

General Bradley will be available on tomorrow and, I think, through Friday, noon.

**Senator Bridges.** I think, Mr. Chairman, of course, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the one day of the year when it would be particularly appropriate, and when they would be most pleased at being shown the courtesy of not being involved before our Committee.

**Senator Russell.** Thank you, and we will arrange it so as not to interfere with their program on that day; but that does not mean that we won't have a hearing on Armed Forces Day.

**Senator Knowland.** One question, Mr. Chairman, on the list of information which you indicated to Mr. Larkin, I think either yesterday or the day before, there was one additional bit of information which I do not think we have yet received; and that was—on the day before these hearings commenced, when you first brought up the Wake Island report, you recall that we requested a list of those that had been entitled to receive a copy of the, I think, 40 copies that were distributed, and that information has not been supplied to the Committee as yet.

**Mr. Larkin.** No, sir; it has not; but now I will have a little time to check into that matter for you, sir.

**Secretary Marshall.** General Bradley controlled that, and he can give you that information.

**Senator Russell.** Senator Sparkman.

**Senator Sparkman.** Along that same line, I had intended to ask, and forgot, when questioning General Marshall, if we might not have a listing of the members of the United Nations showing, not just the contributions that they have actually made, and which have actually been received in Korea—General Marshall gave that several days ago—but to offers that have been made at any time, and the disposition that has been made of them.

**Mr. Larkin.** We will get that for you.

**Senator Russell.** The Committee will stand recessed until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 1:09 o'clock, p.m., the Committee stood in recess until 10 o'clock, a.m., the following morning, Tuesday, May 15, 1951.)